

VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM—2007

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 14, 2007

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIST RADICALISM TO THE HOMELAND

MAY 3, 2007

THE INTERNET: A PORTAL TO VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

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**VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO
DEFEAT IT**

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VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

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**THE ROLE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COUNTERING
VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM**

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THE THREAT OF ISLAMIST RADICALISM TO THE HOMELAND

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, McCaskill, Tester, Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, and Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good morning, everybody.

I want to say just a word of internal housekeeping about a new seating arrangement that our Committee will follow. I hope the new seating arrangement has not discouraged people from attending today. [Laughter.]

Here is how this happened. A small group of us Senators, a bipartisan group, were sitting together last week talking about the unfortunate extent to which partisanship interferes with our getting the people's business done, with a lot of the things that we all really want to do. This is a subject that I am sure does not only occur among Senators, but as we hear increasingly from our constituents, it does occur among them. They are fed up with the prevalence of partisanship that stands in the way of us getting things done for them.

And one of the Senators in the discussion, who was a Republican Senator, said, "The whole place is organized in a way that encourages partisanship. We have separate lunches. We even sit separately, one side and the other, at our Committee meetings and hearings." So with the freshness that comes with being a freshman member, Senator McCaskill said, "I have been thinking about that ever since I arrived. Why do we sit with Democrats on one side and Republicans on the other side at the Committee hearings?" And then someone else said, "Maybe we ought to try it a different way."

So I mentioned this to Senator Collins, and in the entrepreneurial, innovative spirit in which we have tried to characterize our leadership of this Committee, we immediately decided to implement Senator McCaskill's idea. And we do so with some seriousness, though not wanting to overstate the significance of this, for two reasons. One is that this Committee has operated in a wonder-

fully nonpartisan way over the time that Senator Collins was Chairman, and I have committed myself to continue that as well. And I think it is part of the reason why we have been able to get some things done for the country.

So in beginning to sit Democrat, Republican, Democrat instead of either side, we are carrying forward the spirit that has guided this Committee, and I hope we are sending a message to you out there who are watching us that we are together, that when we confront and deal with a problem such as we are going to talk about, which is the threat of domestic, "homegrown" Islamist terrorism, we obviously do not think of ourselves primarily as Democrats, Republicans, or even Independents. We think of ourselves as Americans, as Senators, who have a responsibility to try to protect our people.

So the first message we hope to send is to you, that this Committee works together across party lines. And the second is to us because it gives us an opportunity to chat with one another as the hearings go forward.

I said at the beginning, a while ago, that I do not take this to be an enormous step. You might say, if I may paraphrase an earlier comment, this new seating arrangement of the Homeland Security Committee is a small step for the Committee. We hope it will lead to larger steps of nonpartisan accomplishment for the Senate.

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, Senator McCaskill.

Senator MCCASKILL. I would just like, if you would allow me, to briefly comment. This has been really an interesting experience from my perspective. When your e-mail went out on Friday announcing this change, I was gleeful and excited, and I think that my constituents at home in Missouri approve heartily of the idea that we would maybe change some things to try to embrace bipartisanship. But it was fascinating to me the reaction internally in the Senate that it was as if lightning had struck the building and that the glass and the panes were shaking.

I have learned in the short time I have been here that when they say in the U.S. Senate "It has always been done that way," they really mean it. [Laughter.]

And so I think for the staffs particularly, and I want to say to the staffs, I do understand how much work staffs do in the U.S. Senate and what great work they do, and to whatever extent that this has caused stress among the staff, I apologize to the staffs of all of the Senators for that. And I want them to know that it really was just a suggestion and I did not stomp my feet or demand change. And I am hopeful that we will all adjust to this new seating arrangement and that it does not cause any undue work or consternation on behalf of the staffs that work so hard on all of our behalf.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator McCaskill. Don't let the rapid response discourage you from any other innovative ideas. [Laughter.]

Now let's go to the subject of the hearing, and in a sense, in a very real sense, to begin this new seating arrangement sending exactly the message that we all feel about the topic of this hearing.

This is the first in a series of hearings our Committee will conduct as part of a broad investigation into the threat Islamist extremism inside the United States poses to the American people. In doing so, I am continuing and building on an investigation that began when Senator Collins was Chairman last year, particularly looking at radicalization of inmates in American prisons.

Today we are going to focus on what we are doing to detect, deter, and defeat this threat. I thank Secretary Chertoff, and Mr. Allen and Mr. Sutherland of the Department of Homeland Security, who will be on the second panel, for being here today to share with us the Department of Homeland Security's views and plans on this important subject.

The Department's own Homeland Security Advisory Council in a recent report reached some sobering conclusions about the challenges ahead. It called radical Islam the "most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today," said that it is spreading, and predicted that the number and magnitude of attacks on the United States will increase.

We Americans obviously have already been attacked several times by these terrorists: At the Marine barracks in Beirut as far back as 1983; the World Trade Center in 1993; Khobar Towers; the bombings at the embassies of ours in Kenya and Tanzania; the attacks on the *USS Cole* as it lay in port in Yemen; the bombing of Khobar Towers again; and, of course, the attacks that woke us up and began the war against Islamist terrorism on September 11, 2001.

Those attacks that I have mentioned either occurred outside the United States or, as on September 11, were carried out inside the United States by people, terrorists, who had come here from abroad with that evil intention. We are going to focus in these hearings on the threat of homegrown terrorism in the United States, but we are focusing on it because it is part of a larger global threat.

I believe that this series of hearings is justified and important because of what we have already seen happen not just here in the United States, but much more graphically and devastatingly in Europe. The London subway terrorist bombings and the Madrid bombings were carried out by either citizens or long-time residents of the United Kingdom and Spain, respectively. Similar plots by citizens or residents of the Netherlands, Denmark, and France have been foiled. In fact, the Director of MI5 in Great Britain intensified my interest, and I would guess the interest of many others here in this country, in investigating this kind of threat to our homeland when she said last year that her agency had identified more than 200 cells, with a total of more than 1,600 individuals within the United Kingdom who were plotting or facilitating acts of terrorism there.

Is the same thing happening here in the United States? Could it happen? And, most importantly, what should we be doing about it? Those are the questions that this hearing and the longer investigation it begins will ask and hopefully answer in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and the other relevant agencies of our government.

There are, of course, differences between Europe and the United States, which some people believe are quite relevant to the threat

that we are discussing. American society has welcomed Muslim Americans, just as it has embraced generations of new immigrant Americans before. There certainly appears to be a greater level of integration and assimilation of Muslims into American society than into many other countries, including some in Europe. But last fall, Steven Simon of Georgetown University testified before this Committee at a hearing on the fifth anniversary of September 11, 2001, that, "Muslims are increasingly choosing not to assimilate into American society, finding solace in their religious identity instead."

Assuming for a moment that there is some validity to the notion that there is a growing divide occurring here, one possible cause is the use of the Internet to promote the terrorist's dark age and hateful vision. It gives their multimedia campaigns of alienation and violence a global reach, including right into American homes and offices.

As part of this investigative series, our Committee will look at the impact of extremist propaganda on the Internet, on the Islamist terrorist presence in the United States, and how our government and people combat it. We will also look at what Mr. Allen calls "other nodes" where radicalization may be occurring, including the prisons, perhaps universities, perhaps mosques. The domestic threat to our safety will require a strong, comprehensive, and creative strategy of homeland security.

Remember that the 9/11 Commission said that one reason September 11, 2001, happened was a failure of imagination, and by that they meant our failure to imagine that people could do what the terrorists did to us on September 11. So I think we all want to make sure that our imaginations do not fail us again as we counter the possibility of this new threat of Islamist extremist and terrorist groups within our own country. The Homeland Security Advisory Council, which I mentioned earlier, charged by Secretary Chertoff with assessing the threats to the United States in the next 5 years, has recently given us some guidance on this. The task force is chaired by Lee Hamilton and Frank Cilluffo, the former homeland security assistant to President Bush, and in January it found that, "Understanding the future of terrorism requires our understanding threats and developments in a wide range of areas." And "just as al-Qaeda has demonstrated their flexibility and capabilities to adapt their tactics and procedures, we must maintain the same level of flexibility and unpredictability." It then recommended that "Countering homegrown radicalization must be one of the Department's top priorities."

I agree, and that is why we will be holding these hearings.

This is going to be an important, complex, and at times difficult or awkward investigation and conversation. I understand that and Senator Collins does, too, but we must have this conversation and then act sensibly on it if we are to preserve our security and our freedom.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me first say that I am happy to sit either on your left or on your right, whichever you prefer. And I am proud of the bipartisan work of this

Committee which culminated just yesterday in the passage of major homeland security legislation.

Mr. Chairman, when you were talking about the 9/11 Commission's admonition that we not experience a failure of imagination, it brought to mind what the mandate and approach of this Committee has been. Over the past 2 years in particular, this Committee has made an effort to look ahead to identify emerging threats and to avoid the trap of pursuing only reactive measures to the dangers that face our Nation. We responded with landmark legislation to strengthen our intelligence analysis, to improve security at our seaports and our chemical facilities, and to reform our national preparedness and response systems.

The homegrown terrorists who bombed the London subways, as well as those who plotted against the airliners flying out of the United Kingdom last summer, focused our attention on domestic radicalization. In England, we observed extremist, alienated Muslim citizens targeting their fellow citizens as well as our country for attacks. This Committee anticipated the threat of domestic radicalization in our country and responded with an investigation into this emerging threat, examining first radicalization in our prisons.

For the past 5 years, the Federal Government has attempted to prevent terrorists from entering our country from abroad. Our homeland security efforts have made it increasingly difficult for foreign terrorists to infiltrate and operate in the United States. Increased border security and screening of overseas airline passengers, while critical to help keep out foreign terrorists, do not, however, protect us from homegrown terrorists. The rise of domestic terrorist cells inspired by but not necessarily directly linked to al-Qaeda is an emerging threat to our Nation's security.

After the first hearing that this Committee held last year, Senator Voinovich and I wrote to the White House expressing our deep concern about the threat posed by the extremist misrepresentation of the Muslim faith. Our letter said, "We believe countering this threat domestically as well as internationally is a critical element of our plan for victory in the war on terrorism.

"We are convinced that to prevent domestic radicalization, which has been identified as the precursor to terrorism, the Federal Government must prioritize outreach to American Muslims to foster positive relations and build strong community ties."

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that under your leadership the Committee is continuing its examination of this issue and continuing the quest for positive outreach as well as direct measures against this new threat. The Department of Homeland Security has undertaken efforts to assess the threat posed by those who want to radicalize Americans in order to promote attacks on this Nation and our allies. I also want to commend the Department for its awareness of the need to reach out to mainstream Muslims and to reassure them that they are valued fellow citizens, but most of all to ask for their help in countering this threat.

When Secretary Chertoff testified before us last fall, he wisely stressed, "We must not only work across Federal, State, and local government to prevent domestic terrorism, but we must also build a new level of confidence and trust among the American Muslim community who are our critical partners in protecting our country."

I am, therefore, very pleased that DHS, the FBI, the Department of State, and Department of the Treasury are supplementing their homeland security defense activities with an analysis of the concerns of Muslim Americans and with outreach and engagement programs. We must make the hearts and minds of our Muslim neighbors a constant focus of our attention, and the Department of Homeland Security has done some valuable work along these lines. Its threat assessment effort has included analyses of matters that cause concerns among some Muslim Americans, such as aviation watchlists, immigration processing, and perceptions of the selective application of laws and procedures.

Now, I do want to emphasize that identifying sources of concern does not mean that we should abandon essential security activities, but it does obligate us to ensure that the rationales are well explained and that implementation is fair and reasonable.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, faithful Muslims are our allies in promoting tolerance and protecting all of our citizens against attacks. Our enemy is the violent absolutism of any stripe, whether its recruiting efforts are directed at Muslim Americans, at non-Muslim prisoners who could be converted and then radicalized, or at other citizens.

I look forward to learning more today about the Department's efforts, and I also very much appreciate the Chairman extending this investigation to look at the use of the Internet as a recruitment and radicalization tool.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins, for that excellent statement.

Secretary Chertoff, thanks again for being here. We really do look forward to working with you on this question and look forward to your testimony now.

**TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,¹ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Collins. I think it is terrific that this hearing has been scheduled and this investigation is underway, because I think as you said, Mr. Chairman, this requires us to examine a subject that can be awkward at times. But I think it is important, and I think the American people need to be confident that we look at difficult problems square in the face and not merely easy problems.

In asking why this issue of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is of such concern, it seems to me there are two elements that come to mind. The first is, as Senator Collins said, we spend a lot of effort trying to keep dangerous people out of the country and making sure we know who is coming into the country. But, of course, that set of measures does not work if we are dealing with American citizens or lawful permanent residents who have become instruments of terror. So we recognize that there is an additional vulnerability we have to address.

Second, I think if you look at the experience that they have had in Europe in which people who appear to be well settled in the

¹The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 177.

community, second and third generation citizens of the United Kingdom or other Western European countries, in some instances are people who are married and had children who then became either actual suicide bombers or at least plotted to become suicide bombers, I think it shakes our sense of what the threat is. There is a little bit of a tendency to assume that the people who become suicide bombers are teenagers or people who are unstable or disenfranchised. And yet when we see people who at least on the surface seem to be full stakeholders of society and, frankly, when we see people who have families prepared to strap on bombs or carry bombs onto airplanes, it does rock our sense of what human psychology is. And, of course, it raises the question whether we ourselves should be self-conscious about threats within our own communities and our own neighborhoods.

So I think this is a very anxiety-provoking question and one which will benefit from some sober analysis and some serious conversation.

Let me begin by asking the question—and I have a full statement which I request be made part of the record.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection.

Secretary CHERTOFF. But what do we mean by “radicalization”? And I want to begin by saying that I think what we are trying to address here is a form of ideology of violent extremism, and I want to choose those words carefully, because to me the word “ideology” suggests a whole comprehensive system of beliefs, whether it is misplaced or not, but one that has a certain integrity. And, of course, the “violent extremism” suggests it is not merely an ideology, but one that people are prepared to put into practice through the extreme use of violent measures.

Now, it ought to be clear, based on this definition, that we cannot equate an ideology of violent extremism with an entire religion such as the Muslim religion. In fact, we know that the vast majority of Muslims in this country, like the vast majority of Jews and Christians, are not violent, are not adherents to an extreme ideology, and are full participants in the United States. So we have to make sure we do not ever make that improper connection or equation of this ideology and any religion.

On the other hand, we have to also recognize the historical reality and the current reality that there is a subset of individuals who we have to characterize as “violent Islamist extremists,” meaning that they are adherents to an ideology that is distinctive and has a narrative of the world; it is one that at least uses the language of Islamic symbols. It may be a perversion of the language, but it uses that rhetoric. And it has as a goal acts of violence that are aimed at creating a society that will ultimately be radically different from the one we have now, one which is not characterized by democracy, freedom, and tolerance, but one that is characterized by intolerance and totalitarianism. And whether we believe that this goal of a totalitarian world or totalitarian part of the world is a realistic goal, it is one that is deeply believed in by the people who are adherents to this ideology.

So the question becomes: How do people who are born in the United States or have been raised here from a young age, how do they become recruited into this ideology and indoctrinated to the

point that they are actually prepared to kill themselves in order to carry out acts of violence against Americans? I think there are a lot of forces that come into play, and there is a lot we do not know. But there are some things we do know.

We do know, for example, that you cannot simply say it is a matter of those who are poor, uneducated, or isolated from society. Actually, if you look at some of the September 11 hijackers, they were among the most privileged members of their own generation and people who had access to Western ideas and Western education.

How do people become willing to be swayed toward violence? Well, some of that is psychological and probably requires an individualized analysis, and part of what I think we are trying to do in our intelligence gathering and questioning is to get a sense of what moves people down this path of recruitment. But I do think there are some generalizations we can make.

First, people have to be persuaded if they are going to become part of this ideology that there is some need to effect radical political or social change, and that may come from their own sense of inadequacy or indignity.

Second, they have to be presented with a comprehensive world narrative, something that explains both their own sense of being troubled and what the ideology wants to achieve, and presents it as a coherent story line. And we know in the case of Osama bin Laden and his adherents, they have a vision of the world and a narrative that they propagate.

And, third, people have to at some point be willing to believe in that narrative to such a degree that they are prepared to give their lives for it.

Now, what are the prospects for this kind of radicalization and recruitment inside the United States? Well, it does seem at this point we have less of this homegrown radicalization here than we have seen in Western Europe. I think it reflects in part our free market economy, our pluralistic culture, our democratic ideals, and the fact that part of the spirit of this country is that we have no group that considers itself the host and no group that considers itself the guest. Every American—including the four Americans I escorted into citizenship a couple of days ago at Walter Reed—becomes a 100 percent stakeholder as soon as they are born into this country or as soon as they are naturalized into this country. So those are some real advantages that we have.

Among other things because of the nature of our society, I think the Muslim-American community here is better educated and more affluent than perhaps their counterparts in other countries. Nevertheless, we would make a mistake to assume that we can rest on our laurels. The use of the Internet and radicalization in places like prison does appeal to people who, for whatever reason, feel either isolated individually or in groups, and that compelling narrative is one which will attract people to acts of violence. So we need to figure out how to address this, and at DHS we have three elements to a strategy: First, continue to develop a better understanding of radicalization; second, enhance the capacity of the Department and its partners at all levels to counteract radicalization; and, third, engaging with key communities to promote our civic en-

gagement and protect civil liberties. And let me talk very briefly about each of these.

First, on the issue of understanding, we have identified and devoted 30 of our intelligence analysts specifically to discuss the issue and study the issue of patterns of radicalization and to work with others in the intelligence community, State, and local partners to detect potential homegrown threats. The analysts are divided among five regions across our country, so we look at the particular challenges in each region. We are investing resources in science, technology, and research through a DHS Center of Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, and we have devoted money to research on other elements of what leads to radicalization. So we are trying to get some good social science and hard science analysis.

Second, we are trying to enhance our own capacity to counter this. We have a Radicalization and Engagement Working Group that we set up in the fall of 2005 that is looking across all of our agencies and with our partners at the Bureau and the Department of State to see how we can identify threats and also opportunities to counter those threats. Among other things, last September, the working group hosted an interagency roundtable on the problem of radicalization in prisons, including representatives from the Justice Department, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Bureau of Prisons. We continue to push forward on this, working with State and local partners.

Third, and perhaps most important, we are promoting civic engagement. Within a matter of days after September 11, 2001, the President was very forthright in making sure that he told the American public this was not about a war between Islam and the United States and that Muslim Americans had to be treated like all other Americans, as full partners. We have continued that substantial outreach, including my own personal outreach, to Muslim communities across the country, and we have regular community roundtables in cities all across the Nation.

Most important, we have assembled an Incident Management Team and identified community leaders that we can reach out to at a time of stress, like last August when we had the London plot, so we can, first of all, check the pulse of the community, inform them about what we are doing, and then obviously give them whatever information they need to communicate with their constituents. So I think those are very important measures we want to build on.

I want to conclude by making a general observation. This is unlike some of the challenges we face when we are dealing with the possibility of people smuggling terrorists in from overseas or bad things in cargo, because here we are dealing with a network threat. The spectrum of terrorism extends from the very highly organized and almost state alter ego type of terrorism you get in Hezbollah, all the way down to the self-initiating type of terrorists you get when people recruit themselves over the Internet and then come together in small groups to carry out terrorist acts.

Therefore, this is not going to be solved simply by creating a big Federal program and a bureaucracy to deal with it. This is a true instance where to fight a network, we need to have a network, and

that means working not only with government agencies but with communities and non-government agencies to deal with this issue.

Second, and last, I would say this is preeminently and ultimately a battlefield of ideas in which we have to be able to identify what are the ideas and the elements that are bringing people into these networks of terror and how do we counteract that. And there we have some strong social strengths, but we are going to have to do some creative thinking.

So I welcome this investigation. We look forward to cooperating with the Committee and moving forward on it. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Secretary. It was a very thoughtful statement. I would like to do 7-minute rounds of questions. Let me pick up on your last point because it is a critical point, both in terms of the specific subject we are facing and the larger war on terrorism.

This is, like all wars, a war for security, but it really is a war about ideas, and we will win the war ultimately by confronting the extremist, inhumane, regressive, repressive ideas that the Islamist extremists peddle with our own reactions, our own much better ideas, and much better value system. And in this sense, I thank you also for what you and Senator Collins said about the Muslim-American community, because in a very real way, the best idea we have going for us is America at its best, is the openness and opportunity of our society. And you said it, the President said it, all of us feel it. We are not involved in a war against Islam and are certainly not making Muslim Americans somehow the enemy. The enemy is extremism, Islamist extremism, and terrorism. And, in fact, one of the most significant reactions to it, I think most potentially constructive, successful reactions, is to build on the American ideal, the American reality, and if I may put it this way, to draw the American family closer together, including the Muslim members of the family, as opposed to somehow making them feel as if they are "the other." This is not the way America is, and it would be a stupid and un-American thing to do. So I thank you for your comments.

Generally speaking, I take your testimony to say—and I will question Mr. Allen on this, too—that at this point we know enough to conclude that the problem of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is less than it is in Western Europe, for instance, but we would be naive to assume that there are not forces out there that are, in fact, trying to radicalize people, and bring people into the Islamist terrorist movement in this country.

I know that under Mr. Allen, who is your Chief Intelligence Officer, you are building a crew of 30 analysts that will be devoted to this problem. You mentioned dividing them into five regions. At some point in this investigation, I know we would like to have a closed, classified hearing. But to the extent that you can in open session, tell us what the Department has learned thus far about the status of domestic terrorism and the efforts at radicalization of American citizens and permanent legal residents.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, let me begin by saying that although I agree that it is less than Western Europe, that is not to say that it is non-existent. We do have an issue of homegrown radicalization. Some of it is pretty evident publicly. We have Adam

Gadahn, who is over in South Asia somewhere, an American-born convert to some form of Islam, or what he characterizes as Islam, who is a propagandist for bin Laden.

We do see instances—and I will leave some of it for a classified hearing—where we do see radicalization. Some of it is self-generated and some of it may be linked to connections to South Asia, where Americans, either born Muslim or some who convert, become recruited to an ideology and at least begin a discussion of carrying out acts of violence against the United States.

One of the areas we did focus on early was prisons because we know that is a population that is a little bit more perhaps isolated than the rest of the country. It tends to be a group that has a higher percentage of people who are willing to be violent from the get-go. And it is a traditional breeding ground for all kinds of extreme ideologies, from the left to the right, Christian, Muslim, or whatever.

So those are some of the principal areas we are focused on.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So this is less than Europe, but it is real here, and we cannot close our eyes to that.

Let me ask you a little bit more about where you place the threat of domestic Islamist radicalism in the list of threats to our homeland today.

Secretary CHERTOFF. I would say that it is not—in terms of the consequence and in terms of the likelihood of success, I would still say the greater threat comes from either a group coming from outside the country or a group that is in the country but is being guided by and working with a group outside the country, what I would still call international or transnational activity.

I think there is no question that there are groups inside the country, self-generated, that could carry out acts of violence. I think the sophistication would likely be a lot less than we saw on September 11, 2001. And I think their chances of success would be somewhat less. But that will change, and particularly if—I go back to the prisons again. If we get people who have proven that they are capable of carrying out acts of violence, buying into this ideology, their capabilities will begin to improve.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do we have any evidence at this point of participants in the global Islamist extremist terrorist network coming into the United States with the specific intention of radicalizing American citizens or residents?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I guess I would separate two things. We obviously know from September 11, 2001, that we had people coming into the country, and I do think we have reason to believe that there are efforts to—I want to be careful how I say this—work with reliable people embedded in the country, if possible, to carry out plots.

In terms of recruiting, though, and the ideology, I would say that the principal way to enter the United States is through the Internet. I do not think it is necessary to send radical recruiters into the United States. I think there is a risk of doing that, but I have no question about the fact that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and others like them quite consciously use the media, including the Internet, as a recruiting tool.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And also a communication device.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Absolutely.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Once somebody signs up.

We are talking here about radicalization, domestic homegrown terrorism, and naturally thinking about acts of violence. I assume that part of what the Department is also focused on with other agencies of our government are people who would not be considered capable of or intending to carry out violent acts but who may be supportive enough to, for instance, provide safe houses or financial support or access of some other kinds. Is that correct?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Absolutely. And, in fact, a lot of the efforts undertaken over the last few years in domestic enforcement are focused precisely on people who are facilitators, although they may not be operators.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up on the conversation that you just had with Senator Lieberman. Our last hearing showed that radicalization can be accomplished in the prison system, both through what I would call self-radicalization, where a prisoner gets radical literature or access to the Internet and self-radicalizes, and then seeks to convert and radicalize others. We also saw examples of radical recruiters where radical imams were going into the prisons and trying to convert and radicalize.

As the Department has learned more about the radicalization process, which are you seeing more of? Are you seeing the presence of radical recruiters or does the evidence suggest self-radicalization perhaps using the Internet or radical literature as the more predominant method?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do not know if I can quantify it. I would say the presence of a radical imam is probably more dangerous because it is a more dynamic recruiting environment. And it may precipitate then an interest in the literature or further self-radicalization. I do not know how easy it is for someone by themselves sitting in a prison to start to get interested in this, although experience in other areas shows me almost anything gets into prison because people have a lot of ingenuity in smuggling things in. But I would say that probably the most effective, quick way to radicalize is putting an imam in.

Senator COLLINS. We have talked a lot in this Committee about radicalization within a prison, and obviously, a prison population is fertile ground—alienated, anti-government, more prone to violence. Are you looking at other possible sites for radicalization, whether it is college campuses or madrassas or even perhaps some radical mosques?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me preface it by saying this is one of those discussions that falls in the category of awkward.

Senator COLLINS. Right.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Because, on the one hand, we do know that universities and madrassas can be sites for radicalization. On the other hand, we have a very strong tradition in this country of not getting into the business of moderating people's religious activities. And I will be honest. That is a real issue of delicacy for us, and that is why I think in some ways—I am concerned about those things, but I do not know that the way to address it is by having

the authorities start to get intimately involved. I think the solution is to get the community itself involved, and if I could take a moment just to tell a really quick story about how this works.

When I was in Germany about a month or so ago, the Ambassador kindly, at my request, set up a meeting with Muslim community leaders in Germany. I wanted to see how they were dealing with the issue of radicalization. And they said to me that they had experienced a case where a person had come in from outside to their community and was recruiting people to a radical Islamic ideology. And they said, first of all, this person was a complete ignoramus, had no idea of even the most basic elements of Islam, but was persuading young people that this was a narrative they ought to sign onto. And so they themselves went out and counter-programmed and countered that.

So in some ways, the answer to your question is yes, but I want to be careful to say I am not advocating a heavy Federal footprint on this.

Senator COLLINS. Nor am I, and that is why I think that the outreach to the Muslim community is so critical and that we need to step up even further our outreach in that area.

The third issue that I want to touch on is what is perhaps a false sense of security in this country that domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorists are simply not a threat here, that we are different from Western Europe, that fortunately our Muslim community is more integrated, more mainstream, more prosperous than what we see in Great Britain and France.

But the fact is that should be a very small comfort to us, not only because it can and is happening here, but also because radicalized extremists from Great Britain, from France, who are citizens of those countries can travel here pretty easily.

Do you have concerns about our Visa Waiver Program—we tried to tighten that up in the bill that the Senate just passed—making it relatively easy for an extremist to travel from Great Britain, a British citizen, after all, without undergoing the kind of scrutiny that would occur if that same individual were not a citizen of a country with which we have the Visa Waiver Program?

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are very concerned, and that is why we supported the effort that this Committee made to allow us to dramatically tighten up, even for visa waiver countries, the criteria for entry and giving us some more information, because we are worried that, notwithstanding the best efforts of our friends and allies overseas—and they have been tremendous friends and allies—by their own admission there is an increasing pool of what we call “clean skins,” people who have no obvious record, who are citizens of the country, who could come in and become a problem here.

So that is why homegrown radicalization over there creates a greater vulnerability in the Visa Waiver Program.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.

I do want to explain to my colleagues that, consistent with the new seating arrangement, what we will do in terms of calling on Members is that we will call on Members who arrive before 9:30, that is, when the gavel goes down, in order of seniority regardless

of party, and then we will call on Members who arrive after 9:30 in the order in which they arrive regardless of party.

That logic now leads us to Senator Akaka.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I join with my colleagues in welcoming you to this Committee on the threat of Islamist radicalism to our homeland. Of special interest to me, Mr. Secretary, is the issue of improving our intelligence collection and information sharing environment in the Department of Homeland Security. I have been very concerned since the creation of this Department that, first, its creation not jeopardize the effectiveness of existing intelligence agencies and, second, that the creation of a new Department focused on domestic threats would not endanger the legitimate rights of privacy and civil rights of American citizens.

This is a major challenge. I introduced S. 82, the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007, which reaffirms the authority of the Comptroller General to perform audits and evaluations of the intelligence community to improve congressional oversight. I would ask unanimous consent at this time, Mr. Chairman, that a memorandum prepared for me by the Congressional Research Service entitled "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence" be included as part of the hearing record.¹ This memorandum makes clear the role and authority of the Standing Committees of the House and Senate to oversee the intelligence community, of which the Department of Homeland Security is now a member.

Mr. Secretary, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) wants to increase collaboration among the 16 intelligence agencies that it oversees. He is doing that by trying to integrate information technology, procurement, and human resources.

From your perspective, how well is the collaboration and integration of functions progressing with the DNI?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think it is progressing quite well across the Federal environment. Even in the couple years I have been on the job, I have seen significant increases in the degree and quality of cooperation.

I think everybody in the community buys into the idea of sharing. We do find sometimes people either do not recognize the significance of the information they have as intelligence, so they kind of unwittingly fail to share it, and we try to correct that. In our own Department, I issued a directive recently, mirroring one that the Justice Department had issued, that makes it very clear that within our own house there is a heavy presumption in favor of sharing, and we are not going to allow people to decline to share based on such customary phrases as "That is operational information."

So I think we have made an awful lot of progress. I think the next area where we have to continue to make progress is in sharing at the State and local level. We are trying to do that with the Fusion Centers which will give us a point of contact with States and localities so that we can move information back and forth. We

¹ CRS memorandum submitted by Senator Akaka appears in the Appendix on page 205.

are also expediting, and I think dramatically increasing, the security clearances for State and local officials. We are establishing a fellowship program for State and local officials to come and work on intelligence here. The idea is to really thicken that set of relationships.

Senator AKAKA. It is difficult to build a sense of community when several agencies have existed for decades and have their own culture and expertise. With Homeland Security, you have both legacy agencies and a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis trying to create its own culture to serve the Secretary's needs.

From your perspective, what are the major challenges remaining for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think recruitment is always a challenge. We are competing now not only with the other agencies but with the private sector to recruit translators and people who are analysts, so that is always a challenge; continuing the process of building our information technology that allows sharing in a more expedited and more efficient fashion. I think those are two areas where it takes a little bit of time and effort, but they are critical if we are going to continue to mature our information and intelligence collection and analysis department.

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich and I have also been working to resolve issues on expediting security clearances, and we look forward to working with you on that.

Let me ask another question here. Are you satisfied with the Department's ability to recruit and retain intelligence personnel?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, again, as I say, the problem is we are competing with other agencies and with the private sector, so I would like to see, first of all, more young people being interested in being public servants. When I have been out with Muslim community leaders, I have talked specifically about how I think it would be beneficial from a number of standpoints for them to encourage people in their community coming out of college or out of graduate school to look to public service as a career path.

So I want to make sure we continue to have a pool of recruits that is sufficient to let us satisfy our needs, and I think we are in a very competitive environment.

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich and I have been working on human capital. I am very concerned about future recruitment as well.

What additional tools do you need to be successful in meeting your recruitment goals?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, as I say, I think first we need to expedite and streamline the process of clearing people. Right now the FBI and contractors have an enormous burden in terms of background checks. It may be that—and I think the OMB has talked about this—we need to look more fundamentally at what we are doing in background checks to see which of the things we are doing are really legacies of the Cold War that we do not really need to continue to use, and what new things we ought to do.

I had a circumstance where I was talking to a person we were recruiting for a senior position who, by dint of the fact that he had served overseas in the Foreign Service in a lot of different posts, was told that a background check was going to take months be-

cause he had been overseas a lot, so there was a lot of investigation. Even when they were overseas with a top-secret clearance for the U.S. Government. So I confess there are times that kind of does boggle the mind a little bit, and I think we probably need to break a little china in the background-checking organizations to inject a note of common sense.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your responses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator McCaskill, you are next.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, Secretary.

Having visited with a number of American Muslims over the last 2 years, my heart hurts for them. And as I look at the radicalization around the globe and the threat it poses to our country, I want to echo the sentiments of other Members that have talked about using the American-Muslim community as maybe our strongest tool against the radicalization that is being attempted in various venues.

I am curious. What kind of structure do you have in your Department to embrace this community? And have you made an effort to employ in the highest levels of the Department of Homeland Security American Muslims so that their perspective and their view of this problem—and, frankly, I think they have the key to more solutions than we may have—and they are deeply offended at this movement and what it represents to their faith. Do we have American Muslims at the highest level of the Department of Homeland Security?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am a little bit at a handicap because I usually do not ask people what their faith is. But I know in one instance we had a senior person in the intelligence function who was—I believe he was Muslim. I think he has now moved to another intelligence agency.

We obviously have the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office, which is very committed to outreach. I know that Mr. Allen—and I am sure he will speak to this—is very interested in recruiting. And as I say, I have gone out when I have been in the community and made a point of trying to encourage people to come forward.

I want to be a little careful because, again, I do not want to—there is a little bit of a tendency sometimes—you used to see it in the area of human resources where minorities were kind of given that as their portfolio and almost like limited to that. I want to make it clear when we bring Muslims into the Department, it is not simply to be “experts on Islam.” It is to do the whole range of things.

Senator MCCASKILL. Sure.

Secretary CHERTOFF. And I have said I want it to be Border Patrol agents, Coast Guard cutter skippers. I just think that in general we benefit from having—it is not just talking the talk. It is walking the walk in terms of that integration.

Senator MCCASKILL. I agree. I think it would be, frankly, counterproductive to put them just in the civil rights and outreach department.

The other thing I have noticed since visiting with this community is I hear so much misinformation across the media. It is amazing to me when I will listen to one of these talking heads on cable television refer to being Muslim as if that is something that is wrong, inappropriate, scary, or something that we should be fearful of.

Do you all have a program within your Department where you track those kinds of comments in the public media? And have you ever found an occasion after one of those statements—I am thinking particularly when there was press about Senator Obama and where he had been schooled and the incredible misinformation that was put out there, trying to make it look like that he was in some terrorist recruitment camp or something. It was wildly inappropriate.

I was hoping at that moment that you or someone at your level in government would step forward and say: Wait a minute. What you are doing here hurts America. It hurts the way we are viewed in the rest of the world by the Muslim community. It hurts with American Muslims and how they feel and how they are treated.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I did not say it publicly because it did not come up publicly. What I said, when I spoke to a large group in Detroit, was I thought there was a bit of a brouhaha about a Member of Congress who got sworn in and chose the Koran. And I said, I thought that was actually a good thing that the—I will probably get in trouble for saying this, but I am going to say it because I believe it. We respect all religious faiths, and you ought to take your oath of office using the holy book that you believe in. And I did it on a Jewish Bible when I got sworn into this job or being a judge, and Muslims ought to do it on the Koran and Christians ought to do it on the Bible. And I think that is a positive thing.

In terms of the misinformation on the media, that is a subject of a whole separate hearing. We do not track misstatements on the media. I would get into a whole ton of trouble from the First Amendment advocates if I were to start to do that. I guess I have to subscribe to Justice Brandeis' view that the best—or Justice Holmes' view, the best cure is more discussion and more debate. But I think everybody of good faith ought to step on efforts to demonize particular religions.

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I understand that you would never speak out in terms of trying to limit the speech on the media. But correcting their speech from your position of authority I think would be tremendously powerful. And I think in the long run the signals that the top levels of our government send around the world about the way we view the Muslim faith may be the most powerful weapon we have against terrorism.

Secretary CHERTOFF. I agree with that. The President himself has been very—not only public, but passionate about making it very clear that he respects the Muslim faith. And I think all of us at every level of government, when the opportunity presents itself, in an appropriate way should make that point very clear. I agree with you.

Senator MCCASKILL. Since it is under your hat, so to speak, students that come here to get educated—in visiting with an American friend of mine who is originally from Iran, he has been in this country as an engineer for a number of years. He talked about within his generation that the best work that America did in terms of diplomacy was allowing these students to come from other countries and then them going home, because when they live here and they learn here and they get to participate in the American dream, I might argue, and maybe at our best, because I think I certainly look back at my time in college as some of the best times I had, maybe not for all the right reasons, but I really am worried about what we are doing in the name of homeland security as it relates to this very important deportation of democracy, because the young people who come here to learn in terms of college education go back home at the highest levels of their government, at the highest levels of the world of medicine or engineering, and they bring back what they saw of this wonderful experiment called democracy in America.

I worry about what we are doing in terms of the visas and the educational opportunities, and if you would speak to that, ways that you could maybe take responsibility to making sure that we continue to export democracy through these educational exchange programs.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I agree with you, that is a very powerful benefit to the United States, and Secretary Rice and I, about a year ago, announced an initiative to try to emphasize again how we want to welcome people, and the vast majority of people are good people who want to come to the United States. We did make some adjustments to the student visa process to allow somewhat longer visas and people to come a little bit early or ahead of schedule.

At the same time, we still do, as Senator Collins said, have the fundamental responsibility to check the people who come. And there are people who want students visas that, believe me, you do not want to have come into this country. It is only a small minority, but regrettably, a small minority can do a lot of damage.

So it does mean we have up front in the visa process a certain amount of vetting and checking, which I think is appropriate. But we have tried to smooth the process and make it more efficient, and also to give a longer period so that there is not a need to go through the process, just bureaucratically a lot of different times.

Part of this is we want also to send a positive message out. I know Karen Hughes and others are really working very hard to make sure we are not allowing negative stereotypes that people get from the media to infect the willingness of people to come over here.

Senator MCCASKILL. I would appreciate it if you could get my office or the Committee the numbers of students that are coming to get educated in America from countries that are primarily Muslim and how those numbers have tracked over the last several years.¹

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will do that.

¹ Charts on student data submitted for the record by Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 210.

Senator McCASKILL. Thank you very much, Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator McCaskill. Next is Senator Voinovich to be followed by Senator Tester.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. I commend you both for your leadership in conducting hearings to consider if there is a security threat of homegrown radicalization of American Muslims. And as this Committee has already learned at previous hearings, radicalization can be a precursor of terrorism and is, therefore, a significant homeland security concern.

I think that one of the things that people have to understand is that we are at war against a transnational terrorist movement fueled by radical extremists. These individuals seek to exploit the religion of Islam through violent means to achieve ideological ends. I like to say that we are in the fourth world war against Islamist extremists, religious fanatics who have hijacked the Koran into making people believe that the way to heaven is jihad against the United States and other people that share our values.

In my work on this Committee and on the Foreign Relations Committee, one of my chief concerns has been how to combat the spread of radical jihadist ideology. This struggle transcends borders. We need to be proactive about combating extremism at home in the United States and as well as abroad.

I think Members of the Committee might be interested that for the last several years we have been trying to get the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to do a survey of the OSCE members regarding anti-Semitism, Muslim xenophobia, existing laws, how are they being enforced, and, perhaps most important, developing an infrastructure of understanding so we bring people together and prevent incidents like we experienced in England last summer.

While I am pleased that the Department is taking this issue seriously, I am convinced that if we are going to be successful, we need to better engage Muslim communities across America and facilitate interfaith dialogue to prevent isolation.

This is a book that I shared with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Geneive Abdo's book "Mecca and Main Street." Ms. Abdo conducted a year survey of the Muslim community in the United States. The fact of the matter is that Muslim Americans feel a lot more isolated today than they did before September 11, 2001.

We have got to be very careful about developing this infrastructure of understanding between Jews, Muslims, and Christians so that we make sure existing walls do not get larger. I know the President has recognized this problem. He has tasked Karen Hughes with improving our public diplomacy. Ms. Hughes has worked to establish more dialogue with America's Muslim communities and to empower American Muslims to act as American ambassadors in other countries. The Ambassador to Brussels, for example, brought Muslims from the United States to Belgium to talk

with Muslims there to try and do his part in trying to bring people together and to discuss how Muslims are treated in our country.

The real issue here gets back to the same old story in this government: Who is the orchestra leader? Do you know what he or she is doing? Does he or she know what you are doing? Is anybody looking at the big picture.

Secretary CHERTOFF. We actually are quite well coordinated. I think on most of these issues, they fall within either my domain or Justice or State, and we all talk regularly among ourselves about these issues. Sometimes there are more formal interagency coordinations through the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, but a lot of times on some of these issues, it is a question of my just going over and having lunch with Secretary Rice or Attorney General Gonzales, and we coordinate that way, or we do it at lower levels.

Senator VOINOVICH. If I asked you for an organizational chart that showed who is working on this issue, what their responsibilities are, and how they are being coordinated, is that available today?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do not think there is an organizational chart just on the issue of who coordinated radicalization. We do have a group within our own agency, a working group, and there is an interagency working group in which we participate with the other departments. I can get you those.¹

I would not want to say that is the full measure of everything that we do, but those are probably the two most systematic, institutionalized mechanisms for driving forward on this.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I would like to have that, and I am sure the Members of the Committee would as well.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Sure.

Senator VOINOVICH. We must be sure that someone has looked at the big picture, how agencies are working together, and who is responsible for what.

The other thing that you mentioned in your testimony is the recruitment of a talented workforce and security clearances. Both are items on GAO's high-risk list, and our oversight is designed to address these long-term management challenges.

I would hope that you would share the frustration that you have with the folks over at the Office of Management and Budget because we are pushing them very hard to resolve the backlog. Reciprocity of clearances is a major challenge.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, at least at the higher levels of OMB, I think there is agreement with what you are saying, and I agree with you, too.

My experience has been is you start to grow into it at the level of the people who actually have the responsibility. They are always hesitant and perhaps overcautious, the feeling being that it is always safer to continue doing what you are doing.

I always take a little bit of pleasure in trying to revolutionize in those areas. For example, we laid down a mandate recently that if you are TS/SCI, top secret-sensitive compartmented cleared, in an-

¹ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) testimonies submitted for the record by Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 212.

other intelligence agency at the Federal level, that is good enough for us. We should not require you to go through another background check. That is crazy, absent something new that arises and maybe you need to be updated.

So we are, I think, turning the battleship around on this, but it is frustrating and it is hurting us.

Senator VOINOVICH. We will try and help.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, and I am kicking some you-know-whats. [Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Keep kicking. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Good questions.

Next is Senator Tester, to be followed by Senator Coleman, if he returns, or Senator Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Secretary Chertoff, thank you for being here today. I think we are very fortunate that the message of Islamist radicalization has not nearly found the audience in this country that it has in the Middle East or even Europe, and I would like to know more about why you think that is and whether you can identify any factors that might change that dynamic. But as we look at the problem of radicalization, it is clear to me that specific events can have major impact on individuals' decisions to engage or be sympathetic to radicalism. Events like September 11, 2001, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq were moments that clearly drove some in other countries to identify with al-Qaeda and similar organizations—September 11 because it promoted in the Middle East the notion that al-Qaeda had achieved some kind of success. Fortunately, our troops in Afghanistan made sure that success was extremely brief and did a good job keeping al-Qaeda on the run.

I mention Iraq as well because the war seems to have raised suspicions about America and its motives in the eyes of many on the Arab street. It has not had the positive impact that many had hoped for, and that is why we had foreign fighters pouring into Iraq after the invasion to try to commit jihad against American forces.

But I do think we do ourselves a disservice if we believe that Iraq is some sort of flypaper, that our involvement there makes extremists less likely to do harm in the United States.

Mr. Secretary, as we think about what might happen in Iran, do you expect there could be further impact on Islamist extremism if there is some kind of military confrontation with Iran? As you know, the Vice President and others in the Administration have said that all options remain on the table. What are your views in regard to military confrontation versus diplomatic solutions in Iran as it applies to radicalization?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me take your two separate questions.

First, there was a lot of social science analysis of why the problem seems to be greater in Western Europe than in the United States, and I think there is less assimilation in Western Europe. I think there is less fluidity in the economy in some of those countries. As I said, I believe that compared to their counterparts in Western Europe, American Muslims are better educated and more

prosperous, and I do not think we have, with maybe a few exceptions, large pockets of people where you have foreigners essentially being the only residents in a particular community, as they do have in some places in Western Europe. So I think we are much more assimilated.

Now this is a little bit more speculative on my part. I think there is a fundamental difference with the way we deal with people who come in to become American citizens or people who are second and third generation American citizens. I think the dominant spirit of this country is every American is as much a participant and stakeholder as every other American. You are not here as a colonial legacy or because of the fact that you used to be part of the American empire. You are here because you have chosen to come here. And I think that sense of social mobility has been a really positive benefit. I think some of the European countries have had to struggle with that.

So I think those are advantages, but they are not things to be taken for granted or to be treated as an indication we are absolved of the need to look at these other issues.

I guess on the other question I am going to say this: I do not believe that one can appease oneself out of problems with violent extremists or ideologies of hate or terrorists. I think that once the ideology exists, it will fasten onto any excuse and that you cannot bargain with it or barter away with it or try to mollify it by avoiding necessary action that you need to do to protect yourself.

Bin Laden declared war on the United States well before September 11, 2001, well before Iraq, well before Afghanistan. He was offended by the fact that we had American troops in Saudi Arabia. He was offended by the fact that women soldiers walked around with their faces revealed. Well, that is too bad for him. We are not going to compromise our values or our national security simply because we are afraid that exercising our values or promoting our national security is going to offend somebody.

That is not to say we ought to take measures like this lightly or that we ought to do it in a way that is dismissive of other cultures or the dignity of other people. But the bottom line is I do not think that there is any amount of propitiating radical extremists that is going to make them less intent on killing us. And I think at some level resolution, determination, and strength are very powerful, positive messages for the United States, because I do think it is an antidote to those who believe that radical extremists have discovered the key to victory.

Senator TESTER. Just a quick follow-up. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but using force against radical extremists tends to work better than diplomacy?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I cannot tell you in the abstract. I can tell you that I think that you need to make the decision based on what you think is going to be most effective. But I would say renouncing force in the hope that is going to buy you peace is a huge mistake, a historically demonstrated mistake, vividly brought to mind with that charming picture of Neville Chamberlain announcing peace in our time.

I think at the end of the day, you have to make a decision about what the right approach is based on circumstances and based on

what is in the best interest of the United States, not trying to figure out what is going to make the enemy less angry at you.

Senator TESTER. OK. A couple things. You listed three things: Understanding why radicalization occurs, enhancing your ability to respond, and promoting civic engagement. And I think in the beginning you talked about protecting civil liberties, but you did not expand on that in your speech. Could you tell me what you meant by that and how that can be effected?

Secretary CHERTOFF. What I meant is that it is very important—and I guess I view this as part of civic engagement—that we make clear that we are not racially profiling people, we are not imputing to people that they are dangerous or threatening because of the fact that they happen to be Muslim or because of the fact that their ethnic heritage happens to be a particular type of ethnic heritage.

We have to continue to treat every American with the same respect that our Constitution requires regardless of their heritage, regardless of what their religion is. And I think when that is not honored, that actually has a counterproductive effect.

Senator TESTER. Well, my time has run out. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tester.

Senator Coleman, to be followed by Senator Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I do appreciate your comments in response to Senator Tester's question. I have written the word "Chamberlain" that you spoke about. I think it is important to make clear we are talking about radical extremists. We are not talking about Muslims. We are not talking about Islam. We are talking about radical extremists. And by definition, those are folks who do not want to negotiate with us. They want to kill us. And so how do you deal with that?

I would suspect that the battle, the need for resolution, for determination and strength against radical extremists is so that in the end, talking internationally, you have India, the largest democracy in the world, I think perhaps the largest Muslim population in the world, but the Muslim population there does not see radical extremists, say that they have defeated us and this is the path, because if that becomes the path, then we all face even greater challenges than we face today.

Talking about the international—reflecting on this from reading Secretary Allen's testimony, he may want to delve into it—but it appears that one of the differences between what we face in Britain where radical extremists were able to move folks, part of the population and part of British society to step forward, was support from al-Qaeda, support from other groups. That may be operational support, maybe—but a range of support.

Which leads me then to the question in this country, be it Iran, be it groups that fund al-Qaeda, can you talk about the cooperation with the State Department and with other agencies on the international side to help us measure whether that support is coming in and whether we are doing things that are effective in blocking it?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Obviously a major focus of what we do in the intelligence community as well as the Homeland Security Council, which always involves the intelligence agencies and the Department of State and the Department of Defense, is to assess where the international dimensions of the threat are. We have various strategies we have put together on how to address that threat in what was at one—and the acronym is global war—or the kind of shorthand is global war on terror, and a dimension of that strategy which was formulated is focused in particular on how we can deal with international connections as they facilitate or further terrorist action in this country. So we do coordinate through the inter-agency process with all of the agencies in a common strategy.

Senator COLEMAN. Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that the silos are broken down? One of the great problems of September 11, 2001, was to get the FBI and the CIA—there was not the coordination. And I say this because I think it is a fair statement. On other levels in Iraq itself, folks at times see, when we are dealing in some areas of the Middle East, the State Department approach and the Defense Department approach. I have actually had folks on the ground say that at times they are in conflict.

On the intelligence side, do we have the level of integration, the absence of conflict, so that you are comfortable that we have truly broken down the silos that exist or that have existed?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we have done an awful lot. I can measure it based on what I saw when I was here on September 11, 2001, and what I saw when I came on the job, my current job, in February 2005, and what I see now.

Certainly at the policy level, at the senior level, I think those silos have all gone. I think when you delve deep in the organization, you sometimes find either people do not understand what they have has intelligence significance so they do not think to share it, not out of ill will but because they just do not realize its value, and you do find some people who just still cannot get around the idea that you do not own the information, you have to share the information. So, as we recruit people, as we educate people, I think this problem is diminishing.

We do need to take care that we do not reintroduce the silos. Something that is ironic about Europe is the Europeans, because of their data protection rules, actually affirmatively place very powerful barriers to information sharing in their own governments. So they erect silos. That is an approach which I think, if it were ever to be introduced into this country, would actually slide us all the way back to where we were. So we have to be vigilant against backsliding.

Senator COLEMAN. Just talking about data very briefly, do we have common databases between the State Department and DHS to track international and domestic trends?

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have interoperable databases. It is not one single database, but we do integrate and move across our various databases for the same type of information.

Senator COLEMAN. The British were very effective—and thank God they were very effective—in thwarting a plot to destroy aircraft that was headed to the United States, including the situation

of a family, suicide terrorist bombers, being willing to take their child to do that.

As you look at how Britain accomplished that, are there tools that they have that we do not have that we should put in place to make sure that we would have been able to do the same thing? Is there something you need from us for us to rest easy knowing that if the same thing had occurred in this country, we would have had the same capacity to stop it before the terror and destruction did take place?

Secretary CHERTOFF. They are different than we are. They have some tools that we do not have. We have some tools they do not have. They are very nimble in their ability to do electronic surveillance. They are capable of getting the authority to do it in a very rapid and efficient way, which allows them to get coverage very quickly. I think we have a good system. Again, one wants to guard against something that would make that system less efficient.

On the other hand, we have the capability of using our electronic surveillance in court. They do not. And I can tell you from personal experience actually that is a tool we have that probably they would benefit from having.

So, I think we have a good set of tools. I would be more worried about losing the tools we have than anything else.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. And if we are in a situation where it appears that we are going to lose those tools—

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will speak up.

Senator COLEMAN. Make sure you speak up.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Believe me, I will.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Warner is next, to be followed by Senator Carper. Senator Warner, good morning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER

Senator WARNER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and our distinguished Ranking Member for scheduling this meeting. I think it is extremely important.

I always enjoy listening to you, Secretary Chertoff. I like to think of the days when you were a circuit judge, but I think you have done very well adapting to this new position. And I have read through very carefully your opening statement, and I want to commend you on one or two phrases in there worth repeating: "It is critical that we recognize that American Muslims have been and will continue to be a highly valued part of the fabric of our Nation." There is a vast understanding about the radical extremists. Yes, they are a small segment within a very large framework of the Muslim religion and one that has been respected worldwide for many generations and that we must always continue to focus on that, because I think to the extent that our own citizens of the Muslim faith in this community are willing to come forward and help us in this rather arduous but important learning process, so much the better.

I wanted to follow-up on Senator Coleman's questions. I listened to bits and pieces, but I would like to ask you: Do you feel there is a centralization of all the pertinent information in the Adminis-

tration to which you have access? You said informally you visit with your counterparts, heads of agencies and departments and sometimes at a Cabinet meeting. But is there a single source to which you or your subordinates can go, given sometimes time is short, to access the information that you feel you need?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, it is all fused at the Federal level at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

Senator WARNER. I would hope that would be the case.

Secretary CHERTOFF. And that is the kind of one-stop shop, and when we dealt with the August threats or when we deal with threats now, the place we go to for the kind of bottom line as well as the comprehensive analysis is the NCTC. They do, however, when there is disagreement or dissent among various agencies, they will make a note and present the fact that there may be a competing or a somewhat different point of view.

Senator WARNER. Now, you make reference to a video that you prepared, and I presume elsewhere I can infer that you may have some written material. I would suggest to our leadership that, if not, would you provide copies to the Committee. I personally would like to look at that video and examine the written material.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A very good suggestion. Please do.

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will do that.¹

Senator WARNER. In that context, is there someone within our framework of government, like the NCTC, that reviews that material such that what you promulgate is consistent with what other departments and agencies are promulgating? I am not suggesting a censored system or to lose the dynamic individuality which you express at all times. But it seems to me we want to make certain that one publication out of one agency is consistent with others.

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we do—I cannot tell you the precise mechanism because I was not involved in preparing the material. But we do work on an interagency basis, particularly with the State Department, the Office of Public Diplomacy. If I was going to identify one place where the expertise in terms of public outreach to the Muslim community is most likely centered, it would be in the Office of Public Diplomacy.

Now, some of what we did—different videotapes have different purposes. Some were internal consumption in terms of training our own inspectors about certain kinds of cultural things so they did not mistake behavior that is perfectly normal cultural behavior for something that was sinister.

So we have to adapt it to our own purposes, but I think we do generally coordinate our communications and messaging on an interagency basis.

Senator WARNER. You say you think you do. Can we have it verified for the record?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will verify it. I will provide for the record what the mechanism is.²

Senator WARNER. I really think it is extremely important, right down to how your various operators on the front lines in the air-

¹List of materials in DHS response submitted for the record from Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 663.

²DHS responses submitted for the record from Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 663.

ports and elsewhere have to deal with this material. There should be a consistency.

Secretary CHERTOFF. Right, and certainly within the agency I can tell you that we—I mean, the purpose of the training program was to give all the inspectors who encounter Muslim travelers a sufficient understanding about the way you treat certain forms of dress so that they were respectful. And we wanted, in fact, to make sure they were consistent.

Senator WARNER. Well, consistency is important, but also it appears to me that each of our Federal departments and agencies should have a structure, but not build it to the point where it is duplicated in each of them and we have an inefficiency in government and government expenditure of taxpayer funds. So to the extent we can have a consolidation, to not lose your individuality but have that consolidation and dissemination and review process, so much the better. And you think the NCTC is—

Secretary CHERTOFF. The NCTC does the intelligence. We have an interagency working group which does coordinate on the issue of what we are doing with radicalization across the government. I was only hesitant because the particular video you are talking about, since it was an internal video, I do not know exactly what the vetting process for that was. But it may be that Mr. Sutherland knows or Mr. Allen knows. If not, we will get it to you.

Senator WARNER. So often that internal material finds its way externally. People just hand it out.

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is true.

Senator WARNER. So we have to be careful that it is correct and it is right.

Do you find the same level of cooperation with the other nations? You say on page 3, “In this regard, the Department is working with our foreign partners to share information and, where feasible, to identify trends and patterns in radicalization.”

Can you expand a little bit on that?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, and this is, not surprisingly, a concern not only for our own country, but a concern for Western Europe, and actually Asia as well. Countries with substantial populations of Muslims are looking at the issue of radicalization, and we do get the benefit of some of their experiences in how to combat radicalization, recognizing that there are some cultural differences. Some countries do things that I think we probably would have difficulty doing. They will have institutionalized, government-run programs to deprogram people who are religious fanatics. I think that would be problematic for us from a cultural and maybe a legal standpoint.

But we do a lot of cross-border discussion. When I have gone over to Europe the last few times, we have had discussions about this, and they are doing research and we are exchanging research on this particular issue.

Senator WARNER. Last, if I may say, as we on the Armed Services Committee constantly review these very important perspectives on the radical extremists, we are reminded that when we went into this operation in Iraq, we had less than adequate planning on having our actual soldiers, right down to the privates and

so forth, understand the culture. And, therefore, I urge that you dwell on history.

If you go back and study history, some of the problems that we are experiencing today were experienced by other nations. I mean, Great Britain went into Mesopotamia and divided up these areas into Iraq and Syria and so forth. They thought they could do it over a very short period of time, but it ended up a very prodigious, difficult task, and at the end they were not sure they had done it properly. And now we are seeing some of the wrongs that are being inflicted.

So do encourage your folks—I spend a lot of time now trying to read a lot of books on this subject. I must confess I had not really understood the complexity of this really extraordinary, magnificent religion, but how it can fracture and what the cultural differences are.

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do, too. I certainly hope that the academic arena—this is a very fertile field of study, and it is going to be for the 21st Century, probably the dominant international challenge. And I think it is one well worth spending time looking—

Senator WARNER. Well, that is a proper note on which to discontinue my questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Would the Chairman advise us with regard to the vote that was scheduled?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, we are waiting to hear. Apparently around 11:15, so my hope would be that Senator Carper and Senator Pryor—well, Senator Carper could ask his questions. And then if the vote is called, we will break and come back and hear Mr. Allen and Mr. Sutherland. Mr. Allen is one of our Nation's natural assets, so I would urge everyone to return for his testimony.

Senator WARNER. I would share those views about Mr. Allen.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I know you do.

Senator WARNER. In my 29 years here, we have had our paths cross many times. We are fortunate that he has remained in public service.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Amen. I want to say very briefly that the exchange, Senator Warner, you had with Secretary Chertoff in which he mentioned the National Counterterrorism Center I found very gratifying because it is one of those cases where the 9/11 Commission recommended creation of the NCTC, we brought it out of this Committee through the Congress, and it actually exists. One of the most thrilling moments I have had when Senator Collins and I went out to visit it, somehow located in your State of Virginia, Senator. I do not know whether you—

Senator WARNER. I know where to find it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Arranged that. But I would urge all the Members to go visit it. It is quite remarkable. I remember getting home that night and saying to my wife, "Sweetheart, I saw something today that should make you and everybody else in our country feel just a significant degree safer." So I thank you for that.

Senator Carper.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. You mentioned that was one of the most thrilling moments. Not a cheap thrill. [Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No. NCTC is quite expensive. That is right.

Senator CARPER. Judge, how are you?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Very good. Thanks, Senator.

Senator CARPER. Nice to see you. I was with some of your old compadres earlier this month. Judge Jane Roth has moved from active status to senior status on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and we were having a swearing-in for her successor, and she remains very active, as you might imagine. But a couple of your old colleagues, I was talking about their degree of joy and serving on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and they all told me to a person, they said the job they really would like would be Secretary of Homeland Security. [Laughter.]

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is not what they said at the time, but I appreciate the sentiment.

Senator CARPER. I told them that I did not know if there would be an opening there anytime soon, so we will see.

King Abdullah was here the other day and spoke to a joint session of the Congress, and I had the pleasure of spending some time with him over in his country a little over a year ago and then here last year when he was visiting at the White House. He brought really one central message in the joint address to the Congress, and I do not know if you had a chance to listen, with everything else that you are doing. But his message was that to the extent that we want to tamp down the threat of terrorism here and around the world, we need to focus on the Middle East, not just Iraq, not just Iran, and those countries, but we need to focus on Israel, we need to focus on the longstanding enmity between Israel and the Palestinians, and just put a whole lot of time and energy around getting a solution there that we have talked about forever, but to get it not next year, not next decade, but this year.

Your thoughts, please?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that this is a moment in the Middle East of great challenge but also great opportunity. I think that some of the regimes now recognize that they are facing a threat to their own existential survival, whether it be from Sunni extremists or Shi'ite extremists or Iran. And that is causing them perhaps to be willing to take a second look at maybe changing some of their positions.

On the other hand, I also think that when you are in a period of danger and flux, it tends to make you all the more conscious of making sure you are not buying a pig in a poke and that, if you are going to reach agreements and you are going to change position, you are confident you are not going to compromise your own existence.

I know the Secretary of State, in whose domain this lies and who has much more expertise than I do, is very aggressively working on this. I think this is, as I said earlier, the No. 1 area, I think, of international engagement for the foreseeable future.

Senator CARPER. President Abbas, the President of the Palestinians, was here in Washington. I want to say it was June 2005.

Whenever it was, it was like 5 months after his election as President. Some of us had the chance to talk with him over lunch, and I asked him a question. I said to him, "In terms of a timetable that you would recommend to this country, to our Administration, for putting a full-time, high-level envoy in the Middle East to work 24/7 on trying to help foster an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis, when would be a good time to begin to do that?" This was again, I believe, June 2005. He had been in office 5 months. He said, "Five months ago." And I applaud the efforts of Secretary Rice, but she has a lot on her plate. I have suggested to others in the Administration and I would suggest to you is you have your conversations with the President and others that we make this the kind of priority that King Abdullah has reminded us again that it should enjoy.

I had a visitor in my office, a fellow who works for you, the other day. Kip Hawley came by and spent some time with us to talk about the work that they are doing at TSA. I arranged to have on the telephone a constituent of mine from Delaware whose last name is Kelly, a fairly prominent businessman, a highly regarded family, and a lot of times when he goes to the airport to try to get on a plane, he gets detained. And it has happened to him repeatedly, and his family gets detained. And his name is Kelly. And I think there are folks who—his name keeps popping up because there must be some Kellys that are involved with, I do not know, the Irish Republican Army or some kind of terrorists there. And it is sort of difficult for him to get out of that loop. And as one who has rushed through airports—and I am sure we all have—trying to get through security, get to our plane, and make our connections, to have that kind of thing happen again and again repeatedly is more than an annoyance. It is an incredible aggravation.

And I thought, if that happens to him, I wonder how often it must happen to people who happen to be from the Muslim community, who may live here, are citizens here, work here, and contribute in their communities.

I would just say, to what extent has this kind of thing come to your attention and does it receive your concern?

Secretary CHERTOFF. It comes to my attention very frequently, and often from, surprisingly, well-placed people who have had relatives who get put into secondary screening. We are in the process now of scrubbing the TSA list and removing a bunch of names which will, to some degree, alleviate the problem. But it is actually a mechanical problem.

The difficulty is that we can remove people from the list, based on information like name and date of birth if they are not the person that we are concerned about. But because we have not yet completed the process of migrating the actual implementation from the airlines into TSA, the airlines are uneven in whether they correct their lists or not. We leave it in the hands of the airline employee at this point as the one who does that check. So we are, unfortunately, a hostage to the failures of some of the airlines.

You also have to distinguish between cases where someone goes into secondary based on a name issue or versus based on a behavioral characteristic, which they may not be aware of, but it may have to do with something about their travel that tripped a wire

that put somebody into secondary. And it may also be that people are carrying things in, and they wind up getting caught in the checkpoint. They may go into secondary from that standpoint.

So we are working to make it more efficient, but we still are basically operating a name-based system, and in a name-based system, people with identical names, you are going to have to make some kind of an adjustment to allow you to take people out of that field.

Senator CARPER. Let me just ask that you continue to focus hard on this one, if you would, please.

Since September 11, 2001, many Americans have developed, as we have heard, biases of negative feelings toward Muslims, unfortunately. In my visits to countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia last year, we learned that many of the citizens there no longer want to come to America because of the kind of prejudices that they have experienced here. I think this means that fewer Muslims have the opportunity to come here and learn the truth about the benefits of living in a democratic society. I think it also hurts the counterterrorism partnerships we are attempting to develop with those countries because when the citizens return home and tell about their negative experiences at our airports and other places, it helps reinforce the negative beliefs about America.

You talked a little bit about this. I would just ask you to go back and maybe recap. But what are some of the things being done at the Federal level, particularly under your purview, to develop the infrastructure of understanding and human relations that is necessary around this country to ensure that Americans do not develop, further develop Muslim, I will call it, xenophobia?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think briefly two things. In terms of what happens overseas, we have been working with Secretary Rice over the past year plus on an initiative to be more welcoming and more efficient in the way we deal with people all over the world, of course, also in Muslim countries, to encourage them to come in.

As far as domestic attitudes, the President has been very forceful, and Attorney General Gonzales, Director Mueller, I, and others have taken multiple opportunities to stress how important it is not to confuse the ideology of violent extremism with all Islam. And it is only a very small number of people who are using the rhetoric of Islam as a way of packaging an ideology of hate.

This is an issue which should require the engagement of the media. And it has not being Pollyanna-ish; it is just being accurate. So I think all of us can carry that message forward.

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper.

Senator Pryor, I think we have about 7½ minutes left on the votes. You have a good, solid 7 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I will try to keep it under that, if I can.

Thank you, Secretary Chertoff, for being here. Some of the Senators today have touched on this issue of how many Muslims in this country feel isolated, they feel disconnected to this country and our society and our culture. How should the United States foster

relationships with the Islamic community in the United States? And how can we encourage the more moderate elements of American Islam to come forward and have a meaningful role in our society?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think it is an undertaking that requires Federal, State, and local participation, including a lot of local participation, because the truth is most people of whatever community, their principal experience with government is at the local level. So part of it is setting the tone from the top, as the President has done and others have done, in getting out and visibly engaging with and supporting the Muslim community, promoting recruitment of Muslims into all elements of what we do and publicizing that. And then a lot of it is educating State and local governments. They need to reach out as well to their communities because the face of the government to most people is your city or town government.

Senator PRYOR. I think that is true, and you talked about the ideology of hate and how that is really inconsistent with the religion that they practice. And so I think, though, that is a real challenge for you, and one question I would have for your Department is: Do you have any sort of—I do not know what you would call it—Islamic advisory council where you have a selection of people from around the country that can give you input, give you feedback as you are looking at your efforts in the United States? Do you have anything like that?

Secretary CHERTOFF. I would tell you we do it in two ways. One is we do have an Incident Management Team, which is an identified group of influential leaders in the Muslim community that we can reach out to at the time of an incident and engage with in terms of, first of all, giving them information they can communicate and, second, hearing back from them what they are hearing in their community.

Second, I and others in the senior leadership take the opportunity, with Mr. Sutherland's facilitation, to meet with significant groups of Muslims. I have done it here in the National Capital Region on a number of occasions. I did it in Detroit recently. I have done it in Germany. And that is a way of getting feedback from a wider pool of people, and it is something that I want to continue to do so I get a lot of different perspectives.

Senator PRYOR. The reason I say that is because we do not have a large Muslim community in the State of Arkansas, but we do have some presence there, and I have had a few reach out to me and say that they feel like second-class citizens. Many of these are U.S. citizens. They feel like second-class citizens, and they feel like because they are practicing Muslims that they have given up a lot of their privacy rights and they have given up—they just feel, as I said, like second-class citizens.

So I just want you to be mindful of that. I am sure you hear some of that as well, but I think some sort of continuing dialogue between your Department and the community at large would help.

Let me move on, if I can, to another point, and that is, we all remember the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. One thing I have reminded fellow Members of the Committee on a couple of occasions previously is that when Timothy McVeigh made the decision

to bomb Oklahoma City, apparently he had it narrowed down between Oklahoma City and Little Rock. And so terrorism and the threat of terrorism is very real to us in our State.

How does the Department of Homeland Security differentiate between terrorism motivated by radicalized Islam versus other types of extremist ideologies?

Secretary CHERTOFF. We do not really distinguish in the sense that we look at and we are concerned about protecting against terrorism, whether it is motivated by an extremist ideology on the right, the left, religious or secular. In terms of the current threat environment, I think it is pretty clear that violent Islamist extremism poses more of an actual threat than some of the white supremacist groups and things of that sort, partly because we have been very successful in prosecuting and dismantling some of the purely domestic organizations.

Senator PRYOR. Are you trying to address those threats as well?

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes, we do, and that comes in the threat reporting, and it is part of what we and the Department of Justice focus on.

Senator PRYOR. I have one last question, and I know we have a vote, and both Senators here need to run to the floor very shortly. When we look at our border officials, our law enforcement investigators, Justice Department, your folks, to identify members of a terrorist group, for example, al-Qaeda—when you walk into this country, you do not have an ID card that says, “I belong to al-Qaeda.” How good are we at making those determinations at the border or inside the country? How good are we at identifying members of al-Qaeda?

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are good, although not perfect. But how good we are depends in significant part on whether we can continue to get the information we need to assess whether someone is linked to terrorism. Some of the passenger name record data that we get that shows linkages with suspicious phone numbers or travel arrangements or credit cards has been critical in identifying people that we have to turn away at the border. We turned away a guy a few years ago based on that kind of information who later blew himself up in a suicide truck bomb in Iraq.

We sometimes have to struggle, particularly with the Europeans, who are a little bit reluctant to give us that information. But we think it is critical in pulling that needle out of the haystack.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Pryor.

Secretary Chertoff, thanks for your testimony. I think it has been very thoughtful, educational, which is what these hearings are about, at least at the outset, and balanced. I think you particularly struck a very important balance on that sensitive and awkward question that we are dealing with, and it is sensitive and awkward because that is the kind of country we are. We do think of ourselves as a family, so that the enemy in this war is Islamist extremism. It is most definitely not Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans are allies in that war because we are part of the American family.

But your testimony also tells us that there are Islamist extremists in the United States, and there are attempts to expand their

numbers and radicalize others, both within the country and via the Internet from outside. And we would not be using the imagination, as the 9/11 Commission challenged us to do, to avoid another September 11, 2001, if we did not focus on this problem.

So I appreciate the extent to which you and your Department have begun to do it. We want to work together with you. I do not know that this series of hearings, which will go on for some period of time, will ever lead to legislation. It may simply be a process of our oversight of the Executive Branch of our government and working with you and others there to make sure that we are deterring, detecting, and defeating this internal enemy.

But I thank you very much for your testimony. It has been very helpful.

Again, I urge people to remain. I will come back as quickly as I can to hear Mr. Allen and Mr. Sutherland. For now, the hearing will stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will reconvene. I thank everyone for your patience while the Members of the Committee went to vote. I thank Senator Voinovich for remaining here.

Charles Allen has had a long and distinguished career in service of our government, working for more than three decades for the Central Intelligence Agency, and really, if this was sports, Mr. Allen, I would say you are a major acquisition for Team Homeland Security, and I thank you very much for taking this on.

Someday, if they make a movie of your life, I have been thinking you look a lot like the late Jason Robards. Too bad he is not around to portray you, but we will probably find Leonardo DiCaprio or somebody like that. [Laughter.]

OK. So, anyway, Mr. Allen is now the Chief Intelligence Officer at the Department of Homeland Security. He is joined on this panel by Daniel Sutherland, who heads the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department, who draws from a career as a civil rights attorney at the Departments of Justice and Education, which has, I know, been a real help to him in the Department in carrying out the important work that he is doing.

So we look forward to the testimony from both of you. Mr. Allen, please begin.

**TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN,¹ ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, and thank you, Senator Voinovich, for the opportunity to share perspectives on the threat of Islamist radicalization to the homeland from our intelligence point of view.

This really is a pleasure to appear with Mr. Sutherland, who is the Department of Homeland Security's Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Talk about a major acquisition, I think the Secretary has absolutely one in Mr. Sutherland.

The issue of radicalization has been a clear priority for the intelligence and law enforcement communities, but engaging with local

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Allen appears in the Appendix on page 181.

communities I think is key if we are to deter Islamist radicalization in the homeland. I have just a few oral remarks, and, of course, I have submitted a longer written statement, if you will let that be entered into the record.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It will be in the record, without objection.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir. Terrorist attacks in Western Europe over the past several years, especially the aviation threat that was disrupted by the United Kingdom in August, as well as disruption of extremist cells in North America, highlight the threat that the radicalization process poses. Increasingly, we are facing the threat of homegrown terrorists. The U.S.-U.K. aviation plot, occurring a year after the subway attacks in the United Kingdom, was a wake-up call to the British in terms of the breadth and depth of Islamist radicalization there. We believe that the radicalization threat we face in the homeland is different from that currently confronting Western Europe, but we remain concerned that radicalization will eventually spawn operational attacks in the homeland if we do not gain deeper insights into the phenomenon and actively work to deter it.

Today the extremist individuals in the United States have proven to be involved primarily in aspirational plotting, hatched largely by isolated actors who lack the will or the capability to carry out large-scale attacks. In contrast, plots involving homegrown extremists in the U.K. and Western Europe have been linked to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. We have yet to find such deep linkages in the United States, but we remain vigilant and we recognize we are not immune to the threat.

To address Islamist radicalization, my office is taking a geographical and collaborative approach to assessing radicalization in the homeland. Working with our State and local partners, we initially have focused on assessing radicalization in California and in the New York City metropolitan area, to include New Jersey. We are now focusing on the Midwest, the National Capital Region, and Texas. We will conduct additional regional or State assessments, and our goal is to build a baseline that addresses the how and the why of radicalization at the local level. Again, with our State and local partners, we will use this baseline to develop a national assessment of radicalization.

Each regional assessment frames a local picture by drawing on local unique information and expertise. We share our analysis with Federal, State, and local law enforcement and intelligence and homeland security professionals during face-to-face meetings to gain their insights and refine our assessments. To date, we have held analytic exchanges on radicalization with State and municipal representatives in multiple communities, the results of which have helped to strengthen and broaden our perspectives and insights.

Our work on radicalization is preliminary and is by no means complete. Thus far, we have noted that the process of radicalization varies across ideological and religious spectrums, geographic regions, and socioeconomic conditions. We have determined that radicalization has numerous diverse pathways. We have yet to identify a single path or a set of shared signatures. Individuals and groups are radicalizing or de-radicalizing based on a variety of factors. We have found, however, that radicalization consistently is

tied to a charismatic individual such as an imam or an Islamic organizer. I should emphasize that my office is basing our intelligence analytic approach to radicalization on collaboration with State and local analysts.

In addition to continued meetings with analysts and other professionals, we have also developed a virtual community of interest on our Homeland Security network to encourage and support dialogue and collaboration among my analysts and their colleagues at the State and local levels.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for interrupting, but just for the record, just say a bit about the Homeland Security network.

Mr. ALLEN. This is a community of interest, a COI, that we run over the Homeland Security network, intelligence which can move out and move information back and forth at official-use-only levels. And it works.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Great. Thank you.

Mr. ALLEN. Los Angeles and New York have real specialists in this area, really young, brilliant people that we can reach out to.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Thanks.

Mr. ALLEN. We have also held an analysts conference on radicalization, and we plan to hold additional conferences on a regular basis. Certainly in those conferences we would like to invite your staff to come to those.

We are seeking to develop the capability to identify and track emerging radicalization trends before they manifest into violence. As we collect additional data on radicalization, we are going to look for indicators of the process here in the United States. Our initial assessments have focused on establishing a baseline, but we are now seeking to identify radicalization indicators that can be measured over time. These indicators could be disseminated to State and local partners in an effort to identify and measure elements of radicalization. Ideally, we hope to develop a warning capability of radicalization that can support departmental efforts such as Mr. Sutherland's outreach and engagement activities, as well as State and local efforts.

In conclusion, we recognize that radicalization is a key threat to the homeland and analytic challenge for homeland security. Determined to ensure that we develop insight into radicalization and that we remain sensitive to its actors, both in the United States and abroad, we have dedicated ourselves to fortifying and sustaining our analytic capabilities that are critical, I believe, in preventing and mitigating terrorists and extremist elements from Islamist extremism.

Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to speak. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. Excellent opening statement. Mr. Sutherland.

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL W. SUTHERLAND,¹ OFFICER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Senator Voinovich, for the opportunity to testify today. It is certainly a privilege to testify alongside Assistant Secretary Allen, and we hope that our testimony today will demonstrate how closely our offices work together on these projects.

I have a written statement, again, that I will just summarize here, but hopefully it will be made a part of the record.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It will be.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Let me just tell you briefly about our office and what we are responsible for. In accordance with 6 U.S.C. 345, our mission is to help the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the security of our country while also maintaining respect for the Constitution, Federal civil rights laws, and departmental policies. In essence, we provide advice at the intersection of homeland security and civil rights and civil liberties. So we are involved in a wide range of issues, for example, developing redress mechanisms to watchlists, integrating people with disabilities into the Emergency Management System, adopting equal employment opportunity policies, and ensuring that information technology is accessible to people with disabilities. Those are all issues that come within our area.

One of the things that we have done since the beginning of our office, that we began when the Department started, was to try to help our colleagues in the Department establish and cement positive relationships with a variety of ethnic and religious communities that represent them. So we have worked with Catholic and Protestant organizations who are concerned about immigration law and policy, with Sikh Americans who are concerned about different screening policies, with leaders of the Amish community who have been concerned about identification issues, with Jewish community groups on a wide variety of issues, and with other communities as well.

But I want to specifically address, of course, today the Department's work with American-Arab and American-Muslim communities, but I think it is important to understand that the work is part of a broader fabric of work that we are trying to develop.

With regard to these particular communities we are talking about, we decided as a Department to embark upon a project to develop, cultivate, and maintain strategic partnerships with key leaders of the American-Arab, American-Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. We believe that a critical element of our strategy for securing the country has to be to build a level of communication and trust and confidence that is unprecedented in our Nation's history. I think that echoes a lot of the comments that were made earlier today. We believe that we will be a much safer country if we better connect the government to these communities, if we learn to improve our work through listening to their concerns and their ideas, if we convince more young people from these communities to join us in public service, if we receive their help in edu-

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Sutherland appears in the Appendix on page 191.

cating us about the challenges that we face, and if we receive their help in educating the community about the challenges that we face in our security mission.

So we have been very active in trying to engage with these communities. Within just the past several months, leaders of these communities have met not only with Secretary Chertoff but with other Cabinet officials—the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, the Director of the FBI, and others—and we are making sure that this engagement is part of the structure of our work that we are doing across the country. We are actively participating in meetings in cities like Detroit, Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other cities.

We are also working to build the capacity of our workforce to better understand the challenges that face us. Through a project that we call Civil Liberties University, we are developing a wide range of training that will help our colleagues, and we have just released a training DVD for our personnel who interact with Arab Americans and Muslim Americans as well as travelers from the Arab world and the Muslim world.

Senator Warner asked about it earlier, and he asked whether the project was one that was coordinated. And all of the work that we do in this area I want to stress is very well coordinated with our colleagues from the FBI, the Justice Department, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and others. We work in an inter-agency fashion, have an excellent level of cooperation. That particular project featured—one of the experts features was from the National Security Council, a Muslim woman on the National Security Council. So it is something that we hope was beneficial to our colleagues who have asked for that kind of training, as well as for the community who believes that if our personnel better understand their cultures and traditions and values, they will be treated with more dignity and professionalism.

Secretary Chertoff also mentioned another initiative we have undertaken in terms of engagement, which is what we call an Incident Management Team, which would be convened if and when there is another terrorist attack on the country. We actually did convene the group in the wake of the London arrests in August and had a very good and helpful dialogue between a number of government agencies, not just Department of Homeland Security, but also a number of over two dozen Arab-American and Muslim-American leaders around the country.

Let me just mention in my last few moments four steps that we think need to be taken at this time in terms of these issues.

The first is we believe we need to deepen this level of engagement. We need leaders from all branches of government to take steps to engage with these communities, meet them, learn about them, listen to them, and open lines of communication. We need government leaders to make public statements that drive the debates. The statements that I think have been made here in the previous few hours are very much needed and extremely significant. We need to have leaders that state publicly that words like “imam” and “mosque” are not bad words. Those are good words. Those are people who are part of our community, as Senator Lieberman has

said. So the first thing is that we really need to deepen the engagement.

Second, we must institutionalize the engagement effort for success over the long term. We need to redouble our efforts to ensure that all the relevant agencies in the Executive Branch and, by the same token, in the Legislative Branch are equipped to play a really significant, long-term, and successful role in these issues.

The third is we need to continue to address policy issues of concern. When we prepare for our community roundtable meetings, we always remind ourselves that a lot of talk and no action will not produce the results that we want. We have got to be credible. The government must listen to issues of concern and address issues of concern and report back to the community when progress is made.

And, finally, the next step I wanted to mention is we must challenge the communities to get involved. We know that these communities are anxious to roll up their sleeves and get involved. It is important at this time for us to say loudly and clearly, "You are welcome to sit at the table with us. We need your help and want it." And I will just give a few ideas of some areas where we need to encourage their involvement with us.

We need community leaders to convince more of their young people to consider public service as a career. Secretary Chertoff talked about that earlier. We desperately need their language skills, but we also need their cultural insights. We need them in jobs that would be front-line counterterrorism, but we also need them in IT jobs and budget jobs and all the sorts of jobs that you find in the Federal Government. So we just need to have people from these communities to see government service as a place where they can build a successful career.

We also need people from—another area of challenge I think is for these communities to help us increase the integration of new immigrants, particularly those from the Arab and Muslim world. We also need to challenge community leaders to help explain within the community our security mission. There are times when we must deport someone who has come to the country illegally, and we need to have community leaders who will help explain that to people in the community and try to help in terms of tensions.

The last thing I want to mention is we need to challenge community leaders to influence Muslim perspectives in other parts of the world. But in all of these areas, community leaders are already stepping up to the plate, so as a government we simply need to recognize the efforts that have already been made and then step up our support and encouragement for even more significant efforts in all of these areas.

So I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sutherland. Very helpful.

Mr. Allen, I take it from your testimony, which builds on Secretary Chertoff's—and I am paraphrasing what you said—that there is a problem of homegrown terrorism here in the United States now. We are increasingly facing a threat from it. It is different from Western Europe, but as you said, you remain concerned

that it may spawn greater attacks on us from within our country in the time ahead.

I was interested that you said, and I appreciate it, the information that you have is at this point preliminary and incomplete, though the work goes on.

I wanted to ask you, based on the state of knowledge that you have now identified—and as I said earlier, I like your word “nodes.” What are the nodes that you are looking at with most concern about areas where radicalization of Muslims may occur?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, as we said, there is no one single pathway, but we did identify nodes; in some cases it was an extremist mosque. There are scattered, very small but scattered mosques, where there are charismatic leaders. Sometimes it is a university group, very rare but you can find that.

Prisons, as the Secretary said, certainly is a matter of great concern, both here at our level with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, of course, State and local levels. Certainly Los Angeles and the New York police departments are looking at those issues.

It can be a storefront. It can be a small group of people who are discontented or alienated getting together.

It is my view that we have great opportunity as a country to really begin to deal with this issue, and I think deal with it in ways that Mr. Sutherland outlined, I think so eloquently. I think that is what is required because I think what we really need to do, Mr. Chairman, is to counter what I call the single narrative of al-Qaeda, a violent, ideological, extremist point of view that preaches only violence. And we have golden opportunities to preclude it.

I think we will learn a lot more in the coming days, in the coming weeks. The Bureau is working on this issue. We find a tremendous amount of talent down at the local level—in every State that we visited, the prison officials, social workers, police departments have detectives looking at this question. There is a lot of enlightenment out there at the local and State levels, and we want to take advantage of it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is an interesting and helpful answer. For instance, I hear that if you are looking for the key places where this may be occurring, one of the more important things to do is to find a charismatic individual, and that individual may be in a mosque or in a jail or in a storefront. Obviously, that excludes the Internet, which is a different and more private area.

I noticed that you said that you were focusing, Mr. Allen, initially on California and New York City for a more intensive review, including New Jersey.

Mr. ALLEN. And New Jersey, yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is that because you have reason to believe there is more reason to be concerned about radicalization going on there?

Mr. ALLEN. I think there are pockets of radicalization, and we have seen that. We had the Lackawanna episode. We have had problems in California, at Lodi. We had the Torrance, California, issues.

I just think that we have such enormously good knowledge. When you go into New York City and you talk to the intelligence division of Commissioner Kelly’s organization, you talk to Deputy

Commissioner Cohen, there is just so much wisdom there and so much personal knowledge, not only of New York City but the Northeast. And you go out to Los Angeles and you go to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center out in Los Angeles and you talk to Chief Bratton, Sheriff Baca, you talk to the FBI, Steve Tidwell, who is the FBI out there, you see that there is a lot of wisdom there. And you talk to prison officials.

So those are probably reasons, but we are looking at Texas, we are looking at other States, as you know, and even Detroit, of course. We are going to look at the Southeast as well.

So we have got to criss-cross the country with our analysts, and as the Secretary said, we have dedicated quite a number of analysts to this, and they are learning as they go, too.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very important.

Mr. Sutherland, let me ask you, from your outreach to the Muslim community, to speak a little bit about the comments that I made and read from others about one of the reasons America's different than Western Europe is that fortunately it has been our tradition to integrate and assimilate succeeding generations of new immigrant Americans, and so that is affecting the Muslim-American community. I hear it myself in my own interactions with the Muslim-American community. I do not want to denigrate our friends in Europe too much, but I have had more than one conversation with somebody whose family went to Europe first, said to me they never felt like—whatever the country it was they were in—they were French or British or German or otherwise. But then when they came to this country, after a period of time they felt like Americans. It is something we should be proud of.

The other side of it is this warning that Mr. Simon of Georgetown University gave last year that there is perhaps an increasing divide occurring between the Muslim-American community and the broader American family of which it is part.

What is your sense of that as you conduct your outreach to the Muslim-American community now?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Well, Senator, I think your comments are directly on point. We spent some time in Europe, and we spent a lot of time with allied governments talking through these issues. We do believe there really can be no doubt that the life that Muslims find in America is a good life. And you find that in public opinion polling and other surveys. They know this is a country where they can raise families the way they want to raise them. They can worship freely. They can pursue education and business careers if they want to. They have opportunities here in America that they do not have in other countries.

I think it is typical, as Secretary Chertoff said, of the immigrant integration that we have had in our country. One factor I think to mention, too, is housing patterns. Here in this country people spread out, and you do not find neighborhoods of people who are, let's say, Muslim who speak just Urdu. That just does not happen in our country. It does happen in other countries. So housing patterns is a major factor.

Those are strengths. We have a very strong, rich, well-connected Muslim community in this country that we can build from. We

need to maintain that, and I think that really gets to where your comments are about the future and the alienation.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you see a growing divide, or is that not a justified statement? I am quoting from the professor.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I have some misgivings about that statement, I think in part because I know what we are doing. I know what Secretary Chertoff is doing. I know what my colleagues at the FBI are doing. There is a lot of work going on in government trying to establish those connections.

I do feel at times like events run past us. There is so much bad on TV. Every night you turn it on, you see something bad. There are pressures that seek to pull us apart.

So I think that gets back to my argument on next steps. We really have to work hard to deepen the engagement, and I feel like we have an opportunity now. I do not know how long the time period is, the next couple of years, to make that happen.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Sutherland, you mentioned that immediately after the London plot last summer, DHS created an Incident Management Team to reach out to Muslim community leaders to exchange information. How often did that team meet?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. If I can just clarify, the team was created much in advance of that particular incident. We had to have the structure in place in advance, and the nice thing is, if there is another incident, a reason to call the group together, we are in place. We know what we are doing. We have each other's contact information. We know where to go. We have a charter for the group.

We have only met formally that one time because luckily, in the past year or 18 months since we have organized in that way, there has been only that one particular incident.

Senator COLLINS. I knew that was the answer, obviously, and the reason that I raise that issue is our investigation into the failed response to Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated the benefit of joint exercises, joint training, ongoing communication among all those involved in the response.

Would it be beneficial, do you think, even if there is not an immediate incident that you are responding to, to convene this group periodically to make sure that the communication avenues are well established? The last time you want to be exchanging business cards is in the midst of a crisis. And I wondered what the Department's approach was to making sure—I am concerned that this group has only met once. It was obviously set up in advance, but it has only convened once.

Do you have any intention of regularly bringing this group together to make sure that everyone knows each other, understands each other's roles, and that you are not trying to operate on the fly after an incident?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I have two answers. One is these are people that all work together quite regularly. So we are in regular communication, both in government and outside government. But your point is a very good one, and we actually have a staff member who is smiling back there because she is working on creating an exercise where we will work with the team in an exercise context, exactly as you are referring to, because we see exactly what you are

laying out. We need to know exactly how we would respond if there is a particular incident.

Senator COLLINS. She is smiling. I can see that. [Laughter.]

But that really was one of the lessons that we learned from our in-depth investigation into Hurricane Katrina, that all the paper plans in the world do not substitute for a hands-on exercise. So I do hope that you will pursue that.

I also want to ask you about these community roundtables that the Department with its partners is convening that have been held in Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, and, it is my understanding, four or five other cities, because I think they, too, offer tremendous promise as far as outreach to the Muslim community, because that outreach is going to be absolutely the most important thing we can do to counter homegrown terrorism in my view.

What have been the results of those roundtables?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Well, they are just such a fascinating set of discussions. It is hard to even summarize where they go. We just had one, for example, in the city of Houston just a few days ago, Chicago the week before that. So these meet every other month or at least once a quarter. We are involved in six different cities, but we know that our colleagues in DHS are involved in three or four other cities, and the FBI is involved quite regularly.

Just in terms of results, one of the results is we always try to start one of the meetings by giving a report on some initiative, some government initiative that is a significant initiative that they probably have not heard about and they want more details about.

For example, the Department just started this project called Department of Homeland Security's Travel Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), which is a redress mechanism, somebody who is a traveler who is having difficulty traveling. Senator Carper mentioned someone earlier. This is a mechanism for them to file the issue in front of the government and for us to resolve it. It is a big development in terms of redress, and we are going to the communities and explaining that, and then this is information that is very valuable to them as they go back to their groups and their communities to explain how to use this.

So we give them information about a significant project and get their feedback on it. Then in the meetings, they will raise specific issues with us. Sometimes there are large policy issues about immigration processing, security clearance questions. Sometimes it is about a specific individual having a security clearance problem.

So we try to work through specific problems as well. There is accountability built into the system because we always have a segment to discuss old business. What was raised last time? Do you have an answer this time? So it is a dynamic, ongoing process that gets better and better as times goes by.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Mr. Allen, I want to join with my colleagues in thanking you for all your years of service to the intelligence community. I think we are extraordinarily fortunate to have you in the position that you now occupy.

I want to raise an issue that I raised with Secretary Chertoff that came out of the hearing that our Committee held last year to look at radicalization within our prisons, and that is, we found evi-

dence both of what I call self-radicalization, where a prisoner using radical literature sent into the prison and access to radical Web sites on the Internet, essentially self-radicalized and came up with a bizarre form of Islam—that is what happened in the Torrance case, essentially. But we also found evidence of what I would call radical recruiters, extremist clerics coming into the prison without the prison officials' understanding that they were extremists, and attempting to convert and then radicalize prisoners.

As you look at those two avenues, what is your assessment of which poses the greatest threat to us? It seems to me self-radicalization is far harder for us to get a handle on, but I have no feel for how prevalent one versus the other is. Do you have a sense of that at this point?

Mr. ALLEN. Senator, I think it probably is a combination of the two. I am and have been surprised, because I worked in foreign intelligence most of my career, to come to the Department and then work and shape and inform the intelligence of the Department, in talking to local officials in New York and other places that there is radical literature that finds its way into our prison systems, particularly at the State and local levels. Efforts are being made, of course, by the Bureau of Correction officials in the States to preclude this because this is truly a virulent type of literature.

The Internet—and I should have mentioned it earlier—is a major driver. That is such a powerful way of self-radicalization. We see people in other countries, in Europe particularly, there have been cases where people have primarily become radicalized through the Internet. When you know that there are several hundred Internet—there are extremist Web sites, several hundred of them that, of course, the intelligence community has to follow to see what is on that, there are just hundreds and hundreds of those that are very virulent, that come from around the world.

The radical recruiters has been another surprise to me, coming primarily from foreign intelligence and hard targets, the fact that religious workers prior to September 11, 2001, were given quite a bit of latitude in who they were. As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and the Secretary are engaged in regulatory actions, and already tremendous work has been done by the Department of State and Consular Affairs to thoroughly look at anyone applying on a R-1 visa, religious worker visa. So that has been tightened because we do not need radical imams coming and creating problems in certain communities, and they have. They have come in on R-1 visas.

So I think it is a combination of the literature, the Internet, and the radical recruiters, who frequently are in the form of so-called religious workers, although what they are preaching is hatred of the West and hatred of what this country stands for.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Senator VOINOVICH.

Senator VOINOVICH. In the bill we just passed, S. 4, the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, one of the things that I amended the bill with was a nonbinding sense of the Senate to enhance our efforts against radicalization. My amendment recommended to utilizing subject matter experts to better understand the cycle of

radicalization; fostering a culture of understanding and mutual respect; and recruiting professionals with diverse worldviews, cultural backgrounds, and foreign language expertise. I think you are trying to do that but that you have some problems. For example, you must ensure that the lexicon used in public statements is precise and appropriate, and does not aid extremists by offending the Muslim community.

Mr. Sutherland, I would like you to comment on how we handle the use of language. I think that is something that we should be concerned about. We should pursue broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim community. Mr. Sutherland, you said that you are working on educating State, local, and community leaders on the threat of radicalization, sharing best practices for community outreach and developing interfaith partnerships, and addressing prisoner radicalization and post-sentence reintegration. That covers the waterfront.

One of the things that is of concern to me is despite the fact that you have met with various groups, there is still a need to provide information to a lot of cities around the country about what they can and should be doing. In other words, you need to share best practices. It appears to me that you have been working fundamentally with your law enforcement agencies to interface with leaders from the Muslim community.

In Cleveland, for example, we have a group called Ishmael and Isaac, and they are bringing young Jewish and Muslim people together to start talking to each other, which is great. But there does not seem to be a vehicle to bring together the leaders of the Muslim, Jewish, Christian community, and I just wonder: Have you identified in some of these areas vehicles that you could use to convene people?

I was talking to one of your staff members, Mr. Sutherland. We discussed the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which has been in place for a long time. Quite frankly, I am not sure we have a Muslim on the Civil Rights Commission in Ohio.

We have another organization in Cleveland I created when I was mayor. It is the Cleveland Roundtable. It is designed to deal with racism and religious tolerance and so forth. I am sure they would like some information about how do you go about bringing people together.

You have community relations boards in probably almost all of the major cities. I suspect that you may have them in other parts of the country. You should identify who they are and make them aware of your efforts.

This type of effort will help encourage these communities to start talking to each other. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be more of an isolation today of the Muslim community than there was before September 11, 2001. Somehow we have got to break that feeling and start turning it the other direction. I would like your comments on how do you do that.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Senator, I think that there is a lot of the kind of work you are talking about that is already going on all over the country, and it is a snowball that is starting to go down a mountain. I will give you an example.

Every one of the cities we work in, there are really interesting engagements like those you mentioned. For example, in the city of Los Angeles, the new Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security is a Muslim American. There are developments like that in nearly every city. In Dearborn, Michigan, where I spend quite a bit of time—I am really getting frequent flyer miles from Northwest Airlines—there are so many things that we are invited to.

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Abdo spends a lot of time discussing Dearborn in her book.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Right. It is a fascinating and important community. I think Cleveland and others are as well.

But the difficulty, I think, with it is that while there is so much of this engagement, particularly between Jewish and Muslim and Christian groups, it is not broadcast, it is not known. And I know the Muslim community organizations are always asked, Why don't you denounce terror? They have denounced terror so many times, they do not know what to do or how many different angles can they denounce it from. But for some reason, that is not reported in the media, it is not getting through to people.

So I think a lot of what you are talking about is happening. We need to try to strengthen it. But we also as a country need to figure out ways to promote what is, in fact, happening. Muslims in this country are well engaged and well connected.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is there coordination between you and Karen Hughes?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Yes, sir. We have an interagency working group that Karen Hughes' office asked us to chair that focuses on domestic engagement. It is a very collaborative effort between FBI, Justice, Treasury, her office, NSC, NCTC, and a wide variety of agencies who all have parts to play in this. As Secretary Chertoff was saying, it is a network problem, and there is a network solution. Certainly that is true at the Federal level.

Senator VOINOVICH. Can you give me an example of cases where you have listened to a group and have made changes? Because I am sure the people you are meeting with will say, "This is a dog-and-pony show. These people are bringing us in. They are going to go through the motions and probably not going to listen to us." Can you give us some examples of cases where you have listened and changes have been made?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Yes, sir. I will give you an example. A couple of years ago, the American-Arab Antidiscrimination Committee brought us about a half a dozen complaints of children, juveniles, who were prevented from flying, apparently because their names were similar to ones on the watchlist. It was obvious this child, this 7-, 8-, 10-year-old child, is not the problem, but they brought a package of these complaints to us.

We took them to our colleagues at the Transportation Security Administration, and we worked on them together. TSA realized that they could help solve some of that problem by issuing new guidance to the airlines, which they then did. We reported that back to the American-Arab Antidiscrimination Committee that these complaints had been resolved, and policies have been put in place, and the American-Arab Antidiscrimination Committee then

issued a press release congratulating TSA for improving its work in this particular area.

There are other examples like that, but that is one that I can suggest. We have a lot of interchange on policy issues.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am glad you did that, but I keep getting complaints from people that feel they are being profiled just because of their name. I think that can really be an irritant to them.

The other thing is that I do not know whether or not your Customs and Border Patrol agents are increasingly more aggressive.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Yes, and those are the exact issues that are raised with us all the time, and we are confident that they will be with us for a long period of time. But one thing that we try to say to people is: If you have complaints like that, bring them to us. We really will work on them and try to resolve them. And we have a fairly good success rate of getting these things resolved. And I would make that specific offer to your office, Senator. When you get those complaints, please have people call our office, forward them to us, and we will get to work on them. We have an excellent relationship, for example, with Customs and Border Protection. They see over a million people a day. And they know that every once in a while there are issues, and they want to solve those problems. And so they really appreciate that kind of feedback and the opportunity to resolve them.

So that is one thing, I think, that we can say to these communities. Yes, you probably feel and you experience some more difficulties than you did prior to September 11, 2001, but one of the answers is the government really is engaged to try to solve those problems as well.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich.

I want to discuss one or two quick questions, and if Senator Voinovich has another one or two, then we will let you go.

Mr. Sutherland, it strikes me that we have not asked one of the fundamental fact questions, which is: What is your best estimate of the size of the Muslim-American community population?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Senator, I am not a demographer. We hear the number 7 million. We also hear 3 million. Typically in speeches I say there are between 3 and 7 million Muslims in America. But the Census does not ask a religion-based—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. It is a little hard to answer.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it is hard to judge.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Yes, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I do not think anyone would argue with the statement that the total, whatever it is—3 or 7 million—that it is a very small number, a very small percentage of that certainly, but a very small absolute number who would be categorized as Islamist extremists.

I want to ask you a tough question. It is a subjective question, but it is relevant to what we are talking about. To the best of your knowledge, based on the interaction you have had with the Muslim-American community, what is the attitude of the overwhelming majority—who are obviously law-abiding, good Americans, contributing to the country, peaceful, etc.—toward the Islamist extrem-

ists? In other words, is it anger? Do they feel threatened? Is it that these are members of our community who have gone in the wrong direction, but we understand why? Are there some who feel some understanding? I do not mean they support but, say they understand why they are angry and it is a kind of benign reaction to it?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Senator, I have had these conversations a number of times with Muslims around the country, and Arab-Americans as well, they get lumped in there. Of course, you know the vast majority of Arab-Americans in this country are Christian not Muslim.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very important fact that most people do not appreciate.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I think that people from these communities, when you talk about al-Qaeda and you see a statement from Adam Gadahn on TV, they feel—I just jotted down a few phrases: “Threatened.” More Muslims are victims of this kind of terrorism than anyone else, more Muslims, far more Muslims.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is exactly what I had in mind.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. They feel perplexed. I have asked, “Why do you think they do the things that they do?” And they do not know any better than any of the rest of us. And the last thing I wrote down is they do not feel that is “part of us. They are not part of our community that has gone”—“they were never part of us. That has nothing to do with us.” And I think it is difficult. Sometimes you ask a cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic, “Why don’t you denounce terrorism?” And his reaction is, “Why would I denounce terrorism? That is not part of me. That has nothing to do with me. Yes, I am Muslim, but that has nothing to do with me.”

And so I think that is a sentiment that I get from the Muslim community as well: “This is not us. It has nothing to do with us. And we are Americans. We want to be on safe airplanes, and we want to help with the security mission of this country.”

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that answer. I appreciate it.

Mr. Allen, in the work that you are doing, you are putting together a whole new operation, part of which is to focus on this radicalization and homegrown terrorism. We know that the FBI is doing a lot of work in this area as well. There are other governmental agencies, too. Is there, in your opinion, adequate coordination or are we seeing overlap?

Mr. ALLEN. There is remarkable collaboration. We hold regular analytic exchanges with the Bureau analysts. Under Willie Hulon in the National Security Branch, they are looking at the radicalization phenomenon. We are looking at it in a very bottoms-up approach, which I think is just a little bit different, trying to understand the phenomenology and trying to look at indicators so we can warn—I do not think we can predict where we are headed, but I think we can develop warning indicators, as I said in my statement, and also metrics. Eventually we have got to look at the metrics from an intelligence perspective.

So our relationship with the Bureau is very strong, very rich. Deputy Director Pistole and I recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on how we integrate intelligence, and it was a rich session with Senator Rockefeller.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Voinovich, do you have any other questions?

Senator VOINOVICH. No, I do not. I just want to say thank you very much Mr. Chairman for having this hearing, and I have to say that I am very comforted by what I have heard from Mr. Sutherland particularly, because he sits where the rubber hits the road.

Mr. Allen, we are grateful to have you at the Department given your experience, and you have laid things out in a very understandable way about what you are doing. I want to congratulate both of you on the work that you are doing. You have got to do a lot more of it for sure, but it is nice to know somebody is over there thinking about some of these things that have been on my mind. I was wondering is anybody doing anything, and the fact of the matter is there is a whole lot being done. I want you to know that this Committee will do everything it can to be supportive of your efforts, including, and I want to underscore this, ensuring you have the personnel, of having the personnel to get the job done that we have asked you to do.

Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about the Department of Homeland Security having the resources it needs to get the job done. All too often we ask you to do things, but we do not provide the resources that are necessary, and sometimes the people over at OMB do not ask for the resources. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Voinovich is a rare person around here. He not only sees the problem and legislates, but he actually wonders about how that legislation is being carried out and whether we have given the departments enough resources to do what we want them to do before we come back to conduct oversight hearings and accuse them of not doing what we have asked them to do.

Today's hearing has been very helpful. We have a problem here. We have a threat, and it is probably going to grow. But we are also marshalling our forces, both in terms of investigative and law enforcement work, and critically important outreach to the Muslim-American community, which ultimately not only are going to be the foremost targets of global Islamist extremism, but also are going to be the best opposition that we have to the radicalization within America from the American family.

So we are going to keep in touch on this. We will probably ask both of you to come back again if you have anything that you want to tell us before we call you back or you need any help, because George Voinovich and I are from the Federal Government and we are here to help. [Laughter.]

Even people who work for the Federal Government. Mr. Allen, did you want to say something else?

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for your comments.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you both. Our record will stay open for 15 days for additional comments. We may frame some questions to you in writing.

For now, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

THE INTERNET: A PORTAL TO VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The Committee will come to order. Good morning. This morning we are going to focus on a most important and, I would say alarming, subject, "The Internet: A Portal to Islamist Extremists."

I want to thank our witnesses for being here. One is still on the way, caught in Washington traffic.

I looked over the testimony that you have submitted to the Committee and I must say that I find it both riveting and chilling, and something that we have a responsibility to not only pay attention to, to acknowledge that it is there, but as a National Government do something about.

This is the third hearing that our Committee has held during the last half year on the topic of Islamist radicalization and recruitment within the United States of America.

The first hearing, held September 19, 2006, under Senator Collins' leadership, addressed Islamist radicalization recruitment in America's prison system.

Then a few months ago, in March, Secretary Chertoff and other witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security told us about the threat they see that we face from Islamist extremists right here at home and what they are doing to protect us from that threat.

At that hearing, Secretary Chertoff testified that Islamist extremists posed the greatest threat to our homeland security today and that those extremists are using the Internet as their primary recruiting tool, not to mention using it for organization and communication, as well.

This morning we are going to hear from three witnesses who will testify more specifically about how these extremist groups are using the Internet against us.

The Committee plans to continue to focus on this critical threat next week with another hearing, where we will ask what other

agencies of the Federal Government, including particularly the FBI and the Department of State, are doing to assess and confront the threat of Internet-based terrorist activity.

It is another irony of the digital age that the Internet, which was invented by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), at the Department of Defense as a way to ensure undisrupted communications in the event of an enemy attack, is now being used to recruit and train terrorists who are plotting enemy attacks against America and other targets throughout the world.

As we are hearing today, the Islamists, who have made a global political ideology now out of a religion, use the Internet as a way to reach across national boundaries to recruit new soldiers, sympathizers, and financial supporters. They are involved in a focused campaign using the Internet to broadcast news from their own point of view, needless to say to propagandize, to conduct online classes in terroristic tactics and ideology. They also use the Internet to transcend gaps in space and time, to research potential targets, and to share information with each other about planned operations.

We will hear today from Frank Cilluffo, Director of George Washington's Homeland Security Policy Institute. Along with Dr. Gregory Saathoff of the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group, Mr. Cilluffo co-chaired a task force on Internet radicalization that has just completed a study of the problem and is releasing a report as part of this hearing today. And we thank him and his colleagues for doing that.

The task force's report tells us that the people who create these Web-based extremist propaganda and recruitment operations have a slogan. It is "keyboard equals Kalashnikov," a contemporary twist on the old adage that the pen is mightier than the sword, but really about how the magnificent capabilities that the Internet provides us can also be turned into a weapon against us.

Perhaps the most macabre example of their exploitation of the Internet is one that we are going to hear today from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Felter, Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. In an effort to raise its visibility and recruit new members, as Colonel Felter will tell us, an Iraqi insurgent group held a Web site design contest open to anyone in the world with an Internet connection. And what was the prize given to the winner of that contest? The opportunity to launch a rocket attack against American forces in Iraq with just the click of the mouse from the winner's computer.

These are obviously not the efforts of amateurs. Terrorist groups run their own professional media production companies that produce video and audio for Internet broadcast. They create Web sites, chat rooms, online forums, libraries, and video games that promote the Islamist agenda. They are a clear and present danger.

Our country must take the challenge posed by these Internet terrorists very seriously and launch our own aggressive coordinated and effective response. We simply cannot cede cyberspace to the Islamist terrorists because, if we do, they will successfully carry out attacks against us in our normal environment. We have to do everything we can as quickly as we can to disrupt their Web sites

when appropriate and necessary, and compete with them for the attention of those who frequent their sites. We need to monitor the sites constantly for information and use them to exploit divisions among different sects and factions. And we need to recruit “trolls” who can sow seeds of doubts in the different extremist Web sites and chat rooms.

Obviously in the end, we need to develop the ability to shut down these sites when they represent an actual danger to us. It’s tragic that the Internet has become a twisted tool for those who want to kill innocent people and aim to sow fear and division in the free world, but that is the reality that this hearing will reveal and it is why we must commit ourselves to meeting the challenge that it represents head on.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing today.

Radical movements bent on violence are nothing new. The Internet, however, has dramatically expanded the ability of radical groups to recruit, train, motivate, and coordinate terrorists over vast distances without any direct contact. No matter how secure we make our borders, no matter how effectively we track traditional communication methods, the Internet provides terrorists with a powerful tool to reach new recruits and to spread their message of violence and hatred.

Just last week, for example, three British Muslims went on trial in London on charges that included using Web sites and e-mails to urge terrorist attacks both inside and outside the United Kingdom. The prosecutor noted, “Each of them was adept at the use of computers and the Internet and primarily by that means they each demonstrated . . . an avid adherence to the need for violent holy war.”

At the same time, a Federal court in this country, in Toledo, Ohio, heard charges against five men that included distributing information on bomb making that they have downloaded from the Internet. They await trial.

Since the development of browser software in the early 1990s that allows the easy access to text, image, sound, and video files, the Internet has become a potent tool for delivering radical materials to target audiences in distant or hostile locations. These materials can be stored on any server connected to the Internet, ready for instant access by the curious or the committed.

The recruiting and reference materials on the Web for violent extremists are truly disturbing. Our enemies can consult Web sites to learn techniques for shooting down helicopters. They can watch videos of hostage beheadings, read letters left by suicide bombers, or listen to messages from militant leaders.

Consider this: Most of the 42 groups on the U.S. State Department’s 2005 list of foreign terrorist organizations have Web sites to promote their violent message. Those Web sites can also serve terrorist groups as forums to plan and coordinate operations as well as to finance their murderous attacks.

And even if there were no Web sites, the Internet would still allow radicalizing messages as well as operational instructions to be passed along by e-mail.

We do not yet know if the use of the Internet rivals or even exceeds the importance of community-based and personal recruitment. It does, however, represent a troubling extension of their reach: Easy, inexpensive, immediate, and powerful. As one journalist has observed, "The conjunction of 21st Century Internet speed and 12th Century fanaticism has turned our world into a tinderbox."

Our witnesses today can help this Committee understand some urgent questions. What is the role of the Internet in radicalizing, recruiting, and financing terrorists? What techniques and appeals are used? Are Internet sites targeting potential recruits right here in our own country? How can we shape effective countermeasures?

Mr. Chairman, I hope that what we learn today will help us resist the perversion of the World Wide Web into a weapon of worldwide war. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.

Senator VOINOVICH, thanks for being here this morning. Since there is only the three of us, would you like to make an opening statement?

Senator VOINOVICH. If I may.

Senator COLLINS. Please.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this series of important hearings examining the threat of Islamist radicalization in our homeland. You have shown courage and leadership in choosing to tackle a complex and divisive issue which I think is really very important to our future security.

The United States is at war against a transnational terrorist movement fueled by radical extremists. The struggle transcends borders and the Internet has exponentially increased the reach and operational capabilities of terrorist networks.

When we speak about the issue of radical Islam, we must continually draw the distinction between the religion of Islam and the manner in which the religion can be exploited and distorted by violent extremists to inspire and justify their actions. We must never associate the reprehensible behavior of violent extremists with the Muslim faith.

Particularly, today I would like to recognize Frank Cilluffo for his extensive work on the issue of radicalization. Mr. Cilluffo has been among the first to present constructive recommendations of actions the Federal Government can take to address and prevent extremism domestically. His work on the Homeland Security Advisory Council Future of Terrorism Task Force was very influential in my recent Sense of the Senate Resolution on combating domestic radicalization.

The Federal Government has an important role to play in fostering positive relations and building strong community ties. I am convinced that to prevent radicalization we must work to better engage Muslim communities across America and facilitate interfaith dialogue to prevent isolation.

I am pleased to note that in my home state of Ohio there is a strong multicultural relations outreach in effect and I, Mr. Chairman, am personally involved in it to see if we cannot use some of our communities in our State as a role model for other places in the country.

There is a theological debate that must take place within Islam regarding modernity. We have an opportunity to influence this debate by upholding American values of democracy and tolerance and by ensuring that American Muslims are engaged rather than alienated.

Although the U.S. Government cannot prevent use of the Internet by extremists, we have an opportunity to thwart their operations through the use of intelligence. We must also encourage the development and availability of a peaceful counter-narrative to challenge the extremist's message.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. And again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this important hearing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich, for that opening statement.

Again, I thank the witnesses for being here. Mr. Doran, thanks for making it through the traffic. I am going to call on you now.

Michael Doran is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support for Public Diplomacy at the Department of Defense. I am counting on you at the outset to talk a little bit about your office and then about the specific problem.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. DORAN,¹ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. DORAN. Thank you very much. I apologize for being caught in traffic.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to testify today regarding the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations.

The President has said that "the war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st Century and the calling of our generation."

This struggle differs from past ideological conflicts in that the Internet allows relatively small organizations with limited resources, such as al-Qaeda, to broadcast messages across the globe instantaneously. Al-Qaeda and its associates, in particular, use the Internet to attempt to influence the global political environment, to spread their political ideology, to disseminate the extremist interpretation of religion that supports it, and to coordinate their operations.

The focus of my office's efforts is on foreign language insurgent Web sites believed to be operated by non-U.S. persons. We work closely with the Department of State, the National Counterterrorism Center, and other agencies to remain abreast of how our adversary uses this medium.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Doran appears in the Appendix on page 231.

Our deep commitment to a free society and the very nature of the Web make it virtually impossible to prevent terrorists from using the Internet altogether. From a handful of sites in 2000, today there are many thousands of such Web sites in existence with more appearing each week. Through the deft use of members only user groups and password-protected bulletin boards terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda manage to maintain the integrity of their brand, instructing sympathetic audiences as to the whereabouts of their authoritative communications.

At any given moment, in any given language, only a limited number of sites post original material produced directly by terrorist organizations or by religious authorities to whom the organizations have pledged loyalty. The majority of terrorist Web sites in operation are either mirrored versions of these existing sites or simply bulletin boards that disseminate material that originated on the Web sites under the direct control of the terrorist organizations.

Terrorism experts have long analyzed terrorist attacks as a form of communication. A primary goal of a terrorist attack is to attract attention so as to disseminate information. The Internet ensures the terrorists have the means to communicate their message to the world immediately and directly without being filtered through the prism of mainstream media.

The anonymity of the Web and the ready availability of a virtual space for posting material in large quantities make it easy for terrorist-related sites to pop up temporarily, publish new material, and then move to another address when necessary. Once the material has been published, it is immediately duplicated on a large number of sites located on servers across the globe. The speed with which this dissemination process occurs poses a serious challenge to those in the U.S. Government working to locate hostile sites and to assess their content.

In fact, the Web has created conditions that make it possible for us to imagine a wholly new type of terrorist network, one that is almost entirely virtual, composed of individuals who are not personally known to each other, but who are animated by the same ideology and willing to coordinate actions in pursuit of it.

In addition to easing communication, for some groups terrorists use of the Internet may increase the difficulties that law enforcement authorities face in tracking and apprehending potential terrorists aided by the Internet and other communication technology. Terrorists can operate in a variety of different jurisdictions, each with their own specific laws and regulations governing the monitoring of the Internet and the prosecution of online crime.

The Internet is more than just a tool of terrorist organizations, however. It is also the primary repository of the essential resources for sustaining the culture of terrorism. It houses hundreds of thousands of pages of books that define the extremist interpretation of religion that feeds the global terrorist movement.

For instance, the followers of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who at one time served as the spiritual guide to Ala Musab al-Zarqawi, have compiled on a Web site dedicated to their mentor a considerable library of downloadable books that treat subjects covering all aspects of religious life. A large part of this material is devoted to debunking the moderate critiques of the extremist interpretation of

religion. Sites such as this allow the Internet to function as a kind of virtual extremist madrassa.

Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda use the Internet for a variety of organizational purposes, including propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, training and instruction, and operational planning. Thanks to the Internet, terrorists now have direct control over their message and the means of disseminating it with the ability to disperse their propaganda directory to sympathetic audiences without the filter of third-party media.

Terrorists also post violent images such as decapitation videos to invoke fear and to deliver threats. But intimidation, for all that it grabs attention, is not the main theme of terrorist propaganda which, more often than not, generally focuses on the perceived wrongs that Muslims have suffered at the hands of non-Muslims, led by the United States. It also stresses the religious justifications for taking violent action against them as a matter of defense.

Terrorist propaganda seeks to delegitimize the adversaries of the extremists, to spread disinformation about enemy actions and intentions, and to bolster the morale of the followers, all ultimately to persuade potentially sympathetic audiences that jihad is a fundamental component of religion and the only effective means for redressing grievances.

The Internet is also a useful tool for recruitment. In addition to other social influences, potential recruits are flooded with propaganda, training manuals, and religious justification for joining the jihad via the Internet. It is difficult to say how much direct recruitment takes place on the Web. While it is likely that direct invitations to take part in terrorist organizations are usually delivered face-to-face, there is no doubt that the Web plays an important role in indoctrinating recruits before they are drawn in directly. Probably for this reason, extremist Web sites will not attempt to recruit overtly for violent action, but will instead legitimate the actions of terrorists and encourage readers to support the jihad however they can.

Terrorist Web sites, chat rooms, and other forums make use of the Internet for fundraising. These Web sites often use the argument that every Muslim has a duty to support jihad, but that participation on the ground is not required of everyone. The appeal for financial support alone is a method of permitting an individual to feel that they have done their duty as a Muslim, but do not need to change their life in order to join the actual fight.

Terrorist use of the Internet also includes operational training. Would-be terrorists can find training information in the use of small arms, mortars, rockets, and artillery, guidance on where to fire at U.S. military vehicles in order to inflict the greatest damage, sniper training, and detailed instructions about the construction of improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, etc.

Training is also available for guidance on how, when, and where to cross the borders of Iraq to join the jihad and how to avoid detection as a jihadist.

As I have endeavored to illustrate, terrorists use the Internet for a wide variety of purposes and their use of the technology continues to evolve. I have provided the Committee with compact discs containing audiovisual material from some of these terrorist Web

sites for these Committee Members who are interested in seeing a demonstration of some of the typical content found on these Web sites.

The briefing on this CD was produced by the Department's Center for International Issues Research (CIIR), an innovative center focused, in part, on observing terrorist activity on the Internet in order to provide policymakers and agencies with a greater understanding and awareness of the strategic communication campaign being waged by extremist groups across cyberspace. CIIR was established precisely out of the recognition that al-Qaeda and its affiliates use the Internet with alacrity on a global scale and that such a threat required a team of monitors located in one place capable of following the day-to-day expression of extremist ideology across national and linguistic barriers.

When recognizing the nimble use that al-Qaeda makes of the Internet, it is tempting to call for us to counter it directly on the Internet. Ultimately, the key to countering the terrorists use of the Internet is not solely a reciprocal set of actions by the U.S. Government on the Web, though that should not be ruled out.

As the President has reminded us, we will counter the terrorist ideology most effectively by using the strongest weapon in our arsenal, the power of freedom. The Internet is a tool of a free society and, as such, it can sometimes be used as a tool to undermine freedom. Nevertheless, the answer to the terrorist message of tyranny, intolerance, and violent extremism is to effectively communicate the alternative vision: Freedom, tolerance, and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Precisely in order to address the challenges presented by the war of ideas and to communicate our message of freedom and opportunity in the information age, in December 2006, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy created my office, Support to Public Diplomacy. My office's mission is threefold. First, we are working to create organizational change within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure that strategic communication and information are integral to policymaking, implementation, and assessment. My office is not a public affairs office. We are working to institutionalize the concept that information and communication are not just what government officials say but also the actions that we take.

Support to Public Diplomacy's second core mission is developing and coordinating key themes and messages within the Department of Defense to promote policies. In policy development and implementation, we work with the Department of Defense Public Affairs and Joint Staff and other policy offices.

Our third core mission is to work with other U.S. Government partners, particularly the Department of State—the lead for U.S. Government in public diplomacy—to design and facilitate whenever possible strategic communication policies and plans to effectively advance U.S. national security.

With regard to countering ideological support to terrorism and terrorist use of the Internet, my office seeks to enhance understanding of how terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda conduct influence campaigns, and our goal is to develop policy and strategies to counter them.

The President's National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides a strategic vision for the defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life in a free and open society, and the creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

The Department will continue to work with our U.S. Government partners to engage the terrorist enemy in the cyber battlefield as a critical domain in our efforts to win the war of ideas and ultimately achieve this strategic vision.

Thank you for the opportunity speak to you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have with one small caveat. I took over in my new position on Monday, so I have been on the job for 3 days.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. You were very knowledgeable and spoke well.

Mr. DORAN. My mind is not cluttered by any of the facts.

But I do have a background in the online jihad. I was a professor before I came into government service and I was working on these Web sites.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. I appreciate it.

I know you have just come in. Your statement was a strong one and it really does document for us the reality and the extensiveness of the use of the Internet by terrorist groups. So it is not just to propagandize or get out their message, but they are using it to recruit, to organize, to plan attacks and that is, as I said at the beginning, both a riveting and chilling reality which we have got to deal with.

We will come back with some questions for you but I thank you for your testimony and welcome to the job.

Mr. DORAN. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Lieutenant Colonel Felter is the Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy. Colonel, thank you for being here. We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH H. FELTER, PH.D.,¹ DIRECTOR, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, U.S. ARMY

Colonel FELTER. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is really an honor for me to provide testimony on the topic of jihadi use of the Internet.

It is also an honor to sit next to Frank Cilluffo and Michael Doran, whose scholarship has been a great resource for us at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC).

Coalition forces have had great success in interdicting al-Qaeda worldwide. We have captured, we have killed, we have denied safe haven, we have done a great job keeping the pressure on al-Qaeda. But despite these military successes in neutralizing key commanders and denying safe havens, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda's associated movements in other terrorist groups continue to actively tar-

¹The prepared statement of Colonel Felter appears in the Appendix on page 239.

get and execute terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests and allies around the world.

It is important to bring operational commanders like al-Zarqawi and al-Masri to justice. But they are a symptom, not a cause of the global epidemic that we must contain. The real center of gravity of this violent movement are the ideas of radical jihadist thought. It is these ideas that insulate al-Qaeda against U.S. pressure and enable the movement to spread, even as its leaders are captured and killed.

But it is not possible to capture, kill, or incarcerate ideas. These ideas, spread on the Internet, have helped al-Qaeda become a social movement beyond an organization. This movement would not be impossible without the power of the Internet and the capability it offers al-Qaeda's thought leaders to define the way disillusioned youth think about the world.

The Internet allows thousands of disenfranchised and displaced individuals to build a virtual community of followers bound together only by a body of shared ideas and digital relationships. We cannot prevent all of these relationships from forming to stop the generation of these ideas but we can do a better job of understanding how these ideas are created, where they come from, and how the Internet facilitates the processes so we can monitor and thwart those who join the movement.

In this testimony I am going to describe the sources of these ideas and how violent extremists use the Internet to spread their radical ideology. I would also like to show a video to graphically demonstrate some of these ways the jihadists are using the Internet to spread this ideology. And I will conclude with some recommendations for how we can more effectively combat extremist efforts on the Internet.

If we are confronting an ideology spread online, we must know what this ideology looks like and its sources. We did this pretty well in the Cold War. Entire academic disciplines were stood up to understand the nature of Soviet Communism, Chinese Communism. We knew Marx, Mao, Lenin. We were very familiar with the ideologues driving the communist movement. I think we are doing this less well today with this new hostile ideology that we are confronting in this global struggle.

For example, the most important thought leader which Mr. Doran mentioned earlier in al-Qaeda, they are not really the operational leaders like Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. They are unknown to most Americans, people like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. He is a Palestinian-born individual now under house arrest in Jordan.

In the Combating Terrorism Center, we have mapped al-Qaeda's ideological influence. We have looked at thousands of these texts again, that Mr. Doran mentioned, on their online library, the Tawhid Web site. Many of these ideologues are long dead. They died in the 13th Century. Even to me, for example, many are alive today. It does not matter. Once their ideas are out there online, they are there and they endure and they have an effect on the movement.

There is clear evidence that the grand ideas developed by these scholars inspire terrorist attacks worldwide. For example, the

Spanish indictment of the Madrid train bombers identifies more than 50 electronic books that had been downloaded from the Internet and were found on the hard drives of the bombers' computers. The authors of these books track very closely with the list of the most influential jihadi authors developed by our researchers at West Point.

The power of the Internet is key to giving more people from more places more reasons to join the movement. It provides the opportunity to foster a sense of connection between the movement's supporters and its foot soldiers in the field and to expand its options for participation.

In one extraordinary example, which Chairman Lieberman mentioned, they actually had this contest to develop the Web site. They made the prize of, with a mouse click, launching rockets into an American base in Iraq. So someone from the privacy of his own home anywhere in the world could click on the mouse and attack Americans and feel connected to the movement and to the foot soldiers in the field.

A popular book available online today is entitled "39 Ways to Participate in Jihad" and it spells out a variety of ways to participate in jihad, short of going to Iraq and Afghanistan and actually fighting as a foot soldier. It is similar Marxism. Its main concept is from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. So they are expanding the options to participate in the movement and the Internet is making this possible.

For example, if you are technically savvy or if you know how to use Google Earth, you can get on to Google Earth and provide targeting information for jihadis. They did it in Fallujah several years ago, where people were actually calling in saying, "this is what this block looks like, move here. It is empowering more and more people to get involved with the foot soldiers in the field and connected to this movement."

I would like to show a video for about 2 minutes that demonstrates how the jihadis are using the Internet to do some of these things and then conclude with a few recommendations.

[Video played.]

Colonel FELTER. This is al-Qaeda showing its operatives in Northern Iraq and Kurdistan, to demonstrate that they actually have a presence there. They are actually walking in circles. It is a propaganda video. But they want to advertise their success and make people feel good about the movement.

Here is the example of the technical expertise that is being applied on the battlefield, using Google Earth, for example. This is from the Islamist aArmy in Iraq.

The youth are especially at risk for being influenced by the Internet. If it is entertaining, they are going to keep watching. If you celebrate attacks and executions, you can inform kids about the movement through an entertainment mechanism.

This is a rap video that Mr. Cilluffo had in his report by the same group.

This is Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most prolific jihadi ideologues giving classes online and bringing more people into the movement.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, you may recognize him.

These terrorist groups, they are learning organizations. This is al-Masri, who was reported to have been killed last week but replaced al-Zarqawi after he was killed last year, demonstrating how to make explosions and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

We are seeing the same technology for IED technology in Iraq showing up in Afghanistan now and the Internet is directly responsible for that.

[Video ends.]

Colonel FELTER. I hope that provided some context for my earlier description.

I would like to conclude with some recommendations. Given what we know about how radical Islamist extremists are harnessing the power of the Internet, the CTC believes efforts to combat the threats posed by these terrorists can be enhanced in a number of ways.

One, we have got to know our enemy. We have got to read what the terrorists are telling us online. At West Point, we are very familiar with Sun Tzu's maxim of knowing your enemy. In this war, the enemy has often been characterized as a hostile ideology responsible for extremist Islamist radicalism. We must develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of this ideology and what is driving it. I think our Center's systematic mapping of the ideology in one of our recent reports is a good example of doing this.¹

Overall, we just have to increase efforts and programs designed to translate and analyze the jihadi strategic texts proliferated online. We are very much in need of that. I know Mr. Doran and Mr. Cilluffo are involved in this, but we have to expand this greater and involve more organizations and centers.

We need to exploit enemy vulnerabilities made publicly available on the Internet. There are many opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and divisions identified by the jihadis themselves. It is made conveniently online.

One of the most effective ways to hurt the jihadis is to use their own writings against them. Jihadis compete for membership. They do not all like each other. It is not a monolithic organization that everyone supports everyone. They are discrediting and delegitimizing their competitors online. We need to find those voices and empower them, identify them and find out what arguments are being used to delegitimize jihadis from the inside.

The CTC is looking at much of al-Qaeda's internal discourse through a program at the U.S. Special Operations Command where we are mining the Harmony database, which is all of their internal documents captured in the course of operations. You do not need access to a classified database to do that. Much more information is available online. Areas of disagreement, ideological fault lines, internal riffs, and power struggles are all described in great detail on various Internet sites. These are opportunities we must better exploit.

We also have to harness broader resources and bring them to bear in the fight. Just as the terrorists identified 39 ways to participate in jihad, we need to create greater opportunities for Ameri-

¹The CTC report is available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/atlas.asp>.

cans with a wide array of expertise to quietly contribute to the fight against terrorism.

We are doing this at West Point by being a bridge, bringing in some of the top academic experts in the field and bringing them to civilian and military decisionmakers where their expertise is most needed. We need to create more mechanisms and make it more attractive for a vast array of American expertise to be employed against this enemy.

Much of this untapped talent is in the younger generation. At West Point we see the creative and Internet savvy potential of our young cadets and how they are particularly adept at identifying opportunities to enlist the power of the Internet to combat the terrorist threat. One of our cadets in the terrorism studies program, for instance, analyzed hundreds of online videos and attacks against American troops in Iraq to identify more effective counter-measures and tactics that can increase survivability of our forces. His analysis is being used in the field today.

In closing, I would like to quote Douglas MacArthur in his farewell address to the Corps of Cadets in 1962. He admonished that "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, and inviolable. It is to win our wars." This maxim remains true today. At West Point, we appreciate that the Internet is being used as a weapon in this generational conflict. We are committed to preparing our Nation's future military leaders to respond effectively to this threat and to use the same weapon to take the fight back to the enemy.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee and I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Colonel. Great point from MacArthur at the end. Thanks for your testimony.

A vote has just gone off in the Senate but we probably have 10 or 12 minutes before we have to leave. I hope you can do your opening in that time, Mr. Cilluffo. If not, we will finish when we get back.

Thanks for being here. Thanks for choosing to publicize your findings here at this hearing.

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO,¹ ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have rarely had an unspoken thought, but I will try to be quick, especially since we agreed with many of the findings, which is quite rare.

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, Senator Voinovich, your continued examination of the issues involved in extremist radicalization is central to understanding our enemies. Thank you for your leadership in pushing these critical issues to the fore.

These are complex issues. They do not make for simple hearings, so I applaud the efforts that all of you put in.

I am pleased to be before you to share the findings and recommendations of our report, "NETworked Radicalization: A

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo appears in the Appendix on page 248.

Counter-Strategy.”¹ The work is a joint project of GWU’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group and was supported by a top-notch group of diverse subject matter experts, some of whom are here with me today, and I would like to acknowledge them quickly: Abdullah Ansary, Mary McCarthy, Steve Herrick, and David Heyman, a very diverse group of folks.

I would also like to thank my co-chair and co-sponsor, Dr. Gregg Saathoff, along with my wonderful HSPI team.

We are facing a global insurgency, as we have heard. To prevail, we must win the battle for hearts and minds, remove terrorist masterminds, and offer hope and opportunity to those who might otherwise be seduced by the jihadi Salafist ideology. We need to recognize that we must enter a new phase in our campaign. While not discounting military actions and the need to hunt down individual terrorists, the war is now one of ideas and cyberspace is the new battlefield.

Our adversaries currently have firm possession of this battlefield because they understand the shift and have created and disseminated a narrative that resonates, energizes, and expands their ranks. By incorporating and manipulating local political grievances, some of which are legitimate, they have woven an effective tale of an imaginary clash of civilizations in which a monolithic West is engaged in an aggressive struggle against a monolithic Islam.

Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers, and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization. The real-time two-way dialogue of the chat rooms has taken the fight global, enabling extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed, and spread exponentially. This mutual affirmation, in turn, gives rise to a sense of community and belonging, in essence a virtual ummah.

From Toronto to Morocco, London to Madrid, and in Holland, America, and beyond, we have witnessed the effects of radicalization. Some have termed these instances as homegrown terrorism, a bit of a misnomer as the Internet has created a largely borderless world for terrorists. Therefore terror networks are best understood in this global context rather than simply a national framework. Connecting the dots of terrorist activity around the world, we are able to see that this pace of transformation is striking and has been accelerating, as the British have recently identified.

Our report focuses on radicalization in the context of this transnational insurgency that is a global extremist jihadi Salafist movement, perhaps best exemplified by al-Qaeda but including other terror networks, those that think global but act local, ascribing to the same ideology.

Radicalization is defined as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use violence as a method to effect social change. Let me note that we have chosen not to use the term Islamist extremism in our discussions. Radicalization is

¹The report submitted by Mr. Cilluffo appears in the Appendix on page 257.

not unique to Islam, nor is it a new phenomenon. The West is not at war with Islam. Terrorism is, in fact, un-Islamic.

Recent polling by the University of Maryland indicates that 88 percent of Egyptians and two-thirds of Moroccans and Indonesians believe al-Qaeda attacks against civilians violate the principles of Islam. In addition, extremists have misappropriated the concept of jihad, using it wrongly to justify acts of violence not sanctioned by the tenets of Islam.

Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of this compelling narrative and social connectivity with new audiences. Previously, computer mediated communication was used for a range of terrorist operational activities: Communications, fundraising, planning, coordination, training, sharing of lessons learned instantaneously on the Internet, information gathering and data mining, propaganda, and obviously misinformation and disinformation.

But the “killer application” of the Internet is, in fact, the nexus between the physical and the cyber, not so much its use as a propaganda and operations tool. There can be no compelling counter narrative until the extremist narrative itself is well understood, including how that message is couched, what is emphasized and ignored, what references and allusions are made, what audiences are targeted, and how messages are adapted to reach new audiences and respond to new events.

How can the Nation that gave rise to Silicon Valley, Hollywood, and the Internet itself be outplayed in the realm of ideas? Part of the answer is that we have not really applied our collective talents and energies to the problem. Domination of the battlefield is not much of a feat when only one side has shown up. In this instance, it will require international collaboration as transnational threats require transnational solutions.

The virtual world cannot be divorced from the physical world in which it is grounded. It is the complex iterative and dynamic interplay between the two that helps explain why the extremist narrative resonates and how it spreads. There is no set formula or profile that explains why someone is vulnerable to radicalization and goes on to become a terrorist. We do know, however, that social bonds play an important role in the radicalization process.

This is especially true for diaspora communities which often turn inward for an enhanced sense of dignity. Youth in these communities, including second and third generation, may feel alienated not only from their parents’ culture, but the culture of the very country in which they live.

This ambivalence about their parents and new country means that young people may therefore rely on each other for a sense of community, making it easier for a single radicalized individual to influence others. Therefore, there may also be an element of youthful rebellion in all of this, and some may be swept in the romanticism of joining an international brigade. I hope we, too, do tap into our young talent to tackle that, as well.

Let us not kid ourselves, American Muslims, like their European counterparts, may feel alienated, too, though not to the extent we have witnessed overseas. Perhaps the most striking example is

Adam Gadahn, an American citizen from California who now serves as al-Qaeda's English-language spokesperson.

Adept at building networks offline, he was able to carry that ability along with a sense of moral outrage to the online environment.

Which raises another important issue in understanding radicalization, the need for social networking analysis, which offers a way to visualize the nodes in a network and how things move through that network, such as weapons, pieces of knowledge, or people. In other words, how networks thrive and grow, and how they atrophy and die.

At least part of the solution lies within the Muslim community itself. Unless the counter messages come from within, they will fail to resonate because they will be seen as inauthentic and untrustworthy. The Koran and Islamic scholars are arguably the most important means of our response. While there may be a role for governments to play by helping at arm's length to amplify these voices at the grassroots, the challenge lies in figuring out how to do so without tainting the credibility of either the message or the messenger.

So where do we go from here? First and foremost, we need to challenge the extremist doctrine by crafting a compelling counter narrative that debunks and discredits myths and falsehoods and recognizes the realities, such as the fact that more Muslims than all non-Muslims have been killed by terrorist activities in recent years, again in 2006 as well.

Our ultimate aim is to deconstruct the al-Qaeda brand campaign and turn it into nothing more than a passing fad.

The counter narrative should offer a dream focused on realistically attainable and alternative futures.

One caution, however, the counter narrative is not to be confused with a PR campaign to improve the image of the United States.

While the counter narrative must incorporate core values common to all, we must not shrink from using graphic visuals demonstrating the deadly impacts of terrorism. Where appropriate, we should fight fire with fire such as the unsanitized visuals from Beslan and Jordan. In counterterrorism we are always talking about terrorists and their martyrs. We have had our martyrs, too.

The message must spring from authentic sources and in this case an authentic messenger may, in fact, be an extremist who has renounced terrorism. For example, "60 Minutes," 2 weeks ago aired a segment in which Hassan Butt, once a recruiter for al-Qaeda in the United Kingdom, focused on how he was misled and became disillusioned with the movement.

And how many times have we heard, "Where are the moderate Muslims denouncing terrorism?" In fact, the American-Muslim community and others issued a fatwa to this effect immediately following the September 11, 2001, attacks which was echoed again in 2005 by the Fiqh Council, but no one remembers. The media can play an important role by covering groups that speak out against the extremist elements in messaging and by using Islamic terms appropriately when reporting the story.

The second element of a counter strategy involves cross-cultural dialogue and understanding. This dialogue includes addressing the perceptions and realities of American-Muslim alienation and mar-

ginalization. It is important to note that all of this takes place in a very public square where, as recent studies have shown, cultural and religious knowledge in general is lacking.

Greater civic engagement of the Muslim communities will further enable integration. Senator Voinovich, I thank you for taking up these efforts yourself.

If we accept that premise, then we need to align our means with our ends. Clearly there is something wrong when the DHS office responsible for engaging with American-Arab and American-Muslim communities nationwide has only a director and two full-time employees.

Real traction will be generated outside government, though. People-to-people exchanges are critical to be able to actually strengthen the ties that bind us all.

We also need to do our homework when it comes to the scientific aspect of all this.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because your recommendations are every important to us, I do not want you to rush and I want us all to be here to hear them. So I am going to ask you to hold. We will go right back to you to finish when we return.

The hearing will stand in recess and we will return as soon as we can. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will reconvene.

I apologize to the witnesses, particularly to you, Mr. Cilluffo. But thank you for your testimony so far. Proceed, please.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To pick up where we were, we also believe it is essential to do our homework when it comes to the scientific aspects of all of this. Our counter strategy will only be as powerful as the depth of our understanding of the process of radicalization both online and offline. Until we recognize and address the need for more behavioral science research in this area, we will be missing opportunities to intervene and stop the process dead in its tracks. And by that I mean the life cycle of terrorism. What is the cycle from sympathizer to activist to being willing to engage in indiscriminate violence, including potential suicide violence?

Performing and exploiting the type of research that is needed will take time, of course, but there are many other steps that we can take in the interim. For starters, legal means to disrupt extremist use of the Internet must be deployed against Web sites that directly advocate violence or provide material support to known terrorist organizations, crossing the line from protected speech to illegal acts of violence. Technical means could also be used to knock our adversaries off balance. Practically speaking though, it is difficult to squelch an extremist presence online. Like a game of Whac-A-Mole, you knock one site down only to find it pop up elsewhere.

Work in the shadows, where appropriate, may also yield results, as is true in the context of other criminal investigations. As chat rooms have replaced the smoke-filled bars of the Le Carre novels, we must have a greater footprint and presence here.

More intelligence officers are needed to exploit the convergence of human intelligence and cyberspace to actively undermine the

trust that binds enemy networks and to better inform our counterterrorism and counter narrative efforts.

“Honey pots” offer one way to achieve these goals. Among other things, they could allow us to better understand how local political grievances may become appropriated by the larger extremist movement which, in turn, could help us drive wedges and blast open existing fault lines between and among factions. While unintended, some of our counterterrorism actions have had the net effect of uniting our adversaries. We must pursue a course of disaggregation and facilitate rifts and dissension among terrorists, their organizations, organizations from other organizations, that from a movement and that from society writ large. And along each step of the way there are different elements of statecraft that need to be brought to bear.

Finally, we need to build capabilities at the Federal level. We have known for more than a decade that we need to shore up language skills and cultural knowledge in the Federal workforce. Moreover, we need to harness intergovernmental efforts to generate a strategic communications plan, one that is comprehensive, well informed, and that allows us to effectively articulate an anti-extremist message. We are not suggesting the sort of centralized approach that we adopted during World War II with the Office of War Information.

Today, no single organization or institution, either within government or outside of it, is capable of managing this effort alone. Instead we need a decentralized approach, a network of networks that links and coordinates the efforts of both public and private actors to use all elements of statecraft to counter our adversaries.

In closing, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to try to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.

You are making a real contribution with your work. I thank you for it and I hope you will continue.

Mr. CILLUFFO. It is a group effort, Mr. Chairman, not me.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Let me start with a few factual questions about what you have told us.

Am I correct that predominately these Web sites are in Arabic, Mr. Doran?

Mr. DORAN. I cannot give you exact numbers, but I think that they are in many different languages. I would say that, as far as al-Qaeda is concerned, the key Web sites are probably in Arabic originally, but this is a global phenomenon.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. To bring it closer to home, do they have Web sites that are in English, that people in the United States who do not speak Arabic can go up on?

Mr. DORAN. Yes.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Unequivocally.

Colonel FELTER. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. They do.

There was one mention, I think maybe by Mr. Doran, about the use of a password or a code system to enter conversations. How difficult is it to break that system?

Mr. DORAN. It is very difficult because the people who are controlling access are familiar to each other. I think it was Colonel

Felter who said that we are talking about social networks working with, incorporating the Internet into their non-Web-based activities.

So if you have a group of people that know each other and are communicating through cyberspace, they can decide whether to let people in or not on the basis of word of mouth and not just what they see on the Internet.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But am I correct, Mr. Cilluffo, in assuming that if one went to a Web site and got on one of these Web sites, and got engaged or drawn in, is there an obvious way in which that person would be recruited?

Mr. CILLUFFO. It is, in part, self-enlistment and it is, in part, recruitment.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you would click to a particular portal if you wanted to do more than just read the propaganda?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Absolutely. The Web sites themselves are static. It is the dynamic side where, just like every day use, my four children use the Internet and they have dolls, Webkinz, and they use it to interact with one another.

It is a very similar process in this case. But obviously they are going to be distrustful of individuals they do not know. So there actually are known cases of where they test individuals. They actually put them—just like you are initiating to join a secret club or whatever it may be—they actually put them through tests to see how tough their skin really is, in terms of—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. In your testimony, Mr. Doran, you said that there were core Web sites that produce additional material and that there were others, perhaps thousands, that simply repeat what are on those core Web sites? If I got you right, for instance, al-Qaeda maintains five significant Web sites? Was that from your testimony?

Mr. DORAN. I did not use the number five.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So talk to me about the impact of the core Web sites.

Mr. DORAN. These are Web sites that are controlled by people who are known to each other and they will post authoritative information on the Web site. And then it will be disseminated out by loyalists all across the Internet.

On these bulletin boards, these are bulletin boards where they are password-protected. Certain individuals user names will become known as authoritative individuals. I will give you an example.

There was this American, Johnson, who was kidnapped in Saudi Arabia and killed. Within hours of his kidnapping his wallet with his ID appeared, a photo of it appeared on this Web site. So from an event like that, you can then conclude that Web site is directly connected to the kidnappers and it is an authoritative Web site.

Then an individual on that Web site, whenever an al-Qaeda related event would take place, would tell you if you want to see our statement about the event go to the following address. Then you go to that address. Once it is out there and authenticated, then it just spreads like wildfire.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Colonel Felter, is there any way that you or either of the other panelists can answer for us how many hits these Web sites receive from within the United States of America?

Colonel FELTER. I think they can be tracked. I do not have an exact figure. But there are tools, like with any Web site, you can identify how many hits.

Mr. Chairman, one thing that is important to know on the Internet, you may get one download from one terminal and then that individual may burn 1,000 CDs. So it is hard to say one download of a particular piece could go to—many more people have access to computers than Internet connection. So it is hard to know how many people are actually getting access to some of this information.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Cilluffo or Mr. Doran, do you have any basis for estimating how active these Web sites, the terrorist Web sites, are within the United States from within the United States?

Mr. CILLUFFO. I don't have a clear answer in terms of the domestic activity. But to get to one of the points that Colonel Felter made, not only do they burn CDs, but they will actually move from sites to other sites to other sites, many of which are what you call parasiting, they are on innocent or innocuous sites. So it does make it difficult.

One point you had mentioned earlier, al-Qaeda does have a formal media arm, a production arm. And that is as-Sahab. If you were to actually look at the video quality from 2002 to 2007 today, it has improved exponentially. In addition to its production facilities and efforts, it actually has a clearinghouse. The Global Islamic Media Front serves as the clearinghouse not only for as-Sahab, but others as well.

So they actually do have a traditional production entity. And maybe Colonel Felter wants to build on that.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do they have a single major Web site, al-Qaeda, that is theirs?

Mr. CILLUFFO. They have had many different Web sites. But one of the challenges, I think, is how do we delineate al-Qaeda classic from all the other groups it spawned? It does have its own sites, al-Zawahiri sites. But most of those we are also aware of and clearly they take operational security very seriously themselves.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Colonel, did you want to add anything?

Colonel FELTER. No, that is fine, sir.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Doran, Colonel Felter in his testimony has said that the government should not waste resources trying to take down the Web sites of extremist groups. He says, "Attempts to shut down Web sites have proven as fruitless as a game of Whac-A-Mole." In other words, you shut down one place and another just pops up to take its place.

But others argue that when you have Web sites, such as the one that you have talked about, that are broadcasting on the best way to shoot down a helicopter that you should shut it down. I would like to get your assessment of that. Some have argued that shutting down those Web sites, even if it is temporary, at least prevents

others from accessing information that could be used to kill Americans and other innocent individuals. Others say that what we should do is just track those Web sites because it is useful to us and helps us understand how terrorists think.

What is your judgment on that?

Mr. DORAN. I am going to come right down the middle between the two. I think it is a discussion that needs to be ongoing and we should not take a categorical position on either side. We need to talk about which Web site and for which purpose in terms of shutting down.

But as Mr. Cilluffo was saying, al-Qaeda has this brand name, as-Sahab, its production facility. It has a number of other brand names, al-Faja'a, al-Borak, and so forth.

It has engaged in this online branding precisely to get around the problem of not being able to present material on one single Web site. So you do run into this Whac-A-Mole problem, you whack it here and it pops up in another place. But keeping this branding, maintaining the integrity of its brand precisely to get around this problem. So they are quite adept at getting around it.

Now that is not an argument not to do it, but it has to be an ongoing discussion. And it has to be an ongoing discussion on both the classified and unclassified level. So I would not like to get into that too deeply.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Cilluffo, what is your advice? Should we try to shut down the most violent and extremist of these Web sites? Or should we just monitor them carefully, try to devise counter-measures? What do you think we should do?

Mr. CILLUFFO. We, too, did not see it as an either/or proposition, that we can and must use all means and instruments that we have. But for the most part, you do have a Whac-A-Mole problem because the Internet is international by its very nature. You do not need to be a major country to be able to use some of those capacities.

But I would like to recognize we do need to also look to how we can work with other countries. The United States hosts a number of these sites but so do others. The Saudis actually recently came up with a very aggressive plan on cyber crime. They actually have just put forward a bill that prohibits any Web sites that are linked to a terrorist organization with both prison time and financial penalties. So maybe there are some issues we can look at there.

I am more interested not only in the Web sites themselves, but I think we have to go to where the action is, and that is the chat rooms. That is where the ideas themselves are propagating. We need to get our arms around this, roll up our sleeves, and engage here. This is where the battle of ideas are.

The static issue, you know what? To some extent, there is not all that much we can do there. But what we can do is get people who are versed in the Koran, to be able to identify how these ideas are just flat wrong. And that is where I believe some of our activity should really be focusing.

I also think in the intelligence business we need to put the same effort and resources we do for cultivating human sources in the physical world in the cyber environment and exploit advances in technology to be able to further enhance our capacities there.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Colonel, I was intrigued by your recommendations when you talked about the need to create opportunities for more Americans to “quietly participate” in the fight against terrorism. And you talked about the Cold War and how there was a tremendous academic focus. We brought a lot of resources to bear across disciplines, not just in the military. What are your further thoughts on that? How can we engage more Americans, particularly those in the Muslim community, to as you put it “quietly participate”?

Colonel FELTER. Thank you, Senator.

I can use the example of our Center at West Point where we actively enlist the cooperation of a variety of academics around the country. They will not work for the U.S. Government. They will not work for the Army. They will not work for the intelligence agencies. But we found they were comfortable working with us as an academic institution.

So I think if we could find these bridges, these appropriate bridges, to bring the tremendous expertise that is out there in our country that is not getting to your office, to the offices of the military leaders and the other policy makers, I think that would be a useful effort to make. Make people more comfortable joining the fight.

We have been surprised, at West Point, where these academics may be a little gun shy to say do not put my name on that product because I do not want to lose academic credibility. Several months into that they realize that the U.S. Government is not such a bad organization to support and they have even come out and become more visible.

But I think giving people more opportunities to contribute in the ways that they are comfortable with and in a way that gets to the people that really make the decisions and can take action on I think is a useful thing to pursue.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. This problem that we have is multifaceted. I just was reading the recent issue of *The Economist*, “Recent opinion polls suggest that three-quarters of Iraqis think America plays a negative role in their country and most want American troops to go.”

Then it went on, but America’s troubles there do not stop at Iraq’s borders. “An opinion survey in four Muslim countries, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia, this week shows 79 percent of the respondents believing that America aims to divide and weaken the Muslim world. Big majorities want American troops out of Muslim countries, most strikingly in Egypt, one of America’s closest Arab allies—91 percent endorse attacks on American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

So that’s one problem that we have. There is a feeling, I think, in the Muslim world that somehow we are there to undermine the Muslim world, which we are not. But that is what is being propagandized out there.

Then the next issue you have is how do you get moderate Muslims or even fundamentalist Muslims who believe that what terrorists are doing is not consistent with the Koran to speak out? And

I have read several books regarding the fact that in those countries, it is very difficult for someone to speak out and say that you can be a good Muslim and be for freedom, democracy, and rule of law. Because if you do, you risk harm. So where do you find the folks that have the credentials to come out and say what these violent extremists are giving you is inconsistent with what Mohammad would want you to do in these circumstances?

There is some reluctance for people to speak out. It cannot be us. It has got to come from those people who have got the credentials to be listened to.

The thing that concerns me is, whether anybody has, really sat down and developed a strategic plan about how we go about counteracting this particular issue. For example, the Internet. How do we bring all of our resources to bear? What are all the aspects about it? How do we develop a critical path, with identified tasks and a detailed plan for implementation?

You are doing it at West Point. You have got the Defense Department. We have got Homeland Security. Mr. Cilluffo you said that we have only one key person at Homeland Security and two individuals to help them to work on radicalization? I would like the witnesses' comments. Have we really taken this seriously? And in your opinion, what is it that we need to do to bring our resources together to counteract this and make a difference?

Mr. DORAN. Is that to me?

Senator VOINOVICH. It is to all of you.

Mr. DORAN. Yes, we are taking it extremely seriously. And it is a centralized effort of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy. The President has also charged Karen Hughes with leading the effort in this regard. And in my Department the seriousness with which we are taking it is evidenced by the creation of my office.

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you ever seen a strategic plan about how we are going to institutionalize this and make a difference?

Mr. DORAN. With the problem of radical Islam?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, the overall issue and its various components, such as dealing with the Internet problem.

Mr. DORAN. The Internet problem is part of a larger terrorism problem. And so I think it needs to be seen in that regard. We do not regard our answer to the Internet problem as just things that we do on the Internet, but it is our entire policy and the entire freedom agenda.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you coordinate with Homeland Security?

Mr. DORAN. Yes, we coordinate with Homeland Security, with the State Department, and all agencies.

Senator VOINOVICH. And you are saying Karen Hughes, at the State Department, is the one in charge, she is the orchestra leader?

Mr. DORAN. She is the interagency lead on public diplomacy countering extremism.

Colonel FELTER. Sir, as an academic institution we are a little bit off the hook for this. But I would say we try to support the efforts of our colleagues that are on the hot seat by providing content to what may be the strategic plan might look like. I think it is important, from the academic side if I can speak for that, to identify these opportunities to identify the divisions within the movement.

We are limited in what we can do, as Americans and Westerners, to discredit and delegitimize the movement. But we can find voices within the movement that are delegitimizing and discrediting the movement from within. Sometimes these voices are within the jihadis themselves. Sometimes they are on the margins of support for jihadis, within the Salafist community, in the broader Islamist community.

From the academic perspective, Senator, I think we can find those dissenting voices in those divisions and empower them, amplify them. Make sure that voices within the movement are getting the air time that they need. Because I think the most damaging thing that can happen to the jihadis and these extremists is to have folks within their movement or slightly on the fringes discredit them, say hey, Muslim on Muslim violence is not good. Attacking the sources of a Nation's wealth, do not want it. These forces are out there. They are out there online and we can find them, as Mr. Cilluffo said, in real time in the chat rooms.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Senator Voinovich, if I could build on that, because I am very much in line with Colonel Felter's thinking here. I am not sure there is the possibility to have a single agency that should be—that can be held accountable for this issue. Quite honestly, I think government is only part of the solution. But government does have a role in recognizing some of the problems, amplifying the voices that are out there already in a way that does not discredit them. We can look at organized crime models.

For example, by that, I look back to the Falconi assassination, the judge in Sicily. Prior to that there had been a number of assassinations. But this was a judge that actually tried to help the Sicilian people. He had a good working relationship with the United States, tried to bring in opportunities that were usurped by the Mafia to provide services.

Once he was assassinated, the hearts and minds of the people turned overnight against the Mafia.

Abu Nidal organization, this was super terrorist No. 1, we seem to forget. He was the big mover and shaker. He did not get defeated through external means. He was defeated because he started losing trust and confidence in his own minions, not to use—since we used the Mafia, not to use the wrong term, but he whacked them because he lost confidence in his own people. We need to look to other unconventional means to be able to look at that.

Now part of that is in the national security environment. The more important set of issues is how do we get the communities that are out there? How do we amplify that? How do we make that message sticky? Part of it is the stickiness of the message. Their message is sticky to a certain constituency. Sometimes the status quo is not sticky. So we have to find new ways to be able to provide stickiness.

One of the ironies we are seeing here is that they are revolting, as I mentioned in my oral remarks, part of them do not feel part of their first and second generation, the parents who moved to, whether it is Western Europe. Nor do they feel part of their own country that they sort of have reaffirmed these aberrant attitudes among themselves.

Well, education has an important role here. There are people who are out there, their messages are not necessarily getting heard. But I would suggest that we have a lot to learn from other countries.

I am impressed with the United Kingdom—they have got their hands full. And maybe their issue is a little more focused. It has got a much stronger Pakistan connection than some of the other areas. And you cannot generalize France, Germany, they all have their own unique attributes.

But they proposed an effort called the Radical Middle Way which is a program, I think we heard from them publicly, they were willing to be recognized in our report, as were other Islamic scholars or Sharia law experts, too. I would recommend that is one place to give some thought to. They are putting together a counter radicalization strategy. The British Government is there.

Only part of it, though, is in the security services. The other part is in other civil departments within the British Government that are sometimes at odds with one another. But we never have that problem here, do we?

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich.

Let me pick up a little bit on Senator Voinovich's last question because the three of you have laid out a picture here which is serious, that the enemy that attacked us on September 11, 2001, the enemy that we declared war against shortly thereafter, is using the Internet to propagandize, radicalize, recruit, and in some cases actually to operate.

I hear one thing clearly, which is that—well, we ought to develop a counter narrative, which is a way to try to compete with the propagandizing radicalizing recruiting part of it.

Is the U.S. Government doing enough to counteract the use of the Internet for radicalization and recruiting to the Islamist extremist cause? Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Unequivocally, no.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Colonel Felter.

Colonel FELTER. I think we have a lot of other opportunities that we could take advantage of.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That we are not doing. Mr. Doran.

Mr. DORAN. I think we are taking it very seriously and our policy is evolving on this. As I said, the creation of my office is one of the signs of the seriousness with which we are taking it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. DORAN. If I could say one word about that—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But you would not say that we are doing enough yet to meet this Internet threat?

Mr. DORAN. That is a tricky question because what is enough? We will have done enough when al-Qaeda is defeated, but we are taking it extremely seriously.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What I hear is we have a lot more to do.

I want to ask you, Mr. Cilluffo, a brief question to lead to this because in your testimony you touched on this. I want you to draw it out for a minute or two. Are we seeing evidence that the Internet is actually accelerating the radicalization process? Is it possible

that virtual relationships are replacing human relationships that we once thought were essential to the radicalization process?

Mr. CILLUFFO. That is an excellent question and we do need to focus a little more on small and large group psychology here in terms of what is happening. But what is unique and we have seen is people on the Internet will say things to one another that they would never say face-to-face. There is a bravado. They are already like-minded in some way that they are drawn to one another.

I can get my news RSS if I want to look at it through a political filter or a religious filter, I will always be reaffirmed in that particular perspective that will never have context.

We are seeing that same challenge on the Internet and there is that reaffirmation. Now at some point they need to go from the cyber to the physical. Whether it is the Toronto 18 case, which this is our backyard. This was Canada and the United States. It starts on the Internet but then at some point they go and bond in a physical sense.

There are also studies in terms of counterintelligence that are interesting to look at where people commit espionage, those that are more into the technology will do things in that sense that they will never do person to person. So I think if you are jogged in the right way, jotted in the right way, and I am sure I have written e-mails I wish I did not and probably would not say person to person. But you do see that.

Now the psychology there, I think it is more of a reaffirmation right now.

And kiddie porn, I am sorry, but child predators as well. It is not just terrorism. You look at other environments, suicide in Tokyo, the group suicide—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I want to ask you a question about that and pose it in this way. The child predator is exactly what I had in mind. Let me use the terrorists.

If we knew that a group of terrorists was meeting in an apartment or even a mosque, and they were meeting with some regularity, presumably our government would—hopefully, our government would try to either infiltrate that operation with a covert agent or would try to use electronic devices to hear what was going on so that we could stop it before it actually acted.

You have testified to us today that there are some operations that are occurring, that is work on operations, actual terrorist operations are occurring over the Internet. What can we do to disrupt them? We talked about the passwords before and are we doing enough?

The example that I had in mind as I read your testimony is that we know that there are many police departments around the country today that are having members pose as child predators in chat rooms—excuse me, pose as the potential victims of child predators in chat rooms, to entice the predators into a situation where they can be arrested.

Is the U.S. Government doing any of that now? And should we? Mr. Cilluffo, go ahead.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, we actually played with—and my team will probably now turn pale—but I used that exact example as something we might want to consider. Not the government, but

if media does it. But it actually may be against the law for media to do that if they actually talk about terrorist activities.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What we are talking about here, and you understand it, is I am using the child predator example.

Mr. CILLUFFO. We actually looked at it even further.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What I am saying is somebody, an agent of our government would go on one of these Web sites, attempt to be recruited, and then infiltrate the operation as a way to get information before they strike.

Mr. Doran, do you have a thought about the wisdom of such action?

Mr. DORAN. No, I do not because that is an operational issue.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which would fall under the FBI?

Mr. DORAN. It is best discussed in a classified setting.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Colonel, do you want to add anything?

Colonel FELTER. Sir, I echo Mr. Doran's comment. I would hope that we are exploring all opportunities to interdict the terrorists but I imagine that the details of something like this would probably be best talked about in a classified environment.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I do want you to know that after the open session of the hearing is concluded, we are going to have a closed session with a representative of the Director of National Intelligence to ask these questions.

You know I, for one, would like those who are operating these terrorist Web sites to worry that we are working very hard at infiltrating them just to create a bit of imbalance and caution.

My time is up. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cilluffo, one of the challenges that we face as we deal with such a powerful tool as the Internet is whether or not we understand sufficiently the radicalization process. Do you think that we do understand that? I mean radicalization has gone on for decades with different groups. But the Internet allows radicalization to reach people who in an earlier pre-Internet age never would have been exposed to the message that could radicalize them. Do we understand the process of radicalization sufficiently?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Not well enough. The limited insights we do have actually come to conclude that there is no single profile. We do need to understand, forgive the bad pun, but what makes them tick. We have come to recognize that there is not a one-size-fits-all.

And that is important because if you look at the message itself, it has something that everyone can agree to and it resonates with the individual. But then it is tailored to the very specific constituencies, communities that they are trying to address. And I actually look at the physical threat in this way. It is actually a transnational insurgency, but it has got very local sets of issues, as well, that are being exploited by those that can use it for their aims.

So no, we do not. The United Kingdom is a little different from Germany, which is a little different from France, which is very different from the United States. But I think we are getting a better sense of what that is. I do not think we will ever have a cookie-cutter, we know when they do this, this, this, and this, that those are all the indicators that they are going to go blow themselves up.

Because I am not sure that they know. And I am not sure they have actually thought it through as much as we always say.

But one thing we would like to do and should be doing, as much as we can be interviewing everyone, not just those in the U.S. custody, but others what is that process? And we need to get a better understanding of what that is.

Senator COLLINS. Because there may be certain triggers that we can identify along the spectrum that would help us develop more effective countermeasures.

Mr. CILLUFFO. That I agree with fully.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Doran, in addition to having sufficient knowledge and understanding we also need sufficient resources, the point that Senator Voinovich was making. I am struck, as I read about these Web sites and as I look at them, very few of them are in English. Do we have a sufficient number of translators who can help us translate these Web sites, as well as understand the nuances that might be lost even to someone who understands Arabic, for example, but does not have the cultural awareness of why certain images are powerful?

Mr. DORAN. It was precisely in recognition of that fact that the Department set up, in 2003, the Center for International Issues Research. The Center combines people who are fluent in different Arabic dialects and different languages around the world, but specifically on the Arabic side, people who are fluent in different dialects together with English speaking analysts, to convey to an English-speaking audience some of these nuances of dialect and culture and so on. And they examine the images and they try to understand what it means when somebody in an Iraqi dialect says something as opposed to somebody in a Saudi dialect and so forth.

So we are working very hard on that.

Senator COLLINS. Colonel, I am still struck by your idea of trying to get more participation by Americans. We are never going to be able to hire a sufficient number of translators. We obviously could do much better than we are doing now, but it is unlikely that we will ever be able to have a sufficient number of government employees to act as translators.

But undoubtedly, in the American population at large, we do have individuals who have the language and cultural knowledge that we so desperately need.

Are you aware of any efforts to try to enlist Americans who are not members of the government or affiliated with West Point to assist in this important task?

Colonel FELTER. Senator, thank you. I have one example that we just sponsored at West Point in our Center. We are having a contest. In sending this contest out, the question is can terrorists be deterred? A big question. We are adding a little prize money and sending it out to schools around the country. I think we are going to tap into some creative expertise that we otherwise would never have thought.

I think we have a tremendous amount of expertise in our country that is not being tapped.

