[Senate Hearing 110-117]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-117
AVIATION SECURITY: REVIEWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 17, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Margaret Spring, Democratic General Counsel
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on January 17, 2007................................. 1
Statement of Senator Carper...................................... 33
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 15
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Statement of Senator Lott........................................ 26
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 17
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 23
Witnesses
Hawley, Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'', Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Appendix
Coyne, James K., President, National Air Transportation
Association (NATA), letter dated January 17, 2007, to Hon.
Daniel K. Inouye and Hon. Ted Stevens.......................... 39
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip''
Hawley by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 40
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 52
AVIATION SECURITY: REVIEWING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11
COMMISSION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building. Hon. Daniel K.
Inouye, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
The Chairman. I apologize for my delay here, but this is
our first meeting of the Commerce Committee and I think it is
significant that we begin with the tragic moment of this
decade, 9/11. And I'd like to welcome all of you here.
And I'd like to announce, now, that this committee has no
Ranking Member, it has a Vice Chairman, with all the
prerogatives of the Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it's your show. Want to say something?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. I guess we should go
through the traditional handing of the gavel, but it makes no
difference, as far as I'm concerned, who's Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, thank you.
[Applause.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Chairman, if you wish me to
proceed, what I'd like to start off by doing is recognizing
that we are graced by the presence of three new people on our
full Committee. And one is Senator Carper, who is not here, but
who was born in West Virginia; the second is Senator Claire
McCaskill, who is going to be an absolutely superb member of
this committee, and I hope she enjoys it as much as we'll enjoy
working with her; and the other is Senator Amy Klobuchar, from
Minnesota, and she's going to be a terrific member, too. So, I
just wanted to say that.
I would also suggest, Mr. Full-Committee Chairman, that we
not have statements--I won't make a statement, I'll just put it
in the record--and that we go right to Mr. Hawley--Secretary
Hawley, that we go to you and have you give your statement, and
then we'll follow with questions, if that's all right.
[The prepared statements of Senators Rockefeller and Inouye
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this very important hearing,
and for shining a light on the crucial legislation a number of us
cosponsored and introduced earlier this month, S. 184, the Surface
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007, or the STARS Act.
We know that we are a nation with enemies, and we know that because
of our freedoms and our economy, we are a nation of targets. In the
years since terrorists used one mode of transportation to wake us up to
their sick motivations and evil designs, we have made strides to
protect the people and assets associated with that mode, aviation.
Despite the good, bipartisan work by this committee in the years since
September 11th to address the vulnerabilities of our passenger and
freight rails, our ports and waterway facilities, and other elements of
our transportation infrastructure, I am afraid that some in Congress
and in the Administration have not been as diligent in protecting these
other modes.
If we are to take our responsibilities as Members of Congress
seriously, we must make certain that the trucks, trains, pipelines, and
barges carrying hazardous materials are made secure. We must demand
action to protect our passenger rail and transit systems so that the
tragedies we have witnessed in Madrid, London, and Mumbai are not
replayed here. We must do what we can to protect our transportation
systems from evil motives and opportunities that we would never have
thought to imagine just a few years ago.
It is important for these witnesses to be heard before this
committee, and it is even more important for the Committee to take
quick action on the STARS Act. I look forward to voting it out of
Committee, and anticipate its timely consideration by the full Senate.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
As we embark on the first hearing of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation in the 110th Congress, I wish to welcome
the new members to the Commerce Committee:
Senator Tom Carper of Delaware;
Senator Claire McCaskill of Missouri;
Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota; and
Senator John Thune of South Dakota.
I would also like to recognize my Vice Chairman, Senator Ted
Stevens. I look forward to our continued partnership to address issues
of importance to our Nation.
The members of this committee have much work to accomplish over the
coming weeks and months. I am confident this can be done in a
bipartisan fashion.
Among other priorities, we need to ensure the security of all
transportation modes. This Committee was instrumental in developing
legislation to secure aviation and port infrastructure, but we must
complete our work to secure the other modes of surface transportation
including rail. In addition to tackling new transportation security
threats through legislative initiatives, we have a duty to provide the
necessary oversight on the implementation of security measures we
mandated as long ago as 5 years and as recent as this past October.
In addition, this committee must effectively assert its
jurisdiction to protect and improve both our energy and environmental
security through technological innovation that will increase fuel
efficiency and encourage the development of alternative, clean-burning
fuels, and reduce the production of greenhouse gases.
Further, ``science'' is our middle name and we must ensure that the
scientists who study the issues within this committee's jurisdiction
receive the resources their work deserves and the opportunity to
communicate their results to the public so that Congress can make its
decisions with the best information possible.
As the communications policy and technology committee, we must work
to encourage innovation, competition, and competitiveness, and ensure
that all Americans share in the benefits of technological advancements.
I look forward to working collaboratively with the members of this
committee as we tackle these, and other important issues.
On a few matters of ``housekeeping,'' for full Committee hearings
which will be chaired by me, I would like to continue the procedure for
opening statements and member questions that Senator Stevens and I
adopted last year. Under this procedure, Senators will be allotted 7
minutes for the first round of questions, up to 2 minutes of which may
be used for a brief opening statement.
If time permits, at the discretion of the chair, members may ask a
second round of questions. This will ensure that all our witnesses have
as much time to answer questions as we can provide them.
Subcommittee Chairs may establish their own opening statement and
question procedures for subcommittee hearings as the circumstances
warrant.
On another matter of ``housekeeping,'' as the Chairman of the
Committee with jurisdiction over technology and communications it may
seem inappropriate, but I would be most appreciative if during hearings
members would minimize the use of BlackBerry devices and cell phones,
as a courtesy to the witnesses.
With respect to this morning's hearing, Senator Rockefeller, who
will be chairing the Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security
Subcommittee, has great expertise in this area with his background on
this committee, the Intelligence Committee, and the Finance Committee.
I appreciate his chairing this hearing today.
I will submit the remainder of my statement for the record so that
we can quickly move to our witness and allow ample opportunity for
members to ask questions.
I recognize my Vice Chairman, Senator Stevens, for any remarks he
would like to make before I turn the gavel over to Senator Rockefeller.
Our nation has taken many important steps that have strengthened
the security of our transportation system over the past 5 years. This
is particularly true of the domestic aviation industry. Both the
government and private sectors have made a tremendous investment to
develop a layered security regime in which the vast majority of the
traveling public has confidence.
In fact, more Americans flew last year than any other year in the
history of commercial aviation, and as potential threats arise, the
security system has proven to be flexible enough to keep passengers
flowing while remaining responsive to security challenges.
Despite our efforts to ensure the security of the aviation system
in the United States, more needs to be done to address ongoing threats.
The bipartisan 9/11 Commission provided a valuable public service by
making recommendations on how to ensure against a repeat of the events
of September 11, 2001. They identified several key shortcomings in our
aviation security system, including the process for cargo and baggage
screening, checkpoint screening for explosives and passenger
prescreening. Each of these weaknesses, if unaddressed, offers an
opportunity for our enemies to launch a potentially devastating attack.
The development of an advanced passenger prescreening system, a
vital component of our security system, has been delayed for several
years. That is too long.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs to move
forward with this system, to strengthen aviation security while
protecting the civil rights of all Americans. The installation of
integrated or ``in-line'' Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) will not be
completed for more than a decade if deployment continues at its current
pace. Again, this is too long given the economic and operational
benefits this system provides. We must speed up this process.
In addition, the TSA must address the security of all cargo going
on passenger aircraft. The TSA must work with Congress to make certain
extensive screening becomes a reality in the near term.
This summer's foiled plot to target U.S. and British air carriers
with liquid explosives has shown both the successes of our overall
security efforts, as well as our remaining weaknesses. Intelligence was
vital in stopping that attack at the planning stages, but we can only
guess how the security regime would have responded if the plot had been
put in motion. It was a stark reminder of the continual efforts of our
enemies, and the continual resolve we must have to secure our citizens
and our economy against their efforts.
It is critical that this committee work with the Administration,
the public, and the aviation industry to improve the existing system of
security and fix any remaining problems. We must both ensure the
integrity of our security system, and keep the country's vital economic
engine functioning efficiently.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ``KIP'' HAWLEY,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hawley. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and
members of the Committee.
When I last appeared before this committee, we had a very
direct conversation about Secure Flight, TSA's watch-list
matching program. I announced at that time that I directed a
re-baselining of the program to assure that it meets our
stringent privacy requirements. That work is now complete, and
we are moving forward to start implementation of Secure Flight
next year.
It is important to note that watch-list matching of known
terrorists with passenger lists is not on hold while waiting
for Secure Flight. That process works well today and will
continue until we are sure that Secure Flight is fully ready.
To assure the accuracy of the No Fly List itself, we will
shortly conclude a case-by-case review of every name on the No
Fly List. Working with our partners at the Terrorist Screening
Center and in the intelligence community and law enforcement,
this effort will effectively cut the No Fly List in half.
Of course, TSA's most visible presence is at the airports.
On the morning of August 10th, about a month short of the fifth
anniversary of 9/11, we had an unscheduled, real-world test of
TSA, in particular, and aviation security, overall.
TSA, in just a few hours--literally overnight--rolled out a
new checkpoint security process for every passenger in America.
Also, TSA put these changes into effect worldwide for every
flight bound for the United States, and deployed Federal Air
Marshal teams to saturate affected flights flown by U.S.
carriers.
For TSA, August 10th represents both an affirmation of how
far we've come in 5 years and gives us confidence in the path
ahead. I'm proud of the way TSA men and women, including
Federal Air Marshals, stepped up to this challenge, and of
their commitment to our mission going forward.
August 10th also illustrates how some of the security
layers that I have mentioned in previous testimony work in a
live-fire situation.
The first layer I identified was working with our partners
in the intelligence community, law enforcement, and the
military, others at DHS, and elsewhere in the U.S. Government,
to identify and act on the threat at its origin. That happened
in August, and the coordinated actions across the Government
gave us, at TSA, key, timely information that enabled us to
stay ahead of the threat.
TSA does not act alone. Airports and airlines work
alongside TSA every day. I cannot express, enough, my
appreciation for the job they did this summer. We were all on
the same page and acted together in a coordinated and sustained
effort.
The same thing can be said for our international partners.
We worked together to put in place what has become an ICAO-
recommended practice worldwide, and is enforced today
throughout the European Union, Canada, and Australia.
Connecting with partners in the U.S. Government in the aviation
industry, and with government entities around the world, is a
vital part of our security system and does not happen by
accident. At TSA, building and practicing these connections is
a core function of the agency.
I've testified before this committee on a number of
occasions about the importance of taking full advantage of our
existing workforce, and of recognizing that the human mind
itself is the most advanced technology on Earth.
As you know, we've put a major focus on sophisticated and
continued training of our Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs) in detecting improvised explosion device (IED)
components. Beyond IED training, we have developed advanced
capabilities in behavior observation, bomb appraisal, and
document verification. We have also made a major investment in
our workforce to retain and motivate the best security
officers. Our work over the last year has resulted in
significant reductions in old problem areas, like attrition and
injuries.
For the first time, TSOs have significant long-term career
opportunities, as well as pay increases for excellent
performance. The impact of this renewed focus on mission
performance and our TSOs is that we have an engaged workforce
that is well-trained and motivated. I think you can feel it at
checkpoints around the country.
The challenge in August was unplanned, but it was not
unexpected. We will continue to be challenged, and have to be
prepared for the unknown new threat, as well as address all the
known threats. This puts a priority on layers of security that
are flexible, connected, and cannot be engineered around.
So, even as we continue to deploy technology, we must also
continue to invest in our workforce and take advantage of the
unique asset that it represents. Every day, all across the
country, there are thousands of TSOs, inspectors, and Federal
Air Marshals who, on a moment's notice, can and do deploy
anywhere in an airport or the world.
Our mission is security, and we never forget that. To meet
an adaptive enemy whom we cannot always predict, there is no
substitute for alert and prepared people.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I'd be
happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, Department of
Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity
to speak with you about the progress the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has made in fulfilling the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission related to aviation security.
First, I would like to thank the Committee for the tremendous
support given to DHS and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) over the past year, especially as we have sharpened our focus on
explosives at the passenger checkpoint. We look forward to continuing
our partnership on these and other issues in the coming year.
2006 was a demanding year for TSA, and its partners in aviation
security generally, but it ultimately has demonstrated how far we have
come in securing our Nation's transportation systems since the 9/11
Commission issued its report and recommendations.
While last year is most notable for the activities related to the
liquid explosives plot, I would like to highlight for the Committee
several initiatives that helped us prepare to meet that and other
security challenges as well as the challenge presented by increased
passenger loads. Last year we discussed our need to focus more on the
threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at the passenger
checkpoint. We knew that, while technology is a key component of our
security strategy, we had opportunities to increase security by better
enabling our workforce, specifically our Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs). I will discuss some examples later in my testimony,
but the efforts were centered around training and retaining our best
people, giving them financial and career progression incentives, and
expanding opportunities for more advanced security skills like behavior
observation.
While those efforts were underway, TSA, anticipating increased
summer passenger loads, changed the way it hires new employees from a
centrally operated headquarters model to one where the local airport
team managed its own hiring. This transition was complete in time to
staff the Memorial Day to Labor Day peak summer travel period.
In the weeks before Memorial Day, there was concern about TSA's new
staffing model and the agency's readiness to handle the summer traffic.
The liquids ban in August raised issues about large scale cancellation
of flights due to security delays. Our ``3-1-1'' security procedures,
which allow passengers to bring onto planes small quantities of liquids
that do not represent a significant security risk, were controversial,
and many felt that the Thanksgiving holidays would be affected by
security delays. But TSA, airlines, airports, and passengers were ready
for the summer, flights were not canceled as a result of the liquids
ban, and all handled the holiday travel season without incident.
Similarly, TSA's Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) put forth
major efforts at improving its operating procedures to better retain
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) and improve TSA's ability to quickly
support emergent circumstances that might occur anywhere in the world.
Examples of these efforts include the comprehensive listening and
employee involvement initiatives that resulted in more flexible dress
code and travel requirements, as well as the FAMS support of the
emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens from Lebanon.
The value of a fully-staffed, fully-prepared, and actively engaged
TSA front-line workforce, be they TSOs or FAMs, was made evident most
dramatically in TSA's response to the discovery in the United Kingdom
of a plot to use liquid explosives to take down passenger aircraft
bound for the United States. TSA acted decisively and swiftly to
protect the traveling public. Literally overnight, our dedicated TSOs
implemented major new screening protocols to focus on and protect
against the imminent threat. FAMs moved, in the hundreds, to conduct
missions of unprecedented tempo and complexity to combat the threat and
instill confidence in the security of commercial aviation. The support
of our partners in the airports and airlines, as well as the
cooperation of the traveling public, was invaluable in achieving this
success. All of us can be proud of the fact that while this was
enormous change, implemented on an emergency basis, the U.S. aviation
system continued to function--that, even though there were security
delays in the first few days of the new process, the system operated
smoothly from August right through the recent holidays.
In this regard, we would emphasize that TSA's ability to deal
effectively with the liquids plot, as well as its ability to assist
with the impact of Hurricane Katrina, depended upon TSA's flexible
personnel management authorities established in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA). These authorities permit TSA to
flexibly manage and deploy its workforce, including its TSO workforce,
in carrying out important security work directly affecting national
security. During Hurricane Katrina and after the United Kingdom air
bombing plot was foiled, TSA changed the nature of employees' work--and
even the location of their work--to flexibly respond to these
emergencies. Similarly, FAMs were redeployed on hours' notice to
support the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Lebanon. This flexibility
is a key component of how DHS, through TSA, protects Americans while
they travel. For these reasons we would strongly oppose any legislative
proposal that would diminish the authority that this committee gave to
us in ATSA.
It is also important to note that our partners in other countries
around the globe stepped up in a major way to implement the new
protocols that we instituted with necessarily short notice. The
communications efforts that followed the emergency actions resulted in
unprecedented advanced harmonization of security measures that
subsequently resulted in nearly identical measures for the United
States, Canada, the entire European Union, and Australia, as well as
adoption by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) of a
world-wide recommended practice reflecting the same procedures.
We have learned a great deal since the 9/11 Commission released its
findings about the nature of the terrorist threat today and about the
best ways to use the tools at our disposal to deal with that threat.
Our experience teaches us that the 9/11 Commission recommendations can
be most effective when applied in the context of the constantly
changing world in which we operate. They inform our path forward as we
integrate them with the additional insights we have gained since their
publication.
Since its inception, TSA has embraced the essential concept that no
single security strategy is foolproof, but by employing layers of
security to our mission, risk to our Nation's transportation system can
be mitigated. Our layered approach to security utilizes and relies upon
interconnecting networks among our partners in the aviation industry--
air carriers and airport operators; State and local governments and
their law enforcement agencies; and other Federal entities including
among others, other DHS components, the FAA, and the Federal
intelligence community; as well as other nations allied with us in the
fight against terrorism. Our layered approach utilizes technology and,
more importantly, depends upon the skills and dedication of our TSOs.
We have learned that the most visible part of our aviation security
mission, the screening of passengers and property at the airport, is
but a part of our arsenal against terrorism. We cannot focus on a
``catch them in the act'' strategy that waits until a person tries to
board an aircraft with a weapon. No matter how good our screening is,
and how sophisticated our technology is, our success is greatly
improved with our ability to anticipate the terrorist act and thwart it
well before it gets off the ground. This was demonstrated not only by
the timely investigation, revelation, and frustration of the British
liquid explosives plot, but also by the early disruption of a plot to
attack tunnels under New York's Hudson River.
Our People
Most importantly, we know that our mission cannot be achieved with
a checklist mentality in an assembly-line environment. Our people are
the most critical asset in our mission of securing the Nation's
transportation systems. No existing technology can provide a fully-
automated approach, and even with extensive use of technology, we will
always need the critical thinking skills of people to adapt to emerging
threats.
The introduction of several new programs focuses on developing
specialized skills in our workforce. TSA has implemented a behavior
observation and analysis program, called Screening of Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT), designed to provide TSA Behavior
Detection Officers (BDOs) with a non-intrusive means of identifying
potentially high-risk individuals. The program was developed and
implemented to observe normal passenger characteristics and anxieties
and identify anomalies to detect individuals who may be a threat to
aviation and/or transportation security. SPOT is also part of a larger
effort by the agency to add more layers of security to protect against
those individuals seeking to defeat our security systems.
