[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
XINJIANG
=======================================================================
REPRINTED
from the
2008 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio MAX BAUCUS, Montana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor
CHRISTOPHER PADILLA, Department of Commerce
DAVID KRAMER, Department of State
Douglas Grob, Staff Director
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Deputy Staff Director
Xinjiang
Findings
Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained severe, and
repression increased in the past year. Authorities
tightened repression amid preparations for the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games, limited reports of
terrorist and criminal activity, and protests among
ethnic minorities.
The Chinese government used anti-terrorism
campaigns as a pretext for enforcing repressive
security measures, especially among the ethnic Uyghur
population, including wide-scale detentions,
inspections of households, restrictions on Uyghurs'
domestic and international travel, restrictions on
peaceful protest, and increased controls over religious
activity and religious practitioners.
Anti-terrorism and anti-crime campaigns have
resulted in the imprisonment of Uyghurs for peaceful
expressions of dissent, religious practice, and other
non-violent activities.
The government also continued to strengthen
policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and
promoting assimilation. Policies in areas such as
language use, development, and migration have
disadvantaged local ethnic minority residents and have
positioned the XUAR to undergo broad cultural and
demographic shifts in coming decades.
In the past year, the Commission also observed
continuing problems in the XUAR government's treatment
of civil society groups, labor policies, population
planning practices, judicial capacity, and government
policy toward Uyghur refugees and other individuals
returned to China under the sway of China's influence
in other countries.
Recommendations
Support legislation that expands U.S. Government
resources for raising awareness of human rights
conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) and for protecting Uyghur culture.
Raise concern about conditions in the XUAR to
Chinese officials and stress that protecting the rights
of XUAR residents is a crucial step for securing true
stability in the region. Condemn the use of the global
war on terror as a pretext for suppressing human
rights. Call for the release of citizens imprisoned for
advocating ethnic minority rights or for their personal
connection to rights advocates, including: Nurmemet
Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison after
writing a short story); Abdulghani Memetemin (sentenced
in 2003 to 20 years in prison for providing information
on government repression to an overseas human rights
organization); and Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult
children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 2006
and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, for
alleged economic and ``secessionist'' crimes); and
other prisoners mentioned in this report and the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support funding for non-governmental
organizations that address human rights issues in the
XUAR to enable them to continue to gather information
on conditions in the region and develop programs to
help Uyghurs increase their capacity to defend their
rights and protect their culture, language, and
heritage.
Indicate to Chinese officials that Members of the
U.S. Congress and Administration are aware that Chinese
authorities themselves have called for improving
conditions in the XUAR judiciary. Urge officials to
take steps to address problems stemming from the lack
of personnel proficient in ethnic minority languages.
Call on rule of law programs that operate within China
to devote resources to the training of legal personnel
who are able to serve the legal needs of ethnic
minority communities within the XUAR.
Human Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
INTRODUCTION
Human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) remain severe, and repression increased in the
past year. As detailed by the Commission in past Annual
Reports,\1\ the government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a
pretext for enforcing repressive security measures and for
controlling expressions of religious and ethnic identity,
especially among the ethnic Uyghur population, within which it
alleges the presence of separatist activity. It enforces
``strike hard'' anti-crime campaigns against the government-
designated ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and
extremism to imprison Uyghurs for peaceful expressions of
dissent,
religious practice, and other non-violent activities. In the
past year, the government used these longstanding campaigns as
a springboard to increase repressive practices amid
preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports
of terrorist activity, and protests among ethnic minorities. In
the past year, the government also continued to strengthen
policies aimed at diluting Uyghur ethnic identity and promoting
assimilation. Policies in areas such as language use,
development, and migration have disadvantaged local ethnic
minority residents and have positioned the XUAR to undergo
broad cultural and demographic shifts in coming decades.
