[Senate Hearing 110-436]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-436
VEHICLE SAFETY FOR CHILDREN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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0SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Margaret Spring, Democratic General Counsel
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire,
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Ranking
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
BILL NELSON, Florida TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on February 28, 2007................................ 1
Statement of Senator Carper...................................... 6
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 49
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Sununu...................................... 2
Witnesses
Campbell, Hon. W. Packy, Former Representative from New Hampshire 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Claybrook, Hon. Joan, President, Public Citizen; Former
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.. 19
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 21
Gulbransen, Dr. Greg, Pediatrician, Syosset, New York............ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
McCurdy, Hon. Dave, President/CEO, Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers; accompanied by Robert Strassburger, Vice
President, Safety and Harmonization............................ 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Medford, Ronald, Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle
Safety, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration......... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Appendix
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
(AIAM), prepared statement..................................... 69
Fennell, Janette E., President, KIDS AND CARS, prepared statement 84
Greenberg, Sally, Senior Product Safety Counsel, Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc., prepared statement.............................. 71
VEHICLE SAFETY FOR CHILDREN
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you all for being here today. It is my
pleasure to welcome you to our Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety Subcommittee hearing on vehicle safety for
children. This is our first meeting of the year, and I want to
thank my colleague, the Ranking Member, Senator John Sununu,
who does a fantastic job on this issue and many others. We look
forward to having a productive couple of years. We anticipate
some of our colleagues will come and go today, because there
are a lot of committee hearings going on right now, but I just
wanted to say good morning, thank everyone for being here to
talk about auto safety for children.
We have jurisdiction over a wide range of issues that are
important to the daily lives of consumers, and Senator Sununu
and I have already discussed some other hearings that we'll
have in the future. Some of those relate to children, some of
those relate just to the general public, but I'm very pleased
that we're taking this first hearing, at Senator Sununu's
request, to talk about the subject matter today.
In 2005, 1,451 children ages 14 and younger died as
passengers in motor vehicle crashes, and approximately 203,000
were injured in the United States. That's an average of four
deaths and 556 injuries each day. We both feel that we need to
work to reduce those numbers. And I know that Senator Sununu
has shown a great commitment to this issue and, as I said, many
others. I have two children myself and I feel the compulsion to
try to make our vehicles and our roads safer for our children.
I also want to thank the witnesses for being here this
morning, providing testimony, for working with the Subcommittee
staff on a variety of topics, in terms of scheduling and
statements, et cetera.
Today, we'll have five witnesses. They'll discuss a variety
of topics and issues related to auto safety for children,
including the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of
2007 that was introduced yesterday by Senator Clinton and
Senator Sununu. And I hope that today's discussion will begin
that process of dialogue that we're famous for, sometimes
infamous for, here in the U.S. Senate. I hope that it
definitely leads to more safety for our children and our other
auto passengers.
With that, I'd like to hear from Senator Sununu.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. I
certainly appreciate the fact that you've made the commitment
to make this our first hearing of the year. As you indicated,
Senator Clinton and I introduced legislation yesterday that
would address, in particular, non-traffic fatalities. Over
1,000 children in the last 5 years have been killed in non-
traffic accidents, and thousands more have been injured. And
it's not just children, but, of course, when it happens to the
youngest among us, I think anyone, whether you're a parent or
not, can't help but feel the enormity of the loss.
Representative Peter King has introduced legislation on the
House side, and I certainly want to thank him for his great
leadership on this issue. As well, Packy Campbell will be
joining our panel today, a good friend of mine from New
Hampshire who has dealt very personally with the impact that
non-traffic auto fatalities can have on a family. This has been
a long process, especially for a lot of the advocates and the
coalition of partners that have worked on this legislation. We
introduced legislation at the end of the 1st session in 2005,
but obviously weren't able to see it completed on the floor,
and this hearing, I think, is an important and early beginning
to the process in the new session of the 110th Congress.
You spoke about the impact accidents have. We're talking
about thousands of lives, thousands of families. And anytime we
talk about regulation, whether it's with auto safety or any
other area, we have to be mindful of the cost. But the
important thing, I think, in the construction of the
legislation that we've introduced is that--in two of the key
areas, making automatic windows safer, and ensuring that cars
can't inadvertently be put into gear without the knowledge of
the driver--the costs to implement these improvements are less
than $10 on a car. And that is really significant, that
existing technologies are there to make a huge difference in
this area.
And regarding the visibility behind a vehicle, where
someone may unknowingly back over or back into a child, the
technology exists that can certainly prevent tragic accidents.
There's no question it's more than $10 a car to implement
today. But there are different options and opportunities to
both improve that technology and to bring down its cost.
Equally important, we are mindful that changes and
improvements in auto safety don't happen overnight. The auto
industry has implemented significant improvements in past
years, ranging from antilock brakes to side airbags. And this
is done because it makes good business sense, because it makes
good safety sense, because it makes a difference in the lives
of the consumers that drive those vehicles. Things don't
necessarily happen overnight, but I feel--and I think the
supporters of this legislation feel--there are improvements
that can, and need, to be made. We provide a window for NHTSA
to develop new rules in these areas, and then to implement
those rules over a 3-year window. And I think that is
realistic, it's doable, it's achievable, and ultimately it will
have a huge impact on both the fatalities and the injuries that
we see in these three key areas.
Our bill doesn't mandate any particular approach to dealing
with brake-shift interlock or window safety or rear visibility.
We don't tell the auto manufacturers how to do it. We don't
tell NHTSA how to develop the standard. But we simply say that
standards in these areas are essential, because they will have
a material benefit for consumers. So, this is the beginning of
the process, this session. I want to certainly thank all of
those that have been involved in the KIDS AND CARS coalition
for the advocacy work that they've done, and the work that
they've done in helping to gather information. One of the
things we realized early on was that we don't have good
collection of data in this area. And NHTSA, represented by Mr.
Medford today, I think is making strides in improving the
process for data collection. So, we've already had a good
impact in that area.
I look forward to the testimony of all of our panelists
today. I hope this Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee
can move the legislation as one of its first orders of business
this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Now, typically what we will do is, we'll allow government
officials to testify on a separate panel, but, by agreement
with Senator Sununu and also with the permission of Ron
Medford, who's going to be our first witness, we'd like to
consolidate the panels today.
So, let me introduce the panelists. Y'all come on up, grab
a seat, all the panelists, and, as y'all are taking your seats,
I'll introduce you. I'll recognize Mr. Medford first.
Mr. Medford is the Senior Associate Administrator of
Vehicle Safety of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, NHTSA. He'll be talking about NHTSA's effort to
enhance automobile safety for children, and he'll give us a
progress report on some of the studies under SAFETEA-LU.
And we'll also hear stories from two parents whose children
were tragically killed in separate non-traffic automobile
accidents. Mr. Packy Campbell, whose son, Ian, was the victim
of a runaway car, and also Dr. Greg Gulbransen, who
accidentally backed over and killed his 2-year-old son,
Cameron. I appreciate you all being here and your willingness
to testify.
Also, we'll have Joan Claybrook, the President of Public
Citizen. She brings a wealth of experience and insight into the
area of automobile safety. She was the NHTSA Administrator
during the Carter Administration and has remained active in
this area ever since. She'll talk about a variety of auto
safety issues.
And, finally, we'll have Mr. David McCurdy, on behalf of
the automobile industry. He's the President of the Alliance for
Automobile Manufacturers, and he'll talk about some of the
advances made in child safety standards by the industry. He
will provide an update on safety measures taken by the
industry.
So, with that, what I would like to do is acknowledge Mr.
Ron Medford and ask him to make his opening statement.
We're going to do 5 minutes on the opening statement. I'd
love for y'all to watch the time. And then we'll have a series
of questions after that.
Mr. Medford?
STATEMENT OF RONALD MEDFORD, SENIOR ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR VEHICLE SAFETY, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Medford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sununu. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee
this morning to discuss the important issue of improving
vehicle safety for children. I regret that Administrator Nason
could not appear before you because of a prior commitment to
testify at a House hearing this morning.
I ask that my written statement be submitted for the
record.
While every highway-related death is a tragedy, the loss of
a child is particularly devastating. Administrator Nason, the
mother of two young daughters herself, has made protecting
children one of her top priorities. Earlier this month, NHTSA
hosted a public meeting to discuss ways to increase the use of
Lower Anchorages and Tethers for Children, or a system known as
LATCH. LATCH is a system of anchorages built into newer
vehicles that is designed to make it easier to install child
seats. This meeting came about as a result of a new survey
conducted by NHTSA which found that 40 percent of parents with
LATCH-equipped vehicles still rely on seatbelts to secure their
child seats. The survey also found that many parents are
unaware of either the existence or the importance of LATCH. As
a result of this public meeting, NHTSA is now working with
vehicle and car seat manufacturers, consumer advocates, and
others to develop a national education campaign to better
inform parents on proper child seat installation. Installing a
child seat should not be a daunting task for parents, and NHTSA
is committed to making LATCH better known and easier to use.
Regarding back-over crashes, last November NHTSA released a
comprehensive study on this problem. As a part of the study,
NHTSA tested camera-based systems currently available, to
evaluate their performance and effectiveness in mitigating
back-over crashes. Our study found that, while rear-facing
cameras helped drivers better see pedestrians in the back of
the vehicle, the presence of fog, rain, or glare, can
significantly reduce their effectiveness. We also found that
cameras were not effective at night. And, finally, our research
showed that, even if the camera can clearly discern the object,
preventing the crash is still dependent on the driver observing
the video display and reacting quickly enough. Although our
studies show that cameras have limitations in preventing
crashes, NHTSA believes this technology holds great promise.
And, accordingly, we are continuing our research this year on
examining the human-factors issues related to camera
effectiveness.
Regarding the entrapment hazard posed by power windows, the
Senators may recall that in 2004 NHTSA finalized a regulation
mandating all vehicles sold beginning October 1, 2008, have
recessed window switches to prevent their inadvertent
activation. Last year, NHTSA added to this rule, pursuant to a
mandate in SAFETEA-LU, requiring that power-window switches
have to be pulled up or out to work. We were pleased to
complete this mandate nearly a year ahead of the deadline set
by Congress. We believe that, once in effect, these new rules
will significantly help reduce the likelihood of these
incidents.
Mr. Chairman, it is the worst fear of every parent to lose
a child. The good news is that child safety in vehicles has
come a long way. In 1975, the fatality rate for children 5
years old and younger was 4.5 per 100,000 children. Today, the
fatality rate for children under 5 is 2.27, a record low.
However, moreover, current statistics show that children 9
years of age and younger had the least amount of fatalities
among any age group. These improvements in child safety are
attributable to a combination of innovative safety features on
the vehicle, widespread use of child safety seats, and enhanced
drunk-driving enforcement. NHTSA is committed to making
additional safety improvements to further protect children. Of
all of the lifesaving work NHTSA does, I consider this our most
important duty.
Thank you for your consideration and for this Committee's
ongoing effort to improve highway safety. I'd be glad to answer
any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Medford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald Medford, Senior Associate Administrator
for Vehicle Safety, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Mr. Chairman, my name is Ron Medford, and I am the Senior Associate
Administrator for Vehicle Safety at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
this Subcommittee to discuss the important issue of improving vehicle
safety for children. I regret that NHTSA Administrator Nicole R. Nason
could not appear before you because of a prior commitment to testify at
a House subcommittee hearing.
The mission of NHTSA is to reduce fatalities and injuries on our
Nation's roads. In 2005, the last year for which complete data are
available, there were 43,443 highway-related fatalities and 2.7 million
injuries. Vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for the age
group of 4 to 34.
While every highway-related death is a tragedy, the loss of a child
is particularly devastating.
Administrator Nason, the mother of two young daughters herself, has
made protecting children one of her top priorities. Earlier this month,
Administrator Nason hosted a public meeting with industry leaders and
consumer advocates to discuss ways to increase the use of Lower
Anchorages and Tethers for Children, or the LATCH system. LATCH is a
system of anchorages built into newer vehicles that is specifically
designed to make it easier to properly install child seats. This
meeting came about as a result of a new survey conducted by NHTSA which
found that 40 percent of parents with LATCH-equipped vehicles still
rely on seat belts to secure their child seat. The survey also found
that many parents are unaware of either the existence or the importance
of the LATCH system.
As a result of this meeting, NHTSA is working with vehicle and car
seat manufacturers, child seat installation instructors, and consumer
advocates to develop a national education campaign to better inform
parents on proper child seat installation. Installing a child safety
seat should not be a daunting task for parents, and NHTSA is committed
to making LATCH better known and easier to use.
Additionally, NHTSA is currently working to revise its ease-of-use
ratings for child seats. We believe this new rating system will serve
as a strong incentive for child seat manufacturers to make proper
installation of car seats easier for parents.
Another area of concern that NHTSA is active in addressing is back-
over crashes. Last November, NHTSA released a comprehensive study on
this problem. This study estimated that back-over crashes cause at
least 183 fatalities and up to 7,419 injuries annually. Thankfully the
majority of these injuries are relatively minor, meaning that the
victims are treated in the emergency room and released.
As part of this study, NHTSA tested several systems currently
available to evaluate their performance and potential effectiveness in
mitigating back-over crashes. Our tests found that the performance of
ultrasonic and radar parking aids in detecting children behind the
vehicle was typically poor.
Our study also looked at camera-based systems and found that they
provide drivers with the ability to see pedestrians in the majority of
rear blind spot zones. However, we found that rain, fog or glare from
the sun can significantly reduce the camera's ability to show drivers a
clear view of an object in back of the vehicle. The cameras are also
not effective at night. Finally, our research showed that even if the
camera can clearly discern the object, preventing the crash is still
dependent on the driver observing the video display and reacting
quickly enough.
Although our study showed that cameras have limitations in
preventing back-over crashes, NHTSA believes this technology holds
promise. Accordingly, we are continuing our research in this area.
Regarding the entrapment hazard posed by power windows, the
Subcommittee may recall that in April 2004, NHTSA finalized a rule
mandating that all vehicles sold in MY 2008 have recessed window
switches to prevent their inadvertent activation. Last year, NHTSA
added to this rule pursuant to a mandate in SAFETEA-LU requiring that
power window switches not only be recessed, but have to be pulled ``up
or out'' to work. We were pleased to be able to meet this mandate
nearly a year ahead of the deadline set by Congress. Although a child
fatality due to a power window is an extremely rare occurrence
(approximately one to two children a year on average) we believe that
once in effect, these rules will significantly reduce the likelihood of
these incidents.
Mr. Chairman, it is the worst fear of every parent to lose a child.
The good news is child safety has come a long way. A generation ago it
was not uncommon for children of all ages to be sitting anywhere in the
car, completely unrestrained. Through our educational efforts, and the
passage of Anton's Law and other similar legislation, now 98 percent of
children under 1 year old are buckled up.
More important, these changes in law presaged a change in society
toward child safety in vehicles. Apart from being illegal in all 50
states, most parents now would never consider not buckling up their
child. This focus on child safety by parents is paying dividends, as
NHTSA data shows that children 9 years of age and younger have the
least amount of fatalities among any age group.
NHTSA is committed to making additional safety improvements to
further protect children. Of all the lifesaving work NHTSA does, I
consider this our most important duty.
Thank you for your consideration, and for this Subcommittee's
ongoing effort to improve highway safety. I would be pleased to answer
any questions.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Medford.
We've been joined by Senator Tom Carper, of Delaware. And
he's decided not to give an opening statement, right?
Senator Carper. Could I just make one really, really short
statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the
hearing and for letting me step in for a little while. I have
three hearings going on at the same time, so I'm not going to
burden you for long with my presence.
I'm delighted to see my old colleague--not ``old''----
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper.--but my colleague of longstanding, Dave
McCurdy. For those of you who follow baseball, I think today
may be the first day of spring training.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. And Dave McCurdy and I used to play on the
Congressional baseball team, and a couple of years, I remember,
when I was nominated for Most Valuable Player by the
Republicans--I'm a Democrat.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Tom Ridge was the outfielder for the
Republicans for a while. A couple of years, I think we've
picked him as our Most Valuable Player. This guy can handle
himself well behind the witness stand, and he is also pretty
good with a baseball. Real good with a bat. But it's great to
see you.
And thank you all for being here and testifying with us
this morning.
Thank you, David. Welcome.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Senator. And thank you for
joining us.
Our next witness is Packy Campbell, former State
Representative for the State of New Hampshire.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. PACKY CAMPBELL, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mr. Campbell. Good morning. A little nervous this morning.
It's my first time in front of the--what I call the ``real
Congress.'' I've been in front of the Senate in New Hampshire a
whole bunch of times in the panels, so----
It's an honor to be here with the Members of this
Committee, and it's an honor to be one of the advocates, but
also a politician who realizes that sometimes it takes an act
of Congress to save lives. And it's going to take an act of
Congress to save more lives.
My story, of losing my young son, and literally having my
child die in my arms, is tragic. It's heart-wrenching. It can
keep you awake nights. I'm not here to pull at your
heartstrings, although this is an emotional issue for me and
all of the family advocates. I'm here to tell you that this is
a good commonsense measure. As a Republican in the New
Hampshire House in the ``Live Free or Die'' State, I've never
voted for a helmet bill or a mandatory seatbelt bill. What are
we talking about? And sometimes, the safety advocates have to
tap me and say, ``Remember, safety is a good thing.''
I know safety is a good thing, and I know this is a good
bill, because it's reasonable, it's cost-effective. You know,
my story relates to a brake-shift interlock or a brake
transmission, which they call BTSI, or ``Betsy'' is the word
I'm supposed to learn. But no matter what the issue is, whether
it's power windows or rear visibility standards, as a parent
and as a compassionate Congress, as human beings, sometimes we
need to regulate. This is one of those times.
The industry and NHTSA has been excellent. I came down and
met with NHTSA and had over 12 people in the room, with the
help of Congressman Bass. We had a great meeting. Out of that
meeting came real, productive measures. Those measures were the
first step in the right direction of this thing. I realize
there are things that happen in SAFETEA-LU. It was SAFETEA-LU
that motivated me to come here, because, quite frankly, as a
parent, I was angry, because I said, ``It's not enough.'' But
then, as a legislator, I calmed down and said, ``It's a step in
the right direction. We're moving the ball forward.'' This bill
is good legislation. I hope that all the Committee members will
join Senator Sununu and Senator Clinton and cosponsor this
bill. I think it would be a great statement, politically, that
we need to care about our children, and we need to protect our
children.
I obviously failed in reading my statement here. But it's
just sometimes something you've got to speak from the heart. I
hope that this Committee and this Senate will do an act of
Congress to save other parents and to save lives. I know there
are other measures that could have happened, or should have
happened. The bottom line is, my son's death wasn't counted, it
hasn't been counted, that--the rules that NHTSA can make up,
they can't make with those statistics. Those statistics have
not been gathered to a degree that allowed them to do
rulemaking. Those statistics need to be gathered. This bill,
unfortunately, needs to hammer that point home so that NHTSA,
who is willing to do their job, who's trying to do their job,
will have clear direction that this data needs to be tracked so
that we have a reason--a justified reason--I mean, they do a
cost-benefit analysis, as morbid as that is, with these safety
features. Since we don't have the data, we can't do that
analysis. That's why we need an act of Congress to say, ``These
are important safety features, and we should enact them.''
I thank you very much, and--I lost track of time, but I
think my 5 minutes is up. And I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. W. Packy Campbell, Former Representative
from New Hampshire
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Consumer Affairs,
Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, for the opportunity to
provide this testimony on the need for improved efforts to protect
children from vehicle-related injury.
My name is Packy Campbell. I live in the small town of Farmington,
New Hampshire with my lovely wife Brenda, and our children Ryan, Sarah,
Adam and our infant child Sean. Also in that town is the grave of my
son Ian Joseph, who tragically died at our house on April 14, 2004 just
shy of his second birthday.
I am a politician by choice, an advocate by circumstance. I served
two terms in the New Hampshire House of Representatives. It was during
my first term in the House that my son Ian was killed in a non-traffic
non-crash incident in our driveway. Ian was killed when his then 4 year
old brother was able to knock my company's F-350 pickup truck out of
park without either turning the vehicle on or touching the brakes, a
feat believed to be impossible due to the fact that the vehicle was
equipped with brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI). When
purchasing that vehicle I intentionally sought to buy one with safety
features that would keep myself, family and others safe.
However, although equipped with some safety features, my 4 year old
son Adam was able to put the truck key in the ignition and, without
starting the vehicle or touching the brakes, shift the truck out of
park and into either neutral or reverse. That nearly 8,000 pound truck
then rolled in our driveway and crushed Adam's best buddy, our toddler
son Ian, who died in my arms on the front porch of our home.
I have become aware of that our family's tragic accident is not all
that unusual. On April 12, 2005 Milan Richard Hedmark died in a
startlingly similar situation. It was this revelation that motivated me
on my current course of action to seek legislation, as I realize my
responsibility now is to protect children and families from
experiencing this type of tragedy.
Our accident involved a vehicle equipped with brake shift
interlock. What is brake shift interlock? It is a mechanical or
electrical design in a vehicle steering column that prevents a car from
coming out of park unless the brake petal is depressed. Virtually every
car made has these features. However some cars are designed so that the
safety feature only works in four out of five key positions.
Since the accident occurred I have worked with NHTSA, with the
automobile industry, and with advocacy groups like KIDS AND CARS, to
make known the risks to children posed by cars that do not contain
simple, cost effective safety measures proposed in the Act, and to
mandate such features in all vehicles sold in the U.S. by 2010. In my
discussions with NHTSA even some of their representatives were shocked
to learn of what Mr. Keith Brewer at NHTSA called a ``sweet spot''
where a BTSI equipped car can be put into neutral without touching the
brake.
Through the combined efforts of those groups, and others, a
voluntary agreement (NHTSA-2006-25669-2; ``Reducing the Risk of
Inadvertent Automatic Transmission Shift Selector Movement and
Unintended Vehicle Movement; a Commitment for Continued Action by
Leading Automakers'') was reached to promote public consciousness of
the fact that brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) is not
foolproof right now, by disclosing which vehicles do or do not have
BTSI safety features to prevent inadvertent roll-away accidents, and to
work to make sure that all vehicles sold in the U.S. by 2010 are fully
protected against roll-away incidents such as the one that took the
life of my son Ian, and hundreds of other children.
When first presented with the agreement, I was hesitant to support
it, as I thought that the Cameron Gulbransen 2005 bill should have been
passed to mandate both disclosure and changes to vehicle design
standards. I was convinced to support the voluntary agreement, however,
by the promises of design changes by 2010 and immediate disclosure by
the industry and NHTSA of vehicles that complied, and with a personal
commitment to me by key members of NHTSA to produce a list of vehicles
that DID NOT comply. At the time, I thought that doing something now to
save some lives in 2010 was autos worth supporting the voluntary
agreement. I wanted a list of non-compliant auto's so that it could be
provided as part of the law enacted by the New Hampshire Legislature
and signed by Governor Lynch to mandate the disclosure of all vehicles
that did not have complete brake shift interlock features.
With all due respect, in regards to the agreement I quote Ronald
Reagan who said ``trust, but verify.'' If there is a commitment on the
part of industry what is wrong with holding industry accountable for
that commitment.
On a more personal level, my 9 year old son said to me regarding
this proposed law that ``people are more likely to break their promises
than they are to break the rules.''
When the list of compliant vehicles was released by NHTSA and
industry in September, I contacted NHTSA for two reasons. The first was
that the F-250 was on the list but did NOT comply with BTSI. Some 6
weeks later, Ford amended their list to delete the F-250. This was
presumably only done as a result of my contacting NHTSA about the
problem with Ford's list. The second was that I wanted to see what I
was promised, namely what I call the ``non-compliant list.'' The
response I received was that there is no such list, and that I would
need to figure it out on my own. I therefore joined Janette Fennell of
KIDS AND CARS in writing to NHTSA on October 2, 2006 requesting that
NHTSA publish such a list, just as it publishes the list of compliant
cars.
On February 16th, just 9 short days ago, NHTSA finally produced the
list. Upon being advised of the newly created list this past weekend,
it only took me a minute to confirm that the voluntary agreement is
still insufficient. Specifically, the same F-250, and the F-350 that
killed my son, are not on either list. Every vehicle manufactured and/
or sold in the U.S. is supposed to be on the list, and I found two that
are not in just about a minute, approximately the time it took my 4
year old son to run into daddy's truck only slightly ahead of my wife
and I and get the vehicle to roll-over his baby brother. I will not be
surprised to find that other vehicles are, for whatever reasons,
omitted from the list; for example, I am told that the Chevy SSR and
Saab 9.2 are on neither list.
Regardless of why these errors, and perhaps others, were made, the
point is that this voluntary system is just not an adequate way for
this Nation to take reasonable steps to protect our children. When
industry and the marketplace are unable to come to grips with a
problem, it is sometimes necessary for the government to step in and
mandate such reasonable steps to promote the public safety.
These examples show that without an act of Congress industry and
NHTSA will be unlikely to provide the type of information promised.
Additionally, that agreement only deals with one of the issues
addressed in the Gulbransen bill, namely the brake transmission shift
interlock. It does not deal with auto reverse power windows, nor with
rear visibility standards, both of which have caused death and injury,
both of which are easily avoidable and equally deserving of action by
Congress.
As a parent who is a member of a group of parents who are forced to
deal with the loss of their child, the principal is simple: safety
features are not luxury items, nor should the be optional equipment.
Further, the absence of safety features is not something that should be
hidden from consumers. It is not the fault of parents that accidents,
otherwise preventable, happen. Great parents suffer great tragedies.
The only way to ensure that fatalities will not happen is to design
them out. This proposed Act will design out, with reasonable affects to
the cost structure on the industry, defect's that costs the lives of
children.
PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT MY SON IAN WOULD BE ALIVE IF HE AND HIS
BROTHER HAD JUMPED INTO THE OTHER VEHICLE IN MY DRIVEWAY AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT. That vehicle, a 2002 GMC Envoy, was equipped with BTSI in
all key positions, making the roll-away accident impossible for a 4-
year old to cause. The fact that I purchased both of those cars with
the expectation that they would behave in the same way shows why we
need Congress to act on this bill.
Finally, the agreement does nothing to require industry or NHTSA to
compile statistical data of non-traffic, non-crash situations involving
bodily injury or death. It will take an act of Congress to change the
reporting requirements of law enforcement across the company. NHTSA did
a 2004 study of death certificates my sons death certificate was not
reported in a way that it was calculated in that study. It will take an
act of Congress to make relevant statistics a possibility.
When my little son Ian died in the little town of Farmington in the
little State of New Hampshire in April 2004, his death was not tracked,
recorded or counted by any governmental agency in this country. His
death, and hundreds of other deaths in such non-traffic non-crash
situations, should not go un-noticed. They should be heard by this
Congress, and NHTSA, and industry, as a call, or more appropriately a
cry, to take reasonable steps to avoid such needless deaths and
injuries in the future.
NHTSA may suggest to this Congress that it is working on these
issues through rulemaking. In fact, prior to offering the voluntary
agreement NHTSA offered to put the issue in rulemaking, and asked me to
petition for such a rule. I declined that request.
Although NHTSA has the authority to make rules with the force of
law when circumstances warrant, rulemaking requires NHTSA to perform a
cost-benefit analysis on any proposal to require a safety feature.
However, without any accurate data on non-traffic non-crash related
deaths, such an analysis is impossible.
More importantly, it is a morally reprehensible analysis to do in
the first place. One child's death is enough when it can be so
reasonably avoided by the common sense, reasonable and affordable
safety measures proposed by this Act. Congressional action circumvents
this morbid ``cost-benefit'' analysis. Congressional action is needed
now.
It is only by enacting this law that the Federal Government will
begin to collect data on such incidents, and will force the industry to
implement reasonable measures to avoid the deaths of hundreds of
children in the future. It is my hope, and my prayer, that my little
Ian's death does not go unnoticed by this Congress, but that instead
you hear his cry, and the cry of his family and hundreds of family's
across this great Nation, and enact the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and
Cars Safety Act of 2007.
I thank you for the opportunity to speak and submit testimony to
you on behalf of my son Ian, his brothers and sister, my wife Brenda,
and on behalf of the hundreds of other families who look to this
Committee and this Congress to learn from our tragedy and do the best
you can to prevent such needless deaths in the future.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Our next witness is Dr. Greg Gulbransen.
Doctor?
STATEMENT OF DR. GREG GULBRANSEN, PEDIATRICIAN, SYOSSET, NEW
YORK
Dr. Gulbransen. Mr. Chairman, good morning.
I'm Dr. Greg Gulbransen. I'd like to start by saying thank
you for taking on this challenge.
I wish to thank you and Members of the Consumer Affairs,
Insurance, and Automobile Safety Subcommittee for inviting me
to appear before you today to testify on the important issue of
child safety as it relates to the vehicles that we drive.
I'm here today to speak to you as a dad, a pediatrician, a
board member of KIDS AND CARS, and a concerned citizen in an
attempt to make vehicles safer for the American family. My
wife, Leslie, and I, along with hundreds of other families, are
determined to prevent our tragedy from happening again and
again to so many other families.
On October 19, 2002, a preventable, but unthinkable,
tragedy struck our family. It was 9:30 p.m., and I stepped out
to move my SUV into the driveway. Inside my home were my--the
babysitter, Leslie, my wife, and my two young sons, or so I
thought. It was a habit of mine to back the SUV into the
driveway in the evening, because in the morning the streets are
congested with children playing and people walking their dogs.
Cameron was not in the driveway when I got into my SUV. While
driving in reverse, I remember looking over my shoulder and
using the rearview and both side mirrors, and backing slowly
into my parking space. I thought I was driving a safe vehicle
and doing the right thing, until I suddenly felt the front
wheel go over a bump. I had no idea what I had run over. I knew
I couldn't have hit the curb, and it was too early for the
newspaper. Out of concern, I jumped out, and there in the
headlights was my 2-year-old son, Cameron, in his baby-blue
pajamas, holding his blanket, face up, dying of massive,
profuse head injuries. I knew immediately it was too late, but
I did everything I could to save my dying son.
I can't begin to describe the sickening shock and
devastation. How could this have happened? I looked where I was
driving, but yet I never saw him. I never had a chance of
seeing Cameron, because he was too small--too small for the
large blindspots that are built into the design of our
vehicles. While SUVs, minivans, and pickup trucks have become
more popular, they pose a greater danger for our children.
These vehicles have huge blind zones that have led to tragedies
for many families, because drivers simply cannot see who or
what is behind them when they are driving. These technologies
will continue--I'm sorry--these tragedies will continue, if
something isn't done.