TSA has also implemented the Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) program
to prevent the introduction of explosives and IEDs from entering the
aviation system. The BAOs are trained bomb technicians who provide
advanced training for the workforce and resolve alarms that are beyond
the TSO workforce capability.
TSA continues to develop and refine our plans relating to document-
checking, whereby specially trained TSOs examine boarding documents to
detect and deter individuals attempting to board aircraft fraudulently.
This interaction with passengers also gives these TSOs an additional
opportunity to observe behavioral characteristics of passengers and
identify anomalies that would warrant additional screening, augmenting
other security programs such as SPOT.
TSA also continues to add elements of randomness and
unpredictability to the airport security environment to prevent
terrorists from committing terrorist or harmful acts.
Our mission success therefore depends on recruiting and keeping
trusted, bright, well-motivated, well-trained people who have the right
tools, work in a positive, team-driven environment, and are involved
and challenged by their work. Our work force must be rewarded by fair
compensation and benefits and have prospects for continued advancement
based on their ability and effort.
To this end, in 2006 we rolled out a comprehensive performance
management system for making TSA a true performance-based organization.
Under this system, TSA is now compensating its TSOs based upon their
technical proficiency, training and development, customer service
skills, teamwork, professionalism, and leadership. By recognizing and
rewarding the right skills and new skills, as well as higher
proficiency levels, we are reinforcing critical performance areas and
developing new ones to support the ever-changing needs in security.
Another critical program introduced in 2006 is the TSO Career
Progression initiative. TSA is committed to creating a career track and
advancement opportunities that will encourage not only quality
performance, but also longevity among our TSOs. This program created
new pay bands for TSOs and the opportunity to serve in advanced
positions as Behavior Detection Officers, who execute TSA's Screening
Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) Program, BAOs, and TSA-
Approved instructors, who provide a full range of required TSO
training.
Passenger Pre-Screening
The focus on people applies to those who work at airports and
airlines and fly as passengers as much as to those, like TSOs and FAMs,
who provide security for the system. This topic rightly received
considerable attention from the 9/11 Commission.
Regarding passenger pre-screening, I testified before this
committee in February 2006 on the status of Secure Flight, TSA's watch-
list matching program, and am pleased to update the Committee in the
context of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
While we are aware of concerns regarding the effectiveness of the
current system of screening domestic airline passengers against the No
Fly List, today any person on the No Fly List will not fly. The No Fly
List is regularly kept up to date and changes are made as required.
Secure Flight, when operational, will bring the process of comparing
passenger names against the No Fly List, now performed by aircraft
operators, into the government. That is why I have said that it is more
important that Secure Flight is built right--with all the needed
operational attributes and privacy that will withstand any challenges.
So while I am mindful of the urgency to bring Secure Flight into
operation quickly, I am also mindful of my obligation to the public not
to get into a situation where we either have to stop flights or allow
them to fly without a way to prevent No Flys from boarding.
TSA is firmly committed to protecting the privacy and civil
liberties of travelers. After completing a vulnerability assessment of
the Secure Flight program and after considering feedback from the
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as DHS
evaluations of the program, I announced to this committee that TSA was
re-baselining the program. At that time, we undertook this effort to
assure privacy and information security in Secure Flight by making sure
the foundation of the program was strong and that it will be successful
upon implementation. That work has now been completed.
I am pleased to update you that we are currently working with the
DHS Screening Coordination Office (SCO) toward achieving DHS
certification and demonstrating satisfaction of the ten areas of
Congressional direction to GAO. We are working closely with GAO to
facilitate their review of the program's development. In addition,
through regularly scheduled meetings with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), we are coordinating airline industry needs with CBP
and the airlines with the intent of providing a single DHS system
interface to the industry.
Key to our efforts in improving passenger pre-screening has been
the tremendous undertaking to systematically review names on the No Fly
List. The purpose of the review is to remove, or downgrade to the
Selectee List, individuals that do not meet the established criteria
for the No Fly List. The review implements new guidance for the No Fly
and Selectee Lists ratified in July 2006 by the Terrorist Screening
Center's (TSC) Governance Board. Just as the threat environment is
fluid, so must the No Fly List be maintained as a true list of
individuals who currently pose a threat, rather than maintaining on the
list those who were feared to have presented a threat in the past, but
no longer do. TSA and the TSC, in collaboration with all the nominating
agencies responsible for compiling the No Fly List, are in the process
of a thorough, name-by-name review of that list. We expect that by the
time the review is completed in mid-February, the No Fly List should be
reduced by approximately 50 percent. A similar review will be
undertaken with respect to the Selectee List.
Integral to the successful execution of our passenger pre-screening
efforts is our redress system, by which travelers who either previously
have been misidentified or believe they are on the No Fly or Selectee
List in error may apply to have that error corrected. We have
significantly modified the process in response to customer feedback
that the process was too cumbersome and expensive. Now an applicant
need submit only a single document--a United States Passport--to verify
his or her identity. Approximately 70 percent of applicants have this
document and are therefore able to apply for relief without submitting
other documentation. We have also eliminated the requirement that
identity documents be notarized and we allow electronic submission of
the application and supporting documentation. Finally, TSA introduced
an automated Redress Management System (RMS). After assuring the
privacy of users and the security of the system, RMS was launched on
October 6, 2006, enabling travelers to submit and check the status of
their applications electronically via the Internet.
TSA has already seen a dramatic improvement in customer service.
TSA received and processed more than 20,000 redress requests for
calendar year 2006. At the same time, the average processing time has
been reduced from 60 to less than 10 days. TSA is also working with
other DHS components to bring to reality the DHS Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), Secretary Chertoff's and Secretary of State
Rice's joint vision of one-stop redress for travelers. This program
would provide travelers with a single, simple process for addressing
Federal watch-list misidentification issues and other individual
complaints that arise from the traveler's screening experience.
Explosives Detection Technology
In partnership with DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate, TSA
benefits from a robust research and development program for explosives
detection. TSA has invested over $1 billion to purchase, install and
upgrade explosives detection systems at airports over a three-year
period. In Fiscal Year 2006, TSA invested approximately $534 million in
the purchase and deployment of explosives detection technology, which
included Next Generation technology and Letters of Intent (LOI)
reimbursement.
DHS continues to move forward to research, pilot, and deploy
additional checkpoint explosives detection technologies. These new
technologies will be deployed as soon as their reliability is assured.
In the coming weeks, TSA will also begin testing x-ray backscatter
technology that will be able to detect non-metallic devices and
objects, in addition to metallic weapons and other threat items.
Consistent with all other elements of security, the integrity of
explosives detection ultimately depends upon a well-trained, dedicated
workforce. In the fall of 2005, TSA developed and rolled-out advanced
IED training for every checkpoint TSO, including detection of liquid
explosives. More than 38,000 TSOs have completed this training, which
has subsequently been reinforced with intensive technical classroom
training and online improvement training to reinforce explosives
detection capabilities.
TSA conducts its own explosives covert testing on our checkpoints,
and we have made changes to our protocols to improve passenger
screening. We are working with GAO to incorporate any lessons learned
from their tests in our training and screening protocols, as well.
Checked Baggage Screening
Today TSA meets the requirement to screen 100 percent of all
checked bags for explosives. Since the initial deployment of explosives
detection systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection units (ETDs) to
screen checked baggage electronically for explosives after 9/11, TSA
has aggressively pursued innovation and investment intended to
dramatically improve the system. Today, 67 airports are either
operational or deploying some form of advanced in-line baggage
screening system.
In February 2006, TSA delivered to Congress a Strategic Planning
Framework for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). This
framework details TSA's long-term planning philosophy for the
development and implementation of optimal baggage screening solutions
at the Nation's top 250 airports, where over 99 percent of checked
baggage originates, and currently guides TSA's investment and
deployment decisions. The plan also includes a funding prioritization
schedule, a deployment strategy, an EDS life-cycle management plan, and
a stakeholder collaboration plan.
TSA, through an Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), has
been working separately with aviation industry stakeholders to develop
a cost-sharing formula and innovative financing solutions for the EBSP,
and has been exploring the options proposed to expedite the deployment
of in-line EDS. This Baggage Screening Investment Study (BSIS) has been
completed and will be provided to Congress in the near future.
Air Cargo Security
TSA has augmented air cargo security through a combination of
layered security measures, including screening and vetting, that
enhance security without unduly disrupting the flow of commerce. As
part of this effort, TSA is implementing a comprehensive final
regulation to strengthen air cargo security throughout the supply chain
and has issued targeted rules that set additional security requirements
for regulated parties. These rules include: the elimination of all
exemptions from cargo subject to screening, increasing to 100 percent
TSA's screening of counter-to-counter cargo and increasing to 100
percent TSA's screening of all cargo received at Category II, III, and
IV airports. TSA also targets certain high risk categories of cargo for
100 percent screening, utilizes over 396 canine teams to screen cargo
at 74 of the Nation's larger airports, and is requiring Security Threat
Assessments for all supply chain workers with unescorted access to air
cargo.
TSA vigorously enforces these regulations and security directives
through inspections and imposition of civil penalties for violations,
through a committed staff of 300 air cargo security inspectors and
additional aviation security inspectors. Thus far, this program has
successfully managed risk, while allowing the airline industry to
provide air cargo service on passenger flights. We plan to maintain
this approach of vigorous enforcement, coupled with continued
technological research and development. However, any mandate to
physically inspect 100 percent of air cargo within 3 years is not
feasible without impeding the legitimate flow of commerce and imposing
an unreasonable cost on the government.
Conclusion
2006 was a growth and performance year for TSA. We have come a long
way since this committee wrote ATSA and since the 9/11 Commission
issued its recommendations. We now have a strong, flexible, effective
operating capability at TSA with the proven ability to network with
others in government and industry around the world. While we still have
holes that need to be filled and foundations that need to be
strengthened, we have a sound strategy, effective against an adaptive
enemy, and the operating capability to execute it. Part of this
strategy will be a continuously adaptive response. While we understand
that travelers are looking for continuity and certainty in their travel
experience, we need to balance that need against the need to remain
adaptive to the ever-changing threat.
This Committee created the TSA and gave it a critical mission. The
men and women of TSA have signed up to do that mission and are today
fulfilling it. It is demanding work and our job satisfaction comes from
participating in the most compelling mission of our time and we
understand that while criticism comes with the job, TSA has the honor
of doing meaningful work on behalf of our country.
Further progress in 2007 will be made and our success will be
greater if we can finish the build-out of TSA and achieve what ATSA
envisioned. The Congress and Administration have provided the
authorities and the resources we need for 2007 and we will soon have
recommendations for 2008. I look forward, and I know I speak for every
one of us at TSA, to working with the Committee and others in Congress
on achieving the vision that was contemplated during the intense
aftermath of 9/11, and we will do so with the same intensity we all
felt 5 years ago.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today.
I am happy to respond to the Committee's questions.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Hawley.
And I would now call upon the Chairman of the Full
Committee.
The Chairman. And I have just one technical question. In
your statement, you said that it would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to physically inspect 100 percent of air cargo
within 3 years without imposing an unreasonable cost on the
government. How would this affect just passengers? Why do you
just have passengers checked?
Mr. Hawley. What if we--I didn't----
The Chairman. Hundred percent.
Mr. Hawley. Of baggage--of freight on passenger aircraft?
The Chairman. Would that be feasible?
Mr. Hawley. Well, it would--if it were required by law,
we'd figure out a way to do it in the time-frame that it--it's
required. The concern that I have is that 100-percent
requirement in a statute will focus the effort on getting the
100 percent done, which makes it more of a logistics issue than
a security issue. And it just says, ``Hey, we've got to get 100
percent of these packages screened in the way that is
required,'' and it would divert resources that we may prefer to
be able to move around on an unpredictable basis. So, I think
the concern is that, for a very small incremental benefit of
security, it would take away resources that we could more
productively apply elsewhere.
The Chairman. What is the present percentage of inspection?
Mr. Hawley. It's a classified number, and we can talk about
it in that environment, but it was recently tripled. But more
importantly than that, we've been adding security measures to
air cargo over the last year. It's something that Secretary
Chertoff has a very strong interest in, and he had us really
focus on that.
So we, in the last 6 months, have eliminated all exemptions
to air freight. So, it used to be that there was a certain
percentage of freight that was not exempt, and that was the
classified number. But what we've done now is, we've eliminated
all exemptions, so that right now, no freight is exempt from
screening and we require a random continuous screening of
everything, in addition to the former requirement that we had.
The Chairman. The rest of the questions I have relate to
the explosive detection system, and I'd like to submit them,
Mr. Chairman. OK?
Senator Rockefeller. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. The former Chairman of the Full
Committee, Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, I congratulate you on what you've done so far.
I know that the 9/11 Commission has issued a report card
dealing with the standards that they seek to have established.
I do think that we've invested a substantial amount of money
over the last 5 years and made considerable progress.
I would ask a little clarification of your answer to the
Chairman's question. Now, you're talking about baggage
originating in the United States, going to another place in the
United States, I assume. Is there a difference between that and
baggage that's going out of the country?
Mr. Hawley. No. Anything that's loaded onto a passenger
craft is subject to this requirement.
Senator Stevens. And why would it be more difficult to
establish the same criteria for the cargo that's getting onto a
passenger plane?
Mr. Hawley. There are a lot of--the operational impact is
significant, because a lot of that freight is palletized, put
into very, very large packages that do not fit in the existing
EDS machines, and we have a----
Senator Stevens. We call those ``combo flights'' up our
way, in Alaska. I thought they were basically barred in many of
the aircraft today.
Mr. Hawley. We have a special program for--that includes
Alaska--that's different because of the different nature of
Alaska, obviously. But we have a science and technology project
that's now operating in San Francisco that is using the EDS
machines and trying to establish what the operating protocol
would be if we wanted to run everything through the EDS
machines. So, it's something that we are looking at. It would
take a tremendous amount of resources to get this done.
Senator Stevens. Is there palletized freight on our major
airlines in what we call the Southern 48?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. And where is it? Is it like it is in
Alaska--in front of the passengers?
Mr. Hawley. It's underneath, typically.
Senator Stevens. Yes. Underneath.
Mr. Hawley. And what they do under our new system is--that
we're trying some innovative things, with canine teams, of some
programs that are in Europe, where they essentially get inside
the shrinkwrap of these palleted items, and then have the dogs
come by and take, you know, do their reading of the fumes based
in that pallet.
So, we're looking at a lot of innovative things. And I
should say, we don't disagree that screening air cargo on
passenger planes is very important; it's really a question of,
Operationally, what is the best security value for the
investment of time?
Senator Stevens. Have airlines in any way objected to
application of screening to that type of cargo?
Mr. Hawley. I don't get real pushback from airlines, on the
concept that we need to do it, and I've heard a lot of
suggestions about increasing the number of canine teams,
because canines are effective and very flexible. And it clearly
is a shared responsibility. We all have the same interest at
heart. So the question always boils down to, OK, how are you
operationally going to do it? Where's the money going to come
from, and what are you doing today that you are not going to do
once you divert the resources?
So, we're all on the same page in terms of needing to do
intense security on cargo and on passenger aircraft; the debate
is, how exactly do you we get it done?
Senator Stevens. As you know, a substantial portion of
cargo that comes into the United States across the Pacific
comes through our airport in Anchorage. I think it's the
number-one cargo landing port now on a daily basis. That
sometimes is then broken down and put onto other planes leaving
Anchorage and to go throughout the U.S.
There is no screening of that as it comes into the United
States. Why shouldn't it be screened there?
Mr. Hawley. Well, there is the--all freight cargo that
comes in on, with no passengers, so that is not subject to
screening. But anytime that freight gets onto a passenger
aircraft in the United States, it's subject to our air cargo
requirements.
Senator Stevens. I understand what you're saying about the
availability of trained dogs to perform this mission. Have you
thought of trying to contract that out to the private sector? I
think they have a way of responding quicker to demands like
this.
Mr. Hawley. Well, the requirement now is principally on the
airlines, who then contract out with people to do a lot of the
work that they do now. So what we would do is establish a
performance standard, and then we would debate over who would
do it. And whether the airlines contract for, whether the
government pays for it--those type of things. It could work
well either way.
Senator Stevens. Why haven't you increased the standard for
baggage? I mean, for cargo that's on passenger planes?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we have very significantly increased it.
We've had a number of different measures over the last 6
months, including the formal rule that we put out which gets at
securing the supply chain itself; and then, we've added
additional measures, like: anytime somebody shows up at an
airport and wants to put a package on a specific flight, it has
to be screened the same way as checked luggage.
So, we keep going after additional security measures to put
on top of each other. And I think the goal of 100-percent
screening is something that is necessarily out in the future.
Our concern is that, while that debate is going on, we're doing
things right now that will affect, and meaningfully improve,
security in the immediate term.
Senator Stevens. Well, shifting over to other things,
although it has some impact on this also, this committee has
oversight on the airline industry, per se, and we know that
almost every one of those airlines has been in and out of
bankruptcy during this 5-year period that your agency's been in
existence. But it seems like every time we require an addition
to the security system, it is pushed off on the airlines to pay
for it. That can't continue, really, in terms of issues like
this. Isn't there some way we can devise to screen these, this
cargo that goes onto passenger aircraft, without increasing the
cost to the airlines, per se?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, and you could say, ``Well, the Government
pays for it,'' but one of the things that we're doing now----
Senator Stevens. The Government doesn't pay for it, the
airline traveler is the only person in the United States that
pays for security. The rest of it is paid out of taxes. And I
think that every time we add a burden to the system, we further
compress the ability of the American airlines to survive.
What are they doing in Europe?
Mr. Hawley. Well, it's principally, it's virtually all on
the private sector, including the airlines. So----
Senator Stevens. Do they have higher standards of
examination of cargo like this?
Mr. Hawley. They have, not identical, but pretty close--
there's a pretty close match in, particularly passenger
screening, and we're working with them to align the air cargo.
But really the burden is principally on airlines overseas.
