[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TIBET
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REPRINTED
from the
2008 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio MAX BAUCUS, Montana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor
CHRISTOPHER PADILLA, Department of Commerce
DAVID KRAMER, Department of State
Douglas Grob, Staff Director
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Deputy Staff Director
Tibet
Findings
As a result of the Chinese government
crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries,
nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave
of Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008,
Chinese government repression of Tibetans' freedoms of
speech, religion, and association has increased to what
may be the highest level since approximately 1983, when
Tibetans were able to set about reviving Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.
The status of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue
deteriorated after the March 2008 protests and may
require remedial measures before the dialogue can
resume focus on its principal objective--resolving the
Tibet issue. China's leadership blamed the Dalai Lama
and ``the Dalai Clique'' for the Tibetan protests and
rioting, and did not acknowledge the role of rising
Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies that deprive
Tibetans of rights and freedoms nominally protected
under China's Constitution and legal system. The Party
hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama, increased
attacks on the Dalai Lama's legitimacy as a religious
leader, and asserted that he is a criminal bent on
splitting China.
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism has
reached its highest level since the Commission began to
report on religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in
2002. Chinese government and Party policy toward
Tibetan Buddhists' practice of their religion played a
central role in stoking frustration that resulted in
the cascade of Tibetan protests that began on March 10,
2008. Reports have identified hundreds of Tibetan
Buddhist monks and nuns whom security officials
detained for participating in the protests, as well as
members of Tibetan secular society who supported them.
Chinese government interference with the
norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism
toward the Dalai Lama, one of the religion's foremost
teachers, serves to deepen division and distrust
between Tibetan Buddhists and the government and
Communist Party. The government seeks to use legal
measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Authorities in one Tibetan autonomous prefecture have
announced unprecedented measures that seek to punish
monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic officials
accused of involvement in political protests in the
prefecture.
The Chinese government undermines the
prospects for stability in the Tibetan autonomous areas
of China by implementing economic development and
educational policy in a manner that results in
disadvantages for Tibetans. Weak implementation of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law has been a principal
factor exacerbating Tibetan frustration by preventing
Tibetans from using lawful means to protect their
culture, language, and religion.
At no time since Tibetans resumed political
activism in 1987 has the magnitude and severity of
consequences to Tibetans (named and unnamed) who
protested against the Chinese government been as great
as it is now upon the release of the Commission's 2008
Annual Report. Unless Chinese authorities have released
without charge a very high proportion of the Tibetans
reportedly detained as a result of peaceful activity or
expression on or after March 10, 2008, the resulting
surge in the number of Tibetan political prisoners may
prove to be the largest increase in such prisoners that
has occurred under China's current Constitution and
Criminal Law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Convey to the Chinese government the heightened
importance and urgency of moving beyond the setback in
dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives
following the March 2008 protests. A Chinese government
decision to engage the Dalai Lama in substantive
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and
improve the outlook for local and regional security in
the coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese government, in light of the
tragic consequences of the Tibetan protests and the
continuing tension in Tibetan Buddhist institutions
across the Tibetan plateau, the urgent importance of:
reducing the level of state antagonism toward the Dalai
Lama; ceasing aggressive campaigns of ``patriotic
education'' that can result in further stress to local
stability; respecting Tibetan Buddhists' right to
freedom of religion, including to identify and educate
religious teachers in a manner consistent with their
preferences and traditions; and using state powers such
as passing laws and issuing regulations to protect the
religious freedom of Tibetans instead of
remolding Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Continue to urge the Chinese government to allow
international observers to visit Gedun Choekyi Nyima,
the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized, and
his parents.
In light of the heightened pressure on Tibetans
and their communities following the March protests,
increase funding for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
and health conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in
Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable
benefits without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans
into these areas.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance
of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters
and rioters, honoring the Chinese Constitution's
reference to the freedoms of speech and association,
and not treating peaceful protest as a crime. Request
that the Chinese government provide details about
Tibetans detained or charged with protest-related
crimes, including: each person's name; the charges (if
any) against each person; the name and location of the
prosecuting office (``procuratorate'') and court
handling each case; the availability of legal counsel
to each defendant; and the name of each facility where
such persons are detained or imprisoned. Request that
Chinese authorities allow access by diplomats and other
international observers to the trials of such persons.
Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence
with
Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are
imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of
human rights. Representative examples include: former
Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-
year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing
posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in
prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life
imprisonment for printing leaflets); reincarnated lama
Bangri Chogtrul (serving a sentence of 18 years
commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8
years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a
public festival).
The United States should continue to seek a
consulate in Lhasa in order to provide services to
Americans in Western China. With the closest consulate
in Chengdu, a 1,500 mile bus ride from the Tibetan
capital of Lhasa, American travelers are largely
without assistance in Western China. This was recently
underscored during unrest in Lhasa when U.S. citizens
could not get out and American diplomats could not
enter the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
introduction: tibetan protests on an unprecedented scale
The Tibet section of the 2008 Annual Report focuses on the
unprecedented cascade of Tibetan protests that began in Lhasa
on March 10, 2008,\1\ and by the end of March had swept across
much of the ethnic Tibetan areas of China.\2\ No peacetime
Chinese government\3\ has been confronted by expressions of
Tibetan discontent as widely dispersed and sustained since the
Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of
China in 1949. Two key factors distinguish the current protests
from the March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising that followed the Dalai
Lama's escape from Tibet, and the March 5-7, 1989, protests and
rioting that led to the imposition of martial law in Lhasa.
First, the 2008 protests spread far beyond Lhasa and the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR). Second, protests continued to occur
even after Chinese security forces established and maintained
lockdowns.
As a result of the Chinese government crackdown beginning
in March 2008 on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries,
schools, and workplaces, the repression of the freedoms of
speech, religion, and association has increased to what may be
the highest level since approximately 1983, when Tibetans were
able to set about reviving Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and
nunneries.\4\ The Commission has reported since releasing its
first Annual Report in 2002 on underlying human rights issues
that played important roles in the 2008 Tibetan protests.\5\
The Commission's 2007 Annual Report observed that then-
declining numbers of political detentions of monks and nuns
showed that state repression of Tibetan Buddhism may have
resulted in a more subdued monastic community--and that such a
decline concurrent with a high level of monastic resentment
against Chinese policies suggested that the potential for
resurgent political protest exists.
Tibetan protesters resorted to rioting in a total of 12
county-level areas, according to official Chinese media
reports,\6\ but Tibetan protests (generally peaceful) took
place in more than 40 additional county-level areas.\7\ China's
state-run media generally reported only the protests during
which some Tibetans turned to violence, and characterized all
of the participants linked to such events as ``rioters.''
Rioting took place in Lhasa city on March 14,\8\ in Aba (Ngaba)
county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan
province, on March 16,\9\ and in six counties in Gannan
(Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, from
March 14-19.\10\ International media and non-governmental
organization reports noted that Tibetans attacked ethnic Han
and Hui individuals and businesses.\11\ The Lhasa rioting
resulted in substantial property damage and at least 19 deaths,
according to official reports; the actual death toll could be
much higher (see Consequences of the Protests: Death,
Detention, Patriotic Education, Isolation in this section).\12\
[See figure titled Map of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level
Areas below and Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites,
County-level Areas at the end of this section.]
Peaceful Tibetan protesters called for Tibetan
independence, the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet,\13\ the release
of the Panchen Lama,\14\ and freedom of religion generally.\15\
Many, but not all, of the protests began at Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries,\16\ the institutions impacted most
negatively by Chinese government regulation of Tibetan Buddhism
and Party policy toward the Dalai Lama, whom most Tibetan
Buddhists regard as their spiritual leader.\17\ Monastic
protests gained support from members of Tibetan secular
society.\18\ The large scale of Tibetan participation in the
protests--at substantial peril to the protesters--reflects the
urgency of the underlying issues and the imperative for Chinese
authorities and Tibetans to work together to resolve them.
TIBETAN FRUSTRATION: FACTORS UNDERLYING THE PROTESTS
China's leadership blamed the Dalai Lama and ``the Dalai
Clique'' for the Tibetan protests and rioting in the run-up to
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games,\19\ and did not
acknowledge the role of rising Tibetan frustration with Chinese
policies toward Tibetans. A senior TAR Party official used
language that attributed directly to the Dalai Lama violent
activity during rioting such as ``beating, smashing, looting,
and burning.'' \20\
Chinese government policies that deprive Tibetans of rights
and freedoms nominally protected under China's Constitution and
legal system have been the root cause of the protests and
riots. Party control over China's legislative, governmental,
and policymaking process, as well as contradictory provisions
in Chinese laws and regulations, support the government's
unrestricted ability to implement unpopular programs among
Tibetans. Heightened state interference with Tibetan Buddhist
norms since 2005 has left the
religion especially hard-hit.\21\ [See Heightened Repression of
Tibetan Buddhism in this section.] The unproductive dialogue
between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives,
along with the lurid invective of the Party's anti-Dalai
campaign, frustrate Tibetan hopes for improved relations with
the Chinese government, and strike at Tibetan sensibilities.
Policy Toward the Dalai Lama
The Party hardened policy toward the Dalai Lama in the wake
of the Tibetan protests, increasing attacks on the Dalai Lama's
legitimacy as a religious leader, and asserting that he is a
criminal bent on splitting China.\22\ ``Even the Lord Buddha
will definitely not tolerate this honey-mouthed and dagger-
hearted Dalai Lama, the scum of Buddhism, an insane ruffian and
a beast in a human shape!'' said the Party-run Tibet Daily.\23\
Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Zhang Qingli likened
the Dalai Lama to ``a jackal and wolf cloaked in a [monk's
robe]'' and called for a ``people's war'' against threats to
stability and unity that he blamed on ``the Dalai Clique.''
\24\ Officials launched aggressive reimplementation of
political indoctrination campaigns\25\ across the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China, and sought to compel Tibetans to
denounce the Dalai Lama\26\ and sometimes to state that he was
responsible for the protest and riot activity.\27\
Chinese government officials have intensified their
campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama by holding him directly
responsible for Tibetan violence committed during rioting, and
seeking to tie him to allegations of Tibetan ``terrorist''
objectives and activity. A Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
spokesman claimed on April 1,\28\ but provided no credible
evidence to prove, that the Dalai Lama is responsible for the
objectives and activities of two Tibetan NGOs based in India--
the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and the Tibetan People's
Uprising Movement (TPUM). TPUM\29\ and the TYC,\30\ according
to their Web sites, seek Tibetan independence, thereby
rejecting the Dalai Lama's autonomy-based Middle Way
Approach.\31\ TPUM's ``Declaration'' states, ``The Tibetan
People's Uprising Movement is a global movement of Tibetans
inside and outside of Tibet taking control of our political
destiny by engaging in direct action to end China's illegal and
brutal occupation of our country. Through unified and strategic
campaigns we will seize the Olympic spotlight and shine it on
China's shameful repression inside Tibet, thereby denying China
the international acceptance and approval it so fervently
desires.'' \32\
The MPS claimed, but did not substantiate, that the TYC and
other unnamed groups provided two classes on how to carry out
terrorist activities.\33\ According to China's state-run media,
after monks in the eastern TAR allegedly carried out a series
of small bombings in April, the alleged bombers confessed
that--by listening to radio broadcasts--they ``were following
separatist propaganda from the Dalai Lama.'' \34\ A Chinese
security official told a Western media organization in October
that on September 23, 2008, the Changdu (Chamdo) Intermediate
People's Court sentenced several of the monks to terms of
imprisonment for ``terrorist actions.'' \35\ According to an
international media agency report, in December 2005 then-TYC
President Kalsang Phuntsok said: ``[We] have a youth section
which is not so much influenced by the Buddhist philosophy.
They are very much attracted by the movements which are going
on all over the world, mostly violence-infested movements, and
people see they are achieving results. They look around
everywhere, whether it's Israel or Palestine or the Middle
East--these give them every reason to believe in every
[violent] movement that is being waged on this Earth.'' \36\
According to a Tibetan media report, former TYC President
Lhasang Tsering told about 200 young Tibetans gathered at a
public forum in India in February 2007 that the 2008 Beijing
Olympics provide ``an amazing opportunity as we can fight them
when they would be most needed to be `well-behaved.' '' He told
the audience, ``For a committed activist you don't need CIA's
support to cut a telephone line in Beijing or throw an iron rod
on the power cables in Shanghai. These kinds of sabotages can
be done by any ordinary person, and can weaken the power from
inside. Sometimes the whole city goes dark by one simple but
technically correct act.'' \37\
The Dalai Lama, however, has expressed no support for the
political objectives or methods of TPUM or the TYC, and has
maintained his consistently pacifist counsel to Tibetans--
wherever they live. In an April 6 statement, the Dalai Lama
appealed to Tibetans to ``practice non-violence and not waver
from this path, however serious the situation might be.'' He
urged Tibetans living in exile to ``not engage in any action
that could be even remotely interpreted as violent.'' \38\ He
continued to reiterate his explicit support for China's role as
the Olympics host throughout the period of the protests and
their aftermath.\39\
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
U.S. government policy recognizes the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in
other provinces to be a part of China.\40\ The U.S. State
Department's 2008 Report on Tibet Negotiations observed that
the Dalai Lama ``represents the views of the vast majority of
Tibetans and his moral and spiritual authority helps to unite
the Tibetan community inside and outside of China.'' President
George W. Bush met in September 2007 with President Hu Jintao
at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Sydney,
Australia, and told Hu that if Chinese leaders ``were to sit
down with the Dalai Lama they would find him a man of peace and
reconciliation.'' \41\ The Report on Tibet Negotiations stated:
The United States encourages China and the Dalai Lama
to hold direct and substantive discussions aimed at
resolution of differences at an early date, without
preconditions. The Administration believes that
dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his
representatives will alleviate tensions in Tibetan
areas and contribute to the overall stability of
China.\42\
The U.S. Congress awarded the Congressional Gold Medal to
the Dalai Lama on October 17, 2007.\43\ The congressional act
providing for the award found that the Dalai Lama ``is the
unrivaled spiritual and cultural leader of the Tibetan people,
and has used his leadership to promote democracy, freedom, and
peace for the Tibetan people through a negotiated settlement of
the Tibet issue, based on
autonomy within the People's Republic of China.'' \44\
The status of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue, which resumed
in 2002,\45\ deteriorated after the March 2008 protests from a
condition characterized by the absence of evident progress, to
one that may require remedial measures before the dialogue can
resume focus on its principal objective--resolving the Tibet
issue. The Chinese government and the Dalai Lama continue to
maintain their fundamental positions toward the dialogue. [See
CECC 2007 Annual
Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, for
additional information.]
The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyari and Envoy Kelsang
Gyaltsen met on May 4, 2008, in Shenzhen city, Guangdong
province, for an ``informal meeting'' \46\ with Communist Party
United Front Work Department (UFWD) Executive Deputy Head Zhu
Weiqun and Deputy Head Sita (Sithar).\47\ The purpose of the
meeting, Gyari said on May 8, was to discuss the ``critical
situation in Tibet'' and to reach a decision to continue formal
discussions.\48\ The envoys called on Chinese authorities to
release prisoners (Tibetan protesters), allow injured persons
(protesters) to receive adequate medical treatment, and allow
``unfettered access'' to Tibetan areas by tourists and media
organizations.\49\ The Dalai Lama included similar points in an
April 6 statement that he addressed to Tibetans worldwide\50\
and reiterated them as his priorities in a May 25 interview
with a Western newspaper.\51\ President Hu Jintao said on May
7, soon after the Shenzhen meeting, ``We hope that the Dalai
Lama side take[s] concrete actions to show its sincerity by
earnestly stopping activities involving splitting the
motherland, instigating violence and disrupting the Beijing
Olympics so as to create conditions for next consultation.''