I learned, later, that there are technologies, like cameras
and sensor systems, that would have warned me that my son was
behind my vehicle. As a pediatrician who advocates for
children's safety, and as a father who has lost a child, I
can't stress enough how important it is to get these lifesaving
technologies into vehicles.
While the Government is responding for collecting accident
data and recognizing safety issues affecting our daily lives,
at the present time the Government hasn't even set up a
database to collect information about non-traffic injuries.
Yes, my son was also not a statistic. No one ever even counted
his death. It was an unevent.
Without data collection, how can we expect the Government
and the automobile industry to appreciate the need to make the
necessary safety improvements in our vehicles? I find it
curious that it's taken the efforts of a nonprofit agency, such
as KIDS AND CARS, to bring this issue to the public attention.
If not for their work--if not for their efforts to inform the
public about these dangers, I'm certain we would not have--we
would not be here today, trying to work together to solve this
grave public health and safety issue.
Yes, the ultimate responsibility for operating a vehicle
lies with the driver. I feel that pain every single day.
However, the automobile industry is responsible for designing
safe vehicles, and the Government has both the duty and the
obligation to protect children in and around motor vehicles by
setting reasonable safety standards.
The truth is that when drivers are backing their vehicles,
they are forced to put blinders on that prevent them from
seeing large areas behind their vehicle. Parents know the
driver should not be required to bear the burden for this
problem alone, especially when motor vehicles come equipped
with large blind zones as standard equipment, blind zones that
cannot be eliminated by mirrors and cannot be made safe by
educational messages alone. Only technology that provides
drivers with visibility behind the vehicle can shine a light
into the blind zone and ensure that our children are protected.
I'm not talking about futuristic, pie-in-the-sky
developments that are years away. I'm talking about stuff that
already exists, that's already being offered as either standard
or optional equipment on many current production vehicle
models. Until the Government acts to provide that technology in
every vehicle, drivers will have little chance of preventing
back-over crashes, and our children will remain at risk even
near their own homes. That's why the Cameron Gulbransen Kids
and Cars Safety Act of 2007 is so important.
While my son's name is on the bill, it's not about him at
all. It's about every single child that's ever been backed
over, inadvertently left in a vehicle, or accidently trapped in
a power window. This legislation honors all of them, and shows
how much we are trying to make vehicles safer for the American
family.
For some reason, there's a little confusion. The press
seems to think that all we want to do is advocate that cameras
are on the rear of all these vehicles. It's not that. We want
safety performance standards for rearward visibility.
So, thank you for your time and giving me the honor to
crusade here today for safety of children. I thank you for the
past support for this legislation and your efforts to get it
enacted last year before Congress adjourned. I hope that
passage of this legislation will be of--a priority of the
Subcommittee, and I want to help in any way I can. I think this
is my fifth time down here, and I'll continue to keep coming
down.
I'm happy to answer any questions you have. I also have
included attachments to the testimony to illustrate the
enormous blind zones behind some vehicles, a fact sheet on the
major provisions in the legislation, and information about the
growing number of child deaths.
Please remember the motto from KIDS AND CARS, ``Be sure you
can see before you turn the key.''
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gulbransen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Greg Gulbransen, Pediatrician, Syosset, New
York
Mr. Chairman, good morning. I am Dr. Greg Gulbransen and would like
to start by saying thank you for taking on this challenge. I wish to
thank you and the members of the Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety Subcommittee for inviting me to appear before you
today to testify on the important issue of child safety as it relates
to the vehicles we drive. I am here today speaking to you as dad, a
Pediatrician, a board member of KIDS AND CARS, and a concerned citizen
in an attempt to make vehicles safer for the American family. My wife
Leslie and I, along with hundreds of other families are determined to
prevent our tragedy from happening again and again to so many other
families.
On October 19, 2002 a preventable but unthinkable tragedy struck
our family. It was 9:30 p.m. and I stepped outside to move my SUV into
the driveway. Inside my home were the babysitter, Leslie, and my two
young sons; or so I thought. It was a habit of mine to back the SUV
into the driveway in the evening because in the morning the streets
were congested with children playing and people walking their dogs.
Cameron was not in the driveway when I got into my SUV. While driving
in reverse I remember looking over my shoulder and using the rear view
and both side mirrors and backing slowly into my parking space. I
thought I was driving a safe vehicle and was doing the right thing
until I suddenly felt the front wheel go over a bump. I had no idea
what I had run over. I knew I couldn't have hit the curb. Out of
concern I jumped out and there in the headlights was my 2-year-old son,
Cameron, in his baby blue pajamas holding his blanket, face up,
bleeding profusely from a massive head injury. I knew immediately it
was too late but I did everything I could to save my dying son.
I can't begin to describe the sickening shock and devastation. How
could this have happened? I looked where I was driving but yet I never
saw him! I never had a chance of seeing Cameron because he was too
small. Too small for the large blind zones that are built into the
design of our vehicles.
While SUVs, minivans and pickup trucks have become more popular
they pose a greater danger for our children. These vehicles have huge
blind zones that have led to tragedies for many families because
drivers simply cannot see who or what is behind us when we drive. These
tragedies will continue if something isn't done. I learned later that
there are technologies, like cameras and sensor systems that would have
warned me that my son was behind my vehicle. As a pediatrician who
advocates for children's safety and as a father who has lost a child, I
can't stress enough how important it is to get these life-saving
technologies into all vehicles.
While the government is responsible for collecting accident data
and recognizing safety issues affecting our daily lives, at the present
time the government hasn't even set up a database to collect
information about non-traffic injuries. Without data collection how can
we expect the government and the automobile industry to appreciate the
need to make the necessary safety improvements in our vehicles? I find
it curious that it has taken the efforts of a nonprofit agency, KIDS
AND CARS, to bring this issue to public attention. If not for their
efforts to inform the public about these dangers, I'm certain we would
not be here today trying to work together to solve this grave public
health and safety issue. Yes, the ultimate responsibility for operating
a vehicle lies with the driver. I feel the pain of that every day.
However, the automobile industry is responsible for designing safe
vehicles, and the government has both the duty and the obligation to
protect children in and around motor vehicles by setting reasonable
standards for safety. The truth is that when drivers are backing their
vehicles they are forced to put blinders on that prevent them from
seeing large areas behind their vehicle. Parents and other drivers
should not be required to bear the burden for this problem alone,
especially when motor vehicles come equipped with large blind zones as
standard equipment. Blind zones that cannot be eliminated by mirrors
and cannot be made safe by educational messages alone. Only technology
that provides drivers with visibility behind their vehicle can shine a
light into the blind zone and ensure that our children are protected.
I am not talking about futuristic, pie-in-the-sky developments that
are years away, I am talking about existing technology that is already
offered either as standard or optional equipment on many current
production vehicle models. Until government acts to provide that
technology in every vehicle, drivers will have little chance of
preventing back-over crashes, and our children will remain at risk even
near their own homes.
That's why the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007
is so important. While Cameron's name is on the bill, let's remember
this isn't just about Cameron. This bill is about every single child
that has been backed over, inadvertently left in a vehicle or
accidentally trapped in a power window. This legislation honors all of
them and shows how much we are trying to make vehicles safer for the
American family.
Thank you for your time and giving me the honor to crusade here
today for the safety of children. I thank you for your past support for
this legislation and your efforts to get it enacted last year before
Congress adjourned. I hope that passage of the legislation will be a
priority of the Subcommittee and I want to help in any way I can. This
is my fifth trip to Capitol Hill to urge passage and I will come as
often as you like to see this important bill enacted.
I am happy to answer any question you have. I also have included
attachments to my testimony that illustrate the enormous blind zones
behind some vehicles, a fact sheet on the major provisions in the
legislation and information about the growing number of child deaths
and injuries.
Please remember the motto from KIDS AND CARS when you get behind
the wheel of your vehicle today, ``Be sure you can see before you turn
the key.''
______
The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 Fact Sheet
At least four young children are killed in a non-traffic automobile
incident every week. The age of victims in these cases is usually less
than 5-years-old. These tragedies are truly heart-wrenching--but also
preventable. This bill addresses the leading causes of these needless
deaths and injuries by directing the Secretary of Transportation to
issue safety standards and take other action to reduce the incidence of
child injury and death inside or outside of parked passenger motor
vehicles.
The Need To Protect Children In and Around Vehicles
Since 2001, over 1,000 children have died in non-traffic incidents
and this statistic has been steadily rising. Preliminary data indicate
219 documented fatalities in 2006. The government currently does not
collect data about non-traffic incidents, so we know that the real
fatality numbers are much higher. (data provided by Kids and Cars,
www.KidsAndCars.org.)
A 2002 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study (July
2000-June 2001) reported that over 9,160 children are treated in
hospital emergency rooms due to non-traffic incidents.
The Bill
The Cameron Gulbransen KIDS AND CARS Safety Act of 2007 directs the
Secretary of Transportation to issue safety standards to decrease the
incidence of child injury and death. The Act:
Establishes reasonable rulemaking deadlines regarding child
safety, applicable to all passenger motor vehicles, in three
ways:
-- Ensures that power windows and panels automatically
reverse direction when they detect an obstruction to prevent
children from being trapped, injured or killed.
-- Requires a rearward visibility performance standard that
will provide drivers with a means of detecting the presence of
a person behind the vehicle in order to prevent backing
incidents involving death and injury, especially to small
children and disabled people.
-- Requires the vehicle service brake to be depressed
whenever the vehicle is taken out of park in order to prevent
incidents resulting from children disengaging the gear shift
and causing vehicles to roll away.
Establishes a child safety information program, administered
by the Secretary of Transportation. This will involve
collecting non-traffic incident data, informing parents about
these hazards to children and ways to mitigate them, as well as
making this information available to the public through the
Internet and other means.
Support
Senators John E. Sununu (R-NH) and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY)
are the prime senate sponsors; the House of Representatives companion
bill is sponsored by Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) and
Congressman Peter King (R-NY)
Groups supporting the bill include: KIDS AND CARS, Consumers Union,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, the American Academy of
Pediatrics, Public Citizen, Kids in Danger, Trauma Foundation, The Zoie
Foundation, Adrianna's Rule Foundation, Veronica's Eyes Foundation,
Craig's Crusade and more.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Ms. Joan Claybrook, Public Citizen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC
CITIZEN; FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I'd like to acknowledge the role of this Committee
in passage of the SAFETEA-LU bill for which we are very
appreciative. It's a wonderful piece of legislation, and it's
made a huge difference already in safety.
Second, I'd like to acknowledge the work that was done on
the TREAD Act, although some of you weren't here then. This
committee did pass the TREAD Act in 2000, and it also has made
important improvements in the activities of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Third, I'd just like to direct the Senators to some of the
families that are in the first rows here who have come to
Capitol Hill to lobby for the legislation, and to thank Senator
Sununu for your cosponsorship of this important bill.
Mr. Chairman, I have divided my statement into three parts:
the importance of protecting children inside cars, the
importance of protecting children outside of vehicles, and
school bus safety. And because there's so much to say, I'm
going to have to urge that you pay attention to the testimony
as its whole, but I'm just going to mention a few items in it.
First, I do want to support the enactment of the Cameron
Gulbransen legislation. It's really an important piece of
legislation, and it needs to be passed.
But the question of what the Committee is going to do in
terms of its decisions in the legislative process beyond that
legislation, I think, need to be addressed in terms of the
number of deaths to children in the different types of crashes
that occur.
And it's amazing, I just got this data yesterday from
NHTSA--late yesterday--and so, I don't have it included in my
testimony, but I do have--it's being distributed today--a sheet
that pictures a car that describes the different crash sources/
modes, and where these deaths and injuries occur. The data are
for 2005. In frontal-crash impacts--these are 0- to 8-year-old
children who are--there are 241 deaths in frontal-impact
crashes. There are 257 deaths of children in rollover crashes.
There are 61 deaths in rear-impact crashes. There are 200
deaths in side-impact crashes. There are 339 deaths of child
pedestrians. And there are 226 deaths that would be prevented
were the Gulbransen law to pass.
So, there you have the importance of that bill spelled out
by the statistics and the data. Incredibly, incredibly
important. And it's no less important than front-, rear-,
rollover, or side-impact crashes that occur.
Now, the other interesting piece of information that I got
from NHTSA late yesterday was the relationship between the
deaths of children and the deaths of adults in those modes of
crashes. And--in terms of percentages, because the numbers are
quite different--but if you compare the 0- to 8-year-old
children in these modes of crashes to adults age 13 and above,
they're 33 percent for rollovers, where children are killed;
and 34 percent for adults. Same thing. For frontal, you have 31
percent for the 0- to 8-year-old, and 38 percent for adults, so
it's very close. For the side, it's 26 percent and 22 percent--
26 for children, 22 for adults. And in the rear, there's a
bigger difference, 8 percent and 3 percent.
Now, what does that say to us, in terms of what's needed?
Well, first--cars are not made for children. They're just not
made for children. Motor vehicles are made for adults. And so,
the items that are addressed in our testimonies jointly today
are ones that say, ``These are the most important areas where
there are simple remedies.'' Most of them are incredibly
inexpensive, like the brake-shift interlock, which is
voluntarily offered by the auto industry, but only 80 percent
of the vehicles comply with it today, and less used to when
this voluntary deal was first agreed to in the 1990s. It costs
a couple of dollars, and it means that no kid can shift that
gearshift out of park and into neutral, and let the car roll
away, because they can't reach the brake. And so, the brake-
shift interlock requires you to put your foot on the brake
before you can shift. And I will say that when I was 5 years
old, I did that in my parents car, and, as a result, I almost
died, because the car almost rolled over a cliff. And if some
woman hadn't seen it happen and stopped it, I would be dead, at
5 years old. So, this is a really important, but small, item.
But if you look at the back-over, which is where the
largest number of deaths are occurring, and which is really
unnecessary, I want to say two things. One is that in 1980 I
issued a conspicuity standard, a standard which measures what a
person inside the vehicle can see all around, 360+. And that
standard took 10 years to develop, and it was never
implemented. NHTSA never implemented it. And, as a result, we
have vehicles that are designed so that--and Consumer's Union
has documented this--so you cannot see children for many, many
feet, particularly if you're short. And many women who drive
these SUVs are short. You cannot see your children. And even if
you're taller, you can't. So, there's got to be something done.
And what this bill has in it is a safety performance standard.
It's not a requirement for any particular technology. It's a
safety performance standard. So, I think that this bill is
well-warranted.
In terms of power windows, when I was at NHTSA in the
1960s, we started working on power windows. They were just
coming into vehicles and--in a widespread way. And no one knew
what to do. Well, now we have the methods for raising and
lowering the window changed. The auto reverse in Europe costs
$10 to $12 a window. If you ask any parent would they spend $10
to $12 per window to protect their kids from being strangled or
their arms or hands being cut off, you wouldn't find a parent
in this nation that wouldn't pay that amount of money. And when
you think about the cost of fancy radios and all the rest of it
that are put in cars that cost much more, then you know that
these are cheap, very cheap, by comparison.
And when the industry does something in mass production,
the costs go way down. They always complain about it, and then
they give you the optional equipment price, but when they put
it in mass production, the price goes down.
There are several other things that I mention in my
testimony. I'll just briefly say that child restraints are only
tested for frontal crashes, they're not tested for side, rear,
or rollover crashes. They should be. The rear seatbacks often
fall down on children, because they're not built in a strong
enough way, and the standard for vehicle seats is 35 years old.
And we tell people to put their kids in the back seat, and,
when we do, the seat can go back and harm them. When NHTSA did
crash tests for the rear-impact tests that they were going to
raise to 50 miles an hour, almost every seat back fell
backward. Now, who doesn't go 50 miles an hour down the
highway, right? You may not crash at 50 miles an hour, but it
could be at 40 in the rear. NHTSA did nothing to issue a new
standard to require that seat backs don't fall back. And yet,
we tell all people to put their kids in the back seat. If that
seat back falls backward, what happens is, the front seat
passenger goes zooming backward, because your belt doesn't hold
you in a rearward crash, and you become a quadriplegic or
paraplegic, and you crush your child. Terrible. And that data
is generally not collected.
So, I urge you to pass this bill. I urge you to look at
these other issues. They're very minor costs, most of them. The
seat-back cost couldn't be $15 or $20 to fix per car. And I
urge you to consider all of these issues, because they're
really critically important, and children deserve it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen;
Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Consumer Affairs,
Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, for the opportunity to
provide this testimony on the need for improved efforts to protect
children from vehicle-related injury. I am Joan Claybrook, the
president of Public Citizen, a national non-profit public interest
organization with over 150,000 members nationwide. We represent the
interests of consumers and ordinary citizens through lobbying,
litigation, regulatory oversight, research, and public education.
Child safety issues first gained the spotlight in the 1990s, with
the discovery that auto manufacturers were installing cut-rate airbags
that were killing children. I had alerted manufacturers in 1980 of
research pointing to the need to consider designs and technologies such
as top-mounted, vertically deploying airbags, dual inflation, technical
folds, and tethers in order to reduce risks to children and small-
statured adults, but most automakers failed to follow through on this
information. Although automakers had known for a dozen years that the
child/airbag relationship was delicate, they neither warned the public
against placing children in the front seats nor designed airbags to
protect children. Instead, they exploited the discretion granted them
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) broad
performance standard and abused it. It took Congressional action to
force NHTSA to require the automakers to accommodate children in airbag
design. This story, unfortunately, is paradigmatic of the child safety
issue.
Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for children
ages 3 to 14 in the United States. \1\ NHTSA reports that in 2005,
1,946 children were killed and 234,000 children were injured in motor
vehicle crashes. \2\ That means that each day an average of 5 children
are dying in motor vehicle crashes while another 640 are injured. \3\
Moreover, children are also at serious risk in and around motor
vehicles in non-traffic related incidents, and these data are
completely missing from state and Federal safety databases. In the
absence of government data collection, KIDS AND CARS, a national
nonprofit safety organization, maintains a database of child fatalities
from motor vehicle events other than crashes on the Nation's roadways.
These non-traffic motor vehicle related events--which include children
being backed over by vehicles, being inadvertently left in hot
vehicles, being strangled by power windows, and setting cars in motion
when left unattended in a vehicle--killed at least 226 children in 2005
alone. \4\ (We suspect these numbers could be even higher, because
NHTSA does not currently collect non-traffic death and injury data;
KIDS AND CARS is the only source for these data.)
What is even more tragic about these bleak statistics is that many
of these deaths and serious injuries could have been prevented. When I
refer to preventability, let me be clear that I am not blaming parents;
instead, I am referring to the failures of industry to design motor
vehicles for children and of our Federal Government to use the
resources at its disposal to gather data and set standards to protect
children from needless harm. I am sure that we will undoubtedly hear
today about the need to educate parents, or that many of the deaths and
injuries we will discuss today are attributable to parental neglect. I
caution you to reject these arguments, for they are simply the child
safety equivalent of the ``nut behind the wheel'' argument that
industry raised for years in order to avoid accepting responsibility
for its design failures. We know that children must be driven to
school, the doctor, and so on; we know as well that parents do not have
fifteen arms or eyes in the backs of their heads, and that children can
get into enormous danger in a split second. Vehicles must be designed
with some recognition of these simple facts of life, and NHTSA must
ensure that they are. As NHTSA and manufacturers continue their pattern
of neglect, then we must turn to Congress to make sure children are
protected.
I. Child Safety Is Undermined by Unnecessary Information Gaps
A core issue for child safety is how little information is
available to guide policymakers and help the public hold NHTSA and the
motor vehicle industry accountable. One problem is that information
which NHTSA has at its disposal is not readily accessible to the
public. For example, a researcher interested in learning the number of
children killed in rear-impact crashes or side-impact crashes in a
given year cannot find this information through the public interface
for NHTSA's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). NHTSA can and
will generate reports from that data, but only upon request.
NHTSA's data gathering systems have focused on injuries and deaths
from crashes on the Nation's roadways and have never tracked the deaths
and injuries related to motor vehicles in non-traffic incidents. The
invisibility of non-traffic incidents in NHTSA data has resulted in
decades of neglect of several kinds of alarming yet preventable child
deaths and injuries, such as back-overs in driveways and strangulations
in power windows of parked vehicles. Thanks to the enterprising work of
KIDS AND CARS, we know much more about the gravity of these risks to
children. NHTSA is only now taking the initial steps to begin gathering
this kind of data systematically, thanks to Congress's decision in
2005's Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) to require NHTSA to do so.
Meanwhile, the agency is undermining our ability to know about
potential defects in child safety seats. Outraged by the revelation
that NHTSA had known of the Ford-Firestone deaths but failed to act,
Congress demanded in the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000 that NHTSA create
an early warning system--a database to alert the public of trends
suggesting a potential safety defect. NHTSA has created that system,
but it has inexplicably opted in its implementing rule to keep most of
that data secret from the public. (In fact, when NHTSA created the
database and starting gathering information from manufacturers in 2003,
it kept all such data secret, pending the outcome of litigation
challenging the agency's first rule to exempt the data from public
disclosure. After NHTSA lost in court, it returned to the drawing board
and proposed a rule that would keeps most of this data secret.
Meanwhile, at present none of this data is yet available to the
public.) \5\
In addition to monitoring NHTSA's efforts to implement the data
gathering requirements of SAFETEA-LU, I encourage Congress to hold the
agency's feet to the fire on its decision to keep the TREAD Act's early
warning data (including data on child safety) a dark secret. I also
call on Congress to require the agency to close the information gap by
compiling the latest safety data on children and other vulnerable
populations (such as seniors and pregnant women) in readily available
periodic reports.
II. Children Are Unnecessarily at Risk From Insufficient Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards
It is no easy task to try to catalogue all the vehicle-related
harms that children face. Of course, there are all the risks that are
specific to children, such as unsafe booster seats, inadequate child
restraints, and vehicle back-overs. There are also all the risks that
adults face--frontal, rear, side-impact, and rollover crashes--which
may be magnified for children. I want to focus on a few of the most
urgent risks, and I believe it would be useful to group them in three
categories: risks children face inside the vehicle, those they face
outside the vehicle, and those they face when they are entrusted to
school buses.
A. Protecting Children Inside the Vehicle
Children face a range of harms while they are inside the vehicle--
as passengers in cars on the road, and as occupants (often active
occupants) in cars that have been parked. I want to focus on a few core
issues that are most in need of oversight and legislative action.
1. The Child Safety Gap in Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Federal motor vehicle safety standards protect all of us, including
children, every day. The increase in the number of passenger vehicles
and drivers since 1966 is substantial, yet both the number of deaths
and the death rate have declined dramatically in the last 40 years.
NHTSA's motor vehicle safety standards have played a large role in
achieving these savings. Nonetheless, there are significant gaps in
existing and developing safety standards: just as manufacturers fail to
design vehicles to protect children, NHTSA is not doing enough to
develop safety standards that will adequately address the particular
needs of children.
Side impact crashes. Perhaps the most important example is side-
impact crash protection. The current side-impact crash protection
standard (FMVSS No. 214) does not address rear occupants. NHTSA
proposed in 2004 to amend the side-impact standard to include demanding
new tests for front seat occupants, essentially requiring the use of
upper and lower interior side-impact air bags. The proposed rule's
requirements for rear seat occupants, however, are far less demanding
and can be met with foam padding instead of dynamic side-impact
airbags, which offer greater protection. What does this inadequate
proposal mean for children? Simple: parents are instructed to place
children in the rear seats, precisely where the current and proposed
side-impact standards fail to offer sufficient protection. \6\
Moreover, the proposed rule endangers children under 12 who are in the
front seat of a vehicle, because side-impact airbags for front seat
occupants that comply with the proposed rule still allow children to be
ejected from the vehicle. In short, NHTSA's new proposal offers no
protection for children whether they ride in the front or back seat.
\7\ Meeting the needs of children in side-impact crashes should be a
higher priority, given that side-impact collisions account for 42
percent of vehicle-related child fatalities for rear-seated children
ages 0-8. \8\
Rollover crashes. The safety gap for children also means that weak
standards will be doubly weak for children. A significant portion of
vehicle-related child fatalities--around 30 percent of child deaths
from motor vehicle crashes--is attributable to rollover crashes. \9\
Unfortunately, NHTSA has proposed a standard for roof strength in
rollover crashes that will not adequately protect anyone, much less
children. Among its problems: it maintains the static platen test,
which fails to accurately replicate the damage and forces a vehicle is
subjected to during a rollover crash, and its inadequacy will not
mitigate the deaths and injuries specifically attributable to the
cascading effects of a weak roof, which include the creation of
ejection portals when the window glazing fails, belt failure, door
retention failure, and injury from the violent intrusion of the roof
itself. I look forward to this particular issue being addressed in more
detail in the months to come, as this Committee conducts oversight of
the Administration's implementation of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU),
which requires NHTSA to issue roof crush and ejection mitigation
standards.
Seat backs. Unmet needs for adult safety protection can put
children at particular risk. One case in point is the need for stronger
seat backs. In a rear-impact crash, the vehicle's front seats can
collapse rearward. The result is not just back injury, paraplegia, and
quadriplegia for the front-seat occupant: the rearward collapse of the
back of the front seat injures any occupants behind it, in the rear
seat. All too often, the rear seat occupants injured or killed in cases
of seatback collapse are the vehicle owners' own children. NHTSA does
currently have a seat strength standard, but it remains so pathetically
inadequate that some believe vehicle seats are held to a weaker
standard than lawn chairs. Manufacturers are well aware of the dangers
of seat back failures in crashes, \10\ and NHTSA is likewise aware
\11\--although it nonetheless aborted its proposal in 2000 to remedy
the problem. \12\ Congress must insist that NHTSA make necessary
updates to this important rule.
2. Child Restraints
The revolution that was supposed to fill, or at least bridge, this
safety gap for the youngest children was the widespread use of child
restraints and booster seats. Child restraints have definitely had a
positive effect on child safety, even when they are misused.
Nonetheless, there is much more NHTSA can do to improve child safety by
focusing its safety and consumer information programs on child
restraints.
The Need for Safety Standards
Under FMVSS 213, the only test child safety restraints must pass is
a standard for 30 mile per hour frontal-impact crashes. Children are at
risk in all crashes, not just frontal-impact crashes. For example,
side-impact collisions account for 42 percent of child fatalities for
rear-seated children ages 0-8, \13\ and on average 32 percent of
children killed in motor vehicle crashes die in rollovers. \14\ Federal
motor vehicle safety standards are designed to ensure that our motor
vehicles meet a very basic level of safety and are capable of
protecting occupants from common crashes and other safety concerns. Is
it unreasonable to expect these standards to require basic protections
for children, the most precious cargo our vehicles will ever carry, in
common vehicle crashes?
In 2000, Congress instructed NHTSA in section 14 of the TREAD Act
to initiate a rulemaking on side-impact crash test standards for child
restraints, which was supposed to be completed 2 years later. After
considering the issuance of such a rule NHTSA decided that more
research was necessary and then promptly abandoned the rulemaking it
was explicitly required to complete. Congress never authorized NHTSA to
abandon this rulemaking. Congress must ensure that NHTSA does not
continue to stall on this important issue but instead pushes forward
with research and the timely issuance of a much needed standard.
In addition to failing to issue safety standards for child
restraints in even the most basic of vehicle crashes, NHTSA also fails
to guarantee that child restraints are safe and appropriate for the
upper age/size range recommended to use them. FMVSS 213, the only
standard applicable to child restraints, which includes booster seats
used by older children, is severely limited because it tests safety
seats only for children weighing up to 65 pounds, even though booster
seats are recommended for children up to 80 pounds. \15\
Finally, it is essential for NHTSA to issue standards for child
restraints for the crash types discussed above, while including a full
range of representative child test dummies, including the 10-year-old
child test dummy for children up to 80 pounds which the agency has
developed but not included in performance standards. Currently, the one
standard test required for child restraints only requires child
restraints to perform adequately in frontal crash tests at 30 miles per
hour. This is dangerously inadequate. NHTSA must also test child safety
seats in side-impact, rear-impact, and rollover crashes in order to
guarantee that children are properly protected.
The Need for Built-In Restraints
Properly installed child restraints can reduce the chance of a
fatality in a vehicle crash by 71 percent for infants and by 54 percent
for children 1-4 years old. \16\ A recent NHTSA study that evaluated
the effectiveness of a new standardized installation method, however,
found that many parents still improperly install child restraints in
vehicles. \17\ Child car seats are the only consumer product mandated
by law that requires a 32-hour training course to learn how to install
correctly.
In 2002, a new safety technology known as LATCH (Lower Anchors and
Tethers for Children) became mandatory in new vehicles. NHTSA mandated
these new child restraint attachment standards in order to end
confusion about installation methods and to help parents safely install
restraints for their children. In December 2006, however, NHTSA
released a final report on the study it conducted to evaluate the LATCH
system. The results show that the system is so confusing that many
parents and caregivers are not properly using the system, and the need
for education about the system is great. \18\
To NHTSA's credit, the agency has acknowledged that there is a
widespread problem with poor child restraint installation, and it has
promised to work to eliminate this confusion so that all children can
be properly restrained in vehicles. \19\ Working to educate people
about proper installation methods, however, does not go far enough to
address the many installation difficulties and confusion surrounding
child restraint systems. Only with built-in child restraint systems can
parents avoid the problem of mis-installation.
Built-in child restraint systems, also known as integrated child
restraints, when combined with 5-point harness systems are the most
effective way to safely restrain children in motor vehicles. Currently,
integrated child restraints can accommodate children other than infants
over the age of one. Their mandatory installation in all new vehicles
would eliminate widespread restraint mis-installation problems for
forward-facing seats, ensuring that children over the age of one are
properly restrained in motor vehicle crashes.
Furthermore, integrated child restraints would ensure easy
notification if a safety defect is discovered. Currently, child seat
purchasers must register themselves for notice in case of a recall, in
contrast to the automatic registration that takes place when a vehicle
is purchased. Built-in restraints eliminate the need for self-
registration, which can reduce parents' likelihood of receiving timely
recall notification.
Finally, integrated restraints would instantly make it possible
that child safety seats could be included in all the safety standards
for which the vehicle is tested.
The Need for Consumer Information
In the absence of any requirement for integrated child restraints,
NHTSA should at a minimum provide consumers more information about the
child restraints on the market. The New Car Assessment Program (NCAP),
which NHTSA launched under my watch in 1978, provides consumers
information about vehicle performance under conditions which are more
stringent than those used for safety standards. NCAP has been quite
successful in creating market incentives for manufacturers to improve
safety. Additionally, NCAP's most important success has been in
educating consumers about the safety of available vehicles, empowering
consumers to make educated choices about the vehicles they choose to
purchase for themselves and their families.