And one of the things I was going to mention is that we--
one of the things we've done for air cargo is we've got 360
canine teams, and we've devoted a quarter of their time in the
air cargo environment, so that--of our security resources--
we're devoting a greater proportion to get after the air cargo.
And that's at no additional cost, either to us or the airlines.
Senator Stevens. Now, I'm going to get shot when I get home
tonight. My colleagues know this. Repeatedly, we have been
stopped because my wife's name is Catherine Stevens. And it
comes out, in terms of the No Fly List, as ``Cat Stevens.'' As
a matter of fact, one time I personally was taken to the
security advisor because I was checking in the baggage in her
name--mine and hers--and they took me, too.
Now, what has been done to really try and find a way to
deal with this? I believe that we should have those lists, but,
for instance, it would seem to me that anyone that was making
such a list would put down ``Cat Stevens, male.'' That doesn't
take that much change in these lists. Has anyone looked at
trying to make them more, really, a means of identifying a
person that is a great risk to the passengers?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. And that is something that, once Secure
Flight is up, next year, will be a thing of the past. But right
now what happens is, when we get a name--for instance, if a Cat
Stevens and a Catherine Stevens--the Catherine Stevens would
tell us, and then we'd put a notation in the record that we
send to the airlines that says, ``This is Catherine Stevens,
she's not Cat Stevens and don't hassle her.''
Unfortunately it depends, airline by airline, how their
individual systems work, as to how effectively that's done. And
it definitely--we recognize the inconvenience, we--it hits
people at kiosks and printing boarding passes at home. But that
is the one piece of the puzzle--that's the cost to the watch-
list system we have now. But, the upside of it is, we have a
very good reliability in terms of stopping people who are the
person you want to keep off the airplane. We do an excellent
job of that.
Senator Stevens. I have a feeling that someone who knew
their name was on it would find a way to use a false name. It's
the people who use their own name that are the ones most
affected by the purge list today.
Mr. Hawley. Well, the system is smarter than that,
actually, and there are a variety of things where that is taken
into account. And I'll just leave it at that in the public
session.
Senator Stevens. All right. One last comment. Your
testimony indicates that you dealt with the passenger redress
concept, reducing the delay from 60 days to 10 days. And in the
absence of these new concepts, such as Secure Flight and
Registered Traveler, is there any other solution to dealing
with the people who have been denied boarding passes?
Mr. Hawley. Well, working with the airlines to help with
their matching process is something we are doing; and that--
that's probably the next-best thing that will happen prior to
introducing Secure Flight. It's having the sophistication of
the matching software that would identify--as you point out--
this is a male, or this is a female, or other characteristics.
So, until we get Secure Flight up, it really is a function of
how well we can get the matching to work consistently across
airlines.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I've asked that my statement appear
in the record.
Senator Rockefeller. It will be done.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
Chairman Inouye, thank you for scheduling this hearing today. Being
our first hearing in the new Congress, I would like to welcome the new
members to the Committee. Welcome.
Mr. Hawley, thank you for your willingness to appear before the
Committee and for your tireless work to secure our Nation's
transportation systems. While you have made tremendous strides, TSA
must continue to press forward by focusing on a risk-based layered
aviation security system, and developing and maintaining a workforce
that is flexible and proactive. The American taxpayers have invested
substantially in security over these past 5 years, and some may
question the rate at which significant measures, such as passenger pre-
screening programs, have been implemented. We must work together to
develop the appropriate solutions to these issues.
The 9/11 Commission was tasked, in part, with setting a benchmark
for aviation security, but the real-world applications and solutions to
many of the Commission's goals remain a significant challenge. In
December 2005, the 9/11 Commission issued a report card on the
implementation of its recommendations and gave TSA very low grades in
transportation security categories. Although we have come to realize
over the years that in matters of security, there is no ``one simple
solution,'' this does not mean that more progress in certain critical
areas should not be made.
I have maintained that true improvements in our aviation security
system rest on the promise of technology development and deployment.
Today, U.S. airports screen an annual 535 million parcels of checked
baggage for explosives. That number will certainly increase in the
coming years. The projected growth and changes in our aviation system
also call for a new and focused direction for both safety and security.
We need to be proactive and find ways to finance the deployment of
proven and effective technologies, in an innovative fashion. Similarly,
we need to encourage the private sector to develop inventive,
integrated and interoperable solutions.
We must find these solutions while being mindful of the required
delicate balance between implementing tough security measures and the
effect of these regulations on the Nation's economy. One such issue
which has proven challenging to all entities involves the screening of
100 percent of air cargo. The U.S. air cargo supply chain handles more
than 50,000 tons of cargo each day, of which 13,000 tons, or 26
percent, is designated for domestic passenger carriers. We are tasked
with delivering a common sense solution that meets the goal of
balancing enhanced security without excessively impeding the normal
flow of commerce. Shutting down the movement of goods is not
acceptable--but creating unrealistic and unattainable deadlines is not
the answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you to
address these challenges in the new Congress.
Senator Rockefeller. I want to, at this time--not for the
purposes of questioning, but for the purposes of courtesy--to
recognize Senator Klobuchar, Amy Klobuchar from Minnesota. This
is your first meeting with this committee, and I think you'll
find this the most exciting Committee that you're on.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Senator, I look forward to serving on
the Committee. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. We look forward to having you here,
very, very much.
Mr. Hawley, we had a chance to talk, at some length the
other day, in a secure situation, so use your discretion as you
answer these questions. There was a question of the cargo
supply chain, and--if that's international, then it's where
it's loaded, perhaps it was loaded on a truck to then be loaded
on an airplane in a foreign port, foreign airways, and then
there's a question of off-loading. Now, once you've off-loaded,
I would think that that responsibility comes to an end and
there should have been a really good check in the system.
The problem is that TSA's computer models estimate that, if
you do full physical screening just at the end of destination
in an airport in our country, that you can only really do 4
percent of the daily volume. And the reason for that,
evidently, is because of equipment breakdowns, inspection
problems, reassembling what you take apart to look at for
transport, and all the rest of it. But 4 percent is not very
encouraging.
Now, we discussed that in a number of ways, but I'd like to
have you answer that.
Mr. Hawley. Sure. The detail on the operations is what
really will determine whether it's effective or not, because if
you say it's 100 percent of electronic screening or box opened
or whatever the definition is, there's a difference of--if you
go through and just open the lid in every box, that's an open-
box inspection--which is different from if you pull out the
stereo speakers and look inside the, you know, the battery
compartment or you take it apart. So, you could say, ``Well,
we're going to run every one of these packages through an x-ray
machine,'' which may or may not get at the threat you're
looking at. So, that's why we prefer not to have a 100-percent
requirement on anything, because you tend to be focused, then,
on, ``How do we accomplish what is written in the law?'' as
opposed to a smarter security that says, ``OK, we're in a risk-
based business. How are we going to stop the bomb from being
here?''
So anything that switches off the brain is, I think, a bad
thing, and to replace it with a risk-based scenario, where we
actually have engagement on how we screen and it, I think, it
is a better--So, I think 4 percent is too low, period, by an
order of magnitude. And we definitely are on the program. This
is a serious priority of ours, and we are elevating security.
So, we're very comfortable working with the Congress on
achieving the objective. The part that really gets me concerned
is when we embed in the law 100 percent, because then that
restricts, really, what you do.
Senator Rockefeller. I understand that. At the same time,
when you say this is sort of a risk-based assessment, that can
be pretty hard to do. I mean, people can now break things apart
so that each of the individual parts mean nothing, but when
they're assembled they become a dangerous weapon.
Mr. Hawley. Yes. Well, it depends what you're looking for.
If you're looking for a bomb that's going to blow up the plane,
that's an easier thing.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, they couldn't possibly blow up a
plane because it's in many pieces, but it may be shipped with
the idea of doing damage once it's landed.
Mr. Hawley. Exactly, so that would--if you're going to--
that's a very hard assignment to figure out, operationally. So,
that would be an enormous cost. And right now, our focus is
principally on explosives. The TSA function is to make sure
there's not a bomb on the plane that's going to take down a
passenger aircraft. So, it's the--Customs and Border Protection
handles the ``what's in the box'' and whether it's legal or
illegal, and that is a different regime, not covered by what
we're talking about here.
Senator Rockefeller. If one's dealing with risk, one is
making a judgment of what part of a piece of baggage or cargo,
et cetera, might be more dangerous than another part, or what
is it that we have to focus on. Now, that can be done from two
points of view. One would be that we know how to get the really
dangerous stuff, and so, don't go at the rest of it; or one
could argue that Homeland Security is, in my judgment, vastly
underfunded, and, therefore, you're forced to make a risk
assessment, because you can't do all of what, in fact, you
would like to be able to do. And I wonder if you could just
help me, a little bit, to understand that.
Mr. Hawley. I think, as a security matter, even if we had
unlimited resources I would probably not suggest the 100-
percent standard. And I think a way to look at it is--I
mentioned, on packages that are targeted for specific flights--
on packages that are targeted for specific flights, they're
screened the same way as a checked bag. So, that is a higher-
risk package because somebody says, ``I want this package on
that flight.'' And if we have a controlled supply chain that we
know the people shipping it and know the people carrying it,
and it could go on any flight, and perhaps even be trucked--
that, then you'd say there's a lower risk to that, because the
person packing the box did not know whether, in fact, it was
going to go on a truck or an aircraft. So, that that kind of
trade-off, you can make. And I think, as we discussed, and as
you raised with me, there is the concern of other people at the
airport, in terms of insider threat, so that if you spend all
your resources opening boxes and not applying your resources
more generally, that opens up another vulnerability.
So, I think that it applies not only in what boxes you
open, but where you put your security resources, so there's no
other area that's wide open, because the adaptive terrorist
will go there.
Senator Rockefeller. All right, well, my time is out and,
for the moment, in the second round I'm going to talk a bit
about general aviation.
Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a few questions about the TSA. One of my
impressions of the TSA is that TSA seems to react to the latest
security breach or the latest thing that's in the media. What
can the TSA and the aviation industry do to anticipate what's
coming down the road, instead of always be reacting to the
situation?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. Well, we of course want to do both, and,
when we do react, people notice it. But that doesn't mean that
we don't try to get ahead of it. And I think the liquids plot
this summer is a good example. And I think it's not widely
known that, when we were talking about the IED component
training a year ago, that there was a liquids component to that
training. And, in fact, we were doing covert testing on liquid
explosives prior to knowing about this plot.
So, we have--and as we were just talking with Senator
Rockefeller--as we have security measures that we can move
around in unpredictable fashion, it covers both what we know,
but also can disrupt what we don't know.
So, the connection with the intel community is critical for
us, that really starts our day, the connection with the intel
community, and then operationalizing it at TSA to try to get
ahead.
Senator Pryor. About 11 months ago, Cathleen Barrick from
the GAO came here to talk to the Commerce Committee about
implementing the Secure Flight program and some of the
challenges that remain there, and then, I guess, last month TSA
issued the Secure Flight Report. And one of the concerns that
the GAO had was privacy. And my question for you is, do you
think that the Privacy Office report addresses the GAO concerns
sufficiently?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the report that just came out referred to
an incident that was prior to the GAO reports. The GAO report--
and this recent one--were on the same topic. And when I
mentioned in my opening statement when I was here last year and
called, basically, a halt to Secure Flight until re-baselined
to protect privacy--we were all talking about the same thing.
And we are on the same page now, going forward, with what the
privacy requirements are. And we have now completed that re-
baselining so we're prepared to move forward. And GAO will be
evaluating us going forward, and we have a lot of engagement
with them right now.
Senator Pryor. What is your time-frame on moving forward
and having some sort of final set of rules out there?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we expect to begin implementation in
calendar 2008.
Senator Pryor. Implementation in calendar year 2008, but
early 2008? Late 2008? What, where?
Mr. Hawley. Well, a lot will depend on the rule. And there
has been so much public anxiety about this topic that we're
very confident people will have a lot of comment. And that will
dictate a lot of the time right there.
Senator Pryor. We've talked a little bit about the 9/11
Commission recommendation of screening everything, but part of
their recommendations deals with individuals who have been
selected for secondary screening. And I guess the 9/11
Commission believes they should all undergo explosives
screening. But that's not what TSA has been doing. You guys
have apparently been screening passengers by an observation
technique, is that right?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, that's on top of the other screening.
Senator Pryor. OK, do you conduct explosives screening for
every passenger that's been pulled out for secondary screening?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. For secondary screening, we do random
explosives checking of every passenger.
Senator Pryor. And are your TSA people out on the front
lines, are they trained to do this kind of screening?
Mr. Hawley. The explosives screening, absolutely.
Senator Pryor. And are you happy, generally, with what you
see? Are you satisfied with what you see from your TSA
screeners?
Mr. Hawley. I am very proud of the work that they've done,
particularly in the last year. I'm extremely, very positive on
it.
Senator Pryor. Well, the reason I ask is because, our
office receives complaints from time to time, various screeners
or various airports where things just don't seem to be working
very smoothly, but you're satisfied with the screeners?
Mr. Hawley. I am, and I think the night of August 9th,
10th--these guys we woke up in the middle of the night and
said, ``Come to work and change the entire security process,
and forget about vacation or anything else for the foreseeable
future.''
Senator Pryor. Are you saying that the system we have
cannot be improved upon?
Mr. Hawley. Oh, absolutely. I think we have great people,
we've now started to improve the training, we've put incentives
to keep the good people in. And those kind of things, reducing
injuries, all of those things make for a better workforce.
Senator Pryor. And you feel like the workforce is getting
better?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. That's all I have. Thank you, Mr. Hawley.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And just a couple of things first; and one is to say that,
in front of this hearing, this first of the year, that I want
to pay our commendation to Senator Stevens for a lot of good
work in chairing this committee, and other committees. Not that
we're sorry to see the change, Senator Stevens, but the fact is
that you did--to borrow an expression--a heck of a good job.
And, Mr. Chairman, my congratulations to you as well, for
taking over this very important subcommittee.
Mr. Hawley, you made a comment in response to Senator
Pryor's question that said, ``We have a random check on every
passenger,'' I'm not quite sure I----
Mr. Hawley. Every passenger is subject to a random check.
So, in other words----
Senator Lautenberg. Can be, have a----
Mr. Hawley. Yes, yes.
Senator Lautenberg. I see. OK. And I think it's fair to say
that there has been a real improvement in the TSA process, the
screener process, and we're pleased to see it.
I have a question, however, about the complement that is
necessary to do the job. We're looking at 2 million people a
day boarding airplanes, over 750 million in the air--2015, I
think, it's expected there'll be a billion passengers a year
flying. We're breaking all kinds of records for air travel. And
we have a limit of 45,000 screeners, and we don't have that
many people working, how many people do we have employed right
now?
Mr. Hawley. A little bit under 43,000--it depends on full-
time equivalent, so our cap it comes out to 43,000.
Senator Lautenberg. The cap or the dollars?
Mr. Hawley. The dollars. So, the cap says you can't have
more than 45,000, but the money, if you spend it, only gets you
43,000. So, the cap is effectively at 43,000.
Senator Lautenberg. Could we use more screeners than that?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think we are not bumping up against the
cap and limiting our operation because of that, at this point.
And I think, you raised the issue of--as traffic grows--at some
point there is a limit. But we've been having a lot of
efficiency gains in the workforce, better scheduling and better
metrics that allow us to manage better, so, so far we're able
to manage it by--take the greater number of passengers with
operating efficiency. So, at this minute, it's not a problem.
As passengers grow, it certainly is a subject of conversation.
Senator Lautenberg. What's the turnover rate within TSA?
Mr. Hawley. It's about 20 percent overall, but the critical
part is the part-time. So, we're about 16.5 percent on the
full-time and about 38 percent on part-time.
Senator Lautenberg. Is that a heavy load?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the----
Senator Lautenberg.--those, those billets?
Mr. Hawley. No, actually, we're able to fill the jobs. It
costs us $12,000 every time we hire and train. So, any
turnover--particularly in a part-timer--is a bad deal. And what
we want to do is get people in who will stay, and last spring,
as you may know, we went to a local hiring model which has
allowed us--that in itself gets us a higher retention rate.
Senator Lautenberg. That's a very, that's a very high rate
as it is. Twenty percent or sixteen percent turnover in a
workforce, that's not a lot.
Mr. Hawley. Well it--pre-9/11 it was 140 percent.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, that doesn't, that's not a good
mark to go to. You're looking at the possibility of turning
over 9,000 people, eight to nine thousand people a year, that's
quite an assignment.
I had asked to have the cap removed and we had a vote on it
which was overwhelmingly approved in the Senate, to lift it up
to 45,000 to try to accommodate the needs of the passengers.
And I think it's generally thought that if we could get
security review time down to 10 minutes, that would be a good
objective. Is that achievable?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. And by and large, we are achieving
that. And I think the Thanksgiving and New Year, all of those
high travel times, we did manage to get through without
unreasonably long lines.
I'm very mindful of this issue, and my obligation to come
forward if I believe there is a security impact. But right--as
of this moment--I'm comfortable with the package that we have
now.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, the fact of the matter is that I
fly almost weekly between here and home, and I see lots of
times when the security lines are far more than 10 minutes in
the Newark Airport, North Liberty and we're short, I think,
about 100 TSA screeners. And, is that an exception, or is that
more likely around the country?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we have to delve into the number, but
according to my information, we're not under, significantly
understaffed at Liberty Airport.
Senator Lautenberg. What did you say?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, there may be a reduction of the number
from last year. We have the screener allocation model, as you
know, and that would be at X. And it may, in fact, be below X
in 2007----
Senator Lautenberg. I'd have to look at that, Mr. Hawley,
because it's been a continuing problem.
Mr. Hawley. I'll look at it as well.
Senator Lautenberg. I'm very close to the management at
Newark Airport. So we, how many people do we have in training
at a time?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know off the top of my head, but it
would be to replenish----
Senator Lautenberg. Right. So does that say that there are
more than 43,000 people?
Mr. Hawley. No.
Senator Lautenberg. If it's less than 43,000, then you
don't have 43,000 screeners, then.
Mr. Hawley. But, we look at it checkpoint by checkpoint.
And it varies by time of year, and all sorts of things, so the
number moves all of the time. And we look at it down at the
granular level for the checkpoint for the airport, as opposed
to the overall number.