Government policy in the XUAR violates China's own laws and
contravenes China's international obligations to safeguard the
human rights of XUAR residents. The government has failed to
implement its legally stipulated ``regional ethnic autonomy''
system in a manner that provides XUAR residents with meaningful
control over their own affairs. Instead, authorities exert
central and local government control at a level antithetical to
regional autonomy. Government policies violate the basic human
rights of XUAR residents and have a disparate impact on ethnic
minorities.\2\
ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES, ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS, AND SECURITY MEASURES
The Chinese government uses anti-terrorism campaigns as a
pretext for enforcing harsh security policies in the XUAR. In
the past year the government used security preparations for the
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, reports of terrorist
activity, and protests in Tibetan areas of China and within the
XUAR as platforms for advancing repressive security measures in
the region. In spring 2008, the Chinese government claimed it
had broken up three terrorist plots to disrupt the Olympics, as
well as an attempted terrorist attack on an aircraft. As in the
past,\3\ however, the government provided scant evidence to
back up its claims and continued to enforce restrictions on
free press that hindered efforts to report on the region.\4\
During the same period, local governments implemented a series
of measures to tighten security, restrict religious activity,
and hinder citizen activism.\5\ In March 2008, authorities in
Hoten district suppressed demonstrations by Uyghurs calling for
human rights and detained protesters.\6\ The government
continued to implement repressive security measures throughout
the summer, during which time the Olympic torch passed through
the XUAR in June\7\ and as the government provided limited
reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region in
August.\8\ Measures reported by Chinese government sources or
overseas observers included wide-scale detentions, inspections
of households, restrictions on Uyghurs' domestic and
international travel, controls over Uyghur Web sites, and
increased surveillance over XUAR religious personnel, mosques,
and religious practitioners, as well as increased monitoring of
other populations.\9\ [For more information, see box titled
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics below.]
Authorities in cities outside of the XUAR also increased
controls over Uyghur residents leading up to and during the
Olympics.\10\ In the aftermath of the Olympics, XUAR chair Nur
Bekri outlined increased measures to ``strike hard'' against
perceived threats in the region, casting blame on U.S.-based
Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer and ``western hostile
forces.'' \11\ Local governments and other authorities reported
carrying out propaganda education campaigns, and in September,
XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan described plans to
launch regionwide anti-separatism education later in the
year.\12\
``Strike hard'' anti-crime campaigns in the region have
resulted in high rates of incarceration of Uyghurs in the
XUAR.\13\ Statistics from official Chinese sources indicate
that cases of endangering state security from the region
account for a significant percentage of the nationwide total,
in some years possibly comprising most of the cases in
China.\14\ In 2007, the head of the Xinjiang High People's
Court said that the region bears an ``extremely strenuous''
caseload for crimes involving endangering state security.\15\
In August 2008, Chinese media reported that XUAR courts would
``regard ensuring [state] security and social stability [as]
their primary task.'' \16\
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Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reiterated a
pledge in August 2008 to use harsh security measures to crack down
against the government-designated ``three forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism.\17\ On August 13, Wang Lequan, XUAR
Communist Party Chair, described the battle against the ``three
forces'' as a ``life or death struggle'' and pledged to ``strike hard''
against their activities. XUAR Party Committee Standing Committee
member Zhu Hailun reiterated the call to ``strike hard'' at an August
18 meeting. The announcements followed the release of limited
information on terrorist and criminal activity in the region and came
amid a series of measures that increased repression in the XUAR. The
measures build off of earlier campaigns to tighten repression in the
region, including efforts to tighten control as the Olympic torch
passed through the region in June. Reported measures implemented in the
run-up to and during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games include:
Wide-scale Detentions. Authorities have carried out wide-
scale detentions as part of security campaigns in cities throughout
the XUAR, according to a report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project.
Reported measures include ``security sweeps'' resulting in mass
detentions in the Kashgar area and Kucha county, including blanket
detentions in Kucha of young people who have been abroad; the
detention of non-resident Uyghurs in Korla city; the forced return of
Uyghur children studying religion in another province and their
detention in the XUAR for engaging in ``illegal religious
activities''; and the detention of family members or associates of
people suspected to be involved in terrorist activity.
Restrictions on Uyghurs' Domestic and International Travel.
Authorities reportedly continued to hold Uyghurs' passports over the
summer, building off of a campaign in 2007 to confiscate Muslims'
passports and prevent them from making overseas pilgrimages,
according to reports from overseas media. Authorities also coupled
restrictions on overseas travel with reported measures to limit
Uyghurs' travel within China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Controls Over Religion. XUAR officials have enforced a series
of measures that ratchet up control over religious practice in the
region, according to reports from Chinese and overseas sources.
Authorities in Yengisheher county in Kashgar district issued
accountability measures on August 5 to hold local officials
responsible for high-level surveillance of religious activity in the
region. Also in August, authorities in Peyziwat county, Kashgar
district, called for ``enhancing management'' of groups including
religious figures as part of broader government and Party measures of
``prevention'' and ``attack.'' The previous month, authorities in
Mongghulkure county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, called for
strengthening management of religious affairs; inspecting all mosques
and venues for religious activity; curbing ``illegal'' recitations of
scripture and non-government-approved pilgrimages; and
``penetrating'' groups of religious believers to understand their
ways of thinking. Authorities in Lop county, Hoten district, have
been forcing women to remove head coverings in a stated effort to
promote ``women for the new era.'' Authorities have also continued to
enforce measures to restrict observance of the Muslim holiday of
Ramadan, which, in 2008, took place in September.\18\
Controls Over Free Expression. Authorities in the XUAR
ordered some Uyghur Web sites to shut down their bulletin board
services (BBS) during the Olympics, according to Radio Free Asia. In
a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out during the Olympics,
Commission staff found that BBSs on the Web sites Diyarim, Orkhun,
and Alkuyi had been suspended. The BBS Web page on Diyarim contained
the message, ``[L]et's protect stability with full strength and
create a peaceful environment for the Olympic Games[!] Please visit
other Diyarim pages[.]'' The message on the BBS Web page on Orkhun
stated, ``Based on the requirements of the work units concerned, the
Orkhun Uyghur history Web site has been closed until August 25
because of the Olympic Games.''
