[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS
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HEARING
before the
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
SENATE HOUSE
BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, ALCEE HASTINGS, Florida,
Co-Chairman Chairman
RUSSELL FEINGOLD, Wisconsin LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
CHRISTOPHER DODD, Connecticut New York
HILARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JOHN KERRY, Massachusetts G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
GORDON SMITH, Oregon ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina MIKE PENCE, Indiana
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
DAVID KRAMER, Department of State
MARY BETH LONG, Department of Defense
DAVID STEEL BOHIGIAN, Department of Commerce
RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS
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SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
COMMISSIONERS
Page
Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 1
Hon. Alcee Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 7
Hon. Chris Smith, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 12
WITNESSES
Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, European and
Eurasian Affairs............................................... 2
David Bakradze, Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Georgian
Government..................................................... 17
Paul Sanders, Executive Director, The Nixon Center............... 28
Paul Goble, Director of Research and Publications, Azerbaijan
Diplomatic Academy in Baku..................................... 31
RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS
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SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held at 1:35 p.m. EST in 2325 Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Co-
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
presiding.
Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee Hastings, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon.
Chris Smith, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Witnesses present: Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, European and Eurasian Affairs; David
Bakradze, Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Georgian
Government; Paul Sanders, Executive Director, The Nixon Center;
and Paul Goble, Director of Research and Publications,
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. The Helsinki Commission will come to order. Let
me first apologize for the schedule we're going to have to
follow for today's hearing. The House members are in the midst
of a series of votes, and we expect that they'll be here
probably in the next 15-20 minutes.
I'm required to be on the Senate floor at 2:00. I'm going
to have to leave here about at about 10 of two in order to be
able to get back to the Senate floor. We could have a break in
the action, and if that happens I will recess the committee
subject to the call of the chair at that time, which will be
Chairman Hastings when he gets back from the floor. We do
apologize for that.
But I must tell you, this is one of the most important
hearings that the Helsinki Commission is conducting this year
dealing with Russia, Georgia and the return of power politics.
I was attending a Foreign Relations Committee hearing a
little bit earlier today where we were having a hearing on NATO
expansion dealing with Albania and Croatia. Most of the
questions at that hearing by senators focused on Russia. Even
though their impact on Croatia and Albania is not very great,
what they did during the Bucharest Summit, their influence in
the judgment made collectively by our NATO allies on extending
invitations to Georgia and Ukraine is well documented. And
since that time, of course, with the Russian use of military
within Georgia, it represents a new chapter in the relationship
between the United States and Russia.
We obviously strongly condemn in the strongest possible
terms Russia's use of military force within Georgia. We also
are concerned as Russia is gaining more aggression
internationally they are also internally moving in the wrong
direction as it relates to the liberties of the people within
Russia. The freedom of press, the freedom of expression--all
that is being moving in the wrong direction. One of the
consequences of what has been done by Russia and Georgia is a
concern that there could be more independent thoughts within
Russia in which how Russia responded to Chechnya we are
concerned we could see a breakout of certain concerns within
Russia itself.
For all of these reasons, today's hearing becomes
particularly important. I think what we're looking for, we're
looking for a way in which the United States can constructively
engage Russia. Russia is a major player internationally. We
need to constructively engage Russia. But at the same time
we've got to make it clear that we cannot allow or tolerate or
condone Russia's aggression and the use of military in the
sovereign country of Georgia.
That's going to be our challenge, and I really do look
forward to our witnesses. We have three panels that we will
hear from today, starting with the deputy assistant secretary
for the State Department, Matthew Bryza. It's a pleasure to
have you back before our committee. We would welcome your
testimony.
MATTHEW BRYZA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, EUROPEAN
AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Bryza. Thank you, Senator. It's a pleasure to be here,
and I'm so pleased to have a chance to speak about something a
lot of us feel passionately about Georgia and its freedom, its
democracy, its prosperity--as well as what you talked about:
coming up with a way to engage with Russia in a constructive
way, which we believe is possible if we handle what just
happened in Georgia appropriately.
As you were suggesting, by simply acquiescing to Russia's
flouting of its international commitments to recognize and
support Georgia's territorial integrity as expressed in
numerous UN Security Council resolutions, we do not do a
service to Russia. Russia for centuries, as many of the experts
sitting behind you and in the audience are aware, has had a
centuries-old foreign policy quest of stabilizing its southern
border, going back to Ivan the Terrible and even before.
Therefore, a stable Georgia that's democratic, prosperous,
successful--even, we would argue, within NATO--is something
that ultimately help Russia achieve one of its most enduring,
most fundamental national security objectives.
For a moment, I'd like to talk about why Georgia matters to
us. I mean, we all feel strongly about Georgia in this room.
Then I'd like to address the narrative that's been coming out
of Russia with which we have some serious differences. And
finally for a couple of minutes describe where we go from here
with Georgia and in the region.
Georgia matters to us. It mattered to us in the beginning
of the last decade, in the '90s, initially in a strategic way
because of oil and gas pipelines. That's how many people in
Washington first drew their attention to Georgia. We were
successful in working with the Georgian government, with the
Azerbaijani government, with the Turkish government to develop
a new generation of oil and gas pipelines that for the first
time provided a way to get Caspian oil and gas to global
markets free from either geographic chokepoints, like the
Turkish Straits or the Straits of Hormuz, and free of monopoly
power.
Georgia then came to matter to us even more because of
security, a second set of interests, especially after September
11th. And we know that in the case of Iraq, Georgia had the
third largest contingent in our coalition. And then Georgia in
recent years has really elevated its strategic importance to us
because of democracy, because of a remarkable transformation
that began with President Eduard Shevardnadze--let's be fair.
He was a leader of heroic proportions. Unfortunately, under his
leadership, his tiring leadership, the State of Georgia nearly
ceased to exist. He acquiesced in an attempt by a regional
strongman, the Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze, to steal an
election, contravening an agreement that former Secretary Baker
had negotiated with the opposition and Eduard Shevardnadze. The
Rose Revolution followed.
The Rose Revolution brought to power people that we knew
well but, not as well as we knew Eduard Shevardnadze. He was a
darling of Washington, as you recall. But the people that came
into power through the Rose Revolution were friends whose
friendships we had developed through their active participation
in a whole variety of assistance programs here in the United
States that aimed to strengthen democracy and, well, by design
build a cadre of young reformers who we hoped someday would
take over. Suddenly in November of 2003 they found themselves
in power. And their record on reform has been remarkable. Today
we learned that this year the World Bank has dubbed the
Georgian economy the 15th easiest place to do business in the
world--it was 18th last year--15th in the world. The only EU
member states that are ahead of it are the United Kingdom,
Finland, Ireland, and Denmark. So Georgia's doing pretty well
on economic reform. The World Bank also in 2006 tallied Georgia
the world's reforming economy.
On democracy there've been dramatic strides, but there are
shortcomings. Perhaps we'll talk about those in the question
and answer session. Difficulties came to the fore last
November. I had the honor to come up here and testify before
you in the wake of those events in November of last year.
Georgia matters to us for these three sets of interests:
energy, security cooperation, and democracy.
What's the narrative, my second set of points? The
narrative that's been coming out of Russia is that Russia was
obligated to intervene in Georgia to protect its citizens in
South Ossetia and defend its peacekeepers because Georgia, out
of the clear blue sky, started to attack Russian peacekeepers
and the city, or the town, of Tskhinvali in South Ossetia on
August the 7th. We have said--I have said, but my superiors
have said repeatedly, we urged the Georgian government not to
attack the town of Tskhinvali and not to engage the Russian
military at any cost because there was no way to prevail in
such a conflict. That's true. That's on the record.
But there's much more to the story than that. The conflict
certainly did not begin on August 7th. If we just dial back a
couple of days, in the early part of August there was a tit-
for-tat exchange of explosions, on August 6th some firing of
artillery initiated by the South Ossetian side, we believe, and
rocket-propelled grenades by so-called South Ossetian
peacekeepers whom we believe were positioned behind Russian
peacekeepers firing over the head of the Russian peacekeepers
at Georgian villages and Georgian peacekeepers. Already we saw
that the Russian peacekeepers were playing a role in providing
a shield, we believe, to the South Ossetians who were shooting
at the Georgian positions.
We also know that atop the chain of command in the South
Ossetian de facto government were active duty Russian officials
from military and other services in positions such as the so-
called minister of defense, secretary of the national security
council, head of the security services, who were running the
security apparatus of South Ossetia. It appears that the chain
of command of those South Ossetians firing on the Georgians
before the Georgians attacked Tskhinvali were Russian officials
seconded from Moscow. It's an oversimplification by far to say
that the Georgians attacked Tskhinvali; the Russians intervened
to protect their citizens and their peacekeepers.
We should really look at what actually happened and then
recognize that for months before that Russia had put in place a
whole series of provocative steps in Abkhazia--including
declaration that Russia essentially would no longer honor its
commitments to support Georgia's territorial integrity but
would instead develop new, specific special relations with the
separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as the
shooting down of an unmanned aerial vehicle, reinforcement with
combat troops of so-called Russian peacekeepers--a whole series
of steps that escalated tension in Abkhazia in the period from
April to June. It led to a very active period of diplomacy with
our German allies taking the lead within the UN grouping, the
UN friends group that mediates the Abkhazia conflict.
Throughout that period, I hate to say, my very professional
and pleasant Russian diplomatic colleagues did not wish to
engage, failed to show up to a couple of meetings, and as the
tension was really increasing in July said they were simply
unavailable due to vacations. This was in a period of
heightening tension that culminated, unfortunately, in armed
conflict in August.
The narrative is much different from what we've been
hearing from Russia. It wasn't that the Georgians out of the
blue provoked something. It's that the Georgians were provoked
for months, and I would even argue years--and we can go into
that in the question period.
Finally, where do we go from here? We believe we need to
pursue three sets of goals.
One, we need to support Georgia. We need to support its
economy, as is evident in this $1 billion economic support
package we're pulling together. We need to make sure that the
presence of Russian troops in the Port of Poti and along the
east-west highway does not strangle the Georgian economy or
undermine confidence in the banking sector.
We welcome news that there appears to be a new agreement,
brokered by French President Sarkozy with President Medvedev,
according to which the Russians will pull those troops, and
already may be pulling out the troops from the Port of Poti,
and will pull back all of their forces by October 1st from
anywhere in Georgia beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia. That's a
step forward.
That said, it's essential that we remember that we are,
well, under UN Security Council resolutions, obligated to
support Georgia's territorial integrity. We cannot simply
acquiesce to Russian claims that it can keep, as it says, now
7,600 soldiers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That is in sharp
contrast to a whole line of Security Council resolutions until
now.