I think like the jihadis use many people to further the interests of their movement, we can do the same. I think people would get involved given the right opportunity and provided the right mecha-

nism. It does not have to be government. It does not have to be a burden on the taxpayers. I think there are ways to bring more people into the fight, so to speak. We just have to be creative and think a little out of the box.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I have been very active over the last several years with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and trying to work with an organization called the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), to elevate the issues of anti-Semitism and xenophobia to a serious undertaking by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We are finally making some progress. They finally established a core budget after 4 years.

One of the things that I discovered as we went through the process is that in other countries it does not seem that these kinds of groups have the access to the Internet that they have here in the United States. Abe Foxman, in his book, "Never Again," outlines specifically what some of these countries are doing.

Is there something that we can do that other countries are doing within the framework of our Constitution that could limit Internet use for recruiting and propaganda purposes by extremists here in the United States? And are other countries doing a better job of monitoring what is on the Web and somehow, through technology, making sure that it does not get through?

Mr. CILLUFFO. I think that is actually a fascinating set of issues. Rather than shutting down and closing, maybe the best solution is greater transparency and openness and further—first, part of it is making sure they have access to the Internet.

But we can also circumvent their filters and get down to individuals and try to change their minds there. So that, to me, should be an important part. And it should not be government. It should be through multicultural, multireligious denominational groups, because a lot of the—because we cannot—I think it should be in a multi-denominational kind of way.

That is where I think the British are doing some unique work. And that is this Radical Middle Way where I may not agree with 90 percent of it. But do you know what? That is irrelevant. But it does denounce and it supports and agrees with certain principles that I think we all value. I think that is a way to get around that.

Senator VOINOVICH. So other countries screen out more than what we do.

Mr. CILLUFFO. And this is a way we can touch them, too, is to use the Internet as an advantage.

Senator VOINOVICH. You are basically saying because of our freedom of speech and so forth that we should let it come through?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Let us get to them, too. I am actually saying using it in a positive way where more transparency on our side can touch constituencies that maybe are being filtered by their own—

Senator VOINOVICH. So improve our monitoring? But the fact of the matter is that at this stage of the game we are not doing the job.

Mr. CILLUFFO. From my perspective, not enough.

Senator VOINOVICH. So there is a wonderful opportunity there to get the best minds together and say how do we counteract this? And then start to have a plan to get that done?

Mr. CILLUFFO. In both the cyber but also the physical world. Ambassador Korologos, when he was in Belgium, he briefed our group. I thought he had a very neat—

Senator VOINOVICH. I had dinner with Tom Korologos. He is fantastic. He brought Muslims from the United States to Brussels to talk about how Muslims are treated here in the United States and to generate ideas on how they could do a much better job in Belgium in terms of integration and dialogue.

Mr. CILLUFFO. It was positive, too.

Senator VOINOVICH. One thing I think that the Committee ought to know is that Senator Akaka and I have been zeroing in on the need for more people becoming fluent in Arabic and Farsi. We have something called the National Virtual Translation Center that is working on this. And in the competitiveness bill the Senate passed last week, we are talking about putting more money into foreign language capabilities. So there is some real concentration on seeing if we cannot get more people to be made available to you, Mr. Doran, and West Point, and so on for foreign language.

The real issue is—Mr. Cilluffo maybe you can answer this—what are we doing to try on the local level to get groups together to start talking with each other within the Muslim community itself and also in terms of the Muslim community with the rest of the community so you develop a dialogue?

We had testimony that the FBI is sitting down with various organizations and having them vet their concerns about their civil rights being violated—profiling and all of that.

But the next level down is, how do you reach individuals who are really starting to feel like they are becoming isolated. How do we break them out of that, so that we tear down the walls and there is more dialogue going on?

Mr. CILLUFFO. At the local level, I recently came back from Los Angeles. I think there are some models with Sheriff Baca and Chief Bratton at the Los Angeles Police Department that are well worth the effort and time. These are not things that are instantaneous. If you go in with only a counterterrorism mindset, it is going to create a distrustful environment to begin with. If you come in with a community policing environment where—we had some of this dialogue in our own task force effort where people did come in with totally wrong stereotypes, within the Muslim community, thought that the PATRIOT Act was meant to do specifically this, this, and this, and law enforcement who thought oh, everyone has got to be on the wrong side of the issue, they have to be terrorists themselves.

Once you actually sat them around the room, we were able to diffuse myths on both sides. And these were very knowledgeable senior people. I am not talking necessarily the other citizens.

So I think that is part of it. I think that Los Angeles has done a very good job there. And I think you have had Sheriff Baca up here to testify recently. It might be worth getting Bill Bratton out, as well.

Colonel FELTER. Sir, if I could highlight an example from academia again. At West Point we have a course called "Winning the Peace," where the culminating exercise is we take a group of cadets, many of whom will be deployed within months to Iraq and Afghanistan, down to Jersey City where there is a 2-day exercise where they go to a mosque, they meet people of a variety of faiths, Jewish, Christian, Coptic Christian, Muslim, and Hindu. And they do exactly what you are describing, a 2-day dialogue.

And it is amazing the stereotypes that are dispelled, both from the cadets who may have stereotypes as they deploy into these areas of similar faiths, and from the representatives of the different faiths that they are talking to soldiers about the U.S. military.

I think it is those grassroots efforts that are going to make a difference.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, to Senator Voinovich.

I want to thank the witnesses. You have been extremely helpful. You have educated us in a lot of ways. I want to come back to what Senator Collins noted from your testimony, Colonel Felter, which is it is quite interesting that we have not really developed the body of knowledge and academic interest in these critical subjects in this next period of our history as we did at the outset of the Soviet era and the Cold War.

Though it is reassuring that the three of you actually are involved, or have been before you came into the government in such studies, both of Islam and what I have come to call Islamism, by which I mean a political ideology that has grown out of Islam, but is clearly not Islam. So I thank you for that.

My conclusion is, and it is hard to reach anything other than this conclusion, that we have a real problem here on both levels, both on the level of the counter narrative to the propaganda and radicalization that the Islamist terrorist Web sites are putting out. And then the second part, which we are going to pursue both in the closed session we are going into now and next week with witnesses from the FBI, as to what we can and are doing to disrupt the more operational use of the Internet for actual terrorist activities.

But you have greatly assisted our work here. This Committee is going to stay on this because I think it is critically important to carrying out our responsibility as the Homeland Security Committee.

So I thank you. The record of the hearing we will keep open for 10 days in case you have any additional testimony or responses you would like to submit or we may have a couple of more questions we want to give to you.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, can I just add something?

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. It just came to me. When I was mayor and when I was governor, we had major diversity sessions. In other words, we ran our people through a diversity training because I thought that they would better understand each other, it would help management, and they go back in their respective commu-

nities and have—particularly emphasis on African-Americans and Hispanics.

But it just hit me, there was not anything at all about the Muslim religion or the Jewish religion or some of the Christians. And I just wonder if the people that do that kind of work have added that as a new dimension.

Because we really do not understand each other. I got this book by Esposito on the Muslim religion, a very good book. I bought it for the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and said will you read it?

Because, the fact is, we are Members of the Senate. I do not think any of us, a lot of us, understand what the Muslim religion is talking about. There are stereotypes about that. I think that more Americans understand that, I think the better off we are all going to be. I think that maybe that is something that we ought to really give some thought to.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree and what the appropriate role for government is here, I think we have to determine. It is both. It is the long rich remarkable history of Islam and it is the shorter, but now very real, history of Islamism, which itself has an intellectual history that you all know about and we have begun—there have been some very, I think, helpful and good TV documentaries on this in the last half year or so.

But in a constructive way, person to person, Senator Voinovich, you are absolutely right, that a lot of the work that we have put into race relations in this country and trying to better understand each other has to now go into the same kind of mutual understanding among religious groups.

Senator COLLINS, do you want to say anything in closing?

Senator COLLINS. I am fine, thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks again to the three of you. The hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Committee was recessed, to reconvene in closed session.]

VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DEFEAT IT

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Collins, and Stevens.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank our witnesses and members of the public for being here.

Today's hearing—our fourth on Islamist radicalization within the United States—takes on a special sense of urgency with the arrests Tuesday of six would-be terrorists who are accused of plotting to force their way into Fort Dix with automatic assault rifles to kill as many American soldiers there as possible. According to the FBI's affidavit in the case, the perpetrators thought that the death toll from their action could reach into the hundreds.

This was obviously a chilling story. A part of it that I want to focus on at the outset of this hearing is this: These six were not radicalized in faraway extremist madrassas, nor did they receive their weapons or tactical training at al-Qaeda camps in distant mountains. According to the FBI affidavit, the accused New Jersey terrorists were radicalized and planned and trained for their attacks right here in the United States. They were propagandized and instructed with videos either downloaded from the Internet or passed from computer to computer on DVDs. Though there is no evidence at this time of an operational link to al-Qaeda, there quite clearly is an ideological link. Osama bin Laden's radical message reached across cyberspace and traditional borders, and poisoned the hearts and minds of these six men in New Jersey.

This is not the first terrorist plot against the United States since September 11, 2001, that has been stopped before it could be carried out, and it most surely will not be the last to be attempted. It is another wake-up call to the American people that there are people in this world who so hate our American way of life that they are intent on wantonly killing Americans. These arrests in New Jersey remind us that the work we have done since September 11, 2001, through this Committee to create the Department of Homeland Security, reform our intelligence agencies, protect our borders,

and strengthen our law enforcement agencies' anti-terrorist capabilities has been absolutely necessary. But there is much more we still need to do.

The topic of today's hearing is "Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It." It follows on our Committee's earlier hearings into Islamist radicalization within United States, particularly in U.S. prisons and over the Internet. Today we want to ask representatives of Federal Government agencies what they are doing to combat such radicalization at home, and in the case of two of the agencies represented here whose responsibilities are largely abroad, what they are doing to reach out to build bridges into the Muslim world that will present an alternative path to the future than the one the Islamist extremists present. And this is relevant because of the role that foreign Islamist terrorists' thinking has on the radicalization of Americans, as we have seen in the allegations in the New Jersey case.

The other thought that struck me in response to what happened in New Jersey is that most of us have taken some comfort since September 11, 2001, from confidence that our best hope for preventing Islamist radicalization and terrorism within America by Americans was America itself—the openness and opportunity, the freedom of speech and religion that our country provides to all who live here.

We have thought that the American Muslims were more fully integrated into American society than Muslim communities, for instance, in Europe and therefore that the threat of homegrown Islamist extremism was small or nonexistent here, certainly much less than elsewhere.

I personally believe that remains true but, obviously, not for all Muslims in America, as the case of the Fort Dix six shows. These were young men working their way up in America, owning businesses, buying homes, going to college, and raising families. And yet, according to the affidavit filed by the FBI, they became so hostile to this country that welcomed them and gave them opportunities that they planned to attack it and kill a large number of its citizens.

This morning we are going to ask our witnesses why they believe this happened, how we can prevent such radicalization here at home, and if we cannot in all cases, how can we stop it before it strikes us. This is an important hearing and painfully timely. I again thank the witnesses for being here, and I look forward to their testimony.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this very timely and important hearing. As you mentioned, earlier this week the plot by the six men in New Jersey who planned to attack Fort Dix and kill hundreds of American soldiers was uncovered. These violent extremists were living within our borders, three of them legally. They appear to have had no direct contact with foreign terrorists, but were inspired and motivated in some measure by violent messages and videos available over the Internet.

The New Jersey conspirators serves as a chilling reminder that no matter how secure we make our borders, no matter how effectively we track foreign terrorist groups, America remains exposed to the threat of “homegrown terrorism.” The planned attack on Americans at Fort Dix is a stark warning to citizens, to law enforcement officers, and to homeland security and intelligence officials of the urgent need to be alert to this domestic threat.

The thwarting of the conspiracy against Fort Dix offers hope, however. A concerned citizen—an alert store clerk—told local police about a video with gunfire and extremist rhetoric. This clerk followed the slogan that one sees in New York City on the subway of “See something, say something.” Through the local police partnership with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, this report was passed along to Federal officials, including the FBI. Cooperation among citizens and officials defeated a potentially lethal plot.

Today’s hearing focuses on Federal efforts to counter this violent extremist ideology. What are we doing to encourage citizens to remain attentive to the threat of homegrown terrorism? What steps can we take to work more closely with peaceful, law-abiding Muslim Americans—the vast majority—to understand the process of radicalization and to counter the violent messages spread by terrorist groups? What are Federal agencies doing to explain to other nations that America wants peace, protects religious freedom, aids its friends, and opposes intolerance and tyranny?

Last fall, Senator Voinovich and I expressed our concerns in a letter to the White House in which we inquired about the administration’s strategy for confronting the threat of homegrown terrorism, especially by seeking assistance from America’s Muslim communities.

The challenge is to engage Muslim-American leaders in the battle against an extremism that distorts their faith to justify violence. Their outreach and assistance are essential to counter radical messages that can lead some to adopt a violent ideology.

The agencies represented before us today have many worthwhile initiatives underway to combat this violent and hateful movement. These efforts are directed not only at terrorists and their plots, but also at the misperceptions and distortions that terrorists exploit to attract and energize new recruits and donors. There are several such programs: The FBI, the Treasury Department, the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—all have worthwhile programs and policies. I will not repeat them in my opening statement because we are going to hear about them today.

Let me just conclude by saying that I hope that today’s hearing will help us better understand what needs to be done and to evaluate the successes of these and other measures and to consider opportunities for new initiatives.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Senator Stevens, thanks for joining us.

We will now go to our witnesses. First, Jeremy Curtin is the Coordinator, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, and obviously we understand that you are fo-

cused on public diplomacy abroad, but I know you have been grappling with the central question that we are asking about home-grown radicalization, which is how do we prevent it, and the challenge to prevention here is how do we build bridges to the people who otherwise would become radicalized and perhaps commit terrorist acts. Thanks for being here. We look forward to your testimony now.

TESTIMONY OF JEREMY F. CURTIN,¹ COORDINATOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CURTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator Stevens. I appreciate being here and the connection you are making between our work in public diplomacy and national security. Even though we take different perspectives on the challenge, we are very much working towards the same end, to make the United States safer.

The mission of my particular bureau, the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) in the State Department, includes countering violent extremist ideology overseas. We have specific programs dedicated to this objective, including a new Counterterrorism Communication Center intended to coordinate inter-agency public diplomacy activities in this area. I will describe these programs briefly in a moment, but first I would like to put our work in the broader context of public diplomacy because, as Under Secretary Karen Hughes has said, meeting this challenge is not a question of an immediate threat today, but rather it is the work of years and generations. We have to reach out to the next generation and to broader populations overseas that might be vulnerable to extremist lies and messages of hate.

Focusing on the longer term, our sister bureau, Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), under Assistant Secretary Dina Powell, has extended our exchange programs and educational programs overseas to younger and more diverse participants in order to reach them earlier than ever before and in order to provide opportunities to people who earlier had been outside the circle of opportunity provided by our exchange programs. ECA is creating a strategic continuum for engaging future leaders and at-risk populations. English ACCESS micro-scholarships and other programs reach people as young as 14 years old, definitely the next generation.

On the nearer horizon, Under Secretary Hughes is focusing our information resources on populations and programs important to the ideological struggle. Citizen Dialogues, which is part of a new Strategic Speaker Program, sends teams of American Muslims abroad to engage Muslim communities in other countries. We also send individual speakers to talk about Muslim life in America, as well as about religious freedom, diversity, tolerance, and other core values.

IIP's Digital Outreach Team and Arabic Web-based programs have established a U.S. Government presence in Arabic cyberspace, ensuring that we are "present for the debate," as recommended by Ambassador Edward Djerejian. Our Persian-language Web site

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Curtin appears in the Appendix on page 291.

serves as a virtual embassy to Iran and allows U.S. officials and others to discuss issues like nuclear non-proliferation with the Iranian people. The Public Affairs Bureau's Rapid Response Unit monitors foreign media and provides embassies and military commands with background and talking points. New media hubs in Dubai, Brussels, and London facilitate engagement by U.S. officials with Arabic and other foreign media, especially television, in real time.

The Internet is the central focus of my bureau's engagement strategy, as exemplified by our Digital Outreach Team and our Arabic and Persian electronic outreach programs. We have increased our presence on Internet discussion forums and increased our Webchat and Webcast activities. We are exploring the applicability of other new cybertechnologies like the virtual world of Second Life. In cooperation with other agencies, we are monitoring and analyzing Internet activity, especially in Arabic and English, more vigorously than ever before.

Even in this high-tech age, our diplomats in the field are the linchpins to everything we do. They know what works locally. They deliver the message to editors and appear on local television. They manage our in-country Web sites, in local languages. And they also manage our exchange and educational programs. Under Secretary Hughes has put together a pilot country initiative, the purpose of which is to bring new resources to our diplomats in the field specifically working on these issues of countering the ideological message.

Over the 20 months of Under Secretary Hughes' tenure, we have created or expanded exchanges and information programs. Much of what we have done, we have done out of existing funds, and we are depending heavily on the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental appropriation and on increased requests in the FY 2008 budget so we can continue these programs.

I want to speak for a moment about our Counterterrorism Communication Center. It is an interagency initiative to develop and deliver effective messages to undermine ideological support for terror and to counter terrorist propaganda. The Center provides leadership and coordination for interagency efforts in the war of ideas and seeks to integrate and enhance the U.S. Government's diverse public diplomacy counterterrorism activities. The Center issued its first product this past weekend—counterpoints to al-Zawahiri's tape which was released on Saturday.

All these programs are brought together under the Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication headed by Under Secretary Hughes. This is a process that involves engagement with many of our partner agencies, USAID in particular, but also DOD and others.

Just very briefly, I would say this cooperation and coordination is improving all the time. We have daily discussions, and we have many specific forums for discussion and for action now, which I would be glad to discuss later if you would like.

The main point I want to make, in addition to the details of what we do, is that we do have to see it all as part of the whole. Public diplomacy and our information programs must be seen as part of the broader global response to terrorism, which also includes the domestic side as well as our international and global side.

Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Curtin. We have a lot of questions for you, but that was a good opening statement.

Next we are going to hear from Chip Poncy, Director of Strategic Policy, Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes at the Department of Treasury.

TESTIMONY OF CHIP PONCY,¹ DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC POLICY, OFFICE OF TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. PONCY. Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of our Department, the Department of the Treasury, to conduct charitable sector outreach and to develop a better understanding of Muslim-American communities. It is also an honor to testify with friends from the FBI, from the Department of State, and from USAID.

Since September 11, 2001, and under the direction and leadership of the Administration and the Congress, Treasury has tackled terrorist financing issues together with its partners from these and other agencies across the Administration, as well as with our international counterparts from finance ministries around the world, State and local governments, and the private sector.

In 2004, the Congress and the Administration improved Treasury's ability to contribute to the counterterrorist financing campaign through the creation of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). TFI's overarching mission is to: One, safeguard the financial system from illicit finance; and, two, develop and apply economic and financial measures to combat rogue nations, terrorist organizations, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, and other national security threats. It is the only office of its kind in the world.

To advance our counterterrorism financing campaign, we must aggressively apply the authorities and the resources that we have to identify, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist organizations and their support networks. A critical component of this campaign is combating terrorist exploitation of charities. These efforts form the basis for our outreach to the charitable sector and to the Muslim-American communities. Our efforts in this regard must begin with a clear understanding that terrorist organizations consistently establish and infiltrate charities to raise funds and support.

Charities are an attractive target for terrorist organizations for a variety of reasons, two of which bear emphasis: First, the legitimate activities of charities operated by terrorist organizations, such as establishing and operating schools, religious institutions, and hospitals, create fertile recruitment grounds, allowing terrorists to generate support for their causes, and to propagate violent and extremist ideologies. Second, by providing such genuine relief and development services, these terrorist-related charities engender broader public support or sympathy, thereby making many governments reluctant to take enforcement action against them.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Poncy appears in the Appendix on page 295.

The ongoing nature of such terrorist exploitation of charities is well documented and is described in the annex to Treasury's recently revised Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines. Two prominent examples are: The critical role of Hamas charities in building popular support for the Hamas terrorist organization in the Palestinian territories, and Hezbollah's effective and substantial control of the charitable distribution networks in southern Lebanon.

In response to this ongoing abuse of charity, TFI has worked with its interagency partners to develop and implement a four-pronged approach that includes: One, more effective oversight; two, preventive measures, such as targeted sanctions; three, comprehensive and sustained outreach; and, four, international engagement.

These comprehensive efforts to combat terrorist exploitation are particularly important in countering violent Islamist extremism for two reasons: First, such efforts cut off a primary means of terrorist financing; and second, these efforts prevent terrorist organizations and violent Islamist extremists from leveraging charitable assistance in order to recruit and radicalize additional members and operatives for terrorist organizations.

This aggressive strategy also requires sustained outreach to charitable and Muslim communities. Our outreach underscores the four following fundamental points: First, strong U.S. support for charity in Muslim, American, and global societies; two, the ongoing, deliberate, and effective exploitation of charity by terrorist organizations; three, the comprehensive approach that the United States is applying to overcome this exploitation; and, four, the need for strong communication and collaboration between the U.S. Government and the charitable sector to overcome such abuse.

Although these four fundamental points may seem somewhat self-evident at first glance, they present substantial challenges upon further examination. One good example can be seen in examining and communicating the nature of terrorist exploitation. Such exploitation may involve the narrow diversion of funds intended to support charitable activities but actually redirected for terrorist purposes. This type of abuse, although difficult to detect, can be easier to understand and accept by many in the charitable and Muslim-American communities as a threat.

A more common and difficult problem arises when explaining the broader exploitation and deliberate use of charity that well-organized terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, employ. Often charitable and Muslim communities are not aware of this form of broader exploitation because their charitable funds are actually used for charitable purposes. A fundamental problem arises, however, when a terrorist organization controls and administers such charity in ways that radicalize communities and recruit support for terrorist organizations. This broader form of exploitation is difficult to detect, and it is not broadly understood.

Other significant challenges in our outreach involve explaining the actions that we are taking to combat this exploitation, including our use of targeted economic sanctions. As this Committee has noted in prior hearings, sustained outreach is critical to ensure that the rationale for our policies is well understood, is well explained, and that implementation is fair, reasonable, and effective.

Treasury engages in such sustained outreach in a variety of ways. A core component of our outreach program involves coordinating with and joining our interagency partners from the FBI, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, to organize and participate in public meetings, discussion groups, and conferences around the country, including in cities such as Boston, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Dearborn, Michigan. These efforts are organized with and directed specifically towards Muslim-American and Arab-American communities to discuss our counterterrorism policies.

Another aspect of our outreach involves participating in a similar range of engagements with the charitable sector. Our engagement with the charitable sector is both direct and often in partnership with the IRS, the National Association of State Charities Officials, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the American Bar Association and the American Legal Institute.

Through such outreach to Muslim communities in the charitable sector, Treasury has developed numerous working-level relationships to address of particular concern and to develop guidance that these communities can use to promote and to protect their charitable giving. One good example of this can be seen in the development of Treasury's voluntary anti-terrorist financing guidelines. These best practices outline in detail a range of financial, programmatic, organizational, and specific counterterrorist financing practices that charities can employ to protect themselves from terrorist abuse. Treasury's guidelines and other helpful materials are publicly available on TFI's Web site.

Treasury, in coordination with its interagency partners, is also discussing with the charitable sector and with Muslim-American communities ways that we can build upon these efforts. A particularly important challenge is developing safe and effective mechanisms for charitable and Muslim communities to deliver assistance to places of evident need but where terrorist groups are known to operate extensively. We will continue to explore ways to help address such particularly challenging circumstances in consultation with the private sector and our interagency partners.

In closing, I would like to underscore the importance of maintaining a comprehensive approach to countering violent Islamist extremism. This approach must include the continued and aggressive application of our clinical trial financing authorities. It must also include sustained outreach to the charitable and Muslim communities about the threats we face and the actions we are taking to combat these threats, with the recognition that the moderate Islamic community is our most important asset in these efforts.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I would also like to publicly thank my family for being here today, and particularly my wife, Jane, for their unwavering personal support.

I would be happy to answer any questions you have. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks a lot, Mr. Ponce. I think you made them all proud, and you helped our work here. I have been very impressed by the work of your office, but I must say I did not appreciate until hearing your testimony the outreach that you are

doing to the Muslim community, and I would like to ask you more about that when we get to the questions.

Next we have John J. Miller, Assistant Director, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. Thank you. You are not the first person I have seen from the Bureau since Tuesday, but the first I have seen in public, so I therefore want to express the gratitude of all of us here, and of, I am sure, the American people, for the extraordinary work that the Bureau did in breaking up the group in New Jersey.

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. MILLER,¹ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

Mr. MILLER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Collins, and it is good to see you again. It is very good to have the opportunity to discuss the FBI's Community Outreach Program in my capacity as the Assistant Director for Public Affairs of the FBI. I am happy to join with my colleagues here from the State Department, the Department of Treasury, as well as USAID, to discuss the important efforts of the U.S. Government to strengthen our relationship with segments of the community and to better allow us to recognize and prevent violent and other illegal activities.

This past Tuesday afternoon, just as the affidavit and complaint were being unsealed in the Fort Dix terrorist plot case, the FBI's Community Relations Unit initiated a conference call from FBI headquarters to organizations representing American-Arab and American-Muslim communities across the country. We briefed them on the background of the case, as was laid out in the affidavit, which was extraordinarily detailed. I have seen the material outside the affidavit, and most of the case is contained in that public record. We also referred them to places where they could access that public record and study the documents themselves.

This kind of spontaneous dialogue, which would have been remarkable, has become part of our set operations plan when there is a breaking event involving terrorism, especially in the context that we know that can bring stress on the Arab-American and Muslim communities.

In our discussions, they asked what they could do to be helpful in terms of messaging. They asked, would it be helpful, for instance, if they reiterated from those mainstream and large national groups their prior public messages condemning terrorism and radicalization? We discussed, from our side, about law enforcement's message being measured and deliberate to say the indictment charges a group of individuals, not a religion, not an ethnic group, not a community, but individuals for discrete and specific alleged acts.

We do this because we want to be aware of and responsive to any potential backlash in terms of hate crimes, rumors, suspicions directed at that community. It is a key part of our outreach effort, especially when we know there is going to be intensive publicity surrounding those events.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Miller appears in the Appendix on page 304.

Allow me to give you some background on why these conference calls have become a key tool in our efforts. Over the past 2 years, the FBI has worked very hard to strengthen and refocus our community outreach efforts in general, but with some specificity towards the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities. We began these efforts by strengthening our outreach to the leaders of the key national groups. We brought in the key leaders to meet with the Director of the FBI, with the Deputy Director, and with the Office of Public Affairs on a number of occasions over the last 2 years, and we maintain regular contact with those groups.

While that gives us a good view of the larger national picture, what it was not giving us from FBI headquarters' standpoint was a grassroots view. So we set out very quickly after developing that to work our way down really to the street level.

Every one of the FBI's 56 field offices has a community outreach specialist or someone with that responsibility. What we first tried to do was to marshal those forces and leverage their ability to reach out into the key communities in those cities. We started that by using our secure video teleconferencing system at FBI headquarters, by breaking the community outreach specialists by field division up into regions, and then by engaging them on the teleconferencing to assess what their community outreach efforts and issues were.

We also brought in the community leaders from the national groups into a 1-day conference that touched each one of the 56 field offices, and they were able to question the community outreach specialists, the assistant special agents in charge, supervisors of various programs who attended this, to say, "Tell us about your community. Are you aware of this community here or that community there? Can you outline for us the efforts?" In some places, they were able to provide real added value. In other places, they were candidly surprised at the level of positive outreach efforts that were going on in the field that they as national members of their groups just were not aware of. So it was a generally positive experience.

Last year, nationally the FBI held approximately 85 outreach events in the community. These events are attended in the field by FBI executive management, in most cases the special agent in charge, in other cases the assistant special agent in charge, in some cases the Assistant Director in charge when it comes to large offices. I would like to share a few of the other focused events we have done in different forums.

We have tried to set a goal nationally of trying to achieve a 25-percent participation from these communities in our FBI citizens academies. This is a very successful program, one that is geared at bringing the FBI closer to the community and demystifying the FBI for the community through a series of classes that will go in some cases over 8 weeks.

We have also found that there are barriers between certain communities where there are serious trust issues to bringing them into an FBI office, getting their names and backgrounds, and engaging them for that long a period of time. So we developed the Community Relations Executive Seminar Training, which is the CREST program, and that is focused on taking the program out, whether

it is to a mosque, a meeting hall, a restaurant, a community meeting place, and asking them to help us develop the curriculum. What are the areas they are interested in? Maybe we want to talk about counterterrorism and radicalization. Their concerns may be are their kids safe on the Internet, are their businesses safe from credit card fraud, and are they safe from identity theft? But when we develop the program in partnership, it has a much more user-friendly feel, and I think we are breaking barriers with that program.

In New Jersey, the field office based out of Newark developed a Children's Day, which was held at Giants' Stadium, involved recruitment efforts towards making youngsters up through even high school-aged children, largely from the Egyptian community, aware of opportunities in the FBI, even if that is a long look forward for some of them. There were recruiters there. There were FBI agents with FBI gear, even a helicopter. It received very good reviews from the community in terms of opening doors, opening eyes, and very good press coverage from the media.

In November, the New York field office did a day-long conference focused on the youth of the Pakistani-American community based in Queens. The event featured speakers from the community, as well as religious leaders, as well as FBI officials, as well as other well-known figures within the Pakistani-American community, including Hamid Mir, a very well-known television journalist from Pakistan, someone who as a journalist has interviewed Osama bin Laden, who is familiar with many of the issues and spoke to some of them.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Miller, I am going to interrupt. What did they talk about? What was the program?

Mr. MILLER. Well, it was a little cutting edge, Senator, and I say that because they talked about community impressions, about law enforcement and the government. The government talked about its outreach efforts to the community, and it was spirited throughout the day, but I would say useful in that it opened a door of dialogue, particularly into the younger Pakistani-American community that, before the conference, had not yet fully been opened, and that is something that the New York office is trying to continue.

It was no small feat. We had to reach into the Finance Division and really cobble together \$33,000 to get the hotel space, fly people in, get the right people to get the amount of attention to make it successful. But I think on balance it worked in a very positive way.

Far from New York City in a very different environment in Springfield, Illinois, the special agent in charge there, Weysan Dun, did a similar day-long conference, bringing in statewide leaders to a Holiday Inn, serving a Halal meal, and discussing many of the same issues, although with a more mature, older crowd. But the issues fell along some of the same lines.

Several divisions have benefited from cultural diversity training given by our partners in the Arab-American Anti-Defamation Committee, including an attorney who is staffed there named Noar Shor, who has been a good friend of the FBI and a good training partner. We have stepped up our outreach to Arab-American media, including appearances by FBI executives on al-Jazeera, Bridges TV, and others.

In the big cities, in New York and Los Angeles, particularly in Los Angeles, and especially here in the Washington field office, they have leveraged their relationships with the community by putting together cultural diversity committees from the Arab-American, Sikh, Muslim communities and having monthly meetings, whether there were burning issues or not, to discuss the regular dialogue between them. And I look back on Los Angeles, in particular. They had some very serious issues between the office and the community, and they hashed them out at those meetings. And even though they did not achieve full agreement on every issue every time, the meetings continue. They still come back. The dialogue remains open. And we think that is a key.

The Muslim leaders we have been talking to have acknowledged that there is a growing discussion here in the United States about fears of radicalization. From their sense—and this is based on a recent conference call we had—they do not believe that their community is as ripe for radicalization as many of the observers in this discussion suggest. Additionally, what we got out of that call is there is a good deal of concern among Muslim and Arab-American leaders that the increasing volume of this discussion may have an unintended consequence in that there could be a further backlash of suspicion against the Muslim community, which they feel they have suffered under since September 11, 2001, on some level or another. They emphasize that, in their view, if we overlook the progress we have made, we do so at our own peril.

It is hard to say, I will submit right now, whether putting the spotlight on this issue is more helpful or reinforces a negative stereotype. I think the conference calls we have been doing serve as a good example of the frank and candid discussions that we have going on because I do not think we can begin to attack, deal with, or stem the real root problems of radicalization or turning that around if we do not have these clear and open and regular two-way lines of communication between the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, the State Department, and these communities. And our approach has been in the national meetings to bring the other agencies in with us and to attend their meetings so that the government approach to this is a whole government approach, to the extent we can make it that way. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Again, impressive outreach, and I want to ask you a little bit more about what the content of it is and what your goals from it are.

The last witness on the panel is Jeffrey J. Grieco, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Grieco.

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY J. GRIECO,¹ ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GRIECO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and the Committee for inviting me today to testify on behalf of the agency and its work to help counter violent Islamist extremism and our efforts to coordinate our public diplomacy efforts overseas.

The President's National Security Strategy is emphatic in calling for a more robust role for development in our national security architecture. Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, it reduces the long-term threats to our national security, and it is essential at bringing hope and opportunity to societies that are subject to terrorist subversion and vulnerable to terrorist messaging.

To support the strategic policy positions that were set forth by President Bush in both the 2002 and the 2006 National Security Strategies, the Department of State and USAID have collaborated on publication of two Joint Strategic Plans—the 2004 and 2007 editions—which set forth the Secretary's direction and policy priorities for both organizations in the coming years.

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes has been tasked by the President with leading the efforts to promote America's values and to confront ideological support for terrorism around the world. She has spoken about her strategy involving a diplomacy of deeds as among the most effective means for defusing the hostile propaganda purveyed by extremist enemies of the United States.

As the principal agency of the U.S. Government delivering development assistance and humanitarian aid around the world, USAID performs deeds every day—day in, day out—in over 80 missions around the world. We play a critical role in the diplomacy of deeds that Under Secretary Hughes has talked about. USAID has missions in 27 of the 49 countries that have more than a 50-percent Muslim population. Significantly, approximately 50 percent of our funding goes to predominantly Muslim countries. This agency has extended a lifeline in many cases to countries in the Muslim world that would have been devastated by natural disasters, unprecedented droughts, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Development funds are allocated, as you know, to a wide range of programs that include health, education, job creation, etc.

It may come, though, as somewhat of a surprise to learn that most of the employees at USAID are not American citizens. Over 5,000 of our employees are what we term "Foreign Service Nationals"—that is, they are citizens of the country in which we are operating. They are the backbone of our missions overseas, especially in the Muslim countries, and they are regarded among our richest assets. They often work in some of the most dangerous and forbidding regions—regions that our expatriates cannot go into.

Last year, the agency lost two of these heroes. One was assassinated by terrorists in Baghdad for simply working for our USAID mission. The other, Dr. Bijan Acharya, worked for our USAID/Nepal office and was an environmental officer there for more than

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Grieco with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 313.

a decade. He died last year in a helicopter crash traveling to a site to conduct public diplomacy and outreach on a project in the Himalayas.

Many Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), in the agency go on to serve their countries in important government roles. For example, Dr. Mohammed Mubaid used to work at the USAID mission in West Bank/Gaza doing democracy and governance programming. Today Dr. Mubaid is one of the most prominent leaders in Palestinian civil society. He successfully led the largest ever civil society and democracy-strengthening project ever done in the West Bank and Gaza during a very challenging and politically sensitive time. He established and worked together to strengthen the capacity of over 100 other Palestinian civil society organizations throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Our engagement with FSNs is a capacity-building measure of a wholly different sort. Our hope, though, is that we will not forget the public diplomacy benefit that we gain from them and we will not forget to engage, empower, and support that effort.

The Department of State has the lead in America's public diplomacy activities. They have direct authority over the communications vehicles that the United States has at its hands, including the full range of public affairs, international information programs, and educational and cultural programs that Mr. Curtin has summarized. USAID's authorities in this regard are a little more narrowly drawn, but not fully exploited as of yet.

Section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires us to clearly identify to foreign audiences where we are working, that the assistance is "American aid." USAID's role in public diplomacy has been focused on telling America's foreign assistance story to the world. However, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, USAID decided to expand its activities under this authorization in several ways:

First, we organized and implemented a new comprehensive U.S. branding and marking effort across the foreign assistance landscape. I will be discussing each of these points briefly.

Second, we established a professional and trained communications field capacity that we never had before.

Third, we developed and produced a targeted public affairs/information campaign in targeted countries that receive U.S. foreign assistance.

Let me first talk about the branding and marking. This has come up even this morning in the Secretary's testimony at the Senate appropriation Committee on Foreign Operations (SACFO) hearing.

USAID has established detailed policies and regulations and guidelines for marking and publicizing our assistance to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer receives full credit for the assistance that we are delivering overseas. USAID has established a universal brand that conveys that the assistance is from the American people. To help focus this image abroad, USAID, under the supervision of our administrator, developed a new brand that was updating our traditional USAID logo or seal, and combined it with a new U.S. foreign assistance brand name and a tagline. We have provided a sample of one of our humanitarian flour bags. You can see how the new branding looks. It says in big, bold letters, "From the American People." This campaign included the development of clearer

graphic identities and other assistance in terms of graphic standards manuals that helped the field to understand how to implement the changed rules.

In January 2006, we revised the foreign assistance regulations at the agency to include new branding and marking requirements for USAID staff and all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive funding either through grants or cooperative agreements. These regulations require that all of our programs, all of our projects, our activities, our public communications, our commodities, whether they be partially or fully funded by a USAID grant or cooperative agreement, must now be marked appropriately overseas. USAID's Food for Peace program, which is our Public Law 480 humanitarian food assistance program that is feeding Darfur and many other regions, also has requirements for marking on all of the food bags and other materials that go in. The regulations require that, to the maximum extent practical, public recognition be given that Title II-funded commodities have been "provided through the friendship of the American people as food for peace."

Overall, the agency believes that the marking and branding effort that we have undertaken has finally brought credit in the field, and we see that on our trips for the foreign assistance generosity that the American people have bestowed. Just a quick example is the Pew Research study that was done after the tsunami in Southeast Asia where they stated that the U.S. tsunami aid effort was widely hailed there, with over 79 percent of Indonesians saying they have a more favorable view of the United States now as a result of the relief efforts and having seen the relief efforts on television and in other ways.

Second, talking about USAID's new field capacity, in 2004, in order to improve the public knowledge of our foreign assistance in developing countries, we established new communications guidelines for the agency and began building a network of over 100 communications specialists located at each of our missions around the world. Their job is to help promote the foreign assistance message abroad and to serve as a key humanitarian and development assistance content provider to the Department of State. These specialists are complementary to the State Department's public affairs officers in the field. They oversee the agency's branding and marking efforts; they provide vital coordination with the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs offices; they provide content for the Ambassador and other VIP representatives' speeches on various foreign assistance matters; and, more importantly, they provide well-written and understandable local language support and cultural support for our activities.

Third, our targeted public affairs campaigns. Another pilot activity that was funded by USAID headquarters was conducted by our mission in the West Bank and Gaza. In late 2004, we concluded that efforts to increase awareness among Palestinians of U.S. foreign assistance could potentially achieve a measurable, positive change in the awareness of the populations toward the United States. In November 2004, our research showed that only 5 percent of Palestinians were even aware that the American people provided assistance to the Palestinian people. USAID designed a first-ever comprehensive public affairs campaign. We designed a combination

of television, radio, print, and billboard advertising. The campaign was designed to highlight and explain how American assistance was provided to the Palestinian people and to tie that assistance directly to a core theme of the focus groups that we ran in advance of the campaign. The tag lines that we had in this West Bank/Gaza campaign read, "From One Human Being to Another: U.S. Aid From the American People."

In April and May 2005, the campaign was launched. The public opinion research we conducted shortly thereafter by an independent public opinion polling agency demonstrated the effectiveness of this kind of campaign. Over 46 percent of the Palestinians that were surveyed said they saw the advertising; 54 percent of the Palestinians surveyed confirmed they now had awareness of contributions of the United States to the well-being of their people and to the development of the West Bank and Gaza; 33 percent could now identify—which is a pretty big number—that the United States was now their largest donor for West Bank and Gaza affairs; this is also a very big number for us: 61 percent of the respondents indicated that their views toward the American people had become more positive because of the campaign.

We have undertaken similar pilot campaigns now. We funded a pilot activity in Indonesia following the tsunami. In Jordan, we did a modest public affairs campaign using print ads and bulk e-mails in 2006 and 2007, and that resulted in over half of Jordanians polled showing that they were aware that the United States was the largest provider. That is the largest recognition level of any bilateral donor.

With these modest public affairs pilot projects overseas, we have shown at the agency than you can have United States aid efforts have a meaningful impact on public opinion, both towards the U.S. Government and towards the American people. What has proved successful for us is: Using generally accepted commercial advertising practices, which in the government sometimes may be difficult; tailoring our public affairs campaigns to individual audiences with carefully tested messages; using local firms to do the production and the advertising who know the local environment and know the cultural issues involved; and, lastly, using standard private sector practices of monitoring, polling, and focus group follow-up.

In closing, Under Secretary Karen Hughes likes to say that she views her job every day as "waging peace." The word "waging" is used deliberately, she says, because she believes we have to be very intentional about what we are doing in our public diplomacy activities.

I hope this testimony makes clear that USAID is waging peace every day in the field and that we are taking very proactive steps to brand, mark, communicate, and inform our audiences about how our humanitarian and our development assistance from the American people is helping them every day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Grieco. That was very interesting. Obviously, foreign aid programs begin for a host of reasons, but insofar as American credibility and the attitude toward America in foreign countries, particularly in this case predominantly

Arab or Muslim countries, the better the attitude is toward us, presumably the less appeal there will be for radicalization. So I am really intrigued and encouraged that you have done some before-and-after surveying and that you find that the branding and marketing you have done has worked. I appreciate that.

Mr. CURTIN, USAID is out there in the way described trying to do good, but also to create a more positive attitude generally toward America. How do we confront the competitive challenge of al-Qaeda and the other Islamist extremists? At the same time that this general attempt by the United States to help develop more positive feelings toward us is going on, how do we try to intervene in the negative campaign to poison the minds of people in the Islamic world against the United States and against everybody who does not follow their extreme views?

Mr. CURTIN. In the public diplomacy context, the first step we try to take is to offer an alternative vision, and some of that is the sort of thing that Mr. Grieco was talking about. We offer them opportunities that they might not have in their lives to focus on the future instead of a message of death and hatred.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. How do you do that?

Mr. CURTIN. Well, through offering education programs, through programs like the English teaching programs which the State Department sponsors, training programs that USAID fosters through some of our NGO partners, but also basic things like digging wells. I mean, Mr. Grieco digs the wells and we talk about them. But it is not only a matter of image. It is not only a matter of making sure people know what we are doing, although that is an important part of it, but it is actually putting in place things that can change people's lives.

The terrorists' messages per se, which tend to be introduced in a small way through the Internet or otherwise and then spread through more traditional media, especially television, we are trying to confront directly through some of our programs like our Digital Outreach Team, which—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In those same media?

Mr. CURTIN. Not in the extremist media, but in, for lack of a better term, mainstream Arabic media—Internet, television.

One of the things Under Secretary Hughes has done is to insist that our people are out there appearing on television, including in Arabic. Ambassador Djerejian made the point in the study about public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world. The first thing is to be in the conversation. If you are not there, you cannot have an effect. So we are there now, I would say, in a way that we have never been before. But we also have to be engaged across the board. There are no single answers. There is broadcasting, there is Internet, which is our area. We send speakers out. We send Muslim Americans out.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you reach out into the mosques, which we know in some cases are centers of the radicalization?

Mr. CURTIN. We do. We do not send people to preach.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. CURTIN. But we send Muslim Americans to go into the mosque communities and engage with Muslims overseas. That approach comes from a very specific incident that Under Secretary

Hughes encountered in Germany with a Turkish woman. Under Secretary Hughes asked her, "Can I come and visit your community?" And this woman said, "No. We don't invite our government there. Why would we invite an American Government official?" "Well, what if we sent Muslim-American citizens?" And the Turkish woman said, "Yes, that person would be welcome." And we do that. We do that on a fairly broad scale.

It is not to say this is right, this is wrong, but to tell people about America so that we can overcome some of the negative images they are painting.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Now, you have a harder job doing what Mr. Grieco did or USAID does with polling before and after. But how do you determine whether these programs are working?

Mr. CURTIN. We have taken seriously the need for evaluation. In our exchange programs in particular, we have what I think is a good process for measuring the effects of exchange and educational programs and it has been going on for a couple of years. It is through interviews before, during, after; interviews with groups that are not participating so we have a standard. And with our OMB process, which requires us to have evaluation programs, that specific evaluation process has been judged very highly, among the top in the government.

We are trying to develop now ways to measure, in similar fashion, our information programs. We are doing studies for American Corners, which is one of our programs. We are going to undertake them with our hard language Web sites. Honestly, we are less well along in that process than we have been in other areas, but we do take it serious, and we are applying expertise in that area. We have a separate office now for public diplomacy evaluation. I have an office in my bureau that does it too.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I happened to have a meeting this morning with a man—not an American—who has been active in international efforts to combat terrorism, and I asked him, "Just step back globally, how do you think we are doing?" And he said, "I think we are doing much better at protecting the borders, at coordinating international intelligence, at some of the homeland security measures that have been taken." He said, "But what we have not figured out yet how to do is public diplomacy." And he acknowledged that it is a totally different realm than the other work.

How would you respond to that?

Mr. CURTIN. I would never want to say we are satisfied, but I think, in fact, that we have put into place a number of very strong and meaningful programs on the information side, the education side, and exchanges and otherwise. It is a new ball game. Even though September 11, 2001, was 6 years ago, we are playing on a very different field from the Cold War. It is a much more competitive international information environment.

If we look at the polls, we are not doing very well at all, but I think we have to take those snapshots in time and also snapshots in place. And we take them seriously, but I do not think it is a good measure of how well we are doing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Thank you. My time is up on this round. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Mr. Poncy, I was particularly interested in your testimony about the use of certain Islamic charities as conduits for terrorism financing. Back in 2003 and 2004, I chaired a series of hearings looking at terrorism financing, and I remember in particular a report from the Council on Foreign Relations that found that individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia were the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda.

I was struck, as I listened to your testimony, by the difficulty in dealing with Islamic charities which may have a dual purpose. In other words, some of these charities may well be conduits for charitable contributions and for good works, and yet may also be a source of funding for terrorists' activities. And that dual purpose makes it very difficult to counter the terrorism financing aspects because these charities at the same time are doing some good works for the Muslim community.

Could you talk a little more about how you are countering donations to charities that may be doing good, legitimate charitable works at the same time they are supporting terrorist attacks?

Mr. PONCY. Thank you, Senator. I think you have put your finger on the most challenging aspect of this component of our terrorist financing strategy, which is the charities that we are talking about that are engaged in terrorist financing are not charities that live in a black-and-white universe. Out of the 44 charities that we have designated since September 11, 2001, on account of terrorist financing activity, I am not familiar with a single charity out of that group that was actually not engaged in some charitable assistance. So if we look at—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You have designated them as supporting terrorist activities?

Mr. PONCY. Exactly. We have subjected 44 different charitable organizations to sanction under our Executive Order 13224, but none of these charities was exclusively engaged in terrorist financing activity. Every one of these was engaged also in legitimate charitable assistance, and that is exactly the difficulty that we are facing.

So, again, I think the way that we can combat this most effectively is first by education, explaining to the donor communities, to the charitable communities, and to the Muslim-American communities that this is the nature of the problem we face. And, therefore, if you see the U.S. Government and its allies taking steps to shut down these charities, then a defense cannot be, well, these charities actually were engaged in some charitable assistance, because that is not the issue. The issue is whether or not these charities are, in fact, engaging in terrorist support. They may be doing a number of other things, some of which may be laudable. But the view that we have always taken is that if any aspect of a charity's organization is engaged in terrorist support, then the charitable organization is a problem.

Now, it does raise operational issues as to whether or not we can look at minimizing collateral damage when we look at shutting down a charity that may be engaged in legitimate work in addition to terrorist financing support, and that is a very difficult challenge. I would say that our approach so far has been to look behind the charity, at the individuals in addition to the organization, and at

those branches of international organizations that may be engaged in this and to try to get an analysis that allows us to distinguish potentially those elements that may not be engaged versus those that are engaged. And in some instances, for example, we have been able to designate an entire global network of charities. Al-Haramain is a good example. In other instances, we have only gone after certain branches. IIR is an example of that.

So it will just depend on where we see the abuse happening, but going back to the outreach to the sector, it has to start with a fundamental recognition of the problem, which is the complicated mix that you have alluded to, rather than the unfortunate fiction that there are charities that pretend to be charities and are not, and there are charities that actually just do charitable work.

Senator COLLINS. And, in fact, the vast majority of the ones that are problems are doing both.

Mr. PONCY. Exactly.

Senator COLLINS. And I do think that makes this so challenging, and that is what our hearing showed when we had this series of hearings in 2003 and 2004. And it sounds like the situation is much the same now.

If you move to close down a branch of a charity because you know that it is a conduit to terrorists and is providing financing, and yet in the community, the local community's eyes, that charity is doing all good works, providing a community center, programming, a health clinic, I think that makes the case for why outreach and having a relationship with the community is absolutely vital, because otherwise all you are going to get is suspicion about the actions our government is taking and a feeling that something good is being taken away from the community rather than, in fact, that it is something that is a source of evil.

Mr. Curtin, you mentioned in your testimony the Digital Outreach Team that is engaged in Arabic language forums and chat rooms, and that certainly is very helpful. The previous hearing we held looking at the use of the Internet was very illuminating as far as what kinds of radical messages you could access on the Internet, including—and I just found this horrifying—explicit and accurate instructions on how to shoot down a helicopter.

I am, however, concerned about the level of resources that we have dedicated to that task of the Digital Outreach Team. How many people do you actually have engaged in this?

Mr. CURTIN. The team itself has three people on it. It is brand new. It is backed up by our broader Arabic team and we are expanding it now, practically as I speak, to 10 people. But we are also—through this Counterterrorism Communication Center which I mentioned, of which the Digital Outreach Team will be part—connecting to DOD in a more operational way so we will be able to draw on their resources.

But it is a very small operation. We want to expand it more. We hope we will be able to do that through the supplemental appropriations, first of all. But it is an effort to get inside people's heads. Instead of just spouting—not that we spout talking points—but instead of just making speeches to them, we will get into conversations and rebut what they are talking about. I am optimistic that

it will have an impact over time. We are starting and I think it is going to make a difference over time.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I think that is absolutely critical, and it is an effort that we should fully fund and not shortchange. I know initially you had only two people involved. I am glad it is up to three.

Mr. CURTIN. Well, there are two analysts, but it is run by a Foreign Service Officer who knows the policy and is very careful about what we are saying, even though we say it more informally than we normally would.

Senator COLLINS. It is just if you look at those sites and you look at the prevalence of the Internet in our society today, and that it is a means of radicalization and recruitment, that does not involve, as the Chairman said, having to go to Pakistan for training or even face-to-face contact at all, it seems that it would be foolhardy for us not to invest in countermeasures, and that is certainly an important one.

Mr. CURTIN. If I might just say, what we are doing is one level and it is a public diplomacy response. There are other agencies that are very heavily involved in these issues.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins.

Mr. Poncy, let me ask you a few follow-up questions. Of the 44 charities that the Federal Government has sanctioned since September 11, 2001, because they are, to some extent, involved in terrorist financing, are any of them effectively subdivisions or wholly owned subsidiaries of a terrorist organization abroad?

Mr. PONCY. The relationship between the charities and the terrorist organizations is very much fact specific, but the general theme that we have seen is that these charities operate as an essential element of the organization. One way to look at this historically that some countries have adopted and that we have resisted is to look at terrorist organizations and to try to distinguish—break the organization down into different components: A political party, a militant wing, a social services and charitable organization component. And we have resisted that, and we have very strongly advocated to our partners overseas that that sort of a division with terrorist organizations does not work for a couple of reasons.

The fact that the money is fungible to the extent that you are giving money for the social welfare services of a terrorist organization, it frees up money to build bombs and conduct militant activity.

There is also a level of control with respect to these organizations, and, again, it will differ by organization and by the facts of particular charities. But the level of control that a terrorist organization exerts across all elements of its operations, including its charitable operations.

So those are the facts that we look at.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So I assume, therefore, that of the charities that you have closed, certain ones had a unique and close relationship to, for instance, Hezbollah or Hamas.

Mr. PONCY. Absolutely.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So these are not charities that started out as legitimate charities and then just started inadvertently to contribute to terrorist-related organizations, correct?

Mr. PONCY. The fact patterns are most often where terrorist organizations actually establish these charities.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. PONCY. That does not always happen. Sometimes you can see a charity or a particular branch become infiltrated through management—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Yes, that is very important. And, obviously, they are playing on the good will or ethnic identity of people that they are trying to raise money from. But the connection, therefore, between the local charities, American-based charities, and foreign terrorist groups is knowing. I mean, they are not being duped by, for example, Hamas or Hezbollah. They intend to support them. Correct?

Mr. PONCY. That is certainly our view of it.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Let me just ask you very briefly about your outreach to the American-Muslim, and American-Arab communities? What is the purpose of it? Is it to explain why you have sanctioned the 44 organizations? Is it to say that we think these 44 are up to a lot of no good but there are others, obviously, in your community that are OK and so—we know that giving charity is one of the great sort of religious mandates of Islam—if you want to fulfill that religious responsibility, there are a lot better ways to do it? Or is it to gain information that will help you determine whether to take action?

Mr. PONCY. The way that we have conducted all of our outreach I think is under an umbrella, a very broad objective, which would be to assimilate, to integrate the Islamic community, the Arab-American community into American society, into the global economy, not just through our engagement on terrorist financing issues, but more broadly. There are other elements of the Treasury Department that are engaged in economic dialogue on financial markets, etc., that attempt to integrate more than anything.

Our engagement on the terrorist financing issues, it really goes back to the four fundamental points that we consistently find are not evident out in these Islamic, Muslim-American communities. One, the fact that the U.S. Government does support charity, as self-evident as that seems, I think the numbers from Mr. Grieco, my colleague over at AID, are telling. There are, in my view, a surprising number of people that are not aware that the U.S. Government, in addition to the American people, are among the most generous sources of charity in the world.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. PONCY. So just that is a fundamental message that we take to the community.

Second, the nature of the abuse that we have been talking about, what Senator Collins was referencing in terms of the mixed bag that we find in these charities, that is often a surprise. There is an assumption that there is this black-and-white picture, and it never is black and white. And that does help with the third point, which is to explain why the U.S. Government acts the way we do when we see these problems and the fact that if a charity is en-

gaged in legitimate services in addition to financing terrorism, that is not a defense. That also can be surprising to the broader community.

And then, last, the very good work that we can do if we are working together, and I think that the guidance that we have put together from the Treasury Department with the Muslim-American community and the charitable sector about what are the steps they can take to avoid this typology from happening to them, to protect their operations, not only with their own organizations but, frankly, with their overseas recipients, and what should they be looking for, what kind of questions should they be asking, that kind of information is now available through our guidance that we were not able to put together but for working closely with the charitable sector and the community.

So those four elements would be really the touchstone of our outreach.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Miller, let me ask you a similar question. Obviously, since September 11, 2001, was one of the main missions of the FBI—and we have invested a lot of money in beefing up your ability to do this—has been to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, here in the United States particularly. Can you explain for us how the Bureau's outreach programs to the American-Arab and American-Muslim communities support that mission? And you have described a lot of the context, which has been quite impressive. But what is the purpose? Is it to, in the most direct law enforcement sense, gain information, and even to engage informants? Is it to just have an understanding of what we are about, that the government is not anti-Muslim, it is anti-Islamist terrorists? Tell me what the purpose is and how it relates to the mission?

Mr. MILLER. It is to try and open the doors to the FBI to a community where, as I have indicated—and I think we all understand—there is a certain level of suspicion from the fallout in the post-September 11, 2001, world. I think I would also separate those two issues.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which two?

Mr. MILLER. When you mix community outreach with informant development, you almost doom both to failure. There are people at the FBI who are very skilled at developing sources and informants, sources in their communities of interest, whether it is Chinese espionage, organized crime, or terrorism, informants as they develop through their cases. And they will continue to do that. Community outreach is to develop better citizens who have a confidence in their government, and particularly their FBI.

The corollary I would use is if a person is walking down the street and they see two guys in hooded sweatshirts running out of a bank with a big bag with money signs on it and one is stuffing a gun in his pants and jumps into a car and gets away, we all expect that person to walk to the phone on the corner and call 911.

One of the difficulties we have in engaging some communities is when they are more suspicious of or afraid of the FBI or their government than they are of what they are seeing in the community, we do not have that dialogue. We are pushing very hard to try and allay those suspicions, to try and relax those tensions by becoming

more transparent more accessible, and accessing the community on a more grassroots level, not just the national groups here in Washington—that is very helpful—but in the street. So when somebody turns to somebody in the community and says, “I think I am concerned about something, and I want to tell somebody, but I am afraid to just call up. Do you know somebody?” That person they turn to might have been in the CREST program, a citizens academy, and now have a face and a name at the FBI that they have a bond of trust with, some confidence in that they will go to. That is part of the goal of this program.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very interesting. I am just going to ask Senator Collins’ indulgence to ask one more related question, which is, as I listen to your testimony, it is hard not to draw the conclusion, which probably is surprising to most people, that it is the FBI that has the most extensive contact of any agency in the Federal Government with the American-Arab and American-Muslim communities. Do you think that is right? I cannot think of another off-hand.

Mr. MILLER. I would say that we are operating at a certain advantage because, among agencies at this table and other agencies now, we have 56 field offices and 104 resident agencies (RAs).

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, exactly. Right.

Mr. MILLER. Over the last 2 years, seeking to leverage those field components into this discussion, to activate them, to monitor them, to push them, I think we have positioned ourselves that way. But I have to say quickly after that, when we go to a community meeting, a town hall event, the questions that come back at us come from communities that look at the government as a monolith.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MILLER. And Steve Tidwell, our Assistant Director in charge of the Los Angeles office, only half-jokingly has a sign for community meetings that says, “I don’t do foreign policy.” Eventually, the questions go beyond FBI issues into immigration issues, into Treasury issues, State Department issues, and then into foreign policy. They want the FBI official there as a U.S. Government official to defend our policies with Israel and answer to those concerns for that community.

So what we have sought to do—and Mr. Poncy is nodding because I have pulled him into this, and he has pulled me into Treasury’s—is when we hold these meetings, even if they are not in Washington, we try to get the component agencies to get somebody to go out and be at the big long table at the front of the room. So rather than blow off those questions by saying, “Well, that is not an FBI issue,” we are able to say, “Well, we have the right person here.” And that is a further part of that development of opening channels to the government from people that we are going to want to hear from.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ideally, the hope would be that with this kind of outreach—and maybe it should be augmented by other groups in building these bridges, you may actually be doing something to reduce the possibility that the people in that community will become radicalized and fall into the path that these six in New Jersey apparently did.

I am going to stop there and yield to Senator Collins, and you have a lot of time now. It is part of a balance-of-payments system.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I actually just have one final question that I want to raise with Mr. Miller, and it follows along with the conversation that you just had with our Chairman. We have heard of the great success that the Los Angeles FBI field office has had with developing relationships with Muslim and Arab communities in the region. And you mentioned that you have 56 offices; each of them is required to establish outreach programs.

Give us your assessment of that effort nationwide. It clearly is going well in L.A. What about in other communities with large Muslim populations, such as Detroit, for example?

Mr. MILLER. I think the Detroit office—and that is an obvious one for the reasons you point out—even before September 11, 2001, had that level of engagement and has a very good relationship. Dan Roberts, the former SAC, or special agent in charge, of the Detroit office, has been very engaged. And even to the extent in charity cases where they have had to execute search warrants, they have brought in community leaders and briefed them very quickly, and they have kind of graded their procedures in such a way to maintain community relations when they do enforcement actions out of sensitivity.

I think when you look at 56 field offices or 104 RAs, you are going to see some have a large community, some have a small community. What we found was, because the community was off to itself and fairly quiet, some were not aware of their community before we engaged them on the video teleconferences with the community leaders, and they said, “We do not really have any issues here.” And one of the community leaders said, “Well, do you know about this neighborhood? It is just 10 miles outside the city, but it is part of your area.” So we created that awareness or stimulated that awareness and engaged.

In the smaller offices, we urged them to use the citizens academy because it is a good way to bring people in and then to get them to go forth and share that message. In the larger offices, we asked them to step up to something much closer to what L.A. and Washington do with the advisory boards and the regular meetings with the same individuals.

Senator COLLINS. Have these outreach efforts had an impact on recruitment, since obviously the Bureau does not have as many Arabic speakers or Muslim field agents as you would like?

Mr. MILLER. I do not think we can see the full effects of it because we have only nationally realigned and focused this really in the last just under 2 years, starting in December 2005. But I think when you see the recruitment of our linguists in the Arabic languages and the other dialects, it has been going very well and continues; 95 percent of them are native speakers, not people who learned the language to get a job. That is working.

We still have a lot of work to do on the special agent side of that, but I think that these programs as they go forward are making the FBI more attractive to those people who may start off with a town hall meeting, maybe attend a CREST, end up in a citizens academy, and leave saying, “I should be with these people.”

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, and let me just end my questions by echoing Senator Lieberman's praise of the Bureau. The case at Fort Dix really is heartening because it was an alert, average citizen who brought the information to the attention of local law enforcement, which in turn turned it over to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. It was our hope when we created or encouraged the creation of the Joint Terrorism Task Force that we would have that kind of cooperation and synergies among all levels of government, and in this case it appears to truly have happened. And I really believe that is key to our successful efforts in dealing with homegrown terrorism as well.

Mr. MILLER. I thank you for that, Senator, and if you will allow me, I would like to add that we have seen that. We have seen in the Toledo case, a member of the community came forward. We have seen in the Miami case, it was a member of the community, and specifically a member of the Muslim community who came forward, even though the group behind the plot was not a Muslim group. And we see that again here. So we know those efforts are having some effect.

Senator COLLINS. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Mr. Miller, let me build on this. I want to ask you whether there are any conclusions we can draw from the Fort Dix case or other information you have about the trend lines in homegrown terrorism. And I come back to what I said in my opening statement, which I think is still largely true from my experience, that America's best defense to terrorism by Americans is America.

We were shaken by the fact that the subway bombings in London, of course, were carried out by British—a lot of them British citizens, certainly long-time residents, who turned against the government, and the facile American response is, "Well, they have never been allowed to really integrate into British society, but that is different here." Yet we saw in this case that these were immigrants to the country, three here illegally, three not, who were seen ostensibly to be making their way up in America and yet got radicalized and were allegedly planning this terrorist act.

From the large interaction that the Bureau has with the American-Arab and American-Muslim communities, should we expect more homegrown terrorist acts?

Mr. MILLER. I think if you look at the cases of the last couple of years, let's say starting on August 31, 2005, with the Torrance case, followed by the case in Toledo, followed by the case in Miami, up through the case in Atlanta where you had the connections between those two operators and the group in Canada, and then others in London and in Denmark, through the case in mid-December with Derrick Shareef, in Chicago, planning the hand-grenade bombings of the mall, you see a certain tempo of activity, of U.S.-based, self-initiating, self-radicalizing, self-financing groups coming together.

Now, when you look at them within the context of the larger Muslim population, there is a very few number of individuals. So the questions that we ask are—and now we ask them again and in a different way with the Fort Dix case—where did they become radicalized, how did they become radicalized.

If you go back to the incident you cited, the July 7, 2005 bombings, the House of Commons report concluded, after a pretty good look at the circumstances of the individuals, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, some of them second-generation British citizens—

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. That there was no accurate profile across the cases that said that this is the type of person or the single set of dynamics that will cause radicalization.

If you pull up the Torrance case as an example, what you see is a mix. You have a piece of prison radicalization involving Kevin Lamar James and prisonmate, Levar Haney Washington, who then gets out of jail. But when he gets out of jail, he does not recruit fellow criminals. He goes to people, one of whom is already a Muslim, the other of whom is a fairly recent convert, but both of whom have no predisposition towards criminal activity, and he takes them through a path of radicalization. So you see a mix there of several different themes.

We are looking hard at this. We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the larger intelligence community and the Director of National Intelligence to try and figure out if there are a set of models or anything that will tell us better where to lay those tripwires to look for people who are going over the line from radical ideas, which is legal in a free society, and encouraged, to going operational and finding where to set those tripwires has been a daunting and amorphous task.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, you anticipated exactly the question I was going to ask, and you are absolutely right, it is very important to say it, always, that we are talking about a very small number of people, a very small percentage of the American-Arab or American-Muslim communities. But obviously, as we found on September 11, 2001, it only took 19 people, a small number of people, to wreak havoc on our country and really change our sense of ourselves for a long time. And I suppose ideally—I am thinking of this not from a law enforcement point of view, because I think you have got a lot set up now to deal with that, as the string of cases you have broken reveals, but in the ideal world you would be able to follow the profile and do something to prevent the radicalization of those individuals, almost like the work that is being done in medical science to try to find a mutated gene that will create cancer and get in there and affect that gene before it does.

Mr. MILLER. Well, let me first say, Mr. Chairman, we are not there yet.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MILLER. But we have started down that path. I think as Mr. Curtin said, part of it is a competing message. That is probably the bulwark behind our community outreach program. Part of the competing message is that the FBI is there for the community and should be considered with confidence and trust. That involves transparency of the FBI. Keeping that separate from source development, I think, as we discussed, is key also. But the engagement on the community level in the towns I think is for the FBI's standpoint as a law enforcement organization probably as close as we will get to that while we continue to look at the model.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just a few more questions. One of the responsibilities of this Committee is governmental organization, so I need to ask whether you, Mr. Miller, and you, Mr. Poncy, coordinate what you are doing in any way.

Mr. MILLER. It is a closely coordinated conspiracy. [Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. In the public interest.

Mr. MILLER. I am sure that Mr. Poncy is tired of being hauled over to the FBI. We do not have any short meetings on this subject.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. MILLER. Our last engagement, we had Mr. Poncy and then people from the Terrorist Screening Center and DHS sit through the meeting with the community leaders and the director, which takes a little more than an hour, and then adjourn to a rest-of-the-day meeting where we identified the action items. We have a habit in government, Mr. Chairman, of having meetings, writing down lists, and then going away, and the next meeting is in 6 months.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I have noticed that.

Mr. MILLER. So we wanted to take action items out of that room and then sit down with the other component agencies and work through them. The privacy officer from the Terrorist Screening Center stayed through the day. The deputy there stayed through half the day but had to leave for another meeting. Mr. Poncy was there and stayed until the last bitter question and came up with a list of things that, come the next meeting—and this is a two-way street. When we come up with action items for them, we will go back into the community and try to float this balloon, ask these questions, help us on recruiting and so on, think of a program. Would it be an FBI camp for kids, more engagement with an organization like the Boy Scouts or a youth organization?

When we come back together, we are all expected to have the answers to that.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Curtin and Mr. Grieco, I assume that the key person in the Federal Government for outreach outside of the United States, to the Arab and Muslim world is Under Secretary Hughes.

Mr. CURTIN. That is right, on the public diplomacy side, and our embassies are engaged in many different ways, including with USAID, with Muslim communities or communities all around the world, including countries with significant Muslim population, but it is the Under Secretary.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you all interact, that is, those of you who are involved in public diplomacy abroad and people like Mr. Miller and Mr. Poncy who are outreaching to the Arab-American and American-Muslim community here?

Mr. CURTIN. The State Department has not been part of the same formal process that they are talking about. We do talk to one another on particular issues. We do have outreach to the American-Muslim communities to hear what they are thinking about.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Through your office and Under Secretary Hughes?

Mr. CURTIN. Through Under Secretary Hughes, and my office does in order to help us—get them to help us to engage Muslim communities overseas. So we are not formally part of their process, but we do talk to one another, in fact.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Based on your experience abroad—and I know these are two very different worlds, the world of the American-Arab and American-Muslim community and the world of the international Muslim community. But do you have any counsel to give your colleagues or to us about what the Federal Government can wisely do to try to prevent more radicalization within the American-Muslim community?

Mr. CURTIN. I do not really have certainly counsel to offer this esteemed group and my colleagues. But one thing I would say, for us in public diplomacy the key word has always been “engagement.” And it seems to me that what we see with the Treasury and the FBI is centered on engagement, so that we know whom we are dealing with, we know what they are thinking about, we know what their concerns are, and we know what their perspective is. And overseas it is critical that we know what the people in different countries are thinking about and how they are looking at us because, as you know, it is very different. People in different countries look at the world in different ways from the way Americans do. And I think it is true in the United States. We have such a mix of people.

So I would say more of the same as far as my own limited knowledge of what the FBI and the Treasury are doing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I thank you all. We are living, as I said, in a post-September 11, 2001, world, which is a different world for us here in America and for the rest of the world, and we are asking the kinds of questions that we have not asked before. I appreciate what you are doing in this outreach and also in using the law enforcement tools that you had and that you have been given since September 11, 2001. I think you have used them very effectively to protect our freedom and our security here at home.

We are going to leave the record of this hearing open for 10 days if you want to add anything or we want to submit questions. I am actually going to send you a question in writing, this is the kind of question that the Federal Government employees love to have us ask, which is: You are doing such a critical mission, whose importance we saw just in the last few days. What are the one or two things more you need to better carry out the mission that we are asking you to carry out in our interest?

Senator COLLINS, do you want to add anything more?

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to join you in thanking our witnesses not only for their testimony today, but also for their very important work. Again, I appreciate your leadership on this issue. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Well, you began it when you were Chairman.

I thank everybody for being here. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:34 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning and welcome to this fourth hearing in the Homeland Security Committee's ongoing investigation of Islamist radicalization within the United States.

The goals of these hearings are four in number, as I see them: First, to determine the extent of Islamist radicalization within the United States; second, to learn how and why radicalization occurs; third, to ask what can be done to counter the extremist message that incites its recruits to violence; and, fourth, to assure that our government is doing everything it can to prevent Islamist extremists from carrying out violent attacks against the American people from within our country.

With today's hearing, which is titled "Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience," we look across the Atlantic Ocean for advice and guidance from those on the front lines of the battle against terrorism in Europe, as well as those who have studied it there and here in the United States.

We will be hearing also from the co-authors of a new report on the integration of Muslims into American society who, I believe, will compare and contrast their findings about the Muslim-American community with communities in Europe.

Let me welcome our witnesses and thank them for taking the time and, in the case of our two European distinguished visitors, making the effort to join us today to offer their testimony and answer our questions.

The witnesses are: Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, France's leading magistrate for counterterrorism; Lidewijde Ongering, Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands; Dr. Marc Sageman, leading American researcher on global Islamist extremism; and Lynn Martin and Farooq Kathwari, co-chairs of the Task Force on Muslim American Civil and Political Engagement, which was created by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

We look to Europe today because European nations have experienced over the last several years a sharp growth in “homegrown terrorism,” terrorism that—while it may be inspired by the same ideology that has fueled the atrocities of al-Qaeda—has been perpetrated by individuals born and raised within Europe.

Research tends to show that, overall, European populations have thus far been more susceptible to Islamist radicalization than those in the United States, but that may be changing. And that is one of the questions that we want to ask. The bombing attacks in London, the killing of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and the Madrid train bombings in 2004 all were either carried out exclusively by or aided by homegrown terrorists.

Many other Islamist terrorist plots have been disrupted across Western Europe, thanks to aggressive law enforcement and excellent intelligence, including the extraordinary attempt to blow up airliners on the way to the United States from the United Kingdom last summer, which, of course, thankfully was stopped.

We look to Europe because of the decisive steps that governments there have taken to address these threats. Just as we created the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of September 11, 2001, and its dreadful attacks, European governments have altered their structures, policies, and procedures to adapt to the new threat. We hope today to learn from your experiences and your successes.

We in the United States cannot ignore the warning signs within our Nation. Homegrown Islamist extremists have recently been arrested and accused of forming plans to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey, and in a separate case to set ablaze the underground aviation fuel lines that feed JFK Airport in New York.

These are just the most recent examples. Since September 11, 2001, the fact is that a significant number of terrorist plots have been thwarted by American law enforcement, often working with our allies throughout the world, particularly in Europe.

There was a recent Pew Center report on Muslims in America which gave us new and unsettling reasons to be concerned about the threat of Islamist radicalization in the United States. The poll showed that, among Muslims in America between the ages of 18 and 29, 26 percent said there were times that suicide bombings may be justified. A shocking 5 percent of American-Muslim adults 18 and over had a favorable opinion of al-Qaeda; another 16 percent had a somewhat unfavorable view; and a puzzling 27 percent had no opinion at all.

These numbers are profoundly troubling, of course, because September 11, 2001, showed us that it takes only a handful of committed terrorists, in that case 19, to carry out a devastating attack. And the recent arrest of the alleged Fort Dix and JFK plotters shows that thanks to modern media, like the Internet, these homegrown terrorists do not need to meet with an al-Qaeda operative or journey to a terrorist training camp faraway from the United States to plan attacks against Americans from within America. They can now become fully radicalized on virtual networks by just sitting at their computers. That is why it is important, as I said at the beginning, to understand how people become radicalized so

that we can counter that process, if at all possible, before it turns into action.

I would say finally that the evidence that I have cited, while some of it is very unsettling, is not cause for panic. It is not a time to panic or divide. It is, rather, a time to unite and defend the freedoms that we cherish here in the United States of America and, of course, among our allies in Europe.

I look forward to hearing our panel's thoughts on these questions, and, again, I thank you all for joining us today.

Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we have gotten a late start today because of our classified briefing that both of us attended. Your opening statement, as usual, gave an excellent overview of our investigation and the hearing today. So I am going to forego my opening statement, although I want to assure everyone it was eloquent, and I am going to ask unanimous consent that it be put into the record so that we can proceed with our witnesses' testimony.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So ordered. Without objection, the record will note that the statement was eloquent. [Laughter.]

As I am sure it would have been.

[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]

OPENING PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Americans have no monopoly as targets of violent extremists. We are not alone in our determination to defeat terrorism and to protect innocent lives. Many of our European allies have also felt the lash of hatred and murder.

The bombings in London and Madrid and the violent protests in the Netherlands demonstrated that violent extremism has many targets in addition to Americans. Like the six men arrested last month in the Fort Dix case, those charged with the bombings in London and Madrid were home-grown terrorists. They were living and working in the countries whose people they chose to attack.

In Europe, as in America, the main focus of the battle against violent extremists is that small but deadly group of terrorists who invoke a warped vision of Islam as their guide and justification. In Europe, as in America, violent extremists include both non-citizens and native-born; both the self-radicalized and those won over by outside messages; both the lone wolf and the group member.

Today's hearing gives us an invaluable opportunity to learn from the experience of others. Europe's large Muslim immigrant populations, its proximity to Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, and its demographic trends give its governments at least as much incentive as America has to understand the sources and targets of violent radicalization and to take effective action to counter the threat.

What I have already learned has reinforced my belief that there is no universal solvent to wipe away the stain of violent extremism. Police work, border security, and intelligence gathering are certainly part of the mix, but as the office of the Netherlands Coordinator for Counterterrorism recently observed, "Polarization, inter-ethnic violence, and xenophobia remain causes of concerns," because they can increase the sense of rejection and alienation among Muslim communities.

As the French experience with riots by young Muslims from housing projects suggests, unemployment and poor prospects for integration into the economic life of a country may also foster grievances that feed the radicalization process. And as research among actual violent jihadists reveals, ties of kinship, friendship, and community can play a role in drawing isolated or aggrieved young people into the ranks of extremists.

The work of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs task force will also prove useful as this Committee continues its work. Among its many points, the task force makes the important observation that some people's belief that Islam is incompatible with

American values may simultaneously promote exclusionary attitudes in the larger population while undermining Muslims' receptivity to our efforts to engage them.

I hope the Chicago Council witnesses may be able to draw distinctions between European and American society that will help us understand and address the factors that radicalize Muslim citizens and residents to violent extremism. In particular, I am interested to hear if our witnesses believe whether factors that have led to recent violent activity in Europe are also present in the United States. I also look forward to hearing what we can do proactively to prevent a similar cycle of radicalization in the United States.

All of these considerations are important as we seek ways to combat violent extremism directly and to curb its growth by improving outreach efforts to our Muslim neighbors, and by promoting the inclusion of all resident Muslims in the peaceful and tolerant fabric of American life.

I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming today's witnesses. Their testimony and comments will be valuable additions to our understanding of the threat we are all trying to counter.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let us begin now with Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière. Judge Bruguière has been at this work for a long time. He is really a globally known and admired figure, and I am personally grateful that you took the time to be here and share your thoughts with us. He is a great ally of the United States who, I know, enjoys tremendous respect among our law enforcement community.

Judge Bruguière, welcome.

TESTIMONY OF JUDGE JEAN-LOUIS BRUGUIÈRE,¹ FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE, FRANCE

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, thank you very much for inviting me to be here today. I will provide a brief summary of my statement, but I would ask that my entire statement be included in the hearing record.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection.

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. At the judicial level in France, I have been responsible for the fight against terrorism since 1981. In France—unlike in the United States—criminal investigations are conducted by judges, who have sweeping judicial capabilities such as issuing on their own search warrants, seizures of evidence, intrusive measures, including wiretapping, and cooperating with other countries in the fight against terrorism.

I do not need to convince you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, in a country that has also heavily suffered from terrorism, culminating on September 11, 2001, of the gravity and the severity of the terrorist phenomenon, a phenomenon that is at the heart of the concerns of the United States today.

Terrorism of Islamist origin, the one conveyed by al-Qaeda, is a deadly poison for our democracies that we must fight adamantly without second thought.

France and the United States are particularly mobilized in this fight against terrorism. In this fight, we must stand together. France has always stood by the United States. I have personally stood by the United States in my duties under all circumstances.

Terrorism is a strategic menace, a global menace of a new, atypical, and asymmetrical genre. It demands recourse to all the State's means.

¹The prepared statement of Judge Bruguière with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 326.

Obviously, a counterattack strategy against terrorism entails the use of military means, when and where necessary, specifically in Afghanistan and in Iraq. But the specifics of this threat require other resources.

Recourse to military means must not be exclusive to the use of other tools in the field of intelligence and law enforcement.

This panoply of tools and measures must serve as a real operational strategy, anticipatory and flexible, adapting to the contours of the threat and aimed at preventing the occurrence of terrorist actions and to stay a step ahead of terrorist organizations. The system that we have implemented in France since the beginning of the 1990s has allowed us to effectively counter all terrorist activities aimed at our soil to date.

But before outlining the main components of our strategy to fight terrorism, I will present briefly the evolution of the Islamist terrorist threat over the last 20 years.

In Europe, and more specifically in France, the first manifestations of terrorist threat of Islamist origin dates back to 1993. After the interruption of the electoral process in Algeria and the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a radical Salafist movement, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), emerged.

This situation has caused in Europe, but especially in France, the creation of clandestine structures of logistic support to guerillas in Algeria. These networks were activated in 1995 by the GIA for its operations on French soil.

So the GIA, a Salafist organization, evolved beyond the Franco-Algerian framework. This new strategy was a precursor to that of al-Qaeda.

This global strategy led the GIA to hijack an Air France aircraft in 1994 in order to crash it over Paris, and 6 months later, to perpetrate a series of attacks in France. This was the first time an airplane was designed to be used as a weapon of mass destruction.

The decline of the GIA in 1996 should have been accompanied by the displacement of the epicenter of terrorist activism towards the Pakistani-Afghan zone. It is in this context that we have detected since 1996, through an investigation, the "Ressam" network, the Millennium Bomber. This was al-Qaeda's first attempt to strike the United States on its homeland.

September 11, 2001, was the result of this continuing trend. It was neither an unforeseeable occurrence nor a historical accident.

The period after September 11, 2001, has shown that the danger has not disappeared and has always been a worldwide dimension. The al-Qaeda network, although deprived of their sanctuary in Afghanistan, has demonstrated that it is still active.

The European Islamist movement, composed principally of Maghrebis, has always been active and presents the characteristic of being constituted of a network of dispersed, polymorphic, and mutating cells. In addition, during this period, other lands of jihad appeared to be active: Pakistan and the Caucasus.

But it is Iraq that has been the most powerful driver of terrorist activity, having a greater force of attraction than previous lands of jihad, especially in regard to radical European Islamist movement.

Several phases must be distinguished. From 2003 to 2004 the European mujahideen left for Iraq without thinking of returning,

but to die there as martyrs. After 2004, because of the influence from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, these mujahideen were mostly trained to commit attacks in Europe.

The current situation is characterized by the permanence of the menace, the increased globalization of Islamist networks, and the search for new strategies to validate the terrorist message.

The terrorist menace is reoriented on two fronts: The first in the North and the second in the South, in the Maghreb area.

In 2006, the GSPC, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting, rejoined al-Qaeda after having made an operational alliance 2 years earlier with the al-Zarqawi network operating in Iraq.

This development marked the appearance of a new terrorist entity called "al-Qaeda of the Maghreb Countries," significantly increasing the terrorist threat in Europe and over France.

A strategy in the fight against terrorism must meet a certain number of conditions to be effective. Even when there are no attacks, the powers of intelligence services must be strengthened, a criminal legal system with the appropriate legislative tools must be implemented, and international cooperation must be reinforced. In this regard, the French system for fighting terrorism has proved its efficiency.

Over the years, this system, intentionally consistent with the law, without relying upon special legislation, has demonstrated that it is unrivaled in effectiveness and legality.

France has a long experience of fighting terrorism which goes back to the early 1970s. Thus, France has developed a complete legal doctrine for fighting terrorism which is considered to be a strategic threat. This doctrine led to the publication of a White Paper in 2006 that I will submit for the record.¹

The White Paper describes several changes to the legal system, with respect to laws as well as implementing procedures.

With respect to laws, the French Parliament has given the French system for fighting terrorism an arsenal of laws designed for this purpose.

The criminal charges of terrorist conspiracy is unquestionably the most effective legal weapon against terrorist networks. It makes it possible to fight the threat at the top, by attacking the logistical and financial support for the networks. There is no need to prove that the network in question is linked to an organization or even to a specific plan. It is sufficient that the network was likely to give any assistance in a terrorist context to activists, even when the activists are unidentified.

In addition, there are procedural laws. The cornerstone of our system is the centralization in Paris of prosecution, investigations, and trials.

It enables us to better understand the terrorist phenomenon which is becoming more widespread, polymorphous, and changing.

In addition, on this subject, the investigating judges may use intrusive measures, such as telephone wiretaps and audio surveillance of private places. However, to be effective, this legislative arsenal must be implemented as a part of a real operational strategy.

¹The White Paper submitted by Judge Bruguière appears in the Appendix on page 342.

From this point of view, the participants in the fight against terrorism have developed a proactive methodology in France that is directed to preventing the threat. This risk prevention strategy brings together, in a real operational synergy, intelligence agencies, law enforcement authorities, and the judiciary.

In addition, France has significantly increased international cooperation, especially with the United States, for the sole purpose of neutralizing terrorist networks where they are operating.

This legal system, which is flexible and centralized at the same time, has enabled us to anticipate terrorist acts for more than 10 years and to contain the terrorist threat and stop attacks on our soil and even outside of our borders, specifically in Australia.

Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Judge, for that excellent opening statement, and your description of the comprehensive French program and, in fact, the aggressiveness of both the laws and the implementation is something I would guess that most Americans do not appreciate. It is important for us to consider those and also to note, if I am correct, that in the last decade there has not been a significant terrorist attack in France. That is correct, yes? There has not been a significant terrorist attack in France in the last decade or more.

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. Yes. As I explained, since 1996 we have not suffered any attack in France, and that is the major reason that we have the capacity within the system to track down all the sleeping cells that support such operations. For example, in 2000, we have succeeded to arrest groups who are intending to carry out a very deadly operation in Strasbourg, and we arrested them maybe one week before they had the capacity to do it. We seized all the materials, explosive materials, devices, and so if we didn't have this system, we would have suffered a very deadly attack at that time.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Lidewijde Ongering, we are grateful that you are here. You come to us after a distinguished career in a wide array of public service responsibilities in the Netherlands as the Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Ministry of Justice, a relatively new organization of your government. And I will say to note for the record—and perhaps you will tell us more—that the threat level, what we would call the terrorist threat level, within the Netherlands has been dropped since the creation and functioning of your department.

So thank you for making the trip, and we look forward to your testimony now.

TESTIMONY OF LIDEWIJDE ONGERING,¹ DEPUTY NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, NETHERLANDS

Mrs. ONGERING. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to tes-

¹The prepared statement of Mrs. Ongering appears in the Appendix on page 460.

tify here today. It is a great honor for me to speak about our experiences with homegrown terrorism in the Netherlands.

My organization was established in 2004 to coordinate and direct the Dutch counterterrorist policy. I have chosen to limit myself to the subject of jihadism. This is by far the greatest threat in my country at present. I would like to outline what we regard as the main sectors contributing to this threat, and then I will describe the Dutch approach to counterterrorism.

The horrifying attacks of September 11, 2001, opened the eyes of the world to the dangers of jihadist terrorism. Even a small country like the Netherlands was not immune to this threat. This realization was soon driven home by a far smaller incident: The death of two Dutch Muslims in Kashmir in January 2002. The Dutch Intelligence and Security Service was soon able to report that both men had been recruited for the jihad by Salafist militants. The two young people both grew up in the Netherlands.

At that time many people were shocked that terrorists could be living among us. The reality that terrorists could emerge from our society and strike in the Netherlands was made painfully clear at the end of 2004 with the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. The murderer was a young man of Moroccan descent who grew up in Amsterdam and seemed to be fully integrated in our society. He was part of a network of young Dutch jihadists who had fallen under the sway of a Salafist from Syria.

These examples make clear that we define radicalization as homegrown when the process has taken place in the Netherlands. Radicalization and terrorism are both domestic and international phenomena, interlinked and interdependent. Globalization has intensified these links.

The appearance of homegrown terrorism in the West can be attributed to a variety of factors. Your Congress has asked what the Dutch Government's view is on the causes in our country. I would like to mention a number of "push and pull factors" that could provide an explanation.

One pull factor is Islamic missionary activity, particularly sponsored by Saudi Arabia. They are propagating Salafism to the world's Muslims. This has in some cases proved to be a breeding ground for radical sympathies. The Salafist movement preaches a return to the earliest incarnation of the faith and fiercely opposes all forms of "non-belief," including democracy, Western laws, and lifestyles. For most of the known Dutch terrorists, the nonviolent variety of Salafism was the first step towards jihadism.

Another pull factor is the global dissemination of jihadist ideology. Al-Qaeda is not only a terrorist network. Al-Qaeda is first and foremost an ideology, which appeals to Muslims from a wide variety of backgrounds. Their ideas are being spread all over the world, thanks in large part to the Internet.

A last pull factor is the influence of what we call trigger events. Modern communication technology enables us to follow news from the other side of the world as it unfolds. Even small incidents can spur people on to violence, even at an individual level.

Turning to the push side of the equation for a moment, I believe it is relevant to understand the history of Muslim immigrants in our country. This has made some of them more open to radical in-

fluences. Large numbers of Muslims were brought to the Netherlands as cheap labor in the 1960s. A lack of education, cultural differences, and difficulties in social integration beset this group. Muslims' integration into Dutch society has not been helped by the growth of radicalization and Islamophobia due to the many acts of jihadist violence in the world. This has led to a growing polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims, a trend that can further accelerate radicalization.

An underlying factor in radicalization is the identity crisis often experienced by young people trapped between two cultures. In their search for identity, some of these young people turn to radical Islam. For these young Muslims, national borders hardly exist anymore. For that reason, the term "homegrown terrorism" is slightly outdated. Dutch Muslims went, for instance, to Kashmir. Spanish participation in the war in Iraq formed the motive for jihadists in Madrid to blow up several trains.

Clearly, terrorism can manifest itself at any time anywhere in the world. We have decided to analyze and tackle the dangers of radicalization and terrorism as a coherent whole. We have developed a comprehensive approach, including both repressive measures and a strong emphasis on prevention. After all, no one is born a terrorist. People who set out to kill other people first go through a process of radicalization. We are convinced that there are many opportunities to intervene in this initial phase.

Of course, the main goal of the comprehensive approach is to identify acute threats in time and prevent bloodshed. We have done everything possible in recent years to create the conditions for an effective counterterrorism policy. Our laws have been amended. The police and criminal justice authorities have been given new powers to be able to investigate and arrest in an earlier stage. Intelligence and security services received more staff and funds, and their information can now be used in court by the public prosecutor.

These measures have been clearly successful. Several terrorist networks in our country have been broken up. A sizable number of jihadists have been given prison sentences. Jihadist recruiters have also been tackled. These government actions have been effective in disrupting the formation of jihadist networks in the Netherlands. As a result, jihadists are contending with a lack of leadership and major internal divisions. Taken together, these developments made us decide to lower the general threat for the Netherlands from "substantial" to "limited."

The lowering of the threat level has been made public. The Dutch Government wants to inform its citizens about the real threat situation to prevent unnecessary fear. A lower threat level, though, is no reason to be less stringent in any of the measures that we have taken. It does, however, encourage us to push ahead with the course we have been following.

Above all, we want to prevent the formation of new terrorist networks. That is why we are investing so much in tackling radicalization in many different ways. We do it at the national level, but our primary focus remains our cities and neighborhoods and the role of police and local government. The Dutch approach has three main planks:

First, we are working to integrate Muslims into Dutch society. Our focus is on paying more attention to the identity issues confronting young Muslims in a Western environment, combating discrimination, and encouraging Muslims to participate in society and politics.

We are also trying to counteract polarization and Islamophobia. Dutch training programs for imams are being supported so that Dutch Muslims will no longer be dependent on imams imported from their countries of origin.

Second, we are promoting and supporting social resistance to radicalization within the Muslim community. This problem cannot be solved without the help of our own country's Muslims. A crucial aspect of these efforts is ensuring the availability of a wide range of information. We have set out to counteract the radical Islamic voices on Dutch language Web sites. We are working on taking radical sites offline, with a notice and takedown procedure directed at the providers. At the same time, we are working with Muslim institutions to increase the diversity of the information available about moderate Islamic currents—in other words, challenging ideas with ideas.

A third and final way we work to prevent radicalization is by identifying, isolating, and containing radical processes. We want to stop radicalization before it leads to violence. This requires the authorities to be proactive in detecting signals that an individual might be isolating themselves or even turning against society. Systems have now been developed in several major Dutch cities to report suspected radicalization to a local information point where it can be assessed and used to develop a tailor-made approach. In some cases, the police and security services follow radicals closely, sometimes openly.

Special attention is paid to the risk of radicalization in prison. To protect other detainees from becoming contaminated, we have decided to concentrate convicted jihadists in two detention centers and keep them separated from other prisoners. Prison staff in these institutions are specially trained to detect signs of radicalization.

Special attention is also paid to what we call "hotbeds of radicalization." A small number of locations in the Netherlands, such as a few Salafist centers and mosques, have been identified as potential gateways to radical milieus. The Dutch authorities keep a close watch on the imams and governing bodies of these institutions and remind them forcefully of their social responsibilities. Our message is clear: We will not allow them to preach intolerance. They must also exclude jihadist recruiters and stop young people from opting for violence. If people in or around these centers prove to be promoting radicalization or spreading hatred, we do not hesitate to prosecute them or deport them as a threat to national security.

I have given you a brief overview of the Dutch analysis and the approach to fighting radicalization and homegrown terrorism. I do not claim that our experiences and conclusions can be transplanted to other European countries or the United States. I am convinced, however, that thanks to the many international dimensions and interconnections, real and virtual, in today's world all Western

countries are at risk from homegrown terrorism. This demands an intelligent, broad strategy.

Finally, I would like to stress our outstanding cooperation with the United States, including this and other exchanges of information and experiences.

Thank you, and I will be glad to answer your questions.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Ongerling. That was extremely helpful in all ways.

I do want to say, having heard our two European witnesses, that you have been much more timely, which is to say, you have adhered more to the time limit than our normal homegrown witnesses do. So I appreciate that. [Laughter.]

Unfortunately, the bell has gone off for a vote on the Senate floor, but I do believe we have enough time, Dr. Sageman, to hear your testimony, and then with apologies, we will recess so we can go and vote, and then we will come back quickly to hear our final two witnesses.

Dr. Sageman, thanks for being here.

**TESTIMONY OF MARC SAGEMAN, M.D., PH.D.,¹ PRINCIPAL,
SAGEMAN CONSULTING, LLC**

Dr. SAGEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Collins and Carper. Thank you for inviting me to present my views on the threat of violent Islamist extremists in Europe and the United States. There is a great disparity in the threat faced in these two continents. Data on arrests for Islamist terrorism indicate that the rate of arrest per Muslim capita in Europe is about five times that of the United States. In order to understand this discrepancy, we must analyze the process transforming normal young Muslims into people willing to use violence for political ends. I call this process “radicalization,” and it is critical to understanding and assessing the threat faced by the West.

This is a complicated issue, and given the time constraints of this hearing, my remarks will necessarily sound a little too simplistic. I apologize for this.

My continuing research shows that the terrorists are really idealistic young people who seek glory and thrills by trying to build a utopia. Contrary to popular belief, radicalization is not the product of poverty, various forms of brainwashing, youth, ignorance, lack of education, lack of job, lack of social responsibility, criminality, or mental illness. Their mobilization into this violent Islamist born-again social movement is based on friendship and kinship. Lately, over 80 percent of arrested terrorists in Europe and the United States are part of the Muslim Diaspora, mostly second or third generation. They are radicalized in the West, not in the Middle East. Usually, they are small groups of friends and relatives who spontaneously self-organize into groups that later turn to terrorism. Before September 11, 2001, they were able to travel freely and connect to al-Qaeda. This is no longer the case, except for the British. So these groups are physically isolated and connected through Internet forums, inspired by the extremist ideology and hoping that

¹The prepared statement of Dr. Sageman appears in the Appendix on page 470.

they will be accepted as members of al-Qaeda through their operations.

From my research both in Europe and the United States, I have come to think about the process of radicalization as consisting of four prongs: A sense of moral outrage; a specific interpretation of the world; resonance with personal experiences; and mobilization through networks. This process is, of course, driven by young Muslims chasing dreams of glory by fighting for justice and fairness as they define it. They are enthusiastic volunteers, trying to impress their friends. Unfortunately, suicide bombers right now have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants.

The sense of moral outrage is really driven by Iraq at this point. Iraq did not cause this problem, but Iraq is now fueling it. As I speak to young Muslims in Europe or here, Iraq dominates the conversation. More locally, they also pay particular attention to police action, bridging the local and the global.

On the level of interpretation, in order for this sense of moral outrage to be translated to radicalization, it must be interpreted in a special way, and the way they interpret it is a “war against Islam.”

Having said this, it is important to realize that the terrorists are not—and I emphasize “not”—Islamic scholars. The defendants at the various trials in here and in Europe are definitely not intellectuals who decide what to do after careful deliberation. I believe that the explanation about their behavior is not found in how they think but, rather, in how they feel. All these perpetrators dream about becoming Islamic heroes in this war on Islam, modeling themselves on the mujahideen in Afghanistan when they were fighting the Soviets or seventh century warriors. Many hope to emulate their predecessors by now fighting in Iraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, a “war against Islam,” occurs within a certain cultural tradition, and this is where Europe and the United States differ.

First, our founding concept is this is a melting pot. In Europe, nationalism is built on an essence, and if it is built on an essence, this is not as welcoming to outsiders as a melting pot would be.

Second, the notion of the American dream, which is the land of opportunity, a recent poll, the one that you mentioned, the Pew Research Center poll showed that 71 percent of Muslim Americans believe in the American dream. This is not the case in Europe.

And, third, American individualism in a sense protects us from having Muslims interpret what is happening to them in a collective way hostile to the host country.

Probably the biggest difference between the United States and Europe is resonance with personal experience, and here we are facing very different Muslim populations. The American-Muslim population is upper class or middle class. I would say middle class. The ones in Europe, as was mentioned, are unskilled labor, and so we are facing very different populations because of our history.

In terms of labor market, there is far less discrimination in the United States than we find in Europe, and this is very important because a lot of unemployed young Muslims are attracted by the thrill of belonging to a clandestine operation.

And, finally, the fourth prong is that they mobilize through networks, and this is very important because, up to now, you have angry young Muslims but really not violent ones. It is really through the networks that they are transformed into terrorists through a process, a natural process of mutual support and the development of a small collective identity praising other terrorists. And, therefore, they become terrorists themselves.

Now that I have analyzed the threat, let me make a few comments about what can be done.

First and foremost, we have to remove the glory from this concept. We have to deglorify it. We have to really put it now into a law enforcement perspective as opposed to militarize the problem, because there is nothing more thrilling to a young person than to go against a uniformed person of the only remaining superpower.

On the first prong, I think that we need to leave Iraq as soon as it is feasible.

[Applause.]

Dr. SAGEMAN. Iraq is driving this process in Europe and around the world. We may need to be in Iraq for local reasons, but not for terrorism. Terrorism is a one-way street.

In terms of policing, community policing, what you heard before from both the French and the Dutch is exactly right, and I think those two countries have done it right. But we need to have police forces recruit young Muslims into police forces so that you do not have white Caucasians patrolling South Asians or North Africans.

So far Muslim Americans have shown themselves to be very patriotic, and this has not been well recognized by the press or our government. It is important that we recognize the patriotism.

On the second prong, what we need to look at is not so much the ideology and the text, but really the images, the dreams. And here I think we should not really focus on the war of ideas as much as war of dreams. In this sense, we should learn our lesson from our experience with the civil rights movement when Martin Luther King inspired a generation with his speech, "I Have a Dream."

On the third prong, I think we are doing much better than in Europe.

On the fourth prong, it is absolutely important to disrupt the networks, as the French and the Dutch did. This is critical. But also we need to have some presence on the Internet where young Muslims share their dreams, hopes, and grievances. This is an internal Muslim discussion. However, we can encourage some young Muslims who reject violence to actively participate in these discussions in order to actively challenge the various calls to violence emerging from them. The American-Muslim community is relatively young, having mostly immigrated in the last half of the past century. It is a young generation searching for its identity and trying to define its role with respect to the rest of American society. It is important for the rest of American society to welcome them and help them integrate better within the fabric of our Nation. We are doing better than our European counterparts in this regard, but we must continue to promote core American values of justice and fairness and fight those elements in our society that try to single out and antagonize part of our Nation.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Doctor. You, too, were very punctual and had some interesting things to say.

I am going to recess the hearing now, and we will be back as soon as we can.

[Recess.]

Senator COLLINS [presiding]. The Committee will come to order.

Dr. Sageman, did you finish your testimony before we broke for the vote?

Dr. SAGEMAN. Yes, I did. Thank you very much.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. It was very interesting. I had to leave a little bit before Senator Lieberman, so I was not sure.

We will now turn to Secretary Martin for her testimony and Mr. Kathwari's testimony.

TESTIMONY OF HON. LYNN M. MARTIN AND FAROOQ M. KATHWARI,¹ CO-CHAIRS, TASK FORCE FOR MUSLIM AMERICAN CIVIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT, CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Ms. MARTIN. Thank you, Senator, and we are honored, of course, to be here, too. We all listened to Dr. Sageman, actually, with great interest because it is always nice when you hear yourself reflected in data to some extent.

As some of you may know, yesterday we released a report called "Strengthening America: The Civic and Political Integration of Muslim Americans." So we are not here to talk about the European experience, which is, as both the Europeans who gave such superb testimony, in my view, and Dr. Sageman said, really totally different than the American experience. But what this group has done over 18 months, a group that is half Muslim and half non-Muslim—and I suspect it is clear which part of that I probably was in—tried to see what could we do to make America stronger, to see a problem, the possible alienation, the increasing belief among many Muslim Americans that they were not as large a part of the American experience as they could be, and what could we do to accelerate that assimilation.

Other groups have gone through the same things. That is no different. But we do not believe that there is the time, the leisure to let it take 10 or 50 or 100 years, as it did for my forebears and yours. We think it has to be accelerated, so we have come up with—we released yesterday a group of ideas for both Muslims and non-Muslims to accelerate the process and, in doing so, to strengthen America and its security. We divided it. We have six very quick points.

First of all, start recognizing Muslim-American contributions, which are many. Now, this does not mean that Muslim Americans mustn't speak out more. They must, and it must be better articulated. And you will see a lot of these recommendations fall into each other. There are not as many strong Muslim organizations because they are young. They are babies at the organization level. And we think strong Muslim organizations that reflect the true

¹The joint prepared statement of Ms. Martin and Mr. Kathwari appears in the Appendix on page 476.

feelings and beliefs of the citizens, of the American citizens who are Muslim, would be very helpful to everyone.

We know we have to increase the civic engagement of Muslims. We know that we have to build a different kind of media coverage. Everybody can't always be bad. We have got to see the success stories, and you know of one who has, in fact, strong business in your State, Senator, and you know that, too. We think we have to give increasing national attention to the diversity of American Muslims. They don't come from one country. They come from all over the world, and that diversity is reflected in how they produce and some of their feelings and the level of the experiences they bring.

We also know that they are first generation, that they tend to have equal or better education than the average American, that many of them are our doctors, our lawyers, lead our businesses in ways that, if we did not have them, it would be a loss for America.

We also know it is the American dream, and we believe strongly that there are American problems with this assimilation, and not just assimilation, not in the sense that they must blend, but in ways that one can be proud of one's faith, can practice one's faith, and still be more than 100 percent American.

I would also add here that it took a year and a half. It was not easy. It is never easy—perhaps you recognize that, Senator—to get 32 very different people to agree on anything, especially when a few of us always know we are right. That was my experience, at least in the House. And the fact is we all stand by this report—not with every sentence, not with every part, not with every mention, but with both the tenor and with the six recommendations, which we believe are the core of it.

Much of my learning took place because I had one of the great Americans and a superb Co-Chair. The CEO of Ethan Allen, Farooq Kathwari, is with me, and I would like to just pass the baton to him.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Kathwari.

Mr. KATHWARI. Yes, thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity of being here, and it was a privilege co-chairing with Lynn Martin over the last 15 months.

Now, some of the things that I am going to say are, I think, somewhat a repeat of what Ms. Martin has said. That is, notwithstanding September 11, 2001, challenges faced by Muslim Americans, the experiences of Muslim Americans—Senator Lieberman, good to be here and good to see you again.

Chairman LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Good to see you, and thank you. I apologize for the strange life that we lead.

Ms. MARTIN. I, too, was eloquent. [Laughter.]

Mr. KATHWARI. Well, it is a pleasure to be here, and, of course, our headquarters are in Danbury, Connecticut.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Duly noted for the record, with thanks.

Mr. KATHWARI. I was just saying that notwithstanding September 11, 2001, the experience of the Muslim Americans has not been much different from other immigrant communities. All had to struggle to make America their home. In fact, there are two communities that are also treated with a religious identity. It is the Jewish Americans and the Muslim Americans. One does not see the religious identification with others, such as Italians, Irish, the

Polish, and many others. This does create a perception of a Muslim monolith. The fact is that the Muslim community here in the United States and the rest of the world has tremendous diversity in ethnic, linguistic, ideological, social, economic. It is wrong and dangerous to think of them as one monolith.

Now, despite the perception, Muslim Americans are successful. They are entrepreneurs, they are professionals, they are academics. They are, most of them, first-generation immigrants from across the globe, and a significant portion of the remainder is African-American.

Muslim Americans are having issues of real and perceived discrimination after September 11, 2001. There is a Pew study which says that Muslim Americans under the age of 29, which happens to be about 60 percent of the population, since September 11, 2001, about 40 percent of them said that they have had some sort of a discrimination. So we have to be careful about it.

In our study, we also found different perceptions. The non-Muslim Americans perceive that Muslim Americans must speak more strongly against political extremism and the use of violence. American Muslims, on the other hand, perceive that they do speak, but the behavior of the minority extremists gets most, if not all, of the media coverage.

As Ms. Martin has said, there are six recommendation and, again, for Senator Lieberman, the report called on Muslim Americans to get across to the broad American public by getting the message across that they are opposed to terrorism and extremism. The report called for fostering close relations with the media, including efforts to increase the number of Muslim-American journalists and creating a national organization focused on educating the public on the diversity of Muslim cultures in society. It encourages civic engagement among Muslim Americans and greater efforts of inter-faith dialogue.

Other recommendations include building strong Muslim-American institutions by such means as expanding engagements with universities and policy research institutes.

And, finally, my strong plea to our national leadership and the media is that it is wrong and dangerous to think of Muslims and Islam as one monolith and also to associate Muslims and Islam with terrorists and extremists. When we do that, we help the terrorists and extremists, and not the Muslim Americans or Muslims of the world, and, more importantly, the well-being and the security of the country here.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kathwari. I apologize, Secretary Martin, that I was not here for your comments. I appreciate the work of the task force, and I thank you for what you have said. And, of course, your concluding remarks, this is exactly what we are grappling with. In so many ways, the Muslim-American community is like every other immigrant community that has come here. And we have always prided ourselves on our openness and inclusiveness, and the fact is that a significant number of Muslim Americans, including yourself, are playing leading roles in this society, very constructive roles. And I would say, generally speaking, the Muslim-American community is composed of good American citizens.

Incidentally, you make a very good point, very important. I know it, but maybe other people do not know it. The Muslim-American community is a very diverse community, including a significant number of people, particularly African-Americans, who are not immigrants, who were born here.

So the challenge to us, obviously, is to be true to our values, to recognize the truths of the broader community, while also trying to deal with what, unfortunately, appears to be the danger from a small number who are being radicalized. And that is exactly what this Committee inquiry is about.

Let me start with a question I was going to get to a little bit later on, but it flows naturally from your testimony. In my opening statement—and you were not able to be here at that point—I pointed to some of the numbers in the recent Pew study on Muslim Americans. Of course, the troubling part was the number of younger Muslim Americans who said that suicide bombing in some cases was—I do not know the exact word, but “justifiable” or “understandable.” And then a number of others who either had no opinion and a small number, but nonetheless 5 percent, thought that they had some sympathy with al-Qaeda.

So how do you interpret those numbers? And what do they say to you, as an American, is happening here? And I ask both of you, really, but I would appreciate it if you would start, Mr. Kathwari.

Mr. KATHWARI. I think you are absolutely right that we have to understand that there is not one Islamic or Muslim monolith. You are going to have different perspectives.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. KATHWARI. And I think that is very important, and the leadership should understand it because when it filters down, it filters down to law enforcement, it filters down to the folks at immigration because without realizing it, they start looking upon Muslims as one. So it is very important, because it is very important that, God forbid, there is some radical, some extremist—and you are going to have—you cannot control everybody, do something what you do not want to have in a situation that all the Muslim Americans with this great diversity are impacted, because that is a self-fulfilling prophecy. And, in fact, we know that those who are radicals, extremists, want that kind of a thing to happen.

So I think what needs to be done is the responsibility is on all sides. First, American Muslims, this very diverse community has to help shape the debate. They have to help shape the debate about educating. We also heard when Dr. Sageman was saying that many of the young people really are not scholars. And, in fact, sometimes the people that talk to them are also not scholars.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. KATHWARI. They impact them. And young people get impacted. So I think it is extremely important among the Muslim-American community that they should have spokespeople, they should have people who can speak with the full understanding of the religion, because Islam does not preach extremism, does not preach violence, does not preach killing of innocent people. So I think that is very important.

The second is I think the tone of the voice of our leadership—and I was very glad this morning, I was a little bit late because

the White House invited me to be with the President, and he had decided to go to the 50th anniversary of the Muslim Center in Washington.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes.

Mr. KATHWARI. And I was there, and he spoke, and with a tone of saying that, yes, American Muslims are diverse and they also are American citizens, and we have to be careful of not associating terrorism and extremism with them, even though that was the terrorists—so I think, from a leadership point of view, that is very important to project, and also I think that message and partnerships with the media has to be done, because it is important. And I think also efforts have to be made that alienation should not take place among the young, because alienation brings humiliation, and humiliation results in acts of violence. So we need to be careful about that, too.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I am actually going to go from that point back to Judge Bruguière and Mrs. Ongerling and ask you both to comment on the last point that Mr. Kathwari made about alienation, but also about Dr. Sageman's provocative interpretations about the motivations of young Muslims being radicalized.

In other words, in particular, I was really fascinated by the emphasis on friendship and kinship, and, of course, the quest to be heroes, and the lesser role, if I might say so, of religious radicalization, whether that is borne out in the work that you have done in France and the Netherlands.

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. It is not so easy to answer the question because it is a very difficult problem, a difficult issue. As you know, in France, we have basically about 5 million of the community coming from the Maghreb, especially Algerians. At the present, 8.5 percent of the global population, that is a lot. And globally it is a peaceful population. We do not have any problem, just with basically about 100, maybe less, who are directly involved in the radical operation.

The difficulty that we have is to know in what way one—there is no typology of the terrorist. We do not know exactly why such individuals shift from fundamentalism to radicalism and operational. Generally, it is very reactive to outside operations and context.

Iraq played a major role in converts. That is true, we know. But also we have also incidents with the Internet, with all the sites, and so the capacity to discuss about choices and the activity of some individuals who are much more radical and try to recruit them.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. And that is a very concerning problem because it is very difficult for us, on the intelligence level as well as law enforcement, to detect those because we do not know exactly when. And so we know that external factors—Iran, Afghanistan—have an impact in the process of radicalization.

And, second, what is a key point on that is the situation in the prison. We can maybe have a discussion specifically about that. Those are powerful factors of converts.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very interesting, because we touched on that in the first in the series of these hearings, that there is some evidence of radicalization, Islamist radicalization, in American prisons. So you are saying you have found that as well in France?

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. Absolutely.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which is to say that a single person or maybe a few people are actually converting for the purposes of radicalization others that they are in prison with.

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. In the prisons, there is a very high level of contamination. That is very difficult, because there are many solutions. We can separate the individual. It is difficult because we would need to have many prisons to do it, that we now know that is the best response. We have experience about that, regarding the recruitment of individuals. These are directly implied in operational cells. We saw that about one year ago.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So then you try to break up the groups and separate the prisoners in the different facilities?

Judge BRUGUIÈRE. Yes, but it is difficult. We do not have the capacity in France because it is necessary to build new prisons, and that is not so easy to do.

But the fact that we arrest a lot of people, a very high rate of arrests because our system allows us to arrest anyone that could be implied or suspected to support anyone, as you know, associated with terror, has prevented many attacks. We have many members in the prisons, and we have difficulty in separating them and preventing them from actively recruiting new members of jihad.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Ongerling.

Mrs. ONGERING. It is hard to give a typical profile of extremists. What we see in our country, the children of immigrants from Muslim culture are likely to suffer an identity crisis, and sometimes that makes them vulnerable for extremist ideas. First and foremost, they are seeking an identity, and it is not religion in the first place. So on that point I agree with Dr. Sageman.

But we also find the level of education does not tell us all. We have examples of very well educated people in our country who also seem very well integrated in the country, and then all of a sudden, they turn their back to our society. And the London bombers showed us the same. So that is also a difficult explanation.

But we find that stronger social bonds within the groups, that will certainly help. We have Islamic people from Turkish background and Islamic people from Moroccan background. The Turkish people, they seem to be less affected by the extremist ideas because their social bonds—well, they are really close, so that might give an explanation there.

On the point of the prison, we also find that radicalization in the prison taking place in our country, and that is why we decided to concentrate those extremist people who were sentenced to prison in certain areas, and especially from preventing them spreading their ideas to others.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Unfortunately, they have called another vote, and I am going to go back. So I think I am going to ask one more question and then let you go. I do not want to put you through the torture of the life that we lead.

Dr. Sageman, if you want to add anything, I want to ask you a question about how to counter the proliferation of extremism propaganda which plays into some of the psychological factors you have described, and you have talked particularly, as we saw at a previous hearing, that the Internet is playing an important role not only in facilitating the radicalization process, but in reducing the amount of time people take to go through the process. And I wonder what your thoughts are—and I do not know whether your task force, Ms. Martin, approached this—on how the government or others can counter those radical messages being pushed out over the Internet on radical Web sites to this small but vulnerable population.

Dr. SAGEMAN. Yes, it probably is a critical issue of the future because, like my son who is growing up and is on the Internet quite a bit. Young people are on the Internet, not my generation. And what we find is that it is the interactivity in the chat room. It is not those Web sites, those horrible Web sites. It is really the interactivity.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct.

Dr. SAGEMAN. And before, what we had was groups, face-to-face interaction. Now it has all migrated to the Internet.

Unfortunately for the government, this is an internal Muslim dialogue. It is not one that I think the U.S. Government can participate in. That's why I was mentioning—I think Mr. Kathwari also mentioned it—that we should encourage young people to actually participate in that type of discussion and challenge the people who call for violence.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. So the best answers will come from within the Muslim communities themselves.

Mr. KATHWARI. Yes.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Secretary Martin, do you want to add anything?

Ms. MARTIN. Just very quickly, again, our thanks, first of all, Chairman, on this. Ultimately, it has to come from within, and then from all Americans. Traditionally, American solutions are best when we come at them together.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct.

Ms. MARTIN. But having said this, one of the parts of what we were looking at is how to more greatly involve young people. Whether they are Muslim or not, we all know teenage angst. We all know that some young people become more religious, some young people go to whole different—how do we, in the best sense of the word, harness that?

So I think your point of getting young Muslims and non-Muslims alike, I believe, conversing, talking in part of the Internet where they are not listening to us, because I think asking them to listen to us is a non-starter, if you want to know the truth.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a good point.

Ms. MARTIN. And so what we are looking at is the next step.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very important. One of the great challenges—it is true here, and it is true in so many other areas of challenge in our society. How do you get attention for something that is not dramatic? In other words, how to get coverage of the

majority mainstream Muslim voices? That is the challenge that we have.

Ms. MARTIN. Could I just say this? Senator, I have never heard you shout, and you and I go back a long time.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, you have not talked to my wife. [Laughter.]

Ms. MARTIN. Well, luckily—I will stay with my statement—I have never heard you publicly shout.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Ms. MARTIN. And I think one of our concerns is that we have entered a TV, and almost exclamation point to the Internet, time of shouters. And it is time for the non-shouters to again work.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. You all have not been shouters today. You have really shed some light. There are different opinions here, but it has been very helpful to our Committee. I thank all of you for coming. I particularly want to thank Judge Bruguière and Mrs. Ongerling for taking the time and making the effort to come here. I know you have wonderful relations with your peers in the U.S. Government. They appreciate your help and respect what you have done greatly, and I do as well.

We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 2 weeks if any of you would like to add additional statements or any of the Members of the Committee want to submit questions to you. But I thank you very much, and with that I adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

THE ROLE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COUNTERING VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lieberman, Pryor, McCaskill, Collins, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. I thank our witnesses for being here.

Today we convene the fifth hearing of this year on the challenge of “homegrown” Islamist extremism right here in America. This is an inquiry that began under Senator Collins’ chairmanship and that we have continued together now this year.

This hearing focuses on the critical role of local law enforcement in detecting and preventing another terrorist attack on our homeland, not one planned, manned, and financed from abroad like the September 11, 2001, attacks, but one conceived from within our country by what one of our witnesses calls “unremarkable people” bent on spectacular destruction.

Earlier this year, our Committee heard testimony from Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen, and the testimony was quite clear that the threat from homegrown Islamist extremism is on the rise here in America and that the Federal Government simply cannot counter it alone.

At our September 10, 2007, hearing, Director Mueller said, “The role of our local law enforcement partners is absolutely critical to identifying individuals and groups presenting this threat.” In fact, it is the men and women of State and local law enforcement who both by the strength of their numbers and through their daily contact with the public in the communities they serve, including the Muslim-American communities that they serve, are most likely to be the first to come across homegrown terrorists. That makes this proud blue line of 750,000 State and local law enforcement officers across our country our first line of defense against the growing problem of homegrown terrorism.

Today's two panels of witnesses will give us the opportunity to learn about the terrorism strategies local law enforcers are following and to do so from a geographic cross-section of our Nation's police departments. We have officials here from North and South, East and West, and that reminds us that the threat of Islamist terrorism is ultimately national.

We are first going to hear from the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), whose representatives will discuss the findings of their ground-breaking report, which is entitled "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." After more than 2 years of investigation and research, the NYPD team has, for the first time, at least in this amount of detail, mapped out the radicalization process that is taking place in New York City, and certainly by inference in the United States generally, and elsewhere. Their conclusions are riveting, impressive, and disturbing.

Violent Islamist ideology can radicalize alienated but otherwise, as I said earlier, "unremarkable" individuals who are not normally found on the radar screens of State and local law enforcement. Often the Internet is a driver and an enabler of the radicalization process in America, as our Committee learned in a hearing that we held earlier this year. Once radicalized, people may act on their own or in small cells without any direction or connection to a foreign terrorist organization. That is the pattern that we know has developed in attacks, both those that have been carried out and those that have been, thankfully, thwarted in the United States and Europe, from London, England, to Lackawanna, New York, from Fort Dix, New Jersey, to Portland, Oregon.

The NYPD report also lays out the challenge for local law enforcement, which is to identify, preempt, and, thus, prevent homegrown terrorist attacks, even though—and I repeat—such attacks may not resemble typical criminal behavior that normally draws police attention before they are carried out. That is why neighborhood intelligence and outreach to Muslim-American communities is so important.

The second panel includes officials from the Los Angeles, Miami-Dade, and Kansas City, Missouri, police departments. They are going to tell us about the tools and tactics that they have been developing to help detect, deter, and disrupt homegrown terrorist plots. At the heart of their strategies, it seems to me, is the requirement for knowledge of and familiarity with violent Islamist ideology and the local Muslim communities, the overwhelming majority of which, of course, are not engaged in violent Islamist ideology. Each of these local police departments has reached out to their Muslim-American communities and established relationships with them and their leaders. Each has developed strategies that integrate the global threat of Islamist terror into local solutions, whether it is the LAPD's new Community Mapping Project, Miami-Dade County's focus on long-term intelligence gathering, or Kansas City's patrolling strategies and actions to stop terrorist financing.

It is crucial, I think, that these and other local efforts be linked together so that clues to potential terrorist attacks are not lost through jurisdictional silos but are shared by local departments nationwide through national intelligence databases, fusion centers,

and Joint Terrorism Task Forces that can connect the dots with information gathered at all levels and geographies of law enforcement. In other words, one of the major post-September 11, 2001, conclusions and reforms adopted by the Federal Government was to break down the stovepipes and to create places where intelligence was fused so that, to use the familiar phrase, we would be able to connect the dots. I think it is critically important now that the same reforms happen at local levels to keep them working together.

I want to make a final point here. The departments represented before us today are doing their work in this critical area very well, but it is my impression at this point of our investigation that this is not the case nationwide. And that is a conclusion I want to stress. The evidence suggests we have a problem growing here of homegrown terrorism. I do not want to overstate it, and yet we would understate it at our peril. We have a problem. And these four police forces that are before us today are unique among local law enforcement in this country in developing the kinds of outreach, prevention, and detection programs that are now the exception, not the rule. And that reality represents a national vulnerability that we must together fix as soon as possible.

So this is going to be a very important and interesting hearing. I thank our witnesses for coming from all across the country. As I said before you were here, Senator Collins, this is an investigation that began when you were Chairman and we have continued it now together, and I do not know that anybody else in Congress is doing anything quite like it. I think it is critically important for our security, so I thank you for initiating it, and I call on you at this time for your opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that you are holding this hearing today. I think it will help deepen our understanding of the threat of homegrown terrorism and the role that local law enforcement can play in countering it.

The rising threat of homegrown terrorism magnifies the importance of local law enforcement in our efforts to protect our country from attacks. While some terrorists are foreign nationals crossing borders to operate as part of an international network like al-Qaeda, others may be native-born or naturalized Americans radicalized by a Web site advocating violence or in an extremist mosque or even in prison.

As recent domestic plots against Fort Dix and the JFK International Airport demonstrate, local law enforcement officers are often our first line of defense against such homegrown terrorist threats. Whether local officers are patrolling, investigating the link between a stolen car and a driver's forged identification, or conducting community outreach, their actions can help to disrupt terrorists' planned attacks within our country. These officers are often present at the first encounter with radical elements in their communities.

For example, four of the September 11, 2001, terrorists, including the one who hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, had earlier been pulled over and ticketed for speeding. Each of them had violated

a U.S. immigration law, but the State and local officers who stopped them were not aware of that. If standard procedures had included checks for such infractions, and if we had set up an effective system to get that data to these front-line officers, perhaps part of the September 11, 2001, plot might have been detected and disrupted.

Surveilling and photographing public buildings, smuggling drugs or cash, buying precursor materials for bombs, making violent statements or threats—checking on any of these behaviors can turn a routine policing incident into a chapter of the broader fight against terrorism. Alert officers sensitized to the potential implications of these behaviors are powerful weapons in our homeland security arsenal.

Local police are also particularly well positioned to understand the roots of violent extremist behavior in the ethnic, racial, or religious communities in their towns and cities and to reach out to those communities in a respectful and cooperative spirit. Each of the departments represented before us today has worked on understanding the process of radicalization to the point of violence and on avoiding attitudes or tactics that can alienate local populations and reduce their willingness to report suspicious events or to cooperate in police investigations.

With wider awareness of threats, more extensive coordination, and better information sharing, the Nation's local law enforcement officers can play an even stronger, more collaborative role in our counterterrorism partnership. Today we will learn more about the initiatives of the New York City, Los Angeles, Kansas City, and Miami-Dade police departments to combat the threat of radicalization and domestic terrorism. I particularly look forward to hearing about New York City's study of the radicalization process based on foreign and domestic case studies. It offers a very useful framework for analyzing and intervening in this lethal process. Like the Chairman, I was struck by the finding that often the individuals who go through the radicalization process are "unremarkable" citizens, living lives without any contact with the criminal justice system.

Similarly, the work of the LAPD in creating a fusion center, which I have visited, and in developing a Community Mapping Project provides examples of best practices that can be extended elsewhere. I look forward to deepening this Committee's understanding of how local police departments have organized themselves for counterterrorism work, how they develop and use personnel and programs, and how they interact and coordinate with agencies on the Federal level, like the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. They can also help us identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned and ensure that our sharing of information and analysis provides effective, actionable leads.

While our witnesses today represent major cities, we must keep in mind that terrorists, whether foreign or homegrown, can also plan, train, buy supplies, assemble bombs, or carry out attacks in smaller communities or rural areas. We must ensure that those officers in smaller departments benefit from the skills and knowledge developed in larger departments and that our Federal assistance is

delivered in ways that can provide the greatest support for all local law enforcement efforts.

So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for scheduling this very important hearing.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins.

We will go now to the first panel. We are glad to welcome Lawrence Sanchez, Assistant Commissioner, New York City Police Department, and Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst of the New York City Police Department. Thanks for all your work. I think you have broken new ground, and we are very grateful that you are here to talk to us about it.

Commissioner Sanchez, I believe you are going to begin.

**TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE H. SANCHEZ, ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Mr. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators, Committee Members, staff, and guests. We, in the New York Police Department, again are very grateful for the opportunity to address this Committee on what this department views as a critical issue affecting the safety of the citizens of New York City.

Since September 11, 2001, the world has witnessed dozens of attack plots, all highlighting the potential threat of radicalization by Islamist extremism, especially in Western democracies. In New York City itself, we have experienced this phenomenon up close as evidenced by the 34th Street case, the Fort Dix case, and the JFK case.

Your Committee's interest in the role of local law enforcement relative to the Islamist extremist-based threat is one that the NYPD has continued to evolve since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001.

In a city of about 8.5 million, where 40 percent of its population is foreign born, the New York Police Department views its mission as going beyond that of the more traditional Federal mission on terrorism. In other words, rather than just protecting New York City citizens from terrorists, the New York Police Department believes that part of its mission is to protect New York City citizens from turning into terrorists. And that is a very important point because it changes the threshold, it changes the focus, and actually it makes the job a lot harder.

That is why the understanding of all aspects of Islamist extremism, how it plays into radicalization, the agents involved, and the tactics involved, are all vital to our department's ability to counter the effects of this phenomenon across this 8.5 million population.

As you mentioned, we published this study on the homegrown radicalization in the West. This analysis and compilation of 11 cases documents a continuity of behaviors and indicators across all 11 cases that may—and I emphasize “may”—be signatures or precursors of potential future terrorist acts.

Mitch Silber, one of our senior civilian analysts, who has been actually working on this for the past 3 years, has spent a good part of his time traveling to the front lines of homegrown radicalization, which are in Europe, in the U.K., the Netherlands, France, Spain, and spending a lot of time actually looking at what has been

termed “innocuous behaviors,” and plotted and documented these in his study of these 11 cases.

I am going to turn the floor over to him so he can give you a brief synopsis of the highlights of what this study encompassed. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Commissioner. Mr. Silber.

TESTIMONY OF MITCHELL D. SILBER,¹ SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. SILBER. Thank you, Commissioner. Thank you, Senators.

The NYPD believes that the threat, and the nature of the threat, of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. While the threat from overseas remains, most of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in the West since September 11, 2001, have fit a different pattern. The individuals who plotted or conducted the attacks were generally citizens or residents of the nations in which the attacks occurred. Though a few may have received training in al-Qaeda camps, the great majority did not. Although al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for each attack, these attacks were not under the command and control of al-Qaeda Central, nor were they specifically funded by al-Qaeda Central. Rather, they were conducted by local residents and citizens who used al-Qaeda as their ideological inspiration. This is a homegrown threat, and it is driven by radicalization.

The current threat that homegrown al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism presents to Europe is on an order of magnitude greater than that of the homegrown threat to the United States. Second- and third-generation Muslim citizens, whether they are in Britain, Spain, Germany, Denmark, or other European nations, are more alienated, less accepted, and, thus, more vulnerable to radicalization than in America. To some degree, America’s longstanding tradition of absorbing varied diaspora populations has protected the United States and retarded the radicalization process at home. However, one of the primary conclusions of our report, “Radicalization in the West,” is that the process of radicalization that led homegrown groups in Europe, Canada, and Australia to plot against their host countries is applicable and has already occurred within the United States.

American Muslims are more resistant, though not immune, to the jihadi-Salafi narrative. The thwarted plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey in May 2007, was conceived by homegrown jihadists, took place less than 2 hours from Manhattan, and only underscored the seriousness of this emerging threat to the homeland.

With this in mind, NYPD sought to better understand this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives unremarkable people to become terrorists. Our study examined the trajectories of radicalization that produced operational cells in Madrid, in Amsterdam, in London, in Sydney, and in Toronto to construct an analytical framework that tracks jihadist recruits from the stages of pre-radicalization to self-identification to indoctrination

¹“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” report from the City of New York Police Department, prepared by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt appears in the Appendix on page 537.

through jihadization—a cycle that ends with either capture or death.

It then compares this model with the trajectories of radicalization observed in conspiracies within the United States, including the jihadist clusters in Lackawanna, New York; Northern Virginia; Portland, Oregon; New York City; and, last, with the Hamburg cell that was responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001.

More recently, based on my travels to Denmark and Germany this past month, and based on conversations with their intelligence and police services, the two plots that were thwarted this past September in both countries also seemed to follow the same basic process that we have identified.

The dissection and comparison of these plots led to the assessment that there is a common pathway of radicalization in the West. Each of the stages in this process is distinct and a specific signature is associated with it. All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all of the stages, and the vast majority stop or abandon this process at different points. Moreover, although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression. However, individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in a terrorist act.

Pre-radicalization: Pre-radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology. Based on our comparative studies of 11 cases, individuals who are vulnerable to this radicalization tend to be male Muslims between the age of 15 to 35 who are local residents and citizens from varied ethnic backgrounds. Significant proportions come from middle-class backgrounds and are not economically destitute. Moreover, many are educated, with at least a high school background, if not university students. Recent converts to Islam are particularly vulnerable to this ideology and have played an important role in many of the groups. Nevertheless, the far majority of group members do not start out as radical, or even devout, Muslims.

Self-identification: Self-identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity, and begin to associate themselves with and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for this identity crisis and subsequent religious seeking is often what is called in behavioral science a “cognitive opening.” This is an event which challenges one’s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens one’s mind to a new perception or view of the world.

Some of the crises that can jump-start this process include economic—losing a job, blocked mobility; social issues—alienation, discrimination, racism, real or perceived; political issues—international conflicts involving Muslims; or personal issues—a close death in the family.

For many Muslims in the West, especially those of the second and third generations, who are seeking to learn about their Muslim heritage, the Salafi interpretation is the version of Islam that they

are most widely exposed to. It has become more mainstream and has proliferated within diaspora communities. This interpretation of Islam is not the cultural Islam of their parents or of their home countries. And while this may begin as an adoption of a more peaceful, apolitical, or political variants of Salafi ideology, it also can become a stepping stone to the jihadi-Salafi interpretation which paves a path to terrorism by its doctrines, which suggest that violence is a viable and legitimate means to defend Islam from perceived enemies, even if it means attacking one's own government and/or sacrificing one's own life.

Indoctrination: Indoctrination is the stage in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts this ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. This action is militant jihad.

Group members leave the mosque if it is not sufficiently extreme and too conspicuous. Gradually, they begin to separate themselves from secular society, and they self-radicalize. Radicalization continues in the living room of the nearby private house or apartment. The only window left open to the world is the Internet. However, at this point individuals are interacting with like-minded others in a virtual echo chamber—individuals who only reinforce their beliefs.

Jihadization: This is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in militant jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation, and execution. One particularly important observation is that this process of participating in autonomous jihad is very much a group phenomenon. While earlier stages may occur on an individual basis, this phase is closely associated with friends deciding to partake in an action together rather than as isolated individuals. Often individuals will seek to travel abroad to participate in the field of jihad, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Somalia, or Iraq—only to be redirected to the West to do something for the cause there.

Frequently, the group members participate in outdoor activities, like rafting, camping, and paintball, to vet, to bond, and to train. In addition, mental preparation commences as jihadist videos are watched. Last, potential targets are chosen, surveillance and reconnaissance begins, and the group weaponizes with readily available components.

It is critical to note that while other stages of radicalization may take place gradually over 2 to 3 years, the jihadization phase—the stage which defines the actual attack—can occur quickly and with very little warning. In some cases, this stage runs its course in as little as a couple of weeks.

So what explains this phenomenon? Well, it begins with alienation of second- and third-generation Muslims, individuals who are torn because of the secular West and their religious heritage. It also encompasses economic stagnation and perceived discrimination—issues that are far more concerning in Europe than in the United States.

In addition, there is a search for identity. This exposes individuals to the Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation, and this can be through a variety of different conduits: Muslim student associations at universities, NGOs, mosques, and probably most importantly, the Internet.

There is also the prevalence of jihadi subculture in most cities in the West; if individuals are looking for tapes or books they can find in a local mosque bookstore or via a student group. In addition, this is a vulnerable demographic. These individuals are at a very action-oriented age.

And, finally, there are the current military clashes in the Islamic world that highlight the fault lines between the West and Islam. These are portrayed by some as a clash of civilizations or a war on Islam, and they are portrayed as crises that necessitate mobilization.

The list of grievances is long, and it includes issues like Spanish participation in Iraq, U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Canadian or Australian participation in Afghanistan, U.S. support for Israel, British presence in Iraq or Afghanistan, and India's presence in Kashmir. However, it is important to note that the removal of any one or two of these issues would not eliminate the threat, and I call attention to the Madrid 2004 train bombings. Clearly, the grievance that drove these individuals was to punish Spain for its participation in the coalition war in Iraq. However, the second rationale is not as well known. The individuals who conducted the attack cited the Spanish occupation, and this is the Spanish occupation of al-Andalus going back to 1492 and the expulsion of the Moors by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella—clearly a grievance that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.

In conclusion, since September 11, 2001, U.S. authorities have uncovered homegrown jihadists in such varied locations as Lackawanna, New York; Northern Virginia; Portland, Oregon; Fort Dix; and New York City. These arrests, along with trends observed at the street level in New York City indicate that radicalization is taking place in the United States. Our fear is that even small conspiracies with limited capabilities could carry out attacks equivalent to the London subway bombings, the Madrid train bombings, or even a jihadist version of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Thank you very much.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Silber. That was very thoughtful and informative, and I appreciate that work very much.

Let's do 7-minute opening rounds since there are three of us here.

Let me go back to something I said in my opening statement, which is the previous testimony of Secretary Chertoff and Director Mueller, that there is a very real threat from homegrown violent Islamist extremism. A National Intelligence Estimate that came out in July said the same thing as your report, just to establish a basis of fact here. In your report, there is a section titled "The New York City Experience," and you write, "Radicalization continues permeating New York City, especially in Muslim communities."

I wonder if you would take a moment to just add a little bit and explain what that statement means, not just to New York but in

terms of the real or potential threat from homegrown Islamist extremism in the United States.

Mr. SANCHEZ. Well, I think, Senator, you can look at it from several different angles. One is that New York is not immune, just as any other city, and the amount of extremism available on the Internet has been growing logarithmically. It is available. It is easy to get. You do not have to go far to find an Internet cafe even if you do not have a computer. You can always be subjected to the extremism provided in the Internet and the virtual world.

In the 34th Street case, we found this extremism in a bookstore that would sell extremist material. And not uncommonly, you will find other places of business where they do sell jihadist tapes, jihadist literature. So the availability of material that is extremist continues to grow, and it is made available in the regular business abodes that you would see in any city.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Would you say that the Internet today is the most significant factor in the radicalization that is occurring in America?

Mr. SANCHEZ. I would, because I believe the Internet is usually the stepping stone where people go to look first. If you look across these phases of radicalization, there is an identity phase where people are really looking for an answer. When you look for an answer, people nowadays, especially in Western societies, go to the Internet. And, unfortunately, because the extremist message is the most popular, when you Google something like "Islam," you are going to get the first 15 sites all going to be extremist sites. So you get an immediate exposure to that.

Then the Internet plays another role. When you move on to another phase, which is one of looking for other like-minded people so you can come out of the virtual world and meet real people, it has chat rooms. It talks about places. It talks about things you could do together. It talks about events that you can go and join and become part of it. So now it gives you indicators for the real world where you can meet real people rather than living in this virtual world.

And then as you progress down these stages, the Internet then becomes a research tool for maybe things you want to do. If you want to research information on bomb-making material, the Internet, again, becomes a resource for that.

So it really covers the breadth of a radicalization process and becomes a useful tool in each of its phases.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. One of the things in response to your report and a hearing earlier in the year as a result of an investigation on the role of the Internet that I have been thinking about is whether we should make a request of the Internet service providers to take some of the extremist Web sites off. They have got that capacity. They do it in some cases where there is dangerous material. None of us likes censorship, but insofar as this is a real threat to security, I wonder if you have thought about that as one response to what you found in your investigation.

Mr. SANCHEZ. It would be, I think, a very important step if we were able to curb the amount of extremist sites available on the Web. But I am skeptical that we would, again, have a lot of traction in doing that because we have seen so many sites go down and

we have seen so many sites go up. I mean, even in the world where there is a lot of law enforcement putting a lot of effort on cases of child pornography, they have not been able to curb it much. It stops and comes up. I think it is almost a futile attempt.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I hear you, and that is a question I have asked myself, something we are exploring. Obviously, you would not knock off a Web site on Islam. You would have to find evidence on the site that it was quite literally fomenting, insurrection, violence, and that it was providing a chat room in which some things were happening which were going to lead potentially to radical action.

Going beyond the Internet, I was struck by the NYPD report concluding that potential violent Islamist extremists, including those who go on to the Internet, still need what the report calls a “spiritual sanctioner” and an “operational leader,” which suggests that the Internet alone cannot complete—or even initiate in some cases the radicalization process. I wonder if you would talk about that a bit and also whether the Internet in some cases itself becomes the spiritual sanctioner.

Mr. SANCHEZ. Let me give that one to Mr. Silber. I think he can do a good job on that.

Mr. SILBER. Right. One of the cases that we discussed was the Toronto 18 case from the summer of 2006, and that was really a demonstration of where a group of individuals met on the Internet and interacted on the Internet. But at the end of the day, before they could actually commit an act, they had to leave the virtual world and meet in the real world, and to some degree, that is maybe an intervention point for law enforcement.

But more specifically in terms of these two archetypes that we highlighted, the spiritual sanctioner, I will talk about that one first, and that is really an important individual, and it is interesting that the individual is more often than not the imam in the mosque. This is really a self-appointed expert on Islam and may know just a little bit more than everybody else. But this person’s role really cannot be underestimated because it is this individual who is giving this minority extremist view of Islam and making it legitimate to these individuals who do not have much knowledge of Islam to begin with. And in almost every one of the cases that we looked at, that individual played a key role in guiding the radicalization of the individuals and telling them what was a legitimate response, what was approved by Islam or not. And this really drove these groups’ radicalization, and we really see that person as key for bringing people from stage two, self-identification, where it is simply just a religious awakening and can be very benign, to step three, which is indoctrination, where clearly someone has adopted the fact that violence is a legitimate means to an end.

And as far as the operational planner goes, that person has also a critical role, and often the difference between a group of individuals that is simply an aggrieved bunch of guys and a group that actually goes operational. And one could look at Mohammed Siddique Khan on July 7, 2005, in London, or even really Mohamed Atta from the Hamburg group as being the individual who took these disparate individuals who really did not have the backing in terrorism and made them an operational group.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. Thank you. My time is up. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As usual, you and I focused on exactly the same issues, so I am going to continue along that same line of questioning.

In your report, you found that the individuals who go through this process are not on law enforcement's radar, that they are largely, your term was, "unremarkable individuals." But in all 11 cases, there was, as the Chairman indicated, a spiritual sanctioner and an operational leader.

There is no profile for the individual who may be recruited to go through this process, but is there a profile for the spiritual sanctioner and the operational leader? Mr. Silber.

Mr. SILBER. In terms of the spiritual sanctioner, really the only profile in terms of commonality was this was an individual who believed that they knew more about Islam and knew a little bit more than the rest of the group. So they had some claim to legitimacy. In the European cases, a few of these individuals actually had experience fighting in what they believed was a legitimate jihad overseas, so they had this veteran status. Specifically, in the Hamburg group of September 11, 2001, there was an individual named Mohammed Haydar Zammar, and this was a person who had experience fighting in jihad in Bosnia. So when he claimed to know what the true Islam was, that carried more weight with this group of neophytes.

And as far as the operational planner, it is really somebody with the mentality, discipline, and intellect to be able to lead the group. And, again, Mohammed Siddique Khan in the July 7, 2005, attack, this was a Leeds Metropolitan University graduate. Again, with September 11, 2001, with the Hamburg group, Mohamed Atta was an individual who was an engineering and architectural student. So these were people who were well educated, well informed, and had the knowledge to be that leader.

Senator COLLINS. What your findings suggest to me is that it is almost impossible to try to figure out who is going to go through this process because they are average citizens or average residents, but that if we can figure out who is likely to be the spiritual sanctioner or the operational planner, that could lead us to the entire network, because it is really telling that in every one of the case studies that you looked at, you had those two roles. Is that a fair assessment of how we should target the efforts?

Mr. SILBER. I think certainly having those individuals is a necessary condition for a group to go forward, and actually one group that we profiled, the Hofstad group in Amsterdam, was a group where it was unclear who the operational leader was. And as a result, this group never actually went forward to fulfill their greater plans. One individual acted ahead of everybody else and assassinated Theo van Gogh. But that group did not have an operational planner and could not go forward.

But certainly those two individuals are critical for the group to go through the whole process, and it may be worthwhile to try and identify those individuals as a first step.

Senator COLLINS. Commissioner Sanchez, I was struck in reading about the department that you have an enormous number of indi-

viduals with foreign language capabilities that allows you to more easily do outreach to specific communities, and it really is in stark contrast to the lack of that capability at the Federal level.

I am wondering whether it is because you have made an effort to recruit from those communities, or are you investing in significant language training for your police officers?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Having spent over 20 years at the CIA before coming to the New York Police Department, I was overwhelmed by the resources they had as far as language and culture.

I think being that New York City is 40-percent foreign born, the NYPD mimics that demographic breakdown. There are probably in the area of being between 25- to 40-percent foreign born, just by the typical average recruiting would have classes that would include quite a bit of both first- and second-generation people from various countries. So it was not something—there was not a program we instilled. It was resources we found. And what we have done with it is rather than allowing it to just be part of the fabric of the NYPD, we sort of corralled it to be able to use it as best we can on this issue.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.

Senator Voinovich, thanks for being here this morning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, and thank you for following up on the hearings that Senator Collins started on this issue of radicalization. I think it is one of the most important issues that we need to be concerned about, and I congratulate you for the outstanding work that you have done in this report.

As a former mayor, one of the things that I always was troubled about is too often the interface with the community is always through the police department. And I wonder, do you have any other vehicle where you are reaching out to the Muslim community besides the police department? Do you have a community relations board, for example, that has outreach into the neighborhoods where people live to develop an understanding and dialogue and a communications network?

Mr. SANCHEZ. The department does have a community—whole community policing unit. The department is very big. The department is 53,000—37,000 in uniform, the people we have. Community outreach is a very important part of what we do. Yes, it is mainly a police-run community effort, but it is usually run from our little home stations called precincts that are within each of these communities. These are the actual first faces and the common faces that the people in those neighborhoods, be it if it is the Hassidics on two blocks and the Pakistanis three blocks over, see on a daily basis. So we do most of our work through the police and an outreach that includes civilians within that police department, but it is done through the police department.

Senator VOINOVICH. We call them “police-community relations.”

Mr. SANCHEZ. Correct.

Senator VOINOVICH. I had them out in the district, and they got the local people together with the department.

Mr. SANCHEZ. Correct.

Senator VOINOVICH. And beat cops to talk and dialogue with each other and get to understand each other.

Mr. SANCHEZ. And they have picnics, and they do all kinds of events with them. It is very important that we always preserve that as a function without ever tainting it with any preconceived notions of anything that we know about terrorism, because they are dealing with people on a daily basis and the most important thing they do is to secure and develop confidence within those communities across every ethnicity that lives there.

Senator VOINOVICH. What efforts are being made by the Muslim community? I recently met with Imam Rauf in my office, and if you are familiar with him, he is trying both, in the United States and internationally, to get Muslims to understand that you can be a good Muslim and you can believe in the Declaration of Independence and all of the things that we hold dear to us, and that they are not inconsistent.

But is there any effort in the Muslim community to try and counteract the more radical elements who try to get people to do things that are inconsistent with the Koran. Because unfortunately, and I believe incorrectly, it casts a bad shadow over the entire Muslim community.

Mr. SANCHEZ. It is a very tough issue, Senator, for various reasons. One is that, unfortunately, Islam is not a religion that has tenets, doctrines, and hierarchy. So you cannot have one spokesman to try to set a standard. Even when we looked across al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, they all emulated a different cleric.

That said, the other problem we have is that it is not always about the religion, we have seen. It is a political ideology that cuts and pastes religion to fulfill conviction. And what I mean by that is the spiritual sanctions that we get in Western democracies, they are not like learned scholars with 35 or 40 years of studying at al-Azhar University and others, and really studying the religion and becoming experts on this. These are 22- and 23-year-old kids that are coming out of some of the Muslim student associations who are very charismatic and become spiritual sanctioners.

So, again, it just continues to justify that this is not so much about the religion, but they are skilled enough to provide this religion justification for a political conviction. We see many times where the moderate church is trying to influence the more extremist mosques. A moderate mosque influencing a more extremist mosque can actually polarize them. They do not want to listen to them. It is almost as if you had a charismatic Catholic Church trying to influence a conservative one, and we have that dynamic going on.

So I do not know if the answer is going to be through the religion at the end of the day.

Senator VOINOVICH. We talked about the Internet. What do European countries do? Are radical Web sites as available in France or Britain as in the United States? I mean, the Internet has become a dangerous source of propaganda and an even more dangerous source of terrorist training.

Mr. SANCHEZ. It is a global phenomenon, but I will let Mr. Silber talk to you about that because he has actually sat with these people from the other countries and talked about that.

Mr. SILBER. Yes, Senator, they are as frustrated as we are in the fact that it is so difficult to regulate, and even if some attempt were to bring down a site, these people are very resilient, and individuals find other ways to bring these Web sites back in some type of other formula.

The only thing that we have seen—and, really, I do not know if there is enough data to measure success or not—at least in the U.K. they raised the threshold in terms of what they can do a prosecution for in terms of the Internet, and probably within about the last month or so, they convicted an individual up in Scotland for incitement to violence, an individual who had downloaded significant data from the Internet about how to conduct attacks. And this was an individual who himself had not gone through a conspiracy stage, but at least the fact that he had downloaded this information, had spent an amount of time on the Web at these different Web sites, was ultimately convicted and received a sentence of 8 years.

So that is what the Brits are experimenting with, in a sense raising the threshold in terms of what you can do or not do on the Internet, and it still remains to be seen if that is going to be successful and discourage people from going to these Web sites.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I know you talked about it, but Internet use in inciting violence may be something that we really ought to look into. The Internet has become a weapon that is being used to incite individuals to conduct that which they ordinarily would not be involved with or would be incapable of in the first place.

I remember when I was a State legislator, and the police department came to me, and we had a lot of fire bombing going on in the late 1960s. Individuals would meet in the street at 3 o'clock in the morning with a bottle of kerosene and a wick and they would have matches or some other device to ignite it. But they could not arrest them until they put it together and they were ready to go with it. We got a piece of legislation passed that said that under those circumstances law enforcement could act and not wait until it was too late. And, frankly, they did not use it very often, but the fact it was there and available to them meant a great deal in terms of dealing with some of the stuff they were confronted with on the street.

So I think we have got to maybe look at some of these things differently than we would traditionally because of technology.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. I agree with you, and I appreciate your statement. We should work together to see if there is something we can do. I know there are some others on the Hill that are interested in this with the Internet service providers to try to bring down some of these violent Web sites, understanding that they can bounce up again somewhere else, but at least we will make it harder for them to do business, which is, I think, by extension, exactly what you were trying to do in the case that you described.

Because this is so interesting, I am going to ask that we do another round, a shorter round, maybe 4 minutes each, just to subject you to a continuing cross-examination.

I want to stress something Mr. Silber said, because for a long time I think we have felt that because America is such an open society, Muslim Americans, like every other wave of immigrants that have come to the country, have had opportunity unmatched elsewhere, including in Europe, that we would not face this problem. And it is, first, reassuring, based on your investigation on both sides of the Atlantic, that you agree that the problem is significantly less severe here than in Europe for exactly that reason, that the Muslim Americans who have come here from the various places they have worked their way up, and obviously the overwhelming majority are very loyal and proud American citizens. But you had a sentence that is worth remembering, which is that American Muslims are more resistant but not immune—and that is the point—to what you call the jihadi-Salafi ideology.

Second, Commissioner Sanchez, I am paraphrasing, but I think you said that the aim of this investigation and of the NYPD was not just to prevent terrorist attacks, obviously, post-September 11, 2001, in New York City, but to try to understand and then prevent the radicalization that leads to terrorist attacks.

So in the end, what are the steps that you come away with that you feel in this very unusual area, unremarkable people, not on the screen of law enforcement, how do you begin to try to prevent the radicalization that leads to terrorism?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Let me try to answer it this way. The key to it was first to understand it and to start appreciating what most people would say would be non-criminal, would be innocuous, looking at behaviors that could easily be argued in a Western democracy, especially in the United States, to be protected by First and Fourth Amendment rights, but not to look at them in a vacuum, but to look across to them as potential precursors to terrorism.

New York City, of course, has created its own methods to be able to understand them better, to be able to identify them, and to be able to make judgment calls if these are things that we need to worry about. In a closed forum, I could go into a lot more detail, Senator, as you have been briefed in the past on how we do business. But the understanding and appreciation and the acknowledgment of the dynamics of the issue are the first steps.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that and I thank you for it. This investigation by the Committee is ongoing, but I will tell you what I said at the outset, that your department obviously has done real pioneering work here. There is great work being done by the three other departments we will hear from in a minute. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. And, quite surprisingly, in some communities with significant Muslim-American populations, there is very little of the organized outreach that these four departments are involved in.

I wanted to ask you whether you or anyone else is doing anything—your responsibilities are large enough in New York, but what has been the reaction of law enforcement around the country to this report that you have done and some of the law enforcement that you are working with?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Mixed, Senator, at best, and for various reasons—and various reasons that are very understandable. The reality is that crime has dropped in New York City for the past 15 to 16 years in a row. It is an unbelievable trend. Homicides this year might even come under 500, which would be unheard of. Because we have been attacked twice, we have been given tolerance by the public and the luxury to be very aggressive on this topic.

The City of New York might be a No. 1 target, but as you point out, Senator, it is not unique to this phenomenon of radicalization, which worries us every single day, because at one point we have the Federal Government on the front lines for those attacks that are generated where people are radicalized from overseas and come to New York. We are hoping we have a handle on things that are incubating in the streets of Queens. But what we do not have confidence in is that things are incubating in the United States in another city which is not doing anything, and can come to New York City as a target city.

That said, the motivations and incentives in many of the cities that have high crime—terrorism is not going to be the first issue, especially if the calculus at the end of the day is that the terrorist act by those potential extremists is not going to be in that city. So it makes it difficult to be able to create some kind of a comprehensive approach to this in the United States.

That said, the New York Police Department has launched an Operation Sentry where we have started an outreach program to all the departments around us, as small as they might be, from Poughkeepsie to Newburgh to Suffolk County. And we are creating training, we are showing them how we do business in New York City, and basically trying to proliferate the way we do business and understand this phenomenon.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Commissioner, what has been the reaction of the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to your report?

Mr. SANCHEZ. I guess that has sort of been mixed, too. Our relationship with the FBI has actually—and as you probably heard in a lot of different settings, become stronger and a lot closer. I will honestly tell you, when the NYPD got into this business, it was horrible. There were a lot of turf issues, as one might expect. There was a lot of hostility. But I guess the size of our department kept this alive, and our commitment that we are not going to go away kept this alive.

Now, that said, I think we continue to depend on the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and we continue providing over 125 detectives to the JTTF to protect us from that threat that is coming from overseas where we cannot collect on it, we do not know when these people got radicalized, and we do not know where they are going. So we really depend on that, and we take direction from them there, and they know that.

The reception, I think, on our paper has been mixed in that a lot of organizations would have rather put something out on this before we did. It was important for us to get this out quickly because every day we are fighting the war of civil liberties, one we are trying to protect, but one we are also trying to inform. And we could not be too politically correct on all of this and still preserve

the program that we continue to be very aggressive on in New York City.

So the short non-answer: It has been a mixed response. Sometimes it is just quiet. But it has not been volatile or hostile.

Senator COLLINS. That is my assessment as well, based on our discussions with the FBI in particular.

We held a hearing earlier this year that the Chairman referred to looking at the use of the Internet as a radicalization tool, and I had the uncomfortable feeling that perhaps some of the Federal agencies involved in this fight were not taking the threat of domestic radicalization through the Internet seriously enough.

What is your assessment? Do you think the Federal response to the threat of homegrown terrorism is at the level it should be?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Senator, it is tough to say because one of the problems I see that the Federal officials have—I said before that part of our mission drives the way we do business, and part of our mission is to protect New York City citizens from becoming the terrorists. The Federal Government does not have that mission, so automatically, by definition, their threshold is higher. So they are going to have a lot harder time having to deal with behaviors that run the gamut on First and Fourth Amendment rights and to be able to even look and scrutinize them without having even reached a standard of criminality that you need if your prime objective is you are going to lock them up. So it is difficult. Even though the will might be there, I think the limitations actually hinder the ability. And, of course, resources, think about New York City. The Intelligence Division is 600 strong, and we are only doing five boroughs.

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Silber, my time is almost expired, but I want to bring up very quickly an issue that this Committee looked at a few years ago, and that was the financing of the spread of an extremist ideology by the Saudis through the financing of radical mosques and madrassas in this country. Are you seeing that in New York City as well? We looked at Northern Virginia in particular, which is where we saw it.

Mr. SILBER. Right. I think probably the biggest challenge that we see is probably the proliferation of the ideology that originates from Saudi Arabia. To date, NYPD has not pursued any terrorist financing cases. What we do see is the ideology. One of the things that we cite in our report were Noble Korans that were produced by al-Haramain Institute that ended up in the New York State prison system, and these were particular Korans that on the English side of the page had special footnotes and appendices that did not appear in the Arabic. And this, again, is a Koran that originated in Saudi Arabia.

Much of the literature that we see being read by some of these student university groups is books that originate from Saudi Arabia about Muhammed ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. So we do see the ideological influence right now more so even than a financial role in proliferating the ideology.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I have met on a couple of occasions with our Joint Terrorism Task Force, about 3 years ago and then more re-

cently in Cleveland, and I was impressed with the fact that they felt that information was really being moved around from Federal agencies to local agencies and they had a really good network there that would never have existed when I was mayor because of all the turf business, even among the Federal agencies.

Do you share that observation, that the communication between these agencies is a lot better than it was before? Or do you think it needs to be improved?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Senator, I can tell you that in New York City, our relationship with the JTTF and as far as whatever information we need—and, believe me, in New York we have progressed way past being enamored with threat information. We have been more seized with a lot more deep, strategic thought pieces that the intelligence community has had. And I can tell you that we have access to any and all of those at our request.

Senator VOINOVICH. And do they have the same thing? In other words, are you responding and sharing with them information that you pick up?

Mr. SANCHEZ. Right, and the beauty of it is that the people who have the clearances can guide those that may not have clearances that are doing the work. You can always protect sources and methods and still guide direction and operations. And I think we have found a way to actually make that work.

Senator VOINOVICH. In some areas around the world, we are seeing a rise of anti-Semitism. Do you see any of that in New York?

Mr. SANCHEZ. We have started to, as you have seen from some of the events we had at the tail end of the U.N. General Assembly, where we had the swastikas being painted—something that has not happened in New York City for years. We moved very quickly on the hate crimes to try to stem it before it got any traction. We are hoping we have stemmed it, but we are hoping it is not a trend that is going to take any hold. But you do have instances of that. You just have to move quickly to nip it in the bud.

Senator VOINOVICH. In Ohio, we are trying in certain places—I am particularly familiar with what we have done in Cleveland—to bring the Jewish and the Muslim community together. Is there any effort under way in New York City to do the same thing?

Mr. SANCHEZ. I do not know if there is a strategic effort. There have been instances where on occasion there have been meetings set up where it involves Jewish leaders speaking to Muslims. But I am not aware of any strategic effort to do this on a consistent basis at this point.

Senator VOINOVICH. In our 9/11 legislation, we included a Sense of the Senate in regards to the prevention of radicalization leading to ideologically based violence. And at the end of it, we talked about the Department of Homeland Security educating State, local, and community leaders in regard to radicalization.

Do you think that the Department of Homeland Security has been aggressive enough in this area? Or have you pretty well taken it over because you are on the street and you are able to do it?

Mr. SANCHEZ. A little of both, Senator, in that I think the Department of Homeland Security has a much larger job, which, of course, then dilutes what we really need. I mean, they have to look at the entire country. They are trying to get their hands around

radicalization State by State. And at this point, because of where we are in this, they are going to be limited by the information that has already been gathered through investigations, and not by starting at the ground up and figuring out what the real source of radicalization or the significance of it is in each.

So as we do our work in New York, we have become very specific to New York City, so our information has become a lot more detailed in what we need. So the DHS studies are still probably less detailed than we need at this time, but they have been supportive in everything else that we have wanted them to do, including creating ways of getting information easier, actually detailing people to help us on certain projects. So it is a mixed bag.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich.

Commissioner Sanchez and Mr. Silber, thanks for your testimony. Thanks for the investigation and research that led to your report. Thanks for your service in general. This Committee looks forward to continuing to work with you on this problem. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SILBER. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

We will now call our second panel to the table. That will be Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department; Major Michael Ronczkowski, Homeland Security Bureau, Miami-Dade Police Department; and Major Thomas Dailey, Homeland Security Division of the Kansas City Police Department.

We thank you very much. You have traveled some distance to be here. But in each of your cases, based on the investigation our Committee has done, your departments are doing very important work that we both wanted to give some national attention to but, frankly, we also wanted to learn from.

So we will begin now with Chief Downing. Thank you, Chief.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL P. DOWNING,¹ DEPUTY CHIEF, COUNTERTERRORISM AND CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. DOWNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators, and guests. It is a pleasure and an honor to be here to speak to you today.

I come from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), which is a department of nearly 10,000 people, of which we have approximately 300 dedicated to this counterterrorism effort. But the real challenge is that while we may be No. 2 or No. 3 in size, the 17,000 or 18,000 local law enforcement agencies spread throughout the United States probably have as an average less than a hundred people. And so while our initiatives and projects and themes may appear grand and best practices, the real goal is to try to instill this level of focus and strategy to these smaller agencies throughout the United States.

I had the pleasure to work in England with the New Scotland Yard for 2 months last year, and the stories that were told when I got there—just a year and a half prior they believed the IRA

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Downing appears in the Appendix on page 627.

threat was over, that there was no terrorism issue there, and that they were focusing too much attention on it. Days later, as you know, explosions rang out throughout London, 52 British citizens were killed, and people were asking what happened.

In November, the day I got on the plane to leave for England, the head of MI5 publicly stated that there were 1,600 people under surveillance for counterterrorism-related activity. There were 200 cells and 16 active operations, and people asked, how could this be? How could this be happening right under our noses? So today I bring you lessons from both sides of the Atlantic that I learned and share with you.

Unlike Federal agencies, local law enforcement is part of the community. Knowing the community is what we do, and the close relationship that we have is the key to prevention. No agency knows their landscape better than the local law enforcement, and we were built and designed to be the eyes and ears of communities or the first preventers of terrorism. And not only us, but we tried to instill that idea of being the first preventers of terrorism to private security, the private sector, the faith communities, the communities that we work with every day, the businesses, and the corporations. Everybody has a responsibility.

But it is also our position that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement in this counterterrorism effort. Legitimacy starts with the organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. And we want to be recognized as sincerely honoring this principle in intelligence and counterterrorism activities and respect this community so that they can respect us.

In the LAPD, we believe that no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.

My testimony is based on the following four principles: That American-Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family, and the value of the individual, and that community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat. Society as a whole fears the indiscriminate mass violence we are seeing around the world, and only when the community leaders support this effort will there be a flow of credible intelligence.

We have tried to align our people, our purpose, and our strategy around the mission of building capacity to both hunt and disrupt operational capability, the recruiting, the funding, the planning, the surveillance, and the execution of operations; but just as important, equally important—maybe more important—we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation; great efforts at organizing and mobilizing in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent extremists from making inroads into this faith community. We have gone to great lengths to extend ourselves and extend an olive branch to that community so that we can stand with them, that they feel confident

to resist the extremists from taking over mosques or taking over their youth.

Local law enforcement can play a vital role in the fight against violent ideological extremism as the educator. We talk about this balance between soldier and educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned that Muslim communities in the United States are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they may turn to other sources which they have for news and socialization, such as the Internet.

We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and also become safe havens for potential terrorists to hide among the population. We do not have the same kinds of problems as England, France, Israel, and Germany. The underlying motivations are unique to the host country. And we also do not have the same kind of response—the Building Identity and Resisting Radicalization (BIRR) Project in Australia, the Channel Project in northern England, the Jail Deradicalization Project in Malaysia. But we have pioneered outreach efforts in the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

For the past 18 months, LAPD has been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with the Muslim communities, bringing the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage, and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of police service. And our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education and prevention. We now have terrorism liaison officers in all of our divisions, in all of our fire stations. We have public health involved, code enforcement involved, parking enforcement involved, and L.A. Unified School Police involved. We are trying to institutionalize this idea and create more awareness, orientation, and also public data collectors.

LAPD has learned the hard way. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture, and in Los Angeles, we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs.

You mentioned homicides. As of today, we have had 335 year-to-date. Last year-to-date at this time we had 399, and we hope to finish the year under 400. Normally, 65 to 70 percent of our homicides are gang related. But regardless of how many officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. Prevention is the lesson learned from the gang experience. And while more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community, with the strengthening of family structure, economic base, the weakening of political power bases built on victimization, and a cultural tolerance of violence. Congress should ensure that DHS provides to local law enforcement the tools needed to establish this relationship and enlist the entire Muslim community in public safety.

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists, those who intentionally plant seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society, from legitimate actors. The LAPD must also have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and

terrorism activities on the Internet, and we have recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative to conduct an extensive Community Mapping Project. We are also soliciting the input of local Muslim groups so the process can be transparent and inclusive.

But this is not just a data set. It is the start of a longer conversation. We will identify with communities and the community identifying with its families, neighborhoods, city, State, country, and police. We probably have over 700,000 American Muslims throughout the Los Angeles region, but we do not really know where they live or what they do or how they are structured. We have great outreach, and we have got great relationships, but the idea here is to actually map out, to find out where the Pakistani Muslims live, the Somalians, the Chechnyans, the Jordanians, and then identify risk factors, exposure to Wahhabi-Salafi preaching, socioeconomic conditions, age and gender demographics, and look at those, and on one side be the catalyst to infuse social services and governmental resources, and then on the other side possibly be involved in intelligence approaches so that we know what is going on in those communities.

For the past 18 months, LAPD's outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities has helped the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage, and listen. This has helped to build more robust trust in the area. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans doing law enforcement. But we also need to help them develop the counter narrative, to inspire the American-Muslim community to responsibly partner with law enforcement, to help us with our purpose, and that is, to protect American values. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Chief, thanks very much. Very impressive and helpful testimony. I have some questions I want to ask you, but will wait until the end of the testimony.

Major—not Mayor. I did not want to declare your candidacy today.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. I would rather be a Major. [Laughter.]

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. You are a smart man.

Major Ronczkowski, thanks for coming up representing the Homeland Security Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police Department.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR MICHAEL R. RONCZKOWSKI,¹ HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU, MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and other distinguished Members, I appreciate the opportunity to come forth today to give you some insight to what the Miami-Dade Police Department is doing in the realm of Islamist extremism as well as homeland security and the threat that may exist.

We work with the simple premise of Merriam-Webster's definition of "extremism" as the advocacy of extreme measures or views.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Ronczkowski appears in the Appendix on page 635.

Nowhere in that definition does it point to any one particular group or segment of society that may exist. We are concerned with not only those of Islamist extremism but those which may exist in the homeland that will cause others to join them. It may be a white supremacist group. It may be other groups. There are many extremists that are out there. We are looking for the melding of them coming together.