The overall number, we say, we just can't go over the cap,
and we're not close to that.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Hawley, I suggest that you review
this.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. And get back to us with that. Mr.
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that an opening statement
that I wanted to submit be included in the record.
Senator Rockefeller. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on the safety
of our skies--and the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for improving
it. The 9/11 Commission gave the Bush Administration a report card on
aviation security.
When it came to screening passengers for explosives, the government
earned a ``C.''
And when it came to screening their bags and cargo, the government
earned a ``D.''
Those grades show we do not have enough screeners working in our
airports--and we do not provide those screeners we do have with the
training or technology they need.
We need to give the Transportation Security Administration the
resources it needs to protect the Nation's aviation system. Right now,
the TSA has less than forty-five thousand (45,000) screeners in
airports from Burbank, California to Bangor, Maine. Forty-five thousand
is not enough.
Across our country, more than two million people fly every day; 760
million people fly every year. By 2015, our aviation system is expected
to carry one billion passengers a year.
Forty-five thousand screeners cannot get one billion people through
security and to their gates on-time.
We need more screeners. And we need them now.
I offered an amendment to the SAFE Ports Act in September to lift
the arbitrary cap on the number of screeners that TSA can hire--and to
get the right number of screeners into our airports, helping passengers
make their planes. The Senate passed my amendment by a vote of 85-12.
But House Republicans gutted it from the final SAFE Ports bill--and
replaced it with a provision on Internet gambling.
We should not be gambling with aviation security.
America's travelers want this cap on screeners lifted. I plan to
offer legislation again to do that.
In 1990, I served on the Pan Am Flight 103 Commission--and we
looked into the disaster that killed two-hundred-and-seventy people
over Lockerbie, Scotland. Back then, our commission found that we
needed better screening for explosives. Seventeen years later, I am
still saying that same thing.
It's time to stop saying we will get it done later. It's time to
start acting on it now. It's time to let TSA hire as many screeners as
it needs to keep our skies safe.
Senator Rockefeller. Senator Klobuchar?
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Secretary Hawley, as a former prosecutor running an office
of about 400 people, I have some sense of the challenges you
have, in terms of employees and in terms of the setting of
priorities and the need to triage things. And we certainly have
that every day in our office.
And I also see the changing world and how you have to adapt
technologies. And we went from crooks using crowbars to having
them use computers. And I've always said, we're as
sophisticated in getting the crooks as the technology that we
have. And we have to be as sophisticated as they are.
So, along those lines, my question is about the TSA-run
passenger pre-screening and how quickly do you think we're
going to be able to get an effective pre-screening system as
the 9/11 Commission recommended?
Mr. Hawley. The key question of matching terror watch lists
against passenger lists, that's happening today, run by the
airlines. So, in terms of a security impact, anybody who's
known to the Government as somebody who should not be flying
is, in fact, today not allowed to fly. Having said that, we
want to replace the current system with what we call Secure
Flight, which is a Government-run program, which doesn't
involve us sharing watch lists. So, it's a better system.
And, we had a huge privacy issue, as you know, over time.
And last year we went back and just re-did the whole program to
make sure it was solid on the privacy thing. That's done now,
and now we're moving forward. So in 2008, we expect to be able
to deploy Secure Flight finally, and take it all in-house.
Senator Klobuchar. So, the time-line is to get it done by
2008?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. My second question is along the line
of Senator Stevens' ``Cat Stevens'' question--and that's based
on my own personal experience. I had two hip replacements this
year because of something I was born with, in the middle of the
campaign, I might add, and so I am personally familiar with all
of your screeners on a very intimate basis.
Every time I go through the checkpoints, and I can say that
they do a very good job, and I am in no way thinking that
people should get special treatment, I think that it's
impossible just to have someone give a card. But I hang out at
these screening points with people that are much older than
myself who have had joint replacements. And I was just
wondering if there's any technology being developed to be able
to help people with these hip and knee replacements go through
security. I'd say about 10 minutes is spent on each one of them
after they go through security. And again, I don't come from
any complaints, I think it's the right thing to do. But as we
move forward and try to triage our resources, and as more and
more people are getting knee and hip replacements, if there's
some thought to technology in this area?
Mr. Hawley. Well, there is technology, and it comes with a
cost--the famous backscatter technology is one that would be
well-suited for this. There's also millimeter wave. Backscatter
technology is famous because there are those who believe it
shows too vivid an image of the person. So, there's that kind
of a trade-off. But the short answer is: Yes, there is
technology that does address that. It does come with other
issues as well.
Although I have to say, I think the behavior observation--a
lot of the person-related screening, as opposed to ``are you
carrying something'' screening--is really where we've got to
go. Because we can't just keep taking away things from people
based on--that we think they could use it as a weapon. So, we
have to keep the clear weapons out of the way, no explosives,
but get an opinion about the person and that, I think, is where
we have to go.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens?
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
I was just sitting here wondering if you could give us an
update on the concepts of the frequent traveler, or the special
access that we've been thinking about over the years. Is it
going to be possible?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. It's--it is now, essentially, in
operation. And one of the providers is rolling it out in
airports this week. So, when I was last here we said it was
going to be a private sector program. And that has happened,
we've done our security piece. And one of the unsaid things
about this is that the private sector developed a credentialing
program that involves biometrics, without a penny of cost to
the Government, that is now up and operating for the RT
program, but conceptually could be used for other programs as
well.
So, I think everybody wants to know about shoes, coats and
laptops, but there are other benefits to Registered Traveler
that have already come to the fore. So, it's operating now.
Senator Stevens. You say you're going to be able to get a
program that will take care of the problem of laptops? I don't
understand.
Mr. Hawley. No. The frequent traveler would prefer to keep
shoes on, keep the laptop in their briefcase, and keep the coat
on. And we're not yet at the point where we can accommodate
those requests, so that tends to be where the discussion is:
``Why do I have to still take off my shoes?'' And we're now
testing a shoe scanner that is at one of the facilities that's
rolling out Registered Traveler to see whether that helps with
the shoes. And we'll keep moving as we can get technology to
make it easier and easier. But we have already done the
biometric certification and we've got the program now running,
and it's up to airports as they decide to roll it out, to come
forward.
Senator Stevens. Will those people still be subject to
random search?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Rockefeller. Senator Thune, from South Dakota, we
welcome you to this committee, I think you'll enjoy it a great
deal and will add a great deal to it.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being
added to the Committee. I'm kind of the newbie here, and I'm
anxious to take on many of the issues that this committee deals
with, many of which directly affect my state. So I'm grateful
for the opportunity to serve on the Committee. I look forward
to working with you, the Chairman, and the other members of--
the Ranking Republican on the Committee--on the issues of
importance to our country and to our respective states.
And I appreciate the hearing this morning. And I guess what
I would simply say with respect to this morning's hearing, Mr.
Chairman, is that one of the things that I hear quite often--I
also serve on the Armed Services Committee--is that you cannot
succumb to the tendency to prepare for and fight the last war.
And Mr. Hawley, I appreciate you being here today and
responding to questions, and I think that's something we always
have to keep in mind, too, is how do we anticipate what the
next threat is to our security, to passenger safety on our
airlines.
And I would like to direct a couple of questions, if I
might, to you with regard to some of the changes that have been
put in place, and how they bear on smaller airports. In my
state of South Dakota, we are a state with smaller population
centers, and air service into and out of our state is somewhat
limited--relative to what I would like to see it be. I'd like
to see a few more direct flights from Sioux Falls to
Washington, D.C.--I don't think I'm going to see that any time
soon--but I do think it's important that we evaluate, always,
how these policies that we put in place are impacting smaller
airports.
I guess I'm interested in knowing if there were any
differences with regard to some of the changes that were put in
place last summer regarding gels and liquids, and the response
in smaller airports in comparison to large airports. Did TSA
see any difference in how capable our smaller airports were at
implementing the new screening protocols? Were smaller airports
perhaps more nimble and quicker in terms of adapting to these
new changes? Or were they behind the curve in terms of having,
perhaps, fewer resources to throw at it?
Mr. Hawley. It's pretty even across the system and we are
testing, a part of--we do covert testing--and the bulk of our
covert testing is at larger airports but we are checking
airports of all sizes to be able to answer that question.
Overall, it is remarkably consistent and it needs to be,
because obviously you start at a small airport, you could end
up anywhere.
One of the changes--one of the things is that we do custom-
tailor the security for the airport. In the area of document
verification, in 200 of the smaller airports, we now have a
trained Transportation Security Officer (TSO) checking the ID
and validating the credential, versus an outside contractor.
So, we've been able to work with a lot of the small
airports to say, ``Why don't you guys carry the bags, that's
not a security function, and we'll take over the identity
verification?'' And that is, I believe, an increase in
security. And it's something that we've been able to work out--
in the smaller communities, it has a bigger impact in the
larger airports because of the cost. So if you were to say,
what's the biggest difference small to large? I would say that
would be it. But it's not a requirement, it's really a business
practice.
Senator Thune. And you had mentioned in your testimony that
the TSA is introducing some new programs focused on developing
specialized skills in the TSA workforce, including training of
behavior detection officers, and bomb appraisal officers. I
guess I'd be interested in knowing as well, are there plans in
place to ensure that smaller airports are receiving that type
of specialized training for their TSA staff as well?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, although the direct answer to your
question is it's not at the top--the first roll-out of the
behavior detection will be at the larger airports, but the plan
is to train everybody in the base level of that skill, and then
add the more advanced on top of that. So it's not excluded, but
it's not, frankly, at the top of the priority list at this
point.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that.
And Mr. Chairman, as I said, I'm looking forward to the
opportunity to serving with you all on this committee, and
probing some of these difficult and challenging issues that we
face.
So, I thank you for your testimony and for your response to
those questions.
I yield back my time.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator, and I resonate
with your Sioux City-direct-to-Washington flights--West
Virginia and South Dakota, which are two of the more rural
states in America, as we both know.
Mr. Hawley, a couple of questions: There is a tendency on
the part of Members of Congress and, obviously members of the
public, to try and speed up the system, almost at any cost. And
I, frankly, would just prefer to see you doing what you can
possibly do as well as you can do it, even if it takes longer.
Now, let me give you an example. We were discussing a
moment ago the situation where Catherine becomes Cat, I was on
a shuttle yesterday from LaGuardia with my Chief of Staff whose
first name is Carrie, and they had down only a Catherine. One
of the TSA screeners said, ``I'm sorry, I can't let a Carrie go
through when we have a Catherine down.'' Now, we were literally
minutes from missing the shuttle, which would have caused me to
miss two votes, or three or five or whatever it was yesterday
afternoon. And I was thinking, as this was sorted through, that
it was exactly what should be happening. That your screener,
who was just at the part that you enter, she looks at the names
and make sure that the identification is right. It would have
been irresponsible had she allowed the Carrie H. to go through
without knowing that it was actually Catherine H. And I think
those kinds of things make enormous differences.
The speed with which we do things--getting into the fast
lane, all of that--are tremendously important, but this all
comes from 9/11 when two large, fueled airplanes, or three--
actually four--attacked. I think that airlines are still very
much the weapon of choice--airplanes I would say--are the
weapon of choice. I think it'll spread, dirty bombs, things of
that sort, I think they're all part of our future.
But, in the meantime I think we just have to do it right.
The focus has to be transportation security and airline
security.
Now, we were discussing the 45,000 cap limit, and then that
sort of nudges me toward general aviation. I believe that about
three-quarters of all the flights in the air at any given
moment in the United States are general aviation. The
percentage of those which are over a certain weight limit or
under a certain weight limit, I'm not exactly sure. But that
involves some 19,000 airports at which general aviation planes
are likely to land, only in our own country.
In the times that I've used general aviation, I think only
once in my life have I ever gone through a passenger thing. I
find this very disturbing, and I talked about it very openly
with the general aviation people who are not anxious to see
changes made, but understand that they have to do their part,
too.
You have a program about that, and in our discussions the
other day, I think you talked about that--you're going to have
to have a lot more than 45,000 people if we do general
aviation, which is excluded at this point. I don't understand
the reason for that. I have a son who lives in New York, and
when that single-engine plane went into a building, it was a
building right next to where he was, and it was a single-engine
plane. Well, in fact, it turns out that most general aviation
is single-engine airplanes.
Now, you make cutoffs, and if this is a secure matter and
you can't talk about it, then don't. But I think the matter of
making sure that general aviation goes through approximately
the same process--or at least something that measures the
standards of passenger screening, of pilot identification,
what's going onboard--is very much a part of our future. And if
it is not, then we're not taking the lessons of 9/11 seriously.
Your comments, sir?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think we agree that we can have no
doors completely open. And I know we agree on the topic of--we
have to be concerned about other threats than blowing up a
plane, other kinds of weapons. And Secretary Chertoff has made
it an unmistakable priority at DHS for me and my colleagues at
other DHS entities. And so we are looking at what are the steps
we take in the short term that would measurably improve
security as we figure out the longer-term issue? And I think at
the end of that spectrum is the physical screening of
passengers getting on GA airplanes.
But there are a lot of security measures, there are
security measures in place about security on the ground, but
there are a number of gradations that we can ratchet up. And
frankly, we plan to over the next year--and are in conversation
now with the GA community about--what we can do operationally
now as we develop some of the issues going forward.
Senator Rockefeller. But that doesn't really answer my
question, and I've overrun my time. So, I'll return to my
questioning after Senator Lott has a chance to ask questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Lott. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
apologize for my tardiness, but we were marking up the small
business benefits part of the minimum wage increase and I
wanted to participate in that. But thank you for having the
hearing, I'm looking forward to working with you on aviation
issues.
It's good to see you again, Mr. Hawley, thank you for
coming and for the job you've been trying to do. It's not an
easy task--everybody's expecting you to do more, sometimes
less, improve efficiencies, make us safe, and it's a real
challenge.
I don't want to repeat the questions that have already been
asked. First, just my continued admonition, and that is to
insist that your decisions make common sense, and that your
workers use common sense. Because that's the biggest problem I
run into sometimes at airports. What goes on just doesn't make
common sense in terms of who you check and how they're checked.
I always kind of enjoy the fact that my wife almost always
gets snatched out of line, and just to make her madder, I take
on down the hall waving at her as I leave, and she doesn't
appreciate that. But, you know, from various reasons, for
instance, when she's trying to go through the line, her ticket
may be in the name of Tricia Lott, but her name, her ID card is
Patricia T. Lott. And somehow or other, the person at the
counter doesn't get it--that it, you know, look at the picture,
yes, it's the same person, common sense is still a problem we
run into.
With regard to cargo vulnerabilities, I know you've been
working on that. And one suggestion that the Commission made
was to have at least one blast-proof cargo container on every
passenger plane carrying cargo. I think I understand from the
staff, you said earlier that part of the problem is that cargo
is on pallets quite often, and you can't get it through a
scanner. This makes common sense. Have you looked at that
possibility?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. There is a pilot ongoing right now on
that, and that gets me--we talked a little bit earlier in the
hearing--about risk-base. And that is one of the ways we can do
it--put in place something more quickly--is to say, for
packages that we're more concerned about, we put them in the
blast-proof one and that's a mitigation measure.
The issue, of course, is how much they weigh, and it's my
understanding there's a new version coming out that would be
significantly less in terms of weight, but as good in terms of
bomb-proof.
Senator Lott. Well, composite materials now are much
lighter and not as heavy and they're more resistant to blasts.
Mr. Hawley. No, it is definitely something that we're
looking at, and there is a place for it in the solution.
Senator Lott. Well, I think Congress is going to be pushing
on this subject. We need to try to get ahead of the curve to
come up with some improvements there.
Now another area, see, I believe a lot of what we need is
technology. We've been slow in moving the technology. I know
there's a cost factor--some of the technology is new and
unproven, and then you always run into, or sometimes at least,
a privacy consideration.
For instance, I understand you're developing the whole body
backscatter x-ray imaging systems to improve the detection of
explosives carried by passengers, but some people are concerned
about privacy requirements. You're trying to address that. I've
looked at that technology, and you know, it's pretty amazing
how effective it is in how you can pick up even the smallest
thing that a person might have in their shoe or on their
person. And I know we get into these privacy considerations,
but if I run the risk of being blown out of the sky, I might
make, you know, a little concession in terms of this.
I realize--look, when it comes physique, I'm embarrassed by
what the scanner shows. I mean, I look pretty pitiful. But
again, I think your specifications don't cover the field of
technology. I think this is a technology that we need to move
aggressively to. So how are we doing on that?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we've got two major suppliers, both of
whom are, you know, in a horse race, so to speak. But that
gives some competition to the marketplace, and we're testing
one of them in Phoenix--actually we're testing it now, although
not actually running people through. We're testing the
operation capability, the power needs of it, how much does it
weigh, where do you put the resolution. So, we're actively
pushing that now, and that will be in operation in Phoenix. So,
we are moving forward with it on operational testing.
Senator Lott. That's good, but I think you need to move
more aggressively. I mean, I was looking at this technology
back in the summer. It's there, it's available now, we're using
it at our--or that type of technology--at our ports. I just,
you know, you need to move more aggressively on some of this
stuff. Because your biggest cost is the manpower cost. We're
not going to continue to give you the money you've had. We're
going to expect you to do more with less and less people, and
you're going to have to use technology to do that. So,
aggressively pursue the technology.
I don't know what the technology is, but I don't understand
why it's taking so long to implement a program I believe you
said you were going to do a year or so ago. With regard to--I
call them frequent flyers--you pay $100, now I understand
you've got, it's working, a pilot program at two or three
places----
Mr. Hawley. We're done. You were unmistakable last year in
this and TSA has done its part. It's now up to the airports. So
the program is now available to move forward as the private
sector wishes to proceed. TSA has done all that it's got to do
on it, and we're just--we're ready, and we've got one operating
in Orlando, and there are others that are opening, I believe,
this week.
Senator Lott. And it's $100--you have to undergo the check,
and you have to pay a $100 fee or whatever?
Mr. Hawley. Well, TSA says, ``We're going to run a
background check and we're going to charge you $28 to do
that.'' Whatever they sell the card for is somebody else's
call. Our part of the cost is $28.