We need to support Georgia, make sure that the
democratically elected government of Georgia cannot be ousted
by this Russian military operation. Our own secretary of state
had stated how she had heard from the Russian foreign minister
that, in fact, changing the government in Georgia was one of
the objectives of these military operations. Cannot oust a
democratically elected government.
Secondly, we need to then blunt these objectives of Russia
including the potential ouster of this democratic government.
We need to make clear that the east-west corridor on energy,
which I began talking about, continues to function fine. Even
the Russian military operations cut the flow of oil to the
Black Sea coast of Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline continue to
function throughout these military operations.
Finally, we need to shore up the neighbors of Georgia but
also all the states along Russia's periphery. Many of these
countries worry that somehow Russia has dealt a serious blow to
stability in the region. They want to make sure the United
States is going to remain engaged. We are going to remain
engaged. We are going to do all we can to strengthen our
relations with Azerbaijan, with Ukraine, with the Baltic
states, with Kazakhstan. I myself am leaving in a couple of
hours to go to Armenia, to Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of
Azerbaijan in an attempt to lay the foundation for a highly
energized effort to come up with a framework agreement to that
conflict within the next couple of months.
That's it. I've gone, probably, over my time. I just wanted
to lay out where we hope to go from here, try to correct the
narrative, and underscore the importance the Georgia to us.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much for your testimony.
It is extremely disturbing to hear that one of the
strategies is to unseat the the democratically elected
government of Georgia. There was almost universal support for
Georgia's policies in regards to what Russia was doing within
Georgia. But the ground circumstances being what they were, it
clearly has an impact on the domestic politics within Georgia.
I know we have the speaker of the parliament that's with us
today, but I would like to get your assessment as to what
impact this has had on the stability of the current government
in Georgia and the politics within the country itself.
Mr. Bryza. It appears that Georgians have rallied behind
their elected government. There have been large-scale
demonstrations, and statements across the board from former
opposition leaders, perhaps future opposition leaders, that
first and foremost it's important that this democratically
elected government of Georgia flourishes, survives, is not
threatened. We heard statements from very senior leaders within
the NATO alliance, some people who had their own questions
about the way their relations were going with the current
government of Georgia, who have echoed exactly what I said.
Given what we had heard and what transpired on the floor of a
UN Security Council at the very beginning of this conflict,
it's critical that we all make clear we support this
democratically elected government of Georgia.
But I want to make clear that what we support is any
democratically elected government of Georgia. We may be
personally fond of or dislike current leaders in Georgia--
that's not relevant. Our personal feelings are not relevant
about personal leaders in Georgia, with all due respect to the
speaker of whom everyone in this room I'm sure is quite fond.
What matters is that the Georgian people elected this
leadership, and it is the Georgian people that must determine
the political future of the country. There may be early
elections. Who knows? There could be referendum. Whatever the
Georgian people decide in consultation with their elected
leaders is fine by the United States government as long as it
is the Georgian people deciding the course of their political
development.
Mr. Cardin. I should point out that we did extend
invitations to both the Russian Federation and Georgia for
representation here today. We're very pleased that the
government of Georgia made available the speaker of the
Georgian parliament for our hearing. We regret that the Russian
Federation did not accept our invitation and, therefore, we do
not have a representative from the Russian Federation that is
with us today.
You believe that what Russia is doing here as a signal to
Georgia is meant to be a clear warning to some of the republics
of the former Soviet Union that Russia intends to be active--
they said they're going to protect Russians wherever they may
be. I assume that the most direct focus of that statement would
be the former republics of the Soviet Union, even though
Russian population is throughout the world including the United
States. But what impact is this having on the Ukraine? Or what
impact is this having on some of the other former republics
that are developing close ties with the West?
Mr. Bryza. Yes, it's hard to discern what was floating
through the minds of those decision makers in Moscow when they
decided to invade Georgia in terms of relations of Russia with
the other states in its periphery. The impact has been quite
negative. In Ukraine, in particular, people listen very
carefully to some statements coming from the very top in Moscow
suggesting that Russia reserves the right to use force again,
to, quote, ``protect the rights,'' unquote, of its citizens,
instant citizens--people who are suddenly issued passports and
then are dubbed a justification for the potential use of force.
In Ukraine, of course all eyes are on Crimea. And there have
been additional statements, rumblings, coming out of high
levels in Moscow that will perhaps the decision of Nikita
Khrushchev to cede Crimea to Ukraine was a wrong decision.
We can only hope that those are no more than bluster, those
sorts of statements. Those sorts of policies hearken back to,
actually, a different century. A different century is when the
invocation of protection of either Orthodox Christians in the
Balkans or Russian Citizens led to outright warfare. We hope
these are mere examples of bluster when it comes to Ukraine.
When it comes to some of Russia's closest allies, let's say
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, again the impact of
the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and the invasion of Georgia has not gone over well. If
you look at the statement that was issued, the communique
issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes
the five Central Asian states, Russia and China, it's
remarkable. It's remarkable in what it doesn't say, which is
that it does not endorse at all the recognition by Russia of
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It's remarkable
in what it does say, which is that all states reiterate their
support for the principle of territorial integrity, which is
amazing in that every time we try to insert reference to
territorial integrity at the United Nations, Russia vehemently
opposes that.
Mr. Cardin. What good timing.
I'm going to turn the gavel over to Chairman Hastings. I
thank you very much for your testimony. Chairman Hastings is a
very quick learn. He's going to pick up immediately every word
you said and is going to be ready to challenge the statements
and properly represent the commission.
Mr. Bryza. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin: And thank you for being here. And I apologize
to the witnesses of my requirement to be on the Senate floor.
Mr. Bryza: Thank you.
HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hastings. Secretary, how are you doing?
Mr. Bryza. Hello, Mr. Chairman, very well, thank you. Thank
you for a chance to speak here today.
Mr. Hastings. OK. You just finished testifying, I gather.
Mr. Bryza. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. And did the senator get an opportunity to ask
you some questions?
Mr. Bryza. He sure did. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. OK. Well, correct me if I then ask a question
that he's already asked.
But let me begin by asking you what if any leverage do you
feel that we have in dealing with this situation, more
specifically dealing with the Russian Federation.
Mr. Bryza. Number one, our leverage is limited in a
situation in which a country with 30 times the population of
its neighbor and a military that's nearly 100 times larger than
that neighbor decides to invade it. Once you get into that
situation there's, I don't think any country on earth has
leverage to turn around that calculus.
Now we are in a different realm--a realm in which, I think
as our president, our secretary of state has said, Russia is
forced to weigh some serious costs not only to its reputation
but in addition to its economy. We have seen already that there
have been over $20 billion worth of investment that have left
Russia since this happened. There was a drop in the stock
market just last night--8 to 10 percent--$200 million plus have
gone away in the stock market.
There have been some serious economic impacts. There's been
serious reputational damage to Russia. I think that in this
case words really do matter. I think back to my experience when
I was on the ground in Georgia during the military operations
when there was serious concern that perhaps there was about to
be Russian assaults on Tbilisi. It happened three or four times
while I was there where everybody in the city got very nervous,
and we wondered what was going to happen. At one point, the
reports of Russian armor moving toward Tbilisi happened to
coincide with President Bush's impending press conference. I
can say I talked to several European journalists who were
positioned up in hills above the road between the town of Gori
and Tbilisi who said that within minutes of President Bush's
strong statement finishing, they saw those armored columns turn
around and head back toward Gori.
To me at the time, that was a powerful reflection of the
fact that words really do matter and that Russia really does
care about its reputation. It cares about the reputation in
terms of its investment climate. It cares about its reputation
in the world. If it didn't, Russia wouldn't want to be a member
of the G-8. Russia wouldn't say, ``We don't care about being in
the G-8'' if it really didn't care. If Russia didn't care about
being in the G-8, it wouldn't mention it at all. It would just
remain silent.
We have leverage that can play itself out in a whole series
of ways--in terms of reputation, in terms of economics. And it
could go beyond that in terms of other measures that are being
considered. But for now, we don't want to be sounding like
we're wagging our finger, raising threats. We don't want to
burn bridges. We want to escalate, if need be, prudently,
whatever leverage we might employ, but always with the hope and
the anticipation that at some point Russia will recognize the
costs are simply too high of continuing on this path and that
Russia will fully implement its obligations under the cease-
fire agreement and will restore its respect for Georgia's
territorial integrity as outlined in so many Security Council
resolutions.
Mr. Hastings. In South Ossetia and in Abkhazia in the last
few days, Russia has increased its number of troops and
indicated very strongly that they are going to be there for a
substantial period of time and then are making the efforts in
the United Nations to have recognition of these two areas. How
do we assess their actions in that regard, and is it not that
they are in complete derogation of international norms as it
pertains to sovereignty when it comes to invading a sovereign
territory?
Mr. Bryza. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yes, we do take that
position, that Russia has made numerous commitments, again
under Security Council resolutions to which it signed on, that
it will support Georgia's territorial integrity and
sovereignty. And it has blatantly contradicted those
commitments. It's not ironic, but maybe it's just unfortunate
that Russia was able to contradict itself after a few weeks
earlier it invoked the principle of noninterference in other
countries' internal affairs.
Mr. Hastings. On that point, do you that they adhered to
the six-point agreement to the letter?
Mr. Bryza. No, absolutely not, absolutely not.
Mr. Hastings. Tell me where they did not.
Mr. Bryza. Sure. First of all, in point five of the
agreement, there's talk of additional security measures. What
those security measures are is clarified in a subsequent letter
from President Sarkozy and in additional clarifications that
Secretary Rice negotiated with our French ally.
Taking that body of information, what is there is a
statement that Russia has the right to carry out patrols within
a few kilometers of Tskhinvali, not fix checkpoints either
along the highway or any road in Georgia, and certainly not 200
kilometers from South Ossetia out in Poti or in Sinaki. That's
a blatant violation. We hope that this agreement that President
Sarkozy negotiated yesterday with President Medvedev will lead
to Russia pulling out its forces from Poti. We did receive
initial reports today that Russia has begun removing its
equipment from around Poti. But at the same time, Russia has
announced that it is reserving the right to bring in another
7,600 soldiers into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they say at the
request of the leadership of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Again,
to us that absolutely violates the territorial integrity of
Georgia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain part of Georgia.
It's irrelevant that Nicaragua, the only country in the world
besides Russia, recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. These areas remain part of Georgia. Point five
is where there's a blatant violation of the cease-fire
agreement.