But we are going to focus on the Islamist extremist side of the house, and the role of local law enforcement is key, it is critical. What we are looking at—at the local law enforcement level—is a proactive posture. The Miami-Dade Police Department does not take a reactive—we want to be proactive. And in order to do that, we must get out there, work with the community, be aware of what is going on, and I am going to highlight some of those efforts.

As you have noted, as well as other folks have noted, the Internet is a huge dilemma for us. We cannot police at the local level the Internet. Just go onto a very popular location, MySpace, that many teenagers are on. Type in the word “jihad,” and you will get 45,600 results back. Type in “Islamist extremism,” you are getting between 500 to 800 results back. Why is that key? Are every one of those violent extremists? No. But the discussions are there. They are posting pictures. We are aware of a lot of what is going on. And there are many other forums. I do not want to single out any one. But we do have to look at all of them, from YouTube to MySpace, what Google will bring back. It is amazing what you can come up with.

Miami-Dade County is a large area, larger than two States and about 17 countries, where more than half of our citizens are foreign born. Nearly two-thirds speak another language. That diversity is exemplified in the religious bodies that we have. We have over 900 congregations and 70 different theologies represented.

It is in the past 10 years that the Muslim component has come into play. We have got about 70,000 folks that follow Islam within our region. Nothing near what New York and L.A. are encountering, but we have them from far different reaches. We have them from Iran, we have them from Pakistan, we have a small Somali component. We have varying degrees. And as noted in New York’s study, as well as other studies that have been done, such as the one in the Netherlands, there are many factors that come into play, and we are seeing some of them down in our area.

I will provide you some insight into what we have been doing with the Federal partners, some of which has been exemplary. We are fortunate to have an exceptional relationship with not only the FBI but also with DHS down in our area.

As I noted before, we are taking a proactive posture. We do not look at counterterrorism. We look at it as antiterrorism, one that should be taken by all law enforcement. What we have been approaching is getting the local law enforcement officer on the street to be the eyes and ears. Federal law enforcement does a great job, but they are not out there 24/7/365, as the local law enforcement is. We have reached out to our local law enforcement and been giving them a fundamental understanding of not only what to look for but different cultures, different keys, different patterns of behavior that may exist that they should be aware of.

But something is missing. We need to teach them about Sayyid Qutb, who had a presence here in the United States prior to going over to lead the Muslim Brotherhood, and Abdul Azam—these are ideologues of al-Qaeda—as well as others that may exist. Few have hardly even heard of them.

We have gone ahead, and we have put out classes that have reached out to our local law enforcement partners, not just in our department but the 109 different ones in our region. Yes, there are 109 law enforcement agencies, many small, many large.

The traffic stop is a component that is experienced by every single law enforcement agency at the local level. Federal law enforcement does not do many. Local law enforcement may do 50 to 100 within a week within an agency. That is key, because if you look at some of the main players that have been stopped since 1988 with the Japanese Red Army bomb maker in New Jersey, Timothy McVeigh, and most recently the individuals in South Carolina, they have not been stopped by Federal agents. They have been stopped by local law enforcement for traffic infractions.

We keep talking about the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system is key. However, these are folks that are going under the radar screen, and something that in this country we rely upon heavily is not mass transit, it is local transportation, and that is the vehicle. That vehicle gets stopped, gets ticketed, has traffic crashes. Those are opportunities to uncover different pieces of the puzzle.

It is time that local law enforcement starts acting locally and thinking globally. We have taken an approach that it is nice to know that you can go ahead and do things within a certain jurisdiction, but we are not an extension of necessarily the local government. We are an extension of the national effort, national law enforcement. We understand in South Florida what is going on in Cuba. We understand the tri-border region. We understand what is going on in the Middle East. These are representations of our communities, so we have a need to understand what is taking place out there.

The terrorist organizations that we are facing today are no longer hierarchical, top-down chain of command. They are very flat organizations as, through the Internet and through other means, the radicalization piece is huge. What we are going to find in the local law enforcement is material support. That is the financing and weapons that may be necessary to carry out a plot, as well as the recruitment. These are the three main pieces. We are not going to catch Osama bin Laden at the local level.

Efforts that we have been working with Major Cities Chiefs Association and Federal partners have helped us reach out to Los Angeles, Kansas City, and New York on a continual basis, but those efforts need to continue to go forth. What we are starting to see is diffusing of the information. While diffusing of the information is great on a national level, it has got to start at the local level. As you pointed out, many agencies at the local level have a huge presence, have had radicalization, from Hancock, New York, to Bridgeview, Illinois, to Lodi, California. Nobody has been immune. South Florida has not. As you pointed out, Senator, the traffic stop,

in South Florida, next county up—we have had many Islamist extremists that have come through the South Florida region.

In November 2005, the Miami-Dade Police Department went to address some of the issues, and that was the identification of skills, knowledge, resource, accessibility, and motive—what I call “SKRAM”—what we are trying to locate within these terrorist organizations. We started that by developing a Homeland Security Bureau in 2005. We are not as large as New York or L.A., but we have committed 65 dedicated, experienced investigators, as well as analysts, to go ahead and address this problem. Our mission is simple: We put together a component that addresses what the community represents. We have everything from Spanish-speaking officers to Polish, to Tagalog, to Arabic. We have covered everything that we can possibly think of.

We have moved into a partnership with the HIDTA, the High-Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area, with our own resources, \$500,000, a \$7 million general fund budget. Our department has taken this commitment. This commitment is from the top down, from Director Robert Parker, Chief Ricky Smith, Mayor Carlos Alvarez. It is a buy-in that has to go across all avenues.

We are divided into three functional areas. That is our intelligence area, our operations area, as well as our infrastructure protection. There are many good programs that come about, but if we do not look at it as a whole, we are not doing much service.

Our Intelligence Operations Center is the piece that fuses the information and, if you will, we are the fusion component for South Florida.

We have started to have partnerships with our corrections folks as well as our partners in the fire department, and we are developing those relationships as we speak.

As I said, most of what we have is done through the general fund, so we are limited in what we do and our approach. But the commitment was there. Our endeavor to pursue all avenues of homeland security were there. Our commitment is 100 percent homeland security and the threat not only from Islamist extremists but white supremacists, motorcycles, whatever the case may be.

We have gone ahead, and we have become the model at the national level Department of Homeland Security by outfitting not only the National Operations Center (NOC) with a detective, we took a unique approach. We took the approach of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. We have partnered with the Broward County sheriff and the Palm Beach County sheriff's office to put a rotational officer at the NOC to get situational awareness down so we can put it down to the road officers.

Our Federal partners have been exemplary. We have been part of the JTTF from the early beginning. We have been part of the field intelligence group, the Department of Homeland Security, and ATF, some of which has helped us in the most recent case, what has been known as the Liberty City Seven case, where we had radicalized youth trying to go ahead and blow up the Sears Tower.

We have worked with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, with Director Parker on the homeland security effort, and many other initiatives that have taken place.

We have enlisted the public's help because this is not just a problem of law enforcement, it is not just a problem of the Miami-Dade Police Department. It is a problem for this Nation, and everyone has a responsibility to take an effort.

We have come up with different programs. Programs are nice, but they do not address the overall issue, whether it is an 866-58-ALERT number that they can call in tip lines, seven signs of terrorism, which I will provide your staff, we took a unique approach. We did it in black and white without faces because terrorism is faceless. We do not want people looking for colors. We do not want them looking for certain types of folks. And we put that out there, and we have had a huge response, not only from the local community, if you will, the Hispanic community, but we had a huge buy-in from the Muslim community when some of them did see it.

We have gone ahead and we have worked with security, schools, shopping malls, many different folks. But the most important folks that we have reached out to in the past year, probably more than ever, has been the Muslim community. We only have 70,000 in the region, 50,000 in our area. They come from Guyana, Southeast Asia, Trinidad, Africa. We have Hispanics, we have Anglos, we have many converts. But we cannot overlook anybody. All you have to do is look at Jose Padilla as an example of that.

We have worked with various organizations, from the American Muslim Association of North America (AMANA) to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and to many of the student organizations. We have 12 fully functional mosques in our area. There are another five that work in concert to these schools and universities. We have put on regional training. We have brought in the imams, the clerics, the instructors, and the teachers. They have shared their food with us. We have brought them in to the road officers as well as the investigators.

These are things that have to be understood. There are many cultures out there. We are probably the greatest example of that in a small, tight-knit area. And even though this is a small component, we have had great success and great buy-in from publications to our awareness campaigns to our overall training where we have invited them as well as them talking to us, showing up at their trainings and their different meetings that they have.

There are 750,000 local law enforcement officers. Please do not overlook one of them. They are far more powerful than anything possibly at the Federal level. Why? Because they are out there 24/7/365. But it is the small ones we cannot overlook. We are reaching out to our region. I know my partners are reaching out to theirs.

I thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Major. I appreciate the testimony. Again, I appreciate all you are doing.

Major Dailey, I appreciate your coming from Kansas City to tell us what the Homeland Security Division there is doing about the problem of homegrown Islamist terrorism.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR THOMAS DAILEY,¹ HOMELAND SECURITY DIVISION, KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

Mr. DAILEY. Thank you, Senators. Good to be here. Good to see a familiar face, Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCASKILL. Great to see you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Did she prosecute you or did you prosecute her? [Laughter.]

Mr. DAILEY. Actually, she was a great ally.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am sure she was. I know. She is a great addition to the Senate.

Mr. DAILEY. I have been accused of not being able to introduce myself in 10 minutes, so let me just try to hit the highlights of our concerns, our counterterrorism efforts.

I will talk about and demonstrate the need for a national model for police agencies. We find violent Islamist extremism to be a fluid and ever evolving threat, and terrorist operations have become more subtle and sophisticated, and it necessitates a constant adaptation by police agencies and law enforcement, and there is no section of this country that is immune from the influence of Islamist extremism.

We are centered in the middle of the Nation. We have a metropolitan area of about 1.7 million people, and our adversary is a silent, careful group disguised as legitimate Islamic organizations and charities. There is a high geographic concentration of refugees from East African countries who are predominantly Muslim. Within this group may be individuals who have stolen the identity of refugees to gain entry into this country. There is a possibility that exists that members of terrorist organizations and those posing as their family members are now residing in our community. And this issue is certainly complicated by the fact that deportation of a refugee is very difficult due to the refugee status.

We have had more of a concentration of Middle Eastern immigrants and some refugees that are based around the Islamic religious centers. Many of them are intensely loyal to their homeland and their religious beliefs. They have established businesses and immersed themselves into the community, but they still may have sympathies with terrorist organizations as it relates to conflicts in their homeland. Some individuals have been identified that have ties back to terrorist organizations and may be conduits for fundraising, recruitment, or terrorist acts.

One of the areas of concern in Kansas City includes an environment created for the support of terrorism through fundraising. It involves criminal predicates of acquiring money and material through activities such as fraud, forgery, money structuring and laundering. The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department Intelligence Unit incorporates detectives trained in financial investigations, which adds an important component to our investigative capabilities. Our Counterterrorism Patrol Strategy that I will describe in a little bit incorporates the importance of recognizing and noting financial transaction records by patrol officers. Important

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Dailey with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 645.

also in this process is a very close working relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office, which includes regular consultation with them.

Another concern is the criminals that we know whose parole stipulations prohibit them from associating with each other are using freedom of religion to gather and may use this opportunity to further criminal endeavors and may offer a route to the radicalization process.

We have talked at length already about the Internet, and I am going to skip over some of that. It certainly is the new recruitment and training camp and makes it a lot easier for this radicalization process to take place. But I would also add that the Internet and the media I believe provide a shortcut to the radicalization process, that was outlined for you, through imitation. I would just offer the recent campus shootings, school shootings, and I could spend an hour on the relationship of the gangs and what may evolve in the imitation process.

We have worked very hard to develop counterterrorism strategies and to build bridges and enhance partnerships with the legitimate Muslim-American community.

Many of the ideas and the initiatives for our strategy were a result of exposure to the successes, the failures, and the gaps in the counterterrorism efforts and strategies at the national level that I studied while attending the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, which is an outstanding program and it is a DHS-funded program.

The prevention of terrorism is a result of a working intelligence cycle, and it is our goal to engage all our officers and citizens in this effort as a force multiplier, if you will. The foundation of our strategy is centered around the Kansas City Police Department Counterterrorism Patrol Strategy; the Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW); the Kansas City Police Department Intelligence Unit; and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. And I think it is important to just highlight how this patrol strategy came about as it relates to the need for a national model.

In 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security outlined three strategic objectives, and two of the three had to do with prevention of terrorism and the deterrence of terrorism. In 2003, when we started looking at this, it was found that most local law enforcement efforts and funding were directed towards the response to terrorist attacks, and most prevention efforts were aimed at developing intelligence analysis centers. To my knowledge, there were no known prevention or deterrence models for law enforcement agencies to implement that standardized training or strategy for the detection, identification, reporting, or interdiction of potential terrorists.

I developed this proposal and met with the chief and our Kansas City Police Department Executive Command staff, and they supported it wholeheartedly. And I think that it is an absolute key point that was brought out earlier, that any of these initiatives will fail without the continued support and encouragement of the chief and key decisionmakers. And that commitment to counterterrorism was further demonstrated when Chief Jim Corwin, who was my

deputy chief when I brought this proposal to him, became chief. He initiated and created the Homeland Security Division in 2004.

This project was initiated with the goal of translating current successful policing and investigative techniques into terrorism prevention tactics rather than try to reinvent the wheel. The basis of the strategy was a great document, "The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security 2003," and it consisted of a booklet of key actions and tasks representing a framework for prevention. But it was written from a perspective for all agencies, all jurisdictions. And it is our belief that terrorism and the activities, by their nature, are a criminal act. Local police departments should look to the tactics and strategies that have proven effective in fighting crime as the basis for combating terrorism.

We extracted the tasks out of this document that would apply to local law enforcement, and we had a whole wall full of sticky notes of tasks and activities, and we clustered them and framed them into general components. There were five areas we identified as components for the strategy. One was the prevention and deterrence activities and tactics. The second was community-oriented policing activities. The third was training for the officers and the community. The fourth was data collection and information sharing, and a fifth was a component for project evaluation.

In those five component areas, we found traditional policing methods, skills, and tactics that we were already using that would carry out these project objectives. We are defining suspicious behaviors and activities; identifying and targeting possible suspects, associates, and organizations; consensual stops and specific questioning; collecting and analyzing intelligence information; deploying resources and hardening areas of vulnerability; using counter surveillance and the screening of people entering large public events; educating and enlisting the public's help in gathering suspect information; and using financial analysis techniques to investigate suspect organizations.

In order to identify and incorporate the most successful policing tactics and take advantage of the collective expertise that already exists in most agencies, we identified various units within the police department, and representatives were designated, and we gave them the challenge to assist in developing these concepts; applying research results and translating their experience into the prevention and detection activities. And I will not go through all of them, but some of the people we incorporated were from the Border Patrol, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Gang Unit, Career Criminal Unit, Narcotics Interdiction, our Community-Oriented Policing units, Training Division, Computer Unit, Planning and Research, and numerous others.

Upon completion of this project, the information was put into training modules for pre-service, or the academy, and in-service training for Kansas City Police Department officers and community groups.

An understanding on how terrorists operate through pre-incident indicators and characteristics we think are a key to preventing terrorism, and I have included a description of the module, and I certainly will not go through that. But the idea was to use case studies, and I was interested in the New York report because they did

the same thing. We used that during the training as a means to understand terrorism acts that have occurred, what could have been done to prevent those acts at an earlier stage, in the identification stage, or case studies where terrorism was prevented and what they did. We incorporated those and culled patrol tactics from them.

The patrol strategy establishes a clear structure for reporting, which was missing and is missing in most agencies. And, again, I will not go through the modules.

A very important piece of this strategy is an outreach and applied community-oriented policing. Most police departments poo-pooed community policing when it was introduced over a decade ago. It has been demonstrated since then that when the community and the police regularly join in problem solving that it does result in specific crime problem reduction, the fear of crime is reduced, and we believe this same philosophy can be implemented to counter the threat of radical Islamist terrorism and domestic terrorism.

It is recognized that it is important to have members of the Muslim community and all communities as part of our efforts. We have had specific open forum meetings with members of the Muslim community. For example, after September 11, 2001, we had a city-wide forum to discuss the repercussions from the September 11, 2001, attacks, and how we can assist them and the whole community in coming together to prevent any repercussions. In areas where there is a high concentration of Muslim immigrants, especially most recently from East Africa, officers are in regular contact and conduct neighborhood meetings. We train the officers to build partnerships and trust, which has already been mentioned as a key, as well as methods for cultivating resources within those communities. And again, the community policing module is included in the information.

One piece of it is worth mentioning. We have developed community presentations for community groups, business groups, security companies, and landlords. We have yet to have a community meeting where we did not have somebody come up afterwards with some kind of suspicious activity they wanted to relate to us.

The culmination of this effort is the information gathering, analysis, and sharing process, and, of course, the single objective of this is to give advance warning of those who may be involved in the process leading up to committing acts of terror, what may happen, indications and warnings, and what may be done to prevent them. And for this to take place, it is critical for possible terrorism information gathered from all the sources to be routed to the regional information sharing or analysis agency, but also the State and the Federal Government. And right now, for example, currently when information is received through the Kansas City Police Department communications or from department personnel that requires immediate investigation, it is routed to our Intelligence Unit, who responds to where the call came from for investigation.

Suspicious activity reports are routed to the Intelligence Unit and the Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Center for analysis. Any information that is linked to an open case or that may be a credible threat is routed to the JTTF for follow-

up. The Terrorism Early Warning is not an operational arm. We use the JTTF as the operational component.

We operate in concert with the FBI, and we have personnel assigned to the JTTF, which includes the DHS agencies as part of the intelligence cycle. And the FBI in turn will, in the near future, have personnel assigned to our TEW.

We belong to a nine-county Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Committee, and the TEW, which is partially funded through DHS, was established as a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional analysis center. The analysis center ensures a coordinated flow of intelligence to and from all sectors and levels of government. Of course, the desired end of this effort is the ability to view raw data from all sectors of the community and the provide analytical insights with specific and actionable informational products. The TEW distributes intelligence bulletins and training bulletins several times a week, or sooner if needed.

The TEW Executive Committee, that establishes the policy is comprised of local and county first responders, Federal agencies, and private sector. This was done to reach as many segments of the community as possible and create an information conduit.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for interrupting. If you can bring it to a close pretty soon, because we are going to have votes later this morning, and I want to give everybody a chance to ask some questions.

Mr. DAILEY. I am almost done.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK.

Mr. DAILEY. The bottom line is this: It is critical to close these gaps between those who are gathering the information, those who connect the dots, and those who are on the street and are most likely to encounter terrorism. To date, this has resulted in numerous leads and contributed to the cases leading to indictments and furthered the effort of identifying those who constitute a terrorism threat.

This Counterterrorism Patrol Strategy was very labor intensive. It took us over a year to complete. The Bureau of Justice states there are over 15,000 local, county, and State police agencies, and the smaller agencies do not have the resources to develop a comprehensive strategy, and it would be our recommendation that DHS collaborate with the FBI and police agencies to design a law enforcement counterterrorism patrol strategy model consisting of best practices. And this model could be tailored by existing regional training academies and made part—consideration could be given to making it part of the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) requirements that most States have.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Major, for that testimony. Your final point is actually the point that I wanted to begin my questioning on.

You have each described thoughtful, progressive, practical outreach prevention programs to try to counter Islamist terrorist radicalization, obviously terrorist acts. I am going to ask you for a short answer at the outset. Were these programs self-initiated totally, or to any extent, were they encouraged by the Federal Government, particularly the Department of Homeland Security or the FBI?

Mr. DOWNING. Well, in local law enforcement, we have been in this community policing mode for a long time and moving into this intelligence-led policing mode, so we are used to reaching out and creating partnerships and developing those partnerships. So this just focused the problem on another area, and especially as the counterterrorism expanded from 30 people to 300 people, we had more resources to do it, and that became a priority for us. So this was self-initiated.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Self-initiated. Is there any Federal funding in the work you are doing?

Mr. DOWNING. Not for the outreach.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Major Ronczkowski, how about Miami-Dade?

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Yes, sir. Self-initiated. It is from the aspect of they were a different part of the community. It was a newly emerging component of the community. We took them on, just as we take on any other piece of the community. We were aware of what the FBI was doing as far as their outreach, their mosque outreach programs and things that they have. But we also understand they have a fundamentally different mission than we do. We are looking to work within the community. They have a different mission within the community on how they address issues. Our issues start at the ground level and work up. Theirs come from the top down sometimes. As far as Federal funding, absolutely not. Completely generally funded.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. And, Major Dailey, how about Kansas City?

Mr. DAILEY. Yes, sir. Self-initiated, and the funding, the TEW is partially funded through DHS.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is. Do they have a specific program or is it just you applied and were able to get some funding?

Mr. DAILEY. It is through our Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) region.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. You made some suggestions at the end. Let me ask, generally speaking—Major Dailey, about this. Let me ask Chief Downing and Major Ronczkowski, if you had your druthers, what kind of assistance, apart from, obviously, some money—but that is OK to ask for, too—what kind of assistance would you hope for from DHS or the FBI? The points you are making and I am making here, too, is that you have self-initiated this because you have seen it as part of your expanded responsibility to maintain public safety post-September 11, 2001. But in doing so, as Commissioner Sanchez made clear in his testimony, you are performing a national function. He is making the point from the perspective of New York City, which is that people are going to be radicalized elsewhere in America, but they are going to come to New York to carry out plans because New York is New York. So let me ask you what thoughts you have about what we could do to ensure that State and local law enforcements have the direction that you need and the support to be full members of this national counterterrorism strategy.

Mr. DOWNING. Well, I do think it is crucial to recognize that local law enforcement has been invited to this table, and only recently. We are still trying to fine-tune and make some adjustments so that

the information sharing environment is truly authentic and that we are truly trusted partners and there is value in that.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But you are not sure you are there yet?

Mr. DOWNING. We are not quite there yet.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. DOWNING. We have great relationships, no doubt, 100 percent better than they were a few years ago. But we still have some low-hanging fruit to pick, and we still need to show that the 750,000 law enforcement officers who are out there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, have a different perspective than what Federal agencies have, which I know New York is criticized for having their people out in foreign lands. But I think it is a good idea because it gives a local perspective that the Federal Government does not have here. If they are in Jordan, what is the intelligence in Jordan telling them about the local community in New York? And that is what is so crucial to us.

So if we had assistance in the area of outreach, this Community Mapping Project I am hoping could possibly be a pilot project for what the rest of the Nation could look like, because if we identify these communities and show where the communities are at risk, we could do a lot of prevention by infusing social services and governmental resources, and also it will help us with our intelligence-led strategy to prevent radicalization and prevent terrorism.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Chief Downing and Major Ronczkowski.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Well, seeing you said it, I will not be bashful. We could use more funding.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. We actually have a very good relationship. We are working with major city chiefs, as well as my colleagues here, with a few different initiatives, and they have been working and bringing DHS to the table. It is a relationship that is continuing to grow. I will tell you, 2 or 3 years ago we had a decent relationship. South Florida is unique. We have had a very good Federal relationship. The FBI supervisor in charge down there has come to the table full boat with law enforcement welcomed at every angle. His staff has been meeting with our staff on a regular basis. The Department of Homeland Security has been helping us with everything from getting us a classification of a secure room facility to obtaining secure systems.

As the chief has pointed out, it has to be a trusted partnership. I have a lot of information I would love to share with them, but if I do not know what it is that they need and they do not tell me what they need and why they need it, I cannot get it to them.

We have an interest overseas. We are just not the local folks that only know about our neighborhoods. We know about other countries. We know other jurisdictions. The reason we do, we have a huge influx of people living within our communities that travel back and forth. They bring us the information. So as they pointed out, we need to know not only what is over there, but how it is impacting our communities. The only way we are going to do this is starting down at the bottom. What is being dictated from our communities is based on 20-, 25-, 30-year investigators, officers that are on the street. Many of the Federal agents, they come down 2,

3, to 4 years. They are there, they are gone, they move on to another city. We are there for 20 to 30 years. We know what is going on, and we need to know what is also going on at other levels. But the partnership has been tremendous.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. My time is up. I am going to yield to Senator Collins. I do want to point out that the second phase of legislation implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations that we adopted a few months ago, signed by the President, does for the first time specifically enable and encourage the Department of Homeland Security to use some of the State Homeland Security Grant money and the Urban Area Security Initiatives to fund local law enforcement counterterrorism programs. So hopefully there will be a flow of money beginning in this fiscal year, which, of course, has already begun, but we have not funded. But that is something you should be asking us questions about, instead of us asking you. [Laughter.]

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As usual, the Chairman has given me the useful transition to my first question. The homeland security legislation which the Chairman mentioned, the Senate version also would have created within the Department of Homeland Security a new Office for the Prevention of Terrorism (OPT). We had already given it its acronym. And the whole purpose of this office, which was suggested to us by State and local law enforcements, was to have a single point of contact within the Department that would be tasked with working with State and local law enforcements. Now, unfortunately, from my perspective, that has been scaled down to just a coordinator. I would like to hear from each of you an assessment of the degree of cooperation you have with DHS and whether you think it would be helpful to create a specific office dedicated to the prevention of terrorism. We have FEMA to work on preparedness response, but prevention really is the key.

We will start with you, Chief.

Mr. DOWNING. I think so. We have a unique and productive relationship with DHS. We have a DHS representative in our Fusion Center, Joel Cohen, who is a tremendous asset to our whole intelligence-gathering operation. And we have had pretty good luck in the whole UASI process. In the last three UASI cycles, I think our police department received approximately \$40 million to build infrastructure to help prevent terrorism from the Los Angeles Regional Common Operating Picture (LARCOP), to the regional video command centers and license plate recognition, and things that really detect that. But I think we are going a little bit deeper now. Now we are talking more about what we can do on the motivational side of the terrorist equation, and what DHS could assist us with in developing programs and funding to make our outreach really meaningful and bring value to that so that we not only identify—are able to identify this radicalization process that was so well discussed in the New York report, but also look for communities at risk and see what we can do to assist and support those communities.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Major Ronczkowski.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Yes, thank you. We have had a very good relationship with DHS, particularly in the past year. We, too, have a reports officer that has just been assigned down to the region, and he will be working out of our office—James Davies. We have been in discussion with Charles Allen with regards to getting an intelligence analyst down in our shop.

My gap is not with the City of Miami or Hialeah Police Department. My gap is at the Federal level, and that is what I am trying to bridge.

Some of the funding that has come in, whether it is UASI—which we are part of. We have seen a decrease in funding in South Florida. When it comes to South Florida, it is rather unique. You take out and you impact South Florida, most people think you are impacting tourism. You are impacting the entire Caribbean Basin. What happens in South Florida will impact the entire Caribbean Basin because they are very dependent on us, from our shallow draft ports, our cruises, whatever the case may be. What comes from South Florida generally goes down there.

Most of the equipment and the monies that have been out there have been going towards responding, reacting, and recovery. I agree there needs to be an office to prevent, work on the intelligence aspect, the interdiction, and the information flow. Those are key. Many people are trying, but there is no focal point that is out there.

A lot of the money that is coming in is being absorbed in management and administration, going to the State level. We are the largest law enforcement agency in the Southeast, and our money has to go through the State. There should be opportunities to have some of that funding go directly to us where efforts of what we are already doing could be expanded. We will be inclusive of other agencies, including the State. However, you are talking millions of dollars that are being absorbed that could be used toward prevention.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Major Dailey.

Mr. DAILEY. Yes, ma'am. The funding mechanism is getting very cumbersome because it has to go through a UASI region. It does not go from an individual police department. It has to go through the region and then through the State and then through DHS.

One of the big issues that I think has got to be resolved before we can really truly attack this prevention problem as one is we have three streams of information: We have DHS, we have the FBI, and we have DOD. In our region, we have local FBI. The Joint Terrorism Task Force is represented by DHS agencies, Federal Protective Service, Secret Service, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. But it does not solve the problem of the information streams going both ways.

I think there are some good programs in place now. DHS is placing analysts in State Fusion Centers. We hope that will trickle down to where they will place analysts in regional Fusion Centers. Outside of the critical infrastructure protection guy in Kansas City, we do not have a DHS representative, a liaison, an Office of Terrorism Prevention, an officer who could help implement programs. There are numerous programs that come out of DHS on a regular basis.

So I would say more of a presence from DHS, especially in the Fusion Centers, Regional Fusion Centers as opposed to State Fusion Centers—or in addition to State Fusion Centers. And the funding right now—and I will just give you one example of an interdiction project we had at terminals, hubs of people who were in this country illegally, their visas expired from countries that have origins of terrorist organizations. We are doing that with our interdiction folks that are working narcotics. When we tried to put this program in place for funding through the Federal Government, it was turned down, and it was the one thing that we have had measurable results in stopping people that had ties.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I would like to say thank God for local government and what you are doing, because a lot of what you are doing, I think, should have been inspired by the Department of Homeland Security, but they have other things that they are doing.

I am interested about the funding issue. I met yesterday with the head of the Ohio Department of Public Safety and his Office of Multicultural Affairs at the Ohio Division of Homeland Security, and they claim that there is not any money for the kind of thing that we are talking about here today. Apparently, you have found money or interpreted programs in such a way that you can get money.

Mr. DOWNING. Well, in the UASI process, with our UASI partners, we are one of the six Tier 1 cities that developed investment justifications and projects which were preventative in nature, mostly protecting critical infrastructure, detecting surveillance and terrorist acts, and making sure that we had communication interoperability. And those are the kinds of projects that have run in our region.

Senator VOINOVICH. Those are infrastructure projects primarily.

Mr. DOWNING. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. But in terms of the manpower that you would need to adequately maintain police-community relations; is there any pot of money that you can reach into that would help you get that job done?

Mr. DOWNING. No, none of the UASI or State Homeland Security Grant Assistance Program money paid for personnel with the exception of intelligence analysts.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do any of you do community relations other than through your police departments?

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Yes. Our department works in concert with the county's Community Relations Board. We do have one at the county level that we do work with.

Senator VOINOVICH. How about in L.A.?

Mr. DOWNING. We do. We have a Human Relations Commission, an organization that reaches out to the faith and non-faith communities.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is that working out in terms of your Muslim community?

Mr. DOWNING. It has an impact. It does play the table. We have faith forums that they help us coordinate and facilitate. It plays a role, I believe.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is that the vehicle you are using in your public relations campaign to reach-out to the community? I was very impressed with some of the things that you are trying to do to create an infrastructure of better human understandings. Is that coming out primarily through the police department or through your community relations?

Mr. DOWNING. That is the police department. That is the outreach efforts through the police department. Trying to really institutionalize, not making it the priority but a priority with the boots on the ground, so to speak, so that there is an orientation toward what we are trying to accomplish.

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that I have picked up from meeting with some of the leaders in Ohio is that it seems like the only people that we are interfacing with are police personnel. There is a feeling that they would like to meet folks from the community, and there is an assumption that the reason we are reaching out to you, is that we have a problem with you; that we are getting to know you better because we want to use you to get better information.

Mr. DOWNING. Right, when we began the dialogue, we were right up front. We said we are not out here to knock on your door and have you tell us about terrorism or who wants to do bad things to good people. We are here, we want to talk to you about what community problems can we solve in your neighborhood, getting the trees trimmed, the potholes filled, and the lighting good. We want to integrate you into some of our advisory boards, our Neighborhood Watch programs, the Business Chambers of Commerce. That is the kind of dialogue we are having.

Senator VOINOVICH. An empowerment kind of effort on your part to get people involved in the community to kind of realize that they are not separate and apart, that they are part of the community and you would like them to be part of it.

Mr. DOWNING. Absolutely.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. We did something similar where, prior to September 11, 2001, last year, we went out to meet with them, as the chief said, some agencies do go out there and try to solicit them to provide information. Our whole intention was you can be targeted because the September 11, 2001, anniversary is coming up. There are people that are in the community that are against you, and so what can we do to help you on that angle?

So they were part of it. We were part of their issues, that they address on a regular basis. But we were not out there soliciting from them. We just wanted to be inclusive of them.

Senator VOINOVICH. Have all of you started another dimension of your diversity training for your police officers that deal with this specifically in terms of the Muslim community?

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. We have done a small version at the academy level. We do not have a huge Muslim community. We have reached out to the police academy that is under our direction, and we pointed out to them what to look for, what to encounter when somebody does not know something. There might be a reason for it. They may

be elusive. It may be a cultural perception. You are not seeing the whole picture. And we tried to expand upon them the whole picture of what is out there.

Senator VOINOVICH. How about Los Angeles?

Mr. DOWNING. Yes, we have, and an expanded effort, as you may have heard, Chief Bill Bratton has expressed desire and thinks there is a big need to have a national counterterrorism academy directed at local law enforcement to train the mid-level practitioners—this is going to be a generational problem, and local law enforcement needs to kind of shift into this area of intelligence-led policing.

Senator VOINOVICH. I have not asked you this, but in terms of diversity training, you get the new cadets, and then, hopefully, you have an ongoing program of diversity training?

Mr. DOWNING. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you created a new element that deals with Muslims and the Muslim religion?

Mr. DOWNING. We have. In the recruit training, the supervisor training, the watch commander training. And as I sit here today, the new command development training for our new command officers, and they are going through it as we speak.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Perfect timing. A vote has gone off. While we have some time, Senator McCaskill gets the last round of questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I have got to welcome Major Dailey, and I remember when you were not a major.

Mr. DAILEY. You do.

Senator MCCASKILL. It makes me feel old when I look at the command staff of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, and I remember when all of us were not in charge of anything. So please tell everyone there—I say this sincerely—one of the highlights of my life was the working relationship I had with the police department when I was prosecutor. And pardon my parochial bias to both of you, but in terms of a professional, well-trained, dedicated police force, I do not think it gets any better than Kansas City, Missouri. And so please tell them all hello for me and that I am still in uniform withdrawal.

Mr. DAILEY. I will. Thank you.

Senator MCCASKILL. As I look back on what we have done successfully in Kansas City over the years when we have dealt with crime problems, invariably there has been a component that has become institutionalized in the communities that are impacted by that crime. This is a little more difficult because you do not have a neighborhood-based problem as much as you have a specific kind of deeply hidden problem within a broad community. I think back to the days when the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime was formed, when we had a serious violent crime problem in a certain area of Kansas City, and the police department began something very unusual where the weekly meetings started, where the police were expected to be there, and it was a community-run meeting, where the

community was really dictating the agenda of the meeting, and basically kind of taking the police department on in a way where they began to feel more empowered, and as a result, I think our tips got much stronger, our witnesses—and as I look at this issue, we spend so much time talking about the bad-guy radicals and we do not spend as much time talking about the good-guy Muslims that are American citizens, that want just what we want. They are deeply offended by the radical movement and what it implies for their religious beliefs. They are deeply offended at the violence and the loss of life that this radical movement has, in fact, caused.

And so I know you all have talked about various things you are doing to reach out, and I know Senator Voinovich talked about recruitment. Have we been successful in Kansas City recruiting any members of the police department that are of the Muslim faith, to your knowledge, Major?

Mr. DAILEY. I am not aware. I do not know. I know we have some that are of the Muslim faith, but I do not know their heritage.

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think that is something. Do you all do any kind of structure reach-out to the community in Kansas City? I know if I look at particularly health care, I have so many friends in Kansas City that are in the health care profession that are Muslim, they are all Americans, but their ancestors came from various countries, many in the Middle East. Have we kind of formalized a partnership with them in Kansas City where they are called upon to help us in terms of where there might be problems in the community?

Mr. DAILEY. We have a faith-based initiative that reaches out to that component. One of the things that was brought up is an excellent point about using people. We are very careful and sensitive to that, and I think we have to leverage the resources we have. This money is going to dry up. Homeland security money cannot last forever. So we are trying to leverage the resources we have that are already in place, and we have an extremely strong community policing outreach. And it is targeted towards neighborhoods, bad neighborhoods, but it can also be used for this purpose, new immigrants coming to this country.

And as you said, there is an awful lot of people out there that are willing to share our concern and help in this effort, and we do reach out and form the neighborhood groups, the community groups, and stay in constant contact with them.

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it is one of those things that the more that you all can do in that regard, I think that there are—I have talked to many American Muslims that are afraid to participate now because they are feeling so targeted. They are worried that if they begin to speak out and try to do more to help, that somehow they are going to bring attention to themselves, to their families, in a way that people in the community, as you mentioned, Major, that mistakenly believe that these loyal, patriotic Americans are somehow not good guys. And so, protecting the wonderful American-Muslim community that wants to help us in this regard seems to me—and whatever strategies you guys can focus on that would help do that I think would be really important, because that is where we are going to get our best info. Always, we get it from

inside. I do not think ever in law enforcement you get your best information from people who do not have access to potentially information that would be helpful to preventing some of this horrible crime that we have to prevent.

Mr. DAILEY. And one of the things, going back to the question asked earlier, is in this training for this patrol strategy, we spend a great deal of time on cultural differences and learning how to build trust and relationships. And I think a key component is understanding Muslim culture from a policing perspective, how they have seen the police in the past and how not to offend them and these types of things.

Senator MCCASKILL. Do all of you feel confident that the police that work for your departments know that the vast majority of Muslims in this country have the same view of America and law and order as they do? Do you feel comfortable that your police officers know that?

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. I think in our community they do. We are such a diverse community, a lot of cultures are widely accepted. I do not think anybody singles out any one.

Senator MCCASKILL. Right.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. I think one thing we do have to watch for—and I mentioned this earlier—is the commingling. There are many people that do not like this country, and they come from all walks of life, and there are many that are here in this country, and that is where that homegrown aspect—and I concur with the second- and third-generation—we have seen that in crime, second- and third-generation terrorists are going to probably be no different. But I think we have to watch out for what we are looking for is not always what we see.

Senator MCCASKILL. Right.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. And there are a lot of pieces of this puzzle that are out there, that are already here and deep-rooted into these various communities. Our officers are aware of that. As much as I like? No. Are we going to try to get it to them? Yes, but that comes with time, personnel, and money, of course.

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say that—another bias—I think the best law enforcement work that is done in this country is done by local police departments and not by people that work for the Federal Government. So there it is. It is out on the table.

Thank you all very much for being here.

Mr. RONCZKOWSKI. Thank you.

Chairman LIEBERMAN. She is that tradition of plainspoken elected officials from Missouri. Senator McCaskill says it like she means it, and she does.

I share her admiration for local law enforcement. What you have done here is really quite impressive, I will start with the New York folks, then Los Angeles, Miami-Dade, and Kansas City. This was self-initiated. You took this on yourself at the local level because you felt it was now part of your expanded responsibility to provide for the public safety of the people of your local area. You are carrying out a national function in doing so.

My conclusions from the testimony are pretty direct, which is that there is a problem here of homegrown Islamist terrorism. It

is increasing. We do not want to overstate it because we want to just emphasize, all of us, what is the reality, that the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans are law-abiding and patriotic and probably fear more than most anybody else the radicalization process going on, particularly as it may involve their children. But it is a problem. We have to deal with it, and we have to deal with it in exactly the methodical, community-based outreach and prevention approach that these four great law enforcement agencies are doing.

I am going to take it on as my responsibility as Chairman of this Committee, working, obviously, with Senator Collins and the others, to push the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to give both those of you who have self-started some more support in doing what you are doing to carry out a national function, but also to set a goal that in every community where there is a Muslim-American community of any size, that there ought to be exactly the kinds of local law enforcement outreach and community-based prevention programs that you four are carrying out.

So I thank you very much for what you are doing. You have really set a national standard, and we are going to try to make sure that the rest of the country catches up with you.

The normal proceeding here is that the hearing record stays open for 15 days if any of you want to submit additional testimony, and sometimes the Senators have additional questions that they will submit to you for answers for the record. But you have the very sincere gratitude of this Committee and the people of the communities that you serve.

With that, I adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
BEFORE
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
ON
RADICALIZATION
03/14/07

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins and other distinguished Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on radicalization.

Introduction

I am pleased to appear before the Committee to highlight the Department of Homeland Security's work in the area of preventing and countering radicalization. This issue is one of singular importance, and I commend the Committee for holding this hearing.

The issue of "radicalization" has received growing attention based on developments both overseas and at home. Terrorist attacks by "homegrown" violent Islamic extremists in Madrid and the United Kingdom, and the arrests of radicalized individuals in the United States, Canada, and Australia, have demonstrated the diversity of the patterns, trends, and developments associated with the radicalization phenomenon.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change. It is important to note that we do not limit our analysis of the radicalization process to those who claim to be Muslim and have become violent. Our understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization must encompass a wide range of threats against our country, including various white supremacy and fascist organizations, militia movements and other violent groups, among others. When we understand the process that leads a person to support and/or pursue violence, we will be in the best position to protect our country from the widest possible range of threats we face.

Although much of my discussion will deal with violent Islamic extremists, I want to emphasize that those who support the use of violence to achieve their goals represent a small, fringe element within the American Muslim community. It is critical that we recognize that American Muslims have been, and will continue to be, a highly valued part of the fabric of our Nation. American Muslims have been outspoken in their opposition to terrorist violence and have been strong contributors to our country for many generations. American Muslims are active participants in our secular democracy and, as with all Americans, we will continue to ensure that they have the freedom to choose the best way to raise their families, receive an education, relate to and participate in government, start a business, and become prosperous in their professions. Thus, my

comments today regarding threats posed to the American public are addressed to a small number of people of a variety of faiths and backgrounds who support terrorist violence.

The United States is fortunate that radicalization seems to have less appeal here than in other parts of the world. Though it is difficult at this stage to determine the exact cause of these differences, there appear to be a set of advantages the U.S. enjoys. Among these are economic advantages associated with low barriers to employment markets and business creation, traditional cultural acceptance of religious expression and free speech, unfettered participation in the U.S. political process, and a high degree of social integration. As we learned from the Oklahoma City bombing, our country is not immune to homegrown violent extremism.

Radicalization is a global problem that must be addressed through focused efforts targeting its root causes. My Department has developed a comprehensive approach to address this important concern. Given the elasticity of the term “radicalization,” and the complexity of the issues surrounding it, there is no one single part of the DHS enterprise best-suited to develop and implement a departmental strategy to address issues related to radicalization. Consequently, this effort harnesses the full power of DHS by incorporating intelligence, law enforcement, policy, research, community outreach, legal, science and technology, and academic options, tools, and initiatives. And, we will align ourselves with the broader U.S. government programs and initiatives focused on radicalization including those run by the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Prisons and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center, among others. As an organization created to secure the homeland, DHS is taking innovative steps to prevent and counter domestic radicalization. This approach has three interconnected elements:

- Developing a better understanding of the radicalization phenomenon;
- Enhancing the capacity of the Department and its partners to counter radicalization; and,
- Engaging with key communities to promote civic engagement and protect civil liberties.

Develop a Better Understanding of the Radicalization Phenomenon

The first element in our approach is to develop a more thorough understanding of the issue. Countering and preventing domestic radicalization requires that we understand all facets of the phenomenon. This requires a partnership between intelligence analysts, policy makers and researchers.

One of the main pillars in our strategy is the development of a national assessment on the dynamics of domestic radicalization. While capitalizing on our intelligence resources is important, DHS is also working with the academic and scientific communities to better understand the radicalization phenomenon. Through its relationships with academia and sponsorship of research, the Department has begun engaging scholars and practitioners to better understand the social and behavioral dynamics of radicalization.

Enhance the Capacity of the Department and its Partners to Counter Domestic Radicalization

The second element in our strategy is to work to improve DHS' capacity, as well as to enhance the capacity of state and local governments, and our foreign partners, to address and counter domestic radicalization. We are committed to working closely with our law enforcement partners at the state and local level to recognize the signs of radicalization, and improve local outreach efforts to vulnerable communities. Given their understanding and well-established relationships with local communities, community officials, police officers, and civic leaders are essential tools in the effort to counter domestic radicalization.

DHS is therefore working to improve and formalize information sharing and reporting pathways to create a common operating understanding of the scope of radicalization. As DHS officials and community leaders throughout the nation understand more about the radicalization phenomenon, they will be able to provide greater information on trends, nodes, and potential cases of radicalization in their communities. We will use existing relationships and organizational structures, such as the Fusion Centers and the States' Homeland Security networks, to improve understanding of the radicalization process, to report immediate operational threats, and to train our workforces to meet the highest standards of professionalism as they interact with religious and ethnic minorities.

Our Department also has engaged extensively with international partners on these issues. While the dynamics of radicalization may vary in countries with legal, economic, and social structures that differ from those of the United States, the efforts of other nations may provide lessons on how to both undermine the factors contributing to radicalization and mitigate its effects. In this regard, the Department is working with our foreign partners to share information and, where feasible, to identify trends and patterns in radicalization. For example, under the auspices of the UK-US Joint Contact Group, we are working with the UK Home Office to develop best practices to prevent and counter the domestic radicalization phenomenon and promote civic engagement.

We must build the capacity of our own workforce to confront the issues that we face today, while maintaining respect for privacy and civil liberties. As a result, our workforce will be offered the finest training materials available today. Towards this end, the Department's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has released a training video for DHS personnel on basic aspects of Arab American and Muslim American Cultures and Beliefs. It has also produced educational posters that give guidance on how to screen individuals wearing religious head coverings. Similarly, our Department's new Chief Learning Officer, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and training offices at various components are focusing training resources on these issues.

Engage Key Communities

The radicalization process often thrives upon falsehoods and misinformation. With the proliferation of media resources and outlets such as 24 hour news and the internet, it is possible for individuals and groups to quickly promulgate rumors, conspiracy theories, and propaganda to wide audiences with little or no accuracy or accountability. The effects of this misinformation can be corrosive to our attempts to implement rational, impartial, and effective policies to protect the homeland.

The Department will continue to work with the media and community groups to create an informed public, and will ensure that our actions, and the context within which we determine our actions, are made known to the public while ensuring the protection of intelligence and law enforcement information and operations. We must continue to create inroads and opportunities for dialogue with all Americans of every ethnic, cultural and religious community.

Public outreach and engagement initiatives with key communities play a major role in the Department's efforts to prevent and counter domestic radicalization. In order to fully capitalize on the strategic advantages the nation enjoys, we are seeking to build an unprecedented level of cooperation with key ethnic and religious groups, who truly represent their communities, and engage these communities as full partners in our efforts to prevent radicalization.

An effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and faiths. To be successful, the Department must be able to fully explain and defend our policies and, where appropriate, make necessary adjustments to account for legitimate concerns.

The Department has also assembled an "Incident Management Team" to engage with Arab, Muslim, and South Asian American leaders in the aftermath of any future terrorist act or homeland security incident. This group will be activated in the hours after any future significant terrorist act, and was in fact deployed after the arrests in London this past August. The goal of the group is to provide community leaders with timely and relevant information from key security agencies, as well as for community leaders to provide the government with information on tensions or reactions from the communities. We believe that this Incident Management Team will be a critical tool in the hours and days after another terrorist attack on our country.

Conclusion

I want to thank you again for this opportunity to testify about our efforts to counter and prevent radicalization in the homeland. As I am sure you and your colleagues appreciate, this phenomenon presents a real and serious challenge to our nation, and requires that we utilize the full ambit of intelligence and law enforcement resources. In doing so, however, we should also capitalize and take advantage of the many benefits American society affords.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

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Written Testimony of

CHARLES E. ALLEN

Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
Chief Intelligence Officer
Department of Homeland Security

“Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland”

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

March 14, 2007

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins and other distinguished Senators: Thank you for the opportunity to share perspectives on the threat of Islamic radicalism to the homeland. I appreciate the opportunity to appear along side my colleague Daniel Sutherland today. We work closely with the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Privacy Office to ensure all of our activities are fully consistent with constitutional and federal law.

The spate of terrorist attacks in Western Europe over the past several years and the more recent disruption of extremist cells in North America highlight the threat radicalization poses. We believe the threat we face in the near term is less than that currently confronting our European allies, but we are concerned that radicalization will continue to expand within the United States over the long term.

In general, we have found that it is more difficult for radicalized individuals in the United States to turn their ideologically-driven violent inclinations into successful terrorist attacks. We believe that in Europe there exist closer links between criminal and extremist social networks and that Europe's larger pool of disaffected Muslims have more opportunity to connect with terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida globally. In the United Kingdom, several cases of home-grown radicalization have been linked to al-Qa'ida, who provided both operational expertise and ideological reinforcement in attack planning. Thus far, we have not seen these types of linkages

between homegrown extremists and international terrorist groups in the United States, but we remain vigilant, and recognize that we are not immune to the threat.

In response to the threat, the Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis realigned its analytic cadre in late 2006, and created a branch focused exclusively on radicalization and extremism in the homeland. This branch focuses on understanding the 'how and why' radicalizing influences take root. This approach differs from the traditional counterterrorism emphasis on the who, what, where, and when of potential threats. In studying the radicalization phenomena, we are working closely with our Federal, State, and local partners and are focusing on a wide range of actors and organizations both Islamic – those who try to gain legitimacy by illegitimately wrapping themselves within Islam – as well as non-religious extremists.

By identifying critical factors at the “front end” of the radicalization process, we will assist policymakers, and intelligence and law enforcement officers in developing the tools, procedures, and methods needed to prevent radical beliefs from “crossing the line” to committing violence. This Office of Intelligence and Analysis project is part of a broader DHS approach in addressing the issue of radicalization.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

No universal definition of radicalization exists in the intelligence or the academic/social science communities. We have, therefore,

developed a “working” definition. Radicalization entails *“the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”* This definition separates radicalization from terrorism by emphasizing the difference between related social patterns, some of which may eventually lead to terrorism. Within these patterns we are interested in the interplay between radical actor groups and “nodes.” Radical actor groups are communities and sub populations experiencing radicalization. Nodes are the conduits facilitating or supporting a person or group through the radicalization process. They may be physical institutions, virtual communities, charismatic individuals, written or recorded material, or even shared experiences.

METHODOLOGY

My Office is taking a phased approach in studying radicalization, focusing more on examining radicalization dynamics in key geographic regions throughout the country. Our first phase focused on assessments in California and the New York City Metropolitan area to include New Jersey. Our second phase focuses on the Midwest, the National Capital Region, and Texas. We will conduct other regional or state assessments in future phases, with the goal of providing the building blocks for a more comprehensive national baseline assessment.

Each regional assessment begins by framing an intelligence picture unique to that state or region. First, we examine national-level intelligence reporting and open-source information. We then take

those findings and share them during face-to-face meetings with federal, state, and local law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security professionals to gain their insights. As of March 2007, we have held analytic exchanges on radicalization with state and municipal representatives from: New York City; Albany (NY); Los Angeles; San Diego; San Francisco; Sacramento; Chicago; Columbus (OH); Springfield (IL); Richmond, Baltimore; Washington DC; Detroit; Houston; Austin (TX); El Paso; Huntsville (TX); and Raleigh (NC). We have found that a number of foreign governments also are keenly interested in the issue of radicalization and possess in-depth substantive knowledge. Our meetings with officials from these countries have helped to strengthen and broaden our perspectives and knowledge.

FINDINGS

Our research indicates that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. We have found that there are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization and that it is not a “one-way street.” Individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety of factors. Most of the groups and individuals we examined thus far did not appear committed to the final “stage” of the radicalization process—that is, the use of violence.

Our work on radicalization is preliminary and by no means complete. Some of our initial findings include:

- Radicalization occurs through a variety of human and institutional catalysts, such as formal and informal religious institutions (for example prisons), and increasingly within university settings and youth groups. Charismatic leaders and the Internet play significant roles in this process.
- Charismatic leaders naturally attract individuals willing to emulate their actions based on their views of the world. Within a radical context, the engaging personalities of the leaders enable them to instill a brand of extreme ideology in impressionable individuals, particularly the youth.
- Globalization has created a dynamic environment characterized by a confluence of political, religious, racial, and cultural flashpoints. This environment is being exploited by a small, yet influential number of radical actors who are hostile toward the United States.
- Radicalization is “marketed” through diverse methods by distinct actors with extreme ideological views. The methods used by extremist actors to market their message are tailored to appeal to the various audiences.
- Extremists are adept at developing propaganda and manipulating social situations to create perceptions of victimization. They will use deliberate actions for the sole purpose of provoking media, law enforcement, or political responses that can be used later for propaganda purposes.
- Insular communities with little exposure to moderating influences are particularly vulnerable to radical messages if

they are isolated and alienated from the surrounding society.

The nature of this alienation determines who is responsible for their discontent.

- The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has identified several groups active in the United States that serve as “gateways” to radicalization because of their doctrines, ideologies, and activities as well as the character of their leadership and membership. The experience of joining these groups may involve a deterioration of familial, social, and societal ties resulting in the acceptance of a new collective identity with the group. Most of the groups effecting this socialization do not directly support violent extremism. That said, violent actors on the periphery of the group may exploit the socialization process to spot, assess, and recruit vulnerable individuals.
- Radicalization in prison is becoming increasingly common. The nature of the prison environment, coupled with societal marginalization of convicts, cultivates a strong desire for social bonding, group identity, protection, spiritual guidance, and positive reinforcement, all things that extremist actors exploit. The degree to which prison radicalization is problematic varies greatly from state to state. While high-profile cases in recent years focused attention on the radicalization of Muslim inmates, this phenomenon is significantly less endemic than recruitment and violence by criminal and racists gangs in U.S. prisons.
- “Lone-wolf” radicalization is not unique to any particular ideology, and the ease of mass communications portends an increase in acts of terror by violent individuals. Moreover,

formal affiliation with a group is not a predicate to radicalization, nor is it a predicate to being trained, obtaining resources, or otherwise supporting an operational capability.

INITIATIVES

My Office has several key initiatives to analyze and report on radicalization dynamics. This year I directed my intelligence analysts to reach out to relevant State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) to develop joint analytic products, centered on radicalization. Our analysts continue to travel and meet with state and local intelligence and law enforcement professionals to present our findings on radicalization and extremism and to solicit their unique insight into what is taking place in their communities.

I also have initiated programs designed to provide the physical infrastructure and information management technology to allow for the sharing of intelligence reporting and analytical products on radicalization. Under the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), we have established a Community of Interest (COI) for analysts at DHS and SLFCs to collaborate. This capability allows for protected virtual exchange so that homeland security analysts can collaborate while being protected from intrusion. We are also posting both intelligence reporting and analytical products at the unclassified and For Official Use Only levels. Importantly, earlier this year, we hosted an analyst conference inviting current and potential users of the COI to meet with our analysts. A key theme of the discussions

was radicalization in the homeland. We plan additional conferences in the months ahead.

Currently, my Office, in full coordination with the Department's Chief Information Officer, is deploying the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) at the SECRET level to the SLFCs. The establishment of these capabilities is a major step forward in increasing our collaborative efforts to better understand radicalization dynamics in the homeland and information sharing in general.

Finally, we are exploring methods to develop a capability to track emerging radicalization trends before they manifest into violence. As we collect additional data on radicalization, it may be possible to provide indicators of the process here in the United States. While our initial assessments have been focused on establishing a baseline, we are now seeking to establish radicalization indicators that can be measured over time. These indicators could then be disseminated to the SLFCs in order to train officers in how to code law enforcement and intelligence reporting. Coding law enforcement and intelligence reporting for radicalization activity and measuring it over time should make it possible to enhance our "warning" capability on this issue. Ultimately we should be able to identify those populations and locales where radicalization is occurring, as well as its scope. This information can then be collected and analyzed nationally and be used to help target counter-radicalization efforts more specifically, objectively, and appropriately.

CONCLUSION

The Department, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, recognizes that radicalization is a serious homeland security challenge. Therefore, we are working with determination to ensure that we develop and maintain consistent awareness of radicalization trends and actors, both in the United States and abroad. We are dedicating ourselves to fortifying and sustaining the analytical capabilities that are critical in preventing and mitigating threats from radicalization.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for giving me the opportunity to speak with you and the members of the Committee on this significant homeland security issue. I welcome your questions.

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Written Testimony of

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“Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland”

United States Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

March 14, 2007

Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. It is a privilege to testify alongside a legendary public servant like Assistant Secretary Allen. We hope that our testimonies today will demonstrate how closely our offices are working together to tackle the issues you are considering.

In seeking to counter the phenomenon of radicalization, it is critical that our country better understand and engage Muslim communities, both in America and around the world. Though there is no magic formula, we believe that engaging key communities and promoting civic participation can help prevent the isolation and alienation that many believe are necessary precursors for radicalization. I look forward to working with this Committee to tackle this complex issue.

Mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

In accordance with 6 U.S.C. § 345, the mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is to assist the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the security of our country while also preserving our freedoms and our way of life. In essence, we provide advice to our colleagues on issues at the intersection of homeland security and civil rights and civil liberties. We work on issues as wide ranging as: developing redress mechanisms related to watch lists; integrating people with disabilities into the emergency management system; ensuring appropriate conditions of detention for immigrant detainees; adopting equal employment opportunities policies to create a model federal agency; and, ensuring that information technology is accessible to people with disabilities.

Since its inception, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has worked to help the Department establish and cement positive relationships with a variety of ethnic and religious communities, and the organizations that represent them. We have worked with Catholic and Protestant organizations concerned with immigration law and policy, with Sikh Americans concerned about various screening policies, with the leaders of the Amish community regarding identification issues, and with Jewish community groups on a wide variety of issues.

Today, I want to specifically address the Department's work with American Arab and Muslim communities, but it is important to remember that the work I describe is part of a broader effort to ensure that all communities in this country are active participants in the homeland security effort.

Engagement with American Arab and Muslim Communities

When I first assumed this role in April 2003, I quickly realized that many of the issues facing our Office would be those affecting Americans of Arab descent and those who practice Islam. I then realized that we had the opportunity to do much more than solve specific isolated problems. These communities want to have two-way communication with the government – certainly they want to be able to raise complaints about various situations or policies, but they also want to be invited to roll up their sleeves and help find solutions.

Therefore, the Department has embarked on a project to develop, cultivate and maintain partnerships with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. We believe that a critical element of our strategy for securing this country is to build a level of communication, trust, and confidence that is unprecedented

in our nation's history. We believe that we will be a much safer country if we better connect the government to these strong communities; if we learn to improve our work through listening to their concerns and ideas; if we convince more young people from these communities to join public service; if we receive their help in educating us about the challenges we face; and, if we receive help from key leaders in explaining our security mission to their constituents.

Infrastructure

We have invested a great deal of time in developing an infrastructure for success. For example, we now know many key leaders of the American Arab and Muslim communities. We have solid lines of communication with religious leaders, community activists, renowned scholars, and business leaders; we have established good links with professional and social organizations; and we have constructive and frank interactions with many of the leading civil rights organizations. In short, we have cemented positive relationships with key figures and civil society institutions in these communities.

Second, we now have experience with many of the media outlets through which many American Arabs and Muslims receive their information. This includes traditional sources of media, locally-based ethnic newspapers and magazines, internet-based media, and international satellite networks.

Third, we now know many of the concerns of these communities. We know that these include: aviation watch lists; immigration processing; encounters at the border; investigative methods; detention and removal; and, of course, foreign policy.

With regard to radicalization, we now have a good sense of the narrative used by violent extremists who are recruiting young Western Muslims, and therefore we

understand the counter-narrative that we should use to combat extremism and promote integration.

Finally, we now have a better understanding of what the government wants and needs from American Arab and Muslim communities, and what these communities want from the government.

Engagement

Based on this infrastructure, we have been very active in trying to engage with these communities. This applies, as well, to our colleagues at the Department of Justice, FBI, Treasury, and others, who have all made concerted efforts in this regard. Of course, as with all outreach efforts, the government must be careful to choose constructive people to partner with, and, by the same token, community members are careful to meet with government officials who they believe will be reliable partners.

Much of our Office's work has involved bringing leadership to the interagency engagement effort. Together with our partners in other agencies, we have worked hard to ensure that national organizations have access to leaders here in Washington. Within the past several months, national community leaders have had substantive meetings with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Treasury and others. These are not simply occasional meetings, but are becoming part of the structure of our work. For example, several senior leaders of our Department have met with community leaders in both formal and informal settings over the past several months. Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the Justice Department hosts regular meetings between government agencies, including the

Departments of Homeland Security, State, Treasury and Transportation, and national civil rights organizations.

This engagement takes place across the country. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties now actively leads or participates in regularly-scheduled meetings with leaders from these communities in cities such as Houston, Chicago, Buffalo and Los Angeles. In Detroit, the U.S. Attorney has asked me to chair the regular meeting there, referred to as “BRIDGES.” In all of these venues, the local leaders of the DHS component agencies participate, usually along with the U.S. Attorneys’ offices and the FBI. These meetings typically include two to three dozen people around a table in a conference room, at either a government agency or a community center. The meetings typically begin with a substantive presentation by the government on an issue of concern, such as redress for watch list misidentifications. Then, old business is discussed – government agencies are asked to provide updated information on issues that have been raised in previous meetings. Finally, the communities present new issues to discuss with the agencies. As you can see, the meetings provide an opportunity for the communities to learn information about significant new government projects, as well as to raise specific issues of concern in a format that emphasizes accountability for answers.

Building capacity

Our Office is also working hard to build the capacity of our workforce to address the new challenges that face us. Through a project we call “Civil Liberties University,” we have developed training that provides new skills and competencies for our front-line officers. For example, we have just released an intensive training DVD for DHS personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from the

broader Arab and Muslim world. The training includes insights from four national and international experts – an Assistant United States Attorney who is Muslim, a member of the National Security Council who is Muslim, an internationally-renowned scholar of Islamic studies, and a civil rights attorney who advocates on issues of concern to Arab American and Muslim American communities. This training program has been applauded by the communities who believe that they will be treated with more dignity and professionalism if front-line officers understand their cultures, traditions and values; and, by our colleagues in the Department who believe that such training will help them do their jobs more efficiently and effectively.

We have also produced educational materials with guidance to DHS personnel on how to screen and, if necessary, search individuals who wear common Muslim and Sikh head coverings; training on how to screen those of the Sikh faith who carry a *kirpan*, or ceremonial religious dagger; and a tutorial on the Department's policy prohibiting racial profiling.

This type of training is truly a win-win situation: our workforce wins by acquiring new skills that they need to better carry out their jobs; and, we all win because American Arab and Muslim communities gain confidence that their insights and contributions are welcomed in the homeland security effort.

Incident Management Team

If there is another terrorist attack on the United States, American Arab, Muslim and South Asian communities would likely be at center stage. These communities may be a focus of investigative activity, rightly or wrongly, and quite possibly could be victims of racist retaliation. These communities could also be important keys to calming

tensions throughout the nation, assisting law enforcement in locating the perpetrators and serving as public spokespersons in the media. Therefore, it is critical that the U.S. government be in contact with leaders from these communities in the hours and days after an incident.

As a result, we have established an “Incident Management Team” that will connect government officials with key leaders of these communities in the event of another attack on our country. The purposes for this Incident Management Team include:

- For the U.S. Government, to give these community leaders information they need in the aftermath of an attack. Although no classified or restricted information will be shared, it is still important that community leaders hear important news directly from us;
- For the community leaders, to give the U.S. Government information it needs – allegations of hate crimes that we need to investigate or hopefully deter; reactions or concerns to policies or enforcement actions taken by the government; information about the pulse of these communities in the aftermath of an attack; and, possibly, information about how the government might be effective in investigating the terrorist act(s); and, finally,
- To develop, to the extent possible, a common understanding about the messages that government and community leaders will be sending to these communities, the country and the world.

This Incident Management Team is made up of key government agencies, as well as approximately two dozen community leaders that we have come to know well.

Government participants include several components within DHS, including the Office of

Public Affairs, DHS' Office of Strategic Planning, and the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A). We are joined by the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, the FBI, the State Department, and the Department of the Treasury. I serve as the chair. Community participants include scholars, community activists from several cities, and representatives of national organizations.

On the morning of the announcement of the London arrests this past August, I convened this IMT. Representatives from TSA, I&A, and the British embassy all provided briefings to the community leaders on the events from the last several hours. While no classified or sensitive material was provided, the briefings were very substantive and gave these leaders concrete information they could share with their communities. There was a question and answer session for the briefers, and then the community leaders shared reactions to the events. The call was valuable for the community leaders, because they received key and timely information, and it led to tangible results. Several organizations issued press releases, which assured their communities that the government was engaging actively with them, again illustrating that there is no need to feel isolated from the homeland security effort.

In addition to building bridges with community leaders, we have also developed strong relationships across the government. The working relationships among federal agencies on these issues are extremely strong. We work on a daily basis with colleagues from State, Justice, FBI, Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security Council.

We have also developed strong relationships with allied governments. We work particularly closely with our colleagues in the United Kingdom, but also regularly meet

with representatives of the Canadian and Australian governments, and others as well – such as colleagues from Denmark and the Netherlands.

Next Steps

Again, our goal is to develop, cultivate and maintain partnerships with key leaders of the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh and South Asian communities. We have laid a strong infrastructure, and we have taken a number of important steps in the early phases of this project. We have seen enough progress to know that we can reach this goal, in the relatively near future, if there is a continuing strong and sustained commitment from all.

Let me highlight four steps that we believe need to be taken at this time:

First, we must deepen the engagement; we must take all of this activity to the next level. Leaders from all branches of government need to take steps to engage with these communities; meet them, learn about them, and open lines of communication.

Government leaders also need to make public statements that impact opinion and drive current debates in ways that increase our citizens' desire to get involved in public life and public policy, and that decrease the natural tendency toward isolation from government.

For example, in the days after the August 2006 arrests of the bomb plotters in London, Secretary Chertoff made the following remarks to an audience in Los Angeles:

“Given recent events, I think it’s good to reinforce the message that America values its rich diversity. Muslims in America have long been part of the fabric of our nation. The actions of a few extremists cannot serve as a reflection on the many people who have made valuable contributions to our society. Right here in Los Angeles we work with several Muslim American leaders who are helping us to better secure our

country. Muslim Americans, like all Americans are united in our resolve to live in safety and security.”

We need to ensure that a wide range of senior government leaders make statements such as these.

We also need to connect with young people from these communities. Although it is considered a mortal sin by those of us inside the beltway, the typical 18-25 year old in this country does not have a subscription to the Federal Register or the Congressional Record. We need to find innovative new strategies to improve communication with young people from these ethnic and religious communities.

Second, we must institutionalize the engagement effort for success over the long term. At the Department of Homeland Security, we have established the DHS Radicalization and Engagement Working Group, which Secretary Chertoff mentioned earlier today. We have also established the Incident Management Team and our colleagues at I&A have established a unit focused on radicalization issues. But we need to redouble our efforts to ensure that all of the component agencies are equipped to play a significant role in reducing isolation and therefore radicalization.

The work that we are trying to do is also taking place at our sister agencies – Justice, State, Treasury, NCTC, and others. The White House’s National Security Council and Homeland Security Council are also focusing on institutionalizing policies that mitigate the threat posed by radicalized individuals. Finally, we need to ensure that state and local governments continue to reach out and connect with these communities.

Third, we must continue to address policy issues of concern. In preparing for our community meetings, we remind ourselves that they will be seen as useless if concrete

results are not visible. We have found that these communities have provided a great deal of constructive criticism – that is, they have identified problems we need to address and, in some cases, made excellent recommendations for solutions as well. To be credible, the government must continue to address issues of concern and report back to the communities when progress is made.

Finally, we must challenge the communities to get involved. Homeland security is a team sport – to achieve our mission, we need help from every part of America. We know that these communities are anxious to roll up their sleeves and get involved. It is important at this time that we say loudly and clearly: “We need your help and we welcome you to the table.”

Specifically, we need community leaders to convince more of their young people to consider public service as a career. One of our priorities as a government has to be to get young people from American Arab and Muslim families to join government service. We desperately need their language skills, but we also need their cultural insights. We need to challenge community leaders to extol the virtues of public service, whether it is as a candidate for political office, as an FBI agent, a soldier, an accountant, a lawyer, or an IT specialist – we need more people from this community to see government service as a place they can build a successful career.

We also need to challenge these communities to help us increase the integration of new immigrants, particularly those from the Arab and Muslim worlds. We need to ensure that these new immigrants become comfortable with their children’s schools, get plugged into places of worship where they can build friendships, learn to speak English,

and become familiar with their local government. This is a job that local communities are best poised to accomplish.

We need to challenge community leaders to spread understanding of our security mission. There are times when we must deport someone who has come to our country illegally; we need community leaders to calm community tensions and explain the role that Homeland Security officers must play. There are times when someone is questioned at an airport or border port of entry; we need community leaders to explain that in many cases these are important features of the landscape we have post 9/11. We do not need community leaders to become our spokespeople; but we do need them to help build a level of understanding regarding these issues, which will help people respond to the latest headlines most successfully.

We also need to challenge community leaders to influence Muslim perspectives in other parts of the world. For example, Muslim communities in Europe are much less integrated, successful and prosperous than American Arab and Muslim communities. We need to challenge community leaders here to communicate with communities in Europe, to convince them Muslims can successfully integrate into secular democracies while maintaining their religion, and fully participate in those countries. From decades of experience, Muslims in America know that the environments created by democracies such as ours give them freedom to choose the way they want to worship, raise their families, get an education, relate to their government, start a business, and become prosperous in their professions. Muslims in Europe need to be convinced of these principles, and American Arab and Muslim leaders can play a significant role.

In all of these areas, community leaders are already stepping up to the plate. For example, many Arab and Muslim community leaders have traveled internationally and talked about the issues of the day. As a government, we simply need to recognize the efforts that have already been made, and then step up our support and encouragement for even more significant efforts in all of these areas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we recognize that this will not be an easy task. This will be a path with many peaks and valleys. There are constant pressures that seek to pull us apart; we must resist those. We have to make sure that those who believe in cementing positive relationships are the voices that shape opinions, and that these are the people who are influencing the debate. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I welcome your questions.



Memorandum

September 14, 2006

SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence

FROM: Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

This memorandum examines the intelligence oversight structure established by Congress in the 1970s, including the creation of the congressional select intelligence committees by the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively.¹ It also looks at the intelligence oversight role that Congress reserved for congressional committees other than the intelligence committees;² examines certain existing statutory procedures that govern how the executive branch is to keep the congressional intelligence committees informed of U.S. intelligence activities; and looks at the circumstances under which the two intelligence committees are expected to keep congressional standing committees, as well as both chambers, informed of intelligence activities.

If I can be of further assistance, please call at 707-7739.

Background

In the wake of congressional investigations into Intelligence Community activities in the mid-1970s, the U.S. Senate in 1976 created a select committee on intelligence to conduct more effective oversight on a continuing basis. The U.S. House of Representatives established its own intelligence oversight committee the following year.³

¹ The U.S. Senate approved S.Res. 400 establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 19, 1976, by a vote of 72-22. The U.S. House of Representatives approved House Resolution 658 establishing the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 14, 1977, by a vote of 227-171.

² For a review of Congressional oversight, see CRS Report RL32617, *A Perspective on Congress's Oversight Function*, by Walter J. Oleszek.

³ For a detailed review of U.S. congressional intelligence oversight from the Truman to Kennedy Administrations, see David M. Barrett, *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story From Truman to Kennedy*, (University of Kansas Press, 2005). See also Frank J. Smist, Jr., *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994*, Second Edition, The University of Tennessee (continued...)

Until the two intelligence committees were created, other congressional standing committees – principally the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations committees – shared responsibility for overseeing the intelligence community. Although willing to cede primary jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the two new select intelligence committees, these congressional standing committees wanted to retain jurisdiction over the intelligence activities of the other departments and agencies they oversaw.⁴ According to one observer, the standing committees asserted their jurisdictional prerogatives for two reasons – to protect “turf,” but also to provide “a hedge against the possibility that the newly launched experiment in oversight might go badly.”⁵

³ (...continued)

Press, 1994). For a review of Congress as a consumer of intelligence, see L. Britt Snider, *Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence* (Center For the Study of Intelligence, 1997).

⁴ The U.S. Intelligence Community is composed of 16 agencies of the U.S. Government; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); National Security Agency (NSA); National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); intelligence organizations of the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines; Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Coast Guard; Energy Department; Department of Treasury; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The Director National Intelligence, through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), directs the Intelligence Community (IC) and also serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC).

⁵ Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005). See *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence After September 11*, Chapter 14, L. Britt Snider, p. 240.

Intelligence Committees' Statutory Obligations

Under current statute,⁶ the President is required⁷ to ensure that the *congressional intelligence committees* are kept “fully and currently informed”⁸ of U.S. intelligence activities, including any “significant anticipated intelligence activity,”⁹ and the President and the intelligence committees are to establish any procedures as may be necessary to carry out these provisions.¹⁰

The statute, however, stipulates that the intelligence committees in turn are responsible for alerting the respective chambers or congressional standing committees of any intelligence

⁶ National Security Act of 1947, Secs. 501-503 [50 U.S.C. 413 - 413(b)]. In a change enacted as part of the fiscal year (FY) 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 102-88), Congress, for the first time, placed a statutory obligation upon the President to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of United States intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity. Until 1991, the Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence agency heads had been statutorily responsible for keeping the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of such activities under changes enacted in 1980. See *FY1981 Intelligence Authorization Act, Sec. 501(a) (P.L. 96-450)*. In enacting the FY 1981 Act, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) asserted that one of its principal goals was to modify the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, which required reports on CIA covert operations to as many as eight congressional committees, and substituting in its place a general provision requiring prior notice of covert operations and full access by the two intelligence committees to information concerning all intelligence activities. See *S.Rept. No. 96-730, 96th Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 2-3 (1980)*.

⁷ In authorizing fiscal year 2007 appropriations for the Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence adopted several proposed statutory changes that would have the effect of tightening executive branch reporting requirements to the congressional intelligence committees. See *S. 3237, Sec. 304*.

⁸ The phrase “fully and currently informed” originated in the requirement contained in Sec. 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Identical wording also is contained in S.Res. 400, 94th Congress, which created the SSCI. See *S. Res. 400, 94th Congress, Sec. 11(a)*. Historic practice has been that in fully and currently informing the intelligence committees about intelligence activities, other than covert actions, the executive branch generally has communicated such information – almost always in classified form – to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committees, often in writing. Such communications then typically are made available to the rest of the committee membership.

⁹ In Senate report language accompanying the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 102-88), the SSCI wrote, “The requirement to report significant anticipated activities means, in practice, that the committees should be advised of important new program initiatives and specific activities that have major foreign policy implications.” See *S.Rept. No. 102-85, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., p. 32 (1991)*.

¹⁰ National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 501(c) [50 U.S.C. 413]. According to accompanying report language, “The President may, for example, prescribe procedures under which certain information is to be furnished by a designated official....One or both committees may, for example, adopt procedures under which designated members are assigned responsibility on behalf of the committee to receive information in particular types of circumstances, such as when all members cannot attend a meeting or when certain highly sensitive information is involved.” See *S.Rept. No. 96-730, 96th Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 12-13 (1980)*.

activities requiring further attention.¹¹ The intelligence committees are to carry out this responsibility in accordance with procedures established by the House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, in order to protect against unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and all information relating to sources and methods.¹²

The statute stipulates that: "each of the congressional intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such committee or committees."¹³

This provision was included in statute after being specifically requested in a letter from then Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Frank Church and Ranking Minority Member Jacob Javits in an Apr. 30, 1980 letter to then-intelligence committee Chairman Birch Bayh and Vice Chairman Barry Goldwater.¹⁴

Intelligence Committee Obligations Under Resolution

In an apparent effort to address various concerns relating to committee jurisdiction, the House of Representatives and the Senate, in the resolutions establishing each of the intelligence committees, included language preserving oversight roles for those standing committees with jurisdiction over matters affected by intelligence activities.

Specifically, each intelligence committee's resolution states that: "Nothing in this [Charter] shall be construed as prohibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other committee to study and review any intelligence activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee."¹⁵

Both resolutions also stipulate that:

Nothing in this [charter] shall be construed as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing committee of the [House/Senate] to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.¹⁶

Finally, both charters direct that each intelligence committee alert the appropriate standing committees, or the respective chambers, of any matter requiring attention. The charters state:

¹¹ National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 501 [50 U.S.C. 413] (d).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ S.Rept. No. 96-730, 96th Congress, 2nd sess., p. 14, Footnote No. 3. (1980).

¹⁵ House Rule XLVIII 2.(c), U.S. House of Representatives. S.Res. 400 (Sec.3(c)), U.S. Senate.

¹⁶ Ibid. House Rule XLVIII 2.(d). S.Res. 400, Sec.3.(d).

The select committee, for the purposes of accountability to the [House/Senate] shall make regular and periodic reports to the [House/Senate] on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the attention of the [House/Senate] or to any other appropriate committee or committees of the [House/Senate] any matters requiring the attention of the [House/Senate] or such other appropriate committee or committees.¹⁷

Cross-over Membership

Both resolutions also direct that the membership of each intelligence committee include members who serve on the four standing committees that historically have been involved in intelligence oversight. The respective resolutions designate the following committees as falling in this category: Appropriations, Armed Services, Judiciary, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee.¹⁸

Although each resolution directs that such cross-over members be designated, neither specifies whether cross-over members are to play any additional role beyond serving on the intelligence committees. For example, neither resolution outlines whether cross-over members are to inform colleagues on standing committees they represent. Rather, each resolution directs only that the “intelligence committee” shall promptly call such matters to the attention of standing committees and the respective chambers if the committees determine that they require further attention by those entities.¹⁹

Summary Conclusions

Although the President is statutorily obligated to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, the statute obligates the intelligence committees to inform the respective chambers, or standing committees, of such activities, if either of the two committees determine that further oversight attention is required.

Further, resolutions establishing the two intelligence committees make clear that the intelligence committees share intelligence oversight responsibilities with other standing committees, to the extent that certain intelligence activities affect matters that fall under the jurisdiction of a committee other than the intelligence committees.

Finally, the resolutions establishing the intelligence committees provide for the designation of “cross-over” members representing certain standing committees that played a role in intelligence oversight prior to the establishment of the intelligence committees in the 1970s. The resolutions, however, do not specify what role, if any, these “cross-over” members play in keeping standing committees on which they serve informed of certain intelligence activities. Rather, each resolution states that the respective intelligence committee shall make that determination.

¹⁷ Ibid. House Rule XLVIII 3.(a). S.Res. 400, Sec. 4.(a).

¹⁸ Ibid, House Rule XLVIII 1. S.Res. 400, Sec.2(a)(1)).

¹⁹ Ibid.

Comparison of Active Students from Various Countries

	16-Mar-07	Sep-06	Sep-05	Sep-04
Afghanistan	174	157	94	64
Algeria	153	152	148	154
Bahrain	345	368	366	371
Bangladesh	2255	2364	2659	3009
Egypt	1335	1353	1266	1277
Eritrea	142	146	138	142
Indonesia	8155	8263	8610	9523
Iran	2141	2087	1910	1824
Iraq	156	133	82	69
Jordan	1613	1621	1635	1698
Kuwait	1579	1608	1551	1620
Lebanon	1821	1857	1885	2170
Libya	127	88	33	16
Morocco	1426	1510	1826	2067
Oman	216	233	274	320
Pakistan	5034	5219	5896	6981
Qatar	288	256	193	224
*Saudi Arabia	10049	9787	2837	2929
Somalia	4	4	5	6
Sudan	165	159	147	193
Syria	395	398	433	522
Tunisia	270	245	269	317
UAE	789	772	836	1013
Yemen	250	256	248	255

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Notable Historical Change by Percentages

Highest change of %	Sep 06 to current	Sept 05 to Sep 06	Sep 04 to Sep 05
Afghanistan	11%	67%	47%
Bangladesh	-5%	-11%	-12%
Indonesia	-1%	-4%	-10%
Iran	3%	9%	5%
Iraq	17%	62%	19%
Lebanon	-2%	-1%	-13%
Libya	44%	167%	106%
Morocco	-6%	-17%	-12%
Oman	-7%	-15%	-14%
Pakistan	-4%	-11%	-16%
Saudi Arabia	3%	245%	-3%
Syria	-1%	-8%	-17%
UAE	2%	-8%	-17%

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United States Mission to the OSCE

Statement on Freedom and Security: Outreach and Prevention of Discrimination

As prepared for delivery by Timothy Keefer,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights
to the Supplemental Human Dimension Meeting, Vienna
July 15, 2005

Thank you for the opportunity to speak at this Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on "Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism." The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, headed by Daniel W. Sutherland, provides proactive legal and policy advice to the senior leadership of the Department on a wide range of issues, seeking to help them to shape policy in ways that are mindful of our civil rights and civil liberties. The Department has been in existence for just over two years and is a place of firsts in many respects. One such first is the establishment of this team of attorneys who specialize in civil liberties issues and report directly to the Secretary. It is notable that an agency that has a largely law enforcement and military mission has a civil libertarian in the senior leadership. This has helped the Department:

- improve the operation of watch lists;
- improve training for our law enforcement officers;
- help people with disabilities to be better prepared for emergencies;
- investigate and resolve civil rights and civil liberties complaints from citizens about Department policies and actions;
- significantly increase the employment of people with disabilities into our agency; and,
- help improve our nation's immigration policies.

We believe that people should be viewed as individuals, based on the content of their character, on what they do, not on their race or ethnicity or religious beliefs. We are convinced that we cannot do an effective job in homeland security without actively, fully connecting with the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities here in our country. We need these communities to be part of our team. The Muslim-American and Arab-American communities have been part of the fabric of the country for decades, in industry, in academia, in the military service, in government service, in the medical profession, and in our neighborhoods. Like all Americans, Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans suffered on September 11, 2001. The tendency to condemn all members of any particular ethnic or religious group for the actions of some is contrary to our founding principles, wrongheaded, and worse yet, counterproductive. If we isolate whole categories of people, we will be violating this fundamental national value. In addition, this is also an important threat to national security, because an important element of our nation's strategy must be to build

bridges with the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities, and with the Arab-American and Muslim-American world. If we cement solid relationships with the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities here in America, as well as with other ethnic and religious communities, we will be aligning ourselves with some of our best allies in this battle of ideas. We have the common goal of protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of all of our people; this is a fundamental element of our government.

The question now is this: How can our government better engage with Muslim-American and Arab-American communities?

First, we need to work together to ensure that our civil rights laws are fully enforced. Religious liberty is a fundamental American value and the Justice Department regularly prosecutes lawsuits to the religious rights and freedoms of all Americans. It has filed suit on several prominent religious expression cases, seeking to defend the rights of religious minorities to live their faith.

- Federal law enforcement has worked hard on behalf of those who are, or are perceived to be, Muslim, or of Arab or Middle Eastern South Asian origin. To date, the Department of Justice has investigated over 630 incidents since 9/11 involving violence or threats against individuals from these backgrounds.
- The Justice Department intervened in the case of a Muslim-American schoolgirl who was suspended for wearing a Muslim headscarf, or Hijab. Although she had worn the scarf without objection for several weeks, on September 11, 2003, she was informed that doing so violated the school district's dress code, which prohibited all headwear. The Justice Department resolved the matter with a consent decree, which will allow the student to wear the headscarf, and which requires the school district to make reasonable exceptions for *bona fide* religious obligations.
- The Justice Department recently sued the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority, alleging that it has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of religion by: (1) selectively enforcing its uniform policies regarding head coverings toward Muslim-American and Sikh-American bus and train operators; and (2) failing or refusing to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim-American and Sikh-American bus and train operators.

As part of its statutory responsibility, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has resolved a number of complaints that individuals and organizations have brought to us. For example, we reviewed allegations concerning a young Muslim-American man from an African country who came to the United States seeking asylum. As a result of our review, we recommended to border and transportation security officials that they consider strengthening asylum policies in several ways, including the health and medical services provided to detainees, the length of time in detention prior to a hearing in court, and the process for determining the age of asylum applicants. Border and transportation security officials have agreed with many of our recommendations, and we are working with them to make these changes in asylum policies.

As a result of several complaints that the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) has brought to us, we have worked with transportation security officials to improve the operation of aviation watch lists. For example, ADC brought us complaints about young children who experienced difficulties in flying apparently because, as one airline told the family, these children appeared on a “security list.” During the course of our investigation of these matters, we worked closely with transportation security officials. We concluded that in both cases the airlines had not properly followed our security directives with regard to these lists. Transportation security officials have since made improvements in the operation of the aviation watch lists that help to minimize the times that airlines make errors in misidentifications. This led to ADC’s April 27 press release titled, “TSA Improves No Fly List Procedures.”

Secondly, the key, of course, is to take proactive steps to try to prevent civil rights problems from happening in the first place. Our workforce needs to better understand the cultures, values, customs and traditions of Muslim-Americans, Arab-Americans, and other ethnic and religious communities in America. Dr. Margaret Nydell of Georgetown University states, “Perceptions become realities to the people who hold them, and people who lack cross-cultural experience can easily misunderstand the attitudes and behaviors they confront.” We must work hard to ensure that these misperceptions and misunderstandings are addressed. Important steps have been taken in this area:

- On February 27, 2001, in his first State of the Union address, President Bush stated that racial profiling “is wrong and we will end it in America.”
- On June 16, 2003, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the guidance President Bush had called for – *Guidance Regarding the Use of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies*. The Guidance is important because for the first time the concept of “racial profiling” is defined with rigor; practical instructions are given about how law enforcement officers can avoid engaging in it; and, the applicability of this concept in the national security context is explained.
- Former Secretary Ridge immediately established a Department-wide working group to study how to most effectively implement the new Guidance. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties co-chaired that working group.
- On June 3, 2004, former Secretary Ridge issued a memorandum laying out the Department’s position with regard to racial profiling. The statement strongly condemns racial profiling. Moreover, it contains a one-paragraph statement of DHS policy on the issue – in a format that allows all DHS components to incorporate the policy statement easily into manuals, handbooks, and other formats.
- Our Office prepared a CD-ROM that gives our law enforcement officers a tutorial on President Bush’s policy prohibiting unlawful racial profiling. The tutorial takes about 20-25 minutes, taking the officers through a series of hypothetical fact patterns; it does not allow them to move through the tutorial without thinking because there are test questions embedded in the presentation

– wrong answer, it takes you back.

- We along with law enforcement have also engaged in a great deal of outreach to community leaders in cities like Los Angeles, Buffalo, Detroit and Washington. Together we have identified a number of issues and worked to address them before they mushroom.
- Our Office has re-packaged and sent a CD-ROM with basic law enforcement encounter information about Arab and Muslim culture to thousands of DHS employees. The CD-ROM was prepared by the Community Relations Service of the Justice Department.
- We have also worked with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) to update and strengthen the training of law enforcement cadets on racial profiling. The FLETC training curriculum on this subject has been significantly expanded and strengthened.
- The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection training office has put together an extremely effective and helpful training session on Arab and Muslim culture.
- We are listening to concerns raised by people in these communities and taking steps to improve airline screening.

Of course, our colleagues in other civil rights agencies in government are also doing great work in this area and we are making great progress in the effort to protect the civil rights of Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans.

- Our Office participates in a regular meeting hosted by the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights to dialogue with leaders from Muslim-American and Arab-American advocacy groups, and all relevant government agencies are represented at this meeting.
- The Treasury Department has also encouraged and helped facilitate the creation of the National Council of American Muslim Non-Profits by the Islamic charitable community in the United States. The Council is comprised of a diverse group of representatives from the Muslim-American community who are joining forces to organize, protect and promote charitable giving against the backdrop of demonstrated terrorist abuse.
- There has been a great deal of training for federal law enforcement officers on the culture and values of the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities.

The third area in which we need to engage with each other is in the area of employment. We need to seek ways to encourage people with specialized language skills and cultural competencies to seek employment with the federal government. Engagement is a key: if people in Arab-American and Muslim-American communities are convinced that, for example, the Department of Homeland Security understands their concerns and is actively engaging with them, it is likely that more

people from these communities may seek employment with us. That means that we will have more people with critical language skills and, just as importantly, cultural competencies.

Finally, we need to place a top priority on ensuring that Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans are given full and equal opportunity in education, in employment, in housing, and in their interactions with government agencies, and in so many other areas of public life. A University of Michigan study of the large Arab-American and Muslim-American community in Dearborn, Michigan, released in July 2004, contains some important results:

- 15% say that “since 9/11, they personally had a bad experience due to their ethnicity.” By contrast, “a third also say they received gestures of support from non-Arabs after the attacks.”
- 91% say they are proud to be American.

We believe that we have the hope of seeing levels of engagement between the government and Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans that have never been reached before in the history of this country. For example, within the last few months, ADC and other leading Arab-American, Muslim-American, Sikh-American and other groups have met with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI. We need to continue to work together to establish solid lines of communication between law enforcement and the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities. It is critical that we talk with each other – when an inflammatory incident happens, if community leaders know to call a law enforcement official the incident can be addressed or explained quickly and the tensions eased. Moreover, if a community leader grows to know and trust a law enforcement official, he or she will feel comfortable to call that official if there is something of concern happening within the community. Most of all, these open lines of communication can help improve the government’s work – if community leaders have constructive criticisms, they will have an open door to share those ideas and help us to improve. In short, we need to build a level of communication, trust, and confidence that is unprecedented in our nation’s history.



United States Mission to the OSCE

Improving the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in Preventing and Combatting Hate Crimes

As prepared for delivery by Shaarik H. Zafar
 Special Counsel for Post 9/11 National Origin Discrimination
 Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
 at the Second OSCE Meeting of Police Experts
 in Vienna on September 13, 2005

I am honored to represent the United States at this landmark OSCE conference on combating hate crimes. Hate crimes are a scourge that affects all participating States, which we properly should work together to address.

I work for the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice. The Justice Department serves as prosecutor for Federal law. The Civil Rights Division enforces Federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, and national origin. These statutes cover areas in which the Federal government, rather than the State governments exclusively, have authority. In this regard, we enforce Federal civil rights statutes in areas such as criminal law, employment, housing, education, and disability rights. This includes prosecuting hate crimes – violent and intimidating acts based on the victim's race, color, religion or national origin.¹

I serve as the Special Counsel for Post 9/11 National Origin Discrimination, and in this capacity, lead our Initiative to Combat Post 9/11 Backlash.² Former Attorney General John Ashcroft created this position in the wake of the September 11 attacks to work with the American Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and South Asian communities. A principal focus of mine, and of the Civil Rights Division, is investigating and prosecuting hate crimes. I view this position as a tremendous opportunity to help protect the rights of minorities and ensure that racial or sectarian violence has no refuge in our country.

Hate crimes – violent acts motivated by bias or hatred of a particular religious, racial, or ethnic group – are among the most pernicious crimes known to our legal system. They are qualitatively and quantitatively different from other forms of crime. Hate crimes are designed not only to target the immediate victim, but also to instill terror and fear into an entire community. They are calculated to be divisive, to turn neighbors against neighbors, and to undermine the very fabric of our modern societies.

¹ See 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 245 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631 – Hate crimes are violent and intimidating acts of racial, ethnic and religious hatred that interfere with Federally protected rights, such as housing, employment, voting, and public services.

² See <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/nordwg.html>

But hate crimes are not a new development. As we all know, racially- or religiously-motivated violence marked much of the 20th Century. And unfortunately, this has often been State-sponsored, or at least State-condoned. From the Holocaust, to genocide in Rwanda, to the disintegration of the Balkans, such conduct represents the very worst of humankind. Even today, governments, typically dictatorships, abuse their sovereign authority and commit acts of violence and intimidation against their ethnic and religious minorities.

But of course, most hate crimes do not play out on such a grand stage. Rather, they are usually marked by a debased and common thuggishness, and both crime and criminal are too often unnoted and unpunished. As such, we as participating States must make every effort to fight such crimes. In order to do so, however, we must first understand their nature. In the United States, we have learned that hate crimes cannot be fought successfully only by using traditional law enforcement means. Rather, governments must tailor their response to hate crimes to fight not only the criminal violence and intimidation, but also the underlying message of hate.

What I would like to do today is to share with you the model we have found to be effective, and some of the experience we have had fighting hate crimes following September 11. Let me make one initial point at the outset: there is not one strategy we employ to combat hate crimes against the Muslim community, and another against, for example, the Jewish community. While we do tailor aspects of our approaches, our policy is the same regardless of the affected community. Hate crimes are immoral and repugnant. They have no place in a civilized society and the Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those who perpetrate such violence are prosecuted to the fullest possible extent.

Our model has three elements: (1) hate crime laws; (2) the criminal enforcement of these laws; and (3) public outreach by law enforcement to vulnerable communities.

I. HATE CRIMES LAWS

As a Federal republic, primary responsibility for criminal law enforcement in the United States has rested traditionally with the states. Hate crimes in particular have been chiefly the province of State authorities. Accordingly, 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal laws that specifically address hate crimes. The Federal government also criminalized certain actions taken against "any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin."³

Hate crimes in the Federal system are punished more severely than their non-hate motivated counterparts, as they target not only the individual victim, but also the larger community. This also follows because hate crimes may be more likely to provoke a wave of other crimes: both copycat crimes against other persons like the victim, in addition to retaliatory offenses from the targeted group. In light of these concerns, the United States Sentencing Commission has established a provision that provides for an enhanced sentence for a Federal defendant whose crime was motivated by hate.⁴

³ See 18 U.S.C. § 245

⁴ See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1, available at <http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/g12004.pdf>

In the United States, laws prohibiting hate crimes are not intended to confer special rights or status on particular groups. Rather, they are intended to promote equality. To this end, while the United States strongly opposes hate crimes, the United States does not support the widespread use of racial preferences. The United States' Constitution's promise of equal protection under the law has been construed to be generally incongruent with fostering racial preferences and classifications.⁵ Such preferences themselves can create the same division, disharmony, and mistrust as hate crimes. We believe the most effective model for defeating sectarian and racial criminality is the promotion of equal access and individual merit as the guiding forces behind opportunity and advancement.

Nor is a legal response targeted only to protecting or prosecuting certain races or religions. Indeed, the September 11 attacks affected not only the American Arab and Muslim communities, but also those perceived to share this ancestry. We have seen "backlash" crimes where the victim was Indian, Eastern European, or Portuguese, but was mistaken for being Muslim or Arab. In fact, the first casualty of a Post 9/11 backlash crime was Balbir Singh Sodhi, a member of the Sikh faith, whose turban was mistaken for a Muslim head covering.

The lesson we have learned is that ignorance combined with bigotry is a very dangerous combination indeed. But it is a combination we must combat.

II. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

The enactment of effective anti-hate crime statutes is only the first step. Such statutes are meaningless without a robust and thorough enforcement effort. The law enforcement community must press investigations and prosecutions of hate crimes without bias themselves. Indeed, unequal or selective enforcement of such statutes robs essential civic organizations – the police and the courts – of the appearance of impartiality necessary to their effective functioning.

Accordingly, following September 11, the United States Government moved quickly to respond to the backlash crimes that were occurring. The Justice Department established the Initiative I now lead, and immediately started reaching out to the American Muslim and Arab communities, encouraging them to report incidents. And, we swiftly and successfully prosecuted the most egregious offenders.

- One man was prosecuted for attacking a Pakistani restaurant with Molotov Cocktails, and now faces from 5 years to life in prison;
- Another man, claiming he was angry about the 9/11 attacks, drove his pickup truck through the front doors of the Islamic Center in Tallahassee, Florida. He went to a bar afterwards where he bragged about what he did, claiming he was getting back at Arabs and Muslims for 9/11. He was convicted on state and Federal charges, and now is in prison.

⁵ See *Gutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 309 (2003)

- We recently prosecuted another man for throwing a homemade bomb at the Islamic Center of El Paso. He was sentenced in June of this year to 171 months (14.25 years) in prison followed by 3 years supervised release.

III. PUBLIC OUTREACH

On one level, hate crimes are like other crimes. There is a perpetrator, a victim, and a crime scene – and police officials use standard techniques to solve the crime. But because of the effect of hate crimes on the larger community, law enforcement officials must take steps to prevent escalation and encourage the reporting of incidents after they occur. Only by working closely and effectively with the affected community can the cycle of violence be cut, and hate crimes robbed of their most pernicious aims.

Thus, while essential, investigations and prosecutions are not the only tools we employ in combating hate crimes against the Muslim community. Public outreach, for example, continues to play a major role in our work for 2 major reasons:

- (a) First, by meeting regularly with Muslim communities, we become sensitive to cultural and religious considerations, which frankly allows us to do our jobs better. We have found that when law enforcement officials develop partnerships with members of a particular community, they obtain cultural, religious, and linguistic insights that aid both in crime prevention and effective policing.
- (b) Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, outreach allows us to learn first hand what the issues of concern are.

There are essentially 2 basic components of a successful outreach program. The first is going out, meeting with the community, and establishing partnerships. For local police, this means knowing the local community leader or imam, **preferably on a first name basis**. This also means visiting the mosque, introducing yourself to the congregants, and encouraging them to report hate crimes to you. And in order to foster credibility, when appropriate, officials should publicize information on arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

Ideally, these initial communications take place before a hate crime or other stressful event occurs, and will eventually expand to regular meetings with community leaders, to discuss both security and civil rights concerns. Indeed, experience has shown that cities that had strong communication structures in place before 9/11 were better prepared to deal with backlash violence. In this regard, consistent and regular meetings are essential. Moreover, **this effort must be institutionalized**, in order to overcome law enforcement personnel turnover, changes in community leadership, and other crises that can erode relationships.

The second component involves law enforcement training and developing cultural competence by providing officers a basic understanding of Muslim cultures, beliefs, and practices. In the case of recent immigrants, an understanding of the various ethnic and national backgrounds is also helpful. We have found that these insights are particularly useful when it comes to reporting. I have spoken to FBI agents, police officers, and NGO representatives, and there

appears to be a consensus that in combating hate crimes, getting a case reported is often the biggest obstacle.

Several factors may explain this. For example, in some parts of the Muslim and Arab Worlds, interaction with police carries with it a stigma, which may discourage reporting. Additionally, negative experiences with police in his native country may affect the willingness of a recent Muslim immigrant to come forward. Finally, there may be the belief that reporting a violation is pointless, and nothing will come of it. While challenging, our view is that these factors can be overcome through training, outreach, and the building of trust.

In a recent study, the Police Executive Research Forum concluded:

An informed community policing officer must have basic knowledge of and respect for the religious beliefs and cultural practices of the people they serve. When law enforcement demonstrates an awareness of cultural and religious sensitivities and traditions, they can engender a bond of trust with those communities. Diverse communities (especially those most affected by September 11 backlash) may well be willing to work with investigators who they believe will respect their traditions and act responsibly to keep terrorists out of their communities.⁶

The United States believes this trust not only leads to better relations, but also results in an increased willingness to report crimes.

Now, it is unlikely that every officer can learn all of the customs of every community, but it is possible to learn basic information that not only shows sensitivity, but allows officers to do their jobs better. For example, in the Muslim context, training allows officers to know what actions should be taken with regard to

- (a) Entering a mosque;
- (b) The Sacred days of Islam, e.g., *Ramadan*, *Eid*; and
- (c) Entering a Muslim home

⁶ Protecting Your Communities from Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Vol. 2: Working with Diverse Communities, p. 25-26, available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1364>

There are many examples of successful outreach programs throughout the United States. For example,

- (a) The Chicago Police Department holds a regular Multicultural Forum geared toward the Middle Eastern and Asian communities;
- (b) The police departments of Dearborn and Detroit, Michigan regularly work on outreach initiatives with the region's large Arab American community; and
- (c) The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also works with Arab and Muslim NGOs and trains law enforcement officers to properly respond to hate crimes and to avoid racial and ethnic profiling in investigating crimes. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties presented a side event detailing these outreach efforts at the July OSCE meeting on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism.

At the Department of Justice, we focus on national outreach. Immediately following the September 11 attacks, we began arranging meetings across the country between law enforcement, city officials, and the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities to enhance mutual understanding and encourage cooperation. In Washington, one of the most important activities we conduct is a regular meeting with representatives of key Federal agencies and leaders of NGOs representing these groups. The focus of these meetings is to increase dialogue and address the communities' concerns regarding hate crimes and other civil rights violations.

We also heard of instances where police officers had difficulty identifying and distinguishing religious head wear worn by Muslims versus practitioners of other faiths, such as Sikhs. Based on conversations we had at our interagency meeting, we produced 2 straightforward training posters that explained the *hijab* and turban, gave examples, and suggested recommendations on interacting with individuals who don such coverings.⁷ Additionally, we have produced educational brochures on hate crimes and other types of national origin and religious discrimination, and have translated these into 16 different languages including Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Punjabi, and Farsi.⁸ Moreover, we have utilized the relationships established at our Washington meetings to distribute these materials nationwide.

In the final analysis, the vast majority of Americans are good and understanding people who believe in pluralism, want education, and are eager to do the right thing. Working in the Civil Rights Division, I do see instances where people fall short of acceptable behavior. This, of course, is not a recent phenomenon. As the African American and Jewish American communities can attest, hate and bias crimes did not start after 9/11. However, in the United States, these are still very much the exception and not the rule. We in the Department strongly believe this, which is why we devote time and resources in creating educational materials and conducting outreach, as well as focusing on investigating and prosecuting hate crimes.

The Department of Justice is centrally involved in protecting the civil rights and liberties of all Americans. And Muslim Americans are just that, they are Americans. Our effort to combat hate crimes against the Muslim community, which was born of necessity in the wake of September 11, now exists as a natural continuation of the Department's mission to advance and defend the civil rights. And this is a mission we take seriously.

⁷ See http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/muslim_poster.pdf and http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/sikh_poster.pdf

⁸ See http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg_brochure.html



United States Mission to the OSCE

Statement on the Importance of Dialogue and Public Engagement in Promoting Tolerance and Integration

As prepared for delivery by Shaarik H. Zafar,
Senior Policy Advisor, Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
at the OSCE Tolerance Implementation Meeting
on Promoting Inter-Cultural, Inter-Religious and Inter-Ethnic Understanding,
Almaty, June 12, 2006

I am honored to represent the United States at this landmark OSCE meeting on promoting tolerance and inter-cultural, inter-religious, and inter-ethnic understanding. Many of the problems the world faces today are directly attributable to the lack of such understanding. As such, I applaud the Belgian Chair for its initiative in planning this meeting and the Government of Kazakhstan for hosting it. I look forward to working with delegations from all of the participating States over the next two days as we discuss ways to promote tolerance between cultural, religious, and ethnic communities.

I would like to focus my remarks on the lessons the U.S. government has learned on the importance of dialogue and public engagement in promoting tolerance and integration, and preventing and reconciling conflicts. Initially, consistent communication and dialogue with the American public is an essential part of the Federal government's work. Our open system of governance requires that we respond to inquiries; educate and share information on our programs and policies; and provide a platform for the community to air grievances, thoughts, and opinions. We do this in a variety of ways: we develop educational materials; we respond to correspondence; and we also reach out to community groups directly and make senior government representatives available to answer questions and provide information and guidance.

Our experience has shown that community dialogue is particularly important in the context of law enforcement and homeland security. Indeed, public interaction and relationship building are widely-acknowledged as essential tools in the post-September 11 environment. In a recent study, the Police Executive Research Forum concluded that, "When law enforcement demonstrates an awareness of cultural and religious sensitivities and traditions, they [sic] can engender a bond of trust with those communities."¹ Not surprisingly, agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security have robust public outreach initiatives.

I work for the Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.² The mission of the Department is to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and respond to threats and hazards to the nation, while ensuring safe and secure borders;

¹ "Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement," Vol. 2 "Working with Diverse Communities," available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1364>

² www.dhs.gov/civil liberties

welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors; and promoting the free-flow of commerce. The role of our Office is to ensure that the Department carries out its mission while maintaining our fundamental rights and liberties.³ We also work to promote diversity and integration, and prevent and reconcile conflicts between the Department and the American public. Specifically, we

- assist the Secretary for Homeland Security review policies and procedures that impact civil rights;
- review and assess information alleging abuses by Departmental personnel;
- provide leadership to our Department's Equal Employment Opportunity program; and,
- serve as an information and communication channel with the public.

I would like to draw special attention to this last point. We believe it is a wise investment to spend significant amounts of our time communicating with the public, providing information, and hearing and responding to concerns. We are convinced that our first function – helping to shape policy in ways that are mindful of the U.S. Constitution and Federal civil rights laws – is much more effective when we listen to the reactions and concerns of the American people. Good policy and good communications with the public are inherently connected with one another.

In this regard, we have sustained dialogues with numerous American communities. For example, we meet with leaders of the disability community to discuss emergency preparedness issues, particularly in the context of natural disasters. We also meet with immigration advocacy groups, who are concerned with border security and naturalization policies. And we regularly meet with the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Middle Eastern, and South Asian Americans to discuss ways to protect the homeland while maintaining civil rights in a post September 11 context. As this is my area of focus, I would like to share with you lessons we have learned by engaging with these communities.

9/11 of course represents the height of intolerance. Sadly, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, we witnessed an increase in acts of bigotry, born of hatred and ignorance, and directed against those who were, or perceived to be, Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern. I say “perceived to be” because often times the victim did not fall under any of these categories. I have seen cases where the victim was Eastern European or Portuguese, but was mistaken for being Arab. In fact, the first casualty of a Post 9/11 backlash crime was Balbir Singh Sodi, a member of the Sikh faith. The lesson we learned is that ignorance combined with bigotry is a very dangerous combination indeed. But it is a combination that all Member States must combat. The question then, is how?

Recommendation 1: Public officials should publicly condemn discrimination and take proactive steps to regularly meet with vulnerable communities.

We have found that one very easy, yet beneficial, step is for senior government leaders to make public statements condemning intolerance and bigotry. Speaking at the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. on September 17, 2001, President George W. Bush made it clear that backlash crimes would not be tolerated, stating that “Those who feel like they can

³ What we in the U.S. refer to as “civil rights and liberties” may be defined broadly as “human rights.”

intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don't represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they should be ashamed of that kind of behavior."⁴

Such statements are essential in times of crisis, to diffuse tensions and prevent or de-escalate conflicts. We recall that Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke eloquently on this subject in the wake of the London bombings.⁵ But leadership statements should not be limited to times of crisis. Indeed, we recommend that Member States encourage their public officials to set the national mood and regularly speak out on the importance of pluralism, diversity, and respect.

Senior officials should also make it a point to lend support and meet publicly with members of vulnerable communities. Last October, our Department was privileged to co-sponsor a unique "iftaar" – an event breaking the fast during Ramadan – along with the EU and British Ambassadors to the United States. The event was remarkable because it brought together U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, then British Home Secretary Charles Clarke, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, and European Commission Vice President Franco Frattini, along with many of the top leaders of the American Muslim community. In this informal and comfortable setting, all of these senior leaders gave moving comments about the value of tolerance and respect.

Unquestionably, such actions from senior government officials have helped develop growing partnerships with key Arab, Muslim, and South Asian American leaders. But they have also sent a message to the broader American public that these communities are a valuable and integral part of the American fabric, and deserve respect.

Recommendation 2: Member States should aggressively enforce anti-discrimination laws and encourage communities to report abuses.

While important, words and meetings must generate action. We fully agree with a central premise of this session that dialogue itself is not enough and that "[i]t is of fundamental importance to take concrete steps and carefully developed measures designed to create and preserve a harmonious and inclusive society."⁶ An example of this is our commitment to enforcing civil rights laws and encouraging communities to report allegations of illegal discrimination. I previously served as the Special Counsel for Post 9/11 National Origin Discrimination at the U.S. Department of Justice.⁷ There, my role was to

- coordinate the investigation of hate crimes, employment discrimination, and other unlawful forms of national origin and religious discrimination;
- conduct outreach to vulnerable communities to provide them information about Federal civil rights protections; and
- Encourage these communities to report abuses to the appropriate authorities.

⁴ Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>

⁵ Statement to Parliament on London Bombings, July 11, 2005, available at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7903.asp>

⁶ The Annotated Agenda of the Tolerance Implementation Meeting on Promoting Inter-Cultural, Inter-Religious and Inter-Ethnic Understanding p. 4, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2006/05/19272_en.pdf

⁷ <http://www.usdoj.gov/ert/nordwg.html>

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice has investigated over 700 incidents involving violence or threats of violence against individuals perceived to be Muslim, or of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent. Working with its partners in state and local governments, the Justice Department has brought charges in many of these cases, and has also filed lawsuits to protect the rights of vulnerable communities in the context of employment, housing, and religious discrimination.

At the Department of Homeland Security, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has used its statutory authority to

- investigate complaints involving illegal racial, ethnic, and religious profiling committed by Department personnel;
- improve the operation of aviation watch lists; and
- work with border security officials to strengthen asylum policies

Notably, these enforcement actions, beyond being legally and morally sound, reinforce civic participation and promote tolerance and integration. This is particularly true for recent immigrants, whose prior experience with law enforcement in their native countries may have largely been negative. By encouraging communities to report violations, and then taking action and bringing investigations and prosecutions, we send three powerful messages: (1) Arab, Muslim, Middle Eastern, Sikh, and South Asian Americans are just that—Americans, and are entitled to the same rights and liberties as everyone else; (2) hate crimes and illegal discrimination have no place in a civilized society, and will not be tolerated; and (3) in the United States, there is a legal process that addresses discriminatory acts. All Americans have the right to participate in the legal process, and we should all expect justice from the legal system.

Recommendation 3: Member States should develop training programs on ethnic and religious minorities to foster cultural competency among government officials.

My first two points, regarding public statements and civil rights enforcement, dealt with communicating with the American public generally, and specifically, with the American Arab, Muslim, Middle Eastern, Sikh, and South Asian communities. It is just as important to remind those of us in government about the importance of tolerance and respect.

Our experience has shown that beyond the public relations benefits, our dialogue and outreach efforts help government officials do their jobs better. In the law enforcement context, we have found that when officers and agents develop partnerships with members of a particular community, they obtain cultural, religious, and linguistic insights that aid both in crime prevention and effective policing.

But there are times when such self-gained insights are not enough. In order to reduce stereotypes, our workforce needs to better understand the cultures, values, customs and traditions of ethnic and religious communities. Dr. Margaret Nydell of Georgetown University states, "Perceptions become realities to the people who hold them, and people who lack cross-cultural experience can easily misunderstand the attitudes and behaviors they

confront.”⁸ We must work hard to ensure that these misperceptions and misunderstandings are addressed.

In this regard, we have found that providing law enforcement officers with education and training on cultural and religious traditions leads to greater understanding, and is useful in countering stereotypes and prejudice among public officials. The U.S. government has taken several important steps in this area. For example,

- The Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice has prepared an excellent CD-ROM for law enforcement officials on basic aspects of Arab and Muslim cultures;
- The DHS Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties has just finished taping a more in-depth training video on Arab and Muslim beliefs and cultures, which we will be releasing in the very near future; and
- Our Office and the Department of Justice have produced a series of posters on Muslim and Sikh religious head coverings, which provide basic guidance on how to interact with individuals wearing these garments.

We have sent thousands of these products to local, state, and Federal law enforcement officers throughout the country and the reviews have been extremely positive.

Forgive me for being redundant, but I must stress this point: educating government officials about cultural and religious minorities is not simply about being polite. While improving sensitivity and promoting tolerance, this training helps government employees do their jobs better. We repeatedly emphasize to our law enforcement colleagues that the training we offer is not what derisively is referred to as “political correctness or sensitivity training.” The training is a concrete, hard-nosed effort to help them do their jobs better. When they understand the cultures, values, and traditions of particular peoples whom they encounter, for example, at the border, they will have a better understanding of whether this is a person who can be admitted to our country. By the same token, displaying cultural and religious awareness helps minority communities feel connected to the government, making them more likely to engage and work as part of the process.

Recommendation 4: Whenever possible, Member States should promote inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious dialogue, even in the absence of conflicts.

Let me conclude by making a point about the benefits of inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious dialogue. But before I do so, I must admit that promoting such dialogue vis-à-vis distinct communities, as opposed to promoting dialogue with the government, is not a chief mission of our Office. The Department of Justice’s Community Relations Service is the U.S. government’s “peacemaker” for community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin.⁹ We are fortunate to have the Director of the Community Relations Service, Sheree Freeman, with us as part of the U.S. delegation, and she can discuss her activities in more detail.

⁸ *Understanding Arabs* (Introduction: A message from Margaret Nydell) (2002)

⁹ www.usdoj.gov/crs

Nevertheless, I humbly submit that along with promoting tolerance and civic integration, a by-product of our public engagement efforts has been improving inter-community dialogue. Although we do occasionally meet with distinct groups, our practice is generally to meet with the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian American communities together. While there are often different perspectives, our experience has been that these communities share similar concerns about issues such as hate crimes, employment discrimination, religious freedom, and racial profiling. While we cannot accept credit for this phenomenon, I think it is important to highlight the fact that the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian American communities now regularly work together to lobby, educate, and, frankly, complain about the government. They support each other's causes; participate in each other's conventions; and recognize each other's achievements. And while the United States is fortunate in that there are relatively few tensions between these communities domestically, we do take comfort in the possibility, however remote, that this inter-community dialogue may help prevent future conflicts. At the very least, the level of support and cooperation between these communities is certainly a model others should follow.

Thank you.



United States Mission to the OSCE

Session 17: Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination II Forward-Looking Discussions

As prepared for delivery by Shaarik Zafar
to the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting
Warsaw, October 12, 2006

Mr. Moderator,

The United States welcomes the opportunity to discuss ways to successfully implement our shared OSCE commitments on tolerance. The U.S. delegation also wants to express its appreciation for the good work of the Belgian Chair-in-Office in focusing his energies on this topic, through the three tolerance meetings and the Holocaust memorial ceremony in January. We look forward to similar leadership under the incoming Spanish chairmanship.

The importance of listening and having mechanisms in place to hear-out the concerns of minorities has long been evident. As the U.S. delegation noted at the Almaty conference earlier this year, various governmental agencies in the United States have developed special programs to reach out to minorities. For instance, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security hold regular roundtable meetings with representatives from Muslim-American, Arab-American and South Asian-American communities, both in Washington and throughout the country. These meetings provide an opportunity for these Americans to raise their concerns in a non-bureaucratic manner and find timely solutions to problems. For example, as a result of these meetings, both departments have published guidance on best practices while searching Muslim and Sikh Americans who wear religious head coverings. The Department of Justice also successfully litigated a case protecting the right of a Muslim American schoolgirl to wear a religious head covering in a public school. These actions are consistent with OSCE tolerance commitments regarding the right of individuals to wear religious dress, and so in this regard, we remain concerned about limitations on religious dress in some participating States.

Concerning the work of the OSCE in the tolerance field, we are pleased with ODIHR's efforts in the strengthening of ODIHR's capacity for reviewing draft legislation and assisting participating States in ensuring that national laws treat all citizens equally. We encourage participating States to pass anti-discrimination laws, and to seek the assistance of the legal advisor in the ODIHR Tolerance Program, the Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, or the ODIHR's Rule of Law unit in doing so. The ODIHR Tolerance Program already has a number of successful projects on education for Holocaust Remembrance, on police hate crimes training, and on combating anti-Semitism. Those programs should be expanded, and ODIHR and the Panel of Experts on Religious Freedom should follow them up with educational programs to combat intolerance against Muslims, Christians and other religious communities.

It is imperative that we build on the existing momentum and continue to address these problems head-on during the coming year. The United States therefore believes additional follow-up is needed and would support a Ministerial decision calling for a high level conference next year based on the Cordoba format that specifically addresses these established areas of concern, including issues of anti-Semitism. We also note the willingness of Romania to host such a conference and welcome this offer.

The unique evil of anti-Semitism continues to plague all parts of the OSCE region. This is a particularly serious issue within the spectrum of issues of intolerance and discrimination toward ethnic and religious minorities that all OSCE participating States face. We can all do more. Following the Cordoba format would ensure OSCE efforts to combat anti-Semitism are not diminished, while allowing the conference to explore answers to other pernicious ills, such as discrimination against Muslims, intolerance towards Christians and other religious groups, as well as the plight of the Roma.

A separate issue is the reappointment of the three Personal Representatives of the Chair-in-Office – a matter to be decided by the incoming Spanish chairmanship. The United States is optimistic the incoming Spanish Chair-in-Office will reappoint the three Personal Representatives with their distinct mandates, and we strongly support their reappointment. As we all remember, the purpose of the Personal Representatives is to highlight these pressing issues until the OSCE can address them more systematically and institutionally. We welcome ODIHR's plans to upgrade the Tolerance Program to a department, while maintaining the current distinct topical structure. We also look forward to the meeting Professor Weisskirchen will convene in Berlin next month on anti-Semitism, under the auspices of the Germany delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

In closing, Mr. Moderator, we, along with many other participating States, have denounced recent manifestations of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, Christianophobia, anti-Romism and other intolerant acts. Unfortunately, we likely will continue to face these evils for the foreseeable future. It is important that all OSCE States work to confront and overcome such intolerance in what will be an ongoing struggle.

**STATEMENT OF
MICHAEL S. DORAN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

3 May 2007

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to testify today regarding the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations. The President has said that “the war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation.” While this struggle bears some comparison with past ideological conflicts, it differs in that the Internet allows relatively small organizations with limited resources, such as Al-Qaeda, to broadcast messages across the globe instantaneously. In past conflicts, only nation states could disseminate their messages so widely.

Terrorists are using the Internet now more than ever in an attempt to influence the global political environment. Al-Qaeda and its associates, in particular, use the Internet to

spread their political ideology, disseminate the extremist interpretation of religion that supports it, and coordinate their operations. The focus of my office's efforts is on foreign-language, insurgent websites believed to be operated by non-US persons. We work closely with the Department of State, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and other agencies to remain abreast of how our adversaries use this medium. Because individuals can access the Internet anonymously from virtually anywhere on the globe, the use of the web by terrorists is a constantly moving target.

Our deep commitment to a free society and the very nature of the web make it virtually impossible to prevent terrorists from using the Internet altogether. From a handful of terrorist web sites in 2000, today there are many thousands of terrorist-related websites in existence, with more appearing each week. Through the deft use of members-only user groups and password-protected bulletin boards, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda manage to maintain the integrity of their "brand," instructing sympathetic audiences as to the whereabouts of authoritative communications. At any given moment, in any given language, only a limited number of sites post original material produced directly by terrorist organizations or the religious authorities to whom the organizations have pledged loyalty. The majority of terrorist websites in operation are either mirrored versions of existing sites, or simply bulletin boards that disseminate material that originated on websites under the direct control of terrorist organizations.

Those characteristics that turned the Internet virtually overnight into an indispensable tool of our day-to-day life have also made it a boon to terrorist organizations: using the Internet is cheap; it allows the rapid dissemination of text, video, and audio files; and, importantly, it allows anonymous communications to very large

audiences. The benefits to terrorist groups of a cheap and anonymous multi-media communications system are obvious.

Terrorism experts have long analyzed terrorist attacks as a form of communication. A primary goal of the terrorist attack is to attract attention so as to disseminate information. In the 1970s, terrorism expert Brian Jenkins expressed this insight by famously remarking that "terrorists don't want a lot of people dead, they want a lot of people watching." In today's world, marked as it is by groups such as Al-Qaeda, it is no longer true that terrorist groups don't want a lot of people dead. It is, however, still very much the case that they want a lot of people watching. The Internet ensures that they have the means to communicate their message to the world immediately and directly, without being filtered through the prism of the mainstream media.

The anonymity of the web and the ready availability of a virtual space for posting material in large quantities make it easy for terrorist-related sites to pop up temporarily, publish new material, and then move to another address when necessary. Once the material has been published, it is immediately duplicated on a large number of sites located on servers across the globe. The speed with which this dissemination occurs poses a serious challenge to those in the U.S. government working to locate hostile sites, and assess their content.

In fact, the web has created conditions that make it possible for us to imagine a wholly new type of terrorist network – one that is almost entirely virtual – composed of individuals who are not personally known to each other but who are animated by the same ideology and willing to coordinate actions in pursuit of it.

In addition to easing communication, for some groups, terrorist use of the internet may increase the difficulties that law enforcement authorities face in tracking and apprehending potential terrorists. Added by the internet and other communication technology, terrorists can operate in a variety of different jurisdictions, each with their own specific laws and regulations governing the monitoring of the Internet and the prosecution of online crime.

Al-Qaeda and likeminded groups have a striking ability to obtain a large variety of multimedia products, rapidly repackage them to fit their own goals and objectives, and then make that data available to a global audience via the Internet. The Internet, therefore, is more than just a tool of terrorist organizations: it is the primary repository of the essential resources for sustaining the culture of terrorism. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda use the Internet for a variety of organizational purposes including propaganda dissemination, recruitment, fund raising, training and instruction, and operational planning.

But the Internet is more than an operational tool. It also houses hundreds of thousands of pages of books that define the extremist interpretation of religion that feeds the global terrorist movement. For instance, the followers of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who at one time served as the spiritual guide to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have compiled on a website dedicated to their mentor a considerable library of downloadable books that treat subjects covering all aspects of religious life. A large part of this material is devoted to debunking the moderate critiques of the extremist interpretation of religion. Sites such as this allow the Internet to function as a kind of virtual extremist madrassa.

Thanks to the Internet, terrorists now have direct control over their message and the means of disseminating it, with the ability to disburse their propaganda directly to sympathetic audiences without the filter of third-party media. Terrorists also post violent images, such as decapitation videos, to invoke fear and deliver threats. But intimidation, although it grabs attention, is not the main theme of terrorist propaganda, which more often than not generally focuses on the perceived wrongs that Muslims have suffered at the hands of non-Muslims, led by the United States. It also stresses the religious justifications for taking violent action against them as a matter of defense. Terrorist propaganda seeks to de-legitimize the adversaries of the extremists, to spread disinformation about enemy actions and intentions, and to bolster the morale of followers - all ultimately to persuade potentially sympathetic audiences that jihad is a fundamental component of religion and the only effective means for redressing grievances. .

The Internet can facilitate terrorist recruitment. Along with print materials, social influences, and other factors; potential recruits are flooded with propaganda, training manuals, and religious justification for joining the jihad via the Internet. It is difficult to say how much direct recruitment takes place on the web. While it is likely that direct invitations to take part in a terrorist organization are usually delivered face-to-face, there is no doubt that the web plays an important role in indoctrinating recruits before they are drawn in directly. Probably for this reason, extremist websites will not attempt to recruit overtly for violent action, but will instead legitimate the actions of terrorists and encourage readers to support the jihad however they can.

Terrorist websites, chat rooms, and other forums make use of the Internet for fundraising. These websites often use the argument that every Muslim has a duty to

support jihad, but that participation on the ground is not required of everyone. The appeal for financial support alone is a method of permitting an individual to feel that they have “done their duty” as a Muslim, but do not need to change their life and join the actual fight.

Terrorist use of the internet also includes operational training. For example, an online initiative, called “Jihad University,” offers training information in the use of small arms, mortars, rockets, and artillery; guidance on where to fire at U.S. forces vehicles to inflict the greatest damage; sniper training; and detailed instructions about the construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide vests, etc. Training also includes information on how, when, and where to cross the borders of Iraq to join the jihad, and how to avoid detection as a jihadist.

As I have endeavored to illustrate, terrorists use the Internet for a wide variety of purposes, and their use of the technology continues to evolve. I have provided the Committee with compact discs containing audiovisual material from some of these terrorist websites for those Committee members who are interested in seeing a demonstration of the some of the typical content found on these websites. The briefing on this CD was produced by the Department’s contracted Center for International Issues Research (CIIR), an innovative center focused in part on observing terrorist activity on the Internet in order to provide policy makers and agencies with a greater understanding and awareness of the strategic communication campaigns being waged by extremist groups across cyberspace. CIIR was established precisely out of the recognition that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates use the internet quickly and effectively on a global scale. Such a threat

required a team of analysts capable of following the day-to-day expression of the extremist ideology across national and linguist barriers.

When recognizing the nimble use that Al-Qaeda makes of the internet, it is tempting to call for us to counter it directly on the net. Ultimately, the key to countering the terrorists' use of the internet is not simply or primarily a reciprocal set of actions by the U.S. government on the web. As the President has reminded us, we will counter the terrorist ideology most effectively by using the strongest weapon in our arsenal - the power of freedom. The Internet is a tool of a free society, and, as such, it can sometimes be used as a tool to undermine freedom. Nevertheless, the answer to the terrorist message of tyranny, intolerance and violent extremism is to effectively communicate the alternative vision: freedom, tolerance, and mutually-beneficial cooperation.

Precisely in order to address the challenges presented by the war of ideas and to communicate our message of freedom and opportunity in the Information Age, in December 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy created my office, Support to Public Diplomacy (SPD). SPD's mission is three-fold. First, we are working to create organizational change within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure that strategic communication and information are integral to policy making, implementation, and assessment. It is important to note here that part of that cultural change means explicitly understanding that information and communication is not just what government officials say. SPD is not a public affairs office. SPD works to lessen the "say-do" gap. These efforts at cultural change are essential to SPD's second core mission: developing and coordinating key themes and messages within DOD to promote policies. In policy development and implementation, we work with DOD Public Affairs

and Joint Staff, and other Policy offices. Our third core mission is to work with other U.S. government partners, particularly the Department of State – the lead for U.S. government public diplomacy – to design and facilitate whenever possible strategic communication policies and plans to effectively advance U.S. national security.

With regard to countering ideological support to terrorism and terrorist use of the Internet, my office seeks to enhance understanding of how terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda conduct influence campaigns, and to develop policy and strategies to counter them. As I have emphasized, increasingly these influence campaigns are being conducted via the Internet, but with immediate impact on the U.S. and partners' forces around the world.

The President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides a strategic vision of the defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and the creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them. The Department will continue to work with our U.S. government partners to engage the terrorist enemy in the cyber battlefield as a critical domain in our efforts to win the war of ideas and ultimately achieve the President's vision.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH H. FELTER, PHD, UNITED STATES ARMY
DIRECTOR OF THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
THE INTERNET: A PORTAL TO VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, Distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor for me to provide testimony to you on the topic of Jihadi use of the Internet. It is also an honor to sit next to Mr. Frank Cilluffo, whose work on cyber terrorism is used at our Center, and Mr. Michael Doran. Mr. Doran trained one of our Center's most gifted scholars on the Jihadi Movement.

Coalition Forces have had great success interdicting al-Qa`ida worldwide. Indeed, a significant number of the organization's senior leadership have been killed or captured since the 9/11 attacks. Despite our military success neutralizing key commanders and safe havens, however, the al-Qa`ida organization and its associated movements continue to actively target and execute terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel, our interests and our allies around the world.

It is important to bring operational commanders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri to justice; indeed this is a key component of our overall effort to combat terrorism. However, the existence of men like Zarqawi should be seen as more of a symptom, than a cause, of the global epidemic that needs to be contained. The real center of gravity of the violent movement that sustains al-Qa`ida are the ideas of radical Jihadist thought. It is these ideas, not necessarily the individual leaders, which insulate al-Qa`ida against U.S. pressure and enable the movement to spread even as its leaders are captured or killed. The internet facilitates the dissemination of these ideas and, perhaps more importantly, offers like-minded would-be terrorists the ability to network around these dangerous concepts.

It is not possible to capture, kill, or incarcerate ideas. We should not think of al-Qa`ida in terms of organizational charts and bureaucratic hierarchies that typify a conventional military enemy. Al-Qa`ida has become a brand name, a way of seeing the world. This global movement would not be possible without the pervasiveness of Internet accessibility and the capability it offers al-Qa`ida's thought-leaders to define the way disillusioned youth think about the world. The Internet allows thousands of disenfranchised and displaced individuals to build a virtual community of followers bound together only by a body of shared ideas and digital relationships. We cannot prevent all of these relationships from forming or stop the generation of these ideas, but we can do a better job of understanding how the Internet facilitates these processes so we can monitor and thwart those who join the Jihadi Movement.

In this testimony, I will first describe how violent extremists think about how to use the internet to spread their radical ideology; second I will discuss some of the ways these extremists use the internet to meet their goals and finally I will recommend more effective ways to combat extremist efforts on the internet. The specific recommendations which I will explain in detail at the conclusion of my testimony are to:

- 1) Establish and support dedicated programs to translate and analyze jihadi strategic texts that are proliferated online;
- 2) Exploit vulnerabilities and divisions identified by the terrorists themselves online;
- 3) Harness more diverse communities of expertise and bring greater resources to the fight using similar web enabled techniques developed by terrorist's themselves.

To provide context for these recommendations, it is first important to understand how violent extremists are using the internet to spread their radical ideology in a variety of ways and with great effect. I will highlight several of these

which include education and expanding opportunities to participate and support global jihad.

1. The Ideological Basis for Al-Qa`ida

The most important thought leaders in al-Qa`ida are not Usama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa`ida's most well-known operational leaders. Rather, they are people unknown to most Americans, people like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abd al-Qadir ibn Abd al-Aziz and Abu Qatada al-Filistini.

There is clear evidence that the grand ideas developed by these scholars and other ideologues lesser known in the West informs and inspires terrorist attacks worldwide. For example, the Spanish indictment of the Madrid train bombers identifies more than 50 electronic books that had been downloaded from the internet and were found on the hard drives of the bombers' computers. The authors of those books track very closely with the list of the most influential Jihadi authors developed by our researchers at West Point. Their writings are being exported around the globe thanks to the internet. Thus, an electronic book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the most influential Jihadi ideologue based on our empirical assessment, is one the most translated texts in Indonesia today.

Many of the Jihadi Movement's most important books are housed on a website that serves as al-Qa`ida's library.¹ This online library serves as a repository for over 3,000 books and articles written by Jihadi authors on various dimensions of ideology and strategy. These texts have been downloaded tens-of-thousands of times and copied on CD-ROM exponentially more. These texts have been found in the possession of both dead and aspiring terrorists. And we know that these texts are being actively translated from their original Arabic into a variety of languages so that the ideology gains global exposure.

¹ In 2006, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point used this library to map the Jihadi Movement's most influential ideologues. The results are now available online: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas.asp>.

Take for example the book written by Jihadi strategist, Abu Bakr Naji, called the *Management of Savagery*. Writing as a high-level insider, Naji explains in painstaking detail how al-Qa`ida plans to defeat the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, establish sanctuaries in security vacuums around the world and create more resonant propaganda. It has become essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the strategic thinking of al-Qa`ida's leadership and the future of the Jihadi Movement.

Or consider the 1,600 page treatise written by Jihadi historian, Abu Musab al-Suri, a man who claims that he is "one of the few Jihadis who understand the Western culture and mentality." In his book, Suri walks readers through an in-depth discussion of America's global war on terror. He spells out the operational and strategic lessons-learned by Jihadi groups over the past century. He highlights the present obstacles that current Jihadi participants need to overcome and he articulates a number of strategic goals for the Jihadi Movement's aspiring leadership to understand, most of them focused on swaying public opinion. Suri's analysis provides the operational framework for Jihadi webmasters, software programmers, graphics designers, movie producers, and translators, tying them together with frontline soldiers in an increasingly coherent narrative of resistance.

II. Turning Consumers into Producers

The web enabled ideas that drive al-Qa`ida do not come from a single source, nor are they intended to be received by small cadre of supporters. The Movement's chief priority seems to be giving more people from more places more ways and more reasons to join their Movement. In so doing, they have pioneered new tactics, techniques and procedures on the battlefield and they have learned to leverage technology in more creative and sophisticated ways online. In one extraordinary example, an Iraqi insurgent group held a website design contest among its worldwide supporters. The prize for the winner was to

launch a rocket attack against a U.S. base in Iraq simply by clicking the mouse on their computer from the comfort of their own home.

Jihadi thinkers see themselves waging a series of insurgencies that are linked intellectually by a shared ideology. The key to their victory, they argue, is winning the hearts and minds of various Muslim constituencies. The two primary ways in which Jihadi thinkers have sought to do this is by: 1) indoctrinating successive generations of Muslim youth with the Jihadi value-system; 2) creating as many possible new avenues for Muslims to participate in the Jihadi Movement.

The terrorists are taking advantage of the web's potential to greatly expand opportunities for their followers and sympathizers to support this deadly movement. For example, one book available online, entitled *39 Ways to Participate in Jihad*, spells out a variety of options to aid and abet the terrorists' cause short of overt participation in terrorist attacks and many facilitated by the internet. For example, the book urges supporters to spread news about jihadis fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today we see thousands of websites springing up to distribute information created by terrorists and insurgents in those countries. The book also encourages parents to teach their children about the path of jihad. It urges mothers to socialize their children with a Jihadi mindset from an earlier age by reading them bedtime stories of the great Jihadi fighters or showing them videos of successful Jihadi attacks against American forces. Today we see video games distributed online that focus on killing effigies of President Bush and teaching a distorted version of history that emphasizes the role of terrorists.

Other ways in which Jihadi thinkers have sought to increase participation is by encouraging members to study anthropology, sociology and public administration using online distance learning opportunities for those who cannot attend formal schooling. Having this knowledge, one author argues, will help the Movement be more effective in exploiting and co-opting local tribal politics

throughout the Middle East. It will also help them know how to provide social services and establish governing institutions in destabilized areas.

In short, these trends represent a large-scale effort by the Jihadi intelligentsia to harness the power of the internet and maximize the vibrancy of their movement by including new and diverse participation. By doing this, our enemy hopes to transform the various local insurgent and revolutionary efforts into an organic, global social movement, one that transcends organizational limitations, adapts to changes on the ground and allows for anyone to support these efforts at any level of commitment or knowledge-level.

Today, a new generation of technically capable jihadis is building tools to enable other supporters to build websites, translate videos, and use encrypted communications. Even more traditional jihadi propaganda has grown more sophisticated. Videos and audio tapes are now translated into English, Kurdish, French and German. Jihadi propagandists, whom we still know comparatively little about, spin the unpopular aspects of their Movement – attacks that kill Muslim women, children and the elderly, for instance – while drawing attention to their confrontation with American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The jihadis understand that the best way to indoctrinate people is to enable them to easily participate in the movement and this is made possible through the power of the internet.

Jihadis now use information widely available online to gather operational and strategic intelligence. Google Earth, which creates easy to use maps based on widely available satellite photos is used to plan attacks in Iraq. Jihadi intelligence operatives gather information from U.S. websites to analyze the weaknesses of the U.S. intelligence community. Jihadis gather specifications on U.S. tactical vehicles used in Iraq based on the manufacturer's websites.

All of these tactics speak to the internet's capability to transfer information farther and faster than ever before. The United States benefits tremendously

from this trend, as business and government become more efficient. The downside, however, is that we cannot control who accesses this information and some of it can and will be used against us.

III. Recommendations:

Given what we know about how radical Islamic extremists are harnessing the power of the internet, the CTC believes efforts to combat the threats posed by these terrorists can be enhanced through 1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of the ideology fueling Islamic radicalism which is exported online; 2) better exploiting the terrorists organizational rifts and network vulnerabilities that they expose online and 3) expanding opportunities to support our collective efforts to combat the terrorist threat harnessing more diverse communities of expertise that can contribute to the fight.

1. Know your enemy – read what the terrorists are telling us online. At West Point, we are very familiar with Sun Tzu's maxim stressing the critical importance of knowing your enemy. In this war, the enemy has often been characterized as the hostile ideology responsible for extremist Islamic radicalism. We must continue to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of this ideology and what is driving it. Our center's systematic mapping of jihadi Salafi ideological influence is one example of such an initiative. Increased efforts and programs designed to translate and analyze the jihadi strategic texts proliferated online are needed to expand our understanding of this hostile ideology further.

2. Exploit enemy vulnerabilities made publicly available on the internet. There are many opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and divisions identified by the Jihadi's themselves – and often made conveniently available online. One of the most effective ways to hurt the Jihadi's is to use their own writings, discourse and web postings against them. The CTC in support of the US Special Operations Command, is mining the terrorist's internal documents captured in the course of operations supporting the GWOT and stored on the Department of Defense's

Harmony data base to identify fractures and fault lines in the jihadi salafi movement in general and al-Qa`ida in particular. However, we don't need access to classified data bases to find and exploit such internal fractures and network vulnerabilities. Much more information is available online. Areas of disagreement, ideological fault lines, internal rifts and power struggles are all described in great detail on various internet sites. We have at our disposal an online repository of jihadi literature, chat room postings and other materials –all primary sources and updated in real time- and it is a resource we must better exploit.

Because of its speed, anonymity, and accessibility, the internet has created a phenomenon unprecedented in human history: a globally-connected community of terror. But the struggle with al-Qa`ida will only be the first in a series of struggles against the new generation of globally-connected terrorist organizations, both Islamic and non-Islamic. Regardless of their ideology, terrorist groups that use the Internet share similar capabilities. They also share the same weaknesses. The internet helps us take advantage of these weaknesses. We can monitor them to follow the networks and assess their operational capacity. We can sabotage them by infiltrating their networks and flooding the web with bogus information. And we can anticipate their attacks by reading their strategic literature and following trends on their web forums and discussion boards.

3. Harness broader resources and bring them to bear in the fight. Attempts to shut down websites have proven as fruitless as a game of whack-a-mole. An open society in the information age offers opportunities for asymmetric warfare that cannot be taken away, only countered. A more fruitful response to extremist Islamic terrorist use of the internet is to bring a greater diversity and breadth of resources into the fight. Just as there are *39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad*, we must create opportunities for Americans with a wide array of expertise to quietly participate in the fight against terrorism.

The CTC does this already. We rely on a wide network of academics to do much of our analytical work. Many of these individuals would be unwilling to work openly with the government because of disagreements over politics or policy. Nevertheless, they have critical expertise on Jihadi theology and the history, sociology and political context of the current fight. They will work with West Point because we are an academic institution and rigidly defend the academic integrity of our products. We need to create more mechanisms for the vast array of American expertise to be deployed against this enemy.

At West Point we see how the creative and internet savvy potential of our younger generation is particularly adept at identifying opportunities to enlist the power of the internet to combat the terrorist threat. One of our cadets in the terrorism studies program for instance, analyzed hundreds of online videos of attacks against American troops in Iraq to identify more effective counter measures and tactics that can increase survivability of our forces. His analysis is being used in the field.

Douglas MacArthur during his farewell address to the Corps of Cadets in 1962 admonished that, "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars." This maxim remains true today. At the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, we appreciate that the internet is being used as a weapon in this long war we are waging with radical Islamic extremism. We are committed to preparing our nation's future military leaders to respond effectively to this threat and to use this same weapon to take the fight back to the enemy. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

“The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism”

**Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute
The George Washington University**

Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

May 3, 2007

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished members of the Committee, your continued examination of the issues involved in extremist radicalization is central to understanding our adversaries. Thank you for your leadership in pushing these critical homeland security issues to the fore – proactive consideration of these challenges and carefully calibrated responses using all instruments of statecraft is crucial to bolstering our national security.

I am pleased to be here today to share the findings and recommendations of our report, “NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy.” This report was developed by the Task Force on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization, which was convened under the leadership of The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). I am pleased to recognize my co-chair, Dr. Gregory Saathoff, and would like to thank the members of the task force, a group of well-regarded subject matter experts from a broad spectrum of disciplines. A copy of the report is attached for submission to the record.

Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of a compelling message and social connectivity with new audiences. Cyberspace is now the battlefield and the “war” is one of ideas. Our adversaries currently have firm possession of the battlefield because they understand this shift and have crafted and disseminated a narrative that resonates and has served both to energize and expand their ranks. Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups like al Qaeda. The real time, two-way dialogue of chat rooms has taken the fight global, enabling extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially.

Use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) has made a range of terrorist operational activities cheaper, faster, and more secure. Communications. Fundraising. Planning and coordination. Training. Information gathering and data mining. Propaganda and spreading misinformation. Radicalization and recruitment. The list is long, and not even complete.

Use of the Internet by terrorist groups has evolved over time. Terrorists once used the Internet primarily to support operations. Increasingly, however, the World Wide Web is also used for another purpose: to spread radical ideologies faster, wider, and more effectively than ever before possible. Radicalization, whether facilitated by CMC, face-to-face interaction, or other means, can create pools of like-minded believers who may go on to enlist into terrorist movements and plan and commit acts of violence. Radicalization is the lifeblood of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement, generating new recruits for existing groups or creating environments in which new groups arise.

Planning and preparations for the 9/11 attacks were facilitated by the Internet. Operatives engaged in the attack used it to communicate. Flight schools were researched through it, as were targets. Its uses have evolved over time and to increasingly gruesome creative effect – witness the videotaped beheadings of Nicholas Berg and Daniel Pearl circulated online to the four corners of the earth. These uses of the Internet, horrific as they may be, are fundamentally static – one-way communication directed at a global audience. Terrorists, however, now make effective use of the many varieties of interactive communication made possible by the Internet. By its very nature, the Internet “enables groups and relationships to form that otherwise would not be able to, thereby increasing and enhancing social connectivity.”¹ As a new means of social interaction, it brings together people – friends, family members, or complete strangers – with similar interests and values, fostering a sense of affiliation and identity. The “killer application” of the Internet is not so much its use as a broadcast tool, but its function as a communications channel that links people in cyberspace, who then meet and can take action in the physical world.² While no one-size-fits-all model can indicate which individuals will be receptive – or vulnerable – to an extremist message and “call to action” at the nexus of the physical and the cyber realms, the world has, unfortunately, witnessed a growing number of instances demonstrating the global reach of the terrorist narrative.

From Toronto to London, from Madrid to Morocco, and in Holland, America and beyond, people have faced the impact of radicalization. Some view these instances as examples of “homegrown” terrorism, but the label is something of a misnomer. The Internet has created a largely borderless world; participants in terrorism are therefore perhaps best understood within this transnational context, rather than merely a national one.

Our report focuses on radicalization in the context of the transnational insurgency that is the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement, perhaps best exemplified by al Qaeda but including other groups ascribing to the same ideology. Radicalization is defined as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”³ Let me note that

¹ John A. Bargh and Katelyn McKenna, “The Internet and Social Life,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 55, 573-590 (2001), p.2, http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jab257/internet_and_social_life.pdf.

² Ibid, p. 3, citing J. Kang, “Cyber-race,” *Harvard Law Review* 113 (2000): 1150.

³ Charles E. Allen, “The Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland.” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (14 Mar 2007), p. 4.

we have chosen not to use the term “Islamist extremism” in our discussions. Radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon. The West is not at war with Islam – terrorism is in fact un-Islamic. This finding is mirrored in a recent poll of the Muslim world, which indicates that large majorities in some countries – from 65% in Indonesia to 88% in Egypt – view violence against civilians as violating Islamic principles.⁴ Further, extremists have misappropriated the concept of jihad, using it – wrongly – to justify acts of violence.⁵ Therefore, wherever cited in our report or my testimony, the words “jihad” and “jihadi” will appear in quotes.

The Internet facilitates radicalization because it is without peer as a tool for both active and passive communication and outreach. The global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement was quick to recognize this and adopt a sophisticated media posture. Indeed, al Qaeda as we now know it is as much an inspirational as an operational force, and the movement it has spawned is fuelled by ideology propagated in a range of ways from simple word of mouth to complex technological means. Extremists value the Internet so highly that some have adopted the slogan “keyboard equals Kalashnikov.”

Terrorist groups now have their own media production arms (al Qaeda relies on As-Sahab and the Global Islamic Media Front, for example⁶). Terrorists produce their own television programs and stations, websites, chat rooms, online forums, video games, videos, songs, and radio broadcasts.⁷ Through these media, terrorists have woven a tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations” in which, supposedly, a monolithic West has been engaged in an aggressive struggle against a monolithic Islam since the time of the Crusades. The messaging is meant to resonate with a younger generation, and reinterpret Islam to suit the agenda of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement. Muslims are told that Islam is under siege, that only adherence to the terrorists’ ideology can save it, and that they have a personal duty to commit violence in defense of Islam.

Our adversaries comprise a global, transnational insurgency. To prevail against it, we must win in the battle for hearts and minds, remove terrorist masterminds, and offer hope and opportunity to those who might otherwise be seduced by the “jihadi” ideology. We have entered a new phase of this struggle and must rethink our strategy as a result. Military activities and hunting down individual terrorists are alone insufficient.

Work is already underway around the world to combat radicalization. In Indonesia, for example, rock star Ahmad Dhani uses both his music and his stardom to counter calls to

⁴ Steven Kull, et al, “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda,” The Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 24, 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf, p. 10.

⁵ In its true sense, jihad refers either to inner struggle (striving for righteous deeds), or to external struggle against aggression and injustice in which strict rules of engagement concerning the protection of innocents apply.

⁶ Sebastian Usher, “Webcast News Gives Al-Qaeda View,” *BBC News*, September 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4298206.stm.

⁷ Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2004, p. 4.

violence with a message of peace and tolerance.⁸ In Jordan, 170 leading Muslim clerics came together in 2005 to issue a *fatwa* (Islamic legal pronouncement) in Amman denouncing all acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam.⁹ In Yemen, the government has sought to reform imprisoned terrorists through theological debate. Members of the Committee for Dialogue, composed of senior clerics and ministers, meet with prisoners and attempt to convince the extremists that there is no basis in Islam for terrorism. Those who accept the clerics' arguments are re-integrated into Yemeni society; according to the government, as of June 2005, 364 individuals had been rehabilitated and released.¹⁰ In Saudi Arabia, the government has aired documentaries featuring renunciations of terrorism by former "jihadis,"¹¹ placed banners and signs throughout the capital that depict the human costs of terrorism,¹² and even utilized terrorist websites to communicate directly with the extremists, attempting to engage in dialogue with them in order to convince them to renounce their radical beliefs.

Efforts are also already underway here at home. Immediately following September 11, 2001, a fatwa condemning terrorism and extremism was issued by American Muslim jurists and ultimately was endorsed by more than one hundred and twenty U.S. Muslim groups, leaders and institutions. In 2005, the Fiqh Council of North America, comprised of Islamic scholars from the United States and Canada, issued a fatwa against terrorism and extremism.¹³ Within government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has produced "an intensive training DVD for DHS personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from the broader Arab and Muslim world." The logic underlying this tool is simple but forceful, namely, that members of these communities will "be treated with more dignity and professionalism if front-line officers understand their cultures, traditions and values..."¹⁴

Admittedly, some of these measures may be limited in their ability to counteract the impact of the extremist narrative, which is being accepted and adopted by an important minority around the world. It is also important to recognize that certain countries and institutions may be sending mixed messages by simultaneously engaging or acquiescing

⁸ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Warrior of Love: An Unlikely Champion of Moderate Islam," *The Weekly Standard*, November 15, 2006, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/932fifqs.asp?pg=1>.

⁹ Kenneth Ballen, "The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html>.

¹⁰ Michael Tarnby, "Yemen's Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to Society?" *Terrorism Monitor*, July 15, 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369745>.

¹¹ See "TV Seminar Offers an Overview of the Series titled Jihad Experiences," *Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, Issue No. 13700, December 27, 2005, <http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/12/27/article118422.html>. See also "TV broadcasts a five part series titled 'Jihad Experiences, the Deceit...'," *Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, Issue No. 13672, November 25, 2005, <http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/11/29/article111369.html>.

¹² Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Security and the Islamist Insurgency," *Terrorism Monitor*, January 26, 2006, <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369879>.

¹³ Jason DeRose, "U.S. Muslim Scholars Issue Edict Against Terrorism," *NPR All Things Considered*, July 28, 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4775588>.

¹⁴ Daniel W. Sutherland, "Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 14, 2007, p. 7.

in other activities that would seem to undercut the efforts referenced. A key task will be to identify those already working successfully against radicalization, coordinate their activities and new counter-tactics in a comprehensive strategy, and identify best practices that can inform new approaches. As our adversaries operate transnationally, so too must our responses be international and transnational in nature.

Part of the solution lies within the Muslim community itself. Unless both the counter-messages and those who deliver it come from within, the counter-narrative will be deemed inauthentic and untrustworthy, and will fail to resonate. While there may be a role for governments to play by helping, at arm's length, to amplify these voices emanating from the grassroots level, the challenge lies in figuring out how to do so without tainting the credibility of either the message or the messenger.

Covert work, an important component of our counter-strategy, may yield results, as is true in the context of other criminal investigations. Through careful and patient effort, it is possible that an intelligence officer posing as a sympathizer could infiltrate an online extremist community. While remaining cognizant of civil liberties, "[t]he public nature of...chat rooms mitigates the need for informed consent."¹⁵ Seeds of confusion, doubt and distrust could then be planted in order to chip away at the ties that bind individual extremists into a cohesive and dangerous group. Terrorist susceptibility to psychological manipulation should not be discounted or underestimated. The infamous Abu Nidal, for instance, was ultimately brought down by such measures, which fostered and magnified concerns in his own mind about the loyalty and discipline of those surrounding him. Without loyalty, the system of trust – the glue that binds terrorist organizations together – collapses.¹⁶

Drawing on the collective knowledge of recognized specialists in religion, psychology, information technology, communications, law, intelligence matters, and other fields, we offer a five-pronged plan that contains a range of ideas to guide our response postures both online and offline, and heighten their effectiveness. These proposals are informed by three key themes: how and why individuals are influenced via CMC; the need to counter extremist speech with an effective counter-narrative that challenges extremist ideology and offers an alternative to those who feel alienated and marginalized; and the importance of intelligence work to inform counterterrorism and the counter-narrative.

Key Recommendations

1. Craft a Compelling Counter-Narrative for Worldwide Delivery, in Multimedia, At and By the Grassroots Level

Challenge extremist "doctrine." The global extremist "jihadi" Salafist movement propagates misinformation and distorts genuine theological tenets for the purpose of

¹⁵ Jack Glaser, Jay Dixit, and Donald P. Green, "Studying Hate Crime with the Internet: What Makes Racists Advocate Racial Violence?" *Journal of Social Issues* 58, no. 1 (2002): 190.

¹⁶ Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi, "The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2002) 66.

expanding the movement's ranks and energizing its base. These myths and falsehoods must be debunked and discredited. The price paid in blood by Muslims has been high: "Muslim terrorists have usually killed more Muslims than Jews or Christians."¹⁷ Qur'anic passages such as "the sword verse" (9:5) are wrongly invoked to justify acts of violence.

Offer a compelling narrative that pulls potential extremists back from the brink. A narrative will only appeal if it resonates with an individual's personal experience. Creation and distribution of a counter-narrative should not be confused with efforts to improve America's image. Rather, the counter-narrative should offer a "dream" in the form of hope and realistically attainable alternative futures to those who might otherwise be seduced by the lure of extremist ideology.

Use graphic visuals to magnify the impact of language. Footage of dead children. Images of the carnage of other innocents whose lives were cut short by terrorism. Distasteful as this may be to invoke, the power of visuals is profound. They can enhance exponentially the impact of the written or spoken word. Our adversaries have not hesitated to rely on this tactic to inspire others to join the extremist cause. Where appropriate, we should fight fire with fire.

Build on core values common to all. Non-extremists everywhere, no matter their religious or political stripe, hold dear certain universal values such as "respect for the law, freedom of speech, equality of opportunity, respect for others, and responsibility towards others." What unites us is indeed greater than what divides us¹⁸ and the counter-narrative must emphasize this crucial point.

Amplify and augment non-extremist voices emanating from the grassroots. Many Islamic clergy members and scholars have stated, for instance, that Islam expressly forbids attacks against civilians and suicide bombings. However, these and other messages of moderation are simply not being heard and noticed to the same degree as their extremist counterpart. More such speech is needed and, to magnify it, resources should be provided where necessary.

Authentic sources must deliver the message. Unless elements of the counter-narrative emanate from within the Muslim community and are conveyed by voices that are trusted and credible within those communities, the opportunity to achieve impact will be limited at best. For example, Radio Free Europe was created by and for Polish dissidents who possessed a thorough understanding of the many facets of the issues at play and could use effective satire as part of their counter-narrative. Another authentic messenger may, in fact, be former extremists who publicly repudiate those beliefs and reject their previous existence. Testimonials and renunciations, broadcast on television or the Internet, may prove persuasive and resonate with youth in

¹⁷ Christopher C. Harmon, "The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist," *Policy Review* (April/May 2007): p. 10, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848137.html>.

¹⁸ Ruth Kelly, "Britain: Our Values, Our Responsibilities," speech by United Kingdom Communities Secretary, October 11, 2006, <http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1503690>.

particular.¹⁹ To the extent that we can, we should foster opportunities that facilitate an exit from terrorist groups.

2. Foster Intra- and Cross-Cultural Dialogue and Understanding to Strengthen the Ties that Bind Together Communities at the Local, National, and International Levels

Address perceptions and realities of American Muslim alienation and marginalization. It has been argued that “the United States may be one of the most religious nations on earth but Americans know woefully little about their own religions, or the religions of others.”²⁰ Such ignorance has profound implications as we seek to increase dialogue and further integrate Muslim communities within the U.S. The genuine sense of alienation and marginalization that many Muslims in the United States feel must be addressed. Greater civic engagement of Muslim communities will further enable integration as appropriate.

Civic Engagement. Democracies are by their very nature inclusionary, and national and domestic security policy debates, forums, and activities will benefit by ensuring that American Muslims are part of such discussions. At the federal level, a promising, yet underfunded and under-resourced effort is that of the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Responsible for engaging with American Arab and Muslim communities nationwide, the Office has only a Director and two full-time employees. At the community level, examples of civic engagement include involvement of American Muslims in efforts to “Train the Trainers” in Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) in the state of Michigan. A first step was to translate the CERT Instructor Guide into Arabic. Another model of engagement with Muslim communities is the Tulsa, Oklahoma Citizen Corps Council’s Language – Cultural Bank that brings together individuals with foreign language skills or multicultural experiences in a volunteer capacity to assist community agencies with disaster response, emergency preparedness, and crisis management.

People to People Exchanges. While more pronounced in Europe, Muslim communities on both sides of the Atlantic share feelings of estrangement. People-to-people exchanges can open minds, undermine stereotypes that feed violent ideologies, and reduce alienation by creating new forums for discussion. A successful bilateral approach to further efforts to promote cross-cultural understanding was that of the U.S. Embassy in Brussels and the Belgian Royal Institute’s conference with Belgian and American Muslims titled “Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgian-U.S. Dialogue.” Initiated by Ambassador Tom Korologos, and co-sponsored by the Royal Institute for International Relations, the conference used mediated dialogue “to work together to break stereotypes and foster networking opportunities” with the goal of identifying best practices “for improving the participation of Muslim

¹⁹ See “Bastards of the Party,” produced by Antoine Fuqua and Cle Sloan, *HBO*, February 6, 2007, <http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/bastardsoftheparty/index.html>.

²⁰ Stephen Prothero, “Another Amen for Religious Liberty,” *On Faith* blog, posted March 19, 2007, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2007/03/another_amen_for_religious_lib.html.

communities in Belgian and American societies.” Similar benefits can be achieved through international student exchange and scholarship programs, such as the Fulbright Scholarship.

Role of the Media. The media can play a major role by covering stories and events when groups speak out against extremist elements and messaging, and by taking care to use Islamic terms appropriately.

3. Recognize and Address the Need for Additional Behavioral Science Research into the Process of Radicalization both Online and Offline

Deepen our understanding of the process of radicalization to further inform counter-strategy. Greater study of the process of radicalization is needed, in part to identify trigger points and possible points of intervention. This will require a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on experts in fields ranging from sociology to psychology to religion to socio-economics to law enforcement.

Apply social networking theory. Social network analysis will serve as an important tool to assist us in making sense of the various connections within a terror network. As one former analyst explains, “[t]errorist organizations do not have organizational charts, they have relationships and if you can understand those relationships, you have gained valuable intelligence.”²¹

4. Deny or Disrupt Extremist Access to, and Extremist Efforts through, the Internet via Legal and Technical Means, and Covert Action, Where Appropriate

Invoke the full force of the law where it makes most sense to do so. Legal means for disrupting extremist use of the Internet may be useful against websites that directly advocate violence or provide material support to known terrorist organizations, crossing the line from protected speech to illegal acts of violence.

The convergence of human intelligence and cyberspace must be fully appreciated and skillfully exploited in the Information Age. The intelligence community should work to gather information about extremist groups through their online activities, and act – at an appropriate or judicious time – to disrupt the plans of those plotting acts of violence. More intelligence officers are needed for a range of purposes, to include infiltrating chat rooms, recruiting individuals and conducting false flag operations.

Undermine the trust that binds enemy networks. “Honey pot” websites that resemble the extremists’ own would simultaneously permit the gathering of information about visitors to the site while enabling counterterrorism personnel to sow the seeds of

²¹ Bryan Bender, “Antiterrorism Agency Taps Boston-area Brains,” *The Boston Globe*, March 27, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/28/antiterrorism_agency_taps_boston_ar_ea_brains/, citing Montgomery McFate, former Navy analyst.

doubt and distrust among extremists. Honey pots could allow us to better understand how local political grievances can become appropriated by the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement, which in turn can inform a counter-strategy to drive wedges between and among factions, thereby playing on existing fault lines.

5. Remedy Resource and Capability Gaps in Government

Address deficits in linguistic and cultural knowledge, skills and abilities. The ability to speak, understand and translate Arabic is crucial to prevention and response efforts, yet U.S. government capacities in that regard are much weaker than they should be.


Choose words carefully to reclaim the high ground. Ill-chosen words and expressions by governments and institutions are used in extremist propaganda to further radicalize potential adherents. We have ceded the high ground to terrorist networks by adopting their preferred vocabulary, and thereby inadvertently serving their interests. In crafting a counter-narrative, words and concepts must be chosen carefully to avoid bestowing on our adversaries qualities such as honor and nobility that they so clearly do not embody.

Remedy the lack of a strategic communications plan. There currently exists no comprehensive well-informed strategy for effectively articulating an anti-extremist message. The U.S. State Department has a “small digital outreach team,” which “monitor[s] Arabic political discussion forums on the Internet and...overtly participate[s] in them in an effort to correct misperceptions about U.S. policy in the Middle East.”²² But no single organization or institution either within the government or outside of it is capable of managing this effort alone. Instead, a decentralized network of networks must be established that links and coordinates efforts by a variety of actors, both public and private. Multiple government agencies must be budgeted according to their mission in order to build an anti-extremist messaging capability.

Expand community policing programs. At the local level, law enforcement must develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim communities. Local figures are best placed to identify radicalization at its earliest stages. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials and communities, founded on a solid education about Muslim cultures and Islam, is crucial.

In closing, I would like to recognize the Committee and your highly professional staff. On behalf of the task force, we commend the Committee and staff for taking the time to examine this threat proactively, for probing and asking the hard questions about the battlefield and the underlying issues at play, and for trying to better understand our adversaries. I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

²² Nicholas Kravev, “Arabic speakers monitor Net chats,” *The Washington Times*, March 9, 2007, <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070308-111426-4682r.htm>.



NETworked Radicalization: *A Counter-Strategy*

A Special Report by

The George Washington University
Homeland Security Policy Institute

The University of Virginia
Critical Incident Analysis Group

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
**HOMELAND SECURITY
POLICY INSTITUTE**

CIAG
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The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) is a nonpartisan “think and do tank” that builds bridges between theory and practice to advance homeland security through a multi and interdisciplinary approach. By convening policymakers and practitioners at all levels of government, academia, and the private sector, HSPI creates innovative strategies and solutions to current and future threats to the nation.

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Introduction

Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of a compelling message and social connectivity with new audiences. Use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) has made a range of terrorist operational activities cheaper, faster, and more secure, including communications, fundraising, planning and coordination, training, information gathering and data mining, propaganda and misinformation dissemination, and radicalization and recruitment. The list is long, and not even complete. Before the Internet, terrorists seeking to communicate with one another through electronic means used telephones or radios, which could be tapped. Terrorists seeking to offer training meant congregating trainers and trainees in a fixed training location, exposing the group to capture or worse. Terrorists or their supporters engaged in fundraising or recruitment often pursued these aims in public settings. And terrorists researching a potential target often did so at public libraries and bookstores, subjecting them to surveillance in these public spaces. Now, with the Internet, all of these same activities can be conducted in relative anonymity from safe locations across the globe:

- Terrorists can draft an email message and save it as a draft rather than sending it, so that anyone with access to that email account can log in and read the message. Known as “dead drops,” these communications are less subject to interception.¹
- Terrorists can post training manuals online or even hack into a legitimate website and hide training materials “deep in seemingly innocuous subdirectories of the legitimate site,” a process known as “parasiting.”²
- Terrorists can conduct research on potential targets online, where both text and imagery, including satellite photography, is frequently available. Google Earth, for instance, has been used to target British soldiers in Iraq with increasing accuracy.³
- Terrorists can appeal anonymously for donations of financial or other support via websites.

Planning and preparations for the 9/11 attacks were facilitated by the Internet. Operatives engaged in the attack used it to communicate. Flight schools were researched through it, as were targets. Its uses have evolved over time and to increasingly gruesome creative

¹ See Appendix A. All information provided, without a pinpoint source, originates from task force briefings with subject matter experts and officials with personal experience in dealing with the issues under study. The task force received many briefings of a sensitive nature and some briefers wish to remain anonymous.

² “Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups,” Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, November 2003, http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/TAG/ITB/ITB_032004.pdf.

³ Thomas Harding, “Terrorists ‘use Google maps to hit UK troops,’” *Telegraph* Online, January 13, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/13/wgoogle13.xml>.

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effect – witness the videotaped beheadings of Nicholas Berg and Daniel Pearl circulated online to the four corners of the earth. These uses of the Internet, horrific as they may be, are fundamentally static – one way communication directed at a global audience.

What renders the Internet a particularly potent tool is its capacity to foster interaction. Virtual chat rooms make real time, two-way dialogue possible, permitting extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially. For the post-Iraq (post-2003) generation especially, Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment. In short, cyberspace is now the battlefield, and the “war” is one of ideas. Our adversaries currently have firm possession of that battlefield because they understand this shift and have crafted and disseminated a narrative that resonates and that has served both to energize and expand their ranks. They have woven an effective tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations” in which, supposedly, a monolithic West has been engaged in an aggressive struggle against a monolithic Islam for centuries, since the time of the Crusades. The messaging is meant to resonate with a younger generation, and reinterpret Islam to suit the agenda of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement.