Inspections of Households in Ghulja. Authorities in the
predominantly ethnic minority city of Ghulja searched homes in the
area in July in a campaign described by a Chinese official as aimed
at rooting out ``illegal activities'' and finding residents living
without proper documentation, according to Radio Free Asia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN XINJIANG
The government imposes harsh restrictions over religious
practice in the XUAR. [For detailed information, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion--China's Religious Communities--Islam.]
CONTROLS OVER FREE EXPRESSION IN XINJIANG
Authorities in the XUAR repress free speech. Authorities
have levied prison sentences on individuals for forms of
expression ranging from conducting historical research to
writing literature. [For more information on these cases, see
box titled Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in
Xinjiang below.] In August 2008, Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in
the advertising department at the Xinjiang People's Radio
Station was fired from her job and detained in apparent
connection to her writings on the Internet that were critical
of the government.\19\ The government engages in broad
censorship of political and religious materials. In 2008, the
XUAR Propaganda Bureau announced it would make ``illegal''
political and religious publications the focal point of its
campaign to ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications.'' \20\ The focus on religious and political
materials builds off of earlier campaigns to root out such
publications.\21\ Also in 2008, officials in Atush city
reported finding ``illegal'' portraits of Uyghur activist
Rebiya Kadeer and pictures with religious content.\22\ [For
more information on Rebiya Kadeer, see box titled The Chinese
Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer below.] In addition,
authorities closed some Uyghur-language Internet discussion
forums during the period of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic
Games.\23\
Central and local authorities further regulate religious
expression by controlling the contents of materials published
by the
Islamic Association of China, a Communist Party ``mass
organization'' that, along with local branches, controls Muslim
practice in China.\24\ Authorities have detained individuals
for their possession of unauthorized religious texts.\25\
LANGUAGE POLICY AND ``BILINGUAL'' EDUCATION IN XINJIANG
In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to
diminish the use of ethnic minority languages in XUAR schools
via
``bilingual'' and other educational policies that place primacy
on Mandarin, such as by eliminating ethnic minority language
instruction or relegating it solely to language arts
classes.\26\ The policies contravene provisions in Chinese law
to protect ethnic minority languages and promote their use as
regional lingua franca.\27\ According to reports from official
Chinese media, by 2006, the number of students receiving
``bilingual'' education in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within
six years.\28\ Although the long-term impact remains unclear,
sustained implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual''
education and other language policies increases the risk that
Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages are eventually
reduced to cultural relics rather than actively used languages
in the XUAR. [For more information on ``bilingual'' education,
see Addendum: ``Bilingual'' Education in Xinjiang at the end of
this section.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaking Out: Uyghurs Punished for Free Speech in Xinjiang
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed by the Commission in past Annual Reports,\29\ Chinese
authorities have detained or imprisoned ethnic Uyghurs for various
forms of peaceful expression, including non-violent dissent. Such cases
include:
Tohti Tunyaz, a Uyghur historian living in Japan whom Chinese
authorities detained in 1998 while he was visiting the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to conduct research. He received an
11-year sentence in 1999 for ``stealing state secrets'' and
``inciting splittism,'' based on a list of documents he had collected
from official sources during the course of his research, and on a
``separatist'' book he had allegedly published.\30\
Abduhelil Zunun, who received a 20-year sentence in November
2001 after translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into
the Uyghur language.\31\
Abdulghani Memetemin, a journalist sentenced to nine years'
imprisonment in 2003 after providing information on government
repression against Uyghurs to an overseas organization. Authorities
characterized this act as ``supplying state secrets to an
organization outside the country.''