Senator Lott. Now, what are you saying here, that it's
really up to the individual airport authority?
Mr. Hawley. No, it's a private--yes, it is up to the
individual airport. But it's a private sector-funded program.
Senator Lott. I don't understand why you wouldn't want to
do this. I mean, that's one way of thinning out these lines and
getting a check on people. Why are you saying, ``do it if you
want to''? I mean, this is something probably we should do.
Mr. Hawley. Well, it gets to the security value of that
particular background check. And, we've got 60 million people a
month coming through, and it doesn't quite get us to the level
of comfort that we could radically change the checkpoint
process for the Registered Traveler. When, hopefully, we get to
that point, I think it will be a slam dunk in terms of its cost
justification. But for us right now on the security front, it
doesn't offer enough of a benefit to do less security than we
now are asking.
Senator Lott. Well, we continue to need to do more and to
do a better job. It continues to be an unbelievable hassle at
the airports. And it's an area we're concerned about, because
it is a place where we--we're standing in line. And if people
recognize Senator Rockefeller, for example, they begin to
explain to him why they're mad about it. And so, we're going to
be mad at you until you help us deal with that constituent
complaint.
And I do understand that it's been difficult, it takes
time, it takes money, but I do think technology is a key to the
solution. And we need to move a lot faster in that particular
area.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Lott.
Let me just pick up on that, technology versus people. I'm
not sure that the right answer always comes down to technology.
In other words, as you indicated in your testimony, there's
nothing better than the human brain. There's nothing better
than somebody being able to look you in the eye and figuring
out what you're about, reading your body language. And you may
have nothing on you that's detectable, but the person may just
figure you're something of a risk and take you out of line and
look at you further, and often nothing will come of it, but I
feel comfortable with that.
Now, I go through your puffer system or whatever else, and
I'm impressed with that technology. It's sort of a ``gee whiz''
type thing, and it seems to work. On the other hand, it breaks
down quite a lot, it's very expensive, you can't get them all
over the place. So, just take the question of people versus
technology. One thing you don't have a lot of is money, and I
remind all as I always do--and Senator Lott knows far better
than I do--that your testimony has been screened by OMB. And
therefore, you know, you sometimes can't speak as freely as you
want to, and that's just the way the system works. I regret it
under any administration, but that's the way that works.
Can you reflect with me, just a little bit, philosophically
on people versus technology? There's a madness and a love of
technology in this country, and I think it's the only thing
that can get the job done in some cases. And, I think,
sometimes it can't read things that people can.
Mr. Hawley. I think where technology is an accelerator,
that's where we need to focus. And one of the issues that we
have is that a lot of the technology that we buy now is new and
that it is when it is most expensive and least reliable. And
when we get further down the technology curve, that's where the
real payoff comes. And, I think, the technology solution is
indispensable. I think the people part is also indispensable--
that a lot of the technology is single-purpose, or focused on a
particular thing. And as a number of the Senators have
mentioned, we want to be able to address threats that weren't
yesterday's threat. And the people--finding somebody with
hostile intent--is a critical component of that.
And what we've done--nobody else sees 700 million people a
year up close the way we do. So, to take advantage of the fact
that we're interacting, and bring the behavioral science--that
science--to the fact that we have people already at the
airport, who we are already paying to elevate the capability,
and then let them use common sense.
And I think one of the biggest changes we've made in the
last year was during the liquids thing--everybody was focused
on the baggie. But we did go to exactly the common sense
security that, Senator Lott, you've mentioned before, to give
discretion for common sense to the front-line officer. And that
is a major cultural change from going to a checklist
orientation--where you have to do exactly this and you'll get
punished if you don't, to ``Here, you're trained, this is a
threat that could come in a lot of different ways. You make a
threat assessment, based on your common sense.'' So, I think
the human intuition is immediately available--we are using that
in training. So, for the next 2 years, I think that is likely
to be the bulk of it. And then, as the technology moves on the
technology curve--which is probably a year and a half, 2 years
out--that will then tilt the balance.
Senator Rockefeller. Let me get back to the general
aviation situation.
I indicated I didn't think you'd answered my question. And
it may be that you can't because, again, because of security, I
don't know. But let me just ask it more simply: If three-
quarters, approximately, of airplanes in the sky at any given
moment during the course of the day are general aviation, and
so much of our resources--or virtually all of our resources--
are going into the other 25 percent. There is nothing written
in the book that says that a small jet or some large propeller
plane or a single-engine plane can't do catastrophic damage.
Now, it's a question in some cases of fuel--the larger the
plane, the more fuel, therefore there's an instinct to go to
the larger plane because it will carry more fuel. And the other
one would be--a smaller plane could be carrying something which
was an explosive device that had nothing to do with fuel, but
had its own timing system and all of the rest of it. What, in
fact, is being done by the general aviation community, in your
judgment, and what do you think that we need to do, if you have
the resources? No--what do we need to do as a government in
terms of general aviation? And do you have the resources to do
the Government's part?
Mr. Hawley. I do understand your question, and I don't
think there is a--there's not a classified problem--so if I'm
not answering, it's not that.
I know what you're talking about, I think it is something
we take very seriously. Secretary Chertoff has it very high on
his radar. And so our approach is, ``Let's get incremental,''--
we've got to do a serious job of securing that so-called supply
chain, as well as the other.
And it is a very different, different bird, as you say,
given that there are many, many, many small--and we've started
with the approach of securing the physical airport itself. We
also screen the pilots, individuals who are certified to fly
them. And we're getting at it from that perspective.
The question we need to work out with the community is,
what is the security benefit of screening every individual
passenger in some format? It's sort of like hazmat trucking,
that if you say terrorists are only going to use trucks that
are certified for hazmat, then you're not cognizant of the fact
that, well, heck they could go steal one that's not hazmat and
put hazmat in it because they're not afraid of violating the
law. So, you have to, you have to look at, at the whole
picture.
And I would expect that we'll have a more robust plan to
come back here to you with, it's something we're working on
now, we're studying that through 2008, but we absolutely
understand the other point that, that you were making.
Senator Rockefeller. But it's three-quarters of all
flights. What is the difference between me--if I were to be
some danger--getting onto a commercial flight, which is 25
percent, or getting onto a general aviation flight, which is 75
percent? Why would one be locked down completely? And I think
you've done a very good job at increasing security and making
it--I've been very impressed by your screeners. I don't
understand how they've gotten better. It's too easy to say that
they have gotten better. I think you're right--they're both
polite and they're tough. And, yes, lines have been sometimes,
and that's part of what security's about.
But the 75 percent--if an enemy, particularly an Al Qaeda-
type enemy--they always look for the soft places. Now, they
look for the dramatic places--the Twin Towers--or they look for
the soft places. One of the two. General aviation is one of the
soft places.
Mr. Hawley. OK. Secretary Chertoff's risk basis--you've got
the large aircraft for use as a weapon, use it as--blow it up.
One of the impacts on the ``blow it up'' is on the total
network. So that if aircraft are being attacked by terrorists,
that will have an impact on the total network of commercial
aviation, and less so--less network effect in general aviation.
So, in terms of differences, there isn't--apart from those
which you already addressed--that would be the principal
difference. So while they're numerically more, their network
effect is less. But then when you go to your other payload--so
to speak--scenario, then that pops up on the consequence chart
of very, very high, and that--that is the piece of general
aviation that we're focused on, is to hit that high
consequences piece.
Senator Rockefeller. What should they be doing?
Mr. Hawley. The basics of securing the aircraft, observing
anything out of the ordinary--all of those basics are
remarkably effective, at virtually no cost. So that is the
basic.
We're doing more in the screening, we're doing more vetting
of the FAA lists, so we have a certain requirement that is,
maybe yearly, but we're doing it much, much more than that. So,
we're able to catch if anybody has changed on the list from
when it was originally done.
So there will be a big cliff when it goes from those kind
of solutions to the, ``OK, now we gotta physically screen
people who are getting onboard the flight.'' So, there is a
classified element of this, but I think you've posed the policy
issue squarely, which is: We can do the things that are
relatively easy and not expensive, but there is a big next step
that will cost to take. And I think that is--that's the issue
that you're highlighting.
Senator Rockefeller. Is your expectation that we will come
to that point within the next several years?
Mr. Hawley. You know, I don't know on the issue of
passenger screening. If it turns out that that is the way to
address the high consequence, then absolutely. But what we're
going to figure out, what we're working on, is how do we
address the high consequence if it's screening? If it's
something else, then that's where we'll go.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. A final question, and I have some
that I want to submit to you and I have one announcement that I
have to make.
With respect to the screeners, I'm actually--it's a
quizzical matter. Because I can remember, we started with one
set of screeners, and then we made a very large change, and
many of them left, and new ones were brought in, and there
wasn't really any difference in the quality of their work--this
was some time ago.
Now, suddenly, things have gotten a lot better. Now, what
do I mean by that? What I mean is, that they take their time,
they're polite. That if you have a three-ounce or less bottle
of fluid, they find that in their screening devices. Even if
it's in the carry-on bag, they find that, they take it out.
They say, ``This is OK but it should be in a plastic wrapper,''
and in other words, that kind of care is, to me, very obviously
present now.
But I would suspect that, if TSA were to take a group of
their employees, and to send them through the screening process
with, you know, malevolent material on them, that a lot them
would get through. And I suspect that would be the case.
So, the question is, when you're talking about improving
their nature--I and others can be, you know, we can be
persuaded by the friendliness, the toughness, the precision,
their patience--all of those things which I think are
remarkable--politeness which is very, very hard at the end of
the day. But, in the final analysis, if the sort of the quiet
testing that I'm sure goes on in TSA--running people through,
deliberately carrying things that should be caught, and
sometimes aren't caught or often are not caught, then that's a
very different result.
Mr. Hawley. Totally agree. We are--we have the base level
of testing that everybody's familiar with in terms of the x-ray
tests, and we do covert testing. We also do take the security
officers and have them do exactly what you described, sometimes
at other airports where they're not recognized.
But we are rolling out a program in 2007 that is directly
related to that, in terms of doing the IED component test kits.
To have them deployed at the check points, where they will work
with them all day and test, and peer test, with each other. It
is the ability to find the detonator, the individual piece of
an IED, that is the standard.
And that's the principal thing that's changed since before
9/11. Is that now it is, a very tough standard. But the
training is far advanced, and I believe our workforce steps up
to that. But we're--one of the reasons that we're deploying
these kits in a widespread manner is to be able to build up the
database. Because when you do individual covert testing, you
know, in a system like ours, you're not statistically
significant. So, if we can get out twelve or fifteen hundred of
these and build up the test scores, then we really can come
back here with statistically significant data that will be able
to demonstrate progress, or non-progress.
Senator Rockefeller. All right. I have five more questions
which I'm going to submit to you in writing, but we've been
joined by Senator Carper. And I want to welcome you, Senator
Carper, to the Committee. You're a superb member, even though
you haven't opened your mouth yet, because I know you very
well, and you were born in West Virginia, which gets you a few
extra points. And we welcome whatever questions you may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to be
here. Maybe I shouldn't open my mouth, and then people will
think I really know something.
This falls under the rubric of ``all politics is local,''
but in my state, one of the issues I focus a fair amount on is
affordable housing. I'm a huge proponent of home ownership. And
one of the companies that's been especially supportive of that
over the years is a company called Leon Wiener and Associates.
Leon Wiener, who is the founder of the company, passed away
a couple of years ago, and it's now run by a fellow named Kevin
Kelley.
Kevin's a name as close to that of somebody that's on a
watch list from the IRA, and for some time, when he's gone to
the airport to catch a flight to go to one place or the other,
he ends up not getting to fly, or at least delayed.
I don't know about you, but when I go to airports--and
Senator Rockefeller, this may be for you too--I usually get
there in a hurry, I don't have much time to go through the
screening. I do, like everybody else, but it's a rush
situation. And I'm trying to make my flights, and make my
connecting flights, and I can't imagine what it's like to be
who you are--who you say you are--actually be an upstanding
citizen within your state, and to face these delays over and
over again.
He's not the only one. He's not the only one in my state,
and I suspect you heard from others. I'm told Senator Lott may
have talked about his wife this morning facing a similar
situation.
And as, on the one hand, we try to be careful and cautious
and enhance security on our flights, we also want to do
whatever we can to make sure that we're not inconveniencing--
needlessly inconveniencing--people. Like, whether it's Mrs.
Lott, or whether it's Kevin Kelley, or a whole lot of other
people.
I suspect you already responded to this question, this
issue, but for me--would you just restate what, what we're
doing to get this resolved, and soon?
Mr. Hawley. Sure. First off, I do understand that it is a
pain for an awful lot of people, and that is something that I
hear about a lot, and it's something that we work on a lot. And
so, I guess I understand the question.
The answer is, that in the next year we will get Secure
Flight deployed, and that problem will then go away.
Senator Carper. When you say next year--early next year?
The middle of next year? The end of next year?
Mr. Hawley. I would say by New Year's Eve is what I would
sign up for, and then whatever we can do faster. It would be
depending on the comments that we get. This is principally the
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and the comment period,
and what comments we get, and how long that takes.
Senator Carper. I want to make sure I understand it. When
you say by next--by New Year's Eve of this year?
Mr. Hawley. Of 2008.
Senator Carper. So that would be almost 2 years away.
Mr. Hawley. That's, yes, so. Let me go back to the--so,
that brings up the question: OK, that's a long time--what are
we doing about it in the meantime?
And the first thing we've done is scrub the list. And we've
gone over every name on the No Fly List. And we'll have that
review complete here in the next couple of months, and that
will reduce the No Fly List to the bare minimum of people who
really, really today represent the threat. And that's going to
be on the order of magnitude of about a half. So that itself
will reduce the problem.
The second piece is redress, where we now have gotten the
process from a paper, 60-day process, to an electronic 10-day
process to get on the cleared list, where we circulate to the
airlines and say, ``Hey, this is the guy who's not the
terrorist, let him go through.''
The problem that your friend is having--and a lot of people
are having--is that there are different airline systems who are
able to use the cleared list in--to different degrees of
effectiveness. So, the problem is isolated to, ``Can I get my
boarding pass at home, or print it off at the kiosk?'' Those
are the two areas where you're impacted. So, if the airline
can't clear you in their system, those are the two places it
fits. And the trade-off for that is, we have a very good system
of keeping people who are on the watch list off planes.
Senator Carper. What do we need to do to help expedite this
solution?
Mr. Hawley. I think a lot of the responsibility, frankly,
is on TSA to prove that the privacy protections are robust and
real. And I think a lot of questions have been raised as to our
trustworthiness on that. And that's where we spent a large part
of the last year--re-baselining, rebuilding the program. So,
we've now done it to our satisfaction, and now comes the
process of convincing GAO and the public that it is as robust
as we think it is.
Senator Carper. Second question. In Northern Delaware we
have an airport, it's about 30, 35 miles away from Philadelphia
International. Philadelphia International is one of the busiest
airports in the country now, and frankly one of the airports
with the longest delays. They have huge problems with
congestion, there are airplanes trying to get in and out of
Philadelphia.
With that in mind, at least one national carrier--
international carrier, Delta, has decided to operate flights
out of New Castle County Airport, just south of Wilmington,
Delaware to provide the direct flights to Atlanta. And the
service is actually quite well-received, and our expectations
is that they're probably going to build on that.
But getting federalized screening at the airport has been--
as you may know--difficult. And I just want to ask, what was
the reason for the initial decision not to federalize the
airport in time for the start of passenger service to Atlanta?
Any ideas on that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. It is a widespread issue for us. It does
get to the resource base of saying, at what point are we
deploying further TSA screeners around the country to smaller
airports? And what we find is that when we do that, service is
initiated--a lot of times service then decreases, or leaves,
and then we've got our TSA people stuck there. And the really
hard problem is when it's reduced, because you can't pull them
out totally, and once you federalize, it's hard not to.
So, we're looking--and I'm familiar with Wilmington--but as
an overall system, one of the things we've talked to airlines
and airports about, is using the privatization option for the
smaller airports, where you can have an arrangement with your
local sheriff, or other local people, where we can deputize to
do the screening. And that way we don't have to put full-time
TSA people, but you still get your federalized screening, and
can fly into the sterile area, the big airports. So, I think
that is a very promising way to deal with it that doesn't drain
TSA resources, but keeps the security.
Senator Carper. My time's expired, I'm going to submit one,
at least one question for the record, just to follow up on
private----
Senator Rockefeller. Go ahead, Senator. Take your time.
Senator Carper. OK, thank you.
When it appeared that the New Castle County Airport would
not receive TSA screeners, apparently they explored contracting
with a private company. And I'm told that bids were tough to
come by because of the small size of the service needed, as
well as, I guess, liability issues that were raised. And so,
I'll just go back at this a little different way and ask, how
has the TSA addressed the problem that we faced in Delaware
when looking to contract security? And what, if any, changes
have been made?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we just announced one in New York where
it was a three-party deal, and that's what we're looking for.
And if the bid is--``find me an agency to bid on it,'' that's
going to be harder than, ``find me some off-duty police
officers who are going to be around the airport anyway,'' and
we can, you know--they can earn a little extra money and
provide additional service.
So, I think that the second--identifying individuals who
are in the community anyway is a profitable way to go. So, Mo
McGowan right here, runs that part of the world, so we'll go
huddle after this.
Senator Carper. Say the name of the person again?
Mr. Hawley. Mo----
Senator Carper. Mo----
Mr. Hawley. McGowan, over there in the red tie.
Senator Carper. Thank you, thanks so much. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller. He probably has problems going through
passenger screening, too.
Senator Carper. With a name like Mo McGowan, do you think?
Senator Rockefeller. Yes.
Senator Carper. I hope not, because it's a theme. Hey, Mo.
No, Mo.
Senator Rockefeller. I guess the final words I'd say is
that, there are a lot of things we have yet to discuss. And you
will--I hope you'll answer my questions, and I hope we'll
continue meeting.
I think it needs to be said that--at least in this
Senator's judgment--you're doing an extremely good job. And the
relationship between leadership over at TSA, and what happens
at TSA, is obviously enormous. In that 9/11 could be repeated
in some form almost any day, again, there's an instinct on our
part to push, to push, to push. And I would just say that as
we're pushing, it would be my feeling that you're trying to do
as much as you possibly can. But for heaven's sake, don't
bypass anything.