\52\
On July 1 and 2, 2008, the Dalai Lama's envoys met in
Beijing with UFWD officials, including UFWD Head Du Qinglin,
for the seventh round of formal dialogue.\53\ The Chinese team
presented the envoys a set of new preconditions (the ``four no
supports'')\54\ that intensify the Chinese government and Party
campaign to hold the Dalai Lama personally accountable for
Tibetan views and activities that he does not support and that
contradict his policies and guidance.\55\ A UFWD spokesman
described the four types of activity that the Dalai Lama must
not support as: (1) attempting to disrupt the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games; (2) inciting violence (during Tibetan
protests); (3) alleged ``terrorist activities'' by a Tibetan
NGO; and (4) seeking Tibetan independence.\56\ Du Qinglin
demanded that the Dalai Lama ``should openly and explicitly
promise'' to fulfill the requirements of the ``four no
supports'' and ``prove it in his actions.'' \57\ The demands
pressure the Dalai Lama to serve as an active proponent of
Chinese government political objectives as a precondition to
continuing a dialogue that seeks to resolve political issues,
and to take action to alter the political positions and
activities of Tibetans within China and internationally.\58\
After the Beijing talks, Chinese officials and the Dalai
Lama's envoys both stated that continuing the dialogue is in
jeopardy and depends on measures that the other side should
undertake. A UFWD official said that if ``the Dalai side''
could not ``materialize'' the ``four no supports,'' then
``there would hardly be the atmosphere and conditions required
for the contacts and discussions between the two sides.'' \59\
Special Envoy Lodi Gyari said that the Tibetan delegation had
been ``compelled to candidly convey to our counterparts that in
the absence of serious and sincere commitment on their part the
continuation of the present dialogue process would serve no
purpose.'' \60\
Heightened Repression of Tibetan Buddhism
State repression of Tibetan Buddhism in 2008 has reached
the highest level since the Commission began to report on
religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in 2002. Chinese
government and Party policy toward Tibetan Buddhists' practice
of their religion played a central role in stoking frustration
that resulted in the cascade of Tibetan protests that started
on March 10, 2008, when approximately 300 Drepung Monastery
monks attempted a protest march in Lhasa.\61\ The protests
spread quickly across the Tibetan plateau and involved a large
but undetermined number of Tibetan Buddhist monastic
institutions and thousands of monks and nuns.\62\ [See figure
titled Map of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas above
and Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas
at the end of this section.]
Reports have identified hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monks
and nuns whom security officials detained for participating in
the protests,\63\ as well as members of Tibetan secular society
who supported them. Peaceful protesters raised Tibetan Buddhist
issues by calling for the return of the Dalai Lama,\64\ the
release of the Panchen Lama (Gedun Choekyi Nyima),\65\ and
freedom of religion generally.\66\ [See box titled The Panchen
Lama and the Golden Urn: China's Model for Selecting the Next
Dalai Lama.] Details about the detainees' well-being and status
under the Chinese legal system are few. Armed security forces
maintained heightened security at some monasteries and
nunneries after the protests as authorities conducted
aggressive campaigns of patriotic education (``love the
country, love religion'').\67\ Demands that monks and nuns sign
statements denouncing the Dalai Lama angered monks and nuns and
prompted a second wave of protests and detentions.\68\
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The Panchen Lama and the Golden Urn: China's Model for Selecting the
Next Dalai Lama
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy the Dalai Lama recognized as the Panchen
Lama in May 1995, turned 19 years old in April 2008. Chinese
authorities have held him and his parents incommunicado in an unknown
location since May 17, 1995,\69\ three days after the Dalai Lama
announced his recognition of Gedun Choekyi Nyima.\70\ The Chinese
government told the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion in
September 2005 that Gedun Choekyi Nyima is leading a ``normal, happy
life and receiving a good cultural education.'' \71\ A TAR official
described Gedun Choekyi Nyima in July 2007 as a ``patriotic'' boy who
is ``living a normal life in Tibet'' and ``studying at a senior high
school'' and ``does not want his life to be disturbed.'' \72\ The
Chinese government has provided no information to support the statement
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima is in the TAR or any other Tibetan area of
China.
The State Council declared the Dalai Lama's 1995 announcement
``illegal and invalid'' \73\ and installed Gyaltsen Norbu, whose
appointment continues to stir widespread resentment among Tibetans--
evidenced by Tibetan protesters' calls in March 2008 for Chinese
authorities to ``release'' Gedun Choekyi Nyima.\74\ Party officials
assert that the next Dalai Lama will be selected in the same manner as
Gyaltsen Norbu: by drawing a name from a golden urn. Ye Xiaowen,
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and
an alternate member of the Communist Party Central Committee,\75\ said
in an interview published on March 13, 2008, that SARA would ``take
control'' of identifying the next Dalai Lama using ``historical
conventions.'' One of those conventions would be drawing a lot from an
urn containing the names of three government-approved candidates to be
the ``soul boy'' (reincarnated lama).\76\
Ye's reference to ``historical conventions'' refers to a 1792 Qing
Dynasty edict demanding that the Tibetan government in Lhasa reform
religious, administrative, economic, and military practices to suit the
Qing court.\77\ The first of the edict's 29 articles directed that the
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama be selected by drawing lots from a golden
urn, and that a high-ranking imperial official must be present to
confirm the result.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE NORM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISM: SYSTEMATIC STATE INTERFERENCE
Chinese government interference with the norms of Tibetan
Buddhism and unrelenting antagonism toward the Dalai Lama, one
of the religion's foremost teachers, serves to deepen division
and
distrust between Tibetan Buddhists and the government and
Communist Party. As the Commission's 2007 Annual Report
documented, law, regulation, and policy that seek to prevent or
punish Tibetan Buddhist devotion to the Dalai Lama, categorize
him as a ``splittist'' (a criminal under Chinese law\79\), and
that set aside centuries of religious tradition\80\ create
obstacles of profound implications for Tibetan Buddhists.\81\
Legal and regulatory interference with Tibetan Buddhism
antagonizes Tibetans in general, but it is especially harmful
to Tibetans who regard the Dalai Lama (in his capacity as the
spiritual leader of the Gelug tradition of Tibetan
Buddhism\82\) as their guide on what Buddhists believe is the
path toward enlightenment.
The function and legitimacy of Tibetan Buddhism--the core
of Tibetan culture--has been especially hard-hit since 2005.
Legal measures closely regulating monastic life in the TAR took
effect in January 2007.\83\ Nationwide measures establishing
state supervision of the centuries-old Tibetan tradition of
identifying, seating, and educating boys whom Tibetans believe
are reincarnations of Buddhist teachers took effect in
September 2007.\84\ The government seeks to use such legal
measures to remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state, and to
use legal pressure to compel Tibetan acceptance of such
measures. For example, a February 2008 Tibet Daily report
provided information about conditions in TAR monasteries and
nunneries less than one month before the protests erupted.\85\
The TAR procuratorate reported that it had ``targeted monks and
nuns'' with campaigns on ```love the country and love religion'
thinking'' (patriotic education), and implemented measures
linked to the government and Party's ``integrated management of
the temples.'' \86\
THE GANZI MEASURES: PUNISHING ``MONK AND NUN TROUBLEMAKERS''
The government of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, issued on June 28, 2008,
with immediate effect, unprecedented measures that seek to
punish or eliminate from the prefecture's Tibetan Buddhist
institution those monks, nuns, religious teachers, and monastic
officials whom public security officials accuse of involvement
in political protests in the prefecture.\87\ Of 125 documented
Tibetan protests across the Tibetan plateau from March 10 to
June 22, at least 44 took place in Ganzi TAP according to an
August 5 advocacy group report.\88\ Protesters at 40 of the 44
documented protests included Tibetan monks or nuns.\89\ Nearly
38,000 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns were residents of 515
monasteries and nunneries in Ganzi TAP as of 2005, according to
the Sichuan Daily.\90\ Ganzi TAP has been the site of more
known political detentions of Tibetans by Chinese authorities
than any other TAP outside the TAR since the current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987,\91\ based on data
available in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
(PPD).\92\
The ``Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious
Monasteries and Individual Monks and Nuns'' (the Ganzi
Measures) took effect on the date they were issued and punish
speech and association, not violent activity:
In order to defend social stability, socialist law and
the basic interests of the people, the measures listed
below have been resolutely drafted for dealing clearly
with participants in illegal activities aimed at
inciting the division of nationalities, such as
shouting reactionary slogans, distributing reactionary
writings, flying and popularizing the ``snow lion
flag'' and holding illegal demonstrations.\93\
The Ganzi Measures appear to apply some punishments that
may be without precedent in post-Mao Zedong China and that,
based on Commission staff analysis, do not appear to have a
clear basis in national legal measures that establish central
government regulatory power over religious activity in China.
Such measures include the 2004 Regulation on Religious
Affairs\94\ and the 2007 Management Measures for the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.\95\ For
example, punishments in some cases can include the partial
destruction or closure of a monastery or nunnery.\96\ In other
cases, authorities may punish a trulku (a teacher that Tibetan
Buddhists believe is a reincarnation) by stripping the trulku
of his religious position and function.\97\ [See Addendum: The
June 2008 Ganzi Measures: Dealing Strictly With Troublemaking
Monks, Nuns, and Monasteries.]
Weak Implementation of Regional Ethnic Autonomy
Tibetan protesters, in their widespread calls for Tibetan
independence, provided an unprecedented de facto referendum
rejecting China's implementation of its constitutionally
enshrined regional ethnic autonomy system.\98\ The Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law\99\ (REAL) is the state's principal legal
instrument for managing the affairs of ethnic minorities. Its
weak implementation has prevented Tibetans from using lawful
means to protect their culture, language, and religion. This
has exacerbated Tibetan frustration. The Chinese leadership's
refusal to recognize the REAL's failure to fulfill the law's
premise that it guarantees ethnic minorities the ``right to
administer their internal affairs'' could expose the leadership
to further increases in Tibetan resentment, continued calls for
Tibetan independence, and the risk of local instability. [See
box titled Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts
Within and Between Laws below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts Within and Between
Laws
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Premise of Autonomy
The REAL's Preamble asserts that the regional ethnic autonomy system
``reflects the state's full respect for and guarantee of ethnic
minorities' right to administer their internal affairs,'' and ``has
played an enormous role in giving full play to ethnic minorities'
enthusiasm for being masters over their own affairs.'' \100\
Conflicts That Impede Autonomy
Article 3 obligates ethnic autonomous governments to apply the
decisions of higher-level authorities under ``the principle of
democratic centralism''--a system that is more consultative than
democratic. A Chinese government White Paper said that democratic
centralism ``requires that the majority be respected while the minority
is protected.'' \101\
Article 7 sets aside ethnic minority rights to ``administer
their internal affairs'' by subordinating ethnic autonomous governments
to every higher level of government authority.\102\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impediments to Regional Ethnic Autonomy: Conflicts Within and Between
Laws--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 12 provides a basis for establishing boundaries of
ethnic autonomous areas that can reflect factors such as ``historical
background'' and ``the relationship among the various nationalities''--
but it is Beijing's view of history and ethnic relations that
determines whether the REAL unites--or divides--territory where ethnic
minority groups live.\103\
Article 19 (and Constitution Article 116) provide ethnic
autonomous congresses the power to enact autonomy or self-governing
regulations ``in the light of the political, economic, and cultural
characteristics'' of the relevant ethnic group(s)\104\--but China's
Legislation Law intrudes upon the right of ethnic minority people's
congresses to issue such regulations.\105\
Article 20 provides ethnic autonomous governments the right to
apply to a higher-level state agency to alter or cancel the
implementation of a ``resolution, decision, order, or instruction'' if
it does not ``suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area''
\106\--but the Legislation Law bars ethnic autonomous governments from
enacting any variance to the laws and regulations that matter the most:
those that are ``dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous
areas.'' \107\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Development vs. Ethnic Minorities' Autonomous Rights
The Chinese government undermines the prospects for
stability in Tibetan autonomous areas of China by implementing
economic development and educational policy in a manner that
results in disadvantages for Tibetans. In a November 2007
academic thesis, Dr. Andrew Fischer analyzed the relationship
in Tibetan areas of China between ``economic polarisation,
social exclusion, and social conflict.'' \108\ ``The
exclusionary experiences of Tibetans in different tiers of the
labor market are interlinked through polarisation,'' he said,
``and operate along educational or cultural axes of
disadvantage''--with the result that ``class grievances mutate
into cross-class collective grievances.'' \109\ The relevance
of the point is evident in the social and professional range of
Tibetan protesters who were not monks and nuns: business
operators, workers, university graduates, junior high school
students, farmers, and nomads.
The Chinese government facilitates resentment among non-
monastic Tibetans against the increasing Han dominance in
economic and cultural spheres principally by failing to empower
local Tibetan autonomous governments to protect Tibetan
interests. Among the consequences are the decline of the
use\110\ and teaching\111\ of Tibetan language, and educational
and training programs that leave Tibetans poorly prepared to
compete in a Han-dominated job market.\112\ Fischer observes in
a forthcoming paper that preferential policies toward Tibetans
are not as important in ``dealing with disjunctures across
changing educational and employment systems'' as achieving
``holistic political representation and decision making of
minority groups.'' \113\
The Qinghai-Tibet railway, a premier project of the Great
Western Development program\114\ that entered service in July
2006,\115\ is an example of how Chinese policies prioritize
accelerating economic development over protecting ethnic
minorities' rights of autonomy. The impact of the Qinghai-Tibet
railway could overwhelm Tibetans and sharply increase pressure
on the Tibetan culture. Based on Commission analysis of
fragmentary and sometimes contradictory information, more than
a half million passengers, most of whom are likely to be ethnic
Han, may have traveled during the first 18 months of railway
operation (July 2006 through December 2007) to the TAR to seek
work, trade, and business opportunities.\116\
The Chinese government announced in January 2008 steps
toward building a new railway that will open up the eastern TAR
and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP--areas where Tibetan protesters have
been active--to population influx from one of China's most
populous provinces.\117\ The railway will originate in Chengdu
city, the capital of Sichuan province, and traverse Kangding
(Dartsedo), Yajiang (Nyagchukha), Litang (Lithang), and Batang
(Bathang) counties in Ganzi TAP before entering the TAR near
Mangkang (Markham) county in Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, based
on a China Daily sketch.\118\
A Ministry of Railways spokesman said in August 2008 that
the government expects to complete construction by 2020 of six
rail lines feeding the Qinghai-Tibet railway.\119\ Authorities
had announced two of the rail lines (Lhasa-Rikaze and Lhasa-
Linzhi) previously.\120\ The spokesman did not provide any
information about the railway route between Golmud city and
Chengdu city. Depending on the government's economic,
political, and geographic objectives, the route could traverse
a number of Tibetan autonomous areas, including one or both of
Yushu and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai province, and one or
both of Ganzi TAP and Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture in Sichuan province.\121\ Such a route would pass
through some of the most remote Tibetan autonomous areas--areas
where remoteness and the unavailability of high-capacity
transportation links have helped the proportion of Tibetan
population to remain relatively high.\122\
A five-year TAR government economic development program
announced in the aftermath of the Tibetan protests indicates
that government policy will prioritize and accelerate
industrial expansion and resource extraction.\123\ TAR economic
commission director Li Xia said that the government ``will pool
21.17 billion yuan (about 3 billion U.S. dollars) for 10 mining
projects, four construction and building material enterprises,
three medicine and food plants, and five industrial development
zones in five years.'' \124\ The government expects the
projects to be operational by 2013, Li said.\125\ The report
did not disclose details about the source of the funding for
the projects, the location of the industrial development zones,
or the extent to which authorities expect the new projects to
attract non-Tibetans to the TAR to seek employment. The total
cost of the 22 projects will be equal to approximately two-
thirds of the 33 billion yuan cost of constructing the Qinghai-
Tibet railway.\126\
Another state-run program that prioritizes economic
development by settling Tibetan nomads into compact communities
is nearing completion throughout Tibetan areas, disrupting an
important sector of the Tibetan culture and economy.\127\
Nomads participated in the wave of protests following March 10
in substantial numbers, placing some Tibetan counties on the
protest map for the first time\128\ since the current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987.\129\
Consequences of the Protests: Death, Detention, Patriotic Education,
Isolation
At no time since Tibetans resumed political activism in
1987 has the magnitude and severity of consequences to Tibetans
(named and unnamed) who protested against the Chinese
government been as great as it is now upon the release of the
Commission's 2008 Annual Report. Few details are available
about the thousands of Tibetans whom Chinese security officials
detained, beat, fired on, or otherwise harmed as armed forces
suppressed protests or riots and maintained security lockdowns.