Despite NCAP's importance to consumers and the program's success at
motivating manufacturers to strive for higher safety ratings, NHTSA has
failed to include child restraint systems in its NCAP testing. The only
evaluation rating NHTSA conducts on child restraint systems for
consumers is an ease-of-use rating. Although important for consumers,
the ease-of-use rating should not be NHTSA's top rating priority for
child restraints when the safety of these restraint systems is left
unevaluated. NHTSA's failure to test child restraints through the NCAP
program leaves parents and caregivers at a great loss and children at
great risk. Parents and caregivers are denied information necessary to
make safe and educated decisions about the restraint systems they
choose, and a valuable opportunity is squandered to encourage
manufacturers to build safer restraint systems. (Of course, with built-
in child restraints, the child systems would be tested every time the
vehicle itself is put through its paces.) NHTSA should inform consumers
about child restraint performance in frontal, side, rear, and rollover
crashes.
Europe and Japan administer programs similar to NCAP in order to
inform consumers about the safety of available vehicles. \20\ In both
of these programs, child restraints are tested, and consumers are
provided with a safety rating system that informs them of the different
products' safety performance levels. \21\ In Europe, child restraints
are tested and rated in both frontal and side-impact crashes, and in
Japan child restraints are tested and rated in frontal-impact tests.
\22\ Although it would be ideal for these programs to test and rate
child restraint performances in a greater variety of crash scenarios,
these programs are still admirably providing people with an important
and necessary service. If Europe and Japan can provide their citizens
with this valuable safety information, the United States can do so as
well.
3. Power Windows and Strangulation
Child safety is not a static issue: as motor vehicle technology
develops and evolves, potential safety hazards themselves evolve. Power
windows are a case in point: as this technology has added convenience,
it has also added risk. Power windows pose a serious threat to children
who, time and again, are killed or injured when they are trapped in a
power window as it rises.
Congress moved forward to force NHTSA to address one factor of this
risk. In the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Congress required all
power window switches in motor vehicles to have safer pull-up designs
rather than the dangerous rocker or toggle switch designs. The risk
from rocker and toggle switches was that children would unintentionally
engage the window by pushing on the switch and then kill or injure
themselves from the rising window.
These new switches, however, will not completely eliminate the risk
of a child being injured or killed by a power window. Even with safer
designs for window switches, children are still at risk if someone
begins to close a power window without realizing that the child's head
or other body part is in the way of the rising window. A child has been
killed by a power window every month for the last 3 months: one in
Canada this month, one in New Mexico last month, and one in Detroit in
December. The Detroit incident is particularly noteworthy because the
vehicle involved was a Pontiac Vibe, which has the safer power window
switches. (In fact, protecting children from being trapped in power
windows could also protect adults in some cases--such as, for example,
the Illinois paramedic who was injured when his arm was trapped in the
window of a vehicle attempting to drive around an ambulance.) \23\
One solution to prevent these tragic injuries and deaths is to
require automatic reversal technology in power windows when the window
meets an obstruction. Automatic reversal technology would ensure that
power windows would reverse direction whenever they detect a trapped
object. This simple, lifesaving technology is already widely available
throughout Europe, and it is even included as a feature in many of the
same vehicle models that do not include this feature in the United
States.
Currently pending in the Senate and the House of Representatives,
the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would address
this need with a requirement for a performance standard that could be
met by auto-reverse technologies.
4. Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock
Another danger children face in motor vehicles is the risk of
shifting a parked vehicle into gear and causing it to roll away and
crash. Since 1998, over 100 children have died in vehicle roll-away
incidents, though this statistic is likely an undercount. \24\
A proven way to prevent roll-away incidents is with Brake-
Transmission Shift Interlock (BTSI), a basic safety feature for
automatic transmission vehicles that requires the brake pedal to be
depressed before the driver can shift out of park. Since most children
cannot reach the brake pedal, BTSI prevents them from putting the
vehicle into gear, thus preventing the vehicle from rolling and
crashing. NHTSA has recommended since 1980 that manufacturers include
BTSI in all vehicles, yet to date only about 80 percent of new vehicles
include this necessary safety feature. \25\ Additionally, many of the
vehicles that do include BTSI do not include BTSI versions that work in
all ignition key positions.
Since the 1980s, auto manufacturers have opposed mandatory BTSI
standards and have attempted to avoid them by proffering voluntary
standards. Voluntary standards rarely work and are often just a
tactical delay employed by manufacturers to avoid regulations.
Automakers' repeated failure to include BTSI in all vehicles is another
example that voluntary standards are unreliable, subject to
manufacturer caprice, set without a public process, and not subject to
compliance requirements.
The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would
require that BTSI be included in the vehicle safety standards for all
light vehicles and in all ignition key positions.
B. Protecting Children Outside the Vehicle
Children also face serious vehicle-related hazards outside the
vehicle. We are familiar, of course, with back-over deaths, which occur
when a parent is backing out a driveway and cannot see a child who has
appeared in the path of the car. Children are also, like all of us,
exposed to potential danger as pedestrians. Further action is needed to
protect children from these risks.
1. Improving the Driver's Ability To See Children in the Path of the
Vehicle
Drivers must be able to view the environment in which they are
operating their vehicles. It is a simple premise, one that takes on a
tragic dimension when children are hurt or killed simply because the
driver could not see them.
Among the dangers vehicles pose to child pedestrians are back-over
incidents. Backovers occur when a motor vehicle backs up and hits or
rolls over a child. These terrible tragedies occur because drivers
can't see the children behind their vehicles. Many light trucks and
SUVs have blind zones behind the vehicles that can be startlingly
large: in fact, the latest Consumers Union analysis shows that the
worst offender is the 2006 Jeep Commander Limited, which has a blind
zone of 44 feet for a driver who is 5 feet 8 inches tall, or 69 feet
for a driver 5 feet one inch tall. \26\ Dozens of children could fit in
such a large blind zone and be hidden from the driver's view.
Because of NHTSA's historical failure to assess these risks, we
have relied on other sources to reveal the magnitude of the problem.
KIDS AND CARS has found evidence pointing to 100 children killed in
back-overs each year, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention report 7,500 children treated in hospital emergency rooms
between 2001 and 2003 for back-overs. \27\ NHTSA has subsequently
confirmed the gravity of this risk in a November 2006 report (which was
mandated by SAFETEA-LU) on technology designed to prevent back-over
incidents from occurring. NHTSA concluded that, every year, thousands
of children are injured and at least 183 people die in back-overs. The
study also found that camera-based detection systems were much more
effective than sensor-based systems at helping drivers detect child
pedestrians behind their vehicles. \28\
Children are also at risk precisely where everyone assumes they
must be most visible: in front of vehicles. Especially with the rise in
popularity of large SUVs, drivers cannot see the area immediately in
front of them, which puts small children in intersections and driveways
at increased risk.
Children are like the canary in the coal mine, their heightened
risk alerting us to a problem that affects all of us: the need for
standards to secure drivers' ability to see the environment in which
vehicles are operated. When I was the administrator of NHTSA, I
supervised the completion of a decade-long effort to develop a
conspicuity standard. I issued this standard in 1980, but it was
revoked before it could take effect. NHTSA has not relaunched the
rulemaking in the 20 years since.
The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would
require a performance standard for rearward visibility to help end the
tragedy of back-overs. In addition to a rearward visibility standard,
however, Congress should require NHTSA to issue a general conspicuity
standard. Clearly, the importance of driver visibility has been
recognized for sometime, and the issuance of a new standard is long
overdue.
2. Improving Protection for Child Pedestrians
In 2005, 339 child pedestrians were killed, and an estimated 16,000
child pedestrians were injured. \29\ In addition to visibility
standards, NHTSA also needs to address the design of motor vehicles,
which through proper engineering can minimize the injuries inflicted on
pedestrians hit by a moving motor vehicle.
In Japan and Europe, motor vehicles are routinely tested and rated
for their performance in crashes with pedestrians. Vehicles receive
stars based on their ability to inflict the least amount of possible
injury on a pedestrian. These ratings, which are a part of Europe and
Japan's New Car Assessment Programs (NCAP), help to encourage auto
manufacturers to invest in design and technology innovations for
pedestrian safety. Additionally, the European Union has also issued a
pedestrian safety directive, in which European, Japanese, and Korean
(but not, notably, U.S.) auto manufacturers have agreed to voluntarily
improve pedestrian protections in their vehicles.
Although a voluntary agreement is inadequate to address the
importance of pedestrian safety (and European safety groups,
accordingly, are advocating mandatory pedestrian safety standards), the
European Union is still taking greater steps to address the importance
of pedestrian safety than the United States. Pedestrian protection is
not rocket science: numerous technologies already exist which auto
manufacturers could incorporate into new vehicles, such as sensor
systems that detect pedestrians and automatically reduce vehicle speeds
and vehicle hoods that give way, thereby reducing impact forces, when
they collide with pedestrians. I challenge Congress to follow the lead
of the rest of the world by taking a far more aggressive stand against
the dangers vehicles pose to pedestrians. Congress should instruct
NHTSA to issue safety standards to protect all pedestrians, including
children.
C. Protecting Children on School Buses
We have NHTSA safety standards to thank for the nationwide
implementation of safety features that school buses have enjoyed for so
long it is difficult to remember a time without them. Among the
important safety features are the stop sign arm that extends out when
the bus is loading or unloading children and improvements to fuel
tanks. The statistics bear out these benefits: according to NHTSA,
between the years of 1990 to 2000, an estimated 26,000 school buses
crashed each year, with only 10 children dying and 9,500 children being
injured each year. \30\
The leading safety feature on school buses for several decades has
been compartmentalization: the design of the seats as compartments that
contain children in a crash. Historically, compartmentalization has
served as an effective safety measure in frontal school bus crashes;
however, in other crash modes, children have been left unprotected and
unrestrained. For compartmentalization, seats are positioned close
together so that in frontal crashes children impact into deformable
seatbacks that absorb the impact force. In other crash modes, such as
side-impacts and rollovers, compartmentalization is ineffective and
children can be thrown around the bus and hit their heads on unpadded
structures. In crashes of this nature, specially designed restraints
can be effectively used to protect children, but no Federal standard
exists to require restraints in school buses.
Currently, states have been left to themselves to develop laws for
school buses, with no guidance from the Federal Government. The only
Federal standards regulating school bus crashworthiness require
occupant protection only in frontal crashes, and even for frontal
crashes the standards do not require dynamic testing with child
dummies.
In the absence of Federal guidance, the states are embarking upon
their own policy plans, with the result that we are on the brink of
seeing a confusing mish-mash of different laws in all of the states,
rather than one uniform law that provides comprehensive safety for all
child passengers. At this point there are five states with school bus
seat belt laws, including Florida, where most safety advocates fear
that the law will cause more harm than good. Restraints cannot simply
be retrofitted into existing bus designs.
State policymakers have requested guidance from NHTSA on developing
these laws, but NHTSA has declined to offer any assistance, claiming
that 3 years (minimum) of research and development are necessary before
any recommendations can be made. The Federal Government's failure to
address this issue is unacceptable.
The only way to ensure that children are safe in school buses is to
pass comprehensive Federal standards that will protect children in all
crash modes and require appropriately designed restraint systems in all
school buses. With states left to themselves to develop these
regulations on a state by state basis, the country will be left with an
inconsistent hodgepodge of school bus restraint systems, which would
hinder and confuse school bus safety developments.
III. Congress Must Improve NHTSA's Capacity To Protect Children
I want to conclude by reiterating the very important role NHTSA has
played and should be playing in improving safety for children, and for
us all, in and around motor vehicles. I have advocated for motor
vehicle safety improvements for 40 years, from the very birth of NHTSA
to today. We cannot ever forget how far we have come from the time that
people were routinely impaled by steering columns and air bags were an
achievable but nonetheless neglected safety technology. After 40 years
of being caught in a tug of war between industry interests and its
statutory mission, NHTSA still has much to do to protect the public,
especially children. Unfortunately, this important agency has been
pulled away from its mission and stuck in a morass of analyses,
reviews, and indifference for far too long.
If Congress expects that this hearing, or the Cameron Gulbransen
Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007, will result in a renewed dedication
to child safety, then it will have to take additional steps to improve
NHTSA's capacity to meet these compelling needs. Throughout my
testimony, I have already identified many specific steps that are
needed to address particular issues for children. What I want to
address now is the bigger picture: what Congress can do to ensure that
any of the specific remedies discussed so far will actually result in
improved protections for children.
Most important, of course, is that NHTSA needs funds for testing
and analysis of child dummies and the development of performance tests
for needed safety standards. Moreover, as we have found repeatedly over
the years, NHTSA also needs specific mandates and clear deadlines in
order to make issuance of new or improved standards a real priority. I
would like to conclude by discussing a factor that Congress will need
to address but which often goes unmentioned: the need to shield the
agency from the political interventions of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the White House Office of Management
and Budget.
Although Congress delegates authority to act directly to the
Department of Transportation, which acts through NHTSA to meets its
safety obligations, the White House has for over 20 years asserted the
right to interfere with that delegation and impose its political
priorities in the rulemaking process. Through Exec. Order No. 12,866,
the successor to Exec. Order No. 12,291, the White House arrogates to
itself the power to weaken or eliminate proposed motor vehicle safety
standards, power it executes by requiring the agency to submit its
draft regulations to OIRA.
OIRA has long stood in the way of improved motor vehicle safety.
For example, OIRA ordered NHTSA to weaken its proposed rule for tire
pressure monitoring systems--the telltales that alert drivers whenever
their tires are dangerously underinflated. Although Congress required
NHTSA to mandate a TPMS that alerts drivers whenever a tire is under-
inflated, OIRA intervened to force the agency to produce a weak rule
that would fail to alert drivers whenever all four tires were
underinflated or if two tires diagonal from each other were under-
inflated. OIRA's interference has resulted in unnecessary harm to the
Nation's motoring public and litigation that is still being waged to
force the agency to do what Congress told it to do.
I fear that, even if the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety
Act of 2007 were passed, and even if Congress were to require NHTSA to
address the other issues I have identified, children will still be in
unnecessary danger because of the political machinations of OIRA. The
White House signaled its hostility to any further improvements in
safety standards by nominating Susan Dudley, an anti-regulatory
extremist from the industry-funded Mercatus Center, to head OIRA.
Dudley has been no friend to motor vehicle safety; in fact, she opposed
advanced air bag standards, based incredibly on the argument that if
consumers truly valued air bag protections they would have already
compelled recalcitrant auto makers to install them. \31\ Dudley's
history of regulatory comments and other public pronouncements has led
me and others in the public interest community to conclude that she
would, as OIRA administrator, demand the impossible of agencies,
standing in their way until they prove a case for regulating that
Dudley will ensure cannot be proven.
Although the Senate wisely declined to allow Dudley's nomination to
leave committee in the 109th Congress, the White House decided to
renominate her in the 110th--and to put her in office through the
backdoor, while her nomination is officially pending, as an appointed
``senior advisor.'' The Bush Administration then moved to give her even
more power by releasing, on January 18, Exec. Order No. 13,422 and the
Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices. These proclamations,
combined, give OIRA the power to review not just regulations but also
``guidance,'' an amorphous category of agency information that
apparently includes any ``pronouncement about the conditions under
which [an agency] believes a particular substance or product is
unsafe.'' \32\ The new order and bulletin give Dudley a powerful new ax
she can use to chop this Congress off at the knees. \33\ Whatever this
Congress decides to do for the important issues of the day--global
warming, fuel economy, and, yes, child safety--Dudley will be able to
undo.
Conclusion
Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today
to testify on these critical needs of children for improved motor
vehicle safety. I am eager to address your questions.
ENDNOTES
\1\ National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, 2005
Traffic Safety Facts: Children available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2005/2005TSF/810_623/810623.htm.
\2\ Id.
\3\ Id.
\4\ See KIDS AND CARS, National Data Base of Non-Traffic Incidents,
available at http://www.kidsandcars.org/ .
\5\ Public Citizen's comments on the latest rulemaking to keep the
data secret outline the legislative, rulemaking, and litigation history
of this disastrous plan. See http://www.citizen.org/documents/
EarlyWarningCBIComments.pdf.
\6\ Consider other deficiencies regarding back seats: we lack
reminder telltales alerting drivers when backseat passengers are
unbelted, and we have no reminder systems to alert parents that a child
has been left in the backseat of a parked vehicle, where the child
could overheat and die.
\7\ Meanwhile, although it is beyond the scope of child safety
issues, it is also worth noting that the 2004 proposal came out before
Congress required, in 2005's SAFETEA-LU, that NHTSA upgrade the side-
impact standard for occupants in all seating positions. The proposed
rule clearly does not meet that test.
\8\ Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, Researchers Release New
Findings on Protecting Children in Side Impact Crashes, Press Release,
Sept. 13, 2005.
\9\ From 1993 to 1998, 31.8 percent of children who died in motor
vehicle crashes died in rollovers. See F.P. Rivera, P. Cummings & C.
Mock, Injuries and Death to Children in Rollover Motor Vehicle Crashes
in the United States, 9 Injury Prevention 76 (2003).
\10\ Internal GM documents obtained by CBS News reveal that General
Motors (GM) knew of the dangers of weak seats in 1966. See CBS,
``Collapsing Car Seats,'' Nov. 19, 2002. Also, in a recent court case,
a former Chrysler manager responsible for minivan safety issues
testified that his investigation team determined that Chrysler seat
backs needed to be redesigned. Chrysler, however, did not redesign the
seats and disbanded the investigation team. Experts at the trial also
testified that minivan seats collapsed in nearly every rear-impact
crash test that Chrysler conducted. In the case, the jury ultimately
awarded $105.5 million to the parents of an infant who died when the
seat back collapsed and a family friend was thrown backward into the
child. See R. Robin McDonald, $105 Mil. Verdict Returned Over Minivan
Seats, the legal intelligencer, Dec. 2, 2004.
\11\ NHTSA has long acknowledged the need to improve Federal
seating system requirements. Over 30 years ago, NHTSA proposed a
rulemaking that would address seating system safety and consolidate
FMVSS No. 202 ``head restraints'' and No. 207 ``seating systems.'' Most
recently, in a 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), NHTSA stated
that in crash tests the agency conducted ``the values of head and neck
injury criteria . . . were much higher than acceptable thresholds.
Direct contact of the head of the dummy with the interior of the
vehicle compartment, which occurred when the front seat rotated
backward excessively due to the high impact, contributed to these high
values.'' 65 Fed. Reg. 67,702. Additionally, fuel integrity crash tests
revealed significant seat back failures that caused the front seat
occupants to become projectiles into the rear seat. However, to this
day, the agency has not updated Federal safety standards to adequately
protect occupants from seat back failure.
\12\ NHTSA spokesman Rae Tyson stated that ``the seatback
rulemaking was terminated for the simple reason that we believe it may
be wiser to approach the seat as part of an integrated unit rather than
treat it as a separate part.'' Jeff Plungis, $106 Million Judgment
Against Chrysler and New Safety Studies Intensify the Debate Over
Federal Standards, detroit news, Dec. 19. 2004. This is what NHTSA
proposed to do in 1974. It appears that the agency has dragged its feet
hardly an inch in three decades.
\13\ See Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, supra note 8.
\14\ See Rivera et al., supra note 9.
\15\ For more information about children in this vulnerable
category, see Public Citizen, The Forgotten Child: The Failure of Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers to Protect 4- to 8-Year-Olds in Crashes (April
2002).
\16\ National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, 2005
Traffic Safety Facts: Children available at .
\17\ Lawrence E. Decina, Kathy H. Lococo, and Charlene T. Doyle,
Child Restraint Use Survey: LATCH Use and Misuse, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, December 2006.
\18\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, LATCH Child
Safety Seat System Confusing Says NHTSA Study, News Release, December
12, 2006.
\19\ Nation's Top Highway Safety Official Calls on Manufacturers,
Retailers and Consumer Groups to Make Child Safety Seats Easier to
Install, NHSTA news release.
\20\ Vehicle Safety Opportunities Exist to Enhance NHTSA's New Car
Assessment Program, Government Accountability Office, April 2005.
\21\ Japan NCAP: http://www.nasva.go.jp/mamoru/english/2006/child/
howto.html; European NCAP: http://www.euroncap.com/content/
safety_ratings/ratings.php?id1=6.
\22\ Id.
\23\ See EMS Network, Woman Assaults Paramedic With Car--Illinois,
Dec. 5, 2006, available at .
\24\ Automakers Agree to Add Break-to-Shift Interlocks The Safety
Record September/October 2006, Volume 3 issue 5.
\25\ Id.
\26\ See Attachment 1.
\27\ See id.
\28\ NHTSA's report is not, despite this positive conclusion, the
last word on back-over issues. See Attachment 3 for safety groups'
response to NHTSA's inexplicable conclusions that back-over avoidance
technologies, such as cameras, are somehow other than cost-effective.
\29\ NHTSA Traffic Safety Fact Sheet 2005 Child Safety.
\30\ School Bus Restraint Study National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2000 PowerPoint presentation.
\31\ See Public Citizen & OMB Watch, The Cost Is Too High: How
Susan Dudley Threatens Public Protections (Sept. 2006), available at
.
\32\ OMB, Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices, available at
, at 10.
\33\ More information is included in Attachment 2.
Attachment 1--Consumers Union Release on Blind Zones
Consumer Reports Releases New Vehicle Blind Zone Data, Listing 2006
Jeep Commander Limited as Worst Overall
CR cautions: the area behind your vehicle can be a danger zone
for youngsters.
YONKERS, NY--Consumer Reports' latest examination of vehicle blind
zones--the area behind a car or truck that's hidden from the driver's
view--shows that the 2006 Jeep Commander Limited ranks as the worst
vehicle overall.
Consumer Reports measured the blind zone behind the Commander at 44
feet for a driver who is five feet, eight inches tall and a stunning 69
feet for a shorter driver (five feet, one inch tall) with all three
rows of seats raised. The Commander's blind zone is considerably larger
than that for other mid-sized and large sport-utility vehicles (SUVs).
Until now, the vehicle with the worst blind zone in Consumer
Reports' tests was the 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche 1500, a pickup truck,
which had a blind zone of 29 feet for a five-foot, eight-inch driver
and 51 feet for a five-foot, one-inch driver. But the redesigned, 2007
Chevrolet Avalanche LT has no blind zone when equipped with the
optional rearview camera. Without the camera, the vehicle had a 31-foot
blind zone for a five-foot, eight-inch driver and 50 feet for a short
driver. The Commander also offers an optional rearview camera, which
CR's test vehicle lacked. This camera can significantly reduce or
eliminate the blind zone.
To help consumers understand how large some blind zones are,
Consumer Reports has been measuring the blind zones on vehicles that it
tests and rates since 2003. CR's database now covers about 200 vehicles
from model years 2002 through 2007. To measure the blind zones, a 28-
inch traffic cone was positioned behind the vehicle at the point where
the driver could just see the top. This cone simulates the height of a
small child.
``Consumer Reports findings illustrate that the danger of vehicle
blind zones correlates with the use of large SUVs, minivans and pickups
trucks as common family vehicles. Consumers must be cognizant of this
danger--and the value of rearview cameras--when going out to purchase a
new vehicle,'' said Don Mays, Senior Director for Product Safety and
Consumer Science at Consumer Reports.
KIDS AND CARS, the safety group, estimates that more than 100
children were killed by vehicles whose drivers simply could not see
them in the blind zone behind the vehicle. According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, nearly 7,500 children were
treated in United States emergency rooms between 2001 and 2003 for
back-over injuries. Many of these incidents could have been prevented
if drivers had a way to see or detect what is behind them while backing
up. Every vehicle has blind zones. Side and rearview mirrors are
insufficient to combat them. Consumer Reports tests show that, in
general, the longer and higher the vehicle, the bigger the blind zone
is likely to be.
There are no Federal Government requirements for back-up warning
sensors or rearview cameras on any passenger vehicle sold in the United
States.
``Unfortunately, the few vehicles that now come with this
technology are higher-end models, and most devices are available as an
extra-cost option--often requiring the purchase of other equipment like
an expensive navigation system,'' said Sally Greenberg, Senior Product
Safety Counsel for Consumers Union in Washington, D.C. ``We believe
that back-up technologies, such as rearview cameras are essential, and
should be a requirement by Federal law. Their cost is small compared to
the cost of a child's life. And once this technology becomes standard
equipment in vehicles, systems will become more economical for
manufacturers to produce.''
``Without these devices, parents and families will continue to
suffer the terrible tragedy of accidentally backing over a child,''
Greenberg said. ``That is why it is critical that Congress pass the
Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005--to require a
rearward visibility standard that will provide drivers with a means of
detecting a child behind the vehicle.''
Consumers who wish to improve the safety of their current vehicle
can add an aftermarket rearview camera. Consumer Reports tests have
shown that most work well. Such cameras typically cost several hundred
dollars and are best installed by a professional.
To learn more about the vehicle blind zones, and see measurements
for models tested by Consumer Reports, visit www.ConsumerReports.org.
Consumer Reports is one of the most trusted sources for information
and advice on consumer products and services. It conducts the most
comprehensive auto-test program of any U.S. publication or website; the
magazine's auto experts have decades of experience in driving, testing,
and reporting on cars. To subscribe to Consumer Reports, call 1-800-
234-1645. Information and articles from the magazine can be accessed
online at www.ConsumerReports.org.
Consumer Reports Tested Best & Worst Rear Blind Zones
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driver
Vehicle Class Height Best Worst Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Sedans 5 8" 2006 Subaru 2003 Suzuki Aerio 12
Impreza 2.5i (6) GS (23)
5 1" 2006 Subaru 2003 Suzuki Aerio 24
Impreza 2.5i (11) GS (49)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mid-sized 5 8" 2006 Hyundai 2005 Cadillac STS 13
Sedans Sonata GLS (9 ) ( 21)
2004 Ford Taurus
SES (21)
2005 Mitsubishi
Galant GTS (21)
5 1" 2004 Acura TSX 2006 Mercury Milan 22
(12) (35)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Sedans 5 8" 2003 Lexus LS430 2004 Audi A8L (20) 12
(9)
5 1" 2003 Lexus LS430 2006 Cadillac DTS 22
(16) (30)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wagons & 5 8" 2004 Chevrolet 2005 Chevrolet 10
Hatchbacks Aveo LS (5) Malibu LS Maxx
(17)
5 1" 2004 Chevrolet 2005 Chevrolet 16
Aveo LS (10) Malibu LS Maxx
(23)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small SUVs-- 5 8" 2006 Subaru 2003 Honda Element 13
Four Door Forester 2.5X (9) EX (18)
2006 Toyota RAV4
Base (18)
5 1" 2006 Subaru 2003 Honda Element 21
Forester 2.5X EX (35)
(12)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Midsized SUVs 5 8" 2004 Volkswagen 2006 Jeep 18
Touareg (11) Commander Ltd.
(44)
5 1" 2005 Nissan 2006 Jeep 29
Pathfinder LE Commander Ltd.
(18) (69)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large SUVs 5 8" 2002 Toyota 2004 Dodge Durango 17
Sequoia Ltd. (14) Ltd. (19)
5 1" 2004 Dodge Durango 2007 Chevrolet 27
Ltd. (24) Tahoe (38)
2004 Nissan Armada
LE (24)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minivans 5 8" 2005 Dodge Grand 2005 Saturn Relay 15
Caravan SXT (12) FWD (19)
5 1" 2004 Ford Freestar 2005 Toyota Sienna 26
SEL (16) XLE (28)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pickups 5 8" 2005 Nissan 2004 Ford F-150 23
Frontier LE (16) XLT (34)
5 1" 2005 Dodge Dakota 2007 Chevrolet 35
SLT (24) Avalanche (50)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coupes 5 8" 2003 Hyundai 2005 Chevrolet 15
Tiburon GT (10) Cobalt SS (23)
5 1" 2004 Mazda RX-8 2005 Chevrolet 23
(19) Cobalt SS (32)
2006 Honda Civic
Si (19)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this chart Consumer Reports identifies the length, in feet, of the
blind zone for each listed vehicle. The distance noted is how far
behind the vehicle a 28-inch traffic cone had to be before the person,
sitting in the driver's seat, could see the cone's top by looking
through the rear window. Distances are provided for vehicles that are
currently sold with no major changes from the vehicle CR tested. This
chart does not include tests performed on vehicles using rear view
camera systems, either standard or optional.
Attachment 2--Information on New Executive Order and Guidance
Bulletin--Latest White House Power Grab Puts Public at Risk--Problems
of the Jan. 2007 Executive Order and Bulletin on Guidance (January
2007)
The White House released a double whammy attack on the public
interest on Jan. 18, 2007: (1) a new executive order increasing burdens
on the regulatory process, and (2) a final bulletin creating new
burdens on agencies ability to inform the public. Together, this double
whammy is an enormous challenge to the ability of the Federal
Government to protect and inform the public.
Market Failure . . . and New Excuses for Failing the Public
The White House already demanded, under Exec. Order No. 12,866
(1993), that agencies state the reason for a new regulation in an
economic impact assessment. The new Bush executive order now changes
the language, putting the spotlight on ``market failure'' as the chief
rationale--and adding that the purpose of the justification is ``to
enable assessment of whether any new regulation is warranted.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exec. Order No. 12,866 Revised Text
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each agency shall identify
Each agency shall identify in
the problem that it intends to the specific market failure (such
address (including, where as externalities, market power,
applicable, the failures of lack of information) or other
private markets or public specific problem that it intends
institutions that warrant new to address (including, where
agency action) applicable, the failures of public
institutions) that warrant new
agency action,
as well as assess the significance as well as assess the significance
of that problem. of that problem,
to enable assessment of whether any
new regulation is warranted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market failure is an economics term describing situations in which
private markets, left to themselves, fail to bring about results that
the public needs. This order, however, will be enforced by Susan
Dudley, the radical extremist that the White House is setting up for a
recess appointment to become the administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the White House Office of
Management and Budget. Based on an evaluation of Dudley's record in a
report released last year, Public Citizen has concluded that, in her
hands, the market failure provision will become a barrier to the
protections that the public needs.
Deputy Dudleys in Every Agency
Although Congress delegates power directly to the agencies
themselves, thereby diffusing authority throughout the Executive Branch
and preventing any single office from becoming all-powerful, the White
House has claimed yet more power to control agencies and distort
regulatory policy with political goals. The new executive order
commands every agency to designate a Presidential appointee to serve as
the ``Regulatory Policy Officer.'' Agencies will not be allowed to add
new regulatory initiatives to their annual plans without the approval
of the new officer.
Putting Industry Costs Above the Public Interest
The new order requires agencies to develop annual plans for
upcoming rulemakings that identify ``the combined aggregate costs and
benefits of all regulations planned for that calendar year to assist
with the identification of priorities.'' This new requirement will make
cost/benefit analysis the central factor in setting priorities for
needed protections of the public interest. These cost/benefit analyses
are notoriously biased against regulation, especially long-term goals
such as preventing global warming or cancers that manifest years after
exposure to toxic substances.