In point six, we believe that's violated because by
recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we
believe Russia is prejudging the outcome of the negotiations
that are foreseen in that sixth point of the cease-fire
agreement.
Mr. Hastings. Secretary Bryza, there are few people that
have had as much input and involvement in Central Asia and
Georgia specifically, the Caucasus, than yourself. And I have
great respect for the extraordinary work in the area of
diplomacy that you and Dan Fried and others have put forward.
Last week, the vice president went to Tbilisi and in the course
of his meetings offered that there would be $1 billion that
would be in the hands of the Georgian government for purposes
of infrastructure development.
I've had a little involvement in these areas as well. It is
so regrettable that for 10 years, really 11 years, I served on
a committee dealing with Abkhazia in the OSCE, and we were
never really able to get the cooperation that we needed to try
and remedy what was described as the ``frozen conflict.'' I
have concerns about the $1 billion, and yesterday I filed
legislation that is missing a component that I intend to amend
that legislation.
It's the question that I put to you. One, do we have the
exacting restrictions or outlines and guidelines as to how the
money is to be spent? Second, if all of it is to be spent--the
$1 billion I'm talking about now--for infrastructure and
reconstitution and humanitarian aid, does that not ignore the
extraordinary need for a country that has made positive steps
in democratization to make further steps and to have the needed
resources in order to be able to do that, in two areas, maybe
three: judicial reform and/or the development of an independent
judiciary? I have maintained and will continue to maintain that
for as long as we promote democracy, if we do not promote
judicial independence in the various countries that we
participate in, then we are missing a major component. You and
I know that before the presidential elections that the media
was under assault by the Georgian government as is presently
constituted, or at least some of this administration and more
specifically President Saakashvili and those that were
associated with him--closing the television station that you
and others and I and all of this commission railed against them
actively about.
Obviously there's a need to understand that in a democracy
there is a component called media that needs to be addressed in
a positive manner, and the further development of civic
society, a society where people have freedom of expression and
their rights. If we spend $1 billion, shouldn't we spend some
money to develop in those areas? Otherwise, you build a road,
and you still have the same inequities in the society that are
missing. That was a long way to say that I want to know what's
going to happen with the billion dollars.
Mr. Bryza. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you could imagine, of course I couldn't agree with you
more about the need to keep working on Georgia and helping
Georgia strengthen its democratic institutions. Independent
judiciary of course is crucial to that, as is free media, as is
the emergence of a viable opposition that will contribute to an
open and constructive debate on how to improve the country. Of
course we're going to continue our democracy assistance. In FY
'08 we've got $14 million budgeted. In FY '09, $15 million.
Mr. Hastings. That's a pittance.
Mr. Bryza. Well, it's where we were earlier, and it's what
we calculated working together with congressional staffs as
what we thought was a reasonable amount at the time given the
absorptive capacity. But of course, we're happy to look again
at it, particularly in this environment now where there's so
much more money, as you just described, coming in.
In my testimony, in my statement I should say, I did talk
about the fact that of the three sets of interests we have in
Georgia, strategic interests--in energy and regional economic
cooperation, security, and democracy--democracy has become the
most strategically relevant of the factors of them all in the
last couple of years. Of course we have to keep working on
democracy.
Let me answer the second part of your question: Where the
heck is this money going, and how did this come about? It came
about in conversations we were having when I was in Tbilisi in
the midst of the military operations with the prime minister of
Georgia, Lado Gurgenidze, who expressed real concern that it
was possible the banking system could suffer a loss of
confidence and that commercial goods shippers could also lose
confidence and therefore not wish to let contracts or implement
them and provide Tbilisi and other Georgian cities with the
goods they need because of the military operations. At the
time, nobody knew what was going to happen with the military
operations. Still, when you've got Russian military
checkpoints, or observation points, around the Port of Poti and
along roads that are used for commerce, there is a danger that
the Georgian economy could lose the confidence that has
sustained it. We already have seen a drop, a severe drop, in
foreign direct investment. It is FDI that has sustained
Georgian economic growth, near double-digit growth. If that's
gone, if the confidence is gone, then the economy can suffer
seriously, and that can lead to a non-democratic change in
government.
The initial, urgent request from the Georgian government
was for budget support to help them address what the Georgian
government estimates is about $400 million in immediate needs--
immediate damage, immediate steps that must be taken to get
people in shelter, to address their basic humanitarian needs,
to begin repairing some of the damage, and also to sustain
confidence in the economy.
We're not doing this all on our own. There's $400 million
in damage to the Georgian economy. We're going to provide $250
million quickly. There's still almost half that's left for
someone else to handle. We hope the European Union is going to
pick up that part of the tab. Then there's the need to shore up
confidence in the banking system. The IMF is taking that on
with a $750 million standby program. We worked actively, of
course, with the government of Georgia and the IMF to set that
up. It's not as if the U.S. government is trying to take on the
task of repairing all this damage on its own. But we wanted to
make sure that we sent a clear signal to everybody who cares
about the Georgian economy that the Georgian economy is not
going to go away.
Then we also want to provide $150 million worth of
assistance from OPIC to help with mortgages so that the
Georgian people can rebuild and purchase new houses. In general
what we're trying to do besides addressing humanitarian
concerns is to restore growth in the economy and then, as I
said, repair the damage.
That's what it's all going to. We could down into even more
detail if you wish.
Mr. Hastings. I understand. Then let me ask you to make a
submission to us that would be more detailed.
Mr. Bryza. OK.
Mr. Hastings. It would be deeply appreciated. In an effort
not to take up all the time. I do have one more question. I
have several, but this one is just a question of how diplomacy
is undertaken and coordinated with those who are involved.
First, my compliments to Mr. Sarkozy and the EU and those who
have been involved in working to achieve some positive results.
I have a concern, and I'll share it from the perspective of one
who is not a diplomat but that from time to time, I think that
I have tried, especially in this area, to wear a bigger hat
than just a policy-maker's. When I first became president of
the Parliamentary Assembly, my first act was to go to Russia
and to meet with Sergei Lavrov. Obviously, 31 countries later
in two years supplied an opportunity to meet with lots of folk
and, indeed, go back and meet often with our Russian
interlocutors. When the vice president or Secretary Rice were
the two of them are recent visitors to Tbilisi and elsewhere in
Georgia, they did not go to Moscow. I think that's a mistake. I
understand that there are all sorts of channels of
communication that are undertaken between parties of interest.
But as a for example, in the development of the six-point plan,
Mr. Sarkozy did go to Moscow and did go to Tbilisi. Earlier
this week, he did go to Moscow, and he did go to Tbilisi.
I don't understand that missing link. I don't suggest that
you should have an answer. I communicated to you for purposes
of carrying it back to those that are going to be involved.
There are two sides, and probably as many as 20 sides in this
story, and they have to be communicated with actively and
directly. Otherwise, I think, we send bad signals. That is my
story, and I'm sticking to it.
Mr. Bryza. Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Smith.
HON. CHRIS SMITH, COMMISSIONER,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening
this very important hearing. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for
testifying.
You know, the week before last, I went to Georgia and spent
four days on the ground there. I first want to commend our
ambassador, Ambassador John Teft, for the extraordinary job I
believe that he has done, is doing, and I hope will continue to
do. He is a seasoned professional. It came through in all that
I found that he was doing on the ground, a good manager, and
really helped to cobble together what was a crisis situation, a
good response, and I think he represented our country
extraordinarily well.
Along the way, while I was there I joined Senators
Lieberman and Graham and met with President Saakashvili and the
prime minister and others. We did hear from them in terms of
their economic needs. They provided us with a detailed road map
to recovery. I know that they had also met with Senator Biden
as well as with Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Berman and provided them with that same information, and the
billion-dollar price tag order of magnitude was what was
discussed as well in our conversations as enough to really make
the difference and to help keep that confidence in this very
important democracy and economy.
I also met with the patriarch, and I want to commend him
publicly for his bravery in going to the war-torn area and
retrieving some of the dead individuals. Though he did it as an
act of bravery, I think he sent a clear message to all that the
church cares for the dispossessed, the disenfranchised, and in
this case those who had died a very cruel death.
I met with a number of the representatives. Human Rights
Watch had a strong message, especially as it relates to cluster
bombs. You might want to speak to that. As people flow back,
they were very concerned that, the Russian cluster bombs and
those red, looks like toys type of deal, that many people could
find themselves dead as they're plowing their fields or as kids
walk in the meadows. I also met with the Red Cross.
I will say that, and this is with a little bit of regret or
disappointment, one of the things, the overriding reason why I
first got on the plane and went to Tbilisi was the fact that
two young people from my congressional district were in
Chiatura and were behind the Russian lines, had tried at least
once to make their way through, were turned back at gunpoint.
This 7-year-old and 3-year-old, who were not with their parents
but with the grandparents, were very frightened. When I got
over there, because of the publicity that was generated about
these two Evans girls, Sophia and Ashley, all of a sudden a
number of members of Congress and individual families contacted
me with a very similar plight of Russian children who were in
harm's way.
My first stop was with the OSCE Mission and with the Red
Cross, both of whom said that they would be more than happy,
and the Red Cross says ``This is what we do,'' to send in a
van, a vehicle, with all sides aware of it, and that includes
the Russians, retrieve these children and bring them to safety.
To my shock, our consulate general did not know about this
option. I brought the names to the Red Cross, and several of
those kids now have been safely extracted.
I want to thank Eric Fournier, the French ambassador, and
John Teft again for his marvelous work in helping to facilitate
this. He went and got the two kids from my district and went
through what should've been a two-and-a-half-hour trip, it
turned into a six-hour trip--three hours at one particular
Russian checkpoint. Not only was he very brave, but he was very
diplomatic and as the father of the Evans girls said at a press
conference in Tbilisi, ``Viva la France.'' I think it brought
us closer together because it was an act of kindness, but it
was also of courage.
My hope, Mr. Secretary, would be that we really, stay up a
little bit later at night and think how we can come up with a
protocol that when Americans are behind lines, no matter where
it is--Lebanon, and most recently, and of course this South
Ossetia and Abkhazia turmoil--that there is an immediate go-to
to the NGOs. And it seems to me the Red Cross jumps off the
page as the people who do this and do it extraordinarily well.
So I would hope there would be a lesson learned on that one
because my trip might not have been necessary if the Red Cross
had done that, that job.
But I did learn a lot. It reinforced much of what I had
already thought. As Chairman Hastings and I know from Nina
Berganazi, all those years when she would raise the issue of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia that this has been a simmering,
festering problem. The Russians, regrettably, acted like
bullies and went in and used brute force to drive people out
and to ethnically cleanse both of these areas.