China's state-run media reported extensively on personal injury
and property damage that Tibetan rioters caused from March 14
to 19 in locations such as Lhasa city, Aba county, and Gannan
TAP, but authorities provided few details about the thousands
of Tibetans whom they acknowledge detaining as a result of the
incidents. Moreover, officials have provided little information
about the suppression of peaceful Tibetan protests that took
place over a period of weeks in more than 40 counties where
Chinese state media did not report rioting, and where security
officials reportedly detained thousands more Tibetans.\130\
[See 2008 Annual Report, Section II--Rights of Criminal
Suspects and Defendants for more information about legal
process and abuse of Tibetan detainees.]
death
At least 218 Tibetans had died by June as the result of
Chinese security forces using lethal force (such as gunfire)
against Tibetan protesters, or from severe abuse (such as
beating and torture), according to an August 21 Tibetan
government-in-exile (TGiE) report.\131\ The Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy
reported on June 20 that ``more than 100'' Tibetans had
died.\132\ Neither organization commented publicly on the
substantial difference between the estimates. If a report is
accurate that, on March 28, authorities cremated near Lhasa
more than 80 (apparently unidentified) bodies of Tibetans
killed in connection with protest (or riot) activity, then a
full accounting of all of the casualties may never occur.\133\
The March 14 Lhasa protests and rioting resulted in the
largest number of Tibetan fatalities reported for a single
incident. On March 16, the TGiE reported that ``at least 80
people were killed'' on March 14 in Lhasa.\134\ Jampa Phuntsog
(Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the TAR government, denied at a
March 17 press conference, however, that security forces
carried or used ``any destructive weapons'' as they suppressed
the March 14 riot.\135\ Additional incidents of lethal weapons
fire against Tibetan protesters took place on at least six
occasions outside the TAR, according to NGO and media reports:
on March 11 in Daocheng (Dabpa) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan
province;\136\ March 16 in Aba county, Aba prefecture, Sichuan
province;\137\ March 16 (or March 18) in Maqu county, Gannan
TAP, Gansu province;\138\ March 18 in Ganzi county, Ganzi
TAP;\139\ March 24 in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP;\140\
and on April 3 in Ganzi county.\141\ Up to 15 Tibetans were
reportedly wounded by weapons fire on April 5 in Daofu (Dawu)
county, Ganzi TAP, but no fatalities were reported.\142\ The
Dalai Lama issued statements on March 18\143\ and April 6\144\
appealing to Tibetans to refrain from violent activity.
Chinese officials have not acknowledged the deaths of
Tibetan protesters as the result of lethal force used by
Chinese security forces.\145\ Instead, state-run media has
emphasized the consequences of Tibetan violence, especially the
deaths of 18 civilians and 1 policeman in the March 14 Lhasa
riot.\146\ International media and non-governmental
organizations also reported Tibetan violence, sometimes
resulting in death, against ethnic Han and Hui individuals in
Lhasa.\147\
detention
Unless Chinese authorities have released without charge a
very high proportion of the Tibetans reportedly detained as a
result of peaceful activity or expression on or after March 10,
2008, the resulting surge in the number of Tibetan political
prisoners may prove to be the largest increase in such
prisoners\148\ that has occurred under China's current
Constitution\149\ and Criminal Law.\150\ The current period of
Tibetan political activism began in 1987. [See chart titled
Tibetan Political Detention by Year, 1987-2008 below.]
Chinese security officials detained thousands of Tibetans,
first in connection with the cascade of protests (and sometimes
rioting) followed by the imposition of security lockdowns at
protest locations, and then as monks, nuns, and other Tibetans
expressed anger at the aggressive reimplementation of political
indoctrination campaigns, including patriotic education.
China's state-run media acknowledged in reports in March and
April 2008 that a total of 4,434 persons characterized as
``rioters'' had either surrendered to security forces or were
detained by them in nine counties where rioting reportedly took
place between March 14 and 19.\151\ The nine counties were
located in Lhasa municipality and Gannan TAP. The reports did
not name or provide detailed information about any of the
detainees. Two official reports on April 9\152\ and one report
on June 21\153\ disclosed the release of a total of 3,027 of
the 4,434 persons who reportedly surrendered or were detained.
The June 21 report (on Lhasa) noted that the persons released
had ``expressed regret for conducting minor crimes.'' \154\
Based on the April 9 and June 21 reports, the status of more
than 1,200 of the persons who had surrendered or been detained
remained unknown.\155\ [For detailed information, see table
titled Official Chinese Sources: Detention, Surrender, and
Release of Alleged ``Rioters'' below.]
Official Chinese Sources: Detention, Surrender, and Release of Alleged ``Rioters''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linzhou
county, Aba
March 14 county,
Lhasa city, March 14 Gannan TAP, March 14-19 rioting March 18
rioting Xinhua, rioting Xinhua, April Tibet rioting Total
April 9\156\ 9\157\ Daily, Xinhua,
March March
19\158\ 25\159\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surrender: Total 362 2,204 (incl. 519 monks) 94 381 3,041
Surrender: Released 328 1,870 (incl. 413 monks)
Surrender: Formal arrest
Surrender: Remain detained 34 334 (incl. 106 monks)
Police detention: Total 953 440 (incl. 170 monks) 1,393
Police detention: Released
Police detention: Formal 403 8
arrest
Police detention: Remain
detained
Total: Surrendered or detained 1,315 2,644 94 381 4,434
Total: Remain detained 116 116
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June
21\160\
Total: Sentenced 42 42
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June 21
Total: Released 1,157 1,870 3,027
(Reports as of June) China Daily, June 21 Xinhua, April 9
Total: Status unknown 0 774 94 381 1,249
(Reports as of June)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese authorities had by late June provided detailed
legal process information about only a few dozen of the
protest- and riot-related cases that may have reached trial in
the Lhasa area, and no information about a possibly greater
number of prosecutions that could take place in other locations
across the Tibetan protest area. All but 14\161\ of the
individual cases known to the Commission about which China
disclosed criminal charge information
involved charges of violent or ordinary crime committed during
activity characterized as rioting.
The largest such disclosure of official information was on
the Lhasa Intermediate People's Court April 29, 2008,
sentencing of 30 Tibetans to imprisonment for periods ranging
from three years to life.\162\ The court convicted the
defendants for crimes described as ``arson, looting, picking
quarrels and provoking troubles, assembling a crowd to storm
state organs, disrupting public service, and theft.'' \163\ A
Lhasa court convicted an additional 12 persons on similar
charges on June 19 and 20, bringing to 42 the total of
officially acknowledged convictions linked to alleged riot-
related activity in Lhasa municipality, according to an
official report.\164\ An additional 116 persons were awaiting
trial.\165\ A Party-run Web site disclosed on March 30 a
reshuffling of TAR court and procuratorate personnel that could
have facilitated an increase in case handling capacity by the
two intermediate people's courts located nearest to Lhasa.\166\
An official Chinese report disclosed on July 11 that on June 19
and 20 four local courts in Lhasa and Shannan (Lhoka)
Prefecture sentenced an additional 12 persons to imprisonment
for alleged involvement in the Lhasa rioting.\167\ The same
report disclosed that courts had not yet sentenced anyone to
death in connection with alleged rioting, but that 116 persons
``were on trial'' and that Chinese law would determine whether
some of the persons tried would be sentenced to execution.\168\
The most extensive NGO compilation of detailed information
about the detention of Tibetans resulting from the protests has
been an April 25, 2008, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (TCHRD) list of 518 Tibetans.\169\ Media
organizations and NGOs continued to report additional
detentions during the months preceding publication of the
Commission's Annual Report. Two reports released in August by
different Tibetan reporting agencies placed the total number of
Tibetan detentions since March 10 at 6,705 and ``over 6,500''
respectively.\170\ Neither report provided any information
about the number of detainees who had been released or remain
detained, or who had been sentenced to imprisonment or
reeducation through labor (RTL). Security officials in the TAR
``deported'' on April 25 to Qinghai province 675 monks,
including 405 monks studying at Drepung Monastery and 205 monks
studying at Sera Monastery, according to an August 28 media
organization report.\171\ Many of the monks were originally
from Qinghai; others were from Tibetan autonomous areas of
Sichuan province.\172\ ``All'' of the monks from Qinghai
remained detained in their hometowns, according to the report,
which did not name any of the detainees and provided few
details about detainees' current locations.\173\ The 610
Drepung and Sera monks removed from the TAR were among a total
of approximately 950 monks authorities detained from the two
monasteries on April 10 and April 14, according to the same
report.\174\
patriotic education
The Party responded to the Tibetan protests with further
escalation of the very political indoctrination campaigns, such
as patriotic education (``love the country, love religion''),
that helped to
provoke Tibetans into protesting in the first place.\175\ Party
Secretary Zhang Qingli issued an order on April 3 that
officials across the TAR must conduct patriotic education
programs at monastic institutions, workplaces, businesses, and
schools, and require participants to sign denunciations of the
Dalai Lama, according to a media report.\176\ The Tibet Daily
reported that the Party had organized a teleconference to warn
cadres against ``war-weariness'' and to conduct educational
activities that would ``remove the scales'' from the eyes of
the ``vast masses'' so that they would ``see clearly what Dalai
really wants and what he has already done.'' \177\ According to
another Tibet Daily report, the Lhasa city school system
trained nearly 3,700 patriotic education ``core instructors''
who lectured a total of nearly 180,000 persons who attended a
total of more than 1,000 lectures.\178\ Officials in Tibetan
autonomous areas outside the TAR launched political
indoctrination campaigns\179\ in prefectures where protests
took place,\180\ as well as in locations where protests were
not reported.\181\
The aggressive new patriotic education campaigns fueled a
second wave of protests and detentions that began in April and
continued as the Commission prepared the 2008 Annual Report.
Authorities may have detained hundreds of monks, nuns, and
other Tibetans as the result of incidents arising from Tibetan
refusals to fulfill the demands of patriotic education
instructors.\182\ Government measures to prevent information
from reaching international observers have hindered an accurate
assessment of the full impact of patriotic education and other
political indoctrination programs on Tibetan communities. In
addition to the standard demand that monks and nuns denounce
the Dalai Lama, officials sought to pressure senior Tibetan
Buddhist figures\183\ and ordinary monks, nuns, and
villagers\184\ to affirm support for the Chinese government
assertion that the Dalai Lama was responsible for the protests
and rioting. Authorities in some cases vandalized or destroyed
images of the Dalai Lama, offending monks and nuns and
prompting comparisons with the Cultural Revolution.\185\
Security forces responded to an April 3 protest resulting from
patriotic education in Ganzi county with lethal weapons
fire.\186\
isolation
Chinese security officials imposed and maintained measures
that isolated Tibetan communities from each other and from the
outside world as the Tibetan protests spread and the Chinese
government response gathered momentum. Authorities confiscated
cell phones and computers, turned off cellular transmission
facilities, and interfered with Internet access, according to
accounts.\187\ Authorities threatened Tibetans with punishment
if they shared information about Tibetan fatalities or
detentions.\188\
The Chinese government continued to deny international
journalists and foreign tourists access to the TAR after
dropping plans to reopen the region to such visitors on May
1.\189\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Qin Gang
confirmed on June 12, 2008, that the TAR remained temporarily
closed to foreign journalists and blamed the closure on ``the
Dalai Clique.'' \190\ The level of access by foreign
journalists and tourists to Tibetan autonomous areas located in
other provinces--which unlike the TAR do not require special
permits of foreigners for entry--varied during the post-March
10 period. [See 2008 Annual Report, Section II--Freedom of
Expression--Restrictions Bolster Image of Party and
Government.] The Dalai Lama stated in a May 25 interview that
the most important gesture he would like to see from the
Chinese government would be to permit international journalists
to travel to the Tibetan areas of China to ``look, investigate,
so the picture becomes clear.'' \191\
Long-term Implications of the Tibetan Protests
Chinese government decisions guiding recovery from the wave
of protests (and rioting) could alter the outlook for the
Tibetan culture, religion, language, and heritage. Continuing
with the current mix of policy, law, and implementation, and
waiting for the Dalai Lama to pass away so that Chinese
officials can supervise the installation of a Dalai Lama whom
Tibetans are unlikely to accept, could result in heightened
risks to local and regional security for decades to come.
A Chinese government decision to fulfill the Constitution's
guarantees of the freedoms of speech, religion, and
association; to ensure that laws and regulations on regional
ethnic autonomy deliver to Tibetans the right to ``administer
their internal affairs''; and to engage the Dalai Lama in
substantive dialogue on the Tibet issue, can result in a
durable and mutually beneficial outcome for Chinese and
Tibetans.
Tibetan Political Imprisonment: No News of Early Release, Sentence
Reduction
The Commission is not aware of any reports of Tibetan
political prisoners to whom Chinese authorities granted a
sentence reduction or an early release from imprisonment during
the past year. The Dui Hua Foundation noted in a June 17, 2008,
report that it had not seen any such developments recently, and
that cases involving the charge of splittism\192\ are being
``strictly handled.'' \193\ Officials rarely grant clemency to
Tibetan or Uyghur political prisoners, who are typically
charged with splittism, Dui Hua said.\194\
The Commission is not aware of new developments in the
cases of Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso\195\ (detained in 1996 and
serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets,
distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans
in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub\196\ (sentenced in 2000 to
life imprisonment for printing leaflets); reincarnated lama
Bangri Chogtrul\197\ (detained in 1999 and serving a sentence
of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting
splittism''); or nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced in November
2007 to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at
a public festival).
Addendum: List of Tibetan Protest Sites, County-level Areas
County-level areas and cities where peaceful Tibetan
protests (and in some cases, riots) reportedly took place from
March 10, 2008, through the end of April. Multiple protests
took place in several counties.
Beijing municipality (1)
Beijing municipality (1): Beijing city.
Tibet Autonomous Region (17)
Lhasa municipality (7): Lasa (Lhasa) city,
Linzhou (Lhundrub) county, Dangxiong (Damshung) county,
Qushui (Chushur) county, Duilongdeqing (Toelung Dechen)
county, Dazi (Tagtse) county, Mozhugongka (Maldro
Gongkar) county.
Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture (4): Jiangda
(Jomda) county, Gongjue (Gonjo) county, Basu (Pashoe)
county, Mangkang (Markham) county.
Shannan (Lhoka) prefecture (1): Zhanang
(Dranang) county.
Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture (2): Rikaze city,
Sajia (Sakya) county.
Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture (2): Naqu county, Suo
(Sog) county.
Ali (Ngari) prefecture (1): Ritu (Ruthog)
county.
Qinghai province (13)
Xining municipality (1): Xining city.
Haidong prefecture (1): Hualong Hui Autonomous
County.
Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
(TAP) (3): Tongren (Rebgong) county, Jianzha (Chentsa)
county, Zeku (Tsekhog) county, Henan (Yulgan) Mongol
Autonomous county.
Hainan TAP (4): Gonghe (Chabcha) county,
Tongde (Gepasumdo) county, Xinghai (Tsigorthang)
county, Guinan (Mangra) county.
Guoluo (Golog) TAP (3): Banma (Pema) county,
Dari (Darlag) county, Jiuzhi (Chigdril) county.