From Guidance to Darkness
The executive order and the new bulletin on guidance work together
to create a new bureaucratic bottleneck that would slow down agencies'
ability to give the public information it needs.
Guidance
agency policy other than a rulemaking which sets forth:
a policy on a statutory issue
a policy on a regulatory issue
a policy on a technical issue
an interpretation of a statutory issue
an interpretation of a regulatory issue
Significant Guidance
guidance which:
leads to an annual effect of $100 million or more or
materially and adversely affects the economy
creates inconsistencies with another agency's activities
materially alters budgetary impact of grants,
entitlements, etc.
raises novel legal or policy issues
implicates the President's priorities
The bulletin requires significant guidance to be approved by a
senior-level agency official, and the executive order adds another
layer of review by the White House itself. By requiring White House
approval of important guidance, the White House will insert its
political agenda and pro-business bias into every level of agency
policy, so that our Federal Government will handcuff itself instead of
the companies that violate the law and put the public in danger.
The bulletin also requires the agencies to create a webpage listing
all significant guidance and creating a public challenge process, for
industry to demand changes to the policy statements, interpretations,
and so on that it opposes.
So Much for the New Congress
The upshot of this whole executive order is that the White House is
already working to undermine not just agencies but also the new
Congress' ability to protect the public. Whatever gains might come to
consumers and other public interest sectors in the 110th Congress are
already vulnerable to being rendered meaningless by the powers the
White House is giving itself.
Attachment 3--Safety Groups' Response to NHTSA Backover Report--Review
and Response of Safety Groups to NHTSA'S Vehicle Backover Avoidance
Technology Study, Report to Congress--Agency's Conclusions Contradict
Study Facts
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Study,
Vehicle Backover Avoidance Technology Study, Report to Congress (Nov.
2006), reaches a number of negative conclusions about the state of
back-over detection technology, even though the Study itself contains
many positive factual findings--findings that support both the need to
adopt this technology and the readiness of the technology for use in
motor vehicles. This review and response evaluates the major
conclusions reached by NHTSA and shows why those conclusions are not
backed up by the facts in the Study.
Scope of the Safety Problem
The Study admits that estimates of almost 200 people killed and
thousands injured each year in back-over crashes is too low, NHTSA does
not yet collect data on this issue.
The Study uses available sources of data to estimate that each year
at least 183 people are killed and between 6,700 and 7,400 are injured,
at least 1,000 seriously enough to need hospitalization, in back-over
crashes. The Study estimate is based on samples taken in a single year
and on older data (1998) that does not capture the full effect of the
sales of larger vehicles over the past decade. The Study acknowledges
that in light of current data limitations the reported deaths and
injuries are only a rough estimate. Yet, NHTSA dismisses the data
collected by KIDS AND CARS which has documented news reports of back-
over incidents indicating that the annual death toll of children
continues to rise.
Due to limitations of available data on back-over crashes, NHTSA
asserts that it ``is unable to conclude . . . that there is an
increasing trend in back-over crashes.'' This does not mean, however,
that back-over crashes are not on the rise. NHTSA does not have annual
data on back-over and other non-traffic deaths and injuries, and only
began to consider how to collect such data in response to a mandate
from Congress in SAFETEA-LU (2005). The Study admits that ``there are
no accurate trend data specifically for the non-traffic incidents'' in
Federal databases, and also acknowledges that ``the extent and nature
of back-over crashes are difficult to determine because many crashes
are not reported in currently available crash databases.'' Without
comparative data, collected over a number of years, no conclusive
determination can be made about whether there is an increasing trend in
back-over crashes.
The Study confirms that young children are at greatest risk. Yet,
NHTSA has not developed plans to use technology currently available in
many high-end vehicle makes and models to protect these children.
The Study confirms the KIDS AND CARS data showing that children
under 5 years old, especially toddlers up to age 2, are the highest
risk group. Despite information dating back to 1971 that children are
at risk in back-over crashes, NHTSA relies on general education
messages that are not part of an overall strategy to prevent back-over
crashes. Moreover, NHTSA has not included this issue as part of its
crash avoidance program or its advanced vehicle safety technology
(AVST) initiative.
The Study also confirms that many, if not most, back-over crashes
involve parents or neighbors, people who are highly motivated to avoid
injuring their children. Yet, NHTSA mistakenly concludes that
technology is not currently an appropriate remedy.
The Study points out that people in their 20s and 30s have a
greater exposure as drivers in back-over crashes because they are
parents of young children and are involved in more backing situations
when young children are present. The Study also cites data from Utah
indicating that 48 percent of back-over incidents involve a family
member and another 24 percent involve a neighbor. These drivers can be
expected to be highly motivated to avoid such incidents, probably have
greater awareness of nearby children and many may already heed some or
all of the existing educational messages intended for their benefit.
Such drivers are also highly motivated to use back-over prevention
technology properly.
Feasibility of Backover Prevention Technology
The Study finds existing back-over prevention technology can detect
children and other objects in the rear blind zone. Yet, as child deaths
continue to mount NHTSA dithers and concludes much more research is
needed.
The Study found that camera systems provide drivers with a clear
image of most of the rear blind zone behind their vehicle and that
these systems ``have the potential of providing a good field of view of
the objects including pedestrians behind the vehicles.'' Also ``[t]he
rearview camera systems examined had the ability to display pedestrians
or obstacles behind the vehicle clearly in daylight and indoor lighted
conditions.'' The Study found these facts even though it reviewed only
a limited number of so-called ``parking aids'' and did not evaluate
technology specifically designed for use as a back-over prevention
system.
Even though the Study finds that rearview camera systems allow
drivers to see pedestrians in ``the majority of the rear blind zone
areas[,]'' NHTSA concludes that more research is necessary because
current sensor and video/camera systems do not always provide a view of
obstacles in the entire rear blind zone. However, drivers without any
back-over avoidance technology have absolutely no warning that
pedestrians are in the rear blind zone. Backover prevention technology
would at least provide drivers with an opportunity to avoid backing
collisions.
NHTSA is actively engaged in developing and promoting other,
similar radar- and sensor-based crash avoidance technologies, such as
advanced cruise control which is already in the market, lane departure
warning systems which are now being field tested and used in some
commercial vehicles, as well as intersection collision warning systems.
Despite this active effort to use the same type of technology to
provide driver warnings in other crash modes, NHTSA is highly negative
about the use of back-over prevention systems despite the fact that a
version of that technology is already standard equipment in many
vehicle lines and is already being used by drivers for that purpose.
Detection Technology Testing
The Study finds that existing rear visibility technology provides
drivers with a view of rear blind zones that prevents back-over crashes
even when children move into the vehicle path. Yet, NHTSA surprisingly
concludes that these technologies are not effective.
The Study cites research to show that some rear object detection
systems were successful in detecting and preventing impact with rear
objects most of the time. Sixty five percent of drivers avoided
unexpected obstacles that appeared suddenly during backing when relying
on a combination of existing technologies. Another study showed ``Rear
video cameras [are] effective in 23 percent of rear backing maneuvers
when [an] ``unexpected'' obstacle is placed 2-3 feet behind the
vehicle.'' Thus, nearly one-fourth and possibly as many as two-thirds
of incidents, including those in which a child runs immediately behind
the vehicle while it is backing, may be prevented by existing back-over
prevention technology. This would represent a vast safety improvement
and could save as many as 46 (23 percent) or 123 (65 percent) lives
annually based on NHTSA's rough estimate of 183 deaths each year (an
estimate that may understate the problem).
The Study documents that in 2006 there were already 36 vehicle
makes and 100 model lines offering some form of back-over ``parking
aid'' technology as standard equipment. The use and installation of
such technology is clearly feasible as back-over detection technology.
Many drivers are already using ``parking aids'' for this purpose. The
widespread proliferation and use of these systems to improve rearview
visibility appears to have a high level of driver acceptance. The Study
cites survey results of drivers who own ``parking aid'' equipped
vehicles. The majority of drivers found the systems to be helpful in
parking, at least 85 percent felt the systems are effective or very
effective in giving warnings, and 80 percent thought that the system
would lower their risk of being in a backing crash. Overall, it appears
these drivers know how to properly use the technology.
The Study also mentions that the effectiveness of back-over
prevention systems, especially cameras, could be diminished as a result
of practical problems caused by weather conditions such as snow, rain,
fog and glare from the sun. However, this is largely a red herring.
Based on a review of cases in NHTSA's databases the Study finds that
``[t]he weather did not appear to be a major factor in these back-
overs, as the weather was classified as `normal' in the majority of
crashes. . . .''
The Study also combines two research and testing issues. The first
is whether the technology itself can perform the function required,
that is, provide the driver with visual notice of obstacles in the rear
blind zone. Statements in the Study support a conclusion that current
camera-based or combination video-sensor systems do provide drivers
with a view of obstacles in the rear blind zone. As the Study admits,
the existing technology is capable of detecting objects in the blind
zone behind the vehicle and warning the driver.
The second issue is whether the technology will be properly used by
drivers, i.e., the human factors issue common to all technological
applications. While both issues are related to the overall
effectiveness of the system, the human factors issue goes beyond the
evaluation of whether the technology itself can perform the task
required. Human factors evaluation is highly dependent on the
complexity of the system, clear user instructions, the amount of time
permitted to become familiar with the system, and repeated use. In this
respect, use of a back-over avoidance system is analogous to use of the
required vehicle rearview mirror system, including the need to properly
arrange and pay frequent attention to the inside as well as both the
driver and passenger outside rearview mirrors. The same type of
attention and appropriate response is required for back-over prevention
technology.
Rearward Visibility Standard:
The Study documents the need for a rearview visibility performance
standard. Yet, NHTSA defers and delays while children are at risk.
Large rear blind zones exist that threaten everyone--children,
seniors, the disabled, and all pedestrians--despite a Federal safety
standard for rearview mirrors, intended to reduce the number of deaths
and injuries that occur when the driver does not have a clear view to
the rear of the vehicle. The Study acknowledges that ``[a]lmost all
vehicles have rear blind zones that could obscure the driver's
visibility of small children.'' This confirms research conducted by
Consumers Union showing the size of the average blind zone behind
different types of vehicles. The Study also documents that current
back-over technologies are, to varying degrees, effective in providing
drivers with a view of the rear blind zone. Still, NHTSA presents no
plans to conduct rulemaking on a rearward visibility performance
standard to limit the size of the vehicle blind zone and enhance the
ability of drivers to see behind their vehicle. Furthermore, there is
no stated timeline for agency action to develop specifications for the
performance of the technology to prevent back-over crashes and no
intention to make the specifications mandatory.
Backover Crash Education:
The Study finds that current back-over awareness and educational
efforts are not scientifically sound countermeasures that have proven
effective. NHTSA concludes that such educational efforts have value but
available technology does not.
The Study finds that current back-over prevention programs ``have
been designed based on specific back-over incidents rather than on a
data-driven, research-based back-over strategy.'' Despite the
disconnect in logic, NHTSA promotes these types of education and
awareness efforts even though the agency states that none of the
programs have an evaluation component to establish their effectiveness
as a countermeasure. NHTSA concludes that such efforts may make drivers
sensitive to the problem and provide common sense safety tips. At the
same time, NHTSA disapproves of requiring the use of available
technology that has shown positive results in tests and already is in
wide use, as part of a comprehensive approach to back-over prevention.
The educational programs reviewed in the Study, as well as in
NHTSA's ``Safety Tips for Parents'' found on their website in
Preventing Backovers in America's Driveways, call for checking the area
around the vehicle before backing the vehicle. The Study, however,
relies on research testing of rearview back-over prevention technology
that uses ``surprise'' or ``unexpected'' obstacles that are introduced
after backing has begun or near the end of a backing maneuver. Merely
education and awareness programs that rely on checking around the
vehicle before backing begins cannot address such dynamic situations.
Backover prevention technology systems that detect people and objects
in the vehicle blind zone are needed to allow drivers to continuously
check behind their vehicle during backing.
The educational messages also caution parents to ``know where your
children are and have them stay in your full view and well away from
your vehicle'' and to listen for children who may have dashed behind
your vehicle suddenly'' while you are backing up (``Safety Tips for
Parents'').
First, parents are highly motivated to protect their children and
may be already aware of these educational safety tips. Second, some of
these safety tips may actually divert the driver's attention from the
driving task during backing by constantly trying to keep children in
full view with conventional mirrors or turning your head. Third,
reliance on your sense of hearing (auditory cues) to detect children
who have moved into the vehicle path during backing is not only
unreliable but can be masked by other interfering sounds. This safety
tip ignores the fact that children often assume that they can be seen
and may make no sound to attract attention. Although these safety tips
may be good advice for drivers with no other means of detecting
children and objects in the vehicle blind zone when backing, they are
an inadequate substitute when far more direct and effective detection
and warning technology systems are available.
Education and awareness are not an adequate substitute for
lifesaving technology to prevent back-over deaths and injuries.
Legislation is necessary to direct NHTSA to advance a comprehensive
strategy that couples reasonable information with back-over detection
technology to assist drivers.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:
The Study states that, at present, meaningful estimates of safety
benefits and cost-effectiveness cannot be calculated. In contradiction
NHTSA offers up an unsupported conclusion that back-over systems will
have low effectiveness and do not appear to be particularly cost-
effective.
The Study clearly asserts that data on which to base accurate
benefit/cost assessments of back-over detection technology is not
available. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, the
Study attempts to analyze the cost-effectiveness of existing ``parking
aids'' as a surrogate for back-over prevention systems. The analysis,
however, is based on a series of assumptions that are not supported by
data or evidence, including assumptions about incremental system cost,
the cost of system repairs due to damage, crash speed distribution and
human reaction using the system. No data was collected or presented to
support any of these assumptions.
The Study also failed to include any estimate of savings from
reduced damages and costs avoided as a result of rear-end collisions
prevented by the ``parking aids.'' The failure to include any such
savings was based on the unsupported reasoning that ``parking aids only
mitigate the cost of the smaller number of minor backing crashes which
tend to have smaller total costs.'' However, no data was collected from
drivers using ``parking aids'' to determine the accuracy of this
conclusion.
Finally, this analysis also assumes that there are no safety
benefits, that is, potential deaths and injuries that would be
prevented, because the agency believes that ``parking aids'' are not
intended to function as back-over prevention systems and, therefore,
would not provide such benefits. In actuality, reports indicate that
drivers with ``parking aid'' systems are in fact using the systems for
back-over prevention purposes as well as to avoid damages from low-
speed backing crashes. Thus, NHTSA uses its analysis of ``parking
aids'' to eliminate the inclusion of safety benefits and to conclude
that none of the currently installed rear object detection systems are
cost-effective.
As a result, the Study casts a pall over the cost-effectiveness of
back-over detection systems even though it readily admits that without
studying a true back-over crash detection technology system
``meaningful estimates of death and injury benefits and cost
effectiveness cannot be calculated.''
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
David McCurdy?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVE McCURDY, PRESIDENT/CEO, ALLIANCE OF
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; ACCOMPANIED BY
ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND
HARMONIZATION
Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Sununu, and other Senators--Senator Carper--thanks for the
comments, earlier.
I am President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers. The Alliance represents the BMW group,
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors,
Mitsubishi, Porsche, Toyota, and Volkswagen, close to 85
percent of the manufacturers. Now, I will tell you, unlike some
of my colleagues here, I've only been in this job 3 weeks. So--
--
[Laughter.]
Mr. McCurdy. But I come to--so, this is somewhat of a
baptism--but I come to the industry from the tech community,
having been the CEO of the Electronic Industries Alliance and
then previously served with my colleagues. But I first want to
commend, actually, the advocates and the parents who are
pushing this. And we all, I think, have heartfelt sympathy and
concern, and can't imagine the horrific images and memories
that they have to deal with on a daily basis. My wife, by the
way, is a child psychiatrist, and I would tell you, children
are a top priority for us, as well.
Mr. Chairman, in your office you have a little plaque that
says, ``Arkansas comes first.'' Well, Mr. Chairman, for
automakers, ``Safety comes first.'' And it's seen as a public
health challenge. Our industry invests more in research and
development than any other industry, including pharmaceuticals
and computers. And I encourage the Chairman and the Ranking
Member, plus staff--and, as a matter of fact, I extended an
invitation to Representative Campbell this morning, to visit
one of the test and safety facilities. I did it yesterday, flew
to Detroit to a 4,000-acre facility with 5,000 employees there
dedicated to testing and safety. I saw crash tests. They didn't
set them up for me. They have two a day. There's a regular
ongoing process. Got to test drive for--to see electronic
stability control, antilock brake systems. I saw demo on backup
technology. I looked at this almost--incredible army of test
dummies that they now have, each of them costing well over 100-
and-some-odd-thousand dollars per piece, saw the deployment of
side airbags, some of these new technologies. And so, I would
encourage you to actually visit. We could arrange that.
Despite some of the common perception and--I think the
recent record proves that safety developments often happen
faster through market-based initiatives rather than just
legislative mandates. Our companies' intense competitiveness
has already accelerated safety feature introductions to speeds
faster than would be developed through regulation. And I want
to point to one thing that Senator Sununu, as an engineer,
knows: data, data, data. And I think it's really critical. And
actually, the parts of the bill, the Gulbransen bill, we
support wholeheartedly, and that is collection of much of this
information and data, because I don't think you can get enough.
Recent technologies, like side airbags and stability
control, have been introduced ahead of Federal legislation or a
legislative mandate. As I stated, safety is our highest
priority. Ours is a high-tech industry, using cutting-edge
safety technology to put people first. In 2005, automakers
invested $40 billion in research and development, roughly
$2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the United States
that year. The challenge is that the development costs may
total up to a billion dollars for a new product--I'm not
talking about some of these--but it may take 3 to 5 years to
bring a product to market. Automakers lead legislative and
regulatory initiatives with the invention, development, and
implementation of advanced technologies focused upon safety
improvements, including dual-stage frontal airbags. History of
airbags--let me tell you, I saw the introduction, and see the
difference between a dual-stage; de-powering of airbags, which
were serious reasons for injuries in the past; side-impact
airbags; safety-belt pre-tensioners--didn't know exactly what
that was--saw it in action yesterday in a crash test; load-
limiting retractors; side-curtain airbags; advanced lighting;
adaptive speed control; lane-departure warnings; brake-assist
systems; and much more. And those were not--and most of these
are voluntary, implemented by the manufacturers. These items
were not mandated. Antilock brakes, stability control, side
airbags for head and chest protection, side curtains, pre-crash
occupant positioning, which is a very important thing--pre-
crash occupant positioning, especially with children--lane-
departure warnings, radar use for collision avoidance.
Seatbelts and restraint systems, by the way, as you see the
statistics, 43,434 people killed in the United States,
fatalities in automobiles, a huge portion of those, because the
occupant was unrestrained, didn't use seatbelts.
We've supported the 10-year Air Bag and Seatbelt Safety
Campaign. We've seen progress in the States. We believe there
should be more. The Alliance is also actively participating in
blue-ribbon panels, and working in conjunction with NHTSA. The
LATCH provision that Mr. Medford mentioned, helped standardize
the way children restraints attach to vehicles, is an important
step from that. I actually saw demonstrations on that, as a
matter of fact, yesterday.
Last summer, alliance members joined others in developing
and implementing brake-transmission shift interlock systems, in
response to some of the concerns of this Committee, that work
in all key positions. There is real progress there, and we will
continue to make progress.
In the end, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that market-
driven innovation, combined with comprehensive and current
data, are necessary to make insightful and sound public-policy
decisions. And with regard to the bill, the thing, I think,
that's important--and the Senator mentioned it in his opening
statement--that they're not trying to prejudge the rulemaking
by picking the technology. That was a very important statement,
and one that opens up, I think an, opportunity for
manufacturers to work with this Committee and the authors of
this bill to--and NHTSA--to make sure that we achieve an
objective that I think we share.
Mr. Chairman, I could go into detail, but, perhaps in
questions, with regard to S. 1948 that was introduced
yesterday, I think the Committee would be interested to know
the manufacturers' position with regard to that bill, and I'll
be glad to go into it in detail, but my time has run out, so I
will stop at that point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dave McCurdy, President/CEO, The Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers; accompanied by Robert Strassburger, Vice
President, Safety and Harmonization
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Dave McCurdy and I am President
and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. Within Alliance
membership, safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech
industry that uses cutting-edge safety technology to put people first.
In fact, automakers invest more in research and development than any
other industry, including pharmaceuticals and computers, according to
the National Science Foundation. In 2005 alone, automakers invested $40
billion, roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the U.S.
that year. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) is a
trade association of nine car and light truck manufacturers including
BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda,
Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen.
Industry, Consumers and Motor Vehicle Safety
Automakers lead legislative and regulatory initiatives with the
invention, development and implementation of advanced technologies
focused upon safety improvements. Consider for example the installation
of: dual stage frontal air bags, side-impact air bags, safety belt
pretensioners, load limiting retractors, side curtain air bags (for
side-impact and some with roll over capacity), advanced lighting,
adaptive speed control, lane departure warnings, brake assist systems,
adjustable torso belts for small passengers, child security door locks,
automatic door locks, electronic stability control systems, battery
isolation in severe collisions, automatic post collision notification
to emergency responders, engineered structures for car to truck
collisions and other crash modes. All of these technologies are
voluntarily installed by manufacturers on their own initiative.
The automobile industry engineers, manufacturers, and markets the
most complex consumer product that is offered for sale in the global
economy. It is a product of great utility, essential to the day-to-day
flow of people, goods and services in developed and developing
economies and a key contributor to economic growth. Motor vehicle
manufacturers' institutional successes are contingent upon the desire
of individual consumers to purchase the products our manufacturers
offer for sale. In making their independent purchase decisions,
consumers balance many considerations, style, color, fuel economy,
performance, reputation, safety, technology content, interior noise
levels, accommodation for passengers, cargo, pets and all those things
we transport frequently or rarely.
The industry is brutally competitive with little margin for error.
A new product program may consume as much as $1B in development, take 3
to 5 years to bring a product to market and in a strong economy, may
sometimes actually have a chance to earn a positive return on
investment. Globally and here in the U.S., manufacturing capacity
significantly exceeds market demand. This condition makes for great
consumer choice, value and competative/lower product prices. We have
seen the effects of global and local excess capacity in our market here
in the U.S. reflected by real lower prices for vehicles that are
increasing equipped with more performance and technology content. Much
of that additional performance and technology content is safety
related. Consumers expect more safety performance and technology
content and manufacturers respond to those customer needs and demands.
Before addressing specific performance conditions and technology
installations, it is important to understand the industry's approach to
motor vehicle safety. There are several principles to which the
industry adheres and it's important to explain these precepts.
First, we consider motor vehicle safety to be a public health
challenge. Collisions result in a human toll and in direct economic
loss. This is why we work to improve safety. In every respect, it is in
the interest of the industry and society to reduce these losses.
Second, as with any public health challenge, it is essential to
base policy and improvement initiatives on good scientific
understandings of the priorities, cause and pathology of specific
concerns. It is also important to use good science in identifying and
prioritizing specific opportunities for improvement. To do so, good
solid data about the human victim and injury morphology, the
environment in which collision events occur (roadways), and the vehicle
are necessary. Therefore, we support the collection and analysis of
collision data and the prioritization of collision problems by measures
of harm (numbers of fatalities, serious injuries, total economic cost,
lost days of productivity, etc.). Ideally, with a good understanding of
collision related injury patterns, problem areas can be identified,
prioritized and addressed in sequential order to ensure the maximum
safety return and to facilitate continued improvement.
Third, there are many public institutions with an interest in
improving motor vehicle safety; think of this effort as injury control.
Auto makers have an interest in injury control as do many public
institutions and classes of individuals: drivers, other roadway users,
law enforcement agencies, municipal and state governments responsible
for roadway safety, medical practitioners, first responders,
legislative bodies, government regulators, and various nongovernmental
organizations. All of these institutions and groups are partners in
injury control and our common interests are to improve motor vehicle
safety.
Fourth, safety resources should be expended so as to maximize the
safety return and injury reduction consequent to the expenditures.
Alliance Members Are Aggressively Pursuing Safety Advancements,
Collectively and Individually
Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health
challenge--one that automakers are addressing daily, both individually
and collectively. Alliance members make huge investments in safer
vehicle design and technology. Most of the new, significant safety
features currently available on motor vehicles--antilock brakes,
stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side
curtains, pre-crash occupant positioning, lane departure warnings,
radar use for collision avoidance--in the U.S. were implemented
voluntarily by manufacturers, not as a result of any regulatory
mandate. While the industry is engaged in high-tech research and
implementation of new safety technologies, it continues to add safety
features voluntarily, even such mundane features as right-hand side
mirrors for passenger cars, obstacle detection devices for sliding
doors and automatic liftgates, automatic lights on with wiper use, etc.
Those who claim that vehicle safety will not be advanced in the absence
of regulatory requirements are living in the past and are not paying
attention to today's marketplace.
The Alliance also has engaged in collective activities, not only of
its member companies, but also with other vehicle manufacturers and
interested safety partners. A number of these initiatives are intended
to enhance child safety directly or indirectly. However, it is
important to state here: Auto manufacturers, as well as all other
safety advocates, implore parents and caregivers to NEVER leave
children unattended either in or around automobiles and NEVER leave the
key in the ignition.
Vehicle Safety for Children--Traffic Related
According to Federal Government statistics, in 2005 there were a
total of 43,443 traffic fatalities in the United States. The 14 and
younger age group accounted for 4 percent (1,946) of these traffic
fatalities. The majority of young children riding in motor vehicles in
the United States are restrained by some type of child safety seat or
seat belt, with 98 percent of infants and 89 percent of children ages 1
to 3 so restrained in 2006. Children between the ages of 4 and 7 are
also restrained at somewhat lower rates than younger children, with 78
percent of these children restrained by a safety seat or seat belt in
2006. Most children now ride in the rear seat of vehicles. In 2006, 93
percent of infants, 94 percent of children ages 1 to 3, and 91 percent
of children ages 4 to 7 rode in the rear seat. National fatality data
show, however, that of the more than 400 tweens--children 8 to 12 years
old--killed in crashes each year, nearly 50 percent are unrestrained
and one-third were riding in the front seat. In 2004, a Partners for
Child Passenger Safety (PCPS) study found that 35 percent of 9 to 12
year-olds were riding in the front seat, compared to only 7 percent of
4 to 8 year-olds. Research shows that children are 40 percent more
likely to be injured in a front seat than if they had been seated in
back. Finally, child restraint use continues to be lower when the
driver was unbelted than for belted drivers. National fatality data
show when adult drivers are not restrained 91 percent of 8 to 15 year-
old fatals are unrestrained. However, when adult drivers are
restrained, 48 percent of 8 to 15 year-old fatals are restrained.
Research has shown that lap/shoulder belts, when used, reduce the
risk of fatal injury to front seat occupants (age 5 and older) of
passenger cars by 45 percent. For light-truck occupants, safety belts
reduce the overall risk of fatal injury by 60 percent. But in light
truck rollover crashes, seat belts reduce the risk of being killed by
80 percent. Research on the effectiveness of child safety seats has
found them to reduce fatal injury by 71 percent for infants (less than
1 year old) and by 54 percent for toddlers (1-4 years old) in passenger
cars. For infants and toddlers in light trucks, the corresponding
reductions are 58 percent and 59 percent, respectively.
Alliance members' support of the Air Bag and Seat Belt Safety
Campaign conducted over the last decade has worked to get children in
back seats properly restrained in a restraint appropriate for their age
and size. Moreover, the Campaign has been very successful in increasing
seat belt usage--20 percentage points in the last 10 years. Further
still, the Campaign has been successful in securing the adoption of
primary enforcement seat belt laws. States with primary enforcement
laws have average safety belt usage rates approximately 11 percentage
points higher than states having secondary enforcement laws. NHTSA
estimates that a single percentage point increase in safety belt use
nationwide would result in an estimated 280 lives saved per year. In
1996, 11 states had primary enforcement laws covering 38 percent of the
population. As of 2006, 25 states and the District of Columbia have
primary enforcement laws covering 65 percent of the population. When an
adult restraint is used, it is far more likely that children riding
with that adult are restrained as well.
Alliance members were also active participants in two Blue Ribbon
Panels on child passenger safety. The Automotive Coalition for Traffic
Safety (ACTS), at the request of the U.S. Department of Transportation,
served as the facilitator for both Panels. The first endeavor was the
Blue Ribbon Panel on Child Restraint and Vehicle Compatibility. This
panel was announced in February 1995 and recommendations were released
that May. One key recommendation resulted in the new LATCH (Lower
Anchors and Tethers for CHildren) system created to help standardize
the way child restraints are attached to vehicles without using a seat
belt. All child restraints and most new vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2002 were required by NHTSA to include hardware
components designed to simplify child seat installation and to reduce
the incidence of misuse and incorrect installation of child safety
seats. A study released by NHTSA in December 2006 concluded that LATCH,
``appear(s) to be helping to reduce insecure installation of child
safety seats.'' The study further concluded that people who have
experience with LATCH appear to prefer its use over the conventional
method using the vehicle seat belt. Finally, the study concluded that
the primary reason that people do not use LATCH is that they don't know
about it or because LATCH was not available in some center-rear seats.
The Alliance has committed to work with NHTSA to resolve these and
other questions about LATCH.
The second panel, the Blue Ribbon Panel on Protecting Our Older
Child Passengers was announced in November 1998. Panel members focused
recommendations on getting 4 to 16 year-olds into the correct restraint
systems and seating positions for their age and size.
Please see http://www.actsinc.org/blueribbon.cfm for more
information about both of these Panels.
To address the large number of tweens who are needlessly at risk
when riding in motor vehicles because they are not always wearing seat
belts and many sit in front seats, the Alliance turned to ACTS.
According to research released by ACTS, parents have more influence on
tween behavior than many people realize. Tweens are well aware of
safety messages, including the benefits of buckling up and dangers
associated with sitting in front of a deploying air bag. However,
safety awareness alone has limited influence on how tweens ride in
vehicles because other factors may be more important to them. Even
though tweens are becoming more independent, they still need parental
guidance to ensure their safety in cars.
Surveys showed when parents take control, tweens tend to sit in the
back. Two-thirds of tweens sit in a back seat when parents make the
decision, compared to only half of tweens who independently decide
where to sit. When tweens in two pilot sites were asked what might
encourage them to sit in a back seat, most said being told by a parent
or the vehicle's driver. This was especially true for those tweens who
were less likely to buckle up. To reach out to tweens, their parents
and others who influence their behavior--to increase the number of
tweens who are properly restrained in back seats--ACTS established a
new interactive website, http://www.tweensafety.org.