Abdulla Jamal, a teacher arrested in 2005 for writing a
manuscript that authorities claimed incited separatism.\32\
Nurmemet Yasin, a writer who received a 10-year sentence in
2005 for ``inciting splittism'' after he wrote a story about a caged
bird who commits suicide rather than live without freedom.\33\
Korash Huseyin, chief editor of the journal that published
Yasin's story, who received a three-year sentence in 2005 for
``dereliction of duty.'' Huseyin's sentence expired in February 2008,
and he is presumed to have since been released from prison.\34\
Mehbube Ablesh, an employee in the advertising department at
the Xinjiang People's Radio Station, who was fired from her job in
August 2008 and detained in apparent connection to her writings on
the Internet that were critical of government policies, including
bilingual education.\35\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIVIL SOCIETY IN XINJIANG
XUAR government policy hinders the growth of civil society
in the region. Authorities have banned gatherings of private
Islam-centered social groups, which had aimed at addressing
social problems like drug use and alcoholism.\36\ Fears of
citizen activism have prompted the suppression of locally led
political movements, including demonstrations in Hoten district
in March led by women protesting repressive policies in the
region.\37\ Government policy in the XUAR also affects the work
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that aim to research
conditions in the region. In July 2007, authorities in Beijing
ordered the Beijing-based foreign NGO publication China
Development Brief to stop publishing its Chinese-language
edition and accused the English-language editor of having ties
to Xinjiang ``separatist'' groups.\38\ Though the charge of
contact with these groups may have served as a cover for other
motivations for barring the publication,\39\ that authorities
wield contact with overseas Uyghur organizations as such a
pretext presents a chilling effect on organizations that
research the XUAR.\40\ [For more information, see Section III--
Civil Society.]
MIGRATION AND POPULATION PLANNING POLICIES IN XINJIANG
While the Commission supports Chinese government
liberalizations that give citizens more choices to determine
their places of residence,\41\ the Commission remains concerned
about government policies that use economic and social
benefits\42\ to channel migration to the XUAR and engineer
demographic changes in the region.\43\ The government has
touted migration policies as a means to promote development and
ensure ``stability'' and ``ethnic unity.'' \44\ Demographic
shifts have skewed employment prospects in favor of Han Chinese
and funneled resources in their favor.\45\ In addition,
migration also has created heavy social and linguistic
pressures on local ethnic minority residents.\46\
The Commission also remains concerned that while the
government promotes migration to the region,\47\ it implements
policies that target birth rates among local ethnic minority
groups to reduce population increases.\48\ In 2008, the
government reported that the XUAR had achieved 65,000 fewer
births in 2007 under policies of providing rewards to families
who had fewer children than legally permitted.\49\ Overseas
Uyghur rights advocates have reported that authorities have
carried out forced sterilizations and forced abortions to
implement population planning policies.\50\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government has waged a longstanding campaign against Uyghur rights
activist Rebiya Kadeer. Authorities sentenced her in 2000 to eight
years in prison for ``supplying state secrets or intelligence to
entities outside China,'' after she sent newspaper clippings to her
husband in the United States. Kadeer has reported that before her
release on medical parole in 2005, Chinese authorities threatened
repercussions against her family members and business interests if she
discussed Uyghur human rights issues in exile. Soon after Kadeer moved
to the United States, authorities began a campaign of harassment
against her family members remaining in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), culminating in the imprisonment of two of her sons in
2006 and 2007.\51\
In May 2005, authorities detained Aysham Kerim and Ruzi
Mamat, two employees at Kadeer's trading company in the XUAR, and
attempted to take her son, Ablikim Abdureyim, into detention.
Authorities ransacked the company offices at the same time and
confiscated documents. Authorities released Aysham Kerim and Ruzi
Mamat in December 2005, after detaining them for seven months without
charges.\52\
In August 2005, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in
the XUAR had formed a special office to monitor Kadeer's relatives
and business ties in the XUAR. Around the same time, authorities
detained two of Kadeer's relatives to pressure them to turn in their
passports.\53\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Chinese Government Campaign Against Rebiya Kadeer--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2006, authorities held Kadeer's son, Alim Abdureyim,
in custody and informed him that he was under suspicion for evading
taxes.\54\
Authorities held Alim in custody again in late May 2006,
along with his brother, Ablikim, and sister, Roshengul, and
authorities later placed Alim and Ablikim in criminal detention and
Roshengul under house arrest. Authorities beat Alim and Ablikim while
in custody. In June, authorities took their brother Kahar into
custody as well and charged him with tax evasion, Alim with tax
evasion and splittism, and Ablikim with subversion of state power.