Yushu (Yulshul) TAP (1): Yushu (Kyegudo)
county.
Gansu province (7)
Lanzhou municipality (1): Lanzhou city.
Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (6): Hezuo (Tsoe) city,
Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Luqu (Luchu) county, Maqu
(Machu) county, Diebu (Thewo) county, Zhuoni (Chone)
county.
Sichuan province (17)
Chengdu municipality (1): Chengdu city.
Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture (5): Ma'erkang (Barkham) county, Songpan
(Zungchu) county, Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) county, Aba
county, Rangtang (Dzamthang) county.
Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (11): Kangding (Dartsedo)
county, Daocheng (Dabpa) county, Yajiang (Nyagchukha)
county, Litang (Lithang) county, Xinlong (Nyagrong)
county, Daofu (Tawu) county, Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi county, Dege county, Shiqu (Sershul) county, Seda
(Serthar) county.
Addendum
THE JUNE 2008 GANZI MEASURES: DEALING STRICTLY WITH TROUBLEMAKING
MONKS, NUNS, AND MONASTERIES
The government of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), located in Sichuan province, issued with
immediate effect on June 28, 2008, the ``Measures for Dealing
Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and Individual Monks and
Nuns'' (Ganzi Measures).\198\ The Ganzi Measures are divided
into three groups: Articles 1 to 4 deal with ``monk and nun
troublemakers''; Articles 5 to 9 address ``troublemaking
monasteries''; Articles 10 to 12 seek to punish management
officials of monasteries and nunneries who failed to ``fulfill
their responsibilities.''
Based on Commission staff analysis, some punishments do not
appear to have a clear basis in national legal measures that
establish central government regulatory power over religious
activity in China. Three examples are:
The punitive demolition of lawfully
constructed monastic residences;
The punitive reduction of the number of
lawfully registered monks or nuns entitled to reside at
a monastery or nunnery; and
The punitive removal from a reincarnated
Tibetan Buddhist teacher of his religious position and
function.
MONKS AND NUNS: REEDUCATION, CRIMINAL CHARGES, EXPULSION
Articles 1 to 4 divide punishment for monks and nuns into
four levels of severity. Determinants include official
assessment of whether an alleged offense is ``minor'' or
``serious,'' whether or not a monk or nun is cooperative and
provides a written statement of guilt, and whether a monk or
nun is ``stubborn.''
Articles 1 to 3 impose ``reeducation.'' Article 1 applies
the least level of punishment and allows a monk or nun to
undergo reeducation in a family household if the head of
household serves as guarantor that the monk or nun will remain
inside the house and ``strictly follow reeducation.'' Articles
2 and 3 require that reeducation take place ``in custody,'' but
the measures do not specify the type of facility in which the
monk or nun will be confined while under custody.
Article 4 provides for punishment ``according to law'' for
activities such as ``instigating splittism and disturbances''
(e.g., prosecution in a court on charges such as Article 103 of
China's Criminal Law (inciting ``splittism''), or Article 293
(``creating disturbances'')). Other activities punishable by
law are ``hatching conspiracies,'' ``forming organizations,''
and ``taking a leading role.''
Articles 3 and 4 include expulsion of a monk or nun from a
monastery or nunnery and permanent revocation of official
status as a monk or nun.
MONASTERIES AND NUNNERIES: SHRINKING SOME, CLOSING OTHERS
Articles 5 to 9 describe ``cleansing and rectification'' of
monasteries and nunneries, a process that penalizes the
institution of Tibetan Buddhism.
Article 5 provides rectification for monasteries and
nunneries where 10 percent to 30 percent of monks and nuns
participated in ``disturbances.'' The monastery or nunnery will
be sealed off, searched, religious activity suspended, and
``suspect persons detained according to law.''
Article 6 provides for rectification of Democratic
Management Committees (DMCs) at monasteries and nunneries where
DMC members ``participated in disturbances.'' Local government
officials may take over the management of a monastery or
nunnery if they deem ``suitable personnel'' to be unavailable.
Normal management functions of monasteries and nunneries will
be suspended while a DMC undergoes rectification.
Article 7 provides for expelling monks and nuns from
monasteries and nunneries and annulling their official status
as ``religious practitioners'' if they do not ``assist''
officials conducting rectification, refuse to be photographed
and registered, leave a monastery or nunnery without
permission, or fail to ``correct themselves'' during
reeducation.
Article 7 provides for the demolition of monastic
residences that were occupied by monks or nuns that officials
expel. (The Commission is not aware of a national or provincial
legal measure that provides for the demolition of monastic
residences as punishment for offenses such as those listed in
Article 7. Based on information available to the Commission,
monasteries and nunneries apply for and receive permission from
local government officials to renovate or construct monastic
residences.\199\ The Ganzi Measures do not make clear whether
the residences of monks and nuns expelled under Articles 3 and
4 will also be demolished.)
Article 8 requires re-registration of all monks and nuns
resident at monasteries and nunneries involved in
``disturbances.''
Article 8 reduces the total number of monks and nuns
permitted to reside at monasteries and nunneries involved in
``disturbances'' by the number of monks or nuns who are
expelled from each monastery or nunnery. (Once officials reduce
the number of monks and nuns permitted to reside at a monastery
or nunnery, restoring the number of monks and nuns to its
previous level would require coordination between a monastery
or nunnery's Democratic Management Committee,\200\ a state-
controlled Buddhist association, and the local
government.\201\)
Article 9 provides for the investigation, loss of status as
a ``registered religious institution,'' and closure of a
monastery or nunnery if officials determine that a DMC does not
improve after rectification, or if monks or nuns ``go out again
and make trouble.'' (Once a monastery or nunnery is de-
registered and closed, provisions of the Regulation on
Religious Affairs would require provincial-level approval
before the monastery or nunnery could be re-established.\202\)
MONASTIC OFFICIALS, TEACHERS, AND TRULKUS: PUBLIC HUMILIATION, LOSS OF
POSITION
Articles 10 to 12 punish members of a monastery or
nunnery's DMC that do not maintain control of monks and nuns
and ``take a clear stand on the issue'' (e.g., uphold
government and Party policy). All three measures refer to DMC
officials including monks, khenpos (abbots), geshes (teachers
who have attained the most advanced degree of monastic
education), and trulkus (teachers that Tibetan Buddhists
believe are reincarnated).
Article 10 provides for ``careful scrutiny'' of mistakes,
criticism, and reeducation of DMC members that were ``not
directly involved in disturbances,'' but that failed to ``take
a clear stand on the issue,'' investigate and discipline monks
and nuns that protested, or that were ``lax'' or deemed to have
committed ``instances of poor management.''
Article 11 provides for television and newspaper coverage
of ``detailed examination'' of DMC members before a monastic
assembly if DMC members are ``two-faced'' or fail to ``make
their attitude clear.'' Such DMC members must submit a
``written guarantee'' (presumably of correct behavior) at the
publicized event.
Article 12 provides for punishment under China's Criminal
Law as well as loss of government, consultative, and religious
positions for DMC members that ``collude with foreign
separatists'' (a probable reference to the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan Buddhist monastic community in other countries),
``assist'' protests, ``tolerate'' protests, or ``incite''
others to protest. Officials will strip trulkus accused of such
behavior of ``the right to hold the incarnation lineage.'' (The
Commission is not aware of a legal basis in China's national
regulations on religion for stripping a trulku of ``the right''
to be a trulku. The 2007 Management Measures for the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (MMR)
provide detailed regulation of the process of identifying,
seating, and educating a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist
teacher--including regulation of whether or not a reincarnated
teacher is entitled to reincarnate once again.\203\ The MMR
does not, however, provide a process whereby the state may
``strip'' a trulku of his religious position and function.)
Endnotes
\1\ ``China Detains Tibetan Monks Protesting on Key Anniversary,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 March 08.
\2\ See The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace, Hearing of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written
Statement Submitted by Steven Marshall, Senior Advisor, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China. See also, ``Protests Fueled by Patriotic
Education Continue Amidst Lockdowns,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Online), 10 April 08.
\3\ Intermittent armed conflict between Tibetans and the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) took place at various times and locations
following establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1,
1949, and continued through the 1950s as the PLA cemented political
control in ethnic Tibetan areas that today comprise the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs),
and 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TACs) located in Qinghai, Gansu,
Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.
\4\ The past 25 years (since approximately 1983) in the Tibetan
areas of China have been characterized by factors including the Tibetan
rebuilding of the Tibetan Buddhist monastic institution and the
resumption of Tibetan Buddhism as a central (though constrained)
feature in the lives of most Tibetans. See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) (Online), ``Human Rights Situation
in Tibet: Annual Report 2005,'' 118. TCHRD notes in note 72 that the
period from 1983 to 1987 ``was one of rapid growth for monasteries and
nunneries.'' Tibet Information Network, ``News Review No. 26: Reports
From Tibet, 1997,'' April 1998, 4. The news summary notes, ``Until 1983
some 70 monks at Drepung monastery were married men with families.''
\5\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, Section IV. ``Tibet:
Special Focus for 2007'' provides an overview of Commission Annual
Report coverage since 2002 of key Tibetan issues.
\6\ The 12 county-level areas are: Lhasa city, Duilongdeqing
(Toelung Dechen), Linzhou (Lhundrub), and Dazi (Tagtse) counties,
located in Lhasa municipality in the TAR; Aba (Ngaba) and Ruo'ergai
(Dzoege) counties, located in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture in Sichuan province; and Xiahe (Sangchu), Maqu (Machu), Luqu
(Luchu), Zhuoni (Chone), and Diebu (Thewo) counties, and Hezuo (Tsoe)
city, located in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP in Gansu province. ``Judgments
Pronounced Publicly on Some Defendants Involved in Lhasa's `14 March'
Incident,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source Center, 30 April 08). The
Xinhua article refers to five monks sentenced for rioting in Dechen
township of Duilongdeqing county. ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou
County Surrender Themselves to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, 19 March 08
(Open Source Center, 19 March 08). The Tibet Daily article reports the
surrender of persons allegedly involved in ``serious incidents of
beating, smashing, looting, and burning'' in Linzhou county. ``Tibet
Issues Arrest Warrants for 16 Suspects In Riot,'' Xinhua (Online), 5
April 08. According to the April article in Xinhua, the 16 suspects
allegedly took part in a March 15 riot in Dechen township, located in
Dazi county. ``Police: Four Rioters Wounded Sunday in Aba of SW
China,'' Xinhua (Online), 20 March 08. The Xinhua article from March
reports Tibetan rioting in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. Security forces reportedly
shot and wounded four Tibetans. (The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy reported on March 18 that security forces shot and killed
at least 18 Tibetans.) ``Lies Cannot Conceal Evil Nature,'' Sichuan
Daily, 10 April 08 (Open Source Center, 16 April 08). The Sichuan Daily
article alleges that on March 15, Lhamo Kirti (Tagtsang Lhamo)
Monastery monks attacked government offices, police stations, and
shops. Similar incidents reportedly took place elsewhere in Ruo'ergai.
``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua (Online), 9
April 08. According to this Xinhua article: ``From March 14 to 19,
assaults, vandalism, looting and arson occurred in the Xiahe, Maqu,
Luqu, Jone, Hezuo and Diebu areas of Gannan . . . .''
\7\ ``Protests Fueled by Patriotic Education Continue Amidst
Lockdowns,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 10
April 08.
\8\ ``Dalai-Backed Violence Scars Lhasa,'' Xinhua (Online), 15
March 08; ``China Clamps Down on Tibetan Protests As Many Deaths,
Injuries Reported,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 March 08; Jim
Yardley, ``Chinese Police Clash With Tibet Protesters,'' New York Times
(Online), 15 March 08.
\9\ ``Police, Officials Hurt in Sichuan Riots,'' Xinhua (Online),
20 March 08; ``Violence, Protests Spread From Tibet to Western China,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 08; Benjamin Kang Lim and Chris
Buckley, ``Tibetan Riots Spread, Security Lockdown in Lhasa,'' Reuters
(Online), 16 March 08.
\10\ ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua;
TibetInfoNet (Online), `` `The World Will Not Look Away.'
Demonstrations in Amdo Machu and Region,'' 17 March 08.
\11\ Jill Drew, ``Tibet Protests Turn Violent, Shops Burn in
Lhasa,'' Washington Post (Online), 14 March 08. According to the
report, ``The confrontations, initially led by monks, were joined
Friday by hundreds of Tibetan civilians, who began attacking shops
owned by ethnic Han and Hui Chinese. Street fights between Tibetans and
Chinese continued into the night, according to reports from the
region.'' International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 54. The report quotes an eyewitness description of activity
on March 14 near Ramoche Temple in Lhasa: ``Then they poured into
Tromsikhang [the market at the corner of Barkhor Street] from Ramoche
Temple. On the way, many shops owned by Chinese and Chinese Muslims
(Hui) were destroyed.''
\12\ ``Number of Rioters Surrendering to Police Tops 280 in
Lhasa,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 March 08 (``Rioters [in Lhasa] . . .
attacked schools, banks, hospitals, shops, government offices,
utilities and state media offices. Damage is estimated at more than 244
million yuan (34.4 million U.S. dollars).''); ``More Than 200 Injured,
Shops Set Alight in Aba Riot,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily
(Online), 3 April 08 (``More than 200 people were injured and 24 shops
and 81 vehicles were set alight in the March 16 riot in the Aba Tibetan
and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of southwestern China, an official said
Thursday.''); ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua
(``From March 14 to 19, assaults, vandalism, looting and arson occurred
in the Xiahe, Maqu, Luqu, Jone, Hezuo and Diebu areas of Gannan,
leaving 94 people injured and incurring 230 million yuan (32.8 million
U.S. dollars) in damages.'')
\13\ See, e.g., Jim Yardley, ``Tibetans Clash With Chinese Police
in 2nd City,'' New York Times (Online), 16 March 08. The New York Times
reported that according to a Tibetan in India who spoke by phone to
Tibetan protesters in Xiahe county, Gansu province, thousands of
protesters on March 16 shouted slogans including, ``The Dalai Lama must
return to Tibet.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Scores of Tibetans Arrested for Peaceful Protest in
Lhasa,'' 11 March 08. On March 10 in Guinan (Mangra) county, Qinghai
province, a few hundred protesters shouted slogans calling for the
Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Around 40 Middle School Students Arrested in
Marthang,'' 17 March 08. Approximately 100 Tibetan middle school
students in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang) county, Sichuan province,
demonstrated inside the school compound, calling for the return of the
Dalai Lama to Tibet.
\14\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango
County,'' 25 March 08. More than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, shouted slogans on March 25 including,
``Release [the] Panchen Lama.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Hundreds of Tibetans Protested in Chentsa, Malho
`TAP,' Qinghai Province,'' 25 March 08. Hundreds of Tibetans protesting
on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai
province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and
shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh Panchen Lama Erdeni
Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 March 08. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\15\ See, e.g., ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times (Online),
last visited on 18 June 08. The Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful
demonstration, demanding the freedom for religious belief.'' In another
protest, several hundred Labrang Tashikhyil monks and ordinary citizens
staged a protest march on March 14 and shouted slogans including,
``Return us to religion freedom.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``China Detains Drakar and Gaden Choeling Nuns in
Kardze,'' 17 May 08. Two nuns were detained for calling for religious
freedom, among other things. The detentions sparked a larger protest
resulting in the detention of at least 10 more nuns. ``Tibet Monks
Disrupt Tour by Journalists,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York
Times (Online), 27 March 08. On March 27, a group of Jokhang Temple
monks shouted that there was no religious freedom when a group of
international journalists on a government-handled tour visited the
temple.
\16\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Climate of Fear
as Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa,'' 20 June 08. According to ICT, of
125 ``separate incidents of dissent'' that the organization documented,
``47 have been carried out by monks, 44 by laypeople, and 28 by both
monks and laypeople.''