In 2005, a total of 414, or 21 percent, of the fatalities among
children age 14 and younger occurred in crashes involving alcohol.
Another 48 children age 14 and younger who were killed in traffic
crashes in 2005 were pedestrians or pedalcyclists who were struck by
drinking drivers (BAC of 0.01 g/dL or higher). The Alliance's support
of MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving--described below--is
aimed at ending drunk driving in the United States and the associated
fatalities and injuries including those involving children.
Vehicle Safety for Children--NonTraffic Related
Turning to the issues that were before this Committee in the 109th
Congress as presented in S. 1948, ``The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and
Cars Safety Act of 2005,'' the Alliance supports the establishment of a
data collection system for non-traffic, non-crash events involving
motor vehicles. Good solid data about the human victim, injury
morphology, the environment in which events occur, and the vehicle are
a necessary first step to identifying possible interventions that might
be effective. However, before determining whether action by this
Committee on this point is needed, please consider that Congress has
already acted on this issue with the provisions of Sections 2012 and
10305 of Pub. L. 109-59 (119 Stat. 1539 and 1941 (2005)) that was
enacted as part of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).
Similarly, the Alliance supports the establishment of a consumer
information program to provide information about hazards to children in
non-traffic, non-crash incident situations. However, implementation of
such a provision(s) could and should be timelier that the 18 months
proposed in S. 1978. The Alliance believes 90 days following enactment
may be possible. Such a directive could, for example, complement SAFE
KIDS Worldwide's ``Spot the Tot'' program designed to prevent injury to
children in non-crash events. The program is a nationwide expansion of
the successful program of the same name created by SAFE KIDS Utah. It
is designed to raise parents' awareness of the risk of vehicle back-
overs in driveways and parking lots by providing a few simple tips for
adults and kids to make sure the area around the vehicle is safe before
driving away.
With regard to the mandated rulemakings on vehicle technology, we
offer the following.
The 109th Congress specifically addressed power window switches in
motor vehicles. Power window safety has been addressed by Congress
previously. Section 10308 of SAFETEA-LU directed:
``The Secretary [of Transportation] shall upgrade Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 118 to require that power windows in
motor vehicles not in excess of 10,000 pounds have switches
that raise the window only when the switch is pulled up or out.
The Secretary shall issue a final rule implementing this
section by April 1, 2007.''
In April 2006, NHTSA implemented the changes to FMVSS No. 118 that
were required by SAFETEA-LU. See 71 Fed. Reg. 18673, April 12, 2006.
(``The agency is amending . . . the standard to require that any
actuation device for closing a power-operated window must operate by
pulling away from the surface in the vehicle on which the device is
mounted [i.e., ``pull-to-close'' switches]. This provision implements
the mandate of section 10308 of SAFETEA-LU.'')
NHTSA's April 2006 final rule also responded to petitions for
reconsideration received in response to the agency's September 2004
power window final rule. Whether the installation of automatic reversal
systems for power windows and panels should be mandated was evaluated
by NHTSA in response to separate petitions for rulemaking submitted to
the agency seeking such a mandate. NHTSA denied these petitions to
include an automatic reversal requirement under FMVSS No. 118 in part
because the petitioners did not provid any new data regarding the
incidence of fatalities and injuries for inadvertent or intentional
actuation of power window switches. NHTSA concluded that their most
recent amendments to the standard ``. . . will prevent the types of
power-window incidents that have been documented.'' The agency further
rejected some hypothetical scenarios offered by petitioners by stating,
``. . . there is not any documentation that any such cases have
actually occurred. Even so, the risk of unintentional switch operation
. . . is already addressed by the safer switch requirement of the final
rule . . . we do not believe that the speculative arguments in the
Advocates, et al., petition about magnitude of risk justify their
request for the agency to require automatic reversal systems, absent
data demonstrating a safety problem. It is not feasible to eliminate
all potentially conceivable risks through regulation.'' (emphasis
added).
Regarding rearward visibility, again Congress has addressed the
issue of back-over incidents by requiring several studies on the
magnitude of the problem and the potential effectiveness of different
technologies to address the problem. A report on one such study was
released by NHTSA in November 2006. That study concluded that back-over
crashes involving all vehicle types, ``are estimated to cause at least
183 fatalities annually . . . [and] between 6,700 and 7,419 injuries
per year . . .'' The report also described the results of tests
conducted by NHTSA involving several systems currently available as
original equipment on vehicles and aftermarket products to evaluate
their performance and potential effectiveness. The report concluded
that, ``the performance of sensor-based (ultrasonic and radar) parking
aids in detecting child pedestrians behind the vehicle was typically
poor, sporadic and limited in range.'' The testing by NHTSA did find
that camera based systems, ``may have the greatest potential to provide
drivers with reliable assistance in identifying people in the path of
the vehicle when backing.'' However, NHTSA cautions, ``readers of this
report about relying on the results of our testing or other published
test results to promote such systems as an effective means to address
the back-over crash risk.'' The agency cited numerous reasons for this
caution, including the need to better understand the environmental
factors (e.g., rain, fog, or other inclement weather, or sun glare)
that limit the effectiveness of cameras and the limits of driver
performance using such systems. The report observed that: ``Even if
cameras allow the driver to identify an object in the back of a
vehicle, the driver must look at the display and have the capability to
identify an object or person in the path when backing up, and to react
and brake quickly enough to prevent the incident. The speed being
traveled, the level of driver attention and reaction time all play
significant roles in estimating the systems' effectiveness.''
Therefore, the Alliance believes that a mandate to require technology
that may or may not be effective in addressing a problem whose exact
nature is not objectively known would be premature.
Finally a mandate to require brake transmission shift interlocks
(BTSI) to work in all ignition key positions is simply not needed. A
BTSI requires the operator of the vehicle to be positioned in the
driver's seat and to depress the service brake pedal in order to shift
the automatic transmission control out of the ``Park'' position.
Virtually all automatic transmission-equipped cars and light trucks
have a BTSI, but not all of them work in all ignition key positions. In
August 2006, Alliance members, and others, completed development of and
immediately began implementing an initiative to further reduce the
incidents of shift selector movement in vehicles equipped with
automatic transmissions in circumstances where an unsupervised and
unattended child has gained access to both a vehicle and its ignition
keys by requiring that the vehicle's service brake be depressed, in all
key positions, before the transmission can be shifted out of ``Park''.
Approximately 80 percent of 2006 model year cars and light trucks are
already equipped with an all-key-position BTSI and all new vehicles
will have it no later than September 1, 2010. More information about
this agreement can be found at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov under
``Agreement on Brake Transmission Shift Interlock'' or by entering
docket number ``25669'' in the search box found at http://dms.dot.gov/
search/searchFormSimple.cfm.
Other Alliance initiatives are providing real-world safety benefits
to the public, including children. These are described below.
In December 2003, auto manufacturers committed to a plan developed
by an international group of safety experts for enhancing the crash
compatibility of passenger cars and light trucks. The plan established
new performance criteria for further enhancing occupant protection in
front and side crashes between cars and light trucks. It also defined
research programs to investigate future test procedures and performance
criteria. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) facilitated
the development of this plan with the sponsorship of the Alliance.
By September 2009, 100 percent of each participating manufacturer's
applicable vehicles will be designed to these criteria. However,
participating auto manufacturers began implementing the front-to-front
and front-to-side performance criteria immediately upon industry's
agreement. Manufacturers' recent progress in implementing this
commitment is described below.
Approximate Percentage of Production Designed in Accordance w/
Performance Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Production Production
Crash Mode Year 2005 Year 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Front-to-Front Criteria 62% 75%
Front-to-Side Criteria 33% 53%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The frontal component of the commitment established criteria to
further reduce the potential for vehicle override and under-ride in
serious front-to-front crashes between cars and light trucks by
requiring sufficient overlap between the primary energy-absorbing
structures (PEAS) of the two vehicle types. This may be achieved by
``geometric matching'' or alignment of these structures or by providing
additional structure in light trucks (called secondary energy absorbing
structures (SEAS)) for this purpose. In November 2005, new test
procedures were added by safety experts to measure the performance of
the SEAS. An updated version of the December 2003 compatibility
commitment, reflecting this change, was submitted to NHTSA on May 10,
2006.
In 2006, IIHS completed an analysis of the safety benefits of the
front-to-front compatibility agreement.
In front-to-front crashes involving light trucks into passenger
cars, IIHS found that the passenger car driver was 16 percent less
likely to be killed if struck by a sport utility vehicle (SUV) with a
front-end design that met the compatibility performance criteria.
Similarly, the passenger car driver was 20 percent less likely to be
killed if struck by a pickup truck with a front-end design that met the
compatibility performance criteria. The overall reduction in passenger
car driver deaths in front-to-front crashes involving both SUVs and
pickup trucks was 19 percent.
In front-to-side crashes involving light trucks into passenger
cars, IIHS found that the passenger car driver was 30 percent less
likely to be killed if struck by a sport utility vehicle (SUV) with a
front-end design that met the front-to-front compatibility performance
criteria. The passenger car driver was 10 percent less likely to be
killed if struck by a pickup truck with a front-end design that met the
front-to-front compatibility performance criteria. The overall
reduction in passenger car driver deaths in front-to-side crashes
involving both SUVs and pickup trucks was 19 percent.
The front-to-side crash component of the commitment established
performance criteria that further enhances head protection for people
riding in passenger vehicles that are struck in the side. Manufacturers
have voluntarily agreed to engineer their vehicles using two test
options: (1) the Federal Government's (NHTSA) optional side-into-pole
test (see FMVSS 201), or (2) the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) test for consumer information, using a moving deformable barrier
with front-end geometry to simulate an SUV or pickup. Use of the NHTSA
pole test option will sunset in 2009, and all manufacturers will then
have to use the IIHS test.
In 2006 the IIHS updated its estimate of the real-world benefits of
side airbags in reducing struck vehicle driver fatalities. The results
show that side airbags that protect people's heads are reducing driver
deaths in cars struck on the driver side by an estimated 37 percent.
Airbags that protect the chest and abdomen but not the head are
reducing deaths by 26 percent. The results also show an estimated 52
percent reduction in fatality rates for drivers of SUVs equipped with
side airbags with head protection. These real-world findings
corroborate the good crash test performance of these devices in crashes
simulating an SUV striking the driver side of a vehicle and suggest
that the manufacturer's voluntary front-side commitment will lead to
significant reductions in struck vehicle driver fatality rates.
To learn more about the Crash Compatibility initiative, please see
http://www.autoalliance.org/safety/ or visit http://dms.dot.gov/search/
searchFormSimple.cfm and enter docket number ``14623'' in the search
box.
Another voluntary initiative led to the establishment of test
procedures and performance criteria to assure that in the event an
occupant is out-of-position at the time of deployment of a side air
bag, the risk of serious injury is limited to 5 percent. In response to
concerns about potential injury risk to out-of-position (OOP) women and
children from deploying side airbags, the Alliance, the Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM), the Automotive Occupant
Restraints Council (AORC), and IIHS used a joint working group to
develop test procedures with injury criteria and limits to ensure that
the risk of injury to OOP occupants from deploying side airbags would
be very limited. The initiative produced recommended procedures for
evaluating occupant injury risk from deploying side air bags that were
finalized in August 2000 and updated in September 2003. Currently, 90
percent of Alliance member company side airbags have been designed in
accordance with the recommended procedures. More importantly, the field
performance of side air bags remains positive. For more information,
please visit http://twg.iihs.org/ or visit http://dms.dot.gov/search/
searchFormSimple.cfm and enter docket number ``5098'' in the search
box.
In July 2006, Canada's Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and
Communities (The Honourable Lawrence Cannon) announced the signing of
three memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with vehicle manufacturers.
Each of the agreements will advance the safety by:
updating the side-impact protection requirements to better
protect children who sit next to an air bag;
improving compatibility between vehicles of different sizes
to reduce the severity of occupant injury in side and frontal
collisions; and
promoting the use of new technologies in the design and
manufacture of vehicles to ensure optimal seatbelt fit for
front seat passengers.
Each of these MOUs are based on voluntary agreements first
initiated and developed by the Alliance. In announcing these
agreements, Transport Canada stated that, ``The department continues to
modernize its system of regulatory governance by making smarter
regulations through innovative consultation mechanisms and processes,
harmonized initiatives and voluntary agreements with the transportation
industry.''
These efforts to develop voluntary standards to enhance motor
vehicle safety, when combined with an industry commitment to design
vehicles in accordance with them, is a model for responsible industry
action. These programs are proven to be a very effective way to bring
significant safety improvements into the fleet faster than has been
historically possible through regulation. The voluntary standards
process also has the flexibility to produce rapid modifications should
the need arise.
The Alliance has also developed a set of principles to address the
safety aspects of driver interactions--often called ``driver
distraction''--with new in-vehicle telematics systems. The Alliance's
Driver Focus--Telematics Guidelines relate to the design, use, and
installation of invehicle information and communications systems. The
Guidelines contain 24 principles to enhance the safety of driver
interaction with telematics systems. Each principle includes
verification procedures and performance criteria for the safe operation
of advanced in-vehicle information and communications systems intended
for use by the driver while the vehicle is in motion. The Guidelines
were first issued in draft form in 2002 and continue to be updated as
research, field data, and technology become available. Alliance members
are voluntarily using the Guidelines to minimize driver distraction and
collaborate with NHTSA on efforts to further enhance efficiency using
in-car systems. Transport Canada is also in negotiations with
automakers to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which would
set out the general terms and conditions with regard to limiting driver
distraction from in-vehicle telematics devices pursuant to the Alliance
Guidelines. Finally, the United Nations Inland Transport Committee has
accepted these Guidelines and has presented them to its World Forum for
the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), the internationally-
recognized governmental body that helps set the future direction of
global motor vehicle safety activities. For more information, please
visit http://www.autoalliance.org/safety/.
Alliance members are also individually pursuing initiatives to
enhance motor vehicle safety. One such initiative that has received
widespread support is the installation of vehicle-based technologies to
encourage safety belt usage. Preliminary research on one system
deployed in the United States by one Alliance member found a
statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt
use for drivers of vehicles equipped with that system compared with
drivers of unequipped vehicles. NHTSA estimates that a single
percentage point increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in
an estimated 280 lives saved per year. Beginning in model year 2004,
all members of the Alliance began deploying various vehicle-based
technologies to increase safety belt use. Eighty-five percent of model
year 2006 cars and light trucks were equipped with safety belt reminder
systems.
Significant Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Fatalities and Injuries
From Motor Vehicle Crashes, but Challenges Remain
Over the past 25 years, significant progress has been made in
reducing the traffic fatality rate. In 1981, the number of fatalities
per 100 million vehicle miles traveled stood at 3.17. By 2005, this
rate had been driven down by 54 percent to 1.45 fatalities per 100
million vehicle miles traveled. The level of competitiveness among
automakers has helped to accelerate the introduction of safety features
in the absence of regulation, aiding in the progress made. In fact, all
of the most recent technologies like side airbags and stability control
have been introduced ahead of Federal regulation or legislative
mandate.
Safety is an area in which manufacturers compete and seek
competitive advantage. Manufacturers leverage their safety performance
and equipment in efforts to distinguish their products from
competitors. Manufacturers continue to make innovative safety features
available to consumers across their entire product line. For example,
side airbags with head protection were available on 84 percent of model
year cars and light trucks. Two-thirds of these air bags were side
curtains and one-quarter were rollover-activated devices. Another
example: electronic stability control was available on 63 percent of
model year 2006 cars and light trucks. These two breakthrough
technologies, as well as the others mentioned and the growing use of
electronics and radar to take advantage of the time prior to a crash to
either eliminate it or reduce its severity through automatic braking,
demonstrate the commitment of manufacturers to improving safety.
Despite the progress made, however, data show that 43,443 people
lost their lives on U.S. highways in 2005 and almost 2.7 million were
injured. Tragically, 55 percent of vehicle occupants killed in crashes
were not restrained by safety belts or child safety seats. Alcohol was
a factor in 39 percent of all fatalities. This is unacceptable. As a
Nation, we simply must do better.
As the General Accounting Office reaffirmed, vehicle factors
contribute less often to crashes and their subsequent injuries than do
human or roadway environmental factors. \1\ We will never fully realize
the potential benefits of vehicle safety technologies until all vehicle
occupants are properly restrained and all impaired drivers are off the
road.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Highway Safety--Research Continues on a Variety of Factors
That Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes.'' U.S. General Accounting
Office, GAO-03-436, March 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased Safety Belt Usage and Preventing Impaired Driving Are Needed
Today To Prevent Needless Fatalities and Injuries
The single most effective way to reduce traffic fatalities and
serious injuries in the short-term is to increase the proper use of
safety belts and child safety seats. Alliance members have a long and
proud record of working to increase safety belt usage. Over the past
two decades, efforts, nearly totally funded by automakers, have lead to
a 44 percentage point increase in safety belt usage; from 37 percent in
1986 to 81 percent in 2006, resulting in an estimated 12,000 additional
lives saved annually.
However, we are still working to make that number higher, and with
good reason. Safety experts say an additional 3,000 lives a year could
be saved if the safety belt usage rate increased to 92 percent. Belt
use in 5 states and one jurisdiction (CA, HI, MI, OR, WA, and PR)
currently exceed 92 percent confirming that high belt usage is
possible. The proper use of safety belts and child safety seats is the
single most effective way to reduce traffic fatalities and serious
injuries.
The significant increase in belt use over the years is largely due
to high visibility enforcement mobilizations. Last May, the most
successful mobilization ever was conducted with more than 10,000 law
enforcement agencies providing stepped up enforcement and close to $31
million in state and national paid advertising to augment the
enforcement effort. Funding for the enforcement ads, both national and
state, comes from funds earmarked by Congress for this purpose. These
mobilizations have consistently achieved dramatic increases in safety
belt use. We believe that it is important for Congress to continue to
provide funding for these law enforcement mobilizations and the paid
ads informing the public about them.
Primary enforcement safety belt use laws are significantly
correlated with higher safety belt usage levels. States with primary
enforcement laws have average safety belt usage rates approximately 11
percentage points higher than states having secondary enforcement laws.
Currently, only 25 states and the District of Columbia have primary
safety belt laws. Efforts to enact primary enforcement laws are now
being enhanced by the Section 406 incentive grants Congress provided in
SAFETEA-LU for states passing primary enforcement laws or achieving
high belt use rates. Primary enforcement bills have been introduced in
at least a dozen states this year and the Alliance is actively working
to secure their enactment.
Impaired driving is also a significant highway safety problem.
While substantial progress in reducing impaired driving has been made
in the last quarter century, more must be done to prevent these
needless tragedies. Just one-half of 1 percent of the trips taken
annually in the United States by personal motor vehicles are made by
alcohol-impaired drivers. Yet, these trips result in nearly 40 percent
of all motor vehicle fatalities occurring in the United States each
year.
In November 2006, the Alliance joined with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the
Governors Highway Safety Association, The Century Council, the
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS), and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, to support MADD's
Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving. There is no single solution that
will eliminate drunk driving. Drunk driving remains a behavioral
challenge, a law enforcement challenge and a challenge requiring
innovative new approaches, including exploring new technologies.
Recognizing this, the Campaign has initiated a bold new 4-point plan
intended to end drunk driving in the United States. The plan is leading
the Nation toward the goal of eliminating drunk driving through:
1. Intensive high-visibility law enforcement, including twice-
yearly crackdowns and frequent enforcement efforts that include
sobriety checkpoints and saturation patrols in all 50 states.
2. Full implementation of current alcohol ignition interlock
technologies, including efforts to require alcohol ignition
interlock devices for all convicted drunk drivers. A key part
of this effort is working with judges, prosecutors and state
driver's license officials to stop repeat offenders.
3. Exploration of advanced vehicle technologies through the
establishment of a Blue Ribbon Panel of international safety
experts to assess the feasibility of, the potential benefits
of, and the public policy challenges associated with a range of
advanced technologies that might help prevent drunk driving.
These technologies must be moderately priced, absolutely
reliable, and unobtrusive to the sober driver. This element of
the Campaign is being led by the Alliance.
4. Mobilization of grassroots support, led by MADD and its 400+
affiliates, to make the elimination of drunk driving a reality.
MADD is uniting drunk driving victims, families, community
leaders, and policymakers in the fight to eliminate drunk
driving.
Comprehensive and Current Data Are Necessary To Make Insightful and
Sound Public Policy Decisions
Sound science provides the foundation on which we build true
progress. Data collection is critical to assessing a promising idea's
expected real-world benefits. Our extensive research starts with
knowledge of human behavior and how people act--and react--in autos.
The Alliance sponsors a significant amount of safety research that
is shared with the safety community. The Alliance is sponsoring a
program to collect-real world crash data on the performance of de-
powered and advanced air bags at three sites around the U.S. (Dade
County, Florida; Dallas County, Texas; and Chilton, Coosa, St. Clair,
Talledega, and Shelby Counties in Alabama). This program adds valuable
information about air bag performance to the extensive crash data
already being collected by NHTSA through NASS. The Alliance project
observes all the NASS data collection protocols so that the Alliance
funded cases can be compared with, and evaluated consistently with,
other cases in the NASS dataset. For more information, please visit
http://groups.iihs.org/brp/.
In December 2006, NHTSA issued a technical report, titled An
Evaluation of the 1998-1999 Redesign of Frontal Air Bags. The Alliance
estimates that approximately 25 percent of the crash investigations
considered as part of this evaluation were cases investigated by the
Alliance. The report finds that, compared to first-generation air bags,
redesigned air bags reduced fatalities to infants and children by 83
percent and to out-of-position drivers by 70 percent in low-to-25
moderate speed crashes. Yet they entirely preserved the overall life-
saving benefits of first-generation air bags for belted drivers and for
passengers age 13 and up.
Consistent with need for more real-world data, some Alliance
members have voluntarily installed Event Data Recorders (EDRs) that
provide improved data to assist safety researchers, auto engineers,
government researchers and trauma doctors in their work. EDRs can
improve our collective understanding of crash events and lead to
improvements in vehicle safety systems. Recording certain data elements
in the moments just prior to and during a crash can contribute to the
breadth and reliability of the crash data already gathered by state and
Federal governments and widely used by public and private entities to
study and improve transportation safety. NHTSA and NTSB have noted the
important safety benefits of EDRs and NHTSA has recently issued a
regulation federally mandating performance and disclosure requirements
for voluntarily installed EDRs. NHTSA's regulation, acknowledging the
importance of consistent EDR requirements and encouraging the continued
voluntary installation of EDRs by automakers, preempts conflicting
state and local requirements and any requirement that would affect EDR
performance, design, or operation, including ``On/Off Switches''.
Mandated EDR ``On/Off Switches,'' which were considered and
dismissed by NHTSA as technically unfeasible, have, nonetheless, been
proposed in a recent House bill. As certain parties fail to
acknowledge, the EDR's in today's vehicles are typically integrated
into the air bag control module. They are not stand-alone devices that
can be deactivated without disabling the airbag system. Disabling the
EDR would also be prohibited by Federal law. Federal motor vehicle
safety standards (FMVSS) No. 208 requires that ``[a]n occupant
protection system that deploys in the event of a crash shall have a
monitoring system with a readiness indicator.'' (49 CFR Part 208,
S4.5.2). These monitoring systems are integrated with EDR functions.
And, it would also violate Federal law to install a switch that would
disable the airbag system. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Section 30122 of Title 49, United States Code, forbids a
manufacturer, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from ``making
inoperative'' anything that is installed in a motor vehicle to comply
with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Potential Benefits of Vehicle Safety Technologies Can Not Be Fully
Realized Until Vehicle Occupants Are Properly Restrained and
Impaired Drivers Are Off the Road
Motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility among government,
consumers and vehicle manufacturers. Auto manufacturers are more
committed than ever to developing advanced safety technologies to
reduce fatalities and injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes.
But as a nation, we will never fully realize the potential benefits of
vehicle safety technologies until occupants are properly restrained and
impaired drivers are off the road.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
I want to thank all the panelists for your opening
statements.
And I have two very quick motions. First is that all the
written testimony and exhibits offered by the witnesses be made
part of the record.
Is there any objection?
[No response.]
Senator Pryor. If not, so ordered.
Senator Pryor. And, second, that Senator Stevens, from
Alaska, will be added as an original cosponsor to the Clinton-
Sununu bill that we've been talking about today.
Is there any objection to that?
[No response.]
Senator Pryor. If not, then so ordered.
We've been joined by Senator Klobuchar, of Minnesota, who,
by the way, thinks that we're all wimpy here in Washington when
our kids don't have school when there's 3 inches of snow on the
ground.
[Laughter.]
Senator Klobuchar. That would be correct.
[Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. But, Senator, we normally allow Senators to
make an opening statement of a couple of minutes. If you'd like
to, feel free.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm
very pleased to be on this subcommittee. My background involves
work as a prosecutor, and I've dealt with public safety issues
before, and I wanted to be on this committee for that reason.
I thank you also for holding this important hearing. I
know, from my own experience with car safety for kids--my
daughter is now 11, but I had many difficult situations with
car seats. I thought I'd have them installed right, and then I
would turn and she would be halfway over in the car seat. And I
think it just shows--and I had tried my best and pulled those
seatbelts as tight as I could, and then trained and done
everything--that clearly there is more work to be done. I also
remember going on vacation and trying to get, when she was a
little older, one of those booster seats from a car rental
place, and they only had ones for little kids, and we had to go
to Target and buy one. I have found it to be a confusing area,
and I think it's something that is ripe for making sure that we
do everything that we can to protect kids in cars, because I
appreciated the work that's been done with education efforts
with seatbelts, Mr. McCurdy, but the issue for these kids is,
they're just relying on adults to take care of them, and
manufacturers to take care of them, and they don't have as much
say in what's happening.
And I've read the statistics about how a child dies in this
country almost every other year from a non-traffic accident.
They're backed over, strangled by--or every other day--they're
backed over, strangled by a power window, killed when a car is
accidentally shifted into gear. And the CDC has found that more
than 9,000 children were treated in a single year in hospital
emergency rooms for non-traffic-related issues with cars. And,
most of the time, a parent or other family member is involved,
and clearly they didn't intend to do this, but we need to put
every safety measure we have in place, so this doesn't happen.
Senator Clinton and Senator Sununu's bill calls upon the
Secretary of Transportation to craft and implement some of
those tools to create new rules that regulate rearward
visibility, power-window performance, and shifting from park to
drive. And I fully support this bill and look forward to asking
some questions.
Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Medford, let me start the questions by asking you one.
In 2000, under the TREAD Act, Congress directed NHTSA to
initiate a rulemaking to consider whether to require more
comprehensive safety tests for child restraints in side-impact
and rear-impact crashes. But, ultimately, the agency concluded
that there were too many uncertainties to issue a proposed
rule. What uncertainties are out there?
Mr. Medford. Thank you, Senator. The uncertainties that
were considered at the time that rule was issued in an ANPR,
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, in 2002, as the agency
began to look at it, and got comments from the public, there
was no performance standard. Remember, child seats are actually
tested on a simulator or a sled, not in a vehicle, per se. So,
there are some challenges in developing a test for a sled,
which generally uses a frontal crash simulation. So, there was
test method development that hadn't been worked out. Then there
were no side-impact dummies that could actually measure the
injuries sustained to children effectively. And then, there was
a lack of injury criteria for those dummies. So, the agency--it
was the time before I was there--but the agency withdrew that
and continued to do research. And just in the past few months
we've continued to do research, and--as have most other parts
of the world--looking at an effective standard for side-impact
for children. And we think we're close, and expect, this year,
to have a test method and at least one 3-year-old dummy that we
can use to begin to consider rulemaking in this area. But it
has been a technical challenge, and that was why it was
withdrawn at the time.
Senator Pryor. So, in other words, it sounds like you're in
the process of coming up with a new test that you feel would
provide you the data that would be helpful.
Mr. Medford. Yes, sir. We don't have the final test
results, and we haven't finished the research, but we will
finish it this year and make a decision this year.
Senator Pryor. Great. At this point, I'm going to turn it
over to my colleague Senator Sununu, because it's his bill that
we're talking about today. And then we'll turn it over to
Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
Mr. McCurdy, you spoke a little bit, generally, about
improvements that have been made in safety over the last 10-15
years, and Ms. Claybrook used the phrase--and I think we
understood what she meant when she used it--that cars aren't
designed for kids. In other words, we're adults, we buy the
cars, we drive the cars, we're concerned about safety,
generally speaking, but, historically, all the design criteria
haven't focused on 5-year-olds--or 10-year-olds, for that
matter. But the LATCH system was mentioned in some of the
earlier testimonies. That's obviously focused on children.
Could you expand a little bit on systems that either have been
implemented, or that you believe the industry is close to
implementing, that are focused on child safety?
Mr. McCurdy. Well, thank you, Senator. As we mentioned, the
BTSI voluntary work that this alliance led and--in conjunction
on the brake-transmissions interlock, I think is an important
step. I saw, yesterday, as a matter of fact--and, again, that's
why I want to encourage you all to take advantage of this--you
know, side airbags that, when you look at some of the test
results--and I watched a number--not only the live ones, but
some previous ones--a lot of the injuries would not have been
protected--or prevented from existing technologies, because
young--adults average, you know, the size of--that they
replicate with dummies, and children often become flying
objects within vehicles if it's a rollover or something. That's
why both the head protection airbags development, I think, is
critical. The LATCH system a children were young, there wasn't
such thing, but--you know, it may be a little cumbersome, quite
frankly, and I think they're working to try to find out how to
make that more usable. But it is a serious restraint.
We're actually working--and I think the manufacturers are
coordinating--with the car seat manufacturers, that are
separate from the auto manufacturers. And I think that's an
area that probably needs to have some focus to see if there
are--is some compatibility there, and some standards, and so
that they can work together to ensure that they are secured
there.
The dual-stage airbags and the de-powering of airbags for
young children, I think, was particularly designed to protect
them, because we saw, in the first iteration of airbags, that--
such explosive force--that small adults and children were often
injured severely and fatally because of that. They actually had
to go back and get some real changes, I believe, so that they
could go through a process of de-powering. So, again, the
unintended consequences of a well-intended, you know,
objective, but we actually had to go back through the
rulemaking process and change that in order to see that it was
amended and workable to actually save lives. So, there are a
number of those kinds of developments. Again, I--this is my
third week, so I probably don't have the complete compendium,
but I can--I will gladly find more specifics and provide those
to you and to the Committee.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Mr. Medford, you spoke little bit about the testing or
review of some of the camera systems that are available now on
many vehicles, some as standards equipment on cars that are
sold today, some as optional equipment. But as I think you're
well aware, the legislation doesn't require cameras, it doesn't
require any specific piece of equipment. It simply calls for
NHTSA to establish a rulemaking to create a visibility standard
so that we have good definition of how big a blind spot is, or
should be, or how much visibility we have on the rear of the
vehicle.