If it takes me missing my airplane or somebody having the
wrong name and not being able to get on, then let that be as
you work out the wrinkles in that system, because it has to be
as flawless as it can be.
Final question--are there any areas--I mean it is generally
understood in the Congress that there's been so much attention
on wars overseas, and not really enough attention on the war on
terror overseas, or the war on terror and what it could do in
this country--and that is where Homeland Security as a
department comes in. I think Michael Chertoff is doing a very
good job, however, I think there's universal agreement that
Homeland Security is underfunded. And I think it's incumbent
upon those who come before us to tell us if they think some
part of their part of that program is being underfunded.
Because the security of Americans is far more related to the
work of Homeland Security than it is to what's going on in
Iraq. At least that's my point of view.
So, if you put yourself at the top of the heap, then you've
got to be aggressive about asking for funding where you think
you don't have enough. Senator Carper indicated that, ``Gee,
that's 2 years away.'' Maybe it's really important that it be 1
year away, and it could be if you had more funding. Or maybe
it's not because you're simply working on technology and the
rest of it. Could you be forthright with us on the matter of
adequacy of funding, or not?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. And I believe all the pressure I get
from Secretary Chertoff is along the lines you mentioned of--
it's security first, this is the mission and we've got to be
direct--and to me saying, ``You've got to be direct in saying
this is what it takes to do this.'' And then have the
discussion up front that says, ``Do we want to do it or not?''
And if we're going to do it, we've got to fund it. So, clearly
that is the philosophy of the Department.
On Secure Flight, we are looking at exactly that question,
what would it take to move it up significantly from what I've
just described? And budget is not in that discussion yet. So,
we're going to figure out what it is, and then we'll have the
budget conversation.
So, and particularly on the issue of TSOs, we're dialed
into that as well. So, we will be candid on that--there are
obviously budget requirements that we respect, and I know the
Congress respects. So--but it's a policy issue, and we will
certainly surface those issues.
Senator Rockefeller. That's very important. And I thank you
very much for your appearance.
I wish to say, on behalf of Chairman Inouye, that our next
hearing is at 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 18th, and it will be
on surface transportation security. Thank you, Mr. Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
National Air Transportation Association (NATA)
Alexandria, VA, January 17, 2007
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman,
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Vice Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Inouye and Vice Chairman Stevens:
The National Air Transportation Association (NATA), the voice of
aviation business, is the public policy group representing the
interests of aviation businesses before Congress, Federal agencies and
state governments. NATA's 2,000 member companies own, operate and
service aircraft. These companies provide for the needs of the
traveling public by offering services and products to aircraft
operators and others such as fuel sales, aircraft maintenance, parts
sales, storage, rental, airline servicing, flight training, Part 135
on-demand air charter, fractional aircraft program management and
scheduled commuter operations in smaller aircraft. NATA members are a
vital link in the aviation industry providing services to the general
public, airlines, general aviation and the military.
On behalf of NATA and its 2,000 members, I am writing to express
concerns with legislation that would have a significant negative
economic impact on hundreds of aviation ground service providers across
the country. H.R. 1, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives last
week, includes a provision that would direct the Department of Homeland
Security to issue a rule that would require the screening of all air
cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft within 3 years. Such a
requirement, without significant increases in Federal funds to
accomplish this goal, will lead to unbearable increases in costs for
companies who provide ground support to commercial air carriers.
The language included in H.R. 1 constitutes an unfunded mandate,
and represents a dramatic reversal in current DHS policy, which
assesses security initiatives through a risk-based approach. Currently,
technology does not exist that would allow all cargo carried aboard
passenger aircraft to be screened in a manner that does not
significantly disrupt the flow of commerce. Before directing airlines
and ground service providers to comply with such a massive initiative,
Congress must first invest in technologies that will streamline the
cargo screening process. An across-the-board proposal to scan all cargo
within such a small time-frame, however, directs vital resources away
from critical DHS programs, forcing the Department to spend a
disproportionate amount of time on one particular aspect of aviation
security.
I am pleased that the Senate is taking a different approach from
the House to such important legislation, starting with today's hearing
regarding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation
considered in the House was passed with no committee input and no
opportunity for amendment. It is imperative that such a vital piece of
legislation go through the standard legislative process, so proposals
can be properly vetted and examined, and other alternatives can be
debated. Today's hearing regarding the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission is a step in the right direction.
As the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation begins
discussion today on improvements to aviation security, I ask that the
Senate take a more reasonable, risk-based approach to improving air
cargo security. Aviation ground service providers are eager to assist
in developing reasonable, long-term solutions to improving all aspects
of aviation security, including further measures to secure air cargo
aboard passenger aircraft. The best long-term solution to screening air
cargo should begin with Federal investment in technologies that will
make cargo screening more precise and more efficient. Should Congress
direct the Transportation Security Administration to increase the
amount of air cargo screened, those increases should be directed based
on risk rather than a ``one-size-fits-all'' solution, and they should
be accompanied with appropriate Federal funds to allow airline service
providers the opportunity to invest in additional infrastructure to
meet the needs of the new requirements.
Thank you for your attention to this important issue.
Sincerely,
James K. Coyne,
President.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
recommended that the TSA assess the feasibility, expected benefits and
costs of replacing Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines with stand-
alone Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines for primary screening.
Has the TSA completed such an assessment?
Answer. In February 2006, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) delivered to Congress a Strategic Planning
Framework for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). This
framework details TSA's long-term planning philosophy for the
development and implementation of optimal baggage screening solutions
at the Nation's top 250 airports, where over 99 percent checked baggage
originates, and currently guides TSA's investment and deployment
decisions. The plan does include replacement of ETD with EDS at many
medium and small airports. However, the volume of checked baggage at
the remaining airports would not support the capital investment that
would be required for an EDS installation. The plan examines a variety
of baggage screening configurations and matches those configurations to
airport operational designs and needs.
The plan also includes the following key elements:
Funding prioritization schedule.
Deployment strategy (includes a strategy to expedite the
deployment of in-line EDS systems, where an in-line solution is
appropriate to an airport).
EDS life-cycle management plan.
Stakeholder collaboration plan.
Question 2. When does the TSA anticipate completely phasing out ETD
machines at all but the smallest airports?
Answer. In February 2006, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) delivered to Congress a Strategic Planning
Framework for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). This
framework details TSA's long-term planning philosophy for the
development and implementation of optimal baggage screening solutions
at the Nation's top 250 airports, where over 99 percent checked baggage
originates, and currently guides TSA's investment and deployment
decisions.
The plan does include replacement of ETD with EDS at many medium
and small airports. However, the volume of checked baggage at the
remaining airports would not support the capital investment that would
be required for an Explosives Detection System (EDS) installation.
Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) equipment would remain at these
airports as the primary checked baggage screening solution.
Additionally, ETDs would remain at airports with EDS solutions for
secondary checked baggage screening. The plan estimates that by 2019
the optimal screening systems will be installed at all airports.
Question 3. What level of staff savings have been achieved since
March 2005 from replacing stand-alone EDS machines with in-line EDS
machines?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
identified six airports that converted to in-line baggage systems
during this period: two Category X airports (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport and McCarran International Airport), three
Category I airports (Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, Bob Hope
Airport, and Metropolitan Oakland International), and one Category II
airport (Richmond International Airport).
The aggregated Full Time Equivalent (FTE) reduction from Staffing
Allocation Model (SAM) 2006 to SAM 2007 is 318 FTE. Of this number, 60
percent left the TSA workforce through attrition. The remaining
positions, based on historical rates, should leave by the end of the
Fiscal Year 2007.
Question 4. How is the TSA selecting and prioritizing its R&D
projects for aviation checkpoint security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses a
risk-based approach to identify its Research & Development (R&D)
requirements. TSA assesses its current capabilities and the
effectiveness against identified risks, including an assessment of the
latest intelligence information. The primary focus for R&D efforts
related to checkpoint security technology has been to increase
explosives detection capabilities. Working with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), TSA
ensures its R&D priorities are incorporated into the overall DHS R&D
program.
Question 5. Do you have any specific evidence or statistics
demonstrating that the investment in R&D for checkpoints has been
effective and has addressed the highest priorities?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
identified the need for technologies and procedures that will assist in
the identification of explosives. This is the highest priority for
aviation checkpoints, and TSA has been working with the Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) to
address this priority. The development of technology solutions has been
challenging, in that the systems must be able to effectively detect
explosives and ensure that the flow of passengers is not delayed. TSA
believes that previous investments in the area of R&D will support a
significant increase in systems deployable in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.
For example, one of the solutions to be evaluated is technology to
support the identification of those who might portray ``hostile
intent'' as they approach the screening process. Use of closed circuit
TV cameras, along with individuals trained in recognition of signs of
``hostile intent,'' will allow TSA to direct those individuals to a
more intense screening process.
Question 6. Are these priorities being acted on by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and
the Transportation Security Lab?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been
working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) to prepare several new technologies for
operational testing and evaluation (OT&E). With the continued lab
support from DHS S&T, TSA has recently initiated an OT&E pilot using
whole body imaging systems and will soon be initiating OT&E pilots
using cast and prosthetics scanners for people, as well as bottled
liquid scanners, automated explosives detection systems and advanced x-
ray technologies for carry-on items in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. Efforts
undertaken by S&T to identify a method to detect the possible presence
of ``hostile intent'' within the population approaching the screening
process will afford TSA another potential solution to support a systems
approach to security screening.
Question 7. What is the status of the rapid-response task force
convened by Admiral Jay Cohen, Under Secretary of the Science and
Technology Directorate, to address the detection technology gap exposed
by the foiled liquid explosives plot in London?
Answer. Based on the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate's (S&T) ongoing efforts, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) will begin conducting airport
demonstrations using bottled liquid scanners in the coming months. TSA
and S&T will share performance data gathered during these
demonstrations to determine the extent to which a technology solution
is ready for wide-scale purchase and deployment. While these
demonstrations are underway TSA continues to implement several security
procedures that address the vulnerability identified by the incident in
London including the limitation of the amounts of liquids that
passengers are permitted to carry on-board an aircraft.
Question 8. What is the status of the DHS testing efforts--through
the Transportation Security Lab--to develop a liquid explosive
detection technology, and what steps has the TSA taken to address this
vulnerability?
Answer. Based on the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate's (S&T) ongoing efforts, TSA will begin
conducting airport demonstrations using bottled liquid scanners in the
coming months. TSA and S&T will share performance data gathered during
these demonstrations to determine the extent to which a technology
solution is ready for wide-scale purchase and deployment.
In the interim, TSA has implemented several security procedures
that address the vulnerability associated with the identification of
liquid explosives. Beginning August 10, 2006, TSA implemented
restrictions on the carriage of liquids, gels, and aerosols into the
sterile area and onboard aircraft. Except for exempt items (baby
formula/milk/breast milk/food, medications, and liquids/gels required
for medical purposes), all liquids, gels, and aerosols must be placed
in travel size containers (3.4 oz/100ml) that fit comfortably into a
single, sealed, quart-size plastic bag. All liquids, gels, and aerosols
(including exempt items) are x-rayed and physically examined by
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Additionally, randomly chosen
samples of passengers' quart-size plastic bags are subjected to
screening using explosives trace detectors (ETD) at each checkpoint.
New training requirements have been established to cover the additional
screening procedures associated with this threat.
TSA uses a layered approach to security at checkpoints, and
technology is just one component in the strategy. TSA has modified
existing technologies and developed procedures at the checkpoint to
successfully detect explosives. Key to the successful detection of
explosives is the TSOs. TSOs have received training in explosive
detection and have demonstrated proficiency. On the personnel front,
TSA has invested resources in developing, implementing, and training
TSOs in order to augment the current technology available. On the
technology side, we have made modifications to the technology.
Therefore, existing technology solutions are being used more
effectively and efficiently to meet TSA security goals through better
trained TSOs and equipment modifications. The prohibited items list was
modified to reduce the number of items TSOs are looking for to allow
them to concentrate technology more on explosives. TSOs are also
trained in behavioral recognition and bomb appraisal. Canines provide a
visible, unpredictable deterrence in and around the checkpoint and also
have detection capability. All things considered, TSA has successfully
deployed checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities in a
layered security system.
Question 9. Could you update us on the status of any plans the
agency has to lease equipment, rather than buy it, and the impact that
leasing may have on the cost of acquiring and maintaining screening
technologies over time?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) worked in
collaboration with aviation industry stakeholders to develop a cost-
sharing formula that reflects the benefits each party derives from the
installation of the optimal baggage screening solution, including
national security benefits and labor and other cost savings. The
Baggage Screening Investment Study (BSIS) was sent to Congress in
February 2007, which TSA is now evaluating. In addition to the
recommendations in the BSIS, TSA plans to continue to engage industry
and the Administration to examine various leasing and service contract
options to potentially reduce the Federal burden of purchasing and
maintaining explosives detection systems (EDS).
Question 10. The GAO has reported in the past that the TSA's
coordination with other Federal agencies and outreach to transportation
industry association stakeholders has been limited. What actions has
the TSA taken to improve coordination with the aviation community?
Answer. In an effort to centralize and improve the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) outreach efforts to the transportation
industry and create a focal point for inter-agency coordination, the
Office of Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) was
established in late 2005. With ten distinct transportation modes
identified within TSNM, three were specific to the aviation sector:
Airlines, Airports, and General Aviation. In addition, TSNM-
International works closely with the aviation community. General
Manager (GM) positions were created to lead each office to improve
communication and present a more consistent and focused message to both
industry and other government agencies. They are charged with
conducting outreach and participating in a variety of industry
sponsored events.
TSNM-Airports maintains a high profile with its stakeholders,
including those within the Federal Government, at other levels of
government, and among its industry stakeholders. In particular, with a
population of over 450 regulated airports of varying sizes and
complexities under its purview, TSNM-Airports has established a robust
and effective partnership with several key commercial airport industry
associations, including the Airports Council International-North
America and the American Association of Airport Executives. Through
daily contacts, TSNM-Airports communicates timely information
effectively among the full range of industry stakeholders. Aside from
the ongoing daily dialog, TSNM-Airports conducts a monthly conference
call from TSA Headquarters offices in Arlington, Virginia, attended by
representatives from both associations. These calls typically include
the participation of 90 to 100 Airport Security Coordinators (ASC) from
all major airports around the Nation. TSNM-Airports uses this process
to regularly inform the associations and the airport community of
pending regulatory changes through the issuance of security directives
and to provide updates on TSA programs being implemented at airports.
Additionally, TSNM-Airports coordinates and manages meetings between
Airport Directors and senior TSA leadership on issues ranging from
financial reimbursements, technology requests, TSA staffing, and future
terminal design and construction work.
As the TSA spokesperson to the airport community, TSNM-Airports
participates in frequent industry-sponsored conferences, meetings and
seminars to keep the community apprised of operational issues, policy
guidance, and future plans. These opportunities are an excellent forum
to provide a large audience with the TSA's strategic vision and to meet
individually with specific airport representatives. Some of the issues
brought up by the airports include leased space and potential pilot
programs. TSNM-Airports works with other offices within TSA on these
issues and provides timely and accurate feedback to the airports. TSNM-
Airports meets regularly with the Airport Associations Board of
Directors and Senior Security Directors. These meetings allow Directors
to broach specific, technical issues and to brainstorm ideas. They also
provide a forum for them to address issues regarding current policies.
On several occasions, senior Airport Directors and association
managers have been invited to participate in classified threat
briefings. These briefings outline the current threat situation and
threat streams and provide a discussion of TSA's plan to counter the
threat. Attendees must possess a Secret security clearance, which TSNM-
Airports helps them acquire.
TSNM-Airlines works daily with stakeholders to develop and maintain
close and effective working relationships with air carrier security
directors and the major airline associations including the Air
Transport Association (ATA), which is the primary trade and service
organization of the U.S. airline industry. ATA represents over ninety
percent of U.S. airline passenger and cargo traffic. TSNM-Airlines also
has extensive knowledge and close relationships with the other four
major airline associations in Washington, D.C., including the Air
Carrier Association of America, which represents low-fare carriers, the
Regional Airline Association, which represents regional air carriers,
the National Air Carrier Association of America, which primarily
represents charter airlines, and, on occasion, the International Air
Transport Association, which represents international air carriers. In
addition, they have developed effective working relationships with the
Air Line Pilots Association, the Coalition of Airline Pilots, the
Association of Flight Attendants, and several other aviation union
groups. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Business
Travelers Association are business related stakeholder associations
with which TSNM is also in close contact to gather industry input and
share information with these groups on TSA issues and programs.
TSNM-Airlines consistently partners with other agencies within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), such as Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), as well as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and works closely with the White
House Homeland Security Council on projects such as Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 16. To complete planning and
implementation of HSPD-16, TSNM-Airlines has worked closely with DHS
Offices of Policy and Infrastructure Protection, the United States
Secret Service, as well as the Department of Commerce, Department of
Defense, Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Department of State.
Pursuant to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
the Aviation Government Coordinating Council (GCC) was established as
an interagency body to include Federal and State officials with
responsibilities that relate to the aviation sector. DHS has designated
TSNM-Airlines as the Chair of the Aviation GCC, and in this chair,
TSNM-Airlines coordinates with other departments and agencies for the
aviation transportation sector. The Aviation GCC has met on several
occasions. HSPD-7 called for the establishment of the Aviation Sector
Coordinating Council (SCC) to be led by the owners and operators of the
aviation industry. It is self-organized and has elected its own
chairman. The Aviation SCC is working to institutionalize the private
sector's coordination of policy development, aviation sector-wide
strategy and planning, and program promulgation and implementation. The
Aviation SCC will also conduct sector-wide industry coordination. The
Aviation SCC has also met on its own and also met with the Aviation GCC
for an initial introductory meeting.
The objective of the Aviation GCC is to work in cooperation with,
and as the counterpart to, the private industry Aviation SCC to
coordinate aviation security strategies and activities, to establish
policies, guidelines, and standards, and to develop program metrics and
performance criteria for the aviation mode. The Aviation GCC fosters
communication across government and between the government and private
industry in support of enhancement of the Nation's homeland security
posture.