\17\ The Dalai Lama is the foremost religious teacher of the Gelug
tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, whose adherents at present are more
numerous than those of other traditions of Tibetan Buddhism such as the
Nyingma, Kargyu, and Sakya. The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to
Peace, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written
Statement Submitted by John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State.
Deputy Secretary Negroponte described the Dalai Lama as ``the
undisputed spiritual leader of the Tibetan people,'' and ``the
spiritual leader of the vast majority of Tibetans.''
\18\ See, for example, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Mobile Phone Pictures Depict Intensity of
Demonstration in Amdo Labrang,'' 14 March 08. A protest demonstration
by Labrang Tashikhyil monks ``eventually grew into thousands when
laypeople also joined in.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in Tongkor Monastery in
Kardze,'' 5 April 08. Approximately 300 Tongkor Monastery monks
marching in protest toward government offices were ``later joined by
hundreds of laypeople.'' ``Tibetans Wounded in Sichuan Protest,'' Radio
Free Asia (Online), 5 April 08. ``Local people'' joined protesting
monks from Nyatso Monastery (referred to as ``Mintso'' in the article),
increasing the crowd to about 1,000 persons.
\19\ ``Door of Dialogue Still Opens to Dalai: Premier,'' Xinhua
(Online), 18 March 08. ``There are ample facts and plenty of evidence
to prove that the riot in Lhasa was organized, premeditated,
masterminded and incited by the Dalai Lama clique, said Wen.''
\20\ ``Hao Peng: Patriotic Education Should Be Reinforced Among
Buddhist Monks at Monasteries,'' China Tibet News, 5 April 08 (Open
Source Center, 10 April 08). Speaking to the Tashilhunpo Monastery
Democratic Management Committee, Deputy Party Secretary Hao Peng called
on the committee to ``educate the masses of monks so that they can see
clearly the true colors of Dalai and recognize that Dalai has not been
a Buddhist monk since a long time ago but a politician that engages
himself in the evil deeds of separating the motherland by means of
beating, smashing, looting, and burning under the disguise of a lama
and under the signboard of Buddhism . . . .''
\21\ Significant factors were Zhang Qingli's arrival in the TAR as
Acting Party Secretary in November 2005, his promotion to TAR Party
Secretary in May 2006, the TAR government Standing Committee's issuance
of the TAR Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on Religious
Affairs'' in September 2006, and the State Administration for Religious
Affairs issuance in July 2007 of the Measures on the Management of the
Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. ``Zhang Qingli
Becomes New Party Chief of Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 May 07;
``Xinjiang Communist Party Official Promoted to Acting Secretary of the
Tibet Autonomous Region,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 19; Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures
for the ``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Zizang
zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)] [hereinafter
TAR 2006 Measures], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07;
State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management
of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan
fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07, effective 1
September 07.
\22\ For example, ``Chinese Foreign Ministry Says: We Hope the
Dalai Will Treasure the Opportunity of Consultation, and Stop his
Separatist and Sabotage Activities,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source
Center, 29 April 08). Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Jiang Yu
said on April 29, ``We hope the Dalai will treasure the opportunity of
consultation, stop his violent and criminal activities with concrete
actions, stop his activities to interrupt and sabotage the Beijing
Olympic Games, and stop his activities to split the motherland so as to
create conditions for the next consultation.''
\23\ ``Dalai Lama, Wolf in Human Shape,'' China Tibet News, 21
March 08 (Open Source Center, 24 March 08).
\24\ ``Unifying the Masses' Hearts and Will To Fight a People's War
Against Separatism and To Maintain Stability: The Tibet Autonomous
Region Holds a Video/Telephone Conference on Handling the `3.14
Incident' and Maintaining the Region's Stability; Zhang Qingli Gives
Important Speech,'' China Tibet News, 19 March 08 (Open Source Center,
19 March 08).
\25\ ``State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu
Heads Central Work Team on Tibet Inspection,'' China Tibet News, 25
March 08 (Open Source Center, 25 March 08). Meng Jianzhu said, ``[W]e
must continue to deepen education in patriotism in the monasteries and
temples, and unfold in depth there propaganda and education in the
ethnic and religious policies and the legal system . . . .'' ``Hongyuan
Begins `Maintaining Stable Thinking Among the Masses' Educational
Campaign,'' Sichuan News, 27 March 08 (Open Source Center, 27 March
08). OSC summary: officials in Hongyuan County began a campaign to show
herdsmen and local farmers the ``truth'' of the March 14 events in
Lhasa. ``Qiang Wei Stresses the Importance of Resolutely and
Unswervingly Struggling Against Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and
Promoting Unity,'' Qinghai Daily, 29 March 08 (Open Source Center, 1
April 08) (``We should continuously step up the education campaign and
extensively reveal the true features of the Dalai clique in separating
the motherland and sabotaging national unity. We should carry on legal
system education with a great fanfare. We should make more efforts in
providing public opinion guidance.''); Jill Drew, ``In Tibetan
Monasteries, the Heavy Hand of the Party,'' Washington Post (Online), 6
April 08 (``After widespread protests swept the Tibetan plateau last
month, Chinese leaders responded with a combination of arrests,
interrogations and vigorous education campaigns.''); Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar
Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education'
Campaign,'' 31 May 08 (``The stipulated two-months' renewed ``Patriotic
re-education'' campaign launched at the beginning of April following
unprecedented protests across Tibetan plateau since 10 March, not only
permeates the monastic institutions but also government employees,
security forces, farmers, nomads, private entrepreneurs and educational
institutions.'').
\26\ See, for example, Woeser (Oezer), ``Woeser: Tibet Update (May
1-6, 2008),'' China Digital Times (Online), last visited 4 June 08.
April 30, Gonsar Monastery, Dege county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan
province: ``[T]he work team force the monks to sign their names in the
official document entitled ``Expose and Criticize the Dalai Separatist
Clique'', and also demanded each monk to hand in two photos to paste on
the document.'' Woeser, ``Tibet Update (2),'' China Digital Times
(Online), last visited 12 June 08. April 12, Ganzi TAP: officials told
``religious leaders and other figures'' attending ``emergency
meetings'' in Ganzi's 18 counties to sign documents ``opposing the
Dalai Lama.''
\27\ See, for example, ``Personalities From All Walks of Life in
Qinghai Province Strongly Condemn Lhasa Violent Crime Incident,''
Qinghai Daily, 1 April 08 (Open Source Center, 7 April 08). ``Cadre
conferences, meetings of villagers, seminars of non-Party personages,
and seminars of religious figures have been convened in various
locations in our province in recent days, to continue to expose and
criticize the Dalai Lama clique's reactionary nature and its monstrous
crimes which disrupt stability in Tibet.'' ``Update for Friday, 4 April
08,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 4 April 08. April 2,
Bathang Choede Monastery, Batang (Bathang) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP,
Sichuan province: officials pressured 200 monks to sign a statement
alleging that the Dalai Lama ``was responsible for inciting the recent
demonstrations in Tibet.'' The monks refused to sign the document,
resulting in an argument with officials that led to the detention of
five monks, including abbot Jigme Dorje and disciplinarian Yeshe.
\28\ ``China Publishes Evidences of Dalai Clique's Masterminding of
Riots,'' Xinhua (Online), 1 April 08. ``Solid facts showed that the
unrest in Lhasa, the capital of southwest China's Tibet Autonomous
Region, was organized, premeditated, masterminded and instigated by the
Dalai clique and its `Tibet independence' forces.'' ``Subsequently, the
`Tibet independence' forces in the United States proposed the idea of
the `Tibetan People's Uprising Movement.' Senior officials of the Dalai
clique studied and approved the plan. They believed that 2008 would be
their last chance to achieve `Tibet independence' and decided to use
the `favorable opportunity' before the Olympics to stage sabotage
activities in the Tibetan-inhabited areas in China.''
\29\ Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (Online), ``Press Release:
Launch of the Tibetan People's Uprising Movement,'' 4 January 08. TPUM
was established in January 2008 as ``a new coordinated Tibetan
resistance effort in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.'' The
alliance consists of five Tibetan organizations: the TYC, the Tibetan
Women's Association, the Gu Chu Sum Movement of Tibet (an organization
established by former Tibetan political prisoners), the National
Democratic Party of Tibet, and the India chapter of Students for a Free
Tibet. TYC President Tsewang Rigzin described TPUM as ``a unified
movement to bring about an end to Chinese rule in Tibet.''
\30\ Tibetan Youth Congress (Online), ``About Us,'' last visited 3
June 08. The TYC was established in October 1970. Among the four
``tasks'' assigned to TYC members are, ``To dedicate oneself to the
task of serving one's country and people under the guidance of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Spiritual and Temporal Ruler of Tibet,''
and, ``To struggle for the total independence of Tibet even at the cost
of one's life.'' (The TYC does not, however, accept the Dalai Lama's
guidance on seeking ``genuine autonomy'' for ``Tibet'' under Chinese
sovereignty, nor does the TYC expressly disavow the use of violence in
the campaign for independence.)
\31\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``His
Holiness's Middle Way Approach For Resolving the Issue of Tibet,'' last
visited 3 June 08.
\32\ Tibetan People's Uprising Movement (Online), ``Background,''
last visited 16 September 08.
\33\ ``China Publishes Evidences of Dalai Clique's Masterminding of
Riots,'' Xinhua. ``To implement the `Tibetan People's Uprising
Movement,' the `Tibetan Youth Congress' and other `Tibet independence'
organizations held two training classes on how to carry out violent,
terrorist activities.''
\34\ The English language version of the Xinhua report attributed
the monks' actions to ``the Dalai Lama.'' The Chinese language version,
however, attributed the monks' actions to ``the Dalai clique.''
Substituting ``Dalai Lama'' in the English language version for ``Dalai
clique'' in the original Chinese version indicates the level of state-
run media interest in associating nominally ``terrorist'' events with
the Dalai Lama, especially in international (English) reporting,
whether or not there is a factual basis for doing so. ``Police in Tibet
Arrest 16 Monks as Bombing Suspects,'' Xinhua (Online), 5 June 08;
``Individual Monks in Changdu Area Carried Out Bombings To Echo the `14
March' Incident. Public Security Organs in Tibet Cracked Three Cases in
a Row and Daunted the `Tibet Independence' Forces,'' Xinhua, 5 June 08
(Open Source Center, 6 June 08).
\35\ ``Tibetans Jailed For Blasts,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 2
October 08. According to the article, the court sentenced four Oezer
(Oser) Monastery monks and a total of five monks from Gonsar Monastery
and Khenpa Lung Monastery to imprisonment for involvement in setting
off a series of small explosions in Mangkang (Markham) county. An
official told RFA that the blasts caused no casualties and minimal
damage to government property.
\36\ Terry Friel, ``Dalai Lama Rejects Tibetan Buddhist Praise of
China,'' Reuters (Online), 29 December 05.
\37\ ``Think Like a Mosquito--Lhasang,'' Phayul (Online), 25
February 07; Tibetan Youth Congress (Online), ``Lhasang Tsering''
[short bio], last visited 2 August 07. Lhasang Tsering served as TYC
President from 1986 to 1990.
\38\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08.
\39\ Ibid. On the Olympics, the Dalai Lama said, ``I have from the
very beginning supported the holding of these Games in Beijing. My
position on this remains unchanged. I feel the Tibetans should not
cause any hindrance to the Games.''
\40\ Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, U.S.
Department of State, Report on Tibet Negotiations, April 2008. The
Report is mandated by Section 611 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, 2003.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ H.R. Con. Res. 196, 110th Cong. (2007) (``Authorizing the use
of the Rotunda and grounds of the Capitol for a ceremony to award the
Congressional Gold Medal to Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama.'') The House Concurrent Resolution provided for the award
ceremony to take place in the Capitol Rotunda, and for the Capitol
grounds to be available for a public event sponsored by the
International Campaign for Tibet.
\44\ S. 2784, Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act,
The Library of Congress (Online), enacted 27 September 06;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``U.S. Congress Passes Bill
To Award the Dalai Lama the Congressional Gold Medal: Bill Cosponsored
by 387 Members of U.S. House and Senate,'' 13 September 06. The bill
was introduced as S. 2782 by Senators Dianne Feinstein and Craig
Thomas, and as H.R. 4562 by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Tom
Lantos.
\45\ ``Dalai Lama's Envoys To Begin China Visit on May 3,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 4 May 08. The
report lists the six previous sessions of dialogue: September 2002,
May-June 2003, September 2004, June-July 2005, February 2006, and June-
July 2007. All of them took place in China except in 2005, when the
envoys met their counterparts in Bern, Switzerland.
\46\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 8
May 08.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Ibid.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08.
\51\ ``Full Transcript of Interview with the Dalai Lama,''
Financial Times (Online), 25 May 08. In response to the question,
``What are your priorities for these talks? '' the Dalai Lama said,
``Stop the arrests, and release [the arrested].'' To the question,
``[I]f there were one or two gestures or concrete gestures that the
Chinese could make, what would they be, to pass your test? '' the Dalai
Lama responded, ``Then stop, inside Tibet, arresting and torture. This
must stop. And then they should bring proper medical facilities. And
most important, international media should be allowed there, should go
there, and look, investigate, so the picture becomes clear.''
\52\ ``President Hu: Next Contact With Dalai Lama To Be Held at
Appropriate Time,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 May 08.
\53\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 5
July 08.
\54\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua, 6 July 08 (Open
Source Center, 7 July 08).
\55\ ``China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional
Preconditions to Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 30 July 08. The Dalai Lama has expressed support for
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; he counsels Tibetans not to engage in
violent activity; he does not lead the Tibetan Youth Congress (which
does not support the Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach); he seeks
``genuine autonomy,'' not independence. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy
said in his July 5, 2008, statement that the envoys ``categorically
rejected the Chinese attempt to label [the TYC] as a violent and
terrorist organization.''
\56\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua. ``Comrade Du
Qinglin raised in clear-cut terms a requirement of `four no support's'
for Dalai; in other words, if Dalai Lama truly wished to do something
useful for the country, the nation, and the well-being of the Tibetan
people in his remaining years, he should give an open and explicit
promise and take corresponding actions in the forms of giving no
support for activities that aimed to disturb and sabotage the Beijing
Olympic Games, giving no support for and making no attempt to conspire
and incite violent criminal activities, giving no support for and
taking earnest steps to check the violent terrorist activities of the
`Tibetan Youth Association,' and giving no support for any
[propositions] or activities that sought to achieve `Tibet
independence' and split the motherland.''
\57\ ``Beijing Holds Talks With Dalai's Representatives,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 3 July 08.
\58\ ``China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional
Preconditions to Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China. For example, Chinese government pressure on the Dalai Lama to
take action against ``propositions or activities'' in support of
Tibetan independence is important because Chinese government targets
are not limited to plans or activities that include violence--Chinese
targets include a point of view and the peaceful expression of it. Many
of the countries where Tibetans live, including India, have
constitutions that protect the freedom of speech and governments that
strive to respect that freedom.
\59\ ``The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work
Department Answers Xinhua Reporter's Questions on the Recent Contact
with Dalai Lama's Personal Representatives,'' Xinhua.
\60\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,
Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari.'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
\61\ ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times (Online), last
visited on 18 June 08. Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful
demonstration, demanding the freedom for religious belief.'' ``Ethnic
Unrest Continues in China,'' New York Times (Online), 5 April 08.
``Tibet was shaken by protests last month by Buddhist monks demanding
religious freedoms.''
\62\ Some of the protests reportedly involved hundreds or even
thousands of monks. ``The Dalai Clique's Scheme To Undermine Tibet's
Social Stability Is Doomed to Failure,'' Xinhua, 16 March 08 (Open
Source Center, 17 March 08). Reports that 300 Drepung Monastery monks
protested in Lhasa on March 10. ``Chinese Police Fire Tear-Gas at
Protesting Tibetan Monks,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 March 08.