Have you tested other systems, devices, or technology for
improving visibility around a car? What types of approaches
have you looked at to date?
Mr. Medford. Yes, Senator, we have tested, and included in
the report in November, the available technology that we are
aware of. And, at that time, it was sensor technology, which
was both ultrasonics and radar-based systems that were often
included in vehicles today, more-expensive vehicles, for
parking aids, as you're backing slowly into a parking spot. It
would--it's really intended by the manufacturers to provide an
aid for you in backing into those spots. We looked and examined
those, and, quite frankly, found there are many dead zones, and
we don't believe they're reliable for this purpose, and
wouldn't recommend them for protecting children, identifying
them, because of the blind spots.
We also looked at a couple of different mirror systems, one
actually used by Toyota, in the rear pillar portion, which is a
mirror system that allows you to look from your rearview mirror
to the pillar mirror, and then, that provides some view of the
back area, some of the blind spot--and found that the images
were so distorted that they were not helpful for people. We
also looked at an after-market mirror that would actually be
placed on the rear window, and you'd look--you'd actually turn
your head and look through that, and also found that to be
distorted.
And when we looked at the camera systems, we did find these
are systems with good cameras that basically reveal almost the
entire area behind the vehicle. And so, they have that
capability of providing good views behind the vehicle. What we
did also say in that report, as you probably know, sir, was
that until we understand how effectively people will actually
use those systems--because it--an average backing speed is
about 3 miles an hour, and, as you go in reverse, there's a
little bit of a delay, and the camera comes on, you look--if
you look quickly in there, and you recognize there's something
there, and you detect it, you should stop, and you put on your
brake, everything works perfectly--when you're backing at 3
miles an hour, within a little over 2 seconds you've actually
traveled almost 10 feet. So, these systems are relying
completely on human behavior, as they currently exist. And
what--we're not saying, at the moment, that that's not good.
What we're saying is, we'd like to understand how effective
human behavior is with the systems that exist. And we're
studying that this year in our laboratories.
Senator Sununu. What about the collection of non-traffic
data? I mean----
Mr. Medford. Right. We're----
Senator Sununu.--obviously, to any person who has
experienced, or knows someone who has experienced one of these
accidents, I'm sure it comes as a surprise that we haven't
collected good information on non-traffic injuries or
fatalities. What are we doing to improve that now? And----
Mr. Medford. We----
Senator Sununu.--what should we be doing?
Mr. Medford. We are aggressively expanding our data
systems. There was a requirement in SAFETEA-LU that the agency
develop a surveillance system and publish, every 2 years, data,
to the Congress and to the public, about non-traffic injuries.
We have a series of pilot studies going on now to make sure
that--we're actually trying to identify systems that are going
to be effective in identifying these non-traffic injuries.
NHTSA's data systems that were originally put in play really
were never intended for--to collect data on these systems. The
census data that we do for fatal crashes--the FARS, Fatal
Accident Reporting System--has a census of every death that
occurs in a vehicle. Some of that data actually captures non-
traffic injuries, and we're trying to do all we can to ensure
that we're capturing those cases. We're also expanding our
state data systems to include police action reports that
include non-traffic injuries, which were typically excluded
from our collection system, to see how valuable they are. We've
entered into a program with the Consumer Products Safety
Commission that has an all-trauma data system, which collects
from--daily--from hospital emergency rooms around the country,
all incidents that are treated, regardless of whether or not
they involve vehicles or any other consumer products, to see
what value they have. We've initiated a special crash
investigation initiative on back-over crashes, where we do
detailed investigations to try to understand exactly how the--
what the circumstances are for the back-over crashes, something
we're very concerned about. So, those are the initiatives. And
we'll have--be revealing the results of those pilot studies
this year, as the analysis gets completed.
Senator Sununu. Thank you. I have one final question, and I
appreciate Chairman Pryor being very lenient with my time.
Collection of data, I think, is absolutely essential, and I
think that's one of several areas where, I think, there's very
strong consensus on the value of the provisions in this bill.
One of the things that we require to be collected, and, even
more importantly, disclosed, are vehicles that do and do not
have the brake-shift interlock safety feature that we've
discussed here.
Representative Campbell, after your son's death, I'm
curious to know, How were you able to determine whether your
car had this or, in this case, didn't have this feature? Was
the information available? And what did you do to finally get
the answer to your questions?
Mr. Campbell. The information was not available. And when
my accident--my tragedy happened, I had no idea that this was
possible. And, no, the information wasn't available. I then
contacted NHTSA, honestly, about--almost a year after my son's
death, because I thought either my car was broken or I was a
bad parent, because I let my child die. And I realized that
great parents suffer great tragedies, and that I'm not a bad
parent, that the only way to prevent these types of accidents
is to design them out. Because whether it was me or some of the
unfortunate families that are here today, statistically, if you
don't design out these very hidden--very hidden safety
problems, we will not start saving lives.
I went down to Washington, contacted your office, and your
staff. I had a great meeting with NHTSA. I remember it really
well because it was--December 8th was my birthday--and there
were about 12 people from NHTSA there. And that's when I began
to understand that this was actually a design feature, that 80
percent of the cars didn't have it. You know, we talked a
little bit about the voluntary agreement. I--you know, and the
data in that says that they'll give me a list of vehicles that
will have it. We actually didn't get a list of vehicles that
didn't have it until just recently. And it took writing a
letter and putting it on the docket to say, ``Hey, we need this
information.''
I went so far as to pass a bill in New Hampshire and say,
``Hey, we need to disclose--the automobile dealers need to tell
people that BTSI doesn't work in every key position,'' because
I haven't met a person who hasn't said to me, ``In a million
years, I never thought that would happen.'' Even the people at
NHTSA said, I quote, the term ``sweet spot,'' from Keith
Brewer--I don't know his job there--but he--one of the first
people I met with at NHTSA--and was surprised that his 2001
Ford didn't work in every key position. And that's when I
realized that this is a big, big problem, and a big, big
tragedy that--look, I'm not mad at the industry, I'm not mad at
NHTSA. I'm trying to be forgiving and understanding. I wouldn't
want to tell people, ``Here's some of the dangerous things
about my product,'' when I'm selling it. But we have an
obligation, as Congress, as leaders, to say, ``I'm sorry. You
must tell consumers.'' There was no disclosure in the owner's
manual, there was no information from dealers.
When Michael Harrington asked the big three, ``Hey, can I
have this list?'' they said, ``No.'' That was back in November
of 2005. When I got a list, it was, ``Yes, we have that in all
our cars.'' Untrue statement. You have it in four out of five
key positions. So, when I ask you, ``Does your car have BTSI?''
and you say, ``Oh, yes, it does,'' I expect that means it has
it in every key position, not four out of five. And we were
left with a situation where it was--and I--this is in my
written testimony, and I hope you'll read it--but it's
important to restate it--my children beat me out the door by
about a minute. My excited little 4-year-old and his younger
brother, 2 years old, ran out and got in the car, and they were
able to roll it in a matter of seconds. If they had gotten in
the other vehicle in my driveway, a 2002 Envoy that had BTSI in
every key position, which was the normal car that we normally
use for our family, my son would be alive, because that type of
accident was impossible in a car that had BTSI in every key
position. Because they got in my Ford F-350, four-door, that
accident was designed in to happen on purpose. And I could go
into what I've discovered and why it happened, but I hope
that's--all that stuff will come to light when we have this
process, this process of getting legislation. You will see,
there is no alternative.
I appreciate the voluntary agreement, but it wasn't until
this Committee hearing that we got the follow-up information of
what happened. I appreciate the industry, and I quote, ``a
shared responsibility of manufacturers, consumers, and
government.'' This is a big step. But when we get into all the
nitty-gritty of that issue, you'll find that it correlates the
same way of not enough disclosure, not enough people
understanding what a blind zone is, or people not realizing
their windows don't go back down. They think that they do. I
mean, this is a--this is a problem.
So, I thank this Committee, and I thank everyone who's
supporting this bill.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor. Senator Klobuchar?
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Campbell, for being here, and sharing
this, and trying to take your grief to help other parents and
other families.
I had some questions, for you, Administrator Medford, and
they relate to the back-over avoidance and the recent NHTSA
study that found that it wasn't cost-effective. And then you
said, just now, that the cameras might work, but that we're not
sure if people would use it practically. Many consumer groups
have conducted their own studies that have challenged the
results of that initial NHTSA study, and I just wondered how
you responded to those challenges.
Mr. Medford. I just got, this morning, a copy from
Consumer's Union, one of the responses to their studies so, I
must apologize, I haven't read the responses. But we don't know
whether the systems are cost-effective or not. We've not made a
determination. What we have said is, this is how much they
cost. We think they provide a very good field of view in back
of the vehicle. We're positive about that. We just don't know
how effectively consumers will use them, in terms of doing the
steps that they must do, in the limited time that they have, at
the speed for which they back, to actually prevent the tragedy.
We are very serious and very interested in solving this
problem. We grieve terribly at the deaths of these children. We
share that concern.
Senator Klobuchar. All right, thank you.
Mr. McCurdy. Senator?
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. McCurdy?
Mr. McCurdy. Senator, could I respond? Yes, if--thank you.
Yesterday, I met with Dr. Green, who has been conducting some
of these human-factor studies on back-ups with these different
systems, including video. And I would implore and ask that,
perhaps in later hearings or independently, we can get a copy
of some of those tests and actually show you the video of
individuals who were put in those situations, to test their
reaction time to obstacles or objects that appeared in the
back. And I will also tell you, kind of personally and
anecdotally, I happen to have three different vehicles, I have
three different types of sensors right now. One is a camera,
one is a more sophisticated kind of combination of radar, and
one is the traditional sound-based. None of them work
perfectly, and each have flaws. My wife told me--she would kick
me, but, after 35 years, I guess I can get by on this one--she
has the car that has the camera in the back--or that has the
rear view--and it was new, and so she started focusing, kind
of, on that, in the back-up mode, was at the grocery store and
was pulling back, but was so focused on the camera, forgot to
look to the right, and another car was coming from an angle--
you know, typically you're supposed to look both directions,
and--but got so focused on the camera, forgot that, and backed
into the side of that car. So, there's----
Senator Klobuchar. But why would they be putting them in
models, then, though, if they're----
Mr. McCurdy. No, because----
Senator Klobuchar.--perceived to be ineffective--I'm just--
--
Mr. McCurdy. No, they're not--they are effective for
certain things. They're not effective for every conceivable
situation. And what--the technology, I think, that NHTSA and
others are going to have to look at is, there are other blind
spots, there are other areas, there are 360s. Some of these
incidents would not have been prevented by having a backup
camera. And if they're front wheels, you have other kinds of
potential risks. But, you know, I tell you, from the industry
standpoint, because--actually, safety sells. If you look at the
J.D. Power listing, nine of the ten top criteria are safety
features that people want. I think surround-sound kind of snuck
in there somewhere, but the rest of them were all safety
features. But, again, they're not a panacea. That's why we do
say it's shared responsibility. We accept responsibility. It's
shared. But you also have to have the educational awareness
and, again, information, and probably some training. I'm a
passionate advocate of technology, but, I will tell you
technology does not solve all problems.
Senator Klobuchar. You know, and I understand, now, that
the manufacturers have agreed with--Mr. Campbell's tragedy
here--that they will agree, voluntarily, to equip all the new
vehicles with the all-key-position BTSI, which is great. But
what I'm wondering about is, with this agreement in place, what
objection would there be to have a mandatory rule?
Mr. McCurdy. I've already told the Senator that if the goal
posts are not moved, that we will--I think we have a lot of
room to work together on this bill. I come as an honest broker.
I am new to this position. But I would tell you, in the----
Senator Klobuchar. I'm new to mine, too.
Mr. McCurdy. Pardon?
Senator Klobuchar. I'm new to mine, too.
Mr. McCurdy. Yes. And--but having worked on both sides of
this daises, or these dais, on Capitol Hill, I would tell you
that, to the extent that--where there are reasonable and
actionable items, we're going to work with them, and we think
there areas that we can continue to support----
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Mr. McCurdy.--and will actively support.
Senator Klobuchar. Good.
Mr. McCurdy. It's not a perfect bill, but, again, we will
work to try to see that this goes through the process.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And thank you.
Administrator Medford, the issue I was raising earlier, in
my opening comments about the car seats, and you talked about
the fact that the LATCH system is designed to make it easier to
properly install seats. But I think something like 40 percent
of parents are still using seatbelts instead of the LATCH
system. You've also said before that NHTSA is working with
vehicle and car seat manufacturers, child-seat installation
instructors, and consumer advocates to develop a better
education campaign. I wondered if you've explored the idea of
an actual built-in child-restraint system or other steps that
we can take beyond education to make sure that kids are
properly restrained when riding in cars?
Mr. Medford. We have. As a part of that February 8th
meeting that I mentioned in my testimony, Senator, we also are
looking at changing the LATCH regulation to see if there are
ways to make it easier and actually changing the ease-of-use
ratings that we're currently giving to car seat manufacturers.
We have a system where we actually give star ratings, or
grades, to car seat manufacturers about how easy it is to
install their seats. We're going to revise that system this
year. We think we're giving too high of grades for current
seats. So, we're taking a number of steps to make it easier.
I think, in 1995, we had a survey that showed that 89
percent of the car seats that were installed in cars were
incorrectly installed. Today, we're--we've reduced that number
to about 39 percent, but there's still a lot of work to be
done. Car seats are, by far, the most important piece of safety
device for children in a vehicle, but it has to be properly
installed, and they have to be in the right seat. But if those
two things are done, they provide tremendous safety benefit to
kids.
Ms. Claybrook. Can I comment on that?
Senator Klobuchar. Ms. Claybrook?
Ms. Claybrook. First of all, integrated seats are those
that would actually be built into the vehicle, and----
Senator Klobuchar. You mean, so I wouldn't have to do all
the----
Ms. Claybrook. So, you wouldn't have----
Senator Klobuchar.--seatbelt?
Ms. Claybrook.--to buy an extra seat, so you wouldn't have
to worry about which LATCH you had in, or seatbelt you were
using, so that when the car is tested for adult crash tests, it
would also be tested--you could put a child dummy in the child
seat and test it at the same time, so it would reduce the cost
of testing. If there was a defect recall, you'd have the name
of the owner of the vehicle, you do not often have the name of
the owner of the child restraint, because it is sold
separately. And so, you would have a seat that fits, that's
tested with that vehicle, and the parents can know and rely on
that. And there are systems that have been designed that are
built in, so that when you buy that car, you have it. And if
you don't have children, but you still carry children because
you're an aunt or an uncle or a grandparent, you have that
seat, as well, so you don't have to go buy a separate seat
yourself. And there have been systems that have been designed
for 1- to 10-year-olds. And Volvo has done some, Chrysler did
at some point. So the industry has not really addressed this
issue--although it's been talking about it since the 1970s--
because it hasn't been required to do so. It's a perfect
example of how cars are not built for children.
Senator Klobuchar. One last question before--Mr. McCurdy,
you want to respond to that?
Mr. McCurdy. The information I have received on that--we
actually asked those questions yesterday when we were looking
at the car seats, and, I will tell you, that LATCH system is
hard--was not an easy one to hook up. And, again, I think
that's where we have to work with the car seat manufacturers.
I'm not trying to dispute Ms. Claybrook's claim, but reports
that I've actually heard is that parents have not been pleased
with some of those built-in systems, that they are not as
convenient and not as uniformly accepted. So, again, consumers
ultimately make the decision which vehicle, which--and I don't
think government is in a position to design those features in.
And I think we need to have the data and work with those
manufacturers to understand that.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. I'll be honest. I just can't
believe, in this day and age that there isn't some easier way
to design this system. And I don't believe that, you know,
anyone wants to hurt children. I just think that we need to
make this more of a priority, because this is, again, based on
my own experience, and we all bring our own experiences to the
Senate, but it seemed to me that there must be an easier way to
make these seats so that they're in the cars, yourself instead
of having to pull all these belts and trying to do it yourself,
and then you're not strong enough, and then they fall over on
the side.
Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Let me follow-up, if I may. Ms. Claybrook, when I asked my
first question earlier to Mr. Medford about the TREAD Act and
the comprehensive safety test with child restraints, et cetera,
you communicated that they were working on something. I'd like
to hear your comments. I should have asked for your comments,
as well.
Ms. Claybrook. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, the TREAD Act said, in 2000, that, within 2
years, they had to issue a child-safety standard that protected
children in side-impact crashes. And in 2002, before that
deadline occurred, the agency issued a notice, which said that
they just couldn't do it. They were going to issue an advance
notice, and then they were going to work on it. But they never
really had a all-points call for help on this, they didn't have
a public hearing on it, they had a notice, but that's it. They
didn't inform the Committee. And it's now been 7 years since
that--almost 7 years since that law was passed, and it's just,
to me, an example of how this issue is not a priority.
Now, there is a safety standard for side-impact protection
that Dr. Runge issued in a proposed form in 2004, for adults,
that because of the way that it's written--at least the
proposal was written--would require side-head airbags for
adults. But in that side-impact standard, it doesn't have them
in the rear seat, which is where we have children, including
older children, 12-year-old children, for example; and in the
front seat design for the side-head airbags, it says that
children under 12 would submarine and could be ejected from the
vehicle, the way they've got the proposed rule written. So,
there are two side-impact issues here, and I think that the
agency definitely ought to put a priority on them. I don't know
how much money they've spent. I haven't had a chance to analyze
their budget for this and whether they've put as much money as
they should have into it.
But clearly, the integrated seat is really, to me, the
answer to this issue, because a lot of parents don't realize
that, in a side-impact crash--it's one of the worst crashes you
can have for a child, because the child is thrown sideways in a
side-impact crash. They have very small bones in their
backbone, and so, they are very often likely to be quadriplegic
and paraplegic as a result, and, if they're put in seatbelts,
which some children at those ages are, then they're really in
deep trouble.
So, I'm not telling Mr. McCurdy how to design his
integrated seats. That's the genius of the auto industry. And I
defer to the genius of the auto industry. But what happens is
that when you have a standard that is required in performance
terms, the industry stops lobbying against it, and they start
settling down and letting the engineers do their work. That's
the real issue here. And on the voluntary standards, by the
way, on the brake interlock, I don't understand why it
shouldn't just be required, because a voluntary standard means
the public is excluded from any participation in the rulemaking
process, there's no enforcement, the agency has no
responsibility to do anything, and the companies can change
their mind. And they've changed their minds all sorts of times,
and the whole issue of a voluntary standard is, ``Don't
regulate--don't require us to do it now. We'll take care of
it.'' And then, if they don't do it later, well, there's no
legislation pending at that moment, so nothing happens. And no
one knows they've stopped complying. I'll submit to the
Committee a list of when the industry has promised to do
something voluntarily, which is an avoidance-maneuver device,
as opposed to a real sincere interest in putting them in.
[The information referred to follows:]
Automakers: Safety Just Another ``Option''
The Industry's False Promises to Voluntarily Improve Vehicle
Compatibility and Side Impact Safety
Voluntary ``Standards'' Are Not Standards
Voluntary safety ``standards'' do not work, and the historical path
of automakers' voluntary efforts is paved with broken promises. In
fact, Congress rejected them almost three decades ago when it passed
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966. As the
Senate Committee Report stated:
The promotion of motor vehicle safety through voluntary
standards has largely failed. The unconditional imposition of
mandatory standards at the earliest practicable date is the
only course commensurate with the highway death and injury
toll. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Committee Report on S. 3005, The Traffic Safety Act of 1966,
June 23, 1966, at 271, 273, 274.
Not only were the 1966 Congressional legislators right, but
voluntary ``standards'' violate core principles of democratic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accountability and transparency:
Involve no mechanisms for accountability: If the voluntary
proposal proves dangerously deficient, automakers shirk
liability because there is no recourse for injured consumers,
nor for the government to initiate a defect investigation or
compel the industry to perform a recall;
Involve closed, secret processes and meetings: The public,
which is at risk, is shut out of the development of the
proposal, which instead is designed in secret by industry
working groups who are not subject to oversight, compliance
with statutory requirements, responsibility for explaining the
basis for their decisions, or judicial review of their
decisions;
Lack transparency: The public has no means to secure an
independent evaluation of the quality of the industry's
voluntary tests or standards. The public receives no
verification that a particular vehicle actually complies with
the industry's voluntary tests, as they do with government
standards that are subject to public compliance testing and
enforcement, and there is no vehicle sticker at the point-of-
sale to indicate that a standard is met;
Lack a baseline for safety: High-income purchasers, who can
afford safety extras may be protected, but low-income
purchasers remain vulnerable to cost-based decisions by
manufacturers; and
Produce weak and non-binding results: Proposals are
invariably weak because they represent the lowest common
denominator among companies looking out for their own costs and
product plans, and there is no obligation to install technology
in compliance with the group standard, meaning that companies
can change their minds at will and decide to withdraw any
protection offered by the voluntary ``standard.''
History of Broken Promises
When it comes to voluntary agreements, automakers have reneged or
retreated on promises for decades. From General Motors' promises in
1970 to voluntarily put air bags in all its vehicles by the mid-1970s
(GM installed just 10,000 in model year 1974 and 1975 vehicles, and
then discontinued the program), to Ford, DaimlerChrysler and GM's
recent recanting of their widely publicized 2001 promises to
voluntarily improve the fuel economy of their light trucks by 25
percent (withdrawn after the threat of Congressional action on fuel
economy receded), ``voluntary'' is often just another name for the
manufacturers' tactical maneuvers and delay.
The industry's approach to interior vehicle head protection
illustrates how, for automakers, safety is optional. In 1970s, General
Motors began to improve head protection in its vehicles with such
technologies as air gap head protection padding installed in critical
interior roof areas. However, by the 1980s GM had discontinued
designing in such protections in most of its vehicles, preferring to
focus on more marketable performance characteristics, such as
horsepower and acceleration.
In 2003, as part of a supposed effort to improve vehicle
compatibility, automakers announced a voluntary plan to test and
install side air bags in most new vehicles. The plan, however, does not
make any specific commitment to redesigning vehicles to improve side-
impact safety. Moreover, there is no requirement that all vehicles
become compliant with the plan, and no outside body will verify vehicle
compliance. In fact, even the safety tests developed for the side air
bags are voluntary and unbinding. The plan--developed in closed, secret
deliberations--involves no procedural or judicial oversight, provides
no mechanisms for accountability, and offers no baseline for safety.
Just the year before, General Motors, in cost-cutting measures,
made side-air bags--as well as anti-lock breaks--optional equipment in
a number of models where they had been standard. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Incantalupo, Tom. ``A Drive For Safer Autos Advocates Press For
Action As U.S. Weighs Costs, Benefits.'' Newsday Long Island, NY) May
14, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industry's Refusal To Improve Safety of ``Cash Cows''
Why should the industry be trusted on safety when auto
manufacturers have unblinkly faced the carnage inflicted on other
motorists from light trucks' high bumpers and menacing front grilles,
building ever-more heavy and terrible SUVs over time and continuing to
market them militaristically, such as with ads calling the Lincoln
Navigator an ``urban assault vehicle.'' In fact, General Motors' new
Hummer is a direct adaptation of a military vehicle. The chief designer
of the upcoming 2006 Toyota Tundra brags that his aggressive design
reflects ``the power of the fist.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Rechtin, Mark. ``Toyota Concept Truck hints at next Tundra.''
Automotive News January 4, 2004. .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1998, the auto industry promised the NHTSA Administrator Dr.
Ricardo Martinez that it would make modifications to achieve safer
designs, mainly by adjusting vehicle suspension, but the industry
refused to provide any details of their plans. Consequently, the
promise rang hollow as vehicles continued to be designed large and
aggressive, and the resulting highway carnage continued.
In December 2003, auto manufacturers announced a voluntary
initiative to address incompatibility and aggressivity. The plan, which
would be phased in on most vehicles by September 2009, would phase in
side air bags and lower bumpers of SUVs or add a barrier to prevent
them from riding over cars.
Yet the Alliance makes no specific commitments to redesign vehicles
to protect consumers, despite the fact that it has known for decades
that pickup trucks act as battering rams in crashes, and that that the
height and stiffness of SUVs makes them major killers on the highway.
Moreover, there is no requirement that all vehicles become compliant
with the plan, and no outside body will verify vehicle compliance.
A voluntary ``standards'' program is a particularly inapt solution
where, as here, thousands of lives are at stake, the manufacturers have
long been on notice of the serious safety hazards in these vehicles,
and the externalities of their marketing-driven decisions to produce
ever-more aggressive and deadly vehicles are imposing needless
suffering and costs on all of us.
Ms. Claybrook. I'm not saying, in this case, they're not
sincerely interested. I'm not saying you haven't done a great
job, Mr. McCurdy, in designing these systems. I applaud you for
that. Thank you. But let's just make sure that everyone knows
that they're in every vehicle. That's all. We just want to make
sure they're in every vehicle.
So, I--the other point that I'd--if I could take one or
more minutes----
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Ms. Claybrook.--on the child restraints, which is that the
NCAP, the New Car Assessment Program, which tests cars at
approximately 5 miles an hour above the standard, the only NCAP
program, New Car Assessment Program, for child restraints is
whether the restraints fit. They don't test it at a higher
speed than the standard. So, they don't have a front, rear,
rollover, side, or any kind of vehicle test under the New Car
Assessment Program. Now, there's a hearing next week at NHTSA
which--at which this will be raised, but I just wanted the
Committee to realize that, again and again, the children are
treated as second-class citizens in both the NHTSA rulemaking
and in the auto industry decisionmaking.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Medford, let me also say, after the hearing, I'll look
closer at that report that we've been talking about regarding
the rear-facing cameras. We actually have a vehicle that has
one, and one of the things I believe you said earlier is, the
effectiveness at night is in question. I find that to be
opposite, because when you put the car in reverse, the reverse
lights, which are white, come up, and they illuminate the back
side. But, again, I'll look at your findings there. And you
also mentioned that a lot of this depends on the user, the
consumer, the person who's driving. And that's exactly right.
But you could make the same argument about rearview mirrors. If
they don't use those properly, and if they don't, you know, pay
close enough attention, there's no point in having a rearview
mirror. So, I'll look at that, and we'll follow up with that
separately.
Dr. Gulbransen----
Dr. Gulbransen. Yes.
Senator Pryor.--I'm sorry I butchered your name earlier. I
really----
Dr. Gulbransen. No, I----
Senator Pryor.--did not intend to do that. Let me ask, just
on a personal note, Was--the tragedy that you faced--was that
on private property?
Dr. Gulbransen. Yes, it was. I lived in a townhouse at the
time, and it was in the driveway.
Senator Pryor. And do you know if that was reported in----
Dr. Gulbransen. Well, I filled out a police report, but it
didn't become a statistic----
Senator Pryor. It did not.
Dr. Gulbransen.--from what I was told.
Senator Pryor. That was my question.
Dr. Gulbransen. That's what I----
Senator Pryor. Did not become----
Dr. Gulbransen.--was told.
Senator Pryor.--a statistic.
Dr. Gulbransen. Right.
Senator Pryor. OK. And so, when we were talking about
statistics earlier----
Dr. Gulbransen. Wasn't in there.
Senator Pryor.--you would agree that we need a better----
Dr. Gulbransen. Right.
Senator Pryor.--statistical collection----
Dr. Gulbransen. In order to make changes, you have to learn
from information. You've got to collect the information.
I just wanted to make one comment. I know I'm just a----
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Dr. Gulbransen.--study of one, or ``an'' of one, and I'm
just, you know, sort of a grassroots general pediatrician. And
I wouldn't want to be in the position of Mr. McCurdy, of going
back to the automobile industry, or Mr. Medford, who's got to
design these studies, which are very difficult to design, I can
imagine. As a pediatrician who reads a lot of research, a lot
of stuff is very flawed when you're reading it, and I can only
imagine how difficult this is going to be for him to design the
stuff. But just sort of like in a grassroots level, having been
an operator of a vehicle for many years without a camera, and
then with a camera, I can tell you, it definitely makes a
difference. It's not going to save everybody, but it's
definitely going to make a difference. It's remarkable how now
I don't want to drive a vehicle without a camera, because I use
it as, you know, an additional device. Yes, you've got to look
everywhere, plus now the camera. But it's really helpful. I'm
actually afraid to go in reverse if the car doesn't have a
camera. And in my practice, I think the patients are afraid to
tell me they don't have cameras. They park down the block or
something. But most of them will come in now, and they say,
``You know, I got a camera. Now I wouldn't go''--the comment is
always the same, ``I can't drive without one.'' And it's not
perfect, but certainly it's going to be helpful. I mean, I used
to be a kindergarten teacher, believe it or not, and there are
actually--I'd call your--to your attention to this one handout
here. Sixty-two children behind this one vehicle. It's a well-
known, very popular American-made SUV. And there's actually
three classrooms worth of children behind that vehicle that
can't be seen by somebody who's driving in reverse. So, you
know, that's--it's just scary.
So, I can only tell you, from someone who actually lived
through the trauma, drove without a camera, drove with a
camera, it definitely makes a difference. I can only imagine,
if I had to, sort of, look forward, that the best technology
would probably envision--probably involve audio and visual at
the same time, because some people don't hear as well, some
people don't--or may not look--they may not look, because
they're looking somewhere else. So, it's going to have to be a
combination. But that's only my speculation.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. McCurdy, let me follow up with a question earlier, and
that is about the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers'
voluntary agreement on the brake-transmission shift interlock.
That's a voluntary agreement that your companies have entered
into. Was there anything that prompted that?
Mr. McCurdy. Well, I--I'll have to ask the staff, because
it was before my time. It may have been awareness on this
particular incident. I don't recall. If I could ask Rob?
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Mr. McCurdy. He's our----
Senator Pryor. Yes.
Mr. McCurdy.--safety expert.
Mr. Strassburger. Yes, it was Mr. Campbell--Representative
Campbell, working with Congressman Bass, coming to us, asking
us to look at the issue and take it on. And we did.
Senator Pryor. Great. And could you identify yourself, for
the record, please?
Mr. Strassburger. Rob Strassburger, with the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
And, Mr. McCurdy, this agreement that you've entered into,
does it require all of your association's vehicles to have that
device?
Mr. McCurdy. All have agreed to participate in that, yes.
Senator Pryor. Does that mean every single vehicle will
have it?
Mr. McCurdy. Yes.
Senator Pryor. OK. And I've heard some discussion earlier
about ``in key positions,'' which I'm not 100-percent sure I
understand. Does that mean----
Mr. McCurdy. I've spent a lot of time asking that same
question, Senator, trying to understand the acronym and make
sure that it's there. And I've been, again, kind of tutored by
my staff that one of the reasons there appear to be some
differences in the language is that actually, believe it or
not, the nature of the keys are changing so dramatically. What
you and I probably think of as a traditional key, that concept
is changing, they're moving to start buttons and they're going
more electronic. So, they wanted to get away from just kind of
the standard vision of a key, but they are talking about it in
all positions.