Alim reportedly confessed to the charges against him after being
tortured. During the same period, authorities placed Kadeer's brother
under house arrest and other family members under surveillance,
including grandchildren whom authorities prevented from leaving home
to attend school.\55\
On November 27, 2006, an Urumqi court sentenced Alim to seven
years in prison and fined him 500,000 yuan (US$62,500) for tax
evasion. The court imposed a 100,000 yuan (US$12,500) fine on Kahar,
also for tax evasion. Kadeer described the cases against her sons as
a ``vendetta'' against her. Sources had informed her that authorities
would offer leniency to her children if she refrained from
participating in a November 26 election for presidency of the World
Uyghur Congress.\56\
An Urumqi court sentenced Ablikim to nine years in prison and
three years' deprivation of political rights on April 17, 2007, for
``instigating and engaging in secessionist activities,'' alleging he
disseminated pro-secession articles, planned to incite anti-
government protest, and wrote an essay misrepresenting human rights
conditions in the XUAR.\57\ Both Alim and Ablikim remain in prison,
where they are reported to have been tortured and abused, and where
Ablikim is reported to be in poor physical health without adequate
medical care.\58\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN XINJIANG
Development policies in the XUAR have brought mixed results
for ethnic minority residents. While economic reforms and
development projects have raised living standards in the
region,\59\ they also have spurred migration,\60\ strained
local resources,\61\ and disproportionately benefited Han
Chinese.\62\ Han benefit through
development projects focused on Han-majority regions and
development-related employment prospects that privilege Han
areas and Han employees.\63\ Development policies in the XUAR
reflect tight central government control over the region\64\
and are intertwined with policies to promote ``social
stability.'' \65\ In the past year, the government reported on
development projects directed at improving conditions for
ethnic minority residents, but the overall impact remains
unclear.\66\
LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
The government enforces repressive labor policies,
including measures that have a disproportionate negative impact
on ethnic minorities. While the Chinese government continues to
fill local jobs in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also
maintains programs that send young ethnic minorities to work in
factories in China's interior.\67\ Authorities reportedly have
coerced participation and subjected workers to abusive labor
practices.\68\ In addition, in 2007 and 2008, overseas media
reported that authorities in the XUAR continued to impose
forced labor on area farmers in predominantly ethnic minority
regions.\69\ The XUAR government also continues to impose
forced labor on local students to meet yearly harvesting
quotas. In 2007, Chinese media reported that work-study
programs requiring students to pick cotton have decreased in
recent years, but also reported that some 1 million students
picked cotton in the region that year.\70\ In addition, both
public and private employers continue to enforce discriminatory
job hiring practices that limit job prospects for ethnic
minorities.\71\ [For more information on labor conditions, see
Addendum: Labor Conditions in Xinjiang at the end of this
section.]
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG
Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers
to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial
shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial
system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and
translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching
systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process
and undercutting legal bases that guarantee the use of ethnic
minority languages in judicial proceedings.\72\ [For detailed
information, see Addendum: Access to Justice in Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese government repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) has forced some Uyghurs into exile, where, depending on their
destination or transit country, they face an uncertain legal status,
barriers to local asylum proceedings, and risk of refoulement to China
under the sway of Chinese influence and in violation of international
protections. Uyghur migrants outside the refugee and asylum-seeker
population also face dangers, as China's increasing influence in
neighboring countries has made Uyghur migrant communities there
vulnerable to harassment and to deportation proceedings without
adequate safeguards. A summary of key concerns follows:\73\
China's Increasing Influence\74\
China has exerted a strong influence on neighboring countries
through mechanisms including bilateral agreements and the multi-
country Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spotlight: Uyghur Refugees and Migrants--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the SCO, member countries agree to cooperate in anti-
terrorism activities. China has been a key player in advancing
cooperation and promoting campaigns that use the fight against
terrorism as a pretext for repressive policies against Uyghurs both
inside and outside China.
Vulnerabilities Outside China
In some neighboring countries, Uyghurs are unable to apply
for asylum locally, increasing their vulnerability as they seek other
forms of protection, such as by applying for refugee status through
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and resettling in a
third country.\75\
In one neighboring country, Chinese influence reportedly has
swayed authorities to block Uyghurs' access to local asylum
proceedings, while letting asylum seekers of most other
nationalities apply.
Access to local asylum proceedings would increase the likelihood
that authorities safeguard the rights of asylum seekers during the
refugee status determination process. In one of China's neighboring
countries, for example, extradition proceedings are suspended for
individuals who seek asylum locally.
Some countries have extradited Uyghurs with UNHCR refugee
status to China, where they have faced abuse, imprisonment, and risk
of execution.\76\ In other cases, the UNHCR has been unable to gain
access to individuals who want to initiate asylum proceedings,
including some people who reportedly have been deported to China
without adequate safeguards.
Violations of International Law
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees\77\
forbids the return of refugees to ``the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.''
Under the Convention Against Torture,\78\ ``No State Party
shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.''