Reports that an estimated 500-600 Sera Monastery monks protested in
Lhasa on March 11. International Campaign for Tibet (Online),
``Protests Spread Throughout Tibet: Thousands Gather in Towns and
Monasteries,'' 16 March 08. Reports that more than 1,000 Kirti
Monastery monks protested in Aba county (Aba Tibetan and Qiang
Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province) on March 16. (Rioting also
took place at the same location on the same date.)
\63\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Provisional List of Known Tibetan Arrestees--Updated on 25
April [2008].'' Of the 518 persons named on the list, 232 are monks
(none are nuns). (Chinese authorities reportedly detained a substantial
number of monks and nuns in the period following the publication date
of the TCHRD list.)
\64\ See, e.g., Jim Yardley, ``Tibetans Clash With Chinese Police
in 2nd City,'' New York Times (Online), 16 March 08. According to a
Tibetan in India who spoke by phone to Tibetan protesters in Xiahe
county, Gansu province, thousands of protesters on March 16 shouted
slogans including, ``The Dalai Lama must return to Tibet.'' Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Scores of Tibetans
Arrested for Peaceful Protest in Lhasa,'' 11 March 08. On March 10 in
Guinan (Mangra) county, Qinghai province, a few hundred protesters
shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Around 40 Middle
School Students Arrested in Marthang,'' 17 March 08. Approximately 100
Tibetan middle school students in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang)
county, Sichuan Province demonstrated inside the school compound,
calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet.
\65\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango
County,'' 25 March 08. More than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county,
Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, shouted slogans on March 25 including,
``Release [the] Panchen Lama.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy (Online), ``Hundreds of Tibetans Protested in Chentsa, Malho
`TAP,' Qinghai Province,'' 25 March 08. Hundreds of Tibetans protesting
on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai
province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and
shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh Panchen Lama Erdeni
Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,''
Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 March 08. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\66\ See, e.g., ``Tibet Update (1),'' China Digital Times. The
Drepung monks ``joined the peaceful demonstration, demanding the
freedom for religious belief.'' In another protest, several hundred
Labrang Tashikhyil monks and ordinary citizens staged a protest march
on March 14 and shouted slogans including, ``Return us to religion
freedom.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``China Detains Drakar and Gaden Choeling Nuns in Kardze,'' 17 May 08.
Two nuns were detained for calling for religious freedom, among other
things. The detentions sparked a larger protest resulting in the
detention of at least 10 more nuns. ``Tibet Monks Disrupt Tour by
Journalists,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online),
27 March 08. On March 27, a group of Jokhang Temple monks shouted that
there was no religious freedom when a group of international
journalists on a government-handled tour visited the temple.
\67\ ``A Reader for Advocating Science and Technology and Doing
Away With Superstitions'' (translated by International Campaign for
Tibet in When the Sky Fell to Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in
Tibet, 2004). ``Conducting patriotic education among the monks and nuns
in the monasteries is an important aspect of strengthening the
management of religious affairs by the government. . . . Dalai's bloc
has never stopped penetrating and engaging in splittist activities in
our region under the support of international antagonistic forces. . .
. The monks and nuns should be religious professionals who love the
country, love religion, obey the discipline, and abide by the law.''
\68\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for
Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign,'' 31 May 08;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``More Than 80 Nuns Detained
After Peaceful Protests Continue in Kham,'' 30 May 08; Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 55 Nuns of
Pang-ri Nunnery for Protesting,'' 17 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 16 Monks for Defying
`Patriotic Re-education' '' 15 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``Monks of Drepung Monastery Detained During
Patriotic Education Campaign,'' 14 April 08.
\69\ ``Chronology of Events Surrounding Recognition of 11th Panchen
Lama,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile, reprinted in World Tibet Network
News (Online), 6 August 02.
\70\ P. Jeffrey Hopkins, ``The Identification of the Eleventh
Panchen Lama,'' University of Virginia, Center for South Asian Studies
Newsletter, Fall 1995.
\71\ UN Commission on Human Rights (Online), ``Summary of Cases
Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received,'' 27 March 06, 24-25.
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief sent a request
to the Chinese government for information about Gedun Choekyi Nyima on
June 9, 2005. The Chinese government provided a response on September
7, 2005.
\72\ ``Official Urges Dalai Lama To Abandon Secessionist,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 29 July 07.
\73\ ``It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama to
Universally Identify the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,''
People's Daily, 1 December 95 (Open Source Center, 1 December 95).
\74\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Protest Erupts After Prayer for Deceased in Drango County.'' More
than 400 monks in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province,
shouted slogans on March 25 including, ``Release [the] Panchen Lama.''
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Hundreds of Tibetans
Protested in Chentsa, Malho `TAP,' Qinghai Province.'' Hundreds of
Tibetans protesting on March 22 in Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan
(Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, carried photographs of the Dalai Lama
and Panchen Lama, and shouted slogans including, ``Release the eleventh
Panchen Lama Erdeni Gedun Choekyi Nyima.'' ``Latest Updates on Tibet
Demonstrations,'' Radio Free Asia. More than 1,000 monks and other
Tibetans shouted slogans on March 18 in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, including, ``Release the Panchen Lama.''
\75\ ``List of Alternate Members of 17th CPC Central Committee,''
Xinhua (Online), 21 October 07.
\76\ ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and Socialism Cracked--
Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs Administration Director Ye
Xiaowen,'' Southern Weekend, 13 March 08 (Open Source Center, 10 April
08).
\77\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Did Tibet Become an
Independent Country after the Revolution of 1911? '' 15 November 00.
``In 1792 the twenty-nine-article Imperial Ordinance was issued. It
stipulated in explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living
Buddhas in Tibet as well as the administrative, military and foreign
affairs.'' (The edict sought to impose Qing control over religious,
administrative, military, fiscal, commercial, and foreign affairs. The
edict demanded that the Amban, ``Resident Official'' representing the
imperial court, would have equal status to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas,
and function as the supervisor of the Tibetan administration.)
\78\ ``Chinese-Installed Panchen Lama Pledges To Meet Communist
Party Expectations,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
January 2006, 3.
\79\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103 (``organize, plot or carry out the scheme of
splitting the State or undermining unity of the country''; ``incites
others to split the State or undermine unity of the country'').
\80\ Tibetan and Himalayan Digital Library (Online), ``The
Periodization of Tibetan History: General Chronology,'' last visited 18
June 08. Sonam Gyatso (1543-1588), the Third Dalai Lama, was the first
person to have the title. The first and second Dalai Lamas were
recognized posthumously.
\81\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 191-197.
\82\ The Dalai Lama is the foremost religious teacher of the Gelug
tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, whose adherents are more numerous than
those of other traditions of Tibetan Buddhism such as the Nyingma,
Kargyu, and Sakya.
\83\ Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the
``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Zizang zizhiqu
shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)] [hereinafter TAR 2006
Measures], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07.
\84\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07,
effective 1 September 07.
\85\ ``Tibet Procuratorial Organs Carry Out `Anti-Secession
Struggle' Intensively,'' Tibet Daily, 13 February 08 (Open Source
Center, 14 March 08).
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and
Individual Monks and Nuns [hereinafter Ganzi Measures], Order from the
People's Government of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, No. 2,
issued 28 June 08 with immediate effect, translated from Tibetan
language in International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``New Measures
Reveal Government Plan To Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist
Practice,'' 30 July 08.
\88\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 3, 22-23. ICT states that the actual number of protests is
certain to be higher than 125.
\89\ Ibid.
\90\ Sichuan Province Party Committee Policy Research Office,
``Improve Capacity to Resolve Minority Issues, Make Efforts to Build a
Harmonious Ganzi,'' 10 August 05. According to the Sichuan Province
Party Committee Policy Research Office, August 10, 2005 report, there
are 515 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Ganzi Prefecture and 37,916
monks and nuns, which represent 4.49 percent of the prefecture's total
population. ``Facts and Figures of Tibetan Development,'' Xinhua
(Online), 27 March 08. In comparison, there are 46,000 Tibetan Buddhist
monks and nuns in the entire TAR. CECC Staff Interview, September 2003.
According to a Chinese official, there are approximately 21,000 monks
and nuns in Qinghai province.
\91\ The current period of Tibetan political activism began on
September 27, 1987, when 21 monks from Drepung Monastery staged a
peaceful protest march in Lhasa, calling for Tibetan freedom. It was
the first Tibetan political protest in China in the post-Cultural
Revolution period that was internationally reported.
\92\ As of October 31, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database (PPD) contained records of 2,534 Tibetan political prisoners
detained or imprisoned since 1987. Of those 2,534 Tibetan political
prisoners and detainees, 543 are known or believed to be currently
detained or imprisoned. The rest are known or believed to have been
released or to have escaped or died. Of the 2,534 Tibetans who became
political prisoners or detainees since 1987, 321 of them were residents
of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), according to PPD
information. Of the 321 Tibetan residents of Ganzi TAP who became
political prisoners or detainees since 1987, 199 of them are known or
believed to be currently detained or imprisoned. Of the 199 Tibetan
residents of Ganzi TAP who are known or believed to be currently
detained or imprisoned, 179 of them have been detained during the
period beginning March 10, 2008. Due to the large number of detentions
of Tibetan protesters since March 10, 2008, and a lack of complete
information about the detentions, the PPD does not contain information
on a large number of Tibetans detained since that date.
\93\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Measures Reveal
Government Plan To Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist Practice.''
\94\ Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, translated on the Web site of China Elections
and Governance.
\95\ Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, issued 13 July 07.
\96\ Ganzi Measures, art. 7, provides for the demolition of
monastic residential quarters under certain circumstances. Ganzi
Measures, art. 9, provides for revocation of a monastery or nunnery's
registration followed by closure of the monastery or nunnery under
certain circumstances.
\97\ Ganzi Measures, art. 12, provides for stripping a trulku of
``the right to hold the incarnation lineage.''
\98\ PRC Constitution, art. 4 (``The people of all nationalities
have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written
languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.''),
arts. 112-122.
\99\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted
31 May 84, amended 28 February 01. The REAL's Preamble asserts that the
ethnic autonomy system ``reflects the state's full respect for and
guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to administer their internal
affairs'' and gives ``full play to ethnic minorities' enthusiasm for
being masters over their own affairs.''
\100\ REAL, Preamble. ``Regional ethnic autonomy reflects the
state's full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities' right to
administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of
equality, unity and common prosperity for all nationalities.''
``Regional ethnic autonomy has played an enormous role in giving
full play to ethnic minorities' enthusiasm for being masters over their
own affairs, in developing among them a socialist relationship of
equality, unity and mutual assistance, in consolidating the unification
of the country and in promoting socialist construction in the ethnic
autonomous areas and the rest of the country.''
\101\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Building of
Political Democracy in China [Zhongguo de minzhuzhengzhi jianshe], 19
October 05. ``Democratic centralism is the fundamental principle of
organization and leadership of state power in China. When democratic
centralism is practiced, it requires that we give full play to
democracy and discuss matters of concern collectively, so that people's
wishes and demands are fully expressed and reflected. Then, all the
correct opinions are pooled, and decisions are made collectively so
that the people's wishes and demands are realized and met. The practice
of democratic centralism also requires that `the majority be respected
while the minority is protected.' We are against the anarchic call for
`democracy for all,' and against anybody placing his own will above
that of the collective.''
\102\ REAL, art. 7. ``Institutions of self-government in ethnic
autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole
above all else and actively fulfill all tasks assigned by state
institutions at higher levels.''
\103\ PRC Constitution, art. 62(12), 89(15). (Only the National
People's Congress (NPC) and State Council have the constitutional
authority to approve the establishment of autonomous regions,
prefectures, and counties, and to alter their boundaries.)
\104\ REAL, art. 19. ``The people's congresses of ethnic autonomous
areas shall have the power to enact self-governing regulations and
separate regulations in the light of the political, economic and
cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the
areas concerned. . . .'' PRC Constitution, art. 116. ``People's
congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact
autonomy regulations and specific regulations in the light of the
political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or
nationalities in the areas concerned.''
\105\ PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 9. ``In the
event that no national law has been enacted in respect of a matter
enumerated in Article 8 hereof, the [NPC] and the Standing Committee
thereof have the power to make a decision to enable the State Council
to enact administrative regulations in respect of part of the matters
concerned for the time being, except where the matter relates to crime
and criminal sanctions, the deprivation of a citizen's political
rights, compulsory measure and penalty restricting the personal freedom
of a citizen, and the judicial system.''
\106\ REAL, art. 20. ``If a resolution, decision, order, or
instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit the
actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency of
the area may report for the approval of that higher level state agency
to either implement it with certain alterations or cease implementing
it altogether. . . .''
\107\ PRC Legislation Law, art. 66. ``. . . An autonomous decree or
special decree may vary the provisions of a law or administrative
regulation, provided that any such variance may not violate the basic
principles thereof, and no variance is allowed in respect of any
provision of the Constitution or the Law on Ethnic Area Autonomy and
provisions of any other law or administrative regulations which are
dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous areas.''
\108\ Andrew Martin Fischer, ``From Labour Polarisation to Urban
Employment Exclusion,'' in A Theory of Polarisation, Exclusion and
Conflict within Disempowered Development: The Case of Contemporary
Tibet in China (Thesis with London School of Economics, November 2007).
Dr. Fischer conducted fieldwork in the TAR and Qinghai, Gansu, and
Sichuan provinces.
\109\ Ibid., 30-31.
\110\ TAR Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the
Tibetan Language, adopted July 9, 1987, by the Fifth Session of the
Fourth TAR People's Congress, and amended on May 22, 2002, by the Fifth
Session of the Seventh TAR People's Congress, arts. 3-5. In 2002, the
TAR People's Congress revised the 1987 TAR Regulations on the Study,
Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language, ending the precedence of
the Tibetan language by authorizing the use of ``either or both'' of
Mandarin and Tibetan languages in most areas of government work.
\111\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2007, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 08. ``In middle and
high schools--even some officially designated as Tibetan schools--
teachers often used Tibetan only to teach classes in Tibetan language,
literature, and culture and taught all other classes in Chinese.''
\112\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 169, citing Ma
Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, ``Temporary Migrants in Lhasa in 2005,''
Section IV(4.8), Table 14. Based on a survey published by Chinese
academics Ma Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, the rate of illiteracy among
Tibetan migrants (32.3 percent) was almost 10 times higher than for Han
migrants (3.3 percent), and Han migrants were better prepared to secure
jobs that require skills learned in junior or senior middle school. Of
the migrants surveyed, Han reached junior or senior middle school at
about twice the rate of Tibetans: 53.7 percent of Han compared to 26
percent of Tibetans reached junior middle school, and 19.4 percent of
Han compared to 9 percent of Tibetans reached senior middle school.
\113\ Andrew Martin Fischer, ``Educating for Exclusion in Western
China: Structural and Institutional Foundations of Conflict in the
Tibetan Areas of Qinghai,'' CRISE Working Paper, Oxford: Centre for
Research on Inequality, Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House,
2008 (forthcoming). Dr. Fischer conducted field work in Qinghai
province.
\114\ Li Dezhu, ``Large-Scale Development of Western China and
China's Nationality Problem,'' Seeking Truth, 15 June 00 (Open Source
Center, 15 June 00). Li Dezhu (Li Dek Su) addresses the social and
ethnic implications of the program that Jiang Zemin launched in 1999.
Li states that the program is intended to ``accelerate economic and
social development of the western region and the minority nationality
regions in particular.''
\115\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Ready for Operation on July 1,''
Xinhua (Online), 29 June 06. Zhu Zhensheng, the vice director of an
office managing the railway, said that the railway startup is one year
ahead of schedule due to ``good construction, environment, and safety
conditions.''
\116\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Statistics Add to Confusion, Mask
Impact on Local Population,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2008, 4.
\117\ ``Province To Be Transport Hub,'' China Daily (Online), 23
January 08. Sichuan province Governor Jiang Jufeng and Party Secretary
Liu Qibao signed an agreement on January 10, 2008, with Minister of
Railways Liu Zhijun to include the ``Sichuan-Tibet railway'' in the
national railway network plan.