By its very nature, the Internet “enables groups and relationships to form that otherwise would not be able to, thereby increasing and enhancing social connectivity.”⁴ As a new means of social interaction, it brings together people – friends, family members, or complete strangers – with similar interests and values, and fosters a sense of affiliation and identity. The “killer application” of the Internet is not so much its use as a broadcast tool, but its function as a communications channel that links people in cyberspace, who then meet and can take action in the physical world.⁵

And who are those individuals who will be receptive – or vulnerable – to an extremist message and “call to action” at that nexus where the cyber and physical realms meet? There is no one-size-fits-all explanation, and much still remains to be learned on this count. However, from Toronto to London, from Madrid to Morocco, and in Holland, America and beyond, we have witnessed the effects of radicalization. Some have termed these instances as the rise of “homegrown” terrorism, but the label is something of a misnomer. The Internet has created a largely borderless world and those who participate in terrorist acts are therefore perhaps best understood within this global context, rather than merely a national one.

Preliminary Matters of Scope and Definition

⁴ John A. Bargh and Katelyn McKenna, “The Internet and Social Life,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 55, 573-590 (2001), p.2, http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jab257/internet_and_social_life.pdf.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3, citing J. Kang, “Cyber-race,” *Harvard Law Review* 113 (2000): 1150.

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This report focuses on radicalization in the context of the transnational insurgency that is the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement. Further, the report explores the relatively delimited question of how to respond to and counter Internet-facilitated radicalization. It does not address wider policy questions, not because they are unimportant, but because they fall outside the scope of this particular study. Key terms are defined as follows:

- Radicalization is “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”⁶
- Recruitment is “the solicitation of individuals to commit terrorist acts or engage in behavior for a terrorism purpose.”⁷
- The global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement is a transnational insurgency, perhaps best exemplified by al Qaeda but including other groups ascribing to the same ideology. The movement seeks to seize control of the countries of the Muslim world and unite them in a single state (*caliphate*) governed by the extremists’ literal interpretation of Islamic law. The terms “jihad” and “jihadi” appear in quotation marks because extremists have hijacked the concept of jihad, using it – wrongly – to justify acts of violence. Unfortunately, the media and government entities have adopted this incorrect usage, and it has now become part of common parlance. In its true sense, however, jihad refers either to inner struggle (striving for righteous deeds), or to external struggle against aggression and injustice in which strict rules of engagement concerning the protection of innocents apply.⁸

Radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world and Islam is only one of several that terrorists may invoke to justify acts of violence (though such acts run counter to the very tenets of Islam). Indeed, terrorist organizations of all stripes, adhering to any number of extremist belief systems, are present on the Internet and have used it to radicalize and recruit others.

⁶ Charles E. Allen, “The Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, delivered on March 14, 2007, p. 4.

⁷ Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, et al., *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*, Special report by The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute and the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group, September 19, 2006, p. 3.

⁸ See Appendix A.

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**Virtual Propaganda and Radicalization:
*Connecting the Dots in the Real World***

Propaganda and radicalization matter, whether online, offline or a mixture of the two. Propaganda fuels the radicalization process, and evidence of the effects of that process is disturbing:

Adam Gadahn. An American citizen from California, Gadahn now serves as al Qaeda's English-language spokesman under the name Azzam al Amriki. He has produced propaganda videos, circulated over the Internet, which extol Muslims to join the global extremist "jihadi" Salafist movement and take part in "slitting the throats of the infidel."⁹ Adept at building networks offline, he was able to carry that ability – along with a sense of moral outrage – to the online environment.

Hassan Abujihaad. Formerly known as Paul R. Hall. "[A]n American-born Muslim convert," Abujihaad was arrested in March and charged with disclosing secret information about the location of Navy ships to terrorist groups. Abujihaad was in contact with extremists online and had ordered from them videos "that promoted violent jihad."¹⁰

Christopher Paul. In April 2007, Paul, an American from Ohio, was charged with providing training to al Qaeda operatives, and planning terrorist attacks overseas. He is alleged to have trained with al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recruited for al Qaeda in Germany. He is also believed to have provided equipment and money to terrorists plotting attacks overseas.¹¹ It is further alleged that Paul watched propaganda videos showing violence against Muslims.¹²

The Madrid Bombings. On March 11, 2004, terrorists detonated a series of explosives placed on Madrid's commuter trains, killing one hundred ninety-one people. The terrorists are believed to be members of an autonomous network active in North Africa, connected to al Qaeda only by ideology and drawing no more than inspiration from other terrorist groups. The Internet is known to have played a role in promoting extremist ideology among the group. Specifically, among propaganda circulated by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) was speculation as to the impact of an attack prior to

⁹ Raffi Khatchadourian, "Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown," *The New Yorker*, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/070122fa_fact_khatchadourian.

¹⁰ "Judge Orders Terror Suspect Held without Bond" *International Herald Tribune*, March, 23 2007, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2007/03/23/america/NA-GEN-US-Navy-Terror.php>.

¹¹ Peter Selvin, "Jury Indicts Ohio Man for Conspiring With Al-Qaeda," *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2007, p. A09,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/12/AR2007041200689.html>.

¹² Kevin Bohn, "Ohio Man Charged With Helping al Qaeda," *CNN*, April 12, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/04/12/terrorism.charges/index.html>.

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Spanish elections.¹³

The London Bombings. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers killed themselves and fifty-two others in a series of coordinated attacks on London's public transportation system, targeting crowded commuter trains and a bus. Three of the bombers were born and raised in Britain. There is no indication that the attacks were planned or supported by al Qaeda or other foreign extremist groups.¹⁴ Instead, the group appears to have formed, planned, and acted on its own.

The Toronto Case. In June 2006, Canadian authorities arrested seventeen people (later eighteen) suspected of plotting a series of terrorist attacks including truck bombings against the Toronto Stock Exchange, a strike on Parliament, the murder of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and other acts of mass murder. The group appears to have sprung up on its own, its members radicalized in part by extremist "jihadist" videos downloaded from the Internet and viewed as a part of training exercises.¹⁵

Radicals in the Netherlands. These include the Hofstad Group, which plotted to conduct suicide bombings and assassinate Dutch politicians. One operation allegedly considered was an assault on a nuclear power plant. The Group included immigrants, the descendants of immigrants to the Netherlands, and indigenous Dutch converts to extremist "jihadi" Salafist beliefs; one person who helped provide safe houses to the Group was a former policewoman. Dutch police have identified several examples of Dutch Muslims, mostly young and not religiously trained, who have adopted extremist "jihadi" Salafist beliefs to which they were exposed over the Internet.¹⁶

Casablanca. In March 2007, a Moroccan man was killed in Casablanca when the explosives he had strapped to his body exploded inside an Internet café. The man and his companions often visited the café to view "jihadist" websites. It appears that the bomb detonated during a struggle with the café's owner, who wanted to stop the men from downloading and viewing propaganda materials in his shop.¹⁷

The pace of "transformation" is striking and has been accelerating.¹⁸ London police chief Ian Blair has said that the suspects in the plot to bomb airliners in the United Kingdom during the summer of 2006 went "from what would appear to be ordinary lives in a matter of some weeks and months, not years, to a position where they were allegedly

¹³ Geoff Pingree and Lisa Abend, "Judge Assesses Madrid Attacks," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 13, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0413/p06s02-woeu.html>.

¹⁴ "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," United Kingdom House of Commons, May 11, 2006, p. 21, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf.

¹⁵ See Appendix A.

¹⁶ S.J. van Hulst, "Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat," Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006, p. 47.

¹⁷ Craig S. Smith, "Companion of Suicide Bomber Questioned over Casablanca Internet Café Blast," *International Herald Tribune*, March 12, 2007, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/03/12/news/morocco.php>.

¹⁸ Stewart Bell, "Jihadization of Youth a 'Rapid Process,'" *The National Post*, January 26, 2007, <http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=25e76872-b309-47a7-841b-938bdd9ffd71&k=76582>.

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prepared to commit suicide and murder thousands of people.”¹⁹ This toxic combination of speed and potential consequences brings into stark relief the urgent need to better understand how and why radicalization occurs, either in person or via the Internet or chat rooms, so that it may be countered.

Online Propaganda and Virtual Radicalization:

The Medium, the Message and Reasons for its Appeal

The Internet facilitates radicalization because it is without peer as a tool for both active and passive communication and outreach. Online chat rooms are interactive venues where aberrant attitudes and beliefs may be exchanged, reinforced, hardened and validated (at least in the minds of participants). This mutual affirmation in turn gives rise to a sense of community and belonging – a virtual *ummah* (worldwide Muslim community). Even those who simply lurk in these forums may be at risk, although they may not realize it. As extremist viewpoints are continuously reaffirmed by the like-minded, the doubts of observers/listeners may be assaulted and eroded. CMC has been shown to increase conformity to group norms.²⁰ In studies of racial violence and hate crime over the Internet, it has been demonstrated that the anonymity of the Web and the culture of chat rooms leads to an increased level of endorsement for violence than is actually felt by participants.²¹

As a mechanism to exert influence and mold opinion, the Internet is powerful because it gives voice to potentially everyone and does so in distinctly egalitarian fashion. The case of “*Irhabi* (Terrorist) 007” offers a powerful illustration. Under this pseudonym, and while barely into his twenties, Younis Tsouli rose from obscurity to a position of leadership by participating frequently and enthusiastically in online extremist forums. The sheer volume of Tsouli’s postings began to earn him the trust of other participants and, when he responded positively and energetically to the beheading videos posted on the Web by al Qaeda in Iraq, that group in turn praised and endorsed Tsouli.²²

Indeed, any extremist group, no matter how small, can create a professional-looking website that may reach a wide, geographically dispersed audience of potential recruits. Neo-Nazi groups, for example, “were among the first to seize upon the benefits of

¹⁹ Michael Holden, “Bomb Suspects ‘Radicalized in Weeks’,” *Reuters*, January 24, 2007, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-01-24T175436Z_01_L24334309_RTRUKOC_0_UK-BRITAIN-SECURITY.xml.

²⁰ Bargh, *supra* note 4 at p. 8, citing T. Postmes and R. Spears, “Deindividuation and Anti-Normative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis,” *Psychological Bulletin* 123 (1998): 238-259.

²¹ Jack Glaser, Jay Dixit, and Donald P. Green, “Studying Hate Crime with the Internet: What Makes Racists Advocate Racial Violence?” *Journal of Social Issues* 58, no. 1 (2002): 177-193.

²² See Appendix A.

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cyberspace,²³ establishing websites, bulletin boards, newsgroups, mailing lists, and chat rooms.²⁴ Just a few years ago, hundreds of websites served terrorists and their supporters.²⁵ Now, ten to twenty-five such sites are thought to generate new material which is mirrored in several thousand others.²⁶

These developments mirror those in society writ large, where use of the Internet is continually expanding and evolving as a means of social networking and mobilization. For example, a number of candidates running for president in 2008 announced their candidacy not at rallies or press conferences, but through videos broadcast on their websites. Almost every top contender is turning to social networking sites, such as MySpace, as “a method of reaching people who are historically not interested in voting.”²⁷ Politicians now maintain blogs, conduct web chats with constituents, and hold virtual town hall meetings to shape public opinion and mobilize popular support.

The media posture of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement is, similarly, sophisticated and multidimensional. By way of illustration, al Qaeda has its own official production arm (As-Sahab), for which the GIMF serves as clearinghouse.²⁸ The GIMF itself is a multipronged operation, which to date has used many of the tools of a major public relations effort including television, websites/chat rooms, and word of mouth. Indeed, al Qaeda as we now know it is both an inspirational and operational force. And the movement it has spawned is fuelled by ideology propagated in a range of ways, from simple word of mouth to sophisticated technological means. The Internet facilitates the spread of that ideology and inspiration in various ways, including by serving as a distribution vehicle for videos, songs, videogames and radio broadcasts.²⁹

The primary focus of the movement’s efforts online appears to be youth, including those living in the West. Websites are often flashy and colorful, apparently designed to appeal to “a computer savvy, media-saturated, video game-addicted generation.”³⁰ One site features a game called “Quest for Bush” in which the player fights Americans and proceeds to different levels including “Jihad Growing Up” and “Americans’ Hell.”³¹

²³ Michael Whine, “Cyberspace – A New Medium for Communication, Command, and Control by Extremists,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 22 (1999): 233.

²⁴ Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, et al., “Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites,” *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy* 3, no. 1 (2003): 30.

²⁵ Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2004, p. 2.

²⁶ See Appendix A.

²⁷ Alex Williams, “The Future President, on Your Friends List,” *The New York Times*, March 18, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/fashion/18myspace.html>.

²⁸ Sebastian Usher, “Webcast News Gives Al-Qaeda View,” *BBC News*, September 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4298206.stm.

²⁹ Weimann, supra note 25 at p. 4. See also Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (2007), referencing select concepts/passages in the present report.

³⁰ Bruce Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists,” testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, May 4, 2006, p. 5.

³¹ Jose Antonio Vargas, “Way Radical, Dude,” *The Washington Post*, October 9, 2006, p. C01, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800931.html>.

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These so-called games amount to a dynamic form of propaganda, whose purpose is to transform a generation into radicalized foot soldiers of a global insurgency.³² Videos circulated through websites serve the same purpose, spreading a simple but seemingly compelling message: Islam is under attack and young Muslims have a personal duty to fight in defense of the *ummah*.³³

The images presented in these videos are graphic and calculated to provoke, issue a call to arms and motivate. News footage is included from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Lebanon, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other “hot spots” around the world. U.S. and allied troops are framed as invaders, occupiers, and destroyers. Civilian casualties of these conflicts, especially Muslim women and children, are depicted as victims of Western aggression, with blood, gore, and tears often emphasized. Exposed to these images over and over again, the viewer may internalize the message, becoming frustrated and enraged over the enormous injustice he perceives to be occurring.³⁴

Once produced only in Arabic, videos are being dubbed, subtitled, or produced in a wider range of languages in order to reach a broader audience.³⁵ Some now include hip-hop and rap musicians whose catchy, melodic messages contain calls to violence. In one such video, titled “Dirty Kuffar [Non-believers],” the rapper “Sheikh Terra” sings with a gun in one hand and a Qur’an in the other; images of Iraqis being killed by American troops are displayed, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are lauded, and viewers/listeners are called on to fight back.³⁶ Videos were crudely produced, sold for a few cents and in limited distribution before the Internet. Raids of “safe houses” often yield stacks of DVDs, CDs, VHS tapes, and VCDs. The Worldwide Web has made it increasingly easy to produce and circulate these videos globally.³⁷ All of these visuals are accompanied or underpinned, either explicitly or implicitly, by a carefully crafted narrative depicting the Islamic world under siege or attack.

New video-hosting websites like YouTube broaden potential audience reach further. The site receives tens of thousands of new videos daily, and users watch over a hundred million per day, making content difficult to monitor. Though authorities have identified a number of “jihadist” propaganda items on the site – some being viewed by thousands – these are often replaced almost as soon as they are removed.³⁸ Extremists themselves

³² See Appendix A.

³³ Hoffman, *supra* note 30 at p. 6. See also Weimann, *supra* note 25 at p. 6.

³⁴ See Appendix A.

³⁵ Frank Gardner, “The Growth of ‘Online Jihadism,’” *BBC News*, October 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6086042.stm.

³⁶ This video was viewed on March 29, 2007 at <http://youtube.com/watch?v=5mcSbUQc3hU>. See also Antony Barnett, “Islamic Rappers’ Message of Terror,” *The Guardian*, February 8, 2004, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,6903,1143499,00.html.

³⁷ See Appendix A.

³⁸ Tariq Panja, “Militant Islamic Groups Turn to YouTube,” *The Washington Post*, February 11, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/11/AR2007021100956.html>.

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confess the importance of the video as tool. As one said of his radicalization, the “first time I saw an al-Qaeda video, I was ready to go... I wanted to kill the disbelievers.”³⁹

Extremist interpretations of religious doctrine feature prominently on websites, where articles, pamphlets and even libraries of books appear. These texts are devoted to finding justifications, within the context of Islam, for the movement’s violent ideology and acts. This is intended to assure potential recruits, and to reassure those already recruited, of the righteousness of both the cause and the means adopted to further it.⁴⁰ By way of example, consider the following *fatwa* (religious ruling) published online by an Egyptian declaring suicide terrorism to be legitimate within Islam (contrary to the traditional Islamic jurisprudence that it is a violation of the religion and forbidden by God):

He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, while he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation. While someone who commits suicide has lost hope with himself and with the spirit of Allah, the *Mujahid* [struggler] is full of hope with regard to Allah’s spirit and mercy. He fights his enemy and the enemy of Allah with this new weapon, which destiny has put in the hands of the weak, so that they would fight against the evil of the strong and arrogant.⁴¹

The virtual world cannot be divorced from the physical realm in which it is grounded, however. It is the complex, iterative and dynamic interplay between the two that helps explain why the extremist narrative resonates and how it spreads. There is no set formula that explains why someone is vulnerable to radicalization, or why a radicalized individual goes on to become a terrorist. As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis observes, the process of radicalization “varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socioeconomic conditions.”⁴² Social bonds play an important role in the radicalization process. Some argue that they “are the critical element and precede ideological commitment.”⁴³

³⁹ Stewart Bell, “Making of a Zealot,” *National Post*, June 30, 2006, <http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=04c78d5f-8003-4d21-b845-d17f47852b71&p=1>. In online images, “jihadist” leaders are depicted as either heroic or angelic. Fighters are juxtaposed with images of lions, horses, falcons, and other animals to emphasize their bravery, strength, and ferocity. Those who died while fighting are depicted as martyrs for the cause; their images – in life and, sometimes, after death – are juxtaposed with images of flowers, waterfalls, Korans, and beams of light in order to depict the holiness of their sacrifices and the paradise expected to await them after death. See “The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda,” Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, March 2006, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC%20-%20Islamic%20Imagery%20Project.pdf>.

⁴⁰ See Appendix A.

⁴¹ Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2006): 634.

⁴² Allen, *supra* note 6 at p. 5.

⁴³ Angela Gendron, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, April 2006, p. 9, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.pdf>.

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This is especially true for diaspora communities around the world, which often turn inward to seek mutual support, a sense of identity, and an enhanced sense of dignity. Youth in these communities, including second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants, may feel alienated both from their parents' culture and from the surrounding culture of the country in which these youth live. They may therefore rely on each other to provide a sense of community, making it considerably easier for a single radicalized individual to influence others. Shaming of a group or community is transmitted by first-generation immigrants fleeing economic and social conditions elsewhere to the next generations (second, third and fourth) who may not feel part of either their new land or the land that their parents fled. Their ambivalence about their parents and their new country may lead to disturbance in them as a group and sometimes to violent actions that their individual personal profiles would not immediately have suggested.⁴⁴

While particularly evident in Europe, similar senses of alienation exist within American Muslim communities – although barriers to assimilation are on average much lower in the United States.⁴⁵ American Muslim community leaders have expressed their perception of “the roll back of basic civil liberties in America” since 9/11. Of specific concern is the perception of how the *USA PATRIOT Act* was implemented, and the subsequent “imprison[ment of] well over 1,200 Muslim and Arab men using the pretext of immigration violations.”⁴⁶

Terror networks target young men by giving them “interpretations of Koranic verses that have been chosen so as to lead them to rebel against their parents, their families, and even against the society in which they live.”⁴⁷ Veterans of combat – in Iraq and other places – are particularly useful for recruiting youth, who respect the veterans' anti-authoritarian attitude and “street credibility.” Therefore, there may also be an element of youthful rebellion in all of this, as some may be swept up by the romanticism of joining an “international brigade.”⁴⁸

Through social network analysis, a remarkably complex array of interactions – between terrorists, their supporters, potential recruits and targeted audiences, and many others relevant to understanding this movement – is rendered easier to understand. Social network analysis offers “a way to visualize the nodes in the network and how things

⁴⁴ Lord Alderdice, “The Individual, the Group and the Psychology of Terrorism,” *International Review of Psychiatry* (June 2007), in press.

⁴⁵ Cilluffo and Saathoff, supra note 7 at pp 9-10.

⁴⁶ Parvez Ahmed, “Terror in the Name of Islam: Unholy War not Jihad” (paper presented at the ‘Sacred Violence: Religion and Terrorism’ conference held by the Institute for Global Security, Law and Policy at the Case Western University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, March 30, 2007), citing figures in “The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, April 1, 2003.

⁴⁷ Gendron, supra note 43 at p. 9.

⁴⁸ See Appendix A.

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move through that network such as weapons, pieces of knowledge or people...”.⁴⁹ The Internet, by virtue of being the preferred mode of social connectivity among this generation, coupled with an understanding of social networking can better inform our understanding of the radicalization process and what moves one from sympathizer to activist.

A psychological understanding of radicalization via the Internet includes an appreciation of large and small group psychology.⁵⁰ An important means of understanding large group psychology is through the prism of cultural identity. Historically, geography was a major determinant of cultural, ethnic and religious identity. Whether contained within a country of origin or within ethnic or immigrant communities, spread of these large group identities was only as effective as the limited transportation possibilities at that time. If jet transportation has accelerated the process of large group identity formation, it may be that the Internet is transforming large group identity formation from a lateral, physical process to a metastatic, technological process. Previous boundaries have little relevance. Now, through chat rooms and websites, boundaries are formed and broken instantaneously, so that persons in Seattle, Singapore and Stockholm can meet, establish and maintain ideologic bonds, perhaps even stronger than if they had been forged in face-to-face encounters. Extremist radicalization, whether secular or religious, is inherently a group phenomenon. This can begin in open environments such as universities, or closed environments such as prisons. For large groups, there is a resonance to shared cultural, ethnic and religious symbols. Real events that can be perceived as oppressive or humiliating – described in psychiatric literature as “chosen traumas”⁵¹ – may be memorialized through language, images and music, and may then powerfully resonate within the intended audience and in subsequent generations.

An understanding of small group psychology and sociology is also vital. According to Atran, members of individual cells usually show remarkable in-group homogeneity (age, place of origin, residence, educational background, socioeconomic status, and so on).⁵² This homogeneity can be established and shaped by extremists through initial and subsequent interactions on the Internet, using aliases as the initial identifying feature and progressing in a give-and-take process.

A Snapshot of Countering Efforts To-Date

⁴⁹ Bryan Bender, “Antiterrorism Agency Taps Boston-area Brains,” *The Boston Globe*, March 27, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/28/antiterrorism_agency_taps_boston_area_brains/.

⁵⁰ Emerging neuropsychiatric research is also important to a psychological understanding of this process.

⁵¹ V. Volkan, *Bloodlines* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997) 48-49.

⁵² Scott Atran, “Commentary: A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs and ‘Virtual Jihad’),” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 263-278.

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To generate a sense of context, a sampling (albeit unscientific) of noteworthy and creative initiatives—many of which are not very well known—are highlighted below. Admittedly, some of these measures may be limited in their ability to counteract the impact of the extremist narrative, which is being accepted and adopted by an important minority around the world. It is also important to recognize that certain countries and institutions may be sending mixed messages by simultaneously engaging or acquiescing in other activities that would seem to undercut the efforts referenced.

Britain.

- An important grassroots effort directed against radicalization in the U.K. is “the Radical Middle Way,” an initiative aimed at articulating a mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic and relevant, particularly to young British Muslims. Partially funded by the government, the project is a collaboration among several British Muslim organizations. It seeks to undermine the extremists’ message that violence is a legitimate way of practicing Islam. To this end, the Radical Middle Way maintains a website that features presentations by scholars of religion on the tenets of Islam. The project has also held roundtables with radical groups in Britain, seeking to establish dialogue as a way of encouraging extremists to renounce their radical beliefs.
- Pursuant to a recently announced UK government initiative, Muslim “opinion formers” (imams and others) will be offered “special training in how to face down extremism and be role models for moderation and tolerance.” There is also to be “a major increase in the number of ‘forums against extremism’—regional groups which meet regularly and which were set up in the wake of the July 7 London bombings to enable Muslims to discuss ways of tackling extremism.”⁵³
- In the wake of 9/11, UK intelligence officials posted messages on websites known to be accessed by extremists, to appeal for information about the perpetrators. The requests emphasized that people of all faiths, including Muslims, were murdered that day.⁵⁴

Egypt.

- The Muslim Brotherhood has denounced terrorist attacks committed by “jihadists,” accusing them of having no “conscience or religion.”⁵⁵
- Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt, has issued a statement declaring that “women have equal political rights in Islam,” and that nothing in Islamic principles prevents women from holding high institutional positions including “the highest

⁵³ Patrick Hennessy, “Muslim Leaders Helped to Tackle Extremists,” *Sunday Telegraph*, February 2, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/01/nislam01.xml>.

⁵⁴ Maura Conway, “Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet and Fighting Back,” (paper prepared for presentation at the “Cybersafety: Safety and Security in a Networked World: Balancing Cyber-Rights and Responsibilities” conference held by the Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford, United Kingdom, September 8-10, 2005), p. 24.

⁵⁵ Fawaz A. Gerges, “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects,” *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2004): 594.

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office in Muslim nations.”⁵⁶ This is a direct challenge to the extremists, who seek to enforce incredibly strict restrictions on women.

Indonesia.

- Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, the country’s first democratically elected president, now serves as head of a major Muslim congregation and as senior advisor to the LibforAll Foundation; in those capacities he advocates religious tolerance, pluralism and democracy for all.⁵⁷
- Ahmad Dhani, an Indonesian rock star, has used both his music and his stardom to counter calls to violence with a message of peace and tolerance. His 2004 album, titled “Laskar Cinta” (Warriors of Love) was a direct challenge to “Laskar Jihad” (Warriors of Jihad), a violent militia in Indonesia.⁵⁸

Jordan.

- In July 2005, 170 leading Muslim clerics issued a *fatwa* (Islamic legal pronouncement) in Amman denouncing all acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam. A little known but notable fact, the fatwa was issued a day before the bombings in London on 7/7.⁵⁹

Saudi Arabia.

- Public television aired a five-part series titled “Jihad Experiences: The Deceit.” Among other things, the series featured renunciations of terrorism by former “jihadists.” The series also showcased scholarly rebuttals to extremist propaganda.⁶⁰
- Huge banners and signs have been hung throughout the capital to illustrate the human costs of terrorism.⁶¹ Similar broadcasts have occurred on television and even on the screens of automated teller machines.
- The Interior Ministry is developing a plan (to include lectures and seminars) to portray extremist “jihadi” Salafism as a deviant form of Islam to students in

⁵⁶ “Women Have Equal Rights in Islam and Can Be Rulers,” *Gulf News*, February 5, 2007, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/02/05/10101999.html>.

⁵⁷ See LibforAll Foundation <<http://www.libforall.org/home.html>>.

⁵⁸ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Warrior of Love: An Unlikely Champion of Moderate Islam,” *The Weekly Standard*, November 15, 2006,

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/932ffiqs.asp?pg=1>.

⁵⁹ Kenneth Ballen, “The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html>.

⁶⁰ See “TV Seminar Offers an Overview of the Series titled Jihad Experiences,” *Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, Issue No. 13700, December 27, 2005, <http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/12/27/article118422.html>. See also “TV broadcasts a five part series titled ‘Jihad Experiences, the Deceit...’,” *Al-Riyadh Newspaper*, Issue No. 13672, November 25, 2005, <http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/11/29/article111369.html>.

⁶¹ Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Security and the Islamist Insurgency,” *Terrorism Monitor*, January 26, 2006, <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369879>.

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schools and universities.⁶² Textbooks and curriculum are being audited to ensure that schools are not used to radicalize students.⁶³

- As part of a government-supported “Tranquility Campaign,” volunteers including scholars of religion, psychiatrists, and sociologists have visited websites, chat rooms and forums to engage in dialogue with extremists. According to government figures, almost 700 individuals have recanted their beliefs as a result. As part of the Campaign, there is an ongoing effort to establish a website to help counter extremist ideology.⁶⁴
- Under a new law to fight cyber-crime, approved on April 13, 2007, it is a punishable offence (up to ten years in prison and/or a fine of up to 5 million Saudi riyal, which equates to approximately \$1.3 million) to create a website for a terrorist organization.⁶⁵

United States.

- Immediately following September 11, 2001, a fatwa condemning terrorism and extremism was issued by American Muslim jurists and ultimately was endorsed by more than one hundred and twenty U.S. Muslim groups, leaders and institutions. The fatwa deemed terrorism or involvement in terrorism by any individual or group as *haram* (forbidden) and stated “it is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians.”⁶⁶
- In 2005, the Fiqh Council of North America, comprised of Islamic scholars from the United States and Canada, issued a fatwa against terrorism and extremism.⁶⁷
- “The American Muslim,” an online journal, seeks to highlight the voices of Muslims who have spoken out against terrorism and extremism. The magazine describes the latter voices as “the Muslim majority who don’t get publicity.”⁶⁸
- Another venture, “On the Road in America,” is a reality series produced in the U.S. and licensed to broadcasters in the Middle East. The show features “a caravan of young...Arabs crisscrossing America on a mission to educate themselves and the people they encounter along the way.”⁶⁹

⁶² Mariam Al Hakeem, “Saudi Arabia’s Anti-Terrorism Campaign to Target Students,” *Gulf News*, November 22, 2006, http://archive.gulfnews.com/region/Saudi_Arabia/10084291.html.

⁶³ See Christina Bellantoni, “Islamic groups hit curriculum at Saudi school,” *The Washington Times*, August 2, 2004, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20040802-123606-9597r>. See also “Counter-Terrorism International Conference” (report of conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 5-8, 2005), <http://saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/terrorism-CTIC-overview-Feb05-Q.pdf>.

⁶⁴ See Appendix A.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Jason DeRose, “U.S. Muslim Scholars Issue Edict Against Terrorism,” *NPR All Things Considered*, July 28, 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4775588>.

⁶⁸ Sheila Musaji, et. al., “Muslim Voices Against Extremism and Terrorism,” *The American Muslim*, December 8, 2006, http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/muslim_voices_against_extremism_and_terrorism_part_i_fatwas/0012209.

⁶⁹ Jacques Steinberg, “American Road Trip Through Arab Eyes,” *The New York Times*, January 21, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/31/arts/television/31road.html>.

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- The Terrorism Research Center monitors the Internet for insights into a range of matters including terrorists' "world view, beliefs and strategies"; this information is compiled in a weekly report titled "Terror Web Watch."⁷⁰
- In 2005, the Muslim Public Affairs Council released the *Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism Handbook*. The text is intended to serve as an informational resource for a wide audience, from imams and Muslim leaders to law enforcement and media.⁷¹
- Within government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has produced "an intensive training DVD for DHS personnel who interact with Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and people from the broader Arab and Muslim world." The logic underlying this tool is simple but forceful, namely, that members of these communities will "be treated with more dignity and professionalism if front-line officers understand their cultures, traditions and values..."⁷²

Yemen.

- The government-developed Committee for Dialogue, composed of senior clerics and ministers, is tasked with eliminating extremism through debate. Using only the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the recorded traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, both decisions and practices) as a foundation, members of the Committee attempt to convince imprisoned extremists that there is no basis in Islam for terrorism. Those who accept the clerics' arguments are re-integrated into Yemeni society; according to the government, as of June 2005, 364 individuals had been rehabilitated and released.⁷³

A more robust counter-strategy is needed, however – one that builds on best practices above, but is more comprehensive in nature. Weaving these disparate efforts into a more coherent and powerful international campaign, in part by building on the synergies that may exist between and among these many and varied initiatives, will require ingenuity and resolve on the part of all concerned.

Counter-Strategy: Guiding Principles and Key Challenges

⁷⁰ See Terror Web Watch, *Terrorism Research Center*, <http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=About&file=index&subcontent=products&detail=strategicreports>.

⁷¹ Full text available at <http://www.mpac.org/publications/campaign-to-fight-terrorism/campaign-to-fight-terrorism-brochure.pdf>.

⁷² Daniel W. Sutherland, "Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 14, 2007, p. 7.

⁷³ Michael Tarnby, "Yemen's Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to Society?" *Terrorism Monitor*, July 15, 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369745>.

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Extremists have come to value the Internet so highly that some “jihadists” have adopted the slogan “keyboard equals Kalashnikov.”⁷⁴ Denying or disrupting their access to the Internet is easier said than done effectively, however. In certain circumstances, it may be possible to invoke the law as a blunt instrument to shut our adversaries down. This would be the case when extremist websites directly incite violence or provide material support to known terrorist organizations, thereby crossing the line from constitutionally protected speech into illegal acts. In other instances, technical means could be used to knock our adversaries off balance. The U.S. Air Force, for instance, has announced plans to create a Cyber Command which will, among other things, “work to defeat terrorists by disrupting . . . the Web sites they create for training and recruiting.”⁷⁵

As a practical matter, though, it is difficult to squelch an extremist presence online. A website targeted in one country can often simply move to a new server in another. Indeed, some groups change their server daily. Like a game of whack-a-mole, you may knock down one site only to find another pop up elsewhere. The analogy is imperfect however, because the offending online material may not be so easy to spot. Extremists may go to great lengths to mask their activities online, such as concealing materials by fragmenting, encrypting and scattering them across a number of different websites.

Conversely, much extremist material is openly available and officials have already begun to exploit this intelligence, often using commercial software to monitor targeted websites.⁷⁶ Treasure troves of data may also be contained in computers that are seized by U.S. forces during raids. Yet those finds may not be fully plumbed in part because it is “a daunting challenge” to “find . . . analysts who understand [both] forensic computer jargon as well as counterterrorism.”⁷⁷ A number of U.S. government entities engage in “digital forensics” work of this sort, but the largest effort is that of the Pentagon’s Cyber Crime Center, which supports counterterrorism efforts as well as criminal investigations.⁷⁸

Open source intelligence (or that garnered by other means) that reveals what extremists are saying to one another, and to others they hope to radicalize, is a crucial input for counter-strategy. **There can be no compelling counter-narrative until the extremist narrative itself is well understood** – including how that message is couched, what is emphasized and ignored, what references and allusions are made, what audiences are targeted, and how messages are adapted to reach new audiences and respond to new events. To the extent that government officials are involved in gathering and/or interpreting this information, efforts will be hampered by the paucity of Arabic language skills in the workforce (the vast majority of extremist websites that are of interest in this

⁷⁴ See Appendix A.

⁷⁵ Josh Rogin, “Air Force to Create Cyber Command,” *FCW.com*, November 13, 2006, <http://www.fcw.com/article96791-11-13-06-Print>.

⁷⁶ Conway, *supra* note 54 at p. 23.

⁷⁷ Siobhan Gorman, “Tracking Terrorists With Click of a Mouse,” *The Baltimore Sun*, March 27, 2007, <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal-te.forensic26mar26,0,620050.story?coll=bal-pe-asection>, citing Evan Kohlmann.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

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context are either wholly or partly in Arabic).⁷⁹ Nuances in meaning may also be lost due to a lack of cultural understanding. Until Arab-Americans and other diverse groups are sufficiently encouraged and actually choose public service as a career, this problem will persist.

Covert work alluded to above, may yield results as is true in the context of other criminal investigations. Through careful and patient effort, it is possible that an intelligence officer posing as a sympathizer could infiltrate an online extremist community. While remaining cognizant of civil liberties, “[t]he public nature of . . . chat rooms mitigates the need for informed consent.”⁸⁰ Seeds of confusion, doubt and distrust could then be planted in order to chip away at the ties that bind individual extremists into a cohesive and dangerous group. Terrorist susceptibility to psychological manipulation should not be discounted or underestimated. The infamous Abu Nidal, for instance, was ultimately brought down by such measures, which fostered and magnified concerns in his own mind about the loyalty and discipline of those surrounding him.

“Honey pots” or websites which resemble extremist sites could also be created to further the spread of disinformation. The possibilities here are vast, limited only by our imagination and already thinly stretched resource levels in the intelligence community. Activities of this sort do, of course, run the risk of generating “blowback” (in the layman’s sense of the term) if they are ultimately discovered and exposed. For this reason, it is important to reflect thoughtfully, ahead of time, upon the various potential costs and benefits that may be associated with the action(s), and assess (to the extent possible in advance) whether a net gain is likely to result. Measures to mitigate the impact of possible blowback before it even materializes could also be undertaken in tandem with (or prior to) covert activity. Demonstrating restraint in certain other policy areas that are presently irritants or sources of friction may permit some of the high ground to be recaptured.⁸¹

The larger issue centers on how it is that a nation that gave rise to Silicon Valley, Hollywood, and Madison Avenue came to be outplayed in the realm of ideas, effectively communicated in the new media. Part of the answer is that we have not yet really applied our collective talents and energies to the problem. Domination of the battlefield is not much of a feat when the contest is one-sided because one party defaulted by failing to show. Moreover, it will require international collaboration because transnational challenges require transnational responses.

Fundamentally, the challenge is one of containment and ultimately rollback – of an idea – or more precisely, a collection of ideas that have been packaged into a compelling narrative and effectively marketed. Therefore, we should look to the subject who is, or who eventually becomes, responsive to these ideas as well as those who do not (the control group). The behavioral science underlying that receptivity and/or vulnerability to

⁷⁹ See Appendix A.

⁸⁰ Glaser, Dixit, and Green, *supra* note 21 at p. 190.

⁸¹ See Appendix A.

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the messaging should give rise to possible points of intervention, where the process of radicalization could be halted in its tracks.

Another and more important piece of the explanation is that the solution to the problem simply does not lie firmly within our grasp. Instead, part of the solution lies within Islam itself. Unless both the counter-messages and those who deliver it come from within, the counter-narrative will be deemed inauthentic and untrustworthy, and will fail to resonate. While there may be a role for governments to play by helping, at arm's length, to amplify these voices emanating from the grassroots level, the trick lies in figuring out how to do so without tainting the credibility of either the message or the messenger.

What follows is not a detailed roadmap of highly specific actions that should be taken by particular agencies or entities, in priority order, over a precise time frame. Instead, a range of ideas are proposed to guide our response postures both online and offline, and heighten their effectiveness. These suggestions are informed by three key themes: how and why individuals are influenced via CMC; the need to counter extremist speech with an effective counter-narrative that challenges extremist ideology and also offers an alternative to those who are currently feeling alienated and marginalized; and the importance of intelligence work to inform counterterrorism and the counter-narrative. Some of the recommended ideas are more theoretical and are therefore intended to serve as conceptual foundations or underpinnings for action. Other ideas are quite granular and are offered in a more focused and "mechanical" spirit, as a suggested fix or pinpoint prescription. Against this background, the following five-pronged plan is suggested:

Key Recommendations

1. Craft a Compelling Counter-Narrative for Worldwide Delivery, in Multimedia, At and By the Grassroots Level

Challenge extremist "doctrine." The global extremist "jihadi" Salafist movement propagates misinformation and distorts genuine theological tenets for the purpose of expanding the movement's ranks and energizing its base. These myths and falsehoods must be debunked and discredited. The West is not engaged in battle against Islam. Terrorism is un-Islamic. The price paid in blood by Muslims has been high: "Muslim terrorists have usually killed more Muslims than Jews or Christians."⁸² Koranic passages such as "the sword verse" (9:5) are wrongly invoked to justify acts of aggression.

⁸² Christopher C. Harmon, "The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist," *Policy Review* (April/May 2007): p. 10, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848137.html>.

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Offer a compelling narrative that pulls potential extremists back from the brink. A narrative will only appeal if it resonates with an individual's personal experience. Creation and distribution of a counter-narrative should not be confused with efforts to improve America's image. Rather, the counter-narrative should offer a "dream" in the form of hope and realistically attainable alternative futures to those who might otherwise be seduced by the lure of extremist ideology.

Use graphic visuals to magnify the impact of language. Footage of dead children. Images of the carnage of other innocents whose lives were cut short by terrorism. Distasteful as this may be to invoke, the power of visuals is profound. They can enhance exponentially the impact of the written or spoken word. Our adversaries have not hesitated to rely on this tactic to inspire others to join the extremist cause. Where appropriate, we should fight fire with fire.

Build on core values common to all. Non-extremists everywhere, no matter their religious or political stripe, hold dear certain universal values such as "respect for the law, freedom of speech, equality of opportunity, respect for others, and responsibility towards others." What unites us is indeed greater than what divides us⁸³ and the counter-narrative must emphasize this crucial point.

Authentic sources must deliver the message. Unless elements of the counter-narrative emanate from within the Muslim community and are conveyed by voices that are trusted and credible within those communities, the opportunity to achieve impact will be limited at best. For example, Radio Free Europe was created by and for Polish dissidents who possessed a thorough understanding of the many facets of the issues at play and could use effective satire as part of their counter-narrative. Another authentic messenger may, in fact, be former extremists who repudiate those beliefs and may be valuable to the counter-messaging effort. Consider as a model the HBO documentary film titled "Bastards of the Party" (2006), featuring ex-members of Los Angeles' street gangs condemning and rejecting their previous existence. Testimonials and renunciations (in the context of the extremist belief system under present study), broadcast on television or the Internet, may prove persuasive and resonate with youth in particular.⁸⁴ More recently, "60 Minutes" aired a segment in which Hassan Butt, once a recruiter for al Qaeda in the United Kingdom, repudiated his former existence. Specifically, his role was one of recruiting individuals for the 7/7 bombings.⁸⁵

Amplify and augment non-extremist voices emanating from the grassroots. Many Islamic clergy members and scholars have stated, for instance, that Islam expressly

⁸³ Ruth Kelly, "Britain: Our Values, Our Responsibilities," speech by United Kingdom Communities Secretary, October 11, 2006, <http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1503690>.

⁸⁴ See "Bastards of the Party," produced by Antoine Fuqua and Cle Sloan, HBO, February 6, 2007, <http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/bastardsoftheparty/index.html>.

⁸⁵ See 60 Minutes, "The Network," produced by Michael Gavshon, CBS, March 25, 2007. See also "The Network: Hassan Butt Tells Bob Simon Killing in The Name of Islam Is a 'Cancer'," CBS, March 25, 2007, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/23/60minutes/main2602308.shtml>.

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forbids attacks against civilians and suicide bombings. However, these and other messages of moderation are simply not being heard and noticed to the same degree as their extremist counterpart. More such speech is needed and, to magnify it, resources should be provided where necessary.

2. Foster Intra- and Cross-Cultural Dialogue and Understanding to Strengthen the Ties that Bind Together Communities at the Local, National, and International Levels

Address perceptions and realities of American Muslim alienation and marginalization. In a Washington Post “On Faith” blog to promote his new book, *Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know – And Doesn’t*, Stephen Prothero argues that “the United States may be one of the most religious nations on earth but Americans know woefully little about their own religions, or the religions of others.”⁸⁶ Such ignorance has profound implications as we seek to increase dialogue and further integrate Muslim communities within the U.S. The genuine sense of alienation and marginalization that many Muslims in the United States feel must be addressed. Greater civic engagement of Muslim communities will further enable integration as appropriate. It is important to note that all of this takes place within the larger context of the public square, where cultural and religious knowledge in general is lacking.

Civic Engagement. Democracies are by their very nature inclusionary, and national and domestic security policy debates, forums, and activities will benefit by ensuring that American Muslims are part of such discussions. At the federal level, a promising, yet underfunded and under-resourced effort is that of the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Responsible for engaging with American Arab and Muslim communities nationwide, the Office has only a Director and two full-time employees. At the community level, examples of civic engagement include involvement of American Muslims in efforts to “Train the Trainers” in Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) in the state of Michigan. A first step was to translate the CERT Instructor Guide into Arabic. Another model of engagement with Muslim communities is the Tulsa, Oklahoma Citizen Corps Council’s Language – Cultural Bank that brings together individuals with foreign language skills or multicultural experiences in a volunteer capacity to assist community agencies with disaster response, emergency preparedness, and crisis management.

People to People Exchanges. While more pronounced in Europe, Muslim communities on both sides of the Atlantic share feelings of estrangement. A successful bilateral approach to further efforts to promote cross-cultural understanding was that of the U.S. Embassy in Brussels and the Belgian Royal

⁸⁶ Stephen Prothero, “Another Amen for Religious Liberty,” On Faith blog, posted March 19, 2007, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2007/03/another_amen_for_religious_lib.html.

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Institute's conference with Belgian and American Muslims titled "Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgian-U.S. Dialogue." Initiated by Ambassador Tom Korologos, and co-sponsored by the Royal Institute for International Relations, the conference used mediated dialogue "to work together to break stereotypes and foster networking opportunities" with the goal of identifying best practices "for improving the participation of Muslim communities in Belgian and American societies."⁸⁷

Role of the Media. The media can play a major role by covering stories and events when groups speak out against extremist elements and messaging, and by taking care to use Islamic terms appropriately.

3. Recognize and Address the Need for Additional Behavioral Science Research into the Process of Radicalization both Online and Offline

Deepen our understanding of the process of radicalization to further inform counter-strategy. Greater study of the process of radicalization is needed, in part to identify trigger points and possible points of intervention. This will require a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on experts in fields ranging from sociology to psychology to religion to socio-economics to law enforcement.

Apply social networking theory. Social network analysis will serve as an important tool to assist us in making sense of the various connections within a terror network. As one former analyst explains, "[t]errorist organizations do not have organizational charts, they have relationships and if you can understand those relationships, you have gained valuable intelligence."⁸⁸

4. Deny or Disrupt Extremist Access to, and Extremist Efforts through, the Internet via Legal and Technical Means, and Covert Action, Where Appropriate

Invoke the full force of the law where it makes most sense to do so. Legal means for disrupting extremist use of the Internet may be useful against websites that directly advocate violence or provide material support to known terrorist organizations, crossing the line from protected speech to illegal acts of violence.

The convergence of human intelligence and cyberspace must be fully appreciated and skillfully exploited in the Information Age. The intelligence community should work

⁸⁷ See Appendix A.

⁸⁸ Bender, *supra* note 49, citing Montgomery McFate, former Navy analyst.

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to gather information about extremist groups through their online activities, and act – at an appropriate or judicious time – to disrupt the plans of those plotting acts of violence. More intelligence officers are needed and for a range of purposes, to include infiltrating chat rooms, recruiting individuals and conducting false flag operations.

Undermine the trust that binds enemy networks. “Honey pot” websites that resemble the extremists’ own would simultaneously permit the gathering of information about visitors to the site while enabling counterterrorism personnel to sow the seeds of doubt and distrust among extremists. Honey pots could allow us to better understand how local political grievances can become appropriated by the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement, which in turn can inform a counter-strategy to drive wedges between and among factions, thereby playing on existing fault lines.

5. Remedy Resource and Capability Gaps in Government

Address deficits in linguistic and cultural knowledge, skills and abilities. The ability to speak, understand and translate Arabic is crucial to prevention and response efforts, yet U.S. government capacities in that regard are much weaker than they should be.

Choose words carefully to reclaim the high ground. Ill-chosen words and expressions by governments and institutions are used in extremist propaganda to further radicalize potential adherents. We have ceded the high ground to terrorist networks by adopting their preferred vocabulary, and thereby inadvertently serving their interests. In crafting a counter-narrative, words and concepts must be chosen carefully to avoid bestowing on our adversaries qualities such as honor and nobility that they so clearly do not embody. The European Union has taken a step in trying to more clearly define such terms by producing non-binding guidelines that pertain to matters of lexicon. The intent is to “prevent the distortion of the Muslim faith and the alienation of Muslims in Europe.”⁸⁹ The effectiveness of this measure has yet to be determined.

Remedy the lack of a strategic communications plan. There currently exists no comprehensive well-informed strategy for effectively articulating an anti-extremist message. The U.S. State Department has a “‘small digital outreach team’,” which “‘monitor[s] Arabic political discussion forums on the Internet and...overtly participate[s] in them in an effort to correct misperceptions about U.S. policy in the Middle East.’”⁹⁰ But no single organization or institution either within the government or outside of it is capable of managing this effort alone. Instead, a network of networks must be established that links and coordinates efforts by a

⁸⁹ Bruno Waterfield, “Don’t confuse terrorism with Islam, says EU,” *The Daily Telegraph*, March 30, 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/30/wislam30.xml>.

⁹⁰ Nicholas Kralev, “Arabic speakers monitor Net chats,” *The Washington Times*, March 9, 2007, <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20070308-111426-4682r.htm>.

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variety of actors, both public and private. Multiple government agencies must be budgeted according to their mission in order to build an anti-extremist messaging capability. Unlike the Office of War Information established during World War II and vested with the responsibility and authority to coordinate and oversee counter-messaging efforts, in this instance a more decentralized approach is required.

Expand community policing programs. At the local level, law enforcement must develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim communities. Local figures are best placed to identify radicalization at its earliest stages. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials and communities, founded on a solid education about Muslim cultures and Islam, is crucial.

Appendix A
Task Force on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization
Briefings*

- Geneive Abdo: Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies
- Parvez Ahmed: Chairman of the Board, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
- David Carment: Associate Professor of International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa
- Jim Dempsey: Policy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology
- Anna Gray: Director General, Intelligence Requirements & Strategic Integration, Royal Canadian Mounted Police National Security Investigations
- Tom Korologos: Former U.S. Ambassador to Belgium
- Jeffrey Lang: Author and Professor, University of Kansas
- Mike McDonnell: Assistant Commissioner, National Security Investigations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Fuad Nahdi: Founding Editor, Q News
- Bruno Nordeste: Program Officer, CANADEM, Canada's Civilian Reserve
- Lidewijde Ongerling: Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Netherlands
- Reuven Paz: Director, Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM)
- William Pelgrin: Director, Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure, New York
- Dennis Pluchinsky: Former U.S. State Department Intelligence Analyst
- Marc Sageman: Sageman Consulting
- Anna Stenersen: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
- Daniel Sutherland: Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Department of Homeland Security

- Peter Swire: C. William O'Neill Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University
- Truls H Tønnessen: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment

* The task force consulted, interviewed and received briefings from additional subject matter experts who wish to remain anonymous. All briefings were conducted under "Chatham House" rules.

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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

"Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It"

**Statement of Jeremy Curtin
Coordinator, Bureau of International Information Programs
U.S. Department of State**

**May 10, 2007
2:30 p.m.**

Chairman Lieberman; Senator Collins. Distinguished Members.

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss "Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It." That I am appearing before this committee underlines the fact that public diplomacy is an important component in ensuring the national security of the United States. The relationships we build through international exchanges and information programs conveying an accurate picture of U.S. policy, society and values, over time, make America more secure by countering misperceptions and increasing understanding between ourselves and others.

The mission of the State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs, which I represent, includes countering violent extremist ideology overseas. We have specific programs dedicated to that purpose, including a new Counterterrorism Communication Center intended to coordinate interagency public diplomacy activity in this area. I will describe these programs briefly in a minute.

First, however, I would like to place our work in the broader context of public diplomacy overall because, as Under Secretary Hughes has said, the struggle against extremism is not just a clash of ideas to be settled quickly. The ideological struggle will take years and generations. We must not only counter the information threat of the moment; we must also reach out to the next generation and to broader populations that might be vulnerable to extremist lies and messages of hate.

Focusing on the longer term, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, under Assistant Secretary Dina Powell, has extended our exchanges and educational programs to younger and more diverse participants in order to reach audiences earlier than ever before and to provide opportunities to audiences not traditionally served by U.S. Government exchange programs. ECA is creating a strategic continuum for engaging future leaders and at risk populations. Beginning as early as fourteen, English ACCESS micro-scholarships and other programs establish sustainable relationships with select populations in priority countries. As we speak, nearly 200 international journalists are in this country receiving professional training and learning more about our country under a program in partnership with the Aspen Institute and twelve American communications schools.

On the nearer horizon, Under Secretary Hughes has focused our information resources on populations and programs important to the ideological struggle. Citizen Dialogues, part of a new Strategic Speaker Program, sends teams of American Muslims abroad to engage Muslim communities in other countries. We also send individual speakers to talk about Muslim life in America, as well as topics on religious freedom and diversity and other values relevant to the ongoing ideological struggle.

IIP's Digital Outreach Team and Arabic web-based programs have established a USG presence in Arabic cyberspace, ensuring that U.S. policies and values are included in the conversation about issues central to the ideological debate. Through modern technology as well as traditional means, we are "present for the debate," as recommended by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World headed by Ambassador Edward Djerejian. Our Persian-language website serves as a virtual embassy to Iran and allows U.S. officials and others to discuss issues like nuclear non-proliferation with the Iranian people. The Public Affairs Bureau's Rapid Response Unit monitors foreign media and provides embassies and military commands with background and talking points. New media hubs in Dubai, Brussels and London facilitate engagement by U.S. officials with Arabic and other foreign media, especially television, in real time.

For my bureau, International Information Programs, the Internet is central to our engagement strategy, as exemplified by the Digital Outreach Team, our Arabic and Persian electronic outreach programs, and other operations. We have increased our presence on Internet discussion forums and our webchat and

other activities. We are exploring the applicability to our mission of new cyber-technologies like Second Life. Our coordination with other agencies for monitoring and analyzing Internet activity, especially in Arabic and English, has increased substantially.

Public diplomacy does not thrive on technology alone. Even in this high-tech age of global communication, our diplomats in the field are the lynch pins that make it all possible. They know what works in local conditions. They deliver the message to editors and appear on local television. They manage our in-country websites, in local languages. They also manage our exchange programs and recruit participants. In Edward R. Murrow's famous phrase, our diplomats in the field take the message across "the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person talking to another." Under Secretary Hughes' pilot country initiative, an interagency effort, is intended to put more resources into the hands of our people on the ground.

Over the twenty months of Under Secretary Hughes' tenure, we have created or expanded exchange and information programs specifically to advance the strategy of countering Islamist extremist ideology, both in the long term and in the immediate present. Although funding for exchange programs has risen, we have also expanded our information programs countering extremist ideology by refocusing some existing resources. Our continued efforts depend heavily on the 2007 emergency supplemental appropriation and on increases requested in the FY-2008 budget.

The Counterterrorism Communication Center is an interagency initiative to develop and deliver effective messages to undermine ideological support for terror and to counter terrorist propaganda. The Center provides leadership and coordination for interagency efforts in the war of ideas and seeks to integrate and enhance the U.S. Government's diverse public diplomacy counterterrorism efforts. We have begun to pull together the Center's interagency team, which, this past weekend, issued its first product, counterpoints to the taped message from Zawahiri released Saturday.


The Counterterrorism Communication Center, like the pilot country initiative, the Rapid Response unit, the Digital Outreach Team and other programs, is an operational outgrowth of the Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication headed by Under Secretary Hughes. The Policy Coordination Committee draws together numerous U.S.

Government entities engaged in the fight against extremist propaganda internationally. Besides the State Department, the Defense Department, USAID, and other agencies are key to the effort. Together, these agencies manage a wide array of activities, from exchanges and media training, to Internet outreach.

In recent years, cooperation among agencies has been good, under the umbrella of the Policy Coordination Committee, and we have taken a number of steps to make it better. The Fusion Team, managed by State, provides a weekly forum through which State, USAID, DOD and others keep one another informed about current projects, research and academic work. The Public Diplomacy Working Group on the Internet explores new ways to use technology to counter extremist propaganda; the Digital Outreach Team has its origins in the Public Diplomacy Working Group. Mechanisms including the Under Secretary's Echo Chamber messages and the Rapid Response Unit ensure embassies and military commands have a common set of talking points on breaking issues. The International Information Bureau has created a Public Diplomacy Briefing Book which offers broader guidance on broader issues; the Briefing Book is also used by various agencies. On a day-to-day basis, State is in frequent discussions with a wide range of interagency partners, including CENTCOM and EUCOM, on public diplomacy issues, including the Internet. The Counterterrorism Communication Center will take interagency coordination of public diplomacy activities in the counterterrorism arena to the next level, with a tight focus on monitoring, analysis and messaging.

Mr. Chairman: Internet engagement and information programs are the cutting edge of public diplomacy efforts to confront and defeat violent extremism abroad. These programs do not, however, stand in isolation. To be effective, our public diplomacy must deploy all instruments available, pre-eminently international educational and exchange programs. More comprehensively, public diplomacy is one component of the very broad U.S. Government response to the threat of terrorism and those who promote its ideologies, a response that is domestic as well as international and global.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



**U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

EMBARGOED UNTIL 2:30 P.M. May 10, 2007
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**TESTIMONY OF CHIP PONCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC POLICY,
FOR TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE**

Washington, D.C.--Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to conduct private sector outreach and develop a better understanding of Muslim-American communities. Treasury's primary focus in outreach to the charitable sector and to these affected communities, concerns the ongoing risk of terrorist organizations' abuse and exploitation of charities, as well as using preventive measures to combat such abuses.

I. Introduction

Before describing Treasury's efforts to address these challenging issues, I would like to make three introductory points. First, as I will explain more fully in discussing various outreach initiatives, Treasury enjoys a broad-based relationship with the Muslim community here in the United States and abroad, in the private sector and with the governments of Muslim countries. This relationship not only includes critical and constructive engagement on combating terrorist financing and other threats, but also encompasses economic dialogues on development and financial markets.

Second, it is critical to clarify up front what violent Islamist extremism means and what it does not mean in the context of our counter-terrorist financing campaign and broader counter-terrorism mission. As Treasury and the Administration, the Congress and this Committee have repeatedly recognized, our global war against terrorism is not an attack against Islam or any religion, nor is it an attack against the fundamental freedoms of speech or expression. Rather, our war on terror is focused on Al Qaida and other terrorist organizations that seek to pervert and distort one of the great religions of the world in order to justify their violent agendas, intolerant ideologies and terrorist methods.

Third, I would like to recognize at the outset of my testimony that Treasury's role in combating terrorist financing – and in advancing the broader counter-terrorism mission of the U.S. Government (USG) – relies upon the leadership and support of the Congress and the interagency, international and private sector communities. Since September 11, 2001, and under the direction of the Administration and the Congress, Treasury has worked together with its law enforcement, regulatory and intelligence partners from across the interagency community, international counterparts from finance ministries around the world, state and local governments, and the private sector to help develop and implement a comprehensive and multi-faceted counter-terrorism strategy that degrades the capacity of terrorist organizations and their support networks. Such communication, coordination and collaboration across these relationships are essential to the success of our efforts.

To advance our counter-terrorist financing campaign and the broader counter-terrorism mission, we must aggressively apply our authorities and resources to identify, disrupt and dismantle these terrorist organizations and discredit their view of the world. This includes understanding how violent Islamist extremists can function as key members of terrorist organizations and facilitators of terrorist activity, and taking appropriate action against such individuals. This also includes partnering with our Muslim neighbors, communities and allies to promote tolerance, advance fundamental rights such as the freedoms of speech and expression, protect all citizens of the world against terrorist attacks, and counter the message of violent Islamist extremism that al Qaida and other organizations often rely on to cultivate support for their actions.

In order to fully appreciate how Treasury's efforts to combat terrorist financing and protect the charitable sector from abuse further the overall USG effort to counter violent Islamist extremism, it is useful to briefly review the general mission of Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and to highlight certain elements of TFI's broad counter-terrorist financing strategy. I would then like to focus on Treasury's specific outreach efforts to engage the Muslim and charitable communities, and how these efforts can be particularly effective in isolating and countering violent Islamist extremism.

II. TFI's Counter-Terrorist Financing Efforts of Particular Relevance to Countering Violent Islamist Extremism

In 2004, the Congress and the Administration improved Treasury's ability to contribute to the counter-terrorist financing campaign and the broader war on terror through the creation of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). TFI's overarching mission is to marshal Treasury's unique regulatory, enforcement, intelligence, and policy authorities and capabilities with the twin aims of: (i) safeguarding the financial system against illicit use, and (ii) combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats through the development and application of financial information and economic and financial measures. It is the only office of its kind in the world.

Combating terrorist financing as an essential element of the broader war on terror continues to be a primary focus across TFI. I would like to briefly mention those particular elements of TFI's counter-terrorist financing strategy that are also relevant in countering violent Islamist extremism. These include:

- identifying typologies of terrorist financing support networks and the vulnerabilities of those networks to targeted sanctions and other financial measures;

- developing and implementing effective targeted sanctions regimes and other financial measures against terrorist organizations and their support networks to identify, disrupt, deter and ultimately prevent such support networks from providing terrorists with the resources they need to operate;
- globalizing implementation of international standards to combat terrorist financing, and
- combatting terrorist exploitation of charities.

Of these particular elements of TFI's strategy to combat terrorist financing, I would like to focus on our efforts to combat terrorist exploitation of charities. It is these efforts that form the basis of our outreach to the charitable and Muslim-American communities.

Combating terrorist exploitation of charities

Combating terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector represents an important component of TFI's counter-terrorist financing strategy and is of particular relevance to countering violent Islamist extremism. Terrorist organizations often establish or infiltrate charities to raise funds and support for their activities and operations. Charities are an attractive target for terrorist organizations for a variety of reasons, including:

- Charities enjoy the public trust, have access to considerable sources of funds, and are often cash-intensive.
- Some charities have a global presence that provides a framework for national and international operations and financial transactions, often within or near those areas that are most exposed to terrorist activity.
- Depending on the legal form of the charity and the country of origin, charities may often be subject to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation (for example, there may be no skills or starting capital required, no background checks necessary for employees).
- Unlike for-profit organizations, charitable funds are meant to move in one direction only. Accordingly, large purported charitable transfers can move without a corresponding return of value.
- Charities attract large numbers of unwitting donors along with the witting, thus increasing the amount of money available to terrorist organizations.
- The legitimate activities of charities related to terrorist organizations – such as the operation of schools, religious institutions, and hospitals – create fertile recruitment grounds, allowing terrorists to generate support for their causes and to propagate violent and extremist ideologies.
- By providing genuine relief and development services – as nearly all of the charities associated with terrorist organizations do – these charities benefit from public support, generating reluctance by many governments to take enforcement action against them.

Terrorist organizations have taken advantage of these characteristics to infiltrate the charitable sector and exploit charitable funds and operations to cover for or support terrorist activities or agendas. As explained in Section III below, the ongoing nature of such terrorist exploitation is well documented and

described in the annex to Treasury's revised *Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities* (Voluntary Guidelines).

In response to this ongoing threat, TFI has worked with its interagency partners to develop a four-pronged strategy to combat such exploitation:

- A. Enhancing transparency of the charitable sector through coordinated oversight;
- B. Protecting the integrity of the charitable sector through targeted enforcement actions;
- C. Raising awareness of terrorist financing threats and risk mitigation practices in the charitable sector through comprehensive and sustained outreach; and
- D. Multi-lateralizing our efforts through international engagement.

Each element of this strategy is briefly discussed in turn below.

Enhancing transparency of the charitable sector through coordinated oversight: Strengthening the transparency of the charitable sector combats exploitation by terrorist organizations and abuse more generally by allowing charitable organizations, donors, and government authorities to better understand, oversee and detect abusive activity in the sector. In the U.S., the transparency of the charitable sector is managed by a three-level web of oversight consisting of: (i) the federal government; (ii) state authorities; and (iii) the private sector. At the federal level, the primary vehicle for oversight of charities is the federal tax system, administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS oversees the charitable sector through its Tax Exempt and Government Entities Operating Division (TEGE). Additionally, U.S. states have agencies with oversight responsibilities over any charity raising money in that state, no matter where the charity is domiciled. Thirty-nine states require any such charity to register with them. Finally, a key element of the U.S. system is the self-regulation and self-policing performed by private sector bodies.

TFI and the IRS have worked together to strengthen the transparency of the charitable sector across federal, state and private sector interests through coordinated and enhanced oversight and outreach. Recent and ongoing efforts include the revision of federal tax forms such as the revised Form 1023 application for tax-exempt status, collaboration and awareness raising regarding terrorist financing risks and risk mitigation practices with state authorities such as the National Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO) and the National Association of State Attorney Generals (NAAG), and with private sector umbrella groups such as Independent Sector, the Council on Foundations, the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA), the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, and the Islamic Society of North America. These efforts, coupled with TFI's outreach efforts described below, have improved the transparency of the charitable sector, making it more difficult for terrorist organizations to penetrate and exploit charitable and donor communities.

Protecting the integrity of the sector through targeted enforcement actions: TFI and the IRS, including TE/GE and the Criminal Investigative Division, work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice and other interagency partners to investigate and combat cases of terrorist financing in the charitable sector through targeted regulatory and law enforcement investigations, information sharing, terrorist financing designations, and criminal prosecutions. To date, the U.S. has designated five U.S.-based charities for terrorism related activities, blocked the assets of another U.S.-based charity in aid of investigation, and designated an additional 39 international charities for terrorist financing. Additionally, there have been a number of criminal prosecutions, including the leader of a U.S.-based charity for fraud and racketeering based on terrorist financing activity; an

indictment of the largest Muslim-American charity and its leadership on terrorist financing-related charges, and several investigations of other charities suspected of terrorist activity. Many of these investigations are ongoing.

Raising awareness of terrorist financing threats and risk mitigation practices in the charitable sector through comprehensive and sustained outreach: Identifying, attacking and protecting against terrorist abuse of charities require the active support of charities themselves. The government and the charitable sector share common interests in promoting and protecting charitable giving. Through active engagement with the charitable sector, TFI and its interagency partners are fostering awareness of terrorist financing risks to the charitable sector, explaining USG efforts to combat this ongoing abuse, and clarifying and improving ways in which the sector can mitigate these risks through best practices. These outreach efforts are described in greater detail below.

Multi-lateralizing our efforts through international engagement: The threat of terrorist financing through charities is clearly an international one and requires the understanding, cooperation and collaboration of our international partners. Through bilateral engagement and multilateral bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), TFI and its interagency partners have: (i) published typologies of abuse to improve the global understanding of the terrorist threat to the charitable sector; (ii) established international standards, best practices and information-sharing channels to combat terrorist financing in national charitable sectors and international charitable organizations; (iii) improved global oversight of the international charitable sector; (iv) encouraged investigative techniques for detecting terrorist abuse of charities, and (v) multi-lateralized terrorist financing designations against international charities and charitable officials supporting terrorist organizations.

These comprehensive efforts to combat terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector are particularly important in countering violent Islamist extremism for two reasons. First such efforts attack a primary means of fundraising for terrorist organizations, thereby depriving violent Islamist extremists and their adherents from a particularly effective way of providing the funds necessary to execute terrorist activities and operations. Second, these efforts prevent terrorist organizations and violent Islamist extremists from leveraging relief and development assistance to win popular support from vulnerable populations and to recruit and radicalize additional members and operatives for a terrorist organization.

As discussed in the section on outreach below, such an aggressive strategy in combating terrorist exploitation of charities requires a robust outreach effort to charitable and Muslim communities to ensure that they understand the nature of the threat of terrorist exploitation, the basis of USG actions to combat this threat, and the efforts that they can undertake to mitigate the risk of terrorist abuse.

III. Treasury's Outreach Efforts to the Muslim-American and Charitable Communities

In addition to countering violent Islamist extremism through the particular elements of TFI's counter-terrorist financing strategy discussed above, Treasury is addressing this threat more directly by working with its partners in the interagency community and the Muslim-American and charitable communities to:

- A. Sustain a comprehensive outreach campaign to explain and address the threat of terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector; and
- B. Support a broad economic dialogue with the Middle East / North Africa region.

The overarching objective of this outreach campaign and economic dialogue is to better understand and address the challenges facing the moderate Islamic community and the charitable sector and to support the development and integration of the moderate Islamic community into American society and the global economy, thereby alienating violent Islamist extremists and minimizing their ability to generate support or sympathy for terrorist organizations, agendas or ideologies.

A. Charitable and Muslim-American Outreach

Our outreach to the charitable and Muslim-American communities generally consists of an ongoing discussion relating to the following four fundamental points:

- (i) *The USG recognizes and strongly supports the essential role of charity in Muslim, American and global society.*

Almsgiving is an important expression of religious faith for Muslims throughout the world. Charity is one of the pillars of Islam, pursuant to which observant Muslim men and women have a duty to give a certain percentage of their earnings to specified recipients (*Zakat*), as well provide alms throughout the year (*Sadaqah*). Such giving builds local communities, and also links these communities to the other parts of the world. It is important to recognize and respect this role of charity in the Muslim faith.

It is also important to note that charitable giving and philanthropy is a core American value and an integral part of American culture and society. As an example, in recent years the American people have donated more than \$200 billion annually to charitable causes, including to Muslim populations such as those affected by the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and Southeast Asia and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

The USG strongly encourages such expressions of charity, as evident by the favorable tax treatment that charities and donors receive under the Internal Revenue Code. We will continue to work with the Muslim-American community and the charitable sector to promote the practice of charitable giving in ways that are safe and effective.

- (ii) *Terrorist organizations continue to effectively exploit charity to finance their operations and to cultivate broader support from vulnerable populations.*

As described above, various characteristics of the charitable sector make it particularly vulnerable to terrorist abuse, by both witting and unwitting charities and donors. Such abuse may involve the narrow diversion of funds intended to support charitable activities but redirected for terrorist operations or activities. A more common problem with well-organized terrorist groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas is the broader exploitation of charitable services to radicalize vulnerable populations and cultivate support for terrorist organizations, agendas and ideologies. Often, charitable and Muslim communities are not aware of this problem of broader exploitation because their charitable funds are actually used for charitable purposes. A problem arises, however, when a terrorist organization controls and administers such charity in ways that recruit support and radicalize communities that begin to rely on the terrorist organization for assistance.

As described below, the ongoing nature of such broad terrorist exploitation is well documented and described in the annex to Treasury's revised Voluntary Guidelines. It is critical that our sustained outreach to the charitable and Muslim communities conveys the nature and depth of this abuse.

- (iii) *The USG has developed and is applying a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorist abuse of charity through a comprehensive four-pronged strategy.*

Another critical component of our outreach message involves a clear explanation of the USG's four-pronged approach to combating terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector, as described above. Misperceptions of USG actions to combat terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector, including through the use of targeted sanctions and independent criminal investigations against those charities that operate as part of a terrorist organization's support network, may foster a sense that the USG is unfairly targeting Muslim communities or Muslim charity. Clear and sustained outreach is necessary to explain the USG approach and to address any such misperceptions before they become grounds for victimization and alienation. It is also essential to explain and underscore the importance of legal safeguards that remain in place for those under investigation or sanctioned pursuant to designation under Executive Order 13224.

(iv) *The USG and the charitable sector must work together to promote safe and effective charitable activity and to protect the sector from terrorist exploitation.*

The fourth fundamental element of our outreach to the charitable and Muslim communities is the need for the USG and these communities to work together to overcome the threat of terrorist exploitation of charity. A good example of how this partnership can produce significant results is the revision and issuance of Treasury's Voluntary Guidelines, based on extensive consultation between Treasury and the charitable and Muslim communities.

The revised Voluntary Guidelines are designed to enhance awareness in the donor and charitable communities of the kinds of practices that charities may adopt to reduce the risk of terrorist financing or abuse. Treasury first released the Voluntary Guidelines in November 2002 and solicited feedback from the charitable sector, which indicated that the Voluntary Guidelines could be substantially improved to assist in identifying reasonable yet effective measures to protect against terrorist abuse. In December 2005, based on extensive review and comment by public and private sector interested parties, Treasury revised and released the revised Voluntary Guidelines in draft form for further public comment. Based on the comments received, Treasury further amended the Voluntary Guidelines to improve their utility to the charitable sector in adopting practices that can better protect it from terrorist exploitation.

Charities and donors are encouraged to consult the revised Voluntary Guidelines when considering protective measures to prevent infiltration, exploitation, or abuse by terrorists. In addition, the revised Voluntary Guidelines are intended to assist charities in understanding and facilitating compliance with preexisting U.S. legal requirements related to combating terrorist financing, which include various sanctions programs administered by TFP's Office of Foreign Assets Control. These pre-existing legal requirements are clearly marked in the text of the revised Voluntary Guidelines.

The revised Voluntary Guidelines are also clearly risk-based, reflecting Treasury's recognition that a "one-size-fits-all" approach is untenable and inappropriate due to the diversity of the charitable sector and its operations. Moreover, Treasury acknowledges in the revised Voluntary Guidelines that certain exigent circumstances (such as catastrophic disasters) may make application of the revised Voluntary Guidelines difficult. In such cases, the revised Voluntary Guidelines advocate that charities should maintain a risk-based approach that includes all prudent and reasonable measures that are feasible under the circumstances.

The revised Voluntary Guidelines also explicitly acknowledge the vital importance of the charitable community in providing essential services around the world, the difficulty of providing assistance to those in need, often in remote and inaccessible regions, and the laudable efforts of the charitable community to meet such needs. As stated in the introductory section of the revised Voluntary Guidelines, the goal of the guidance is to facilitate legitimate charitable efforts and protect the integrity

of the charitable sector and good faith donors by offering the sector ways to prevent terrorist organizations from exploiting charitable activities for their own benefit.

Finally, the revised Voluntary Guidelines include an annex that chronicles the nature of terrorist abuse of charities. The annex notes the exploitation of relief efforts by Lashkar e Tayyiba (a.k.a. Jamaat-ud-Dawa) and other terrorist-related charitable organizations or charitable fronts following the October 2005 earthquake in South Asia; the critical role of Hamas-associated charities in building popular support for the Hamas terrorist organization in the Palestinian territories, and Hezbollah's effective and substantial control of the charitable distribution networks in southern Lebanon as some prominent examples among many that demonstrate the ongoing intent and effectiveness of terrorist organizations in exploiting charitable organizations and relief efforts.

TFI, in coordination with its interagency partners, recently released a risk matrix for charities to better understand relevant risk factors in applying the revised Voluntary Guidelines. TFI, in coordination with its interagency partners, has also recently discussed with the Muslim-American community ways to build upon these efforts with additional products that may help the community better understand how to apply the Guidelines under particularly challenging circumstances where the delivery of assistance is desperately needed but where the risk of abuse is also extremely high. We will continue to explore ways to help address such particularly challenging circumstances, in consultation with the private sector and our interagency partners.

In order to convey and engage the charitable sector and Muslim community on these four fundamental points, TFI, together with officials from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, has participated in numerous outreach programs in cities such as Boston, New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan. These events often take the form of "town hall meetings" and address the nature of the ongoing terrorist threat, our counter-terrorism efforts, and how we can work cooperatively with the Muslim and Arab-American communities. Such meetings also provide a forum for communities to express concerns and comment on our efforts. Another important partnership is our work with NAAG and NASCO, whose state-based resources and contacts are vital to getting our message out to the widest audience.

TFI also maintains a number of publicly available web sites and resources, which provide helpful materials related to terrorism financing, U.S. sanctions programs, and risks of terrorist abuse. These offer materials that range from a comprehensive list of designated terrorist organizations and individuals, frequently asked questions, typologies of terrorist behavior, and brochures to a public "hotline". In response to suggestions from the charitable and Muslim-American communities, TFI has also developed a particular web page devoted to terrorist financing issues that impact charities. Treasury is continually updating these materials to reflect changes in law and regulations, additions to the designations list and the emergence of new terrorist risks.

B. A Broad Economic Dialogue with the MENA Region

As noted in my introduction, Treasury's engagement with the Muslim community is not limited to discussing terrorist financing-related issues, but rather includes broad economic ties that Treasury has cultivated throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Treasury regularly meets with Arab-Muslim leaders and bankers as part of its regular course of business, and through formal and informal private sector dialogues, to discuss issues affecting financial markets, as well as the effect of AML/CFT controls on business developments. More generally, Treasury is engaged in a broad effort to expand financial and economic relationships across the Muslim world in a variety of ways. In 2004, Treasury launched the G8-Broader MENA Initiative. Recently, Treasury launched a series of direct bilateral efforts with its colleagues in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC). Additionally,

Treasury continues to be extremely active in providing economic reconstruction assistance, working in particular through the Afghan and Iraq Compacts. Similarly, Treasury helped to lead the economic aspects of U.S. and international relief efforts after the tsunami in Southeast Asia and earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia.

Another of Treasury's broader initiatives regarding outreach to the Muslim community is the U.S.-Middle East and North Africa Private Sector Dialogue (US-MENA PSD). This dialogue, which links the banking and regulatory communities from the U.S. and MENA regions, focuses on the ongoing challenges relating to the development and implementation of effective AML/CFT controls in the banking sector, with the goal of facilitating effective and efficient AML/CFT implementation and paving the way for business development interests and commercial relationships. To date, we have organized two conferences, and the third US-MENA PSD conference is scheduled to take place in December 2007 in Dubai. Our interaction supports moderates within the Muslim faith and allows us to build new relationships with organizations from the Muslim-American communities, like the Arab Bankers Association of North America (ABANA).

Treasury is also working with the Muslim/Arab American communities to help restore confidence in the integrity of the charitable sector. For example, we are actively working with professional organizations such as the Muslim Advocates/National Association of Muslim Lawyers to develop outreach efforts specifically geared towards the Muslim-American philanthropy. The goal is to have such organizations take responsibility for their own governance and to provide assistance to their members.

Conclusion

In closing, I would like to underscore the importance of maintaining a comprehensive approach to defeating violent Islamist extremism. As members of this Committee have noted, there is no silver bullet to defeating violent extremism or absolutism of any kind. Instead, we must continue to work with our interagency partners, international counterparts, state and local authorities, and the private sector to aggressively apply our authorities and resources pursuant to the broader USG strategy to combat global terrorism. We must also continue to aggressively engage in outreach to the charitable and Muslim communities about the threats we face and the actions we are taking to combat these threats. And we must remember that the moderate Islamic community is our most important asset in this long-term struggle.

In the years since September 11th, we have made substantial progress in forging and strengthening the necessary relationships across various agencies and bureaucracies, as well as across nationalities and geographic and cultural boundaries, but much work still needs to be done. I am confident that with the continued leadership of the Congress, the Treasury, our interagency partners across the Administration, and our friends and allies at home and abroad, that we will successfully overcome the challenges that lie before us. And I am honored to continue to serve as a part of this historic effort.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

**Statement of
John Miller
Assistant Director
Office of Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation**

**Before the
United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs**

“Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It”

May 10, 2007

Good afternoon Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the FBI’s Community Outreach Program in my capacity as the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs. I am happy to join with my colleagues here from the Department of State and Department of Treasury, as well as USAID to discuss with you the important efforts of the U.S. Government to strengthen our relationship with segments of the community to better allow us to recognize and prevent violent and other illegal activities.

RADICALIZATION?

At its root, radicalization takes the basic tenets of a faith or a political movement and carries them to extremes, extremes that often are drastic enough to adopt violence to intimidate others into accepting those extremes or to punish those who will not accept the extremes, and that process carries across lines of nationality or religion, from Mohammad Atta to Timothy McVeigh.

The FBI, consistent with the First Amendment, defines radical individuals as persons who encourage, endorse, condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent act or

other crimes against the U.S. government, its citizens, or its allies for political, social, or economic ends.

The FBI recognizes four steps in the radicalization process: pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action. Each step is separate and distinct from the others. Indeed, an individual who completes the first step may never move beyond that first significant action.

The concern with radicalization has always been a part of FBI efforts at outreach into minority and ethnic communities, but this concern has intensified in the aftermath of attacks orchestrated by "homegrown" extremists in Spain, the United Kingdom, and even in the United States. We have seen cases of radicalization of Americans here in Virginia, Portland, Los Angeles, Toledo, and Chicago. And we are not alone. Just last week, a judge sentenced five British citizens to life in prison for plotting to attack targets in London. Others await trial in Canada. These plots have transformed radicalization from an ominous theory into a dangerous reality. And the FBI -- as it has been doing for the past six years -- continues to examine approaches to outreach and develop new ones to address this issue. We cannot effectively counter radicalization without first identifying some of fundamental questions about the nature of radicalization. And we must realize that the answers will not quick-coming or simple.

To understand why any Muslim -- or by extrapolation any minority -- would be susceptible to radicalization the first question that must be asked is what it means to be a Muslim in America? Or what it means to be an American Muslim? There are many factors that may be important to these questions.

In this environment, we cannot just show up at the door and say: “we are from the government and we are here to help.” Instead, the government must earn the trust and respect of such groups. Overcoming distrust and suspicion, especially in the Muslim community, will not, however, be achieved quickly. And we must recognize that developing metrics or statistics to measure the success of the mission is nearly impossible. For example, how can we know if the conversation we have with that 15-year old boy in one of our youth programs dissuaded him from embracing radicalization? How can we know if the brochure that a young girl read inspired her to consider employment with the FBI? Yet the lack of clear metrics should not suggest that our efforts are either unimportant or ineffective.

CIVIL RIGHTS

In getting to know a community, the FBI must confront the same balancing test that it faced even before 9/11: we must strive to protect the civil rights and privacy concerns of individuals in minority and ethnic communities while we work to identify and preempt the planning and execution of terrorist activities in our country. This is not a mission that lends itself to easy solutions, but I want to reassure this Committee that in our efforts to identify and stem radicalization, we work hard to ensure that individuals’ constitutional rights are not compromised.

The laws of the United States, including the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom of religion are, in fact, enormous aids in our outreach to the minority and ethnic communities. In other parts of the world, where such activities are not protected, individuals are muted or forced underground where their anger and frustration festers and

often leads to radicalization and violence. In the United States, individuals can vocalize their frustrations, speak directly to their government, and have law enforcement that protects those very rights.

COUNTERING RADICALIZATION

So what are these other options? What has the FBI been doing to counter the threat of radicalization?

- First, since 9/11, much attention has been given to messages encouraging Muslims toward radicalization. To counter such messages, the FBI engages national Muslim organizations in the United States that have public positions against terrorism and radicalization. The FBI, through its Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters, has constructed relationships with a variety of national Arab-American and Muslim organizations. Two concrete results of those relationships have been a biannual meeting with the FBI Director and a national level phone conference call with key leaders bi-monthly. The FBI Director has found his meetings with the leaders from the various communities to be mutually beneficial and an opportunity to view the world through the eyes of these U.S. citizens. After the last meeting, a working group was organized to convert discussion points into actionable items, as moving from talking to taking concrete action is key. The bi-monthly conference calls allow the organizations at the street level to call up to their national branches, which in turn can bring key issues to the attention of FBI headquarters. We then identify "action items," either for the FBI or for the

community based organizations, to carry out. Progress is gauged on the next conference call. The conference calls are also initiated spontaneously to brief the community on breaking events or to allow the community to bring an exigent issue to the attention of the FBI at the national level.

- Second, a lot of work is taking place at the grassroots for the FBI. Our Special Agents in Charge and our Assistant Directors in Charge have reached out to minority and ethnic communities in their domains, where the potential for radicalization is the greatest. The 56 field offices of the FBI have created innovative programs to communicate with the diverse groups within in their domains, and in turn, each of the Community Outreach Specialists brief the Assistant Director for Public Affairs every sixty days in person via secure video conference. This communication allows us to stay abreast of the outreach efforts, successes, and challenges. This process also allows us to identify best practices by Community Outreach Specialists and share them widely.
- Third, the FBI brings many U.S. citizens into its offices across the country through its Citizens Academies. This program -- now in every FBI field office -- allows citizens to view the Bureau from the inside and to learn about its missions and the difficulties faced in carrying out those missions. A strong effort is made at the field office to attract minorities to the classes, so that we are able to directly interact with individuals from various walks of life.
- Fourth, and closely related to the Citizens Academy is the Community Relations Executive Seminar Training or, as we call it, CREST. This program

is the Citizens Academy on a smaller scale. The program is tailored with input from the requesting organization and addresses issues that are of immediate concern to that organization. The CREST can be held at a venue chosen by the requesting organization. This program allows the FBI to reach into communities where trust with the government or the FBI in particular needs to be built. The CREST program allows us to demystify the FBI and its work. CREST also allows the participants to choose the curriculum. We have found that issues regarding terrorism are not always the first choice for the seminar in Arab-American or Muslim communities. In some cases, these communities have asked for seminars on child safety on the internet and on crimes like identity theft and credit card fraud. These crimes affect the Muslim communities like any other. The effectiveness of the CREST program is that it is often the starting point for bridging the gaps of trust that may exist between the FBI and a given community. In the context of countering radicalization, a key step is to develop relationships within the community based on trust and to do so under non-stressful circumstances rather than in the immediate aftermath of an incident. CREST is a first step in that building process.

- Fifth, the FBI recognizes the crucial need to address the youth in minority communities, and so we have formulated targeted programs. Our field offices sponsor teen academies that are designed to introduce youth to the FBI. We have continued the Junior Special Agent program, designed to introduce youth to the mission and work of the FBI, to encourage good citizenship, and to

encourage youth to consider a career with the FBI. We have also sponsored various youth conferences at the local level, including a very successful Pakistani Youth Conference in a joint effort with our New York field office and the Community Relations Unit at Headquarters.

- Sixth, in the past few weeks, our Community Relations Unit held a conference call with community leaders focused exclusively on countering radicalization. The chief of that unit, Brett Hovington, hosted the call.

RECOGNIZING PROGRESS

Muslim leaders on the recent call acknowledged a growing fear of radicalization by the United States government. According to the group on the call, however, most American Muslim leaders do not think their community is as ripe for radicalization as many observers believe, and these leaders are fearful that by increasing media and public attention on the potential for radicalization in the Muslim community, we may reinforce what some leaders believe is a cloud of suspicion that hangs over their community in post-9/11 America. These leaders emphasized that, in their view, if we overlook the progress we have made, we do so at our own peril. While it is hard to determine whether putting a spotlight on the issue helps defeat radicalization or actually reinforces a negative stereotype, the conference call is a good example of the frank dialogue that now exists between the FBI and the Muslim community's leaders.

Today, the Director of the FBI can pick up the phone and talk to leaders from the various communities in an instant; three or four years ago, that would not have been possible. As I mentioned earlier, the Director of the FBI sits at a table with those same

leaders twice a year; three or four years ago, that was not happening. Throughout the country, Arab-Americans regularly participate in Citizens Academies; three or four years ago, that did not take place. Today, FBI headquarters measures whether outreach efforts across the 56 field divisions are being carried out effectively. Two years ago, we could not do that. We do not intend for these achievements to encourage complacency; the FBI knows that plenty of work still needs to be done in our outreach, not just with the Arab-American and Muslim communities, but with all ethnic and minority communities. But progress has been made, and we and particularly our Muslim-American fellow citizens agree that we need to tend our accomplishments carefully.

We now have partners in the Arab-American and Muslim communities. Some have become publicly declared allies in our efforts to condemn terrorism. They have become our bridge to many who viewed the FBI with either contempt, or worse, fear. They now come through the doors of the FBI and feel free to share their views on sensitive issues. We commend our friends for their efforts, and we commend the leaders of the other minority and ethnic communities who have also become friends with the FBI and who are building similar relationships for their communities.

And while we realize – all too well – that we are going to have disagreements with these same communities, we are talking. And, given the circumstances of today's world that is what matters most. The leadership of the American Muslim community is working vigorously on many levels to emphasize that American Muslims are Americans. American Muslims welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the FBI and other authorities to ensure the safety and security of their communities and the United States.

CONCLUSION

I hope these few minutes have painted a clearer picture of the FBI's strategy to counter radicalization. As our friends on the London Metropolitan Police Force recently told us, this project will take time, and if we cannot immediately measure the results, we must not become disillusioned. I believe this will be a three step process. First, we must address the issue of trust. Second, we must seek to achieve true partnership. Third, we must leverage that partnership to achieve positive change. It has been said that even the longest journey begins with one step. We in the FBI have taken many steps, but we and our community partners understand the journey ahead is long.

I thank the Chairman and the Members of the Committee for their interest in this important issue affecting our nation and look forward to answering any questions you may have.

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Statement of Jeffrey Grieco
Acting Assistant Administrator for Legislative and Public Affairs
United States Agency for International Development
Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

“Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It”

May 10, 2007

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee for inviting me today to testify on U.S. Agency for International Development programs to counter violent Islamist extremism and our efforts to coordinate our public diplomacy activities with the Department of State.

The *National Security Strategy* of the United States (2006 edition) provides the foreign policy and national security strategy of the United States. It is especially succinct with regard to the measures needed to meet this nation’s national security challenges in the age of global terrorism. The President has reiterated that our national security strategy is founded upon two pillars: “The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies... . The second pillar ...is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies...” in the fight against pandemic diseases, terrorism, human trafficking and natural disasters around the world.

The President’s National Security Strategy is emphatic in calling for a more robust role for development in our national security architecture. Development “reinforces diplomacy and defense.” It reduces “the long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.” It is essential to bring hope and opportunity to societies subject to terrorist subversion and vulnerable to terrorist messaging. By helping “expand the circle of development” and “building the infrastructure of democracy” in these societies, we work to reduce the areas in which terrorists thrive as we marginalize their operations.

To support the strategic policy positions set forth by President Bush in both the 2002 and 2006 *National Security Strategies*, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development have collaborated on publication of two *Joint Strategic Plans* (2004 and 2007 editions) which set forth the Secretary of State’s direction and policy priorities for both organizations in the coming years. And to better align foreign assistance with the national security objectives of the United States, Secretary Rice has initiated the most sweeping reform of foreign assistance since the origins of USAID and the Marshall Plan. Over the last year, she has helped put in place a new framework or structure for foreign assistance and given it strategic direction under her Transformational Diplomacy agenda.

In line with these reforms, public diplomacy is undergoing equally dramatic changes designed to reverse the retrenchment in our public outreach efforts that followed victory in the Cold War

A DIPLOMACY OF DEEDS

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes has been tasked by President Bush with leading efforts to promote America's values and confront ideological support for terrorism around the world.

Our experience shows that when people around the world know that America is partnering with them, partnering with their governments, partnering with groups in their communities to improve their lives, it makes a real difference in how they think about us. I am going to be calling on our ambassadors and our public diplomacy professionals in the field to find opportunities to work with other agencies, to work with USAID, ... to highlight the work that America is doing in ways that are relevant to people's lives, to show that we're helping provide clean water or food for their families or to educate young people.

For the moment, I would like to draw attention to a phrase she coined as part of her communications strategy. She spoke of a "diplomacy of deeds" as among the most effective means of defusing hostile propaganda purveyed by extremist enemies of the United States and of showcasing the best of America's spirit and values.

As the principal Agency of the United States Government delivering development assistance and humanitarian aid around the world, USAID's "deeds" – day in and day out in over 80 Missions around the world - play a critical role in the diplomacy that Secretary Hughes is talking about. In working to stabilize fragile societies, mired in poverty and menaced by conflict and disease, it also plays a critical role in advancing the national security of this country. For it is mostly from such countries that the terrorist threat arises, searches for opportunities and finds support.

USAID has missions in 27 of the 49 countries that have more than 50 percent Muslim population. Significantly, approximately 50 percent of USAID funding goes to predominantly Muslim countries. This Agency has extended a lifeline to countries in the Muslim world that have been devastated by natural disasters, unprecedented droughts, tsunamis, and earthquakes.

Development funds are allocated to a wide range of programs, including health, education, and job creation.

I would like to mention one of these job creating efforts to remind us of the human dimension behind the budget numbers and bureaucratic language that broadly describes our foreign assistance programming.

Thanks to a small loan made available by USAID, Ghada Gharib of Egypt now sells beaded jewelry in a local Cairo market. She borrowed \$34 through the U.S.-funded loan

program and now has a small table set up in the market to display the many beaded necklaces and other items she has made. She makes payments of only 20 pounds a week - \$3.40 - as she pays off her fourth loan.

"The money came from America. I benefit because I can make a profit. I used the loan to buy materials I use in my embroidery. My mother also took a loan that she used for beadwork and sewing; my sister too." She now has two paid helpers and is using some of her profits to send her daughter to school - the cost is 200 pounds a year.

ENGAGING HUMAN RESOURCES

It may come as somewhat of a surprise to learn that most of the employees at USAID are not American citizens. Over 5,000 of our employees are what are termed Foreign Service Nationals, that is, citizens of the country where USAID has a presence. They are the backbone of our missions in Muslim countries and are regarded among its richest resources. And they often work in some of the most dangerous and forbidding regions of the world. Last year, the Agency lost two of these heroes. One was assassinated because he worked for our Baghdad mission. The other, Dr. Bijnan Acharya, worked with USAID/Nepal for more than a decade as an Environmental Officer and died when the helicopter he was traveling in crashed in the Himalayas.

These individuals often bring language skills U.S. officers sorely lack and serve as a link with the broader spectrum of these societies that we are now trying to reach. Our programming initiatives in country are indebted to the cultural sensitivity and political acumen that they bring to the table.

Many Foreign Service Nationals, or FSNs, go on to serve their countries in important government posts following service to USAID.

Ana Vilma de Escobar worked at USAID for nine years in the 1980s before she was elected vice president of El Salvador in 2004, the first woman to hold that office. While at USAID, she managed a \$50 million project that promoted non-traditional exports, encouraged foreign investment and supported the development of small- and medium-sized businesses as a tool for economic growth. She also played a critical role in USAID's support for the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development, a think tank whose policy recommendations helped two successive governments design the country's successful economic reform program.

Dr. Mohammed Mubaid is another example of how former USAID FSN's can achieve positive accomplishments within a society which also happen to support U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy interests. Dr. Mubaid used to work at the USAID Democracy and Governance Office at our mission in West Bank/Gaza. He then became Chief of Party of TAMKEEN, a USAID funded project focusing on democracy and rule of law issues in Palestinian society. Currently, he works at Bayan, a USAID funded legislative transparency and accountability program. Dr. Mubaid is one of the prominent

leaders in the Palestinian civil society sector. He successfully led the largest ever civil society and democracy strengthening project in the West Bank and Gaza during a challenging and politically sensitive period. He established and worked to strengthen the capacity of 100 civil society organizations throughout the West Bank and Gaza, including the most marginalized NGOs.

Our engagement with FSNs is a “capacity building measure” of a wholly different order from specific programming in this regard. In short, USAID has been a “school” where some of “the best and brightest” in these societies have matriculated and there is a major public diplomacy benefit we cannot forget to engage, empower and support.

MESSAGING WHAT WE DO

The war on terror has many fronts and facets. Winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world is certainly a key. Post 9/11, we cannot remain indifferent to our nation’s image abroad. If the “diplomacy of deeds” is to have its full amplitude, it is incumbent on us to make those deeds better known and to rescue them from the distortion of our enemies.

The Department of State has the lead in America’s public diplomacy work – having the direct authority over communications vehicles to provide the full range of public affairs, international information programs and educational and cultural exchanges. USAID’s authorities in this regard are more narrowly drawn, but have not been fully exploited until now. Section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) requires us to clearly identify to audiences within the countries where we work our assistance under the act as “American Aid.” USAID’s role in public diplomacy has been focused on telling America’s assistance story to the world.

To the degree that U.S. assistance plays a role in fostering a positive view of the United States, USAID strives to disseminate and amplify the story of that assistance in support of the United States’ overarching public diplomacy goals as articulated by the Department of State. Our work is in direct support of the Department of State’s overall public diplomacy goals and seeks to complement the fine work that the dedicated officers staffing the public affairs sections of our U.S. embassies do every day.

In the aftermath of 9/11 – USAID expanded it’s activities under this authorization in several ways:

- Organized and implemented a new comprehensive U.S. branding and marking effort across the foreign assistance landscape;
- Established a professional, trained communications field capacity; and
- Developed and produced targeted public affairs/public information campaigns in target countries which receive U.S. foreign assistance.

BRANDING AND MARKING

USAID has established detailed policies, regulations, and guidelines for marking and publicizing its assistance to ensure that U.S. taxpayers receive full credit for the foreign assistance they provide. Further, USAID has established a universal brand that conveys that the assistance is from the American people.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks amplified for us the connection between U.S. national security and the good will that could be created toward the United States if more accurate information about U.S. foreign assistance was widely known. USAID determined that we should portray more complete and accurate information about the Agency's foreign assistance. To help focus its image abroad, USAID, under the close supervision of the Administrator, developed a new brand by updating our traditional USAID logo or seal, and combining it with a new U.S. foreign assistance brand name and the tagline, "From the American People." USAID's foreign assistance branding campaign and other efforts ensure that United States foreign assistance overseas is visibly acknowledged and that the American people receive direct credit for their contributions and funding through our foreign assistance programs.

Although USAID first began marking assistance over four decades ago, it was not always systematically or effectively implemented and Agency guidance was minimal. In the not-to-distant past it was sometimes difficult for people to know that the foreign assistance they received was coming from the United States. Further, during much of that time the full set of our branding and marking rules did not apply to large amounts of USAID-funded grants and cooperative agreements. Traditionally, grantees were only required to acknowledge USAID-funding in publications and therefore the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance provided through these grants were sometimes marked with only the implementer's logos and program names (causing potential confusion to the recipients) instead of providing credit to the American people.

In 2004, the Agency took steps to clearly and statutorily communicate that U.S. foreign assistance is "From the American People." This campaign included the development of a bolder, clearer graphic identity that clearly identified U.S. aid as coming "From the American People." The Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs was designated by the Administrator as the implementer of the Agency's new branding and marking plan, and as one of its responsibilities published a comprehensive "Graphic Standards Manual" containing the new marking guidelines. This manual helped to clearly and concisely educate and guide implementers of U.S. foreign assistance both in Washington and the field. In addition, regular interactive and other in-person trainings in the field helped to ease the transition to these new requirements.

In January 2006, USAID revised its foreign assistance regulations to include new branding and marking requirements for USAID staff and all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving funding under grants and cooperative agreements. These regulations require that all programs, projects, activities, public communications, and

commodities partially or fully funded by a USAID grant or cooperative agreement be marked appropriately overseas with the new graphic identity of a size and prominence equal to or greater than the recipient's or other donors' logos or identities.

USAID's Food for Peace program regulations prescribe the terms and conditions governing activities under Title II of P.L. 480, including provisions for implementing the marking requirements of Section 202 of that law. The regulations require that, to the maximum extent practical, public recognition be given in the media that Title II-funded commodities or foreign assistance have been "provided through the friendship of the American people as food for peace"; cooperating sponsors, to the extent feasible, display banners, posters, and similar items at project sites containing similar identifying information; and, unless otherwise specified, bags or other containers of commodities packaged for shipment be similarly marked. The regulations also require that containers of donated commodities packaged or repackaged by cooperating sponsors prior to distribution be plainly labeled with the U.S. aid graphic identity, and, where practicable, with the legend, "Provided through the friendship of the American people as food for peace."

In addition, USAID has established regulations prescribing rules and procedures for the marking of shipping containers and commodities under commodity transactions financed by USAID. These regulations require that suppliers of such commodities be responsible for ensuring that all export packaging and the commodities carry the U.S. aid graphic identity, except where USAID prescribes otherwise in the case of commodities. The regulations also prescribe the manner in which the export shipping containers, cartons, or boxes are to be marked; how the new foreign assistance graphic identity is to be affixed to the containers; the size, design, and color of the graphic identity; exceptions to the requirement to affix the graphic identity; and waivers to the marking requirement where it is found to be impracticable.

Overall, the Agency believes that the marking and branding effort has helped to finally bring credit to the American people for their foreign assistance generosity. For example, the first wide-spread application of the new U.S. aid graphic identity was during the provision of humanitarian supplies after the December 2004 tsunami that hit Southeast Asia. As a Pew Research Center study found: "The U.S. tsunami aid effort has been widely hailed there; 79 percent of Indonesians say they have a more favorable view of the U.S. as a result of the relief efforts." The U.S. brand was prominently displayed on all humanitarian assistance in close cooperation with our disaster response partners at the U.S. Department of Defense.

I must note that the reaction to the new branding and marking requirements from the contracting community was professional and business like. However, the Agency did initially experience hesitation among the non-profit community in this change of Agency policy. However, overtime, as we communicated with the organizations involved, their concerns were addressed. Grantees understood the urgent need to communicate the U.S. foreign assistance brand message, and have since been complying with few problems in the field.

ESTABLISHED NEW USAID COMMUNICATIONS FIELD CAPACITY

An assessment of public diplomacy in the Muslim world, issued in 2003 by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, concluded that too few people knew the extent of USAID's activities and recommended closer integration of the public diplomacy activities of agencies that administer foreign assistance.

In 2004, in order to improve public knowledge of foreign assistance in developing countries, USAID established new communications guidelines for the Agency and began building a network of over 100 communications specialists located at USAID missions around the world to help promote the Agency's foreign assistance abroad and to serve as a key humanitarian and development assistance content provider to U.S. Embassy PAOs.

These communications specialists are meant to be a comprehensive and complementary resource for information regarding USAID's work and its impact on the citizens of the host country. They oversee the Agency's branding and marking efforts in country; provide vital coordination with U.S. embassy's Public Affairs Sections; act as a content production point for the USAID mission's public information efforts; coordinate with public relations personnel hired by foreign assistance implementers; and seek to ensure that materials are consistent, well written and understandable in local languages and cultures. They also respond to inquiries about USAID programs, write speeches on relevant subjects for the Ambassador or USAID Mission Director prepare fact sheets and press advisories, and coordinate Web site updates of U.S. foreign assistance activities.

One of the Agency's new communications guidelines requires that its communications specialists develop a written "Communications Strategy" for the USAID mission that includes goals, objectives, messages, an Action Plan and budget, as well as methods to measure communications impact. In addition, USAID's overseas communications "Survival Manual" encourages communications specialists to monitor local media coverage and obtain and analyze locally conducted polls as a means to measure results. These strategies are drawn-up in coordination with the relevant U.S. embassy public affairs office and are reviewed and approved by the U.S. embassy, the USAID Mission Director and the public affairs liaison officers at USAID headquarters in Washington.

Annual communications training sessions were convened, starting in 2004, to enhance the skills of USAID communications officers who handle public outreach and communications and improve coordination among USAID staff, foreign assistance implementing partners, and the embassy public affairs sections. These training sessions sought to standardize knowledge, increase skills and explain Agency policy as well as communications protocols and procedures. Perhaps most importantly, these sessions encourage the examination of best practices with a view to wider application as well as a review of efforts that have yielded less than optimal results.

The last USAID communications training session focused on public opinion polling, communications measurement and evaluation. Also, we have just recently finished a new section of our overseas communications "Survival Manual" to provide guidance on

communications research instruments, primarily focused on polling. The manual includes key criteria for evaluating the quality of the research instruments and a standard set of questions to include in research instruments. Sharpening quantitative research skills was also emphasized, such as surveys as well as pre- and post-tracking studies to benchmark attitudes and behaviors.

Here are some examples of communications initiatives these specialists have carried out in the field for USAID:

- In preparation for Malaria Awareness Day on April 25, 2007, known globally as Africa Malaria Day (AMD), USAID developed “Malaria Resources” to assist communications specialists in 15 focus countries targeted by the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) and for use by all U.S. diplomatic missions across the globe in their outreach and education activities. Resource materials included: a sample news release, draft op-ed for signature by the local ambassador or mission director, a PMI fact sheet, updated country profiles, and a sample activity paper on how to get involved locally for AMD day. As a result, press coverage of Africa Malaria Day events this year was expansive and accurate in countries throughout Africa and indeed in Europe as well.
- A pilot communication campaign project in Indonesia, which was funded by USAID headquarters, involved communications officers overseeing the development and production of a radio, TV, and print advertisement campaign that focused on health care, education, and economic growth partnerships between the American and Indonesian people, especially in follow-up to the tsunami.

The purpose of this and other communication campaign pilots was to identify effective practices in foreign assistance publicity.

TARGETED PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGNS

Another pilot activity funded by USAID headquarters was conducted by our mission in the West Bank and Gaza. In late 2004, we concluded that efforts to increase awareness of Palestinians to U.S. foreign assistance efforts could potentially achieve a measurable, positive change in the awareness of the populations of the West Bank and Gaza toward the United States.

Based on research that showed that in November 2004 only 5 percent of Palestinians were aware that the American people provided assistance to the Palestinian people, USAID designed a comprehensive public affairs campaign to:

- Increase awareness of U.S. aid;
- Tie that aid to the fact that it is being provided by the American people; and,
- Communicate the sectors of assistance where U.S. foreign assistance funding was being used and convey the results of those activities.

In a relatively few short months, USAID communications professionals in our West Bank and Gaza mission directed the development of our first-ever public affairs campaign. Using a combination of television, radio, print and billboard ads, the campaign was designed to highlight and explain American assistance and tie that assistance directly to a core theme which our focus groups showed would be positively received. We included a tag line to show the generosity of the American people by stating (in Arabic): “From One Human Being to Another...U.S. Aid, From the American People.”

In April and May 2005, the campaign was launched. Public opinion research conducted in June 2005 by an independent public opinion polling agency demonstrates that an effective public affairs campaign can radically improve public perception of the American people’s support for Palestinians:

- Over 46 percent of Palestinians surveyed had seen at least a portion of the campaign;
- Over 54 percent confirmed their awareness of the contributions of the American people to the well-being and development of the West Bank and Gaza;
- 33 percent could now identify the United States as the largest donor nation in the West Bank and Gaza;
- 61 percent of respondents indicated that their views toward the American people had become more positive because of the information campaign.

I should emphasize several items here:

- This was simply a pilot campaign to test whether the concept of “paid media” advertising could/would influence public opinion in a positive way in a target host country. As we see above, it did.
- As in almost all media campaigns of this duration, the changes in public opinion can be short-lived because only a concerted campaign over a sustained period of time could make permanent in-roads into the type of “attitudinal” change which would instill longer term positive perceptions of the United States.
- Public opinion is highly susceptible to other internal and external forces, perhaps even more so in developing countries. Just as learning about American foreign assistance changed stated awareness, news about certain U.S. foreign policy positions, regional conflict or other factors could reverse and mitigate positive public opinion improvements at any time. Again, this supports the need for a sustained effort to truly be effective at changing attitudes.

Several other pilots have been conducted as well. As mentioned, we funded a pilot activity in Indonesia that sought to capitalize on the well publicized U.S. humanitarian efforts after the Christmas 2004 tsunami. In the months surrounding the one-year anniversary of the tsunami, our USAID Mission in Indonesia engaged in a public affairs campaign (centered on a modest number of television, billboards and print ads) to inform the Indonesian population about the broad range of U.S. foreign assistance efforts and tie those on-going efforts to the higher profile post-tsunami humanitarian assistance work. The campaign produced results – an over 20 percent increase in the number of

Indonesians aware of U.S. assistance in the health sector, and an almost 10 percent increase in awareness of U.S. education assistance. Most importantly, of those who recalled the ads, almost 82 percent reported holding “favorable” opinions of the United States.

In Jordan, following a modest public affairs campaign focused on print ads and bulk e-mails conducted in 2006 and 2007, over half of the Jordanians polled were aware of U.S. assistance, the highest recognition level of all bilateral donors.

What these modest public affairs pilots overseas have shown us is that U.S. aid efforts have a meaningful impact on public opinion toward the U.S. government and the American people. What has proved successful has been:

- Taking our cues from generally accepted commercial advertising practices;
- Tailoring public affairs campaigns to individual audiences with carefully crafted messages;
- Using local firms that know the local communications channels and cultural issues; and
- Using standard private-sector practices of monitoring, polling and focus group work.

These efforts provide creditable reason to believe that this approach could be expanded to a larger group of countries with similar impact.

INCREASING CAPACITY IN WASHINGTON

Up to now, I have been talking about messaging in the field. USAID has also had a greater presence and input at the Department of State, specifically in the office of Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes and the R Bureau. To the credit of the Undersecretary, USAID’s “story” has been mainstreamed into the Department’s public outreach and messaging. This has been facilitated by the seconding of a USAID Public Affairs officer to key working groups there, periodic interagency meetings, and the sharing of public affairs information resources across departments and agencies.


Further, the Department of State has been pro-active at reaching out to USAID, including in key meetings, conferences and training opportunities for their public affairs staff. USAID has now participated in all of the recent Department of State regional public affairs conferences as well as the more recent world-wide public affairs conference hosted by Under Secretary Hughes for all U.S. embassy public affairs officers. These key opportunities have allowed both of us to understand each others needs, to realize the strengths and opportunities that our respective missions present and to work on coordination to take advantage of these opportunities.

Just one example here would be informative. Through a USAID partnership with Voice of America, hundreds of international broadcasters and journalists have been trained in health issues concerning reporting on child survival, HIV/AIDS, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the worldwide effort to eradicate polio and emerging diseases like avian

influenza. The success of this partnership is measured in terms of audiences reached, amounts of health programming aired on both TV and Radio, in-country training for health journalists, and costs. VOA, with a worldwide audience of over 100 million listeners worldwide, has produced over 40,000 health stories on polio, malaria, HIV/AIDS, TB, reproductive health and drug resistance over the past decade. Broadcasters have aired stories in over 30 languages. Recently, VOA has reached rural populations in Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and China with news and information about preventing Avian Influenza. VOA has also created a special website at www.voanews.com on AI with support from USAID funds.

Under Secretary Hughes likes to say that she views her job as “waging peace”. The word “waging” is used deliberately, she says, because she believes “we have to be very intentional about it.” I hope this testimony makes clear that USAID wages peace throughout the developing world and we are taking pro-active steps to brand, mark, communicate and inform those audiences about how humanitarian and development assistance from the American people is helping them every day. Thank you.





« Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience »

**Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
U.S. Senate
Washington, June 27, 2007**

Statement of Jean-Louis Bruguière

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, members of the committee,

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here today.

At the judicial level in France, I have been responsible for the fight against terrorism since 1991. In France -- unlike in the U.S. -- criminal investigations are conducted by judges, who have sweeping judicial capabilities, such as issuing on their own search warrants, seizures of evidence, intrusive measures, including wiretapping, and cooperating with other countries in the fight against terrorism.

I do not need to convince you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in a country that has so heavily suffered from terrorism, culminating on September 11, 2001, of the gravity and the severity of the terrorist phenomenon, a phenomenon that is at the heart of the concerns of the United States today.

Terrorism of Islamist origin, the one conveyed by Al Qaeda is a deadly poison for our democracies that we must fight adamantly without second thought.

France and the United States are particularly mobilized in this fight against terrorism.

In this fight, we must stand together. France has always stood by the United States. I have personally stood by the United States in my duties under all circumstances.

Terrorism is a strategic menace, a global menace of a new, atypical and asymmetrical genre.

It demands recourse to all the state's means.

Obviously, a counterattack strategy against Terrorism entails the use of military means, when and where necessary, specifically in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

But, the specifics of this threat require other resources.

Recourse to military means must not be exclusive to the use of other tools in the field of intelligence or of law enforcement.

This panoply of tools and measures must serve as a real operational strategy, anticipatory and flexible, adapting to the contours of the threat and aimed at preventing the occurrence of terrorist actions and to stay a step ahead of terrorist organizations.

The system we have implemented in France, since the beginning of the 1990s has allowed us to effectively counter all terrorist activity aimed at our soil to date.

But before outlining the main components of our strategy to fight terrorism, I will present the evolution of the Islamist terrorist threat over the last 20 years.

1- The emergence of Islamist terrorism took place in the beginning of the 1990s

In Europe and, more specifically, in France, the first manifestations of the terrorist threat of Islamist origin dates back to 1993.

After the interruption of the electoral process in Algeria and the banning of the F.I.S (or Islamic Salvation Front), a radical Salafist movement (the G.I.A, or Armed Islamic Group) emerged.

This situation has caused, in Europe but, especially in France, the creation of clandestine structures of logistic support to guerillas in Algeria. These networks were activated in 1995 by the G.I.A. for its operations on French soil.

So the G.I.A, a Salafist organization, evolved beyond the Franco-Algerian framework. This new strategy was a precursor to that of Al Qaeda.

This global strategy led the G.I.A. to hijack an Air France aircraft in 1994, in order to crash it over Paris, and, six months later, to perpetrate a series of attacks in France. This was the first time an airplane was designed to be used as a weapon of mass destruction.

The decline of the G.I.A in 1996 should have been accompanied by the displacement of the epicenter of terrorist activism towards the Pakistani-Afghan zone.

It is in this context that we have detected since 1996, through an investigation, the "Ressam" network (the Millennium Bomber). This was Al Qaeda's first attempt to strike the US on its homeland.

September 11, 2001 was the result of this continuing trend. It was neither an unforeseeable occurrence nor an historical accident.

2-After September 11 and the current situation

The period after September 11, 2001 has shown that the danger has not disappeared and has always a worldwide dimension. The Al Qaeda network, although deprived of their sanctuary in Afghanistan has demonstrated that it is still active.

The European Islamist movement, composed principally of Maghrebins, has always been active and presents the characteristic of being constituted by a network of dispersed, polymorphic and mutating cells.

In addition, during this period, other lands of Jihad appeared to be active: Pakistan and the Caucasus.

But it is Iraq that has been the most powerful driver of terrorist activity, having a greater force of attraction than previous lands of Jihad, especially in regard to radical European Islamist movement.

Several phases must be distinguished.

From 2003 to 2004 the European mujahideen left for Iraq without thinking of returning, but to die there as martyrs. After 2004, because of the influence from Abou Moussab El Zaarkaoui and these moujahiddin were mostly trained to commit attacks in Europe.

3- Current situation and foreseeable development of the menace

The current situation is characterized by the permanence of the menace, the increased globalization of Islamist networks and the search for new strategies to validate the Terrorist message.

The terrorist menace is reoriented on two fronts the first in the North the second in the South, in the Maghreb area.

In 2006 the G.S.P.C (or Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting) rejoined Al Qaeda after having made an operational alliance two years earlier with the Abou Moussab El Zarkaoui network operating in Iraq.

This development marked the appearance of a new terrorist entity called "Al Qaeda of the Maghreb Countries" significantly increasing the terrorist threat in Europe and over France.

4- Response Procedures in the Fight Against Terrorism

A strategy in the fight against terrorism must meet a certain number of conditions to be effective. Especially, even when there are no attacks, the powers of intelligence services must be strengthened, a criminal legal system with the appropriate legislative tools must be implemented, and international cooperation must be reinforced.

In this regard, the French system for fighting terrorism has proved its effectiveness.

Over the years, this system intentionally consistent with the law, without relying upon special legislation, has demonstrated that it is unrivaled in effectiveness and legality.

France has a long experience of fighting terrorism which goes back to the early 1970s.

Thus, France has developed a complete legal doctrine for fighting terrorism which is considered to be a strategic threat. This doctrine led to the publication of a White Paper in 2006 (that I will submit for the record).

The White Paper describes several changes to the legal system, with respect to laws as well as implementing procedures.

With respect to laws, the French Parliament has given the French system for fighting terrorism an arsenal of laws designed for this purpose.

The criminal charge of terrorist conspiracy is unquestionably the most effective legal weapon against terrorist networks. It makes it possible to fight the threat at the top, by attacking the logistical and financial support for the networks. There is no need to prove that the network in question is linked to an organization or even to a specific plan. It is sufficient that the network was likely to give any assistance in a terrorist context to activists, even when the activists are unidentified.

In addition, there are procedural laws.

The cornerstone of our system is the centralization in Paris of prosecution, investigation and trials.

It enables us to better understand the terrorist phenomenon which is becoming more widespread, polymorphous, and changing.

In addition, on this subject, the investigating judges may use intrusive measures, such as telephone wiretaps and audio surveillance of private places.

However, to be effective, this legislative arsenal must be implemented as a part of a real operational strategy.

From this point of view, the participants in the fight against terrorism have developed a proactive methodology in France that is directed to preventing the threat.

This risk prevention strategy brings together, in a real operational synergy, intelligence agencies, law-enforcement authorities, and the Judiciary.

In addition, France has significantly increased international cooperation, especially with the United States, for the sole purpose of neutralizing terrorist networks where they are operating.

This legal system, which is flexible and centralized at the same time, has enabled us to anticipate terrorist acts for more than ten years, and to contain the terrorist threat and stop attacks on our soil and even outside of our borders, specifically in Australia.

Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

« Violent Islamist Extremism : The European Experience »

US Senate Washington, June 27, 2007

Introduction

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Ce n'est pas vous, élus d'un grand peuple, un peuple ami de la France, qui a si lourdement souffert du Terrorisme et qui a payé en 2001 un tribut particulièrement lourd à cette menace, que je devrais de convaincre de la gravité et de l'acuité du phénomène terroriste, un phénomène qui est aujourd'hui au cœur des préoccupations des Etats.

La France et les Etats-Unis sont particulièrement mobilisés dans ce combat contre le Terrorisme.

Le Terrorisme d'origine islamiste, celui véhiculé par Al Qaida est un poison mortel pour nos démocraties. Un défi permanent à nos valeurs démocratiques, un défi que nous devons relever par un combat sans faille, un combat résolu et sans état d'âme.

Dans cette lutte contre le Terrorisme, nous devons être solidaire. La France a toujours été solidaire des Etats-Unis. Je l'ai été personnellement dans mes fonctions en toutes circonstances. La lutte contre le Terrorisme est une priorité absolue qui a transcendé nos divergences politiques aujourd'hui largement surmontées.

Vous parlez aux Etats-Unis de guerre contre le Terrorisme. Le Terrorisme est une menace stratégique, une menace globale d'un genre nouveau, atypique et asymétrique.

Elle exige le recours à tous les moyens régaliens de l'Etat.

Une stratégie de riposte contre le Terrorisme emporte, bien évidemment, l'utilisation de moyens militaires, là où c'est nécessaires, notamment en Afghanistan et en Irak.

Mais la spécificité de cette menace sa typologie particulière, sa stratégie et les moyens qu'elle met en œuvre exige d'autres ressources.

Le recours aux moyens militaires ne doit pas être exclusif de l'emploi d'autres outils dans le domaine du renseignement ou de l'application de la loi.

Cette panoplie d'outils, de dispositifs et de procédures doit servir une véritable stratégie opérationnelle à la fois anticipative et flexible, s'adaptant aux contours de la menace et visant à prévenir la survenance d'actions terroriste et à garder un temps d'avance sur les groupes terroristes.

C'est ce système que nous avons mis en œuvre en France depuis le début des années 1990, que nous avons perpétuellement adapté à l'évolution d'une menace mutante et qui nous a permis jusqu'à ce jour de contrer efficacement toutes les actions terroristes visant notre sol.

La menace terroriste est d'autant plus grave qu'elle est planétaire, opportuniste et très évolutive. Elle est souvent peu mobilisatrice pour ceux qui n'en ont pas été directement victime.

Il nous faut donc œuvrer pour une prise de conscience de l'acuité du phénomène terroriste en sensibilisant les opinions publiques et les responsables politiques. Il nous faut renforcer les moyens de l'appareil sécuritaire des Etats et améliorer la coopération internationale.

Cette exigence est particulièrement prégnante au regard de l'évolution de la menace islamiste qui ne cesse de se renforcer tout en se diversifiant rendant son appréhension et la mise en œuvre de procédures de riposte efficace particulièrement difficile.

Le Terrorisme d'origine islamiste n'est pas apparu en 2001. Il est la résultante d'une évolution née de l'effondrement du monde bi polaire .

La guerre froide avait, paradoxalement, confiné les idéologies radicales qui n'avaient pu s'exprimer.

La chute du communisme et la mondialisation ont facilité l'émergence et le développement de ces idéologies.

Celle d'Al Qaida, procédant d'une conception radicale du salafisme, qui a forgé l'arme du Jihad mondial, l'arme lui permettant d'imposer par la violence un ordre nouveau, celui du califat mondial.

Comprendre les ressorts et la stratégie mouvante de cette menace exige d'en connaître la genèse et son évolution.

Le 11 Septembre 2001 s'inscrit dans cette trajectoire qui se poursuit en se modifiant par une adaptation constante à la mutation profonde d'un monde qui se reconstruit souvent sur un mode chaotique, comme au Moyen Orient.

Cette menace s'est mondialisée n'épargnant aucune région du monde.

Al Qaida et les organisations qui lui sont inféodées ont prioritairement ciblé l'Occident et en premier lieu les Etats-Unis.

Mais l'Europe –et en particulier la France- a été aux avant-postes de l'activisme terroriste d'inspiration salafiste. Elle est encore aujourd'hui très menacée par ce phénomène qui se développe à la fois au Sud, en Afrique du Nord et à l'Est au Moyen Orient, en particulier en Irak.

A cet égard les procédures de riposte mises en œuvre en Europe jouent un rôle de premier plan pour la sécurité des Etats-Unis.

Pour bien comprendre la situation actuelle et évaluer l'évolution prévisible du risque terroriste, en particulier en Europe, il est nécessaire d'évoquer ne serait –ce que brièvement l'émergence du terrorisme islamiste après la chute du communisme.

1- De l'émergence du terrorisme islamiste jusqu'au 11 septembre 2001

En Europe et plus particulièrement en France les premières manifestations de la menace terroriste d'origine islamiste remonte à 1993.

L'interruption du processus électoral en Algérie après l'interdiction du F.I.S devait engendrer, en réaction, l'émergence d'un courant islamiste radical représenté par une branche algérieniste (l' A.I.S) et une branche salafiste, plus radicale (le G.I.A).

Cette situation a entraîné la constitution en Europe mais surtout en France de structures clandestines de soutien logistique à la guérilla en Algérie. Ces réseaux devaient être ultérieurement activés par le G.I.A pour ses opérations sur le sol français . Ainsi, dès 1994 était apparue l'importance jouée par ces réseaux et cellules clandestines dans la stratégie terroriste des groupes terroristes.

Surtout le G.I.A, organisation salafiste, devait développer une stratégie dépassant la dimension franco-algérienne et annonçant celle d'Al Qaida : l'instauration d'Emirats locaux en vue de la création d'un califat mondial.

Cette stratégie planétaire a conduit le G.I.A à détourner fin 1994 un avion d'Air France assurant la liaison Alger- Paris pour le précipiter sur Paris et à perpétrer, six mois plus tard, une série d'attentats en France.

Cette stratégie du G.I.A annonçait de façon dramatique celle d'Al Qaida : l'exportation de la violence terroriste en Occident et l'utilisation d'un aéronef comme arme de destruction massive.

A partir de 1996, critiqué dans son propre camp par sa dérive sanguinaire, le G.I.A déclinait au profit d'une autre tendance, le G.S.P.C qui a rejoint aujourd'hui Al Qaida.

Surtout, ce déclin de G.I.A devait s'accompagner du déplacement de l'épicentre de l'activisme terroriste vers la zone pakistano-afghane.

Ainsi était mis en exergue – phénomène toujours d'actualité- le rôle essentiel joué par les terres de Jihad.

La Bosnie jusqu'aux accords de Dayton et surtout à partir de 1994 la zone pakistano-afghane qui a attiré nombre de moudjahiddin avec un double objectif : combattre l'ennemi et exporter la violence terroriste à l'extérieur, en particulier en Europe et aux Etats-Unis.

C'est dans ce contexte que nous avons détecté dès 1996, à la faveur d'une enquête, le réseau « Ressam » (le Millenium Bomber). Un réseau ayant une assise planétaire formé et dirigé par Al Qaida dont l'objectif était de frapper les Etats Unis. La première tentative d' Al Qaida de frapper les Etats-Unis sur leur sol.

Le 11 septembre 2001 n'a été que l'aboutissement de cette évolution qui se poursuit. Ce n'est pas un événement fortuit ni un accident historique.

2-L'après 11 septembre et la situation actuelle

La période postérieure au 11 septembre 2001 a montré que la menace n'avait pas disparu et qu'elle avait toujours une dimension planétaire . Les réseaux d'Al Qaida, bien que privés de leur sanctuaire afghan ont démontré qu'ils étaient encore actifs.

La mouvance islamiste européenne composée principalement de maghrébins était toujours aussi active et présentait la caractéristique d'être constituée de réseaux et cellules dispersées, polymorphes, et évolutives. De plus ces structures avaient établis des relations opérationnelles souvent de façon opportuniste avec d'autres réseaux évoluant à l'extérieur de l'Europe.

Par ailleurs au cours de cette période sont apparues de nouvelles terres de Jihad qui ont très sensiblement modifié les contours de la menace islamiste.

En premier lieu le Pakistan. La disparition du sanctuaire afghan lui a conféré un nouveau rôle, un rôle de premier plan, alors qu'il n'était jusqu'alors qu'une base arrière pour l'Afghanistan.

Des réseaux pakistanais installés en Europe sont devenus de plus en plus actifs, recrutant et animant de jeunes extrémistes souvent bien intégrés dans leur pays d'accueil dont ils avaient acquis la nationalité pour les engager dans des opérations terroristes comme à Londres en 2005.

D'autres réseaux également installés en Europe, au Royaume Uni ou en France appartenant au L.E.T ont recruté des islamistes maghrébins pour les former militairement dans des camps du Penjab avant les diriger sur des structures opérationnelles dans le monde, notamment aux Etats Unis et en Australie (cas de Willy Brigitte).

Outre le Pakistan, le Caucase devait également jouer un rôle moteur dans l'évolution de l'activisme terroriste en Europe comme l'a démontré le démantèlement en Angleterre et en France de deux réseaux islamistes entraînés dans les gorges du Pankissi en Géorgie et qui avaient projeté de commettre des attentats chimiques en Europe.

Mais c'est l'Irak qui a été le plus puissant moteur de l'activité terroriste ayant une force d'attraction supérieure aux précédentes terres de Jihad, notamment à l'égard de la mouvances islamiste radicale européenne.

Des réseaux et structures plus éclatés et volatiles se sont constituées à partir de 2003. Certains militants islamistes se sont même rendus en Irak via la Syrie de façon spontanée rendant l'appréhension du phénomène particulièrement difficile.

Plusieurs phases doivent être distingués.

De 2003 à 2004 les moudjahidin européens sont partis en Irak sans idée de retour, pour y mourir en martyr. Après 2004, en raison de l'évolution der la situation en Irak et de l'emprise d'Abou Moussab El Zaarkaoui et de son organisation sur ces militants islamistes venus d'Europe, ces derniers ont été pour la plus part entraînés militairement pour commettre des attentats en Europe . Ce phénomène a été aggravé par le rôle croissant joué par les réseaux du G.S.P.C.

De fait, l'apport de l'Irak dans l'évolution de la menace s'est manifesté sur plusieurs points : l'adoption par les réseaux islamistes radicaux du « chaïd » comme arme nouvelle, la destabilisation de l'Afrique du Nord avec le renforcement du G.S.P.C lié à Abou Mousab El Zarkaoui, l'utilisation de nouvelles technologies (internet, électronique, transmission..) et l'intervention croissante de militants islamistes dotés d'un fort bagage universitaire dans le domaine scientifique.

Cette nouvelle typologie de la menace a sensiblement accrue le niveau de la menace en Europe et en France en particulier où plusieurs tentatives d'attentats ont été contrées entre 2005 et 2006.

3- Situation actuelle et évolution prévisible de la menace

La situation actuelle est caractérisée par la permanence de la menace, la planétarisation accrue des réseaux islamistes et la recherche de nouvelles stratégies pour valoriser le message de la Terreur.

A cet égard, les marchés, l'énergie et les transports sont particulièrement visés.

La menace terroriste s'est réorientée sur deux fronts : un axe Nord-Nord –Est – Sud –Est en Asie que je n'évoquerai pas ici, bien que la dégradation de la situation dans la zone pakistano – afghane ait un impact direct sur la situation en Europe. Un arc Sud qui affecte directement la sécurité du continent européen.

Le conflit irakien a eu pour conséquence inattendue de renforcer la capacité militaire du G.S.P.C et son influence en Afrique du Nord.

En se dotant de capacités militaires accrues dans le sud de l'Algérie, le G.S.P.C a étendue son influence sur le Sahel tout en implantant des bases opérationnelles et logistiques en Algérie.

Le G.S.P.C a ainsi pris progressivement le contrôle de toutes les organisations salafistes des pays du Maghreb.

De plus, le G.S.P.C devait en 2006 rallier Al Qaida après avoir deux ans plus tôt noué une alliance opérationnelle avec les réseaux d'Abou Moussab El Zarkaoui opérant en Irak.

Cette évolution marquée par l'apparition d'une nouvelle entité terroriste baptisée « Al Qaida aux Pays du Maghreb » accroît sensiblement la menace terroriste en Europe et surtout en France.

De plus cette organisation qui dispose de relais au Canada s'avère potentiellement dangereuse pour la sécurité des Etats-Unis.

Cette évolution récente nous conduit à nous interroger sur l'évolution prévisible de la menace terroriste ;

Cette menace se situe toujours à un niveau élevé en Europe et en particulier en France. Ses contours sont néanmoins difficiles à cerner en raison d'un contexte international très instable.

Néanmoins plusieurs facteurs peuvent être pris en compte : la dégradation rapide de la situation dans la zone pakistano-afghane, le climat d'instabilité au Moyen Orient, principalement en Irak et les tensions de plus en plus vives au Maghreb.

La dégradation de la situation au Pakistan- en particulier au Balouchistan et au Waziristan- et en Afghanistan n'affecte pas seulement la sécurité des pays de la région mais a aussi une incidence directe sur le niveau de la menace en Europe où les réseaux pakistanais sont de plus en plus actifs. Le risque d'actions terroristes au Royaume-Uni se situe à un niveau très élevé.

La situation en Irak alimente l'activisme islamiste en Europe. Plusieurs cellules islamistes liés aux réseaux irakiens ont été démantelés en France en 2005 et 2006 alors qu'elles projetaient de perpétrer des actions terroristes.

La situation s'est notablement aggravée par l'allégeance du G.S.P.C à Al Qaida officialisée par un communiqué d'Ayman Al ZAWAHIRI diffusé le 13 septembre 2006 par la chaîne Al Jazeera.

Il s'en est suivi une série d'attentats en Algérie, des tentatives de déstabilisation du Maghreb, et un risque accru d'attentats en France où les réseaux algériens ont toujours été actifs.

Cette situation sécuritaire exige de la part des pays européens une grande vigilance et des actions concertées dans le domaine du renseignement et de l'action répressive.

4- La lutte contre le terrorisme : les procédures de riposte

Pour être efficace une stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme doit satisfaire un certain nombre de conditions : une conscience partagée par l'opinion publique et les gouvernants de la réalité de la menace terroriste même en l'absence d'attentats, le renforcement du potentiel des services de renseignements, la mise en œuvre d'un dispositif répressif doté d'outils législatifs adaptés et un renforcement de la coopération internationale.

A cet égard le dispositif français de lutte contre le terrorisme a fait la preuve de son efficacité.

Se situant délibérément dans le champs de la légalité, sans avoir recours à des législation d'exception, ce dispositif a démontré au fil des années qu'il n'y avait pas d'opposition en efficacité et légalité.

La France a une longue expérience de lutte contre le Terrorisme qui remonte au début des années 1970.

Elle a ainsi développé une doctrine globale de lutte contre le terrorisme considérée comme une menace stratégique. Cette doctrine a donné lieu à l'élaboration d'un Livre Blanc publié en 2006.

S'agissant du dispositif judiciaire il présente de nombreuses originalités, tant sur le plan des outils juridiques que des procédures mises en œuvre.

Concernant les outils juridiques le législateur a doté le dispositif français de lutte contre le terrorisme d'un véritable arsenal de lois dédiés à cette lutte.

Des lois de fond regroupés dans un Titre spécifique du Code Pénal. Ainsi est légalement reconnu le fait terroriste

L'association de malfaiteurs terroriste est sans conteste l'arme légale la plus adaptée à la lutte contre les réseaux terroristes . Elle permet de lutter en amont de la menace en s'attaquant aux réseaux de soutien logistique et financier. Il n'est nul besoin de prouver que le réseau considéré est lié à une organisation ou même à un projet défini. Il suffit que ce réseau ait été susceptible d'apporter une aide quelconque dans un contexte terroriste à des activistes même non identifiés.

Mais également des lois de procédures.

La principale d'entre elles est la centralisation à Paris des poursuites, de l'enquête et du jugement des faits de terrorisme.

Cette centralisation est la clé de voûte de notre système légal. Il permet une meilleure appréhension du phénomène terroriste qui est de plus en plus éclaté, polymorphe et évolutif .

De plus dans cette matière la garde à vue a été portée à six jours et les juges d'instruction peuvent recourir à des mesures intrusives, comme les écoutes téléphoniques et des sonorisations de lieux privés.

Mais pour être efficace cet arsenal législatif doit être mis en œuvre dans le cadre d'une véritable stratégie opérationnelle.

De ce point de vue les acteurs de la lutte contre le terrorisme ont développé en France une méthodologie proactive orientée vers la prévention de la menace.

Cette stratégie de prévention du risque associe, dans une véritable synergie opérationnelle, les services de renseignements au premier rang desquels la D.S.T, les services de police judiciaire et l'autorité judiciaire.

Elle a par ailleurs considérablement développé la coopération internationale notamment avec les Etats-Unis dans l'unique but de neutraliser les réseaux terroristes où qu'ils opèrent.

Ce système légal à la fois souple et centralisé nous a permis d'anticiper les phénomènes terroristes depuis plus de dix ans, de contenir la menace terroriste et déjouer des attentats sur notre sol et même hors de nos frontières , en Australie notamment

Je vous remercie de votre attention

PREVAILING AGAINST TERRORISM

PREVAILING AGAINST TERRORISM

The terrorist threat has never been so great. It has also undergone profound transformations. Like most of its international partners, France has adapted its counter-terrorism toolbox accordingly. The Counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 has thus enabled France to reinforce its means of prevention to match transformations in transports and communications.

By defining a long-term strategy, this White Paper contributes directly to the effort of sharpening and adapting our counter-terrorism tools while framing them in an official doctrine. This document draws on the work of intelligence practitioners, policemen, judges, diplomats, military officers, and other high civil servants, as well as journalists and academics.

Beyond the adaptation of our tools, beyond international cooperation, only the broadest possible mobilization will allow us to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorism. Such a mobilization, in turn, requires accurate information about the reality of the threat and the means at our disposal to counter it. That is the very purpose of this White Paper.



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Against Terrorism



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Preface

With this White Paper on Domestic Security against Terrorism, our country has for the first time developed a genuine doctrine for dealing with a scourge it has had to face many times in its history.

We have, of course, constantly been adapting our efforts to protect our territory and our citizens. Our security and intelligence forces are now trained to anticipate and fight the terrorist threat. Why, then, did we want to go further and formulate a comprehensive security strategy?

- The first reason is that the threat to our country has never been so great: since the Madrid and London attacks we know that Europe is clearly a target. France is thus not sheltered from such attacks. To ensure the security of French citizens, it has become necessary to understand this threat better.

- Another reason is that this is a strategic threat, which targets our interests all over the world. This was demonstrated by the attacks in Karachi, which claimed 11 French lives in May 2002.

- Finally, we need a comprehensive strategy because the terrorist threat has been constantly changing. This means that we must constantly adapt our tools and our system if we want to stay a step ahead of the terrorist groups. We began doing this with the creation of regional centres for the fight against radical Islamism and with the adoption of the 23 January 2006 counter-terrorism law. But we need an adaptation strategy for the long term, similar to the one developed in the 1994 French White Paper on Defence.

The goal of this endeavour is threefold.

- We must first better understand the workings of terrorist groups. We know that they take advantage of well-developed operational networks in European countries. These networks cover a spectrum running all the way from extremist preachers and organizations that send young people to terrorist training camps and battlegrounds to the organizers of attacks and the people who plant the bombs. Only a thorough knowledge


of the networks, the facilitators, and the tools of these groups will allow us to protect our fellow citizens.

- The second objective of this White Paper is to define a counter-terrorist strategy tailored to the threat we face. This strategy must take into account the new technological tools and modern means of communication used by the terrorist groups. It will also develop active international cooperation. This is indispensable to deal with groups that are connected by constantly changing affiliations and to understand the financial networks that they use. We have already developed effective bilateral partnerships. Now we must develop multilateral cooperation.

- Finally, the goal of this White Paper is to better inform our fellow citizens about a threat that concerns them and about the tools we are putting into place to protect them. Faced with a threat that seeks to divide our societies, our fight must be everybody's fight. It must build on a shared conviction about the seriousness of the threat and the importance of the rules that must govern counter-terrorism.

In the fight against terrorism, our democratic principles are our best weapon. Our strength lies in our tolerance, our respect for civil liberties, and our respect for the identities that our country has always defended. To renounce these values would be to play into the terrorists' hands. To give in to the temptation to change our standards would be to begin to lose the fight. So let us remain faithful to our values: they are our greatest strength in our fight against terrorism.

Dominique de Villepin
Prime Minister



Introduction

To fight terrorism effectively, we must be able to name it and define it:

'any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.'¹

This is the definition of terrorism the United Nations Secretary General proposed at the General Assembly Summit celebrating the UN's 60th anniversary in September 2005. Although there is not an international consensus behind this definition yet, France accepted it from the start. It describes a form of violence that our country has known for more than two centuries.

Past, Present and Future Threats

As an active player in international affairs, France has been the target of numerous attacks for the entire second half of the 20th century. We have been victims of terrorism linked to domestic policy issues, including attacks committed in the context of the Algerian War, and terrorism fostered by ideological or regionalist demands.

But we have also been hit by a form of terrorist violence linked to external crises, first when Palestinian terrorist groups started attacking the interests of their adversaries wherever they were, erasing geographical limits. In France, but also in Italy (the Rome airport attack), in Austria (the attack on the headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,

(1) *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations for Decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005 (New York: March 2005).

OPEC), in Uganda (hostage-taking at Entebbe) and elsewhere, we began to witness the first 'globalization' of a cause through terrorist action.

Step by step, other movements started to adopt this type of action. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), founded in 1975 in Beirut, is an example of this. Until it was disbanded in 1984, it committed more than 35 attacks in France, demonstrating that one did not need to be the main enemy of a movement to become one of its victims.

During the 1960s and 1970s, violent extreme leftist and autonomous movements also propagated terror. A handful of these, such as Direct Action, continued to carry out attacks through the 1980s before their ability to do damage was gradually eroded.

The most recent major attacks on French territory go back to 1995 and 1996: the attacks in Metro and express subway in Paris at the Saint-Michel, Maison-Blanche and Port-Royal stations. Although linked to the Algerian civil war, these attacks in a way foreshadowed Islamist terrorism. They were the work of terrorists supported by cells that had been pre-positioned in France and which went from providing logistical support to armed groups in Algeria to taking direct action against a Western state. This issue, new at the time, prefigured the threats that France faces today.

France has not been spared from regionally inspired terrorism. Corsican, Basque and Breton independence movements resort to violence. This type of terrorism is not unique to France. In Spain and the United Kingdom, ETA and the IRA have for more than three decades fought intensely against the government in the name of Basque independence and Irish unity. Regionalist terrorism has not disappeared. In the recent past it went so far as to include the assassination of a representative of the French Republic. Governments must continue to pay close attention to it over the long-term.

But the terrorism with which we are confronted today is the lineage of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, which cost nearly 3,000 lives. This is the threat we must be prepared for in order to protect our fellow citizens.

An Increasingly Lethal Issue

Terrorist movements' capacity for doing harm depends in part on the means of destruction to which they can gain access. The daggers of the 'Assassins'¹ and the guns and firebombs of anarchists in the late 19th century made possible only targeted murders or killings of at most a few dozen victims.

(1) The Assassins were a ruthless Ismailian religious group in Persia, then Syria, from the end of the 10th to the 13th century and which attacked leadership elites.

In the second half of the 20th century, much more extensive massacres and hostage-taking became possible through access to modern means of transport – which became terrorists' targets and tools at the same time – as well as through the availability of powerful explosives on the open market. On 19 April 1995, two isolated individuals in Oklahoma City in the United States carried out an attack that killed 168 people and wounded 600 others.

The capacity to manufacture chemical agents such as powerful nerve agents, as well as the acquisition of biological expertise and technologies, are henceforth within reach of various groups and individuals. This was confirmed by the Sarin gas attacks carried out by the *Aum Shinrikyo* sect in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, and by the distribution of envelopes containing anthrax in autumn 2001 in the United States. These attacks, which only caused a few deaths, revealed how difficult it was to carry out mass attacks with these techniques.

Over the past 25 years, the number of victims caused by terrorist attacks has crossed several thresholds. Before 1983, the bloodiest terrorist attack had killed 85 people (an attack in the Bologna railway station in Italy, in 1980). The threshold of 100 victims was crossed for the first time in 1983, with the double attack in Beirut, Lebanon, against American and French military forces (299 deaths). Until 2001, the deadliest attack had killed 329 people (the destruction of an Air India plane over the Irish Sea in 1985). The threshold of 1,000 victims was crossed with the al Qaeda attack in the United States on 11 September 2001.

Whereas the numbers have fallen since September 2001, the accounting measure for the deadliest attacks has gone from tens to hundreds to thousands of victims in a generation.

The examination of the past and of 'traditional' threats against France enables us to determine the evolving characteristics of the type of terrorism that might pose a lasting threat to France. It is distinguished by violent acts prepared in secret. It is carried out by non-state actors, which makes it less predictable. Its perpetrators are ideologically motivated individuals, committed to an international cause whose rhetoric is rooted in history. One of its goals is to kill as many French people – or foreigners on French soil – as possible, even if its analytical framework, as a matter of principle, does not stop at French borders or at civilian victims. In its logic all attacks are fair game. It seeks the maximum psychological effect on governments and public opinion.

The potential increase in the level of destruction sought by the terrorists is the primary justification for a re-examination of France's counter-terrorism system.

The Emergence of 'Global Terrorism'

The second factor that calls for this White Paper is the appearance, at the start of the 21st century, of a new type of terrorism.

Since the second half of the 1990s, globalization has brought about an unprecedented transformation of all societies. Global public opinion now has access to the same images, often in real time. Distances have been abolished and the repercussions of various regional crises are increasingly powerful. The countries of the Near and Middle East are particularly affected by this instability. The legacy of history, political stagnation in a number of countries, and the consequences of possessing oil resources have left the region in a fragile situation. The disarray of populations facing considerable social and economic difficulties has made them a prime recruiting ground for terrorist groups who take advantage of their feeling of injustice by turning it against the West, which they blame for the region's fate. They have also instrumentalised the message of Islam by imposing an unbending and violent reading of the Muslim religion.

Terrorism has thus undergone a change in nature and degree similar to the changes provoked by globalization. This transformation has led to the emergence of a global Islamist-inspired terrorism, which indiscriminately attacks Western, Arab, or more generally Muslim countries, with unprecedented means of destruction.

This new type of terrorism – embodied by al Qaeda – has had global ambitions from the very start. Since 1998, it has struck in some 20 countries, at an average rate of three or four major attacks per year.¹ It has shown a capacity for action in Europe twice, in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. It is distinguished by its ability to borrow from globalization the very tools that have enabled globalization to succeed. It manages to combine very personal individual concerns with lofty international perspectives; it shows a preference for people-to-people networks; it uses electronic means; it places a premium on publicity; and it shows a capacity for permanent evolution, even advance planning. Globalization is thus denigrated out of principle – yet at the same time its most effective elements are accepted, integrated, and exploited operationally.

We have entered the era of what we shall call 'global terrorism.' This terrorism differs from regionalist terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism. It cannot escape the general rule that all terrorist movements only manage to mobilize a small number of activists. Yet global terrorism alone claims to carry a historical legacy and to stand on a geopolitical base. It seeks to flaunt its ambitions, innovate, and develop the means to attain results that would elevate it immediately to the level of a global and generational adversary. It wants to be capable of inflicting far greater

(1) These figures exclude attacks carried out in war zones.

damage and exercising far greater influence over our societies than the rather more limited objectives of other forms of terrorism.

Anchored in a still young generation, the global terrorist threat will likely prove longlasting. It has acquired a strategic dimension. France is one of its targets. Many French nationals have been among its victims abroad.

We must analyse this threat in order to measure it well, determine how to adapt our counter-terrorism system to counter it, and establish a long-term strategy to limit it. We must avoid the trap of a 'clash of civilizations' that has been set by global Islamist-inspired terrorism and we must refuse the conflation of Islam and terrorism that this movement seeks to provoke.

It is this refusal to conflate Islam and terrorism that France is demonstrating when it encourages the organization of Islam in France, namely through the French Council of the Muslim Faith; when it consistently presses at the global level for a better dialogue among peoples, especially toward our neighbours from the South and in the Muslim world; and when it fights against all forms of hate speech. This policy is all the more well-received because most French Muslims demonstrate respect for the Republican values of tolerance and secularism and condemn the manipulation of Islam's message by extremist factions.

The goal of this White Paper is to formulate France's counter-terrorism doctrine. This doctrine should be known to all, for we will only succeed in fighting terrorism effectively if we have the backing of all our citizens. Only by developing international cooperation will we be able to fight it effectively.

Part I

Global Terrorism: A Strategic Threat

Part of the reason for the strength of global terrorism is the effectiveness of its rhetoric. Its originality lies in its functionally differentiated use of various territories. It adapts its structures and procedures, renews its recruits and knows how to make good use of the means of communication that globalization provides. Today embodied by Islamist terrorism, it is a strategic threat to France.

Chapter 1

Effective Rhetoric, a Strategy for Managing Territory, Evolving Structures

A Simplistic – Yet Complex – World View

The apparent – and well-displayed – simplicity of the world view proposed by global Islamist-inspired terrorism provides a common reference for a movement that at first glance seems to be rather disparate.

A global vision with a simple and powerful message

Global terrorism draws its ideological inspiration from Salafism.¹ Based on the rejection of political and social progress, this school of thought is by nature hostile to democracy. Its point of reference is the memory – partly based on fantasy – of a 'golden age' of original

(1) From the 'Salafs,' or 'ancient ones,' the earliest companions of the Prophet Mohammad.

Islam. It rejects the world as it has evolved. It offers itself as an alternative to globalization. It proposes a return to the practices of the original caliphate based on a narrow interpretation of the Koran.¹

Yet this desire to go back to basics hides a movement that actually advocates an Islamic 'renaissance.' In this sense, Salafism can also be seen as the vehicle for a negative interpretation of a painfully and unjustly endured history. It is the history of the decline of a civilization 'humiliated' by successive physical, economic and cultural invasions by the 'Christian West,' from the time of the Crusades until today.

In this view, as a victim of 'aggression' – its very survival threatened on its own territory – Islam has no choice but to defend itself with the most extreme violence. For global Islamist-inspired terrorism, this 'clash of civilizations' has entered a critical phase of the 'jihad,' thus hijacking this central element of the Muslim religion. This is the powerfully simple message that it puts forth relentlessly.

Jihad and Jihadism

In Europe we tend to translate jihad as 'holy war.' Etymologically, jihad means 'determined effort to reach a goal' – in other words, on one hand, that of defending or promoting Islam and, on the other, what a Believer does to conform to the rules of the Koran. This reference can be found in various parts of the Koran, under different forms: spread Islam through persuasion, fight to repel an attack on Islam, etc. Considering Islam to be a universal value, all of the different movements within Islam accept that its propagation is a duty for the Muslim community.

Just as we make a distinction between 'Islam' and its political exploitation ('Islamism'), it is necessary to distinguish the religious notion of jihad from 'jihadism,' which is its deviation into violence. For the past few years, jihad has often been assimilated – wrongly – with terrorism. This lumping together of two different things only helped the terrorists themselves.

After Afghanistan in the late 1980s, jihadism reached its peak in Algeria in the 1990s, when the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began to go after Europeans – in Europe or in Algeria – as well as Muslims judged to have been excessively influenced by Western culture.

(1) The word 'caliphate' refers to the authority of the caliph, the successor to the Prophet Mohammad, over the entire Muslim community as well as over the territories under its control.

A strategy more complex than it seems

The most immediate goal of the exponents of global Islamist-inspired terrorism is to 'cure' the Muslim people of what they consider as an inferiority complex that they see as a product of colonialism. To do that they seek to undermine the belief of the 'oppressed' in the supremacy of the 'oppressors' by revealing the latter's vulnerabilities. This was the goal of the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.

Once this symbolic power relationship is disrupted, the next goal is to seriously and enduringly impede the functioning of Western societies, by making their energy sources (such as oil and gas) vulnerable and threatening their modes of transport, both domestic and international.

The following stage is to provoke a split, including through physical separation, between the West and Muslims by driving Westerners (including permanent residents, military troops or tourists) out of Muslim lands and by attacking 'intermingling' areas such as tourist sites, and public transport networks in big cities.

To complete the separation, the Islamists terrorists seek the exhaustion of Western governments and public opinion.

Global Islamist-inspired terrorism also manages to recycle non-religious causes whose flames have died out due to lack of support. To the extent possible, it seeks to occupy the political space created by the collapse of communist revolutionary or Third-Worldist ideologies. It occupies the anti-imperialist space that no one else fills any longer. By doing so it seeks to place itself in the continuity of anti-colonial wars. In the rejectionist movement against the West and the fight against the great economic powers, we cannot exclude that it will one day seek a rapprochement with the most radical of the anti-globalization movements.

Rhetoric about 'the near enemy' and 'the far enemy'

The launch of the second Iraq war in 2003 allowed Islamist terrorism to reposition itself in the tradition of nationalist struggles and the defence of identity, and to recreate the combination that worked so well against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The military intervention in Iraq led to a threefold convergence that consolidated the terrorists' position: an ideological convergence between transnational 'jihadism' and Arab nationalism; an operational convergence between the terrorists and the Ba'athist security services; and finally a geographical convergence that allowed al Qaeda – which until then had always fought in the margins of the Arab world like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and East-Africa – to take a position in its heart.

The terrorists' message is boosted by this new set of factors, allowing them to return to the tactic of painting a picture of 'near' and 'far' enemies. The near enemies are the local 'apostate' regimes they accuse of having abandoned their religious identity; the far ones are their

Western 'protectors.' Taking advantage of this new situation, the terrorist movement can even pretend to take a pragmatic approach, such as when Osama bin Laden twice proposed a truce with the Europeans, in April 2004 and in 2006.

The terrorist movement achieves three main benefits from the wide scope of its rhetoric:

The first is an attractiveness that goes beyond the hard core of its original audience and allows it to seduce Western converts. This issue remains marginal. But it has enormous symbolic power. It shows the capacity to overcome ethnic and cultural barriers in the name of universal brotherhood.

The second benefit is to conceal the movement's internal differences. These differences, however, are very real. They have to do with how to characterize the enemy, in particular the possible existence of a tactical hierarchy among Western countries. Such a hierarchy would lead the terrorists to attack first the members of the 2003 coalition of countries that supported the second Iraq war, on the basis of the importance henceforth attributed to this natural battleground.

The third benefit is to reconcile political and ideological terrorism. This is most 'promising' in the long-term, since it makes it possible to combine the mobilization powers of each of these distinct forms of terrorism. Political terrorism is utilitarian. It sets concrete, limited, and asserted goals. It uses violence as a tactical lever. Ideological terrorism, on the other hand, expresses an existential rejection of the world. It refuses any possibility of dialogue or deterrence. Its only end is itself. Its power to harm is therefore, in principle, unlimited.

A Strategy for Managing Territory

The al Qaeda movement's rhetoric is inclusive. It also displays a strategy for differentiated use of territory. The territories in which it now operates can be divided into several different zones, whose purposes are precisely defined but whose borders are constantly evolving. These are sanctuaries, battlegrounds, transit zones, and operational areas.

Sanctuaries

Terrorism needs 'sanctuaries' for shelter, as possible training grounds, and sometimes to help organize the trafficking that provides financial support. After being forced to leave their open-air sanctuary in Afghanistan in 2001, the al Qaeda terrorists went looking for alternatives.¹

(1) Prior to Afghanistan, al Qaeda's sanctuary was in Sudan, which Osama bin Laden left in 1996.

In the absence of states willing to welcome them, they went to places where state authority no longer existed. Thus they took up residence in the desert or mountain zones that are scattered all around the arc of crisis that runs from the Maghreb to Southeast Asia, and which are devoid of state authority or monitoring. These areas include the tribal zones on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the borders of Kashmir and the borders of Iran. That is where the remnants of the original al Qaeda remain. Farther away, these areas include some refugee camps in Lebanon, the tribal regions of Yemen as well as Somalia. Still farther is the Sahel region in Africa, which has become a supply and shelter zone for some small groups, and at the other extreme some remote islands on the Philippine or Indonesian archipelagoes which play the same role.

These hideouts offer effective protection. All indications suggest that the hunt for new sanctuaries continues.

Battlegrounds

The second type of zone consists of the 'lands of jihad,' direct battlegrounds against the enemy, where terrorists gain legitimacy and experience and develop relationships.

During the first part of the 1990s, Bosnia was one of these combat zones. To various degrees, Afghanistan, Chechnya and the North Caucasus remain in this category. But now it is Iraq that has become the centre of gravity of these 'lands of jihad.' By creating a focal point for all the grievances of the Arab and Muslim worlds, the 2003 military intervention in Iraq led to increased radicalization by validating the most simplistic rhetoric of Islamist terrorism. This movement was able to portray the intervention as an attempt to use military power to impose democratic values and as an example of alleged collusion between Shiites and 'Crusaders.'

The dynamic at work in Iraq today thus contributes to the consolidation and spreading of terrorism. Thousands of volunteers from across the Arab world, as well as a smaller number from the European continent, are flocking to Iraq. After gaining valuable experience there, these volunteers find their calling in returning to their homelands. Because of the lack of adjacent sanctuaries, this issue has not yet reached the proportion it once did in Afghanistan. But it takes full advantage of globalization to amplify its message.

Transit and Support Zones, Half-Way between Sanctuaries and Battlegrounds

Global Islamist-inspired terrorism organizes networks to move people, money and weapons. These transit and support zones are of critical importance to the movement, which explains why they are relatively free from violence. Their centre of gravity today is in the area around Iraq, serving either as special entry points into Iraq or as practical communications corridors with Afghanistan or even the North Caucasus.

Operational Zones Where Global Islamist-Inspired Terrorism is at Work

Since 2001, most of the areas where terrorists operate have been concentrated in the Muslim world, as this often makes it easier for them. In the vast majority of cases they take action where they can, when they can, and how they can. Most often, this equation produces a simple result: they act at home, in their own countries, where Western targets representing the 'collaboration' between their governments and the 'occupiers' are normally present.

From the Sahel to the Indonesian archipelagoes, fewer and fewer countries are spared by the spread of terror at an average rate of one major attack every three months (except for Iraq, where the attacks happen daily). The targets are in big cities (Riyadh, Jakarta, Casablanca, Istanbul, Karachi, Amman) as well as in tourist centres (Djerba, Bali, Mombassa, Taba, Sharm el-Sheikh)

Since March 2004, Europe has been among these operational zones. There as elsewhere, the terrorists are acting at home, where they were born, and where they have been living for a long time.

Evolving and Complex Structures

Global Islamist-inspired terrorism is an amorphous collection of entities and individuals, organized horizontally and connected to each other to varying degrees.

The movement's original structure was different and relatively simple. It was vertical, with al Qaeda at the top and a few hundred Mujaheddin groups of varying backgrounds and affiliations at the bottom. These groups had passed through Afghanistan or other combat zones.

Initially, al Qaeda had an underground structure based on narrow recruitment from the middle-classes and created from the coming together of the Gulf Wahabis and Egyptian jihadists. Since 1998 under the joint leadership of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, it dragged the world into the new form of terrorism that we know today with three key actions.

The first stage was the incorporation of the thousands of Mujaheddin who came from the world over to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (between 1979-89), and then to join the Taliban (from 1996-2001). By creating this original model, al Qaeda earned the legitimacy that enables it now to symbolise global Islamist-inspired terrorism in general and to act as its spokesperson in the media.¹

(1) Osama bin Laden's stay in Afghanistan from 1996-2001 also enabled him to bring together individuals and groups from all over the world and to reinforce his influence over them – especially by using his money.

The second key set of events was of course the 11 September 2001 attacks, whose stunning results made it possible for terrorism itself to change the course of world history. Indeed, it was the collapse of the World Trade Centre towers that simultaneously elevated what was once a threat from a few hundred individuals to the strategic level and led the United States to launch a 'war on terrorism.'

Finally, after the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, al Qaeda organized the exfiltration and dissemination of terrorists all around the world.

The original model, however, has been significantly modified since 2001.

Through forced exile from its Afghan sanctuary, the original al Qaeda core group has lost a significant number of its leaders as well as its ability to play the role of single command centre. And the foot soldiers have been obliged to disperse among local militants. They have become part of an increasingly composite landscape never seen before on a global level. The best analogy for understanding it is the Internet: the terrorists form a huge, interconnected web, in which neutralizing one part has little effect on the functioning of the whole.

The network can be broken down into three levels, which – atypically – sit side by side, rather than on top of one another pyramid-style. It is fair to describe it as a network of networks whose borders are porous.

The First Level: the al Qaeda Organization

While partially dismantled, al Qaeda continues – though not without difficulty – to try to plan attacks from its Afghan and Pakistani redoubts. Its direct influence today is mostly concentrated along the axis linking Afghanistan to Iraq, in the Arabian peninsula and in the Horn of Africa. It does, however, still have the will, and even the means, to strike anywhere in the world.

It is in any case the core leadership that maintains the responsibility of keeping the movement ideologically coherent in its public message. This it does via the numerous video messages – around 40 since 2001, not including their many press releases – made by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.

The Second Level: Terrorist Entities with Regional Roots

The types of relationships between these groups and the original al Qaeda vary enormously. They range from 'subsidiary' relationships and partnerships to simple imitations. There are many such organizations, but the ones in Iraq and Saudi Arabia are those most willing to display their attachment to the 'centre.'

While the Iraqi movement has many unique characteristics, the model of a 'regional branch' has spread throughout the Persian Gulf region. The *Organization of Al Qaeda for Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula*, for example, seeks to bring together all the cells working in and around Saudi Arabia. There are also other organizations, all organized in different ways: *Osbat al Ansar* in Southern Lebanon; *Al Ittihad Al Islami* in Somalia, the 'combatant Islamic groups' in different North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Libya); the *Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat* (GSPC), in Algeria; and the *Jamaa Islamiyya* in Southeast Asia.

The Final Level: Individuals Acting Alone or in Cells

Individuals have widely varying roles within the global terrorist movement.

At the top are the 'officers.' They have the address books, compiled in battle zones, training camps or prisons. That enables them to become 'facilitators,' organizers of the groups that support the national networks with false documents, money, lodging, and help crossing borders.

Other members of the movement might be called the 'experts.' Their job is to provide some specialized skill (in explosives, counterfeiting, finance, and computers) to a cell, network, or even the entire amorphous movement.

Cells are normally organized around an individual distinguished by his past accomplishments or personal charisma. The cell is the basic element in the terrorist galaxy, gathering a limited number of individuals around a hard core typically consisting of five to 15 people. By varying its composition according to its missions, it can play a logistical role, an operational role, or the role of ideological radicalization – and it can move easily back and forth among these roles.

Whatever the circumstances, and even in the context of a guerrilla war as in Iraq in 2006, the cell constitutes the basic unit around which the struggle is organized. To understand how a cell functions, it is necessary to determine how independent it is from other cells and from potential external superiors. The study of the major attacks claimed by al Qaeda has made it possible to put forward a basic analytical framework that is based on the 'theory of the three circles.'

The 'Theory of the Three Circles'

This theory places al Qaeda attacks in three categories: The 'first circle' consists of attacks planned and executed directly by al Qaeda in the strictest sense of the term, acting alone. In the 'second circle' are attacks planned by al Qaeda and carried out with outside actors. And in the 'third circle' are attacks decided on and carried out by outside actors, but who claim to belong to the al Qaeda movement.

Thus according to these criteria, the March 2004 Madrid attacks would probably fall in the third category, the July 2005 London attacks might be in the second category, and the 11 September 2001 attacks would clearly be in the first category.

The last possibility is the individual, influenced by the movement but acting alone, or nearly alone, on his own, in his own way, and with his own hands.

As of 2006 this last possibility is still only a hypothesis. But the example of Theo Van Gogh's assassination in Amsterdam in November 2004 suggests that this possibility is no longer unrealistic.¹

(1) Theo Van Gogh was a Dutch film-maker who had made critical references to Islam and some radical Islamist religious groups in his work.

Global Terrorism Renews its Recruits, Adapts its Methods, and Displays a Signature Modus Operandi

Elusive Terrorists

Only a small number of marginalized individuals will ever resort to violence and engage in terrorist activities. This rule of thumb applies to global Islamist-inspired terrorism as well. It consists of a tiny minority of people, even within Muslim communities.

This type of terrorism nonetheless represents a growing threat that is harder to contain than in the past because of the diversification of its methods and its targets for recruitment.

A Minority with Diverse Backgrounds

Although reality cannot be easily reduced to stereotypes, it is primarily in Muslim areas that terrorist networks inevitably seek their recruits. The most likely profile to this day would be that of a young Muslim male, less than 40 years old. Women are only rarely involved.

But the origins, backgrounds and personalities of terrorists are of an unexpectedly wide variety. They have no obviously common bonds and their decision to engage in terrorism is not based on some simplistic determinism. A decline in social position or economic, social or cultural suffering can matter. But this is certainly not as important a factor as is sometimes said.

What comes through among individuals is a feeling of frustration and injustice. They feel frustration at what they believe is the Muslim community's loss of identity. And they believe Muslims to be victims of injustice in the world order.

The cosmopolitan and socially diverse nature of the global terrorist movement's members demonstrates the reality and power of the collective rage that unites them. It would be a grave error to assume it will disappear anytime soon.

Three Successive Generations

The hard core of global terrorism is made up of at least three generations :

- veterans of the first Afghan war, many of whom have been neutralized or have retired;
- militants trained in Afghan camps during the Taliban era;
- new recruits who signed up under the banner of the 'Iraq generation,' and who seem to have a greater propensity to carry out suicide attacks.

These three waves of recruits are intermingled with the current networks. The first, even if decimated, provides historical figures; the second provides active leadership; and the last provides the foot soldiers.

The first two groups remain dangerous. They now belong to the category of professional revolutionaries, old hands from the battle zones, used to operating under cover, exalted for their glorious accomplishments and their status as trained fighters, for their stays in prison, or, for some, for their theological expertise. For all these reasons their identities – even if sometimes multiple – and location are more or less known to the authorities. Some are on international data bases like the lists published under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, which entail the freezing of their assets and bans from staying in or transiting other countries.

Taken as a whole, they constitute a closed group of a few thousand individuals, of which a significant number have in 2006 already been rendered unable to do any harm or have decided on their own to retire. Some of the survivors nonetheless remain active. They use their prestige and experience to rally young recruits of the third generation to the cause.

Well-Honed Recruitment Methods

The recruiter takes advantage of the links that are created by regions, tribes, clans, families or neighbourhoods (in cities, mosques,

sports clubs or prisons) to enroll candidates in all the traditional ways. In this sense, mobilization stems more from political and psychological mechanisms than religious ones.

In Muslim countries, the technique is to invoke notions of purity and unselfishness, to which young people are particularly sensitive, as a means of getting those young people to rise up against the 'occupier' or against a corrupt power.

In the West, recruiters instead seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of the successive generations of immigrants, including those who come from non-Muslim countries (the Caribbean). The goal is to channel the malaise that exists in some big cities toward religious revival or revolt.