I couldn't agree more with the administration that
territorial integrity is extremely important. The real politic
of it is that those lines probably are there at least on the
short term because aggression sometimes does work. But now
we've got to work very hard, overtime, to secure and show our
solidarity with, along with our European Union partners, with
the people, with the leadership of the Georgian government.
They are unified, very, to a large extent about the importance.
While there may be individual people who raise issues about
accountability and that all happens in a democracy. But when it
comes to this foreign threat, which remains potent and real and
menacing, they are in solidarity, and we need to be in
solidarity with them.
The sooner that legislation moves, the better because we
have to send that clear signal that we stand in solidarity with
Tbilisi.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you. Any reaction?
Mr. Bryza. Yes, one reaction, sure. I wasn't privy to, of
course, the conversation with our consul general. But we were,
at least back in Washington, looking at all the options
possible to get access to the Evans girls. And yes, we do, we
are deeply grateful to Ambassador Fournier for that and for all
that he does. He is a tremendous ambassador and a real ally in
every sense of the word. I make it a point every time I'm in
Tbilisi to spend a few hours with him just to think things
through.
But we should also underscore that actually Russia has not
been allowing international human rights organizations into
South Ossetia. It's been blocking them, blocking assistance
convoys. We strongly support the United Nations' and the
secretary general's push for there to be a humanitarian
investigation as well as an investigation of how the conflict
started. But people need to get into South Ossetia to deliver
humanitarian assistance, to assess what has happened, to assess
the cluster bomb reports that Human Rights Watch put out. The
Georgian government has also conceded that it used cluster
bombs, but only against military targets near the Roki Tunnel.
We hope that nobody ever uses cluster munitions, but it's
certain testimony to the Georgian government that it came out
and came clean that in a military situation it used these
munitions on the military situation.
I'd also like to laud the efforts of Human Rights Watch in
general. They somehow got their people in and were able to
counter the absolutely untrue narrative coming out of Moscow
that genocide was committed by the Georgian government, that
2,000 South Ossetians were killed or murdered. As Human Rights
Watch found, during the period of the hostilities, they could
identify 44 people that were killed rather than 2,000. And now
even independent Russian organizations say it could've been a
bit over a hundred. Also Human Rights Watch has documented that
the damage inflicted on Tskhinvali by the Georgian government
was considerably less than the damage inflicted on the
neighboring villages of Ergneti and Tamarasheni, the Georgian
villages, by Russian military operations.
I'm not here to excuse the Georgian military operations
against civilians in Tskhinvali. We urged the Georgian
government not to do that. But Georgia found itself in a very
difficult situation believing that Russian forces had crossed
into South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel, and sensing that
despite a cease-fire South Ossetians continued artillery fire,
heavy artillery fire on Georgian positions, and the Georgian
government thought they were about to lose these villages.
Again, we urged the Georgian government not to engage in a
military conflict. The Russians claimed, they were simply
intervening to save these citizens that they had generated
through passport issuances and that the Georgians had leveled
Tskhinvali. As Human Rights Watch has shown, that isn't exactly
what happened.
Mr. Smith. One quick follow-up. Your assessment of the OSCE
Mission--I was impressed with Steve Young, the senior military,
and Ambassador Hakala They were professional, and they were on
the job, and they have 20 and upwards of 100 people who will be
deployed as monitors. They recently got in on September 4th and
did some monitoring. How would you assess their mission--
whether or not it's enough people, do they have access?
Secondly, our mission of assessment is there on the ground now.
How soon before we get some at least preliminary reports of
what the needs are for the Georgian military as well as the
humanitarian crisis, too?
Mr. Bryza. Thank you. I have only the highest possible
regard for Ambassador Hakala and her team, Steve Young and the
others. They showed foresight, the wisdom and bravery during
the military operations when Ambassador Hakala had Steve and
others out on the road to Gori while tanks were bearing down on
them to figure out what's going on, to see whether we could get
access in the international community to these areas of South
Ossetia for humanitarian purposes. Then a week-and-a-half ago,
we're on the scene in the village of Akhalgori in the
southeastern corner of South Ossetia, where there was a high
degree of tension, and I would credit the OSCE directly for
helping to reduce the level of tension and therefore
potentially avoiding further armed conflict.
Also, we should laud the efforts of the chairman-in-office
of the OSCE, Foreign Minister Finland Stubb, a fellow
countryman of Ambassador Hakala, who also has shown strong
leadership, particularly in fielding quickly an additional 20
OSCE observers, which will then escalate up to a full hundred.
We believe that 100 OSCE observers coupled with the 200 or so
EU observers is plenty to make clear that the point, by the way
we talked about with the chairman before, point number five in
the cease-fire agreement that affords Russians additional
security measures, is no longer valid because there is an
international mechanism in place with these OSCE observers
augmented by the EU observers. So that they're enough.
The problem is that Russia is refusing to allow any
additional OSCE observers entrance into South Ossetia or
Abkhazia. We categorically reject that and will continue to
fight hard to make sure we can get people in to find out what
happened but to deter people from taking any further actions
that violate human rights.
Today, there was a shooting of a Georgian policeman, it
looks like by, potentially, by a South Ossetian. We hold the
Russian government responsible. If Russia is occupying these
areas, it must fulfill the obligations of an occupier, and that
means law and order and preventing human rights violations. We
hold Russia responsible for that.
Our assessment mission, we have EUCOM assessment team on
the ground now, and we hope that maybe by the middle of October
they have will completed the assessment. It's a pretty
thoroughgoing assessment, and they have to look some tough
choices that the Georgian military itself will have to make
about whether it wants to focus on homeland defense and/or
whether it still wishes to contribute to more expeditionary
ventures, like contributing to the coalition in Iraq or Kosovo
or Afghanistan.
Mr. Smith. Again, will you please convey to John Teft how
grateful I and our delegation was very impressed with the
professionalism and his leadership. He was excellent.
Mr. Bryza. Thank you. Few things I could hear that make me
happier than that. He is one of the best ambassadors I've ever
experienced in any country. And he's such a human. There were
some dark moments when we were together as we heard that the
Georgian line had broken outside Gori, and we thought that the
tanks were rolling toward Tbilisi. Besides my wife, there's
nobody else I would've rather had been with in that situation
because it was--we were. He was thinking clearly, totally calm.
We were talking about the Chicago Bears, my team, and his Green
Bay Packers. I guess he made the right decisions because our
team was kept safe. And then we got an announcement that the
military operation was over. We all went home, and we were
smiling.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Secretary, just a recommendation and to
look back in trying to determine what happened, there are
obviously disagreements. And it would seem to me that an
independent analysis would help the reconciliation that's going
to be needed. I recommend, among other things, that OSCE be
given a role in that. And the reason that I do is very simple:
There are opportunities for discussions between Russia and
Georgia and those who are parties that could assist in various
of the structures of the OSCE including the Parliamentary
Assembly. Therefore I would hope that such a role is envisioned
for the OSCE.
I do want to get to the other panels. But I'd be terribly
remiss if I did not ask you at least: How do you see the impact
of this crisis on other former states? And I guess I
specifically raise Ukraine as a concern. The governing
coalition has already felt some of the fallout. Give me a snap
reaction to that, if you would.
Mr. Bryza. Sure. I agree that there has been a negative
impact on political stability--if there ever was a lot of
stability in Ukrainian politics--unfortunately, as a result of
this. The statements that came out of senior levels of Moscow
in recent weeks are chilling in that Russia reserves the right
to use force if necessary to protect its citizens or passport
holders in Ukraine with a particular focus on Crimea. That's
simply unacceptable. That is behavior that is not consistent
with 21st century norms or with membership in the institutions
of the 21st century, as Secretary Rice has said so many times.
We have to make clear we absolutely stand with Ukraine.
Completely, absolutely, unabashedly support its territorial
integrity. By the way, just as the international community
stood with Russia all of these years as it invoked the right to
sustain its territorial integrity within the case of Chechnya;
although we condemned the way Russia did that. But the
international community stood with Russia.
I wanted to make one point about the resolution in Security
Council a couple of weeks ago on Zimbabwe. Russia vetoed it
citing noninterference in internal affairs of foreign
countries, and a couple weeks later invaded its neighbor. That
is a sharp contradiction, and we can't simply allow that.
Mr. Hastings. I do have a series of questions, and I'd
normally do this perfunctorily. But because of the heightened
importance of matters and the fact that I, and I'm sure the
International Relations Committee and other members of Congress
are going to be tooling our legislation supplemental to the
administration's ideas in this matter, I'd appreciate it if I
could get as early a response from your good offices as I can.
Mr. Bryza. Of course. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hastings. All right. I'd like now to call the Honorable
David Bakradze, the speaker of the Parliament of Georgia and
former foreign minister. I'm more than delighted that you are
here. I never anticipated that we would have an opportunity--
we've met before on a couple of occasions, but I didn't think
we would have this kind of meeting.
The speaker's biography is on the table available to all of
the persons that are here. I won't go into detail of it for the
reason that I do want to get on to others as well. But, sir,
you have the floor.
DAVID BAKRADZE, SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT OF GEORGIA, GEORGIAN
GOVERNMENT
Mr. Bakradze. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It's my pleasure and honor to be here. I'll try to be brief in
my presentation, and then I'm looking forward for the series of
questions which will help me to bring my case and clarify the
issues which you think are interesting and important.
The topic of this presentation is return of power politics.
It's quite precise description of what's happening and what
happened in Georgia. And I believe that what happened in
Georgia is much more important than fate of one small country
or fate of two tiny separatist enclaves because it challenges
the basic principles which today constitute the foundation of
international security. Let me elaborate briefly how we see
return of power politics based on what happened in Georgia.
What Russians did in Georgia directly contradicts to the
principle of inviolability of borders. This is the key
principle which constitutes today the cornerstone for European
security. This is the key principle recognized by Helsinki
Final Act. This is the principle on which OSC as an
organization is based. By using military force against Georgia
and by eventually recognizing two Georgian regimes, Russians
tried to change Georgian border by use of force. That is major
development since the post-cold war period because this is the
first time when Russians openly challenge post-Soviet borders
by use of force. We had many cases in the past when Russian
rhetoric was focused on border changes, Russians had
territorial disputes with Baltic countries, and as Secretary
Bryza mentioned, Russian statement concerning Ukraine and
possibility of revising borders with Ukraine. We had other
examples. But it is the first case since the dissolution of
Soviet Union when Russians actually physically change borders
by use of military force. And this is something which is a
significant challenge not only for my country, which is
immediate victim of that action, but for the entire
international community thinking that inviolability of borders
is a key principle on which the security rests.