\118\ Ibid.
\119\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway To Get Six New Lines,'' China Daily
(Online), 17 August 08. ``The six new tracks include one from Lhasa to
Nyingchi [Linzhi] and one from Lhasa to Xigaze [Rikaze], both in the
Tibet autonomous region. Three tracks will originate from Golmud in
Qinghai province and run to Chengdu in Sichuan province, Dunhuang in
Gansu province, and Kuerle [Ku'erle] of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region. The sixth will link Xining, capital of Qinghai, with Zhangye in
Gansu.''
\120\ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 14; ``Government Announces Extension of Qinghai-Tibet Railway to
Rikaze,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 28
August 06.
\121\ CECC staff map analysis. A more northerly Golmud-Chengdu
route could traverse southern portions of Hainan (Tsolho) and Huangnan
(Malho) TAPs in Qinghai province and Gannan (Kanlho) TAP in Gansu
province before entering Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in
Sichuan province.
\122\ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of
China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic
Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-4. Based on official 2000
census data, Tibetans made up 91.6 percent of the Guoluo TAP population
(126,395 Tibetans among 137,940 total population) and 97.1 percent of
the Yushu TAP population (255,167 Tibetans among 262,661 total
population). In Ganzi TAP's three northernmost counties, Dege, Seda
(Serthar), and Shiqu (Sershul), Tibetans made up 96.5 percent of the
population (162,974 Tibetans among 168,928 total population). In three
of the northernmost Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture
counties--Aba, Ruo'ergai (Dzoege), and Hongyuan (Marthang, or Kakhog)--
Tibetans made up 88 percent of the population (145,706 Tibetans among
165,656 total population).
\123\ ``Tibet Plans Huge Industrial Investment,'' Xinhua (Online),
5 September 08. According to the Xinhua report: ``Industrial
development in Tibet had remained inactive for a long time and the
sector only accounted for 7.5 percent of the region's overall gross
domestic product last year, official statistics showed. The 22 projects
are expected to speed up development of other industrial fields and the
comprehensive economic growth.''
\124\ Ibid. According to the report, of the 21.17 billion yuan
total allocated to the 22 projects, ``the mining sector will absorb
15.9 billion yuan and the industrial zones will take 3.45 billion
yuan.''
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ ``Qinghai-Tibet Railway Transports 5.95 Mln Tourists,''
Xinhua (Online), 8 February 08; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 167. The 33
billion yuan construction cost was approximately US$4.12 billion in
2006.
\127\ Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `No One Has the Liberty To
Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan,
and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' 11 June 07.
\128\ For example, incidents of political protest were reported in
nomadic areas such as Banma (Pema), Jiuzhi (Chigdril), and Dari
(Darlag) counties in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province. ``Latest
Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 26 March 08. Banma county: ``After the arrival and the
subsequent tight restrictions by Chinese military forces in Pema
County, a protest was held during which the people demanded concrete
results in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. The same evening in Panchen,
Pangrue and Markhog villages, Tibetans held peaceful demonstrations.''
``Latest Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 23 March 08. Jiuzhi county: ``Around 500 monks and lay people
from Palyul village are holding a sit-down on a hill-top to demand that
Karwang Nyima Rinpoche (Dharthang Monastery head) not be harassed by
the Chinese military. The people have also demanded the United Nations,
U.S. and other countries intervene to resolve the issue.'' ``Latest
Updates on Tibet Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 22 March 08. Dari county: ``Around 200 protesters (including
many horsemen) held protests in Toema and Meyma villages.''
\129\ The current period of Tibetan political activism began on
September 27, 1987, when 21 monks from Drepung Monastery staged a
peaceful protest march in Lhasa, calling for Tibetan freedom. It was
the first Tibetan political protest in China in the post-Cultural
Revolution period that was internationally reported.
\130\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Tensions Are High as the Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa,'' 20 June
08. TCHRD reports that it ``has recorded the arrests or arbitrary
detention of more than 6,500 Tibetans.'' (The report provides no
information about whether or not, and to what extent, this figure
includes more than 4,000 Tibetans whom official Chinese news media
reported surrendered or were detained by police in connection to
alleged rioting.)
\131\ ``Latest Casualty Figures in Tibet,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 21 August 08. ``Update on Death Toll from Tibet
Demonstrations,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 26 March 08.
The report lists the first 40 names published by the TGiE of Tibetans
allegedly killed by Chinese security forces.
\132\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tensions Are
High as the Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa.''
\133\ ``Update on Tibet, 1 May 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 1 May 08. The report alleges that on March 28, Chinese
security forces cremated ``around 83 corpses'' in a crematorium in
Duilongdeqing county near Lhasa in an attempt to destroy ``evidence
related to the recent protests.'' The report described the corpses as
``dead bodies of people who have been killed since the March 14 protest
in Tibet,'' but did not disclose how the location, time, or cause of
any of the deaths was established reliably.
\134\ ``Update on Tibet Demonstration,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 16 March 08.
\135\ ``Governor Denies Use of Lethal Force in Lhasa Riot,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 17 March 08. ``Throughout
the process, [security forces] did not carry or use any destructive
weapons, but tear gas and water cannons were employed,'' Jampa Phuntsog
told reporters in Beijing.
\136\ ``Complete One-Week Update on Tibet Protests,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 18 March 08. The TGiE reports 3 Tibetans
shot and killed and 10 others shot and injured.
\137\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Middle School Student Shot Dead in Ngaba County,'' 19 March 08. ``At
least 23 people including as young as 16 years old student, Lhundup
Tso, were confirmed dead following Chinese Armed police shot many
rounds of live ammunitions into the protesters . . . .''
\138\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Monks, Nomads
Protest as Demonstrations Spread Across Entire Tibetan Plateau,'' 19
March 08. On March 16 protesters stoned government offices and burned a
police station and vehicles before 11 truckloads of security personnel
``suppressed the protests.'' ``The number of casualties was unclear,
although one source that could not be confirmed indicated there could
be as many as 19 deaths.'' ``Latest Update on Tibet Protests,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 18 March 08. In a report dated March 18,
and beneath the subheading ``18th March, 2008,'' the TGiE report
states, ``During the protest in Machu County that continued from
yesterday, People's Armed Police (PAP) shot dead nineteen peaceful
protesters this morning as confirmed by a source.'' TibetInfoNet
(Online), `` `The World Will Not Look Away.' Demonstrations in Amdo
Machu and Region,'' 19 March 08. TibetInfoNet, like the ICT report,
reported that the protest took place on March 16, resulted in
significant property destruction, and was suppressed by 11 truckloads
of security personnel. But, according to TibetInfoNet, no casualties
were reported.
\139\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``At
Least Three Tibetans Shot Dead in Kardze Protest,'' 18 March 08.
According to the report, security forces firing indiscriminately shot
and killed three Tibetans and injured 15 more when hundreds of Tibetans
gathered in the town market and shouted slogans calling for
independence and the Dalai Lama's long life.
\140\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``One
Shot Dead and Another in Critical Condition in Drango Protest,'' 24
March 08. According to the report, security officials killed one person
and critically wounded another when they fired indiscriminately on
about 200 protesters shouting slogans calling for independence and the
Dalai Lama's long life as they marched toward township offices.
\141\ ``Chinese Police Fire on Tibetan Protesters, Death Toll
Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 April 08; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in
Tongkor Monastery in Kardze,'' 5 April 08. According to TCHRD, security
forces opened fire on and killed as many as 15 Tibetans, including
monks of Tongkor Monastery. A monastic protest supported by local
villagers developed after monks refused to cooperate with officials
conducting ``patriotic education,'' and the officials responded by
detaining an elderly monk.
\142\ ``Tibetans Wounded in Sichuan Protest,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 5 April 08; ``Troops Settle Down in China's Restive
Sichuan,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 April 08. Ordinary Tibetans
joined monks of Nyatso Monastery in a peaceful procession to protest
the deaths of Tibetans killed during recent protests. Security forces
opened fire on the protesters at crossroads when officials allowed
monks to continue, but not the ordinary Tibetans, who began to chant
slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's long life and objecting to
Tibetans' lack of freedom.
\143\ ``Dalai Lama Says Will Quit if Violence Out Of Control,''
Reuters, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 18 March 08. The Dalai
Lama said, ``If things become out of control then my only option is to
completely resign. . . . Please help stop violence from Chinese side
and also from Tibetan side.''
\144\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to All Tibetans,'' 6 April 08. ``I want
to reiterate and appeal once again to Tibetans to practice non-violence
and not waver from this path, however serious the situation might be.''
\145\ For example, China's state-run media reported that security
forces in Aba county fired on and wounded four Tibetan protesters on
March 16. TCHRD reported that security forces fired on and killed at
least 23 Tibetans in the Aba protest. Xinhua characterized the incident
as a ``riot''; TCHRD described it as a ``peaceful protest.'' ``Police:
Four Rioters Wounded Sunday in Aba of SW China,'' Xinhua (Online), 20
March 08. Police fired on and wounded four rioters ``out of self
defense,'' a police official said. Tibetans ``destroyed 15 police
vehicles and more than 20 office facilities,'' according to the report.
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Middle School Student
Shot Dead in Ngaba County.'' TCHRD reports the death of ``[a]t least 23
people'' and injuries to ``scores'' of protesters during ``the peaceful
demonstration.''
\146\ State Council Information Office, ``Ministry of Public
Security Holds News Conference To Brief the Press on the Latest
Situation of Cracking Cases of 14 March Incident and Make Public the
Names of Victims,'' 1 April 08 (Open Source Center, 2 April 08); ``Baby
Burned to Death in Lhasa Riot Fire,'' China Daily (Online), 24 March
08. ``At least 18 civilians and one police officer have been confirmed
killed in the unrest in Lhasa, which also saw 382 injured.''
\147\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibet at a
Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China's New Crackdown,'' 5
August 08, 17, 54. According to the report, on March 14 in Lhasa
``Chinese shops were burnt, and Chinese people were beaten severely and
killed.'' ``Transcript: James Miles Interview on Tibet, CNN (Online),
20 March 08. Miles witnessed the March 14 Lhasa riot and told CNN,
``What I saw was calculated targeted violence against an ethnic group,
or I should say two ethnic groups, primarily ethnic Han Chinese living
in Lhasa, but also members of the Muslim Hui minority in Lhasa.''
Miles, who did not witness lethal violence, said, ``But I can do no
more really on the basis of what I saw then say there was a probability
that some ethnic Chinese were killed in this violence, and also a
probability that some Tibetans, Tibetan rioters themselves were killed
by members of the security forces.''
\148\ The largest number of political detentions of Tibetans
reported internationally as the result of a distinct sequence of
political events that took place during the period of the current
Chinese Constitution and Criminal Law, and before the cascade of
Tibetan protests that began on March 10, 2008, resulted from the Lhasa
protests of March 5 to 7, 1989. The Commission's Political Prisoner
Database contains information on fewer than 200 cases of Tibetan
political prisoners whose imprisonment may be linked to the March 1989
political events. The Tibet Information Network reported that at least
1,000 Tibetans were detained in connection with the incident. (Tibet
Information Network, ``A Struggle of Blood and Fire: The Imposition of
Martial Law in 1989 and the Lhasa Uprising in 1959,'' 25 February 99.)
\149\ The current Constitution of the People's Republic of China is
the fourth. The National People's Congress passed the current
Constitution on December 4, 1982; it was most recently amended on March
14, 2004.
\150\ The National People's Congress passed the Criminal Law on
July 1, 1979; it was most recently amended on June 29, 2006.
\151\ The figures reported below (953, 362, 2,204, 8, 432, 94, and
381) total 4,434 persons who surrendered to security officials or were
detained by them during the period March 14 to 19 in the nine county-
level areas named in the reports: Lhasa, Linzhou, Aba, Xiahe, Maqu,
Luqu, Zhuoni, Hezuo, and Diebu. ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots
Detained,'' Xinhua (Online), 9 April 08. TAR government Chairman Jampa
Phuntsog told reporters that police had detained ``953 people who were
suspected of participating in the March 14 violence in Lhasa,'' and
that another 362 persons ``delivered themselves to the law
enforcement.'' ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,''
Xinhua (Online), 9 April 08. Acting head of the Gannan TAP government
told reporters that 2,204 persons (including 519 monks) had surrendered
to police in connection with riots in the prefecture, and that police
had ``formally arrested eight people suspected of participating in the
riots and put another 432, including 170 monks, in temporary custody.''
The report said, ``From March 14 to 19, assaults, vandalism, looting
and arson occurred in the Xiahe, Maqu, Luqu, [Zhuoni], Hezuo and Diebu
areas of Gannan. . . .'' ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou County
Surrender Themselves to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China
Tibet News, 19 March 08 (Open Source Center, 19 March 08). ``Awed by
the powerful legal and policy offensives, 94 criminal suspects in
Linzhou County who were involved in serious incidents of beating,
smashing, looting, and burning surrendered themselves to justice by
2400 hours on 17 March.'' ``381 Rioters in Aba County Surrender to
Police,'' Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 25 March 08.
``A total of 381 people involved in the riots in Aba county of Sichuan
Province have surrendered themselves to the police as of Monday [March
17] noon . . . . Law enforcement authorities . . . issued a notice . .
. urging those who had taken part in the riots on March 16 to submit
themselves within ten days.''
\152\ ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots Detained,'' Xinhua; ``Media
Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua.
\153\ ``42 Rioters Sentenced to Prison,'' China Daily (Online), 21
June 08.
\154\ Ibid.
\155\ ``Officials Report Release of More Than 3,000 of the More
Than 4,400 Detained Tibetan `Rioters' '' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China (Online), 9 July 08.
\156\ ``953 Suspects in Lhasa Riots Detained,'' Xinhua (Online), 9
April 08.
\157\ ``Media Tour in Gansu Interrupted, Resumes Soon,'' Xinhua
(Online), 9 April 08.
\158\ ``94 Criminal Suspects in Linzhou County Surrender Themselves
to Justice,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News, 19 March 08
(Open Source Center, 19 March 08).
\159\ ``381 Rioters in Aba County Surrender to Police,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in People's Daily, 25 March 08.
\160\ ``42 Rioters Sentenced to Prison,'' China Daily (Online), 21
June 08.
\161\ ``Lhasa City People's Procuratorate Gives Permission To
Arrest the First Suspect Who Held Up a Reactionary Flag,'' China Tibet
News, 25 March 08 (Open Source Center, 27 March 08). At least 13 monks
of a group of 15 monks apprehended while protesting near Lhasa's
Jokhang Temple were charged with unlawful assembly. A 14th monk may
have been charged with separatism for displaying a Tibetan flag.
\162\ ``Judgments Pronounced Publicly on Some Defendants Involved
in Lhasa's `14 March' Incident,'' Xinhua, 29 April 08 (Open Source
Center, 30 April 08). ``Total jailed over Lhasa violence rises to 30,''
Xinhua (Online), 29 April 08. Three defendants were sentenced to life
imprisonment; the rest received sentences to fixed term imprisonment
ranging from 3 to 20 years. Monk Pasang, whom authorities accused of
leading a group of 10 persons (including 5 monks) in Duilongdeqing
county ``to destroy the local government office, smash or burn down 11
shops and rob their valuables, and attack policemen on duty,'' received
a life sentence. Two of the monks who ``followed'' Pasang were
sentenced to 20 years in prison; the other three received 15-year
sentences.
\163\ Ibid.
\164\ ``Tibet Confident on Security During Olympic Torch Relay,''
Xinhua (Online), 21 June 08. The article does not name the court (``the
local court'') or provide details about any of the cases.
\165\ Ibid.