China violates international protections for freedom of
movement\79\ by denying travel documents to family members of
refugees who are entitled to derivative refugee status.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDENDUM: ``BILINGUAL'' EDUCATION IN XINJIANG
In recent years the XUAR government has taken steps to
diminish the use of ethnic minority languages via ``bilingual''
and other educational policies that place primacy on Mandarin,
such as by eliminating ethnic minority language instruction or
relegating it solely to language arts classes.\80\ Authorities
justify ``bilingual'' education as a way of ``raising the
quality'' of ethnic minority students and tie knowledge of
Mandarin to campaigns promoting patriotism and ethnic
unity.\81\ XUAR Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan noted in
2005 that XUAR authorities are ``resolutely determined'' to
promote Mandarin language use, which he found ``an extremely
serious political issue.'' \82\ He has also stated that ethnic
minority languages lack the content to express complex
concepts.\83\
XUAR language policies violate Chinese laws that protect
and promote the use of ethnic minority languages, which form
part of broader legal guarantees to protect ethnic minority
rights and allow autonomy in ethnic minority regions. For
example, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10
of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) guarantee that
ethnic minorities have ``the freedom to use and develop'' their
languages.\84\ In the area of education, Article 37 of the REAL
stipulates that ``[s]chools (classes) and other educational
organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students
should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages
and use these languages as the media of instruction.'' \85\
While educational programs that diminish the use of ethnic
minority languages respond to a growing need for fluency in
Mandarin to achieve educational and professional advancement,
XUAR officials do not acknowledge that the need stems from
official failures to implement autonomy in ethnic minority
regions as provided for in Chinese law.\86\
Government efforts to limit minority language use have
intensified in recent years, through both ``bilingual''
programs and other efforts. In 2004, the XUAR government issued
a directive to accelerate the development of ``bilingual''
education.\87\ According to a 2005 Xinjiang Daily article, many
``bilingual'' programs have moved from offering only math and
science classes in Mandarin to teaching the entire curriculum
in Mandarin, except in classes devoted specifically to
minority-language study.\88\ In 2006, authorities in the
predominantly Uyghur city of Atush announced that all first-
grade elementary school classes would teach in Mandarin Chinese
beginning in September 2006 and that all primary and secondary
schools would be required to teach exclusively in Mandarin by
2012.\89\ According to a report from official Chinese media, by
2006, the number of students receiving ``bilingual'' education
in the XUAR had expanded 50-fold within six years.\90\
According to 2007 figures reported by the Xinjiang Education
Department, more than 474,500 ethnic minority students in
preschool, elementary school, and secondary school programs,
including vocational programs, took classes that employed
``bilingual education.'' According to the Xinjiang Education
Department, the figure accounts for almost 20 percent of the
ethnic minority student population and excludes those students
studying in longstanding programs that track ethnic minority
students into Mandarin Chinese schooling.\91\ In contrast, in
1999, experimental ``bilingual'' classes reportedly reach 2,629
students through 27 secondary schools.\92\ The government
prepared a draft opinion in 2008 that details steps to further
expand ``bilingual'' education.\93\
Authorities also have limited opportunities for XUAR
residents to obtain higher education and vocational education
in ethnic minority languages, thereby diminishing the value of
ethnic minority languages in XUAR schooling and creating an
incentive for younger students to study in Mandarin instead of
ethnic minority languages. In May 2002, the XUAR government
announced that Xinjiang University would change its medium of
instruction to Mandarin Chinese in first- and second-year
classes.\94\ In 2005, authorities announced plans to offer two-
year vocational degrees through programs that offer instruction
entirely in Mandarin Chinese.\95\ Recruitment materials for
2007 for the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College stated that
all classes offered would be taught in Mandarin.\96\
XUAR authorities also have expanded ``bilingual'' education
policies to the preschool level, and provide material
incentives to
attract students. Authorities issued an opinion in 2005 to
bolster ``bilingual'' education in XUAR preschools and prepared
a draft opinion on further expanding ``bilingual'' education,
including preschool education, in 2008.\97\ In 2006, official
media reported the government would invest 430 million yuan
(US$59.76 million) over five years to support ``bilingual''
preschool programs in seven prefectures and would aim to reach
a target rate of over 85 percent of rural ethnic minority
children in all counties and municipalities able to enroll in
two years of ``bilingual'' preschool education by 2010.\98\ The
following year, the XUAR Department of Finance allotted 70.39
million yuan (US$9.78 million) to cover
material subsidies for both students and teachers in
``bilingual'' preschool programs.\99\ In February 2007,
authorities in the XUAR implemented a program to send student-
teachers from the Xinjiang Preschool Teachers College to
preschools in Kashgar prefecture to supplement the area's
shortage of ``bilingual'' teaching staff, providing financial
and other incentives to the student-teachers in the
program.\100\ In 2008, the government appeared to have pushed