Now, with this small accident, let me turn to another
issue, which is energy. Which is also very important. Because
what happens, and most of you know the geography, that Georgia
is the only alternative route for Caspian and Central Asian gas
and oil resources to Europe. By controlling Georgia, actually
Russia controls the bottleneck, and by that completely isolates
Azerbaijan, isolates Central Asian states, and leaves no
alternative ways of delivery of Caspian and Central Asian
resources to Europe, which means that Russia will significantly
strengthen its energy monopoly over European energy resources.
Energy is the second very important reason why we believe that
what is at stake is more important than physical control of
these two small regions.
The third reason, and very fundamental reason in our view,
is human rights. Because what happened a few days ago in
Georgia was actually an ethnic cleansing--ethnic cleansing
confirmed by all observers who were able to reach the area. I
agree with Undersecretary Bryza who mentioned Human Rights
Watch, and that was the organization that confirmed the ethnic
cleansing in Georgian villages in South Ossetia, confirmed the
massive looting of Georgian villages, confirmed the massive
execution of male population and massive rape of female
population and all the terrible facts happening on the ground.
That's ethnic cleansing.
Sometimes people think about Kosovo as a precedent in South
Ossetia, and I attended yesterday a number of hearings where
Kosovo was mentioned. So in my vision the difference is very
simple but very important. In Kosovo, there was international
intervention which stopped ethnic cleansing. In Abkhazia, the
reason for ethnic cleansing was Russian intervention. This
makes these two cases absolutely different. Let me be very
clear: What happened in South Ossetia two weeks ago was ongoing
ethnic cleansing which changed the balance of population. What
happened in Abkhazia in 1993, 16 or 15 years ago, was then
ethnic cleansing. You know better than anybody else, sir, from
OSC that this is the ethnic cleansing confirmed by OSC. Three
summits of OSC in Istanbul, in Lisbon, and in Budapest
confirmed ethnic cleansing. Those are summit documents having
signature of then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, then U.S.
President Bill Clinton, as well as other 53 presidents of OSC
member countries.
We have confirmed cases of ethnic cleansing conducted in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The scheme is that in Abkhazia, for
example, from 75 of 80 percent of population has been expelled
from their houses--based on ethnicity, based on the fact that
they were loyal to Tbilisi government, based on the fact that
they wanted to be part of the Georgian state. One expels 80
percent of population under the foreign military support from
homes. Then this same foreign country distributes its own
passports, and then the citizens of that foreign country--
actually foreign citizens--make a decision whether to be part
of that state or not. I mean, it's simple but effective but
very brutal in the human scheme.
How can Russian citizens make a decision to be part of
Georgia or not after they expelled 80 percent of local
population who was in favor of Georgia and in favor of being
part of Georgia? This is something very, very different from
Kosovo, from any other case of self-determination. By
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia what Russia did,
Russians recognized and accepted results of ethnic cleansing.
By that, Russia legitimized ethnic cleansing as a way of self-
determination. That is something very dangerous and very bad.
I think this human rights issue, the fundamental human
rights issue that ethnic cleansing cannot be seen as a
legitimate tool of self-determination of any people is at stake
now. By not following Russia's example, international community
should confirm that independence cannot be based on ethnic
cleansing, which is one of the most terrible human rights
violations.
Another reason and another case what is at stake and why we
believe that it's return of power politics is that it's return
of sphere of influence and buffer zone policies. The biggest
lesson learned by Europe after the Second World War was this
new concept of security, which is indivisible and where
security of small countries matters exactly as much as security
of big countries.
By doing so, by invading, by occupying Georgia, by change
borders of Georgia by use of force, actually Russians bring
back the policy of sphere of influence because they openly
claim ``This is our area of our national interest.'' Because we
have their Russian citizens, because we have historic ties,
because Russian Empire is present in this region, was present
in this region for last two hundred years, this is our area of
influence, so we can do whatever we want in our area of
influence. If this concept of areas of interest and concept of
buffer zones and buffer states come back to European security,
that will be substantial undermining of European security
because it will bring Europe back to 19th century or beginning
of 20th century with all the instabilities which were caused
that time by this concept.
Last thing which we think is at stake and is more important
than Georgia, is Russia itself and what kind of Russia we have,
international community has, as a partner. Absolutely, Russia
is important partner. Russia is important in terms of political
cooperation, in terms of economic cooperation, in terms of
energy cooperation.
The question is: Is it the right Russia which we are having
now as a partner? Is Russia which made a decision to send tanks
to the soil of the neighboring country right partner for Europe
or for United States. What can be the basement of American-
Russian cooperation? What kind of values, what kind of
interest, this cooperation can be based if Russian policy
develops in a way or deteriorates in a way it does? How can
Russia able to make a decision to send tanks and troops to the
neighboring country be a reliable partner for United States or
for Europe?
This is a fundamental question. How can Russia which signs
agreements that it withdrawals from Georgia--and I refer to the
six-point agreement--and confirms that, the presidential
signature is there and they will implement this, and it still
is not implemented? It was signed Thursday, 29 days ago, and
still it is not implemented. How can Russia which does not
respect signature of its own president, which does not respect
its own commitment, which does not respect international law,
how can such Russia be a reliable partner for United States or
for anybody else?
It's about Russia, and it's about what kind of developments
will take place in Russia tomorrow. Because if there is no
price for what happened in Georgia, this will clearly encourage
this folkish thinking in Russia, this thinking that the
bullying policy is successful, and this thinking that Russia is
too important to pay price for anything which they do. In such
case, price tomorrow will be much higher than the price today.
We believe that this is another good reason why this issue
should be addressed very carefully and based on the long term
consideration. We're talking about set of measures which I
believe, I mean, are important. So it's about borders and
European security. It's about human rights. It's about energy.
It's about major geopolitical developments in Europe. It's
about Russia as a future partner and whether Russia can be a
future partner. It's a set of very important issues which we
believe make this case an exceptional case. It's the end of the
Cold War and the case which can, like 9/11, change the entire
geopolitics in the upcoming years.
We have all the signs, unfortunately, that the power
politics at least from the side of Russians is back. The issue
is how to respond, how to answer, and how to go forward. But I
guess that will be part of your questions as well as how we
started and, I mean, obviously you may have some of the same
questions which you had to Undersecretary Bryza to me, I stand
ready to answer any questions in good faith and to the
knowledge I have. I thank you very much for this opportunity
again.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Speaker, thank you very much for being
here and for your presentation. I'm going to go straight to the
very hard question, and it is that there have been a
substantial number of articles in the press on the crisis, and
in many of those articles U.S. officials claim they've
consistently warned Tbilisi not to launch a military campaign
against South Ossetia. Why, then, did President Saakashvili do
precisely what it is said that the U.S. had warned specifically
against?
Mr. Bakradze. Thanks. I regret that Matt Bryza left already
the room here. I think he could confirm, and I'm talking on the
record now. It's a very important clarification. We have been
warned many times, and I confirm that, not to get entrapped by
Russian provocations, not to respond to Russian provocations,
and to be careful in our policy planning. That's absolutely
true, and I confirm. But to my knowledge, at none of the
meetings was I presented with this specific case of Georgia in
attacks against South Ossetia or Tskhinvali because there was
no such plan and no such attacks planned.
Mr. Chairman, that we had this plan for South Ossetia.
Three years ago it was endorsed by OSC. Only reason why it was
not implemented was Russia's resistance. I was myself minister
for conflict resolution for seven months. And I'm still proud
that I was one of the officers of the new peace policy in South
Ossetia that was policy of reconciliation, policy of
investments.
What happened in South Ossetia: this tiny region was
divided in two parts. About half was controlled by Moscow-
backed parties, half was controlled by local administration
which was loyal to Tbilisi. We heavily invested in that half.
We invested not in weapons. We invested in building schools. We
invested in building hospitals. We invested in building discos,
swimming pools, and amusement parks exactly to show to
population on the other side that life is not about war, life
is not about fight, and life is about much better things than
trenches.
Our policy was policy of economic attraction and economic
reintegration, and as one of the authors of that policy I'm
still proud. And I do believe that we were close to resolution,
peaceful resolution of conflict in South Ossetia because we had
all the signs of heavy erosion of the regime in Tskhinvali. And
that's one of the reasons why Russians changed entire
leadership in South Ossetia, in Tskhinvali and instead of local
Ossetian officials, they brought Russian high-ranking officers.
And as I confirmed words of Matthew Bryza, that all high-
ranking security officials in Tskhinvali were acting high-level
Russian security and military officials.
We had all the signs of peaceful resolution of conflict and
having all that--I apologize for this long prehistory--having
all that in place, we had never planned any kind of military
action against South Ossetia. That's true. I confirm that. I
can tell you that there was no meeting in my memory and in my
knowledge where we specifically discussed with anybody from
United States administration the issue of possible Georgian
military action against Tskhinvali.
It's absolutely right that we have been warned many times
not to respond to provocation. We have very good record of not
responding to provocations, especially starting from March this
year when we had non-stop series of provocations, sequence of
provocations, from side of Russia both in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
But unfortunately what happened on August 7 was no longer a
provocation. It was already an action. Because when Russian
military jet intrudes the Georgian airspace, it's a
provocation, and government may respond or may not respond. But
when Georgian villages, Georgian civilian population, are under
heavy artillery bombardment, are under heavy artillery barrage
and there are civilian casualties in place, this is no longer a
provocation. This is already and action which needs to be
addressed by government. I do believe that no democratically
elected government can sit and wait until there are casualties
in the civilian population when the civilian population is
under artillery attack.
To explain to you that we never had the specific discussion
because we never had a plan to attack South Ossetia. I think
the timing itself confirms. This was the timing 7th of August
when big part of Georgian leadership was on vacation, and
president himself had his plane ready to depart for Beijing,
and he has to cancel this trip 20 minutes before it was
canceled. I think this is a small detail, but again it shows
that we had no plans whatsoever to start military action that
day or any other day against South Ossetia.
Mr. Hastings. But did you start military action?
Mr. Bakradze. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Matthew Bryza who
described the sequence of events on the ground. We should look
into the concrete pretext of events but not single out any
particular event out of this chain. And that's actually what
Russians are trying to do at the moment, the Russian propaganda
machine. What they are trying to do, they are trying to say
that, while for example at 11 a.m. Georgians did something and
that was beginning of war. But they fail to mention what
happened at 10:55 a.m. or 11:05 a.m. That's the sequence which
shows. It comes how one defines the beginning of military
action.