The 'Born Again'

The issue of 'born again' Muslims constitutes one of the possible responses to the need to find an identity that many of the most vulnerable people in our society feel. This is especially true for young people, children of immigrant origin and from difficult neighbourhoods, whose personal or professional development has stopped.

Seeking to resolve their personal problems, they turn to radical Islamism, which offers a simple and comprehensive ideological 'solution.' This type of conversion – expressed through sectarianism or political radicalization, and in conflict with the prevailing family and social milieu – has little in common with a return to the religious values of Islam that derive from family and cultural tradition.

Taken in by a charismatic recruiter and hardened by the influence of a narrow group of peers, the 'born-again' believer rediscovers his reference points and starts to believe once again in himself and to gain the respect of those around him.

Happily, the path toward terrorist violence is not automatic. But the stage of 'rebirth' can in some cases lead some more gullible individuals in that direction when the political circumstances, in their eyes, validate the thesis of a humiliated Islam under siege.

The exploitation of the recruits' psychological fallibility is in practice always strongly reinforced by the group dynamic produced by the cell. Indeed, it offers a framework of social links between people who lack such a framework. Most importantly, it puts peer pressure that can reinforce their original commitment in case it might be wavering. It is also within the cell that 'ideologisation' takes place – when personal motivations of a social or familial nature turn into a political-religious commitment to a collective goal.

The more closed the environment, the more these methods are effective. That is why they are so successful in prisons.

Finally, it is worth noting that while the decision to take action is ultimately always an individual one, taken after solitary reflection, that decision almost always comes in a collective framework, especially if it involves the suicide of the person carrying out the attack.

A More Problematic Third Wave

The description of the way in which new terrorists are enrolled shows why the third wave poses different problems from those posed by the first two.

Except for the 'Iraq returnees' who, like the veterans of the Afghan and Bosnian wars, have common, identifiable traits, the main characteristic of the new recruits is that of being difficult to pinpoint.

The new recruits can appear to be successfully integrated. They do not stand out for any particular religious fervour or militancy or from any past clashes with the police. They are indistinguishable, or at most barely distinguishable, from youth in general, with whom they share the same diverse social origins and levels of education. This intentional blending into general society helps to widen considerably the number of communities that could be at risk, which is all the more problematic because the radicalization process has accelerated.

This description fits the terrorists who struck Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005.

* * *

The threat of global Islamist-inspired terrorism is likely to endure. Although the spillover effects from Iraq have led it to spread since 2003, it has not been transformed into a mass movement. But it will have no trouble maintaining its strength, even if it continues to take significant losses.

Effective Management of the Flow of Information, Financing and People

Those who promote global Islamist-inspired terrorism are at home in modern society, even if they deny it. In any case, they systematically exploit all the opportunities it presents.

A key characteristic of globalization is the expansion and acceleration of the flow of information and money. Terrorists take full advantage of these hard-to-control exchanges to hide their secret activities or, on the contrary, to promote their accomplishments by taking full advantage of the media.

The flexibility of the terrorist networks' structures allows them to take better advantage of globalization than the states whose responsibility it is to fight those networks.

How the Terrorists Communicate

The Internet as a Tool of Modern Terrorism

The 'web' is the best symbol of global terrorist activity. Not only is it perfectly suited to the structure of the terrorist movement but it has in particular become an all-purpose tool. The terrorists feel at home on the web.

The Internet enables an individual or a group, even a tiny or secret one, to send messages instantly and openly to the entire world. It also makes it possible to get in touch, also immediately but privately, with a limited number of carefully chosen partners. The particular characteristics of the Internet – through which countless data transits – provide good conditions for anonymity.

To meet their needs in the areas of propaganda, recruitment, long-distance training, or transmission of messages, the terrorists use all the Internet's resources, including both open and closed areas. The most recent types of services offered by the Internet can even help them improve their ability to identify potential targets, thanks to all sorts of data – including geographical data and even satellite imagery – that can be found on the web.

The result of this intensive use of the Internet is the creation of a virtual space whose reach goes beyond the framework of terrorism. The community of sympathetic web-users brought together in this way can create the feeling of a reunified *Umma* (the community of believers), without borders or nationalities, united against a common enemy. Some even believe that global Islamist-inspired terrorism seeks to create a 'virtual Caliphate.'

The Use of Television for Propaganda Purposes

Satellite television – received all over and watched by those of all ages – is another of the terrorists' favourite propaganda tools.

In the rhetoric of Islamist terrorism, the West uses pictures and sounds as a means of intruding in every Muslim household to impose its values. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the terrorists – and certain extremist Muslim religious groups more broadly – now use television to promote their goals. Television is used to broadcast images of hostages begging to be spared before their decapitation and of suicide attacks, punctuated by the insistent appeals of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. The terrorists' objective is to send messages to mobilize those in whose name they claim to speak and to demoralise the adversary.

While the major Arab and Muslim international media generally demonstrate the professionalism necessary to avoid being taken advantage of, the same cannot be said for all satellite channels.

Mobile Phones are Also Well Suited to the Activities of Highly Fragmented Terrorist Networks

The ability to track mobile phone use is greater than it used to be. But the advantages cell networks offer are too tempting, and the means to preserve anonymity still too effective, for terrorists to refrain from using them, whether for operational or personal purposes.

Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing is a particularly important matter in the 'lands of jihad.' In these areas, paramilitary fighting and all that it involves (such as buying arms and ammunitions, and transport and supply for fighters and even their families), is in fact very expensive. As much as the materials necessary for attacks, it is the need to hire 'full-time terrorists' that entails high costs. It requires structured financing, which has two main sources. The first comes from skimming off oil income, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The second comes from collection networks set up in Western countries. In addition, certain preachers divert part of the *zakat*, the contributions that believers make to their mosques.

The security of transfers is ensured by the diversification of funding channels, which are to the extent possible kept outside of the banking system in order to thwart the surveillance and alert measures that apply to international financial flows.

Money orders, in small denominations, are used. Humanitarian Islamic NGOs were for a long time a primary tool, before their activities were subjected to more careful monitoring in France in 2002. But other equally inconspicuous means are still used. This is the case for the oldest and most traditional means, which remain as effective as ever. Human

money carriers are used, as is the *Hawala* channel.¹ Finally, modern kinds of money, which make anonymous money transfers possible, have appeared.²

In Europe, the local needs are smaller because the operational activities are rare and inexpensive. This makes the issue of terrorist financial flows different. The cost of carrying out the March 2004 attacks in Madrid and the July 2005 London attacks is estimated to have been between 15,000 and 20,000 euros. To ensure their financing, the cells may simply resort to delinquency, or even petty crime.

The Movement of People

Moving people remains indispensable in some cases, such as getting volunteers to the 'lands of jihad,' arranging for specialists to make temporary trips, or having human couriers transmit messages or money. These activities thus require the making of false travel documents and identity papers by the group's experts, whose work is vital to the terrorist business.

One of the most disturbing traits in the recent evolution of terrorism is, in fact, that these movements – which are dangerous to the terrorists because they can be tracked – are becoming less and less necessary because of the growing possibility of recruiting locals, including within Europe, and of using the services provided by the Internet.

A Traditional Yet Distinctive Modus Operandi

Global terrorism leaves an immediately recognisable imprint on its operations, wherever they may take place, seeking thus to validate the idea of a global enterprise capable of striking any time and anywhere (see Annex 1).

With the exception of the 11 September 2001 attacks, it must be noted that the promoters of global terrorism have most often sought to keep things as simple as possible. They have so far stuck to expanded use of explosives and suicide attacks. Their 'trademark' is thus not revealed by the nature of the attacks.

(1) *Hawala* is an informal system of international money transfer used in the Islamic world. It works using a compensation system among the participants.

(2) One example is prepaid smart cards – called 'Cash U Cards' – used in Arab countries and in the United Kingdom. Less secure than credit cards, they are anonymous and do not require the user to open a bank account. They make it possible to transfer money or make purchases without using a bank as an intermediary.

Rather, their originality lies in how the attacks are conducted. The first characteristic is the use of simultaneous explosions in one or several sites (13 bombs in four trains in Madrid in March 2004; simultaneous attacks on three subway lines and one bus in London in July 2005; several hundred small bombs in Bangladesh in 2005). Next are the 'soft targets' – civilian targets not directly protected – and the desire to cause as many casualties as possible. Finally there is the issue of timing, initially characterized by the effect of surprise – divorced from the timing of political events – and by the insistent repetition of attacks.

The trademark of global terrorist attacks since 2001 has, nonetheless, undergone a certain evolution, under the effect of the movement's 'Iraqisation' process. In Iraq itself, the development of an old-style guerrilla movement that quickly became widespread has led to the return of targeted assassinations and hostage-taking. Suicide attacks have multiplied. These practices have spread contagiously and have begun to expand beyond Iraq – first to Saudi Arabia, and then to Afghanistan, the Maghreb, and even Europe.

The attacks carried out in Europe seem to have been timed to coincide with political events (the Spanish legislative elections in 2004 and the G8 summit in the United Kingdom in 2005). Some saw in this the desire to directly affect national politics. It could simply be a matter of seeking to maximise the symbolic or media impact of the attacks. While successful, the attacks carried out in Europe were also characterized by the relative amateurism of local recruits trained on the job and probably self-financed.

As of early 2006, our continent had experienced all those terrorist practices ever used before by global terrorism: indiscriminate and simultaneous attacks, targeted attacks, and attacks that crossed the suicide barrier.

Global terrorism continues to give top priority to causing as many immediate casualties as possible. This choice is driven by the desire to send a message of direct hostility to a world symbolized by the targets chosen. But whatever the effectiveness of this operating procedure, repeating it seems to be in long-term contradiction with the need for novelty and for ever more spectacular results that the terrorists have imposed on themselves.

Troubling Prospects for France

France is a Designated Target at the Heart of a Europe under Threat

Global Islamist-Inspired Terrorism Does Not Spare France

France conducts a balanced foreign policy, which promotes respect for the rule of law and multilateralism and which listens to disadvantaged countries. This policy is in no sense directed against any specific state. Nonetheless, our country has been the object of attacks by the promoters of global terrorism.

The indictment always includes the same grievances: a past depicted as particularly burdensome (from the Crusades through colonialism); a military presence in Muslim lands (for example Djibouti); solid support for 'apostate' regimes, especially in the Maghreb; the secularism of the Republican State; the pretension to organize Islam according to a national model (with the 2003 creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith); and finally, the constant determination of French judges and security agencies to preventively neutralize terrorists and their accomplices.

Two further factors have recently emerged. One was the 15 March 2004 law on religious symbols in schools,¹ proof of our unwavering attachment to secularism. The other was the participation of French forces in the operations conducted in Afghanistan.

France is directly and repeatedly the object of various declarations of war put forward by the spokesmen of global Islamist-inspired terrorism.

Starting in 1998, the year al Qaeda was created in its original form, Osama bin Laden listed French military bases in Djibouti among the 23 objectives of his organization. Subsequently, the April 2001 visit to France by the Taliban's avowed enemy Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, led the al Qaeda leader to speak out virulently against France, which he called his main adversary after the United States.²

Since 11 September 2001, no fewer than nine communiqués have called for France to be punished. The main ones include that of Ayman al Zawahiri of 24 February 2004 and that published 18 May 2005 by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of 'al Qaeda in Iraq,' both denouncing the law banning religious symbols in schools. Even more worrisome are the declarations of the 'emir' of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which, in summer 2005, labelled France 'enemy number one,' confirming the overt hostility of Maghrebian extremists toward the former colonial power.

The attack in Karachi on engineers from DCN (the French naval shipbuilder then known as the *Direction des Constructions Navales*) on 8 May 2002, the attack on the tanker 'Limburg' on 6 October 2002, and the kidnapping of French hostages in Iraq starting in 2004 have confirmed that France got no 'special treatment' and that it was not spared from attack either. In addition, the numerous foiled attacks on French soil since 1998, in Strasbourg or in the Paris region, demonstrate that certain groups have already developed plans to carry out large-scale attacks directly in France (see Annex 2).³

(1) Law no. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, which, according to the principle of *laïcité* (secularism), provides the framework for the wearing of symbols or clothing manifesting religious affiliation in public elementary schools, secondary schools, and high schools.

(2) Massoud was assassinated on 9 September 2001, two days before the attacks in the United States, by affiliates of Osama bin Laden.

(3) Examples include, among others: 5 October 2001 – dismantlement of an Algerian Islamist cell suspected of preparing an attack at the time of a France-Algeria football match on 6 October 2001; 16 December 2002 – dismantlement at La Courneuve of a cell suspected of preparing non-conventional (chemical) attacks; 26 September 2005 – French police operation against a cell of former GIA members suspected of preparing attacks against the headquarters of the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, DST), the Orly airport and the Paris Metro.

Europe Targeted by Terrorism

Nearer to the Middle East and thus more accessible than the United States, Europe represents a desirable alternative to anyone thinking about striking the 'far enemy.' It contains a wide range of spectacular targets, some linked to the United States or Israel, which if attacked would create global reverberations. Finally insofar as there are large numbers of Muslims in Europe, it is in direct contact with crisis zones.

The Schengen Area, of which France is a part, has a single external border where entry is monitored by each country according to identical procedures, using a data base of undesirable individuals.¹ It is also characterized by the abolition of checks at internal borders. The setting up of this area was an important step in the European integration process. It must be consolidated because, while this area is not easy to get into, the free movement of people within it can facilitate the organization and movement of networks set up in Europe.

The reasons why Europe has become an operational zone can be found in a range of recently emerged aggravating factors.

Reasons for the Growing Threat to France and Europe

The first of the aggravating factors is the development of a generation of 'home-grown rebels,' with or without French nationality, who are either longstanding Muslims or recent converts.

If Islamists who left France to fight in Iraq were to come back or if some of the thousands of Maghrebian fighters who have gone there did the same, a second aggravating factor would immediately appear. Such prestigious terrorists could represent a considerable force of attraction for many young people of the same generation. These new 'officers' could become the inspiration for new networks, to which they would also bring expertise in urban terrorism.

The third aggravating factor is the movement of 'transnationalisation' of terrorism among Algerian, Libyan, Moroccan and Tunisian groups. Goaded by certain terrorists at the forefront of the fight in Iraq, and bolstered by the feeling of belonging to a unifying cause, many of the support cells that are found in France and its neighbours – in particular

(1) The Schengen Area is named after two conventions signed in the Luxemburg city of Schengen in 1985 and 1990 by five countries, including France. This cooperation was legally incorporated into European Union common policies with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. It now involves the first 15 members of the EU, with special regimes for Denmark and the United Kingdom, and it was widened, with certain conditions, to non-EU member states Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.

those of the GSPC – could be tempted to follow the path opened ten years ago by those linked to the GIA. This would mean turning from logistical support for the fighting in Algeria toward violent acts directed against France.

A final factor aggravating the threat has to do with its growing invisibility and decentralization. The access by Internet to all sorts of expertise or, on a different level, the radicalization of the prison milieu, mean that apprentice terrorists no longer need to be integrated into a fundamentalist movement or to attend Koranic schools (such as the Pakistani *madrassas*)¹. Nor do they need to go to the less numerous and more distant training camps. Relations with the veterans can thus be established more discreetly.

The threat now develops almost invisibly and is much more difficult for the intelligence and security agencies to detect.

One would expect that the recent trend within global terrorism toward smaller and less integrated units would lead it in the direction of less sophisticated actions. It remains to be seen whether this trend will not be affected by an opposite movement in the direction of more spectacular or deadly operational methods.

We cannot exclude another mutation that would lead to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorism. No moral objection to such actions exists in the terrorists' minds. They have in fact clearly shown that no atrocity is too repulsive to them, and they would not in principle reject any operational method if it matched their criteria for effectiveness. There is no doubt, moreover, that some of them have already thought about using such weapons and that they have envisaged to acquire them. Osama bin Laden has in fact often referred to Islam's need to endow itself with nuclear or chemical weapons.² Numerous extremist theologians have in their writings legitimized the use of weapons of mass destruction against Western civilians. The operations undertaken by the coalition in Afghanistan, moreover, have made it possible to establish that al Qaeda had already before 2001 undertaken rather advanced research in the chemical and biological areas, with help from high-level experts. Several terrorists arrested in France since 2001 had been involved with terrorist projects that included a rudimentary non-conventional aspect.

Numerous obstacles still stand in the way of the desire to commit this sort of attack. It is first necessary to have a minimal level of scientific and technical knowledge. It often remains very difficult to acquire the necessary materials, components or equipment. Working with these materials is often complex and dangerous. An attack undertaken with unconventional means can only succeed under very precise conditions. It thus entails a risk of failure. The loss of the Afghan sanctuary thus deprived the terrorists of the capacity to develop major unconventional projects. These

(1) Some of these schools have been identified as training centres for global Islamist-inspired terrorism.

(2) His words, however, could be taken to refer more to Muslim nations in general than to his own organization.

potential complications are probably what has led al Qaeda to adopt, other than on a few rare occasions, a more basic operational process, combining proven techniques (such as the systematic use of explosives) with original tactics (widespread simultaneous attacks in public places).

But other factors darkly suggest a resort to forms of terrorism that would make use of non-conventional weapons. The need to innovate in using terror is one. The growing spread of the technology, equipment and knowledge necessary for chemical and especially biological terrorism is another. This, in fact, makes it possible to cross certain technical obstacles. The recruitment of individuals well-integrated in European societies and trained in chemistry and biology can make it possible to apply expertise in highly toxic chemical products – widely available in business and industry – and publicly accessible procedures for biological production and use.

France's Counter-Terrorism System Must Continue to Adapt

The global terrorist threat could produce highly varied kinds of attacks that our country must be able to counter. To be prepared for any eventuality, we must test our system by envisaging scenarios that would call on the main measures designed to prevent terrorist acts and responding if an attack cannot be prevented.

Seven Scenarios for Testing Our Counter-Terrorist System

The following scenarios are not predictions. Many of them are today highly improbable because of their degree of complexity. Taken as a whole, they nonetheless allow us to outline the policies we must follow to fight terrorism effectively in all its forms.

A Campaign of Bomb Attacks

A terrorist group tries to conduct a campaign of repeated attacks, spread out over several months, with explosions in public places (metro stations, buses, airports, schools, etc.)

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- *The capacity to identify and neutralize the bombers as quickly as possible;*
- *The capacity of all our judicial, intelligence and security agencies to work at an intensive pace for an extended time;*
- *The capacity to maintain the vigilance of the public and state agencies as the country begins to function at the pace required by the constraining measures of the Red – or even Scarlet – level of the 'VIGIPIRATE'⁽¹⁾ plan for several months;*
- *The application over time of drastic and coherent security measures to all national public places.*

Multiple Simultaneous Attacks

A terrorist organization seeks to use suicide attacks to cause simultaneous explosions in public buildings. The targets are large shopping centres, for example.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- *Early actions of our intelligence agencies;*
- *Precautionary, preventive and protective measures taken in the context of the 'VIGIPIRATE' plan;*
- *Increased internal security in a large number of public buildings;*
- *Rapid dissemination of warning signals;*

(1) See p. 68.

- The simultaneous implementation of several plans to help the victims;
- The strengthening of security measures pertaining to the raw materials used for making the types of explosives used (access, tracability) in order to avoid a second wave of attacks.

Diversified Cross-Border Attacks

Three teams of terrorists try to act simultaneously in several neighbouring countries. The objective of the first team is to seize a cargo ship arriving from a nearby country in order to cause damage in an oil terminal in one of our ports. The second team provokes an attack designed to sow confusion in the immediate neighbourhood of a nuclear plant near the border. The third team tries to attack computer systems to interfere with emergency response activities.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- Operational procedures between France and its neighbours, including in the area of public communication;
- Cyberterrorism prevention measures;
- The neutralization and reaction measures foreseen in the dedicated reaction plans ('PIRANET,' 'PIRATE-MER,' 'PIRATOME'...)¹

Radiological Attack

A terrorist tries to set off a 'dirty bomb' (a device made of explosives and radioactive materials) in an underground public transport network.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- National and international measures to control radioactive materials;
- The capacity of early detection of explosives and dangerous substances;
- Public communication;
- Decontamination of the sites polluted by the dispersed radioactive materials;
- The neutralization and reaction measures foreseen in the 'PIRATOME' plan.

Chemical Attack

A terrorist group tries to spread a powerful nerve agent of industrial origin in a large railway station at rush hour, with the goal of causing a large number of casualties.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- The capacity of early detection of the acquisition and transformation of the precursor products for nerve gas;
- The protective measure of the 'VIGIPIRATE' plan and the alert and preventive neutralization measures in the dedicated 'PIRATOX' reaction plan;

(1) See p. 68.

- *The capacity of the emergency and security services to immediately identify nerve gas and to take rapid action in a potentially contaminated atmosphere;*
- *Public communication;*
- *Decontamination of the areas polluted by the nerve agent.*

Infectious Biological Attack

A terrorist group tries to acquire a highly contagious and deadly infectious agent. It seeks to spread it in a number of places to set off an epidemic that could last several months.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- *Early detection of the epidemic via the identification of clinical signs and the comparison of analyses among different laboratories;*
- *The elaboration of procedures designed to isolate infected households, treat the sick, and allow economic and social services to continue to operate;*
- *The production and distribution of prophylactic and therapeutic treatments;*
- *Public communication;*
- *The application of emergency public health restrictions to limit the movement and activities of the population;*
- *Measures of neutralization and reaction foreseen in the 'BIOTOX' plan.*

Attempt to Divert a Nuclear Weapon

A terrorist group tries to move a nuclear weapon from overseas to an urban centre in order to trigger an explosion.

The aspects of our counter-terrorist system most in demand would be:

- *International action against nuclear proliferation;*
- *The capacity to detect the movement of the weapon and to put in place an intercept operation while it is in transit;*
- *The capacity to rapidly neutralize the weapon;*
- *The reaction measures foreseen in the 'PIRATOME' plan;*
- *The capacity to evacuate the population;*
- *If the terrorist group succeeds, the capacity to treat casualties both short-term and long-term, the maintenance of basic communication capabilities in such an environment, and the rebuilding of affected areas.*

The list of scenarios described above is not exhaustive. Other threats that could be carried out are taken into account by the national counter-terrorist system.

To stop all possible attacks, we must continue to adapt our system. Our goal must be to prevent risks and threats through surveillance, detection and neutralization of potential terrorists, to reduce our vulnerabilities, to reinforce our capacities for management of a terrorist crisis and to strengthen our capacity for rebuilding and punishment.

Countering Risk: Surveillance, Detection, Neutralization

The mission of prevention is essential in the fight against terrorism. We have the means to identify the most dangerous individuals, to neutralize those who are planning to act, and to monitor groups that might be at risk. This is all the more effective in that the French penal system – and this is its strength – does not establish a rigid separation between prevention and punishment.

Every day, this prevention mission mobilizes our intelligence agencies and our internal security forces responsible for monitoring the people and goods that enter, exit and cross our territory; our counter-terrorist magistrates; our armed forces; and our diplomatic service.

The terrorism prevention system in place in our country is sound and has proven its effectiveness. But the evolution of the terrorist threat, characterized by the development of global terrorism, makes it necessary for us to continue to adapt this system. This was the imperative that guided the elaboration of the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006.

Strengthening the Capabilities of our Intelligence and Security Agencies

Strengthening our Detection Capabilities

The effectiveness of our security and intelligence agencies, police and gendarmerie stems from their capacity for anticipating violent action and analysing the full range of mechanisms that contribute to the development of terrorism to better counter it. This requires the improvement of our capability to monitor electronic communications, the facilitation of the security and intelligence agencies' access to certain administrative data bases, and a better identification of dangerous travellers.

Improving Surveillance of Electronic Communications

As noted, those involved in global terrorism are comfortable on the Internet, whose characteristics offer them privacy.

(1) Given the technical standards that govern it, the Internet makes it difficult to identify users since the idea of a 'user name' is often virtual and temporary.

(2) An individual can have numerous user names. He or she can thus maintain many different electronic addresses, supplied either by an Internet operator or by global service providers which allow the user, without any identity checks, to create email addresses. Similarly, these same service providers offer the possibility, without further checks, to create websites.

(3) There are many Internet access providers. Some are less sensitive to security concerns than traditional telephone operators.

(4) The services on offer are proliferating. At the start of the decade, email and 'news groups' – where particular topics could be discussed – were the most widely used tools. Today there are many other ways of communicating on the web. People can use 'chat rooms' – which enable users to communicate instantly with others; they can use instant messaging; they can create semi-private communications systems; they can exchange files, even very large ones, via 'peer to peer' (P2P), in other words directly from computer to computer without the data passing through a centralized system; they can call without using the usual telephone networks (for example thanks to free, downloadable software, which can be used with only a user name and a password); they can encrypt communications thanks to commercial software that makes this possible; and they can even talk very easily via videoconference.

(5) The ways of accessing the Internet are being diversified. At first one used fixed telephone lines from home. Now many also use cable, mobile phone networks, or satellites to do so. Access points are also prolif-

erating. It is possible to 'navigate' on the Internet, and thus check email remotely, in Internet cafés, or in most public places that are equipped with 'wifi' (wireless networks). These types of connection are developing on physical networks and communications nexuses; they can be found in hotels, railway stations, airports, and service stations on highways.

There are two parts to the Internet. One is open. It provides free access to information through websites, chats, forums, blogs, so long as one is connected to the right address. The other part is closed. It consists mainly of traditional email, instant messaging, and telephone accounts. Access to information is often protected with user names and passwords.

The creation in the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 of a procedure enabling governmental access to connection data (under the monitoring of an independent authority) allows the specialized agencies to act more effectively and more rapidly to prevent terrorist acts. This system can be activated 24 hours a day in case of an emergency.

The intelligence agencies must be able to identify and extract relevant data from the mass of information that is available in the open part of the Internet. Under certain conditions, they must also be able to access data that circulate on the closed part.

It will likely be necessary to adapt the 10 July 1991 law that governs security intercepts, if only to be able to target not only a predetermined telephone number but an individual, with the full range of means of communication and services that he or she uses.

We must also become more active in shaping Internet standards. To do that, we need a policy that seeks more actively to influence the authorities that regulate the Internet, both in terms of its operational development (at the level of the Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF) and in the area of research (under the auspices of the Internet Research Task Force, IRTF). It is particularly necessary to advocate technical and legal decisions that make it possible to limit anonymous communication.

Authorising Security and Intelligence Agencies to Access Certain Ordinary Administrative Data Bases

The growing discretion of the terrorists and their ability to communicate or move around in relative anonymity are obstacles to effective preventive action of the specialized services. The services have to take into account the evolution of the profile of new recruits. These recruits have not drawn previous attention by the police, or are known for an ordinary criminal past that shows no signs of developing into radical Islamism.

However, the identification of a terrorist before he acts can depend on the verification of a simple piece of operational information, often on short notice.

Until 2006 and unlike most of their counterparts in foreign countries, the intelligence agencies did not have legal access to ordinary

administrative data bases (for identity cards and passports; visas and residence permits; vehicle registrations and drivers licences). The counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 allowed access to the personal data in these data bases, managed by the Interior Ministry, so that the necessary verifications could be made within operationally useful time limits.

All such investigations carried out by the police are kept and put under the control of the National Commission on Data Processing and Liberties (*Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés* or CNIL). They only involve personal data that is not sensitive, such as one's civil status or address. The possible access to more sensitive data, such as that contained in banking, tax, or social security data bases, is only allowed in the framework of a judicial procedure.

Identifying Dangerous Travellers Better

For the branches of the police responsible for counter-terrorism, it is absolutely essential to have access to information about individuals who travel regularly or for extended stays to countries known to shelter areas of radicalization, as well as about the travel movements of people already identified.

The National Cross-border Index (*Fichier National Transfrontière*, FNT) is designed with this goal in mind. The way in which it is supplied with information, however, has become ineffective and obsolete. The boarding and landing cards that passengers fill out are entirely declaratory and cannot be systematically monitored. Moreover, the manual handling of the cards has become an enormous job with the growth in air travel. It unduly occupies the agents needed to carry out security checks and border checks. By authorising automatic information feeding of the FNT with optical reading of the travel papers and visas at the time of the border controls, the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 opened the way to the rapid modernisation of this data base.

The data bases of airlines are also a source of useful information in counter-terrorism. Two types of such data bases exist: commercial reservation databases¹ and departure-monitoring data bases.² Both contain identifying information relative to the travellers as well as information about the flights taken.

Access to data from reservations, departure checks and border checks prior to the flight enables the agencies in charge of counter-terrorism to run checks sometimes several days before the trip. Effective use of counter-terrorism information requires that the data be compared with each

(1) 'Passenger Name Records' (PNR) data bases include a variety of data collected by companies for their business needs. The International Civil Aviation Organization has issued recommendations, but PNR do not conform to any standard. Depending on the destination the airlines must share the information they have with the police.

(2) 'Advanced Passenger Information System' (APIS) data bases are being standardized internationally. Airlines must gather certain data from their passengers, check them, and transmit them to the authorities responsible for border controls in the country of destination before the airplane takes off.

other and sometimes kept in a single data base. They must always be cross-checked with the data base of suspects.

The counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 enables the regulations governing air travel to be extended to international sea and rail travel whenever an external European Union border is crossed.

Ensuring Coordination Among Intelligence and Security Agencies in the Fight Against Terrorism

To be as effective as possible, the activities of the various specialized counter-terrorism agencies require close cooperation.

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, our main partners have been moving to restructure their intelligence coordination agencies. The United States created the post of 'Director of National Intelligence' (DNI) under the U.S. President.¹ In the United Kingdom, in 2003, the authorities put in place a new inter-agency terrorism analysis structure, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). Operating 24 hours per day and bringing together officials from 11 different ministries and agencies, the JTAC's goal is to centralize, analyse and evaluate all terrorism-related information, both on British territory and abroad. The creation of the JTAC brings the operational level (the everyday work of the agencies on the ground) closer to the strategic level, represented by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under the direction of the Prime Minister's Security and Intelligence Coordinator.

In France, the main decisions in the area of counter-terrorism are taken in a number of different high-level bodies. Chaired by the President of the Republic, the *Conseil de Sécurité Intérieure* (Internal Security Council, CSI) defines the orientation for domestic security policy and establishes priorities.² The Prime Minister brings together the ministers involved with counter-terrorism to coordinate their actions and establish their orientation. He chairs the *Comité Interministériel du Renseignement* (Interministerial Intelligence Committee, or CIR).³ This committee also leads the work of technical groups. The Interior Minister leads the *Comité Interministériel de Lutte Antiterroriste* (Interministerial Counter-Terrorist Committee, CILAT) in order to coordinate action undertaken at the interministerial level. The Prime Minister's chief of staff extends the Prime

(1) The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also created a new coordination structure – the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) – directly under the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) According to decree no. 2002-890 of 15 May 2002 relating to the Internal Security Council. The CSI includes the Prime Minister, the Ministers involved and the Permanent Secretary for National Defence. The Secretary General of the CSI is appointed by the President of the Republic and serves under him.

(3) According to ordinance n° 89-258 of 20 April 1989, the CIR is in charge of ensuring the orientation and coordination of the activities of the intelligence agencies. It is staffed by the *Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale* (Permanent Secretariat for National Defence), which is under the Prime Minister.

Minister's leadership by chairing regular meetings of the senior officials responsible for security.¹

At the operational level, the *Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste* (Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, UCLAT), created in 1984 within the Interior Ministry, ensures the coordination of all the counter-terrorism agencies, through the daily analysis and synthesis of information about terrorism. It works closely with the DST, the DCRG, the national gendarmerie, the DGSE and the *Direction Générale des Douanes* (Customs Service). It makes sure that relevant operational information is shared with all the counter-terrorism agencies and authorities, including the counter-terrorist magistrates and the prison management authorities.

Specialized Counter-terrorism Agencies in France

The judicial arm includes a public prosecutor (parquet), an investigating branch (pôle d'instruction) and a panel of judges (formations de jugement) specialized in judging terrorist crimes. All of their files are centralized in Paris.

In the Interior Ministry, most of the specialized counter-terrorism agencies are under the Direction Générale de la Police Nationale (Central Directorate of National Police, DGP/N). The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, DST), in addition to traditional counter-espionage missions, works directly on the prevention and repression of terrorist activities thanks to its judicial and administrative policing attributions. The role of the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (Central Directorate of General Intelligence, DCRG) is to monitor dangerous groups. The Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (Central Directorate of Judicial Police, DCPJ) undertakes numerous investigations through its Division Nationale Anti-Terroriste (National Counter-Terrorist Division, DNAT). In cases of financial crime, one of its specialized offices can be used as well.

The Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit, UCLAT) brings together the information supplied by all the operational agencies, whether in the Interior Ministry, the Defence Ministry or the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry. This unit is also responsible for regularly exchanging information with judicial authorities. The RAID (research, assistance, intervention and deterrence), intervention force of the national police, is constantly available to the DGP/N in

(1) The 'intelligence meetings' chaired by the Prime Minister's chief of staff include the representatives of the President of the Republic's private office (état-major particulier), of the CSI, the chiefs of staff of the Interior, Defence, and Foreign Ministers and the Permanent Secretary for National Defence (SGDN), as well as the directors of the main intelligence services (DGSE, DST, DRM).

case of crisis. The *Police aux Frontières* (Border Police, PAF) watches out for suspicious persons entering and exiting the country. In Paris, the police prefecture maintains specialized administrative and judicial police units. The national gendarmerie under the operational control of the Interior Minister, participates in counter-terrorism through its widespread coverage of the national territory.

In the **Defence Ministry**, the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (Central Directorate of External Security, DGSE) plays an essential role by providing intelligence gathered outside of France. The *Direction du Renseignement Militaire* (Military Intelligence Directorate, DRM) has detection and analysis capabilities (notably through satellite imagery). By virtue of its military attributions, particularly for external operations, the national gendarmerie also plays an important role. Moreover, within its *Groupement de Sécurité et d'Intervention* (Security and Intervention Group, GSIGN), it makes the *Groupement d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale* (Gendarmerie Nationale Intervention Unit, GIGN) constantly available for counter-terrorist action. Finally, the *Direction de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Défense* (Defence Protection and Security Directorate, DPSD) ensures that the personnel and installations of the wider defence sector (state and industry) are protected against terrorism.

The **Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry** has several agencies associated with counter-terrorism. The *Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières* (National Intelligence and Customs Inquiries Directorate, DNRED) gathers, analyses, and distributes customs information related to terrorist financing. The cell called *Traitement du Renseignement et Action Contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins*, (Treatment of Information and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits, TRACFIN) gathers information that it adds to by comparing it with information from other ministries before passing it on to the judicial system. The main role of the FINATER cell (created in October 2001 to prepare and relay ministerial guidelines on the fight against terrorist financing) is to freeze terrorists' financial assets.

Cooperating with Our Foreign Partners

Traditionally, international cooperation in the area of intelligence is primarily a bilateral relationship between services. It is in this framework that most information, especially operational information, circulates. It has, however, become necessary to expand cooperation in a multilateral framework, given the convergence of interests and risks with our partners.

In the **European Union**, after the March 2004 Madrid attacks, a terrorism threat analysis cell was created in the Situation Centre ('SITCEN') that was placed under the authority of the Secretary-General

of the Council, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This Situation Centre, which France actively contributes to, establishes a threat assessment based on the sources provided to it by intelligence agencies, military, diplomats, and the police. The Sitcen can also make useful contributions to operational issues, such as the terrorists' destinations, motives and movements, in order to sensitize all Member States and help them to take appropriate measures. Experience shows that Member States have very different threat perceptions and that their harmonization is highly useful.

The retention of fixed telephone, mobile phone and internet traffic data plays a key role in counter-terrorism. This is often what makes it possible, notably in the case of the March 2004 Madrid attacks, to track down the terrorist network. Connexion data show the identification, place and time of the calls, but not the content of the communications. Already in 2001, France took the decision to require electronic communications operators to keep these data for a year. The adoption in early 2006 of the European directive on the retention of communications traffic data, which requires the data to be kept for at least six months, will be an important step forward. It will allow better cooperation among Member States in identifying terrorists.

The heads of internal security agencies of several European countries meet in the context of the **Club of Bern**, an informal forum for exchanging information in areas such as counter-espionage, organized crime and terrorism.¹ After the 11 September attacks and on the recommendation of the European Union, the Club of Bern created a counter-terrorism group (GAT) that brings together the leaders of counter-terrorist units. This group draws together assessments of terrorist threats and thematic studies on issues such as false documents networks and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat.

At the **multilateral level**, information exchanges on threat analysis take place mostly within the G8² and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Within the G8, the Practitioners Group carries out threat analysis. In NATO, the Special Committee prepares analytical documents on terrorist threats that could affect the Alliance.

(1) Created in 1968, the Club of Bern includes heads of internal security in 19 European Countries.

(2) The G8 is an informal multilateral institution made up of 8 states: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. France proposed its creation at the Rambouillet summit in 1975. This led to the formation of the G7 the following year, which was expanded to include Russia in 1998.

Consolidating our Penal System and Adapting our Prison System to the Threat of Terrorism

Consolidating an effective penal system

To be effective, a judicial system for counter-terrorism must combine a preventive element, whose objective is to prevent terrorists from acting, and a repressive element, to punish those who commit attacks as well as their organizers and accomplices.

The French system follows this logic. But its originality and strength lie in the fact that the barrier between prevention and punishment is not airtight.

On the level of principles, France has chosen to develop a unique penal system to prevent and punish terrorism. The main element is the law of 9 September 1986, adopted after the wave of attacks conducted in 1985 and 1986. It is not a matter of creating extraordinary legislation. It is a specialized penal system tailored to the particular nature of terrorism. Specialized law applies not only to the fight against terrorism, but also to organized crime.

In our legal system, a terrorist act is defined first by the combination of a crime with 'an individual or collective act whose goal is to seriously disturb public order through intimidation or terror' (article 421-1 of the penal code). The terrorist aspect of the crime brings into application a penal system that includes, most importantly, an increase in the severity of the penalties imposed and an extension of the normal statute of limitations (extended to 30 years for felonies and 20 years for misdemeanours).

There are three unique aspects to our antiterrorist penal system.

The first is the existence of a specific offence that enables not only the suppression of support structures of terrorists or their accomplices but also the prevention of attacks still under preparation. Elevated to the level of a specific offence by the law of 22 July 1996, it is without question the cornerstone of the system. It enables the legal system to intervene even before an attack is perpetrated. It is thanks to this law that the terrorist networks' logistical cells and the peripheral structures that surround them can be dismantled. The application of this offence requires an exchange between magistrates and intelligence services. The exchange is facilitated by the fact that the DST is at the same time an internal intelligence agency responsible for preventing activities that threaten national security and a judicial police agency that undertakes sensitive investigations on international terrorism. This dual nature makes possible the use of information acquired through intelligence during judicial procedures, whereas in the other direction, the information gathered in the context of judicial procedures is used to guide the security police work.

The second specificity of the French system is to take into account the seriousness of terrorist acts in the definition of procedural

rules which are more flexible than for normal offences. A terrorist suspect can be held for up to 96 hours, compared with 48 hours under the normal system. The intervention of a lawyer is pushed back to the 72nd hour. In case of an imminent risk of attack or necessity linked to international cooperation, the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 authorizes an extension of up to six days. The means of investigation have also been expanded: it is possible, under certain conditions, to carry out searches and seizures at night and infiltration and 'bugging' of automobiles and residences is permitted. Finally, the serious risks involved justify special protection for witnesses and even investigators. Witnesses can thus be heard anonymously, and the anonymity of investigators can, under certain conditions, be maintained.

The specialization of counter-terrorist magistrates is the third specificity of the counter-terrorist penal regime. Its main characteristic is the centralization of the prosecution, investigation, and judgment of cases in Paris. Seven magistrates of the public prosecutor's office and seven specialized *juges d'instruction* (investigating magistrates) are responsible for terrorism cases. The judgment of misdemeanours is delegated to the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, while that for felonies is the responsibility of a *cour d'assises* (trial court) made up entirely of professional magistrates, as opposed to a *cour d'assises* for normal offences, in which the jury is made up of ordinary citizens. This specialization of the magistrates has made it possible over time to develop a genuine counter-terrorist culture: the terror network's evolution is better controlled, and relationships of confidence built up over time have been developed with foreign security agencies and magistrates.

All in all, the French judicial system for counter-terrorism, constantly adapted since 1986, gives cause for satisfaction.¹ It does not need major reform.

Prison Conditions in Need of Adaptation

Prison has become a place where dangerous proselytization takes place. If we are not careful, this will eventually produce a reservoir of radical activists available to conduct terrorist acts. An examination of past incidents makes it possible to draw a national map of proselytization in prisons and a genuine increase has been observed in certain regions, including Paris region.

Various short-term measures can be contemplated to slow the rise of proselytization. A modification of regulations in the legal code governing prison life should solve some of the problems. It is also necessary to pay close attention to the recruitment of Muslim chaplains in prisons.

The phenomenon also requires structural treatment over the long term. Centralizing the application of penalties at the Tribunal de Grande

(1) The main reforms include the laws of 22 July 1996, 15 November 2001, 9 September 2002, 18 March 2003, 9 March 2004, and most recently 23 January 2006.

Instance of Paris as foreseen in the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 will make it easier to follow-up on prisoners being held for a terrorist offence, wherever they are being held and wherever they may be from. This policy could be bolstered by establishing a computerized national data-base of people sentenced for a terrorist offence.

Neutralizing Dangerous Flows of People, Goods, Funds and Ideas

Monitoring the Movement of Dangerous Individuals

The Entry and Stay in France of People Suspected of Links with Terrorist Activities

With the exception of the special case of people from Member States of the European Union, foreigners who enter and reside in France are subject to a system of administrative authorization.

(1) Entry into France normally requires the issuing of a visa by consular authorities.¹

Heads of French consular posts have the legal right to refuse the granting of a visa in cases where the applicant has terrorist links. This is the case whether it is an application for a long-term visa, which are still handled by France, or for a visa for a stay of less than three months, which is handled under a common regime of the Schengen countries. The Convention implementing the Schengen agreement allows short-term visas to be rejected for this reason, which leads the people in question to be listed in the 'Schengen Information System' (SIS data base).

(2) Contrary to widespread assumptions, even an official visa in good order does not grant an unconditional right of entry into the country.

The visa does allow its holder to depart his or her country with France as a destination. But the border police can refuse the visa holder entry into France for reasons of public security resulting from a link with terrorism. Entry can be refused not only to a foreigner with a regular entry visa, but also to a foreigner holding a residence permit (*carte de séjour*).

Typically, in the process running from getting a visa to entry into France to staying in France, the issue of a threat to public security, specifically linked to a risk of terrorism, can be raised at any time: at the time the visa is applied for; upon admission into the territory; or when the

(1) Except in cases of reciprocal agreements that exempt citizens from certain countries from this requirement.

application for a residence permit is being considered, even for a foreigner who could otherwise claim every right to have one.¹

(3) Links with terrorism, which constitute a legal obstacle to entry into and residence in France, in the same way constitute a legal basis for forced deportation from France. 'Conduct linked to activities of a terrorist nature' thus justifies the deportation of a foreigner, however extensive his or her links with France.²

'Explicit and deliberate acts of incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence' can also lead to deportation. It was on this basis that the Interior Ministry announced the deportation of some ten fundamentalist imams during 2004-05.

Identifying Individuals: the Biometrics Issue

It is necessary to have the ability to prevent dangerous individuals from entering or staying in France. And it is just as necessary to have the ability to deport some of them from the country. But the impact of these measures on civil liberties, especially on the right to come and go, is not negligible. We must therefore be sure that the coercive measures are being applied to the right people, without risk of error. The more certain we can be about identifying the right people, the more certain we can be not to take action against the wrong ones.

Identity falsification and identity theft are big challenges. They raise questions about the reliability of registry office data, identity papers and passports. Using biometrics can help limit fraud by offering a limited number of all-purpose means of identification.

Biometrics makes use of different techniques, including facial recognition; optical (iris pattern) recognition; fingerprints or palmprints; spectral voice analysis; and genetic data comparison.

The advantage of biometric data is that they are unique and indistinguishable from the individual in question. Biometrics thus makes it possible to identify an individual who is present by establishing a link between the person and the identifying documents that is almost impossible to falsify. Biometrics also makes it possible to identify someone by comparing his biometrical data with those contained in a data base.

A number of our neighbouring countries have already begun making use of fingerprint and palmprint biometrics not only for travel documents but also for identity cards. This is the case in Belgium, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. France has already decided to start issuing biometric visas. Making passports and identity papers more secure through fingerprint and palmprint biometrics is a priority. This should take place in

(1) According to Articles L. 314-11 and 12 of the code governing entry and residence of foreigners and right to asylum.

(2) This is clearly expressed in the language of Article L. 521-3 of the code governing entry and residence of foreigners and right to asylum.

a balanced legal framework, taking into account both the protection of civil liberties and the demands of the combat against terrorism.

Stopping Capital Flows that Contribute to Terrorist Financing

Reinforcing our Judicial Apparatus Against Terrorist Financing

Financing terrorism is a criminal offence, banned by Article 421-2-2 of the penal code. It is thus legally possible to track down the networks and, if necessary, to sanction the network's financial support. Practitioners are completely satisfied with the fact that the financial and the counter-terrorism departments of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris can be seized jointly.

The effectiveness of prevention is less certain.

Information circulates appropriately among the different actors: magistrates, intelligence agencies, the Economy, Finance and Industry Ministry's TRACFIN cell, whose responsibility it is to track secret financing in France. It would, however, be desirable to strengthen the legal basis of the exchanges between TRACFIN and the police and intelligence agencies that participate in the combat against terrorist financing and money-laundering.

The way in which certain religious organizations and charities use the money they raise is highly opaque. A number of options are possible to try to lessen the doubts that this absence of transparency can create.

One option would be to require that beyond a certain level of activity, organizations be required to work with an accounting commissioner to certify the legality of all their transactions, or that their obligation to present their accounts to clerks from Grande Instance tribunals be reinforced. These requirements, which are not particularly burdensome and serve the general interest, do not interfere with the right to free association guaranteed by the law of 1901. A reinforcement of the regime that oversees fundraising from the public could also complement the application of this sort of declaratory requirement.

Finally, the procedure for freezing assets of people or organizations with links to terrorist organizations, recently reformed by the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006, should enable the neutralization of suspicious assets, by giving the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry the power even over funds held by EU citizens.

Developing Effective International Cooperation

Already in 1999, at France's initiative, the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted at the United Nations. This text prefigured a number of measures that were taken up again in UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, and also contains other

measures that are enormously helpful in the combat against terrorist financing, such as extradition measures and mutual legal assistance, preventive measures for financial institutions to take, and the lifting of banking secrecy.

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, different international legal instruments were adopted. Their objective is to freeze the financial resources of individuals and organizations that commit or are accomplices in terrorist acts. The main instruments are UN Security Council Resolution 1267, which delegates to a committee the job of updating a 'black list' of names, and Resolution 1373, which accepted the principle of a general obligation to freeze assets linked to terrorism. The system was initially created to fight the Taliban protectors of al Qaeda. Today the lists include more than 350 names of individuals and entities.

Based on Resolution 1373, the European Union created its own list in December 2001, which in particular includes European terrorist organizations (those linked to ETA, Northern Irish, Greek and Italian groups) and external groups (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PKK, Shining Path, and the Iranian MEK), as well as individuals linked to these groups.¹ The system is nonetheless incomplete in the sense that the freezing of assets that is prescribed in Europe only applies to non-residents.

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), set up by the Paris G7 summit in 1989, has made action against terrorist financing its top priority. Now composed of 33 members, the FATF is an active organization in the combat against international micro-financing of illicit activity. It proposes to raise the level of security of international transfers, by obliging financial institutions to note the identity of the person making the transfer, so that the state where the person receiving it lives can easily identify the transaction. In this area, the European Union is seeking to have the system applied to all transfers, of whatever amount.² France must support the adoption, under UN auspices, of a range of international instruments based on the logic at work in the FATF.

Neutralizing Flows of Ideas that Incite Hatred, Violence or Terrorism

Our legal system contains arrangements that make it possible to fight the dissemination of extremist ideas.

(1) Common Positions 2001/930 and 931/CFSP of 27 December 2001, taken in the context of the common foreign and security policy, and regulation 2580/2001 of the Council of the European Union, taken on the basis of Articles 60, 301, and 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Taken together, these three instruments of binding legal force for Member States constitute the mechanism known as the 'Clearing House.'

(2) In 2005 France already managed to get the level at which transfers are followed lowered from \$3,000 to \$1,000.

The law of 10 January 1936 on combat groups and private militias gives the President of the Republic the authority, by decree in the Council of Ministers, to disband associations or 'de facto' groups that promote discrimination, hatred or violence toward a person or a group of people based on their origin or their belonging (or not) to a particular ethnic group, nation, race or religion. Groups acting 'on French territory to undertake activities designed to provoke terrorist acts in France or from French territory to provoke such acts abroad' are also covered by this legislation.

Appropriate tools thus exist against these groups. It is more complicated however to launch legal action when it is a matter of prosecuting similar illegal acts attributed to individuals acting alone.

The penalty for direct incitement to terrorist acts and the justification of such acts by **individuals** is five years in prison and a 45,000 euro fine. In theory, the punitive regime thus seems a good deterrent. This offence, however, does not appear in the penal code but in the law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press. It is thus this law's particular legal framework that applies to the prosecution of illegal acts: the statute of limitations is shortened to three months; seizures or preventive arrest of the person in question is not permitted; and accelerated anti-crime procedures (such as immediate court-appearances, for example), are not possible. In addition, the acts in question must have been public, which excludes individual-to-individual proselytizing done for the purpose of committing a violent act.¹ Finally, the application of this law does not come under the jurisdiction of Paris as part of its national counter-terrorism responsibilities.²

Thus applicable law does not seem well suited to the situation. Two possible routes to improve it exist.

The first consists in taking the offence of incitement or justification of terrorism out of the scope of the press law and integrating it directly into the penal code. Such an approach would not be unprecedented. It is what was done in the case of the offence of incitement to drug use or trafficking. In addition, by dropping the requirement that the incitement be public, this option would easily widen its coverage to include proselytization whose goal or result is the commitment of a violent act.³

The second option would be to incorporate this offence into the penal code while leaving in place the scope of the law of 1881. Illegal acts could thus be prosecuted on the basis of either of the two laws.

(1) In fact, Article 24 of the law of 29 July 1881 requires that the incitement takes place in a public place, real or virtual (electronic means of communication were added to the law with part II of Article 2 of law no. 2004-575 of 21 June 2004).

(2) For a description of the counter-terrorism penal regime, see p. 53.

(3) This would have the added value of dealing with part of the problem of proselytization in prisons.

Protecting the Homeland from Intrusions and Neutralizing Terrorists Abroad Through Action of the Armed Forces

'The object of defence is to ensure, at all times, in all circumstances, and against all forms of aggression, the security and the integrity of the territory, as well as the life of its population.'¹

Backed by this mandate, the military forces contribute to the prevention of terrorism by accomplishing two principal missions, for which they continuously employ 35,000 military personnel. One mission is to protect and control in depth France's national territory, air and maritime space and other areas where France has interests. The other is to undertake external operations whose main goal is to neutralize the terrorist threat before it reaches our country.²

The Armed Forces Protect and Thoroughly Monitor National Territory and Areas Where France Has Interests

(1) Approximately one hundred fixed radars permanently watch over and control the 10,000 aircraft that fly over the national territory every day. Mobile tactical radars complement the system whenever there is a particular need.

In the case of suspect behaviour of an aircraft or troubles on board a plane, combat aircraft and armed helicopters are in a position to intervene very rapidly at the highest state of alert.

To optimize even further its capacity to defend its territory against any intrusion from the air, by detecting the threat before it penetrates French airspace, France must continue its policy of concluding bilateral air security agreements. Agreements have already been reached with Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland. They must be complemented with agreements with Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, as well as with Brazil and Suriname, which neighbour the French Department of Guyane, where the Kourou Space Centre is.

(2) Maritime traffic in the waters around France, its Departments and Overseas Territories, and the areas where we have economic interests³ is monitored with civilian and military assets. In Metropolitan

(1) Article L. 1111-1 of the defence code.

(2) The participation of the armed forces in the 'Vigipirate' plan, and the work done by the national gendarmerie under the direction of the Interior Ministry, are described elsewhere in this White Paper.

(3) The Exclusive Economic Zone extends 200 nautical miles from French coasts, including around the overseas departments and territories.

France, surveillance is undertaken with support from the SPATIONAV network, built around French coastal semaphores and their radars.¹ This network also benefits from information provided by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), by allied navies, as well as by French navy ships on mission in oceans around the world. Suspicious naval activity can be dealt with on short notice by the most appropriate combat tool: surface ship, submarine, commandos, airplane or helicopter.

The safeguard system could usefully be promoted and harmonized within the European Union.

The Armed Forces Help Prevent Terrorism by Acting Outside French Territory

Beyond our borders, our intelligence services, our armed forces, and our diplomatic service work together to identify and prevent threats as early as possible.

As asserted in the report annexed to the Military Programme Law for 2003-2008, the possibility of a pre-emptive action may be envisaged in case a clear and established threat situation is recognized.² Recourse to such action would be in keeping with the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter, in other words in a situation of self-defence.

In a more general sense, the participation of the armed forces in peace restoration or stabilization missions – alongside national and international civilian participants – contributes to the elimination of terrorist havens by stabilizing crisis zones. In 2006, France is actively contributing, at both the civilian and military level, to such missions in territories that have sheltered or continue to shelter terrorists, such as the Balkans, Afghanistan or the Sahel region. In all these actions, the armed forces are supported by the *Direction du Renseignement Militaire* (Military Intelligence Directorate, DRM). With its satellites and interception capabilities, and in cooperation with other domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, the DRM evaluates the threat to our forces.

Parallel to the efforts of prevention in the broad sense, the armed forces participate in the combat against terrorism by attacking it in its bastions. Thus, after the 11 September 2001 attacks, France immediately took part in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean under American command. UN Security Council Resolution 1368, adopted on 12 September 2001, notes that such operations are in keeping with the framework of the legitimate right to self-defence recog-

(1) SPATIONAV stands for *Surveillance des espaces sous juridiction nationale et des approches maritimes* – Surveillance of areas under national jurisdiction and maritime approaches.

(2) 'Pre-emptive' action is commonly understood to mean an action against an imminent threat, whereas 'preventive' action is action against a merely potential threat.

nized by the UN Charter. Our force known as HERACLES involved air forces, naval forces and land forces, and both regular and special forces.¹

Preventive use of enforcement measures, including the use of armed force, may also be considered. It should be authorized by the Security Council under the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²

Strengthening International Cooperation

A characteristic of global terrorism is to refuse to recognize any territorial limits. Any attempt to deal with a movement that disregards borders without the help of others would be doomed to failure.

France did not wait for the 11 September attacks before seeking a concerted and coordinated international response to the terrorist threat. Confronted with the rise of global terrorism, international cooperation was expanded and intensified. Besides the prevention of attacks, its main objective is to reduce the vulnerability of our societies.

Preventing the Threat

The protection of national territory is a responsibility of national states. But international cooperation is indispensable to enable states to uphold this responsibility in a context distinguished by the expansion of financial, economic and human interactions.

(1) The **United Nations** offers a universal framework to mobilize all states in the combat against terrorism at the political level. This combat is often seen as a concern of northern countries. As of early 2006, however, global terrorism had caused more casualties in the countries of the south than in those of the north.

The United Nations also provides a universal framework to set up binding legal norms. UN action in this area has two components. One is the thirteen conventions concluded under the auspices of the UN or its agencies between 1960 and 2005. The other consists of the resolutions the Security Council took under Chapter VII of the Charter.

(1) HERACLES conducted reconnaissance, supply, transport and combat missions, as well as offensive air operations, conducted by the air force and naval aviation, for example, in direct support of American ground troops in Operation Anaconda in spring 2002. France has also deployed a carrier battle group around the nuclear aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* for more than 7 months.

(2) Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council in order to maintain or restore international peace and security to take compulsory measures that States are obliged to follow.

The 13 UN Anti-Terrorism Conventions

Thirteen UN anti-terrorism conventions were negotiated between 1963 and 2005. They define criminal offences that Member States must incorporate into their internal legal systems and rules of judicial competence, extradition and mutual legal assistance that apply to these offences, according to the principle of 'extradite or judge.'

These conventions remain imperfectly applied: many States have still not signed them; others that have signed them have nonetheless not implemented them.

France is already a party to 12 conventions and has started ratification procedures regarding the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

- *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963)*
 - *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)*
 - *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971)*
 - *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988)*
 - *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973)*
 - *International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979)*
 - *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)*
 - *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)*
 - *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)*
 - *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991)*
 - *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)*
 - *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)*
 - *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)*
-

The UN Security Council has several times deemed international terrorism to be a 'threat to international peace and security,' leading it to oblige States to take binding measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. It thus imposed sanctions on Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan, three

States accused of having conducted or ordered acts of terrorism or of having served as a haven for terrorists.

The Security Council extended the sanctions regime against the Taliban under Resolution 1267 to al Qaeda. In addition to the obligation of freezing financial assets and resources,¹ this mechanism also entails obligations designed to prevent the entry, transit of individuals as well as the provision of weapons.

More generally, under Resolution 1373 (adopted on 28 September 2001), States are also required to 'deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts.' This Resolution created a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) tasked with monitoring the robustness of Member States' counter-terrorism legislation and to help those States to fulfil their responsibilities.

(2) The **European Union's** build-up in the area of counter-terrorism is being pursued.

Well underway after the 11 September attacks, this evolution was accelerated after the Madrid attacks of March 2004. In June 2004 the European Union adopted an Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, which contains seven strategic objectives.

The European Union's Seven Strategic Objectives in the Fight against Terrorism

1 – To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism.

2 – To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources.

3 – To maximize capacity within EU bodies and Member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks.

4 – To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control.

5 – To enhance the capability of the European Union and of Member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack.

6 – To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism.

7 – To target actions under EU external relations toward priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.

(1) See page 57 on this point.

The seven objectives are broken down into nearly 100 concrete actions. To strengthen the strategic and political coherence of these objectives and actions, the European Union in 2005 grouped them under four main categories in the context of a global strategy: ensure **prevention**, especially by preventing the recruitment of new terrorists; ensure better **protection** of potential targets; **disrupt** existing networks; improve our **reaction** and consequence management capabilities in case of terrorist attacks.

Despite this progress, the effort in the strategic domain must be continued. It is necessary to consolidate a more comprehensive approach that better integrates the different components of EU counter-terrorism action. In light of this, the European Council decided to name a counter-terrorism coordinator following the March 2004 Madrid attacks. This coordinator plays a useful mobilizing role within the EU structures and among the Member States.

(3) The **G8 and NATO** also play a useful role in the area of **information sharing** on the prevention of the threat.

Since 1996, at France's instigation, the members of the G8 put the combat against threats represented by organized crime, as well as by terrorism, at the heart of their priorities. Among the actions of the G8 in the area of counter-terrorism, the most important include those that have to do with the security of civil aviation, particularly through biometrics and the fight against the proliferation of ground-to-air missiles ('man-portable air-defence systems', or MANPADS); the traceability of terrorist assets; and the fight against documents fraud.

NATO has also undergone an effort to adapt to better combat terrorism in the military domain, which is precisely its area of competence. It can thus help in the protection of specific events (such as the Athens Olympics, for example). NATO is also doing useful work in the area of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence.

Preventing Terrorist Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senior members of the al Qaeda movement have demonstrated the will to carry out attacks with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. The international community has long focused on the prevention of CBRN terrorism. The way to do this is primarily through the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.

(1) The role of the **European Union** in the fight against proliferation has been substantially strengthened by the December 2003 European Council's adoption of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The heads of state and government underscored in this document the risk of seeing terrorists acquire such weapons and expressed the desire to counter this risk.

(2) The goal of the work done in the context of the **G8** is to prevent terrorists and those who support them from gaining access to weapons

of mass destruction and the materials that would make it possible to build them. For the most part this is a matter of traditional control and security measures in the area of non-proliferation.

In particular, the G8 leaders launched in June 2002 the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This partnership between Russia and the seven other members of the G8 seeks to reduce the threat stemming from the continued existence of non-conventional (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons arsenals in the former Soviet Union. The G8 countries committed to devote up to \$20 billion over the next ten years to support projects in this area. France participates actively in this partnership. It must continue the effort begun while ensuring that it remains focused on the fight against proliferation and the risk of non-conventional weapons getting diverted for terrorist use.

(3) The **United Nations** took a critical step in April 2004 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540, which seeks to prevent the risk of terrorists acquiring WMD and their means of delivery. This text is particularly important as the Council was acting in the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter and can ask States to take specific measures to comply with their obligations.

The **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** plays a central role in the security of radioactive materials. This issue remains a major concern, particularly because of the absence of effective control over radioactive materials with regard to the terrorist threat. France, in the context of the G8, played a driving role in launching this initiative. We are carefully following its evolution.

(4) The **Proliferation Security Initiative¹ (PSI)** focuses on intercepting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and equipment and materials used in their construction, being sent to or from countries or entities of concern. This initiative is still being developed. It has already led to concrete interception operations and enabled the development of useful operational contacts in case of a crisis.

The fact that numerous international or regional organizations have adopted specific counter-terrorism measures and action plans is positive. It demonstrates that the threat and the need to counter it collectively are being taken seriously. In the area of the fight against terrorism as in other areas, however, international cooperation is a means, not an end. It must be based on a threefold goal of effectiveness, complementarity, and subsidiarity.

With this in mind, our country must reinforce the pre-eminent role of the United Nations, as a creator of political consensus and as a source of legitimacy and normative power. It must reinforce the action of the European Union.

(1) Launched in March 2003 by the U.S. government. As of early 2006 PSI involved more than 65 countries. At the Paris meeting on 4 September 2003, the 11 'core group' countries (a group that includes France) put forward a 'Statement of Interdiction Principles,' which sets forth the main principles of PSI. This initiative is within the framework of international law and national laws and its goal is to bring together all States that are combating proliferation.

Improving our System

Protecting the Population

Consolidating Planning to Maintain Vigilance

To deal with the full range of threats, our country is constantly adapting its forecasting and deterrence tools. The spearhead of this strategy is the VIGIPIRATE plan, created in October 1981 and well known to our citizens. It has a dual objective: protect France's population, infrastructure and institutions and prepare responses in case of attack.

The most recent version of VIGIPIRATE, in force since March 2003, is based on the premise that the terrorist threat must henceforth be considered to be permanent. It thus defines a baseline of measures that are always in force, even in the absence of threat indications. The plan then has four levels of alert, which are made public. The lowest level (yellow) is that of a vague threat. The measures that are then put in place must make it possible to very rapidly move up to the higher levels, which are orange and red. The highest level (scarlet) seeks to prevent an immediate risk of major attacks.

The VIGIPIRATE plan's general objective is to deter and prevent terrorism. It is complemented by the series of 'PIRATE' intervention plans, each of which is tailored to a particular risk (PIRATOME, PIRATOX, BIOTOX, PIRANET, PIRATE-MER, PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR, PIRATE-EXT).

These plans are constantly updated in response to the evolution of the threats and risks faced by our country. They serve as a matrix for carrying out exercises at the local level (first responders and local officials), the national level (central administrations) and the 'senior' level (involving the participation of ministers or their cabinets).

VIGIPIRATE

VIGIPIRATE, the governmental plan for vigilance, prevention and protection, defines a decision-making process and a list of operational measures.

On the basis of a threat evaluation, a level of alert is established by the Prime Minister, after consultation with the President of the Republic. Each of the four alert levels has a security objective associated with it, which makes it possible to put in place measures to deal with the full range of risks. For example, the plan envisages a military presence in railway stations and airports, enhanced protection for schools, and searches at the entrances of department stores. Such measures are activated by decision of the Prime Minister depending on the alert level and the sectors that are under threat. Local plans set out in detail the practical ways in which local representatives of the State (prefects), local authorities and economic operators will put the measures into place.

The 'PIRATE' Family of Plans

The 'PIRATE' intervention plans are launched by the Prime Minister in case of a specific threat or terrorist attack using a given means of aggression (PIRATOX for a toxic chemical product, BIOTOX for a biological pathogen agent, PIRATOME for nuclear or radiological material, PIRANET for an attack on information systems) or in case of an attack taking place in a particular area (PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR against terrorism related to aircraft, PIRATE-MER against maritime terrorism, PIRATE-EXT in case of a threat or attack against French nationals or interests abroad). These plans define crisis-management and information-processing structures as well as the actions that should be taken by civil and military authorities (including special anti-terrorist units and special forces).

All the governmental plans must be continually adapted and updated depending on the evolution of the threats and risks our country faces. They must also be extended through local implementation plans.

The Contribution of Video-Surveillance

In our country, approximately 300,000 video-surveillance cameras are installed in public spaces. In some neighbouring countries, there are several million.¹ Beyond their decisive contribution to resolving criminal investigations,² these cameras – installed in public areas and sensitive locations – contribute to the prevention of terrorism.

Eleven years after the adoption of the law of 21 January 1995 which regulates video-surveillance in our country, the counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 extended the coverage of public places and thoroughfares (including businesses, transport, offices of airline companies, certain religious sites, etc.) to protect them from the terrorist threat. We must pair the development of video-surveillance with guarantees of the respect for basic freedoms. The installation of video systems requires administrative authorization with time limits and periodic reviews to ensure that the basis for the systems' installation is still appropriate.

The existing video-surveillance systems are effective in preventing burglaries and threats to people and goods. The camera circuits make it possible to identify the first indications of the offence; an intervention team can be immediately sent to prevent it from being committed.

Traditional video-surveillance systems, however, do not make it possible to preventively spot terrorists, who do not normally burglarize. To prevent terrorist attacks more effectively, we need video-detection networks able to find explosive devices and suspicious behaviour. The qualitative jump from one type of network to another requires the development of automatic image analysis techniques. These techniques, which are starting to come onto the market, are able to identify an abandoned package or even suspect behaviour in a tide of images that goes beyond the human capacity for observation.

Ensuring Transport Safety

All modes of transport of people and goods have been hit by terrorism: oil tankers and cruise ships, ferries, commercial planes, public transports, road and railway networks.

Public transport is by nature an easy and 'profitable' target for terrorism. Protecting it has been a priority since the 11 September 2001 attacks.

Air Transport

Methods for ensuring air transport security have been fundamentally rethought since the 11 September 2001 attacks. It is no longer

(1) This is, of course, largely because of the high level of activity among private operators.

(2) A remarkable example of this was the precedent set by the British in the July 2005 London attacks.

only a matter of preventing hijackings and passenger hostage-taking to satisfy political claims, but also of preventing the boarding of any passenger who might destroy the plane in the air or who might take control of it to fly it into a target. At the same time, the risk of loading dangerous cargo has been re-evaluated.

Confronted by such threats, security measures can only be defined in an international framework. For Member States of the European Union, this process was harmonized by an EU Regulation of 16 December 2002, which required modifications of France's civil aviation code.

Security measures for air navigation and air transport in France have three components: ground measures, boarding measures, and in-flight measures. They are gradually called into action by the VIGIPRATE plan and the PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR intervention plan depending on the evaluation of the threat.

On the ground, we had to put in place a security system based on airport architecture originally designed to facilitate access to the planes. There are two areas: the public area accessible to all, including airport workers, passengers and those accompanying them; and the restricted area accessible only to those authorized to enter it – airport workers with identification or previously verified ticket holders. Everything that enters into the restricted area (people, checked baggage, carry-on baggage, food) is checked for dangerous products (explosives, toxic chemicals, radiological materials). These checks are carried out by x-ray machines, metal detectors, and explosive traces detectors. Similar checks take place on the runways to prevent banned objects from being loaded onto planes.

On board the plane, the most notable new measures have been the reinforcement of the flight deck doors and the requirement to install encoded alert systems to prevent intrusions. Some flights take along armed guards.

The flight itself is subject to systematic tracking that constantly compares its flight plan with its actual path.

The United States and Forward Territorial Defence

The United States has installed a 'forward line of defence' of its territory. The airlines that fly to the United States must verify that their passengers are not on a list of individuals banned from flying into the country (the 'no fly list').

If the identification is made before take-off, the passenger is not allowed to board. If the passenger is identified in flight, the plane is diverted. The 'no fly list' is updated continuously by U.S. security agencies based on a variety of sources and according to their own criteria.

While Europe has not taken such a step, some countries have increased security on certain flights though the discreet presence of armed sky marshals on board planes flying sensitive routes. Moreover, access to airline company data for counter-terrorism purposes will reinforce the security of European territory.

Freight transport by air has not been forgotten. Checks are carried out according to the same principles as for passenger transport, with a variation that allows for a secure logistical chain starting with the putting together of packages, and only accredited individuals. 'Approved packagers' prepare consignments free of goods that are banned from secure areas, 'entitled agents' take them all the way to the loading area, and airlines ensure that the security procedures have been respected.

States and airlines are well aware of the risks of MANPAD ground-to-air missiles being used against commercial airlines. The performance level, number and dispersion of these arms make them serious threats to civil aviation. Precautions have been taken around our airports. To complement the surveillance policy undertaken by the relevant international authorities, the search and destruction of these arms must remain a priority for the intelligence and security agencies.

Ground Transport

After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks with hijacked airplanes, the two most deadly attacks taking place in the West were those of Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, both carried out with explosives in public transport, just as the Paris attacks of 1995 and 1996 were.

The public transport of people, whether above or under ground, presents favourable conditions for terrorists: high concentrations of people in limited spaces; small risk of being caught while preparing and executing the attacks; high numbers of victims; large psychological effects in public opinion.

The detection of explosives is a major issue in the prevention of the terrorist threat to transport networks. It is made difficult by the growing use of techniques to conceal explosives and the wide variety of materials used.

The other issue is the detection by a network of detectors of biological, radiological and chemical substances. The goal is to limit the public's contact with these agents and to provide necessary care to possible victims. Detection also makes it possible to circumscribe precisely the contaminated zone and to move forward with decontamination. Detection is critical when the agent used goes unnoticed until the first illnesses become apparent.

Extensive feasibility studies of attack scenarios have been conducted. They have resulted in the development of programmes to

strengthen transport infrastructure security broadly speaking, such as train or automobile tunnels or bridges, by equipping them with means for detection, alert, traffic interruption and fast emergency services. Security issues are now taken into account in the conception phase of major construction projects. The idea of taking into account the objective of security against natural disasters or threats of malicious intent or terrorism should be broadened to include all transport infrastructures.

The protection of cities from the risks associated with the transport of explosive or toxic materials, by rail or truck, is a concern for all countries. It is most complicated in Europe's highly populated regions. Particular precautions are taken regarding the transport of certain dangerous materials, such as nuclear materials. Preventive efforts should be focused on infrastructure (by managing transport routes for dangerous products) and on the enforcement of security regulations.

Maritime Transport

Maritime transport has been an area of sustained attention for twenty years (in particular following the hostage-taking on board the ship *Achille Lauro* in October 1985).

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States took unilateral initiatives in the area of container security (with the adoption of the Container Security Initiative, CSI). France preferred that this problem also be dealt with through international organizations. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) took up the issue and in November 2002 began work that led to the establishment of an International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (known as ISPS code), which came into effect on 1 July 2004.

The ISPS Code requires that all commercial ships making international journeys have a certified security plan. It also calls for the evaluation of port facility security. To ensure that the international norms are consistent with the VIGIPIRATE plan and the PIRATE-MER intervention plan, an inter-ministerial port and maritime security doctrine was adopted in October 2005.¹ This doctrine is based on an analysis of the threat and a hierarchy of responses. It establishes procedures for surveillance of coastal waters and ports, passenger and vehicle checks on ferries, and cargo verification.

A policy of support to states in difficulty could complement the unilateral checks. In the framework of the IMO and the World Customs Organization (WCO), universal norms should be promoted, whether through the exchange of customs information, modern methods of inspections of containers at a distance, or techniques that make it possible to keep their seals intact.

(1) The interministerial doctrine is based on the maritime safeguard concept applied by the navy.

Protecting French Nationals Abroad

French nationals who live abroad and those who travel have also been struck by terrorism.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Directorate for French Nationals Abroad and Foreign Nationals in France, together with diplomatic posts) is responsible for the warnings or recommendations posted on the website giving guidance to travellers (<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/voyageurs>), the content of which is harmonized, to the extent possible, with that of our primary partners. It strengthens, when necessary, the security measures protecting the French communities that live abroad. This work is conducted in coordination with the intelligence, analysis or intervention structures of the other ministries, including the DGSE, the Ministry of Defence's Planning and Operations Centre, the international technical cooperation department of the National Police, the operational crisis management centres under the Interior Ministry (COGIC, COB and CROGEND¹) and the equivalent structures of our foreign partners.

At the request of the chief of staff of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, an 'operational crisis cell' is opened under the authority of the Ambassador to organize and coordinate the crisis response locally, and to answer telephone calls from our fellow citizens. This structure is open to liaison agents from concerned countries at the origin of the crisis. It establishes contacts with active crisis cells in these countries. Generally, mobile teams made up of agents from the ministry and other professionals (doctors, civil security agents, investigators) are sent to the place of the crisis and coordinate on the ground with the equivalent teams of our partners. Joint missions may be organized.

At the European level, the consular affairs working group of the Council has reoriented its priorities, which are now less focused on traditional consular matters and more on security issues. This group has set forth guidelines on security cooperation of EU nationals in third countries. They must now define common operational plans for evacuation of EU nationals in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), along the lines of the EVAC06 exercise planned for the first quarter of 2006, which relates to the evacuation of 8,000 European nationals in a country 10,000 kilometers away from the EU.

(1) COGIC is the *Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises* or Inter-Ministerial Operational Crisis Management Centre; COB is the *Centre Opérationnel Beauvau* or Beauvau Operational Centre; CROGEND is the *Centre de renseignement et d'opérations de la gendarmerie nationale* or National Gendarmerie Intelligence and Operations Centre.

Protecting Territorial Integrity

Preserving Critical Infrastructure

Following the logic of its social and political destabilization efforts, global terrorism will seek to strike targets of high economic and ecological value, especially as the partial or total destruction of certain infrastructures can also cause massive casualties.

As the terrorists prefer to strike where they can as opposed to where they would like to, the hardening of potential targets can lead them to abandon their projects or reduce the effect of their actions. It is thus indispensable to identify critical infrastructures and to have a security policy for them involving the firms of the most sensitive sectors.

This is what the Government's recent reform seeks to do. The reform is based on the arrangements of the defence code, which make public or private operators of vital infrastructures responsible for internal protection measures against 'all possible threats, notably threats of a terrorist nature.'

The top priorities are those activities that are indispensable to the public's essential needs and the maintenance of the security and defence capabilities of the country: food, water, energy, transport, financial institutions, information and communications systems, and command and decision centres.

Working closely with those responsible, the State will establish and keep updated a national security directive for each of these sectors. This directive will define the nature of the threats against which protection is necessary, the security objectives and the combination of the specific plans prepared by each operator (the 'operator security plans') with the VIGIPRATE plan.

Basing their action on each directive, the main companies in each sector will put into action an 'in depth defence' policy required by the protection plans. It will identify their sensitive installations and include both concrete physical measures (guards, secure entrances, locks, surveillance cameras, toxic product detectors, alarms, rescue tools) and organizational measures (more thorough background checks during the hiring process, closer watch over visitors, checks on deliveries, supply chain monitoring, alternative sources).

What is being done on the national level is consistent with efforts on the EU level to protect against all risks to vital infrastructures, especially those functions whose shutdown or malfunction would have major consequences for several countries.

Protecting Sensitive Computer Systems

Information systems are the nerve centres for most organizations. They are therefore a priority target for those who want to destabilize or paralyse the country's functioning.

Yet these networks, whether public or private, do not operate in isolation. Whatever their degree of protection, they are normally open to the outside world, whether through links to the Internet or because of the expanded use of remote maintenance. In addition, the widespread use of standard commercial hardware or software such as Windows or Unix makes the systems more vulnerable to the extent that hackers can do widespread damage with a single attack.

On the technical level, the terrorist threat is not unique. 'Cyberterrorists' would attack information networks just like regular 'cybercriminals.' Attackers could use the tools developed by hackers. The most foreseeable threats are cascade attacks based on malicious computer codes sent out on the web or hidden in an already infected website, which would then be duplicated once introduced in the system. The most insidious threat would consist of attacks targeted by malicious software and sent out in very limited numbers (thus keeping them unknown to anti-virus software providers) and would act as sleeper cells until their simultaneous activation.

The goal of these attacks could be the disruption of vital national systems. It could also be to disorganize these systems at the same time as a terrorist attack, in order to interfere with rescue operations. Nor can more mundane motivations be excluded, such as diverting funds to finance terrorist activities.

The defences are well known. They include systematic updating of software; the application of strict rules for authenticating individuals allowed onto the network; the increasingly general use of cryptography; the installation of firewalls, anti-virus software, and intrusion-detection tools; the use of security certification tools; and in the most critical cases, the isolation of internet networks.

The application of these defences, however, must still be improved.

The State has taken measures to deal with threats to its own information systems. Improving protection of the administration against information attacks is the job of the Permanent Secretariat for National Defence (*Secrétariat général de la défense nationale*, SGDN), whose role is to monitor, warn and intervene in case of an attack on a public administration. A security reinforcement plan for information systems has been developed, with four main objectives: securing the communications of high officials; securing government information systems; putting in place operational capabilities for responding to information attacks; the incorporation of this security policy in a European framework. The efforts (both in terms of means and sensitizing users) must be pursued in the area of prevention in order to reinforce the level of security of government information systems.

Major private companies have not remained passive in this area. Yet there are two major obstacles to broader action. Some business leaders still underestimate the level of threat their companies face. Expenses for information security systems do not have any visible return. They are not always considered to be investments, even if their effect is to preserve the physical capital – and more generally the other assets – of the company.

These obstacles must be overcome through action by experts, the media, and information security professionals, led by the government, to raise business leaders' awareness and coordinate their efforts. A 'best practices' guide should be developed for the most vulnerable businesses (small and medium-sized enterprises).

Strengthening our Crisis Management Capabilities

Improving our Operational Capabilities

The recently updated 'PIRATE' and ORSEC intervention plans are comprehensive tools for managing a terrorist crisis. Their coordination must still be improved

The governmental action plans of the PIRATE family of plans¹ include measures of alert, organization, protection and neutralization of the threat broken down according to different levels of defence and in some cases to the departmental level.² They are mostly devoted to protection.

(1) For a description of these plans, see p. 68.

(2) In the area of crisis management and emergency relief organization, there is, within the State, a level of administrative responsibilities above the Department known as the 'defence zone.' In case of an attack large enough to surpass the departmental level, it is at this level that an event is managed and where operational coordination of civilian and military means takes place. There are seven defence zones in metropolitan France.

The ORSEC¹ plan is triggered by the departmental prefect in case of a major event requiring the organization of emergency relief for the population. For a long time, this plan was only viewed from the operational point of view, for which it was the final tool in a crisis situation. The new ORSEC plan² maintains this essential aspect, which has been proven to work, but places it into a broader context of the general protection of people and goods. It is now, under the authority of the prefect, the central element of the system of organization and intervention that makes it possible to deal with the consequences of any kind of major event, including a large-scale terrorist attack.

The ORSEC operational manual addresses the entire range of crisis-management needs: the advance surveying and analysis of risks and consequences of threats common to all agencies; an operational system, at the heart of the plan, which calls for a single organization to manage major events; preparation and training phases necessary to operational implementation.

The 'PIRATE' and ORSEC plans thus cover the full spectrum of elements involved in dealing with a terrorist crisis: the former covers the threat and the second organizes the aid for the population. Their coordination, however, must be improved.

Overall, the 'PIRATE' plans deal with terrorist attacks in the air, on the sea, or which use unconventional means (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear). They must be complemented by a governmental intervention plan focused on a major conventional attack or on a rapid series of attacks. The standard operating procedures designated by the 'PIRATE' plans and the risk analysis of the ORSEC plans must be made perfectly consistent with each other in every detail.

It is essential that we conduct regular exercises to validate the working hypotheses of the plans, to test their implementation and to improve our response capacities.

Our Crisis Management Assets and Organization Must be Further Strengthened

Organization

We must tighten the network of operational and crisis centres of the various ministries.

(1) On the national level, in 2006, some ministries rely on operational centres to provide 24-hour service seven days per week.

For internal security matters, the Interior Ministry relies on the *Service de Veille Opérationnelle de la Police Nationale* (Operational Watch of the National Police, SVOPN) and the *Centre de Renseignement et*

(1) ORSEC stands for *OR*ganization des *SECours* or Emergency Relief Organization.

(2) Resulting from decree no. 2005-1157 of 13 September 2005.

d'Opérations de la Gendarmerie Nationale (National Gendarmerie Intelligence and Operations Centre, CROGEND). It also has the *Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle des Crises* (Inter-Ministerial Operational Crisis Management Centre, COGIC) for civil security. The Defence Ministry relies on the *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* (Planning and Operations Execution Centre, CPCO) and the air and maritime execution centres. Someone is continuously on duty at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Outside of normal business hours, other ministries resort to different forms of coverage, with activation and reaction times tailored to the types of crises they may face.

This set of arrangements must be improved in two ways. The secure networks for transmitting messages and information must be unified, and a common portal for crisis management – to which on-duty agents are continuously connected – must be created. Reaction times must also be reduced.

The next stage will be the creation of a secure, governmental intranet that allows the authorities to exchange information, confidential or not, at high speed. Such a network, under the name Isis, will progressively be deployed in early 2006.

(2) At the regional level, the crisis management system is the responsibility of prefects, and in Paris of the police prefect. This clear and rational organization takes advantage of the prefects' inter-ministerial prerogatives and long experience in dealing with emergency situations. Over the past few years, the responsibilities and assets of the prefects in the defence zones have been strengthened in order to facilitate the coordination and pooling of intervention capabilities.

Coordination

At the national level, the Prime Minister directs governmental action. He designates the minister or ministers who ensure the operational execution of governmental action and who rely on ad hoc cells or operational centres to do so.

To reinforce the effectiveness of this system, and in particular to facilitate the exchange of information and coordination in case of a crisis involving numerous ministries, we must develop interoperability among crisis centres by developing the capacity to use compatible, shared and secure communications and management tools.

Alerting the Population

The State has the duty to its citizens to alert them in case of an imminent threat that could affect a neighbourhood, a city or a region, in order to shelter the population in the best possible conditions.

During the Cold War, all industrialized States built systems to manage the consequences of potential large-scale military hostilities: the national alert network (*réseau national d'alerte*, RNA) that exists in

France is largely derived from this period. Consisting of a network of sirens, the RNA is now largely obsolete. The sirens only carry a basic, undifferentiated message of alert, badly suited for certain attack scenarios whose effects might be vague or delayed.

In certain attack scenarios, the siren network could nonetheless remain an effective means of quick alert, getting people to stay at home or turn on their radios. This observation has led to new interest for local siren networks, often managed by towns or businesses.

Public services or private companies have put alert systems in place in case of risks to security or health. These systems often use modern calling techniques, corresponding to new communication habits: emails; voice or text messages on mobile phones; recourse to telephones or automated call centres.

Information centres investigate the causes of the events, advise people affected by the alert, and respond to concerns by bringing in specialists. Visual electronic message services, in cities or on the roads (accidents, traffic jams, weather risks...) make possible the quick diffusion of instantly updated messages.

It is by using all of these different tools simultaneously that public authorities must alert their populations. The State can now sign agreements with television and radio stations to pass on the alerts.¹ The expansion of means of communication (such as fixed and portable telephones and the Internet) provides the opportunity to complete the coverage of all of France. General conditions for using telephone and email services must be developed to enable the State to send messages to all mobile phones in an area that has such service in a given geographical zone and to the computers operating in this zone.

Assets on the Ground

If an attack cannot be prevented, it is essential that security and emergency forces be able to act even if the conditions in which they must do so are very difficult.

(1) Maintaining Effective Means of Communication in All Circumstances

The first priority must be improvement of the interoperability between the different forces and agencies involved (Paris prosecutor's office, police, gendarmerie, armed forces, civil security, fire departments) so that they can communicate whatever the circumstances. Interoperability must be sought between equipment, transmission system, software and operational doctrines, including at the European level. Ultimately, the

(1) See decree no. 2005-1269 of 12 October 2005 concerning the national alert code and the obligations of radio and television stations as well as those who control all other means of public communication. This decree was taken pursuant to Article 8 of civil security modernization law no. 2004-811 of 13 August 2004.

means of communication used by the security forces must include the transmission of still images and video.

Force mobility is essential. We thus need to ensure that the systems chosen can operate in areas with no infrastructure or where the infrastructure might be damaged. We must arrange for crisis operations centres that are easily transportable in the affected areas. The military's fixed and mobile means of communications and command may be used if that proves necessary.

In the area of telecommunications, the priority for security forces must be to always have immediate access to the networks in all circumstances.

The ACROPOL police network and the RUBIS gendarmerie network ensure that local authorities have a system to communicate with the security forces. In some cases, however, access to the civilian networks is the only possible means of communication. We must thus explore the possibility of putting into place a system for giving priority to restoring communication of certain public actors in case of a crisis.

(2) Equipping, Training, and Preparing Through Use of Crisis Simulations

Each ministry must equip its own agencies with protective suits, means of transport, and emergency relief equipment. The orientation and programme law for internal security for 2002-07 and the military programme law for 2003-08 enabled the interior and defence ministries to modernize the assets of the police and the military.

Specialized civil and military units have developed solid expertise in the field of terrorism. The police forces (*Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion*, Search, Assistance, Intervention and Deterrence Unit RAID, potentially assisted by Intervention Groups of the National Police) and the gendarmerie forces (units with the security and intervention group GSIGN, including the *Groupe d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale* (Gendarmerie nationale intervention unit, GIGN) and the parachute squadron) train daily to be able to deal with terrorism contingencies, notably hostage taking and hijacking of airplanes or ships. If the scope of the attack requires it – in case of a large-scale hostage-taking, for example – military special forces will help, under a unified command.¹

It is also necessary to pursue the development of crisis management software, which is indispensable to optimise the choices of decision-makers working under pressure and in emergency situations – on issues like projecting the number of potential victims and the degree to which the effects of the attack will spread, and modelling and allocating resources.

(1) Since 1 February 2006, a helicopter squadron is dedicated to the transport of counter-terrorist forces.

(3) Knowing How to Handle the Long-Term Consequences of a CBRN Attack.

In case of CBRN crises, the civil authorities have at their disposal a wide range of analysis, emergency relief, and treatment capabilities: laboratories in the BIOTOX-PIRATOX network, SAMU (*Service d'aide médicale urgente* or Emergency Medical Assistance Services) units with CBRN equipment, chemical or radiological intervention cells of the departmental fire and emergency services (SDIS), decontamination processes; national reinforcements from the *unités d'instruction et d'intervention de la sécurité civile* (Civil Security Intervention and Training Units, or UIISC), and hospitals with special capabilities enhanced by the measures of the BLANC¹ plans. The Central Inter-Ministerial Technological Intervention Unit (*détachement central interministériel d'intervention technologique*, or DCI²) can be mobilized at any time.

For identifying and characterizing the most dangerous biological contaminants, we have a system of laboratories with different capabilities that are integrated across the defence zones of the national territory. This is the network of BIOTOX/PIRATOX laboratories. For the most pathological strains of biological agent, for which there is no effective curative treatment or systematic protection of the public, our capacities at the 'P4' level must be tailored to make it possible to react in case of an emergency and enhanced by mobile assets.³

If necessary, the Ministry of Defence can also make available its decontamination, treatment and rehabilitation capabilities for the affected areas. This includes research centres, army training hospitals and field hospitals (some of which have an NBC-protected surgical division), the NBC defence regiment, and certain engineering regiments.

To Deal with Crisis Situations, the Range of Legal Tools is Broad but Must be Further Enhanced

In case of terrorist attacks whose scope would seriously threaten the country, the state authorities can use exceptional legal means to neutralize the perpetrators and protect the population.

(1) The BLANC plan sets forth measures to be taken gradually in each hospital to temporarily enhance its ability to receive and hospitalize patients, including recalling of personnel, transfers of patients to other hospitals, delaying non-urgent treatment. Particular measures are foreseen for certain contagious diseases and for the victims of chemical or radiological attacks.

(2) The DCI, under the direction of the head of RAID since its inception, is responsible for locating, identifying, diagnosing and neutralizing improvised chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices. It brings together specialized units from different ministries.

(3) The name 'P4' (or rather biosafety level 4) is a reference to the highest level of confinement necessary to protect the environment and people working on highly hazardous pathogenic micro-organisms (those that can be transmitted among humans and for which there is no effective treatment.)

To respond to very serious situations, our law provides for three regimes whose consequences for civil liberties are of growing importance.

(1) Set out in the law of 3 April 1955, the state of emergency applies in the case of imminent danger resulting from serious infringements on public order.¹ The declaration of a state of emergency gives prefects the power to ban the movement of people and vehicles and to implement protection or security zones where individuals' activities are regulated. It also makes it possible to order house searches during the day or at night.

(2) Foreseen by Article 36 of the Constitution, the state of siege, whose declaration transfers the maintenance of order from the civilian authorities to military authorities, can be decreed in case of imminent danger resulting in particular from an 'armed insurrection.' The application of this extraordinary regime, whose origins go back to the laws of 9 August 1849 and 3 April 1878,² would seem to be poorly suited to dealing with the case of a traditional terrorist attack. It could, on the other hand, be conceivable in the case of a major terrorist attack with non-conventional means.

(3) Article 16 of the Constitution constitutes the final extraordinary legal regime for dealing with extremely serious situations.³ This system legally gives the President of the Republic complete power for a limited duration.

These different regimes were established in particular historical circumstances. None of them was specifically conceived for the fight against terrorism. They would certainly make it possible to respond to a situation of exceptional seriousness provoked by major terrorist attacks.

The elaboration of a legal regime more specifically tailored to the types of terrorist crisis situations that the country risks facing nonetheless deserves deeper study.

(1) The state of emergency was declared in 1955 in the French departments of Algeria, then in 1958 in all of France, lasting until 31 May 1963. More recently, the state of emergency was applied in New Caledonia in 1985, and in all of France by the decree of 8 November 2005, which was then extended for three months by law no. 2005-1425 of 18 November 2005 and finally cut back to 4 January 2006 by decree no. 2006 of 2 and 3 January 2006.

(2) It is today codified in Articles L. 2121-1 to L. 2121-8 of the defence code.

(3) Article 16 was applied only once, on 23 April 1961, by General de Gaulle following the 'Generals Putsch' in Algiers.

Establishing a Public Communications Doctrine

The High Cost of Poor Communication

Any failures in the area of public communication when confronting terrorism can carry a high price in the short and long term.

During the crisis itself – for example in case of a mistaken attribution of responsibility for attacks – the damage in public opinion can be immediate and considerable: loss of public confidence and, in some cases, difficulty finding solid bases on which to pursue the investigation.

The consequences of poor public communication are even greater in the months and years that follow. Indeed, the way governments communicate to the public after terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or industrial disasters leaves deep and lasting marks on the collective memory, because of the climate in which the events are experienced.¹ This type of memory thus has an immediate impact on the likelihood that official pronouncements will be believed, or even heard, in case of a similar event later on.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current System

A System Enriched Through Experience

Our country has had a number of opportunities to test the communications systems for managing emergency situations which were not caused by terrorist attacks: floods, forest fires, the December 1999 storms, and the heat-wave of summer 2003. We already have concepts and experience that can, in part, be transposed to communications in case of a terrorist attack.

We also have concrete experience in the area of public communications after the perpetration of a terrorist attack. This, however, is limited, as France has not suffered an attack that caused more than 8 deaths on its territory in one day since the end of Algerian War. In terms of public communication, we have not had to manage the effect of results like those of the most deadly attacks on European territory (nearly 200 deaths in Madrid in March 2004; more than 50 deaths in London in July 2005). We therefore do not have direct national experience in public communications on very deadly terrorist attacks.

Similarly, France has not in the past had to manage extended or large-scale terrorist campaigns. From 1965-2005, thus over forty years, attacks of all sorts killed 192 people on French soil. This figure must be compared to more than 800 victims of ETA in Spain during the same

(1) Thus 20 years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the memory of what was said at the time by certain officials remains vivid.

period and to 1,700 victims of the IRA in the United Kingdom. The current quality of the British organization in the area of communications is largely linked to the lessons learned from the fight against Irish terrorism.

A Centralized, Vertical, and Geographically Dispersed System

Our public communications doctrine and organization for counter-terrorism are made in the image of France and the French state. The system is characterized by three ideas: centralization, verticality, and geographic dispersal.

Given the nature of the challenges we face and the objectives we seek to reach, these traditional characteristics are the source of great strengths and numerous advantages. They also, however, create certain weaknesses.

Centralization is an advantage. It is based on an implicit assumption: in the case of a crisis, everyone looks to the State. This rule of the game is well-known and accepted. The control of communications by a single entity facilitates the handling of the crisis. On the other hand it requires seamless coordination among the different categories of communication: political, judicial, and technical.

In our country, information normally moves both up and down. This approach can cause delays, since each level can tend to filter the information and thus lag in transmitting it. Networking remains alien to the logic of this system.

Our communications system benefits from a genuine strength: its wide devolution across the territorial administrative hierarchy, at the level of defence zone prefects, regional prefects, and departmental prefects. Given the prefects' powers, unified communication at the local level is from the start easier than in Paris.

The Principles of a Communications Doctrine Appropriate for Terrorism: Federate and Orchestrate

Federate

Confronting new risks and high-level threats, public communication must be organized in a more integrated way than before. The creation of new institutions is not necessary. What is necessary, on the other hand, is to increase the performance and effectiveness of the existing structures.

The fundamental step to take is to provide a stable – and inter-ministerial – framework for public communication in case of a terrorist crisis.

We must first establish, on a permanent basis, an inter-ministerial network, led by the *Service d'information du Gouvernement* (Government Information Service, SIG) in which 'communicators' of the different

ministerial departments would participate. The objective of this group would be twofold: to prepare the handling of the crisis in the area of communications, in particular at the time of preparation exercises, and lead the communication during an actual crisis. This group could open up some of its meetings to communications cells set up under the prefects at the zone level.

The stability of the framework for public communication also requires preparation of a communications plan for each of the ministries that would have a role to play in the management of a terrorist crisis. The organization and experience of the defence and foreign ministries in this area should be taken advantage of in the development of these plans.

Orchestrate

(1) The link between political communication and operational communication

The separation of political communication and operational communication is justified by two fundamental objectives.

The first objective is to consolidate public confidence by showing that everyone is operating in his or her area of competence (for communications about an investigation, a magistrate, a policeman and a gendarme each have the credibility their job gives them.)

Second, we must guarantee the credibility of the communication over time by avoiding putting political leaders in difficult situations. They could lose credibility by commenting on areas they have no direct role in, or if their comments are based on incomplete or inexact information.

Putting together a strategy that combines these two levels of communication requires a series of concrete steps. The first thing that is needed is the decision on principle to separate the two types of communication. In this respect, the 'media plans' and the experience of the Defence and Interior Ministries in the area of crisis communications provide a good basis for a doctrinal model. Next, it is necessary to apply this principle in a systematic way in the simulations and exercises conducted at the national level.

The division of roles must also be maintained from the start of a crisis, in the form of regular press conferences and statements, during which each speaker will be immediately identifiable to the audience through the order of the speakers, each speaker's place in the room, or by what he or she is wearing (uniforms for security forces).

(2) Preparation and handling of communication at the level of the European Union

It is essential that we put in place an effective cross-border communications system in case of a terrorist attack.

During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the coordination of separate national communications was greatly facilitated by the existence within

NATO of a spokesman from the organization speaking every day, in direct liaison with the countries participating in operations. This communication was carried out in a network, whose leader was at the organization's headquarters.

This example would be hard to transpose to the European Union, however, whose missions and institutional organization are different from those of NATO.

The absence of a single coordinator in charge of crisis management in the European Union makes it difficult to put in place a single spokesperson's office on all these subjects.¹ The real-time coordination in the area of communication among the institutions of the Union and with the Member States can be organized without institutionalizing such a function.

France must actively support the implementation of effective coordination procedures between the Commission and the Secretariat-General of the Council in the area of crisis communications. Just as on the national level, these procedures should be tested during frequent exercises involving the Member States.

Building on the public communication tools that it maintains within the foreign and defence ministries, France should also develop ties with the bodies in charge of these issues among our main partners.

(1) The European Union does have an informal body for preparation and the sharing of communications via the 'Venice Group,' which brings together the 'communicators' of the 25 Member States and those of the Union's institutions. This group, however, is embryonic. In addition, the EU has no single pre-designated crisis management mechanism.

Better Reparation and Sanction

Reparation for Damage Suffered by Victims

Compensation

The basis of the system for compensating victims of terrorism in France goes back to the law of 9 September 1986. This system was then extended by the law of 23 January 1990, to give victims genuine recognition and allow them to benefit from national solidarity.

Victims of terrorist acts thus benefit from the rights and advantages accorded to civilian war victims by the disabled military pension code: free health care and artificial limbs, jobs designated for disabled people, etc. Children made orphans by terrorism can, under certain conditions, be declared war orphans, and the children of victims are exonerated from having to pay inheritance tax.

A special fund (the *Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des Actes de Terrorisme et d'autres infractions*, Compensation Fund for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Offenses, FGTV, funded by taxes on insurance premiums or contributions) was created to facilitate payments to victims of acts of terrorism and their families.¹ The applicable procedure is particularly simple: informed of the identity of the victims by the chief prosecutor

(1) This now applies to victims of other crimes as well.

(*Procureur de la République*), or by diplomatic authorities, the fund contacts them directly and makes them a provisional offer of compensation for injuries and material damages, and in case of a death, for moral and economic damages of family members.

Naturally, the victims and their families keep the possibility, at any time, of taking the issue to the courts rather than appealing to the fund. But the administrative procedure offers the advantage of helping with the proceedings and of enabling victims to benefit from provisional payments very soon after the incident.¹

The fund thus ensures complete financial reparation for damage suffered by victims of terrorism, in conformity with core principles of law of responsibility. It is now necessary to go further, by supporting, beyond the question of money, a 'principle of restoring the prior condition' of the victim, notably by providing him or her with the means of professional and social rehabilitation in the case of a lost job following an attack.

Reparations via the Penal System

Beyond compensation, reparation is done via the penal system. The provisions of the law of 9 September 2002, which allow victims of the most serious offences to benefit from a lawyer paid for by legal aid regardless of their resources, represented significant progress for the victims of terrorist acts.

Progress must still be made to provide for victims from the time of the attack and all throughout the procedure.

Prosecuting Suspects: Strengthening International Judicial Cooperation

The Adoption of the European Arrest Warrant: A Major Step Forward

On 13 June 2002, the Council of the European Union adopted the framework decision 'on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States.'²

(1) These payments also take into account the specific damages to victims of terrorism (*préjudice spécifique des victimes du terrorisme* – PSVT) that was first demonstrated by a study of victims undertaken in 1987.

(2) The warrant covers two traditional extradition scenarios: it can be issued when the acts a person is charged with are punishable by a custodial sentence or a detention order of at least twelve months, or when the person has already been convicted, with sentences of at least four months. Acts of terrorism already fall within the scope of existing instruments.

The great innovation was to put in place an exclusively judicial extradition procedure, based on the principle of mutual recognition of legal decisions, without the political authorities getting a chance to reverse them. The aim is to speed up the procedures.¹

For terrorism and 31 other categories of serious offences, the surrender takes place without verification of the double criminality of the alleged act: the executing judicial authority cannot refuse to grant the request for surrender on the grounds that the alleged act is not an offence according to the penal law in his country. This flexibility eliminates a source of legal controversy. The framework decision thus marks the end – highly symbolic – of the refusal to extradite nationals among Member States of the European Union.

The French Constitution was modified on 17 March 2003 to allow this framework decision to come into effect, and the law of 9 March 2004 carried out the transposition. As statistics show, we have already greatly benefited from this reform: as of 31 December 2005, French jurisdictions had ordered the surrender of 336 people, including 140 French nationals, and had received 318 positive decisions from the judicial authorities in other EU countries, of which 69 were for terrorist offences. The average length of time for these actions was 45 days.²

All the EU Member States have transposed the framework decision into their domestic law. France must nonetheless continue to carefully watch the implementation of the European arrest warrant for two reasons: to ensure that it is operationally effective and to promote an instrument that is a fundamental stage in the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice that we support in the European Union.

The Development of Joint Investigation Teams to Counter International Terrorism

International judicial cooperation comes in many forms.

It covers close cooperation among magistrates regarding the evolution of the threat, anti-terrorist legislation, and judicial practices (for example the French-American, French-German, French-Italian and French-Spanish groups that meet twice a year).

(1) The time allowed for the process is set, in some cases voluntarily and in other cases obligatorily: Thus the final decision on the execution of the arrest warrant should normally take place within 10 days when the person consents to surrender or within 60 days of the arrest when consent is not given. The latter period can be extended by 30 days.

(2) These data should be compared to the situation prior to the coming into effect of the law of 9 March 2004, when the arrest and surrender of a person to foreign judicial authorities, even European ones, were subject to a procedure that lasted at least six months when the person consented to his extradition, and 12-18 months when all appeals had been exhausted.

It is expressed by the presence of liaison magistrates abroad to ensure better operational cooperation with judicial bodies and to thus guarantee better responsiveness in handling sensitive cases.

It is also expressed through the participation of French magistrates in EU bodies such as EUROJUST. This foreshadowing of a European prosecutor's office can be useful, provided that the conditions of its operation are made very clear, especially regarding the exchange of information and the protection of intelligence.

International judicial cooperation must also be expressed through the use of joint investigation teams, as authorized by a framework decision adopted by the European Union.¹ French-Spanish teams have already made possible some success in the fight against ETA. The possibility of establishing similar operational teams with countries outside the European Union should be explored through ad hoc bilateral agreements.

Punishing the Guilty

Tailoring Legal Penalties

The sentences foreseen for terrorist acts follow an augmentative logic compared with ordinary law. When an offence is normally punished with a sentence of 30 years of imprisonment, it is extended to a life sentence if it is committed with a terrorist goal. The same logic applies for all offences.

The counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 increased and extended legal penalties for certain terrorist offences. Taking part in a group or in a conspiracy whose goal is to prepare one or more crimes against people, or preparation of one or more acts of destruction by explosive or incendiary lethal substances, is henceforth punishable by 20 years of prison. Directing or organizing such a conspiracy is punishable by 30 years of imprisonment.

Keeping All Options Open

Just as it will for those who commit terrorist acts, France will hold responsible States that order them, through their services or via clandestine groups.

If a terrorist action against our territory or against our interests overseas cannot be prevented, our country can respond militarily in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter relating to self-defence. The means

(1) The provisions that transpose this framework decision are in Articles 695-2 and 3 of the *Code de procédure pénale* (penal procedure code).

and the intensity of the response will be tailored to the seriousness of the act committed and to the targets chosen.

As the President of the Republic stressed after the 11 September 2001 attacks, and as he reiterated in his speech at Île Longue on 19 January 2006, nuclear deterrence 'is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet, the leaders of States who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would consider using, in one way or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and adapted response on our part.'

**Taking Substantive
Action Against
Terrorism by
Winning the Battle
in Everyday Life,
the Technological
Battle and the
Battle of Ideas**

France is not at war against the terrorists, but it is undertaking substantive action whose success requires it to maintain constant vigilance, improve technology and win the battle of ideas.

Chapter 1

**Winning the Battle in
Everyday Life: Promoting
Early Detection of Terrorist
Activities Through
Vigilance and Human
Intelligence**

First of all, the fight against terrorism will be won through daily vigilance.

Concretely preventing the risk of attack requires constant mobilization and a culture of 'early detection.' This does not come naturally and can not be left solely to the specialized counter-terrorism security agencies.

This new dimension of the '*esprit de défense*' must be widely promoted and shared throughout French society.

**Public Agents:
Vigilance is Essential****The Role of Non-Specialized Internal
Security Forces**

One of the primary missions of all police or gendarmerie patrols – and more generally all units in the internal security system in the field – is the search for operational intelligence. This responsibility also applies in the area of counter-terrorism.

There are nearly 245,000 policemen or women and gendarmes in France. Because of the spreading of the threat and the evolution of the profile of activists who might be tempted by terrorism, counter-terrorism cannot rely solely on specialized agents. It is essential that all agencies and units contribute to the detection and upward flow of intelligence for use by the specialized agencies.

Surveillance of public areas and contact with the population is a preferred means for gathering information. But a prerequisite for the effectiveness of this work is that internal security agents have a good understanding of the stakes of the anti-terrorist fight. This understanding will allow them to spot indications of possible terrorist activity and enable them to choose the relevant information to transmit to specialized agencies, better placed to do some cross-checking and appropriate administrative or judicial follow-up.

Careful attention must thus be paid to the initial and continued training of magistrates, police forces, and gendarmes. Their instruction must incorporate knowledge of the social and religious realities of contemporary French society and the ideological references of the terrorist groups. The recent renewal of initial training programmes and the development of continuing education and training modules on these issues should be consolidated in the coming years. It would also be appropriate to ensure that the career advancement process for police and gendarmerie takes into account the acquisition and exercise of skills in counter-terrorism.

The risk of terrorism should also be taken into account when determining the places, times and the frequency of surveillance patrols on the street and in other public places.

The number of sites to be watched is such that coordination with municipal police is necessary, in the framework of agreements concluded with the State. Similarly, cooperation with the private security sector is necessary. The latter now employs some 200,000 people. Within the limits set by the law, these regulated professions work toward the prevention of terrorism and promote the level of general security.

Vigilance of Public Agents

Other categories of officials – whose missions do not directly involve security – may be confronted with abnormal situations that could provide indications of terrorist activity. Members of terrorist groups and networks – whether ideologues, recruiters, logisticians, or individuals directly preparing attacks – first undergo a personal trajectory that carries them toward terrorism. In other respects, the clandestine nature of their activity does not keep them from greater or lesser integration in normal life, nor from the administrative formalities that normal life entails. Some are even highly active in social activities. Others, on the contrary, are indoctrinated to break suddenly with their normal circles. Finally, acts of terrorism are preceded by meticulous preparation – organizing the attack,

choosing targets, putting together the means to be used – all phases during which clandestine activity can be revealed to a well-informed witness.

It is thus essential that all categories of public officials be regularly sensitized to terrorism issues and the types of suspect behaviour that it can produce.

The sensitization must be led by the specialized counter-terrorism agencies and must first be carried out via institutional intermediaries in each sector. Its main avenue must be the distribution of an analysis of the threat tailored to those who receive it. This document will describe, in simple terms, potential terrorists, their behavioural habits, their expected modes of preparation or operation and the type of targets that could be struck. This analysis will be accompanied by guidance on what to do in the types of situations described.

It is especially important that personnel, thus sensitized, find an appropriate interlocutor in case of doubt and that they be able to sound the alert at the right time. For each sector, the channel for passing tips to specialized agencies must be identified and easily usable.

At the State level, senior defence officials (*hauts fonctionnaires de défense*, HFD) are responsible for contributing actively to spreading this *esprit de défense*. Their network should be guided by the desire to raise awareness of the terrorist threat permanently, to support the intelligence agencies, and to ensure that measures designed to promote vigilance are applied.

Present in every ministry, working directly under the minister and coordinated by the Permanent Secretariat for National Defence (Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, SGDN), the HFDs are effective points of contact. A reform of their status is underway. The reform will give them greater authority and means in the area of security. It will nonetheless remain necessary to enhance their ability to work in a network by sharing information and lessons learned and to enhance their role by tasking them to lead crisis exercises in their respective ministries.

The specialized preventive counter-terrorism security agencies should also develop contacts with other public services or owners of private places open to the public. These contacts may be periodic or regular depending on the state of the threat.

The Responsibility of Civil Society and the Role of the Citizen

Public Knowledge of the National Counter-Terrorism System

There can be no effective preventive policy in the area of counter-terrorism without the vigilance of everybody. And vigilance must go beyond the public domain.

Everybody is aware of the existence of the VIGIPIRATE plan. This degree of knowledge is a good thing. But we must go further in extending a culture of prevention. This culture should be based on our citizens' knowledge of the organization of the national counter-terrorism system. The State must also tell the public whom to turn to with information about possible terrorist activities.

Whom to Tell About a Suspicious Situation?

- *The first level of contact: the police station or the gendarmerie brigade (for any report or even in case of doubt) or the diplomatic and consular service for French people abroad;*
 - *For public services or private companies having already developed sectoral links at the regional level: one of the zonal directorates or territorial brigades in the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, DST), the Direction de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Défense (Defence Protection and Security Directorate, DPSD), the gendarmerie, or, as appropriate the regional centres in the fight against radical Islamism, in each regional directorate of the Renseignements Généraux (Central Directorate of General Intelligence, DCRG).*
 - *For specific economic or administrative sectors: direct contact with the DST, the DCRG, the DPSD or the gendarmerie.*
-

The Spanish and British precedents have shown that an emergency can make it necessary to have in place an exceptional system in case of imminent or announced risk of a campaign of attacks. Such a system must make it possible to very quickly receive any report having a direct link with the investigation, on the basis of indications made public by the authorities in charge of the investigations.

The State has acquired a telephone and Internet system for receiving public information. It provides a 'counter-terrorist green number' that can be activated in case of necessity, with one branch set up for victims and another for taking testimony.

Developing an Exercise Policy

A new dynamic has been underway since 2002 in the conception and execution of exercises.

The objective of defence and security exercises is to regularly test the procedures and measures foreseen in the official plans and sub-plans, in the first instance in the area of counter-terrorism. They involve every level of crisis management and prepare decision-makers, their 'headquarters,' and operational teams for complex operations (including, for emergency responders working in a contaminated climate). They make it possible to test equipment and crisis management tools.

Among these exercises, so-called 'major exercises' mobilize the entire decision-making and operational chain of command, all the way up to the State's highest authorities (Presidency of the Republic, Prime Minister and his private office, Ministers and their respective private office).

On top of security and defence exercises there are civil security exercises conducted by the Interior Minister. They relate to alert or emergency operations following an event, whether of a natural, accidental or terrorist nature.

The national operational exercise policy must be pursued and strengthened. The four major exercises, organized every year, constitute a base-line that should be extended with national ministerial and local exercises. This system will only be fully effective if comprehensive lessons are drawn after each exercise and if it is complemented by efforts of synthesis and orientation. We therefore need to put in place an indicative exercise planning system for ministries; systematically organize lessons-learned; disseminate results; and draw consequences to guide the adaptation of our planning system and our crisis-management needs.

Progressively, multinational or international exercises are being organized. At the strategic level they concern management of crises that can cross borders and continents such as the reappearance of smallpox by malicious act or terrorism. At the operational level they involve exercises that take place on the borders of two or more countries. They involve a wide range of actors: national and local state authorities, representatives of local governments, vital infrastructure operators, non-governmental organizations, etc.

Several aspects of public communication are now integrated into the exercises. Traditionally, some information about the exercise and its results was provided, while certain operational methods were not revealed. More recently, the simulation of media pressure has become part of the exercise itself. This has led the players to take media issues into account when making their decisions: these include communication about the events and how they are being handled, reactions of public opinion, and international reaction.

We must increasingly take media issues into account in defence and security exercises because they are such a key element in the public communications and crisis management policies.

Public confidence in government will be all the more natural if it is based on the experience of visible preparation for events which, if they occurred, would no longer be a surprise. As part of the exercises, citizens would also benefit from getting experience learning about how to behave during a crisis similar to the one being simulated in the publicized exercise.

Recent Exercises

The most frequent exercises, since 2002, have been about chemical attacks or accidents, with real intervention by emergency units at the site of the event: PIRATOX in November 2003 in Paris, following a scenario in which Sarin gas (the same type used by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in the Tokyo metro) was used; METROTOX in 2003, 2004 and 2005, following a scenario in which toxic gas was used in metro stations in Toulouse, Lyon and Marseille.

The Central Inter-Ministerial Technological Intervention Unit (détachement central interministériel d'intervention technologique, DCI) was used in January 2004 leading to the neutralization of an improvised nuclear device. The 'R-53' exercise in October 2004 in Paris dealt with a 'dirty bomb' radiological attack scenario and was focused on the hospitalization phase.

The scenario 'Ambroise 05' (Ambrosia), a headquarters exercise carried out in December 2005 in Paris, simulated four nearly simultaneous attacks on the public transport system, including one with the diffusion of toxic gas.

The biological area was covered with the governmental BIOTOX 04 exercise in May 2004, which simulated a malicious appearance of smallpox, and with PANDEMIE GRIPPALE 05 (Flu Pandemic 05) in June 2005. Even though the latter exercise dealt with a natural event rather than a terrorist attack, it simulated a crisis situation similar to the extreme scenarios of major attacks.

In the conventional area, three exercises should be mentioned: ESTEREL 04 in the Mediterranean in October 2004; ARMOR 05, focused on maritime terrorism in the English Channel and the Atlantic in May 2005; and finally PIRATAIR 04 in December 2004, which simulated an airplane hijacking, with mid-air interception and intervention on the ground. In the area of the security of information systems, the exercise PIRANET 05 was conducted in November 2005.

At the European level, EURATOX, which simulated multiple chemical attacks on the Plateau of Canjuers in October 2002, and EURATECH in April 2005, which simulated an attack on a chemical railway transport in Drôme, brought together many hundreds of participants from different EU Member States to test the complementarity of the interventional capabilities and the compatibility of procedures and equipment.

Maintaining Public Vigilance

In the sometimes long periods of respite left by the terrorists, vigilance must nonetheless be maintained. Communications efforts reminding people of the reality and permanence of the threat must be undertaken regularly, especially at propitious times such as when exercises are being conducted or during departures and returns from holidays.

In France the operators of the public transport networks have developed a policy of calling for vigilance among travellers, especially regarding abandoned luggage or suspicious packages. These calls, repeated regularly during the day, are nonetheless limited to prescribing a general attitude, without giving precise instructions for what to do in case of a problem.

In the London Underground, the specialized police initiated a procedure called 'HOT' to sum up the three characteristics of a suspicious object: it must be 'Hidden', 'Obviously suspicious' and not 'Typical' of the environment in question. Instructions have also been issued describing what to do in case an object with these three characteristics is discovered.

Our public transport operators must learn from this type of experience to give their users practical guidelines for action beyond simple messages of a general character that are addressed to them.¹

We must also better manage threats of attacks. Experience has shown that, at least in France, the announcement of an attack, committed on our territory or abroad, always stimulates hoaxes. After the anthrax crisis in the United States in 2001, thousands of suspicious envelopes circulated in France and all were transmitted to laboratories for examination, which led to backups and excessive processing period. Similarly, after the Madrid attacks in March 2004, the *Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer* (French National Railways, SNCF) received numerous anonymous calls claiming that bombs had been placed on trains or train tracks, which led to considerable delays. Beyond sensitizing the French to the dangers of this sort of behaviour, it is necessary to increase the severity of punishment for those who sound false alarms.

The Role of Schools

School is a good place to sensitize children to the risks and threats that weigh on our society in general and on the means to deal with those threats in a preventive way. Schools enable future adults to take conscience of their place in society, of the role of the group and of individual engagement, and of respect for common values. In this framework, the fight against all forms of discrimination is an essential element to prevent the development of extremism.

(1) Whereas in 1992 approximately 20% of incidents in the London Underground led to total evacuations, this proportion has now been lowered to less than 1%.

The theme of terrorism may be taken up in a school setting to differing degrees and according to different formats. While elementary school does not seem to be the right place, given the sensitivity of the subject that touches on themes like violence and death, the pupils can nonetheless be sensitized to the question of danger and to the basic rules of caution. In middle school and high school, several programme modules make it possible to take up the question of terrorism, especially in history, geography, and civil education classes.

We must propose paths of action to teachers to respond to their expectations in the area of information about terrorism. In the framework of the initial training of teachers and school officials, a specific module could be focused on the subject that would make it possible to sensitize the entirety of the personnel in elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. In the framework of teachers' continuing education and training an academic day on risks of the contemporary world, including a session on terrorism, could be organized. The *Journée de Solidarité*¹ could also be an opportunity for the teachers and school officials to deal with the question.

Partnership between the Education, Interior and Defence Ministries could also be promoted to co-produce documents for example putting terrorism into perspective or summarising this White Paper. Training should also be undertaken.

Teaching about religions must also be the business of the secular school.

School cannot be a place open to any form of proselytization. This is the meaning of the law of 15 March 2004 which, in application of the principle of *laïcité* (secularism), provides the framework for the wearing of symbols or clothing manifesting religious affiliation in public elementary schools, secondary schools, and high schools.

Yet schools do not exclude religions from their curricula. Only an objective and detailed knowledge of religious traditions and texts can make it possible for young people of all faiths to avoid falling under the sway of extremists distorting the message of their faith, by applying historical, political and social analysis to religions.

It is thus that in terms of method, teaching about religions is part of the required curriculum in areas like geography, history, literature, or philosophy.

(1) A 'day of solidarity', introduced in 2005, on which workers' salaries are allocated to the elderly

Winning the Technological Battle

The Objective: Always Stay Ahead of the Threat

Principles

Terrorists use the most modern technologies both in the organization of their networks and in their operating procedures. They thus progress according to the pace of technological evolution. Government cannot afford to lag behind.

Until now, our internal security policy gave priority to the purchase of products available on the open market. This approach does not enable the State to ensure that technological efforts to block potential criminal use of the new technologies are up to date. We must get ahead by developing research programmes capable of blocking future threats. This is the lesson that can be drawn from the development of defence programmes.

Whereas the technological cycle in the defence area sometimes lasts 15 or 20 years because of the complexity of the equipment, the time horizon for internal security is shorter, on the order of three to five years. Preventing terrorism requires striking the right balance between the two models.

Orienting the Research and Development Effort

We face numerous technological challenges. The responses can only be found in the framework of a comprehensive and pooled approach in the area of research and development (R&D).

Even more than in the past, our approach must be multi-disciplinary, involving human sciences (psychology, linguistics), physical sciences (mechanics, microelectronics), biotechnology, and information technologies. We need a centralized survey of needs as well as a coherent master plan with a clear leader, for each strategic area.

The R&D effort should be organized in three parts:

The first involves keeping watch and carrying out forward-looking analysis in the area of threats, based on the experience of counter-terrorism officials. The evolution of the terrorists' operating procedures should be integrated in government guidelines and choices.

The second part should promote research programmes in the technological areas in which major developments are expected. The role of the National Research Agency (*Agence Nationale de la Recherche*, ANR) in the civilian sector and of the General Delegation for Armament (*Délégation Générale pour l'Armement*, DGA) in the defence sector is to identify the fields that require long-term investment.

The third effort has to do with industrial development and the production of equipment in the areas where the basic technology is mature. Based on an analysis of needs, what is necessary is to adjust applications already being used in various sectors to different objectives, or to speed up the development of specially tailored counter-terrorist equipment. Here, too, we should build on existing structures, for example the Agency for Innovation in Industry (*Agence de l'Innovation Industrielle*, AII), the support programme for competitive clusters in the civilian sector of the DGA.

The sectors that deserve particular attention include protection against the CBRN risk, the detection of explosives, the monitoring of telecommunications, video-surveillance, the protection of information systems and biometrics.

Protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

The 11 September 2001 attacks demonstrated the clear risk of terrorist attacks with non-conventional weapons, which could thus have chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear effects.

An inventory of our detection, diagnostic, prophylactic and therapeutic means – as well as of our means for decontamination and rehabilitation – made it possible to evaluate the current capabilities of our system. This system must be strengthened to deal with the particular characteristics of the terrorist threat, such as 'dirty bombs' (explosives that spread radioactive materials), chemical agents, pathogens, attacks on the

food chain (including drinking water), agricultural resources or the environment.

The priority areas for which new tools must be developed have been identified.

In the nuclear and radiological area, the goal is to be able in optimal security conditions to diagnose and dismantle any weapon and any improvised device.

In the biological area, we must improve our detection and diagnostic capabilities. We must extend the range of detectable agents by developing reliable sensors and common procedures of analysis in the expert laboratories. We must further develop our prophylactic and therapeutic means.

The malicious spreading of emerging or re-emerging diseases can be made easier by the rapid evolution of biological technologies. An enhanced epidemiological detection, diagnostic, and follow-up capability for infected or potentially infected people, animals or plants can make it possible to develop appropriate responses.

In the chemical area, the greatest needs are the acquisition and adaptation of existing techniques to a civilian context: reliable and continuous detection, confirmation and automatic alert in case of detection and reassurance in the opposite case.

The common points in all these areas are the development of miniaturized and automatic sensors that can detect threats rapidly and the extension of the detection capability to the whole range of toxic agents that could be used by terrorists.

Detection of Explosives

We need to be able to detect explosives in areas of significant human or automobile traffic without interfering with freedom of movement. For this we need to develop and perfect automatic sensors that can be used in fixed sites or mobile stations.

Our detection capabilities must cover products, such as ammonium nitrate, that have explosive characteristics when they are prepared and applied in a particular way. These products are for the most part very widely available or easy to prepare via the transformation of easily obtainable raw materials. They are currently detected by specialized dogs. We must develop trace detection devices and make them more reliable.

Monitoring Telecommunications

The development of the Internet and of the numerous services that it offers, especially in the area of voice telephony, significantly changes the architecture of the operators' networks. To maintain the capability for judicial authorities, police forces and intelligence services to access the content of communications as part of judicial or security intercepts, appropriate technical systems must be implemented both by operators and by security services.

The automation of detection will have to include an element focused on voice – eventually enabling recognition of the speaker's voice, his or her language, and automatic transcription and translation of the conversations. High-capacity tools are already available, but the technologies must still be fully validated.

In the area of research in large stocks of data (combining text, sound and digital images), work should focus on word-sorting, which makes it possible to organize the information gathered in texts or in sound recordings in an intelligible manner, and on the recognition of objects or people in a continuous flow of photographs or videos.

The development of **video-surveillance** in the area of counter-terrorism has two components.

The goal of the first is to improve the quality of available products by establishing demanding standards. The standardization of products (cameras, networks, visualization and storage systems, image formats, operating software) must be based on the generalization of digital techniques and the use of dominant standards (such as the Mpeg video format). The counter-terrorism law of 23 January 2006 requires the definition of mandatory standards.

The second component has to do with software. The development of video-surveillance must include the introduction of specialized software capable of face-recognition, movement detection, detection of abandoned objects, and tracking individuals. Only this kind of software makes it possible to quickly and effectively make use of the volume of images received. The results obtained so far by industry are encouraging.

In the area of **information systems**, several steps should be taken to improve security significantly.

Given the recognized lack of trusted security products, we have to be more ambitious in funding research, development and acquisition of such tools. In its networks and sensitive systems, the government must systematically use tested and validated security products and services. Private operators must be involved with this approach from early on. Our goal, in such a sensitive area of national affairs, must be to develop national solutions.

Biometrics

Biometric techniques are now widely used in the area of judicial investigation and they have proven their reliability. The risk of statistical error is very low.

At present, fingerprint and palmprint biometrics remain the primary technological tool available to develop these systems of reliable checks in sensitive or restricted-access areas.¹ The focus needs to be placed on operational development and on diffusion of this technique.

(1) The rate of statistical error for these techniques, already naturally very low, can be reduced to zero by using several fingers or palmprints.

In the area of genetics, the analysis process remains long, and research should focus on making it possible to extract DNA in practically real time from a blood sample.

Automatic face-recognition technology based on photographs and iris-recognition technology is not sufficiently mature to make possible large-scale operational application. Identification via voice spectrum analysis is a field of knowledge that is still too embryonic for it to be operationally applied on a large scale at present. Research programmes in these two areas must be pursued.

The Method: Cooperation between State and Business, which Emphasizes the European Dimension

Encouraging a Process for Developing Anti-Terrorist standards

Compared to the practices of the early 1980s, the conception of products now takes new environmental norms into account in addition to standards for the quality of production. We have to move toward a certification process that takes the specific objective of the fight against terrorism into account.¹

The State must set standards, including in the area of certification, for the organizations, systems and equipments that contribute to the fight against terrorism. This is an indispensable corollary to the policy of vital infrastructure protection decreed by the national security directives. It makes it possible to protect, support and frame the industrial activity associated with security and defence.

The work done in international standardization bodies focuses on a number of different sectors associated with counter-terrorism. These include CBRN detection, emergency communications, first aid equipment, biometrics, logistics chain security, and crisis exercise practices.

French input should be given to the international bodies that the French Standardization Agency (*Agence Française de Normalisation*, AFNOR) participates in. Otherwise, we would be presented with solutions for which our companies would not be prepared or that do not reflect French needs.

(1) After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) began work on the fight against terrorism, from the point of view of 'citizen protection.' This issue was taken up by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the European Committee for Standardization (CEN). NATO also participates, in liaison with the CEN.

Communicating with Companies and Supporting their Efforts

French companies are well placed in the security technologies sector. In this area they benefit from the defence technology sector, with which they work closely. The expertise of our national industrial sector is recognized and used by our foreign partners.

The State can thus rely on national expertise to develop the systems and equipment required by the fight against terrorism. It must support the research and development efforts of businesses. This requires a long-term financial engagement.

For the sectors that require our main efforts (protection from the CBRN threat, detection of explosives, the monitoring of telecommunications, video-surveillance, the protection of information systems and biometrics), the State should establish ambitious programmes and set ambitious objectives. It must get our companies to contribute to projects with research and development contracts. The financial resources devoted to R&D in these sectors could, moreover, be presented in a single budget, making it possible to publicly identify the effort undertaken.

Further Supporting and Enhancing the European Security Research Programme

The global character of the threat and the importance of the means to deploy in response to the threat make European and international cooperation natural.

Cooperation is necessary to pool resources and, in some cases, to attain the critical mass needed to justify certain research projects. Cooperation will make it possible to pursue the standardization project and eventually to guarantee that monitoring and surveillance equipment can communicate beyond borders. It will enable our industry to measure itself against its European partners.

Since 2001, the fight against terrorism has been an important concern of the **European Union**.

Concrete initiatives have been taken with the creation of European agencies in the areas of transport and information networks, including the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Aviation Safety Agency and the European Network and Information Security Agency. But EU efforts go beyond merely creating new institutions.

Significant funds have been allocated within the Framework Research and Development Programmes (FRDP), notably the 6th FRDP underway in 2006. The 7th FRDP breaks new ground by offering a specific element – the European Security Research Programme (known as ‘the ESRP programme’) that could be endowed with 250 million euros per year for the 2007-2013 period.

ESRP offers concrete prospects for developing European security technologies. France plans to take full part in this. An inter-ministerial organization for this purpose has been set up and a close dialogue between government and national industries has been established. This dialogue will make it possible to establish our position, to contribute to the orientation of the program and to prepare our industrial sector for this new framework.

The European Union must support the development of interoperable alert systems and crisis management data-bases. France has identified what is needed in the long run to establish a European crisis management network.¹ The ESRP should also cover video-surveillance, surveillance of goods, detection of dangerous materials, and protection of the transport system. Management of the ESRP by the Commission should be carried out in close collaboration with Member States, who establish security needs.

Given the strong technological commonality between the systems for counter-terrorism and those developed by the defence industries in areas like CBRN, detection, protection of networked systems, and communications interoperability, the European Defence Agency can also offer an appropriate framework for conducting research activities, through cooperation among the 25 or in smaller teams.

The sensitivity of certain subjects – given the need for discretion in the face of certain threats and the need to protect industrial know-how – makes it necessary to focus on limited cooperation with key European partners, depending on the issue.

The cooperation programmes with the United States, especially in the CBRN area, must also be reinforced.

(1) This includes data sharing, secure information links, the setting up of radio networks, and the development of software to help with decision-making.

Winning the Battle of Ideas

In the long run, the only real way to stop the spread of terrorism is with the support and solidarity of citizens. This means that France must fight a battle of ideas, in France and throughout the world. France begins this battle with some initial credit, including the coherence of the principles that guide its internal action and the position it takes in international affairs.

In France, Consolidating Public Support and Isolating the Terrorists

To be heard, a message must be simple. To be convincing, it must be based on the basic values of our democratic tradition.

The Principle: Never Compromise the Fundamental Values of the Rule of Law

France, like all countries threatened by global Islamist-inspired terrorism, faces this fundamental question: How can a democracy, while remaining faithful to its values, fight against a threat that seeks the destruction of what that democracy represents?

Two questions, one as fundamental as the other, must be resolved. Should we go so far as to consider ourselves in a 'state of war against terrorism'? Can we – by virtue of the supposed or real pre-eminence of the fundamental right to security, strictly and durably limit our

fundamental liberties, such as respect for private life or the freedom to come and go?

If we were at war, permanent recourse to emergency legislation would be justified. And if the war took place in part on our soil, those living there would have to accept the curbing of their most essential daily liberties.

France has decided to remain within a peacetime logic. The fact that it is using its armed forces in the fight against terrorism does not contradict this choice.

Our penal law in the area of the fight against terrorism remains a specialized system. It is not an extraordinary system. The most innovative measures in the field of policing civil liberties – such as the development of video-surveillance and the creation of data-bases that process information about international travellers – are accompanied by guarantees that protect our basic freedoms.¹

The most innovative systems are only implemented for limited periods of time, with a 'rendez-vous' clause requiring parliamentary review, so that the government reports on the way in which the new tools have been used.

The Parliament must also be informed about the activity of the intelligence agencies in the area of counter-terrorism. This can take place in the more general framework of the information that the government has pledged to provide to parliament about the activity of these agencies.

This general balance demonstrates a clear consensus that beyond the debate between security and liberty, popular support for our country's battle against terrorism derives from the conservation of our great democratic principles.

France must fight terrorism by remaining firm on the values that hold this country together and which can give substance to the fight. The government must inform citizens about the risks involved and the methods being used. The fight against terrorism also depends on rigorous public communication.

Rejecting the Conflation of Terrorism and Islam

The fight against global terrorism is in no sense a fight against Islam. It is focused on the groups and networks that hijack Islam's humanist tradition and pervert the religion for the goals and causes that the criminals claim to be serving.

We have to reject any conflation of Islam with terrorism. Support for Islam's representative authorities in France and for the message of

(1) These guarantees include the systematic intervention of the National Commission on Data Processing and Liberties (*Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés*, CNIL).

peace sent by the immense majority of imams is part of the absolute refusal of conflation of Islam with terrorism.

It is not up to the State to favour one or another reading of Islam, nor of any other religion for that matter. But language inciting hatred, provocation or discrimination is neither morally nor legally acceptable and will never be tolerated.

The Form of the Message: Public Communications Policy Must Seek the Widest Possible Consensus by Isolating the Terrorists

Rallying the Population

To fight against terrorism, there are two possible types of long-term communication.

The first seeks to create the expression of majority support for the government in the fight against terrorism and its effects. This approach favours dramatization, which often provokes a process of identification with government.

The second approach seeks to build a wide consensus, integrating first and foremost the fraction of the population the terrorists claim to speak for and that they try to detach from the national community. A policy of seeking consensus must coldly and rationally seek to make of the public a clear-eyed ally that is sensitized to the battle being waged by the authorities. It is this second approach that we must follow.

Defining target groups for communication

Five main groups can be distinguished.

- The broad population, including children and adolescents;
- People and organizations engaged in the fight against terrorism: the State and its agents; local authorities and their agents; critical infrastructure operators (health, water, energy, transport, telecommunications); institutions that deal with the public and their employees;
- Populations the terrorists claim to be fighting for. They are put in a delicate position before attacks are committed. They are extremely vulnerable when the terrorists have struck.¹ The reactions of this part of the population are also decisive for any policy that seeks to promote national unity and isolate the terrorists. The communications policy will target both the relevant populations in France and the countries, populations and foreign organizations that could contribute to the isolation of the terrorists;

(1) See the violent reactions against Muslim schools and the religious sites in the Netherlands in November 2004 after the assassination of the director Theo Van Gogh.

- France's foreign partners;
- Both the national and foreign media as special communication channels;

On the level of principles, the groups whose mobilization is desired must be considered as partners in the fight against terrorism.

From the 'need to know' to the 'need to share'

The public is both a stake and a target at the same time. It must be viewed as a full partner. We therefore need to move from a logic of 'need to know,' which traditionally governs the security domain, to a new dynamic of sharing information.

Naturally, this passage from the 'need to know' to 'need to share' does not mean that everything must be made public. The general public will understand perfectly well that a fully transparent policy would be counter-productive in this area. Affirming this new principle, however, moves the burden of proof in terms of communication. In the tradition of Latin States, people have a tendency to keep information to themselves, unless it is obviously harmless. In the future, the principle should be that of communicating information, unless it is obviously dangerous.

This is a major change. But it is indispensable if we want to create, and maintain, the mutual confidence that is the key to a successful and durable mobilization of society against terrorism.

Distinguishing necessary discretion from useless mystery

Whether in time of crisis or not, it is important for the intelligence agencies to adopt a policy of targeted communications. While they must be extremely circumspect about their operational methods and protect their sources, their leaders can usefully speak about the state of the threat and the main goals of their activities. The recent evolution of their practices in this respect is a positive factor worthy of being consolidated.

A need for new interfaces

To concretely apply the new approach, we must first create **communications forums** on a national scale bringing together public communication professionals and the representatives of diverse target groups from the population we seek to mobilize: general opinion leaders (researchers, recognized specialists, and journalists), representatives of local government and operators, leaders from the parts of the public the terrorists claim to speak for. The setting up of this type of forum can also be envisaged at the regional level (in the defence zones or in France's *Régions*.)

The establishment of **informal dialogues** with the press could be useful both to the State and to the journalists, who sometimes feel isolated when it comes to making an ethical choice between defending the national interest and revealing information to the public.

The organization of **national or regional conferences** must be made systematic. These meetings can be organized at the State's initiative

or by research institutes, which are good intermediaries with civil society.¹ This type of gathering will, among other goals, seek to involve in the debate people with particular standing among the populations the terrorists claim to be 'showing the way.' The work of institutes specialized in internal security and defence show that this can be done in this area.²

The creation of **information sources accessible to the wider public**³ and specialists on different aspects of terrorism must be encouraged. Such efforts will be all the more effective if they involve the public and private sectors. Having the State distancing itself in this manner can help lessen the suspicion of manipulation that sometimes surrounds information put out by the government. Making more information public can also help research centres develop their capacity for analyzing terrorism.

Individual expertise on terrorism must be developed in the same spirit. In case of a danger or a crisis, whatever the cause, the media can turn to people known for their expertise, who in principle have the advantage of being able to provide information independently from political, bureaucratic or economic interests.

Isolating the terrorists

The terrorists would like to speak to States as equals. This logic must be refused, both in terms of substance and of style.

The terrorists say they are at war. They call themselves combatants. This was already the case for the extreme-left of the 1970s (at 'war against big capital'). Now it is the case for Osama bin Laden and his supporters, who see themselves in a clash of civilizations. This approach seeks to legitimize terrorism. We cannot accept it. On the contrary, we must marginalize those who undertake terrorist acts, reminding everyone that these are not warriors but criminals. You do not go to war against criminals.

Trying to open dialogue with the terrorists is also out of the question. This is because such a policy would only bolster the terrorists by treating them like appropriate interlocutors. Treating them like this would only enhance their attraction in the eyes of potential recruits or supporters.

(1) The 17 November 2005 conference 'The French in the face of terrorism', organized in the framework of the preparation of this White Paper, is a good example of a conference organized by the State.

(2) Examples include the *Institut National des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité* (National Institute of Higher Security Studies, INHES) and the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* (Institute of Higher National Defence Studies, IHEDN).

(3) Such as the data base on terrorist attacks, made available to the public on-line on 22 September 2005 by the *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (Foundation for Strategic Research), www.frstrategie.org

Fighting Terrorism at the Global Level

Countering Radical Islamist Propaganda and the Rhetoric of Hatred and Intolerance

On this point, international organizations have an important role to play. They have started adapting the tools that make it possible to fight all over the world against incitement to racial hatred and provocation of terrorism.

UN Security Council Resolution 1624, adopted in September 2005, compels all states to adopt a penal system that criminalizes these offences. The Council of Europe's convention on terrorism goes in the same direction. To further develop this normative action in the area of the fight against intolerance and incitement to racial hatred, an international organization such as UNESCO could prove to be an appropriate body to carry the battle of ideas to a global level. It could do this by promoting education programmes and sensitizing people to the terrorist threat.

Another area that should receive priority attention at the international level is the use of satellite television to spread racist or anti-Semitic ideas or that promote terrorism.

The *Al-Manar* affair of 2003-2004 demonstrated the absence of European regulation in this area.¹ Without any other coercive means available, the United States, for their part, put *Al-Manar* on the list of terrorist organizations. The French approach, based on a procedure of gradual warning and then cutting off of the programme, could serve as a model for the adoption of an EU Framework Decision.

Communicating Better

Islamist terrorists of al Qaeda's persuasion reject all dialogue and all communication: 'The jihad and the rifle alone, no negotiation, no conference, no dialogue' wrote Abdallah Azzam, the mentor of Osama bin Laden.² Even if they would accept dialogue, it is hard to see what the objective of such dialogue could be, given that their project lies beyond any political bounds. The causes put forward are more pretexts than claims: Osama bin Laden only focused on the fate of the Palestinians belat-

(1) In November 2003, the Lebanese television station *Al-Manar*, which is close to Hezbollah, broadcast an anti-Semitic Syrian soap opera. This broadcast led the French authorities to develop new legislation relating to audiovisual freedom, which was adopted on 9 July 2004. Its provisions allowed the Conseil d'Etat, to which the issue was referred by the *Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel* (Higher Audiovisual Council, CSA), to order the Eutelsat satellite system to stop carrying *Al-Manar* on 13 December 2004.

(2) Azzam was a radical Islamist theoretician and coordinator of the Arab participation in the Afghanistan war; he died in 1989.

edly. His first statements focused on the American presence in Somalia as a target.

Conversely, the use of warlike terminology, which by definition excludes any room for communication, has the disadvantage of consolidating the threat. It can even constitute the best publicity for the recruitment of new terrorists. Even more seriously, it gives credit to the false and dangerous idea of a 'clash of civilizations' between the West and the Muslim world, which is exactly what global Islamist-inspired terrorism seeks to promote.

In the area of international communication, the work on the terrorists' environment must primarily focus on two things.

The first is to recognize, and to reaffirm, that the Arab and Muslim States are more in symbiosis than in conflict with Western civilization.

The second consists in targeting, in terms of communication, the middle classes and the young generations, including when they see their room for expression curbed by their leaders.

France has a long tradition of Middle East studies. In the past this might have seemed outmoded; it was, in addition, certainly marked by the colonial period. But this tradition underwent an undeniable renewal in the 1980s. The skills that French scholars developed in this period must be put to use to promote our assets in the area of dialogue and to conduct a targeted policy with respect to Muslim opinion leaders.

The question of communication toward the Muslim world in general is also highly relevant. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States has pursued 'public diplomacy' toward the Arab world; to this end they created the Sawa radio station and the al-Hura television channel.

France itself has long had international audiovisual ambitions, with media such as Radio France Internationale (RFI), RMC Moyen-Orient (RMC Middle East) and the Medi I Sat project. The future French international information channel (CFIL) will also have to be present in the Arab world.

Finally, we must also be present in the international Arabic media (in 2006 the al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya and Abu Dhabi TV television channels and the al-Hayat and al-Sharq al Awsat newspapers). This will make it possible for us to be better understood and to avoid misunderstanding about our policies.

Emphasizing a Political Approach

Beyond the elaboration of analysis and language concepts appropriate for communication, containing global terrorism also requires a political approach, which must pursue three objectives: reduce and, ideally, resolve regional crises on which terrorism thrives rhetorically and

opportunistically; build or rebuild the weakest States; contribute to the opening of Arab and Western societies toward one another.

Reducing or Resolving Regional Crises

Certain Near or Middle East conflicts are very present in the rhetoric of Islamist terrorists.

Their resolution would of course not reduce global terrorism, which functionally has nothing to do with them. It is, moreover, worth noting that al Qaeda took off as an organization in the second half of the 1990s, in other words at the very moment when so much was being done to bring the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to a successful conclusion.

Nonetheless, more active American and European involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, followed by positive results, would deprive global terrorism of some symbolic arguments, which would contribute to the drying up of some of its recruitment sources. The political resolution of the Chechen conflict, also very present in the Islamist terrorist propaganda, must, for the same reason, be pursued.

But it is Iraq that has today become the main aggravating factor. It offers the terrorists the image of an Arab country occupied by Western forces and, in operational terms, a new 'land of jihad' even more promising than Afghanistan or Somalia had been. The effects of the current situation will be felt for a long time, even after Iraq will have stabilized.

Africa is also confronted with destabilizing conflicts of which global terrorism can take advantage. This only makes our engagement in the resolution of these conflicts even more important.

Whatever the evolution of the regional conflicts in the coming years, our objective must be to succeed in dissociating local extremism and global terrorism.

The risk of alliances of convenience, of an operational or political character, is hard to avoid. The true threat is that of strategic alliances that would allow global terrorism to win over the militant base of the local extremist groups and enable them to benefit from the mobilizing power of international Islamist ideology.

Our policy will be all the more effective if it is diversified. All forms of terrorism must be fought with the same determination, but, with the goal of effectiveness in mind, in different ways.

When the resort to terrorism links up with a local conflict, by recycling its complaints, it is in our interest to do everything possible to resolve the conflict: first of all for the good of all parties concerned; then to deprive terrorism of a recruitment reservoir and a motor of mobilization. At the same time that we undertake the required actions against terrorist groups, we will seek a dialogue with those who, while they may share certain political objectives with the terrorists, either do not share or renounce the terrorists' methods.

Global terrorism lies outside the political space in which dialogue is possible: its objective is our destruction; violence is not a language but an end in itself.

Our policy of preventing the threat and stopping terrorist acts must be pursued in cooperation with our international partners.

Consolidating Weak States and Reconstructing Failed States

The consolidation of weak states and the reconstruction of failed states, where all form of authority has disappeared, are crucial. They are the keys to the sanctuaries where the terrorists find refuge. The main goal is to restore in these states institutions that function in which the public is confident because these institutions will provide people with an appropriate level of security.

The priority must therefore be to reinforce the capabilities in the area of security, along the lines of what has been undertaken in Afghanistan and in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This implies re-establishing effective police, military and customs forces.

The condition for success of these state building operations in the most fragile areas will ultimately depend on the capacity of the local security forces to collaborate with those hostile to the central authority and on the ability of the government to win them over.

Contributing to the Reciprocal Opening of Muslim Cultures and Western Societies

The integration of radicals into politics is not always possible. When it is plausible, however, we should seek it.

In 1995, the European Union launched the Euro-Mediterranean process, called the 'Barcelona Process.' This partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean plays a useful role, notably by helping the countries on the southern side uphold their responsibilities. The focus on civil societies must not lead us to ignore States already weakened by the numerous challenges they must face. As the Iraqi case shows, the radicalization of populations is often due to the deficiencies of States. The European Union allocates large amounts of money in the Mediterranean region (approximately 3 billion euros per year), but our approach would benefit from being more visible and better targeted.

At the Barcelona summit, in November 2005, the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreed for the first time on a common basis for counter-terrorism by adopting a 'code of good conduct.' They unanimously declared terrorism to be unjustifiable and committed themselves to implementing the ad hoc UN conventions on terrorism and to concluding the negotiation on the global convention on terrorism – which has until now divided them – as soon as possible.

More needs to be done, in particular regarding the definition of terrorism, on which there is still no agreement. France will continue to work determinedly to broaden the basis of international mobilization against terrorism everywhere in the world. Already, an important step forward was taken with the agreement of all UN Member States to 'strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.'¹ This declaration must be made to bear fruit.

(1) Excerpt from the final declaration of the General Assembly Summit celebrating the 60th anniversary of the UN in September 2005.

Conclusion

Terrorism presents two growing threats to our societies: it seeks to splinter them and to make them lose their souls.

At the forefront of this threat, global Islamist-inspired terrorism relentlessly pursues its divisive project.

At the global level, it seeks to divide Western and Muslim societies. In Muslim countries, it seeks to divide Islamist extremists and moderate believers. In France, it seeks to divide individuals of the Muslim faith from others. To splinter our societies, global terrorism resorts to exploiting Islam for political purposes, scorning the precepts of peace and tolerance taught by this religion. We will respond to this moral challenge by fighting any attempt to conflate Islam and terrorism. It is the unity and cohesion of our country that protect us from the clash of civilizations into which global terrorism seeks to drag us.

Global terrorism also seeks to strike at the heart of our democracies.

It seeks this first by destabilizing them with the perpetration of attacks designed to shock public opinion and to undermine its confidence in the capacity of government to defend them effectively. But it especially seeks this goal by pushing citizens to renounce the principles democracies are built on.

The freedom that constitutes the bedrock of our democracy can not be synonymous with improvidence and weakness. We must thus prevent attacks and severely punish those who manage to perpetrate them or who attempt to do so. The challenge is to ensure the effectiveness of counter-terrorism methods while complying with the rule of law. To deviate from this course would in fact be to play into the hands of global terrorism. On the occasion of the commemoration of the first anniversary of the March 2004 attacks in Madrid, the UN Secretary General declared that 'compromising human rights cannot serve the struggle against terrorism. On the contrary, it facilitates achievement of the terrorist's objective – by

ceding to him the moral high ground, and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust [...] among precisely those parts of the population where he is most likely to find recruits.⁷

By respecting the law, the fight against terrorism gains legitimacy. It therefore gains effectiveness, from a long-term strategic perspective.

Our country will continue to travel down this narrow path. It will keep the judge at the heart of counter-terrorism, being careful never to go down the slippery slope of developing extraordinary procedures. Our intelligence and security agencies will use the most modern surveillance methods with continued respect for civil liberties, such as the right to come and go and the respect for privacy. The most restrictive measures will only be adopted for limited periods of time and they will be regularly and repeatedly discussed in Parliament.

Our country has made the legal, philosophical, and strategic choice to fight terrorism within the framework of the rule of law. It will not deviate from this course.

Appendix 1

**Main acts attributed to
global terrorism since
1992**

- **29 December 1992:** double attack at Aden (Yemen) against American soldiers, attributed to al Qaeda
- **26 February 1993:** attack on the World Trade Center in New York (United States) attributed to al Qaeda. 6 deaths and more than 1000 injured.
- **19 November 1995:** suicide attack against the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad (Pakistan), attributed to a group close to al Qaeda. 16 deaths and 60 injured.
- **23 February 1998:** creation of *World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders* under the aegis of Osama bin Laden.
- **7 August 1998:** double suicide attacks simultaneously on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, responsibility claimed by Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places. 224 deaths.
- **12 October 2000:** suicide attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden (Yemen), attributed to al Qaeda. 17 deaths.
- **9 September 2001:** assassination of Commander Massoud by two members of al Qaeda.
- **11 September 2001:** quadruple suicide attacks simultaneously in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania (United States), responsibility claimed belatedly by al Qaeda. 2985 deaths, **5 of which were French.**
- **11 April 2002:** suicide attack on a synagogue in Djerba (Tunisia), responsibility claimed by Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places. 15 deaths, **2 of which were French.**
- **8 May 2002:** attack on French engineers of DCN at Karachi (Pakistan) attributed to a group close to al Qaeda. 14 deaths, **11 of which were French.**
- **6 October 2002:** suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg off-shore Yemen, claimed by al Qaeda. 1 death.
- **12 October 2002:** double suicide attack in a night club in Bali (Indonesia), responsibility claimed by Jemaah Islamiyah, close to al Qaeda. 202 deaths, **4 of which were French.**
- **28 November 2002:** double suicide attack in Mombasa (Kenya) against a hotel and an airliner, attributed to al Qaeda. 11 deaths.

- **12 May 2003:** triple suicide attack simultaneously at Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) against western residential complexes, claimed by al Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula. 34 deaths.
- **16 May 2003:** quintuple simultaneous attacks in Casablanca (Morocco) against western and Jewish communities, attributed to an al Qaeda-inspired group. 41 deaths, **4 of which were French.**
- **5 August 2003:** attack on a Marriott hotel in Jakarta (Indonesia), carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah. 12 deaths.
- **19 August 2003:** attack on the United Nations building in Baghdad. 23 deaths, among them the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and **1 French.** Debut of the jihadist intervention in Iraq.
- **11 September 2003:** the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat pledges its allegiance to al Qaeda.
- **8 November 2003:** attack in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) on the residential complex of Mouhaya. 18 deaths.
- **15 and 20 November 2003:** respectively, attacks in Istanbul (Turkey) against the Jewish community (23 deaths) and British interests (27 deaths), attributed to al Qaeda.
- **11 March 2004:** four simultaneous waves of attacks (10) in Madrid (Spain), attributed to an al Qaeda-inspired group. 191 deaths, **among them 1 French.**
- **9 September 2004:** attack against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (Indonesia), carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah. 9 deaths.
- **7 October 2004:** triple suicide attack in Taba (Egypt), attributed to a group close to al Qaeda. 34 deaths.
- **7 April 2005:** suicide attack in Cairo (Egypt) attributed to a group inspired by al Qaeda. 4 deaths, **2 of which were French.**
- **7 July 2005:** quadruple suicide attacks in London (United Kingdom), claimed by al Qaeda. 56 deaths, **1 of which was French.**
- **23 July 2005:** triple suicide attack in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt). 62 deaths.
- **9 November 2005:** triple suicide attack in Amman (Jordan). 57 deaths.

Principal Threats against France since 1998

- **5 March 1998:** dismantling of an Islamic terrorist cell in Brussels (Belgium), suspected of preparing for attacks in France (Melouk cell).
- **18 May 1998:** declarations by Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani daily *Aousaf* threatening 23 western military installations in the region around the Persian Gulf, including the French base in Djibouti.
- **26 May 1998:** a series of arrests in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland of Maghreb terrorists planning attacks against the World Soccer Cup.
- **11 and 25 June 1999:** diffusion of two communications threatening France and Belgium attributed to an Algerian terrorist cell issued by GIA.
- **25 and 26 December 2000:** arrest in Frankfurt (Germany) of Maghreb terrorists planning an apparent attack against the cathedral and/or the Christmas market in Strasbourg.
- **20 September 2001:** dismantling of an al Qaeda cell in France, Belgium, and in the United Kingdom which was preparing for a suicide attack on the American Embassy in Paris, which was forecasted for July 2002 (Beghal network).
- **5 October 2001:** in Saint-Denis, dismantling of an Algerian Islamic cell suspected of planning an attack at the France-Algeria football match on 6 October 2001.
- **17 October 2001:** threat letters against France by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a dissident branch of the GIA.
- **22 December 2001:** attempted attack against an Air France flight between Paris and Miami, attributed to al Qaeda.
- **12 November 2002:** communiqué from Osama bin Laden justifying the attacks committed on 11 September 2001, as well as the 8 May 2002 attacks in Karachi against French engineers.
- **16 December 2002:** dismantling of a cell in La Courneuve suspected of preparing a non-conventional attack (toxic agents) against the Russian Embassy in Paris.
- **24 December 2002:** continuation of this operation in Romainville.
- **16 February 2003:** statement by Osama bin Laden denouncing Western policy, including the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

- **2 June 2003:** arrest at Charles de Gaulle airport of Moroccan national Karim Mehdi, jihadist linked to the Hamburg cell, who was planning to go to Reunion Island to prepare a terrorist act against tourist sites.
- **16 September 2003:** arrest in Sanaa (Yemen) of a cell leader linked to the organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula planning attacks, especially against the French Cultural Centre and the US Embassy.
- **24 February 2004:** communiqué from Ayman al Zawahiri, deputy of Osama bin Laden, denouncing the French law on *laïcité* (secularism).
- **14 October 2004:** letter from Abdelmalek Droukdal, Emir of the GSPC, to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, denouncing France because of its relations with the Algerian government.
- **18 May 2005:** communiqué from Abu Musab al Zarqawi denouncing the French law on *laïcité* (secularism).
- **June 2005:** threats against the French Embassy in Baghdad.
- **July 2005:** threats made against France by the Pakistani weekly Dharb al Munim (8-14 July issue).
- **September 2005:** undated communiqué (posted online on 14 September) of the GSPC threatening France, qualified as 'enemy no. 1'.
- **26 September 2005:** police operation in France against a cell of former GIA members suspected of preparing attacks on the DST headquarters, Orly airport and the Paris Metro.
- **6 January 2006:** communiqué by al Zawahiri criticizing France for its policy in Algeria.
- **4 March 2006:** Call by al Zawahiri for an economic boycott of a number of European countries, including France, again condemning the French law on *laïcité* (secularism).
- **23 April 2006:** declaration by Osama bin Laden criticizing the French law on *laïcité* (secularism) and the muslims' status in France.

Drafting and Working Groups

Work on this White Paper was begun in May 2005 by Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin at the proposal of Dominique de Villepin, then Minister of the Interior, Internal Security and Local Freedoms. A Directing Committee for the White Paper was set up under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, *Ministre d'Etat*, Minister of the Interior and Country Planning.

Six Working Groups were set up. They were chaired by the Director General for External Security (DGSE), the Director for Territorial Surveillance (DST), the Ambassador-Delegate to the World Summit on the Information Society, the Director of Criminal Affairs and Pardons of the Justice Ministry, the Director General for Political and Security Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Special Advisor to the Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research.

The Permanent Secretary for National Defence (Secrétaire général de la défense nationale, SGDN) was the overall rapporteur of the White Paper. He was assisted by four senior officials from the State Council (*Conseil d'Etat*), the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the framework of the preparation of this White Paper, a conference open to the public, entitled 'The French in the face of terrorism,' was organized on 17 November 2005 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

**Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands
Experiences, Explanations and Approaches**

**Testimony by Lidewijde Ongerling,
Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism**

**U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
27 June 2007**

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, distinguished members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,

I would like to thank you for inviting me to testify here today. It's a great honour for me to speak about our experiences with home-grown terrorism in my capacity as Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands.

I have chosen to limit myself to the subject of Islamic radicalism and jihadism, which is by far the greatest threat to my country at present. I would like to outline what we regard as the main factors contributing to this threat. I will conclude by describing the Dutch approach to counterterrorism. My organisation was established in 2004, following the Madrid bombings, for the purpose of directing Dutch counterterrorist policy. It is our job to enhance cooperation between all agencies and organisations in the Netherlands involved in the fight against terrorism.

Dutch experiences

The horrifying attacks of September 11 opened the eyes of the world to the dangers of jihadist terrorism. Even the Netherlands was not immune to this threat. This realisation was soon driven home by a smaller incident: the death of two young Dutch Muslims in Kashmir in January 2002. Suddenly, we were confronted with the question: what were these two ordinary young men doing in this dangerous part of the world, which had long been the scene of violent clashes between the Indian army and Islamic militants? And why did these young people armed only with knives feel compelled to undertake a foolhardy attack on a heavily armed Indian patrol?

These questions were answered a short time later by the AIVD, the Dutch intelligence and security service. The AIVD had hard evidence that both men had been recruited for the violent jihad by Salafist militants in their hometown of Eindhoven. They had gone to India to join an Islamic fundamentalist movement with the fervent intention of dying as martyrs.

At the time there was widespread disbelief that two young people, both raised in the Netherlands, could be capable of such a thing. They were educated and to all appearances fully integrated into Dutch society. Those close to them – their families and members of the mosque they regularly attended – were equally incredulous. They had noticed nothing unusual, apart from the fact that both had become immersed in their faith. As far as they knew, these were just two deeply religious young men who had gone off to India on vacation.

This incident came as no surprise to the AIVD, but the Dutch public clearly needed to get used to the idea that radicalisation and terrorism did not only happen in faraway places. At that time – early 2002 – many people were shocked that terrorists could be living among them, in their own city or even their own neighbourhood. At the same time there was still a tendency to downplay the extent of the problem. Even if Dutch Muslims were being recruited for the jihad, they were choosing to seek martyrdom elsewhere. They were travelling to the familiar theatres of global jihad, such as Kashmir, Chechnya and the Middle East. The risk that these young radicals could bring the jihad to Western Europe, even to the Netherlands, was conceivable but thought at the time to be minimal.

The reality that terrorists could emerge from our society and strike at domestic targets was made painfully clear on 2 November 2004 with the assassination of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh (a distant relative of the famous painter Vincent van Gogh). The murderer was Mohammed B., a young man of Moroccan extraction who had grown up in Amsterdam. After committing the crime, he instigated a shootout with the police, in the hope that he would die as a martyr, thus ensuring himself a place in paradise. His plan failed – he was only shot in the leg – and he was taken into police custody.

It was later discovered that the murderer of Van Gogh was part of a network of young Dutch jihadists who had fallen under the sway of a Salafist from Syria. This preacher worked in a similar way to the recruiters who had sent the two young men to Kashmir. He urged young people to abandon the mosque in favour of home-based religious instruction, where they could be mentally prepared for the violent jihad. These meetings had come to the attention of the security service, who dubbed the participants the Hofstad group (operation name).

There was one striking difference between the Hofstad group and other networks of jihadists active in the Netherlands. The Hofstad group was not exclusively oriented towards 'Islamic' conflict zones elsewhere in the world. The members wanted to wage jihad in Europe, including the Netherlands. As they saw it, Europe shared responsibility for the suffering of the world's Muslims, and the continent's infidel population had to be punished.

After the bloody bombings of March 2004 in Madrid, the Hofstad group seemed to be making plans for a similar, large-scale attack. The AIVD kept close tabs on members of the group who were in regular contact with each other and travelled abroad. Unfortunately, the security service did not recognise in time that one individual out of this group might also be planning an attack on his own on a single individual (in retribution for allegedly insulting the prophet). Another way in which this group differed from others of its kind was its members' involvement in the political debate about Islam in the Netherlands; to a large extent, they drew their inspiration from the situation in their own country.

In both cases – Eindhoven and Amsterdam – we were dealing with young people who grew up in the Netherlands and became radicalised there. In the Netherlands we use the term 'radicalisation' to refer to a process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods. The term 'terrorist' is then used to refer to radicalised individuals or groups who are willing to spread fear and take human life in pursuit of their political or politico-religious goals. As can be seen from the examples I've discussed, we apply the label 'home-grown' when the radicalisation process has taken place in the Netherlands, regardless of where the terrorist acts are committed.

The terrorist acts committed by Al Qaida over the past several years have cast Islam in a bad light. Militant groups that misuse Islam to justify radicalisation and terrorism are not only found outside the Western world or imported to the Western world. It is a problem rooted in the Muslim experience in the West, especially as it pertains to the younger generation. Radicalisation and terrorism are both domestic and international phenomena, interlinked and interdependent. Globalisation has only intensified this interaction, through large-scale migration, inexpensive flights, broad access to the media, particularly satellite broadcasters, and – above all – the internet.

Explanatory factors

The appearance of home-grown terrorism in the West can be attributed to a variety of factors. Your Congress has asked for the Dutch government's view on what factors contribute to the development of radicalism and terrorism within our own borders. Without claiming to be comprehensive, I would like to mention a number of 'push' and 'pull' factors that could provide an explanation. The pull factors can be defined as the appeal exerted by the radical message and the terrorist networks. Push factors are forces that can alienate people or cause them to reject mainstream society.

When we talk about pull factors, we can't overlook Islamic missionary activities, especially those sponsored by Saudi Arabia. In this way, Salafism has been actively propagated to the world's Muslims since the early 1990s, thereby creating in some cases a breeding ground for radical sympathies. This movement, which has a growing following in the Netherlands, preaches a return to the earliest incarnation of the faith and fiercely opposes all forms of 'non-belief'. As they see it, this includes democracy, Western laws and lifestyles. This message holds an undeniable appeal on account of its simplicity and consistency, not to mention its promise of salvation. Salafism is also characterised by a strong sense of solidarity with the worldwide Muslim community. Most Salafists reject the use of violence, but a fanatical minority wants to defend the faith by the sword and spread it all over the world. Members of this minority are described as jihadist Salafists. For most of the known Dutch terrorists, the non-violent variety of Salafism was the first step towards acceptance of jihadist violence.

So-called Afghanistan veterans have played an important part in establishing and disseminating the radical jihadist philosophy throughout the world. These foreign fighters took part in the resistance to the Russians in the eighties, but after hostilities had ceased, they were often unable to return to their home countries. In many cases they were known to these countries' authorities as Islamic extremists and as such had cause to fear persecution. With their military experience, international contacts and political and ideological drive, these veterans were soon able to win the trust of small groups of other Muslims in the West and broaden their radical influence.

Another pull factor I'd like to mention as a source of home-grown terrorism is the global dissemination of violent jihadist ideology. Al Qaida is not only a terrorist network. Al Qaida is first and foremost an ideology, which appeals to Muslims from a wide variety of backgrounds who believe that their coreligionists are being discriminated against, oppressed or threatened.

With the help of ever more sophisticated and professional propaganda, this ideology is being spread all over the world, thanks in large part to the internet. It is striking how this message has come to drown out more moderate voices on the Web. On radical sites Al Qaida leaders and ideologues consistently present Western involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq as an attack on Islam. In this way they also succeed in mobilising individual Muslims in the West to participate in the jihad.

A last pull factor that bears mentioning is the influence of what we call trigger events. Modern communication technology enables us to follow news from the other side of the world as it unfolds. Even relatively small incidents can be seized on as a justification for violence. It is not even necessary to form a group. The radicalisation process can take place in the mind of a young person sitting in front of his PC in the solitude of his bedroom. An example of such a case was a young Muslim in the Netherlands who saw images of the liquidation of Sheik Yassin of Hamas on the internet. For him, that was the immediate provocation to make explosives for use in an attack. He was able to find the instructions online. Thanks to vigilant police work, the Dutch authorities were able to stop him in time.

Turning to the 'push' side of the equation for a moment, I believe that it is relevant to understand the history of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. The specific background of certain groups has in some cases made them more open to radical messages and influences. Large numbers of Muslims were brought to the country as cheap labour in the 1960s, especially from Turkey and Morocco. In time their families were allowed to settle in the Netherlands. A lack of education, huge cultural differences and difficulties in social integration were some of the most serious problems to beset this group. For certain immigrant groups, these problems have continued to the present day. It is especially true for the Moroccan community, from which a disproportionate number of the young radicals come.