TSNM-General Aviation (GA) serves as a ``one stop shop'' for all
matters relating to GA security. Due to the breadth and diversity of GA
operations, TSNM-GA works in coordination with the industry/GA
stakeholder community to develop and implement security programs and
policies that are reasonable, feasible, and effective. TSNM-GA, on a
regular basis, maintains contact with the 17 GA trade associations that
represent the entire spectrum of GA activities, including the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association, National Business Aviation Association, National Air
Transportation Association, and National Association of State Aviation
Officials via routine one-on-one meetings and periodic GA Coalition
meetings with DHS/TSA leadership. Additionally, TSA interacts with the
GA community through participation at trade association conferences,
industry events, telephone discussions/teleconferences, electronic
dissemination of security advisories, and compliance inspections. TSNM-
GA also continuously coordinates with State, local, and other Federal
agencies, such as CBP and FAA, on various security programmatic and
policy issues.
TSNM-International's outreach to the transportation industry
association stakeholders is both global and regionally oriented. On a
global scale, TSA meets regularly with the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) to discuss, most notably, harmonization of aviation
security measures. Outreach to the aviation industry on a regional
level has been established through the Association of European Airlines
(AEA) in Europe; Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA) and
Association of South Pacific Airlines (ASPA) in Asia-Pacific;
Association of Latin American Airlines (ALTA) in the Caribbean and
South America. In February 2007, TSNM-International held its first
security conference in Miami, Florida, in conjunction with ALTA. The
success of this conference has prompted AEA, AAPA/ASPA and IATA to
request conferences in their regions, which TSA is already planning.
Question 11. How and when do you plan to certify that Secure Flight
has met the 10 mandates Congress required?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
defining and implementing a strategy for Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) certification through close collaboration with the DHS
Screening Coordination Office (SCO). Based on the current schedule, DHS
certification of the 10 areas of Congressional direction given to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) will be complete in the third
quarter of FY 2009, following operational testing with the first groups
of aircraft operators. TSA is working closely with GAO to facilitate
their review of the program's development. Secure Flight is one of the
Department's top priorities, and TSA is continually investigating ways
to accelerate the program schedule to allow for an expedited
implementation of the system, as appropriate and within established
life-cycle cost estimates.
Question 12. At what point in the development of Secure Flight will
certification begin?
Answer. The certification process is under way. Progress is being
made in each of the ten areas of Congressional direction, with three of
the items already completed.
Question 13. Will all mandated areas be addressed simultaneously or
do you plan to move forward incrementally?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration plans to address
each of the ten areas of Congressional direction within a time-frame
compatible with the schedule for critical program milestones. Progress
is being made in each of the ten areas of Congressional direction, with
three of the items already completed.
Question 14. What events need to be accomplished before you can
certify Secure Flight?
Answer. Final certification of the ten areas of Congressional
direction for Secure Flight will occur after parallel operations with
aircraft operators are under way.
The table below identifies completion milestones and Secure
Flight's current program status for each of the ten areas of
Congressional direction.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milestone for Secure Flight
Number Condition Completion Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 System of due process During Nearly complete
(Redress) operational
testing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 System error rate During parallel In progress
will not produce a operations
large number of
false positives
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 TSA has stress tested End of system In progress
the accuracy of the testing
system
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 DHS has established Initiation of Complete
an internal Investment
oversight board Review Board
(IRB) Reviews
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 TSA has sufficient Authority to In progress
operational Operate granted
safeguards to reduce
abuse opportunities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Substantial security Authority to In progress
measures are in Operate granted
place to prevent
hacking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 TSA has effective Authority to In progress
oversight of the use Operate granted
and operation of the
system
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 There are no specific Privacy In progress
privacy concerns documentation
with the established
architecture of the
system
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Accommodate states TSA Office of Complete
with unique Intelligence
transportation needs (OI) assessment
of CAPPS changes
impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Appropriate life- End of program Complete
cycle cost estimates planning
and programs exist
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 15. To what extent is the TSA cooperating with the GAO's
legislatively mandated review of Secure Flight, to include providing
requested documents and interviews, and keeping them abreast of re-
baselining/reassessment efforts?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
created a document library for GAO to review Secure Flight program
documentation. TSA is firmly committed to working with the General
Accountability Office (GAO), and has conducted a number of meetings to
provide program status as well as to discuss specific topics of
interest to GAO. During 2006, TSA was working to re-baseline the Secure
Flight program. Now that the re-baselining work has been completed, TSA
is ready to participate with GAO in their review of the program.
Question 16. Have you provided the GAO requested information needed
to conduct their review, if not, why not?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is firmly
committed to working with the General Accountability Office (GAO) and
is working to provide GAO with the information it requires to review
the Secure Flight program throughout its system development life cycle.
TSA has created a document library for GAO to review Secure Flight
program documentation. It was TSA's initial intent to provide GAO with
program documents which had been finalized so as to not encumber GAO.
TSA has decided to modify this approach and engage GAO prior to the
finalization of documentation. TSA will continue to provide GAO with
the information needed to support its efforts.
Question 17. What other layers of security are in place to prevent
known or suspected terrorists from boarding domestic flights when they
go undetected by airlines' name-match screening processes?
Answer. Currently, air carriers are required by the Aircraft
Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP) to conduct name matches to
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) No Fly and Selectee
lists. Along with the name-matching, a passenger may be selected for
additional screening based on certain nonidentity factors reflected in
reservation information. Once a passenger receives a boarding document
from an air carrier, however, no further name-matching security
measures exist to identify and prevent a specific traveler from
boarding an aircraft. All passengers must go through the physical
screening process at the security checkpoint. New measures such as the
Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) have also been
implemented to identify travelers with nefarious intent.
Question 18. How can the TSA assure the Committee that all airlines
are conducting name-match screening against the terrorist watch list
with the same level of scrutiny and care?
Answer. Most airlines have incorporated an electronic software
program to satisfy the requirements of the regulation to conduct name-
based checks against Transportation Security Administration (TSA) watch
lists. These systems are integrated into the air carrier's reservation
system so that the check is done as a part of completing the
reservation. This helps to eliminate the possibility of human error.
Compliance with this regulatory requirement is part of the
inspections TSA Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs) conduct in the
field. These inspections are listed as critical in the TSA Annual
Inspection Plan, which calls for a frequent review of these measures to
ensure continued compliance.
TSA headquarters-based Principal Security Inspectors (PSIs), who
are the point of contact for the air carriers' corporate security
offices, annually review the procedures used by the air carriers to
conduct these checks. One way to verify the process is to have the air
carrier create a reservation with the name of an individual on a
current watch list to ensure that the process works.
TSA conducted Special Emphasis Assessments on compliance with the
No Fly List in June/July 2005 and September 2005. Both sets of tests
revealed a 94 percent compliance rate.
There is no incentive for an air carrier not to comply with this
process. It is already imbedded into their reservation system. If the
automated systems are down and a carrier must process a passenger
manually, the expense of having to divert an aircraft mid-flight
because the carrier fails to run a passenger against the list is a
significant deterrent to non-compliance.
Question 19. Over the past year, what progress has the TSA made in
conducting assessments of the threats and vulnerabilities facing
critical transportation assets?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been
working continuously to update and expand its assessments of threats
and vulnerabilities in the transportation sector. TSA has been making
use of these assessments in conjunction with our security partners in
government and industry to mitigate, by ``operationalizing''
intelligence and addressing vulnerabilities.
Headquarters Analysis
TSA's layered approach to security seeks to identify and deter
threats well before they reach the Nation's airports, railways,
highways, mass transit, ports and pipelines. Transportation-specific
intelligence is critical to TSA's overall risk-based security strategy,
and its products provide a threat framework to prioritize security
resources and operationalize intelligence. TSA has two operational
programs with field units, the Office of Security Operations, which is
responsible for both aviation Transportation Security Officers (TSO)
screening and surface inspector operations, and the Office of Law
Enforcement, which is responsible for the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAM). These elements incorporate intelligence into their operations
and plans on a daily basis, acting or deploying on the basis of the
latest information.
TSA also coordinates closely and shares information with other
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, the intelligence and
law enforcement communities, other government departments and agencies
such as the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and the transportation industry. These security
partners both provide intelligence and, especially in industry, are
often well-positioned to operationalize transportation-specific
intelligence by adjusting their business or security operations.
TSA's Office of Intelligence has produced classified and
unclassified annual threat assessments for each transportation mode and
the cargo/supply chain sector since 2004. These reports are
disseminated throughout TSA, DHS, and private industry. Other Office of
Intelligence products include:
Transportation Intelligence Gazette
Special Threat Assessments
Weekly Field Intelligence Report
Suspicious Incidents Report
Intelligence Notes
Transportation Situational Awareness Notes
TSA is also conducting specific analyses related to General
Aviation and underwater mass transit tunnels. The General Aviation (GA)
Risk Assessment/Throw Weight Study will analyze the damage potential
and risk associated with GA aircraft, as well as the threat environment
within the National Airspace System. An Underwater Tunnel Working Group
was established in October 2006 consisting of members from various DHS
and Department of Transportation (DOT) entities. This interagency team
has taken significant steps to identify vulnerabilities of underwater
tunnels and has put into place aggressive mitigation strategies to
protect high-risk and high-consequence tunnel infrastructure in both
the short and long term.
Field Assessments
At the field level, TSA conducts various assessments which are
either explicitly vulnerability assessments, or at least provide
vulnerability-related information. In all cases they further TSA's
risk-based security strategy and are described below.
Corporate Security Reviews
A Corporate Security Review (CSR) is an assessment tool that
evaluates corporate level security policies, practices, and procedures.
Specific CSR evaluation criteria have been established for the
pipeline, rail, and highway modes. The CSR criteria identify a desired
baseline of security for a company; and the accumulation of individual
assessments establish an actual baseline in a given industry or mode,
as well as potentially identifying best practices and common concerns.
In the highway mode, TSA entered into agreements with 37 state
departments of transportation or bridge administrations to conduct CSRs
of their facilities and critical infrastructure. In addition, TSA
conducts CSRs of motor coach, school bus, and trucking companies. By
the end of FY 2006, a total of 71 CSRs were conducted in the highway
mode. Additionally, 950 CSRs were conducted by the Missouri Commercial
Motor Vehicle Inspectors under a pilot project that TSA is currently
evaluating.
In the pipeline mode, a total of 54 CSRs have been conducted,
including seven reviews in FY 2006 with companies that represent
approximately 60 percent of the product transported through the
Nation's pipelines. In addition, TSA has joined with Natural Resources
Canada to conduct four security assessments for critical cross-border
energy pipeline systems.
In the rail mode, TSA has developed a CSR program and will be
conducting assessments in Spring 2007.
TIH Rail Assessments
TSA conducts vulnerability assessments of High Threat Urban Area
(HTUA) rail corridors where toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) shipments are
transported. Over the last year, detailed region-wide rail corridor
assessments were completed in Houston, Buffalo, and northern New
Jersey, and a fourth assessment is in the early stages of completion
for the Los Angeles area. The HTUA corridor assessments provide site-
specific mitigation strategies and lessons learned as well as tactics
that can be modified for use at the corporate or national level. HTUA
corridor assessments supported the development of the Recommended
Security Action Items (SAI) issued by DHS and DOT on June 23, 2006.
These performance-based SAIs were developed to foster an enhanced
security posture in the freight rail mode in general and specifically
targeted the transport of TIH materials. These practices have been
agreed to in binding commitments by the Nation's railways, and form the
basis for pending regulation.
Joint Vulnerability Assessments (JVA)
During FY 2006, the Office of Security Assessments completed 15
Joint Vulnerability Assessments (JVAs). The JVA is a physical security
survey conducted jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that
goes above and beyond regulatory requirements and covers all aspects of
the airport operation that includes, but is not limited to:
Critical Infrastructure (power, water, HVAC, communications)
Fuel
Cargo
Catering
Terminal (Public & Sterile)
Perimeter
Access control
Ramp
Baggage
Fixed Base Operators (FBO)
Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Vulnerability Assessments
(MVA)
During FY 2006, MVAs were conducted at 84 domestic airports. TSA
plans to conduct MVAs at all Category X and Category I airports
annually, as per guidance outlined in the National Security
Presidential Security 47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16
(NSPD-47/HSPD-16).
Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments
In September 2006, TSA began developing a methodology and tool to
analyze vulnerabilities associated with U.S. commercial air cargo
supply chain operations. In December 2006, TSA began a pilot program to
test the vulnerability assessment methodology, tool, and protocols in
supply chains at three U.S. airports. The pilot program engages
volunteer companies representing different nodes of the air cargo
supply chain. During the pilot, vulnerability assessment information is
confidential, and no enforcement actions occur as a result of the
pilot. When the pilot is completed in March 2007, TSA will assess the
feasibility of requiring vulnerability assessments in addition to its
regulatory inspection requirements.
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI)
BASE Reviews
Within the last year, the STSI program has conducted 26 Baseline
Assessments for Security Enhancement (BASE reviews) as part of a
program to conduct security reviews on the 50 largest transit systems
nationwide. The BASE process reviews security procedures put in place
by a transit (rail and bus) system to assist in evaluating the
performance of its security system. BASE is not a compliance
inspection, but rather a collaborative effort between the stakeholder
and TSA. No enforcement actions occur as a result of BASE. To conduct
this joint review, STSIs meet with security representatives of the
transit agency to review the agency's pertinent documents.
Security Action Items (SAI)--Non-regulatory inspections
To gain an understanding of the degree of implementation across the
Nation, railroad carriers of TIH materials, DHS and DOT agreed to
conduct SAI Implementation Surveys (SAIIS) of freight rail operations.
These surveys are conducted by STSIs. The surveys are not compliance
inspections, but rather assessments to determine the depth and degree
of employee security awareness and security action item implementation.
The results of the SAI Surveys will be reviewed and the data used to
guide future policy decisions regarding the security of hazardous
material rail shipments. Since October 2006, STSIs conducted 165 field
site visits of freight railroad yards and facilities and interviewed
2,600 front-line railroad workers.
Security Analysis and Action Programs (SAAP)--Risk Assessments
STSIs conduct Security Analysis and recommend an Action Program.
SAAPs are full risk assessments of transit and rail systems. They are
not compliance inspections. An SAAP assessment rigorously analyzes the
likelihood and consequence of the threat stream matrix for the rail
environment and analyzes the effectiveness of countermeasures to manage
risk effectively. SAAPs leverage the DHS Vulnerability Identification
Self Assessment Tool (VISAT).
The STSI program has completed full SAAP assessments on the
following rail systems:
Virginia Railway Express
Alaska Railroad
Tri-Met (Portland, Oregon)
Regulatory Compliance Inspections
In addition to these assessments, regulatory compliance inspections
are also conducted by TSA officials. These compliance inspections are
similar to vulnerability assessments but evaluate the security of a
system against regulatory standards as opposed to threat scenarios. In
FY 2006, TSA conducted 94,145 compliance inspections of airports,
aircraft operators, indirect air carriers, and other regulated
entities. For FY 2007 TSA has developed and implemented a risk-based
national inspection plan. As part of the risk-based methodology for
inspections, TSA Aviation Security Inspectors conduct critical
inspections and testing focused on the nature and credibility of the
security threat, the vulnerabilities associated with the threat, and
the magnitude of potential consequences. The critical inspections are
focused on airport operators, aircraft operators, and cargo. To date in
FY 2007, TSA has conducted 27,557 inspections, including 6,038 critical
inspections focused on airports, aircraft operators, and cargo. Testing
is also conducted to ensure compliance with access control, perimeter
security, passenger checkpoint identification verification, and air
cargo security requirements.
Question 20. How will this information be used to select and
prioritize investments, as well as to assess the effectiveness of these
investments?
Answer. The results of these assessments are an important part of
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) approach to risk management
and help drive the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
resource priorities, decisions and programs.
For example, DHS' Transit Security Grant Program will use the
assessment data to encourage and evaluate project proposals from the
applicants that address the most important risks to the transportation
sector. Follow-up visits to the grant awardees will reveal the degree
to which identified security gaps have been closed. These follow-up
visits will help determine the effectiveness of the grant awards, allow
TSA to update its headquarters analyses, such as the Top 100 List, and
help better understand how its has affected overall risk levels within
the sector.
TSA continually takes this assessment data into account especially
during its annual budgeting process. Program managers set annual and
out-year program priorities based on the outputs from the various
assessments, and these are re-evaluated regularly based on the latest
threat and assessment information. Further, the Risk Management
Analysis Tool (RMAT) will be used in the future to specifically
quantify the cost effectiveness of security investments in the U.S.
commercial aviation system.
The assessment data is also used for development of new security
strategies, establishment of new Security Action Items, and deployment
of operational TSA resources. For example, TSA's Large Aircraft
Standard Security Program (LASSP) will leverage information from the
General Aviation (GA) risk assessment, as well as review existing
standard security programs, to modify its security strategies and
implement an all encompassing security program for aircraft, regardless
of the type of operation, in excess of a scientifically-validated
threshold weight. This program will leverage elements from existing
security programs, while including additional security enhancements.
Security Action Items
Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) Rail assessments supported the
development of the Recommended Security Action Items (SAI) issued by
DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on June 23, 2006. These
performance-based SAIs were developed to foster an enhanced security
posture in the freight rail mode in general, and in transporting TIH
materials in particular.
Operational Deployments
TSA uses real-time threat information to guide its deployment of
resources, including the National Deployment Office, canine teams, and
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) Teams. In response to
indicators and warnings of high threat to transportation, TSA will
surge these resources, as appropriate, to reduce the risk of attack.
Question 21. In developing plans for future years' budgets and
funding, what mechanisms will the TSA use to identify areas where
existing reserves--particularly from programs that are not performing--
can be reallocated to support new and emerging priorities?
Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) leadership
frequently reviews and re-evaluates the allocations of funding provided
to TSA programs, projects, and activities. Additionally, reviews are
conducted as part of the budget process, and as part of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) mid-year review. Programs are compared
against their expenditure plans and if excess funds are identified,
they are either offered up as base reallocations in the annual budget
or reallocated within the budget year through the reprogramming
provisions established by the committees, or both. In addition,
programs are routinely subject to scrutiny through such mechanisms as
DHS and component investment review boards and the Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) conducted under the President's Management Agenda.