back its timeline for reaching target enrollment rates, while
investing more money to bring this goal to fruition, perhaps
signifying a firmer and more realistic commitment to promoting
``bilingual'' preschool education. The government pledged 3.75
billion yuan (US$549 million) in 2008 for ``bilingual''
preschool education and called for achieving a target rate of
over 85 percent of ethnic minority children in rural areas
receiving ``bilingual'' education by 2012.\101\ While the
current scope of the program's coverage varies by locality,
news from local governments indicates that ``bilingual''
preschool programs are already widespread in some areas.\102\
According to 2007 figures from the Xinjiang Education
Department, 180,458 ethnic minority children received
``bilingual'' preschool education.\103\
The government's language policies have impacted ethnic
minority teachers' job prospects. Ethnic minority teachers who
do not speak Mandarin must face additional language
requirements that are not imposed on monolingual Mandarin-
speaking teachers. Teachers have reportedly faced dismissal or
transfers to non-teaching positions for failure to conform to
new language requirements.\104\
The Chinese government's current stance on ``bilingual''
education hinders productive dialogue on ways to carry forward
policies in a manner to protect ethnic minority languages. In
March 2008, XUAR Chair Nur Bekri described criticisms of
``bilingual'' education as an attack from the ``three forces''
of terrorism, separatism, and extremism operating outside
China. He also claimed that ``bilingual'' education in the
region equally valued ethnic minority languages and Mandarin,
despite evidence of the focus on Mandarin from sources
including official Chinese media.\105\
Although the long-term impact remains unclear, sustained
implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual'' education and
other language policies increases the risk that Uyghur and
other ethnic
minority languages are eventually reduced to cultural relics
rather than actively used languages in the XUAR.
ADDENDUM: LABOR CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
Labor Transfers
While the Chinese government continues to fill local jobs
in the XUAR with migrant labor, it also maintains programs that
send young ethnic minorities to work in factories in China's
interior under conditions reported to be abusive. Overseas
sources indicate that local authorities have coerced
participation and mistreated workers. According to a 2008
report issued by an overseas human rights organization, local
officials, following direction from higher levels of
government, have used ``deception, pressure, and threats''
toward young women and their families to gain recruits into the
labor transfer program. Women interviewed for the report
described working under abusive labor conditions after being
transferred to interior factories through the state-sponsored
programs.\106\ In 2007, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on local
authorities who recruited women under false pretenses to work
in Shandong province.\107\
Forced Labor
In 2007 and 2008, overseas media reported that authorities
in the XUAR continued to impose forced labor on area farmers.
According to reports from RFA, based on official Chinese
sources and on information provided through interviews with
officials and residents in the XUAR, in 2007 authorities in
Yeken (Yarkand) county required 100,000 farmers to turn
uncultivated land into a nut production base. The farmers,
whose work included building roadways, forest belts, and
irrigation canals, reportedly received no pay for their work.
One resident interviewed by RFA said that residents who refused
to do the work were fined for each day of labor missed.\108\
The Kashgar district government, which publicized information
about the land cultivation project, including the scope of
labor involved and the projects completed, did not describe how
the labor force was recruited or compensated.\109\ Authorities
reportedly continued to carry out forced labor in 2008,
requiring local residents in the southern XUAR to plant trees
and build irrigation works.\110\
``Work-Study'' Programs
The XUAR government imposes forced labor on local students
to meet yearly harvesting quotas. Acting under central
government authority bolstered by local legal directives, XUAR
authorities implement the use of student labor, including labor
by young children, via work-study programs to harvest crops and
do other work. Students work under arduous conditions and do
not receive pay for their work. While ``work-study'' programs
exist elsewhere in China, the XUAR work-study program also
reflects features unique to the region. The central government
holds close control over both the general XUAR economy and
through its directly administered Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps farms, where some of the region's cotton is
harvested. The central government placed special focus on
supporting the XUAR's cotton industry during its 11th Five-Year
Program, and central, rather than local, authorities reportedly
made the decision to launch the comprehensive work-study
program to pick cotton in the XUAR. In 2007, Chinese media
reported that work-study programs requiring students to pick
cotton have decreased in recent years, but also reported that
some 1 million students picked cotton in the region that
year.\111\
ADDENDUM: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN XINJIANG
Ethnic minority residents in the XUAR face special barriers
to accessing China's legal system. In addition to financial
shortfalls and general personnel shortages, the XUAR judicial
system lacks a sufficient number of legal personnel and
translators who speak ethnic minority languages, entrenching
systemic procedural irregularities into the judicial process
and presenting barriers to citizens' right to have legal
proceedings conducted in their native language.\112\ According