The integration of Muslims has not been helped by the growth of Islamophobia in the Netherlands due to the many acts of jihadist violence around the world. This has led the non-Muslim population to distance itself. This, in turn, has led many Muslims to reorient themselves towards their own communities and cultural and religious backgrounds. As a result, polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims has been on the rise for the past few years, a trend that can accelerate radicalisation processes.

Studies of radicalisation processes in the Netherlands have shown that they are often sparked by an identity crisis. These are typically young people trapped between two cultures. They don't feel welcome as Muslims in the Netherlands, and thanks to their education and social experiences, they feel disconnected from their parents' culture. In their search for identity, some of these young people fall into a life of crime. Others – by no means the least educated – turn to radical Islam. It offers simple answers to the big questions they are grappling with. It offers security and brotherhood and prospects of a heavenly reward. It's possible for perfectly intelligent people to get so caught up in their fanaticism that they see martyrdom as the ultimate goal.

In both a figurative and literal sense, national borders hardly exist anymore. And for that reason the term 'home-grown terrorism' is slightly outdated. Just as Dutch Muslims left home to fight in Kashmir, Spanish participation in the war in Iraq formed the motive for jihadists in Madrid to blow up several commuter trains.

Dutch approach

Clearly, terrorism can manifest itself at any time anywhere in the world. No country can consider itself immune. This does not mean that we intend to resign ourselves to the situation, however. The Dutch authorities have decided to analyse and tackle the dangers of radicalisation and terrorism as a coherent whole. We have developed a 'comprehensive approach' to the task at hand. It includes repressive measures against terrorists, but puts an equal emphasis on prevention. After all, no one is born a terrorist. People who set out to kill other people for political or religious reasons first go through a process of radicalisation. We are convinced that there are many opportunities to intervene in this initial phase.

Goal

Of course, the main goal of the comprehensive approach is to identify acute threats in time and take measures to prevent violent incidents. The Netherlands has done everything possible in recent years to create the conditions for an effective counterterrorism policy. Our laws have been amended to introduce harsher penalties, ban recruitment, freeze assets and so on. We have worked closely with other countries. The Dutch police and criminal justice authorities have been given new powers to be able to investigate and arrest in an earlier stage. Intelligence and security services received more staff and funds, and their information can now be used in court by the public prosecutor.

So far these measures have been successful. Several terrorist networks have been broken up, including the Hofstad group. A sizable number of jihadists have been given prison sentences. Recruiters who were trying to induce young people to take part in violent jihad in countries like Iraq and Chechnya have also been tackled. These government actions have been effective in disrupting the formation of jihadist networks in the Netherlands. As a result, radical Muslims are contending with a lack of leadership and major internal divisions. Taken together, these developments prompted us to lower the general threat level for the Netherlands. For a long time the threat level was 'substantial'; today it is 'limited'. This means that at present we view the probability of an attack as low, although of course it cannot be ruled out completely. As the Dutch government wants to inform its citizens about the real threat situation to prevent unnecessary fear, this lowering of the threat level has been made public.

As I said, the danger is always there, and it can manifest itself at the most unexpected places and times. The Dutch authorities are therefore guarding against any relaxation of vigilance. A lower threat level is no reason to be less stringent in any of the measures we have taken. The lower threat level does however encourage us to push ahead with the course we have been following. We are also carrying on a long-term media campaign calling on the public, civic bodies and the business community to stay alert and report any suspicious circumstances. Above all, we want to prevent the formation of new terrorist networks like the Hofstad group. This is why we are investing so much in prevention, the other pillar of our comprehensive approach. Its main goal is to identify processes of radicalisation as early as possible and counteract them with strategic interventions.

Three main lines

We tackle radicalisation in many different ways. We do it at national level, but our primary focus remains our cities and neighbourhoods and the role of police and local government. I don't have time today to give you a full picture of all our efforts to prevent radicalisation and, ultimately, terrorism. So I'll limit myself to the three main aspects of our policy, illustrated with a few specific examples.

One way we work to prevent radicalisation is by intensifying our efforts to integrate Muslims into Dutch society. We are trying to make Muslims feel more included, mainly by paying more attention to the identity issues confronting young Muslims in a Western environment, combating discrimination and exclusion, and encouraging Muslims to participate in society and politics.

We are also trying to counteract polarisation and Islamophobia by fostering social cohesion and encouraging inter-faith dialogue. There are many local activities targeting young people and their parents.

In this context, the Dutch government also feels strongly that Dutch Muslim communities should have their own training programmes for imams, so they will no longer be dependent on imams 'imported' from their countries of origin. An additional advantage of Dutch imam training programmes is that the clerics they produce are better informed about life in the West and therefore better able to help young people find answers to their questions about life and play a meaningful role in our society. The authorities have also hired specially trained imams to work as spiritual counsellors in prisons.

A second main way we work to prevent radicalisation is by increasing social resistance to radicalisation and terrorism, especially within the Muslim community. In the Dutch government's view, these problems cannot be solved without the help of our country's Muslims. They're the ones who generally suffer most from the radicals and terrorists. They're the ones who run the risk of losing their children to extremism. Muslims are often, wrongly, viewed as collectively responsible for the extremists' acts. They are forced to contend with both radical Islam and Islamophobia in their daily lives. For all these reasons, Muslims are the ones who are best able to recognise and resist the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, jihadism and terrorism at an early stage. After all, these phenomena are all present in their immediate surroundings. So the Dutch authorities attach great importance to communicating with our Muslim fellow citizens.

The authorities are also supporting initiatives in Muslim circles to discuss and resist radicalisation. We are seeing positive developments across the country, activity that suggests growing resistance to terrorism. Muslim leaders are actively excluding people from their mosques who are suspected of recruiting young people. Imams are preaching against the activities of recruiters and other radical elements. A number of mosques have organised programmes and discussion evenings on radicalisation. Some have even issued their own publications on the subject. Many Muslim educational institutions are weeding out radical individuals and influences.

Another crucial aspect of these efforts is to ensure the availability of a wide range of information. At present, young Dutch Muslims who are searching the internet for answers to the big questions of life and who google general terms like 'Islam', 'Koran' or 'mosque' are very likely to end up at radical sites. Other, more moderate information is scarce.

For this reason we have set out to counteract these radical Islamic voices, at least on Dutch-language websites. Where possible, we are going to take the most radical sites offline, the ones that incite hatred and violence. This will be done by initiating a 'notice and take down' procedure with the providers, a procedure currently under construction. Similarly, it is important to counteract undesirable foreign influences that reach the Netherlands through satellite broadcasts and visiting radical preachers. At the same time we are trying to increase the diversity of the information available about Islam by supporting institutions that voice moderate views and pass on factual information about the religion: challenging ideas with ideas. Activities are being organised nationally and locally that specifically target young Muslims, teaching them additional skills that they can use to be active in society and take part in public discussions.

A third and final way we work to prevent radicalisation is by identifying, isolating and containing processes of radicalisation. With this we want to stop radicalisation before it leads to violence. This requires the authorities to be proactive in detecting signals that individuals may be isolating themselves or even turning against society. Systems have now been developed in several major Dutch cities to funnel reports of suspected radicalisation to a central information point at a local level, where they can be assessed and used to develop a customised approach. It is very important that the municipal authorities take the lead in this process, since they are familiar with their own Muslim communities and can take the most appropriate measures. The national authorities are supporting them where necessary, particularly by providing expertise and guidelines.

The customised approach I mentioned is designed to fit the phase in the radicalisation process that the person in question has reached. If he or she is already in the advanced stages, the security services and police are notified. Sometimes decisions are made to follow radicals closely and conspicuously, so that they know they are being watched. We call this a person-specific intervention.

In other cases social services, schools and other institutions can help pull radicalised individuals out of their radical isolation and offer them other social prospects. Special attention is paid to the risks of radicalisation in prison. To protect other detainees from becoming 'contaminated', the Dutch authorities have decided to concentrate convicted jihadists in two detention centres and keep them separated from other prisoners. Prison staff in these institutions are specially trained to detect signs of radicalisation.

Similarly, special attention is paid to what we call 'hotbeds of radicalisation'. A small number of locations in the Netherlands, such as a few Salafist centres and mosques, have been identified as potential gateways to radical milieus. As I said before, experience has shown that for some young people non-violent Salafism is a first step towards further radicalisation. The Dutch authorities keep a close watch on the imams and governing bodies of these institutions and remind them of their social responsibilities. Our message is clear: we will not allow them to cross the line and publicly preach intolerance. We also expect them to exclude jihadist recruiters and stop young people from opting for violence. If people in or around these centres prove to be promoting radicalisation or spreading hatred, we do not hesitate to prosecute them or deport them as a threat to national security.

Conclusion

I have given you a brief overview of the Dutch experience with radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, the factors that we believe have contributed to their emergence and the broad range of tactics we use to effectively combat these dangers. I do not claim that our experiences and conclusions can be transplanted to other European countries or the United States. I am convinced, however, that thanks to the many international dimensions and interconnections, real and virtual, in today's world all Western countries are at risk from home-grown forms of terrorism. We are doing all we can to contain the dangers. This demands an intelligent, broad strategy. One of our biggest challenges is to put a firm halt to radicals and jihadists, while on the other hand reassuring the vast majority of moderate Muslims who live in our country that they can practise their religion freely and that the Netherlands is where they belong. We need to convince them that by participating in politics and society they can help improve their own lives and the lives of their coreligionists both in the Netherlands and abroad.

Finally, I would like to stress our outstanding cooperation with the United States in this fight, including this and other exchanges of information and experiences.

Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.

United States Senate
Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
June 27, 2007

Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists

Marc Sageman, M.D., Ph.D.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to present my views on the threat of violent Islamist extremists in Europe and the United States. There is a great disparity in the threat faced in these two continents. Data on arrests for Islamist terrorism related charges indicate that the rate of arrest per Muslim capita in Europe is about five times that of the United States. In order to understand this discrepancy, we must analyze the process transforming normal young Muslims into people willing to use violence for political ends. The understanding of this process of "radicalization" is critical to assessing the threat facing the West and should be the basis guiding our interventions to counter it. This is a complicated issue, and given the time constraints of this hearing, my remarks will necessarily sound too simplistic. I apologize for this, but I would like to suggest the outline of a framework that might organize our thinking about how us to tackle this problem. These ideas are more fully developed in my new book¹, which I will gladly provide to the committee as soon as it is available.

My continuing research into Islamist extremism² shows that the terrorists are idealistic young people, who seek glory and thrills by trying to build a utopia. Contrary to popular belief, radicalization is not the product of poverty, various forms of brainwashing, youth, ignorance or lack of education, lack of job, lack of social responsibility, criminality or mental illness. Their mobilization into this violent Islamist born-again social movement is based on friendship and kinship. Lately, over 80% of arrested terrorists in Europe and the United States are part of the Muslim Diaspora, mostly second and now third generation of immigrants. They are radicalized in the West, and not in the Middle East. Usually, they are small groups of friends and relatives, who spontaneously self organize into groups that later turn to terrorism. Before 9/11, they were able to travel freely and to connect with al Qaeda central, giving the movement

¹ Marc Sageman, in press, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

² See also Marc Sageman, 2004, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

a greater appearance of unity than it ever had. At this point, only some British Islamist radicals with family connections in Pakistan can physically connect with fellow travelers of the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Otherwise, these new groups are physically isolated but connected through Internet forums, inspired by the extremist ideology and hoping that they will be accepted as members of al Qaeda through their terrorist operations.

From my review of the literature and my field research both in Europe and in the United States, I have come to think about the process of radicalization as consisting of four prongs: a sense of moral outrage; a specific interpretation of the world; resonance with personal experiences; and mobilization through networks. These four factors are not stages in a process, nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in this process. As mentioned earlier, this process is driven by young Muslims chasing dreams of glory by fighting for justice and fairness as they define it. They are enthusiastic volunteers, trying to impress their friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers, or *shahids* as they call themselves, have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants.

1. **Moral Outrage.** One of the major utterances from Islamist radicals is a sense of moral outrage, a reaction to perceived major moral violations, like killings, rapes or local police actions. Before 2003, the major source of such outrage was the killings of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, the second Palestinian intifada and Kashmir. Since 2003, the war in Iraq is definitely fueling this process of radicalization. Although the war in Iraq did not cause this social movement – after all, 9/11 occurred before the invasion of Iraq –, it has since captured all the sense of moral outrage in Muslims all over the world. In all my talks with Muslims, Iraq is monopolizing the theme of any conversation about Islam and the West. The humiliations of Abu Ghraib and GITMO as well as multiple statements from Western leaders surface in such conversations. More locally, many Muslims also cite local law enforcement actions against Muslims, bridging the local and global in their worldview.
2. **Interpretation.** This sense of moral outrage must be interpreted in a certain way to foster radicalization. The common interpretation is that all these global and local moral violations are examples of a unified Western global strategy, namely a "War against Islam." Having said this, it is important to realize that this worldview is deliberately vague and that there has been far too much focus on ideology in trying to understand radicalization. In my observations of Islamist terrorists, I came to the conclusion that there were not Islamic scholars. The defendants at the Madrid bombing trial, at the Operation Crevice trial in London, at the Operation Pendennis litigation in Australia or at the various Hofstad Group trials in Holland are far from being Islamic scholars. The same is true for the perpetrators of 9/11 and those indicted in Miami, New York, New

Jersey and Toronto for attempted terrorist operations. These people are definitely not intellectuals who decide what to do after careful deliberation. I believe that the explanation for their behavior is not found in how they think, but rather in how they feel. All these perpetrators dream about becoming Islamic heroes in this "War against Islam," modeling themselves on the seventh century warriors that conquered half the world and the Mujahedin who defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many hope to emulate their predecessors by now fighting in Iraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, a "War against Islam," occurs within a cultural tradition, and this is where Europe and the United States differ. First, in Europe, nations are founded on the basis of the myth of a certain essence, namely Frenchness, Englishness, Germanness... In the United States and other countries built on successive modern waves of immigration, the founding myth is that of a "melting pot." The point is that the myth of a national essence excludes non-European immigrants, while that of a melting pot facilitates their inclusion into the host society. Second, the notion of the American Dream, the land of opportunity, partially protects the United States from this form of terrorism. Whether it is true or not, the important point is that people believe it. A recent poll found that 71% of Muslim Americans believe in the American Dream³. This is not the case in Europe, where Muslims complain about discrimination in the labor market. Third, American Individualism partially prevents the generation of a collective explanation for any personal adversity. For instance, if a Muslim American is asked why he did not succeed at work, he or she will usually answer, "I did not try hard enough." This individualistic answer also combines the core of the American Dream, namely equal opportunity. On the other hand, when I ask Muslim Europeans the same question, they usually answer with a shrug, "I'm Muslim." This is a collective explanation, which may eventually give rise to anger against the host society. Other polls demonstrate that Muslim Europeans answer that they feel Muslim first rather than a member of their host nation. This does not bode well for the future of European Muslim relations. Finally, U.S. tradition of local grass root voluntarism allows Muslim Americans to channel some of their discontent in local politics. This is less likely in Europe. A sense of local empowerment might be protective against a larger strike against the society in general.

3. **Resonance with Personal Experience.** The interpretation that the West is engaged in a War against Islam sticks more to Muslim Europeans than Americans because it resonates with their everyday personal experience. This notion of resonance brings in the social, economic, political and religious factors that constitute the infrastructure of their everyday life. This factor is what scholars traditionally define as the "root causes" of terrorism. First, from a historical

³ Pew Research Center, 2007, *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, at <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf>

perspective, we are dealing with very different communities. The United States was able to cherry pick immigrants and allowed Muslim engineers, physicians, university professors and businessmen to immigrate. The result is that the Muslim American community is solidly middle class, with a higher average income than the rest of society. This is not true of Europe, which imported unskilled labor to reconstruct the continent that had been devastated by World War II. So, on a socio-economic scale, we are dealing with very different communities: middle class in the United States and an unskilled labor pool in Europe. In terms of the labor market, Muslim Americans believe that they are facing equal opportunity. Europeans know that this is not the case, as the male Muslim unemployment rate is much higher than the average rate in the rest of society. Muslim Europeans strongly believe they are facing discrimination because they are Muslim. Welfare policy also distinguishes Europe from the United States, and allows Europe to tolerate a high unemployment rate. Many Muslim Europeans, because they are unemployed, are on the welfare payroll. Many do not feel the urgency to get a job and a few spend their idle moments talking about jihad. In essence, European nations are funding some young people to be full time jihadi pretenders. As terrorist operations do not cost much, much of the funding for attempted operations come from European states, from their welfare payments. One cannot underestimate the importance of boredom in an idle population, which drives young people to seek the thrill of participating into a clandestine operation.

4. **Mobilization through networks.** The factors described above influence some young Muslims to become angry, and vent their frustration on the Internet. What transforms very few to become terrorists is mobilization by networks. Up to a few years ago, these networks were face-to-face networks. They were local gangs of young immigrants, members of student associations and study groups at some radical mosques. These cliques of friends became radicalized together. The group acted as an echo chamber, which amplified their grievances, intensified the members' bonds to each other, generated local values rejecting those of society and facilitated a gradual separation from their host society. These natural group dynamics resulted in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation, transforming a few young Muslims into dedicated terrorists, willing to follow the model of their heroes and sacrifice themselves for comrades and the cause. Their turn to violence and the terrorist movement was a collective decision, rather than an individual one. Over the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being replaced by online radicalization. It is the interactivity of the group that changes people's beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist extremist forums on the Internet. The same support and validation that young people used to derive from their offline peer groups are now found in these forums, which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link

them to the virtual social movement, give them guidance and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtual marketplaces for extremist ideas, have become the virtual "invisible hand" organizing terrorist activities worldwide. The true leader of this violent social movement is the collective discourse on half a dozen influential forums. They are transforming the terrorist movement, recruiting ever younger members and now more prominently women, who can participate in the discussions.

Now that I have outlined my analysis of the threat, and commented on the cultural and structural differences between Europe and the United States, what can we do about it? From the driver of the process – a search for glory – it becomes obvious that we need to eliminate the glory from this activity and reduce it to common criminality. There is nothing more glorious than to go against men and women in uniform from the only remaining superpower. We need to demilitarize this fight against terrorists and turn it over to law enforcement. It is also important not to give too much importance to the terrorists who are arrested or killed. We should resist the temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another "major victory" in the war on terror. These have the undesired effect of elevating the status of these criminals to that of heroes.

On the first prong, it is important to remove as soon as possible U.S. troops from Iraq, which has become the main source of inspiration of the new generation of Islamist terrorists. In the West, the Muslim community is very sensitive to the action of local law enforcement agencies. If it perceives them to act against its members, it will assume that the state is also against it. In a sense, this is what happened in many European countries, where Caucasian policemen patrol immigrant neighborhoods. Local police forces need to be seen as part of the community at large and their recruitment need to reflect the composition of their communities. It is not enough to have regular meetings with Muslim community leaders, whom the younger generation does not respect. Through the recruitment of young Muslims, police forces would have an ongoing everyday relationship with young people in the community. Furthermore, it is important to win the Muslim community over and explain police actions to them. This has become a problem in England because of the legal ban on commenting on criminal cases in litigation. However, the opposite – making exaggerated claims of threat for short term political benefits – will also alienate the Muslim community. So far, Muslim Americans have shown themselves to be very patriotic, but this has not been well recognized either by the press or by our government. It is important to trust them to continue in this path and not to alienate them.

On the second prong, it is important to show that our counterterrorism efforts are not part of a war on Islam. We have made many mistakes in this arena. Most Muslim Americans do not believe that the U.S. led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce

terrorism. Here, it seems that actions speak louder than words. The government should actively challenge those who question the loyalty of Muslim Americans. The American Dream is alive and well among Muslim Americans. It should be further confirmed through the continued publications of some of their success stories. These stories should become sources of inspiration and hopes for young Muslims, who should be encouraged to emulate these positive role models rather than those of Islamist terrorists. To become successful for a young Muslim American should be viewed as "cool." I see the "war of ideas" or the search for a "counter-narrative" as generally misguided: terrorists are not intellectuals. They do what they do because of vague images of glory, not out of well thought out positions derived from any scripture. The "war of ideas" should be replaced by the inspiration of new dreams and hopes for young Muslims. We should learn our lessons from our own experience with the Civil Rights movement, when Reverent Martin Luther King inspired a generation with his speech "I Have a Dream!"

On the third prong, the United States is doing much better than Europe. We should continue to be fair and fight any discrimination in the labor market, at airports, and law enforcement. Our social internal successes should be internationally advertised through programs sending abroad successful Muslim Americans to talk about their life in our country. Muslims should also be encouraged to enter into the realm of politics and show that they can peacefully influence their environment.

On the fourth prong, it is of course important to disrupt the networks that threaten the United States, Europe or any population. We must eliminate terrorists and bring them to justice. However, this should be done quietly, so as not to elevate common criminals to the status of heroes. Now, many such networks are virtual, centered in Internet forums, where young Muslims share their dreams, hopes and grievances. This is an internal Muslim discussion. However, we can encourage some young Muslims, who reject violence, to actively participate in these discussions in order to actively challenge the various calls to violence emerging from them.

The American Muslim community is relatively young, having mostly immigrated in the last half century. Its young generation is searching for its identity and trying to define its role with respect to the rest of American society. It is important for the rest of American society to welcome Muslim Americans and help them integrate better within the fabric of our nation. We are doing better than our European counterparts in this regard, but we must continue to promote core American values of justice and fairness and fight those elements in our society that try to single out and antagonize part of our nation.

Written Testimony of

Lynn Martin
Former U.S. Secretary of Labor

Farooq Kathwari
Chairman and CEO, Ethan Allen Interiors Inc.

United States Senate
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
June 27, 2007

Thank you, Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins and members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for inviting us to testify during this important hearing. The two of us have cochaired a Task Force sponsored by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs that has brought together a group of 32 distinguished Muslim and non-Muslim Americans to examine the Muslim American experience and provide a roadmap for accelerating Muslim American engagement in civic affairs and U.S. political life. The Task Force's report was released yesterday. We feel that it includes many findings and recommendations that should be useful to this Committee as it examines ways to better protect the country.

The Task Force has concluded that greater Muslim American civic and political engagement is urgently needed to prevent alienation in a community that is vital to U.S. security and relations with the Muslim World. Although Muslim Americans are a well-educated, diverse group that can make greater contributions to the nation, they lack strong institutions and sufficient recognizable public or political voices to gain regular access to government and media circles.


Many Muslim Americans responded helpfully to September 11 and condemned other terrorist acts. Despite this response, many Americans continue to view Muslim Americans with suspicion in the post September 11 environment. The present climate of mistrust and the lack of engagement threaten to marginalize and potentially alienate some elements among Muslim Americans. To combat this trend, it is critical that Muslim American leaders and

institutions continue and amplify their condemnations of extremism and terrorism and continue to strengthen efforts to prevent radical activity within the community.

Non-Muslim groups and government leaders can work to better recognize Muslim American contributions to national security and improve collaborations with Muslim American institutions. Public statements by senior officials acknowledging the significance of Muslim American contributions to national security and emphasizing the importance of not holding any group accountable for the actions of a few would help build public acceptance and understanding of the community. Further cultural sensitivity training for federal law enforcement officers would also increase the trust and communication necessary for fuller cooperation and better securing the country.

It is in the interest of all Americans to build trust and rapidly bring Muslim Americans into the social and political mainstream to strengthen our democratic institutions and improve U.S. foreign policy. Muslim American leaders should continue to take the lead in encouraging greater civic participation, leadership development, and institution building within their community. Non-Muslim groups and government leaders can work to improve collaborations with Muslim American institutions and provide greater opportunities for young Muslim Americans in government service. Media organizations and Muslim American groups can jointly sponsor seminars to address concerns and deepen relationships and understanding. Leading research and policy institutes can deepen their work on Islam and Muslim communities and create partnerships with Muslim American institutions. An American Diversity Dialogue can be established among Muslim and non-Muslim leaders to examine critical issues in Muslim American integration.

We recognize that the integration of minority groups, women, and immigrants into our civic and political processes has been slow, challenging work in the past. Yet its practical and symbolic importance cannot be underestimated. Muslims, like many other immigrant groups, came to the United States in search of religious and political freedom, in need of refuge, and in hopes of prosperity. The tragic events of September 11 and their aftermath have challenged our security, put the dream of America to the test for Muslim Americans, and called our values as a nation into question. By working together to ensure that Muslim American voices are heard, we will not only increase our own security, but make our domestic and foreign policies a truer expression of who we are as a nation.



TASK FORCE SERIES

**Strengthening America:
The Civic and Political Integration
of Muslim Americans**

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MUSLIM AMERICAN
CIVIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Farooq Kathwari and Lynn M. Martin, *Cochairs*
Christopher B. Whitney, *Project Director*

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FOREWORD

America's strength has long been tied to its commitment to diversity and its openness to the waves of immigrants arriving on its shores from every corner of the world. The talents and energies of these immigrants and their dedication to the values of their adopted country have made the United States the world's strongest and most adaptive nation. Muslim American immigrants, while a relatively recent addition to the American mosaic, were on a path taken by many previous immigrant groups prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Those groups had come to the United States in search of the American dream and through hard work achieved much economic success. The path also eventually led them to full participation in U.S. civic and political life.

The Muslim American path to integration changed dramatically with the tragic events of September 11, which left many Americans questioning the loyalty and intentions of Muslim Americans. The subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader war on terrorism contributed to deepening suspicions at a time when Muslim Americans lacked well recognized institutions and leaders who could have helped respond to public concerns.

It is in the interest of all Americans not to allow an atmosphere of distrust and misunderstanding to endure. The nation faces critical foreign and domestic policy challenges relating directly to Muslim populations around the world, which Muslim Americans can help address. Muslim and non-Muslim Americans must work together to expand the opportunities for Muslim Americans to participate in the national discourse and help meet the urgent challenges ahead. Doing so will enhance the nation's security and well-being and reaffirm our commitment to equality under the law, pluralism, and tolerance as bedrock principles of American society.

The Task Force

The Chicago Council Task Force on Muslim American Civic and Political Engagement was convened in February 2006 to consider the engagement of Muslim Americans in the national discourse on U.S. foreign policy. Cochaired by Farooq Kathwari, chairman, president, and chief executive officer of Ethan Allen Inc., and Lynn Martin, former U.S. secretary of labor and former U.S. congresswoman from Illinois, the Task Force brought together thirty-two leading figures

from around the United States to examine the challenges and opportunities for greater Muslim American civic and political participation and to develop a report of findings and recommendations. The Task Force's mandate expressly did not include an examination of U.S. foreign or national security policy toward the Muslim world or any part of it, the perceptions of the American public and American leaders of events and issues involving Muslims outside the United States, the actions or attitudes of Muslim communities toward the United States and its policies and how those actions and attitudes affect Muslim Americans, or the views of Muslim Americans in particular of U.S. policies and actions in the Muslim world or any other dimension of U.S. foreign policy.

As a Midwest institution, The Chicago Council is well positioned to facilitate a dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim leaders on these important issues. The Midwest is home to four of the nine U.S. states with the largest Muslim populations, and there is great diversity within these communities. The Chicago Council also has a strong interest in addressing issues related to immigration. The Council believes that perspectives from the Midwest will be a valuable addition to the national discourse on Muslim American integration.

Acknowledgments

The Chicago Council would like to first thank the Task Force's cochairs, Farooq Kathwari and Lynn Martin, for their leadership and guidance through a demanding eighteen-month process. The Council is especially fortunate to have found two leaders with such broad and complementary experience who could bring their expertise to bear on such a complex and controversial topic. Informed conversations on the role of Muslim Americans in American public life are currently taking place only in a few, small specialized circles. It is a testament to the insight, energy, and dedication of Secretary Martin and Mr. Kathwari that the Task Force was able to assemble a broad and diverse group of prominent individuals on the topic; conduct a series of wide-ranging discussions with the group; seek the views of many interested parties from government, nongovernmental organizations, the media, academia, and civic communities in the United States and Europe; and incorporate the insights gleaned from this process into a thoughtful, wide-ranging report.

The Council would also like to extend its deep gratitude to the Task Force members. They brought varied backgrounds and perspectives to the table and yet were willing to work together during

the deliberations to develop agreement on the broad framework for the report's recommendations. I would like to thank them in particular for their commitment of time and knowledge and their willingness to exchange views in a frank and open manner.

The Council is grateful to Caroline P. Cracraft, formerly of the British Consulate General of Chicago, and Qamar-ul Huda of the United States Institute for Peace, who served as observers and advisors to the Task Force.

Nadia Roumani made invaluable contributions to the Task Force process with two commissioned papers on capacity building for Muslim American institutions that she wrote and presented to the Task Force. These studies provided important information for the development of the report. The Chicago Council would also like to thank Brile Loskota for her work in coauthoring one of the papers. I would also like to thank Craig Charney and his colleagues at Charney Research for organizing two focus groups of Muslims and non-Muslims that helped the Task Force understand perceptions of Muslim Americans.

The Task Force's deliberations were informed by the knowledge and perspectives offered by outside experts who spoke to the Task Force. We are grateful to Richard Cizik, Marda Dunsky, Rabbi Brad Hirschfeld, Sujayman Nyang, and Agha Saeed for providing their time, thoughts, and counsel.

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The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Executive Summary

Muslim Americans were thrust into the spotlight by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, whose perpetrators claimed to be acting in the name of Islam. Many Americans, knowing little about Islam or about Muslims living in the United States, came to identify the terrorist threat with the Muslim community at large and to view Muslim Americans with deep suspicion and doubt. Nearly six years later, fears and suspicion remain. Terrorism remains an urgent threat, the terrorists continue to wrap themselves in the mantle of Islam, misunderstandings persist, and the ability of Muslim Americans to counter the rising tide of skepticism has been impeded, damaging the efforts of the many who are ardently trying to carve a constructive place in American society.

Muslim Americans are a very diverse group, comprised of a mix of ethnic, linguistic, ideological, social, economic, and sectarian groups. Roughly two-thirds are first-generation immigrants from across the globe, and a significant portion of the remainder is African American. Before September 11, many Muslim Americans had begun following the path to integration taken by millions of immigrants and minorities before them—facing many of the same challenges and opportunities. Yet the integration of Muslim Americans was not yet well under way in September 2001. Their institutions were underdeveloped, and they lacked strong, visible leaders.

Despite these limitations, many Muslim Americans joined with other Americans in responding to the September 11 attacks. They volunteered time and money to relief efforts. Several leading national Muslim organizations came out immediately to condemn the attacks. Others have cooperated with law enforcement agencies to address homeland security challenges.

At the same time, extensive federal and other law enforcement investigations since September 11 have focused on Muslim Americans. These investigations have resulted in arrests and a small number of successful prosecutions on terrorism-related charges. Though any involvement of Muslim Americans with extremism raises strong concerns, independent studies have underscored that unlike in Europe, there is little, if any, publicly available evidence to date of widespread or entrenched extremist activity with links to al Qaeda or other global terrorist organizations.

Nevertheless, Muslim American efforts to dissociate themselves from the terrorist threat have not been fully effective for a number of reasons. The perception by many Americans that some

Muslim American organizations and leaders have not fully and readily acknowledged the potential for radicalism within the community and the need for vigilance in countering it has been a barrier to understanding and dialogue. Some Americans have continued to view Muslim Americans with suspicion because they question the compatibility of Islam with American values, focusing on issues such as the treatment of women and the separation of church and state.

Many Muslim Americans and some other Americans believe that hostility toward Islam and Muslim Americans is preventing their voices from being heard and their contributions from being recognized. The contention among some Americans that Islam is incompatible with American values is thought to fuel organized attempts to discredit Islam and exclude Muslims from the nation's civic and political life. This has created fear and resentment among many Muslim Americans that has also contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust.

Further complicating the problem is the fact that Muslim Americans are a relatively new and numerically limited presence in American life. Like previous immigrants and other minority groups, they have not yet developed the capacity to speak out and be heard clearly in the public square. The Muslim American community lacks strong institutions and recognizable public or political voices to gain regular access to government and media circles. Americans' knowledge of Islam and their personal contact with Muslims also remain sparse, undermining efforts to build respect through familiarity.

For all these reasons, Muslim Americans have been relatively absent from the public discourse and our civic and political life. This lack of engagement comes at time when the talents and perspectives of Muslim Americans are needed to address the enormous domestic and foreign policy challenges that face the nation, especially those related to Muslim countries and Muslim peoples around the world. The disengagement of Muslim Americans undermines American values, especially the conviction that the success of our nation relies on embracing our diversity and involving all our citizens in the public arena.

The gathering climate of suspicion and mutual mistrust, exacerbated by the lack of engagement and dialogue, threatens to marginalize and alienate some Muslim Americans to the point where the danger of radicalization of a small minority could become a real possibility. It would take only a single, significant act of terrorism in the United States involving Muslim Americans to cement the impression that rampant radicalism has taken root within the community.

Therefore, the Task Force believes that creating full and equal opportunities for civic and political participation of Muslim Americans is an urgent national need. It is vital that Muslim Americans find ways to demonstrate visibly their commitment to America, its institutions, and its values. This well-educated, diverse group has the potential to make contributions to civic life and policy discourse as varied and numerous as those of any other group of Americans.

The Task Force prepared this report in order to present a balanced, nonpartisan assessment of the current Muslim American experience and recommendations for expediting the Muslim American journey to full civic and political integration. Many immigrant and minority groups have had to overcome suspicion and hostility in order to win full acceptance in the public sphere. While there is no doubt that Muslim Americans would in time achieve full integration in U.S. society, just as other groups have, the need to accelerate the process is urgent. The risks of inaction are substantial: further marginalization of Muslim Americans at best and serious alienation at worst.

The goal of bringing Muslim Americans into the fold of American life as quickly as possible is in the interest of all Americans. Muslim American leaders and organizations, government, the policy establishment, the media, and other major institutions all have significant roles to play in this process. The short-term need is critical, and the long-term gains cannot be overstated. The civic and political engagement of Muslim Americans will not only increase security, but enrich our policies, our society, and our standing as a nation that upholds basic human values of decency and fairness and that provides hope and opportunity for all.

The recommendations that follow call upon a wide range of institutions and leaders, Muslim and non-Muslim, to assist in speeding the Muslim American journey to full participation.

Recommendation #1 Expand and Recognize Muslim American Contributions to National Security

The horror of the September 11 attacks brought Americans together in their common humanity and a sense of purpose in countering the threat of terrorism. Many Muslim Americans shared in this reaction and commitment. A number of prominent Muslim American organizations condemned the attacks of September 11, reached out to help the victims, worked to raise awareness of the Quran's teachings against violence, and cooperated with law enforcement agencies

on anti-terrorism efforts. While government officials have credited Muslim Americans for these and subsequent efforts, doubts about the efforts persist. The visibility and effectiveness of the Muslim American response to September 11 was limited in part by the lack of institutional capacity and recognizable voices in the community. It remains critical that Muslim Americans take more active steps to counter the threat of terror, and that the government work more effectively to build trust and partnerships with the Muslim American community.

Disavowing terrorism

Many Muslim Americans have taken positive steps to denounce terrorism and differentiate their traditions from the beliefs of radical groups. It is crucial that they continue to focus on these positive steps as the danger of terrorism persists. While Muslim Americans question the fairness of holding all Muslim Americans responsible for constantly condemning the actions of a few extremists, the reality is that in the eyes of much of American society, the burden is still on Muslim Americans to respond. Muslim American leaders and organizations can amplify their condemnations of extremism and terrorist acts, strengthen their efforts to prevent radical activity within the Muslim American community, and find more effective ways to communicate these endeavors to the media and the public.

Expanding contributions to homeland security

Successful partnerships between Muslim Americans and local law enforcement such as Southern California's Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress should be expanded. A national network of such partnerships could play a vital role in the early detection of potential threats. Programs like the Muslim Public Affairs Council's "National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism" can be extended to all U.S. mosques. Muslim leaders can do more to encourage young Muslim Americans to seek employment with the U.S. government and could work with relevant government agencies to create internships.

The U.S. government can do more to facilitate communication and cooperation with Muslim America. Public statements by senior officials acknowledging the significance of Muslim American contributions to national security and emphasizing the importance of not holding any group accountable for the actions of a few would

help build public acceptance and understanding of the community. Cultural sensitivity training for federal law enforcement officers would also increase the trust and communication necessary for fuller cooperation. A further vital step is to ensure that any investigations conducted by law enforcement be carried out in ways that do not violate U.S. laws and civil rights.

Recommendation #2 Improve Media Coverage and Public Understanding of Muslim Americans

In recent public opinion surveys, a sizable minority of Americans expressed fear and hostility toward Muslims and Islam, creating perceptions of a rising Islamophobia in the United States. Media efforts to educate the public on Islam and the lives of Muslim Americans have been complicated by the spread of terrorist violence in the Middle East and elsewhere and by terrorists' continuing claim that they are acting in the name of Islam. While many major American newspapers and broadcast media have improved the quality of their coverage of Islam and Muslim societies since September 11, others have continued to present Islam as a monolith and to portray Muslims in stereotypical or biased ways that create an "us-versus-them" mentality. Public opinion studies also show that Americans who are more familiar with Islam and know Muslim Americans personally are more likely to see them as being like other Americans.

Working with the media

Media organizations and Muslim American groups could jointly sponsor seminars to address concerns on both sides and deepen relationships and understanding. Muslim organizations could train their leaders and spokespersons to communicate more effectively with the media and proactively pitch stories. The media can work to eliminate or clarify language that conflates Islam or Muslims with fascism or terrorism, strive for informed coverage of events—including Muslim American condemnations of violence and radicalism—and support the training of more Muslim American journalists.

Creating an independent, national organization dedicated to public education

The creation of a new nonadvocacy institution focused on educating the public about Muslim cultures and societies would help broaden American understanding. The institution would be nonethnic, non-denominational, and nonpolitical and would provide information on the rich and diverse heritage of the Muslim world through exhibitions, lectures, conferences, and publications. Over time, the organization could become a trusted, impartial source of information and expertise for the public, media, and government on the many facets of Muslim life throughout the world.

Undertaking a wide range of efforts to further public understanding

Demystifying Islam for the general public will require greater initiatives by many different Muslim American groups and other American organizations, working separately and in partnership. Interfaith activities, cultural events, and educational initiatives at the primary, secondary, and university levels would all increase awareness of the community and its intellectual, scientific, and cultural achievements. It is vital that non-Muslim religious and secular organizations take part in this work since they have the capacity to reach audiences that Muslim institutions cannot, and their participation would enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the message.

Recommendation #3

Increase Civic Engagement among Muslim Americans

Much of the groundwork for achieving increased civic and political integration is in place. Most Muslim Americans view the United States as their home. They see no contradiction between the moral teachings of Islam and the values that Americans hold dear. A number of institutions and initiatives are already positioned to help. Speeding Muslim American integration is in the interest of all Americans, and success will involve building on these foundations and creating stronger ties between Muslim and non-Muslim groups.

Expanding partnerships

Encouraging Muslim Americans to play a greater part in civic life should be a high priority for Muslim organizations. Opportunities

for engagement can be increased by expanding existing partnerships with non-Muslim groups and by forming new partnerships. Such activities create opportunities for Muslim leaders to frame public service in a Muslim context and make civic participation a fundamental element of Muslim/American life.

Forming a national leadership group of prominent Muslim Americans

A leadership network of prominent Muslim Americans could strengthen Muslim/American institutions and create new programs to encourage Muslim youth to enter public service. The enhanced communication among Muslim American leaders would help their organizations and the community at large respond more rapidly and effectively to public and media interest, especially in times of heightened concern. Members of the leadership group could also serve as "community ambassadors" to the U.S. government, offering informed perspectives on U.S. relations with Muslim societies, and as interlocutors between Muslim Americans and Muslim communities abroad.

Building coalitions on important policy initiatives

Muslim American organizations could make a valuable contribution to the American body politic by expanding their participation in coalitions concerned with issues such as immigration, public health, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. This will help other Americans understand that Muslims have great concern for a wide range of issues affecting the national well-being. It will also enable Muslims to expand their contributions to the larger society and increase the moral authority of Muslim leaders when they seek support on issues of particular interest to Muslim Americans.

Bridging religious divides

The country would benefit from greater cooperation among Muslim, Christian, and Jewish organizations. All three faiths share a deep spiritual connection to the Middle East, but their disagreements over U.S. foreign policy and events in the region have severely strained interfaith relations and hampered the dialogue and collaboration on numerous important domestic issues. Current conversations can be expanded to include an increasingly diverse group of organizations, becoming the basis of a national forum for interfaith discussions.

Strengthening America

Recommendation #4 Build Stronger Muslim American Institutions

Muslim American institutions do not have the range of opportunities for participation in the policy discourse to meet the community's and the nation's needs. Their limited role is partly attributable to the diversity of Muslim America, which complicates efforts to coalesce on issues or to create institutions that cross over among different Muslim American groups. The capacity constraints typical of young ethnic and religious institutions have also been a handicap. In addition, some institutions have avoided foreign policy issues for fear of drawing unfavorable scrutiny or detracting from their work on civil rights. While the challenge of strengthening Muslim American institutions may appear daunting, similar challenges have been met time and again by other immigrant groups and minority communities. Many of the strategies used by these groups can be emulated by Muslim Americans.

Increasing institutional effectiveness and engagement

It is critical that existing Muslim American organizations be strengthened further and that new ones be formed to help increase understanding of Muslim American life and facilitate participation in the civic and political discourse. Many existing institutions need to restructure, develop new strategies, and learn how to effectively deliver their messages. They need to provide Muslim Americans with education on the workings of American civic and political life, and they need to improve dialogue and interaction across ethnic, sectarian, and generational lines within the Muslim American community. As they build capacity, Muslim organizations will have more success in forming partnerships with non-Muslim organizations to address issues of common concern. American foundations should be encouraged to make a long-term commitment to helping these institutions become more effective.

Broadening academic and policy initiatives

The engagement of more Muslim American scholars in the activities of think tanks, research institutes, and universities on issues related to Islam and Muslim societies would also be valuable. There is a need for endowed chairs, fellowships, centers for policy and area studies, and other structures to support the work of established and

emerging Muslim and non-Muslim scholars of Islam. Postdoctoral fellowship programs in Islamic studies that are open to Americans of all religious backgrounds as well as fellowship programs for young Muslim American scholars studying important public policy issues of all types are also needed. Enlarging the scope and impact of academic and policy initiatives will require the strong commitment of American universities, think tanks, government agencies, and philanthropists.

More collaboration between Muslim American institutions and established think tanks and research institutes would also strengthen Muslim American integration into the policy discourse. There are few strong links between Muslim American institutions and leaders and think tanks and research institutes undertaking work related to Islam and Muslim communities. More joint efforts would help add new perspectives to the policy discussions of think tanks and research institutes. It would also help Muslim American institutions build their knowledge base by providing more exposure to policy analysis.

Recommendation #5 Cultivate the Next Generation of Muslim American Leaders

Young Muslim Americans are also not as fully engaged as other American youth in U.S. political and civic life. Developing the leadership potential and professional skills of young Muslim Americans is crucial to creating an informed, seasoned, and capable group of leaders who can contribute to the betterment of the nation as a whole. Engaging young Muslim Americans in civic life is also a critical factor in reducing the potential for alienation.

Making leadership development of young Muslim Americans a priority

Muslim American organizations could work with local, state, and federal government agencies to create internship programs for young Muslim Americans. Think tanks and universities based in Washington should be encouraged to create fellowship programs to increase understanding of the policy process. Muslim and non-Muslim institutions can also jointly sponsor speaking tours to encourage public service among young Muslim Americans.

Training young staff and new leaders

Developing leaders and staff is essential if Muslim American organizations are to maximize their ability to contribute to the policy discourse. Young staff members need high-quality theoretical and practical training. Special attention should be given to leadership training for women.

Recommendation #6 Give Ongoing National Attention to Muslim American Integration

Establishing an American Diversity Dialogue

The Task Force proposes that an ongoing American Diversity Dialogue among Muslim and non-Muslim leaders be established to examine critical issues related to Muslim civic and political integration in the United States. This would help give prominence to the issue and provide thoughtful and informed assessments of Muslim American civic and political integration over time. The American Diversity Dialogue would meet approximately three times a year in a rotating group of cities and would commission research to inform its discussions. It would issue an annual report on *The State of Muslim America* that would be widely disseminated to policymakers, the media, and the American public. Dialogue leadership and membership should be drawn from a group of highly respected public figures such as former government officials, business and civic leaders, and policy experts.

Creating a national philanthropic initiative on American diversity

A national philanthropic initiative on American diversity would expand financial support to nonprofit, nonpolitical educational, research, cultural, and civic organizations in order to deepen appreciation of diversity in America and strengthen its expression in society. The initiative would focus particularly on the Muslim American experience, strengthening public understanding of that experience and creating opportunities for greater Muslim American civic and political participation. Funding would come from foundations and individuals during a one-time capital campaign. The initiative's corpus would be spent over a defined period of time such as ten years.

Conclusion

The recommendations in this report are offered as a step toward strengthening the democracy entrusted to us by the founding fathers and the U.S. Constitution. The integration of minority groups, women, and immigrants into our civic and political processes has been slow, challenging work in the past. Yet its practical and symbolic importance cannot be underestimated. Muslims, like many other immigrant groups, came to the United States in search of religious and political freedom, in need of refuge, and in hopes of prosperity. The tragic events of September 11 and their aftermath have challenged our security, put the dream of America to the test for Muslim Americans, and called our values as a nation into question.

Yet with today's critical foreign and domestic policy challenges, there is an urgent need for Muslim Americans to enter more fully into the national discourse. This is first and foremost the responsibility of Muslim Americans themselves, but also of the government, the policy establishment, the media, and other major American institutions.

By working together to ensure that Muslim American voices are heard, we will not only increase our own security, but make our foreign policy a truer expression of who we are as a nation and reaffirm our commitment to the ideal of *E pluribus unum* (one out of many).

PART I: THE CHALLENGE

1

A Call to Action

Americans have long cherished the ideal of *E pluribus unum*, chosen by the Founding Fathers in 1776 as the motto for the Great Seal of the United States. White, Protestant, and primarily of English descent, the men who led the American Revolution and wrote the Constitution could not have foreseen that the union they forged from the thirteen colonies would one day be a melting pot of immigrants and their descendants from every corner of the earth. Today the Great Seal presides over the world's most diverse and powerful nation, symbolizing a legacy in which countless immigrant groups have successfully cemented their tiles in the great American mosaic.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war on terrorism have subjected this article of our democratic faith to one of its greatest tests. For the first time since the internment of Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor, many Americans are questioning the loyalty of an American group composed largely of immigrants and children of immigrants. Like Japanese Americans before Pearl Harbor, many Muslim Americans before September 11 were quietly following a path taken by millions of immigrants: enjoying their freedoms, pursuing the promise of the American dream, and gradually increasing their participation in the larger society. Then came September 11, an act perpetrated in the name of Islam by anti-American extremists. Muslim Americans became the object of suspicion and misunderstanding in a climate of fear about further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

Muslim American integration was not yet well under way prior to September 11. With underdeveloped institutions, a lack of visible leaders, and their patriotism in question, Muslim Americans have not been effective in responding to the climate of fear and distrust that developed after the attacks. In addition, the perception that Muslim American leaders and organizations have not condemned strongly and frequently enough terrorism committed in the name of Islam has been a barrier to their effectiveness in the public arena. These problems have not only allowed misunderstanding and suspicion to persist, but have undermined the ability of Muslim Americans to contribute their much-needed talents and perspectives to the greater national good. The longer this situation is allowed to fester, the

greater the danger of stigmatization, marginalization and, indeed, radicalization within the community.

Islam is one of the fastest-growing religions in the United States, and Muslim Americans are a very diverse population. The group includes native-born African Americans, immigrants, descendants of immigrants, and converts, all with different American experiences. African-American Muslims have been fully integrated into the nation's civic and political life the longest and often have diverging perspectives and needs from those who have come recently to the United States. Many Muslim immigrants and their children, who make up the majority of the U.S. Muslim population, still have a long road ahead to reach full participation in American life. Many have come to the United States in search of education, economic opportunity, and religious freedom. They feel a strong commitment to the country's well-being, and they seek opportunities to contribute to the society in which they make their home.

Given the enormous domestic and international challenges we face as a nation today, including the intense focus on national security and U.S. policy in the Middle East and South Asia, our civic institutions and policy debates would benefit from the greater inclusion of Muslim American voices. In fact, their perspectives are particularly valuable as the United States considers the uncertain course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenge of Iran, the security of the energy supply, and the growth of Muslim populations in Western countries.

Fully engaged, Muslim Americans could assist in the work of improving relations between the United States and nations with large Muslim populations. A sizable number of Muslim intellectuals now live in the United States for the first time in this nation's history. They could help to promote positive change in Western European countries, where relations between Muslims and the larger population are strained. With their deep understanding of both Islamic and Western democratic traditions, they are well equipped to help create new frameworks for Muslim communities living in pluralistic societies. They can be persuasive spokespersons for America in a world of increasing anti-American sentiment.

The realization of equal opportunities for Muslim Americans to participate more fully in our civic and political life will require new efforts by Muslim American organizations as well as established non-Muslim institutions. Muslim Americans can take the initiative by building leadership capacity and greater public awareness of their commitment to the nation's safety. They are also well posi-

tioned to articulate the fit between Islamic and American ideals and to make the mosque as integral to American society as churches and synagogues.

The firm acknowledgment by Muslim Americans of the potential for radicalism in their community and the need to prevent it is a vital step. Though there is little reason to suspect widespread extremism within the Muslim American community today (see Chapter 3), vigilance is required to ensure it does not develop. Some Muslim American leaders and institutions have taken important initial measures to address this. Others, however, have been reluctant to recognize any potential problem. It is time for all to acknowledge the danger and take further steps to counter it. It is important for Muslim Americans to recognize that violence committed in the name of Islam is of great public concern to Americans, whether it happens here or abroad. It would take only a single significant act of terrorism in the United States involving a Muslim American to cement the impression that rampant radicalism has taken root within the community.

Non-Muslim leaders and institutions must also help advance the process of Muslim integration. They can help Muslim Americans enter and earn their way up the ranks in government, universities, foreign-policy think tanks and research institutions, and the media. The media can encourage tolerance and work to expand the public's understanding of Islam and of Muslim Americans. There is need for the U.S. government to take definite, visible measures to make the civic and political integration of Muslim Americans a high priority and to further recognize positive steps already being taken to minimize the danger of radicalism. An ongoing American Diversity Dialogue among Muslim and non-Muslim Americans about the challenges we face together would give needed prominence to the issue and make all Americans aware that the task of Muslim engagement is urgent and that our success in this endeavor will benefit the whole country.

The goal of these efforts should be to open paths for the integration of Muslim Americans into the nation's civic and political life as quickly as possible. As long as there is a fear of terrorism, there is likely to be heightened scrutiny and mistrust of Muslim Americans. Expanded communication and engagement are the best ways to prevent further misunderstanding, the emergence of an "us-versus-them" mentality, and a national overreaction in the event of a major terrorist incident in which Muslim Americans are clearly implicated.

As Muslim and non-Muslim Americans work together toward this goal, it is important to remember that other American communities, both immigrant and native, have faced similar challenges. These have been overcome by the fundamental American belief in fairness, by the unwavering efforts of community leaders in the face of great difficulty, and by sustained collaborations between the communities and established American institutions and leaders. Success in integrating Muslim Americans into American civic and political life will strengthen us as a nation, failure would impoverish our polity and diminish us as a democracy, and reduce the value of an asset vital to our national security.

The rest of Part I of this report describes the Muslim American experience in the United States and the challenge of integration. Part II then provides specific recommendations on how to accelerate the process of integration, reduce tension and misunderstanding between Muslim Americans and other Americans, and strengthen Muslim American participation in our national discourse.

2

The Muslim American Experience

The origins of Muslim America

Muslim Americans have been part of American life for hundreds of years. Some have asserted that Muslim explorers visited the New World before Columbus, and there is substantial evidence that large numbers of Muslims came to the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries via the Atlantic slave trade. Scholarly estimates of the numbers vary, but it is thought that between 10 and 30 percent of the slaves taken from Africa were Muslim. Although forcibly converted to Christianity, many continued to practice Islam in secret and passed their heritage from generation to generation.

The first significant wave of migrants from the Middle East began after the American Civil War and lasted until World War I. Most were Christian Arabs from Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon who were seeking refuge from conscription and discrimination. A small minority were Muslims. Approximately 7 percent of the Syrian American community joined the U.S. Army during the war, and many other Christian Arab and Muslim Arab immigrants also served. Two laws passed after the war, the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, sharply curtailed immigration, particularly from non-European countries. Racial restrictions were abolished by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, but quotas for many ethnic groups, including those from the Middle East, remained. The Muslims who came in this era tended to be better educated and more urban than their predecessors.

The largest inflow of Muslims began with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished national-origin quotas and opened our doors to an unprecedented number of immigrants and students from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Like many immigrants before them, they came to escape war, poverty, and religious or political persecution. Palestinian immigration accelerated dramatically following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Many Iranians came after the fall of the Shah in 1979. Immigration from South Asia rose significantly after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and other countries added to the inflow and further diversified the American Muslim population. One striking consequence of this history is that

approximately two of three Muslims living in the United States today were born elsewhere.

Muslims born here include children and grandchildren of immigrants, converts to Islam, and a large number of African Americans. Many African Americans embraced Islam because it reconnected them to a history and a cultural identity that had been lost in slavery, teaching racial equality and the need for self-improvement. As their numbers grew, they created institutions such as the Nation of Islam, which focused on civil rights and black empowerment. These institutions were later joined by more conventional Islamic organizations such as the Mosque Cares. The vast majority of African American Muslims now practice in the mainstream of the faith, and many of the nation's leading scholars of Islam are African American.

The diversity of Muslim America

Today's Muslim American population is an extraordinary mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, ideological, social, economic, and religious groups. Native Muslim Americans are well integrated into American society, while many newcomers are just beginning to adapt to American life. In terms of religious devotion, Muslims range from highly orthodox to moderate to secular. Muslims resemble Christians, Jews, Hindus, and other American religious communities in that many of them seek full political and social integration, while others prefer to live primarily in the context of their communities and cultural practices. Many of the immigrants come from Muslim-majority countries and inevitably go through a period of adjustment as they learn the ways of a pluralistic society.

The size of the Muslim American population has proved difficult to measure because the U.S. Census does not track religious affiliation. Estimates vary widely from two million to seven million. What is clear, however, is that the Muslim American population has been growing rapidly as a result of immigration, a high birth rate, and conversions.

According to a 2007 survey by the Pew Research Center, 65 percent of the Muslim American population are first-generation immigrants, and 61 percent of the foreign-born arrived in the 1990s or this decade. Seventy-seven percent of Muslims living in the United States are citizens, with 65 percent of the foreign-born being naturalized citizens. As a point of comparison, 58 percent of foreign-born Chinese living in the United States are naturalized citizens.

A recent study by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University's School of Law found that many Muslims

Estimating the Muslim Population in the United States*

Because the Census Bureau and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services do not collect information on religious affiliation, there is no definitive count of Muslims living in the United States. The available estimates vary widely, from two million to seven million.

The estimates have been made using methods ranging from telephone surveys and answers to the ancestry question in the Census to language use and mosque affiliation. All of these have limitations. Many of the studies done so far have relied on small and potentially unrepresentative samples, and much of the analysis has been predicated on inferences that are difficult to substantiate. Estimates based on national origin have no methodological basis for determining the identity of African American Muslims and assume that first- and second-generation descendants of African immigrants accurately identify countries of origin. They also presume that Muslim immigrants accurately identify themselves as Muslims in the country of origin, which is problematic for those originating from religiously pluralistic societies. Errors in their assumptions about the number of Muslims who have been questioned for their mosque affiliation use self-reported figures that have been questioned for their methodology for estimating the number who are not.

*All source information for estimates in this report is located at the end of the bibliography.

were among the more than 40,000 people who have waited more than three years for a decision on their naturalization applications, a process that should take no longer than 180 days.

Estimates of the African American Muslim population have ranged from approximately one-fifth to one-third of the total for all Muslim Americans. The other major ethnic groups are Arabs and South Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Afghans). Even though most Americans identify Islam primarily with Arabs, two-thirds of Arab Americans are Christian. However, most Arab immigrants since World War II have been Muslims, and Muslims are the fastest-growing segment of the Arab American population. South Asians constitute the fastest-growing Muslim community, perhaps accounting for a quarter of all Muslim Americans. The Muslim population of the United States also includes Turks, Iranians, Bosnians, Malays, Indonesians, Nigerians, Somalis, Liberians, Kenyans, and Senegalese, among others. In addition, there is a small but growing population of White and Hispanic converts, many of them women who have married Muslim men.

Although Muslims live in every corner of the nation, many have settled in major metropolitan areas along the two coasts and in the Midwest: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit/Dearborn. The ten states with the largest Muslim populations are California,

New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Indiana, Michigan, Virginia, Texas, Ohio, and Maryland. There are also established communities near state universities, which often have sizable numbers of foreign-born Muslim students and faculty.

The 2007 Pew survey found that Muslim Americans generally mirror the U.S. public in education and income levels, with immigrant Muslims slightly more affluent and better educated than native-born Muslims. Twenty-four percent of all Muslims and 29 percent of immigrant Muslims have college degrees, compared to 25 percent for the U.S. general population. Forty-one percent of all Muslim Americans and 45 percent of immigrant Muslims report an annual household income of \$50,000 or higher. This compares to the national average of 44 percent. Immigrant Muslims are well represented among higher-income earners, with 19 percent claiming annual household incomes of \$100,000 or higher (compared to 16 percent for the Muslim population as a whole and 17 percent for the U.S. average). This is likely due to the strong concentration of Muslims in professional, managerial, and technical fields, especially in information technology, education, medicine, law, and the corporate world. There is some evidence of a decline in the wages of Muslim and Arab men since 2001, although more recent data suggest the trend might be reversing.

The Muslim American journey is unique in that it is part of two quintessentially American experiences: the African American and the immigrant. Immigrant Muslims and African American Muslims have worked to establish their voices in politics and society, sometimes together, but more often on their own. While they share an identity as Muslims, their racial, cultural, socioeconomic, and historical circumstances have differed widely. In working toward full political participation, immigrant Muslims have a great deal to learn from the successes of African American Muslims, particularly in building institutional capacity and communicating effectively with other Americans. More cooperation between these two Muslim communities would help close the gap between them. It would help them find the commonalities in their separate histories, enabling them to relate more fully to each other as Muslim Americans and to expand their contributions to American society.

Muslim civic and political participation before September 11

Prior to September 11, Muslim immigrants, following the pattern of many earlier immigrant groups, were developing an interest

Political Diversity of Muslim Americans

Many Muslim groups endorsed George W. Bush in the presidential election of 2000, in part because of his promise to repeal the secret evidence provisions of the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which facilitated the use of secret evidence in terrorism cases. Various exit polls found either a plurality or very small majority of Muslim Americans voting for Bush, and some observers have argued that their votes in Florida were important to the President's victory.

Muslim attitudes toward President Bush changed dramatically after the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001. In the eyes of many Muslims, the law disproportionately targeted their communities and violated their civil rights. Negative perceptions were reinforced by the war in Iraq. A 2004 Zogby International/Project MAPS survey found that only 13 percent of Muslim Americans supported the intervention. The 2007 Pew Research Center survey of Muslim American attitudes found that only 15 percent approve of President Bush's job performance.

In 2004 Muslim Americans voted in significantly greater numbers and shifted their support from President Bush and the Republican Party to John Kerry and the Democrats. A 2005 survey by the Muslim American Political Action Committee estimated that the percentage of registered Muslim voters who cast ballots more than doubled between 2000 and 2004. The 2007 Pew survey found that 71 percent voted for Kerry, versus 14 percent who voted for Bush.

Despite the realignment in voting patterns, the socioeconomic and ethnic diversity of Muslim America, strained relations and differing policy priorities between African American and immigrant Muslims, and the conservative social leanings of many immigrant Muslims suggest that Muslims are not likely to vote as a bloc.

in civic and political participation as they became more settled. International affairs and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East were a focal point, particularly among first-generation immigrants. Muslim leaders, imams, and national organizations issued public statements on policy issues, but these rarely translated into actions to influence policy. Muslim Americans also undertook fund-raising for international humanitarian relief and worked on civil rights issues affecting Muslims in the United States.

Yet like many immigrant and minority groups before them, Muslim Americans were also facing challenges on the road to full civic and political integration in American society. Their diversity, the high proportion of immigrants in their population, and the fact that so many of them came from societies offering little opportunity for political participation were especially problematic. Also, many national Muslim American organizations were relatively inexperienced and had not paid sufficient attention to building bridges to other communities and to institutions with similar concerns. As a

result, they lacked the skills for effective organizing and for educating the general public on issues important to their constituencies. They were also generally unsuccessful in forming meaningful ties to government officials and in winning public office. The first Muslim to win a seat in the House of Representatives was elected in 2006. To date, no Muslims have served in the Senate, and only a handful have served in state or local office.

In part, the absence of Muslim Americans from high office is attributable to the fact that they are a relatively new and still numerically limited presence in American political life. It was not until 1950 that an Italian American (John O. Pastore of Rhode Island) was elected to the Senate, and it took another fifty-six years for another Italian American, Nancy Pelosi, to become Speaker of the House. In 1958 Hawaii elected both the first Chinese American U.S. senator, Hiram L. Fong, and the first Japanese American U.S. congressman (and later also the first Japanese American in the Senate), Daniel K. Inouye. This was long after the first major waves of Italians, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants arrived in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is worth noting that Congress has had seventeen members from the Christian Arab American community, which established itself in the United States long before large numbers of Muslim immigrants began arriving. The first was George Kassem of California, elected to the House in 1959.

3

September 11 and Muslim Americans

The September 11 attacks were a major event in American history and a shock to all Americans. Americans awoke to the international terrorist threat of al Qaeda, an elusive, globally dispersed collection of violent individuals with the United States and U.S. interests as their target and Islam as their rallying cry. The horror of the attacks, subsequent media exposure, the declaration of war on terrorism, and repeated images of violence in Muslim societies created a deep fear among Americans of further attacks and of an existential conflict with so-called "Islamic terrorists," who were perceived as enjoying wide support among the world's Muslims. With little knowledge about Islam or Muslim Americans, many Americans came to identify the terrorist threat with the Muslim community at large and to view Muslim Americans with deep suspicion and doubt.

Investigation of Muslim Americans

The U.S. government, eager to prevent further acts of terrorism, took a series of initiatives that had an immediate effect on Muslim Americans. The USA PATRIOT Act dramatically expanded the authority of government agencies to address terrorism, here and abroad. The government also authorized National Security Agency wiretapping and monitoring and FBI surveillance of mosques. According to government data, since September 11 more than 80,000 Arab and Muslim nonnational residents have been required to undergo fingerprinting and registration. 8,000 have been identified for questioning, approximately 5,000 have been arrested or detained, and at least 400 have been criminally charged in terrorism-related investigations. Many in the Muslim American community and some outside scholars argue that these totals for the number of Muslim Americans registered, interviewed, arrested, or detained are low.

Some media and law enforcement experts have questioned the capacity of a number of the alleged terrorist groups to carry out their intended plans, and there is a lack of publicly available evidence and agreement on the number of successful terrorism-related prosecutions. While the Department of Justice has indicated that over 200 of such cases have resulted in convictions, there is no public listing of offenses for which convictions were obtained, and some question how many directly relate to terrorism. The Inspector General of the

Department of Justice discovered that between 2001 and 2005, many cases that were counted as antiterrorism efforts in fact involved crimes such as drug trafficking and marriage fraud. An analysis by the Center on Law and Security released by the New York University School of Law in September 2006 developed a separate list of 510 terrorism-related cases, out of which forty-six resulted in convictions on federal crimes of terrorism. Whatever the numbers, the federal government has not disclosed a finding of any well-organized or deeply rooted terrorist cells with operational links to al Qaeda or other global terrorist organizations—such as those that have been exposed or that have undertaken attacks in Europe. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that extremism within the Muslim American community is not possible. However, judging from publicly known facts, there is little reason to suspect widespread support for terrorism among Muslim Americans. While investigations should and will certainly continue, it is vital that they are carried out in ways that do not violate U.S. laws and civil rights.

Anti-Muslim sentiment

Many Muslim Americans and other observers are increasingly concerned by what they perceive to be rising Islamophobia in the United States. In their view, Islamophobia is the contention that Islam is a monolithic bloc unresponsive to change and lacking commonalities with American values; that Islam is a violent political ideology rather than one of the world's major religions; and that discrimination against Muslims is therefore justifiable. These beliefs are thought to fuel organized attempts to discredit Islam and exclude Muslims from the nation's civic and political life.

A survey by Washington Post-ABC News in 2006 showed that less than one-half of Americans have a positive view of Islam. (About three-quarters say they approve of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.) Some Americans doubt Muslims' desire and capacity for engagement in the larger society. Others question the compatibility of Islam with American values. There are fears of extremism, reservations about the treatment of women in some Islamic societies, and questions about the separation of church and state and democracy's failure in a number of Muslim societies.

Thirty-six percent of Americans stated in a 2005 Pew poll that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence. A 2006 Gallup survey found that approximately one-third of Americans believe Muslim Americans sympathize with al Qaeda, and 39 percent

think that Muslims should be required to carry a special identification card. Only 49 percent consider Muslim Americans loyal to the United States.

Misrepresentations of Muslims and Islam in some media coverage contribute to negative perceptions and apprehensiveness toward Muslim Americans by their fellow Americans. In the flurry of reporting after the September 11 attacks—and given the demand for immediate, round-the-clock attention—some coverage was not as careful as it might have been with more time and research. While some media did an excellent job of providing careful analysis and balanced reporting, there remained a big enough gap in other reporting that many viewers were left without sufficient knowledge and perspective to sort fact from fiction. For example, scenes of virulent anti-American rhetoric and violence by extremists claiming to wear the mantle of Islam were often beamed into American living rooms without commentary or context. Presented without analysis, such reports left the false impression that the extremists represent Islam and that Muslims generally approve of terrorism. This distortion ironically serves the terrorists' purposes by seeming to validate their claim to be acting in the name of Islam.

Public perceptions of Muslim Americans were—and is some cases still are—negatively affected by the frequent use of terminology explicitly or implicitly linking all Muslims and Islam to extremism and terrorism. For example, the word "Islamist" has been used to describe Muslim extremists who violently oppose the encroachment of Western influences upon Muslim societies. Connecting the word "Islamic" to violent extremists who happen to be Muslim deepens the perception of Islam as condoning violence. As Muslim Americans have pointed out, the Irish Republican Army is not referred to as "Catholic terrorists." The Tamil Tigers are not referred to as "Hindu terrorists." Nor is the Ku Klux Klan referred to as "Christian terrorists." The term "Islamofascist," which was coined in an attempt to portray the war on terrorism as a war on fascism, is also inflammatory.

Despite the diversity of the Muslim community in America and throughout the world, media coverage, intentionally or not, also tended to present Islam as a monolith, contributing to an "us-versus-them" mentality. In addition, Muslim protests and denunciations of violence have often been underreported. The use of anti-Muslim epithets by some pundits has gone mostly unchallenged by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This contrasts with the rapid and wide disapprovals usually incurred by media and public figures whose slurs are directed at other racial and ethnic groups. The relative silence in

countering misinformation and bigotry only reinforces the public's mistaken belief that most Muslims condone violence and allows misperceptions to endure.

It is beyond the scope of the Task Force's mandate to report conclusively on the perception and the reality of Islamophobia in the United States. However, the depth of conviction among many Muslim Americans and some non-Muslim Americans of its significance should not be discounted. It points to a potentially deepening crisis between Muslim Americans and other Americans that threatens not only the well-being of Muslims in the United States, but American security at home and abroad.

Lack of Muslim American voices

Efforts by Muslim Americans to expose the fallacy of the terrorists' assertions that they represent Islam and to dissociate themselves from terrorism have not succeeded for a number of reasons. An important obstacle has been the perception that Muslim Americans have not spoken out frequently or forcefully enough to condemn violence committed in the name of Islam, leaving this very deep concern of the American public at issue. While Muslim Americans have become more active in the public sphere since September 11, taking up civil rights issues of concern to their community, they have not yet developed recognizable civic or political voices that regularly and visibly contribute to public discourse. In some cases, Muslim Americans have been fearful and chosen not to speak out. Because their patriotism has frequently been called into question—and because of the inexperience and limited resources of their institutions—many Muslim Americans have shied away from the media and any public statements that may be construed (or misconstrued) as critical of the U.S. government and its foreign policies. They have preferred not to put a spotlight on their community or place themselves or others under scrutiny. Others have spoken out only to protest false charges and personal mischaracterizations.

Despite this seeming withdrawal from the public sphere, there is much evidence that Muslim Americans are committed to the democratic process in this country. A 2005 Zogby International/Project MAPS survey showed that political participation is endorsed by 95 percent of Muslim Americans. The 2007 Pew survey found a voter registration level of 63 percent for Muslim Americans. This compares to a 2004 figure of 72 percent for the U.S. population as a whole, and 2000 figures of 63 percent for Mexican Americans and 57 percent for

Indian Americans. Many Muslim Americans, however, tend to feel politically isolated because they have so few representatives in government and because some non-Muslim political candidates are unwilling to accept campaign contributions or other support from Muslim Americans.

While more Muslims have run for public office at all levels of government over the last few years, many Muslims believe that the current climate of American opinion is not conducive to office seeking. The 2006 election of Keith Ellison, an African American Muslim from Minnesota, to the U.S. House of Representatives affirmed the openness of the American political process. But the ensuing controversy over his decision to use the Quran rather than the Bible when he took the oath of office was a reminder of the animosity and suspicion directed toward Muslims from some quarters. One of his congressional colleagues cited his election as evidence of a need for immigration reforms to limit the possibility of more Muslims being elected to public office.

4 The Challenge of Integration

Muslim Americans are certainly not the first group in America to face challenges in overcoming bias and misperception among those unfamiliar with their ways. Irish Catholics, for example, faced mistrust and hostility on a par with that felt by today's Muslim Americans. They arrived in the wake of the mid-nineteenth-century Potato Famine, a time when Americans were overwhelmingly Protestant and feared that the newcomers were agents of the pope and incapable of becoming loyal Americans. Although the Irish gained some access to political power through their participation in labor unions and urban organizing, continuing anti-Catholic prejudice forced them to establish their own schools, colleges, and other institutions. Not until John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, a century after the first major influx of Irish immigrants, did Catholics achieve full acceptance in American society.

Like Catholics, Jewish immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also confronted exclusion and hostility because of their religion. Many places of public accommodation refused to serve them. Leading universities set quotas to limit the number of Jews in their student bodies. Jews also organized their own schools, hospitals, and civic organizations. During the 1920s and 1930s, Jewish Americans were accused of having dual loyalties and advocating the Communist cause.

Other groups have faced circumstances similar to those faced by Muslim Americans today during times of domestic violence and war. Italian Americans faced discrimination and suspicion during the 1910s and 1920s because a few Italians were prominent in the violent Anarchist movement. German Americans were stigmatized during both world wars. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, 117,000 Japanese Americans—two-thirds of them born in the United States—were relocated and interned, allegedly to prevent espionage and to protect them from harm. In 1988 Congress issued a formal apology for the injustice and paid each surviving internee \$20,000. Today the loyalty and identity of Japanese Americans, German Americans, Jewish Americans, and Catholic Americans are not in question. But their integration into the mainstream was hard won.

While difficult, the process of successfully integrating new groups from widely divergent backgrounds into a society based on the values of liberty and justice—as embodied in the democratic

institutions imparted to all Americans by the Founding Fathers—is a uniquely American experience. It centers on the belief that our diversity makes us stronger; that openness is fundamental to the economic, cultural, and political success of the nation; and that to be a beacon of hope and opportunity for others around the world, we must never shut ourselves off from new people and ideas.

The urgency for Muslim Americans

America's long history with immigrants shows that over time they develop a sense of belonging to the larger society and an interest in civic and political participation. Along the way, other Americans learn more about them and begin welcoming them into the fold of American life. Ethnic and religious groups typically begin this evolution by forming organizations to serve their communities and to gain a foothold in the nation's political life by mobilizing voters, influencing local governments, and other activities. As mentioned, some groups have needed considerable time to overcome obstacles created by prejudice and the discrimination it breeds. Typically, immigrants' integration into the mainstream takes place over several generations.

Muslim immigrants were on a similar trajectory, but September 11 and the war on terrorism profoundly altered their circumstances. The mistrust and divisions that have developed and persisted between Muslim Americans and other Americans have slowed and even stalled the process of integration. In this climate especially, Muslim Americans themselves have not stepped forward as forthrightly and fully as needed to address the issues that engage them and the larger society.

While the integration of Muslim Americans could eventually be achieved on its own, the need to accelerate the process is urgent. The risks of inaction are substantial: further marginalization of Muslim Americans at best and serious alienation at worst. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure that this does not happen.

The danger of further marginalization of Muslim Americans comes at a time when integration and understanding are critical to solving not only problems specific to the Muslim community, but national and international challenges. The United States faces major foreign policy dilemmas involving Muslim countries and Muslim peoples throughout the world, including the war on terrorism, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and conflict and instability in the Middle East and South Asia. These challenges impact policy at home,

including homeland security, energy policy, immigration policy, civil rights, and more. Cultural understanding and sensitivity, historical and political expertise, language and diplomatic skills, research and intelligence gathering experience along with many other capabilities are required to address these challenges. Muslim Americans have invaluable contributions to make in these and many other areas.

Overcoming the obstacles to integration and expanding the opportunities for the engagement of Muslim Americans in U.S. civic and political life is a major national undertaking. But it also presents an opportunity to remind the country that the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans reject extremism and terrorism. We have successfully met this challenge in the past: The idea of holding Italian Americans collectively accountable for the criminality of the Mafia never took root in the American consciousness.

It is therefore critical that the swift civic and political integration of Muslim Americans become a national priority. The recommendations of the Task Force that follow in Part II of this report call upon a wide range of institutions and leaders, Muslim and non-Muslim, to assist in speeding the Muslim American journey to full participation.

Muslims in Europe

European Muslims face even greater challenges than Muslim Americans in their efforts to become more civically and politically engaged. European Muslims tend to be much less socioeconomically integrated than Muslim Americans. Their feelings of alienation have been correspondingly higher, and more of them have been attracted to radicalism.

Muslims began moving to Europe in response to its need for unskilled labor in the reconstruction period after World War II. Overall, Europe's Muslim communities are larger and live more heterogeneous ethnic origins than their American counterparts. For example, the great majority of French Muslims live in North Africa, in Germany, approximately three-quarters of the Muslim population is of Turkish origin. Most of Britain's Muslims are of South Asian heritage, and Dutch Muslims come primarily from Turkey and Morocco.

The 2006 Pew survey estimated that there were fifteen million Muslims in Western Europe. This National Intelligence Council projects that the number will likely double by 2025. Among the countries with the largest concentrations are France (six million, or about 1.6 percent of the population), Germany (three million, or 3.6 percent), Great Britain (1.6 million, or 2.7 percent), Spain (one million, or 2.3 percent), and the Netherlands (945,000, or 5.6 percent). European Muslims are generally poorer and less educated than other Europeans or Muslim Americans. About two-thirds of Bangladeshis and Pakistani households in Britain live below the poverty line, and they are three times more likely than whites to be unemployed. In Germany and the Netherlands, unemployment rates for immigrants are approximately double those of the rest of the population. A 2006 survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 53 percent of Muslims living in Germany reported family incomes of less than 18,000 euros annually, compared with 35 percent of Germans overall. The Center for Turkish Studies recently concluded that two-thirds of the Turks in Germany live below the poverty line or just above it. The 2006 Pew survey found that 45 percent of French Muslims reported family incomes of 17,500 euros or less, compared with 27 percent of the general population.

Europe's Muslims have encountered several barriers to integration. The ethnic and religious diversity that has long been a fact of American life is a relatively new phenomenon in most sections of Western Europe, and nationality in Europe has historically been defined ethnically. There is also generally no equivalent to the American dream to bind European immigrants to their adopted countries. Many European countries also tend to be socially and religiously more liberal than their Muslim countries. And because immigration was originally viewed as a temporary work arrangement, neither the immigrants nor their host countries have made concerted efforts toward integration. The scores of immigrant groups who came to the United States differed widely in their religious and cultural backgrounds, but the prevailing pluralistic ethos and their shared belief in the American dream promoted a high degree of identification with U.S. society and citizenship.

PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force endorses six recommendations to speed the integration of Muslim Americans into American civic and political life:

1. Expand and recognize Muslim American contributions to national security
2. Improve media coverage and public understanding of Muslim Americans
3. Increase civic engagement among Muslim Americans
4. Build stronger Muslim American institutions
5. Cultivate the next generation of Muslim American leaders
6. Give ongoing national attention to Muslim American integration

Recommendation #1 Expand and Recognize Muslim American Contributions to National Security

The September 11 attacks were a watershed moment for all Americans, creating a sense of vulnerability that had long been absent from daily life. The horror of the tragedy brought the nation together with a unity of purpose in countering the threat of terrorism. Many Muslim Americans shared in this commitment in the aftermath of the attacks. A number of prominent Muslim American organizations condemned the attacks and called for fellow Muslims to help those affected, although the community's lack of institutional capacity and recognizable voices limited its responses in an emergency situation.

In the last five years, Muslim Americans have made important contributions to national security by cooperating with law enforcement agencies, a number of leading organizations, including the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow, National Association of Muslim Lawyers, and Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee, regularly meet with the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI to discuss concerns, policies, and procedures. Several organizations have focused on educating law enforcement and the public about Muslim Americans. In 2002 ADC launched a national Law

Muslim American Responses to Terrorism

Many Muslim American institutions were quick to condemn the September 11 attacks, issuing a statement on the same day that read in part: "American Muslims utterly condemn what are apparendly vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent citizens. We join with all Americans in calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators. No political cause could ever be assisted by such heinous acts." The statement was signed by the American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers, Association of Muslim Social Scientists, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Medical Association of North America, Islamic Circle of North America, Islamic Society of North America, Muslim American Society, Muslim American Society of North America, Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC).

In 2004 MPAC launched the "National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism" and set three goals: 1) to raise religious awareness and make it plain that terrorism does not conform to the Islamic principle of *fi'ar* (enough), 2) to increase control of internet use activities in order to prevent exploitation by those enemies, and 3) to facilitate the detection of criminal activity. To work toward these goals, MPAC developed a series of forums and training seminars for mosque leaders and Muslim leaders. The campaign also disseminated guidelines for imams and Muslim leaders. The campaign was endorsed by the FBI and the Islamic Society of North America, the largest Muslim organization in the United States, representing more than 600 mosques nationwide.

Also in 2004, the Council on American-Islamic Relations launched an online petition drive called "Not in the Name of Islam." The petition was designed to disassociate Muslims from violent acts committed in the name of Islam. It was endorsed by many mosques and Islamic organizations, and to date it has been signed by almost 700,000 individuals.

Enforcement Outreach Program and is currently planning to launch an Employment Diversity Awareness Building Program. Muslim American organizations run sensitivity training programs for teachers, the FBI, other law enforcement agencies, and other groups. FBI Director Robert Mueller and other government officials have credited the Muslim and Arab American communities for their assistance in the nation's efforts to thwart terrorism.

Yet much remains to be done. There is still a perception that Muslim Americans have not done enough to address the concerns of those outside the community. Muslim Americans must make it a priority to visibly demonstrate their commitment to America, its institutions, and its values. They must combat the perceptions and fears among Americans of radicalism and reassure the public that the vast majority of Muslim Americans do not espouse violence and do not pose a terrorist threat. At the same time, greater efforts must

Fiqh Council of North America's Antiterrorism Fatwa

After the July 7, 2005, terrorist bombings in London, the Fiqh Council of North America, an eighteen-member association of Islamic scholars who interpret Islamic law in the United States, issued a *fatwa* (a religious ruling) against terrorism and extremism. The *fatwa* states that "Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism." It stressed that "targeting civilian life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is *haram*—or forbidden—and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not martyrs." The *fatwa* cited the Quran and Prophet Muhammad in support of its strong prohibitions of terrorism and of cooperation with those involved in any act of violence. Muslims were encouraged by the *fatwa* to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians. Among the 145 endorses of the *fatwa* were the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Circle of North America, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim American Society, Muslim Student Association of the US and Canada, and the American Muslim Alliance.

be made by the government, the media, and opinion leaders to spotlight positive Muslim American contributions to national security.

Disavowing terrorism

Many Muslim Americans have taken positive but often unnoticed steps to denounce terrorism and differentiate their traditions from the beliefs of radical groups. It is crucial that they not view their obligation in this area as fulfilled. In the eyes of American society, the burden is still on Muslims to respond, and they should do so by amplifying their voices and actions in the hope that more Americans hear and accept the message. There is an ongoing need for Muslim leaders to condemn terrorist acts, strengthen their efforts to prevent extremist activity among Muslim Americans, and find more effective ways to communicate these endeavors to the media.

It is regrettable that so many Americans know so little about Muslim Americans' opposition to violence and about their contributions to national security. Yet a real sense of danger persists and should be addressed—by Muslim organizations, government, and others. No immigrant or minority group in our history has prevailed in combating misperceptions and prejudice except through persistence even in the face of denial.

The nation's estimated 1,500 mosques have a critical role to play in these efforts. Many American mosques are led by foreign-born imams, in part because there are few U.S. training programs

for Muslim clerics and in part because so many congregations are heavily populated by immigrants. While the majority of imams are respected religious leaders, a few high-profile cases in which immigrant imams have been accused of inciting extremist activity have left many Americans with the impression that mosques are centers of radicalism. Muslim organizations could further their contributions to national security by expanding programs like MPAC's "National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism" to all U.S. mosques.

Expanding contributions to homeland security

There is great value in strengthening and expanding successful partnerships like the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC), which was formed by Southern California's Muslim American community and local law enforcement. Once established in other cities, these partnerships could form a national network capable of playing a vital role in early detection of potential threats (see sidebar below on its details). Muslim Americans with law enforcement credentials could form a task force to provide government agencies with new methods for strengthening homeland security in a manner that protects civil liberties. Such a group could also

Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress

Local initiatives can play a critical role in developing cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships between Muslim Americans and U.S. government agencies. One of the best examples of such a partnership is the Muslim-American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC), which was created by Southern California's Muslim American leaders and Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca with the endorsement of U.S. Congresswoman Jane Harman and Los Angeles County Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky. MAHSC's executive board includes leaders of a wide range of Muslim organizations such as the Council of Pakistani American Affairs, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Omar Ibn Al-Khattab Foundation, Muslim Women's League, Islamic Center of Southern California, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council.

MAHSC's mandate is to contribute to national security while also fighting discrimination and acts of prejudice. It has undertaken cultural sensitivity training of terrorism liaison officers and cooperated with law enforcement agencies and ethnic media on an advertising campaign to encourage Muslims to seek careers in law enforcement and elsewhere in government. As Sheriff Baca and his staff have said in testimony before a number of congressional committees, MAHSC has been successful and should be replicated. MAHSC hopes to develop a national network of local community-government partnerships.

serve as a bridge between the government and the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities in the United States.

In addition, the nation would benefit greatly if more Muslim Americans were employed with the U.S. government. Well educated in a variety of fields, they can make a wide range of contributions. There is a particular need for their language skills and cultural competencies in law enforcement and intelligence work. Many Muslim Americans have hesitated to work in government because of a belief that it is not sufficiently responsive to their concerns. Some fear that they would be the object of special scrutiny. The reticence could be reduced if Muslim American leaders and the government worked together to address these concerns. Muslim American leaders could do more to explain to their communities the value of Muslim American participation in government. Trust and confidence-building measures by government agencies can contribute to better understanding, a welcoming environment, and less hesitation among Muslim Americans seeking employment.

Facilitating communication and cooperation

The U.S. government can do more to help combat misperceptions and facilitate communication and cooperation with Muslim Americans. This would not only help ease fears among the public, but would promote the further expansion of Muslim American contributions to homeland security. The Department of Justice, FBI, and Department of Homeland Security have all publicly acknowledged the significance of Muslim Americans' assistance in safeguarding the United States from attack. Yet these statements have rarely been made by senior officials, so they seldom make news. As a result, few Americans are aware of Muslims' contributions in this area. Public statements by the president and by cabinet members would be covered by the media and can be used as an opportunity to strengthen public acceptance of Muslims and recognize the contributions they make to the larger American society. In the aftermath of September 11, President Bush's statements distancing the attacks from Islam and encouraging tolerance likely helped calm public fears. Presidential leadership in this area contributes to deepening understanding and helping Americans see Muslims in a context not exclusively defined by national security issues.

Building trust and creating mutually beneficial partnerships between Muslim America and the agencies charged with securing

Muslim Americans in the U.S. Military

Muslim Americans have been proudly serving their country in the U.S. military for more than a century. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that there are around 4,700 Muslims in the armed services. The number is not definite because religious affiliation is an official response on department surveys. Some advocacy groups argue that many Muslims hesitate to reveal their religion, however, the U.S. military has 75,000. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, more than 4,000 Muslim servicemen have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and at least nine have lost their lives serving their country.

The U.S. military has encouraged Muslims to enlist, recognizing the need for their language skills and cultural knowledge. The military has also been successful in accommodating Islamic religious practices. Mosques and prayer rooms have been built on military bases and in the service academies. The hiring of Muslim chaplains has also increased. In addition, senior military officers and Pentagon officials have also begun to celebrate Islamic religious events with Muslim soldiers.

Like many other groups, Muslim Americans have formed their own service organizations—the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council and the Muslim American Veterans Association—to address the needs of veterans and those currently serving.

the homeland is also a critical task. It is important for the U.S. government to acknowledge that it is wrong to hold any group collectively accountable for the actions of a few. Doing so runs counter to the nation's belief in fairness and justice and would compromise efforts to establish strong partnerships. Federal authorities and local law enforcement officers should start by developing more effective dialogue with Muslim American leaders and their organizations. The most constructive dialogue would be rooted in an acknowledgment that the great majority of U.S. Muslims are loyal Americans and that many can provide unique and crucial support to American anti-terrorism efforts as well as to policy discussions on the evolving U.S. relationship with Muslim countries.

A wider variety of government efforts and more government resources could also improve relations between law enforcement and the Muslim American population in general. Federal law enforcement officers could use additional training and more bridge building with the Muslim American community would increase the trust and open communication necessary for resolving differences that stand in the way of fuller cooperation. Meetings to discuss civil rights issues and community engagement will be more effective if there are more of them and if they are better publicized.

In carrying out this work, the government can build on initiatives already taken. For example, the Department of Justice Community Relations Service (CRS) has assisted local law enforcement agencies with training and other efforts to prevent racial and ethnic tension. After September 11, the department published *Twenty-four Plus One Things Local Law Enforcement Agencies Can Do to Prevent or Respond to Hate Incidents Against Arab-Americans, Muslims, and Sikhs*, which includes tips on the proper reporting of allegations of intimidation, ensuring Muslim Americans' safety, assessing the potential for radicalism, reviewing patrol practices, and training staff. A CRS video titled "The First Three to Five Seconds" is used to increase law enforcement officers' understanding of Arab and Muslim cultures.

Recommendation #2 Improve Media Coverage and Public Understanding of Muslim Americans

Many major American newspapers and broadcast media have improved the quality of their coverage of Islam and Muslim societies since September 11. As they have deepened their knowledge of Islam, Muslim cultures, and Muslim-majority states, they have increased their attention to these subjects, capturing more of the Muslim world's diversity and treating it less like a monolith. Some in the media, however, have continued to present Islam in an increasingly negative light, helping cement stereotypes and lending credence to the "us-versus-them" mentality. For all media, the task of educating the public on the lives and high ideals of the overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims has been greatly complicated by the continuing threat of terrorism and by terrorists' continuing claims that they are acting in the name of Islam.

The misperceptions and negative attitudes toward Muslim Americans in the United States are due in part to the limited knowledge most Americans have of Islam. In a 2005 Pew survey, 66 percent of respondents said they knew little or nothing about Islam; only five percent claimed to know a great deal. However, among the Pew respondents conversant with Islam, 61 percent expressed favorable views of Muslim Americans. Those with a Muslim acquaintance were much less likely to mind the idea of having a Muslim acquaintance (10 percent versus 31 percent) and much less favorably disposed to the idea of requiring Muslims to carry special identification (24 percent versus 50 percent).

As the Pew and Gallup opinion polls of recent years have shown, Americans who are familiar with Islam and who personally know Muslims are more likely to see them as being just like other Americans. Since the days when they began raising barns together, Americans have known that working side by side for the common good is one of the best ways for strangers to build mutual understanding and respect.

Working with the media

Several steps could be taken immediately to build better understanding. Media organizations and Muslim American groups could jointly sponsor seminars to explore problematic aspects of coverage,

Muslim and Non-Muslim Focus Groups

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs commissioned Charney Research to conduct two U.S. focus groups, one Muslim and one non-Muslim, for an in-depth exploration of perceptions of Muslim Americans and their involvement in U.S. society and the nation's policy process. Both were conducted in May 2006. The non-Muslims met in Indianapolis, the Muslims in Chicago.

The research found that both groups had broadly similar views on the state of the nation, the challenges it faces, and the need for greater incorporation of Muslim perspectives in the policy process. Among the key findings:

- Both groups felt that Muslim Americans had made significant social and economic strides but were politically marginalized in U.S. society. Muslim participants in particular felt isolated from the political mainstream.
- Non-Muslim participants had very little interaction with Muslims, and few knew Muslims personally. This group viewed Muslim Americans as high achievers but also as misunderstood by other Americans as a result of media portrayals heavily influenced by international acts of terrorism. Despite their feeling that the portrayals were unfair, the non-Muslims expressed worries about extremism taking root in Muslim America.
- Muslim participants perceived their communities to be deeply divided by class, generation, and national origin. Despite these divisions, they were very proud of their religion and faith and the accomplishments of Muslim Americans and felt that extremism in their communities was rare.
- Both groups were open to greater Muslim American involvement in the U.S. foreign policy process, including creating new institutions, promoting leadership development, building intercommunity alliances on policy issues, electing more Muslim public officials, and increasing the number and prominence of Muslims working in the policy community.
- Both groups demonstrated concern over the country's loss of international standing in recent years, and both endorsed having Muslim American institutions play a greater role in improving U.S. relations with Muslim-majority countries. However, none of the non-Muslims and few of the Muslims had knowledge of specific Muslim American institutions.

gain a deeper appreciation of the differences in perspectives, and devise solutions that address both the sensitivities of Muslims and journalistic principles and practices. Meetings of community leaders and newspaper editorial boards are also important, particularly in smaller markets where the media have fewer opportunities to interact with Muslims. Muslim organizations could also offer ideas for expanding coverage of the everyday activities of Muslim Americans, who are seldom seen or heard except in connection with events in the Middle East. For example, newspapers frequently cover the charitable and civic contributions of organizations associated with

other faiths or ethnic groups, but they seldom report on fund-raising events or cultural activities in Muslim American communities.

The media can make a major contribution to public understanding by working to eliminate language that conflates all of Islam or all Muslims with fascism or terrorism and by giving more coverage to Muslim American condemnations of extremism and efforts to counter radical appeals. When a journalist profiles an outspoken radical Muslim who claims to be a leader but has few followers, the story tends to reinforce the erroneous impression that such views are representative. Reporters and editors can enrich coverage by getting to know more, credible Muslim leaders and constituents and by consulting with scholars of Islam and Muslim affairs.

Diversity in the newsroom is as beneficial as diversity in other parts of American society. The media's success in recruiting and mentoring journalists from minority communities has made their coverage more informed and nuanced. Reporting on Muslims and on Islam will likewise improve as more Muslims enter the profession of journalism and earn their way into senior positions. Special scholarships from journalism schools and media internships for Muslim Americans would stimulate their interest in the field. Mentorship programs for young Muslims already working in journalism are also important.

Muslim American organizations can contribute to better coverage by training their leaders and spokespersons to communicate more effectively with the media, particularly on issues where there is widespread misunderstanding such as the purpose and practice of wearing head scarves, a custom that many non-Muslim Westerners see as symbolic of Islam's oppression of women. These organizations could also reach out to the media in other ways—by furnishing lists of Muslim scholars and leaders who can serve as sources, for example. Such lists would help ensure that news stories will include a wide range of authentic Muslim voices. Persistence in condemning terrorism and extremist ideology will also help Muslim leaders and organizations attract fair and balanced media attention.

Creating an independent, national organization dedicated to public education

A new nondenominational, nonadvocacy institution focused entirely on educating the public about the Muslim world would help broaden American understanding of the diversity of Muslim cultures and societies. The organization would be inclusive and expressive of

the diversity within the Islamic tradition and would not align itself with any of its particular branches or attempt to identify preferred religious or cultural practices. It would provide information on the rich heritage of Islamic societies through art exhibitions, musical performances, public lectures, films, seminars, conferences, publications, and materials created for students and teachers. It could also help improve dialogue and cooperation on political, cultural, and economic issues without taking positions on them. Over time, the organization would become a national resource—a trusted, non-partisan provider of information and expertise for the public, media, and government on the many facets of Islam and Muslim life around the world.

The new institution would supplement rather than replace existing organizations, and its nonethnic and nonpolitical status would give it the potential to attract Americans who are unlikely to join organizations that are predominantly Muslim in membership. It could be supported by membership dues and by contributions from foundations, corporations, and others who recognize the need for this work but hesitate to fund organizations that might be perceived as political or religious. The Asia Society and the Americas Society are useful models for creating a nonadvocacy, educational organization with broad public recognition and credibility.

Undertaking a wide range of efforts to further public understanding

The Task Force recognizes that no single organization or initiative alone can succeed in broadening understanding and facilitating the full engagement of Muslims in American society. We know from our history that such an outcome will only come about through the efforts of many different groups, sometimes working alone and other times in partnership. These efforts could include broad-based interfaith efforts, ranging from dialogue and exchanges between houses of worship to collaborative civic activities. Cultural and civic institutions could contribute by presenting art exhibits, musical performances, films, and public lectures. It is vital that non-Muslim religious and secular organizations take part in this work. They have the capacity to reach audiences that Muslim institutions cannot, and their participation would enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the message.

Collectively, such activities could help demystify Islam for the general public and demonstrate the congruence between Islam and American values. They would increase public awareness of Muslims'

The Five Pillars of Islam

The Five Pillars of Islam are the obligations that every Muslim must satisfy in order to live a good and responsible life.

- **Shahadah** consists of reciting the basic statement of the Islamic faith: "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger." It is said daily in the Call to prayer.
- **Salat** is ritual prayer to be performed five times a day at specified times.
- **Zakat** is a form of self-purification and growth through the compulsory giving of a certain percentage (usually 2.5 percent) of one's wealth to charity.
- **Sawm** requires fasting during the daylight hours of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
- **Hajj** is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Muslims in Mecca stand before the Kaaba praising Allah together. Hajj promotes the bonds of Islamic brotherhood and sisterhood by showing that everyone is equal in the eyes of Allah. Every adult Muslim who can afford it and is physically able must undertake this journey at least once.

long history of intellectual, scientific, and cultural achievement. And, they would show the diversity of opinion among Muslim Americans on sensitive issues such as the treatment of women and perceived affronts to the sacred. Muslim leaders and organizations can also underscore their commitment to the constitutionally mandated separation of church and state, a bedrock principle of American democracy. Some Americans are concerned that some Muslims seek to undermine this principle by advocating the application of Islamic law in American society. It is important to reassure Americans that Muslim Americans do not aspire to this.

Recommendation #3 Increase Civic Engagement among Muslim Americans

Part of America's greatness as a nation lies in its acceptance of diverse faiths, cultures, and personal values. But unless that diversity is actively expressed in civic and political participation, the country cannot reap its full benefits. Long before American women were allowed to vote, they were active in social reform movements and worked on political campaigns. Yet they could not hold office, and they had little effect on public policy. Although the right to vote was a major step toward full inclusion, it was not until women began serving in government in significant numbers that they had a real say in national affairs. The African American journey toward full participation took a different path, but the ultimate benefit was the same: a stronger, more representative polity.

Many Muslim American immigrants are not deeply engaged in civic activities, and many of those who are have confined their participation to their faith communities. Broader engagement gives immigrants a sense of themselves as stakeholders in the life of the country. It can motivate individuals to become active in political parties or to run for local public office, both of which can be stepping stones to state and national office. Also, as any community increases its civic participation, the larger society tends to view it in a more positive light.

Much of the groundwork for the full civic and political participation of Muslim Americans is already in place. Whether by choice or by birth, most Muslim Americans regard the United States as their home. They see no contradiction between the moral teachings of Islam and the values that Americans hold dear. They do not regard the challenges to democracy in Muslim-majority states as a sign that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible; they attribute the problems to complex historical and geopolitical factors. Many Muslims view democracy as the form of government that adheres most closely to Islamic moral teachings, which place great emphasis on accountability and justice. Many also regard the current debates over gender-related issues as an opportunity to redefine the role of women in Islam, placing it in a modern context. The number of Muslim women scholars and activists in the United States is growing. Through their work, Muslim American women are finding new ways to make social contributions within and beyond their communities.

While Muslim Americans may still struggle to find the right balance between their Muslim and American identities, we know from experience that such struggles have defined and enriched every American community. Given that democracy benefits from robust civic and political participation, it is in the interest of all Americans for the government and a wide range of institutions to give Muslim Americans the cooperation and support they need to speed their progress toward full integration.

Expediting full engagement will require Muslim Americans to build more bridges to non-Muslim groups, especially those with whom they have had sharp disagreements over foreign policy matters. The circumstances also require that Muslim Americans forge a shared conviction among themselves that greater civic and political participation can be achieved without the loss of religious identity.

Expanding partnerships

Encouraging Muslim Americans to increase their participation in civic life should be a high priority for Muslim organizations. Civic engagement can take many forms, from volunteering for nonprofits to serving on school boards, taking part in parent-teacher and neighborhood associations, and participating in mosque-church-synagogue exchanges. Opportunities for engagement can be increased by expanding and improving existing partnerships between Muslim and non-Muslim groups and by forming new partnerships, particu-

Habitat for Humanity

Habitat for Humanity International is a nonprofit, ecumenical Christian organization that seeks to eliminate poverty and homelessness in the world. It invites people of all backgrounds to build houses in partnership with families in need. The Habitat idea was conceived in 1965 by Millard and Linda Fuller with Clarence Jordan while they were staying at Kolonia Farm, a small interracial Christian farming community in Georgia. Since its founding in 1976, Habitat for Humanity has built more than 225,000 houses in some 3,000 communities throughout the world, providing safe, decent, affordable shelter to more than one million individuals. Habitat now has a presence in more than ninety countries.

Through its work, Habitat provides an opportunity for diverse groups of people to bridge their theological differences by putting their faith into action, making affordable housing and better communities a reality. Habitat's philosophy is that everyone can use the hammer as an instrument to manifest God's love, and its policy has always been to build with people in need and volunteers, regardless of race or religion.

larly at the local level. The Arab Community Center for Economic & Social Services (ACCESS) in Detroit launched a program in which local community organizations mobilized for a day of public service in non-Muslim communities. The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Progressive Jewish Alliance are jointly developing a program to encourage greater civic engagement. Successful programs such as these could be widely copied. Such activities create opportunities for Muslim leaders to frame public service in a Muslim context and make civic participation a fundamental element of Muslim American life.

Forming a national leadership group of prominent Muslim Americans

Although Muslim Americans have attained prominence in many fields and emerged as leaders in their own communities around the United States, they have not yet pooled their resources, experiences, and ideas in an effort to enhance Muslim American participation in national discourse. Such a leadership network could be instrumental in strengthening Muslim American institutions and creating new programs to encourage Muslim American youth to enter public service. Members of the leadership group could also serve as "community ambassadors" to the U.S. government, offering informed perspectives that could help to lessen tensions between the United States and countries with large Muslim populations. And by interacting with their counterparts in other countries, these leaders could serve as interlocutors between Muslim Americans and Muslim communities abroad.

A relevant precedent for such a forum is the Committee of 100, a national nonpartisan organization of leading Chinese Americans. Founded in 1980 at a time of heightened tension between China and the United States, the committee brings a Chinese American perspective to U.S. foreign policy. The Committee of 100 currently has 149 members in the United States and Asia, all of them leaders in their fields. It gathers once a year to discuss critical issues in U.S.-China relations and Asian American life. It also briefs policymakers, issues position papers, and makes public statements on matters of interest to its constituents.

Building coalitions on important policy initiatives

National Muslim American organizations and associations, focused primarily on the civil liberties of Muslim Americans, have not yet

invested significant energy in joining with other organizations to address larger questions of social justice or social policy. Advocacy coalitions and intercommunity cooperation are important vehicles for mobilizing diverse constituencies and generating broad-based support for change. Muslim organizations could make a valuable contribution to the American body politic by expanding their participation in coalitions concerned with such issues as comprehensive immigration reform, poverty, public health, religious freedom, national security, and the strengthening of democratic institutions here and abroad.

Greater Muslim American engagement in policy-related coalition building will help other Americans understand that Muslim Americans have great concern for a wide range of issues affecting the national well-being. Making a greater effort to demonstrate that concern will enable Muslim Americans to expand their contributions to the larger society. That, in turn, will increase the moral authority of Muslim American leaders when they seek support on issues of particular interest to their community.

Bridging religious divides

The country would also benefit from greater cooperation among Muslim, Christian, and Jewish organizations. All three faiths share a deep spiritual connection to the Middle East, but their disagreements over U.S. foreign policy and events in the region have severely strained interfaith relations and hampered the dialogue and collaborative work they could do on a wide range of important domestic issues.

Interfaith conversations have a long history in this country, and many are under way now. But they have ceased in moments of crisis—precisely when they are needed most. The current conversations can be expanded to include an increasingly diverse group of organizations, from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to evangelical groups, grassroots organizations, and secular organizations concerned with public policy. Over time, such dialogues could become the basis of a national forum in which Muslim, Christian, and Jewish leaders could reinforce the importance of coexisting around shared American values when addressing poverty, human rights, democracy promotion, and other issues of social justice.

Building successful charities

Charitable almsgiving (*zakaat*) is one of the five pillars of Islam, and many Muslim Americans fulfill this requirement by giving to charities that provide humanitarian, educational, and medical assistance in the United States and elsewhere. Like many other communities, Muslim Americans have been particularly generous to organizations providing emergency relief in parts of the world where they have ethnic and religious roots. Such giving has been complicated by federal anti-terrorism regulations instituted in the wake of September 11. The regulations apply to all Americans, but they have had a disproportionately large impact on Muslim American charity.

One of the great challenges to those who wish to support relief efforts in the Middle East is that the work is sometimes carried out by organizations with direct or indirect links to groups the U.S. government has designated as terrorist entities. During and after the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, for example, it was difficult for Muslim Americans (or any Americans, for that matter) to ease the plight of Lebanese civilians without risking scrutiny by the U.S. government for aiding organizations connected with Hezbollah, which managed much of the relief work.

Scrutinized by federal authorities determined to prevent the flow of American funds to terrorist organizations, Muslim Americans

The Muslim American Response to Hurricane Katrina

After the hurricane, Muslim communities across the United States organized food, blood, and donation drives; volunteered time and resources; and held prayer services and fund-raisers for disaster relief. A coalition of major Muslim American groups formed the Muslim Hurricane Relief Task Force to coordinate humanitarian relief. The Islamic Society of North America launched the ISNA Katrina Relief Fund. The Council on American-Islamic Relations called on mosques and Islamic centers nationwide to collect donations for disaster relief. Islamic Relief, an international organization striving to alleviate the poverty and suffering of the world's poorest people, committed \$2 million for Katrina relief projects in Louisiana and Mississippi and assisted evacuees in Houston and Dallas.

In Houston more than 2,000 Muslim volunteers served food to hurricane victims on the fourth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. This effort was organized by the Houston Muslim Relief Group, a coalition of twenty mosques and local Islamic organizations formed after Katrina, in coordination with the Second Baptist Church of Houston and Interfaith Ministries of Greater Houston. In Baton Rouge nearly one hundred New Orleans evacuees found refuge at the Islamic Complex, and the Islamic Center provided shelter to 500 more.

reduced their contributions to Muslim charities, and that, in turn, has curtailed the charities' work. A number of these charities have been investigated for links to terrorist organizations, and some have been shut down. Yet many organizations, non-Muslim as well as Muslim, have questioned the evidence and procedures used in these cases.

Muslim donors and others have expressed concern that federal regulations in this area do not contain a so-called intent clause, which would allow the government to take action against donors only if there was evidence that they knew their contributions would be used for illegal purposes. The lack of such a clause has caused Muslim Americans to worry that their past contributions might lead to criminal prosecution, or in the case of those who are not citizens, to deportation. The U.S. government counters that the current measures are effective and necessary and that publicly available guidelines explain how to make donations in a manner consistent with the law.

Developing reasonable standards and procedures for international charitable giving

Muslim American giving in the Middle East was a powerful tool of public diplomacy for the United States before September 11—and could be again. What is needed is an approach that simultaneously respects antiterrorism policies and allows Muslim Americans to practice their charitable giving without fear of government reprisal. Devising this approach requires the active cooperation of high-level federal officials, leaders of major American charities, and Muslim leaders with a broad understanding of the issue.

Creating a Muslim American charity dedicated to improving the lives of fellow Americans

While many Muslim charities operate domestically, they are largely unknown to the general public, and the complicated status of their international giving has limited opportunities to do more work in the United States. Muslim Americans have the potential to make major contributions to fellow Americans in need, and a national charity inspired by Islamic values and dedicated to domestic needs could have a number of positive effects. In addition to improving the lives of Americans of all faiths, it could inspire Muslim Americans to become further vested in American society and improve public attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. A possible model for such a philanthropy is the U.S. arm of Catholic Charities.

Prominent Muslim Americans should play an active role on the charity's board to ensure that the organization is successful and that its operations are transparent. The board should also include respected non-Muslims, whose participation will engender trust and confidence in the organization, raise its profile in the larger society, and increase its ability to make significant contributions to the national well-being.

Recommendation #4 Build Stronger Muslim American Institutions

Many of the earliest Muslim American institutions were formed by African Americans who saw American Islam as a logical development in black religiosity and a constructive response to racial inequities. African American Muslims used their organizations to serve their community and to represent their interests in the wider society. The influx of Muslim immigrants after the immigration law changes of 1965 dramatically altered the Muslim American landscape and led to the creation of organizations that concentrated on building schools and mosques to accommodate their growing numbers. A few institutions that engaged in broader discussions on policy issues or social justice, particularly within the Arab community, emerged after the 1967 Israeli-Arab War. The 1990s saw the emergence of multithenic Muslim institutions, many of which focused on defending civil liberties and encouraging political participation.

In the period of intense scrutiny that followed the September 11 attacks, it became evident that Muslim Americans were not well equipped to address their civil rights needs or to respond effectively to the concerns of the public, the media, and the government. Muslim leaders recognized the need to build stronger institutions and to make civic and political engagement an even higher priority. Muslim organizations refocused, attempting to strengthen relations with political figures and the media and to educate the general public on Islam and Muslim America. Muslim Americans also recognized the need to accelerate the development of American training programs for imams in order to increase their effectiveness in serving their constituencies and in building bridges to other communities.

Despite these efforts and the achievement of some notable successes, much remains unrealized. Importantly, Muslim American institutions still do not have the range of opportunities for participation in the public and policy discourse that might be expected and certainly is needed at this point. Groups that have participated have tended to do so indirectly, issuing press statements and action alerts and conducting briefings with legislators and the public. Much of their work has focused on documenting civil rights abuses and educating Muslim Americans on their rights and how to engage with law enforcement. The organizations have had only limited access to discussions of foreign policy in connection with the war in Iraq, the recent Lebanon-Israeli war, relief for the victims of the 2005 earth-

quake in Pakistan, and the divide between the U.S. government and the governments of many Muslim-majority countries.

There are a number of reasons for this lack of capacity among Muslim American institutions to participate more fully in the civic and policy arenas. The great diversity of the Muslim American population led to the creation of institutions that were often divided along ethnic or sectarian lines. Many are local or regional rather than national in scope. Sometimes they are ineffective simply because they have tried to do too much, taking on everything from community service to policy advocacy. While some Muslim American organizations have attempted to overcome divisions among ethnic or sectarian groups or between immigrants and African American Muslims, the fragmentation has made it difficult for Muslims to project recognizable public voices.

Muslim American institutions have also faced a long list of challenges typical in young ethnic and religious institutions. Goals are often vague and overly ambitious. Constituencies are defined too

Capacity-Building Case Study: The National Council of La Raza

The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) is the largest Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States. It works to improve opportunities for millions of Hispanic Americans through its network of nearly 300 affiliated, community-based organizations.

The idea for NCLR began to take shape in the early 1960s when many Mexican Americans were concerned that their participation in the national civil rights movement went largely unrecognized due to their geographic isolation and lack of developed institutions. They formed a coordinating body in Washington, and with funding from the Ford Foundation, undertook research to determine the need for more local and national advocacy institutions for Mexican Americans.

The organization has shown great ability in adapting its strategies to an ever-changing political climate. Founded in Arizona in 1968 as the Southwest Council of La Raza, it initially helped establish and support community organizations. Early on it made a commitment to nonpartisanship and equal representation of men and women in its governing body. It quickly evolved into a national institution and in 1972 changed its name to NCLR. In 1979 it broadened its focus to include all Hispanics. Because of financial constraints, NCLR reduced its affiliate support in the 1980s to concentrate on national advocacy work and establish a policy analysis center. But it kept its capacity building mission and steadily worked to rebuild its network of affiliates. In 1996, when welfare-related policymaking shifted mainly to the states, NCLR incorporated state-level advocacy into its legislative agenda. Today, NCLR focuses on ensuring that Latino perspectives are heard in five key policy areas: assets/investments, civil rights/immigration, education, employment and economic status, and health.

generally, or key audiences are overlooked. Many young organizations are overly dependent on individual donors, which can make them beholden to a handful of large contributors and preclude long-term commitments to issues. Few are successful in partnering with other organizations—Muslim or non-Muslim.

In terms of the policy process, few Muslim American organizations are able to engage in policy analysis or policy advocacy. Some have avoided foreign policy for fear of drawing unfavorable scrutiny or of detracting from their work in civil liberties and other areas. Others have not yet acquired the skills needed to succeed in this area. Many organizations that aim to have a say in the policy process lack expertise in the issues and do not possess the experienced staffs needed to operate effectively in legislative affairs, community mobilization, fund-raising, media relations, or public education. (See the Appendix for a list of institutions and their engagement in policy discourse.)

Increasing institutional effectiveness and engagement

It is critical that Muslim American organizations be strengthened further and that new ones be formed to increase understanding of Muslim American life and to facilitate participation in the civic and political discourse. Many of the existing organizations are fulfilling important functions and should be supported in their efforts to increase their effectiveness. They should strengthen their structures and strategies and learn how to effectively deliver their messages. They also need to educate Muslim Americans on the workings of American civic and political life and improve dialogue and interaction across ethnic, sectarian, and generational divides. As they build capacity, these organizations will be able to form more partnerships with non-Muslim organizations to address issues of common concern.

While the challenges may appear daunting, they have been met time and again by immigrant groups and other communities, and their strategies can be emulated by Muslim Americans. For example, there is much to be learned from the experience of African Americans, who successfully developed institutions, messages, and partnerships to achieve self-empowerment and address community needs. Like African Americans and other Americans, Muslim Americans can articulate their concerns and proposals in terms that resonate with all Americans, emphasizing values such as equal opportunity, rule of law, freedom of religion, individual liberty, democratic principles,

Case Study: Japanese Americans and the Redress Movement

Following World War II and the internment of Japanese Americans, the Japanese American community took several initiatives to win back lost rights. These included efforts to repeal California's Alien Land Law, which had long prohibited Japanese from purchasing and owning land in the state, as well as fighting to give Japanese immigrants the right to become citizens, a right denied them for more than fifty years.

Despite these efforts, Japanese Americans for many years hesitated to pursue redress for their internment during the war because they saw their community as small and lacking in political clout. But in 1978 the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), the nation's oldest and largest Asian American civil rights institution, was ready to proceed. From the outset it realized that its success would depend on the active engagement and support of other American communities that recognized the injustice of the internment. It developed a campaign focused on the need to uphold the principles of American democracy. The American Jewish Committee was the first outside organization to join the campaign. Others soon followed. With the support of two members of the U.S. House of Representatives and one senator of Japanese ancestry, it took only one year to pass a bill authorizing an investigation. The investigation was followed by a federal commission, a body that provided an important forum for advancing the issue nationally. The campaign culminated in 1988 with the signing of the Civil Liberties Act, which provided monetary compensation and issued a formal apology. The JACL continues to combat social injustice and serves as an example to other ethnic minorities.

and pluralism. This would align emerging Muslim communities with the larger society, promote acceptance, and facilitate partnerships with other groups.

Increasing institutional effectiveness will require perseverance by Muslim American institutions and the support of established institutions such as think tanks, foundations, universities, and community-based organizations. More diversified funding is important, because broad financial support increases the likelihood of organizational success.

Capacity building can be accelerated by the inclusion of more women in strategic development and day-to-day operations. Muslim Americans are not unique in underutilizing the talents of women. Now that the largest Muslim organization, the Islamic Society of North America, is led by a woman (Ingrid Mattson), there is an opportunity to encourage other institutions to do more to hire and advance women.

American foundations can play a crucial role in making a long-term commitment to strengthening Muslim American institutions

and creating opportunities for civic and political participation. The contributions they make to the institutions of civil society are critical and unique. For example, they often make commitments to sensitive, complex issues of social and public policy avoided by others. They can be powerful advocates for fairness and for access. Foundations can also assist with financial and technical assistance for capacity building in existing organizations working toward full civic and political engagement. They can fund the creation of new institutions to educate the public or undertake policy or academic activities. In addition, foundations can create a forum linking Muslim American institutions to established networks, coalitions, and experts. Such assistance would increase Muslims' familiarity with the best practices in these areas and expand ties to resources and potential outside partners.

Broadening academic and policy initiatives

More Muslim American involvement in the policy-related activities of think tanks and research institutes would help create a core group of specialists and leaders who can help strengthen Muslim American voices and participate in the policy discourse. While many Muslim individuals already do such work, they tend to be scattered across the nation and often lack connections in the policy and public spheres.

Building on the important work being undertaken by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in universities would also contribute to strengthening Muslim American contributions to the national dialogue. There is a need for more endowed chairs, fellowships, centers for policy or area studies, and other structures to support the work of established and emerging scholars of Islam and to encourage younger Muslim Americans to enter the academic and policy fields.

Endowed chairs enrich the intellectual life of universities and the nation by improving scholarship and the quality of interactions between faculty and students. They are also a deeply rewarding way for an individual philanthropist to support a university or an area of academic inquiry. Faculty members who hold these chairs often serve as role models, influencing the academic and professional trajectories of junior faculty and graduate students. Chairs are needed in a wide range of fields related to Islamic studies: religion and history, the modern Middle East and Islamic world, U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East, the role of gender in Islam and in Muslim societies, and Muslim migrant integration in the United States and other Western nations.

Postdoctoral fellowship programs in Islamic studies that are open to Americans of all religious backgrounds are also needed. These programs are a relatively inexpensive way to encourage outstanding emerging scholars to pursue academic and research careers. Fellowship programs for young Muslim American scholars studying important public policy issues not linked to Islam or Muslim societies should also be established. The existence of such programs would underscore the point that Muslim American scholars are not focused exclusively on their own history and identity. It is also important for American seminaries to continue to diversify their faculties and curricula as part of their commitment to strengthening religious pluralism and understanding between faiths.

Enlarging the scope and impact of such initiatives will require the strong commitment of American universities, think tanks, government agencies, and philanthropists. Fortunately, the government, many universities, and leading foundations have already begun making a sustained commitment to these efforts. The U.S. Department of Education Title VI International Education Programs Service provides critical support for foreign language and area studies at institutes of higher education. Title VI centers on the Middle East and South Asia, educating students about Islam and Muslim societies. Foreign language and area studies fellowships assist individuals undergoing advanced training. Federal government funding for these programs should be increased to ensure the nation continues to produce a steady supply of graduates with expertise in Islamic, Middle East, and South Asian studies.

Developing links between Muslim Americans and established think tanks and research institutes

Many U.S. think tanks and research institutes are now doing excellent work related to Islam and Muslim communities, but there are few strong links between these organizations and Muslim American leaders and institutions. Such links are important because think tanks and research institutes play a central role in the policy discourse, and Muslim Americans can bring valuable perspectives and contributions to it. More joint efforts would enrich the policy input of think tanks and research institutes. It would also help Muslim American institutions build capacity by providing more exposure to policy analysis and more ideas for relating their policy perspectives to those of others. Research centers and fellowship programs could be a source of important synergies, as could joint projects such as

the recent collaboration between the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and the Pew Charitable Trusts. With funding from Pew, ISPU conducted focus-group meetings across the country in preparation for a national study of Muslim Americans.

Recommendation #5 Cultivate the Next Generation of Muslim American Leaders

Politically engaged young Americans have been one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. Their intellectual capital, enthusiasm, and energy fuel the work of a broad range of entities that influence, plan, and execute policy. And from their involvement, young Americans gain the knowledge and experience needed for leadership in all areas of civic and political life.

Young Muslim Americans, like their elders, are largely missing from this picture. This is particularly troublesome given the youthfulness of the Muslim American community. Jeffrey Passel of the Pew Hispanic Center has estimated that 36 percent of the U.S. Muslim population is under the age of eighteen, and 55 percent are age 29 or younger. Hostility experienced by many young Muslim Americans from some members of the general public and from some Muslims with different views on questions of cultural accommodation or gender has hindered civic and political engagement. Forty-two percent of Muslim American respondents aged twenty-nine or younger in the recent Pew survey reported being victims of

Interfaith Youth Core

The Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC), founded in 1988 by a young Muslim American and based in Chicago, is a grassroots organization dedicated to strengthening civil society by building mutual respect and pluralism among young people from different religious traditions and empowering them to work together to serve others. IFYC's "shared values" approach encourages youth to express their own religious traditions in social action, recognizing the common value in other traditions such as hospitality, and work together to apply these values for the greater good.

Since 2003 IFYC has reached more than 51,000 people and helped more than 1,700 organizers create and lead interfaith youth service programming in communities across the United States. During IFYC's Days of Interfaith Youth Service in 2006, 4,000 youth from twenty-seven different religious traditions participated in seventy-nine service projects at thirty-five sites nationally and worldwide. These projects included Hurricane Katrina relief, with youth delivering refreshments to volunteers rehabilitating houses in an impoverished section of Biloxi, Mississippi. A religiously diverse group of Brandeis University students volunteered for a day at the Greater Boston Food Bank, where they sorted food to make meals for the hungry. In Philadelphia a group of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian youth and adults assembled "breakfast bags" of nonperishable items for the homebound elderly.

discrimination or intolerance based on their faith within the last year. This compares to 29 percent of Muslims thirty and older who said likewise.

Nevertheless, young Muslim Americans have a strong interest in political participation, driven by a need for self-empowerment. This development is one that all Americans should encourage. Helping to develop the leadership potential and professional skills of young Muslim Americans contributes to a more informed, seasoned, and capable group of leaders who will one day work on behalf of all Americans.

Engaging young Muslim Americans in civic life promotes integration and diminishes the potential for alienation. It also provides a needed talent pool and brings more young Muslims into influential arenas such as Congress, think tanks, and the media. In addition, it helps build bridges between Muslim Americans and the broader public and facilitates the emergence of leaders with whom younger Muslims can easily identify.

Making leadership development of young Muslim Americans a priority

Muslim American organizations and other institutions should strengthen long-term programs for building the next generation of Muslim-American leaders. It is vital to give young Muslim Americans hands-on experience with legislative and policy processes. To that end, Muslim American organizations could follow the lead of other communities that have worked with relevant state and federal government agencies to create internship programs. Programs that give emerging Muslim American leaders opportunities to work on social justice issues and community capacity building are also important. Additionally, there is a need for a stronger network of Muslim American public policy professionals.

Effective programs for the professional development of young Muslim Americans can be easily created by adapting approaches used by other groups. The Jewish community has been particularly successful in developing internship and fellowship programs. Aside from providing financial support for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate studies, many Jewish organizations promote the development of leadership skills and involvement in politics. Organizations such as the American Jewish Committee, the Waxner Foundation, and PANIM (the Institute for Jewish Leadership and Values) give fellowships to those interested in domestic and international policy, leadership, management, and diplomacy.

The Anthony Shaidid Internship Program

The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) has a mandate to defend the rights of Americans of Arab descent from discrimination, stereotyping, and hate crimes. It also promotes Arab cultural heritage and represents the Arab American community on issues of foreign and domestic policy.

Since 1981 ADC has run a successful internship program to expose young Arab Americans to the public policy process and deepen their knowledge of U.S. government institutions. The program has given more than 400 college students from all over the country an opportunity to go to Washington and gain first-hand experience with ADC issues and campaigns. Interns are given practical training in community organizing, media relations, research and writing, legal affairs, political action, and educational outreach. Some interns work in Congressional offices, and each week all interns visit government offices, embassies, and similar institutions. This introduces them to policymaking bodies important in shaping issues of concern to Arab Americans. The internship also offers a variety of leadership development positions within ADC. Interns are selected on the basis of their academic records, personal recommendations, and history of professional, campus, and community activities.

The program now bears the name of Anthony Shaidid, a former ADC media intern who is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist with the *Washington Post*. Other program alumni work in the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, offices of U.S. Attorneys, and nongovernmental advocacy and nonprofit institutions.

The African American and Latino communities also support professional advancement for their younger members. Latinos have developed relevant programs within organizations such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute, Hispanic Alliance for Career Enhancement, Latino Issues Forum, and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. For African Americans, there are relevant fellowship and internship programs within the Congressional Black Caucus, National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, United Negro College Fund, and UNCF Special Programs Corporation. The establishment and promotion of these opportunities have strengthened the networks of both communities and increased their ability to communicate their values and prepare young members for leadership roles.

Muslim Americans have created several programs along these lines. The ADC has a summer internship program that places young Arab Americans in offices of members of Congress, and some interns go on to permanent work for the member. The Muslim Student Network, formerly known as the Muslim Public Service Network (MPSN), is a 501(c)(3) organization founded in 1994 to bring Muslim undergraduate and graduate students to Washington, D.C., each

summer for public policy internships. Alumni now work in policy-related organizations across the country as congressional staffers, emerging scholars, and employees at advocacy institutions. In order to expand, the MPSN needs considerably more resources.

In line with the new academic and policy initiatives discussed previously, think tanks and universities based in Washington should be encouraged to create fellowship programs for young Muslim Americans. These institutions typically have great strengths in public policy work and considerable access to government officials influential in the policy process. Young Muslim Americans would benefit enormously from programs that bring them to Washington for a summer or a semester to meet members of Congress and their staffs and to speak with policy experts and advocacy groups. Such efforts would help build long-term relationships between these institutions and emerging Muslim American leaders. There is also a need to encourage young Muslims to apply to prestigious programs such as the Presidential Management Internship.

Finally, Muslim American organizations can partner with other institutions to encourage public service among young Muslims. These organizations could sponsor nationwide speaking tours in which congressional staffers and professionals engaged in issue-specific advocacy work for nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and foundations talk to young Muslim Americans about their experiences. The focus should be on giving young Muslim Americans about to enter college an introduction to the political process and a better understanding of the importance of public service. Programs such as this can help define public service in a Muslim context and reinforce it as a fundamental part of the Muslim American experience.

Training young staff and new leaders

Developing new leaders and staff is essential if Muslim American organizations are to maximize their effectiveness, particularly in areas related to the policy process. Young staff members need high-quality training—theoretical as well as practical—to succeed in addressing policy issues, fund-raising, mobilization of their constituencies, and communication. Junior staff members, often relegated to programs for the young, should be deployed throughout the organization to gain exposure to people at all levels and in all departments. Special attention should be given to leadership training for women. There is also a need to give young Muslim Americans yearlong internships in these organizations. A greater emphasis on retaining staff members

would also improve capacity, which may require paying higher salaries. Volunteers with extensive leadership experience can be particularly useful in mentoring young staff members.

Recommendation #6 Give Ongoing National Attention to Muslim American Integration

Overcoming the barriers to Muslim American integration is a national challenge that will require sustained efforts by Muslim and non-Muslim leaders and institutions alike. Only through focused and ongoing dialogue and cooperation can lasting success be achieved. The goal of this effort should be to make the expansion of Muslim American participation in U.S. civic and political life a national priority and bridge the divides that threaten our national well-being.

Establishing an American Diversity Dialogue

The Task Force proposes that an ongoing American Diversity Dialogue among Muslim and non-Muslim leaders be created to examine critical issues related to Muslim civic and political integration in the United States. This would help give prominence to the issue of Muslim American integration and provide thoughtful and informed assessments of civic and political integration over time. The dialogue would provide Muslim and non-Muslim leaders with a forum for discussing the barriers to integration, the strains in the relations between Muslim Americans and government agencies, opportunities for improving public understanding of the Muslim American experience, and ways for Muslim Americans to assist in bridging the divide between the United States and the Muslim world.

The American Diversity Dialogue would meet approximately three times a year in a rotating group of cities and would commission research to inform its discussions. It would issue an annual report on *The State of Muslim America* that would be widely disseminated to policymakers, the media, and the American public. The dialogue would also convene and take action whenever there is an urgent need for heightened attention and discussion of the Muslim American experience.

Participants in the American Diversity Dialogue would be drawn from a group of highly respected public figures such as former government officials, business and civic leaders, and policy experts. It should include individuals with broad knowledge of the American political system, U.S. foreign policy and international relations, and the Muslim American experience. Muslim American members

would be selected from the community's most respected and representative leaders. The core membership would be supplemented with participants drawn from among diverse local and regional leaders in each of the meetings' host cities.

A highly regarded independent institution would provide logistical and operational support for the American Diversity Dialogue. This host institution would partner with other institutions around the country in developing briefing papers and policy analyses, organizing dialogue meetings in different cities, recruiting experts to make presentations to the American Diversity Dialogue, and coordinating interviews with government officials. The dialogue would be funded by a variety of donors, including foundations and individuals.

Creating a national philanthropic initiative on American diversity

The creation of a national philanthropic initiative on American diversity would expand financial support to nonprofit, nonpolitical educational, research, cultural and civic organizations for the purposes of deepening American understanding of the value of diversity and strengthening the ways in which it is expressed in American society. It would focus particularly, but not exclusively, on the Muslim American experience, broadening public understanding of that experience and enlarging opportunities for greater Muslim American civic and political participation. Grant making would emphasize attention to these challenges by non-Muslim organizations, but would not exclude support for Muslim American activities. Funding for the initiative would be obtained through a one-time national appeal to foundations and individuals. The initiative's corpus would be spent entirely over a defined period of time such as ten years.

Conclusion

There is no form of government more challenging than democracy. It rests on the will of the majority, yet it requires the protection of minority rights. It is strongest when it is most inclusive, but inclusion can lead to conflict and delay. It sets high ideals for itself—so high that it often falls short. The authors of the Constitution hoped that their charter would enable citizens to create “a more perfect union,” and we now know what they meant: a democracy is a work-in-progress. It will never be perfect, but it can always be made better.

The recommendations in this report are offered in hopes of strengthening the democracy entrusted to us by the Constitution. The integration of minority groups, women, and immigrants into our political processes has been slow work in the past, and outsiders have often had to overcome great opposition in order to secure the rights promised to them in the Constitution. But Americans now take it for granted that full political participation is important on pragmatic as well as idealistic grounds: Access for all mobilizes the energies, talents, and wisdom of all.

Muslims, like many other immigrant groups, came to the United States in search of religious and political freedom, in need of refuge, and in hopes of prosperity. A land of unparalleled opportunity, the United States has enabled its people, no matter their origin, to succeed through hard work and determination. The tragic events of September 11 and the challenges it wrought have put the dream of America to the test for Muslim Americans and called our values as a nation into question.

Yet with today’s critical foreign and domestic policy challenges, many related directly to Muslim American interests, there is now, more than ever, an urgent need to expand Muslim Americans’ opportunities for civic and political integration and fuller participation in the national discourse. This is the responsibility of Muslim Americans themselves, but also of our government, the policy establishment, the media, and other major American institutions.

We know from our history that immigrant groups gradually achieve political integration on their own, but in this instance we have everything to gain by accelerating the process. All Americans will benefit from the contributions that Muslim Americans can make to our society and to international understanding in a world beset by real and imagined differences and by costly conflict. By working together to ensure that Muslim American voices are heard, we will

not only increase our own security, but make our foreign policy a truer expression of who we are as a nation and reaffirm our commitment to the ideal of *E pluribus unum*.

Appendix Muslim American Institutions

This list of institutions that directly engage Muslim American interests has been assembled by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs on behalf of the Task Force. It is intended to be a representative but not comprehensive listing. There are many smaller but still active and important organizations serving the needs of Muslim Americans around the country. The Chicago Council has made every reasonable effort to document the information included in the listing but takes no responsibility for the completeness or accuracy of any particular listing. Nor does the listing of any organization imply any endorsement by The Chicago Council or members of the Task Force of that organization's purposes or activities.

The American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) was founded in 2003 by M. Zubdi Jasser, M.D., and a group of Muslim professionals. AIFD is a public membership organization with headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona. Through commentary and press releases it promotes an understanding of Islam that favors the separation of religion and state, supports the idea that Muslim Americans are able to practice their faith more freely in the United States, and believes that Islam's principles are compatible with free market capitalism. AIFD has opposed religious extremism, terrorism, and the use of Islam to justify violence. Initiatives have included networking with interfaith organizations, posting articles and commentary on its Web site, and contributions to the local discourse on Islam and its coexistence with other religions in the United States.

The American Muslim Alliance (AMA), founded in 1994, is a national grass-roots organization based in Newark, California, with offices in New York and Washington, D.C. It works to increase Muslim participation in electoral politics by encouraging voter participation and helping Muslims run for local office. AMA emphasizes civic engagement, leadership training, coalition building, strategy formation, political participation, and agenda setting. National chairman Agha Saeed played an important role in launching the California Civil Rights Alliance (CCRA), a statewide coalition of twenty-three organizations that campaigned for civil rights in the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 congressional elections.

American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections (AMT) was founded in 2004 as the successor to the American Muslim Political Coordinating Council. Its main objectives are to assist Muslim Americans in becoming full partners in the development and prosperity of the United States, defending the civil and human rights of all, integrating the American Muslim community into everyday American life, and building alliances with fellow Americans on a wide variety of social, political, economic, and moral issues. AMT seeks to achieve these goals by mobilizing Muslim Americans at the local, state, and federal levels to vote for the candidates who support their agenda. AMT issued election plans for the 2004 and 2006 elections. It also conducts voter education and strategic voter mobilization programs. AMT is a coalition of eleven national Muslim organizations: the American Muslim Alliance, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Circle of North America, Islamic Society of North America, Muslim Alliance of North America, Muslim American Society, Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim Student Association-National, Muslim Ummah of North America, Project Islamic Hope, and United Muslims of America.

American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (AMILA), founded in 1992, is a public membership organization headquartered in San Francisco and active throughout the Bay Area. AMILA (Arabic for "to work" or "to act") aims to develop capacity within the Muslim American community through activism, Islamic education, spirituality, and networking with other Muslim groups. AMILA reaches out to Muslim groups through lecture series, study groups, book clubs, and Ramadan spiritual retreats. It promotes cultural understanding and philanthropy through activities like Islamic Art Fairs and "Bid for Everyone" gift drives.

American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA) was founded in 1997 by Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and is headquartered in New York City. ASMA is dedicated to strengthening American expressions of Islam based on tolerance and to fostering environments in which Muslim Americans can thrive without compromising essential values and beliefs. ASMA sponsors lectures, study groups, and cultural programs and participates in coalition building and interfaith dialogue. In 2002 Imam Feisal started the Cordoba Initiative, an interfaith effort to improve the relationship between the Islamic world and the United States through civil dialogue, policy initiatives,

education, and cultural programs. It has programmatic partnerships with institutions such as the National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, the East-West Institute, and the Aspen Institute.

Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) was founded in Washington, D.C., in 1999 by a diverse group of Muslim and non-Muslim academics, professionals, and activists from around the United States. CSID is a membership-based, nonprofit think tank dedicated to studying Islamic and democratic political thought and merging them into modern Islamic democratic discourse. CSID sponsors an annual conference and a series of domestic and international workshops and seminars focused on Islam and democracy. It also issues *Muslim Democrat*, a quarterly member newsletter with original articles, book reviews, and announcements of events. It also issues *Democracy Watch*, a monthly newsletter on democratization and reform efforts in the Middle East and North Africa.

Council for the Advancement of Muslim Professionals (CAMP), established in 1994, is a network of young Muslim professionals with thirteen chapters in the United States and Canada. The main objective of CAMP is to encourage professional development through educational, social, and intellectual activities and networking. This includes working to build understanding and cooperation between the different faiths and cultures of the world. CAMP publishes a quarterly newsletter with event announcements and articles of interest to Muslim professionals. In cooperation with Civilizations of Exchange Cooperation Foundation, CAMP also organizes the Ambassadors of Peace Program, which allows twenty to twenty-five professionally minded individuals from different backgrounds to travel abroad and establish dialogue with Muslims in other parts of the world.

The Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago (CIOGC), founded in 1992, is the federated body of fifty organizations serving thousands of Muslims in the Greater Chicago area. Its members include mosques, schools, and social service and professional organizations from diverse backgrounds. The council works to strengthen the capacity of its member organizations and deepen relationships with other communities as well as city, state, and federal authorities. It also provides civic education, health services, and voter registration and fights negative portrayals of Muslims. CIOGC participates in a number of coalitions advocating labor rights and affordable housing in Chicago, health and education reform in Illinois, and

civil rights and immigration reform at the national level. In 2005 the Council worked to get Illinois legislators to pass a "Charity without Fear" resolution in support of Muslim charities. The council publishes the *Chicago Crescent*, a monthly newsletter. In addition to a weekly electronic newsletter, it also hosts the annual Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) convention attended by more than 40,000 people.

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), founded in 1994, is the nation's largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy group. It is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has thirty-two chapters across the country. It focuses on protecting civil liberties and fostering better relations between the United States and the Muslim world. CAIR's members are predominantly of Arab and Indo-Pakistani descent. CAIR's daily action alerts on issues of interest to Muslims are sent to 500,000 individuals and organizations nationwide. The alerts are also translated into Arabic and distributed globally. Prior to September 11, 2001, CAIR focused on workplace discrimination issues. Since then, it has emphasized civil rights issues related to federal law enforcement. Through public service announcement campaigns it has attempted to improve the American understanding of Muslims in the United States. CAIR's online petition against religiously motivated terrorism, "Not in the Name of Islam," was signed by 700,000 individuals. CAIR also produces an annual report on the civil rights status of Muslims in the United States.

Free Muslims Coalition (FMC) is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has chapters in ten states, Iraq, and Egypt. FMC is a nonprofit public membership organization of Muslim Americans and Arabs who feel that so-called "religious" violence and terrorism have not been fully rejected by the Muslim community. FMC supports the strengthening of secular democratic institutions in the Middle East and the Muslim world by supporting reform efforts. Coalition experts give interviews to the press and television, produce television ads, and publish a blog in support of a modern, secular, and pluralistic interpretation of Islam.

Human Development Foundation of North America (HDF) is a nonprofit organization established in 1997 by the Pakistani American community with funding from the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America (APPNA), the Society for International Health, Education and Literacy Programs (SHL), and the Noor

Foundation. It is headquartered in Schaumburg, Illinois, and has offices in Canada and Pakistan. The mission of HDF is to facilitate a nonpolitical movement for positive social change and community empowerment through mass literacy, enhanced quality of education, universal primary health care, and grassroots economic development. HDF established the "YesPakistan.com" Web portal, which facilitates the development of a virtual community of Pakistanis. HDF also has a summer internship program for students interested in community mobilization and development.

Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), headquartered in Clinton, Michigan, was founded in 2002. ISPU is an independent, nonadvocacy research organization that studies the impact of U.S. domestic and foreign policy on Muslims in America. The organization has more than two dozen full-time staff and scholars who contribute articles and research to the organization. ISPU's main research areas are demographics, relations between the United States and the Muslim world, and the impact of post-September 11 policies on Muslim Americans. ISPU's current priority is to collect demographic data on the Muslim community through a series of surveys, one of which is a national study in collaboration with the Pew Charitable Trusts.

The Institute on Religion and Civic Values (IRCV) is a national, non-profit research center based in Fountain Valley, California. Its mission is to strengthen civil society by exploring issues that affect faith, citizenship, and pluralism and to serve as a catalyst for aligning public policymaking with our nation's core values. In 2007 IRCV began building upon the legacy and sixteen-year track record of its predecessor organization, the Council on Islamic Education (CIE). That organization was founded in 1990 to work within the U.S. K-12 education system to improve coverage of world history and world religions based on contemporary academic scholarship. Utilizing the nonadvocacy model refined during the CIE experience, IRCV's research, consulting, training, and resource development work extends beyond education to areas such as civic engagement, media analysis, inter-religious cooperation, and international development.

International Strategy and Policy Institute (ISPI) was founded in Chicago in 1994 by a group of American Muslims to promote better understanding of Islam and Muslims in the United States. It also aspires to educate Muslim Americans about the U.S. educational

system and ways to participate in the national discourse. ISPI publishes books and papers addressing these issues, holds public seminars and colloquia, and sponsors lectures and discussions.

Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), founded in 1971, is an umbrella organization working to increase the general public's knowledge of Islam and to encourage Muslims to follow Islamic traditions. It also is an advocate for civil liberties and socioeconomic justice in American society. Based in Queens, New York, it has chapters in fourteen cities. ICNA's members are primarily of Indo-Pakistani origin. ICNA outreach activities, conducted through the "Why Islam" project, include a toll-free number to answer questions about Islam, billboards on public highways, community-organizing booths at malls, and radio advertisements. In recent years ICNA has cosponsored its national convention with the Muslim American Society. The ICNA Sisters Wing provides Islamic education and training to women of all backgrounds and publishes *Noor* magazine. ICNA also operates Muslim Children of North America, an educational project focused on children ages five through twelve, and Young Muslims, a national youth organization that provides educational services. ICNA also supports a Muslim Women's Help Network, which is based on the idea that the protection and maintenance of women and children are the foundation of a productive community life. ICNA is restructuring its board and programming to focus on spiritual development and religious education within the community through *halaqas* (religious gatherings) and lectures.

ICNA Relief, a separate charitable organization, provides social services to Muslims and is beginning outreach to the non-Muslim community. After September 11, 2001, ICNA Relief documented civil rights cases and provided case-management services to detainees and their families. In 2005 ICNA Relief raised \$10 million in cash and in-kind donations for earthquake victims in Pakistan.

Islamic Networks Group (ING) was founded in 1993. Based in the San Francisco Bay Area, ING is an entrepreneurial, educational outreach organization with affiliates and partners in twenty U.S. states, in Canada, and in the United Kingdom. ING promotes interfaith dialogue and education about world religions and their contributions to civilization through annual presentations and other educational programs in schools, universities, law enforcement agencies, corporations, health care facilities, and community centers.

Islamic Shura Council of Southern California (ISCS) was established in 1995 to promote communication, understanding, cooperation, and coordination among the Muslim communities in Southern California. The main goal of the organization is to facilitate the emergence of an integrated Muslim community in Southern California to provide guidance on the practice of Islam in the United States. ISCS is located in Anaheim, California, and is affiliated with more than sixty Islamic Centers, mosques, and civic organizations.

The Islamic Society of Greater Houston (ISGH) was established in 1968 for the purpose of reconstructing an Islamic community in accordance with the principles of the Quran and Sunnah (the model practices, customs, and traditions of the prophet Muhammad); providing services for fulfilling the educational, religious, social, economic, and cultural needs of the Muslim community in Houston; providing an Islamic identity for the children in the community; and presenting an Islamic point of view to those outside the Muslim communities. ISGH runs seventeen mosques and community centers. Through its subsidiary, the Islamic Education Institute of Texas (IIET), it operates three full-time schools under the name of Dar-ul-Arqam.

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was founded in 1982 as an offshoot of the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada (MSA-National). ISNA, headquartered in Plainfield, Indiana, is a national association of Sunni Muslim organizations. Membership is diverse but predominantly comprised of immigrants of South Asian and Arab origin. ISNA develops educational, social, and outreach programs on Islam and works to improve relations between Muslim and non-Muslim American communities. In 2004 ISNA launched the ISNA Leadership Development Center, which provides imam training and engages in other capacity-building activities. ISNA also holds the largest annual Muslim conference in the country, in Chicago, with approximately 40,000 participants. ISNA's magazine, *New Horizons*, has a circulation of 70,000. ISNA recently elected Ingrid Mattson, professor of Islamic Studies at Hartford Seminary, as president. She is the first woman president of a national Muslim organization.

Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights was founded in 1993 at the University of Richmond Law School by Professor Azizah al-Hibri and a group of Muslim women lawyers. Its work is primarily

composed of research and writing on Islamic jurisprudential issues relating to women's rights. Now based in Washington, D.C., Karamah promotes the well-being of Muslim communities worldwide through legal education and leadership development. It also works to increase respect and understanding of Islamic law and civilization. Karamah shares its knowledge of gender-equitable Islamic jurisprudence with Muslim women jurists in other countries. With the support of the National Endowment for Democracy, Karamah has established the international Muslim Women Jurist Network to enable members to engage in dialogue on issues affecting Muslim women. Karamah's Law and Leadership Summer Program puts approximately twenty women through a three-week course on leadership training, peace, and conflict resolution.

Muslim Advocates was founded in 2005 as the charitable arm of the National Association of Muslim Lawyers. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the organization uses legal advocacy, policy advocacy, and education to promote justice, freedom, and equality for all regardless of faith. It also promotes the full participation of Muslims in American public life. Most members are lawyers, but the organization is beginning to appeal to other Muslim professionals. Muslim Advocates undertook advocacy work related to the PATRIOT Act in 2005 and met with senior officials of the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI to articulate the Muslim community's civil rights concerns. Muslim Advocates also undertook a campaign to help protect Muslim American charitable giving. The organization has partnered with the ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies on a number of issues such as a campaign to encourage Congress to exercise comprehensive oversight of domestic surveillance. Other partners include the National Immigration Forum, South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow, and the North American South Asian Bar Association. Muslim Advocates is a member of the Rights Working Group, a collaborative campaign addressing human rights and civil liberties.

Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA) was founded in 2001 by Siraj Wahhaj and Ihsan Bagby. MANA, headquartered in Lexington, Kentucky, is a national network of mosques, Muslim organizations, and individuals working to address social and economic problems facing Muslim communities, especially in inner cities. MANA aims to strengthen neighborhoods and institutions that meet the critical needs of Muslim Americans, to call people to the message of

Islam, and to work for remedies of injustice and other ills affecting American society in general and Muslims in particular. MANA's constituents are primarily African American Muslims.

Muslim American Society (MAS) was founded in 1992. Based in Falls Church, Virginia, MAS has fifty-five chapters (most run by volunteers) in thirty-five states. It aims to present the message of Islam as one of peace through submission to the will of Allah, to promote better understanding and more cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims, and to encourage Muslims to take part in building a virtuous and moral society. MAS works primarily through religious education programs, lectures, and youth work through its fifteen community centers. It publishes a magazine for Muslim Americans, partners with ICNA on its annual conference, and is a member of the AMT and the American-Muslim Task Force for Disaster Relief. Membership is largely Muslims of Arab descent, but an increasing number of South Asians and African Americans are participating in its activities.

MAS Freedom Foundation (MAS FF) was founded in 2004 as the public policy and advocacy division of MAS. MAS FF has headquarters in Washington, D.C., and twelve chapters. The foundation seeks to engage the MAS network in civic and policy issues and to build a broad coalition that will enhance the religious, political, and social strengths of the Muslim American community. MAS FF electronically distributes weekly updates on civil rights and organizing. It has organized voter registration efforts that include electronic registration kiosks at mosques around the country. MAS FF is also involved in community efforts to promote a higher minimum wage, poverty alleviation, and disaster relief, including relief for Katrina victims. It has just launched a Civil and Human Rights Division to monitor and address human and civil rights violations in the United States as well as abroad. The division will also work to strengthen coalition ties with existing human and civil rights organizations and will conduct educational and advocacy campaigns to assist grassroots, legal, and legislative initiatives.

Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) was founded in 1988 and has offices in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. It is a public service, policy, and media outreach organization that aims to foster effective grassroots organizing, protect the civil rights of Muslim Americans,

and build relationships between Muslim Americans and their political representatives. MPAC's base is predominantly Arab American and Indo-Pakistani. MPAC, which has a strong history of engaging in interfaith activities in Los Angeles, recently launched a joint project on civic engagement with the Progressive Jewish Alliance. In 2004 MPAC initiated the National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism and set three goals: to raise religious awareness and make it widely understood that terrorism does not conform to the Islamic principle of *jihad* (struggle), to increase control of intermosque activities to prevent exploitation by outside elements and to facilitate detection of criminal activity. To work toward these goals, MPAC developed forums and training seminars involving mosque leaders and law enforcement agencies. It also disseminated guidelines for imams and Muslim leaders. The campaign was endorsed by the FBI and the Islamic Society of North America. MPAC is also a member of the Rights Working Group, a collaborative campaign addressing human rights and civil liberties.

Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada (MSA), founded in 1983, is the oldest Muslim organization in the United States. Based in Falls Church, Virginia, it has chapters at most large universities, where it provides venues for Muslim students of all nations to convene for prayers and educational forums. Because of MSA's decentralized structure, chapters vary significantly. Some chapters are quite conservative, while others have been active on domestic and international issues, taking part in interfaith and global social justice activities. MSA National does not engage directly in advocacy but has used its campus-based student groups to mobilize people for public demonstrations.

National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML) was founded in 1996 as MuslimID, an e-mail discussion list for Muslim attorneys sponsored by Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights. It changed its name and registered as a nonprofit corporation in 2000. Based in Washington, D.C., NAML promotes the integration of Muslims into American society by fostering understanding of and respect for the law, the legal process, and the role of the legal profession. NAML also promotes meaningful access to legal representation for Muslims. Since 1999 NAML has hosted an annual conference on legal issues that pertain to Muslim Americans. It also partners with local Muslim bar affiliates and law schools throughout the country. In 2005 NAML founded its own charitable entity, Muslim Advocates.

Project Islamic HOPE (Helping Oppressed People Everywhere) (PIH) is a civil and human rights organization based in Los Angeles. It supports and follows the leadership of Imam W. Deen Mohammed and organizes rallies, marches, and other events for the local African American Muslim community.

Sound Vision Foundation, based in Bridgeview, Illinois, is a charitable organization established in 1995 to develop Islamic information and educational material for Muslims in the United States. Its materials are now also widely used outside the United States. Sound Vision publishes original content on Islamic life in a Western context, including issues related to youth, domestic violence, the empowerment of women, bridge building, and civic participation. Sound Vision's weekly newsletter provides guidance to Muslim individuals and mosques on how to further mutual understanding with non-Muslims. Sound Vision also produces Chicago's only Muslim daily talk show, called "Radio Islam," in which a diverse group of Muslim and non-Muslim leaders often participate. Sound Vision's other projects include a special series for children, MuslimFest (which showcases Islamic arts and music), and the production and promotion of English language Islamic music.

United Muslims of America (UMA), founded in 1982 and headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, was the nation's first nonpartisan Muslim public affairs organization. Entirely a volunteer organization, UMA focuses on encouraging American Muslims to participate in U.S. political and civic life. It also sponsors the UMA Interfaith Alliance to encourage interreligious dialogue. UMA is a member of American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections.

Zaytuna Institute, a nonprofit educational institute and school, was founded in 1996 by Hamza Yusuf and Dr. Hesham Alalusi in Hayward, California. It provides educational programs, materials on Islam, and training in Islamic religious studies. Zaytuna regularly offers courses on Islamic studies and Arabic language. On average, 250 students register for more than ten courses each quarter. Zaytuna plans to make its educational programs available outside the Bay Area through its soon-to-be-launched Distance Learning Program and the Zaytuna Minara Program. The latter provides a concentrated educational format in which selected topics are taught in multiple, daylong sessions in cities across the United States. To date nearly 1,000 students

have taken part in this program. In 2004 Zaytuna Institute instituted a three-year pilot project for a full-time Islamic seminary program designed to train Muslim students to become scholars, leaders, thinkers, and influential voices in American society. The success of the pilot project led to the creation of a larger program, one that will last for six years and be multidisciplinary.

The following organizations serve various ethnic and national groups, Muslim and non-Muslim.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) was founded in 1980 by former U.S. Senator James Abourezk. ADC has headquarters in Washington, D.C., and thirty-eight chapters nationwide. ADC defends the rights of Americans of Arab descent against discrimination, stereotyping, and hate crimes. It also promotes the cultural heritage of Arab Americans. ADC encourages unified, collective, and effective advocacy work among Arab Americans; promotes a balanced U.S. Middle East policy; and serves as a reliable source for news media and educators. ADC's department of legal services offers counseling in cases of discrimination and defamation. ADC is also involved in cultural and community activities and events. It issues a bimonthly newsletter, *ADC Times*, along with issue papers and special reports on defamation and discrimination. ADC also provides its members with guidance and action alerts on issues requiring a grassroots response.

Arab American Institute (AAI), founded in 1985 in Washington, D.C., is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, national leadership organization that encourages Arab Americans to participate in political and civic life and fosters a national sense of community. AAI convenes national and local organizations for leadership summits and holds meetings with policymakers and U.S. government officials. It promotes Arab American political participation by forming Arab American Democratic and Republican leadership councils, hosting major events at national and state party conventions, conducting get-out-the-vote events and candidate forums, registering and informing Arab American voters in key states, and publishing an annual congressional scorecard.

Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG), founded in 1968 and based in New York, is an educational and cultural membership-based association that does not engage in political

cal lobbying. It develops educational and cultural information and activities on the Arab world and the Arab American community. AAUG's goal is to contribute the intellectual and professional skills of the Arab American community to facilitating positive developments in the Arab world and to build understanding between that world and the United States. AAUG programs include an annual conference, cultural events, summer study in the Middle East, and publication of the *Arab Studies Quarterly* as well as books on the Arab world and the Arab American community.

National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), founded in 1972, is a lobbying group dedicated to the formulation and implementation of an objective, nonpartisan U.S. foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. NAAA focuses on a wide range of Middle East-related issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Middle East peace negotiations, democracy and human rights, the reconstruction of Lebanon, U.S. foreign aid, and regional security and stability. NAAA's national office in Washington, D.C., prepares reports and briefs to assist its board in setting policy objectives. *Voice*, its newsletter, keeps members current on activities in Washington and around the country. NAAA's political action committee supports candidates for federal elective office who are receptive to issues of concern to Arab Americans. NAAA Foundation, a nonprofit educational organization, supports programs fostering an awareness of Arab history, ethnicity, and culture in the United States.

Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC) was founded in 1989 by members of the Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America. PAKPAC has headquarters in Laurel, Maryland, five active chapters, and representatives in many congressional districts. It is a national political lobbying organization focusing on the concerns of the Pakistani-American community and the Pakistani-U.S. relationship. After September 11, 2001, PAKPAC focused on civil rights, and in 2005 it mobilized its members to raise funds for earthquake victims in Kashmir. PAKPAC undertakes direct lobbying efforts with Congress and meets with government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State. The organization is staffed with one full-time secretary. The remainder of its work is undertaken by volunteers and the board of directors.

South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAAIT), founded in 2000, works to increase the capacity of the U.S. South Asian community to participate in the nation's civic and political life. SAAIT is headquartered in Takoma Park, Maryland, and has an office in New York City. In May 2006 SAAIT became a membership organization, and it currently has a listserve of 2,300. SAAIT addresses domestic issues and is particularly concerned with criminal justice, immigration reform, and xenophobia. It addresses these through community education, leadership development, and coalition building. Its civic empowerment programs focus on new immigrants and youth. SAAIT is a member of the National Council of Asian Pacific Americans, through which it collaborates with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security on community civil liberty and security concerns. Among SAAIT's accomplishments are the production of an award-winning documentary and campaign to raise public awareness of post-September 11 hate crimes against South Asians.

Signers of the Report

Geneine Abdo
 Jawad Akher
 Sakem Al-Maryyati
 Khalid Azim
 Yahya M. Basha
 M. Cheryl Bastoumi
 Louise Caltkar
 Colleen K. Connell
 Richard H. Cooper
 Sunil Garg
 William S. Graham
 David D. Hiller
 Shaamil Idris
 Farooq Kathwari
 Dale T. Knobel
 John Jeffrey Louis III
 Lynn M. Martin
 Aminah Beverly McCloud
 Abdul Malik Mujahid
 Gauri Nashat
 Mary Rose Oakar
 Telat Othman
 Eboo Patel
 Inaad J. Qasim
 Ahmed Rehab
 Gouher Rizvi
 Carl Robinson
 Nawar Shora
 Donald M. Stewart
 Philippa Strum
 Sayid M. Syeed
 John Tareishi

Task Force Co-chairs

Farooq Kathwari

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

Elhan Allen Interiors Inc.

Farooq Kathwari is chairman, president, and CEO of Elhan Allen Interiors Inc. He has been president of the company since 1985 and chairman and CEO since 1988. Mr. Kathwari also serves as chairman of the Kashmir Study Group, chairman of Refugees International, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a trustee of the World Conference of Religions for Peace, a member of the American Committees on Foreign Relations' board of distinguished advisors, vice chairman of the National Retail Federation, past chairman and president of the American Home Furnishings Alliance, a director of Henry L. Stimson Center, and a director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He has received National Human Relations awards from the American Jewish Committee, American Muslim recognition awards from several organizations, *Worth Magazine* recognition as one of the fifty best CEOs in the United States, the National Retail Federation Gold Medal, the International First Freedom Award from the Council for America's First Freedom, Ernst & Young's Entrepreneur of the Year Award, and the Anti-Defamation League's Humanitarian Award. He received his B.A. degree from Kashmir University in English literature and political science and an M.B.A. in international marketing from New York University.

Lynn M. Martin

Former United States Secretary of Labor

Lynn Martin, former U.S. secretary of labor and five-term member of Congress, is president of the Martin Hall Group, Inc., a consulting company dealing with human resource issues. She also advises companies on global strategies and activities. For twelve years, Secretary Martin chaired Deloitte & Touche's Council on the Advancement of Women and was an advisor to the firm. She was also a professor at Northwestern University's J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Secretary Martin now serves as a member of the boards of directors of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Constellation Energy Group, Dreyfus Funds, the Procter & Gamble Co., Ryder System, Inc., and AT&T, Incorporated. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, and the Chicago Network. She also serves as a member of the not-for-profit

Special Programs Corporation of the United Negro College Fund. In addition to a number of honorary degrees, Secretary Martin has received the Defender of Justice Award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the Alumni Achievement Award from the University of Illinois, and the Directors' Choice Award from the National Women's Economic Alliance. She was selected as the Mother of the Year by the March of Dimes, has received the Jane Addams Medal from Rockford College, has been elected as laureate of the Lincoln Academy of Illinois, and was selected as Woman of Achievement by the Anti-Defamation League in 2001. Prior to serving as secretary of labor, she represented the 16th District of Illinois in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1981 to 1991. She has also served in state and local elective offices. Secretary Martin graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Illinois in 1960.

Participant Biographic Summaries

Geneive Abdo

Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies
The Gallup Organization

Geneive Abdo is a senior analyst for the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies. She was formerly the liaison officer for the Alliance of Civilizations, a United Nations initiative under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In September 2006 her book on Muslims in America, *Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11*, was published by Oxford University Press. Before joining the United Nations, Ms. Abdo was a foreign correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*. Her twenty-year career focused on coverage of the Middle East and the Islamic world. She was also at the Kroc Institute.

Javed Akhter

Founder and Executive Director
The International Strategy and Policy Institute

Dr. Javed Akhter is a founder and executive director of the International Strategy and Policy Institute (ISPI), a nonprofit organization established in 1994 by a group of Muslim Americans in the Chicago area. Dr. Akhter is also a member of the Chicago Committee of Human Rights Watch and Muslim Public Affairs Council. He is an associate professor of pediatrics at the University of Illinois and a faculty member in the pediatrics residency program at Advocate Hope Children's Hospital in Oak Lawn, Illinois.

Salam Al-Marayati

Executive Director
Muslim Public Affairs Council

Salam Al-Marayati is the director and a founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), a public service, nonprofit, nonpartisan agency that disseminates accurate information about Islam and Muslims to the media and elected officials. Previously, he served as the commissioner of the Human Relations Committee in Los Angeles, board member of the American Committee to Save Bosnia, co-chair of Interfaith Coalition to Heal Los Angeles, and member of the executive committee of the Democratic National Party.

Khalid Azim

Executive Director
UBS Securities LLC

In 2006 Khalid Azim joined the Capital Markets desk of UBS Investment Bank after a nearly ten-year career at Morgan Stanley. Mr. Azim also served as an officer in the U.S. Navy and is a veteran of the first Gulf War. Mr. Azim was selected as a White House Fellow for the 1999-2000 class. He is also a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. New York. Mr. Azim sits on the board of trustees of the Cathedral School of St. John the Divine.

Yahya M. Basha

Founder and Chairman
Muslim American Coalition

Dr. Basha is currently a foundation board member of the Muslim Public Affairs Council and is on the board of governors of the Arab American Institute in Washington, D.C. Dr. Basha was chairman of the American Muslim Council from 2000-03. He has also served as member of the State of Michigan Civil Rights Commission, advisor to the American Muslim Taskforce, chair of American Muslim Political Coordinating Council; board member of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy; and president of the Islamic Medical Association, Midwest Region.

M. Cherif Bassiouni

President Emeritus, International Human Rights Law Institute
Distinguished Research Professor of Law, DePaul University

Dr. Bassiouni is the Distinguished Research Professor of Law at DePaul University and president emeritus of the International Human Rights Law Institute. He is also president of the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy, as well as the honorary president of the International Association of Penal Law, based in Paris, France. Previously, he served as dean, secretary general, and honorary president of the International Association of Penal Law and as nonresident professor of criminal law at the University of Cairo.

Louise Cainkar

Assistant Professor, Social and Cultural Sciences
Marquette University

Louise Cainkar is a sociologist and assistant professor in the Department of Social and Cultural Sciences at Marquette University.

She is currently writing a book based on her study of the impact of the September 11 attacks on the Arab/Muslim community in metropolitan Chicago. In 2004 she received the Carnegie Corporation Scholar Award for her work on Islamic revival in the United States. Ms. Cainkar is a consulting scholar on the Social Science Research Council project "Reframing the Challenge of Migration and Security."

Colleen K. Connell

Executive Director
American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois

In January of 2001 Colleen Connell became the first woman attorney to lead the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois. Ms. Connell joined the staff of the ACLU of Illinois in 1984. Prior to becoming the executive director, Ms. Connell served as the ACLU's associate legal director and director of the Reproductive Rights Project. She also litigated a wide variety of other cases, including matters involving rights of the mentally ill, equal access to education, housing discrimination, freedom of speech and association, and other constitutional rights.

Richard H. Cooper

Chairman
General Welfare Group, LLC

Richard Cooper is the chairman of General Welfare Group, LLC. He is a graduate of New York University and completed the program on Investment Decisions & Behavioral Finance at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a member of the board of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and serves on its executive committee. He also serves as a member of the international advisory committee of the International Crisis Group and is the convener of the R2P Coalition, a group of global human rights organizations.

Sunil Garg

Director, Integration Office
Exelon Corporation

Sunil Garg is currently a director at Exelon Corporation. Prior to joining Exelon in 2002, he worked in consulting for ICF International and did research on inner-city neighborhoods for the University of Chicago's Chapin Hall Center for Children before becoming an assistant to Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley in 1997. In 1999 he was appointed a White House fellow by President Clinton. He currently serves on the board of the Old Town School of Folk Music, the

Chicago Children's Theater, Inter-Faith Youth Core, Kids in Danger, and Residents' Journal.

William S. Graham

Founder

Shenandoah Capital, LLC

William Scott Graham is the founder of Shenandoah Capital, LLC. He was formerly president of USA BlueBook, a leading direct mail catalog in the water and water treatment industry, serving over 50,000 municipal and industrial accounts. He has also held the position of senior consultant and project leader with Grupo Financiero, based in Mexico City, Mexico. Mr. Graham is also the Guatemala project leader and sponsor donor of the organization Water for People.

David D. Hiller

President, Publisher and CEO

Los Angeles Times

David D. Hiller became publisher, president, and CEO of the *Los Angeles Times* in October 2006 after holding the same positions at the Tribune Company starting in November 2004. Hiller came to the Tribune Company in 1988 from the law firm of Sidley & Austin. Previously, he served two years at the U.S. Department of Justice as special assistant and associate deputy attorney general. He is on the board of trustees for Roosevelt University and the Chicago History Museum and is on the board of directors of the McCormick Tribune Foundation and Chicago Tribune Foundation.

Shamil Idriss

Acting Director, Alliance of Civilizations

United Nations

Shamil Idriss is acting director of the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative launched by the UN secretary-general in September 2005 with the goal of improving Islamic-Western relations. Prior to this position, Mr. Idriss served as senior advisor to the Council of 100 Leaders: West-Islamic World Dialogue Initiative at the World Economic Forum and continues to serve on the steering committee for that initiative. From 2000-04, Mr. Idriss served as chief operating officer of Search for Common Ground, a global leader in international conflict resolution.

Dale T. Knobel

President

Denison University

Dale T. Knobel is a scholar specializing in the history of American ethnic and race relations. He has served since 1998 as president and professor of history at Denison University. He came to Denison from Southwestern University in Texas, where he was provost and dean of the faculty. Over the preceding twenty years he served on the history faculties of Northwestern University and Texas A&M University. Dr. Knobel is a trustee of the Institute for the International Education of Students.