I told you that our villages have been under heavy
artillery barrage. And that was very dangerous because of the
civilian population and because of possibly huge civilian
casualties which we might have on the ground. The same morning,
we sent our minister for conflict resolution to Tskhinvali with
the objective to negotiate with Ossetians and to stop somehow
the fire. But he arrived to Tskhinvali, he was not met by any
South Ossetian official. The only person whom he met was
commander of Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov. And
General Kulakhmetov confirmed to our minister that Ossetians
are acting on their own will, and the Russian peacekeepers are
not able to control what's happening on the ground. He had to
leave.
We asked Russian special envoy Ambassador Popov, to go to
Tskhinvali and to communicate and to talk to local Tskhinvali
officials to stop this fire. Popov failed to go there,
justifying this failure that his car was broken and he was not
able to go physically there. President Saakashvili spoke with
Finnish foreign minister and asked to send his special envoy as
soon as possible so that he also goes to Tskhinvali and
negotiates to stop this fire. Because, again, our civilian
villages, peaceful villages, were under artillery fire, and
that was something requiring urgent response.
This diplomacy failed during the daytime of August the 7th,
in the evening President Saakashvili declared unilateral cease-
fire. And his hope was that this unilateral cease-fire would
cause Ossetians to stop firing as well. But it did not happen.
It's political conflict; it's not ethnic conflict. When
Tskhinvali leaders started more intensive, and this bombardment
turned into the carpet bombardment of Georgian villages, that
is confirmed. I again confirm words of Matthew Bryza who said
that Human Rights Watch confirmed that Georgian villages near
Tskhinvali are heavily damaged by this bombardment. When this
bombardment started to be carpet bombardment, so-called
indiscriminate bombardment of population, we had to take,
government had to take a decision to fire back in order back to
stop this fire.
But it would still be a local skirmish unless one thing
which happened on the ground, that which influenced every sort
of development and that was Russian military call on of about
150 tanks and about 2,000 personnel, troops, entering through
territorial Georgia through the Roki Tunnel. We have evidences
of that. Part of that evidence is two days ago we made
available to, at this level, to ambassadors accredited to
Georgia and we're thinking whether to make this evidence public
or not. At this point, this is still not public, but I can just
mention that we have radio interceptions confirming Russian
troops entering Georgian territory in the evening of August the
7th. This was the turning point. And plus to that, of course, I
mean, we have the fact of their physical entry to Georgia. This
was the point.
I have a question whether massive bombardment,
indiscriminative bombardment of civilian population, can be
seen as a beginning of war or not. And if it is not beginning
of war, why response to that bombardment in order to stop it
should be seen as a beginning of war. I have a question whether
intrusion into the territory of the neighboring country
violating the recognized border and sending 150 tanks and 2,000
troops to the neighboring country, is this a beginning of war?
Or, if it is not, why then the following reallocation of
Georgian troops is a beginning of war?
It's a delicate question how one defines what happened and
what was the initial point of the war. In our understanding,
the immediate reason was massive bombardment of Georgian
villages and the starting point of war because otherwise I
still think we could somehow localize the skirmish. But the
immediate point when the war started was the fact when Russian
troops entered Roki Tunnel and entered territory of Georgia.
That was the point when government of Georgia was forced to
take a decision to about the troop allocation. That's the
concrete pretext of these August 7 events.
Mr. Hastings. It sounds, among other things, that there was
a bit of ingenuity on behalf of the Russians, and your
government kind of fell into that trap. There are questions
that still remain, and I understand that. Regrettably, the
Russian Embassy, who was in fact invited to participate in
today's hearing, chose not to. I would urge upon them that I
think that's a mistake. As a former judge, I learned in many
actions to try and listen to all sides. Hearing one side skews
the process, and it gives the impression that someone is on one
or the other side.
I would hope because of the extraordinary cultural and
historic aspects that exist between Georgia and Russia that
whatever the reason was for this particular conflict would be
mediated toward positive resolutions in the interests of both
countries. I find it all over the world astounding that people
that know each other very well--for example, Mr. Putin's mother
lives in Georgia, you know. And Sergei Lavrov is from the
Armenian section of Georgia. I could go on and on and on. When
I'm in Moscow, I don't drink wine but I drink Crouvasier, but I
see Georgian wine when I'm in Moscow. I see Russian food when
I'm in Georgia. And so somehow or another cousins and brothers
and sisters have to stop fighting. I don't know how we
accomplish that.
I also note that the realities on the ground have changed.
It would be difficult. In a totally separate but similar
situation, yesterday I participated in a hearing dealing with
Iraqi refugees. In essence what has happened is Sunnis have
been driven from certain areas and replaced by Shiite. The big
question is in reintegrating them--and I understand that
President Saakashvili's goal is still reintegration of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia--if that is true, then the question is:
Who wants to be the first person that was removed to return?
And that was the question that was put to me yesterday: What
Sunni is going to show up in Anbar and say, ``I'm back now''?
You know, it's kind of difficult, the situation that we're in.
I won't go further because the ranking member has questions,
and we have two other panelists and I'd like to get to them as
well. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Speaker Bakradze, thank you very much for being
here, for your wonderful testimony. I think it's incisive and
really gives us the lay of the land from your government's
perspective, which we need to hear.
You mentioned a couple of things with regards to massive
rapes. Is that quantifiable as to how many women were abused in
that way, and what has happened to those women?
Mr. Bakradze. I'm afraid I'm not able to give you exact
figures now. And this is something which still needs to be
verified and investigated, and we are very open. We invited,
and we invite all interested human rights organization to come
and to go to those refugees and to check because, I mean, it's
difficult because, you understand, it's a delicate issue. Not
everybody may be willing to describe and to talk about this
issue. These ladies need careful approach and very balanced
approach. I mean, if any international human rights
organizations are willing to help us in that, are willing to
help our ministry of health and social care in that, we are
very open, and we ask them to come. But at this point I'm not
able to give you exact figures.
What we know, we know evidence is from eyewitnesses that
the ethnic cleansing was conducted but by so-called Balkan
model, when we know these irregulars or paramilitaries enter
the village, and they loot the village. They torch houses. They
separate male and female population. They take male population
out of the village, and then some of them are beaten, some of
them are executed, some of them are left somewhere in the
forest, and the female population, children, I mean, women,
elder people are subject to, brutal physical action including
also the rape. That was the scheme which was used in all
Georgian villages in South Ossetia that we know from Human
Rights Watch, that we know from other eyewitnesses, that we
know from people who went through themselves. But so far I
cannot give you the quantitative assessment of victims.
Mr. Smith. In the meeting I had with the Deputy Minister of
Interior Golodsta she mentioned that there were at least
stories of women being taken off buses. There was one in
particular that I guess made the television news while I was
there. Have any of those women been recovered, brought back to
safety? Secondly, is there any suggestion that anyone was
trafficked? As the irregulars and the Russians came in, we saw
that during the Kosovo crisis, we saw throughout the Balkan
Wars that exploiters found opportunity to steal away women and
to put them into human trafficking and forced prostitution.
Mr. Bakradze. We still have missing persons, so I cannot
confirm whether these missing persons are victims of
trafficking or they have been executed or they are just hidden
somewhere and will show up later. We have missing people, yet
so far I cannot give you exact numbers. When we find everybody,
identify everybody, then we will be able to give you more
detailed information.
The problem is that so far we are still not allowed to have
any access to Georgian villages, remaining Georgian villages in
South Ossetia, and that includes also possibly the remaining
population being in villages or outside villages in the forests
of South Ossetia. We still have almost no access even to those
villages which are outside South Ossetia but are within the so-
called Russian buffer zone, or security zone, as Russians
describe, so which means beyond the Russian fixed checkpoint.
That is completely illegal, and I again agree with Matthew
Bryza on that, that is completely illegal but that is the de
facto reality, and we do not have access beyond checkpoints. We
have absolutely no access to South Ossetia itself to check the
situation on the ground.
What we know we know from people in mostly international
human rights organizations or, for example, Council of Europe
observers who are able to take this trip. We know it from them,
and we know it from people who managed to escape from there.
But we still need to go and make evidences ourselves, which we
are not able to do at the moment.
Mr. Smith. Are there any preliminary estimates, and perhaps
you could provide this for the record, as to how many people
died, how many have been wounded, and how much property damage
really has been imposed?
Mr. Bakradze. As of casualties, we know exactly about
casualties on the side of Georgian militaries and law
enforcement because besides militaries, our law enforcement
structures, our police was subject target for very intensive
attacks. After the conflict when we still had Russian planes
bombarding Georgian territories. One of their targets was
usually police stations or police patrols on the roads. That
was done on intention, and I have every reason to believe that
it was done in order to break down law and order in the country
because attacking police can lead to nothing else but the
breakdown of law and order and the establishment of chaos in
the country. Police was under attack as well as military.
We have casualties among militaries as casualties among
police. All in all, that's about 160 militaries and policemen
together. As of civilian population, as I said we are still
missing people and we still cannot identify what happens with
those who we are missing. Right now we have confirmed deaths of
up to about 70 people, civilians. But, again, more than that is
considered as missing population, and we still don't have
information on them.
As of economic damage, again, since we cannot access the
area we may have only very preliminary estimations, and that
was partly what Undersecretary Bryza gave you. What we know
that Georgian villages in South Ossetia are completely
destroyed using the bulldozers and technical equipment.
Everything is destroyed there.
Mr. Smith. Now, with regard to the IDPs, that number has
fallen significantly--and it was over 100,000 when I was there.
What are they returning to? And how are the ones --what's it,
over 60,000 still, I think you had indicated earlier--how are
they faring? Is the humanitarian aid getting to them? Secondly
on that question, we know when people are put to flight that a
lot of the individuals, especially the children, suffer
posttraumatic stress disorder. Are there grief counselors or
people who can help them cope with, the frightfulness of tanks
coming down the street?
Mr. Bakradze. Absolutely. We had 118,000 registered IDPs. I
say registers because we had actually we had even more than
that. Now this number is down. It's about 78,000 at the moment,
and the rest have returned. Because there are three different
categories of IDPs. One, people from Gori and adjacent Georgian
towns and villages. Once the Russian occupation of Gori and
adjacent villages was over, is over, these people were able
gradually to start return back. Because immediately once
Russians are out, our police is in, and state is back with its
basic functions with supplies, with police, with law and order.
Immediately we have been able to start return of our IDPs from
those areas, Georgian villages which are in the rest of
Georgia, not in or in the vicinity of conflict zones. Majority
of these people are already back.