\166\ ``List of Appointments and Removals by the Tibet Autonomous
Regional People's Congress Standing Committee,'' China Tibet News, 30
March 08 (Open Source Center, 30 March 08). Although it is not clear
whether or not the reshuffle was linked to the large number of protest-
and riot-related cases, all of the appointments were to the Rikaze
(Shigatse) and Shannan (Lhoka) prefectural procuratorates and courts,
the two locations most easily and quickly reached from Lhasa. It is
also possible that the transfers were part of a five-yearly reshuffle
coordinated with central government changes.
\167\ ``No Death Penalty Handed Down So Far Over Lhasa Violence,''
Xinhua (Online), 11 July 08. The report provided information based on
statements by TAR government Executive Chairman Pema Trinley (Palma
Trily, Baima Chilie).
\168\ Ibid.
\169\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Provisional
List of Known Tibetan Arrestees--Updated on 25 April 2008.''
\170\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online),
``Olympics and Tibet Under a Cloud of Repression,'' 7 August 08;
``Latest Casualty Figures in Tibet,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
\171\ ``Tibetan Monks Still Held in Qinghai,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 28 August 08. ``The remaining 57 monks from outlying areas
were said to have been taken from smaller Lhasa monasteries.'' (The
report did not specify the location of the ``outlying areas.'')
\172\ Ibid. Monks from Tibetan areas in Sichuan province (``Kham'')
``are still being held . . . in Golmud'' (Ge'ermu city, a principal
city in Qinghai, located on the Qinghai-Tibet railway). ``The number of
those still in detention [in Golmud] cannot be independently
confirmed.''
\173\ Ibid. RFA described the source of the information as ``an
authoritative source who spoke on condition of anonymity.'' (The report
did not name any of the monks and provided information of the specific
location of relatively few.)
\174\ Ibid. The source told RFA, ``On April 10 in the afternoon,
security forces detained 550 monks from Drepung monastery, took them to
the Nyethang Military School, and detained them on the school campus.''
[Nyethang (Nedang) is a township located in Qushui (Chushur) county,
adjacent to Lhasa city.] ``Then, on the night of April 14, a huge
contingent of Chinese security forces arrived at Sera monastery and
took away about 400 monks and detained them at a military prison in
Tsal Gungthang.'' [Tsal Gungthang is a township under the
administration of Lhasa city.] (Other published reports have referred
to detentions of substantial numbers of monks from Drepung and Sera
monasteries on or about those dates.)
\175\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 83. Officials had already been
intensifying the ``patriotic education'' program in Tibetan monastic
institutions since 2005.
\176\ ``In Tibetan Monasteries, the Heavy Hand of the Party,''
Washington Post (Online), 3 June 08.
\177\ ``Successfully Handling the Work of Maintaining Social
Stability in All Aspects in a Comprehensive, Deepgoing, and Down-to-
Earth Manner,'' Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News, 3 April 08
(Open Source Center, 06 April 08).
\178\ ``Lhasa's Education System Makes Constant Efforts To Deepen
Education in Patriotism,'' Xinhua, 17 July 08 (Open Source Center, 18
August 08). ``A total of 3,691 core instructors were specially assigned
and properly trained, and 1,057 lecture sessions were held in the
course of the drive, attended by 179,476 people. In addition, 219
people took to the floor to tell their story to 94,708 listeners in 193
sessions, and 265 and 718 sessions were held respectively to greet the
Beijing Olympics and denounce the criminal conduct of the Dalai
separatist clique. Furthermore, 2,533 oath-taking sessions were held
for participants to pledge themselves to safeguard the motherland's
unification, oppose ethnic separatism . . . [ellipsis as published].''
\179\ Campaigns were not limited to Party propaganda on religion,
but also included legal, economic, and historical themes emphasizing
the well-being of the Tibetan people under the Communist Party and the
Chinese government. See, e.g., ``China's Tibetan Affairs Expert Says
There Is a Need To Pay Attention to Educating Young Monks of Tibetan
Buddhism,'' Xinhua, 2 April 08 (Open Source Center, 3 April 08);
``Qiang Wei Stresses the Importance of Resolutely and Unswervingly
Struggling Against Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and Promoting
Unity,'' Qinghai Daily, 29 March 08 (Open Source Center, 1 April 08);
``While Conducting Investigation and Studies in Gannan Prefecture, Liu
Lijun Stresses Need to Effectively Carry Out in a Down-to-Earth Manner
Work on Propaganda and Education in Legal Knowledge at Monasteries of
Tibetan Buddhism,'' Gansu Daily, 4 April 08 (Open Source Center, 26
April 08).
\180\ ``Hongyuan Begins `Maintaining Stable Thinking Among the
Masses' Educational Campaign,'' Sichuan News Net, 27 March 08 (Open
Source Center, 27 March 08). OSC summarizes an article on political
education in Hongyuan (Kakhog, or Marthang) county in Aba prefecture
(where non-violent protests were reported). ``Qiang Wei Stresses the
Importance of Resolutely and Unswervingly Struggling Against
Separatism, Safeguarding Stability, and Promoting Unity,'' Qinghai
Daily. The Qinghai Party Secretary called for stepping up political
education in Huangnan (Malho) TAP (where non-violent protests were
reported). ``While Conducting Investigation and Studies in Gannan
Prefecture, Liu Lijun Stresses Need to Effectively Carry Out in a Down-
to-Earth Manner Work on Propaganda and Education in Legal Knowledge at
Monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism,'' Gansu Daily. A senior Gansu Party
official called for propaganda campaigns and tighter control of
monasteries in Gannan TAP (where non-violent protests and rioting were
reported.)
\181\ See, e.g., ``A Briefing Meeting on the Work of Safeguarding
Stability in Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Is Held in Xihai Town
on 28 March,'' Qinghai Daily, 31 March 08 (Open Source Center, 2 April
08). Senior Party officials in Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (where no protests
were reported) detailed efforts to step up political indoctrination.
\182\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
(Online), ``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for
Opposing the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign,'' 31 May 08;
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``More Than 80 Nuns Detained
After Peaceful Protests Continue in Kham,'' 30 May 08; Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 55 Nuns of
Pang-ri Nunnery for Protesting,'' 17 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Arrests 16 monks for Defying
`Patriotic Re-education,' '' 15 May 08; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``Monks of Drepung Monastery Detained During
Patriotic Education Campaign,'' 14 April 08.
\183\ ``Abbots, Lamas Refuse To Denounce Dalai Lama,'' Phayul
(Online), 30 March 08. Officials in Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP,
convened a meeting of senior Tibetan Buddhist figures from the county's
43 monasteries to launch a patriotic education campaign. The officials
said that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile had
masterminded the protests across the Tibetan area of China, and told
the monastic representatives to provide critical statements about the
protests and to launch signature campaigns criticizing the protests.
``China Steps Up Crackdown in Tibet,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 17
April 08. Officials told (apparently senior) Tibetan Buddhist monks
attending an April 12 meeting in Kangding, the capital of Ganzi TAP,
that, among other things, monks and nuns in the prefecture should
denounce the Dalai Lama as a separatist and state that the Dalai Lama
and Tibetan government-in-exile were responsible for the ``unrest'' in
Tibetan areas. RFA cited as the source a monk in India who cited monks
who attended the meeting. ``Tibet Update (3) April 15 - 27,'' China
Digital Times (Online), last visited 19 June 08. The report refers to
an emergency meeting in Ganzi TAP of the heads of all prefecture's
monasteries and of various work units. All the attendees were told to
acknowledge that the protest incidents were masterminded by the Dalai
clique.
\184\ ``Update for Friday, 4 April 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-
Exile (Online), 4 April 08. Work teams conducting patriotic education
pressured 200 monks at Bathang Choede Monastery in Batang county, Ganzi
TAP, to sign statements supporting the Chinese government position that
the Dalai Lama was responsible for inciting the Tibetan protests. All
of the monks refused. Officials detained five monks, including the
abbot. ``Updates on Tibet, 19 April 2008,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile
(Online), 19 April 08. Officials summoned villagers to meetings in
several locations in Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi TAP, and told
them to sign a statement saying that the Dalai Lama had instigated the
recent unrest. Some villagers walked out of such meetings.
\185\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Mass Detentions
of Monks, Suicides and Despair as Enforced Condemnation of Dalai Lama
Provokes Dissent,'' 29 April 08. The article provides photographic
images of defaced images of the Dalai Lama at Kirti Monastery in Aba
prefecture. ``Tibet Update (3) April 15 - 27,'' China Digital Times.
The report describes an April 17 search of Rongbo Gonchen Monastery in
Huangnan (Malho) TAP: ``Next they searched the living quarters of the
monks, confiscated the Dalai Lama's photos and DVDs. They also
arbitrarily destroy[ed] articles, and stole the monks' possessions.''
\186\ ``Chinese Police Fire on Tibetan Protesters, Death Toll
Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``At Least Eight Shot Dead in Tongkor Monastery in Kardze.''
\187\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``12 Monks of Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing
the `Patriotic Re-education' Campaign.'' ``[C]ell phones were known to
have been confiscated to curb the report of the incident from leaking
to the outside world. . . .'' ``Update on Tibet, 9 May 2008,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 9 May 08. Referring to police raid on
Ratoe Monastery, near Lhasa: ``. . . mobile phones belonging to 70
monks' were confiscated. In addition, the telephone of the monastery
was confiscated too.'' ``Tibet Update (2),'' China Digital Times
(Online), last visited 15 June 08. Referring to Tongkor Monastery in
Ganzi county: ``Each room in the monks' living quarters was searched
and all cell phones were confiscated.'' International Campaign for
Tibet (Online), ``Monks reveal concerns about Chinese allegations on
weapons caches, views on Olympics,'' 16 April 08. Referring to Tibetan
protest areas generally: ``[A]uthorities have confiscated cellphones
and computers, turned off cellular transmission facilities or cut
landlines, and interfered with internet access, according to various
reports received by ICT.'' ``2,000 Tibetans Defy Sichuan Crackdown as
China Admits Shooting,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
Referring to Lhasa: ``Another man said many people had been arrested
but it was hard to know exactly who, because the authorities had cut
off the mobile phone network.'' ``Police Seize Weapons, Ammunition in
Southwestern China Monastery,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 March 08. Referring
to objects, including weapons, seized at Kirti Monastery in Aba county:
``. . . communication facilities including satellite phones, receivers
for overseas TV channels, fax machines and computers were
confiscated.''
\188\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``12 Monks of
Dingri Shelkar Choedhe Monastery Arrested for Opposing the `Patriotic
Re-education' Campaign.'' ``[T]he monks were even known to have been
threaten[ed] with dire consequences if found `leaking' the information
to the outside world.'' ``Update on Tibet, May 31, 2008,'' Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (Online), 31 May 08. Referring to Ramoche Monastery
in Lhasa: ``[A]ll three monks . . . were again arrested by the
concerned local Chinese officials on 26 May for keeping in contact with
outsiders through phone calls. They are suspected of sharing
information with the outside world.'' Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy (Online), ``A Former Chief of Rong Gonchen Monastery in
Critical Condition,'' 18 April 08. Referring to Rongbo Gonchen
Monastery in Tongren county: ``The Chinese authorities have issued
terse warning to the monks about leaking the information to the outside
world following the severe crackdown by the Chinese authorities.''
\189\ ``Tibet To Reopen to Tourists on May 1,'' Xinhua, reprinted
in China Daily (Online), 3 April 08.
\190\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Transcript of Regular News
Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry on 12 June 2008, Moderated by
Spokesman Qin Gang,'' 12 June 08 (Open Source Center, 12 June 08).
After MFA Spokesman Qin Gang stated that the Chinese government is
``not to blame'' for the closure of Tibetan areas to journalists
following the `` `3.14' serious violent criminal incidents,'' a
journalist asked, ``Who is to blame, then? '' Qin replied, ``Do you
really have no idea? Of course, it is the Dalai clique.''
\191\ ``Full Transcript of Interview with the Dalai Lama,''
Financial Times (Online), 25 May 08. ``Then stop, inside Tibet,
arresting and torture. This must stop. And then they should bring
proper medical facilities. And most important, international media
should be allowed there, should go there, and look, investigate, so the
picture becomes clear.''
\192\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103 (``organize, plot or carry out the scheme of
splitting the State or undermining unity of the country''; ``incites
others to split the State or undermine unity of the country'').
\193\ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``Sentence Reductions for
Political Prisoners More Than Previously Thought,'' 17 June 08.
\194\ Ibid.
\195\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 112. Jigme Gyatso
was sentenced in 1996 to 15 years' imprisonment for counterrevolution.
Chinese officials told a UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
(UNWGAD) delegation in September 2004 that he was guilty of ``planning
to found an illegal organization and seeking to divide the country and
damage its unity.'' Another UNWGAD opinion on the case found that
``there is nothing to indicate that the `illegal organization' . . .
ever advocated violence, war, national, racial, or religious hatred,
and that Jigme Gyatso was ``merely exercising the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly with others in order to express opinions.''
\196\ Ibid., 111-112. Choeying Khedrub, a monk of Tsanden Monastery
in the TAR, was sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for his role in
a group of men who allegedly printed pro-independence leaflets.
According to information that the Chinese government provided to the
United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), he was
found guilty of endangering state security and ``supporting splittist
activities of the Dalai clique.'' The UNWGAD reports that the Chinese
response ``mentions no evidence in support of the charges, or if they
used violence in their activities,'' and finds that the government
``appears'' to have misused the charge of endangering state security.
\197\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 210. Bangri Chogtrul
(Jigme Tenzin Nyima), who lived as a householder in Lhasa and managed a
children's home along with his wife, was convicted of inciting
splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment in a closed court in Lhasa
in September 2000. ``Lhasa Court Commutes Life Sentence for Children's
Home Director to 19 Years,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, April 2006, 16. The sentencing document lists evidence against
Bangri Chogtrul that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a
donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business
relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in
Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. Jigme Tenzin Nyima
acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and
knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and
rejected the court's portrayal of events.
\198\ Measures for Dealing Strictly With Rebellious Monasteries and
Individual Monks and Nuns [hereinafter Ganzi Measures], Order from the
People's Government of Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, No. 2,
issued 28 June 08, translated from Tibetan language in International
Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``New Measures Reveal Government Plan To
Purge Monasteries and Restrict Buddhist Practice,'' 30 July 08.
\199\ The Commission does not have relevant information about
Sichuan province or Ganzi TAP regulations. See, however, Tibet
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on
Religious Affairs'' [hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the
Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government
on September 19, 2006, art. 16. ``To rebuild, expand, or repair venues
for religious activities, a petition for examination and approval is
made to the prefectural (city) administrative office (people's
government) religious affairs department in the locality, after
obtaining the consent of the county-level people's government religious
affairs department in the locality. . . .''
\200\ Monks or nuns who administer a monastery or nunnery form the
Democratic Management Committee (DMC). DMC members must implement Party
policies on religion and ensure that monks and nuns obey government
regulations on religious practice.
\201\ The Commission does not have relevant information about
Sichuan province or Ganzi TAP regulations. See, however, Tibet
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulation on
Religious Affairs'' [hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the
Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People's Government
on September 19, 2006, arts. 19, 29. Article 19 stipulates: ``Venues
for religious activities recruit religious personnel, and handle
procedures for their confirmation and for placing [the matter] on
record on the basis of [the venues'] ability for self-cultivation,
management ability, and the economic capacity of their religious
adherents, as well as on the basis of the relevant provisions of the
state and autonomous region.'' Article 29 states that ``religious
personnel'' may not ``engage in professional religious activities''
until their status as a religious professional is confirmed by a
``religious organization'' (a state-controlled Buddhist association)
and reported for the record to the religious affairs bureau of a local
government at county-level or above. (Based on Commission staff
analysis, a monastery or nunnery is unlikely to succeed in increasing
the number of resident monks or nuns unless the local government
endorses the increase.)
\202\ Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, translated on the Web site of China
Elections and Governance, art. 13. Government officials at the county,
prefectural, and provincial levels are involved in the approval process
for establishing a ``site for religious activity.''
\203\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 13 July 07,
arts. 3-5.