John Jeffrey Louis III

Chairman

Parson Capital Corporation

John Jeffrey Louis is chairman of Parson Capital Corporation, a small merchant banking firm in Chicago. He is a director and cofounder of Frye-Louis Capital Management in Chicago and the City Bakery, Inc. in New York City. Mr. Louis is also a director of S. C. Johnson and Son, Johnson Financial Group, and Eximious, Inc. He is the former chairman of the board of National-Louis University, a trustee of Northwestern University, and serves on the board of directors of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Aminah Beverly McCloud

Director, Islamic World Studies, and Professor, Islamic Studies,

DePaul University

Dr. McCloud is a professor of Islamic Studies in the department of religious studies at DePaul University and the director of the Islamic World Studies Program. She is also editor of *The Journal of Islamic Law and Culture* and founder of the Islam in America Conference at DePaul University. She is a board member of CAIR-Chicago, the Healing Project at Boston University Hospital, Radio Islam, the Institute for Social and Policy Understanding, and the Feminist Sexual Ethics Project at Brandeis University.

Abdul Malik Mujahid*Chair*

Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago
Abdul Malik Mujahid is chair of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago. He is the founder, president, and director of Sound Vision Foundation. He gives Friday sermons at Chicago's Muslim Community Center, Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital, and the Downtown Islamic Center. Mr. Mujahid is on the board of trustees of the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions. In the past, he has served as national coordinator of Bosnia Task Force, USA. It was in this capacity that he initiated the formation of the Islamic Shura Council of North America.

Guity Nashat*Associate Professor of History**University of Illinois at Chicago*

Guity Nashat is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor of history at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is a member of the editorial advisory board for *World Civilization* and a member of the Middle East Studies Committee at the University of Illinois. She was formerly a member of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Chicago. She is a member of the Iranian Studies Association, the Middle East Studies Association, and the Council of the Society of Iranian Studies.

Mary Rose Oakar*President**American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee*

Mary Rose Oakar was a founding member of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee's advisory board and was named president in June 2003. She has served as member of the Cleveland City Council, as congresswoman, and as a member of the Ohio House of Representatives. She was appointed by Vice President Gore to the board of Builders for Peace and Economic Development in the Middle East. She has also served as a monitor for the Palestinian elections.

Talat Othman*President**Grove Financial, Inc.*

Talat Othman is president of Grove Financial, Inc., an investment firm specializing in U.S.-Middle East business and finance.

Previously, Mr. Othman established and served as CEO of Dearborn Financial, Inc., was general manager of Saudi Arab Financial Corporation of Luxembourg, and served as vice president and head of the International Money Management Division at Harris Bank. Mr. Othman served on Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government Middle East Institute board and was the founding president of the Middle East Institute board and was the founding president of the founding committee of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago.

Eboo Patel*Founder and Executive Director**Interfaith Youth Core*

Eboo Patel is the founder and executive director of the Interfaith Youth Core, a Chicago-based international nonprofit organization. He serves on the board of directors of the International Interfaith Centre and the Interfaith Initiative of the Points of Light Foundation and is president of the board of *CrossCurrents* magazine. Dr. Patel is an Ashoka Fellow, selected as part of an elite international network of "social entrepreneurs" implementing ideas with the potential to change the pattern of our society.

Imad I. Qasim*Partner**Sidley Austin LLP*

Imad Qasim is a partner in the Chicago office of Sidley Austin LLP. His principal practice areas are mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, venture investments, buyouts, and international transactions. Mr. Qasim is a member of the American Bar Association and is admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, Illinois, and New York. He is a graduate of Georgetown University and Hamilton College. Mr. Qasim is a member of the board of directors of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Ahmed Rehab*Executive Director, Chicago Office**Council on American-Islamic Relations*

Ahmed Rehab is executive director of the Chicago office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the nation's largest Muslim civil liberties and advocacy group. Rehab has traveled to Kericho, Kenya, as part of the U.S. delegation from the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions. He serves as board member and secretary of the

Egyptian American Society. Previously, he served as an educational consultant for Chicago's Niagara Foundation, an interfaith organization that promotes interactive dialogue.

Gowher Rizvi

*Lecturer in Public Policy and Director
Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University*
Gowher Rizvi is director of the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation. Before joining the institute, he was the Ford Foundation's representative in New Delhi, having previously served as the foundation's deputy director for Governance and Civil Society, as a program officer in the Foundation's Asia division, and as the Asia Society's director of contemporary affairs. Rizvi came to the Ford and Asia foundations from Oxford University, where he held several positions. He is also the founder and editor of *Contemporary South Asia*, an academic and policy studies journal.

Carl Robinson

*Managing Partner
MICA Consulting Partners*
Carl Robinson is managing partner of the firm of MICA Consulting Partners. As a licensed psychologist, Dr. Robinson has spent the better part of his career assisting a broad range of businesses in the management of change and in developing effective leadership and talent management strategies. He holds a faculty appointment at Northwestern University and is currently a visiting associate professor of industrial/organizational psychology at Roosevelt University.

Nawar Shora

*Director, Law Enforcement Outreach Program
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee*
Nawar Shora is director of Diversity and Law Enforcement Outreach (LEOP) with the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. He initiated the program in January of 2002. Through LEOP, Mr. Shora has been involved in varied aspects of diversity education and cultural awareness training and has worked with government agencies, private corporations, churches, and academic institutions. He is a subject matter expert on Arabs and Islam on two government training DVDs, one by the Department of Justice and the other by the Department of Homeland Security. He is also author of *The Arab-American Handbook* (Cune Press) due out in fall 2007.

Donald M. Stewart
*Visiting Professor, Harris School of Public Policy
The University of Chicago*

In 2004 Donald M. Stewart retired from the position of CEO of The Chicago Community Trust, a post he held since January 2000. He is currently a visiting professor at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy Studies. Prior to joining the trust, Stewart spent an academic year at the Carnegie Corporation, serving as senior program officer of the education division and special advisor to the president. Dr. Stewart is the former president of Spelman College in Atlanta, where he served for ten years.

Phillippa Strum

*Director, United States Studies
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*
Phillippa Strum is director of the division of United States studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Brooklindian Professor of Political Science Emerita, City University of New York. She is a political scientist specializing in U.S. government and constitutional law, civil liberties, and human rights. She has also taught at Bogaziçi Üniversitesi in Istanbul. Her edited Wilson Center publications include *American Arabs: History, Identity, Assimilation, Participation*. Dr. Strum is the secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Sayyid M. Syeed

*National Director, Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances
Islamic Society of North America*
In 2006 Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed stepped down as secretary general of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) to lead ISNA's Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances. Other former positions include secretary general of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, general secretary of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, and editor-in-chief of the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. Dr. Syeed is a member of the board of advisory editors for the *Middle East Affairs Journal* and of the board of advisors for the Council on American-Islamic Relations.

Task Force Session Speakers

Session I – Opening Comments/Background to the Issues

Marda Dunsky
Assistant Professor
Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University

Sulayman S. Nyang
Professor of African Studies
Howard University

Session II: American Muslim Participation in Foreign Policy Discourse

Salam Al-Marayati*
Director
Muslim Public Affairs Council

Geneive Abdo*
Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies
The Gallup Organization

Agha Saeed
Professor of Political Science and Sociology
California State University, East Bay

Session III: Empowering the Community

Richard Clzlik*
Vice President for Governmental Affairs
National Association of Evangelicals

Dale T. Knobel*
President
Denison University

John Tateishi*
National Executive Director (retired)
Japanese American Citizens League

John Tateishi
National Executive Director (retired)
Japanese American Citizens League
In 2006 John Tateishi retired as national executive director of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) after more than twenty-five years of involvement with Asian American communities. He gained national prominence in 1978 when he launched a campaign to seek redress for Japanese Americans interned in U.S. detention camps during WWII. As the national redress director of JACL, Mr. Tateishi crafted the legislative and public-affairs strategies of a grassroots campaign that lasted ten years and successfully culminated in an apology from the president and the U.S. Congress and monetary redress for the victims of the internment.

Task Force Observers

Caroline P. Cracraft
Vice Consul for Press and Public Affairs (retired)
British Consulate General

Qamar-ul Huda
Senior Program Officer, Religion and Peacemaking Program
United States Institute of Peace

Session IV: Engaging the Community in U.S. Relations with the Muslim World

Brad Hirschfield
Vice President

CLAL - The National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership

Session V: Discussion of City Visits, Capacity-Building Papers and Draft Outline of Report

Nadia Roumani

*Fellow, Center for Religion and Civic Culture
University of Southern California*

Session VI: Discussion and Finalization of Key Findings and Possible Recommendations

(no speakers)

*Task Force members

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**Radicalization in the West:
The Homegrown Threat**

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PREFACE


While terrorism has been with us for centuries, the destructive power and global reach of modern terrorism is unprecedented. The entire world witnessed the attacks of September 11, 2001, but most of the attacks and attempted attacks since then have shown 9/11 to be an anomaly rather than the standard pattern for terrorism in the homeland.

If the post-September 11th world has taught us anything, it is that the tools for conducting serious terrorist attacks are becoming easier to acquire. Therefore intention becomes an increasingly important factor in the formation of terrorist cells. This study is an attempt to look at how that intention forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case studies.

While the threat from overseas remains, many of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States have been conceptualized and planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence. The majority of these individuals began as "unremarkable" - they had "unremarkable" jobs, had lived "unremarkable" lives and had little, if any criminal history. The recently thwarted plot by homegrown jihadists, in May 2007, against Fort Dix in New Jersey, only underscores the seriousness of this emerging threat.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives "unremarkable" people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies. This realization has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country's iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990's, New York City continues to be the one of the top targets of terrorists worldwide. Consequently, the NYPD places a priority on understanding what drives and defines the radicalization process.

The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process.



Raymond W. Kelly
Police Commissioner of the City of New York

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NYPD's understanding of the threat from Islamic-based terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. While the threat from overseas remains, terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Australia and Canada since 2001 fit a different paradigm. Rather than being directed from al-Qaeda abroad, these plots have been conceptualized and planned by "unremarkable" local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration and ideological reference point.

Some of these cases include:

- Madrid's March 2004 attack
- Amsterdam's Hofstad Group
- London's July 2005 attack
- Australia's Operation Pendennis (which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005)
- The Toronto 18 Case (which thwarted an attack in June 2006)

Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point—a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives "unremarkable" people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies and has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country's iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990's, New York City continues to be among the top targets of terrorists worldwide.

In order to test whether the same framework for understanding radicalization abroad applied within the United States, we analyzed three U.S. homegrown terrorism cases and two New York City based cases:

- Lackawana, New York
- Portland, Oregon
- Northern Virginia
- New York City - Herald Square Subway
- New York City – The Al Muhajiroun Two

The same radicalization framework was applied to a study of the origins of the Hamburg cluster of individuals, who led the September 11 hijackers. This assessment, almost six years after 2001, provides some new insights, previously not fully-grasped by the law enforcement and intelligence community, into the origins of this devastating attack.

RADICALIZATION

Ideology

Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out "autonomous jihad" via acts of terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis for action.

- This ideology has served as the inspiration for numerous homegrown groups including the Madrid March 2004 bombers, Amsterdam's Hofstad Group, London's July 2005 bombers, the Australians arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in late 2005 and the Toronto 18 arrested in June 2006.

Process

An assessment of the various reported models of radicalization leads to the conclusion that the radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases:

- Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization
- Stage 2: Self-Identification
- Stage 3: Indoctrination
- Stage 4: Jihadization
 - Each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures
 - All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages
 - Many stop or abandon this process at different points
 - Although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression
 - Individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act

PHASES OF RADICALIZATION

PRE-RADICALIZATION. Pre-Radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology.

- The majority of the individuals involved in these plots began as "unremarkable" - they had "ordinary" jobs, had lived "ordinary" lives and had little, if any criminal history.

SELF-IDENTIFICATION. Self-Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for this "religious seeking" is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one's certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews.

There can be many types of triggers that can serve as the catalyst including:

- Economic (losing a job, blocked mobility)
- Social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived)
- Political (international conflicts involving Muslims)
- Personal (death in the close family)

INDOCTRINATION. Indoctrination is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a "spiritual sanctioner".

- While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, as noted above, association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens. By the indoctrination phase this self-selecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced.

JIHADIZATION. Jihadization is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These "acts in furtherance" will include planning, preparation and execution.

- While the other phases of radicalization may take place gradually, over two to three years, this jihadization component can be a very rapid process, taking only a few months, or even weeks to run its course.

FINDINGS

- Al-Qaeda has provided the inspiration for homegrown radicalization and terrorism; direct command and control by al-Qaeda has been the exception, rather than the rule among the case studies reviewed in this study.
 - The four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this report.
 - In spite of the differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages.
 - This consistency provides a tool for predictability.
 - The transnational phenomenon of radicalization in the West is largely a function of the people and the environment in which they live. Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation.
-

- Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.
 - There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as “unremarkable” from various walks of life.
 - Europe's failure to integrate the 2nd and 3rd generation of its immigrants into society, both economically and socially, has left many young Muslims torn between the secular West and their religious heritage. This inner conflict makes them especially vulnerable to extremism—the radical views, philosophy, and rhetoric that is highly advertised and becoming more and more fashionable among young Muslims in the West.
 - Muslims in the U.S. are more resistant, but not immune to the radical message.
 - Despite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals' religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes the assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a professional career, financial stability and material comforts.
 - The jihadist ideology combines the extreme and minority interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence. Ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the basis of government.
 - This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO's (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist - sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims -- especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.
 - The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization
 - In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology.
 - It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-Salafi message they have encountered.
 - During the Indoctrination phase, when individuals adopt this virulent ideology, they begin interpreting the world from this newly-formed context. Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the Internet allows the aspiring jihadist to view the world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further
-

reinforcing the objectives and political arguments of the jihadi-Salafi agenda.

- In the Jihadization phase, when an individual commits to jihad, the Internet serves as an enabler—providing broad access to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of weapons.
 - Individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization process on their own. Invariably, as they progress through the stages of radicalization they seek like-minded individuals. This leads to the creation of groups or clusters. These clusters appear almost essential to progressing to the Jihadization stage—the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.
 - “Group think” is one of the most powerful catalysts for leading a group to actually committing a terrorist act. It acts as a force-multiplier for radical thought while creating a competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical.
 - Although there are many groups or clusters of individuals that are on the path of radicalization, each group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a “bunch of guys” to an operational terrorist cell. All eleven case studies had:
 - A “spiritual sanctioner” who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In some cases the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.
 - An “operational leader” who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act—organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.
 - The full radicalization of a Western individual, or groups of individuals, does not always result in the committing of a terrorist act in the West. Many fully-radicalized individuals have first looked to conduct jihad by becoming mujahedeen and fighting in conflicts overseas.
 - The image of the heroic, holy warrior or “mujahedeen” has been widely marketed on the Internet as well as in jihadi tapes and videos. This image continues to resonate among young, especially Muslim, men 15-35 years-old—men who are most vulnerable to visions of honor, bravery and sacrifice for what is perceived as a noble cause.
 - Among those individuals who travel abroad in search of jihad, some end up as mujahedeen and fight in foreign lands; some are re-directed to commit acts in the West, often in their country of origin, while others give up and return home because they can’t endure the training or have a change of heart.
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- For those groups of homegrown radicalized individuals who do not seek jihad abroad, the dedication and commitment of their leader to jihad is often the main factor in determining whether the group will commit a terrorist act or not.
 - Although the 9/11 attack, with its overseas origins, is more of an exception in terms of how terrorist plots have been launched since the destruction of the Twin Towers, it has probably been the most important factor in proliferating the process of radicalization, especially in the West. More importantly, 9/11 established the current trend of committing an act in the name of global jihad as a natural culmination of full radicalization and the ultimate responsibility for the fully radicalized jihadist.
 - Prior to 9/11, the entire radicalization process moved at a much slower rate. There was no direct link to jihad, other than to become a mujahedeen. Aspiring jihadists would travel to Afghanistan without any idea that they could become actual terrorists. Now, there is no longer any illusion as to what the adoption of jihadi-Salafi ideology means.
 - The radicalization process is accelerating in terms of how long it takes and the individuals are continuing to get younger. Moreover, with the higher risks associated with heading down this pathway, individuals will seek to conceal their actions earlier, making intelligence and law enforcement's job even more difficult.
 - It is useful to think of the radicalization process in terms of a funnel. Entering the process does not mean one will progress through all four stages and become a terrorist. However, it also does not mean that if one doesn't become a terrorist, he or she is no longer a threat. Individuals who have been radicalized but are not jihadists may serve as mentors and agents of influence to those who might become the terrorists of tomorrow.
 - The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviors can be seen as innocuous; however, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process, their significance becomes more important. Considering the sequencing of these behaviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping to thwart an attack or even prevent the planning of future plots.
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OUTSIDE EXPERT'S VIEW: Brian Michael Jenkins,*Senior Advisor to the President of the Rand Corporation*

The United States and its allies have achieved undeniable success in degrading the operational capabilities of the jihadist terrorist enterprise responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks, and numerous subsequent terrorist operations since then. However, we have not dented their determination, prevented their communications, or blunted their message. We have not diminished their capacity to incite, halted the process of radicalization, or impeded the recruitment that supports the jihadist enterprise. Indeed, recent intelligence estimates concede that "activists identifying themselves as jihadists are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion." As a consequence, "the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad, but also in the Homeland. As the Department of Homeland Security's Chief Intelligence Officer testified in March 2007, "radicalization will continue to expand within the United States over the long term."

This study examines the trajectories of radicalization that produced operational terrorist cells in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Sydney and Toronto to construct an analytical framework that tracks jihadist recruits from pre-radicalization to self-identification to indoctrination to jihadization--a cycle that ends with capture or death. It then compares this model with the trajectories of radicalization observed in conspiracies within the United States including the jihadist clusters in Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, Portland, Oregon, New York City, and lastly with the Hamburg cell responsible for the attack on 9/11.

Although there have been informative analyses of the paths to violent jihad in individual countries, this is the most comprehensive review across national boundaries, including the terrorist conspiracies uncovered in the United States. The resulting model will undoubtedly become the basis for comparison with additional cases as they are revealed in future attacks or arrests.

The utility of the NYPD model, however, goes beyond analysis. It will inform the training of intelligence analysts and law enforcement personnel engaged in counterterrorist missions. It will allow us to identify similarities and differences, and changes in patterns over time. It will assist prosecutors and courts in the very difficult task of deciding when the boundary between a bunch of guys sharing violent fantasies and a terrorist cell determined to go operational has been crossed. Above all, by identifying key junctions in the journey to terrorist jihad, it should help in the formulation of effective and appropriate strategies aimed at peeling potential recruits away from a dangerous and destructive course.

As the NYPD point outs, becoming a jihadist is a gradual, multi-step process that can take months, even years, although since 9/11 the pace has accelerated. The journey may begin in a mosque where a radical Imam preaches, in informal congregations and prayer groups—some of which are clandestine—in schools, in prisons, on the Internet.

Self-radicalization may begin the day that an individual seeks out jihadist websites. In the physical world when would-be jihadists seek support among local jihadist mentors and like-minded fanatics. This is the group that currently poses the biggest danger to the West. It is the focus of the present monograph.

As the NYPD shows, self-radicalization was often the norm, even before the worldwide crackdown on al Qaeda and its jihadist allies forced them to decentralize and disperse. Those who arrived at jihadist training camps, like members of the Hamburg cell, were already radicalized. At the camps, they bonded through shared beliefs and hardships, underwent advanced training, and gained combat experience; some were selected by al Qaeda's planners for specific terrorist operations.

Short of preparing for a specific attack, it is hard to define the exact point at which one becomes a jihadist: Internalization of jihadist ideology? Bonding with brothers at a jihadist retreat? Downloading jihadist literature or bomb-making instructions from the Internet? Fantasizing about terrorist operations? Reconnoitering potential targets? Going to Pakistan? Signing a contract to pray for the jihadists, collect money on their behalf, or support terrorist operations? Taking an oath of loyalty to Osama bin Laden? The legal definition is broad.

Neither imported nor homegrown terrorism is new in the United States. A homegrown conspiracy (albeit with foreign assistance) was responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Another homegrown conspiracy carried out the devastating 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. The United States, over the years, has successfully suppressed these groups through domestic intelligence collection and law enforcement.

Since 9/11, U.S. authorities have uncovered a number of alleged individual terrorists and terrorist rings, including clusters in Lackawanna, Northern Virginia, New Jersey, Portland, New York City, and Lodi and Torrance, California. These arrests, along with intelligence operations, indicate that radicalization and recruiting are taking place in the United States, but there is no evidence of a significant cohort of terrorist operatives. We therefore worry most about terrorist attacks by very small conspiracies or individuals, which nonetheless could be equivalent to the London subway bombings or a jihadist version of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.

This suggests that efforts should be made to enhance the intelligence capabilities of local police, who through community policing, routine criminal investigations, or dedicated intelligence operations may be best positioned to uncover future terrorist plots. Of these, continued intelligence operations are the most important. Radicalization makes little noise. It borders on areas protected by the First and Fourth Amendments. It takes place over a long period of time. It therefore does not lend itself to a traditional criminal investigations approach.

The absence of significant terrorist attacks or even advanced terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 is good news that cannot entirely be explained by increased intelligence and heightened security. It suggests America's Muslim population may be less susceptible than Europe's Muslim population, if not entirely immune to jihadist ideology; indeed, countervailing voices may exist within the American Muslim community. A recent survey of Muslim Americans by the Pew Research Center supports this thesis. The vast majority of American Muslims reject al Qaeda's violent extremism, although younger Muslims are more accepting of violence in the defense of Islam. Conversely, it may merely indicate that the American Muslim population has not yet been exposed to the degree or variety of radicalization that its European counterparts have been exposed to, and it requires not majorities, but only handfuls to carry out terrorist attacks.

There is understandable pressure on law enforcement to intervene before terrorist attacks occur. Protecting society against destruction, and if possible, diverting vulnerable young men from destructive and self-destructive paths are vital and legitimate tasks. Doing so, without trampling our freedoms, requires greater understanding of the process that leads to terrorism. NYPD has drawn the map.

OUTSIDE EXPERT'S VIEW: Alain Bauer,*Criminologist at the Sorbonne University*

Criminologists do not arrest nor do they judge criminals. They try to understand how they work, how their goals are evolving, how their modus operandi changes. It is rare to see a police force able to adapt to the threat, to move from defense to pre-emption, to try to avoid the attack rather than just arresting the perpetrators afterwards. This is what the NYPD has done, after healing from the 9/11 shock.

The NYPD is not only fighting crime and terrorism. It examines clues and evidence worldwide to understand what is going on and to detect, as early as possible, what is going to be a threat for New York City, the citizens of the United States of America and democracies all over the world.

The NYPD has learned how to detect imported terrorists, new converts and homegrown operators. Based on NYPD knowledge and my own findings, we may highlight some discoveries:

- Since September 11th, 2001, jihadists comprising around 70 nationalities have been captured in some one hundred countries around the world and jihadi money has been frozen in 130 countries worldwide. As a result of this global war, the "battlefield" has stretched across more than two-dozen countries, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, the United States and Yemen;
- Terrorism is now the central security concern for our governments. It may even be said that terrorism has become war. However, this all-pervasive terrorism has itself undergone a significant mutation. The state terrorism of the Cold War, whether political or ideological, has almost disappeared;
- Civilians, cities, corporations and the population at large— will be increasingly affected, as they were by the attacks of 9/11 and by the anthrax scares that same year;

New terrorists have emerged. Today, the real menace is hybrid groups that are opportunistic and capable of rapid transformation – and are not really organizations at all, as the West generally uses the term. They do not have solid, rigid structures. On the contrary, they are fluid, liquid, or even volatile. Al-Qaeda is not an organization like the IRA or the Basque ETA. We must look at and think about the terrorism as a continuum. There is a real phenomenon of communicating vessels between the different players.

When it comes to threats, can the "information society" produce serious diagnoses, or is it condemned to bluster? This is a crucial question.

Experts in the threats and dangers of today's world, on either side of the Atlantic, are not working in a vacuum. We live in a society whose major characteristics are not particularly conducive to the tasks of defense and security. Driving while looking in the rear-view mirror only, preparing war while only checking the last one with no idea on what's going on, is a sure way for disaster. We call it the "Maginot Line Syndrome". The concrete one failed during the last World War when Adolph Hitler's army simply went around it. The Electronic one collapsed on September 11th.

We need to be able to move out of the culture of reaction, retrospect, and compilation. Only in this way can we arrive at the stage of forward thinking and enable early detection of the threats and dangers of the modern world, our modern world.

This study is the NYPD's contribution to this essential process.

THE THREAT

The NYPD's understanding of the threat from Islamic-based terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point—a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.

The September 11 plot was conceptualized, manned, and funded by al-Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan. Because the attack originated abroad, it fit and furthered the pre-existing understanding of Islamist terrorism as being a threat from outside our borders.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the United States military and law enforcement captured, killed, or scattered much of al-Qaeda's core leadership—eliminating its sanctuary and training camps in Afghanistan. As a result, the threat from the central core of al-Qaeda was significantly diminished.

However, as al-Qaeda's central core of leaders, operatives, and foot soldiers shrunk, its philosophy of global jihad spread worldwide at an exponential rate via radical Internet websites and chat rooms, extremist videotapes and literature, radical speeches by extremist imams—often creating a radical subculture within the more vulnerable Muslim diaspora communities. This post-September 11 wave of militant ideological influences underpins radicalization in the West and is what we define as the homegrown threat.

Moreover, in the years since 2001, the attacks of September 11 stand out as both the hallmark al-Qaeda attack as well as the singular exception. Bali [2002], Casablanca [2003], Madrid [2004], and London [2005] all fit a different paradigm. The individuals who conducted the attacks were for the most part all citizens or residents of the states in which the attacks occurred. Although a few may have received training in al-Qaeda camps, the great majority did not. While al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for each attack after the fact, these attacks were not under the command and control of al-Qaeda central, nor were they specifically funded by al-Qaeda central. Rather, they were conducted by local al-Qaeda inspired affiliate organizations or by local residents/citizens, who utilized al-Qaeda as their ideological inspiration.

We now believe that it is critical to identify the al-Qaeda inspired threat at the point where radicalization begins. This radicalization may or may not take place in the same town, city, or country as their terrorist target. For example, the pilots who led the September 11 hijackers were radicalized in Germany, but attacked targets in the United States. Conversely, London's July 7 bombers were radicalized in the U.K. and attacked targets in the U.K. Consequently, the point of origin of the development of a terrorist is really the location where the radicalization takes place.

METHODOLOGY

This study provides a conceptual framework for understanding the process of radicalization in the West. This framework is derived from a comparative case study of five prominent homegrown groups/plots around the world which resulted in either terrorist attacks or thwarted plots. The cases include Madrid's 3/11/04 attack, Amsterdam's Hofstad Group, the London-Leeds 7/7/05 attack, Australia's Operation Pendennis which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005 and Canada's Toronto 18 Case, which thwarted an attack in June 2006.

In researching these case studies, the NYPD dispatched detectives and analysts to meet with law enforcement, intelligence officials and academics at each of these locations to enhance our understanding the specifics of these events as well as the phenomenon of homegrown radicalization.

Based on this effort, we have been able to identify common pathways and characteristics among these otherwise different groups and plots.

To test whether the framework that we derived from this effort applied within the United States, we analyzed three post-September 11 U.S. homegrown terrorism cases (Lackawana, New York, Portland, Oregon and Northern Virginia) as well as two New York City cases (34th Street/Herald Square and the radicalization of two al-Muhajiroun members).

Lastly, we applied the framework to the Hamburg cluster of individuals who led the September 11 hijackers. This assessment, almost six years after the attacks, provides some new insights into the origins of this devastating attack that were not previously fully-grasped by the law enforcement and intelligence community.

RADICALIZATION: WESTERN STYLE

Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of the radicalization process. In the example of the homegrown threat, local residents or citizens gradually adopt an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which legitimizes terrorism as a tool to affect societal change. This ideology is fed and nurtured with a variety of extremist influences. Internalizing this extreme belief system as one's own is radicalization.

The progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and developing this extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act defines the process of radicalization. Only through an in-depth understanding and appreciation of the societal and behavioral indicators that define the various stages of this process can intelligence and law enforcement agencies array themselves properly against this threat.

Although the process of radicalization is not unique to the West, the scope of this study will be limited to the Western paradigm—focused on highlighting the indicators and signatures that define how populations, many who are more vulnerable to the militant Islamic message become radicalized while living under the influence of Western culture and values.

Radicalization in the West often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives or with the politics of their home governments. These individuals ultimately seek other like-minded individuals and form a loose-knit group or social network. Together, they progress through a series of events, realizations, and experiences that often culminate in the decision to commit a terrorist act. That said, not all individuals or groups who begin this progression end up as terrorists. Different pathways, catalysts and exposure to extremist nodes affect their progress. Individuals may drop out or stop moving along this pathway for a variety of reasons.

Some key factors in determining how this process advances are determined by social and behavioral dynamics of small groups as well as the amount of time that the group or group member is exposed to the various nodes or incubators of extremism. These incubators are often embedded in legitimate institutions, businesses, clubs, and of course, in the virtual world of the Internet (see Text Box p.20).

Radicalization in the West is, first and foremost, driven by:

- **Jihadi-Salafi Ideology.** What motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out "autonomous jihad" via acts of terrorism against their host countries? The answer is ideology. Ideology is the bedrock and catalyst for radicalization. It defines the conflict, guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment, and is the basis for action. In many cases, ideology also determines target selection and informs what will be done and how it will be carried out.

The religious/political ideology responsible for driving this radicalization process is called jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology and it has served as the inspiration for all or nearly all of the homegrown groups including the Madrid 2004 bombers, the Hofstad Group, London's 7/7 bombers, the Australians arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in 2005 and the Toronto 18, arrested in June 2006.

- *The Religious Dimension.* Jihadi-Salafi ideology is but one stream of the broader Salafi movement. The general goal of this Sunni revivalist interpretation of Islam, is to create a “pure” society that applies a literal reading of the Quran and adheres to the social practices that prevailed at the time of 7th century Arabia.

Implementation of sharia law and replacement of the system of nation states with a worldwide Caliphate are the ultimate political aims. While other Salafi currents encourage non-violent missionary or political activities to achieve these religious/political goals, jihadi-Salafis utilize endorsements of respected scholars of Islam to show that their aims and violent means are religiously justified.

- Contemporary Saudi (Wahhabi) scholars have provided the religious legitimacy for many of the arguments promoted by the jihadists.¹
 - Extreme intolerance and hostility towards unbelievers, including Jews, Christians, Hindus and Shiites, is a core doctrine provided by Wahhabi religious thought. It provides the primary theological foundation for jihadi-Salafi causes and reduces the barriers to violence.
- *The Political Dimension.* The political aspect of jihadi-Salafi ideology is heavily underpinned by the work of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author, Islamist, and the leading intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950’s and 1960’s. He believed that Islam was under attack from the West and divided the world into the Muslim and the non-Muslim. To Qutb, democracy challenged the sovereignty of God’s divine law and should be resisted. Moreover, he also contended that militant jihad had to be used to attack institutions and societies in order to overthrow non-Islamic governments and to bring about a “pure” Islamic society.
 - *The Appeal.* For many Muslims in the West, especially those of the second and third generation who are seeking to learn about their Muslim heritage, the Salafi interpretation is the version of Islam they are most widely exposed to. It has become more mainstream and is proliferated within diaspora communities. This interpretation of Islam is not the cultural Islam of their parents or their home countries.

The personal search for one’s own Muslim identity often dovetails with the desire to find an appropriate Islamic response to the political crises involving Muslims worldwide. Complex disputes like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Kashmir are diluted into one large conflict between “believers” and “non-believers”. This powerful and simple “one-size fits all” philosophy resonates with the younger diaspora Muslim populations in the West who are often politically naïve. This powerful narrative provides evidence of an across-the-board plan to undermine and humiliate Islam worldwide.


As Muslims in the West seek to determine their appropriate response to this perceived "war on Islam" many look for guidance for action from their religion. The jihadi-Salafi interpretation paves a path to terrorism by its doctrines, which suggest that violence is a viable and legitimate means to defend Islam from perceived enemies, even if means attacking one's own government and/or sacrificing your own life.

THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS

The radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases:

- Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization
- Stage 2: Self-Identification
- Stage 3: Indoctrination
- Stage 4: Jihadization

Each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures associated with it. All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages and many, in fact, stop or abandon this process at different points. Moreover, although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression. However, individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in a terrorist act.



Radicalization Incubators

Critically important to the process of radicalization are the different venues that provide the extremist fodder or fuel for radicalizing—venues, to which we refer to as "radicalization incubators."

These incubators serve as radicalizing agents for those who have chosen to pursue radicalization. They become their pit stops, "hangouts," and meeting places. Generally these locations, which together comprise the radical subculture of a community, are rife with extremist rhetoric. Though the locations can be mosques, more likely incubators include cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-governmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores. While it is difficult to predict who will radicalize, these nodes are likely places where like-minded individuals will congregate as they move through the radicalization process.

The Internet, with its thousands of extremist websites and chat-rooms, is a virtual incubator of its own. In fact, many of the extremists began their radical conversion while researching or just surfing in the cyber world. (For further discussion of the role of the Internet --See Text Box on p. 37.)

RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: FIVE FOREIGN CASES




MADRID: MARCH 2004



AMSTERDAM: NOVEMBER 2004



LONDON: JULY 2005



SYDNEY/MELBOURNE: NOVEMBER 2005



TORONTO: JUNE 2006

STAGE 1: PRE-RADICALIZATION. Pre-Radicalization describes an individual's world—his or her pedigree, lifestyle, religion, social status, neighborhood, and education—just prior to the start of their journey down the path of radicalization.

Despite the absence of a psychological profile of a likely candidate for radicalization, there is commonality among a variety of demographic, social, and psychological factors that make individuals more vulnerable to the radical message. For example:

- **The Environment.** The demographic make-up of a country, state, city, or town plays a significant role in providing the fertile ground for the introduction and growth of the radicalization process. Enclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim often serve as "ideological sanctuaries" for the seeds of radical thought. Moreover, the greater the purity and isolation of these ethnic communities, the more vulnerable they are to be penetrated by extremism--under the guise that it represents a purer, more devout form of Islam.
 - Living within and as part of a diaspora provides an increased sense of isolation and a desire to bond with others of the same culture and religion. Within diaspora Muslim communities in the West, there is a certain tolerance for the existence of the extremist subculture that enables radicalization. For the individual, radicalization generally takes place in an atmosphere where others are being radicalized as well.
- **The Candidates.** Individuals, who are attracted to radical thought, usually live, work, play, and pray within these enclaves of ethnic, Muslim communities—communities that are dominated by Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian cultures. Their gender, age, family's social status, stage in life as well as psychological factors all affect vulnerability for radicalization.
 - Fifteen to thirty-five year-old male Muslims who live in male-dominated societies are particularly vulnerable. These individuals are at an age where they often are seeking to identify who they really are while trying to find the "meaning of life". This age group is usually very action-oriented.
 - Middle class families and students appear to provide the most fertile ground for the seeds of radicalization. A range of socioeconomic and psychological factors have been associated with those who have chosen to radicalize to include the bored and/or frustrated, successful college students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants, petty criminals, and prison parolees.

Invariably, these individuals seek other like-minded individuals and often form a loose-knit group, cluster, or network. Commonalities among these individuals' age, residence, school, interests, personality, and ethnicity are critical in determining who becomes a member of a particular group or cluster. As Dr. Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer and author of *Understanding Terrorist Networks*, noted,

"There's really no profile, just similar trajectories to joining the jihad and that most of these men were upwardly and geographically mobile. They came

from moderately religious, caring, middle-class families. They're skilled in computer technology. They spoke three, four, five, six languages including three predominant Western languages: German, French and English." (Al Qaeda Today: The New Face of Global Jihad, PBS.org)

The various local residents and citizens of each of the five Western-based plots, which we have used as case studies, shared many of the commonalities which define the pre-radicalization stage such as:

- Male Muslims
 - While women are increasingly becoming involved with jihadi groups; to date, Western-based radicalized women have primarily acted in a support role
- Under the age of 35
- Local residents and citizens of Western liberal democracies
- Varied ethnic backgrounds but often are second or third generation of their home country.
- Middle class backgrounds; not economically destitute
- Educated; at least high school graduates, if not university students
- Recent converts to Islam are particularly vulnerable
- Do not begin as radical or even devout Muslims
- "Unremarkable" – having "ordinary" lives and jobs
- Little, if any, criminal history

In particular, a review of the each of these five cases we examined reveals common details and instances of these pre-radicalization signatures—signatures depicted in either the people involved in the actual plots or in their surrounding environment. For example,

MADRID (2004 Attack) On March 11th, 2004, a group of young Islamic extremists conducted a series of coordinated bombings against the Cercanias (commuter train) system of Madrid, Spain, killing 191 people and wounding 2,050. Although more than 100 people have been investigated in connection to the bombings, 29 have been charged with participating in the terrorist attack and of the 29, six have been charged with 191 counts of murder and 1,755 counts of attempted murder.

- **The Environment.** Close to 600,000 Muslims live in Spain, with the majority originating from northern Africa's Maghreb countries, mostly Morocco, located just 15 kilometers across the Strait of Gibraltar. Most of those living there

today came during the 1980s. Their numbers grew in the 1990s as they took jobs in Spain's growing agricultural, construction, hospitality and service industry. Currently, there is a growing second generation of teenagers of North African origins who are now 16-17 years old.

The majority of the Madrid terrorists lived in the same or in adjacent neighborhoods within the city limits of Madrid. The areas in which Madrid's Muslims live are quite diverse, with Castilians and other nationalities, such as the Dominicans, co-habiting within a Moroccan diaspora population. This multi-ethnic environment, in general, has facilitated the assimilation of these nationalities into Spanish culture. Yet, it was from this milieu that the Madrid bombers emerged.

- **The Candidates.** The Madrid terrorists were primarily composed of 1st generation North African Muslim men, approximately 30 years old and younger, who fell on both ends of the spectrum of life-success. Some were drug dealers, part-time workers and drifting students. Many of them had criminal records in Spain for drug trafficking and other petty crimes. Others were students, who were doing well in school and appeared to have promising futures. The Spanish authorities never imagined that a group of petty drug traffickers and university students were capable of planning such a massive attack.
 - Jamal Ahmidan, a Moroccan considered the operational planner, was said to have been happily integrated in Spanish society. His Spanish friends included women who sported crop tops, tattoos and piercings.² Ahmidan had immigrated to Spain in the 1990's and became the head of an ecstasy and hashish network that was run by close family members based in both Morocco and Spain.
 - Mohamed and Rachid Ouland Akcha, were also part of this drug network.
 - Jamal Zougam was born in Tangier, Morocco and had lived in Spain since 1983. He and his half-brother Mohammed Chaoui had opened up their own mobile phone shop. Jamal Zougam was described as handsome, likable and one of the more popular youths among the Moroccan community living in Madrid. He enjoyed alcohol, women, and discos and seemed to be perfectly integrated into Spanish society.³
 - Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhret was a promising Tunisian scholarship recipient, who had come to Spain to study economics at Autonomous University of Madrid and who ultimately was considered an ideological leader of the cell.⁴
 - Roommates Basel Ghayoun (Syria) and Anghar Fouad el Morabit (Algeria), were also foreign university students living in Spain.⁵

AMSTERDAM (Hofstad Group) The Hofstad Group was a group of young men who were intent on conducting an attack in the Netherlands and considered a variety of targets and plots including terrorist attacks on the Dutch Parliament and against several

strategic targets such as the national airport and a nuclear reactor. The group also had the intention to assassinate several members of government and parliament. In November 2004, Mohammad Bouyeri, a member of the Hofstad Group, murdered Theo Van Gogh, nearly decapitating him, execution style. This triggered a series of arrests of most members of the group.

- **The Environment.** The Dutch Muslim community is primarily comprised of two major nationalities – approximately 350,000 individuals of Turkish origin and 300,000 individuals of Moroccan descent. The Moroccan community resides primarily in Dutch cities and has had more difficulty integrating into Dutch society and culture.
 - This community traces its roots in the Netherlands back to the 1960's when many immigrated for economic reasons, arriving as temporary guest workers.
 - More than 90% of the Moroccan population came from Berber heritage and were not well educated. According to the Dutch, 2nd generation Moroccans are five to six times more likely to be involved in crime than other Dutch citizens.
- **The Candidates.** The Hofstad Group was a cluster of mostly young Dutch Muslims from North African ancestry. The group was made up of young Muslim males, between the ages of 18 and 28; typically but not necessarily of the second generation as well as a small group of converts.
 - Mohammed Bouyeri was born in West Amsterdam, the son of Moroccan immigrants. He was described as a cooperative and promising second generation immigrant in Holland by some people knew him in at this stage.⁶
 - He attended a local polytechnic to study accounting and information technology, but reportedly spent a lot of his time "on the streets". He had a reputation for a quick temper and he was arrested for assaulting a police officer with a knife.⁷
 - Jason Walters, born in 1985, was the son of an American soldier based in the Netherlands and a Dutch woman. He converted to Islam as a teenager.
 - Ismail Akhnikh, 21, born in Amsterdam to a Moroccan family, who was unruly as a teenage student, was sent to Syria by his family for religious education before he found employment in the Netherlands in the hi-tech industry.⁸
 - Nouredine El Fatmi, of Berber descent, was born in a poor Moroccan village and immigrated to Spain at age 15 before coming to the Netherlands.

LONDON (July 2005 Attack) The July 7, 2005 London transit bombings were a series of coordinated bomb blasts that hit London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. At 8:50 AM, three bombs exploded within fifty seconds of each other on three London Underground trains. A fourth bomb exploded on a bus nearly an hour later in Tavistock Square. The bombings killed 52 commuters and the four suicide bombers,

injured 700 and caused a severe day-long disruption of the city's transport infrastructure countrywide.

- **The Environment.** The United Kingdom has a Muslim population of close to two million, of which half live in London. Approximately 66% of this population is South Asian (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh). More specifically, in the Bradford/Leeds area, more than 10% of this population is of Kashmiri descent. Much of the population in northern England immigrated to the U.K. in the 1960's and 1970's to work in the textile industry, which has now fallen on hard times.
- **The Candidates.** Three of the four bombers--Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, and Hasib Hussain--were second generation British citizens of Pakistani descent from the towns of Beeston and Dewsbury, in northern England. All three grew up near Leeds, about 180 miles north of London. Germaine Lindsey, a fourth bomber, was 1st generation Jamaican from Buckinghamshire, UK—a county adjacent to the city of Leeds.

To many who knew them, all four were described as being well integrated into British society. All four had a Westernized, and unremarkable backgrounds with secular upbringings. None were educated in Islamic-based schools like madrasas; rather, they attended state schools and pursued modern studies. Three of the bombers came from well-to-do families.

- Mohammad Siddique Khan was a family man. He was married, a father, and worked as a teaching assistant with young children—a job he held since 2002. He studied business at Leeds Metropolitan University, from 1998-2001. Following graduation, he worked for the Benefits Agency and the Department of Trade and Industry.
 - As a teenager, Mohammad Siddique Khan shook off his Pakistani-Muslim identity and presented himself as a Westernized young man going by the nickname "Sid".⁹
- Shehzad Tanweer graduated from Leeds Metropolitan University, majored in sports science, specializing in cricket and ju-jitsu. Having come from a hard working and prosperous family, Tanweer had an estate worth \$200,000 and drove a Mercedes.
- Hasib Hussain, an introvert, was the youngest of four children. Despite a good attendance record, he dropped out of secondary school in 2003. Hussain was involved with sports, playing both soccer and cricket for local teams.
- One bomber was a convert to Islam. Germaine Lindsay, 19, was a Jamaican-born British resident who converted to Islam in 2000, and married a white convert. He was described as a bright child, successful academically at school, artistic, musically inclined, and good at sports. Lindsay spent his teenage years close to Leeds, in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire.¹⁰

MELBOURNE/SYDNEY (Operation Pendennis) On November 9, 2005 Australian police raided properties in Melbourne and Sydney, arresting 17 men and seizing bomb-making materials as well as maps of Casselden Place, the Melbourne headquarters of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration.

Although the target set for this group was never definitively determined, the Melbourne suspects had filmed the Australian Stock Exchange and Flinders Street Station, Melbourne's landmark central train exchange. In addition, members of the Sydney cluster were arrested in 2004 surveiling the Lucas Heights nuclear power plant and were reported to have targeted the Sydney Opera House and the Sydney Harbor Bridge.¹¹

- **The Environment.** Australia has approximately 340,000 Muslims and they comprise 1.6 percent of its population of 21 million. This Muslim community is relatively new in Australia as Australia's policy of absorbing significant numbers of refugees from war torn regions of the world played a role in the establishment of this community. Significant numbers of Lebanese refugees, escaping the civil war that ravaged Lebanon during the 1970's and 1980's, settled in Australia. Many second generation Australian citizens from this Lebanese diaspora population work as tradesman and live in the larger cities of Sydney and Melbourne.
- **The Candidates.** There were two clusters of men, one in Melbourne and one in Sydney. Virtually all were male Muslims between the ages of 18 and 28, who were either citizens or long time residents of Australia. At least seven of the Melbourne suspects were second generation Australians, the children of Lebanese immigrants who had grown up somewhat secular and had only began practicing Islam 18 months before their arrest.¹²

Though a few were students, most were tradesmen and laborers, including plumbers and painters. Several had minor criminal records.

- Aiman Joud, was born in Australia to Lebanese parents. One of eight children, he lived with his parents and worked as a site project manager for the family business, Joud Investments. Previously, he had been convicted of firearms and theft charges.
- Abdulla Merhi, 20, a Lebanese from Melbourne, worked as an apprentice electrician.
- Hany Taha, 31, and Izzydeen Atik, 25 had previous police records for minor crimes.
- Fadal Sayadi, 25, a Lebanese from Melbourne, was newly married and reportedly worked as a plumber or concrete worker. He had recently been convicted on minor charges relating to an attempted theft.
- Omar Baladjam, 28, was a former child actor from a popular television show who had starred in Australia Broadcasting Company's *Wildside* and *Home and Away* on TV and ran a painting business.
- Shane Kent, 28 was a convert to Islam.

- Amer Haddara, 26, another of the Lebanese from Melbourne, had earned a computer science degree at university and was working in a personnel recruitment firm.¹³


TORONTO (Toronto 18 Plot) On June 2-3, 2006, police and security agencies in Ontario, Canada carried out a series of counter-terrorism raids in the Greater Toronto Area that resulted in the arrest of 17 individuals. Canadian authorities believe that the men had been planning large-scale terrorist attacks, which included detonating truck bombs in at least two locations in Toronto, opening gunfire in a crowded public area, and beheading Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. It is alleged that the group also had plans to storm/attack various buildings such as the Canadian Broadcasting Center, the Canadian Parliament, the Canadian Secret Intelligence Headquarters, and the CN Tower.

- **The Environment.** The Muslim community of 250,000 in Toronto represents approximately 5% of the overall population. It has a significant proportion of doctors, accountants, businessmen and other professionals among this population. 37% percent of this community has South Asian (e.g. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) origins and twenty-four percent are Middle Eastern.¹⁴
 - **The Candidates.** The Toronto plotters consisted of 18 people, almost all of them in their teens or early 20s. The group originated from two separate clusters—Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto and Scarborough, a neighborhood in Toronto. Accounts from family and friends of the plotters suggest that most, if not all, were “well-integrated” into Canadian society.
 - Fahim Ahmad, Zakaira Amara and Saad Khalid, core members of the group, were friends in Meadowvale Secondary School in Mississauga. They were known to have become more strident in their faith as they grew older.¹⁵
 - Steven Vikash Chand was a Canadian Army Reservist. Prior to converting to Islam from Hinduism, in approximately 2002, he was known to have enjoyed music, dancing and basketball.¹⁶
 - Most of the other plotters were not known to be particularly pious. Two of the plotters, Jahmaal James and Amin Mohammad Durrani, had not practiced Islam until they started the radicalization process.¹⁷
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ARCHETYPES: "The Convert"

Steven Vikash Chand AKA Abdul Shakur

Converts have played a prominent role in the majority of terrorist case studies and tend to be the most zealous members of groups. Their need to prove their religious convictions to their companions often makes them the most aggressive. Conversion also tends to drive a wedge between the convert and his family, making the radicalizing group his "surrogate family."



Steven Chand, age 25, was born in Canada to Hindu parents from Fiji. In some ways, Chand was considered relatively well-integrated, serving in the Canadian military from June 2000 and until April 2004. It was at some point during this period that he converted to Islam.

Chand was described as mild-mannered and easily influenced. Some speculate that his alienation from mainstream Canadian society and conversion to Islam was related to his parents' divorce—an event that further distanced him from his family.

Chand began attending the Salaheddin Islamic Center, a known radical mosque led by fundamentalist imam Aly Hindy. He soon went from seeking answers to providing them. Chand began spending two or three days a week outside public schools handing out extremist literature and seeking converts among school-age children.

As the plot progressed it was Chand who suggested the most unlikely of the group's plans – beheading the Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Other prominent converts among the case studies in this report include: the Walters brothers (Netherlands), Shane Kent (Australia), Germaine Lindsey (UK) and Randall Todd Royer, Yong Ki Kwon, Seifullah Chapman, Hammad Abdur-Raheem and Donald Surratt (Northern Virginia).

STAGE 2: SELF-IDENTIFICATION. This stage, which is largely influenced by both internal and external factors, marks the point where the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam, while slowly migrating away from their former identity—an identity that now is re-defined by Salafi philosophy, ideology, and values. The catalyst for this “religious seeking” is often a cognitive event, or crisis, which challenges one’s certitude in previously held beliefs, opening the individual’s mind to a new perception or view of the world.¹⁸

Individuals most vulnerable to experiencing this phase are often those who are at a crossroad in life—those who are trying to establish an identity, or a direction, while seeking approval and validation for the path taken. Some of the crises that can jump-start this phase include:

- Economic (losing a job, blocked mobility)
- Social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived)
- Political (international conflicts involving Muslims)
- Personal (death in the close family)

Political and personal conflicts are often the cause of this identity crisis. A political crisis is sometimes brought about by some of the “moral shock” tactics used by extremists in spewing out political messages, arguments, and associated atrocities that highlight some particular political grievance that Islam has with the West, or with one’s own government. These messages are usually proliferated via literature, speeches, TV, websites, chatrooms, videotapes, or other media.

Chronic exposure to these extremist political campaigns (e.g. conflicts of Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Israel/Palestinians and Iraq) may initiate feelings of moral outrage. This outrage, which usually resonates louder with Muslims who are already experiencing an identity crisis, leads them in a sense to become “born-again” —a “religious” renewal that all too often is shaped by a radical interpretation of what it means to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim society.¹⁹

A personal crisis such as the death of a family member, a parolee’s search for a new direction in life, a turn to religion as a means to dealing with life crises and disappointment or for atoning for past transgressions, and loneliness are all examples of personal conflicts with which many of these Western-based terrorists struggled.²⁰

The key influences during this phase of conflict and “religious seeking” includes trusted social networks made up of friends and family, religious leaders, literature and the Internet.

Given the high volume, popularity, and almost “faddish” nature of the extremist agenda, an individual who goes searching for answers will invariably be exposed to a plethora of Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam. Most often the vehicles for these exposures include family ties or old friendships, social networks, religious movements like the Tablighi Jamaat, political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, or extremist-like discussions in halal butcher shops, cafes, gyms, student associations, study groups, non-governmental organizations and, most importantly, the Internet.

Ultimately the individual is alienated from his former life and affiliates with like-minded individuals, who, via small group dynamics, strengthen his dedication to Salafi Islam. Importantly, this phase is characterized by a self-selection process by which individuals first join a group that then becomes radicalized.

These crises often compel these individuals to seek out other like-minded individuals, who may be experiencing the same inner conflict. Subsequently, clusters of like-minded individuals begin to form, usually around social circles that germinate within the extremist incubators. Sometimes these clusters develop into actual jihadist cell—a cell that has committed to conducting a terrorist act.

Two key indicators within this self-identification stage that suggests progression along the radicalization continuum are:

- **Progression or Gravitation Towards Salafi Islam**
- **Regular Attendance at a Salafi mosque**

As these individuals adopt Salafism, typical signatures include:

- Becoming alienated from one's former life; affiliating with like-minded individuals
- Joining or forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to strengthen one's dedication to Salafi Islam
- Giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster clothes.
- Wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard
- Becoming involved in social activism and community issues

MADRID (2004 Attack)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** A variety of political and personal crises contributed to Madrid bombers' attraction to the Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islam during their inner battle in defining who they were. For example:
 - For Tunisian scholarship recipient, Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhret, it was a personal crisis. After growing up in a middle-class family in Tunis, Fakhret moved to Madrid in 1994, armed with €29,500 in Spanish-government scholarships to study economics.

"At first he was gracious and engaging," says Miguel Pérez Martín, a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, where he met Fakhret as a fellow student in 1996."

However, over the next few years Fakhret withdrew from school and the world in general. He was described as having become "incommunicative."

(The exact nature of this personal crisis has not been disclosed.) As a consequence, Fakhret spent more and more time in the Salafi mosques and was only interested in talking about Islam and the misery of the world.²¹

As these individuals adopted Salafi ideology, they sought out like-minded individuals by joining groups that provided them a validation of their new found beliefs. Members of these groups had ties to other militant groups; some even had specialized skills that could be used for terrorist purposes.

- Basel Ghayon, a Syrian, and Moroccan Anghar Foud el Morabit joined a Salafi/Wahhabi circle led by Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed, a 32-year-old Egyptian known as "Mohamed the Egyptian."
- Sayed Ahmed, who claimed to be a veteran jihadi who had fought in both Bosnia and Afghanistan, was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. A former member of the Egyptian army, Sayed Ahmed was an explosives expert. He began attending Friday prayers at the M-30 mosque in 2001, where he came in contact with many of the Madrid bombers.²²
- **The Salafi Mosque.** As these individuals continued moving towards Salafism, they began attending Centro Cultural Islámico (Islamic Cultural Center), popularly known as the "M-30 mosque." ("M-30" was a name that was coined for this mosque's due to its proximity to Madrid's M-30 motorway). M-30 had a history of being the mosque of choice for radical-thinking Muslims and as an extremist incubator, became a hub for the formation of the Madrid bomber cell.
 - Some of the Madrid bombers met with remnants of an extremist group which had formed around Imam Eddin Barakat Yarkas in the 1990's. These extremists played a critical role in the further radicalization of the Madrid bombers.
 - Yarkas had organized a militant Salafi support network for jihadi fighters in Bosnia in Spain in the 1990's and prayed at the M-30 mosque in Madrid.
 - Before Yarkas was arrested after 9/11, his group proselytized their views and eventually challenged the imam of the mosque for its leadership.²³

AMSTERDAM (Hofstad Group)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Mohammed Bouyeri's journey to radicalism appears to have begun during his seven month stay in prison—a sentence based on an assault charge. He became more religious and extreme in his views.²⁴
 - After being released from prison, Bouyeri switched his academic pursuits from accounting to social work and began volunteering at his local community center. His friends say he began to wear "traditional" clothing and grew a beard. He was also more sensitive to political issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Bouyeri's transformation continued with a deepening of his religious convictions while his views on social issues became more conservative.

- As Bouyeri became more of an activist he began organizing Salafi-related events at the community center. He discouraged women from attending and sought to ban of alcohol. Eventually, Bouyeri was asked to leave.²⁵
- **The Salafi Mosque.** Bouyeri began frequenting the Al-Tawheed mosque—a mosque that was well known to Dutch authorities as being Salafi and very extreme. The imam at the mosque praised suicide bombers and sold literature that advocated the killing of homosexuals.²⁶

LONDON (July 2005 Attack)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Beeston's extremist mosque and surrounding community, including youth clubs, gyms, and Islamic bookshop served as the “extremist incubators” for Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shezhad Tanweer and Hasib Husain's adoption of Salafi Islam.
 - In 2001, members of the 7/7 London group began to spend time at a youth club in Beeston, playing pool, boxing, and “hanging out.” Extremists often used the club as a venue to proliferate their radical messages to the more susceptible youth. Jihad was a frequent topic of discussion at the club.
 - One of the gyms was known as “the al-Qaeda gym” due to its significant extremist membership.²⁷

All three of the 2nd generation Pakistani London bombers appeared to experience this Salafi-based religious transformation; while Germaine Lindsay converted.

- Mohammed Siddique Khan's transformation began when he first entered Leeds Metropolitan University between 1998 and 2000.²⁸
 - Khan, somewhat new to Salafi Islam himself, began to pray regularly at school, attend mosque on Fridays. He gave up fighting, bouts of drinking and using drugs. He began volunteering as a teaching assistant at an elementary school.²⁹
- Shezhad Tanweer changed as well, giving casinos a rest and growing a beard.³⁰
- Hasib Husain appeared to become more religious – wearing traditional clothing and a prayer cap after a trip on hajj to Saudi Arabia in 2002.³¹
- Germaine Lindsay's mother had converted to Islam in 2000 and, shortly after, he converted—taking the name “Jamal”. Lindsay's behavior became somewhat erratic and he began associating with troublemakers.
 - At his local mosque and within his Islamic circles in Huddersfield and Dewsbury, Lindsay was admired for the speed with which he achieved fluency in Arabic. According to those who knew him, he

memorized long passages of the Quran, showing unusual maturity and seriousness. He also began wearing the traditional white thobe.³²

- In 2002, Germaine Lindsay's mother moved to the US to live with another man, leaving Lindsay alone at the family home in Huddersfield. This has been described as a traumatic experience for Lindsay, for which he was ill equipped and may have pushed him towards seeking solace and support in the Salafist mosque.³³
- **The Salafi Mosque.** Mohammed Siddique Khan attended all three mosques in Beeston, at least two of which had a strong extremist influence.
 - The Hardy Street mosque was run by Kashmiri Muslims; The Stratford Street by Pakistani Tablighi Jamaat; and the Bengali mosque on Tunstall Road by Bangladeshis, primarily. Finally, Khan chose to belong to the Stratford Street mosque—a mosque which followed the more rigid, orthodox, Deobandi school of Islam, with a heavy Tablighi Jamaat presence.³⁴

MELBOURNE/SYDNEY (Operation Pendennis)

Though the details of what characterized this self-identification process among the members of the Sydney and Melbourne clusters are not yet available, it appears these plotters also experienced that same pattern of struggling for identity, dissatisfaction with mainstream Islam, and looking to Salafism as an answer.

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Forty-five year-old cleric Abdul Nacer Benbrika, a native Algerian and leader of both the Sydney and Melbourne clusters, appears to have begun his radicalization journey once he arrived in Australia in 1989. For Benbrika, Sheikh Mohamed Omran, was the extremist incubator, who paved the way for his radicalization. Omran was a follower of the infamous jihadi-Salafi cleric, Abu Qatada, whom Omran brought to Australia on a speaking tour in 1994.³⁵
- **The Salafi Mosque.** Benbrika began preaching at Omran's Brunswick mosque, attracting a small following. He called Osama bin Laden a "great man" and endorsed the goals and actions of Algeria's Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). Later, Abdul Nacer Benbrika was able to extend his influence into New South Wales, creating a second cell in the Sydney area.
 - A number of those arrested in Melbourne as part of Operation Pendennis frequented the Brunswick mosque. This location served as a hub where many of the Melbourne suspects began to self-identify with the jihadi-Salafi ideology propagated by Benbrika.³⁶

TORONTO (Toronto 18 Plot)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Similar to the many of those involved in the other plots and attacks, the Toronto plotters also struggled with their identity as evidenced by this excerpt from a poem that was posted on the Internet by Zakaria Amara in 2001.

*"Please someone find me
I want to find the light
but no one is there to guide me
Open the door someone give me it's key"*

Saad Khalid, a high school student at Meadowvale Secondary School, formed the "Religious Awareness Club". During lunch time, he would preach Islam to other students and spent a good part of his time with Fahad Ahmad and Zakaria Amara. The trio even created a chat group called the "Meadowvale Brothers". Schoolmates stated that the three began to dress more traditionally and became more withdrawn.

- **The Salafi Mosque.** The trio from Meadowvale began attending the Al Rahman mosque in Mississauga, where they met Qayyum Abdul Jamaal, the "spiritual sanctioner" who would help them progress to the next stage of radicalization.³⁷ While some of the other plotters attended different mosques, all were progressively being radicalized.
 - Steven Vikash Chand attended the Salaheddin Islamic Center, a known radical mosque. Imam Aly Hindy, an Islamic fundamentalist, was his mentor.
 - In April 2004, Chand, who had been enrolled in the reservist corps since June 2000, renounced his Hindu faith, declared himself Muslim, and left the reserves.
 - As recounted by those in his unit, before Chand left the reserves, he had reported for duty with the beginnings of a beard, telling his sergeant that it was required by his religion.³⁸

STAGE 3: INDOCTRINATION. Indoctrination is the stage in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause. That action is militant jihad. A “spiritual sanctioner” plays a leading role in this phase of radicalization (see Text Box p. 38).

The key aspect of this stage is the acceptance of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports violence against anything *kufir*, or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda. In effect, as the individuals become indoctrinated, they re-define their direction in life. That is, rather than seeking and striving for the more mainstream goals of getting a good job, earning money, and raising a family, the indoctrinated radical's goals are non-personal and focused on achieving “the greater good.” The individual's sole objective centers around the Salafi aim of creating a pure fundamentalist Muslim community worldwide.

Two key indicators that an individual is progressing to or is experiencing this stage of radicalization are:

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** As individuals begin to conceive militant jihad as an objective, they retreat from the mosque—the mosque that not only served as an extremist incubator for their formative years in becoming radicalized but also and often as the place where these individuals met their like-minded cohorts.
 - This withdrawal is sometimes provoked by the fact that the mosque no longer serves the individual's radicalization needs. In other words, the individual's level of extremism surpasses that of the mosque. Many of these withdrawals are preceded by some type of quarrel between the individual and mosque officials and/or other worshippers. Other times, the mosque is perceived as a potential liability.
 - An individual who begins to contemplate action now perceives the mosque as a threat to exposing his or her intentions. Given the series of terrorist-related arrests over the past few years, mosques are now perceived as being monitored by law enforcement and intelligence.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** As these individuals mold new identities based on Salafi ideology, they now begin to transfer this radical vision and mindset to the real world. Global events are now perceived through this newly found extremist ideological lens. From the conflict in Kashmir to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, all are blamed on a conspiratorial attack by unbelievers on Islam and the Muslim world.

What was merely an ideology transforms into a personal cause. The world for these individuals becomes divided into two sides: the enlightened believers (themselves) and the unbelievers (everybody else). The unbelievers become their arch enemy. Signatures associated with this phase include:

- Joining a group of like-minded extremists that help facilitate the individual's continued departure from the secular world and all the things it represents. The group becomes the individual's new world. The group members

become their new family—substituting the need for any interaction with the outside world.

- Holding meetings and discussions with an increasing radical agenda in more private settings—such as in the private residences of the group members, back rooms of book stores, or in isolated corners of prayer rooms.

Consequently, as individuals progress through the indoctrination phase, they most likely have already sought, found and bonded with other like-minded individuals. This loosely-knit but cohesive group of people forms a cluster—an alliance based on social, psychological, ideological, and ethnic commonalities.

The Internet—An Evolving Resource

The Internet plays an important role during the radicalization process. As individuals progress through the various stages, their use of the internet evolves as well. In the Self-Identification phase, the internet serves chiefly as the person's source of information about Islam and a venue to meet other seekers online. With the aggressive proliferation of the jihadi-Salafi ideology online, it is nearly impossible for someone to avoid this extreme interpretation of Islam.

During the Indoctrination phase those undergoing this self-imposed brainwashing devote their time in the cyber world to the extremist sites and chat rooms—tapping into virtual networks of like-minded individuals around the world who reinforce the individual's beliefs and commitment and further legitimize them. At this stage, individuals or the groups they are in are likely to begin proliferating jihadi-Salafist ideology online along with consuming it. The Internet becomes a virtual "echo chamber" –acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating the path for the ultimate stage of Jihadization.

In the Jihadization phase, people challenge and encourage each others move to action. The internet is now a tactical resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an attack.

ARCHETYPES: "The Spiritual Sanctioner"

Ridwan Al-Issar

A dramatic change in lifestyle and ensuing isolation creates a vacuum requiring even more guidance on how to build a new life that supports his newfound ideology. Individuals seen as being able to provide crucial guidance on how to live every detail of the religion have a critical role during this phase.

Consequently, a critical element in pushing a group further along the radicalization path is the "spiritual sanctioner". This person generally appears during the Self-Identification phase and is the major influence during the Indoctrination phase.

The sanctioner is responsible for developing the "Us-versus-Them/War on Islam" worldview among the group that provides the moral justification for jihad. The sanctioner is often a "self-taught" Islamic scholar and will spend countless hours providing a "cut-and-paste" version of Islam which radicalizes his followers. In many cases, the sanctioner is not involved in any operational planning but is vital in creating the jihadi mindset.

The role of this "spiritual sanctioner" cannot be underestimated because "if an individual respects an Islamic scholar and that scholar tells him that fighting in the jihad is a religious duty and the only way to please God, the advice can have an enormous effect on choices."³⁹

According to press reports, Al-Issar first applied for asylum in Germany in 1995 and was not religious. He used multiple alias and asylum applications to keep him in Germany and the Netherlands. When his asylum application was rejected in Germany, he tried again in the Netherlands in 1998. During his stay in Dutch asylum hostels, it appears he underwent a spiritual awakening.

Al-Issar began studying jihadist literature and learning about Islam on the Internet. There is no evidence that he ever formally studied Islam and the evidence suggests he went from non-religious to Islamic "expert" within about two years.

Armed with his Internet derived "scholarship", Al-Issar soon began giving lectures and gravitated towards the radical Al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam. At Al-Tawheed, Al-Issar came in contact with the young men who formed the Hofstad Group and began serving as their spiritual guide.

Al-Issar eventually withdrew from the mosque and he began preaching in private apartments to his followers. It is unclear exactly how much Al-Issar was involved in the operational planning of the group. He vanished on the day Theo van Gogh was murdered and Dutch authorities believe he may be in Syria.

Other spiritual sanctioners among the case studies of this report include: Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed (Madrid), Abdul Nacer Benbrika (Sydney/Melbourne), Qayyum Abdul Jamal (Toronto) and Ali al Timimi (Virginia).



MADRID (2004 Attack)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** During the indoctrination phase, members of the Madrid group began to separate themselves from secular society. They left the M-30 mosque because it was not sufficiently extreme and was potentially too conspicuous (monitored by the authorities). In mid-2002, some of the main co-ordinators of the attacks began holding their radical discussions in the living room of Faisal Allouch's nearby private house, where they discussed jihad.⁴⁰
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** According to Spanish court documents, Tunisian student Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhel's activities became more radical following Spain's participation in the 2003 Iraq War Coalition.
 - During 2003, Fakhel spent considerable time cruising jihadi websites for ideas on terrorist attacks. Based on analysis of his computer's hard drive, Fakhel was specifically interested in the explosives used in both the Bali and Casablanca.⁴¹

Prison—A Radicalizing Cauldron

Prisons can play a critical role in both triggering and reinforcing the radicalization process. The prison's isolated environment, ability to create a "captive audience" atmosphere, its absence of day-to-day distractions, and its large population of disaffected young men, makes it an excellent breeding ground for radicalization.

Two of the Madrid bombers--Moroccan Jamal Ahmidan and Algerian Alleka Lamari--were either radicalized or more deeply indoctrinated in prison.

- Ahmidan, a non-observant Muslim incarcerated for petty crimes, was indoctrinated into radical Islam while in a Moroccan jail over the course of about 2 ½ years. Ahmidan was fascinated by some of the inmates who were veterans of the Afghan jihad. As these jihadists used the prisons--a haven of disaffected men who are ripe for radicalization-- for attracting future recruits, Ahmidan also became fascinated with their radical views.
- Ahmidan was released in 2003—a man now wholly transformed into a Salafi, ideologically and politically. Upon his return to Spain, Ahmidan not only prayed the required five times a day, but spoke incessantly about jihad and his desire to fight the Americans in Iraq. Although Ahmidan stopped drinking and using drugs following his transformation, he continued to sell drugs to non Muslims.⁴²
- Allekema Lamari, who had been arrested in 1997 for belonging to an Algerian extremist group, had already been radicalized. However, according to open source, his five year stint in prison nurtured his extremist views and actually intensified his radical mindset. During his incarceration, Lamari joined an Algerian Islamist prison group.⁴³

AMSTERDAM (Hofstad Group)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** Mohammed Bouyeri's withdrawal from the Al-Tawheed mosque was influenced by the decision of the entire radical group, to which he belonged—to leave. The group, which included several members of the Hofstad Group, was mentored by Redouan Al Issar, a Syrian who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Issar was the group's "spiritual sanctioner". The group began holding both prayer and political discussion sessions in Bouyeri's apartment. During these private sessions, the group also watched jihadi videos and was active online promoting and debating jihad.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** Mohammed Bouyeri's progression from the self-identification stage to indoctrination was swift. The articles that Bouyeri would write for the community center, where he volunteered, became increasingly more radical—as Bouyeri's religious and political views became intertwined.
 - While in early 2002, Bouyeri was writing about tolerance and mutual respect, by April 2003, he was comparing the Dutch police to Nazis and calling for American soldiers in Iraq to be beheaded.⁴⁴ By mid 2003, his writings became even more strident:

"...the Netherlands is now our enemy, because they participate in the occupation of Iraq. We shall not attack our neighbors but we will those who are apostates and those who are behaving like our enemy."⁴⁵
 - As the group's "communication coordinator", Bouyeri further nurtured his political agenda by hosting a chat room for like-minded individuals, and translating/posting essays by prominent jihadist thinkers, including Abu Ala Maududi and Sayid Qutb, on websites.⁴⁶

LONDON (July 2005 Attack)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** By 2001, the two leading members of the 7/7 group, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer left the local Deobandi mosque in Beeston, saying its approach to outreach was too narrow, its focus too apolitical. The young zealots felt contempt for the mosques' imams, who were from the subcontinent, spoke minimal English and knew little of the challenges British Muslims faced. Moreover, the Deobandi mosques did not address the issues of concern to the members of the 7/7 group and instead abided by an injunction by mosque elders that politics or current events involving Muslims should stay outside the mosque.⁴⁷
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** After they left the mosques, they gravitated to the Iqra Learning Center in Beeston, just blocks away from the youth center. This was part of the process of gradually separating themselves from secular society and self-radicalizing. They were soon joined by Hasib Husain. Here they were free from their parents' Islam as well as from scrutiny. They had political discussions about Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya and organized study groups and produced jihad videos depicting crimes by the West on the Muslim world and

accessed the internet. This local bookshop was a central node in the community for radical Islam - not only did it sell Islamic books, tapes and DVD's, but it also hosted lectures and discussion groups on Islam.⁴⁸

- o By 2002, Khan was leading and participating in paintball outings with youth groups from the Leeds area. These events served as bonding and vetting opportunities and were often preceded by Islamist themed lectures. It is believed that through one of these outings, Khan met Germaine Lindsay.⁴⁹
- o Lindsay had been strongly influenced by the extremist preacher Abdallah al Faisal (also of Jamaican origin) who served a prison sentence in the U.K. for soliciting murder, incitement to murder, incitement to racial hatred and distributing material of a racial hatred nature. Lindsay is believed to have attended at least one lecture and to have listened to tapes of other lectures by him.⁵⁰

MELBOURNE/SYDNEY (Operation Pendennis)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** Ultimately, Imam Abdul Nacer Benbrika broke away from Omran's Brunswick mosque, taking the most violent, radical elements of the congregation with him. In addition, rather than studying jurisprudence at a recognized Islamic university, Benbrika taught himself Islam, largely cut off from the wider community.⁵¹ This absence of a classical background contributed to Benbrika's adoption of the jihadi-Salafi interpretation of Islam and only enabled him to teach the younger group members a "cut and paste" version Islam.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** Based on information that came to light at the trial for the Melbourne cell in the summer of 2006, Benbrika's indoctrination of the group was based on his belief that the Islamic community was under attack from the non-Islamic community of infidels. He said that Muslims were committed to engage in violent jihad, to persuade the government to withdraw Australian troops from Afghanistan and Iraq and frequently discussed the Islamic duty to fight the kufr (unbelievers or infidels). Benbrika preached that there was no difference between the government and the people who elected the government officials.⁵²

Benbrika served as "spiritual sanctioner" for both Australian clusters.

TORONTO (Toronto 18 Plot)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** By 2005, some of the group members from Meadowvale Secondary School began to skip classes to visit Musalla-e-Namira, a private, informal prayer room on top floor of two-story building near a high school in Scarborough.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** By this stage, the young men of Toronto were ready to hear a more strident Islamic message. In Mississauga, the 43 year-old Qayyum Abdul Jamaal was delivering that message. Abdul Jamaal was known

by the other congregants to have an "us-versus-them" view of the world in which Muslims were being oppressed by the West. He had no formal religious role in the mosque but his radical views were tolerated by the leadership because he cleaned the mosque for free.⁵³ Abdul Jamaal also had a reputation for reaching out to young people, taking them camping, playing basketball, etc. The suspects soon began to be influenced by his views and adopted them as their own.

- o Online, the suspects began discussing political issues and the permissibility of jihad. They watched jihadi videos online and communicated with like-minded individuals from around the world ranging from the U.K. to Bosnia. Communication in chat rooms with like-minded individuals around the world served as an "echo chamber" for their jihadists views, serving to only reinforce them. The Mississauga group went as far as wearing combat fatigues to the mosque - a fact that was noted as unusual by the other congregants, but not reported to authorities.
- o As they got deeper into this insular world, their ideas began to harden. An extract from one of Zakaria Amara's online poems written in 2003 stands in stark contrast from a "searching" poem he wrote just two years prior. See the comparison of the two below:

2001

*"Please someone find me
I want to find the light
but no one is there to guide me
Open the door someone give me it's key"⁶⁴*

2003

*"I am filled with peace when at the masjid I hear the Iqama
But when I show more interest they call me Osama
Just trying to practice my deen so they call me extreme
They tell me I am too young, I am only sixteen"⁶⁵*

In Scarborough, convert Steven Vikash Chand and another suspect, Mohamed Durrani took their new found fervor to recruit more young people. Both spent time at the campus of a local high school where they were able to convince the youngest members of the group to join.

STAGE 4: JIHADIZATION. This is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation and execution.

By the jihadization phase, small group dynamics play a much more prominent role. While during the earlier stages, the group members may have been only acquaintances, meeting each other in Salafi chat rooms, at university or simply by being friends, by the jihadization phase the group has solidified and hardened. Individuals see themselves as part a movement and group loyalty becomes paramount above all other relationships.

“Group-think” now becomes a force multiplier for radicalization and invariably paves the way for action. As action becomes a group objective, each member of the cluster is challenged to accept jihad as an individual obligation—anoointing themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. This act of accepting a personal duty to participate in jihad is by its very nature an internal decision and one with very subtle, if not invisible, signatures. In fact, the only way to know if someone has passed this marker is by observing their subsequent actions or by gaining a window into their personal feelings.

While some individuals independently seek opportunities to fulfill this jihadi obligation; others achieve it by being part of a group that decides, collectively, to conduct a terrorist act.

If an attack is a group objective, the next step will include target selection and operational planning. Although the commitment to accept jihad is an individual choice, the decision to attack is made as a group and the actual attack is conducted by the group. The type of targets a group or cluster chooses and the modus operandi it employs might vary considerably between individual clusters. However, the ultimate objective for any attack is always the same--to punish the West, overthrow the democratic order, re-establish the Caliphate, and institute sharia.

It is critical to note that while the other stages of radicalization may take place, gradually, over two to three years, the jihadization stage—the stage which defines the actual attack--can occur quickly, and with very little warning. In some cases, this stage runs its course in as little as a couple of weeks. The jihadization stage contains many sub-stages, all of which usually occur, but not necessarily sequentially. Each of these sub-stages is characterized by a unique set of indicator(s).

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** As each group member accepts jihad, they often look abroad--seeking that one trigger that will lead to their final acceptance of jihad or for others an opportunity to actually conduct jihad.
 - **Traveling Abroad.** Frequently, but not always, one or more members of a particular Western-based cluster travels abroad. This travel often follows or contributes to a member’s decision to commit jihad. The travel is more often than not to a militant training camp—a camp usually in a country or region that is regarded as a field of jihad. Pakistan, in particular, as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Somalia are popular destinations. The “leaders” of these clusters are usually the ones who pursue this travel—an experience that appears to be the final catalyst for group action.

Many of those who embark on such trips either are seeking further religious justification for their newly adopted jihadi mindset or have already committed to jihad and now are looking for opportunities to put thought into action.

- For those seeking religious justification, attending a religious retreat steeped with extremist thought and apart from the distractions inherent in a Western civilization often acts as a “suicidal trigger” in providing the attendee the justification and conviction for suicidal jihad.
- For those seeking action, their initial intention is most often to become a mujahedeen and fight for a particular cause. However, many are regarded as battlefield liabilities and rejected. Some are re-directed to return home and to fulfill their jihadist objectives by conducting a terrorist act in their Western homeland.
 - Individuals reared in a Western urban setting and culture usually lack the physical and mental fortitude and endurance to survive, much less, fight in underdeveloped and severe environments such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq and Somalia. Moreover, the lack of native language capability also can limit their value and acceptance as fighters.
- **Training/Preparation.** As members of a cluster decide to conduct jihad, they become more and more isolated from their “secular” or “outside the group” life. They reach a point where the only people they truly trust are members of their group. They become very attached to each other and often seek opportunities to bond, train, and do things together.

These activities help define the roles and capabilities of each individual while solidifying the group’s cohesiveness, and esprit-de-corps that is vital for a successful coordinated attack. Prior to launching the attack, many of these clusters have participated in some form of group training and preparation to include:

- **“Outward Bound”-like Activities.** Activities such as camping, white-water rafting, paintball games, target shooting, and even outdoor simulations of military-like maneuvers have been popular among these groups once they reach this stage of radicalization.

Once would-be terrorists commit to jihad, some require continual reinforcement for committing the act—an act that will require people to die. For plots involving suicide, one of the most critical requirements for success is the un-wavering conviction of each individual member of the group to die by taking his/her own life. This conviction is especially difficult to maintain in a Western environment—a predominantly secular environment that values life, does not condone suicide, and markets wealth, comfort, and prosperity as ultimate life goals. As members of a cluster progress through the jihadization phase of the process, they have committed to jihad but continue to reinforce their commitment via “group think.” However, each member often

requires additional individual reinforcement. For example,

- **Mental Reinforcement Activities.** Members of a cluster that have committed to murder and, in some cases, suicide often turn to the Internet or other extremist media to fortify their resolve to die.
 - Extremist websites, chatrooms, and blogs provide forums for rallying support, alleviating fears, and obtaining religious sanctions.
 - Jihadist videos and tapes help "psych" the terrorist by glorifying death by jihad as a true hero's inevitable fate.
 - Other means for reinforcement that potential suicide bombers have used include drafting a last will and testament or making a pre-suicide video. Both these mechanisms allow the suicide terrorist to renew his or her extremist vows while ensuring that their death has meaning. It also permits them to bid final farewell to family--hoping to retain their honor and admiration.
- **Attack Planning.** Once a cluster or group decides to conduct an attack, they begin conducting research while holding secretive tactical group discussions on targets, the mode of attack, the operational scenario (date, time, and hour), and the role of each group member. This sub-stage includes several indicators such as:
 - **Researching on the Internet.** The Internet has been used extensively by the plotters of terrorist attacks in choosing targets, formulating the mode of attack, and acquiring the technical capability. The Internet's broad and unrestricted access to information has provided attack planners with a variety of options and advice for launching an attack.
 - **Reconnaissance/Surveillance.** Drawing maps, videotaping targets, and staking out target areas will invariably be conducted in the run-up to any attack.
 - **Acquiring Materiel/Developing the Device.** The majority of the devices used or that were being planned to be used in the homegrown plots were either commercially available or reasonably obtainable. Fertilizer-based devices, commercial explosives, cell phones and explosive ignition devices have all been acquired with relative ease.

That said, the acquisition of the materiel and the development of the weapon has on occasion been associated with low-end criminal activity and almost always suspicious activity such as: cooking chemicals to form explosives in bathtubs, purchasing large amounts of any one chemical or material, outfitting/modifying backpacks, buying TNT and wiring watches as detonators.

The ultimate stage of jihadization is, of course, the actual attack. By this time, all the potential preemptive indicators have expired. The terrorists have attained both intention

and capability and the chances for law enforcement and intelligence thwarting or preventing an attack is extremely low.

MADRID (2004 Attack)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** The catalyst for pushing the Madrid group into the jihadization phase was the anonymous posting on December 10, 2003, of a document called *Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers: Practical Steps for the Blessed Jihad*, on the Global Islamic Media, one of the more popular jihadi websites.

The 42 page document discussed ways to defeat the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Its strategy was to leave the U.S. with the complete financial burden for the occupation, which eventually would result in its withdrawal. The way to accomplish this goal was to politically force U.S. allies to withdraw from Iraq.⁵⁶

“Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq. It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year. We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure.”

This document was also found in Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet's computer and is believed to have influenced the timing of the attack. The document called for a campaign of bombings, shortly before the March 14, 2004 general elections, resulting in a change of government, which would then order the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.⁵⁷

- **Attack Planning.** Once the Madrid group committed to jihad in December 2003, they scrambled to acquire the capability to launch the attack.
 - Fakhet downloaded tactical information on how to make bombs and how to use cell phones as detonators.
 - Jamal Ahmidan used his ties to a Moroccan hashish gang to barter drugs for dynamite.
 - The group rented a house in Chinchon for storing the hashish, dynamite and ultimately building the bombs.⁵⁸
 - On March 4th, Jamal Zougam, purchased and supplied 20 stolen Mitsubishi Tritium T110 mobile phones cell phones to serve as detonators.⁵⁹
 - **The Result.** On the morning of March 11, 2004, the group bombed the Spanish rail system.
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AMSTERDAM (Hofstad Group)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** By 2003, various members of the Hofstad cluster had exhibited actions that demonstrated that they had committed to jihad. Jason Walters, the 19-year old Dutch-American convert, was one of the first to commit to jihad. He had already made a hit list including a number of prominent Dutch political figures including Ayaan Hirsi Ali among others.
 - Some time before September 2003, it is believed that Jason Walters had attended a training camp in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan.
 - Samir Azzouz had become well known to Dutch authorities for attempting to join Islamic fighters in Chechnya.
- **Attack Planning.** By October 2003, Samir Azzouz had obtained bomb making equipment and developed a list of targets including the Dutch Parliament, Amsterdam's international airport and a nuclear power plant.

On October 14, 2003, group members, Samir Azzouz, Ismail Akhnikh, Jason Walters and Redouan al-Issar were arrested for planning an attack in the Netherlands. While the others were released for lack of evidence, Azzouz was tried but acquitted because he had assembled the wrong mix of fertilizer for explosives.⁶⁰

- **Training/Preparation.** Although Jason Walters was also subsequently released, the authorities had confiscated his computer and found chat logs where he had specifically sought out religious sanction for attacks, clearly demonstrating his intentions.⁶¹

During a chat on September 19, 2003, Walters sought sanction (via a friend: Galas03) from Imam Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven for jihad. Abdul-Jabbar was a Dutch convert who was a traveling imam. Walters' screen-name was "Mujaheed":

Mujaheed: "you have to go to jabbar"

Galas03: "I will see him today InshaAllah at the lesson"

Mujaheed: "Go and ask him if it is here allowed to slaughter the unbelievers and/or to steal their possessions"

Galas03: "He has said about it, see it this way: the government, ministries, police etc., their blood and possessions is halal [we can take], because they openly declared war to the islam, but before you do something you have to think twice about what will happen with the islamic community."

Mujaheed: "OK djazaak Allah. This is the fatwa needed. Now I can slaughter every police, minister, soldier, officer etc. And robe [sic] them"⁶²

- **The Result.** By October 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri had become convinced of his personal obligation to do jihad himself, acquired his own gun and he began to practice shooting. As the group began to make plans for carrying out some of their grander operations, without warning, on the morning of November 2, 2004, before these plans could be realized, Bouyeri brutally shot and killed Theo Van Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam. This led to the arrests of the other members of the group within days and effectively rolled up the leaders of the Hofstad Group.

LONDON (July 2005 Attack)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** For some of the 7/7 bombers, the acceptance of their obligation for jihad began in July 2003. Travel abroad played prominently in directing them to conduct an attack in the U.K., solidifying the group's commitment to jihad, and providing them the advice and experience for acquiring the capability.
 - In July 2003, Mohammed Siddique Khan traveled to Pakistan and received military and explosives training at a camp in Malakand, in the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan. The original purpose of the trip was for Khan to deliver funds raised in the U.K. for jihadi groups, such as Kashmiri fighters or the Taliban. However, following his arrival at the Islamabad airport, Khan decided to stay and attend a jihadi training camp.⁶³
 - During his training, Khan met Mohammed Junaid Babar, a New Yorker of Pakistani origin who later confessed after being arrested to being a key al-Qaeda operative who was involved in an attempt to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in 2003.
 - He also met Momin Khawaja, an Ottawa-based software technician who later designed and built electronic detonators to be used to trigger a huge fertilizer-and-fuel bomb along with four British conspirators (Operation Crevice).⁶⁴
 - In late November 2004, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and met Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, a former major in Saddam Hussein's army, who was regarded as one of al-Qaeda's most experienced, intelligent and ruthless commanders.
 - Recognizing the potential for re-directing already radicalized British Muslims, who traveled to the region with the desire to become mujahedeen in Afghanistan or Iraq, Abd al-Hadi was responsible for re-tasking both Khan and Tanweer to attack the U.K..⁶⁵
 - Pakistani records show the pair departed Pakistan on the same flight in early February 2005. Upon their return to the U.K. in February 2005, Khan and Tanweer immediately began planning an attack to punish Britain.

- **Training/Preparation.** As Mohammad Siddique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer moved closer to the launch date, they continued looking for opportunities to bond with other like-minded individuals.
 - Khan and Tanweer rode the whitewater rapids at Canolfan Tryweryn, the National Whitewater Centre, on June 4, 2005—approximately a month before the attack. There is reporting that two members of the unsuccessful July 21, 2005 London bomb plot in London, may have attended this very same whitewater rafting trip.⁶⁶
 - It is important to note that at some point during their travels to Pakistan, both Mohammad Siddique Khan and Shezad Tanweer filmed the video tape justifying their actions for the 7/7 bombings.
 - **Attack Planning.** The bombs used in the 7/7 attacks were homemade using relatively inexpensive, commercially available ingredients. Although these explosive devices could be manufactured using information solely available in the open sources, it is likely that the group obtained specific instruction, tips, or advice from bomb experts during their travel to Pakistan.
 - The first purchase of material to build 2-5 kg of homemade peroxide-based explosive was on March 31, 2005. Materials consistent with these processes were discovered at the apartment in Leeds, which was believed to be the “bomb factory.”⁶⁷
 - In retrospect, wilted plants, along with constantly open windows shielded by window treatments, were indicators that noxious explosives were being prepared at the apartment.
- There appears to have been at least one reconnaissance/dry run visit to London on June 28, 2005 by Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay.
- The three journeyed from Beeston to Luton and then to King's Cross station before traveling on the underground. They were picked up on CCTV near Baker Street tube station later in the morning and returned to Luton at lunch time.
 - Train tickets found at the Leeds bomb factory after the attack suggest there had been additional visits to London in mid-March.⁶⁸
- **The Result.** In the early hours of July 7, 2005, Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shezhad Tanweer, Hasib Hussain and Germaine Lindsay left their homes to complete the final piece of the jihadization phase – the attack.
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ARCHETYPES: "The Operational Leader"

Mohammed Siddique Khan

In order for a group of people with a grievance to turn into a terrorist cell, they need an effective leader. This leadership comes in two forms: Operational and Charismatic. These two qualities are sometimes found in separate people in a group and sometimes in one person. Operational and charismatic leadership are vital in providing training, motivation, discipline and group cohesiveness. Leadership within the group is the key determinant in terrorist "success".



Mohammed Siddique Khan was born in 1974 in Leeds, U.K. to Pakistani parents. At the 30, he was the oldest of the four men involved in the July 7th attacks in London was designated by authorities as the leader. Khan's early life was unremarkable. Khan was not particularly observant as a youth but came to the religion as a young man.

He worked administrative jobs in the public sector before attending Leeds Metropolitan University. During this time he got a part-time job helping at-risk youth and discovered he had a knack for dealing with young people.

Khan's skill with young people led to a job at a local school working with special needs children and youngsters with behavioral problems. He was praised for his dedication, ability to gain the trust of young people and was seen as a role model by many. Khan began mentoring youths through the local mosques, community centers and gyms. As his religious views became more extreme, his charisma and his volunteer work brought the other members of the cell into his orbit.

After Khan's return from Pakistan in February 2005, planning for the 7/7 attacks accelerated. From March until the attacks, the group displayed great discipline, detailed planning and operational security – all indicative of Khan's leadership ability.

Other operational leaders among the case studies in this report include: Fahim Ahmed (Canada), Jamal Ahmidan (Spain) and Mohammed Atta (Hamburg) and Randall Todd Royer (Northern Virginia).

MELBOURNE/SYDNEY (Operation Pendennis)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** By the time of the arrests in November 2005, the two Australian groups had moved quite deep into the jihadization phase, having already accepted their duty to jihad and having begun planning violent acts to coerce the Australian government into withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.

They had held training camps in remote areas and were speaking in codes. They also had amassed extremist Islamic material, conducted surveillance on potential targets and were in the process of creating weapons with readily available materials.

- Previous travel abroad appears to have contributed to the group's entry into the jihadization phase.
 - Among the Melbourne cluster, only convert Shane Kent is thought to have trained abroad. In mid-2001, allegedly he had trained at a Jaish-e-Mohamed camp in Pakistan before proceeding to al-Qaeda's al-Farouq camp.
 - Among the Sydney cluster, at least three of the individuals had already been in Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) training camps in Pakistan including Khaled Chaiko, Mustafa Chaiko, and Mohamed Ali Elomar.⁶⁹
- **Training/Preparation.** Members of both the Sydney and Melbourne clusters traveled to the Australian outback for an outdoor group venture and also began preparing themselves mentally for conducting an attack.
 - The Melbourne suspects participated in outdoor bonding activities, including paramilitary-like training at a rural Kinglake property and at various commercial hunting properties.
 - Similarly, two western New South Wales properties were used as jihad training camps by the Sydney cluster, whose members posed as recreational hunters.⁷⁰
 - Six of the eight Sydney men attended "training camps" held in March and April of 2005, leaving behind ammunition shell casings, and unidentifiable burned and melted material.⁷¹
 - Members of this group watched graphic video footage of executions and decapitations in Chechnya as part of their mental preparation for jihad.⁷²
 - Abdulla Merhi asked Benbrika for sanction to become a suicide bomber.
 - Reportedly, Mazen Touma told his mother that "jihad was an obligation for every Muslim" and that if his mother didn't agree, "he did not need her permission."⁷³

- **Attack Planning.** Both the Sydney and Melbourne clusters conducted reconnaissance and target preparation.
 - The Melbourne suspects filmed the Australian Stock Exchange and Flinders Street Station, Melbourne's landmark central train station.
 - During the November raids by Australian authorities, officers reportedly found maps of Casselden Place, the Melbourne headquarters of both the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Immigration.
 - Members of the Sydney cluster were arrested in 2004 reconnoitering the Lucas Heights nuclear power plant. They were reported to have targeted the Sydney Opera House and the Sydney Harbour Bridge.⁷⁴

Some of the Australian plotters used car theft and credit card scams to finance the purchase of the materiel for conducting the attacks.

- Following arrests made as part of Operation Pendennis, the Sydney cluster was found to have been in possession of hundreds of quarts of chemicals as well as laboratory equipment, 165 detonators, 132 digital timers, batteries, firearms and ammunition. The suspects' homes also contained bomb-making manuals.
 - Reportedly, Australian chemical suppliers claimed they had tipped off the authorities about several attempts by this cluster to purchase large quantities of hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hydrochloric and/or sulphuric acid and hexamine—all chemicals which can be used in explosives⁷⁵
- **The Result.** Following a "walk-in" tip, two government paid confidential informants were able to penetrate the group and enabled the intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and prevent the group from carrying out its attacks in November 2005.

TORONTO (Toronto 18)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** With the influence of radical preachers, the Internet and their own echo chamber of self-radicalization, the Toronto group finally accepted their obligation to jihad and began the jihadization stage in late 2005. Rapidly, they shifted from talking and debating towards action.
 - In late December 2005, Jahmaal James traveled to Balikot, Pakistan for one month, ostensibly to find a bride, but where authorities believe he received paramilitary training.
- **Training/Preparation.** Members from both Toronto clusters used outdoor activities as venues for both training and bonding.

- Cluster members traveled to an isolated rural property in a remote part of Ontario to practice shooting and do military exercises in the snow during the Christmas week of 2005. During this outing, they also made a video imitating military warfare and discussed potential targets with two young Muslim men from the U.S. state of Georgia.⁷⁶
 - Neighbors saw them "dressed in camouflage" and heard "automatic gunfire"⁷⁷
 - **Attack Planning.** Targets which they had already identified included the Canadian Security Intelligence Services office, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the CN Tower (all in Toronto) and the Canadian Parliament Building in Ottawa. The group had already begun to acquire the tools they would need to commit their attacks, including guns, detonators and explosives.
 - When Canadian authorities arrested the group in June 2006, they already had detonators and a handgun and were in the process of seeking to purchase three tons of ammonium nitrate for \$4000.
 - **The Result.** As in Australia, two government-paid confidential informants, who were accepted into the group, enabled the Canadian intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and prevent the group from carrying out its attacks. Arrests commenced on June 2, 2006.
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Trajectories of Radicalization Outside the United States

	Pre-Radicalization	Self-identification	indoctrination	Jihadization
HAMBURG Mohammed Atta Rashid bin al Shihb Masran al Shihb Ziad Jarrah	Arrives as student-Hamburg, 1982 Moves to Hamburg 1985; met Atta Arrives as student-Germany, 1998 Arrives as student-Germany, 1996	Returns from haj, more devout, 1995 Runs student study groups with Atta Father dies; joins Hamburg group, 1998 Returns from Lebanon; devout 1996	Radicalizes at bookstore/private flat Weekly meetings; discuss jihad, 1998-9 Moves in with Atta and al-Shah, 1998-9 Moves to Hamburg; girlfriend problems	Individuals depart for Afghanistan for training; attend AQ camps, 1998-2000 Jihad/ Iraq document posted; attack planning begins, 12/03 Al Issar disappears. Bouyeri kills Theo van Gogh. Hosted cluster arrested November 2004 Khan/Tanweer travel to Pakistan 12/04; return/begin attack planning Recen conducted weapons, maps and explosives obtained; cluster arrested 11/05 Plan formulated; recon conducted; ammonium nitrate ordered; cluster arrested June 2006
MADRID Jamil Ahmidan Samir Fakhet Jamil Zougarn Rabei Ahmed	Runs ecstasy drug network, 1998-00 Arrive as student-Madrid 1994 Run mobile phone shop Arrives in Frankfurt-1999 from Egypt	Incarcerated in Morocco 2001-3 Personal crisis; Dahdah group 1996 Plan mobile phone shop Begins to attend M-30 mosque 2001	Emerges from prison as hardcore Salafi Leaves M-30 mosque; private meetings Attends private meetings, 2002 Radicalizes two foreign students 2002-3	
AMSTERDAM Mohammed Bouyeri Redouan Al Issar Nasser Walters Nouriddin El Faini Samir Azzouz	Studies accounting/IT at polytechnic Seeks asylum in Germany, 1995 Converts to Islam, as teen, 2002 Immigrated to Spain (Morocco), 1997 Successful high school student, 2004	7 months in prison; mother dies, 2003 Forms cluster via El-Tawheed mosque Travels to Pakistan/Afghanistan, 2002 Attends El-Tawheed mosque, 2001 Arrested going to Chechnya, 2003	Reits flat for private meetings, 2003 Lectures on jihad at meetings Arrested; plans political assassinations Reassignment trip to Portugal, 2004 Arrested; plans against airport, 2003	
LEEDS-LONDON Mohammed Khan Shehzad Tanweer Hasib Hussain Germaine Lindsay	Student at Leeds University, 1998-01 Student at Leeds University, 2001-4 Shy high school student, 1998-2003 Converts to Islam in 2000	Becomes devout; volunteer work 2001 Speaks at youth centers w/Khan 2001 Friends with Khan and Tanweer 2003 Mother leaves UK for US 2001	Leave mosques; meetings at bookstore Discussions on jihad; Iraq, Palestine With Khan/Tanweer at Al-Ibra bookstore Meets Khan and joins cluster 2004	
SYDNEY/ MELBOURNE Abdul Benbrika Shane Kent Abdullah Merhi Khaled Chaiko Harry Taha	Arrives: Australia from Algeria, 1989 Converts to Islam in mid 1990's Worked as an apprentice electrician Staunch Salafi 2 nd generation -Lebanese descent	Starts his own breakaway group 1994 Attends AQ training camp in 2001 Attends radical sermons at mosque Attends LeT training camp, 2001 Employed as spray painter	Preaches Iraq/Afghanistan War vs Islam Paramilitary training outside Melbourne Seeks permission to be suicide martyr Camping/ training trips outside Sydney Car theft committed to fund activities	
TORONTO Zakaria Anara Cayum Jamaal Steven Charif Fahim Ahmad Saad Khalid	Meadowdale High School, 2001-4 Pakistan nephew; cleans mosque Serves in Canadian Army Meadowdale High School, 2000-3 Bright student high school 2002-5	Poem-Meadowdale Brothers blog 2001 Befriends youth at mosque Converts to Islam in 2002 Meadowdale blog, changes clothing Forms Religious Club, 2003	New blog poem - changed attitude 2003 Promotes anti-Canada view, 2003-5 Travels to Scarborough; recruit students Discusses permissibility of jihad on web Goes on military training exercise, 12/05	

RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES



PORTLAND, OREGON



LACKAWANA, NEW YORK

NORTHERN VIRGINIA

RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The five foreign case studies discussed are examples of how Europeans, Australians, and Canadian citizens were radicalized. History, geography, politics, demography, and culture are all factors which affect the ease, speed, and degree of how radicalization occurs.

For example, Europe traditionally has served as an asylum for diaspora communities that have sought political, social, and economic refuge from their oppressed lives in their native lands. Generous welfare systems coupled with immigration laws that do not encourage the assimilation of these largely Muslim communities into European culture and society have exacerbated the speed in which radicalization has spread within the European continent. This non-assimilation has allowed the migrant diaspora communities to become isolated--an isolation that has allowed them to avoid traditional European culture, society, and national spirit. For many of this diaspora, Europe is merely a place of residence and not one of belonging.

The United States has appeared to be somewhat immune from this process. It has not experienced an Islamic-based "homegrown" attack and the magnitude of the plots that have been thwarted has not risen to the level of those in Europe. In fact, in most U.S. cases, the would-be terrorists were still at a stage where they were traveling abroad for the purposes of training or becoming mujahedeen to fight abroad—not because they had decided to attack targets in the homeland. Nevertheless, New York City's 2004 Herald Square and the recent Fort Dix plots—plots that involved the targeting of U.S. citizens in the homeland-- are examples that even the U.S. is at risk for a "homegrown" terrorist attack.

We have examined three U.S.-based "homegrown" cases: The Lackawana Six, The Portland Seven and Northern Virginia Paintball. All three cases had progressed to a level of threat where arrests were made and the perpetrators indicted, although none posed direct threats to U.S. lives or infrastructure. However, all three cases involved people who became radicalized to the point of intending to commit jihad—be it as a terrorist or as fighters killing infidels in the mountains of Afghanistan.

The three U.S.-based cases provided fewer examples of signature activities during the stages and sub-stages of the radicalization process than the five foreign examples. The lack of rich details on these U.S. cases, coupled with the fact that they were disrupted at a relatively early stage, obscured the fact that radicalization had occurred. Nevertheless, the three U.S. cases still provided sufficient evidence to corroborate parts of each of the four stages—from pre-radicalization to jihadization—demonstrating that these plots were also underpinned by the same radicalization process that the members of the five foreign plots underwent.

The Plots:

- The Lackawana Six.
 - The Portland Seven
 - The Northern Virginia Paintball
-

STAGE 1: PRE-RADICALIZATION

Most of the same indicators and signatures that were common among the five foreign plots were also common to the three U.S. plots.

Generally, the plot members were:

- Male Muslims, under the age of 35, who were local residents and citizens and came from varied ethnic backgrounds. In fact, all were between the ages of 18 and 37 with the average ages at the time of their training activity being about 27.
- Many, but not all, were the children of immigrants from the Middle East or South Asia; the second generation in the U.S.
- Significant proportions came from middle class backgrounds; none were economically destitute.
- Most had some form of higher education, at least high school graduates, if not university students.

LACKAWANA, NEW YORK (The Lackawana Six)

- **The Candidates.** In Lackawana, the cluster was made up of eight Yemeni-Americans—both 1st and 2nd generation. All were U.S. citizens and the first known to train at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, prior to 9/11.
 - A number of them were second-generation children of immigrants who had come to work at the Bethlehem Steel plant in the 1970's. None were particularly religious.
 - Six were graduates of Lackawana High School. They were known by their peers and family as being more interested in playing soccer and hockey and partying than conducting jihad.⁷⁸
 - One Lackawana-born Yemeni had been raised in Saudi Arabia, had received advanced weapons training in Afghanistan and fought as a mujahedeen in Bosnia in the 1990's – Kamal Derwish.⁷⁹

PORTLAND, OREGON (The Portland Seven)

- **The Candidates.** This cluster consisted of eight people, six of whom were born in the United States. Five were arrested following an attempt to join al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11. The group's membership was quite diverse and included:
 - A 38 year-old middle-class father and husband who was a former engineer for the world's largest semiconductor maker - Intel.
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- An African-American convert, who had majored in Chinese and International Studies at Portland State. Between the years of 1998 and 1999, he was widely described as a model intern while working at Portland's City Hall.
- A one-time Mary Kay cosmetics representative who was trying to get out of his commitment to the U.S. Army reserves after washing out in boot camp.
- The ex-wife of the cosmetic representative, who transferred money abroad to her ex-husband.
- Two brothers of Arab descent who had sought to start a landscaping business.
- A Jordanian national who was a resident of Portland and claims to have been a mujahedeen and fought in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
- An extremist Lebanese imam who preached in the community.⁸⁰

NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Virginia Paintball)

- **The Candidates.** The diverse cluster included:
 - Four U.S.-born converts: two former U.S. Marines and two former U.S. Army soldiers, all who had converted to Islam (one was a decorated Gulf War veteran).
 - A South Korean-born convert who graduated from Virginia Tech with a degree in engineering.
 - A Yemeni national who was the son of a diplomat.
 - A computer technology whiz from Pakistan.
 - A Pakistani-American kitchen designer.
 - A 40 year-old doctoral student in computational biology from George Mason University who served as the spiritual leader of the cluster.⁸¹

STAGE 2: SELF- IDENTIFICATION

Similar to the foreign cases, certain members of the U.S. groups, influenced by both internal and external factors, began to explore Salafi Islam. In some cases, a crisis - personal or external - precipitated this process. While a variety of triggers may have served as the catalyst, ultimately the individual was alienated from his former life and affiliated with like-minded individuals, who via small group dynamics strengthened his dedication to Salafi Islam.

LACKAWANA, NEW YORK (The Lackawana Six)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Kamal Derwish served as both a catalyst and a spiritual sanctioner for the Lackawana cluster's progression into this stage. Upon his return to Lackawana from Yemen in 1998, Derwish, described as "a card carrying member of al-Qaeda," held private meetings at his apartment for small groups of young men following evening prayers. These meetings, with extremist agendas, became popular—drawing as many as 20 regular attendees of males in their late teens and early 20's.
 - Derwish was a skilled mentor, often mixing religion with leisure. Young men were captivated by Derwish's passionate rhetoric. Since few Yemenis in the Lackawana community practiced Salafi Islam, they were awestruck by Derwish, who one follower called a "music man of religion."
 - According to one member of the cluster, "I really was, you know, starting to learn my religion and I didn't see, I never really saw the mujahedeen part of it."⁸²

PORTLAND, OREGON (The Portland Seven)

- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** Palestinian born Mike Hawash was known by friends as an American-trained computer whiz kid, not a disassociated Muslim. By the time Hawash was 30, he was considered a prodigy at Intel, a "go-to" guy in the competitive programming and hardware industry. Hawash was not a practicing Muslim. However, he was drawn back to Islam following the death of his father, who lost a long struggle with diabetes in 2000.⁸³
 - According to his friends, it was a difficult year for Hawash and he returned to Islam as a way to cope. In early 2001, Hawash made a pilgrimage to Mecca. Signs of Hawash's spiritual renewal included:
 - Growing a beard and covering his head with a prayer cap
 - Shedding his secular identity for an Islamic one.
 - Hawash asked those who had known him for years as "Mike" to call him "Maher."
 - Hawash paid off the mortgage on his house because Islam forbids paying interest on loans.
- **The Salafi Mosque.** Hawash stopped worshipping at the Bilal Mosque and started attending the Masjid as-Saber, the Islamic Center of Portland—a mosque recognized as espousing a Salafi message. He began associating with more fundamentalist Muslims, making contact with the men who introduced and orchestrated the travel to Afghanistan for jihad.⁸⁴

NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Virginia Paintball)

- **The Salafi Mosque.** The Dar Al-Arqam, in Falls Church, Virginia served as a Salafi ideological incubator for the Virginia cluster. It was used as a meeting place for extremists and where members of the Virginia cluster were exposed to radical rhetoric and people
 - Ali Al-Timimi, a Salafi and doctoral student in computational biology, frequently gave lectures at the mosque and became the cluster's spiritual and intellectual leader and mentor to many in the group.
 - Prosecutors alleged that al-Timimi enjoyed "rock star" status. He had enormous charisma, wielding significant influence over this group of young Muslim men in northern Virginia.⁸⁵
 - Randall Todd Royer, a convert, former U.S. army member and veteran of the jihad in Bosnia in 1994, lectured at the mosque and spent time with members of the cluster.
 - Lectures at the mosque discussed the righteousness of violent jihad in Kashmir, Chechnya, and other places around the world.⁸⁶
- **Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.** After meeting Ali Al-Timimi and Randall Todd Royer, some congregants of the group began to interact with them and discuss religious matters outside the mosque.

STAGE 3: INDOCTRINATION

Both the Portland and Virginia clusters, like the European, Canadian and Australian groups, withdrew from the mosque as part of their self-imposed isolation. However, the Salafi mosque never played a significant role in the radicalization of the Lackawana cluster since group had not coalesced in a mosque, but rather at Derwish's apartment. In addition, they made the decision to travel to Afghanistan relatively early in their radicalization process.

LACKAWANA, NEW YORK (The Lackawana Six)

Unlike some of the other radicalizing groups of young men, the Lackawana cluster may have traveled to Afghanistan before they had fully accepted jihadi-Salafi ideology. Consequently, the Lackawana cluster received their indoctrination into jihadi ideology while in al-Qaeda's al-Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. Although, their intention to travel to Afghanistan had been to further their pursuit of Salafism, they ended up in a militant training camp—a place that served both as an ideological and jihadi incubator.

- According to one of the six, in the spring of 2000, Derwish - the cluster's spiritual and operational leader, encouraged several members of the community to travel abroad, as part of a pilgrimage to salvage and rectify their insufficiently devout Islamic lifestyle.

- As one of the members of the cluster recounted, "I was hungry for knowledge of the religion itself," said Sahim Alwan, one of the college educated members of the group, "It was a religious quest, and yes, we didn't know about the camp part."⁸⁷
- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** The Lackawana cluster had not coalesced in a mosque and never spent much time in the town's one Yemeni mosque. In fact, their travel was a part of their "withdrawal" from Lackawana's mosque environment and its secular community. Derwish's private residence had been the group's meeting place for radical discussion and further indoctrination.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** Part of their indoctrination while attending the training camp in Afghanistan included watching jihadi videos—videos that glorified the bombing of the USS Cole and highlighted atrocities committed against Muslims in Lebanon, Indonesia and Israel.⁸⁸

PORTLAND, OREGON (The Portland Seven)

- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** Al Saoub, a former mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict, introduced the cluster to a "political agenda"—an agenda that would now allow the cluster to view world events through their newly-acquired extremist lens.
 - According to officials, al Saoub became the de facto leader of the group of six men who would ultimately travel from Portland to China in the weeks following the September 11 attacks. They were planning on traveling to Afghanistan via China.
 - Al Saoub provided the members of this cluster the "political justification" for the group's ultimate objective, which was to travel to Afghanistan and fight U.S. forces as jihadists.⁸⁹

NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Virginia Paintball)

- **Withdrawal from the Mosque.** Beginning in 2000, having progressed to preparing for jihad, the Virginia cluster met frequently in private locations, furthering their radicalization with discussions.
- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** In approximately June 2000, Randall Royer, the convert and former U.S. army member who had fought in Bosnia as a jihadi, held private discussions with members of the cluster on his experiences serving with Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in Pakistan earlier that year. Members of the cluster were told not to discuss further any of what they heard.⁹⁰

STAGE 4: JIHADIZATION

For the Virginia and Portland groups, the attacks of September 11 served as the trigger for their decision to commit to jihad. Many of these plotters had previously traveled abroad and attended training camps where they had completed their indoctrination.

Although travel to Afghanistan--early in their radicalization--helped speed up their indoctrination for the Lackawana cluster, it may have actually acted as an impediment to their final acceptance of jihad.

LACKAWANA, NEW YORK (The Lackawana Six)

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** Members of the Lackawana cluster attended an al-Qaeda training camp in the spring of 2001, and reportedly met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, this exposure to militant jihad at a stage in their radicalization before they had yet to fully be indoctrinated in a holy warrior or mujahedeen mindset may have impeded their progression to the jihadization stage.
 - Four out of the Lackawana cluster members had left Afghanistan before completing the six-week al-Qaeda training course.
 - According to one individual who had left the camp early, when the six re-united in Lackawana later that summer, they discussed the importance of keeping their experience quiet, as though it almost never happened.
 - After September 11, the members of the cluster lowered their profile in the community and began a process of separating themselves from the entire Afghanistan experience. They even broke contact with Derwish, their leader.⁹¹
 - Only one of the seven Lackawana Yemenis made the individual commitment to suicidal jihad. As one of them noted,

“He [Jaber Elbaneh] was planning on going to the fighting against the Northern Alliance, and stuff like that. Basically his mindset was “I want to be a martyr. I want to die.”

 - Following his time at the camp, Elbaneh never returned to the United States, traveling instead to his native Yemen to live with his wife and children.
 - In 2006, Elbaneh was among the 23 men who tunneled out of a Yemeni prison after being arrested in 2003.
 - **Training/Preparation.** Although all six underwent militant training, including firing assault rifles, launching rocket-propelled grenades, and assembling plastic explosives, Molotov cocktails and land mines, these experiences were never transferred into an operation. Since this cluster never progressed any deeper into the jihadization stage, there was never any evidence of any operational targeting or planning in the U.S.
 - **The Result.** The cluster was ultimately dismantled and arrested following the travel of one member to Bahrain in September 2002 to get married. He had sent
-

suspicious e-mails back to the U.S. discussing what was construed to be coded language for a terrorist act--an "upcoming wedding" and "big meal."⁹²

PORTLAND, OREGON (The Portland Seven).

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** While some members of the Portland cluster progressed to the jihadization phase by the summer of 2001, it wasn't until 9/11 that the group as a whole began seeking out opportunities to conduct jihad. Ultimately they determined that jihad could be realized as mujahedeen in Afghanistan battling the American invaders.
- **Training/Preparation.** The group engaged in martial arts training and firearms practice, as part of a training regime, specifically to prepare them for their future lives as mujahedeen. In fact some of the members of this cluster conducted practice firing about two weeks after 9/11.
 - By mid-October 2001 and on the urging of al Saoub, the cluster traveled to Beijing, in an attempt to enter Pakistan with the ultimate aim of joining the Taliban.
- **The Result.** The group made its way to Beijing and eventually to Kashgar, in western China. However, they were eventually turned back by Chinese troops at the Pakistani border. On their return to the U.S. in 2002, six out of the seven were arrested. Al Saoub was killed by Pakistani forces in 2003.


NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Virginia Paintball)

- **Training/Preparation.** During the summer of 2000, the members of the Virginia cluster accelerated their purchase and usage of semi-automatic weapons, ammunition and regularly participated in shooting practice in Pennsylvania and Virginia. The individuals in the cluster clearly saw themselves as soldiers and this was part of their training.
 - In March 2001, in rural Virginia, the cluster used paintball weapons and equipment to practice small-unit military tactics, with the intention of simulating the actual combat environment that they would face.
 - By July, another member of the cluster traveled to Pakistan to train in a LeT camp. All in all, three members of the group engaged in military training in Pakistan before September 11, 2001.⁹³
 - The group also prepared themselves mentally by watching jihadi tapes, prior to launching on their journey to become mujahedeen.
 - The cluster's favorite video, "Russian Hell," a jihad video that featured bloody clips of a Chechen Muslim rebel leader executing a Russian prisoner of war, served as a key inspirational force in maintaining the group's zeal and
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
courage to continue on their path to become jihadists.

- According to one member of the cluster, "They (the videos) motivated us. It was like they gave us inspiration." ⁹⁴
 - **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** Although some of the individual group members had committed to jihad, the decision to accept jihad as a group occurred five days after the 9/11 attacks at one of the members' house, in Fairfax, Virginia. The spiritual sanctioner, Ali al-Timimi, told his followers that the time had come for them to go abroad to join the mujahedeen engaged in violent jihad in Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Indonesia and that U.S. troops were legitimate targets. He also told the conspirators that they could fulfill their duty to engage in jihad by joining the LeT in Pakistan, because the LeT was on the correct path.
 - By September 20, 2001 four members of the cluster had departed the U.S. for Pakistan and by October, all four had participated in training at a LeT camp.
 - **The Result.** On June 27, 2003, eight of the eleven men were arrested on charges they formed a "Virginia jihad network" with ties to the Kashmiri separatist group LeT. ⁹⁵
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
THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE



THE HERALD SQUARE SUBWAY CASE



MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR



SYED HASHMI

THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE

Since September 11, New York City has been targeted numerous times by Islamic terrorists. To date, the 2004 Herald Square plot is the only known homegrown plot in New York City that reached the jihadization stage. However, radicalization continues permeating New York City, especially its Muslim communities. Two particular examples of how radicalization has transformed residents of this City into terrorists include the 2004 Herald Square Plot and, what we refer to as the "Al-Muhajiroun Two."

2004 Herald Square Plot. On August 27, 2004, shortly before the Republican National Convention (RNC), Shahawar Siraj and James Elshafay were arrested and charged with conspiring to attack one of New York City's busiest subway stations at Herald Square with bomb-filled backpacks. The RNC was to be held in Madison Square Garden, a block away from the Herald Square subway stop, starting August 30th. The attackers hoped to collapse the Manhattan Mall, which is immediately above that stop.

- As documented in court records, the plotters had created maps of where they would put explosives and completed a dry run with backpacks to test the police response on August 21, 2004.⁹⁶
- A New York federal court found Siraj guilty of plotting to commit a terrorist act in *United States v. Shahawar Matin Siraj* in 2006. Siraj was sentenced to 30 years. James Elshafay, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced to five years.

The Al-Muhajiroun Two. Although this case did not involve any direct threat to New York City or to the U.S. homeland, it clearly involved the radicalization aspect of the homegrown phenomena. Both terrorists were homegrown in New York City. That is, both became radicalized in New York City to the point of being prepared to commit jihad.

New York City residents, Syed Hashmi and Mohammed Junaid Babar, both members of the New York City chapter of the extremist group al-Muhajiroun, traveled to the UK and joined-up with elements of al-Qaeda. Both became involved in terrorist activities overseas.

- Babar was arrested in April 2004 in New York after his return from Pakistan. He pleaded guilty to five counts of providing and conspiring to provide money and supplies to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
 - Two years later, in June 2006, British authorities arrested the other New Yorker, Syed Hashmi, in London's Heathrow Airport. He was charged with aiding the al-Qaeda plot to attack targets in London and for delivering military equipment and funds to radical Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
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STAGE 1: PRE-RADICALIZATION**The Herald Square Plot and The Al-Muhajiroun Two**

- **The Environment.** New York City has a diverse Muslim population of between 600,000 and 750,000 within a population of about 8 ½ million--about 40% of whom are foreign-born. Unfortunately, the City's Muslim communities have been permeated by extremists who have and continue to sow the seeds of radicalization. Muslim communities are often more vulnerable to the radicals' agenda—an agenda that uses Islam as the center stage for spreading and justifying extremist views. Radicalization is indiscriminate and those attracted to it include New York City citizens from all walks of life, ranging from university students, engineers, business owners, teachers, lawyers, cab drivers to construction workers.
 - **The Candidates.** Similar to the members of both the overseas and domestic case studies, the New York City extremists were male Muslims approximately between 20-30 years old.
 - Shahawar Matin Siraj was a 23 year-old Pakistani illegal immigrant at the time of his arrest. He was member of the Ismaili sect of Islam, a persecuted minority in Pakistan, prior to coming to the United States a teenager with his family in 1999.
 - Siraj described himself as having attended Christian schools in Pakistan and having little interest in religion. ⁹⁷
 - James Elshafay was a troubled young man who was looking for direction in life. He was the 19 year-old son of an Egyptian father and Irish Catholic mother. He converted to Islam at around age 12, at his Egyptian father's insistence and dropped out of school after failing three times to complete the ninth grade. Elshafay spent his teen years drinking and taking drugs.
 - Twenty-six year-old Pakistani-born Syed Hashmi attended Robert Wagner High School in Long Island City and graduated from Brooklyn College in 2003 with a degree in political science. He had been described by those who knew him as a quiet, bright, and caring young man whose devotion to Islam was passionate but not overzealous.
 - Muhammad Junaid Babar was a 29 year-old, Pakistani-born man, whose family moved to the United States when he was two years-old. Babar spent most of his formative years in Queens.
 - Babar attended La Salle Military Academy, an all-boy military boarding school in Oakdale, Long Island and graduated with the rank of Second Lieutenant in 1994.
 - He studied pharmacy at St. John's University in New York but dropped out prior to completing the curriculum.
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STAGE 2: SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Far from being only a European phenomenon, many young Muslims in New York City are also struggling with their identity and often fall prey to the extremist ideology. Dissatisfied with the direction and values that traditional family and religious leaders can offer, they are drawn to alternative leadership and social groups to fill those needs.

Salafi Influences and Incubators

This Salafi ideological influence has engaged the city's Muslim community through a variety of conduits. An individual's first exposure to these more extremist interpretations of Islam is often facilitated by informal groups or clusters of young men. These informal social networks themselves are usually associated with a particular venue – community center, non-governmental organization, university group, housing project, café or even a particular mosque and provide an environment conducive to radicalization.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's). Increasingly, Salafi NGO's are proliferating this militant ideology by distributing literature from Salafi ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Banna. Moreover, these entities are seeking to widen their appeal among students by sponsoring joint Salafi-based events with local MSA's, subsidizing Salafi oriented adult learning classes and by providing forums for young, dynamic imams who espouse a more politicized form of Islam.

Bookstores, Cafes, Hookah Bars, and Internet Cafes. Other seemingly benign venues among diaspora communities can often serve as locations for indoctrination and comprise a radical subculture within the city. The presence of radical literature, extremist tapes and access to jihadi-Salafi websites make these locations incubators that can nurture extremist thoughts and rhetoric and can further the radicalization process (as evidenced by court records of the Herald Square case).

Muslim Student Associations. Among the social networks of the local university population, there appears to be a growing trend of Salafi-based radicalization that has permeated some Muslim student associations (MSA's). Extremists have used these university-based organizations as forums for the development and recruitment of like-minded individuals – providing a receptive platform for younger, American-born imams, to present a radical message in a way that resonates with the students. For example, one book increasingly being cited for discussion by many of these associations is Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab's *Kitab At-Tawheed*, the foundational book for Wahhabi Islam.

Extremist Literature from Saudi Arabia. The "Noble Quran," published by the Saudi-based al Haramain Foundation, is a Wahhabi/Salafi version of the Quran, which found its way into the New York State Correctional system. Although the Quran is in Arabic, it is supplemented by footnotes and appendices that are written in English. These, written by Saudi religious authorities, are non-traditional, militant interpretations of the Quran.

A recent review in *The Middle East Quarterly* characterized this version as reading more "...like a supremacist Muslim, anti-Semite, anti-Christian polemic than a rendition of the Islamic scripture."⁹⁸

As these young Muslims explore their Islamic identity, their activist spirit causes them to gravitate to the more militant message of jihadi-Salafi Islam—a message that calls for aggressive action rather than steadfastness and patience. As Shamsi Ali, Deputy Imam of the Islamic Cultural Center of New York and director of the Jamaica Muslim Center in Queens notes,

“There are local preachers who distort our faith to foment hatred of America. There are people who, rather than encouraging young people to build better lives for themselves, irresponsibly egg them on toward an angry and narrow view of the future. I see this danger every day. As a scholar of the Koran and community leader in New York, I work closely with hundreds of Muslim teenagers. To a person, they have typical American dreams of becoming doctors, business people, baseball players, you name it. But I know Muslim young people well enough to understand that some who are susceptible to dangerous ideologies could turn in the wrong direction.”⁹⁹

- ***Gravitating Towards Salafi Islam.*** Imam Ali’s comments accurately reflect what appears to be a growing jihadi-Salafi subculture within the City. In New York City, Salafism comes in many forms to include sermons given by visiting radical imams, the sale of jihadi tapes, extremist websites, lectures and other activities sponsored by extremist student associations, as well as traveling jamaatis or pilgrimages to and from extremist madrassas and mosques, and radical literature from Saudi Arabia.

As the members of both the Herald Square Plot and The al-Muhajiroun Two searched for their identity they encountered a variety of extremist incubators, which resulted in their introduction to Salafi and ultimately jihadi ideology. (See Text Box: p. 68)

- In the late 1990’s Syed Hashmi joined the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), a Jamaica, Queens-based Muslim NGO sponsored youth group as a means to explore Islam. Subsequently, ICNA’s message was too passive for Hashmi and he moved from ICNA to attend meetings of al-Muhajiroun - where his extremist transformation took root.
 - Although ICNA does not espouse a blatantly radical message, its curriculum is filled with Salafi doctrine and its recommended literature includes the writing and beliefs of such Salafi ideologues as Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Mawdudi, and Hassan al-Banna.¹⁰⁰
 - At Brooklyn College, in 2002, Hashmi was introduced to the views of al-Muhajiroun, an extremist organization.¹⁰¹ There he became a different person and by the time he graduated in 2003 with a degree in political science, Hashmi had become something of a magnet and powerhouse recruiter for al-Muhajiroun.¹⁰²
- The Internet appears to have had the most significant effect on Mohammed Junaid Babar. Once he began his journey exploring Salafi ideology, Babar dropped out of St. John’s University pharmacology program and took on odd jobs, such as valet parking, with no specific career goals. The Internet

introduced him to al-Muhajiroun, which, just like Hashmi, became his ideological incubator.

- According to Babar, during the 1990's "they (al-Muhajiroun) had representatives in New York. I was able to meet them on the internet. We spoke numerous times over the phone and there was also a lot of literature available on the internet I was able to see." As a result of this interaction, he became increasingly politicized and began seeking unity for the Muslim world.¹⁰³

Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay's paths to radicalization traversed a bookstore—an Islamic bookstore which became an extremist incubator for both as they progressed through the stages of radicalization.

- Soon after September 11, Siraj began working in his uncle's Islamic bookstore, which was located next to a Sunni mosque. He started to read the books in the store and attend prayers at the mosque and took an interest in learning more about Islam.¹⁰⁴
- In August 2002, at age 17, Elshafay traveled to Egypt to visit relatives—a visit that is believed to have led to his newly-found interest in Islam.¹⁰⁵
 - When he returned to New York City, he sought out more information about Islam, which led him to the Islamic bookstore where Siraj worked.¹⁰⁶

STAGE 3: INDOCTRINATION

The Islamic bookstore and al-Muhajiroun continued serving as the extremist incubators for both the Herald Square plotters and the al-Muhajiroun Two, respectively. Because each of these extremists established early roots in these incubators, the mosque never played a major role in their radicalization journey. In retrospect, both the bookstore and al-Muhajiroun served as sanctuaries from their withdrawal from mainstream society.

- **Politicization of New Beliefs.** As Shahawar Siraj's commitment to fundamentalist Islam deepened, the Islamic bookstore in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn became his venue for transferring his Salafi-like mindset to his perception of global issues.
 - Political discussions coupled with the constant exposure to extremist literature sold in the bookstore hardened the Herald Square plotters' political views and they began forming their political agenda.
 - As early as November 2002, Siraj said that suicide bombings in Israel were not suicide, but revenge in response to Israeli atrocities and that he would do the same thing. He also stated that the mission of 9/11 was not complete, calling for more attacks on the United States.¹⁰⁷

- Elshafay regularly visited Siraj at the bookstore, looking to him for religious guidance. They would watch jihadi videos. Also, Siraj would give Elshafay books that claimed Jews were conspiring to take over the world economically.¹⁰⁸
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Details of Babar and Hashmi's experiences as part of al-Muhajiroun during the indoctrination phase in New York City are scant. Moreover, al-Muhajiroun has since disbanded in New York City. However, a splinter organization from al-Muhajiroun -- the Islamic Thinker's Society still exists and is worth analyzing as a "stand in" for al-Muhajiroun, as it provides a similar ideological stepping stone to hardened and politicized Islamic extremist ideology. (See Text Box Below)

Al-Muhajiroun and Islamic Thinkers Society

Al-Muhajiroun was founded by Syrian militant Omar Bakri as an affiliate of the local branch of the transnational Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement. Although al-Muhajiroun has since disbanded in the U.K., a number of offshoot organizations have emerged.

- The Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS) is an organization primarily composed of 2nd and 3rd generation college-age Americans of South Asian and Middle Eastern descent and espouses the same extremist worldview as al-Muhajiroun. Their ideology is underpinned by a politicized Salafi outlook that describes the United States as a nation of *kuffars*, or unbelievers. They do not respect U.S. "man-made laws" but rather seek to implement sharia and restore the Caliphate. ¹⁰⁹
- Islamic Thinkers Society claims that the worldwide Muslim community is under attack by a hostile West. It alleges that the West's strategy to undermine Islam combines social, cultural, political, economic, and military aspects. In an effort to support its arguments, ITS posts regular statements on its website about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Kashmir, and other global issues typically important to Muslims worldwide. In this regard, the group's call to jihad represents a justified resistance in defense of the worldwide Muslim community. However, ITS is careful not to explicitly call for violence. ¹¹⁰
- The group has a Wahhabi orientation and is quick to impart "takfir" upon other Muslims who they consider apostates. ITS looks to the writings of influential Muslim ideologue Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah, who inspired leading Islamist thinkers such as Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb, among others. ¹¹¹

Imam Shamsi Ali, Deputy Imam of the Islamic Cultural Center of New York and director of the Jamaica Muslim Center in Queens, cited the Islamic Thinkers Society as a "small organization based in Queens which routinely chooses anger over constructive action." In March 2006 their intolerance was on full display as they disrupted an annual religious Shi'a Ashura procession on Park Avenue in Manhattan. "The mischief mongers manhandled a religious scholar, calling him an infidel, and spread materials mocking Islamic jurists they consider too moderate." ¹¹² Moreover, the small knot of angry young men waved placards which read: "Shia are NOT Muslims!" and "Shia is made of superstitious elements of Judaism." ¹¹³

ITS and other similar organizations serve as indoctrination accelerants due to their ability to act as both incubators and proliferators of radicalization. Their use of the English language as well as the internet amplifies their message and specifically resonates with 2nd and 3rd generation Muslims in the West, many of whom speak or read little, if any Arabic. Thus, even in the virtual world, this organization successfully recruits, indoctrinates, and trains aspiring extremists.

STAGE 4: JIHADIZATION

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** By the spring of 2004, less than two years from the time that both began to become radicalized, Siraj and Elshafay progressed to the jihadization phase—having now decided to put thought to action.
 - As a group, the Herald Square plotters agreed to conduct an actual attack against the people of New York City. They discussed various targets including bridges and police stations.¹¹⁴

For Babar of the al-Muhajiroun Two, the attacks of September 11 were the final straw that solidified his commitment to jihad. Hashmi soon followed suit.

- According to Babar, although his mother had worked in the World Trade Center, the attack had made him more committed toward the cause of jihad. He had wanted to fight a jihad in Chechnya and the Palestinian territory but had not been able to make the right contacts. After September 11, he knew that Afghanistan would be his only opportunity to participate in jihad. He left New York the next week.¹¹⁵
 - Babar initially traveled to the U.K. and to Pakistan, with the intention of going to Afghanistan.¹¹⁶
 - Hashmi moved to Britain from Queens in 2003, and allegedly allowed his London flat to be used to store supplies and money that Babar was shipping out to Abdul al-Hadi al-Iraqi, then head of al-Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷
- **Attack Planning.** Siraj and Elshafay discussed a variety of targets including NYPD precincts on Staten Island and the Verazzano Bridge before settling on the subway station at Herald Square.¹¹⁸
 - The plotters conducted reconnaissance on the subway station and even tested law enforcement response to their attack plans by placing knapsacks filled with clothes on the platform and timing how long it would take the authorities to respond.
- **Training/Preparation.** Babar spent considerable time in Pakistan, initially residing in al-Muhajiroun's office in Lahore before buying an apartment there in 2002.
 - Over the next two years, the flat became a temporary home to a conveyor belt of radicalized British Muslims, many of whom, like Babar, had been born in Pakistan and wanted to fight.¹¹⁹
 - Babar continued his jihadist support activities by seeking ways to smuggle money and military supplies to a senior member of al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and assisting in two separate attempts to assassinate General Pervez Musharraf in 2002.¹²⁰

- In January and February 2004, Babar personally delivered night-vision goggles, sleeping bags, waterproof socks, waterproof ponchos and money to a high-ranking al-Qaeda official in South Waziristan.¹²¹

The Result. The radicalization of both the Herald Square plotters and the al-Muhajiroun Two did not result in an actual attack and direct loss of life; however, these radicalized New Yorkers indirectly supported at least one attack (London: July 7, 2005), and continued facilitating the radicalization trend among young Western Muslims.

- **Herald Square Plot.** On August 27, 2004, Siraj and Elshafay were arrested and charged with conspiring to detonate a bomb in the Herald Square Subway station.
 - Although the defendants never had possession or control of a bomb, according to the court records, Mr. Siraj already had a computer disk containing instructions for making different explosive devices, had showed it to the police informant and had asked him to make copies of the CD. This file was called the "Cookbook".¹²²
- **Al-Muhajiroun Two.** Babar was arrested in New York City in April 2004, after his return from Pakistan.¹²³ Almost two years later, in June 2006, British authorities arrested Syed Hashmi, the Brooklyn College graduate, in London's Heathrow Airport for his suspected role in aiding an al-Qaeda plot to attack targets in London and delivering military equipment and funds to radical Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 - At the end of April 2007, following the successful conviction of five individuals in the U.K. responsible for the Fertilizer (CREVICE) Plot, Queens-raised Babar was exposed as a key al-Qaeda support operative, facilitating the transit and training of both the CREVICE Plot conspirators as well as one of the July 7, 2005 bombers to a training camp in Malakand, Pakistan in July 2003.¹²⁴
 - At this camp, Omar Khyam (CREVICE) and Mohammed Siddique Khan (London 7/7) learned how to handle weapons and explosives.¹²⁵
 - Babar confessed to having supplied people who attended the training camp with aluminum powder and attempted to buy ammonium nitrate for them "with the knowledge that it was going to be used for a plot somewhere in the U.K."¹²⁶
 - When British security officials apprehended Hashmi in 2006, he had been preparing to board a plane for Pakistan carrying a large amount of cash and supplies.¹²⁷
 - The supplies had included ponchos, torches and boots, useful for recruits fighting US troops in remote parts of Afghanistan.¹²⁸

Trajectories of Radicalization Inside the United States

LACKAWANA	<p>American-born of Yemeni descent Counselor at job training facility High school soccer star; gambler Worked at collection agency High school soccer co-captain Buffalo-born; moved -Yemen/Saudi Bronx-born; moved to Yemen 37 year-old taxi driver</p>	<p>Attends Derwish sessions at apartment Seeks more knowledge of Islam Attends Derwish sessions at apartment Attends Derwish sessions at apartment Attends Derwish sessions at apartment Returns to Lackawana via Yemen 1998 Moves in with Derwish 1998-99 Attends Derwish sessions at apartment</p>	<p>Decides to participate in trip to Afghan Interested in trip as religious quest Decides to participate in trip to Afghan Decides to participate in trip to Afghan Decides to participate in trip to Afghan Discusses religious pilgrimage 2000 Becomes #2 in group Decides to participate in trip to Afghan</p>	<p>Cluster travels to Afghanistan spring 2001. Some seek to leave AQ camps early; return to US summer 2001. Elbaneh arrested in Yemen</p>
NORTHERN VIRGINIA	<p>DC- born; PhD biology at GMU St. Louis born; American U. drop-out South Korean born; converted 1997 U.S.-born, raised in Pakistan/Saudi Former U.S. Marine; college grad Served U.S. Army; fought Gulf War</p>	<p>Frequent lecturer at Dar al-Aqram Bosnia vet; spokesman for CAIR 1994 Travels to Pakistan following conversion Works as kitchen designer in Maryland Converts after marrying 2nd wife Converts; earns engineering degree-VA</p>	<p>Private discussions on jihad 2000 Travels to LeT camp in Pakistan 2000 Attends private meetings 2002 Trains with firearm in PA -mid 2000 Serves with LeT in Pakistan 9/01 Military tactics paintball training 3/00</p>	<p>Cluster decides to join jihad 9/15/01 Members travel to Pakistan to LeT camps 9/20/01 Some train in U.S.</p>
PORTLAND	<p>Former Intel software engineer Maher Awash Jeffery Battle Habis al-Saoud Patrice Ford Ahmed Bilal</p>	<p>Father dies 2000; devout after haj 2001 Meets Hawash via Salafi mosque 2001 Amir of cluster at Salafi mosque 2001 Model intern Portland City Hall 1998-9 Regular at Masjid as-Saber (Salafi)</p>	<p>Visited by al-Saoud for private talks Organizes martial arts, military training Preaches martyrdom benefits 2000-1 Participates in shooting practice 9/01 Cluster adopts name-Squad of Death</p>	<p>Al-Saoud suggests joining Taliban 9/01 Entire cluster leaves for Pakistan via China 10/01</p>
NEW YORK	<p>Brooklyn College political science Queens raised -St. Johns U drop-out</p>	<p>Graduates; Al Muhajiroun recruiter 2003 Recruited into Al Muhajiroun</p>	<p>Links with UK extremists; London plot Traveled - Pakistan to provide aid to AQ</p>	<p>Arrested 2006 Arrested 2006</p>
NEW YORK	<p>Illegal Pakistani immigrant Egyptian-Irish from Staten Island</p>	<p>Works at Islamic bookstore -Brooklyn Begins to gravitate to Siraj 2003-04</p>	<p>Begins to discuss taking action 2003 More time spent with Siraj and informant</p>	<p>Maps; Recon 34th subway station Arrested August 04</p>

SEPTEMBER 11 REVISITED

HAMBURG (September 11, 2001 Attack). On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. Each team of hijackers included a trained pilot. The hijackers intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City, resulting in the collapse of both buildings, the death of nearly 3,000 people and irreparable damage to nearby buildings as well as to the families of those who were killed and injured. The hijackers crashed a third plane into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. Passengers and members of the flight crew of a fourth aircraft attempted to retake control of their plane from the hijackers; that plane crashed into a field near the town of Shanksville in rural Somerset County, Pennsylvania.

The 9/11 hijackers were comprised of two different groups of young Middle Eastern males. One group, the leaders/pilots, had spent considerable time in the West, specifically in Hamburg, Germany, while the others, primarily the Saudis, had spent their formative years in the Middle East. The radicalization of the leaders/pilots of the 9/11 hijackers occurred primarily in Hamburg, Germany and followed almost the same exact trajectory that young Westernized men in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Sydney/Melbourne and Toronto would ultimately follow.

A review of some of the lives and experiences of the 9/11 hijackers shows glaring similarities to the lives and circumstances of those involved in previously discussed case studies.

STAGE 1: PRE-RADICALIZATION

- **The Environment.** In the 1990's, the Arab community in Hamburg was relatively small—small enough where people knew each other and each other's religious inclinations. The younger, more Salafi-minded Arab Muslims, usually between the ages of 16-30, did not have their own group or clique; rather they were distributed among the various informal groups—some religious, some not.¹²⁹
- **The Candidates.** The members of the Hamburg cell were part of a larger and more dynamic group of like-minded individuals. Primarily these were students from the Middle East, not very religious, apolitical, and with unremarkable backgrounds. Most were fluent in English, Western-educated, and accustomed to the Western lifestyle. Few, if any, had ever held a firearm prior to receiving training in al-Qaeda camps.
 - Mohammed Atta began his transformation as an accomplished Egyptian student in architectural design, while studying in Germany in 1992. He was raised in a strict but relatively secular, middle-class family.
 - Marwan al-Shehhi was a former UAE soldier who had qualified for a scholarship to study in Germany in 1998. He was a quiet man who always wore western clothes.
 - Ziad Jarrah, a Lebanese, was raised in a wealthy family that lived a secular lifestyle. Jarrah, who was pursuing a technical degree, dated a Turkish dental student while studying in Germany. Jarrah was described as the

- "playboy" of the group. He frequented popular discos and drank beer with his classmates.
- Ramzi bin al-Shibh was Yemeni and came from a moderately religious family and he was familiar with the Quran. From 1987-1995, he worked as a clerk for the International Bank of Yemen. He applied for asylum in Germany using false documentation and moved to Hamburg where he met Atta in 1995.¹³⁰
 - Zakariya Essabar was a Moroccan citizen who moved to Germany in 1997 and to Hamburg in 1998. He studied medical technology and met bin al-Shibh through the mosque.
 - Said Bahaji was born in Germany but raised in Morocco. He attended the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH) in 1996 in pursuit of a career as an electrical engineer. He had no formal Islamic education and was known to be a fan of video games and Formula One Racing.
 - Mounir Motassadeq, a Moroccan who came to Hamburg in 1995 to study electrical engineering at TUHH.¹³¹

STAGE 2: SELF-IDENTIFICATION

- **Gravitating to Salafi Islam.** As one of the few gathering places for Middle Eastern Muslim students in Hamburg, the Al Quds Mosque in Hamburg became the ideological incubator for the Hamburg cell. In fact, many of the 9/11 terrorists met in the mosque and galvanized the relationship that ultimately formed the Hamburg cell.
 - Mohammed Atta arrived in Hamburg seeking to be a successful architectural designer. While he had numerous acquaintances, his introverted and dour personality closed him off from much of German culture and society. As his isolation from his friends and family in Egypt grew, a newly-found reliance on religion took hold. Atta began praying five times a day, strictly observing a halal diet, and avoiding normal student social events like clubs and sporting events.¹³²
 - Following a trip to Egypt and his return from hajj in 1995, Atta became returned even more reserved, intolerant, and intense in his observance of sharia. He began to grow a beard and spent increasing amounts of time at the mosque.¹³³
 - Jarrah's religious transformation followed his 1996 trip to visit his family in Lebanon during holiday break.
 - It is unclear what occurred there, but Jarrah returned more devout, causing friction with his secular girlfriend in Germany. He began to chastise her for not being sufficiently devout.¹³⁴
 - By 1998, Jarrah began spending time at the Al Quds mosque with bin al-Shibh and eventually Atta.¹³⁵
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- The death of Marwan al-Shehi's father may have been the catalyst for his transformation. Soon after his father passed, he became more pronounced in his faith and stopped wearing Western clothes. In early 1998, he transferred to school in Hamburg and soon joined Atta's religious study group.¹³⁶
- **The Salafi Mosque.** Al Quds Mosque served as the initial radicalization venue for the members of the Hamburg cell. Founded by Moroccans, but with an ethnically diverse congregation, the Al Quds mosque was known for its harsh jihadi-Salafi rhetoric. The mosque would regularly sponsor radical imams, who encouraged killing of unbelievers, martyrdom and jihad.
 - By 1996, Atta had developed a circle of acquaintances and was also led many of the student religious study groups.
 - As members of these different study groups, Atta met both Mounir Motassadeq, the Moroccan electrical engineering student and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
 - Over time, Atta and bin al-Shibh become religious mentors for the study groups—accelerating the proliferation of the Salafist message for other students, who were seeking identity through religion to include Zakariya Essabar, Said Bahaji and Mounir Motassadeq.
 - The Hamburg cell formed as these men spent countless hours thinking, talking, reading and debating this interpretation of Islam.¹³⁷

STAGE 3: INDOCTRINATION

- **Withdrawing from the Mosque.** In 1998, as the Hamburg cell became further radicalized, the group moved their meetings from the mosque into both a bookstore near the mosque and Atta's residence—an apartment with which he shared with al-Shehi, bin al-Shibh and others.
 - A year later, Atta and some of his friends moved to another apartment, which they named "Bait al-Ansar" or The House of the Supporters of the Prophet. The group, along with some others, held weekly meetings at the residence with a focus on jihad.¹³⁸
- **Politicization of Beliefs.** Mohammed Haydar Zammar, an auto mechanic and one of the members of the Hamburg jihadi-Salafi community, was instrumental in advancing the group's objective towards political activism. He was the Hamburg group's "spiritual sanctioner". As a jihadi veteran who had fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia, the 300-pound, Syrian-born Zammar used his bona fides as a mujahedeen to support the legitimacy of jihad and the necessity for it in response to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.

Additionally, Atta was already studying other terrorist groups with political agendas.

- o Atta had a home page on the university's server and with two clicks of the mouse, he was able to access the home page for Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group.¹³⁹

STAGE 4: JIHADIZATION.

Although the concept for the September 11 plot was already in the planning stages of al-Qaeda in 1996, it wasn't until 1999 that the critical piece to conducting the attack arrived on bin Ladin's doorstep: the first four members of the Hamburg cell--fluent in English, Western-educated, and accustomed to Western culture and lifestyle. Upon having accepted jihad as a means to an end while in Hamburg, Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehi and Ziad Jarrah departed Germany for jihad in Afghanistan.

In years following September 11, 2001, both the Al-Muhajiroun Two and Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the 7/7 London bombers, among others, would follow Atta and the Westernized 9/11 hijackers' footsteps, coming to Afghanistan/Pakistan with the intention to conduct jihad as mujahedeen in the region, but instead be re-directed to launch a terrorist attack in the West.

- **Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad.** According to his former students, at a certain point, Mohammed Atta began to both believe and preach that the Quran provided the answer and necessity of jihad – to get rid of the Jews and Americans.¹⁴⁰ He used his religious study sessions to further push the group towards a similar acceptance of jihad.


By the end of 1999, the group's adoption and indoctrination into jihadi ideology became complete. Discussions shifted from debates on whether or not jihad was legitimate or not to where and how should they become jihadists. The group now wanted to fight; it just had to choose the war.

- o Originally, the group had planned to go to Chechnya to fight the Russians. Russian atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya had motivated them to join the jihad. However, as a result of a chance meeting on a bus, they were discouraged them from going to Grozny and instead decided to go to Afghanistan for training.
 - Mohammed Zammar, the auto mechanic and former mujahedeen, played an important role in helping them realizing their goal of participating in jihad as he ran a "travel agency" for jihadists seeking to go to Afghanistan.¹⁴¹
 - In November of 1999, Atta, al-Shibh, al-Shehi and Jarrah departed Germany for jihad training in Afghanistan. Following a route designed by Zammar, at least two flew via Turkish airways to Karachi, Pakistan via Istanbul, Turkey. From there it was on to Kandahar, Afghanistan.¹⁴²

- **Training/Preparation.** Once in Afghanistan, Atta and company were approached by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and recruited for the September 11 plot. There they met other al-Qaeda-trained conspirators Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
 - Upon Atta and his three fellow compatriots' return to Germany, in the spring of 2000, another four from the Hamburg cell--Abdelghani Mzoudi, Mounir Motassadeq, Zakariya Essabar, and Said Bahaji—left Germany to train in Afghanistan.¹⁴³
- **Attack Planning.** Although the targets and mode of attack had already been determined by al-Qaeda, upon his arrival in the United States Mohammad Atta planned every phase of the September 11 operation, including designing the teams and assigning roles for all four groups of hijackers, arranging the flight training, reconnoitering the airplanes and the flights and lastly, choosing the date.
 - Atta was not a veteran mujahedeen, nor was he an experienced or accomplished terrorist. Yet, the September 11 plot's success was enabled by an intelligent and disciplined individual who became radicalized while in a Western country, and "joined" al Qaeda (not recruited from above) while seeking an opportunity to fight in Chechnya. He took on the role of "operational leader" for this plot.
- **The Result.** On the morning of September 11, 2001 the nineteen hijackers carried out their devastating attack on the United States.

Without a group of radicalized jihadists, who had been homegrown in the West to lead this plot, the chances of the 9/11 being a success would have been reduced considerably. The Hamburg group underwent a process of homegrown radicalization that matched almost exactly those of the Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Sydney/Melbourne and Toronto clusters. The primary difference between the 9/11 hijackers and the 7/7 bombers was that when the members of the Hamburg cluster came to Afghanistan in search of becoming mujahedeen, they were recruited for a plot against a third country -- the U.S.-- and not redirected to conduct jihad against their place of residence in the West, as was Mohammed Siddique Khan -- against the U.K.

RADICALIZATION TIMELINE



FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

FINDINGS

- Al-Qaeda has provided the inspiration for homegrown radicalization and terrorism; direct command and control by al-Qaeda has been the exception, rather than the rule among the case studies reviewed in this study.
- The four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this report.
 - In spite of the differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages.
 - This consistency provides a tool for predictability.
- The trans-national phenomenon of radicalization in the West is largely a function of the people and the environment they live in. Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation. Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.
- There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as "unremarkable" from various walks of life.
- Europe's failure to integrate the 2nd and 3rd generation of its immigrants into society, both economically and socially, has left many young Muslims torn between the secular West and their religious heritage. This inner conflict makes them especially vulnerable to extremism—the radical views, philosophy, and rhetoric that is highly advertised and becoming more and more fashionable among young Muslims in the West.
- Muslims in the U.S. are more resistant, but not immune to the radical message.
 - Despite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals' religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes the assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a professional career, financial stability and material comforts.
- The jihadist ideology combines the extreme and minority interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence. Ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the basis of government.
 - This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO's, extremist sermons /study groups,

Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist-sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims -- especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.

- The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization
 - In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology.
 - It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the Salafi-jihadist message they have encountered.
 - During the Indoctrination phase, when individuals adopt this virulent ideology, they begin interpreting the world from this newly-formed context. Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the Internet allows the aspiring jihadist to view the world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further reinforcing the objectives and political arguments of the jihadi-Salafi agenda.
 - In the Jihadization phase, when an individual commits to jihad, the Internet serves as an enabler—providing broad access to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of weapons.
 - Individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization process on their own. Invariably, as they progress through the stages of radicalization they seek like-minded individuals. This leads to the creation of groups or clusters. These clusters appear almost essential to progressing to the Jihadization stage—the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.
 - “Group think” is one of the most powerful catalysts for leading a group to actually committing a terrorist act. It acts as a force-multiplier for radical thought while creating a competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical.
 - Although there are many groups or clusters of individuals that are on the path of radicalization, each group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a “bunch of guys” to an operational terrorist cell. All eleven case studies had:
 - A “spiritual sanctioner” who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In some cases the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.
 - An “operational leader” who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act--organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.
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- The full radicalization of a Western individual, or groups of individuals, does not always result in the committing of a terrorist act in the West. Many fully-radicalized individuals have first looked to conduct jihad by becoming mujahedeen and fighting in conflicts overseas.
 - The image of the heroic, holy warrior or “mujahedeen” has been widely marketed on the Internet as well as in jihadi tapes and videos. This image continues to resonate among young, especially Muslim, men 15-35 years-old—men who are most vulnerable to visions of honor, bravery and sacrifice for what is perceived as a noble cause.
 - Among those individuals who travel abroad in search of jihad, some end up as mujahedeen and fight in foreign lands; some are re-directed to commit acts in the West, often in their country of origin, while others give up and return home because they can't endure the training or have a change of heart.
 - For those groups of homegrown radicalized individuals who do not seek jihad abroad, the dedication and commitment of their leader to jihad is often the main factor in determining whether the group will commit a terrorist act, or not.
 - Although the 9/11 attack, with its overseas origins, is more of an exception in terms of how terrorist plots have been launched since the destruction of the Twin Towers, it has probably been the most important factor in proliferating the process of radicalization, especially in the West. More importantly, 9/11 established the current trend of committing an act in the name of global jihad as a natural culmination of full radicalization and the ultimate responsibility for the fully radicalized jihadist.
 - Prior to 9/11, the entire radicalization process moved at a much slower rate. There was no direct link to jihad, other than to become a mujahedeen. Aspiring jihadists would travel to Afghanistan without any idea that they could become actual terrorists. Now, there is no longer any illusion as to what the adoption of jihadi-Salafi ideology means.
 - The radicalization process is accelerating in terms of how long it takes and the individuals are continuing to get younger. Moreover, with the higher risks associated with heading down this pathway, individuals will seek to conceal their actions earlier, making intelligence and law enforcement's job even more difficult.
 - It is useful to think of the radicalization process in terms of a funnel. Entering the process does not mean one will progress through all four stages and become a terrorist. However, it also does not mean that if one does not become a terrorist, he or she is no longer a threat. Individuals who have been radicalized but are not jihadists may serve as mentors and agents of influence to those who might become the terrorists of tomorrow.
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- The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviors can be seen as innocuous; however, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process, their significance becomes more important. Considering the sequencing of these behaviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping to thwart an attack or even prevent the planning of future plots.

IMPLICATIONS

The global jihadi-Salafi movement poses a significant challenge to law enforcement and intelligence since the radicalization phenomenon that drives it is spontaneous, indiscriminate, and its indicators are subtle. Identifying whether an individual is being radicalized is hard to detect, especially in the early stages.

- The individuals are not on the law enforcement radar. Most have never been arrested or involved in any kind of legal trouble. Other than some commonalities in age and religion, individuals undergoing radicalization appear as "ordinary" citizens, who look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is precisely those "ordinary" middle class university students who are sought after by local extremists because they are "clean skins".
- In the early stages of their radicalization, these individuals rarely travel, are not participating in any kind of militant activity, yet they are slowly building the mindset, intention, and commitment to conduct jihad.

As evidenced by all eleven case studies these groups, or clusters of extremists:

- Act autonomously, can radicalize quickly, and often are made up of individuals, who on the surface, appear to be well-integrated into society.
- Are not "name brand" terrorists or part of any known terrorist group. For the most part, they have little or no links to known militant groups or actors. Rather they are like-minded individuals who spend time together in clusters organized, originally, by previously established social network links.
- Are not crime syndicates and therefore, applying organized crime strategies will fail.

The challenge to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the West in general, and the United States in particular, is how to identify, pre-empt and thus prevent homegrown terrorist attacks given the non-criminal element of its indicators, the high growth rate of the process that underpins it and the increasing numbers of its citizens that are exposed to it.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Salafi – From the word "Salaf" which is short for "Salaf as-Salih" meaning (righteous) predecessors or (pious) ancestors

Salafi is a generic term, depicting a Sunni revivalist school of thought that takes the pious ancestors of the early period of early Islam as exemplary models. Consequently, Salafis seek to purge Islam of all outside influences, starting with the cultures and traditions of contemporary Muslim societies, and restore it to that of an imagined 7th century utopia (the Caliphate). The Salafi interpretation of Islam seeks a "pure" society that applies the Quran literally and adheres to the social practices and Islamic law (sharia) that prevailed at the time of the prophet Muhammad in the 7th century in Arabia.

jihadi-Salafi – A militant interpretation of the Salafi school of thought that identifies violent jihad as the means to establish and revive the Caliphate. Militant jihad is seen not as an option, but as a personal obligation. This obligation is elevated above other moral standards, which may be abrogated.

Mujahedeen – holy warriors who fight infidels as a religious duty

Takfir – the practice of declaring that an individual, or a group previously considered Muslims, are in fact kaffir(s) (non-believers in God), an act of accusing others of disbelief, used in the context of branding certain persons or whole communities as unbelievers to religiously justify jihad against them.

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Statement of

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Los Angeles Police Department**

Before the

**Committee on Homeland Security's and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate**

Presented on

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I. Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) efforts to identify and counter violent extremism, which happens in this case, to be ideologically based.

Local law enforcement has a culture and capacity that no federal agency enjoys - the know-how and ability to engage communities that today are a vital part of the equation. Part of this engagement process is the demonstration of sensitivity to terminology that offends and/or isolates communities, hence, "*Ideologically Based Violent Extremism.*"

No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities – the First Preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked Muslim communities in the United States (U.S). Iranians who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national psyche. The reverse is now true as a result of the post-9/11 media coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centerpieces of coverage for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and vulnerability by large swaths of Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling in the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslims' fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries – through groups, training camps, and the Internet – the underlying motivations for

these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

We have learned that Muslim communities in the U.S. are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they may turn to other sources of information for news and socialization, such as the Internet. Unfortunately, despite all of the positive aspects of the Internet, it allows those individuals and groups with ideological agendas to easily make contact with like-minded individuals and access potentially destructive information.

As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community – with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

II. LAPD Strategies and Initiatives

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists (i.e., those who intentionally plant seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society) from legitimate actors. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. The LAPD has done much outreach in this area, both with Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For the 18 months, we have been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities, bringing the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of police service. One of our goals is to be viewed as trusted friends by Muslim communities in our city.

Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by the TLOs has been supplemented with training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counter-narrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. We recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators, is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau initiatives for both the present and future have aligned people, purpose, and strategy around the mission of building capacity to hunt and disrupt operational capability on the part of terrorists (recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations). However, just as important, we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation and have made great efforts and organizing, mobilizing and in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent the extremists from making inroads into this faith community. A few of these strategies are described below:

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be public data collectors and First Preventers.
- We have started a Muslim outreach program with our command staff to leverage resources, institutionalize the idea of developing the counter-narrative, and facilitate an educational process. In developing this counter-narrative, the goal is to inspire Muslim communities to responsibly partner with law enforcement to protect American values. We also aim to elevate the moderate Muslim voice and empower people to counter the extremist ideology with confidence. This enables community

leadership to assist law enforcement in identifying those individuals and groups who espouse extremism and work to divide Muslim communities from American society.

- We are working with a think tank to develop a training program for mid-level executives that will be tailored specifically to state and local law enforcers. It is our hope that this will develop into a model for a national counter-terrorism academy.
- We initiated the Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System – a tool that enhances communication between and within LAPD and the Private Sector.
- Our Archangel program is a Critical Infrastructure Protection System that includes a Protective Security Task Force.
- We are developing a Cyber Investigation Unit to hunt violent extremists on the Internet.
- Our Community Mapping project is described below in Section V.

III. A Different Problem

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions – often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political. There are those among us, I call them political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause. They are the nemesis of community engagement. Their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

Law enforcement’s *ultimate* goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims – not merely disrupt terrorist activities. Let me be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of “clusters” on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?

The point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and by in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from Muslim communities themselves.

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diaspora communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of

Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

The Pakistani-British community in the United Kingdom is a diaspora, which is significant, because it makes the 2nd and 3rd generations of the community particularly vulnerable to the social pressures of growing up in a country very different from their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland. As a diaspora community, they remain transnational, tending to maintain close family, social, and financial ties with Pakistan. Globalization allows a diaspora to maintain these transnational contacts via faster, cheaper air travel, global communications technology (Internet and cell phone), global mass media, and nearly instant transnational banking. If the first two risk factors are present, then one must ask, “Does the community also hail from an unstable homeland with Wahhabi-Salafi ties?” If so, that community, like the British-Pakistani Muslim community, might be at greater risk of incubating homegrown radicalization.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then we will know where to find our Pakistani, Iranian, Somali, Chechen, Jordanian, and North African communities and thus understand how better to support their integration into the greater society. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

IV. Legitimacy and Constitutionality

It is our position that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in counter-terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency – being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle – in intelligence and counter-terrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical. Law enforcement and its advocates must also avoid name-calling exchanges with political jihadists, opting instead to engage them professionally on specific issues. Political jihadists will reveal themselves in these exchanges by being unreasonable and unable to articulate specific grievances, preferring instead to use personal attacks and blanket accusations. In doing so, they are failing in their purpose to attract converts.

Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All forms of communication with the public (whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences) should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement’s most pressing

challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau with nearly 300 officers who are solely dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy that enhances the fight against crime and disorder. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

V. Community Mapping

We need to understand the problem as it exists in Los Angeles before we roll out programs to mitigate radicalization. Historically, the temptation has been to turn to intervention programs before we have clearly identified problems within the community. In the past we have relied on interventions based on "experts," logic or previous programs that are either generic or insensitive to the constellation of issues. This has consistently produced unremarkable results. Public safety pays a high cost for this business practice. This is one of many reasons to support the rationale behind community mapping, a process that delivers a richer picture and road map that can guide future strategies.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative with an academic institution to conduct an extensive "community mapping" project. We are also soliciting input of local Muslim groups, so the process can be transparent and inclusive. While this project will lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles, we also intend to take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions. It is our hope to identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism and then use a full-spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.

Community mapping is the start of a conversation, not just data sets: It is law enforcement identifying with its community and the community identifying with its families, neighborhoods, city, state, country and police. For the past 18 months, the LAPD's outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities has helped the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of the police service area.

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

VI. Conclusion – The Evolving Threat

We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans "doing" law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level.

The U.S. faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Cases in point include the 7/7 bombers, the Glasgow car bombers, and, more locally, Lodi in which local individuals and groups sought out training in Pakistan. This is not intended to dismiss threats that emerge from overseas locations, which should continue to be of concern. Rather, it is an estimate of relative density—locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency.

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. I believe no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.



**MAJOR MICHAEL R. RONCZKOWSKI
MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT
HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU**

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

OCTOBER 30, 2007

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins and other distinguished Members; it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) and its role and that of local law enforcement in countering violent Islamist extremism.

Introduction

For the record, my name is Michael Ronczkowski. I am the Major of the Miami-Dade Police Department's Homeland Security Bureau.

I am pleased to appear before you the Committee to highlight the efforts and initiatives of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) in the area of homeland security and that of countering violent extremism that poses a threat to the Nation. This issue of extremism, both overseas and homegrown, is important to understand and address and I commend the Committee for holding this hearing.

Extremism, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, is the advocacy of extreme measures or views. No where in the definition is any one group, race, religion or ethnicity singled out. This is why we must remain vigilant and understand that extremism comes from all walks of life and encompasses many ideologies. Once we are able to understand the process that leads some one to the fringe of an ideology and support or pursue violence we will be in a better position to protect our communities from the widest range of potential threats. However, for the purpose of my statement today, I will be discussing the role local law enforcement must play in the fight against violent Islamist extremism. It is important to note that Islamist extremists represent a fringe element within the Muslim community inside the United States and the same can be said of virtually any ethnic or religious community in the United States. Miami-Dade County is a dynamically diverse; ethnically, racially and religiously, perhaps more than most jurisdictions.

Miami-Dade County is a vibrant community uniquely nestled along the southeast tip of the Florida peninsula making it the gateway to the Caribbean and South America. The County's unique location makes it an attractive destination for a multitude of diverse ethnicities and religions as well as being a tourist destination that sees over 10 million visitors spending at least one night per year. The diversity of our visitors is also reflected in the communities within the County.

More than half the residents of the County reside in the unincorporated areas patrolled by the MDPD and remaining population resides in the 35 municipalities within the County. Miami-Dade County encompasses more than 2,000 square miles larger than two states (Delaware and Rhode Island) and 17 countries. According to the 2000 Census, 51 percent of the County's residents are foreign born and 68 percent of the residents speak a language other than English at home. Religious representation is just as diverse as the population it serves. According to the Association of Religious Data Archives in 2000, Miami-Dade County reported having nearly 900 congregations representing nearly 70 religious bodies and various theologies.

The Miami-Dade Police Department provides both traditional a municipal police and sheriff services to nearly 2.5 million residents in Miami-Dade County and is the largest law enforcement agency in the Southeastern United States. One of the services provided to the citizens of Miami-Dade County is provided by the MDPD's Homeland Security Bureau (HSB). The HSB has the primary responsibility for gathering, analyzing, disseminating, maintaining criminal intelligence and homeland security initiatives for the Miami-Dade Police Department and providing pertinent information to concerned federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, the HSB conducts security and vulnerability assessments and identifies

the security needs of critical infrastructures and sites within Miami-Dade County that could be potentially targeted by terrorists.

It is the aforementioned that I will highlight as I provide insight to how the Miami-Dade Police Department, under the direction of Director Robert Parker and Chief Ricky Smith, has approached the critical issue of countering Islamist extremism in terms of organizing our homeland security initiatives, personnel and resource commitments, and how we work collectively with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Major Cities Chiefs (MCC), and other state and local law enforcement agencies. I will also provide you with information on how our Department has enlisted the public's help to identify suspicious activity, its outreach programs to the local Muslim community, and the steps the Department has taken to understand the diverse populations within its jurisdictions.