The second category of IDPs is Georgian villages located
between Gori and Tskhinvali. Geographically this is southern of
Tskhinvali and northern of Gori where there is this so-called
security buffer zone of Russian military forces, and the people
there still cannot return. But we expect that at least this
time Russians will respect their commitment. During President
Sarkozy's trip to Moscow two days ago, again it was a very
clear commitment from Russia that they will withdraw this so-
called checkpoint and the security zone. Once Russians withdraw
from this so-called buffer zone, then we expect that we will be
able to bring people back to this area.
The third category of IDPs is IDPs from South Ossetia
itself. Those are people from mixed villages, from Georgian
villages, and this is the most painful and vulnerable category
because unless there is a real perspective of conflict
resolution, unless this international remediated process of IDP
return starts, these people will not be able to return back
because they don't have security guarantees, they have no
property, they have no security, they have no conditions. We
can take care of people from Georgian, from the rest of
Georgia. We will take care of those people from the so-called
security buffer zone once Russians are out. But as of the IDPs
from the conflict zone itself, there we will need an
international directive, international engagement, and the
beginning of the genuine process of conflict resolution which
will include the return of IDPs.
Mr. Smith. I have other questions, but I'll just reduce it
to: Human Rights Council, have they done anything to
investigate, to send investigators? We know how the United
States has responded, many of our European allies, how have
other countries, particularly in Latin America, Africa, Asia,
responded to this crisis?
Mr. Bakradze. We are very open for investigation. We
offered European Union to set up a special group or commission
which will look into all the details and investigate happenings
including, the human rights aspect, which is one of the key
components for us.
I had a meeting two days ago. I was in New York. I met UN
secretary general, and one of the topics of our discussion was
having UN mission to Georgia, special fact-finding mission,
which would include humanitarian and human rights components to
investigate to check what happened on ground. I hope that in
the near future we will have this special UN team arriving
verifying the facts on the ground. Plus to that, we asked for
debates within the UN General Assembly. We asked for debates in
Council of Europe. We asked for debates in OSC Parliamentary
Assembly and NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are very open for
these debates.
This is coming back to your comment, Mr. Chairman. We are
very open for these debates. Truth is on our side, so we are
not afraid. I really regret that I do not have my Russian
counterparts here today because I believe truth speaks for
itself. I would really love to have Russian counterparts here
to listen to them how they explain what happened. We are very
open for debates. We are very open for any kind of fact-finding
mission and investigation, including the one from UN. And I got
the promise from UN secretary general that this mission will
take place.
As of the reaction of the rest of the world, I had 17
meetings in UN during one day. Mostly I met countries of Latin
America, Africa, and Asia, and I think they understand. At
least those whom I met understand that it's not about making
choice between Russia and Georgia, because in such case we
would be in a very difficult situation. Russia is very
important partner. For some countries, Russia is important as a
trade partner. For some countries Russia is important as a
security provider. For others there are different reasons. We
are a small country--we can never compete.
But what is good is they all understand it's not about
making choice for Russia or for Georgia. It's about making
choice for principles. The principles which I said that there
should be no forceful change of borders. There should be no
ethnic cleansing as an instrument to self-determination.
These principles are very important to many countries
across the globe, because there are many countries having
territorial disputes with their neighbors. There are many
countries having separatist enclaves or having ethnic
minorities on their territory. If today we all allow a
precedent that a big country can use force and change borders
of the neighboring country, we are the first victims, but there
may be a lot of countries in many different of the world
troubled by that.
As well as if we allow ethnic cleansing to be recognized as
a legitimate way to self-determination, I expect that many
countries will be in trouble after that. What unites these
countries--and despite Russia's very active diplomacy and
active pressure, there is still only one country, Nicaragua,
which says it will recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia--is, I
think, the understanding that it's not about Russia or Georgia.
It's about the basic principles on which the international
law and order rest today. I hope that with this understanding
we will be able to show to Russia how far it went to isolating
itself from the world community--not only from United States or
European Union, but even isolating itself from its traditional
allies. Matthew Bryza mentioned Central Asian countries,
mentioned Shanghai Organization, and I think that was a very
good example of how far Russia went in isolating itself even
from its most important and traditionally loyal allies.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Speaker, thank you very much. There will
be a robust debate, I'm sure, in Toronto next week during the
meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly. A recommendation to you:
After the attack on the United States on September 11th in
2001, the U.S. government formed a commission to investigate
those tragic events, and the commission members included very
distinguished figures from the major parties, and I would urge
also the possible participation of non-partisan representatives
of civil society. You might consider that while you're about
your business. But I thank you so very much for your
participation.
Mr. Bakradze. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I just
may end with responding to your comment about cooperation with
Russia. Of course, I can confirm even today in this critical
time that we are ready to cooperate with Russia. But this
cooperation should be based on the mutual respect and mutual
recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and
legitimate interests.
Mr. Hastings. Interesting that you should put that in. That
first meeting that I said that I had with Foreign Minister
Lavrov, the first statement out of his mouth was, I appreciate
the fact that we are dealing in the arena of mutual respect.
I'll never forget it. I'll remind him if I get an opportunity.
Mr. Bakradze. It's not our guilt that we are located next
to Russia as country. It's not our guilt that we are 5 million
but not 500 million. And it's not our guilt that unlike some
people in Kremlin, we don't see dissolution of Soviet Union as
a disaster and tragedy but we see it as a moment of happiness
which gave us freedom, life to many Central and Eastern
European countries. Unfortunately, or fortunately, we will not
compromise on those values. I will never say dissolution of
Soviet Union is a tragedy.
Mr. Hastings. All right. I'm going to need to move on to
the next panel. Thank you so very much.
Mr. Bakradze. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hastings. At this time, I'd like to invite the
executive director of the Nixon Center, Mr. Paul Saunders, and
Mr. Paul Goble, the director of research and publications of
the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy in Baku. Toward that end, I
would appreciate it Mr. Saunders if you would proceed, and then
you Mr. Goble. If we have time for questions--the only reason I
say time is the fact that we are expecting a vote real soon.
I'll listen to you all as will the ranking member, and then
we'll try to get some questions in if time permits.
Mr. Saunders.
PAUL SANDERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE NIXON CENTER
Mr. Saunders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, also to
the ranking member, for the opportunity to be with you here
today. I'll try to be very brief and maybe just hit a few high
points from my written statement.
The first point that I'd like to make--Mr. Bryza and the
previous witness, the speaker of the Georgian Parliament, went
through the long and very complex chronology of events that led
up to the events last month. I won't try to do that. I won't
try to assess what both of them said. I would like to make one
point, however, and from my perspective there are really only
two things that are important about what happened. One is that
Russia clearly had prepared well in advance for this kind of
situation and was waiting for the right opportunity. The second
is that the government of Georgia and President Saakashvili
personally knowingly gave them that opportunity against the
advice of American officials. Without going into all of the ins
and outs, that's what I really think the central point is
there.
Next, I'd like to focus on what lessons should we draw from
this experience, because I think there are a number of
important lessons. And after touching on those, I'll try to
very briefly talk about some of our policy options.
First of all, frankly, I think the Bush administration has
profoundly overpersonalized our relationship with the Georgian
government. This was a problem, of course, that executive
branches under both administrations tend to have. But I really
think there was an undue focus on President Saakashvili. There
was excessive and needless praise of President Saakashvili. The
president of the United States on March 19th when Mr.
Saakashvili was meeting with him in the Oval Office said that
he admired the president of Georgia who just a few months
before, as we all remember, had declared a state of emergency,
forcibly dispersed protesters, shut down TV stations.
And certainly the administration considers Georgia a friend
of the United States, but I think it's absolutely unnecessary
for the president to say he admires the president of Georgia,
and it leads Georgian officials to perhaps think that they have
a relationship with the United States that the facts
demonstrated they don't. That's dangerous.
Secondly, I think our administration needs to be much more
careful in how they put American credibility on the line. Our
reputation in the former Soviet Union, to my mind, has been
very seriously by the events that transpired. How? The United
States accepted from Georgia, from its very tiny army, 2,000
soldiers to send to Iraq. Georgia sent soldiers to a combat
zone to help the United States. In Georgia's hour of greatest
need, the United States did not reciprocate that commitment.
I'm not arguing that we should have. I'm arguing that the
administration accepted that assistance from Georgia without
thinking through some of the very predictable expectations and
consequences that it could have. This conflict in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, they existed at that time. The administration, to
my mind, should've thought more carefully about that.
Thirdly, I think we should all learn from this that Russia
has a lot more at stake and is willing to pay a much higher
price to advance its interests on its borders than the United
States does. That doesn't mean that the United States should
allow Russia to create a sphere of influence. But it does mean
that we need to be extremely careful in the kinds of
commitments that we make, the kinds of expectations that we
create, and we really need to calibrate our policy to what
we're ultimately going to be prepared to do.
Fourthly, I think we've learned some lessons about
precedents and vetoes. The Bush administration and others have
been saying very energetically that Kosovo is not a precedent,
that Russia doesn't have a veto over Georgia joining NATO. The
problem with that line of argument is that, we get to decide
what we think is a precedent. We get to decide what we think
our national interests are. We get to decide what we should do
about that. We get to decide how to explain it. We don't get to
decide what other people think is a precedent. We don't get to
decide how they react to actions that we take. They get to
decide. Russia doesn't have a veto over Georgia joining NATO or
not joining NATO. It doesn't, and it shouldn't. But if we
pursue that course of action, then we need to understand that
the United States doesn't have a veto over how Russia decides
to respond. I think that's something that has been,
unfortunately, demonstrated very clearly during recent weeks.
Finally, one other lesson--and it's useful to reflect back
on the 1990s and NATO enlargement in the 1990s, because NATO
did something very important at that time which was to insist
that aspiring members resolve their internal ethnic conflicts
if they wanted to be part of NATO. Because the alliance, did
not want to import these problems into its membership. Perhaps
in retrospect we should've thought a little bit more about that
before pursuing the course that was taken.
Our policy: What do we do about this situation? I think
there's a short-term element to it. I think there's a long-term
element to it. In the short term, we need to make the best of a
bad situation. We need to salvage what we can of American
credibility in this region. To that end, actually I would
broadly agree with the position that the administration has
taken. We need to provide support to Georgia. We need to
continue to articulate our support for Georgia, hopefully more
for Georgia and much less for President Saakashvili as we do
that.
We need to prevent a situation in which the Kremlin
believes that it has deposed the Georgian leadership and that
we did nothing about it or were not able to do anything about
it.
We also need to ensure that Russia follows through on its
commitments and the agreement of the last couple of days to
have the troops out of these special security zones by October
1st.