Question 22. Canada has recently instituted what it calls the
Restricted Area Identity Card, or RAIC, to enhance security at all 29
of the principal air carrier airports in Canada. At the primary access
doors to restricted areas of major Canadian airports, 120,000
cardholders will have either their fingerprint or iris scanned by a
biometric reader. What is preventing the agency from making the kind of
progress that Canada has made in this regard? Does TSA intend to make
TWIC a part of the aviation security environment, and if so, when?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
has focused its initial implementation efforts on Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulated facilities and vessels.
TWIC will provide a common, tamper resistant credential, issued after
the successful completion of a security threat assessment that can be
tied to an individual by a reference biometric. This type of common
secure credential does not currently exist in the maritime environment
whereas airports and airlines have already done a great deal of work in
this area. DHS is presently reviewing all of its credentialing programs
to determine not only where redundancy exists but also where existing
resources may be more efficiently leveraged.
Question 23. At least one major air carrier has taken steps to add
secondary barriers to their aircraft, to supplement the reinforced
flight deck door. Security advocates claim that these barriers are
needed to prevent against a terrorist or other type of criminal from
pushing their way into the cockpit when the flight deck door is opened.
Has TSA taken a position on installation of secondary barriers? Would
TSA support legislation requiring their installation?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), created an acceptable
standard for reinforced flight deck doors in 2003. Current aircraft
design still requires the flight deck door to open during flight for
pilot ingress and egress. While TSA acknowledges opening the flight
deck door while in flight is a vulnerability, each air carrier has
measures in place to mitigate the vulnerability.
The FAA-approved secondary barrier can only be used on certain
types of aircraft. Not all commercial aircraft can accommodate this
barrier without extensive reconfiguration. TSA believes the secondary
barriers are useful, but more options need to be provided before TSA
can take any position on future legislation.
Question 24. Regarding air cargo, Security Identification Display
Areas (SIDA) procedures, which would protect against such unauthorized
access, are not required at all airports served by all-cargo aircraft.
Does TSA believe that security would be enhanced by including all-cargo
aircraft within the SIDA? If so, has the agency determined when it will
act to address this deficiency? Does the agency plan to require
fortified flight deck doors on all freighter aircraft? Does TSA
anticipate applying the new Air Cargo Risk-Based Targeting (ACROBAT)
Program to all-cargo aircraft operations?
Answer. The Air Cargo Security Requirements Final Rule (71 FR
30478) published on May 26, 2006, requires airports that currently
maintain a Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) to expand the
SIDA to air cargo operating areas. At airports where SIDA is non-
existent but all-cargo operations occur, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) requires aircraft operators to incorporate other
security measures into their programs. For instance, TSA requires
Security Threat Assessments (STA) for all persons who have unescorted
access to cargo. Section 1544.228 of the Final Rule requires that all-
cargo aircraft operators comply by March 15, 2007, for direct employees
and by June 15, 2007, for agents. These industry deadlines were
recently extended via notice in the Federal Register to May 15, 2007,
for direct employees, and July 15, 2007, for agents.
TSA continues to support a layered security approach to detect,
deter, and prevent a criminal or terrorist act against an all-cargo
aircraft operator. Since 9/11, all-cargo aircraft operators have
restricted persons accompanying flights as passengers. In addition,
many all-cargo aircraft operators have installed fortified flight deck
doors as a security best practice.
Additionally, TSA has implemented a Federal Flight Deck Officer
(FFDO) program for all-cargo aircraft operators. The program provides
training to pilots, program management, resources, and equipment to
protect the aircraft.
TSA is currently concentrating its efforts on developing an air
cargo risk-based targeting system to assess the risk of cargo destined
for movement on all aircraft operating within the United States. TSA is
conducting a pre-operational test of this system and have included an
all-cargo aircraft operator as a host location for this test. TSA plans
to use this system to assess risk of cargo destined for all-cargo
aircraft as the system matures.
Question 25. The TSA indicated it is developing a plan to deploy
emerging technologies for improving security screening for air
passengers and their carry-on bags. How does this technology differ
from technology used today? Also, will the TSA focus on a ``total
system'' approach which improves detection, increases passenger
throughput and reduces overall cost or will it continue its focus on
individually developed breakthrough technology?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to move forward and is preparing to operationally test and evaluate
additional emerging technologies in FY 2007 to include advanced x-ray
technology systems, automated explosives detection systems, and bottled
liquid scanners for carry-on items, as well as whole body imagers,
second-generation explosives detection trace portals, and cast and
prosthesis scanners for persons. While these new technologies do offer
increased automation for the detection of explosives and increased
passenger throughput, they represent individual efforts that have been
under development for several years and will not likely reduce overall
costs. However, it is essential that TSA continue to drive R&D
requirements that will support moving to a total system approach that
will not only increase capabilities and minimize processing times, but
also reduce overall operation and maintenance costs for the screening
system.
TSA has an ongoing effort to map the path forward for the
checkpoint of the future, which looks at five (5) years and beyond. In
the meantime, TSA has aggressively addressed key existing
vulnerabilities. TSA uses a layered approach to security at
checkpoints, and technology is just one component in the strategy. TSA
has modified existing technologies and developed procedures at the
checkpoint to successfully detect explosives. Key to the successful
detection of explosives is the Transportation Security Officer (TSO).
TSOs have received training in explosive detection and have
demonstrated proficiency. On the personnel front, TSA has invested
resources in developing, implementing and training TSOs in order to
augment the current technology available. On the technology side, we
have made modifications to the technology. Therefore, existing
technology solutions are being used more effectively and efficiently to
meet TSA security goals through better trained TSOs and equipment
modifications. The prohibited items list was modified to reduce the
number of items TSOs are looking for to allow them to concentrate
technology more on explosives. TSOs are also trained in behavioral
recognition and bomb appraisal. Canines provide a visible,
unpredictable deterrence in and around the checkpoint and also have
detection capability. All things considered, TSA has successfully
deployed checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities in a
layered security system.
Question 26. Given the U.K. plot last summer, technology that
screens passengers for concealed or hidden threats has become an
intriguing form of aviation security. Health and privacy concerns have
surfaced with some of these technologies although several foreign
airports are now deploying a safe non-radiating version of this
technology for improved security which finally moves detection beyond
the traditional metal gate approach. Has the U.S. deployed this
technology yet? What are your views on people screening at the
checkpoint?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports
the use of whole body imaging technology and has recently announced the
pilot testing of x-ray backscatter technology, a whole body imager
(WBI), which has been determined to be a safe technology solution. It
will allow our screening workforce to identify both metallic and non-
metallic devices and objects on persons. Over the past several years,
TSA has worked with the vendor of the system that will be used during
the pilot to develop privacy algorithms that produce images that
address privacy concerns while still providing necessary information to
meet security needs. The first unit has been installed at Phoenix Sky
Harbor International Airport with passenger screening operations
beginning in February 2007. The initial use of this technology during
this pilot will be for those passengers who volunteer to undergo
scanning by the WBI in lieu of a manual pat-down inspection.
Additionally, TSA is pursuing other WBI solutions, to include
millimeter wave systems, which offer a non-radiating technology.
Working with the Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate, TSA is evaluating a millimeter wave system at
the Transportation Security Lab in Atlantic City. Once the system's
capabilities are evaluated, TSA will determine whether this is a
solution that it could pilot in an airport environment and later
consider for inclusion in deployment efforts.
Question 27. The spiral development approach for the deployment of
advanced technologies has been very successful for our nations
military. The TSA's approach has been to fund new and inventive
technologies to achieve breakthrough improvements. This has resulted in
the very slow deployment of technology while we wait for the better,
and more expensive systems. For example, technology may exist which
could enhance the screening of liquids at the checkpoint utilizing
existing, cost effective, x-ray equipment, yet this has not been
deployed. Can you provide your views on the TSA's approach to
technology development?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken
advantage of every opportunity presented to operationally test and
evaluate any and all technologies that meet our requirements for
detection, as well as operational suitability. TSA does support spiral
development of technologies and has so demonstrated by the pilot
testing that continues to occur for new solutions. TSA must also ensure
that it invests appropriated dollars wisely. We must determine to what
extent partial solutions should be supported with the funding allocated
when a possible longer-term, more complete solution will be ready for
operational test and evaluation within months of a possible partial
solution investment.
TSA demonstrated its support of spiral development when it
purchased and deployed the explosives detection portals. Recognizing
that this was a first-generation system, TSA deployed sufficient
numbers of units to determine durability and performance in an airport
environment while the vendors continued to work on improvements.
Additionally, TSA has been conducting evaluations of currently
available advanced x-ray technology, and is planning to invest in some
of these systems as an option for screening carry-on items. This
investment will provide some enhancements that will assist our
screening workforce to better identify prohibited items within a bag/
item and provide some automated detection capabilities. While the
automated explosives detection system that will be piloted in FY 2007
will offer a more complete solution, the advanced x-ray technology may
provide an option for use at some airports and for some elements of the
traveling public.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. How does having a 45,000 TSA screener cap in place help
your security mission?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses
people, training, equipment, and technology-based strategies to
efficiently manage each checkpoint. The newly improved Screening
Allocation Model objectively measures and adjusts staffing levels,
scheduling, configurations, and the use of differing technologies at
each airport. This allows TSA to operate efficiently within the 45,000
Transportation Security Officer cap while maintaining high security
levels.
Question 2. Can TSA keep average passenger wait times to below 10
minutes at all major U.S. airports with the current screener workforce?
If not, how many screeners are needed to provide adequate levels of
security and keep average passenger wait times below 10 minutes?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Staffing
Allocation Model incorporates a 10-minute wait for passenger and
baggage screening at the Nation's airports. The current Congressional
allocation allows TSA to adequately maintain a 10-minute standard on 93
percent of calendar days. The remaining days need to be supplemented
with overtime personnel. When 10-minute wait times are exceeded, it is
primarily due to excessive volume demand and input configurations not
meeting volume demands.
Question 3. How many full-time and part-time TSO's are currently
employed at Newark Liberty Airport? Of these, how many are limited-duty
or on leave for medical disability reasons? How many are on military
leave?
Answer. The report below identifies the number of full-time (FT)
and part-time (PT) Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at Newark
Liberty Airport (EWR) as of January 20, 2007.
Airport ID--EWR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand
Job Series Job Title FT PT Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1802 Expert Transportation Security 3 3
Officer
Lead Transportation Security 182 182
Officer (LTSO)
Master TSO-BDO 3 3
Supervisory Transportation 120 120
Security Officer (STSO)
Transportation Security 623 406 1029
Officer
------------------
Total 931 406 1337
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Source: Transportation Security Administration, Office of Human
Capital.
Data Date: January 20, 2007.
Question 3a. Of these, how many are limited-duty or on leave for
medical disability reasons?
Answer. The report below identifies the number of TSOs on limited-
duty and the number of TSOs with approved and/or pending workers'
compensation (WC) claims who are on leave.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
# on Limited Duty # on Leave with
------------------------ Approved or Pending WC
Title Claims
Full Time Part Time -----------------------
Full Time Part Time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
STSO 1 0 *3 0
LTSO 4 0 7 0
TSO 19 5 **46 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals 24 5 56 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* One (1) removal action is pending.
*** Five (5) removal actions are pending.
Question 3b. How many are on military leave?
Answer. There are two (2) employees on military leave.
Question 4. Is former Federal Security Director Marcus Arroyo still
employed by TSA or receiving any TSA funds on a contract basis? If so,
please describe the relationship, and if not, when was his date of
departure?
Answer. Mr. Arroyo is no longer employed with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA). He retired on January 3, 2007. He is not
receiving any TSA funds on a contract basis.
Question 5. Over 2 years ago, in the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004, Congress authorized TSA to put cameras in the checked baggage
screening areas of airports, in order to improve security, deter thefts
and mishandling of checked baggage, and help reduce claims against TSA
for theft and mishandled baggage. How many have you installed, and what
has been the effect?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
established the Closed Circuit TV for Airport Program (CCTVAP) to
connect and supplement existing airport authority owned and operated
video systems. Under the CCTVAP, TSA has entered into Other Transaction
Agreements (OTAs) with 20 airport authorities (3 pending) to upgrade
CCTV systems and recordation at checkpoints and baggage areas.
The objective of the CCTVAP is to provide coverage of TSA areas and
recordation of events plus access to airport authority cameras
throughout the airport. The airport authority is the vendor and,
working with the local TSA personnel, determines numbers and types of
cameras and locations. TSA does not track the total number of CCTV
cameras as the information is continuously subject to change to meet
the need. However, TSA has entered into agreements with the following
airports to support CCTV coverage at TSA screening locations for these
airports:
Albuquerque International Sunport (ABQ)
Burlington International Airport (BTV)
Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD)
Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (COS)
Cyril E. King International Airport, Virgin Island (STT)
Greater Buffalo Airport (BUF)
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL)
Henry E. Rohlsen Airport, Virgin Island (STX)
Honolulu International Airport (HNL)
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)
Louisville International Airport (SDF)
McCarran International Airport (LAS)
Memphis International Airport (MEM)
Miami International Airport (MIA)
Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport (MSP)
Portland International Airport (PDX)
San Antonio International Airport (SAT)
Seattle Tacoma International Airport (SEA)
Southwest Florida International Airport (RSW)
Question 6. Will the Administration request sufficient funding for
more airports to get in-line baggage screening systems, specifically
through the ``letter-of-intent'' process?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Department of Homeland Security remain committed to working with
Congress to develop equitable, feasible, and innovative means to
defraying the costs of more expeditiously installing optimal in-line
checked baggage screening equipment and systems.
Progress on deploying in-line systems has been at a steady pace.
Some of the largest airports in the country including Boston, Atlanta,
Dallas, and Denver have in-line systems and several others are under
construction. Today, 36 airports have operational in-line systems--18
full airport systems and 18 airports with partial systems (terminal
solutions). Over the next two (2) years TSA expects full and partial
in-line systems to become operational at 25 additional airports. This
level of effort best balances resources with all the other risks to
transportation security.
In February 2006, TSA provided Congress with a copy of a Strategic
Plan for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. The Plan identifies
the optimal checked baggage screening solution for the Nation's top 250
airports, which process 99 percent of all checked baggage transported.
These optimal solutions include a variety of in-line system
configurations designed to support the needs of each individual
airport. The plan also identifies a projected time-line when the
implementation of the optimal solution would be most appropriate.
Working with the funding levels provided each fiscal year and the
prioritization model, TSA identifies the projects to be executed.
Question 7. The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that ``The TSA
and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability
of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers'' (page 393
of the report). Trace detection puffers are the only functioning
devices available today (and for the foreseeable future) that are
suitable for screening passengers for explosives. Why isn't TSA
continuing to deploy explosive trace detection ``puffer'' machines? And
why did TSA suspend deployment of this technology in the first place?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
deployed 97 Explosive Trace Portals (ETPs) to 37 of our Nation's
airports to further enhance our ability to detect explosives.
TSA encountered reliability and performance issues once the initial
roll-out of these first-generation ETPs was completed, and the portals
were subjected to a variety of environmental issues. TSA is working
with one of the vendors (GE) to make improvements to these first-
generation units. The information gathered and experience gained
through the initial deployment of these units has provided insight into
operational integration enhancements for the next generation of this
technology.
TSA is working with the vendors to make the necessary improvements
that will enhance the performance of the technology before additional
units are deployed. Once the improvements are made, the ETPs will be
evaluated and deployment will continue.
Additionally, TSA is exploring additional technology solutions that
will provide combined weapons and explosives detection capabilities in
the form of whole body imaging.
Question 8. How many more items are confiscated by TSO's daily/
weekly/monthly as a result of the ``liquid ban'' that TSA implemented
last August?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
confiscate liquids, gels, or aerosols at passenger screening
checkpoints. When items that are prohibited, but otherwise lawful, are
identified at the checkpoint, Transportation Security Officers offer
passengers the choice of voluntarily abandoning the items or disposing
of them by some other method. Examples of other disposition methods
include placing the items in checked baggage or mailing the items from
the airport.
TSA does not record the number of passengers abandoning liquids at
the checkpoint or the estimated volume of abandoned liquids.
Question 9. How many weapons are confiscated by TSO's on a daily/
weekly/monthly basis?
Answer. A core mission of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is to prevent the introduction of items into the
sterile areas of the Nation's airports that could be used for deadly or
dangerous purposes. When the screening process intercepts prohibited
items, TSA denies the items entry to the sterile area; we do not
confiscate them. TSA considers any prohibited item (weapon or
otherwise) discarded at a checkpoint to be voluntarily abandoned
property. When items that are prohibited, but otherwise lawful, are
identified at the checkpoint, Transportation Security Officers offer
passengers the choice of voluntarily abandoning the items or disposing
of the items by some other method. Examples of other disposition
methods include placing the items in checked baggage or mailing the
items from the airport. Unlawful items are directed to the attention of
local law enforcement for appropriate handling.
The following table shows incident records for dangerous/deadly
items recorded in TSA's Performance and Results Information System
(PARIS) in Fiscal Year 2006, sorted as requested. TSA field operations
report information to TSA headquarters regarding a wide range of
screening operations using this system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dangerous or Deadly Item
Type Tot./FY06 Avg./Day Avg./Wk. Avg./Mo.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ammunition 9,953 28 192 830
BB/Paint/Flare/Spear/ 187 1 4 16
Pellet Gun
Bio/Chem/Radio Agent 10 1 1 1
Bludgeon 1,083 3 21 91
Cutting Item (knife, 25,326 70 488 2,111
razor, box cutter,
saber, etc.)
Explosive Device 50 1 1 5
Firearms 2,057 6 40 172
Fireworks 454 2 9 38
Flare 32 1 1 3
Fuel/Gasoline/Paint 60 1 2 5
Thinner
Hand Grenade (real and 76 1 2 7
inert)
Mace/Pepper Spray 532 2 11 45
Martial Arts/Self 2,129 6 41 178
Defense Item
Part of Firearm 1,410 4 28 118
Realistic Replica of 360 1 7 30
Firearm
Stun Gun/Shocking Device 209 1 5 18
------------------------------------------------------------------------