Senator Pryor. OK, so they're talking about it. It'll work
all the time, no matter what the key position, or whatever, may
be?
Mr. McCurdy. That's my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. And----
Ms. Claybrook. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on one
question you asked----
Senator Pryor. Yes.
Ms. Claybrook.--very briefly, which is, the auto industry--
--
Senator Pryor. Microphone, please.
Ms. Claybrook. Sorry. The auto industry has been sued for
not having it's break-shift interlock for a number of years.
This is not something they didn't know about. I would say it
goes back 15 years. And the foreign industry, in 1995, pretty
much agreed to put the brake-shift interlock in, and the
Detroit manufacturers would not. And then, there were 20/20 and
60 Minutes programs--I can't remember which ones--disclosing
this. So, there's been a lot of pressure about this issue. It's
not a brand-new issue. I am deeply grateful that Representative
Campbell and Congressman Bass pushed the companies to take it
the next step. But it's not a brand-new issue. I just wanted--
--
Senator Pryor. Right.
Ms. Claybrook.--to--for the record.
Senator Pryor. I understand that, and I think the Committee
does, as well.
But here's my last question, Mr. McCurdy. On this issue--
would the manufacturers be opposed to a statutory requirement
that this be done? And if so, why?
Mr. McCurdy. Senator--and I indicated this in personal
conversations with Senator Sununu, that if the Senator believes
it's essential to memorialize this agreement, then we would be
supportive of doing so.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Mr. McCurdy. Is that clear? I mean, I----
Senator Pryor. Yes. No, I just didn't know if there was a
good reason why we shouldn't do that. But, OK, we'll continue
to work with you on that.
And the last question I had was on the auto-reverse
windows. We've talked a little bit about those today. But, as I
understand it, the technology exists, they've been using these,
I guess, in Europe. I don't know if they're required in Europe.
I don't know their exact circumstances. But, as I understand,
it's $10 to maybe $15, on average, a window, something like
that. Is this something that your alliance would consider doing
on a voluntary basis, or, there again, is it something that
NHTSA thinks should be done by regulation, or should we----
Mr. McCurdy. Senator, we've worked with NHTSA and--on the
changing of the nature of the shift on the--and activator--on
the power windows. Before, it was one that could be
accidentally suppressed--or depressed, that, therefore,
continued engagement. And so, the design changes were to make
those that they were suppressed--or leveled out. And then, last
year, it was amended again to make sure it had to be a lift-up-
and-out----
Senator Pryor. Right.
Mr. McCurdy.--in order to raise the window. And that's
becoming the standard. That's where auto manufacturers are
going.
I actually asked a question, trying to understand, too, on
the auto-reverse situation--some automakers--first of all, it's
not required, to the best of my members' recollection, in
Europe or in Japan, even though it's--I think, Ms. Claybrook's
correct that in Japan it appears to be more widely used. In
some vehicles--in the vehicle I was riding in yesterday, in the
express position, it is an automatic reverse. But in some
situations, believe it or not, you don't want it having auto-
reverse, because if someone were trying to actually reach into
your car, and you didn't want them to be reaching into your
car--criminal act or something--they could actually force the
window down. So, that's why the lift-up-and-out--so, it's only
in the express position that it would--that it goes down. On
others, you actually have it where it would--where you couldn't
force that down. So, there are some trade-offs there. I'm not
providing an excuse. I'm just telling you that--just some of
the technical questions that have been raised. And, again, I
think we'll--we're willing to work with the Senate and the
leaders and NHTSA to try and find out what is that best
approach.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. McCurdy. And, again, you know--I apologize--this is
where data really is critical, just really understanding the
full impact of that. It does sound easy. I don't think it is as
much a cost issue as it is some other factors. But, again,
we're open to working with the Senate on this.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Now, Senator Sununu, do you have any other questions?
Senator Sununu. Just a follow-up to the question of cost
that you asked, for Mr. Medford, because I do want to be clear
about the cost of the--as clear as we can be about the cost of
the auto-reverse. Ten years ago, I think NHTSA's estimate was
that it would be $100 a window to implement. I think their
current estimate, or the 2004 estimate, was $8 to $12.50 a
window. So, don't you think it's reasonable to assume, not only
can that cost profile be beaten today, but that if this is
established as a standard feature, we can expect it to be
significantly less than that $8 figure?
Mr. Medford. Certainly, Senator, that--if the volume were
to increase, the prices are likely to be reduced. I think the--
there are two types of auto-reverse systems. NHTSA actually has
an optional requirement in its window standard that is more
severe and stringent than the one that exists in the European
standard. And so, they think there may be some differences in
cost, if you had to comply with that one, versus the other one.
And the figures that you quoted, that were in the 2004 notice,
or before that more stringent one than currently exists as an
option in our standard today. And it would be less for the
Europeans, we think.
Senator Sununu. Thank you for the clarification.
Ms. Claybrook?
Ms. Claybrook. Yes, I just wanted to comment that 80
percent of all the vehicles in Europe today have the auto-
reverse in every window. So, I just want the record to be clear
on that.
And, second, for Mr. McCurdy, if we're going to have data--
we don't collect data as well as we should yet--but in 2004 at
least eight children were strangled by power windows. And I
have never heard of a complaint yet, either in Europe, or in
the United States to the few equipped vehicles that are here,
where someone said that some criminal tried to get into their
vehicle and killed them because they had auto-reverse. So, if
we're going to rely on data, let's rely on data. And I know we
have that. And I'd love to have, you know, any further answer
to that, that you might have.
Mr. McCurdy. Well, I appreciate the gentlelady for the
clarification. And, again, for--this is my third week, so I----
Ms. Claybrook. I know it is. And I know----
Mr. McCurdy.--I've got to----
Ms. Claybrook. I know it is. I want to come visit you, so
we can talk some more.
Mr. McCurdy. Yes. No, I----
Ms. Claybrook. Right, OK.
Mr. McCurdy. We've had some previous experience, but it's
been a number of years. You know, and this is not meant in any
way--I asked, probably, a naive question yesterday when I was
in Detroit at this 4,000-acre facility, where 5,000 people are
doing safety and testing on automobiles, and been there for
decades, and looking at people who are so committed to the
purpose of safety. And if you listen to them, there is a real
commitment. And no one is there trying to design things that
intentionally cause harm. And I understand that NHTSA--I don't
know what your budget is on testing, but I know that you do
some in Ohio, and there's a lot of contract--it's a huge
amount--as do other auto manufacturers. And my naive question
was, Where does Public Citizen do their testing? And I got this
blank look. And the fact of the matter is, you do not have a
budget for that. And there's literally millions of dollars
spent on this.
So, I'm offering, again, an invitation for you all, as
Members and staff and advocates, to actually come and observe
and see. And some people will never, you know, be totally
convinced. Perfect is often the enemy of the good. We want to
have some good results here. We want to work with you on those.
And that's the commitment that I give you. And I can't speak
for everybody. And I appreciate everybody saying, ``Well, thank
you for this.'' It's not me. It's that--it's been the work of
these manufacturers and literally hundreds of thousands of
people that have--making this commitment.
Ms. Claybrook. You know, Mr. McCurdy raises a point, which
is, there's no budget in this bill for NHTSA to do this work.
And there's no authorization amount. And Public Citizen, of
course, does not have a testing budget. Wish we did. We'd love
to do that. But we rely on the government. And so, one of the
things that we do do, Mr. McCurdy--and we'd love to do this
with you--is, we lobby for more money for NHTSA to do its
testing work. And I'd love to join hands with you and do this
together. Thank you.
Senator Sununu. Well, I appreciate that very much. I'm
going to conclude my time, there. I know you can be counted on
to lobby for more money for NHTSA----
[Laughter.]
Senator Sununu.--when the authorization period--when we
come to the authorization period. And when we have those
discussions here in this Subcommittee and the full Committee, I
think we need to take into consideration, and we will take into
consideration, everything that we're asking NHTSA to do,
whether it's through SAFETEA-LU or TREAD or this legislation
here.
I want to thank all of the panelists for taking the time to
be here. This hearing, I think, was very detailed, was--went
even a little bit longer than I had expected. But that's a good
thing, because that means we at least gave everyone a chance to
weigh in on the things that they think are of greatest concern
to all of us. And we--I think everyone here on the Committee
and the staff understand, whether they've been to facilities at
the auto manufacturers or not, that you've got great people
working at those companies. They're smart, they're capable.
They have families, they have kids. And there are probably more
than a few that have dealt with the kinds of issues and
problems that we're talking about here. So, I think everyone
recognizes that, when you're talking about children and
families, these issues do cut very close to home--through
family, through friends, through stories that you've heard, and
as we've heard here today.
Dr. Gulbransen and Packy Campbell, very grateful for you
being here, willing to speak on behalf of many, many others,
some of whom sitting behind you today. No one who hasn't been
as close to this as you have can really appreciate the
difficulties and the courage that it takes for you to share
your family's story. So, we're grateful for that.
Mr. Medford, we know you've got a challenging job, whatever
level we authorize for you, and we wish you well in your work.
And, Ms. Claybrook, thank you for being here today, for
your advocacy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor. Well, I want to thank Senator Sununu for his
leadership on this issue. It's very important.
Thank all the members--all the witnesses on the panel
today.
And I also want to say that the record will remain open for
2 weeks for Senators to offer written questions, and we'll work
with the staff on getting those responses back.
But, with that, I want to thank you all very much, and the
hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of the Association of International Automobile
Manufacturers, Inc. (AIAM)
The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM)
appreciates this opportunity to provide its views on vehicle safety for
children, the subject of a February 28 hearing and of legislation now
before the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. AIAM is a
trade association representing 14 international motor vehicle
manufacturers who account for 40 percent of all passenger cars and
light trucks sold annually in the United States. AIAM members include
Aston Martin, Ferrari, Honda, Hyundai, Isuzu, Kia, Maserati,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Peugeot, Renault, Subaru, Suzuki and Toyota. AIAM
also represents original equipment suppliers and other automotive-
related trade associations. For more information, visit our website at
www.aiam.org.
The focus of the Subcommittee's February 28 hearing was Senate bill
S. 694, introduced on February 27 by Senators John Sununu and Hillary
Clinton. Main elements of the bill are requirements for--
A NHTSA rulemaking to mandate that power windows have an
automatic reverse feature.
A NHTSA rulemaking to establish a rearward visibility
performance standard.
A NHTSA rulemaking to establish a vehicle roll-away
standard. This standard would assure that light vehicles having
an automatic transmission may not be shifted out of the
``Park'' position unless the service brake pedal is depressed.
This requirement would apply in all ignition key positions in
which the transmission can be shifted out of ``Park.''
NHTSA to establish a database of injuries and deaths in non-
traffic, non-crash events involving passenger motor vehicles.
NHTSA to establish a consumer information program relating
to child safety in non-traffic, non-crash incidents.
AIAM supports the establishment of child safety as a high priority
for the Subcommittee, and vehicle manufacturers view it as a high
priority for their own research and product development initiatives. We
also support NHTSA's efforts to obtain data on non-crash vehicle-
related events. We believe that such data provides the necessary,
rational starting point and the only appropriate basis for establishing
program priorities for new safety initiatives to address non-crash
events. The alternative of relying upon anecdotal information or
intuitive assessments could well lead to shifting of NHTSA and
manufacturer resources away from initiatives that have greater life-
saving potential, toward actions with lesser potential benefits. We
also support, as a necessary corollary to legislative direction for new
data collection efforts, the provision of adequate budget and staff
resources for NHTSA to collect and analyze the data. Without such
resources and staff, the data collection and analysis process could be
impaired or delayed.
We also support the establishment of a consumer information program
of the type included in the bill, to bring market incentives to bear in
promoting child safety. Reliance on such market-based approaches (based
upon previously developed and reliable data and analysis) can provide
safety benefits more quickly than regulatory approaches in many
instances. Ongoing efforts to educate parents and care-givers as to the
need to use child restraints and the proper use of those restraints
have been highly effective. We continue to support efforts to enhance
the performance of child restraint systems, including efforts to make
restraints easier to use. Extension of such consumer education programs
to include non-crash risks is a reasonable step.
Our specific comments on S. 694 are as follows:
Section 2(a)--Power Window Safety
Consistent with direction under the 2005 SAFETEA-LU legislation,
NHTSA completed a rulemaking to modify power window operating switch
design to require that the switches would operate to close a window
only if the switch were pulled up. See 71 Fed. Reg. 18673, April 12,
2006. In responding to petitions for reconsideration of that rule, the
agency stated that, based on available data, the measures adopted by
the agency would ``prevent the types of power window incidents that
have been documented.'' See 71 Fed. Reg. 18679. The agency went on to
state that risk scenarios presented by safety advocacy organizations
``lacked any documentation that any such cases have actually
occurred.'' Id. Without any documented evidence that a safety problem
beyond that addressed by the 2006 NHTSA rule exists, the redirection of
agency and manufacturer resources to implement automatic reverse
features across-the-board cannot be justified. However, as noted above,
we support the enhancement of NHTSA's data collection capability for
non-crash incidents, and we would be open to reconsidering our
opposition to mandating auto-reverse if new data were to show a safety
need. If Congress deems it necessary to direct further action by NHTSA
on this matter, we urge that it direct NHTSA to conduct a review of the
newly acquired non-crash data in 2 years, and pursue further rulemaking
if justified based upon that review.
Section 2(b)--Rearward Visibility Performance Standard
If Congress mandates improvements in rearward visibility for light
vehicles, we support a true performance-based approach. For example, a
standard could specify an area behind a vehicle that must be visible to
the driver by some means. In this way, manufacturers may implement the
most suitable visibility systems, which could involve technology that
does not yet exist and could well vary among vehicle types. However, we
have two concerns with the language in S. 694 in this regard. First,
although the language of the bill on this point is not clear, the
section 2(f) definition of ``rear blind zone'' could be interpreted to
prevent manufacturers from relying on mirrors or enhanced rear window
design to achieve compliance. Section 2(f) appears to require that
areas beyond those visible through windows and mirrors must be visible,
even if such areas are not safety critical. (The existing bill language
could also be interpreted as excluding mirror and window performance
only in establishing phase-in priorities.) In either case, it is not
clear why visibility provided by windows and mirrors should
automatically be excluded from consideration. Second, NHTSA's November
2006 report on rear visibility technology identifies significant
shortcomings in existing systems. It would be a mistake to mandate the
implementation of new technology until there is a reasonable basis to
conclude that the technology will perform well. Therefore, we urge
Congress to allow NHTSA to extend the time for completing rulemaking
and mandating compliance, based on the availability of effectively
performing rear visibility systems.
Section 2(d)--Preventing Vehicles From Rolling Away
S. 694 establishes the same ``brake-transmission shift interlock
(BTSI)'' performance criteria, with the same September 1, 2010,
effective date as the industry Voluntary Agreement to implement BTSI
that was submitted to NHTSA on August 7, 2006. The bill would require
manufacturers to report and NHTSA to publish the identification of
vehicle models that do not comply with the BTSI criteria; the voluntary
agreement includes a comparable commitment to publish this information.
The industry estimated that 80 percent of model year 2006 light
vehicles complied with BTSI criteria, and 98 percent of model year 2009
light vehicles are projected to comply.
All light vehicles produced by AIAM member companies already
comply. Although we would not oppose a requirement for BTSI, we do not
see a substantive safety benefit that would result from enactment of
section 2(d). We note that requiring a NHTSA rulemaking as in section
2(d) would, to some degree, divert agency resources away from
activities that would presumably have a greater safety benefit.
Section 2(e)--Database on Injuries and Deaths in Non-Traffic, Non-Crash
Events
The provisions of S. 694 regarding the establishment of a NHTSA
database of non-crash events are somewhat more detailed than the
comparable provisions in section 2012 and 10305 of SAFETEA-LU, but we
doubt that these minor differences would lead to any substantive
changes in the data system that NHTSA develops. As stated previously,
we support the development of this database. A more effective step that
Congress could take, however, would be to include in the bill an
authorization of appropriations in an amount NHTSA projects to be
necessary to implement the database, and to support inclusion of the
necessary funding in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget for the agency.
Section 3--Child Safety Information Program
We support the child safety information program described in
section 3. We also support NHTSA's ongoing effort to make the LATCH
system for child restraints more effective and easy to use, and the
provision of consumer information to encourage proper use of child
restraint systems.
______
Prepared Statement of Sally Greenberg, Senior Product Safety Counsel,
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.
Introduction
Consumers Union (CU), \1\ nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports
(CR), welcomes the opportunity to submit comments to members of the
Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety. CU has been testing cars and reporting our findings
to readers since the organization's founding in 1936. CU regularly
testifies before Congress on issues ranging from automotive safety to
health care to telecommunications and financial privacy.
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\1\ Consumer Reports ' is published by Consumers Union,
an expert, independent nonprofit organization whose mission is to work
for a fair, just, and safe marketplace for all consumers and to empower
consumers to protect themselves. To achieve this mission, we test,
inform, and protect. To maintain our independence and impartiality,
Consumers Union accepts no outside advertising and no free test
samples, and has no agenda other than the interests of consumers.
Consumers Union supports itself through the sale of our information
products and services, individual contributions, and a few
noncommercial grants.
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The topic for discussion this morning, vehicle safety for children,
is a top legislative priority for Consumers Union. This Senate Commerce
Committee has a proud history of enacting legislation that has provided
critical protections for children and adults riding in passenger
vehicles. It is not an exaggeration to say that had this Committee not
acted on seat belts, air bags, child car seats, roof crush, rollover
and many other auto safety issues, many thousands of people would
either not be alive today or would have suffered grievous injury.
This hearing provides us with a welcome opportunity to share with
Members of this Subcommittee concerns about the unfinished business of
keeping children safe in and around cars. Our testimony focuses on four
key areas of interest for us both in terms of our testing and our
public policy work: blind zones, LATCH car-seat installation system,
power window switches, and brake-shift interlock.
The Problem of Backing Over Children
Every year, thousands of children are hurt or die because a driver
backing up couldn't see them. Consumers Union has studied the problem
and has found that all vehicles today have blind zones that prevent
drivers from being able to see what is behind them. We also learned
that some vehicles have far larger blind zones than others.
Several years ago, Consumer Reports began measuring blind zones for
every car and truck we test at our Auto Test Division in Connecticut.
(see CR's Best and Worst Blind zone chart in the Appendix) We put a 28"
cone behind the vehicle that approximates the size of a 1-2 year-old
child and asked a 5,8" male driver and a 5,1" female driver to use
their rear view and side mirrors to attempt to see what is behind them
as they back up. The results of our testing have been startling. While
all vehicles have blind zones that are dangerous, some vehicles have
blind areas as large as 69 feet, a sure recipe for disaster if a child
is in back of that car or truck. Back-overs are not ``freak''
accidents--they happen all too often and most important, are completely
preventable.
Currently, there are three sources of data on backing-over
incidents that provide insights into the dimensions of this problem:
\2\
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\2\ With the enactment of SAFETEA in 2005, NHTSA is now required to
collect these data. Section 255 of that law directs the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to establish a method for
collection of ``non-traffic non-crash data'' on ``back-overs, power
window incidents, hyperthermia, fires and other related incidents.''
According to a 2005 report from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), 7,475 children were treated in
hospital emergency rooms after being struck or rolled over by a
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vehicle moving in reverse during the 2001-2003 period.
KIDS AND CARS \3\ own data--which is the only database that
currently tracks non-traffic incidents--shows at least 550
fatal back-over incidents occurred from 2000-2007, primarily
involving children under the age of 5. Most of these incidents
took place in residential driveways or parking lots. An injury
or death occurred in 99 percent of cases documented in the
database. Over 60 percent of backing-up incidents involved a
larger size vehicle, (truck, van, SUV). Tragically, in over 70
percent of these incidents, a parent or close relative was
behind the wheel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ KIDS AND CARS is a nonprofit safety organization based in
Kansas whose founder and president, Janette Fennell, has maintained a
database of statistics on back-over and other non-traffic incidents
since 1999. The government has never gathered these data. Non-traffic,
non-crash incidents occur when a car is either parked or backing up or
moving forward slowly and not driving on the roadways or thoroughfares.
KIDS AND CARS data indicate that back-over incidents have grown each
year as the popularity of longer, higher vehicles like SUVs, pickup
trucks and to a lesser extent, minivans has grown. (NHTSA disputes that
the numbers are growing, while acknowledging it doesn't have good data
to prove or disprove that assertion. Vehicle Backover Avoidance
Technology Study, p. 13.)
NHTSA's recent report, ``Vehicle Backover Avoidance
Technology Study,'' [hereinafter Backover Report] released in
November 2006, used 1998 death certificate data to estimate
that there were 183 fatalities per year from back-over
incidents, and between 6,700 and 7,419 injuries. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ NHTSA's report notes the agency's problem in sizing-up the
dimensions of the problem: ``The magnitude of the back-over problem has
been estimated based on available data. Much of the difficulty in
determining an exact count of back-over crashes is due to the fact that
NHTSA databases mainly cover traffic crashes, which excludes back-over
crashes that occur outside of the traffic-way (e.g., on private
property). In response to Sections 2012 and 10305 of SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA
is currently in the process of exploring alternate ways of developing a
system to improve the collection of non-traffic vehicle-related
incidents. Information on the development is contained in the section
on `Plans to improve data collection in the United States' of this
report.'' Page 13, NHTSA Backover Study.
Young children are impulsive and unpredictable and they have little
understanding of danger. They do not recognize boundaries such as
property lines, sidewalks, driveways or parking spaces. Toddlers have
established independent mobility between the ages of 12-23 months, and
because of their relatively small size, they are often not easily
visible to caregivers. Their concept of personal safety is also
minimal. Back-overs are often the predictable consequence of a child
following a parent into the driveway without the parent's knowledge.
That is the story parents tell us time again--they did not know the
child had followed them out of the house.
The tragic consequences of a parent or caregiver not seeing a child
and backing over that child are enormous. Dr. Greg Gulbransen, a
pediatrician, is here today to describe from personal experience the
tragic result of his inability to see his little son Cameron as Dr.
Gulbransen backed his car into his own driveway.
CU is committed not only to educating parents to the dangers of
blind zones through our publication, Consumer Reports, but to working
for the enactment of legislation that will require that all cars to
meet a rearward visibility standard. CU believes that if technology
exists to prevent these terrible incidents and the cost is reasonable,
such technology should be standard equipment for all vehicles. This is
the provision in the Kids and Cars Safety Act (S. 1948, 109th Congress)
pertaining to back-over prevention:
(b) Rearward Visibility--Not later than 18 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue
regulations, applicable to all passenger motor vehicles,
requiring a rearward visibility performance standard that will
provide drivers with a means for detecting the presence of a
person or object behind the vehicle in order to prevent backing
incidents involving death and injury especially to small
children and disabled persons.
Does the technology exist? Yes, technology exists to allow drivers
to see behind them as they back up and has been used for years. The
legislation we are supporting, the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars
Safety Act of 2007, doesn't require a particular technology--it simply
calls for a rearward visibility performance standard which the
automakers can meet using any technology that satisfies the standard.
Consumer Reports has tested both rear bumper sensors that beep when
they detect an object in the vehicle path and rearview cameras. CR
found cameras to be the most effective for preventing a collision with
an object or person behind the vehicle. Automakers are experimenting
with new technologies all the time, including sensor systems that will
actually park the car.
Is the cost reasonable? NHTSA estimates the cost of cameras, the
most effective technology in current use for seeing what is behind the
vehicle, to be approximately $325. If the vehicle already has a monitor
for a navigation system, or other purpose, the cost is substantially
lower. Put that cost into perspective. A car DVD system costs $1,295-
$2,097, a moon or sun roof costs $700-$1,595, seat warmers cost $645-
$895. These are all options that many auto buyers are actively seek out
when buying a new car. Surely the cost of this technology is worth the
price if it saves a child's life.
Back-overs can happen in any vehicle because all vehicles have
blind zones--the area behind a vehicle you can't see from the driver's
seat. The danger tends to increase with larger vehicles. As CU's Auto
Test Site Director David Champion has noted the longer and higher the
vehicle, the more difficult it is to see a child or something on the
ground behind.
Consumer Reports also advises our readers that ``it's always best
to look carefully behind the vehicle before you get in and again before
you put the car in gear and back up. Remember to back up slowly, and
pay attention to your mirrors.''
Consumers Union joins with other safety groups--including KIDS AND
CARS, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public Citizen, US PIRG,
the American Academy of Pediatrics, in urging Senators to support
legislation to require a rearward visibility standard in all vehicles.
That measure is included in a bill that is co-sponsored by Senators
Hillary Clinton and John Sununu, S. 1948 in last year's Congress and
will be introduced on February 27, 2007 during the 110th Congress.
We also endorse KIDS AND CARS' recommendations to keep children
safe as well.
These recommendations include:
Walk around and behind a vehicle prior to moving it.
Know where your kids are. Make children move away from your
vehicle to a place where they are in full view before moving
the car and know that another adult is properly supervising
children before moving your vehicle.
Teach children that ``parked'' vehicles might move. Let them
know that they can see the vehicle; but the driver might not be
able to see them.
Consider installing cross view mirrors, audible collision
detectors, rearview video camera and/or some type of back-up
detection device.
Measure the size of your blind zone (area) behind the
vehicles you drive. A 5,1" driver in a pickup truck can have a
rear blind spot of 7 feet wide by 50 feet long.
Be aware that steep inclines and large SUV's, vans and
trucks add to the difficulty of seeing behind a vehicle.
Hold children's hand when leaving the vehicle.
Teach your children to never play in, around or behind a
vehicle.
Keep toys and other sports equipment off the driveway.
Never leave children alone in or around cars; not even for a
minute.
Keep vehicles locked at all times; even in the garage or
driveway.
Keys should never be left within reach of children.
Always make sure all child passengers have left the car
after it is parked.
Be especially careful about keeping children safe in and
around cars during busy times, schedule changes and periods of
crisis or holidays.
LATCH Car Seat Installation System
Consumers Union has long been concerned about the safety of child
passengers in cars. We know that when families with children are in the
market for a car, child safety is one of their top priorities. We also
know that parents and caregivers have struggled for years to install
car seats securely enough to ensure that their children will be safe in
the event of a crash. For many parents, getting a secure fit remains a
challenge.
Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (LATCH), an installation
system created to help standardize the way child restraints are
attached to vehicles without using a seat belt, has been in operation
since the NHTSA-promulgated regulation (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 225) became fully effective on September 1, 2002. All child
restraints and most new vehicles manufactured as of that date were
required to include hardware components designed to simplify child
safety seat installation and to reduce the continuing high incidence of
misuse and incorrect installation of child safety seats.
CR also noted in the article attached herein that ``The [LATCH]
system doesn't work equally well in all vehicles. In many cars, the new
attachment points are obscured or difficult to reach, so it's not easy
to use them even with some of the newest child seats. In other models,
the LATCH anchors are positioned too far out from the vehicle's seat,
making it difficult to secure the child seat tightly against the rear
seat's back cushion. Try your child seat in the vehicle before you
buy.''
In 2005 NHTSA conducted a survey to collect information about the
types of restraint systems being used to keep children safe while
riding in passenger vehicles. In particular, NHTSA was interested in
whether drivers with were using LATCH to secure their child safety
seats to the vehicle, and if so, were these seats properly installed.
This is what they found, which we thought was quite instructive:
55 percent of child safety seats, located in a seating
position equipped with an upper anchor were attached to the
vehicle using an upper tether. 45 percent of parents and
caregivers, however, are still not using the upper tethers.
13 percent of the time child safety seat was placed in a
seat position in the vehicle not equipped with lower anchors--
the seat belt was used to secure the child safety seat to the
vehicle--of course, since we're all taught to put kids in the
middle seat.
Among the 87 percent who do place the child safety seat at a
position equipped with lower anchors, 60 percent use the lower
attachments to secure the child safety seat to the vehicle.
81 percent of upper tether users and 74 percent of lower
attachments users said upper tether and/or lower attachments
were easy to use.
75 percent preferred lower attachments over seat belts of
those with experience using both lower attachments and seat
belts.
61 percent of upper tether non-users and 55 percent of lower
attachments non-users cited their lack of knowledge--not
knowing what they were, that they were available in the
vehicle, the importance of using them, or how to properly use
them--as the reason for not using them.
On February 8, 2007, NHTSA held a meeting to give the public an
opportunity to discuss their experiences using LATCH. Consumers Union
tests over 80 vehicles each year. We ask our engineers to fit car
seats--infant, toddler and booster seats--into a wide variety of cars
and light trucks, using both the LATCH system and seatbelts and
comparing the ease of use and other factors between cars and car seats.
We report the results to our readers, raising concerns about LATCH
systems that are particularly difficult to use or belts that could be
better designed. Consumers Union's Jennifer Stockburger, an automotive
engineer and mother of young children, made a presentation at the
February meeting in Washington, D.C., and that Power Point presentation
is attached.
Latch Effectiveness
CU's concerns about the ease of use and operation of LATCH is
discussed below in the August 2005 issue of CR, accompanied by photos:
The Reality of Latch
CHEVROLET AVALANCHE--Where do you put the child seat while securing
the tether? The Avalanche illustrates the potential challenge in
securing a low tether anchor.
Unfortunately, there are factors that can make installation of
LATCH-equipped seats difficult or, in some cases, impossible.
Typically, the safest spot to install a child seat is in the center
position of the rear seat. That positions the child farthest from
danger in an impact. Unfortunately, most vehicles don't equip their
vehicles with lower anchors in the center seats. Chrysler Group and
General Motors are good at providing three sets of attachments in their
larger vehicles, and Ford owner's manuals often allow for child seats
to be positioned in the middle using the inner anchors from the left
and right side LATCH anchors.
Access to the lower anchors varies from vehicle to vehicle; the
best anchors allow the seat to quickly click or be hooked into place,
while others make it awkward to attach and/or detach. Some vehicles
have very firm seat cushions, making it difficult to fit your hand in
to find and access the anchor. Other vehicles have soft cushions, but
the anchor is recessed so far back that it's difficult to reach.
Optimally located lower anchors provide enough space for an adult hand
to easily access them.
Getting to the top tethers can also be a difficult and frustrating
process. Many vehicles have well-positioned anchors that are readily
accessible; parents can simply run the top tether under the head
restraint and clip it into the top tether anchor. Never run the tether
over a removable or adjustable head restraint because the soft material
in the head restraint can compress and create slack in the tether
strap. It is better to remove or raise the restraint and run the tether
over the seatback.