Role of Local Law Enforcement

Local law enforcement plays a critical role in the identification, disruption, and information development of Islamist extremists. Since the tragedy of 9/11, law enforcement and public safety agencies have received funding from a variety of homeland security grant programs. Much of the grant funding has been used to address an array of equipment needs such as explosive detection, bio hazard and tactical response. Funding also addressed the development of emergency management plans and training for first responders including the Incident Command System and National Incident Management System. Collectively, the aforementioned use of funds addressed law enforcement and public safety's ability to react, respond and recover. More than six years after 9/11, funding for long-term sustainability (to include training) of analysis centers at not just the state but also the largest law enforcement agencies is imperative if local law enforcement is going to shift the paradigm from a reactive to a proactive approach. Information that has been developed, verified, corroborated, and has been determined to be credible will afford us the opportunity to prepare the 750,000 first responders with actionable information necessary to recognize behavior patterns that will prevent terrorist actions and protect the nation's citizens.

Counter-terrorism is a term that denotes a responsive posture. The Miami-Dade Police Department prefers to utilize the term Anti-terrorism which is a more proactive posture. Regardless of the term used, both are a part of the core mission of nearly all state/local law enforcement throughout the country. Actually you might include Community Oriented Policing, where each of the 750,000 officers/deputies/troopers (fire fighters, public health nurses, code enforcement inspectors) become part of the process of identifying extremist behaviors. In essence, this is the Terrorism Liaison Officer program or a Regional Domestic Security Task Force as is the case in South Florida.

In order to understand the importance the role local law enforcement must play in the fight against violent Islamist extremism those involved must have a fundamental understanding of the roots and ideologies that this fringe element draws upon in developing their distorted ideology. It is not necessary to be a history major. If law enforcement personnel (federal, state and local) can have a basic understanding of the Islamic culture and the roots of extremist ideology, such as that posed by Wahabism and the Muslim Brotherhood, they will be better equipped mentally to identify behavior patterns of extremists. Just as within Christianity there are different denominations and individually held beliefs within each and the same can be said about Islam. However, law enforcement will often remain indifferent about topics dealing with religion and it is this indifference that must be overcome if we are to work collectively with those practicing Islam

but going to identify those on the extreme fringe. Beyond religion, there must also be an understanding of the cultures present within the community at all levels of law enforcement.

Understanding the role of the various law enforcement partners comes with understanding the mission of each of level; federal, state, and local. It is the local law enforcement contingent that serves as the nation's eyes, ears, first responders, and 24/7 patrollers. An often overlooked mainstay of local law enforcement is the traffic stop. During traffic stops local law enforcement nationwide encounter thousands of people, many with extreme ideologies, something rarely done by federal law enforcement officials. With proper observation, awareness and training, local law enforcement officers are likely to observe behavior patterns that can be vital in the identification of individuals with extremist ideology seeking to pursue violence against our citizens. Unlike countries that rely heavily on buses and trains to traverse local jurisdictions, states or even the country, the United States relies heavily on the use of passenger vehicles. Traffic stops, traffic crashes, and citations (parking and moving) are all opportunities to observe behaviors and actions that may be patterns of extremist actions. Over the past 20 years in the United States many local and state officers have encountered extremists who were determined to inflict harm upon the citizens of this country. Some of the more notable traffic stops are:

- 2007 – Ahmed Abda Sherf Mohamed and Youssef Samir Hegahed students from the University of South Florida stopped for speeding by Sheriff's Deputy in South Carolina and in possession of a destructive device
- 2001 – Mohammed Atta (Tamarac, FL) al-Qaeda 9/11 skyjacker ticketed for an invalid drivers license
- 2001 – Zaid Jarah (Maryland State Police), al-Qaeda 9/11 skyjacker, stopped for speeding on 9/9/2001 and his car was later found at the airport
- 2001 – Hani Hanjour (Arlington, VA), al-Qaeda 9/11 skyjacker, stopped in vehicle with a New Jersey tag and in possession of a Florida license, stopped for speeding
- 1994 – Timothy McVeigh (Oklahoma State Trooper), no license plates, Turner Diaries, carrying a weapon, wearing a shirt that read "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."
- 1988 – Yu Kikumura (New Jersey State Police), Japanese Red Army bomb maker, vehicle stop for routine violation led to discovery of bomb materials

Local law enforcement has traditionally had an awareness of criminal activities within their respective jurisdiction. However, in a post 9/11 era law enforcement must take a posture of reacting locally and thinking globally. Not only does local law enforcement have a duty to prevent attacks in their jurisdiction and protect citizens of a specific geographical boundary but they have an obligation to assist state and national efforts. Beyond traffic stops, there are many instances where Islamist extremism has been deeply rooted in the fabric of local communities from Hancock, New York; Bridgeview, Illinois; Lodi, California there have been numerous incidents that expound extremist Islamic beliefs. South Florida has also seen its share of Islamic extremist who have either visited, lived or worked in the region.

When it comes down to it, local law enforcement is far more likely to encounter an Islamic extremist during the performance of their daily duties than a federal investigator. This is not meant as a negative connotation on our federal partners but is just the reality of having between nearly 750,000 officers patrolling all areas of the country 24/7. However, local law enforcement is not going to encounter Usama Bin Laden or any of the senior ranking members of al Qaeda, rather they are more apt to encounter passive or active supporters of the extremist ideology or even a member of the active cadre. Local law enforcement should not be taking a posture of looking for someone with a destructive device but rather look for those puzzle pieces that can

lead to identification of the pre-incident indicators that exist in every terrorist act. Officers should be looking for those items that are often referred to as "material support". Over the past year and a half there have been several noteworthy cases where Islamic extremists were arraigned, standing trial, or have been sentenced for providing material support in support of terrorism. Many of these support actions dealt with funding, training or weapons.

Just like providing the road officer with the physical equipment necessary and training to perform his duties they are in need of real-time information that identifies actions or activities of extremists to look for while patrolling. It is also important that they receive situational awareness information for data that is beyond their immediate jurisdiction. Information is the key to intelligence and the majority of all law enforcement information comes from patrol officers. It is vital that the development of any information or intelligence be inclusive of local law enforcement officials.

Federal task forces and State managed Fusion Centers do not always drill down to be inclusive of local jurisdictions largely because the bulk of the information lies in a multitude of jurisdictions and databases. Another reason often cited for exclusion is that the concerned local agency does not have officials with the requisite federal clearance(s). It should be noted that this is an actionable item being pursued by the Major Cities Chiefs Association in concert with the DHS and improvement has been noted but a void still exists in some locales. Many jurisdictions have intelligence units with some very tenured officers and some, including the MDPD, have more experienced and larger units than the State. Local jurisdictions are not seeking to compete but rather work collectively and collaboratively with their federal and state partners but obstacles such as clearances and lack of access to federal database systems can slow the process.

Efforts should be made to continue the work of the Major Cities Chiefs with our federal law enforcement partners with regards to terrorism-related topics and initiatives, including the development of joint informational bulletins through the local intelligence units. Fusion Centers are being recognized as a formidable way to develop information and identify extremist behavior patterns but there is a need to define "fusion center" much the same way fusion center standards were developed through the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. There is a tremendous amount of information that resides in the coffers of local law enforcement just waiting to be mined but funding needs to reach the local law enforcement agencies if they are to push the information to the next level. Information has been "fused" at the local levels for years in order to provide command level personnel with analyzed information necessary to make informed decisions and detectives with identifiable links. However, discovering crime links is different than the identification of extremist activities but it is possible with appropriate training, tools and personnel. There is a need for local law enforcement to look for skills, knowledge, resources, access/abilities and motivation (SKRAM) of extremists that are necessary to take any violent action. SKRAM will enable personnel to identify as many members as possible of any extreme fringe. These actions do not occur within a vacuum and local law enforcement need to look beyond making a single arrest; there will be many coconspirators that will provide material support and they too should be pursued to the fullest.

Miami-Dade Police Department's Homeland Security Bureau

In response to the extremist threat present in the United States and the fact that many documented extremists have had a presence in Florida, the Miami-Dade Police Department established a Homeland Security Unit. The Unit eventually matured into the Homeland Security Bureau in November 2005. This maturation, under the direction of Director Robert Parker and Chief Ricky Smith, was the result of taking a proactive stance to address extremism at all levels

and to mitigate the threat that may exist in the South Florida region before any action can develop. The MDPD executive staff decided that it was necessary to understand and address any threat, beyond the two detectives assigned to the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and to commit the resources from within the Department's general fund, with a dedicated staff.

The HSB staff was developed under the same premise that law enforcement should take when pursuing Islamic extremist, that being the identification of, skills, knowledge, resources, access/abilities and motivation (SKRAM). The staff of 65 dedicated and experienced personnel is representative of not only the community based on race, religion and ethnicity, but also benefits of having several languages spoken, including Arabic. The investigative prowess of the personnel assigned to the Bureau is evident in that the average law enforcement experience is between 15-20 years much of which has been in an investigative unit; e.g., Economic Crimes, Robbery, Homicide and General Investigations. The Bureau operates independently, but in concert with, the South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) building that houses a variety of federal, state and local agencies. After spending about \$500,000 the Department relocated its fledgling Bureau in this high security building and took the steps necessary to compliment the degree of security necessary to work seamlessly with federal and state partners. Presently, the HSB is staffed with departmental employees but additional representation is in process to include representatives from the County's Corrections and Rehabilitation and Fire Rescue Departments.

As mentioned earlier, the HSB has the primary responsibility for gathering, analyzing, disseminating, maintaining criminal intelligence and homeland security initiatives for the Miami-Dade Police Department and providing pertinent information to concerned federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, the Bureau's staff also conducts security and vulnerability assessments and identifies the security needs of critical infrastructures and sites within Miami-Dade County that could be potentially targeted by violent extremists.

The Bureau is divided into three operational sections; Intelligence Operations Center (fusion center), Infrastructure Protection Section, and the Intelligence Section which is inclusive of Technical Operations. The Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) is the primary liaison, research and analysis hub. IOC staff monitors information as it is received from local, state, federal and open sources and fuses it with an array of information received within the County and Region. Pertinent information is subsequently disseminated to the appropriate personnel, including road patrol. The Infrastructure Protection Section (IPS) has the responsibility of coordinating the Department's efforts in combating domestic terrorism and educating the public and officers, alike, through public awareness campaigns. This includes conducting security, threat and vulnerability assessments including identifying the security needs of critical infrastructures. The IPS routinely completes homeland security assessments, develops prevention and response plans with private and public sector partners as well as testing them to ensure compliance. The Intelligence Section (IS) consists of the Intelligence Unit (IU) and the Technical Operations Unit (TOU). The IS has the responsibility for gathering, analyzing, disseminating and maintaining intelligence information for the Department consistent with 28CFR. The TOU provides technical support in the form of sophisticated electronic equipment and operational surveillance expertise for all entities of the MDPD.

To address the threat of violent extremists that exist in many arenas, the HSB has a commitment to compliment many of the federal annotated "sectors" as well as "assignments". Although the Bureau often develops "programs or operations" to address specific matters, it was decided by the MDPD staff that it was better practice to not only work within the sector format but to have staff monitor, work with and remain cognizant of those matters germane to our

region is able to identify, plan and commit resources to a truly collaborative effort that provides guidance in an array of matters including the allocation and use of the Urban Area Security Initiative, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and State Homeland Security Grant Program funding.

In response to meetings held between the DHS and the Major Cities Chiefs, the Region decided to take the lead in developing a "regional team" to be assigned on a rotational basis to the National Operations Center (NOC). Collectively with the Palm Beach and Broward County Sheriff's Offices the Miami-Dade Police Department mans the Southeast Florida Desk at the NOC, located in Washington, D.C., which enables investigators within the region to query a wide variety of federal resources and helps to provide local jurisdictions with situational awareness from a national perspective.

Southeast Florida's Work with Our Federal Partners

The Miami-Dade Police Department not only has a strong working relationship with State and Local law enforcement and public safety partners but is fortunate to be in a region that has a wide variety of federal partners, which we all have an outstanding bond. Whether it is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security or United States Coast Guard, we work collectively on a daily basis on a wide range of initiatives and cases.

As noted earlier, the MDPD has had a continual presence and working relationship with the FBI's JTTF. The presence in the JTTF has been expanded to include an additional analyst and detective that are now assigned to the FBI's Field Intelligence Group (FIG). It is this continual working relationship that enabled us to be successful in many cases including one that receive significant media coverage and became known as the Liberty City Seven. This was a case that culminated in arrests in the summer of 2006 with the arrest of seven men who were plotting to attack the Sears Tower, Miami FBI office and other buildings. The extremists involved sought to obtain funding and support for the plot from a government informant posing as a member of the Islamist terrorist group al Qaeda.

I am proud to report that our relationships with the federal law enforcement community has not kept the status quo but has flourished at many levels. Beyond the FBI enhancements, the MDPD has fostered an excellent working relationship with the DHS as a result of Director Parker's affiliation with the Major Cities Chiefs Association and numerous homeland security workgroup meetings the Association has conducted with a variety of key DHS decision makers and senior staff. Besides the assignment of personnel to the NOC, the MDPD has worked collectively with the DHS State and Local Office as well as the Office of Intelligence and Analysis on acquiring clearances, secure office space and systems approval, threat assessment guidelines, and law enforcement deployment teams. It should be noted that the MDPD has received several clearances for key investigative personnel from not only the DHS but also from the FBI. Both agencies have also been cognizant of the need to include the MDPD on a variety of investigations and awareness initiatives. Beyond investigations, the DHS has staff members regularly assisting the MDPD and other jurisdictions in the preparation of buffer zone protection initiatives and they also provided several proactive investigative courses for personnel involved in the preparation of Super Bowl XLII. The FBI has also been a valuable resource for providing lectures and training material to our personnel.

With the geographical boundaries of our County largely being water based, our border is continually exposed to intrusion from foreign means. Therefore, we are not only fortunate to have the United States Coast Guard base located in our County but we are privileged to have

an excellent working relationship with the men and women of the base. These men and women assist in protecting our port and shoreline as well as play a vital role in working continually with us via the RDSTF on matters of mutual concern, including training exercises such as Operation Vigilant Sentry.

Although I have only touched on the excellent working relationship we share in the South Florida region with our federal partners, I would be remiss if I did not also include the outstanding relationships we continue to have with the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Marshal's Service. After all, terrorism comes in a variety of forms but beyond the forms of terrorism we must remain vigilant for those methods, venues, or mechanisms that may be present and provide material support.

Enlisting the Public's Help

Outreach and partnership with the public is crucial if local law enforcement is going to have any impact on the growth of violent Islamist extremism or the identification of any violent threat that may be developing in the homeland. Homeland security is not just a law enforcement or federal problem. Every citizen in the United States, regardless of race, ethnic makeup, or religion, has the responsibility to remain vigilant and identify threats.

The Miami-Dade Police Department's Homeland Security Bureau Internet website (http://www.miamidade.gov/mdpd/BureausDivisions/bureau_Hls.asp) is one vehicle that has been used to enlist the public's assistance. Through this site, the public can contact the Bureau directly via email or telephone as well as receive information on how to report suspicious activity anonymously through the Bureau's "800" number (866-58ALERT). The site also provides informational flyers and video vignettes for the "seven signs of terrorism"; surveillance, elicitation, testing of security, acquiring supplies, suspicious persons, trial runs and deployment of assets, that citizens can be alert for while performing their daily functions.

One program that the HSB uses is called "Operation Vigilance". This program is a collective effort that is undertaken by members of the HSB in concert with security personnel from various locations such as schools, shopping malls and large venues. Personnel working operation vigilance remain behind the scenes looking for any of the seven signs of terrorism. These initiatives help the private sector into gaining insight to what local law enforcement looks for and considers to be behavioral traits of extremist ideologies.




Image #4

The Homeland Security Bureau has also developed several documents that are provided to the public through awareness campaigns, community meetings and community based officers. Image #4 demonstrates one such brochure that is also printed in Spanish. There is also a business card style handout that contains contact information and can easily be carried in a wallet. The Bureau also initiated the design of pocket size anti-terrorism quick reference guides in concert with the Southeast Florida Regional Domestic Security Task Force. These booklets (image #5) were designed in two formats; one for the private sector and one for the public safety community. The private sector guides are provided to media outlets and private security personnel throughout the region.



Image #5

Outreach to the Local Muslim Community

A 2005 survey by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) found there were 70,000 Muslims in Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties, up from about 45,000 in 2001. They are comprised of Persians, Arabs, South East Asians, Guyanese, Trinidadians, Africans, African-American, Hispanic and Anglo's. There are approximately 17 mosques of which five operate as Mosques through the universities and local organizations primarily on Fridays or major holidays. The other 12 operate daily within Miami-Dade County, spread out from North Miami-Dade through Cutler Ridge.

The HSB is currently working with the following Muslim-based organizations:

1. AMANA (American Muslim Association of North America)
2. CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations)
3. FIU MESC (Middle East Studies Center)
4. South Florida Middle East Society
5. FIU Gordon Institute (National Security and Strategic Studies Center)

Over the past year and a half, the MDPD's HSB has hosted several classes and forums to discuss Islamic cultural awareness for local law enforcement and members of the RDSTF. We have made presentations for MDPD personnel, the Archdiocese of Miami, the University of Miami, Florida International University and the RDSTF. We are currently working on a new series for 2008. The new presentations will again be addressed to MDPD and RDSTF personnel, but we will also be presented to Corrections, Municipal Agencies in Miami-Dade County, and Miami-Dade County employees. These classes/forums have included speakers from law enforcement, armed forces, several professors and scholars in the field, and attorneys. Both CAIR and AMANA have assisted in the classes/forums by providing ethnic foods, cultural literature, and support for the classes/forums.

Conclusion

I want to thank you again for this opportunity to testify about our Department's efforts to address extremism at all levels, particularly Islamist, and our continual commitment to protecting the homeland. As I am sure you and your colleagues appreciate, the topic of the fringe extremists poses a serious threat, concern and challenge for law enforcement and public safety personnel at all levels. If we are to be successful in this formidable challenge we must remain cognizant that the eyes and ears of this nation reside with it's citizens and the 750,000 local police officers that patrol our streets 24 hours a day / seven days a week. We should not be naïve or led to believe that only our federal law enforcement have the responsibility to address this topic. Local jurisdictions must take the initiative to prioritize, participate and commit to address Islamist extremism without limitations and regardless of federal funding much the way the Miami-Dade Police Department has done.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

**COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS**

**“The Role of Local Law Enforcement in
Countering Violent Extremism”**



**Major Thomas Dailey
Kansas City, Missouri Police Department
Homeland Security Division**

United States Senate
Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering
Violent Islamist Extremism

Today we find Violent Islamic Extremism to be a fluid and evolving threat. Fundamental Islamic terrorists operations have become more subtle and sophisticated, necessitating adaptation on the part of law enforcement. No section of this country is immune from the influence of Islamic Extremism.

Centered in the middle of the nation in a metropolitan area of 1.7 million people, the Kansas Missouri Police Department is faced with unique challenges in its counterterrorism efforts. In Kansas City we face a silent, careful enemy. Disguised as legitimate Islamic organizations and charities we find the threads leading to Violent Islamist Extremism. Hidden within these groups are facilitators, communications, pathways for radicalization and funding sources for terrorism. There is high geographic concentration of refugees from east African countries who are predominantly Muslim. Within this group may be individuals who have stolen the identity of refugees to gain entry into the country. The possibility now exists that members of terrorist organizations and those posing as family members now reside in our community. Complicating this issue is the fact deportation of a refugee is made more difficult by their refugee status. It is my understanding that in the case of refugees from Somalia, deportations are out of the question since no formal diplomatic relationship exists between the United States and their home country.

We find more of a concentration of Middle Eastern immigrants, and some refugees, are based around the Islamic religious centers. Many of them are intensely loyal to their homeland and religious beliefs. They establish businesses and immerse themselves into the community but may still have sympathies with terrorist organizations as it relates to conflicts in their homeland. Some

Individuals have been identified that have ties back to terrorist organizations which may be a conduit for fundraising, recruitment or terrorist acts.

Areas of concern in Kansas City include an environment created for the support of terrorism through fundraising. Precursors involve the criminal predicate of acquiring money and material through activities such as fraud, forgery, money structuring and laundering. Some individuals involved in aspects of terrorist fundraising are professionals imbedded in communities. This complicates the process of making cases involving the material support of terrorism. The KCPD Intelligence Unit incorporates detectives trained in financial investigations, which adds an important component to our investigative capabilities. The Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy training described below incorporates the importance of recognizing and noting financial transaction records by patrol officers. Important to this process is a close working relationship with the US Attorneys' office which includes regular consultation with the AUSAs.

In Kansas City, Missouri, known criminals whose parole stipulations prohibit them from associating with each other, are using "freedom of religion" to gather and may use this opportunity to further criminal endeavors and may offer a route to the radicalization process.

While the internet is the new "recruitment and training camp", it furthers the ease with which radicalization can access our vulnerable Muslim populations. Conversely, the internet is a tool used to gather information and monitor activities of groups and emerging threats.

The Kansas City Missouri Police Department has worked hard to develop counterterrorism strategies to combat the spread of Violent Islamist Extremism. The Kansas City Missouri Police department has also worked to build bridges and enhance partnerships with the legitimate Muslim American community.

Many of the ideas and initiatives detailed below were a result of exposure to successes, failures and gaps in counterterrorism efforts and strategies at the

national level studied while attending the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense & Security, which is a DHS funded initiative. This report highlights the results of our efforts and implementation of initiatives as we work to prevent acts of terrorism and eliminate the threat of Violent Islamist Extremism.

The prevention of terrorism is a result of a working intelligence cycle and it is our goal to engage all our officers and citizens in this effort. The goals and ideas used to combat terrorism in this effort are not new, but the method used by the Kansas City Missouri Police Department to approach this task may be.

Outlined is a Prevention/Deterrence Counterterrorism effort. This effort is in conjunction with local, state and federal partners. The foundation for this discussion includes the:

1. KCPD Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy (CTPS)
2. Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW)
3. KCPD Intelligence Unit
4. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
5. How reports such as the NYPD report on the Radicalization Process are utilized within the CTPS to stay abreast of threats. (Attachment 4)

I believe it is important to examine how the Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy was constructed. This discussion will demonstrate how traditional policing experience and methods can be reframed and incorporated by patrol officers, in conjunction with the community, to make counterterrorism part of their daily duties.

The September 11th Commission panel report emphasized that the country's 800,000 law-enforcement officers constitute a majority of the countries counterterrorism capabilities. I believe this supported the need for a model to be developed.

The 2002 *National Strategy for Homeland Security* outlined three strategic objectives:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and;

- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur.¹

In 2003, it was found that most local law enforcement efforts and funding had been directed towards response to terrorist attacks. The terrorism prevention efforts were aimed at developing intelligence analysis centers. It was determined that there were no known Prevention/Deterrence models for law enforcement agencies to implement, at the patrol level which included standardized training or strategy for the detection, identification, reporting and interdiction of potential terrorists by patrol officers as part of their duties. These findings were relayed to the Chief of Police with the recommendation that a Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Project be initiated. This proposal was met with full support of the Chief and KCPD Executive Command members.

This is a key point when considering a strategy that will impact an organization's future operations. An initiative such as this has a higher probability of failure without the support and encouragement of the Chief and key decision makers. The commitment to counter terrorism in Kansas City was reinforced when Chief James Corwin gave his initial approval and created the Homeland Security Division in 2004.

Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy

The Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Project was initiated with the goal to translate current successful policing and investigative techniques into terrorism prevention tactics. This effort was accomplished through proactive measures set in place designed to intercept and/or disrupt the advancement of terrorist intentions.

In the proliferation of homeland security guidelines, frameworks, plans, strategies and reports that the practitioner must review, one of the most valuable documents that I believe has been overlooked by first responders is document entitled "*The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security, June 2003*". s.

¹ Office of Homeland Security, (2002), *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, pg. vii.

In the creation of this document, the authors solicited the input of multi-disciplinary Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to determine what tasks are necessary for the prevention of WMD attacks. This document states, "these tasks reflect a base of key actions or activities representing a "framework for prevention" that each jurisdiction should consider in adapting to the exigencies of terrorism." It further encourages those in command positions within organizations to consider the development of prevention plans.

For purposes of communicating these ideas to police officers, it is important to relate the training to existing knowledge and experience, thus ensuring each member will understand and remember the concepts. It is our belief that terrorism preparations and activities are by their nature a criminal action. Local police departments should look to tactics and strategies that have proven effective in fighting crime as the basis for combating terrorism. We see these concepts in action as evidence mounts that shows terrorists are using traditional crime methods to fund their organizations.

To accomplish the goals of the CTPS, it was necessary to identify each action or task that would apply to local law enforcement and extract them from the source document. This was done through a time consuming process that included writing these tasks out, organizing, and collating them into logically related activities or subjects. Each cluster then was framed into a group that could be identified by a general heading.

After numerous reorganization of activities, actions and tasks, five areas were identified as components of an overall Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Project:

- Prevention and deterrence activities and tactics
- Community Oriented Policing activities
- Training
- Data collection and information sharing
- Project evaluation

Within the five component areas, we find traditional policing methods, skills and tactics would be used to carry out project objectives.

These tactics include:

- Defining suspicious behaviors and activities
- Identifying and targeting possible suspects, associates and organizations
- Consensual stops and specific questioning (**see Attachment 2**)
- Collecting and analyzing intelligence information
- Deploying resources and hardening areas of vulnerability
- Using counter surveillance and the screening of people entering large public events
- Educating and enlisting the public's help in gathering suspect information
- Using financial analysis techniques to investigate suspect organizations.

In order to identify and incorporate the most successful policing tactics and take advantage of collective expertise in the areas of the five components, subject matter experts in various units within the KCPD were identified. These representatives were designated to assist in developing concepts; applying research results and translating their experience into the Prevention/Detection activities.

For the Prevention and Deterrence Activities component, personnel from Patrol, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), Gang Unit, Career Criminal Unit, and Narcotics Interdiction were selected for their diverse experience in dealing with "specialized" criminal groups.

For the Community Oriented Policing (COP) component, personnel from Patrol, a Community Interaction Officer, and the Administration Bureau Office were selected. They were selected based on their depth of expertise in their understanding of COP tenets.

The object of the selections was to translate each officer's extensive experience into developing community-policing initiatives as a vehicle to identify suspicious activities related to terrorism.

Due to the wide variance of training that will be needed, personnel from the Perpetrator Information Center (PIC), Patrol, Training Division and the JTTF were selected for the Training component.

To address the numerous issues in the Data Collection and Information Sharing component, personnel from the Intelligence Unit, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), JTTF, PIC, Information Services Unit, and the Critical Incident Site Management Section (CISM) were selected.

The Evaluation component requires expertise in measurement and effectiveness. Personnel from the Planning and Research Unit and the Special Operations Division were selected to develop a method to determine if the information regarding terrorism threats is kept updated and the training and efforts expended are successful factors in the deterrence and interdiction of terrorism.

Upon completion of the Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Project, the information was put into training modules for pre-service (academy) and in-service training for KCPD officers and for community groups. The information developed in these components was used to teach police officers and community members the behaviors and activities that may forewarn of an imminent terrorism conspiracy or attack.

Just as it is important to understand a traditional criminal's traits, behavior and indicators of criminal activity; it is equally important to do the same with Violent Islamic Extremists. To understand terrorism, law enforcement must delve into the organization, religion and culture of Radical Islam, to assist in the identification of possible threats.

Understanding Islamic culture, enables the officers to better understand the differences between westerners and the people of Islam which is useful in interactions, gaining their confidence, and building relationships.

An understanding of how terrorists operate through pre-incident indicators and characteristics are key to preventing terrorism. Presenting specific case studies during training are a means to understanding both how terrorism has occurred and could have been prevented.

The analysis of domestic terrorisms' underlying motivations, causes, tactics and past attacks are important tools in recognizing potential threats. A study of the recruiting methods within the U.S. for both international and domestic terrorism, furthers the understanding of indicators of the presence of terrorist organizations. These efforts promoted deterrence activities and improved intelligence gathering capabilities at the patrol level and from the community through increased awareness and vigilance. The Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Project establishes a clear structure for reporting collected information. This helps to ensure the information reaches the appropriate personnel for analysis and dissemination

To demonstrate how these principles are taught, below are the training module learning objectives for "Patrol Tactics for the Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorism":

1) History: Extremist Ideology

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the history of extremist's ideology. This will enable the participant to better understand the cultural differences of international and domestic extremist groups.

2) Definitions of Terrorism

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the definition of terrorism. This will enable the participant to understand the internationally recognized common elements of international and domestic terrorism.

3) Religion-Application

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of how extremist groups use religion as a justification for their agenda. This will enable the participant to understand how religion can be used as a justification and motivation for extremist activity.

4) Culture-Application

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the cultural differences of international and domestic extremist. This will enable the participant to better understand the cultural differences, thus allowing a patrol officer to interact with these groups in a more efficient manner.

5) Ideological-Application

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the different non-religious ideologies that extremist groups use to justify terrorist attacks. This will enable the participant to better understand the different extremist ideologies, allowing the patrol officer to apply this knowledge when dealing with extremist groups.

6) Demographics

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the different demographics of international and domestic extremist groups. This will enable the patrol officer to recognize the different groups that may have knowledge of and/or participate in extremist activities.

7) Concepts of Jihad

Upon completion, the participant should have a basic knowledge of the term "jihad" and its application to both international and domestic terrorist groups. This will enable the participant to understand the meaning of and to recognize that "jihad" has both domestic and international applications.

8) Types of Terrorism-Application

Upon completion, the participant will be able to identify the two types of terrorism and give examples of each type. The participant will also understand the motivation of each type and the methods employed to carry out each type. This will enable the participant to differentiate between international and domestic terrorism, and apply this information to actual encounters with extremist groups.

9) Geographical Information-Application

Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify the geographical locations of different groups within the patrol officer's area, who may potentially have knowledge of or participate in extremist activities. This will enable the patrol officer to apply specific knowledge of known extremist groups within a patrol area.

10) Police contacts/developing intelligence at the patrol level

Upon completion, the participant should have a general knowledge of methods for cultivating resources within the community through the use of a variety of established community-oriented programs. This will enable the patrol officer to extract information of extremist activity by accessing existing community and cultural groups.

11) Recognition of Indicators/Interdiction of Potential Terrorist Threats

Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify the seven general pre-incident indicators of extremism. This will enable the participant to recognize potential extremist threats.

Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify specific pre-incident indicators and interdiction of extremism during a car check. This will enable the participant to recognize potential extremist indicators when conducting a car check.

- Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify specific pre-incident indicators and interdiction of extremism during a pedestrian check. This will enable the participant to recognize potential extremist indicators when conducting a pedestrian check.
- Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify specific pre-incident indicators and interdiction of extremism during a business/residence check. This will enable the participant to recognize potential extremist indicators when conducting a business or residence check.
- The participant will be exposed to numerous interdiction case studies involving car checks, pedestrian checks, and business/residence checks, to include vehicle-borne bombs. This will allow the participant to bring practical knowledge of the application of indicators of extremism to a multitude of scenarios.

12) Suicide Bombers

- Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify pre-incident indicators of a suicide bomber. This will prepare the participant to readily recognize the signs of an impending suicide bomber incident.
- Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify deterrent techniques before a confrontation with a suicide bomber. This will provide the participant with knowledge and techniques for deterrence of suicide bombers.
- Upon completion, the participant should be able to identify several prevention techniques when confronted with a suicide bomber. This will enable the participant to counter an impending suicide bomber incident.
- The participant will be exposed to several case studies involving suicide bombers. This will provide the participant with practical knowledge of a multitude of scenarios involving suicide bombers.

13) Reporting Procedures

- Upon completion, the participant will be able to identify outside resources dealing with extremist activities. This will allow the participant the ability to access a multitude of outside resources, including federal, state and local resources, when dealing with extremist groups. The participant will understand the proper procedure in dealing with intelligence information and the "cycle of intelligence information".
- Upon completion, the participant will be able to identify methods for the proper documentation of extremist activities. This will ensure the participant has the necessary knowledge of documentation of all potential extremist group contacts/threats.
- The participant will understand the "information path" of reporting and receiving intelligence information and the classification procedure.

(See Attachment 1 for the Goals and Objectives and Index of Training Modules to address the radical Islamic threat)

Outreach and Applied Community Oriented Policing

It has been demonstrated that when the community and the police regularly join in problem solving, it has resulted in reducing a specific crime problem and the fear of crime by the citizens. This same philosophy should be implemented to counter the threat of radical Islamic terrorism in our communities. It is recognized that it is important to have members of the Muslim community, and all communities, as part of our efforts.

We have had specific open forum meetings with members of the Muslim community, which is open to all as a citywide forum, to discuss repercussions from the 9/11 attacks. In certain areas where there is high concentration of Muslim immigrants, most recently from east Africa, officers are in regular contact and conduct neighborhood meetings. In the described COP Counterterrorism training, neighborhood relations are stressed and officers make proactive contacts to increase information exchange. The officers are trained to build partnerships and trust as well as methods for cultivating resources within the community. Proactive contacts also include interviews of those arrested for various offenses for the purpose of source development. This is the Training Module for "Using Community Policing Programs to Counter Terrorism":

1) Community Policing History

- A. Definition
- B. Problem Solving
- C. SARA Model

2) Case Studies

- A. Problem solving successes examples

3) Using Community Policing to Cultivate Information from the Community

- A. Developing relationships/partnerships
- B. Developing trust
- C. How officer's demeanor/attitude determines success

4) Community Policing Programs for Counter-Terrorism

- A. Block watch
- B. Officer liaisons to community groups
- C. Crime free programs
- D. Increased formal communications with community groups
- E. Community crime alerts
- F. Informational fliers/increased information sharing
 - i. All give the police more trained eyes & ears (force-multiplier)

ii. All allow officers to develop sources of information

5) Block Watch

- A. Mobilizes neighborhoods
- B. Teaches crime prevention & detection
- C. Networks the neighborhood with the police
- D. Builds relationships
- E. Acts as an intelligence network

6) Officer Liaisons to Community Groups

- A. Individual officers are now a community group's individual community relations officer
- B. These officers should be trained in all aspects of block watch
- C. These officers are the primary PD contact for these community members
- D. Primary "Relationship Builders"

7) Crime Free Multi-Housing and Related Programs

- A. Develops relationships with rental properties
- B. Teaches – terrorists more likely to live in rental property
 - i. Screening- possible terrorist methods of operation
 - ii. C.P.T.E.D.-Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
 - 1. "Target hardening"
 - iii. Crime prevention/drug detection
 - iv. When to call the police
 - v. Premise liability
 - vi. Criminal detection & reporting
- C. Officers should attend the additional three-day training to become certified in the program.

8) Improved Communication with the community

- A. Using fliers/electronic or paper and the media to increase communication with the community
 - i. Builds trust
 - ii. Gives accurate and timely information to reduce terrorist plots
 - 1. Example of e-mail flyer warning public about what is suspicious at polling places for the 2003 election.

9) Terrorism Training Modules for Officers to teach the public about terrorism prevention.

- A. Terrorism presentation for community groups
- B. Terrorism presentation for businesses
- C. Terrorism prevention for landlord
 - i. Gives background for domestic and international terrorism
 - ii. Describes common methodologies that terrorists use at each group
 - iii. Describes what types of behaviors are suspicious and how to report them.
 - iv. Discusses "target hardening"

10) Using the problem solving model & community policing to combat terrorism

- A. Think outside the box
- B. You are only limited by your creativity
- C. MANPADS case study
 - i. Potential threat identified
 - ii. Partnerships with the community & other agencies
 - iii. Plan developed
 - iv. Implementation failure
 - v. Re-evaluate
 - vi. New plan
 - vii. Community Education
 - viii. Request community's help

(See Attachment 3: training module learning objectives for Community Policing Programs to combat terrorism)

Information Gathering/Analysis/Sharing Process

The process of gathering, analyzing and sharing information is dependant upon the ability to collect as much data as possible, from all sectors of the community, concerning potential terrorist activities. This data must then be analyzed and fused with information from all sources (connecting the dots). The single objective of this process is to give advance warning of those who may be involved in the process leading up to committing acts of terror, what may happen (indications and warning), and what may be done to prevent them..

For this to take place, it is critical that possible terrorism information gathered from all sources, is routed not only to KCPD analysis personnel, but to the regional, state and federal analysis centers.

Currently, the information received through KCPD communications or from department personnel that requires immediate investigation, is routed to the KCPD Intelligence Unit for response. Information submitted as possible suspicious activity is routed to the KCPD Intelligence Unit and The Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Center for analysis. At that point the reported data is checked for correlating information through a network of databases linked to the region, state, and federal agencies. This network is used on a daily basis for analysis and information sharing. Information that may be

linked to an open case or may be a credible threat is routed to the JTTF for follow-up.

KCPD operates in concert with the FBI and has personnel assigned to the JTTF (which includes DHS agencies) as part of the intelligence cycle. The FBI in turn, will in the future have personnel assigned to the TEW. The TEW distributes intelligence and training bulletins and when a threat is discerned the multi-jurisdictional network is used to disseminate that information.

Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Center

As a major metropolitan area, KCPD has a strong working relationship with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, public safety organizations and other-than-first responder organizations. To meet the counterterrorism needs of a nine county region, which is represented through the Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (RHSCC), the TEW (partially funded through DHS) was established as a multi-agency analysis center. This analysis center ensures a coordinated flow of intelligence to and from all sectors and levels of government. The analysis center additionally identifies and addresses specific threats and response plans. The desired end result of this effort is the ability to view raw data from all sectors of the community and provide analytical insights with specific and actionable informational products to help agencies with the Homeland Security mission identify threats before terrorists can act.

The TEW Executive Committee that establishes policy is comprised of local and county 1st Responders, federal agencies, and private sector representatives. This is done to reach as many segments of the community as possible. Participants in this initiative include a Department of Defense component and strong relationship with the FBI Field Intelligence Group (FIG). It is critical to close the gaps between those who are gathering possible terrorism

related information, those who connect the dots, and those who are “on the street” and most likely to encounter terrorism indicators.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This Prevention/Deterrence strategy is designed to be adaptable to evolving threats and knowledge and constantly updated through a Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy Committee. Examples of proposals to adjust the counter terrorism efforts include adding the tenets of the NY paper on radicalization to the CTPS training (Attachment 4) and prevention through the Critical Incident Site Management system (Attachment 5). To date efforts have contributed to cases leading to indictments and furthered the effort of identifying those who may constitute a terrorism threat.

While *The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security, June 2003* was a good resource for the collaboration of agencies (Law Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Management Agency, Public Health, etc), organizations and jurisdictions to develop a framework for prevention by policy makers and stakeholders, it was painstaking to extract and collate the tasks for Law Enforcement. The additional process of developing the CTPS was labor intensive and took over a year to complete. The U.S. Bureau of Justice states there are over 15,000 local, county and state police agencies many of which are smaller and do not have the resources to develop a comprehensive strategy. It is my recommendation that DHS collaborate with police agencies to design a Law Enforcement Counter Terrorism Patrol Strategy model consisting of best practices. This model could be tailored by regional training academies to be taught in pre-service and in-service modules. Consideration could be given to making it part of the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) requirements.

ATTACHMENT 1

Patrol Tactics for the Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorism**Training Module Outline****1) History: Extremist Ideology**

A. Islamic and American Extremist Groups

- i. History
- ii. Religion
- iii. Culture
- iv. Ideological beliefs (non-religious)
- v. Briefly: demographics
- vi. Briefly: parallel the concepts of jihad with an equivalent domestic extremist's mindset

2) History of Terrorism

A. Definition of Terrorism

B. Two Types of Terrorism

- i. International
- ii. Domestic
 1. Examples of each
 2. Motivation
 3. Method

3) Patrol Tactics

A. Legal Considerations

- i. Stops and questioning
- ii. Consensual contacts

B. Know Your Adversary

- i. Local geographical information for different groups
- ii. Police contacts/developing intelligence at the patrol level
 1. Cultivating sources (COP)

C. Indicators of Extremism

- i. Seven Pre-Incident Indicators
 1. Car checks
 2. Pedestrian checks
 3. Business/residence checks
 - a. Case studies/examples
 - b. Vehicle bombs
- D. Suicide Bombers
 - i. Indicators
 - ii. Prevention

4) Reporting Procedures

- A. Outside resources
- B. Documentation
- C. Intelligence information cycle

Patrol Tactics for the Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorism Goals and Objectives

I. The History of Terrorism

1. Understand why this is important.
2. Understand the definition of Terrorism.
3. Understand the terror is an option.
4. Understand the different terrorist operation.

II. Types of Terrorism

2. Understand difference between International and Domestic Terrorist.
3. Understand the three (3) types of Domestic Terrorist.
4. Be able to give examples of Domestic Terrorist.
5. Give Examples of Domestic terror incidents.
6. Understand the three (3) types of International terrorism.
7. Be able to give examples of International terrorist groups.
8. Give examples of International terror incidents.

III. The Culture of Terrorism

9. Understand the Domestic Terrorist specific indicators.
10. Understand the basic culture differences of Muslim.
11. Understand a basic History of Islam and its practices.
12. Understand the meaning of "Jihad" and show how it is being carried out on both the International and Domestic terrorist theaters.

IV. Interdiction Tactics

13. Understand the Anti-Defamation Legion's Extremist Pyramid.
14. Understand the seven basic indicators of terrorism.
15. Understand the "Indication Flow Chart".
16. Know the eight (8) phase of a terror attack.
17. Cite several examples of specific indicators of domestic terrorism.
18. Cite several examples of specific indicators of International terrorism.
19. Cite examples of specific indicators of a suicide bomber.
20. Know the four basic motivators for the cultivation of informants.
21. Know the reporting procedures with regards to terrorist information.

**Post-Hearing Responses to Requests
From Secretary Michael Chertoff
For Senators John Warner and George V. Voinovich**

Request: Senator Warner would like the Department to provide copies of the DVD and any written material that the Department utilizes to train employees on appropriate practices.

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) is providing the following materials to all Members of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee:

1. DVD training video entitled "Introduction to Arab American and Muslim American Cultures Course for DHS Personnel";
2. CD-ROM training video entitled "The First Three to Five Seconds: Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness Training for Law Enforcement";
3. CD-ROM training video entitled "Guidance Regarding the Use of Race for Law Enforcement Officers";
4. CD-ROM training video entitled "National Detention Standards (NDS) Training" for personnel in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Detention and Removal Operations;
5. Educational training posters entitled "Common Muslim American Head Coverings" and "Common Sikh American Head Coverings"; and,
6. Educational training poster entitled "Sikhs and the *Kirpan*."

Request: Senator Warner asked the Secretary to verify that there is someone in the government who reviews all of the employee training materials to ensure consistency across the government.

Response: Many of these materials were created through interagency coordination. For example, participants in the "Introduction to Arab American and Muslim American Cultures Course for DHS Personnel" included representatives from DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Security Council. The "The First Three to Five Seconds: Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness Training for Law Enforcement" was produced by DOJ based on DOJ guidance and repurposed for DHS by CRCL; the "Guidance Regarding the Use of Race for Law Enforcement Officers" was word for word based on the DOJ Guidance of the same title, and produced by CRCL in collaboration with the US Secret Service; and the Sikh and Muslim American Head Coverings and Sikh *Kirpan* posters were produced in collaboration with and/or through guidance from DOJ, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Federal Protective Service. Within DHS, CRCL collaborates with the office of the Chief Learning Officer and members of the Training Leaders Council (TLC) in developing the training materials. The TLC consists of senior training leaders from all of the department's components as well as representatives from several department-level headquarters staff and support organizations with an interest in training issues.

Request: Senator Voinovich would like to see the big picture of the interagency working group that coordinates domestic engagement efforts. Who participates? Who is responsible for what, etc.?

Response: In 2004, the President, by Executive Order, established a Presidential Board on Privacy and Civil Liberties. The Executive Order Board was chaired by then-Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey, and vice-chaired by then-DHS Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson. One of the working groups established was to address American Arab and Muslim communities. This Board was suspended after Congress passed legislation creating the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. However, subsequently, several of the agencies continued to work together informally. In 2006, the Office of State Department Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes, in concert with the National Security Council, began to lead interagency work focused on outreach to Muslim communities around the globe. Because of the important role of American Muslims and other key communities, State Department and NSC officials asked DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Daniel Sutherland to coordinate an informal working group on the domestic branch of this outreach effort.

The focus of this work has been: (a) to coordinate our various efforts at engagement with American Arab and Muslim communities; (b) to stimulate additional work; and, (c) to communicate the efforts of the U.S. Government to Muslim communities in the U.S. and around the world.

The agencies who participated included: DHS (chair); DOJ, Civil Rights Division; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Community Outreach; Department of Treasury, Terrorist Financing; Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Deputy Secretary; National Security Council; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); Department of State (various offices); and, Department of Agriculture. Recently, the group has talked with USAID and U.S. Department of Education and both are enthusiastic about joining our efforts.

So far, the group has witnessed many positive results from its work, including:

- President Bush hosted an *iftaar* at end of the fast meal during Ramadan, and made a public statement on the role of Muslims in America; DHS, with DOJ participation, State, Treasury, also hosted *iftaars* with Muslim American and Arab American community leaders.
- DOJ, FBI and DHS hosted an event during the week of September 11, 2006 to highlight the effective role that Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have played in the past five years, and the increasing levels of engagement between these communities and the government.
- Meetings between community leaders and senior law enforcement officials were held in Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles and Chicago, among others.
- Information about many of these initiatives was shared with the State Department, to be distributed around the world.

- A significant U.S. Government presence received an excellent reception at the 2006 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) convention.
- Attorney General Gonzales has met at least twice with civil rights organizations representing these communities.
- Secretary Chertoff has met with civil rights organizations, and also had dinner in DC, Dearborn, and Munich with Muslim American and Arab American community leaders.
- Under Secretary Hughes has met with community leaders multiple times.
- Former HHS Deputy Secretary Alex Azar gave speeches at events sponsored by the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America, the Islamic Medical Association of North America, and met with the leaders of ISNA.
- Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Wan Kim made two public presentations in Dearborn, Michigan.
- DHS created an “Incident Management Team” that will link U.S. Governmental officials with community leaders in the event of another terrorist attack or homeland security incident.
- In the aftermath of the London arrests, Secretary Chertoff and Kip Hawley, from TSA, made strong statements to the press, which these communities viewed very favorably.
- DHS released a new video that provides training for law enforcement and screening personnel on Arab and Muslim cultures, values and traditions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

In your opening statement before the committee, you said that one of the missions of the Bureau of International Information Programs (Bureau) is to counter violent extremism overseas. What additional resources or authorities does the Department of State (Department) and/or the Bureau need to carry out its mission of countering violent extremism overseas?

Answer:

The State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) engages international audiences on issues of foreign policy, society, and values to create an environment receptive to U.S. national interests. Part of our mission is to counter extremist ideology, misinformation and propaganda. To that end, we communicate directly and openly with foreign opinion makers and other publics through a wide range of print and electronic outreach materials in several languages including Arabic and Persian. Over the past year, we have undertaken a number of initiatives to further our mission against extremist ideology, including the Digital Outreach Team and the Counterterrorism Communication Center. We have expanded other efforts, particularly in Arabic and Persian. We have asked for the additional resources needed to fund these initiatives in our various

budget submissions for FY-07 and FY-08 and in supplemental requests related to Iran and counterterrorism. We believe that the Department, through the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, has the necessary authorities to carry out our public diplomacy mission in this area.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

Please identify each of the different inter-agency federal working groups that the Department participates in that address, in any way, the spread of Islamist extremism abroad or here in the United States. For each inter-agency working group identified, please list the other federal agencies that participate and how often the working groups meet. In addition, please identify whether and the extent to which the Department, and more specifically the Bureau, coordinates its efforts to counter violent extremism with other agencies or offices within the federal government or with any state or local governmental entities.

Answer:

The new Counterterrorism Communication Center (CTCC) is the umbrella for the State Department's Public Diplomacy activities in combating violent extremism and the interagency coordinating office for these actions. The Center was established by the PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications, which is chaired by Under Secretary Hughes. When fully staffed, the Center will have a dozen full-time core staff of State Department employees, officers from various DoD commands, analysts from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and liaison officers from other agencies. The Center Director chairs a

monthly interagency sub-PCC on Counterterrorism Strategic Communications.

The Sub-PCC on Counterterrorism Strategic Communications includes five working groups. The working groups include members from the State Department, Department of Defense, ODNI, DOJ, DHS, and other federal agencies.

- **Internet Working Group.** This group was originally created as part of a separate interagency process to use public diplomacy to counter terrorist use of the Internet. It is now incorporated into the sub-PCC and responds to both the sub-PCC and the original interagency process for which it was created. Its central task is to develop and implement public diplomacy proposals to reach and influence foreign online audiences in the Muslim world.
- **Credible Voices Working Group.** The central task of this group is to mobilize and support strong non-USG voices against terrorism, particularly credible voices in the Muslim world.

- **Research and Analysis Working Group.** The central task of this group is to share research and polling information across interagency lines. It responds to the needs of the Counterterrorism Communication Center for analytic products and programs and connects its efforts with the broader analytic community.
- **Evaluation Working Group.** CTCC activities will be evaluated for effectiveness. The central task of this group is to devise methods to measure the impact of the CTCC's messaging and our overall communications strategy in countering violent extremist ideologies.
- **Messaging Working Group.** The central task of this group is to provide a strategic framework and narrative to counter ideological support for terrorism and to wage an effective campaign to win the war of ideas.

In addition to the Counterterrorism Communication Center, an interagency "**Fusion Team**" meets weekly at the Department of State. The fusion team was launched at the beginning of 2003 to improve the working-level coordination ("fusing") of USG strategic

communication with foreign publics. Team members from participating government offices, bureaus and agencies, including State, DOD and the Intelligence Community, share information about their respective plans and activities in order to leverage each other's communication with international audiences. The team coordinates and "de-conflicts" the production and dissemination of information products, but does not task. Instead, team members reach across bureaucratic boundaries to offer or to seek support for their strategic communication plans and activities.

The **USAID-DOD-DOS Collaboration Group** meets biweekly to coordinate public diplomacy activities to counter violent extremism in a group of key "pilot countries."

On a working level, the Department's Digital Outreach Team has been in contact with CENTCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM, and EUCOM on websites and blogging.

Since the focus of Public Diplomacy is, by definition, foreign audiences, the PD community as such does not deal directly with state or local government entities.

We are active in discussions related to our public diplomacy mission but may not be aware of other USG activities relevant to stopping the spread of Islamist extremism abroad or in the United States.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

According to testimony given by GAO on April 26, 2007, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, the Department of State will soon be releasing a strategic public diplomacy plan aimed at improving America's image abroad. Please explain how this soon-to-be-released strategy will target the spread of Islamist extremism abroad and the extent to which and how the strategy will target the spread of Islamist extremism within the United States. In addition, please identify which other federal agencies will be participating, either directly or indirectly, in executing this public diplomacy strategy.

Answer:

The new U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication was released on May 31, 2007. This strategy is designed to provide a unified strategic framework for U.S. government communications, yet be flexible and adaptable to meet the different needs and responsibilities of very diverse government agencies. The plan was developed by the inter-agency PCC on strategic communications and is the result of extensive input from different agencies, as well as major recommendations from more than 30 reports on public diplomacy, GAO reports, IG recommendations and consultations with private sector communications professionals. The plan is

deliberately short so it will be read and used, rather than placed on a shelf. Attachments provide detailed examples of how to put the strategies into action, as called for by GAO and IG reports. The strategy provides a comprehensive blueprint that brings all of our resources to bear on representing America as a whole, by highlighting the activities and programs our embassies and U.S. Government agencies are undertaking. The agencies participating in the PCC (STATE, DoD, BBG, SMSC, NCTC, NIC, DHS, CIA, USAID, HUD, DOE, HHS, and DNI) will be working to develop implementation plans.

Isolating and marginalizing violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture, and faith is a key objective of the National Strategy. We can achieve this goal by:

- Promoting democratization and good governance as a path to a positive future.
- Actively engaging Muslim communities and amplifying mainstream Muslim voices
- Isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators and organizations.

- De-legitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve political ends

Demonstrating that the West is open to all religions and not in conflict with any faith.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

Please state the mission of the Counterterrorism Communication Center (CTCC) and identify when the CTCC will be fully staffed. Please list the other federal agencies, if any, that will be participating in the CTCC and how the CTCC will impact how other federal agencies will address or target the spread of Islamist extremism.

Answer:

The mission of the Counterterrorism Communication Center is to provide leadership to the U.S. Government's efforts in the war of ideas, integrate overall communication strategies, and intensify and sharpen our messaging to counter terrorist propaganda. By August, the Center will have a dozen full-time core staff of State Department employees, officers from various DoD commands, analysts from the ODNI, and liaison officers from other agencies. Currently, we have representatives from DOD and NCTC; the others will join us shortly.

The Center will work with other agencies through liaison officers and through the coordinating activities of Sub-PCC on Counterterrorism Strategic Communications. The Center will directly work with the full

range of federal agencies involved in counterterrorism to develop more effective messages and themes to counter extremist propaganda and terrorist ideology. The Center will provide leadership for the integration of overall USG research, facilitate the sharing of information and program plans, deconflict duplicate efforts, and develop systems to measure effectiveness.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#5)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

Please state the mission of the Digital Outreach Team (DOT) and identify when the DOT will be fully staffed. Please list the other federal agencies, if any, that will be participating in the DGT and how the DGT will be used to coordinate how other federal agencies will address or target the spread of Islamist extremism.

Answer:

The Digital Outreach Team (DOT), a team of Arabic-speaking analysts under the direction of an experienced Foreign Service Officer, directly engages Arabic-speaking audiences in the “blogosphere” through dialogue in the blogs and chat rooms of Arabic-language cyberspace.

The DOT seeks to engage in these sites by both challenging disinformation about the United States and providing accurate accounts of U.S. policies. Our postings are fully attributed, open, and transparent. Our tone is colloquial, respectful, yet forceful. Our messages are carefully constructed and are both reactive (responding to comments in cyberspace sites) and proactive (initiating discussion on issues that we feel need to be raised). Our presence in cyberspace sends a powerful message that the

United States is willing to listen to the criticisms in the “Arab street” and is willing to responding in a serious way. By August, we will have a joint operation that will include both Department of State and Department of Defense staff working together on the team.

The DOT works regularly with DOD, the military commands, CIA and other agencies to share analysis about Arabic-language website activity and discuss the best ways to ensure the American perspective is represented.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (#6)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

In a Committee hearing on May 3 entitled “The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism,” Senator Voinovich said that the U.S. Government must “encourage the development and availability of a peaceful counter narrative to challenge the extremists’ message.” Does the Department agree with that statement? What is the Department’s responsibility, under current policy, to craft a counter narrative to respond to the Islamist extremists’ message? Has the Department developed or crafted such a narrative? If so, what is that counter narrative?

Answer:

The Department agrees that the U.S. Government must “encourage the development and availability of a peaceful counter narrative to challenge the extremists’ message.” The Counterterrorism Communication Center has a mandate to provide leadership in the war of ideas, and it is developing a counter narrative to the extremist view of the world. This narrative focuses on a positive vision of empowerment, opportunity and political participation, while discrediting the violence and negative messaging of extremists. The CTCC’s interagency working groups on Internet, Credible Voices, and Research will all be essential as we develop this narrative, both by showing us what type of narrative will resonate among our target audience, and by giving us pathways to disseminate this counter narrative response.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

In your testimony, you mentioned that the State Department has specific programs dedicated to the purpose of countering violent extremist ideology. Please explain in some detail, the substance of the counter-narrative being developed. It seems that the baseline question must be: what specific attitudes and behaviors is the United States seeking to change with its counter-narrative?

Answer:

The central attitude we must combat is an unacceptable tolerance and tacit support for terrorism, especially against Americans, that exists within our target audience. While polls have shown that the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not openly support terrorism, too many give it tacit support by not actively opposing the extremist ideology of violence -- especially when it is directed against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. As part of our counter-narrative, we will seek to make terrorism unacceptable under any circumstances, highlighting its terrible cost to individuals and society. We will focus public attention on the need for people to stand up and actively oppose violence against innocent civilians and the needless chaos and destruction that terrorism brings to society. We will expose the

terrorists, many of whom claim to seek noble goals, as hypocrites. In addition to focusing our attention on the negatives of terrorism and action of terrorist groups, we will present an alternative narrative that provides our audience with the positive goals that are supported by American commitment to freedom, democracy and prosperity.

While it is essential to develop and deploy a persuasive counter-narrative, communication strategies work best when used along with success in destroying terrorist operations and infrastructure. An American narrative alone will not win the day without persuasive and committed and credible indigenous voices that mobilize opposition to terrorism throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

Is the counter-narrative being developed with support from in-depth audience research, which describes how target audience opinions are formed and isolates the crucial factors needed to shape our messages and programs accordingly? Please explain.

Answer:

The Counterterrorism Communication Center is working closely with subject-matter experts at the State Department and National Counterterrorism Center as we develop our narrative. We draw on extensive research, polling and audience research through the efforts of our Research Working Group, which includes intelligence analysts from the State Department and ODNI. Our counter-narrative gains both credibility and effectiveness by drawing on the expertise of our analysts in developing coherent and persuasive messages.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

What specific goals have been set for achieving desired attitude and behavior change(s) and how long do you anticipate it will take to achieve such goals? Does each agency pursue a separate set of goals or has a shared performance evaluation and measurement system been established? Are goals set by agency, by country, by region, etc.?

Answer:

The attitude and behavioral changes sought in Public Diplomacy include rejecting terrorism as an acceptable answer to political problems and countering a growing global anti-Americanism by recognizing that the U.S. is a force for positive change in the world. These goals are both long and short term and do not exist in a vacuum apart from the other dimensions of U.S. foreign policy. The short-term challenge for Public Diplomacy is to demythologize the terrorists and encourage the people of the countries at greatest risk to see that their own interests make it imperative that they work to eliminate the terrorist threat. Explaining and creating a more positive view of the United States is a long term project that will require continuing efforts to build bridges between nations through information and exchange programs. The measurement of effectiveness in the Department of State is

overseen by the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office and is an on-going process. The Public Diplomacy goals and objectives have been stated in the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication that was released last month. It is the key document in articulating our policy and it is shared by all the agencies participating in the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy PCC.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

As you know, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent federal agency whose mission is to promote the open communication of information and ideas in support of democracy worldwide. BBG oversees Radio Sawa – a 24 hour Arabic language satellite television channel for the Middle East. Given these important programs, do you believe BBG plays an effective and integrated role in U.S. government efforts to counter violent extremism? Please explain.

Answer:

We believe that U.S. government international broadcasting can and does play an important role in our efforts to counter violent extremism. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) oversees the Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN), which includes AlHurra, a 24 hour satellite television network broadcasting to the Middle East, and Radio Sawa, which broadcasts to Middle Eastern and North African countries.

MBN's mission is to broadcast news and information which is consistently accurate, authoritative, objective, balanced and comprehensive. MBN strives to serve as a model of the free marketplace of ideas and a free press in the American tradition, promoting freedom, democracy and human

rights, including freedom of religion. Additionally, MBN presents the policies of the United States government in a clear and effective manner through news reporting and responsible discussion. Since last fall, Alhurra's coverage of American policy and responsible discussion of that policy has increased dramatically, and we believe this is precisely where the station must go if it is to help the U.S. wage the struggle against violent extremism in the Middle East. In addition, Alhurra is planning programs that we have long supported, including town halls with American Muslims and their counterparts in the Middle East, coverage of the American experience of Muslim and Arab exchange students by those students themselves, and other programs that will serve as platforms for discussion and debate between and among Americans and the people of the Middle East.

Programming directed toward countering violent extremism is an important component of BBG's draft 2008-2013 strategy, which is currently under review by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The BBG strategy is also integrated into our National Strategic Communication Plan. We believe that this is the first time that BBG's strategy has been incorporated into a national plan for public diplomacy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#5)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported last year that public diplomacy efforts of U.S. embassies in Muslim-majority countries generally lacked strategic communication elements found in the private sector—including having core messages, segmented and targeted audiences, detailed strategies and tactics, in-depth research and analysis to evaluate results, and a communication plan that ties these components together. GAO and others have recommended adopting these elements as a means to better communicate with target audiences. What is the status of efforts to develop department and country-level communication plans that are consistent with the new inter-agency strategy for countering extremism?

Answer:

The new inter-agency U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication is the frame work and point of departure for developing the regional and national plans that will be developed. The first step in implementing the National Strategy is for the agencies participating in the PCC to develop their own agency plans. The Counterterrorism Communication Center is working with the State Department's regional bureaus to coordinate the development of regional plans. Finally, the regional bureaus will work with our individual embassies to tailor messaging and programs to local conditions and needs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Coordinator Jeremy F. Curtin by
Senator Susan M. Collins (#6)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
May 10, 2007**

Question:

Please describe the extent of your participation, or that of your agency, in any program and/or outreach efforts headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties—particularly related to the issue of domestic radicalization and Muslim American or Arab American communities.

Answer:

A priority of Public Diplomacy is to find "credible voices" inside the Muslim-American community who would supplement the public voice of the Department of State by participating in the Citizen Dialogue Program under the aegis of the Bureau of International Information Programs, become involved in exchange programs run by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and engage in discussions in cyberspace. The PCC on Strategic Communication has formed a working group on this subject. Many of our international outreach programs depend on our good relationship with American communities with whom DHS and DOJ are also in touch, through formal outreach programs and other channels. We have had discussions with these agencies to share experiences relevant to our missions, in particular on issues related to building trust among the

communities and ourselves and USG agencies. The question of domestic radicalization and Muslim American or Arab American groups falls outside the purview of Public Diplomacy which is restricted by our legislative mandate to engage foreign audiences.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Chip Ponce
From Senator Joseph I. Lieberman**

**“Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It”
May 10, 2007**

- 1. In testimony before the Committee on May 10, you stated that one prong of the Department of Treasury’s (Department) four pronged approach to fighting the abuse of charity for the purposes of spreading Islamist extremism is “comprehensive and sustained outreach.” Please identify how many employees the Department has committed, as a full-time responsibility, to the outreach efforts for the purpose of eliminating the abuse of charities by Islamist extremists. Additionally, how many employees of the Department are assigned such outreach efforts as a part-time or collateral responsibility? Of the employees committed to the outreach efforts on a full-time or part-time basis, how many have linguistic or cultural expertise that helps the employees interact with the Arab- and Muslim-American communities?*

As the policy office for the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) works with other offices across the Department, as well as across the inter-agency community and with international counterparts, to develop and help implement outreach initiatives to combat terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector.

To develop and help execute this strategic outreach and other responsibilities in combating terrorist financing and illicit finance more broadly, TFFC is managed by Assistant Secretary Patrick O’Brien and Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser and is comprised of the Office of Global Affairs (OGA) and the Office of Strategic Policy (OSP). OGA includes one office director, two assistant directors, and nine regional policy advisors, each of whom conducts outreach in his or her region of responsibility on a wide range of TFFC issues, including combating terrorist abuse of the charitable sector. OSP includes one office director, one deputy director, and eight functional policy advisors, each of whom serves on various functional teams addressing TFFC’s strategic priorities. One such team, consisting of three OSP advisors, the OSP director and the special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, focuses on combating terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector, including through comprehensive and sustained outreach.

In conducting outreach to the charitable sector, and particularly to vulnerable Muslim charitable communities, OGA and OSP work consistently with other experts from across TFI and the Department, including experts from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and experts from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; advisors from the

Office of International Affairs' Office of the Middle East and North Africa and Office of Technical Assistance; the Office of Tax Policy and the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Operating Division (TEGE) and Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as well as with our interagency and international partners on such efforts.

Each of these Treasury offices and their relevant experts are necessary to develop and help implement sustained outreach to the charitable and Muslim communities that comprehensively covers the four fundamental points described in my written testimony. Many of these offices include experts with linguistic or cultural expertise that can facilitate engagement with the Arab- and Muslim-American communities, including four advisors from TFFC proficient or fluent in Arabic, one TFFC advisor who is a native Farsi speaker, and several advisors who have lived abroad in Arab or Muslim regions.

2. ***Please identify each of the inter-agency federal working groups that the Department of Treasury participates in that address, in any way, the spread of Islamist extremism here in the United States. For each inter-agency working group identified, please list the other federal agencies that participate and how often the working groups meet. In addition, please explain how these working group(s) affect the Department's outreach efforts, especially for the purpose of countering the abuse of charities by Islamist extremists and their supporters.***

The Department of the Treasury participates in an inter-agency federal working group that focuses explicitly on the spread of violent Islamist extremism both in the United States and abroad. The group meets regularly, and includes all relevant federal agencies, including those from the law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic and military communities.

Treasury also participates in several other formal and informal inter-agency federal working groups that address these issues in the broader context of combating terrorist financing and terrorism more generally. Such working groups include:

- A series of regular inter-agency meetings of experts and senior policymakers from federal agencies across the counter-terrorism and national security community led by the National Security Council Office of Combating Terrorism;
- Regular inter-agency meetings at the Department of Justice (DOJ) with members of the Arab, Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities to address anti-discrimination;
- Periodic inter-agency meetings led by DOJ and the FBI in federal districts and field offices throughout the country with Arab, Muslim and Sikh communities to discuss terrorist financing and counter-terrorism issues of concern to these communities;

- Regular interagency meetings hosted by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Civil Liberties to discuss outreach and other charity-related issues; and
- Periodic interagency meetings of a Charities Working Group hosted by Treasury to discuss issues of terrorist financing involving the charitable sector.

In addition to experts from across those TFI and Treasury offices as described above, these working groups and meetings often include experts and policy advisors from federal agencies and offices across the national security, law enforcement, and development spectrum, including the FBI, DOJ, DHS, and the State Department. These various federal inter-agency working groups and meetings help Treasury coordinate its outreach efforts with those of other agencies engaged in outreach on counter-terrorism issues effecting the Arab and Muslim communities.

3. *Please explain if the Department, either through these working groups or through any other channel, receives direction or guidance from any other department, agency, or office within the federal government regarding the implementation of its outreach efforts for the purpose of countering Islamist extremism? Additionally, does the Department provide any direction or guidance to any other department, agency, or office within the federal government for this purpose?*

Treasury both receives and provides direction and guidance from other federal agencies through these working groups and meetings. In particular, Treasury informs other federal agencies of its equities related to: (i) strengthening effective development and implementation of targeted economic sanctions to combat terrorism; (ii) improving the transparency of U.S. and global financial systems to facilitate U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and to produce useful information for law enforcement in combating terrorist financing and financial crimes more broadly; (iii) strengthening oversight and transparency of the U.S. charitable sector through federal, state and private sector efforts; and (iv) facilitating international engagement and cooperation on these issues through the Financial Action Task Force and other multilateral and bilateral fora and initiatives.

Treasury's outreach efforts are also informed by the work of a number of agencies in the law enforcement, regulatory, and foreign policy communities, including offices from DOJ, the FBI, DHS, the federal financial regulatory community and the State Department.

4. *In testimony before the Committee, you said that Department's voluntary and anti-terrorist financing guidelines are available on-line. Please explain the process by which someone would be able to contact the Department to ask questions about those guidelines.*

The Guidelines were drafted with the direct participation of the private sector and were also subject to public notice and comment. In the latest revision, Treasury received a number of comments and incorporated many of the suggestions received. The Guidelines also include several references to additional guidance and provide information for contacting OFAC and the FBI with specific concerns that the private sector may have.

TFFC/OSP regularly meets with both the charitable sector and the Arab/Muslim American communities in both town-hall events and individual meetings to seek feedback and to discuss issues of concern related to the use of the Guidelines. Additionally, specific questions about the Guidelines have been and can continue to be directed to our office.

5. ***Please describe whether and the extent to which state and local law enforcement agencies are involved and play a role in the Department's outreach efforts to the Arab- and Muslim-American Communities.***

TFFC/OSP works with state and local authorities through the National Association of State Charity Officials (NASCO) and the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). This engagement provides additional means of distribution for the Guidelines and related materials and has provided an additional source of leads for possible investigation and enforcement action.

For example, TFFC staff recently participated in outreach sessions hosted by the U.S. Attorney's Offices in Detroit and Boston with regular members of those field office community outreach groups to discuss particular issues associated with Treasury's authorities in combating terrorist financing.

6. ***Please inform the Committee of what additional authorities and/or resources the Department needs for its outreach program, especially with regard to countering the spread of Islamist extremism.***

Through coordination with existing outreach efforts of other federal agencies, TFFC/OSP is applying its existing resources to advance immediate outreach opportunities with the Arab- and Muslim-American communities and the charitable sector. TFFC/OSP is planning to increase its staffing in fiscal year 2008 to meet several pressing national security needs. These additional resources will assist Treasury in continuing to improve the effectiveness of its outreach efforts.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Chip Poncy
From Senator Susan M. Collins**

**“Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It”
May 10, 2007**

- 1. Among the responsibilities that lie within the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes at the Department of the Treasury, is to prevent money from being funneled to designated foreign terrorist organizations. I understand that your office conducts outreach to both charities and individuals to help them understand why some organizations are considered criminal. Recognizing that some of the organizations also provide social and welfare services to the poor in their respective countries, how do you explain this nuance during your outreach work?*

Our outreach to the charitable sector and to the Arab and Muslim communities begins with a thorough explanation of the nature of terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector, and the rationale behind international standards to prevent such abuse in the charitable sector and how the roles and activities of specialized regional bodies such as the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) contribute to efforts to prevent terrorist abuse of the charitable sector. Treasury’s revised *Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities* (Guidelines) includes an Annex, created in cooperation with the Department of Justice, describing the nature of such abuse.

We discuss how the risk of terrorist abuse facing charitable organizations is ongoing and significant and cannot be measured solely from the important but relatively narrow perspective of terrorist diversion of charitable funds to support terrorist acts. Rather, terrorist abuse also includes exploiting charitable services to cultivate support for terrorist organizations and activities and radicalize vulnerable populations. The Annex to the Guidelines provides several examples of such abuse and further references several additional sources of information describing such abuse in greater detail.

Understanding the nature of this ongoing terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector is critical to understanding our strategy for combating such abuse. Simply put, charity cannot be used to defend or rationalize terrorism or terrorist organizations. Charities that provide social and welfare services to the poor on behalf of terrorist organizations sustain and promote support for such organizations by facilitating terrorist recruitment, ideologies and agendas, political support and operational cover. Moreover, because money is fungible, terrorist organizations that rely on affiliated charities to sustain and promote such support can devote greater resources to planning and executing terrorist

attacks. By attacking the charitable operations of terrorist organizations, we can deprive these organizations of a primary source and means of support.

Our outreach also involves communicating that the U.S. Government recognizes and strongly supports the essential role of charity in Arab/Muslim, American and global society and that we have the common goal of promoting charitable giving. While the overwhelming majority of Arab and Muslim Americans and the broader American donor community pursue legitimate and laudable charitable activities, designations of charities demonstrate that terrorist organizations continue to prey upon the charitable sector as a primary source of terrorist financing and support. However, these designations do not represent the efforts of the vast majority of respected Arab/Muslim-American donors and charities that support a wide variety of worthy organizations and causes. We encourage such expressions of charity and continue to work with all communities to promote the practice of charitable giving in ways that are safe and effective.

In addition, our outreach addresses how the U.S. Government and charitable communities can work together to protect the sector from abuse by terrorists and to ensure that donors' funds are properly used and safely delivered to the recipients. We highlight our ongoing dialogue with representatives of various Arab, Muslim and other communities; our regular participation in meetings with the sector, town hall discussions with local communities, and other outreach events; and our involvement in outreach activities with other U.S. agencies, such as USAID, DHS, and FBI/DOJ. By working with the charitable sector, the Arab and Muslim-American communities and the developmental components of the U.S. government and the international community, we can also facilitate the development of alternative relief mechanisms that can provide the social and welfare services that populations need and which are free from the influence of terrorist organizations.

2. *In a letter dated September 21, 2006, Senator Voinovich and I asked the Administration to explain its strategy for confronting homegrown terrorism. In response, Fran Townsend explained in a letter that the Department of the Treasury "has created a trusted relationship with members of the Muslim community to address the issue of charitable organizations corrupted by terrorist groups." It is my understanding that Treasury employs just one person to create such "trusted relationships." Do you think you have enough resources to reach the "critical mass" necessary to have a positive impact with your efforts? Please explain.*

As the policy office for the Department of the Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) works with other offices across the Department, as well as across the inter-agency community and with international counterparts, to develop and help implement outreach initiatives to combat terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector.

To develop and help execute this strategic outreach and other responsibilities in combating terrorist financing and illicit finance more broadly, TFFC is managed by

Assistant Secretary Patrick O'Brien and Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser and is comprised of the Office of Global Affairs (OGA) and the Office of Strategic Policy (OSP). OGA includes one office director, two assistant directors, and nine regional policy advisors, each of whom conducts outreach in his or her region of responsibility on a wide range of TFFC issues, including combating terrorist abuse of the charitable sector. OSP includes one office director, one deputy director, and eight functional policy advisors, each of whom serves on various functional teams addressing TFFC's strategic priorities. One such team, consisting of three OSP advisors, the OSP director and the special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, focuses on combating terrorist exploitation of the charitable sector, including through comprehensive and sustained outreach.

In conducting outreach to the charitable sector, and particularly to vulnerable Muslim charitable communities, OGA and OSP work consistently with other experts from across TFI and the Department, including experts from the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) Compliance Division and experts from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; advisors from the Office of International Affairs' Office of the Middle East and North Africa and Office of Technical Assistance; the Office of Tax Policy and the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Operating Division (TEGE) and Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Each of these Treasury offices and their relevant experts are necessary to develop and help implement sustained outreach to the charitable sector and Arab and Muslim communities that comprehensively covers the four fundamental points of our strategy to combat terrorist abuse of the charitable sector, as described in my written testimony. Many of these offices include experts with linguistic or cultural expertise that can facilitate engagement with the Arab- and Muslim-American communities, including four advisors from TFFC proficient or fluent in Arabic, one TFFC advisor who is a native Farsi speaker, and several advisors who have lived abroad in Arab or Muslim regions.

This comprehensive approach across various Treasury offices is further advanced through consultation and coordination with the inter-agency community. Treasury is a key participant in the ongoing inter-agency efforts to develop and implement a coordinated approach to outreach in combating violent Islamist extremism at the National Counter-Terrorism Center. In addition, Treasury participates in several other formal and informal inter-agency federal working groups that address these issues in the broader context of combating terrorist financing and terrorism more generally. Such working groups include:

- A series of regular inter-agency meetings of experts and senior policymakers from federal agencies across the counter-terrorism and national security community led by the National Security Council Office of Combating Terrorism;
- Regular inter-agency meetings at the Department of Justice (DOJ) with members of the Arab, Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities to address anti-discrimination issues;

- Periodic inter-agency meetings led by DOJ and the FBI in federal districts and field offices throughout the country with Arab, Muslim and Sikh communities to discuss terrorist financing and counter-terrorism issues of concern to these communities;
- Regular interagency meetings hosted by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Civil Liberties to discuss outreach and other charity-related issues; and
- Periodic interagency meetings of a Charities Working Group hosted by Treasury to discuss issues of terrorist financing involving the charitable sector.

These various federal inter-agency working groups and meetings help Treasury coordinate its outreach efforts with those of other agencies to advance immediate outreach opportunities with the Arab- and Muslim-American communities and the charitable sector. TFFC/OSP is planning to increase its staffing in fiscal year 2008 to meet several pressing national security needs. These additional resources will assist Treasury in continuing to improve the effectiveness of its outreach efforts.

3. ***Please describe the extent of your participation, or that of your agency, in any program and/or outreach efforts headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties—particularly related to the issue of domestic radicalization and Muslim American or Arab American communities.***

Treasury works closely with the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRCL) at DHS on a number of issues related to charities, including through participation in monthly "brown bag lunches" hosted by OCRCL to discuss outreach and other charity-related issues and participation with OCRCL in outreach events with the private sector in Washington, DC, and around the country. For example, over the past several weeks TFFC policy advisors engaged in joint outreach to the Arab- and Muslim-American communities with OCRCL and other members of the inter-agency counter-terrorism community at the following events:

- the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee national convention;
- a DHS teleconference with the Arab-American communities in Chicago;
- the annual conference of the Islamic Society of North America in Chicago;
- outreach sessions hosted by the U.S. Attorney's Offices in Detroit and Boston with regular members of those field office community outreach groups to discuss particular issues associated with Treasury's authorities in combating terrorist financing.

**Responses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Based Upon the May 10, 2007 Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Regarding Violent Islamist Extremism**

Questions Posed by Senator Lieberman

1. Please identify the number of FBI personnel nationwide whose full-time or part-time responsibilities include the community relations program and please identify how many of those FBI employees are special agents and how many are support personnel. Of the FBI employees who have full-time or part-time responsibilities for the community relations program, please identify how many have language skills and/or cultural awareness education specific to the populations with which they work.

Response:

The FBI has a total of 59 Community Outreach Specialists in the Community Outreach Program (COP). This includes 30 full-time and 29 part-time professional support employees. The COP also includes four FBI Special Agents who serve as Community Outreach Coordinators in support of the COP. The COP is overseen by a unit in the FBI's Office of Public Affairs that has a Funded Staffing Level of nine, with eight employees currently on board, including one Supervisory Special Agent. The FBI is in the process of filling the remaining vacancy.

Five percent of the Community Outreach Specialists have relevant foreign language skills. New Agents Training at the FBI Academy includes cultural awareness training, and this training is provided to on-board employees through employee conferences and other means.

2. You testified that the community relations programs pursued by FBI headquarters and the field offices focuses on building critical relationships with the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities here in the United States. Please inform the Committee of what additional authorities and/or resources the FBI needs for its community relations program, especially with regard to countering the spread of Islamist extremism.

Response:

The FBI will continue to work with the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress to ensure this important program is appropriately funded.

3. Please describe whether and the extent to which state and local law enforcement agencies are involved and play a role in the FBI's community relations programs. Is guidance given to field offices about coordinating with state and local law enforcement agencies for the purposes of the community relations program?

Response:

Each of the FBI's 56 FBI field offices has a COP responsible for developing close working relationships with the state and local law enforcement agencies in their territories, and state and local partners frequently participate in the FBI's outreach programs. In addition, there is a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in each FBI field office. These JTTFs, which include representatives from state and local law enforcement agencies, consult those in their COP for guidance regarding various ethnic and minority cultures.

4. As you indicated in [your] testimony before the Committee on May 10, the FBI appears to be the face of the U.S. Government to many communities. Please describe the procedures in place for FBI field offices to handle complaints or concerns with issues that do not fall within the FBI's jurisdiction.

Response:

When complaints or concerns arise regarding issues that do not fall within the FBI's jurisdiction, FBI field offices attempt to bring together the complainant (and/or the appropriate community or organizational leaders, depending on the circumstances) and the appropriate responsive agency (or agencies). This coordination may be fairly informal or may be accomplished by way of a conference call, face-to-face meeting, or town hall meeting.

In addition, FBI field office Special Agents in Charge (SAC) conduct frequent panel discussions open to members of the community. A typical panel may include a moderator, the SAC, FBI Special Agents who specialize in relevant programs, and subject matter experts and/or scholars from various other agencies or organizations. Town hall meetings are generally well received in the community, providing an

opportunity for community members to communicate directly with government officials in a position to act on the concerns raised. These forums also help to keep the FBI informed regarding community issues and concerns that may affect the FBI, even if not formally in our jurisdiction.

5. Please identify each of the different inter-agency federal working groups that the FBI participates in that address the spread of Islamist extremism here in the United States. For each inter-agency working group, please identify the other federal agencies that participate and how often the working groups meet. In addition, please explain how these working groups impact the FBI's community relations program, especially for the purpose of countering the spread of Islamist extremism.

Response:

The FBI participates in four Federal inter-agency working groups that are collectively addressing the spread of Islamist extremism in the United States.

- The FBI, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, others in DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the Department of State (DOS) participate in an inter-agency Federal working group that meets monthly to discuss the spread of Islamist extremism in the United States and how to counter it.
- Along with DHS, DOS, Treasury, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the FBI participates in a Domestic Engagement working group that meets regularly to identify strengths, weaknesses, and best practices for each government agency's community engagement efforts.
- An Incident Management team, consisting of the FBI, DOJ, DHS, and national leaders from the Arab-American, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities, was established to resolve issues that arise in the aftermath of incidents in local communities. The group convenes by way of telephone conference call after an incident and, if an incident warrants, meets in person.
- DOJ's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights hosts an interagency meeting with community leaders approximately every

two months to address civil rights concerns and to connect leaders with the agencies able to help remedy problems.

The FBI's community relations program is in the process of developing new outreach initiatives focused on countering extremism. The FBI is also making use of established relationships with national leaders from various communities to gain insight on how the FBI can be more proactive in this effort.

6. Please explain if the FBI, either through these working groups or through any other channel, receives direction or guidance from any other department, agency, or office within the federal government regarding the implementation of its community outreach program for the purpose of countering Islamist extremism. Additionally, does the FBI provide any direction or guidance to any other department, agency, or office within the federal government for this purpose?

Response:

These working groups are an excellent means of offering and receiving guidance and advice regarding the effectiveness of community outreach programs. In addition, there is a constant dialogue and information flow among government agencies regarding issues that arise to ensure the efforts of the relevant Federal agencies to address these communities' concerns are not in conflict. For example, the FBI has consulted with DHS to address concerns raised by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee regarding delays in processing name checks, has worked closely with DOJ's Civil Rights Division regarding post 9/11/01 civil rights violations, and has involved Treasury in meetings with Arab-American community leaders regarding Islamic charity fund raising.

7. With over 50 field offices, the community relations program in each of the different FBI field offices would presumably be individualized to each office and the demographics of the respective community. Does FBI Headquarters provide each field office with guidance on how to manage their respective community relations program in order to try and create a certain degree of standardization in the program? Or does FBI Headquarters leave the discretion entirely to the individual field offices to tailor their own community relations program?

Response:

The FBI has established guidelines, policies, and procedures regarding outreach activities. Consistent with these, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ)

conducts outreach on the national level and provides guidance to the field to assist them in their outreach on the local level. This guidance allows field offices to adapt their programs to address the demographics of their territories, and it is the SAC's responsibility to ensure the field office is engaging in appropriate community outreach. Each field office is encouraged to establish relevant advisory committees and to conduct other outreach activities, such as Citizens' Academies, Community Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST), town hall meetings, and youth programs.

8. Please indicate if the FBI has implemented any sort of an assessment procedure for the community relations programs in the different field offices to determine if and how the community relations program is contributing [to] the FBI's overall mission.

Response:

Each field office must submit to FBIHQ a detailed semi-annual accomplishments report identifying the types of community outreach conducted in the past six months. The report uses a detailed question and answer format and requires a list of existing and newly developed partnerships with various ethnic and minority organizations and community leaders. The report also discusses the various outreach activities that occurred during the evaluation period, such as Citizens' Academies, CREST, town hall meetings, and youth programs, all of which strengthen community relations, improve the trust between the FBI and the community, and ultimately contribute to the FBI's overall mission success. In response to the semi-annual accomplishments report, FBIHQ replies to the SAC, recognizing field office accomplishments, identifying any areas of concern, and recommending ways to improve the COP, if appropriate.

9. At the hearing on May 10, you explained that the FBI community relations unit initiated a conference call following the Fort Dix arrests on May 8. Please describe the types of circumstances that would warrant the initiation of this type of conference call and identify which organizations participate on the call. How many times have these incident-related conference calls been initiated? Do any other federal agencies participate in these conference calls, and does the FBI work with or participate in the Incident Management Team, which the Department of Homeland Security plans to convene in the aftermath of similar events?

Response:

The FBI conducts routine periodic conference calls with relevant Federal agencies and national community organizations, which may include the Arab-American Institute, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Islamic Society of North America, Muslim Public Affairs Council, National Association of Muslim Lawyers, Sikh-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and/or other interested organizations. The FBI most typically initiates non-routine conference calls in order to respond to community leaders' questions when community events warrant such communications. As the FBI builds and strengthens relationships with community leaders, we rely on these relationships to support two-way dialogue between the FBI and the community, particularly when the FBI's investigative activity - or suspected activity - creates tensions or concerns. For example, the FBI participated in a conference call including DHS immediately following arrests related to a terrorist threat to the JFK International Airport. On occasion, a conference call may be arranged before a particular event is announced to the general public so the FBI can share unclassified information (taking care not to jeopardize the investigation and consistent with DOJ guidelines). This type of call gives national organizations an opportunity to prepare for questions and concerns from their respective communities. As of January 2007, there had been three incident-related conference calls.

Conference calls are also conducted at the local level. Last year, before searching the offices of Life for Relief and Development, the FBI's Michigan field office made significant community contacts in an effort to keep the community informed within the parameters of the sealed affidavits. FBIHQ also conducted a non-routine conference call with community leaders to discuss issues raised by the law enforcement activities. Similarly, before executing search warrants on places associated with two local Muslim businessmen, including a mosque, the FBI's Albany field office contacted the President of the mosque to advise him of the search.

The FBI also uses other means to communicate with these communities. For example, the FBI serves as a member of the Incident Management team, briefing both team members and community leaders regarding issues arising in the community.

Questions Posed by Senator Collins

10. As I mentioned during the hearing, we have heard about the great progress that the Los Angeles FBI field office has had with developing relationships with Muslim and Arab communities. One would hope that one of the goals of FBI is to replicate that progress in all of its field offices across the country. Please provide examples of other U.S. cities where promising outreach efforts are underway.

Response:

It is the FBI's goal to develop strong working relationships with all ethnic and minority communities through the use of the COP. The FBI's Los Angeles field office has a very active Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee, and other field offices have established similar committee or advisory councils that include leaders from relevant ethnic and minority communities. For example, the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO) has established an advisory council that meets both at WFO and at various mosques in the Washington Metropolitan area to discuss a range of issues, including problem trends, hate crimes, and concerns regarding the USA PATRIOT Act. The FBI's Charlotte, Chicago, New York, Buffalo, Detroit, and San Diego field offices have established similar committees, and other field offices are in the process of doing so or have otherwise improved engagement with their Arab-American and Muslim communities. These advisory councils have participated in conferences, town hall meetings, and other forums to discuss issues and develop best practices in the community.

11. In addition to fostering relationships between law enforcement and the public, community outreach work provides us with an opportunity to resolve rumors and break down stereotypes. They can play an especially critical role on the heels of an incident, like the one that we all recently watched unfold involving the "Fort Dix Six." Please provide us with an example of how FBI's outreach efforts would, or have, come into play after a major incident.

Response:

The FBI's effort to build bridges and to establish and strengthen existing relationships with various communities has engendered a level of trust from various community leaders. In the event of an incident or crisis, the FBI can contact these leaders to share information that will combat the development of rumors, speculation, and stereotyping that often develops in an information vacuum. For example, on 3/9/07 the FBI Director held a press conference regarding DOJ's Report on National Security Letters.

The FBI also coordinated a conference call with national community leaders to answer questions related to the press conference, using that forum to address the communities' issues and concerns.

12. Each FBI office is required to engage in outreach to build ties and trust with local Muslim populations. In your testimony, you mentioned that FBI Headquarters is able to measure whether outreach efforts across the 56 field divisions are being carried out effectively. Please elaborate on that statement, and explain exactly how the Bureau goes about measuring the effectiveness of such outreach efforts.

Response:

Please see the response to Question 8, above.

13. Please describe the extent of your participation, or that of your agency, in any program and/or outreach efforts headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties - particularly related to the issue of domestic radicalization and Muslim American or Arab American communities.

Response:

The FBI is a member of DHS's Domestic Engagement working group, which consists of officials from various government agencies, including DOS, Treasury, USAID, and HHS. The Domestic Engagement working group conducts regular meetings to identify strengths, weaknesses, and best practices regarding each agency's responsibilities and contributions. In addition, the FBI and DHS co-chair a working group that is in the process of developing outreach strategies to assist in combating domestic radicalization in the Arab-American and Muslim communities.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Jeffrey J. Grieco, Acting Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, USAID
from Senator Susan Collins
May 10, 2007**

Question 1:

Basic marketing practice tells us that there is great emphasis on knowing your audience. That theme applies not only to private sector companies, but also to the federal government. Are your agency's activities supported by in-depth audience research, which describes how target audience opinions are formed, and isolates the crucial factors needed to shape messages and programs accordingly? If so, please provide an illustration of such research and how it was used to develop, implement, and evaluate a program designed to counter anti-American messages.

Answer:

Knowing your audience is essential for effective messaging. This has long been a basic tenet of USAID's communication strategy and guidelines to the field and to Washington staff. The importance of knowing your audience was recently reinforced government wide with the release of the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* which highlights that "...understanding foreign public opinion is vital to successful communication". Our USAID communicators in the field -- Development Outreach and Communications Officers (DOCs) -- make knowing the audience one of their top priorities and rely on independent polling and related sources as an essential part of developing

their Mission's strategic communication plan -- in close concert with the U.S. Embassy. For example in Afghanistan, recent independent public opinion survey data was relied upon to help shape U.S. Government messages to counter Taliban excesses. Also, USAID staff in Washington routinely forward public opinion survey data to the field from major polling institutions (e.g., Gallup) and Department of State funded country-specific studies when available.

While USAID does not for the most part conduct its own polling data in most countries, it has recently launched major integrated media campaigns in several large Muslim-majority countries -- such as West Bank/Gaza and Indonesia --using television, radio, print, and billboard ads. These integrated public affairs campaigns are specifically aimed to increase awareness that the foreign assistance and resulting accomplishments (e.g. roads, drinkable water, schools, etc.) are provided by the American people.

To be effective, the campaigns rely heavily on pre- (baseline) and post (impact) in-depth public opinion survey data and other associated techniques such as "focus groups" and "opinion leader surveys." In my May 10, 2007 testimony, for example, I highlighted that only a very small percentage -- less than 5% -- of Palestinians were even aware that Americans were providing assistance to those in the West Bank and Gaza. Based on in-depth

polling data and analysis, USAID developed and launched a short, targeted media campaign that increased awareness to over 50%.

Because of the very high costs of mounting national probability surveys, USAID continues to strike a balance between using independently commissioned polling data for specific countries, utilizing polling data from the Department of State (e.g., INR), and screening existing commercial polling data from such organizations as Gallup. Additional resources dedicated to audience analysis could help us sharpen our focus to especially vulnerable groups (youth, women, girls, etc.), conduct more frequent/timely surveys, and to expand in-depth polling in additional high priority countries.

Question 2:

Part of the fight against radicalization is to influence people's perceptions and attitudes towards the United States. Some would suggest that we need to go one step further and influence people's behavior. In other words, not only improve the image that an individual has of our country, but also to prevent them from choosing to commit acts of terrorism against us. What specific goals have been set for achieving desired attitude and behavior change(s) and how long do you anticipate it will take to achieve such goals? Are goals set by agency, by country, by region, etc.?

Answer:

USAID, along with our public affairs counterparts at the U.S.

Department of State, work daily to improve the image of the U.S. overseas.

In particular, I want to highlight *USAID's Telling our Story Initiative* which provides our Agency public affairs professionals with a unique set of tools (website, templates, photo caption guidance, interview guidelines, etc.) to positively influence people's perceptions about the U.S. *USAID's Telling Our Story* highlights how our on-the-ground development assistance (e.g., health care, education, economic support) and humanitarian aid (e.g., food, shelter, drinking water) help to improve their lives, open doors to opportunity, and assist those devastated by floods, hurricanes and earthquakes rebuild their shattered lives. These stories make people around the world know that it's often more important "what you do" than "what you say". *USAID's Telling our Stories* is a good example of the approach that

under Secretary Karen Hughes has so strongly championed -- her "Diplomacy of Deeds" -- in *the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. USAID does not set individual country goals to achieve "desired attitudes and behavioral change" but works closely with the Embassy public affairs and public diplomacy team to develop such goals based on the Country Operational Plans.

Question 3:

We know what makes up the extremist narrative. They paint the West as “aggressive crusaders” while they paint themselves as charitable and righteous. We know that their message is false; that we are not trying to take their land and that they are responsible for more Muslim deaths than we are. Yet we do not seem to be doing a good job pointing out the good that we are doing in the region – like building schools, hospitals and water treatment plants. How can we do a better job of highlighting the good that we are doing around the world, which will help to undercut the extremist narrative?

Answer:

USAID has undertaken a number of initiatives to highlight development assistance and humanitarian aid accomplishments including a new comprehensive U.S. branding and marking effort that let's those in the developing world know that the American people care -- and they can count on us. The branding and marking efforts let people in the developing world clearly and unambiguously know that the aid they receive is "From the American People".

In addition, USAID has recently established and trained a dynamic, highly professional country-based public affairs *cadre* within most USAID missions. This energized group of public affairs specialists proactively highlights development assistance accomplishments with our host-country partners to build schools, roads, and hospitals as well as strengthen the

requisite institutional capacity to keep these going strong and accessible to all in need. Additional resources are needed to keep this *cadre* of well trained in the latest public affairs/outreach tools and to expand their reach so that every USAID mission has a Development Outreach and Communications (DOC) officer -- working side-by-side with their State public affairs counterpart.

Question 4:

Please describe the extent of your participation, or that of your agency, in any program and/or outreach efforts headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties – particularly related to the issue of domestic radicalization and Muslim American or Arab American communities.

Answer:

USAID continues to work closely with the outreach efforts headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. For example, USAID and DHS co-hosted a number of Iftar events last year. USAID and DHS often attend key meetings at each respective organization where Islamic radicalization, both here in the United States and abroad, is discussed. USAID and DHS are also key partners in government wide interagency deliberations such as the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Coordination Committee (PCC). In addition, USAID and DHS continue to jointly plan participation in a number of domestic events that reach out to the Muslim Diaspora. DHS's latest DVD, *"Introduction to Arab American and Muslim American"*, used to assist DHS personnel have a greater understanding of Arab and Muslim American culture, has been circulated within USAID. Overall, participation between our two organizations continues to grow stronger and each looks for new ways to cooperate against a common threat.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Dr. Marc Sageman
From Senator Joseph I. Lieberman**

**“Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience”
June 27, 2007**

Senator Lieberman, thank you for your astute questions. I shall answer them in order.

1. In your testimony, you said that your “research shows that terrorists are really idealistic young people who seek glory and thrills by trying to build a utopia.” The Committee has also heard testimony from other witnesses that the U.S. needs to develop its own narrative to counter the message being spread by Islamist extremists. Do you agree that the U.S. should develop a counter-narrative? If so, what would that counter-narrative look like, how should it be disseminated, and how would it present an alternative to the utopia that is proving so persuasive to young extremists?

With all due respect to your other witnesses, I do not believe that the U.S. needs to develop a counter-narrative. The U.S. has one of the strongest narratives in the world, namely the “American Dream,” the land of opportunity. It attracts hundreds of thousands to come to this country every year. No, the problem is not with the narrative, but in the interpretation of U.S. actions around the world. Less than two decades ago, the U.S. was seen as a shining beacon of justice, keeping its strong core values, which were admired around the world. In the past decade, U.S. policy has given life to the terrorist narrative, namely that the U.S. is engaged in a “war against Islam.” Only deeds will refute this allegation. No “counter-narrative” can do that. As an example, the Palestinian population displays strong anti-Americanism because of U.S. policy. Yet, the same people indicate the U.S. as the country they would most like to emigrate. They are attracted by the American Dream (the U.S. narrative), but condemn U.S. policy.

2. In your testimony, you mentioned that terrorists are often physically isolated yet connected through Internet forums, inspired by the extremist ideology and hoping that they will be accepted as members of al Qaeda through their operations. The Internet has also been credited with accelerating the radicalization process. Would you expand on the role the Internet plays in the radicalization process and comment specifically whether the Internet does accelerate the radicalization process and whether you think the Internet can replace face-to-face meetings when it comes to recruiting potential terrorists? In addition, what role does the Internet play, if any, facilitating the emergence of homegrown radicalization in the U.S.?

The Internet plays a critical role in the radicalization of young Muslims into terrorists. This is a new phenomenon. The pre-9/11 al Qaeda terrorists were radicalized through face to face interaction. After Iraq, and especially in the past three years, this interactive process of radicalization takes place online, in the jihadi forums. This online radicalization is certainly replacing face to face radicalization. The key to understanding

this process is to realize that it is based on interactivity between the members, which makes the participants in the forums change their mind. Some of the participants get so worked up that they declare themselves ready to be terrorists. In a way, recruitment is self-recruitment, which is why we cannot stop it by trying to identify and arrest “recruiters.” These self-recruited upstarts do not need any outsiders to try to join the terrorist social movement. Since this process takes place at home, often in the parental home, it facilitates the emergence of homegrown radicalization, worldwide. In terms of the last question in the paragraph, this process is less likely to take place in the U.S. because the terrorist narrative that this is a war against Islam has much less resonance with the personal experiences of Muslim Americans, as the recent Pew Research Center survey of the American Muslim population clearly shows.

3. In your testimony, you indicated that religion does not play a very significant role in the radicalization process and the motivation for committing terrorist acts. Would you expand on that idea and explain the extent to which you think religion is a motivating factor for radicalized individuals. For example, do radicalized individuals want to commit terrorist acts for the purpose of creating a modern day Caliphate governed by Sharia law or are they more interested in making political statements against their government or others?

People join the terrorist movement for thrill and to fulfill dreams of glory. The present script for such glory is to re-enact their version of the glory days of Islam, namely the great conquest of the Golden Age of Islam, namely its first forty years, from 622 to 662 AD. Unlike most other experts on terrorism, which base their analysis on the content of jihadi websites or secondhand speculation about the terrorists in the press, I have gone to the trials of terrorists, to their environment, and tried to piece together their trajectory from a fairly unimpressive background to terrorism. What I have learned is that the terrorists at their trials in Madrid, in London, in Paris, in Amsterdam, in Hamburg, in New York, were not Islamic scholars and did not know much about the Quran. They lacked a religious education and for the most part had been secular most of their lives. One has to be careful to distinguish what people say about them on jihadi forums and what the terrorists really are. The analogy would be trying to understand the Nazis during World War II by simply listening to their propaganda, without visiting the concentration camps and the killing fields in Eastern Europe. From what I could see, the terrorists committed their acts mostly to impress their friends. They did so according to the jihadi script, but it could have been any type of script (anti-capitalist, anti-state...). It is important to distinguish between after the fact justification and before the fact motivation, and between the people who actually commit terrorist acts and the ideologues who justify them. As I said, the ones on trial, the ones who actually committed the acts did not strike me as intellectuals, who did what they did for abstract well reasoned principles. Looking at them reminded me of Hannah Arendt’s remark about the banality of evil and the mediocrity of the perpetrators.

4. Based on your research in Europe, which countries have the most advanced and effective policies to confront and defeat Islamist extremism, including policies aimed at disrupting the radicalization process. What are those policies and why and how they are

effective? Could any of these policies be applicable to countering radicalization and terrorism in the United States?

The U.S. is by far the best country in terms of confronting and defeating Islamist extremism within this country. When I talk to high level policy makers in Europe, Australia and Canada, I am always asked what we do right, as all these countries notice that we do not have the same problem of radicalization within our country as they do. This relative protection against Islamist extremism is not due to a specific policy of the U.S. government, since as the question implies, we do not have much of a policy. No, this relative protection is due to cultural, social and economic factors in this country, which prevent the terrorist narrative (war against Islam) from getting any traction with Muslim Americans. Radicalization is a bottom up process, and partly depends on the presence of economic opportunities and cultural welcome. A fluid labor market allows Muslim Americans to live the American Dream by providing equal opportunity to them. This refutes the terrorist claim that the country is engaged in a war against Islam.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Dr. Marc Sageman
From Senator Mark Pryor**

**“Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience”
June 27, 2007**

1. You discuss how the “myth of a national essence” accounts for a discrepancy in perspectives of Muslims in America and Muslims in Europe. According to your explanation, it follows that European Muslims feel a greater sense of social and political exclusion than American Muslims. However, Muslims in both groups have been radicalized. You give several explanations for the radicalization of European Muslims. Do you see factors which are unique to American Muslims that lead them to pursue extremism?

Senator Pryor, thank you for your question. Yes, Muslims on both continents have been radicalized, but not at the same rate. The rate of arrests related to terrorism for Muslims in Europe is at least five times higher than the rate for the U.S. on a per capita basis. The absolute numbers is about 1,800 arrests in Europe for about 60 arrests in the U.S. This is quite a disparity. The reason Muslim Americans pursue extremism is the same as their Europeans co-religionists, only less so: a sense of moral outrage; interpreted in a specific way (war against Islam); which resonates with their personal experiences; and mobilized through face to face or online networks. The third prong of this process (resonance with personal experiences) is what protects the U.S. compared to Europe. Equal opportunity in the labor market is probably the biggest factor. A quick comparison between the Muslim American unemployment rate (which is identical to the general population) and the Muslim European one (which is two or three times higher among 15 to 30 year old males) is just an example of the cultural, social and economic differences in the environment for Muslim in the respective continents.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to the Honorable Lynn M. Martin and Farooq M. Kathwari
From Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

“Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience”
June 27, 2007

1. The Pew Research Center released a poll on May 22, 2007 that found that “[a]bout a quarter (26%) of younger U.S. Muslims say suicide bombing can at least rarely be justified” under some circumstances and that 5% of all American-Muslims have a favorable view of Al Qaeda. Throughout the report entitled “Strengthening America: The Civic and Political Integration of Muslim Americans” drafted by the Task Force on Muslim American Civic and Political Engagement sponsored by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, you cite the Pew Research Center’s findings, but do not address the poll results for the support of suicide bombing and the favorable view of Al Qaeda. Please explain why you did not address the statistics related to violence and the terrorist organization that attacked America on September 11, 2001. In addition, please explain why you believe 26% of younger Muslims say suicide bombing is ever acceptable and why 5% of America-Muslims have a favorable view of Al Qaeda.

Response: The Chicago Council Task Force on Muslim American Civic and Political Integration was nearing its conclusion at the time the Pew Research Center survey on Muslim American attitudes was released on May 22, 2007. We had begun the Task Force deliberations in February 2006 and by late May 2007 we had both concluded all the plenary Task Force meetings and were at the stage of finalizing the report in advance of its June 26, 2006 release. It would not have been possible to reference the findings on Muslim American attitudes towards suicide bombings and Al Qaeda without the Task Force undertaking a substantive discussion of what these findings meant and how they related to the report’s other findings and recommendations. We simply lacked the time to do this if we intended to keep to our June 26 release date. The 2007 Pew results that we did reference related to demographic questions, voter preferences, and the findings on youth perceptions of discrimination. There was no need for the Task Force to interpret these Pew results and they primarily served as a source of additional background information.

While there is no formal Task Force interpretation of these findings, the report does clearly recognize the danger of potential radicalization and calls on Muslim leaders to strengthen their efforts to prevent radical activity within the Muslim American community. The report also underscores the need to find new methods for reaching out to younger Muslim Americans to encourage positive participation in American life and to diminish the potential for marginalization and radicalization. It outlines steps that Muslims and non-Muslims should take, including encouraging civic participation, creating internship programs, and developing a new generation of Muslim American leaders.

2. Your report, "Strengthening America: The Civic and Political Integration of Muslim Americans," offers six recommendations to "speed the integration of Muslim Americans into America civic and political life." However, none of those recommendations include a zero tolerance policy for Islamist extremist ideology that calls for the destruction of America's civic and political life. Please explain whether such a recommendation or a similar recommendation was ever considered by the Task Force on Muslim American Civic and Political Engagement sponsored by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. And if such a recommendation was rejected by the Task Force, please explain why.

Response: Throughout the Task Force deliberations and the development of the final report, there was agreement among Task Force members that the report needed to include a strong statement on terrorism. The report both clearly states that there can be no place for supporting terrorism or radical ideologies within the Muslim American communities and outlines positive steps that can be taken to minimize the potential for this.

It calls on Muslim American leaders and institutions to amplify existing efforts to condemn extremism and terrorist acts, strengthen their efforts to prevent radical activity within the Muslim American community, encourage more Muslims to seek employment with U.S. government agencies, and work with relevant national and local government agencies to improve the effectiveness of anti-terrorism collaborative efforts. These are outlined in the report on pages 9-11, 20, and 37-43.

The report also cites the 2005 Fiqh Council of North America antiterrorism fatwa (religious ruling), signed by 145 Muslim American institutions and leaders, which stated in part that, "Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram – or forbidden - and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not martyrs."

3. Please explain the process by which representatives were asked to serve on the Task Force on Muslim American Civic and Political Engagement. What criteria were used to select Task Force members?

Working with representatives from The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, we developed a list of potential task force participants at the beginning of the project. We wanted to target a group of approximately 35 participants who would be both geographically diverse and representative of various groupings of Muslim and non-Muslim stakeholders, with leaders from education, academia, business, former government or political office, the media, and non-government organizations. While there were some participants who were included expressly to bring expertise on Islam and Muslim societies and the American Muslim community to the deliberations, in general the task force was structured as a leadership rather than expert group.

Individuals were identified based on how they would fit into the parameters of the group dynamic described above and on their known interest in the topic or its relevance to their work. In general, we wanted to ensure the group was diverse in its demographic background as well as in its thinking on the various issues to be deliberated. Invitations under our signatures were sent to a larger pool of potential participants, and from those who responded positively we formed the eventual task force. In the end, Task Force membership was diverse geographically and by sector and membership was approximately equally divided between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to the Honorable Lynn M. Martin and Farooq M. Kathwari
From Senator Mark Pryor

“Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience”
June 27, 2007

1. The need for stronger Muslim American voices and institutions is evident. You stress the necessity of a fresh media perspective, celebration of Muslim American accomplishments, and acknowledgement of Muslim American patriotism. How do you propose finding the appropriate leadership for these campaigns? Do you feel there is a particular population or community to target, such as America’s youth or young adults? In your experience, have American Muslim religious leaders been helpful in this endeavor?

Response: Developing Muslim American institutions and leaders that can effectively engage in American civic and political life will be a time and resource intensive endeavor given the daunting institutional capacity and leadership challenges Muslim Americans face. The good news is that this is a process that virtually all immigrant dependent communities have undergone, and there are many examples in our nation’s history of new immigrant groups slowly learning to engage successfully in American society. The Muslim American experience, however, has been complicated greatly by the spotlight that has been placed on the community in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the war on terror, and the U.S. military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Muslim Americans leaders will need to take the lead in addressing these challenges. To be effective, these leaders need to have credibility and buy-in from both within the community and among the various sets of key outside stakeholding groups, which includes the government. While this capacity will have to be slowly built up, it can be accelerated through increased discussions and interaction between Muslim American community and thought leaders on the one hand and government leaders and agencies on the other, and this is something that we hope will become a priority for the U.S. government. Engaging Muslim American youth is particularly important in this process. Doing so both diminishes the potential for alienation and helps develop future leaders who can work on behalf of all Americans.

It is difficult for us to provide a thorough assessment of the role Muslim American religious leaders have played as the Task Force’s mandate did not include a systematic examination of this issue. There is clearly a tremendous amount of diversity among Muslim American religious leaders. The nation has an estimated 1,500 mosques, many of which are led by foreign-born imams. It is our sense that there is strong interest among many Muslim Americans to broaden and improve training provided to these imams and to develop a larger pool of American born or trained imams, who are likely to be better versed and more engaged in American society. Imams and other Muslim American religious leaders have both an opportunity and an obligation to encourage positive integration and diminish the appeal of radical ideology.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Farooq M. Kathwari
From Senator Tom Coburn**

**“Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience”
June 27, 2007**

1. You have previously cited a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center indicating that 40 percent of Muslim youth in America feel discriminated against. However, that same polling data found that approximately one-quarter of the same Muslim youth believe that suicide bombings against civilians are an acceptable practice. In your opinion, what is the significance of that second finding and does it indicate a disturbing trend among American Muslim youth?


Response: Any support for suicide bombings among Muslim Americans is of course a troubling finding. If anything, it suggests a strong need for the types of civic and political engagement programs targeting young Muslim Americans that are outlined in the Task Force report. Having said this, we feel that there are positives to highlight from the Pew findings. A very strong majority of Muslim Americans (78%) said that the use of suicide bombings against civilian targets to defend Islam from its enemies is never justified. This is a higher percentage than found among Muslim respondents in nine of ten other countries surveyed in 2006.

It is also significantly higher than the percentage of Americans who categorically reject attacks on civilians. The Program on International Policy Attitudes undertook a nationally representative survey of 1004 Americans in December 2006 that found that only 46% believed that “bombings and other types of attacks intentionally aimed at civilians” are never justified. Five percent said they were often justified, while 19% said they were sometimes justified and 27% said they were rarely justified. In the same survey, twenty-one percent of Americans responded that attacks by Israelis against Palestinian civilians are sometimes justified.

These questions are not sufficiently detailed to understand how respondents react to them. We believe that additional work to assess Muslim and non-Muslim American attitudes towards suicide bombings or attacks targeting civilians would be an area worthy of further study.

**VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM,
THE INTERNET, AND THE
HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT**

United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Majority & Minority Staff Report

Joseph Lieberman, Chairman
Susan Collins, Ranking Minority Member

May 8, 2008

I. Introduction

This is the first in a series of reports by the Majority and Minority staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Committee) on the threat of homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist extremism. The Committee initiated an investigation into this threat during the 109th Congress under the leadership of Chairman Susan Collins (R-ME). The first hearing on the homegrown threat considered the potential for radicalization in U.S. prisons, including an examination of the activities of Kevin Lamar James, an American citizen. While in prison, James adopted a variant of violent Islamist ideology, founded an organization known as the Assembly for Authentic Islam (or JIS, the Arabic initials for the group), and began converting fellow prisoners to his cause. Upon release, James recruited members of JIS to commit at least 11 armed robberies, the proceeds from which were to be used to finance attacks against military installations and other targets in southern California. James and another member of the group eventually pled guilty to conspiring to wage war against the United States.

The James case is only one example of how the violent Islamist terrorist threat has evolved and expanded since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks and recruited the hijackers abroad before sending them to the United States to make final preparations for the operation. The 9/11 hijackers were indoctrinated into the violent Islamist mindset long before they set foot in the United States. As the James case and others illustrate, however, radicalization is no longer confined to training camps in Afghanistan or other locations far from our shores; it is also occurring right here in the United States.

During the 110th Congress, under the leadership of Chairman Joseph Lieberman (ID-CT), the Committee continued its investigation into the threat of domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist ideology. The Committee has held five more hearings exploring a range of subjects, including an assessment of the homegrown threat in the United States, the European experience with domestic radicalization, the federal government's efforts to counter the homegrown terrorist threat, the role of local law enforcement in responding to the threat, and the Internet's role in the radicalization process.¹

This staff report concerns the last of these subjects – how violent Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda are using the Internet to enlist followers into the global violent Islamist terrorist movement and to increase support for the movement, ranging from ideological support, to fundraising, and ultimately to planning and executing terrorist attacks. In the second section of this report, we examine the increasing number of homegrown incidents and the judgments of the intelligence and law enforcement communities that there will likely be additional homegrown threats in the future. The third section explores the four-step radicalization process through which an individual can be enticed to adopt a violent Islamist extremist mindset and act on the ideology's call to violence. Section four identifies the disturbingly broad array of materials available on the Internet that promote the violent Islamist extremist ideology. The availability of these resources is not haphazard, but is part of a comprehensive, tightly controlled messaging campaign by al-Qaeda and like-minded extremists designed to spread their violent message. The fifth section of the report examines how these materials facilitate and encourage the radicalization process.

Finally, the report assesses the federal government's response to the spread of the violent Islamist message on the Internet and concludes that there is no cohesive and comprehensive outreach and communications strategy in place to confront this threat. The report does not discuss relevant classified tools and tactics employed by the law enforcement and intelligence communities, but does recognize that there is no plan to harness all possible resources including adopting new laws, encouraging and supporting law enforcement and the intelligence community at the local, state, and federal levels, and more aggressively implementing an outreach and counter-messaging campaign on the Internet and elsewhere.

II. The Emerging Homegrown Terrorist Threat

Violent Islamist ideology and the terrorism it inspires pose a substantial threat to America's homeland security. The core tenets of this violent ideology are straightforward, uncompromising, and absolute. The ideology calls for the pursuit and creation of a global Islamist state – a Caliphate – that unites all Muslims – the *Ummah* – and is governed by Islamic law – *Sharia*. In pursuing this totalitarian goal, violent Islamists are not only encouraged to attack those who are not committed to their ideology in its purest form, including other Muslims, but are purportedly obligated to do so.²

Violent Islamist terrorists have attacked the United States and its interests many times. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the attacks on the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the *USS Cole* in 2000, the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, and many others were carried out by well-organized, well-equipped, and well-trained individuals indoctrinated into violent Islamist ideology. The United States government has appropriately focused its attentions at its borders and abroad, disrupting terrorist planning, training, and operations as part of the Global War on Terror. Despite these efforts, the Committee's investigation has found that the violent Islamist threat to the homeland has evolved and expanded.³

The attacks in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, and in London, England, on July 7, 2005, heralded a new form of the violent Islamist threat. In these attacks, homegrown terrorists – violent Islamist extremists living legally in the countries where the attacks took place – bombed public transportation facilities, killing their neighbors, and for some of the attackers, their fellow citizens. Homegrown terrorists inspired by this violent ideology also have planned and, in some cases, carried out attacks in other countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Canada.


The United States has not been immune from homegrown threats, as evidenced by the James case and other incidents. For example:

- In December 2006, Derrick Shareef, a resident of Genoa, Illinois, who was not alleged to be part of a terrorist organization but was inspired by violent Islamist ideology, was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to attempting to acquire explosives as part of a plan to attack the Cherry Vale Mall in Rockford, Illinois.
- In May 7, 2007, a group of six men were arrested as part of an alleged plot to attack the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey. The men – three of whom were legally living in the United States – allegedly watched violent Islamist videos, obtained weapons, and planned and trained for the attack in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

- In June 2007, federal law enforcement disrupted an ideologically inspired terrorist plot to allegedly destroy fuel supplies and pipelines at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.

These incidents and others form part of a growing trend that has raised concerns within the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities. The Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller, discussed this dangerous trend before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 5, 2008. Director McConnell testified that:

Over the next year, attacks by “homegrown” extremists inspired by militant Islamic ideology but without operational direction from al-Qa’ida will remain a threat to the United States or against U.S. interests overseas. The spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that provide religious justification for attacks, increasingly aggressive and violent anti-Western rhetoric and actions by local groups, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries that identify with violent Salafi objectives, all suggest growth of a radical and violent segment among the West’s Muslim populations.... The al-Qaida-propagated narrative of an “us versus them” struggle serves both as a platform and a potential catalyst for radicalization of Muslims alienated from the mainstream U.S. population.



To date, cells detected in the United States have lacked the level of sophistication, experience, and access to resources of terrorist cells overseas. Their efforts, when disrupted, largely have been in the nascent phase, and authorities often were able to take advantage of poor operational tradecraft. However, the growing use of the Internet to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were available only in overseas training camps. It is likely that such independent groups will use information on destructive tactics available on the Internet to boost their own capabilities.⁴

And, according to Director Mueller:

[W]e face the challenges presented by a third group and that is self-radicalized, homegrown extremists in the United States. While not formally affiliated with a foreign terrorist group, they are inspired by those groups’ messages of violence, often through the Internet, and because they lack formal ties, they are often particularly difficult to detect.⁵

III. A Path to Radicalization

Homegrown terrorists are not created overnight. In order to fully identify the best way to combat this threat, the Committee sought to understand the process by which individuals or groups of individuals are radicalized to become violent Islamist extremists. The spark for the radicalization process is the core enlistment message that the leaders of the global violent Islamist terrorist movement use to attract followers. That terrorist message conveys the following three incendiary points:

- The West, led by the United States, is engaged in a war against Islam;
- Muslims are obligated to defend their religion and there are theological justifications for doing so; and
- Violence is the necessary means to defend the religion.⁶

After more than two years of research into homegrown terrorism cases in the United States and around the world, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) developed a model to explain how this core enlistment message, and the “jihadi-Salafi” ideology that provides the foundation for that message, drive the domestic radicalization process – transforming “unremarkable people” into terrorists.⁷ During the Committee’s October 30, 2007, hearing, the NYPD outlined this four-stage model:

Pre-Radicalization: ... [T]he point of origin for individuals before they begin the radicalization process. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi [ideology] ... as their own ideology.

Self-Identification: ... [T]he phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity, and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own.

Indoctrination: ... [T]he phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause... While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, ... association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens.

Jihadization: ... [T]he phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in [terrorist activities] and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the ... terrorist attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation and execution.⁸

According to testimony presented to the Committee, this process has been less likely to occur in the United States than in other countries. Some attribute this to the unique cultural influence of the “American experience” and the general absence of a sympathetic audience in the United States. For the most part, America’s diverse Muslim communities are well integrated into our society and want to raise their families in safe and peaceful communities. And unlike some countries in Europe and elsewhere, the “longstanding tradition of absorbing varied diaspora populations has protected the United States and retarded the radicalization process at home.”⁹ Nonetheless, the recent rise in acts of homegrown terrorism planning and plotting in the United States may be an early warning that domestic radicalization inspired by violent Islamist ideology has become more likely in the United States. Assessments by

both the law enforcement and intelligence communities support the conclusion that the United States will likely face increased levels of homegrown terrorist threats as violent Islamist extremists develop new methods to spark the radicalization process. Indeed, as the terrorists' Internet campaign bypasses America's physical borders and undermines cultural barriers that previously served as a bulwark against al-Qaeda's message of hate and violence, the threat of homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States increases.¹⁰


IV. The Terrorist Internet Campaign

Propaganda has always been integral to the violent Islamist movement, especially for the purpose of attracting followers. Printed materials, videos of terrorist activities, including operations and training, and recordings of sermons and speeches espousing the virtues of the violent Islamist ideology have been distributed and sold around the world for decades.¹¹ But today, for an individual seeking information on this ideology, the Committee found that the Internet provides the most accessible source of information – both passive, in the form of static Web pages, and interactive, in the form of chat rooms and discussion forums that can connect interested individuals with extremists around the world.

The use of the Internet by violent Islamist extremists is constantly in flux, with websites appearing and disappearing regularly. Yet despite the dynamic nature of the websites, there is a generally organized framework for the dissemination of the core terrorist enlistment message. For those who want to know more about violent Islamist ideology, immense caches of information and propaganda are available online. Some material is produced by organized groups committed to advancing this ideology around the world, while other material is produced by self-starting individuals, who themselves may have "signed on" to the ideology's virtual network. These self-appointed amplifiers of the violent Islamist message may not be part of a known terrorist organization, but they choose to advance the cause, not necessarily with guns but with propaganda. Much of this material is readily available through web searches and is often discussed in chat rooms and other online forums where those interested in learning more about the violent Islamist ideology begin the radicalization process and seek out like-minded individuals.

A. Al-Qaeda's Operation

Today, al-Qaeda manages a multi-tiered online media operation in which a number of production units associated with al-Qaeda or allied violent Islamist organizations produce content consistent with the core terrorist enlistment message. This sophisticated structure is a natural outgrowth of al-Qaeda's previous multimedia efforts. Al-Qaeda has long had a media committee¹² and once operated the now defunct www.alneda.com, which pushed the core terrorist enlistment message and disseminated official statements from al-Qaeda leadership.¹³ Al-Qaeda also recognized, prior to 9/11, the value of videotaping attacks and disseminating the statements of terrorists who kill themselves in the name of violent Islamist ideology. Post 9/11, al-Qaeda leadership has accelerated their media campaign as necessary to pursuing their global ideological cause. In what is now a well-known letter to the former al-Qaeda commander in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote, "We are in a battle, and



more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people."¹⁴

Several examples of al-Qaeda affiliated regional production centers include:

- Al-Furqan Media (affiliated with The Islamic State of Iraq)
- As-Sahab Media (affiliated with al-Qaeda High Command)
- Media Commission or Media Committee (affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb)
- Sawt al-Jihad (affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)¹⁵

These production centers, which often include an icon or logo to identify themselves and their propaganda, are highly sophisticated operations that utilize cutting-edge technology. Videos may be relatively straightforward recordings of attacks, or they may be intricate productions with graphics, sound effects, banners, subtitles, animation, and stock footage. These centers also produce online magazines, official statements, news updates, articles, white papers, and even poetry. The use of songs, symbols, and imagery is integral, adding layers of meaning and emotion to what is being seen or heard.



Once content is created by as-Sahab, al-Furqan, or one of the other production units, it is then funneled through a clearinghouse before it is posted on the Internet. One of the most active Internet clearinghouses today is the al-Fajr Media Center, which was established in January 2006. Like the production centers, al-Fajr is almost entirely virtual. The approval process for dissemination is unclear, but once approved, content is moved from al-Fajr to pre-approved websites. On a daily basis, al-Fajr issues a host of material including statements from violent Islamist groups taking credit for attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, and elsewhere.¹⁶

These terrorist groups use clearinghouses for two primary reasons. First, along with the icons and logos that identify production centers, clearinghouses help ensure a message's authenticity.¹⁷ A product released by al-Fajr is recognized as "genuine" and helps maintain message discipline. Because the violent Islamist movement is committed to its strict interpretation of the religion and its long-term goal to destroy the West, message discipline helps prevent deviation from either. Second, the clearinghouse process facilitates the near-instantaneous dissemination of new propaganda. Content approved by a clearinghouse is posted on pre-approved web forums like al-Ekhlaas, al-Hesbah, al-Buraq, or al-Firdaws that include some of the most "exclusive" violent Islamist websites – where access is tightly controlled.¹⁸ The "approved" message is then reposted all over the Internet to become the subject of discussion and debate.¹⁹

The propaganda regularly produced by this process finds its way to literally *thousands* of violent Islamist websites across the Internet, many of which are either "mirrored" versions of one another or "simply bulletin boards" that disseminate the same material created by the production houses.²⁰ This distribution system provides built-in redundancies so that propaganda remains accessible even if one or more of the sites are not available.

Twin suicide bombings in Algeria on December 11, 2007, and a subsequent suicide bombing on January 29, 2008, illustrate how this propaganda dissemination process works. Al-Zawahiri announced in 2006 that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting in Algeria had officially aligned with al-Qaeda.²¹ In forming the alliance, the group assumed the new name al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb and reinvigorated its online operation with the creation of the Media Commission. Very soon after the Algerian attacks, the Media Commission released statements through al-Fajr taking credit for the attacks and providing background and pictures of the suicide bombers. Al-Fajr posted the statement online where it was then viewed and disseminated around the world. The statements included quotes from the Koran, celebrated the attacks themselves, and hit all three points of the core terrorist enlistment message.

Al-Qaeda also uses its online campaign to bypass traditional media and speak “directly” to followers, in part because the terrorist groups believe their message is diluted when replayed or reported by news outlets.²² In December 2007, al-Zawahiri announced in an as-Sahab produced video that he would answer questions submitted by followers via some of the more exclusive web forums. In a subsequent as-Sahab video released on April 2, 2008, al-Zawahiri tried to address certain issues that were undermining al-Qaeda’s credibility among its supporters, including al-Qaeda’s responsibility for killing innocent Muslims and the writings of Sayid Imam al-Sharif. In his new book, al-Sharif, a one-time proponent of violent Islamist ideology and a religious mentor to al-Zawahiri, renounced violence as ineffective and religiously unlawful for the purpose of forcing political change. Al-Zawahiri not only tried to discredit al-Sharif’s new position in his video response, he also released a book on the Internet purporting to refute many of al-Sharif’s arguments.²³

Over the last year, al-Qaeda also made a tactical decision to increase its production of online propaganda and make more of it accessible to English-speaking audiences. Al-Qaeda has sought out English translators and, according to Charlie Allen, the Chief Intelligence Officer at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), al-Qaeda has “ratcheted up the speed and accuracy of translated statements openly marketed to U.S. and English-speaking audiences.”²⁴ For example, al-Qaeda has added subtitles to its video products and made appeals directly to Americans, including specific religious, ethnic, and racial populations in the United States and elsewhere. On September 8, 2007, as-Sahab released a video of an Osama bin Laden monologue titled “Message to the American People.”



This video followed the as-Sahab release of an interview with al-Zawahiri, in which he made the following plea:

That’s why I want blacks in America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all the weak and oppressed in North and South America, in Africa and Asia, and all over the world, to know that when we wage Jihad in Allah’s path, we aren’t waging Jihad to lift oppression for the Muslims only, we are waging Jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind, because Allah has ordered us never to accept oppressions, whatever it may be.

According to Dr. Jarret Brachman, the Director of Research at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, one goal of this tactical decision was to attract particular groups al-Qaeda perceives as “self-starting radicals who [could] reach back to A[ll] Q[ueeda’s] high-command, much like we saw in London with Operation Crevice and the 7/7 attacks.”²⁵ DHS’ Chief Intelligence Officer, Mr. Allen, also recognizes a similar intent in the changes to al-Qaeda’s recent propaganda campaign, which has been assisted by supporters in the United States:

Al-Qaeda’s leadership has delivered over the past twelve months, an unprecedented number of audio and video messages and has increased its translation capability, diversity of subject matters, and media savvy to reach out to wider audiences globally. Its objective is to gain wide Muslim support, empathy, financing, and future recruits. ... To help al-Qaeda target U.S. citizens, several radical websites in the United States have re-packaged al-Qaeda statements with American vernacular and commentary intending to sway U.S. Muslims.²⁶

B. The Purveyors of Violent Islamist Ideology

The Internet hosts a vast electronic repository of texts and treatises by the zealots who have given shape to the supposed theological justifications for violent Islamist ideology and the strategies for advancing its cause. These zealots and their ideas, which have inspired attacks in the West and elsewhere, are considered by some to be the “center of gravity” of the violent Islamist movement, more so perhaps than bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.²⁷ According to testimony received by the Committee, websites that host this material “allow the Internet to function as a kind of virtual extremist *madrassa*” enlisting and inspiring followers around the world.²⁸

One such leader is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a formally trained cleric who served as the spiritual guide for al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s former commander in Iraq. Al-Maqdisi created, and his followers have maintained, a website dedicated to the cleric that includes a large library of downloadable books on the supposed theological justifications for violent Islamist ideology.²⁹ Links to English translations of al-Maqdisi’s writings and many other violent Islamist zealots like Abu Qatada al-Filistini,³⁰ Abdullah Azzam, or Sayid Imam, have been made readily available online by at-Tibyan Publications, which appears to be a global distribution network of like-minded multilingual supporters of violent Islamist ideology who have taken it upon themselves to translate texts and make them available to Western audiences.³¹ At-Tibyan Publications appears to have been at least one of the organizations to translate the English version of *39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad*. This online text has been one of their most popular and widely disseminated publications.³²

The at-Tibyan Publications website also has a list of “recommended scholars” that include al-Zarqawi, Sayid Qutb – whose writings help lay the foundation for contemporary violent Islamist ideology – and one of the leading but lesser known violent Islamist “scholars” named Abu Musab al-Suri. Al-Suri, a one-time associate of bin Laden who was connected to the March 11, 2004, bombings in Madrid, wrote a 1,600-page screed entitled *The Call for Global Islamic Resistance*. In addition to recapping the history of the violent Islamist movement, al-Suri’s text, which has been heavily discussed online, prescribes ways to advance the cause of the ideology in a post 9/11 global environment. Al-Suri’s propaganda includes the creation of global Islamic resistance brigades – isolated cells committed to advancing the violent Islamist extremist agenda.

Though many of the zealots whose writings have been made available by at-Tibyan Publications have been killed or captured, their ideas persist, and the Internet has played a role in keeping those ideas alive and proliferating them with increasing momentum. The organization of the Internet campaign has also helped retain message discipline outside of al-Qaeda's efforts. For example, at-Tibyan Publications did not release al-Sharif's most recent writings, which undermined the terrorists' use of violence, posting instead his earlier writings espousing violence as a necessary tactic for the global violent Islamist movement.


C. Other Violent Islamist Media

Other material available online may be less doctrinal or structured. However, much of it appears designed to appeal to younger audiences who may be the most vulnerable to the influence of the core terrorist enlistment message. One of the older and more prolific media organizations is the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). This group, which does not appear to have any official connections to al-Qaeda leadership, produces and distributes violent Islamist material designed to inform, inspire, and recruit followers into the global violent Islamist movement. GIMF tries to reach as wide an audience as possible by disseminating material in different languages and by tailoring its content to appeal to a range of nationalities, educational backgrounds, and age groups. Original content produced by GIMF may include religious, military, or ideological texts, online magazines, and videos of speeches and military operations. At one point, the GIMF also broadcast a streaming television broadcast called the Caliphate Voice Channel. One of GIMF's most popular products was a videogame called "The Night of Bush Capturing," the object of which is to hunt and kill the President of the United States.³³



Followers of the ideology also produce content that supports the goals of violent Islamists. One of the most well-known examples is the rap video "Dirty Kuffar" (Kuffar means "nonbeliever"), which was downloaded onto millions of computers or watched online.³⁴ In the video, the rapper, waving a gun and a Koran, praises bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks and disparages Western leaders with lyrics such as:


Peace to Hamas and the Hezbollah
 OBL pulled me like a shiny star
 Like the way we destroyed them two towers ha-ha
 The minister Tony Blair, there my dirty Kuffar
 The one Mr. Bush, there my dirty Kuffar
 Throw them on the fire.³⁵



The song is performed against a changing backdrop of images of world leaders morphing into animals or fictional characters and scenes of terrorists engaging in military training and attacking coalition forces in Iraq.

D. Chat Rooms

With the proliferation of violent Islamist ideology on the Internet, anyone looking to learn more about the ideology can easily find it online. For those enticed by its message, either through the Internet or from another source, a likely first stop on the web would be one of the chat rooms or other online discussion forums that “are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers, and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization.”³⁶ Access to chat rooms, however, is tightly controlled. Several layers of validation are often required before access may be granted.³⁷ Topics of discussion are also restricted, and dissenting views are rarely tolerated. Chat rooms also allow for potential followers to maintain their anonymity, which helps draw in a much wider audience. Though young males constitute a solid majority of those participating in these forums, women are becoming increasingly active.³⁸ Once individuals are admitted to them, chat rooms offer users access to each other and to the global violent Islamist virtual network.



V. A Virtual Terrorist Training Camp

The violent Islamist Internet campaign facilitates the exposure of potential followers to the ideology. It allows leaders of the movement to talk directly to those who may be vulnerable to the influences of the core terrorist enlistment message without having the ideology filtered through intermediaries, like community leaders or media outlets.³⁹ And after that introduction, the Internet can play a critical role throughout the radicalization process, the potential end point of which is planning and executing a terrorist act.

In a July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, entitled *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland*, the Intelligence Community assessed:

[T]he spread of radical – especially Salafi – Internet sites, increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States – who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movement – points to the possibility that others may become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate.⁴⁰

In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Dr. Thomas Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, further explained the potential link between a rise in homegrown terrorism and the Internet:

[T]he growing use of the Internet to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were available only in overseas training camps. It is likely that such independent groups will use information on destructive tactics available on the Internet to boost their own capabilities.⁴¹

In presenting the NYPD report on violent Islamist extremism to the Committee, Lawrence Sanchez, the Assistant Commissioner of NYPD's Intelligence Division, testified that the Internet has become the most significant factor in the radicalization process in America today and can play a role in all four steps of that process.⁴² According to the NYPD report:

As individuals progress through the various [radicalization] stages, their use of the Internet evolves as well. In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet serves chiefly as the person's source of information about Islam and a venue to meet other seekers online. With the aggressive proliferation of the jihadi-Salafi ideology online, it is nearly impossible for someone to avoid this extreme interpretation of Islam.

During the Indoctrination phase those undergoing this self-imposed brainwashing devote their time in the cyber world to the extremist sites and chat rooms – tapping into virtual networks of like-minded individuals around the world who reinforce the individual's beliefs and commitment and further legitimize them. At this stage, individuals or the groups they are in are likely to begin proliferating jihadi-Salafist ideology online along with consuming it. The Internet becomes a virtual "echo chamber" – acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating the path for the ultimate stage of Jihadization.

In the Jihadization phase, people challenge and encourage each others' move to action. The Internet is now a tactical resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an attack.⁴³


The Committee's own investigation identified ways in which the Internet campaign can play a significant – if varying – role in each of these four stages.

A. Pre-Radicalization and Self-Identification

Pre-radicalization and self-identification involve an individual becoming exposed to and exploring violent Islamist ideology. Once individuals start exploring, the terrorists' coordinated online media campaign provides ready access to the core enlistment message, which is meant to appeal to those who may be asking questions about their background or heritage.⁴⁴ The violent Islamist extremist answer to these questions is stark – there is only friend or foe, a direct reflection of the violent Islamist ideology that seeks to purge the religion "of all outside influences, starting with the cultures and traditions of contemporary Muslim societies, and restore it to that of an imagined 7th Century utopia."⁴⁵ There is little, if any, room for debate; just the opportunity to learn more about why a call to violent action is supposedly consistent with religious principles. The militant component of the message also taps into youthful idealism by offering the possibility of glorious martyrdom in defense of the religion and the pursuit of the mythical perfect society.⁴⁶ With online propaganda that is often flashy, hi-tech, and interactive, the Internet has helped enable violent Islamists to deliver this message in a way that appeals to increasingly younger demographics.

B. Indoctrination

Once individuals have begun the radicalization process, the Internet then provides opportunities for those who believe in the enlistment message to advance its cause. Followers of violent Islamist ideology have recognized that their movement will be more robust if they make it easier for more people to participate.⁴⁷ One of the most extraordinary examples of this occurred when “an Iraqi insurgent group held a website design contest among its worldwide supporters. The prize for the winner was to launch a rocket attack against a U.S. base in Iraq simply by clicking the mouse on their computer from the comfort of their own home.”⁴⁸



There is also the very popular and accessible online text *39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad*, which, as noted earlier, is one of the most popular texts that was made available on the at-Tibyan Publications website. According to *39 Ways*, a supporter of violent Islamist ideology can aid the movement in myriad ways, including joining the movement in spirit, fundraising, or pursuing what *39 Ways* refers to as “electronic jihad.” Electronic jihad not only entails participating in online chat rooms or disseminating propaganda, but it can also involve cyber attacks against enemy websites, a tactic that is creating a whole new breed of terrorist.⁴⁹

39 Ways also encourages supporters to read and learn the teachings of violent Islamists like Abdullah Azzam, who was a spiritual mentor to bin Laden, and Abu-Qatada, who preached alongside Abu Hamza al-Masri at the now infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in London that counts Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui as two of its former attendees. The text also encourages followers to engage in weapons training and to become physically fit – even laying out a suggested exercise regimen. Disturbingly, *39 Ways* also explains how followers of violent Islamist ideology can participate in the cause by “raising children to love jihad and those who wage it.” This includes having children “[l]isten to tapes of sermons that discuss jihad-related topics such as martyrdom and the virtues of the martyr.”⁵⁰

C. Jihadization

As noted in the NYPD report, the final stage of the radicalization process can eventually lead to operational planning for and participating in a terrorist attack. During this stage, the Internet can be a vital tool for communication, training, and propelling an individual toward violence.

The Internet also plays an increasingly critical role in linking radicalized individuals with the global Islamist terrorist movement – what Dr. Marc Sageman calls “[m]obilization through networks.” According to Dr. Sageman:

Over the past two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being replaced by online radicalization. It is the interactivity of the group that changes people’s beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist extremist forums on the Internet. The same support and validation that young people used to derive from their offline peer groups are now found in these forums which promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtual

social movement, give them guidance and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtual market places for extremist ideas, have become the virtual “invisible hand” organizing terrorist activities worldwide. The true leader of this violent social movement is the collective discourse on a half dozen influential forums. They are transforming the terrorist movement, recruiting ever younger members and now more prominently women, who can participate in the discussions.⁵¹

Asked to expand on the role the Internet plays in the radicalization process, including whether the Internet increases the potential of radicalization in the United States, Dr. Sageman explained:

The Internet plays a critical role in the radicalization of young Muslims into terrorists. This is a new phenomenon. The pre-9/11 al-Qaeda terrorists were radicalized through face to face interaction. After Iraq, and especially in the past three years, this interactive process of radicalization takes place online, in the jihadi forums. This online radicalization is certainly replacing face to face radicalization. The key to understanding this process is to realize that it is based on interactivity between the members, which makes the participants in the forums change their mind. Some of the participants get so worked up that they declare themselves ready to be terrorists. In a way, recruitment is self-recruitment, which is why we cannot stop it by trying to identify and arrest “recruiters.” These self-recruited upstarts do not need any outsiders to try to join the terrorist social movement. Since this process takes place at home, often in the parental home, it facilitates the emergence of homegrown radicalization, worldwide.⁵²

Once “plugged in” to these networks, followers of violent Islamist ideology can become radicalized and are better positioned to take steps toward a terrorist act.

The Internet played such a role for two Georgia Tech students in Atlanta who were able to move from their dorm rooms to online chat rooms where they were then able to self-enlist in the global violent Islamist movement. The students, both of whom were U.S. citizens, used the web to contact a group in Canada informally known as the “Toronto 18.” The Toronto 18, who were originally identified because of their online activity, were alleged to have been planning multiple bombings and attacks against targets in Canada. The Georgia Tech students made contact on the web with members of the Toronto 18 and discussed possible attacks. The two students later traveled to Toronto to further these discussions and then to Washington, D.C., where they videotaped potential targets, including the World Bank headquarters, the Masonic Temple in Alexandria, Virginia, and an oil storage facility close to I-95. The surveillance footage of the targets was not only sent to the Toronto 18, but was also found on the computer of Younis Tsouli, a 23-year old of Moroccan descent residing in the United Kingdom. By the time of Tsouli’s arrest in 2005, he had become a central player in the global violent Islamist online network and had gained the trust of, and directly assisted, al-Zarqawi in distributing videos of attacks in Iraq – all without ever having to leave his home.

The Internet also played a critical role in enlisting and radicalizing Derrick Shareef, who was charged with planning to acquire explosives to attack the Cherry Vale Mall in Rockford, Illinois. Shareef was radicalized in part through his relationship with Hassan Abu-Jihad, a former member of the U. S. Navy who was convicted on March 5, 2008, on federal charges of material support for terrorism and for disclosing classified information on naval ship movements. Abu-Jihad sent the classified information to the Azzam Publications website, which has been used to promote and fundraise for bin Laden, al-

Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations for nearly a decade. Abu-Jihad had also ordered videos from the website and watched the videos with Shareef while the two lived in Phoenix, Arizona. Abu-Jihad and Shareef also discussed acquiring weapons and planning attacks against military installations in the United States. The Internet provided Abu-Jihad with the portal through which he was able to participate in the global violent Islamist movement and recruit others like Shareef to its cause.

D. Lone Wolves

Special note should also be made of the phenomenon of “lone wolves” and the Internet’s influence on them. Even where radicalized individuals or groups of individuals do not actively communicate with other like-minded individuals around the world, the Internet can provide an invaluable “handbook” for lone wolf terrorists.⁵³ FBI Director Robert Mueller testified to the Committee that the Bureau is particularly concerned about such “lone wolf actor[s] ... not tied in with any particular group overseas.”⁵⁴ The emergence of these self-generated violent Islamist extremists who are radicalized online presents a challenge for law enforcement because lone wolves are less likely to come to the attention of law enforcement. Combined with their lethal anonymity, these actors find a ready online guide to taking violent action, such as one post on a website that provided ten steps for how the “Lone Wolves of Al-Qaeda” could operate in America with the goal of mimicking the exploits of John Allen Muhammad, one of the Washington, D.C., snipers.⁵⁵

These lone wolf actors are a particular challenge for local law enforcement – the organizations increasingly relied upon to help prevent homegrown terror attacks. First, most local law enforcement agencies do not have the resources and capabilities to know what is happening on the “virtual street corner.”⁵⁶ Second, the increased opportunity to radicalize online without the knowledge of law enforcement is not just a threat to the community where the terrorist lives and plots, but to other communities that may be targeted.⁵⁷

VI. The U.S. Response

Homegrown terrorism in the United States has been hindered to some extent by certain cultural and community characteristics that have acted to discourage violent radicalization.⁵⁸ However, the sophisticated and organized Internet campaign being waged by violent Islamist extremists around the world has the potential to erode the effectiveness of those inherent national “defenses.” By speaking directly to potential followers in the United States, al-Qaeda and others are able to control their message, suppress dissent, and offer a hateful worldview that dictates, based on a perversion of the Islamic faith, that violence is the only remedy to rectify perceived wrongs. Left unchallenged, it is very possible that the core terrorist enlistment message espoused over the Internet will drive more individuals in the United States all the way through the four stages of the radicalization process and encourage them to conduct actual terrorist attacks.

In June 2006, President Bush approved the National Implementation Plan (NIP), the goal of which was to unify and integrate government activities to address the terrorist threat, including the homegrown threat.⁵⁹ According to Admiral John Scott Redd, the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, “[t]he NIP serves as the nation’s strategic blueprint for the war on terror and it integrates the full weight of our diplomatic, homeland security, law enforcement, financial and military activities, as well as intelligence.”⁶⁰ As evident in Admiral Redd’s description, the NIP recognizes that defeating terrorism, especially terrorism inspired by violent Islamist extremism, will require an array of government

resources in addition to traditional classified counterterrorism tools and tactics used by the intelligence and law enforcement communities.⁶¹

Despite recognition in the NIP that a comprehensive response is needed, the U.S. government has not developed nor implemented a coordinated outreach and communications strategy to address the homegrown terrorist threat, especially as that threat is amplified by the use of the Internet.⁶² According to testimony received by the Committee, no federal agency has been tasked with developing or implementing a domestic communications strategy.⁶³ While there are a series of outreach efforts being pursued by federal agencies, those efforts are limited, isolated, and not part of a strategic, government-wide policy to significantly minimize the influence of violent Islamist ideology in the United States. For example, the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) at DHS meets regularly with religious and ethnic community leaders in approximately five major cities. At those meetings, CRCL listens to and tries to address the concerns of participants. Though the meetings are helpful in establishing relationships and promoting dialogue, they are self-initiated by CRCL and not part of a government-wide outreach effort to address the homegrown threat. In addition, CRCL's narrow mission and limited national presence prevent that program from serving as an effective government-wide force to counter the stark dictates of the terrorist ideology.

In addition, CRCL conducts the meetings more or less independently of the FBI, which already has substantial contact with communities throughout the country through its 56 field offices, each of which engages in outreach through the FBI's Community Relations Unit. Like the CRCL meetings, the FBI's outreach program is not specifically designed to prevent the violent Islamist ideology from inspiring homegrown attacks, nor should it be, according to Director Mueller.⁶⁴ Rather, the FBI program is designed to promote confidence in the government as a whole and, more specifically, the FBI.⁶⁵ Outside of CRCL's outreach efforts, DHS does communicate and occasionally work with other departments like the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Justice, including the FBI, but those efforts are limited in scope. And finally, the efforts by CRCL and the FBI's Community Relations Unit are not tied into programs administered by local police departments, some of which are quite comprehensive.

VII. Conclusion

As this report demonstrates, the use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist extremist groups has expanded the terrorist threat to our homeland. No longer is the threat just from abroad, as was the case with the attacks of September 11, 2001; the threat is now increasingly from within, from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist ideology to plan and execute attacks where they live. One of the primary drivers of this new threat is the use of the Internet to enlist individuals or groups of individuals to join the cause without ever affiliating with a terrorist organization. As this homegrown terrorist threat evolves, so too must our response. Our nation's efforts must go beyond classified intelligence and law enforcement programs. Current efforts that rely on relatively uncoordinated outreach to American-Muslim communities and fragmented communications strategies must be improved. Indeed, the most credible voices in isolating and rejecting violent Islamist ideology are those of Muslim community leaders, religious leaders, and other non-governmental actors who must play a more visible and vocal role in discrediting and providing alternatives to violent Islamist ideology.

To defeat the new homegrown terrorist threat, the United States must carefully develop and implement the cohesive and comprehensive approach called for in the NIP and apply it to an effective outreach

and communications strategy. We must isolate and discredit the violent Islamist ideology as a cause worth supporting, let alone a cause worth advancing by attacking and killing one's neighbors and fellow citizens. In developing such a strategy, the federal government must address several key questions including:

- What, if any, new laws, resources and tactics other than those already employed by intelligence and law enforcement should be used to prevent the spread of the ideology in the United States?
- What should a communications strategy, both on and off the Internet, look like, and what role, if any, should the government have in carrying out that strategy? What role must community and religious leaders play?
- What is the purpose of current outreach efforts, and how can those efforts improve, especially with increased coordination at all levels of government?
- What role should local officials and local law enforcement play given their longstanding relationships with the communities they serve and the fact that they are better positioned to recognize and intervene, if and when it is necessary to do so?

These are just a few of the pivotal questions that must be answered if the threat of homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist ideology on the Internet is to be defeated. Over the past year, the law enforcement and intelligence communities have made it clear that they expect this threat to grow, especially as the Internet continues to be used to spread the terrorists' message, to enlist followers, and to provide more ways to pursue the terrorists' destructive goals. The United States must stay ahead of this threat by pursuing a national strategy to counter the influence of the ideology. This is a critical challenge for the homeland security of the United States; one the U.S. government must work quickly and aggressively to overcome. The safety of the American people depends on it.

¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Threat of Islamic Radicalism to the Homeland*, Mar. 14, 2007; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism*, May 3, 2007; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It*, May 10, 2007; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience*, June 27, 2007; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007.

² Arvin Bhatt and Mitchell Silber, *Radicalization in the West. The Homegrown Threat*, New York City Police Department Intelligence Division, Aug. 15, 2007, p. 37 (submitted as a written statement for the Committee's hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007).

³ According to Mr. Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst for the NYPD:

The NYPD believes that the threat and the nature of the threat of al Qaeda-inspired terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. While the threat from overseas remains, most of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in the West since 9/11 have fit a different pattern. The individuals who plotted or conducted the attacks were generally citizens or residents of the nations in which the attacks occurred. Though a few may have received training in al Qaeda camps, the great majority did not. Although al Qaeda claimed responsibility for each attack, these attacks were not under the command and control of al Qaeda central, nor were they specifically funded by al Qaeda central. Rather, they were conducted by local residents and citizens who used al Qaeda as their ideological inspiration. This is a homegrown threat, and it is driven by radicalization.

Testimony of Mr. Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst, NYPD, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007. See also Written Statement of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, Feb. 5, 2008, pp. 9-10; Testimony of Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, Feb. 5, 2008; National Intelligence Estimate, *The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland*, released July 2007; State of New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness, *5th Annual Counter-Terrorism Conference – Radicalization: Global Trend...Local Concern?*, Oct. 12, 2007 (Key finding - "Radicalization exists in the United States and New Jersey and is a growing concern. There was a consensus among presenters and panelists that radicalization is present in the United States, including New Jersey, but none were prepared to quantify to what extent. Some pointed out that even one radicalized individual willing to do harm is significant. Most stated that they felt the problem was growing.").

⁴ Written Statement of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, Feb. 5, 2008, pp 9-10.

⁵ Testimony of Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on *Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment*, Feb. 5, 2008. See also prepared remarks of Robert S. Mueller, III, delivered at Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, Apr. 7, 2008, available at <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller040708.htm> (last visited May, 5, 2008) ("The bottom tier is made up of homegrown extremists. They are self-radicalizing, self-financing, and self-executing. They meet up on the Internet instead of in foreign training camps. They have no formal affiliation with al Qaeda, but they are inspired by its message of violence. Examples of this tier include last year's plot to blow up pipelines at JFK airport in New York and a 2005 plot to attack military recruiting centers and a synagogue in Los Angeles.").

⁶ Written Statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Rand Corporation, before the U.S. House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, hearing on *Terrorist Use of the Internet for Strategic Communications*, May 4, 2006, p. 6.

⁷ The NYPD report defines "Salafi" as a "generic term, depicting a Sunni revivalist school of thought that takes the pious ancestors of the early period of early Islam as exemplary models. Consequently, Salafis seek to purge Islam of all outside influences, starting with the cultures and traditions of contemporary Muslim societies, and restore it to that of an imagined 7th Century utopia (the Caliphate). The Salafi interpretation of Islam seeks a 'pure' society that applies the Quran literally and adheres to the social practices and Islamic law (sharia) that prevailed at the time of the prophet Muhammad in the 7th century in Arabia." The report then defines "jihadi-Salafi" ideology as a "militant interpretation of the Salafi school of thought that

identifies violent jihad as the means to establish and revive the Caliphate. Militant jihad is seen not as an option, but as a personal obligation. This obligation is elevated above other moral standards, which may be abrogated." *Supra* note 2, pp. 5, 86.

⁸ *Supra* note 2, pp. 6-7.

⁹ Testimony of Mr. Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst, NYPD, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007.

¹⁰ Last year, the Pew Research Center released a report titled "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream" that concludes in part that "Muslim Americans ... are largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate with respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and Westerners around the world. Muslim Americans are a highly diverse population, one largely comprised of immigrants. Nonetheless, they are decidedly American in their outlook, values and attitudes. Overwhelmingly, they believe that hard work pays off in this society. This belief is reflected in Muslim American income and education levels, which generally mirror those of the general public." However, the report also found that 27% of those polled refused to express an opinion of al-Qaeda while 5% actually had a favorable view of the terrorist organization. In addition, the report found that "8% of Muslim Americans say suicide bombings against civilian targets tactics are often (1%) or sometimes (7%) justified in the defense of Islam. Muslims in France, Spain and Great Britain were twice as likely as Muslims in the U.S. to say suicide bombing can be often or sometimes justified, and acceptance of the tactic is far more widespread among Muslims in Nigeria, Jordan and Egypt." Pew Research Center, *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, released May 2007.

¹¹ Thomas Hegghammer, Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, e-mail to Todd M. Stein, Counsel, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff).

¹² Al-Qaeda's media committee was once led by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "No one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks. KSM followed a rather tortuous path to his eventual membership in al-Qaeda. Highly educated and equally comfortable in a government office or a terrorist safehouse, KSM applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes. These ideas included conventional car bombing, political assassination, aircraft bombing, hijacking, reservoir poisoning, and ultimately, the use of aircraft as missiles guided by suicide operators." National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 145, released July 22, 2004.

¹³ *Supra* note 6.

¹⁴ Craig Whitlock, "Keeping Al-Qaeda in His Grip," *Washington Post*, Apr. 16, 2006.

¹⁵ Response to Committee Staff Questions, Dr. Jarrett Brachman, Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Nov. 28, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff). See also Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message*, released Mar. 2008.

¹⁶ Response to Committee Staff Questions, Dr. Jarrett Brachman, Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Nov. 28, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff); Written Statement of Dir. Rita Katz, SITE Institute, before the U.S. House, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, hearing on *Using the Web as a Weapon: the Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism*, Nov. 6, 2007, pp. 6-8.

¹⁷ Response to Committee Staff Questions, Dr. Jarrett Brachman, Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Nov. 28, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff).

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ Testimony of Dr. Michael S. Doran, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support for Public Diplomacy, U.S. Department of Defense, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism*, May 3, 2007; Response to Committee Staff Questions, Dr. Jarrett Brachman,

Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Nov. 28, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff).

²⁰ Written Statement of Dr. Michael S. Doran, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support for Public Diplomacy, U.S. Department of Defense, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism*, May 3, 2007, p. 1.

²¹ Testimony of Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, First Vice President, Investigating Magistrate, France, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience*, June 27, 2007.

²² Supra note 6; see also Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message*, released Mar. 2008.

²³ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, *The Power of Truth? Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri*, Apr. 2008.

²⁴ Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer and Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century: Implications for Homeland Security," May 6, 2008.

²⁵ Supra note 17.

²⁶ Supra note 24.

²⁷ Written Statement of Dir. Lt-Col Joseph H. Felter, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism*, May 3, 2007, p. 4.

²⁸ Supra note 20, p. 3.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ According to Dr. Marc Sageman, "Video cassettes of popular Salafi preachers, like Omar Mahmoud Oatham (a.k.a. abu Qatada), have been commonly found in apartments of arrested mujahedin." Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press (2004), p. 160.

³¹ The website for at-Tibyan Productions is <http://tibyan.wordpress.com> (last visited on May 5, 2008).

³² Dr. Jarret Brachman, Director of Research, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, e-mail to Todd M. Stein, Counsel, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 5, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff).

³³ Staff with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment provided the Committee with the following background information on the GIMF:

The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) was established in August 2004. It first operated from a website located in France, but the group has since relied on numerous IP addresses/websites. In recent years (2006-2007), GIMF has not had one official website, but rather operated on many affiliated sites, especially the jihadist web forums. The most recent GIMF-affiliated sites include blogs in Arabic, English, and German, as well as a German language forum. The declared goal of GIMF is to 'denounce the Zionist enemy' and to 'break the Zionist control over the media and terrorize the enemies.' ... Recent arrests have revealed the identity (Austrian, Canadian) of some individuals reportedly linked to the GIMF. The identity of other members of the GIMF, working on the production of the group's media material, is unknown. ... On several occasions, GIMF has allegedly posted job advertisements asking supporters to fill "vacant positions for video production and editing statements, footage and international media coverage about militants in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Chechnya and other conflict zones where militants are active." The work of GIMF is thus most likely assisted by ordinary, technology-savvy supporters of the jihadist movement. It appears as a quite loosely organized network, which allows a large number of voices to be spread on the web. Jihadists who publish in the name of GIMF range from well-known jihadist sheikhs to

jihadi new-comers. There seems to be no official connection between GIMF and al-Qaeda leadership despite assessments by Western media that GIMF is an “al-Qaeda mouthpiece.” GIMF regularly praises the al-Qaeda leadership, but does not publish statements or other issuances directly from “al-Qaeda Central”. ... GIMF publishes material that includes statements and video footage of operations of various jihadist groups. Lately, a majority of these groups have been Iraqi based insurgent groups, but also Somali jihadist groups and jihadists in Chechnya have been represented by GIMF. As far as we know, GIMF does not belong to, or officially cooperate with, any of these insurgent groups.

GIMF acts both as a producer and distributor of jihadist media material. As a distributor, the GIMF often redesigns and translates/subtitles productions, before spreading them on the jihadist web. ... GIMF ensures wide online diffusion of material produced by other jihadist groups, generally, as mentioned above, after re-designing, translating, or subtitling the production. This indicates its vision of reaching the broadest possible public, including foreign language speakers. ... As a producer of jihadist media, GIMF also seeks to reach a wide audience, albeit, first and foremost Arabic speakers. Yet GIMF differentiates between audiences of different educational levels and targets various age groups through its different productions and methods of persuasion. The main target group is still supporters and potential supporters of the jihadist movement. While GIMF productions are first and foremost distributed online, GIMF also encourages the distribution of printed material, as well as oral dissemination. As for the online media, GIMF is the jihadist media group that employs perhaps the widest range of means of communications: written texts, videos, TV broadcasts, and video games distributed to static websites, blogs and discussions forums, bear witness to a certain creativity.

Thomas Hegghammer, Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, e-mail to Todd M. Stein, Counsel, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with Committee Staff).

³⁴ Omar El Akkad, “Terror Goes Digital,” *Globe and Mail*, Aug. 18, 2007.

³⁵ The video of Dirty Kuffar is accessible <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKgkF7HkzNI> (last visited on May. 5, 2008).

³⁶ Written Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Police Institute, The George Washington University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism*, May 3, 2007, p. 1.

³⁷ *Supra* note 20, p. 1.

³⁸ Written Statement of Dr. Marc Sageman, Principal, Sageman Consulting, LLC, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience*, June 27, 2007, p. 4.

³⁹ *Supra* note 20, pp. 2-4.

⁴⁰ National Intelligence Estimate, *The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland*, July 2007.

⁴¹ Written Statement of Dr. Thomas Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, hearing on *Global Security Assessment*, Feb 13, 2008, pp. 9-10.

⁴² In addition to identifying the Internet as the “most significant factor in the radicalization that is occurring in America,” Assistant Commissioner Sanchez added:

I believe the Internet is usually the stepping stone where people go to look first. If you look across these phases of radicalization, there is an identity phase where people are really looking for an answer. When you look for an answer, people nowadays, especially in Western societies, go to the Internet. ... Then the Internet plays another role. When you move to another state, which is one of looking for other like-minded people you can come out of the virtual world and meet real people, it has chat rooms. It talks about places. It talks about things you could do together. It talks about events that you can go and join and become part of it. So now it gives you indicators for the real world where you can meet real people rather than living

in this virtual world. And then as you progress down these stages, the Internet then becomes a research tool for maybe things you want to do. If you want to research information on bomb-making material, the Internet, again, becomes a resource for that. So it really covers the breadth of a radicalization process and becomes a useful tool in each of its phases.

Testimony of Lawrence Sanchez, Assistant Commissioner, Intelligence Division, NYPD, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007.

⁴³ Supra note 2, p. 37.

⁴⁴ Testimony of Mr. Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst, New York City Police Department, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007.

⁴⁵ Supra note 2, p. 86.

⁴⁶ Testimony of Dr. Marc Sageman, Principal, Sageman Consulting, LLC, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience*, June 27, 2007. Violent Islamist extremists often use the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to enlist followers, but as Mitchell Silber, a senior intelligence analyst with the NYPD, explained in testimony to the Committee, the two wars are just the latest in a series of grievances violent Islamist extremists use to advance their cause:

The list of grievances is long, and it includes issues like Spanish participation in Iraq, U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Canadian or Australian participation in Afghanistan, U.S. support for Israel, British presence in Iraq or Afghanistan, and India's presence in Kashmir. However, it is important to note that the removal of any one or two of these issues would not eliminate the threat, and I call attention to the Madrid 2004 train bombings. Clearly, the number one grievance that drove these individuals was to punish Spain for its participation in the coalition war in Iraq. However, the second rationale is not as well known. The individuals who conducted the attack cited the Spanish occupation, and this is the Spanish occupation of al-Andalus going back to 1492 and the expulsion of the Moors by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella – clearly a grievance that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.

Testimony of Mitchell Silber, Senior Intelligence Analyst, New York City Police Department, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Law Enforcement in Countering Islamic Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007.

⁴⁷ Supra note 27, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Supra note 27, pp.5-6.

⁴⁹ *39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad* is available in English at <http://tibyan.wordpress.com/2007/08/24/39-ways-to-serve-and-participate-in-jihad/> (last visited May 5, 2008).

⁵⁰ Id.

⁵¹ Supra note 38, p. 4.

⁵² Questions for the Record of Dr. Marc Sageman, Principal, Sageman Consulting, LLC, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience*, June 27, 2007, pp. 1-2.

⁵³ According to Dr. Sageman, there are incidences where followers of violent Islamist ideology have become radicalized solely through the Internet. Dr. Marc Sageman, Principal, Sageman Consulting, e-mail to Eric Andersen, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dec. 18, 1007 (on file with Committee Staff).

⁵⁴ Testimony of Honorable Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years After 9/11*, Sept. 10, 2007.

⁵⁵ The Middle East Media Research Institute, "The 'Lone Wolf' Theory and John Allen Muhammad," Nov. 21, 2007, available at <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=ijihad&ID=SP177207> (last visited May 5, 2008).

⁵⁶ Testimony of Major Mike Ronczkowski, Homeland Security Bureau, Miami-Dade Police Department, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007 ("[T]he Internet is a huge, huge dilemma for us. We cannot police [the Internet] at the local level."); Testimony of Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007 ("The LAPD must also have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet, and we have recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists.")

⁵⁷ Testimony of Lawrence Sanchez, Assistant Commissioner, Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism*, Oct. 30, 2007 ("We are hoping we have a handle on things that are incubating in the streets of Queens. But what we do not have confidence in is things that are incubating in the United States in another city who is not doing [what NYPD is doing] and who come to New York City as a target city.")

⁵⁸ *Supra* note 38, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁹ Michael E. Leiter, the Principal Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center provided more detail about the National Implementation Plan in Congressional testimony:

Our intent is to take the high-level strategic policy promulgated by the White House and translate that into coordinated, actionable tasks for departments and agencies to pursue their own mission. The principal, overarching result of this planning is, as the chairwoman has stated, a National Implementation Plan, or NIP, which was approved by the president in June of 2006. And I'm going to very briefly describe some of the key elements of the NIP. Let me first note that there are four parts to the NIP.

And the first element is attacking terrorist capability overseas, the second is countering violent Islamic extremism, the third is protecting and defending the homeland, and the fourth is avoiding terrorist acquisition of WMD. Supporting all of these is what we call a cross-cutting enabler, and that is in fact promulgating and supporting our foreign partners in a way that our foreign partners can then in turn support our efforts overseas.

Second, each of these four components is supported by very, very specific tasks, and each of those tasks is given, then, to a department or agency that has the responsibility for coordinating the interagency efforts. As we can talk about later, many of those actions that involve overseas work, involving law enforcement agencies and others are of course coordinated by the Department of State, which plays that role as a matter of statute.

Third, we not only plan, but we do in fact seek to coordinate and integrate the synchronization of all these joint departmental activities.

Fourth, the NIP is a planning document that is also used by the Office of Management and Budget, and OMB, in conjunction with NCTC, works with the NIP to make sure that department and agency programs are in fact supporting the tasks and objectives of the NIP.

And finally, I want to stress one thing that the NIP and NCTC does not do, and this is a matter of statutory direction. We do not direct operational activity. We are in fact responsible for strategic operational planning, but ultimately, we rely on individual departments and agencies and their statutory authorities to carry out operations.

Testimony of Michael E. Leiter, Principal Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism of the House Committee on Homeland Security, hearing on *Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas*, Oct. 4, 2007.

⁶⁰ Testimony of John Scott Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years After 9/11*, Sept. 10, 2007.

⁶¹ Karen DeYoung, "A Fight Against Terrorism – and Disorganization," *The Washington Post*, July 9, 2006.

⁶² The State Department's Counterterrorism Communications Center released a paper in March suggesting terminology for officials to use when talking about al-Qaeda inspired terrorism. DHS, once again through CRCL, drafted a similar paper in January. These documents were written independently of one another without the endorsement or affirmative input of the National Counterterrorism Center or the White House. In fact, President Bush, in subsequent remarks contradicted the premise of both papers, demonstrating that there is no government-wide strategic communications policy in place today. See also Testimony of Honorable John Scott Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years After 9/11*, Sept. 10, 2007.

⁶³ *Supra* note 60.

⁶⁴ Testimony of Honorable Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years After 9/11*, Sept. 10, 2007.

⁶⁵ Testimony of John Miller, Assistant Director, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on *Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It*, May 10, 2007.