Finally, we need to try to salvage as much as we can of the
existing post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. And to
do that, I think we're going to have to be very careful. I
think that the administration, again, has been correct by all
accounts in making a determination that unilaterally attempting
to punish Russia won't be a successful course of action.
Over the longer term, we have to do a number of different
things. First of all, we cannot condone and should continue to
express our displeasure with what Russia did in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. But I don't see how we get those two territories
back and make them a part of Georgia again. And, you know, we
don't need to announce that. There doesn't need to be a press
release from the State Department. But I think we need to
acknowledge that to ourselves as we move forward and to be
honest with ourselves about what our capabilities are and what
they're not. We can't make this issue a defining issue in our
relationship with Russia. We have too much else at stake:
nuclear proliferation, arms control--there's a long list of
other issues.
Secondly, I don't know whether or when President
Saakashvili will leave office. Matt Bryza left open the
possibility that from his perspective it could be before 2013
when his term runs out. Whatever happens, I don't think we
should be excessively concerned when Mr. Saakashvili eventually
leaves the scene. I think there are a number of other
politicians in the Georgian leadership who are committed to
democracy, committed to friendship with the United States, and
it would not be a tragedy to see Mr. Saakashvili go.
I'll be very brief and just give kind of telegraphic points
for the last few things here.
I think we need to have a real debate about NATO, and I
think the Congress can play a very important role in that. I
don't think we've had a serious debate about NATO. I think we
had a debate about enlargement instead of a debate about NATO.
So that's one thing.
And finally, you've already, Mr. Chairman, mentioned the
need to engage with Russia. I think we do need to engage with
Russia. We need to come up with some creative new ideas for a
security architecture in Europe that is going to be
sustainable. To be sustainable, they have to buy into it.
So I'll wrap it up there and happily turn over the floor.
Mr. Hastings. I appreciate that very much. For the record,
I had an opening statement that I did not offer, and I'll
accept it by unanimous consent. Any opening statement that Mr.
Smith may have should be made part of the record as well as if
Senator Cardin didn't. I guess he had some things to say, but
his official statement will be made part of the record.
Mr. Goble, thank you so much for being patient. It's hard
to apologize for working, but we do have to vote.
PAUL GOBLE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS, AZERBAIJAN
DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY IN BAKU
Mr. Goble. Mr. Chairman, thank you for including me. It's a
pleasure to appear before you and Congressman Smith again after
so many years in a very different capacity. Because I've
prepared written remarks, I want to just hit several of the
high points.
First, two preliminary observations. What has happened in
Georgia is a disaster that was waiting to happen and that can
be repeated elsewhere across the former Soviet space. The
reality is that the border system that was created in Soviet
times was intended to create tension and to justify
authoritarianism.
In 1991 the United States welcomed the end of
authoritarianism but also said the borders could never change
because we were concerned that that could tear things apart.
The consequence of that was to delay this problem. But it is
going to be a worse future, not a better one.
Second, I would like to call attention to one specific
aspect of this conflict that has not been hit very hard. We
talk a great deal about the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Georgia. If the Republic of Georgia has territorial
integrity, or did, internationally recognized, that included
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the fact is that the actions
of President Saakashvili, however foolish they may have been,
were in full congruence with the right of a government to act
on its own territory. The actions of the Russian government
were a violation of international law because they went across
an international boundary.
It is important that we do not make a distinction between
territorial integrity that we're talking about now and
territorial integrity which existed prior to August 1st. That
has tended to get lost in most of the media and most of the
discussion in this city.
Now, there are many lessons, and those are what I want to
end with to be very brief. A large number of countries are
going to have to learn lessons from this conflict. Georgia,
along with its neighbors, is going to have to learn one that
many of the post-Soviet states have--and that is that 1991 did
not repeal history, and it did not repeal geography. It's best
that you try to find a way to live with your neighbors, as
unpleasant as they may be and as much as you hate them for what
they have done. That's just a reality.
The Russian Federation, however, is going to have to
learn--and how well we can teach it is a big question--that it
cannot be a full member of the international community if it is
not willing to play by the rules. The fact is that invading
other countries, like killing people, is wrong. It is terribly
important--many references have been made to getting to the
essentials. The reality is that the Russian government engaged
in an act of aggression across an international boundary. That
doesn't mean we nuke Moscow, but it means we recognize the
fact. And trying to make this into a moral equivalency does not
justify an act of violation of international law of the kind
that the Russian government has engaged in.
But I would like to end by just giving you what I see are
the five lessons we should learn and give you three policy
prescriptions that I think are essential
First, despite all our hopes and expectations, 1991 was not
the end of history. Ending communism didn't end conflict, and
the fact is we're going to have more conflict in this part of
the world in the future than we did in the past. As much as
people don't want to believe that, that's going to happen.
Second, and I will second Paul Saunders' comment, we have
got to end our personalization of relations with foreign
leaders. It is not only that we have sometimes sacrificed our
own ideals and interests in the name of maintaining a
friendship with the leader of a large country--the Russian
Federation--but we have found ourselves made hostage to the
actions of a leader of a smaller country who thinks we will
have no choice given what we have often said. We have been made
hostage, in this case and some others.
Third, we need to learn how to deliver clear and consistent
messages to leaders and populations. The fact is we have
delivered a consistent message to Georgia over this period. We
have had statements about how we always defend our friends from
very senior people, and we have had specific warnings not to do
it. We have had people going in and providing military
instruction, and we have said, ``But you don't want to use
these forces if someone invades your country.'' The fact is
that if you don't have a common that is delivered the same way
every time, you have a problem. There's another way about
delivering a message: It is one of the great tragedies, and
it's one of the reasons I'm no longer in the U.S. government,
that we have destroyed U.S. international broadcasting; we lack
the ability to reach the peoples of this area. The Voice of
America, Radio Free Liberty, all need to be expanded. They're
more necessary now than were 25 years ago, and unfortunately in
the last 10 years we have watched them be destroyed. That's one
of the reasons I took early retirement and was in Estonia,
where I had the pleasure of meeting you, Mr. Chairman, and am
now in Azerbaijan, because I'm trying to what I can't do on the
airwaves by being there. This is critically important.
Fourth, we need to insist on universal standards of
international behavior. That has two implications, neither of
which is entirely welcome. First, we cannot credibly ask other
people to obey the rules if we don't obey the rules ourselves.
We have to be very careful when we take action that we don't do
things that violate the rules, because that subverts our
possibility of asking anyone else to behave. We have done that,
tragically, a number of times. Second, we need to understand
that when the Russian government currently talks about double
standards, and does all the time, the Russian government
complains that we're engaging in double standards. The fact is
the Russian government wants to be treated by a different
standard than anyone else. It wants us to recognize that it has
a right to use military force across an international boundary,
to illegally distribute passports in countries which do not
have an agreement with dual citizenship or even
constitutionally ban it, as is in the case of Ukraine. But the
Russians insist that because they're big and important that has
to be.
Fifth, we need to recognize something else. All too many
times in the last month we have heard people talk about what's
going on and what we should do with respect to the Russian
Federation in terms of the risk of a new Cold War. Let me tell
you that invocations of a new Cold War are precisely designed
to force the United States not to do anything. It is quite
amazing to me that with every other country in the world we
know we have things we agree with, and we know we have things
we disagree with. That's going to be true with Russia, too. It
was even true during the Cold War. Invocation of a new Cold War
is a way, an act, of public diplomacy intimidation against the
United States people and against the United States government.
I would recommend three things that we need to do to get
out of this current problem we're in. First, I agree that we
are not going to see South Ossetia and Abkhazia reincorporated
immediately. That does not mean there isn't something we should
do. In 1932, Secretary of State Simpson announced that it was
American policy never to recognize border changes brought about
by force alone. That led to the non-recognition policy, which
was declared in 1940, for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is
my view that the United States government should immediately
proclaim a new non-recognition policy that the United States
does not recognize the forcible inclusion of these countries by
military is a violation of a policy that we are supposed to
have had online since 1932. It is something that would be easy
to do, would be fully understood, and it would signal to those
people and to the Georgian people that we have accepted a
reality even if we can't change it immediately.
Second, we need to expand our ties with the peoples of this
entire region and our expertise on these areas. It is a tragedy
how few people there are who speak Georgian, who have lived in
Georgia, who know the region or any of these countries. It
should never happen again, as it did during this crisis, that
the Department of State should announce that it could not spare
Mr. Bryza to take a particular trip because it didn't have
anyone else on whom it could count here in Washington for
expertise. When you don't have a bench, it's really tough to
field the first team. But we have got to address that. I
believe the way you do that is to rebuild our area studies
programs by the revival of the National Defense Education Act
Title VI program which was responsible for a lot of us getting
trained.
Finally, it seems to me that recognizing that the borders
of the republics of the former Soviet Union were drawn in order
to create problems rather than to resolve them that the United
States needs to begin to understand that the right of nations
to self-determination is also important and not just border
stability. When we declared border stability was above
everything else in February of 1992, when we said that we would
never recognize any secession, we set in play the forces that
ultimately led to the destruction of Grozny in the genocide of
the Chechen people, first by Mr. Yeltsin and then by Mr. Putin.
It is in many ways our fault because we sent the signals.
I believe we need under the current circumstances to begin
to think about how we create mechanisms of negotiation and of
conversation so that the rights of nations to self-
determination, the right of peoples to democratic choice, will
be respected rather than sacrificed as they have sometimes been
in recent years on the altar of territorial stability. But if
we're going to say territorial inviolability, then let us make
it very clear that if a country does something on its own
territory we have said that's its choice, instead of as we have
done in the Georgian crisis acting as if Moscow has an equal
right to be on the territory of the Republic of Georgia as the
Republic of Georgia government has. This is in no way an
endorsement by me of the some of the decisions that Mr.
Saakashvili has made with respect to the media, with respect to
military action, or with respect to his moves against the
opposition.
Having said that, we need to take seriously that Georgia is
a full member of the international community, and that if we're
going to recognize the rights of states and the territorial
inviolability of their borders, then Georgia had a right too,
and it has been brutally violated by the Russian Federation and
not because of anything the Georgian government did, however
unfortunate it was.
Mr. Hastings. I thank you, Paul. We're going to have to
proceed apace to vote. I would like to make it clear that all
of our testimonies will be on our Web site, and your full
written statements will be included therein. It would be my
hope that, to the extent that it would be possible, that I
could have a casual meeting with either or both of you, even if
it requires coming to Estonia. Thank you.
Mr. Goble. It would be nice. Thank you.
Mr. Saunders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[all]
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