Of all vehicle types, sedans generally have tether anchors that are
easiest to reach, located on the rear deck behind the seats, typically
set inside a small, covered recess. Wagons, SUVs, and hatchbacks with
good tether anchors have them positioned midway up the back of the
seats, sometimes with plastic covers that snap in place when they
aren't being used. Ideal setups provide one top tether anchor for each
seat location, so the straps are anchored straight back without
twisting.
But many wagons and hatchbacks also have less-friendly tether
anchor locations. Some place the anchors at the base of the seat where
it folds. These can be a full arm's-length away, making them already
difficult to reach. To access this anchor from within the cabin, it may
be necessary to tilt the seatback forward--a challenging maneuver if a
large child seat is already on the vehicle's seat. Other models place
the tether anchors beneath carpet or covers in the cargo floor.
Hatchbacks and wagons also often have a cargo cover that protects
luggage from the sun or the prying eyes of thieves. But the space
between the cargo cover and the seatback is often very narrow, making
it impossible to fit the tether strap through. The cover must be
removed to access and install the tether strap, which is just another
annoyance to deal with and adds to the potential for parents or
caregivers to opt out of a crucial step.
TOYOTA RAV4--Even SUVs marketed to families can present challenges
to child-safety-seat installation, especially when attaching the lower
tether anchor. Be sure to try installing a seat before buying a
vehicle.
CU's Recommendations for Improving LATCH Usability & Effectiveness:
LATCH anchors should be required in center rear seats.
Improve top tether access and visibility.
Improve lower and upper anchor clearance so they can be
reached easily.
Ensure that routing for top tethers isn't impaired by head
restraints or other vehicle components.
Ensure top tethers on the seats are lengthy enough (CR found
they were sometimes too short to reach the tether anchor in the
vehicle).
Power Window Hazards
NHTSA estimated in a 1997 study that 499 people each year visit
emergency rooms due to power window injuries, almost \1/3\ of those
under the age of 6, another nearly \1/3\ between the age of 6 and 15.
Since 1971, \5\ at least 59 children have been strangled to death and
thousands more children and adults injured by power windows. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Feb. 1, 1971, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 118,
regulating power windows, was adopted by NHTSA setting minimal safety
standards.
\6\ The number of power windows has increased dramatically over the
past three decades. In 1973, only 1.9 million new vehicles in North
America had power windows. By 1994 that number was 68.1 percent for
passenger cars and 55.3 percent for light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Senate Commerce Committee enacted SAFETEA-LU in 2005, it
included a critically important provision to prevent young children
from accidentally closing power windows on their necks, causing
strangulation. Section 258 of SAFETEA-LU \7\ called for the elimination
of hazardous armrest rocker switches, requiring the safer pull-up or
pull-out switches; NHTSA then published rules requiring safer switches
on all new passenger vehicles manufactured after October 1, 2008. \8\
We have been pleased to see that Model Year 2007 vehicles, with only a
few exceptions, now employ the safer switches. There remains some
unfinished business, however.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ www.consumersunion.org/pub/1205%20Alliance%20rebuttal.pdf.
\8\ NPR story on the new requirement http://216.35.221.77/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=3915926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While getting rid of dangerous switches is a big leap forward, and
should prevent most of the accidental strangulations by children who
are leaning on a switch with their heads in the window path, nonfatal
injuries are still a major safety hazard. Injuries inflicted by power
windows have a very long history--and power windows have enormous
force: they will literally slice a cucumber or green pepper in two. The
injuries that occur when another person inadvertently closes the power
window on a child's fingers or hand or arm are often gruesome.
And yet there is an easy fix for this hazard--auto-reverse or anti-
trap technology that is commonly used in Europe should also be the
standard here. Like garage or elevator door sensors that open the door
if they detect an obstruction, this technology sends a window down if
it meets with an obstacle in its path. Such technology would have saved
the many lives of children strangled by power windows or are missing
fingers or pieces of fingers that were amputated by a power window.
None of this information will come as a surprise to NHTSA--or the
auto industry. Consumers Union has copies of hundreds of reports sent
over the past 4 decades to both the automakers and NHTSA with
heartbreaking stories of small children with amputated fingers or
broken arms and worst of all, strangulations of children because
another child or adult didn't realize she or he was in the path of the
window. The history of the government's failure to require safe power
window designs--and the industry's failure to address the hazard--when
the technology is readily available and the cost is modest, is
difficult to understand.
At least 80 percent of the European car market has vehicles with
anti-trap windows--they have become custom there. An effective anti-
trap voluntary standard was adopted by the European parliament and the
Council of the European Union in February of 2000, \9\ Since that time,
no power window fatalities have been recorded in any vehicle meeting
European standards--and so, though voluntary, nearly every European
automakers has adopted this technology. \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Petition, Center for Auto Safety, Filed with NHTSA August
19, 2003, page 2. www.autosafety.org.
\10\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By contrast, only 15-20 percent of U.S. vehicles have this
technology. The same models of cars equipped with auto-reverse power
windows in Europe do not have that technology in their U.S. version,
even as an option--the Ford Focus is one example. The estimated cost of
making all windows ``anti-trap'' is, according to NHTSA, $8-$12 per
window for a grand total of less than $50.00 per car. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legislation introduced by Senators Clinton and Sununu, the Cameron
Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 (S. 1948, 109th Congress)
addresses the hazard by requiring auto-reverse or ``anti-trap''
technology in all cars by a specific date:
(a) Power Window Safety--Not later than 18 months after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation
(referred to in this Act as the `Secretary') shall issue
regulations, applicable to all passenger motor vehicles, to
ensure that power windows and panels automatically reverse
direction when they detect an obstruction to prevent children
from being trapped, injured, or killed.
Previous NHTSA Proposals on Power Windows
In 1969 the government proposed auto-reverse technology for all
power windows--the automotive industry unanimously opposed this measure
and it was dropped. \12\ The resulting standard imposed minimal
performance requirements for power operated windows. Again in 1996
NHTSA proposed a rulemaking to remedy the hazards from power windows
but took no further action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We urge Members of this Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
Insurance, and Automotive Safety to support the Cameron Gulbransen Kids
and Cars Safety Act of 2007, which will require auto-reverse or anti-
trap technology and address once and for all the hazards to children
and others from power windows.
Brake Shift Interlock
Introduction
Technology to prevent vehicles from inadvertently being put into
gear by children or anyone else when the vehicle is in the ``Park''
position is known as Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock or BTSI. It is
an essential safety technology that requires depressing the brake pedal
to move the gear shift out of park. Since children typically cannot
reach the brake pedal, if BTSI is in place, they cannot place the car
into gear by themselves.
One of the witnesses at today's hearing, Packy Campbell from New
Hampshire, lost his 21 month old son Ian when Ian's brother set his
father's truck into motion and Ian was unable to move out of the way
when the truck suddenly started rolling in reverse. This is not an
isolated circumstance. KIDS AND CARS estimates that over 100 children
have died since 1998 by placing a vehicle into motion. The government
does not track these statistics because they typically do not occur on
public roadways and have not been officially part of the government
database. \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Section 255 of SAFETEA, enacted by Congress in 2005, now
requires that the government begin keeping track of injuries and deaths
involving automobiles even if they do not occur on public roadways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
S. 1948, introduced in October of 2005 as the Cameron Gulbransen
Kids and Cars Safety Act, included a provision calling for brake shift
interlock in all vehicles within 18 months after enactment. \14\ The
provision is below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ S. 1948, 109th Congress, pertinent section: (c) Preventing
Vehicles From Rolling Away--Not later than 18 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue regulations,
applicable to all passenger motor vehicles, requiring the vehicle
service brake to be engaged in all key positions and while the key is
out of the ignition, before starting the engine or engaging the
transmission in order to prevent accidents resulting from vehicles
accidentally or unintentionally rolling away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA announced on August 17, 2006 that the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and the Association of International Automobile
Manufacturers were entering into a voluntary agreement to ensure that
all vehicles sold in the U.S. with automatic transmissions will be
equipped with ``brake transmission system interlocks'' to prevent
children from moving the shift mechanisms out of park. \15\ Automakers
included in this agreement have agreed to comply by September 1, 2010.
\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See this site for information on BTSI:
http://dms.dot.gov/search/
searchResultsSimple.cfm?numberValue=25669&searchType=docket.
\16\ The agreement says that ``any vehicle under 10,000 pounds
produced for the United States market, with an automatic transmission
that includes a `Park' position shall have a system that requires that
the service brake be depressed before the transmission can be shifted
out of `Park'.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to NHTSA, approximately 80 percent of MY 2006 motor
vehicles are equipped with an automatic transmission control system
designed in accordance with the requirements of this agreement. More
than 98 percent of MY 2009 motor vehicles to be produced are forecasted
to be equipped with an automatic transmission control system designed
in accordance with this agreement.
While Consumers Union appreciates that automakers embrace the
importance of having BTSI on all vehicles, CU believes that voluntary
agreements are insufficient to ensure across-the-board compliance with
an important safety standard. Voluntary agreements are just that,
voluntary, and they don't bind the whole industry the way a mandatory
safety standard does. Indeed, a handful of automakers, are not bound by
the agreement because they are not members of the associations that
were signatories to the agreement, though they may well chose to
comply.
Below is the list of automakers that are part of the voluntary
agreement.
Participating Automakers:
Aston Martin
BMW Group
Ford Motor Company
Hyundai Motor
Maserati
Nissan
Suzuki
DaimlerChrysler Corporation
General Motors
Isuzu Motors
Mazda
Porsche
Toyota
Ferrari
Honda
Kia Motors
Mitsubishi Motors
Subaru
Volkswagen Group
The bill introduced on February 27, 2007 codifies the voluntary
agreement and makes it law, thus bringing all auto manufacturers under
the requirement to implement BTSI, but maintaining the same generous
timelines for compliance.
This is the bill's language on BTSI:
Preventing Vehicles From Rolling Away.--
(1) In General.--Not later than 24 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue regulations to
require light motor vehicles that are equipped with an
automatic transmission that includes a ``Park'' position to
have a system that requires the service brake to be de-pressed
before the transmission can be shifted out of ``Park''. This
system shall function in any starting system key position in
which the transmission can be shifted out of ``Park''.
(2) Applicability.--The regulation issued under paragraph (1)
shall apply to light motor vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2010.
The following is a list of Model Year 2007 vehicles that are not
equipped with Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock (BTSI) technology as
reported to NHTSA by the vehicle manufacturers:
Audi: A4/S4, A4/S4 Avant, A4/S4 Cabriolet
BMW: X3, Z4
Buick: Rendezvous
Cadillac: CTS
Chevrolet: Equinox, Express 1500, Express 15-Passenger Van,
Silverado Classic
Ford: E-150, E-350 15-Passenger Van, Freestar, Ranger
GMC: Savana, Savana 15-Passenger Van, Sierra Classic
Honda: S2000
Hummer: H2
Isuzu: Ascender 7
Jeep: Liberty, Patriot
Mazda: B-Series
Mercury: Monterey
Pontiac: Torrent
Saturn: Ion, VUE
Volkswagen: New Beetle
Conclusion
Consumer advocates working on product safety believe that if a
product hazard can be fixed for a reasonable cost, it should be done.
This is especially true with hazards to children. We don't believe in
playing the blame game--blaming parents for being careless or not
conscientious when a product harms or kill their children is
counterproductive and cruel. If we had played the blame game with
safety caps on medicines or poisons, on garage doors or cigarette
lighters, all of which have been redesigned for a reasonable cost with
children's safety in mind--we would have many more children lost to
injury or death.
Whenever we can, we should fix safety hazards for everyone, but
especially when they put our children at risk. We think this bill--
which addresses the hazards of back-over, power windows and brake shift
interlock, provides Members of Congress with a unique opportunity to
fix hazards to children at a reasonable cost.
We urge members of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee to support the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act
and thank you for your time and consideration of these vitally
important issues.
______
Consumer Reports--October 2003
Driving Blind
Every year, children are injured and killed because drivers don't
see them while backing up.
According to KIDS AND CARS, a nonprofit group that wants to improve
child safety around cars, back-over incidents last year killed at least
58 children.
A contributing factor is that consumers continue to buy larger
vehicles--minivans, pickups, and sport-utility vehicles--with larger
blind spots. A blind spot is the area behind a vehicle that the driver
can't see.
To help drivers back up, carmakers and aftermarket companies offer
two types of devices for vehicles: sensors and rear cameras. The
cameras are marketed as safety devices; the sensors, as parking
assists. KIDS AND CARS has called for vehicles to come equipped with
such systems. Now, sensors are optional in many larger vehicles;
cameras are optional in some higher-priced models.
We tested several aftermarket sensors and cameras that can be
installed on any vehicle, comparing them with original-equipment
versions.
The bottom line: Your first line of defense against back-over
accidents is to get out of your car and check behind it just before you
back up.
Rear-mounted video cameras also help prevent back-over accidents
because they let you see much of the area that's usually hidden in the
blind spot. But they tend to be expensive, from $400 to $900, not
including the cost of professional installation, which is recommended.
A plastic fish-eye lens that adheres to a rear window can provide
almost as much help as a video camera on certain vehicles and costs
only about $20.
The sensor systems in our tests, which cost $130 to $500 not
including professional installation costs, worked well for parking but
they aren't sensitive enough to be a reliable safety aid.
*************************************************************
CR Quick Take
The best way to prevent so-called back-over accidents is to walk
behind your car and check for obstructions.
If you want an extra margin of safety, first try the $20 Rear View
Safety Lens, which works on vertical rear windows like those in many
SUVs and minivans.
Camera systems provide a clearer picture and will work on any
vehicle, but they are expensive.
Rear sensor systems can help you park, but they aren't reliable
safety devices.
*************************************************************
The Problem of Rear Blind Spots
Back-over accidents usually occur when a person, often a child, is
hidden in a vehicle's rear blind spot. The longer the vehicle and the
higher the rear window, the bigger the blind spot and the more
difficult it is to see a child or object on the ground behind the
vehicle.
To illustrate that point, we measured the blind-spot area of a
sedan, a minivan, an SUV, and a pickup truck. We placed a 28-inch-high
traffic cone at varying distances behind the vehicle to measure how far
back it would have to be before a driver of average stature (5 feet 8
inches) and one of short stature (5 feet 1 inch) could see it.
We found that a Honda Accord sedan has a blind spot of roughly 12
feet for an average-height driver. That is, the driver may not see a
small object up to 12 feet behind the bumper. The blind spot for a
short driver in the Accord is 17 feet.
The Dodge Grand Caravan minivan has a blind spot of 13 feet for the
average-height driver and 23 feet for the short driver. The Toyota
Sequoia SUV is slightly worse: 14.5 feet for an average-height driver;
24.5 feet for a short driver.
By far the biggest blind spot, however, occurred with a Chevrolet
Avalanche pickup: 30 feet for an average-sized driver, 51 feet for a
short driver.
Your Choices
Camera systems. When the vehicle is shifted into reverse, a camera
sends a wide-angle view of the area behind the vehicle to a monitor
near the driver.
Best for seeing small children or objects in a vehicle's
blind spot. Camera systems also work as parking aids.
But neither model in our tests emits an audible alert when
you approach an object. These systems are expensive.
Details: To use the HitchCAM, your vehicle must have a tow
hitch; the camera is mounted in the trailer-hitch receiver and
broadcasts to a video screen attached to the inside of the
windshield. The camera for the Magna Donnelly Video Mirror
mounts to the rear of your vehicle and sends the image to a
small flip-down screen below the rear-view mirror.
Because it looks straight out the back, the HitchCAM shows more
area. The Video Mirror, which looks downward, displays less area
overall--about 4 feet behind the rear bumper--but enough to help
prevent a back-over accident. This view works better as a parking aid.
The Video Mirror also helped us back up to a trailer. (You must remove
the HitchCAM from the trailer hitch when connecting a trailer.) But the
Video Mirror was much less effective at night than the HitchCAM.
With both systems, image clarity and screen size didn't match those
of factory-installed cameras in the Acura MDX and the Lexus RX330. But
they provide a reasonable image.
Both systems worked well even when splashed with muddy water.
Wide-angle lens. The plastic lens sticks to the rear window and
allows you to see a wide-angle rear view.
Best for seeing objects in the blind spot, parking.
But the lens works only with vertical rear windows, such as
those in many SUVs, minivans, and wagons. It may interfere with
normal rear visibility. Back-seat passengers or cargo may block
the view, and the lens is subject to reflections. You must keep
it free from smudges.
The model we tested, the Elite Enterprises Rear View Safety Lens,
www .rearlens.com, is 6 x 8 inches and made of plastic. Because the
lens is small, details are hard to see. But the lens significantly
reduced the blind spot on most vehicles from 15 or more feet to about 2
feet.
Sensor systems. Using ultrasonic or microwave energy, sensors
detect objects within about 6 feet behind the vehicle and alert the
driver via a beep and/or a lighted display.
Best for a parking aid to help drivers avoid dinging fenders
and bumpers. Models in our tests detected large stationary
objects. For example, they generally picked up a 3-inch-wide
pole when it was 3 to 4 feet away from the vehicle.
But most could not detect objects low to the ground, such as
a bicycle or basketball, or a small moving object.
False signals can also be a problem. They were often caused by dips
in the road and surface changes. Systems with sensors near the rounded
edge of the bumper can pick up the sides of a garage and emit a false
warning. In time, these ``false positives'' may lull drivers into
ignoring the warnings.
All require professional installation.
The Rostra model may require cutting and bending the license plate
and could interfere with the tailgate latch. It might also prevent the
license-plate lights from illuminating the plate. The Guardian Alert
requires a 2-inch receiver tow hitch and 5-pin trailer wiring socket,
but is the only model that didn't require drilling into the vehicle.
All aftermarket systems performed about the same as factory-installed
sensors.
*************************************************************
CR Quick Recommendations
If you want an aid for parking, any of these products can help. To
help prevent a back-over accident, however, only the rear-mounted video
cameras and Rear View Safety Lens are reliable.
Of the two camera systems we tested, the HitchCAM provides the
larger and better-quality video display, but requires a 2-inch receiver
tow hitch and 5-pin trailer wiring socket for mounting. For half the
price, the Donnelly Video Mirror can be mounted on any vehicle with a
rear hatch.
Among sensor systems, the Rostra system is the most sensitive. For
half the price, the ReverseGuard provides good sensitivity but no
visual alert.
*************************************************************
Ratings--Backup Aids (Availability--Most models at retail stores
through 2003.)
Cameras--In order of display clarity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Screen
Brand Price Clarity of display size
($) (in.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HitchCAM HC-001 900 Good 2.75x2
Magna Donnelly Video 400 Fair 2x1.5
Mirror Reverse Aid 22336
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensors--In order of sensitivity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Features
Price ----------------------------------
Brand ($) Sensitivity No. of Audio Visual
sensors alert alert
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rostra 350 Very Good 2 Yes Yes
Obstacle
Sensing
System 250-
1594
ReverseGuard 200 Good 4 Yes No
Classic RA10
Echomaster EM- 130 Fair 2 or 4 Yes Yes
PV
Guardian 500 Poor 1 Yes Yes
Alert Hitch
Receiver
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Availability: Most models at retail stores through 2003.
*************************************************************
How To Avoid a Backover Accident--What You Can do
If children play in your driveway, park your car at the end of the
driveway close to the street.
Show your children how hard it is to see out the back of your car.
Let them see you disappear into the blind spot.
Just before backing up your vehicle, walk behind it to make sure
your path is clear. Be sure children are not so close as to be able to
dart behind you.
Look in your mirrors before you put the car in reverse to monitor
the rear area.
Look around while backing up, using all mirrors and looking over
both shoulders.
Back up slowly.
If you have a backup aid, pay attention to its audible or visual
warnings but don't rely solely on the aid.
______
Consumer Reports--August 2003
Which Power-Window Switches Are Safer?
At least 25 children have died during the past decade from injuries
involving power windows in cars, according to KIDS AND CARS, a
nonprofit group that tracks auto-safety issues involving children.
Typically, the child has his or her head out the window of a parked car
and accidentally leans on the window switch. The glass moves up
forcefully, choking the child.
Two types of switches are inherently riskier than others if they're
mounted horizontally on the door's armrest:
Rocker switches move the glass up when you press one end of the
switch, down when you press the other.
Toggle switches work when pushed forward or pulled back.
A third type, the lever switch, is safer because it makes it harder
to raise the window accidentally. Lever switches must be pulled up to
raise the glass. They generally have not been implicated in fatal
injuries, according to KIDS AND CARS. Switches of any design mounted
vertically or on an upswept armrest are harder to activate by accident.
Lever switches and auto-reverse sensors are common in Europe. But
auto-reverse is required in the U.S. only in vehicles with auto/one-
touch-up windows and remotely controlled windows. (BMW is recalling
some vehicles because of problems with the autoreverse mechanism.)
Clarence Ditlow, director of the Center for Auto Safety (and a
member of Consumers Union's board of directors), says, ``If garage
doors can have a reversing sensor, power windows should.'' His
organization has petitioned the government for upgraded safety
standards.
In response to a petition by safety groups including Consumers
Union, in April 2006, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) decided to ban power window rocker and toggle
switches from U.S. manufactured vehicles. Car makers will install
recessed or lever switches instead. They have until Oct. 1, 2008 to do
so.
The Big Three automakers say they abide by the safety standards in
place wherever their cars are sold. For example, Kristen Kinley, a
spokeswoman for Ford Motor Co., says its power windows meet and in some
cases exceed Federal standards.
KIDS AND CARS is working with Consumer Union for legislation
requiring a national performance standard for power windows.
*************************************************************
What You Can do
Never leave children alone in a car or the keys in the car when
kids are nearby. Pay close attention to the design and location of
window switches when shopping for a new car. Here's a basic rundown for
the vehicles we've reviewed:
Horizontal rocker switches. Most vehicles from Ford, Lincoln,
Mercury, Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac, GMC, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac, and
the Saturn Ion.
Horizontal toggle switches. Some vehicles from Chrysler including
the Dodge Neon, Stratus, and Intrepid, and Dodge trucks.
Lever switches, the safer type. Acura, Audi, BMW, Chrysler
Pacifica, Honda, Hyundai, Infiniti, most Isuzu models, Jaguar, Kia,
Lexus, most Mazda models, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Saturn L
and Vue, current Saab models, Subaru, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo.
______
Prepared Statement of Janette E. Fennell, President, KIDS AND CARS
Child safety and health is purported to be a top priority in this
country. Both the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) have
stated that safety is their top priority. Nevertheless, certain common
design features and equipment built into motor vehicles still place
children at risk of serious, even fatal, injuries in and around motor
vehicles.
In many ways, the development of motor vehicle technology has
improved safety and convenience. However, potential safety hazards have
accompanied the development of some technologies. Power windows are a
case in point. This technology was added as a convenience, but it has
also added new hazards. Power windows pose a serious threat of death
and injury to children when they are trapped by the window as it rises.
This danger has been documented for decades, since power windows first
became popular. \1\ Nothing has been done because the deaths and
injuries are not reported as part of the national traffic safety
statistics. In the 110th Congress, we have not only the opportunity but
the obligation to finally eradicate power window strangulation as a
cause of death and serious injury to children.
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\1\ Ralph Nader, May 1968 letter warning about the dangers of power
windows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress recently forced NHTSA to address one aspect of the risk
posed by power windows. In the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU),
Congress required all power window systems in motor vehicles to have
``pull-up or out'' switch designs which are safer than the rocker or
toggle switch designs. Rocker and toggle switches are known to be
dangerous because they can be pressed by accident, as when a child
unknowingly leans an elbow on a rocker switch, inadvertently closing
one or all of the power windows. ``Pull-up'' or ``pull-out'' switch
designs are not prone to this problem. This change is an important
safety advance but addresses only a portion of the injury problem.
Even with safer window switches, passengers are still in danger if
someone else in the vehicle intentionally closes a power window without
realizing that fingers or hands are in the way of the rising window.
Children continue to be killed and maimed by power windows. In December
of 2006, a Detroit, MI child was strangled to death by a power window.
The Detroit incident is particularly noteworthy because the vehicle
involved was a Pontiac Vibe, which has the safer power window switches.
To prevent these tragic injuries and deaths auto-reverse technology
is needed in all power windows. When a power window rises with 40-80
pounds of pressure and meets an obstruction, auto-reverse technology
would ensure that power windows would immediately reverse direction.
Eighty percent of vehicles sold in Europe already come equipped with
this simple, lifesaving technology. U.S. children deserve this same
protection.
In the U.S., auto manufacturers provide ``obstacle detections
devices for sliding doors and automatic liftgates.'' \2\ The industry
protects us from these moving door panels; but ignores power windows.
What's the difference? Children are just as likely to be injured by
power windows as they are by sliding minivan doors and power liftgates.
The industry needs to simply provide the same technology they already
utilize on doors and liftgates to power windows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Testimony of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance
testimony), page 4, presented at the hearing on Vehicle Safety for
Children, before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, February 28, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The American public, lawyers and safety advocates understand the
danger posed by power windows and that there is an available
technological solution. Safety advocates have been calling for an
improvement in power window safety for decades. Yet, NHTSA has denied
no less than 5 petitions requesting that auto-reverse technology be
added to power windows. NHTSA's reasons for denying the petitions are
the supposed lack of data and cost.
Current cost estimates are between $8-$10 per window. If this
technology becomes standard equipment on all vehicles the true cost
will range between $5-$7 per window or possibly lower. Even at current
cost estimates, this safety technology is far less expensive than many
optional convenience and entertainment features the manufacturers
include in their motor vehicles.
With regard to the lack of data, there is actually an abundance of
information about the issue. NHTSA estimates that there could be 499
hospitalizations annually (NHTSA Research Note, May 1997); small
children are often victims, losing fingers and even limbs. Ten year-old
data shows we have a problem.
NHTSA reviewed 1997 and 1998 death certificates and located at
least 4 deaths for each of those years. NHTSA is aware of the 8
fatalities that occurred in 2004; \3\ yet they continue to state that
``based on all available evidence the agency expects, on average, at
least one child fatality, and at least one serious injury (e.g.,
amputation, brain damage from near suffocation) per year could be
prevented by the requirements of the final rule.'' \4\ This simply is
not the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ NHTSA press event, Children's Hospital, Columbus, OH, September
2004.
\4\ Final Rule, Response to Petitions for Reconsideration, Power-
Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 71 FR 18673, 18680
(Apr. 12, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
KIDS AND CARS collects data about non-traffic incidents involving
children under the age of fourteen. Enclosed are two spreadsheets
containing information KIDS AND CARS has compiled about power incidents
where people were injured, killed or requested something be done about
these ``guillotines on wheels.''
Utilizing methods anyone interested in locating data has at their
disposal, we compiled the spreadsheets that contain information about
children being strangled to death by power windows and others injuries
such as fingers amputations, broken wrists, etc. Though NHTSA and the
Alliance continue to deny that power windows represent a significant
risk to all passengers in vehicles, it was information that had been
reported to them that we used to compile the Spreadsheet #1.
Spreadsheet #1 contains information compiled from NHTSA Office of
Defect Investigations (ODI) reports, Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ)
reports, letters written to alert or complain about the dangers of
power windows to Ford, etc. The list contains over 140 incidents where
people have taken the time to alert auto makers and NHTSA about these
dangers and provide information about injuries and deaths. We simply
took the information NHTSA already has and are reporting it back to you
in a spreadsheet format. We do not understand why NHTSA has never
included this information in any of their reports or studies about
power windows. Though far from comprehensive, (not even the tip of the
tip of the iceberg) it does provide information about the dangers of
power windows. It is important to note that drivers do not have the
ability to see young children seated directly behind them before
raising power windows. They can alert children that windows are being
put up; but do not have the ability to visually monitor them while
driving.
Spreadsheet #2 contains information compiled by KIDS AND CARS
involving children injured or killed by power windows from our
database.
We know there are hundreds if not thousands of power window
injuries and deaths that have been reported to auto manufacturers but
we do not have access to their data, nor is it contained in the
enclosed spreadsheets. We feel the information provided is compelling
enough for Congress to act. But, if the Committee determines more data
is needed to act, we suggest that the Subcommittee use its subpoena
powers to request the relevant records from all auto manufacturers
including complaints, injuries, fatalities and lawsuits filed regarding
power window injuries and deaths. This information is not being
supplied, yet the Alliance notes ``that auto-reverse was denied because
the petitioners did not provide data regarding the need.'' \5\ Why are
they not providing the data that is available at their finger tips?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Alliance testimony, op. cit. note 1, page 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We know that hundreds (most probably thousands) of reports have
been made to auto makers about these injuries and fatalities. The
industry has withheld this information for decades; yet place the
burden on nonprofit agencies to inform NHTSA and the general public
about these dangers.
The combination of NHTSA's 1997 power window injury study, our
spreadsheets and the subpoenaed records of auto makers will finally put
to rest the fact that auto-reverse is a necessary safety feature. We
encourage and trust that you will act with the information provided.
During the last 10 years KIDS AND CARS has advocated for non-
traffic motor vehicle safety for children. During that time we have
tried to persuade NHTSA to collect data about non-traffic incidents and
bring awareness to the dangers children face in and around ``parked''
vehicles. NHTSA freely states that non-traffic incidents are clearly
under their purview; \6\ \7\ but they have resisted getting involved
except when mandated by Congress to act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``NHTSA is also responsible for motor vehicle safety when there
is not a crash or the event occurs off the public traffic way. When the
agency tries to quantify safety problems associated with non-traffic or
non-crash situations it often finds that it has little or no data and
must rely on the data gathering, efforts of others.'' Data Collection
Study: Deaths and Injuries Resulting from Certain Non-Traffic and Non-
Crash Events, May 2004, page 3.
\7\ ``NHTSA is responsible for reducing deaths and injuries
associated with motor vehicle crashes and non-crashes.'' Interim Status
Report, NHTSA Pilot Study, Non-Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Issues,
July 2001, page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again, we need Congress to help save the lives of young children
from these predictable and preventable situations. We have provided
data that for some reason has been ignored by the Federal agency in
charge of keeping us safe in and around our motor vehicles. We know
that the costs are minimal; especially in contrast to the life of even
one child. We know the industry is already using the auto-reverse
technology on many if not most vehicles in Europe, and in door panels
and liftgates and on power windows for high-end models in the U.S.
Safety should not be a luxury only for those who can afford it.
To honor the 60+ children who have lost their lives since this
problem was first brought to the NHTSA's attention, we implore you to
act swiftly and with resolve to stop power window deaths and injuries,
reverse the history of regulatory delay and indifference, and ensure
that power windows will no longer kill or seriously injure another
innocent child.
Attachments to this prepared statement have been retained in
Committee files.