to 2007 reports from the Chinese media, 1,948 of 4,552 judges
in the XUAR were ethnic minorities, and as of September of that
year, 380 lawyers, or 17 percent of the region's total, were
ethnic minorities. The reports did not identify the language
capabilities of these groups.\113\ A law office reported as
China's first bilingual operation opened in the XUAR in
2006.\114\
Recent measures to address shortcomings in the XUAR
judicial system may have mixed results in meeting the needs of
ethnic minority residents. Efforts to dispatch legal workers to
rural areas may strengthen privilege for Mandarin Chinese if
new personnel are not required to speak ethnic minority
languages.\115\ Other steps may bring improvements. In 2007,
the Ili Lawyers Association in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, for example, reportedly encouraged law offices to
increase efforts to recruit ethnic minority graduates who
majored in law in college or other higher education
programs.\116\ In September 2007, the government announced a
program to train 200 native Mandarin-speaking college students
each year in ethnic minority languages, with the goal of
addressing general shortages of interpreters.\117\
The government ties some judicial reform efforts to
government campaigns to promote ``stability'' and fight the
government-designated ``three forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism. In August 2007, the Supreme People's
Court (SPC) announced it had launched a work program to have
judicial institutions nationwide aid XUAR courts, describing
having stability in the region as part of its strategy for the
project.\118\ Jiang Xingchang, vice president of the SPC, said
that China continued to face plots by ``hostile forces in the
West'' to westernize and divide China, and that ``religious
extremism'' and ``international terrorism'' remain ``fully
active'' in the XUAR, while ethnic separatists inside and
outside the country continue ``sabotage activities.'' \119\
Jiang also stated that personnel of the appropriate political
mindset should be selected for judicial exchange programs in
the XUAR.\120\ In August 2008, Chinese media reported that XUAR
courts would ``regard ensuring [state] security and social
stability [as] their primary task.'' \121\
Freedom of Religion--Islam
[EXCERPTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA'S 2008
ANNUAL REPORT--SECTION II, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, PAGES 80-82.]
Authorities increased repression of Islam in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the past year, while the
government and Party continued to strictly control the practice
of Islam in other parts of the country. The Commission observed
broad measures implemented in the XUAR to increase monitoring
and control over religious communities and leaders; steps to
restrict pilgrimages and the observance of religious holidays
and customs; and continued measures to restrict children's
freedom of religion. Throughout China, Muslims remained subject
to state-sanctioned interpretations of their faith and to tight
state control over their pilgrimage activities.
increased repression in xinjiang
Authorities increased repression in the XUAR amid
preparations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games,
protests in Uyghur and Tibetan areas of China, and government
reports of terrorist and criminal activity in the region.
During the year, local governments throughout the XUAR reported
on measures to tighten control over religion, including
measures to increase surveillance of mosques, religious
leaders, and practitioners; gather information on
practitioners' religious activities; curb ``illegal'' scripture
readings; and increase accountability among implementing
officials. Authorities connected control of religious affairs
with measures to promote ``social stability'' and continued
longstanding campaigns to link Islam to ``extremism'' and the
threat of terrorism.\122\ In September 2008, XUAR chair Nur
Bekri called for strengthening controls over religion and for
increasing political training of religious leaders.\123\ Amid
preparations in the XUAR for the Olympics, overseas media
reported in June that authorities in Aqsu district razed a
privately built mosque for refusing to post pro-Olympics
posters.\124\
Local authorities and educational institutions in the XUAR
continued in 2007 and 2008 to impose restrictions on the
observance of the holiday of Ramadan, including restrictions on
state employees' observance of the holiday and prohibitions on
closing restaurants during periods of fasting.\125\ Overseas
media reported on the detention of two Muslim restaurant
managers for failing to abide by instructions to keep
restaurants open.\126\ Authorities intensified limits on the
observance of Ramadan with measures to curb broader religious
and cultural practices.\127\ Some local governments reported on
measures to prevent women from wearing head coverings.\128\ In
March, women in Hoten district who demonstrated against various
human rights abuses in the region protested admonishments
against such apparel issued during a government campaign to
promote stability.\129\
The XUAR government continues to maintain the harshest
legal restrictions on children's right to practice religion.
Regionwide legal measures forbid parents and guardians from
allowing minors to engage in religious activity.\130\ In August
2008, authorities reportedly forced the return of Uyghur
children studying religion in another province and detained
them in the XUAR for engaging in ``illegal religious
activities.'' \131\ Local governments continued to implement
restrictions on children's freedom of religion, taking steps
including monitoring students' eating habits during Ramadan and
strengthening education in atheism, as part of broader controls
over religion implemented in the past year.\132\ Overseas
sources have
reported that some local governments have enforced restrictions
on mosque entry by minors, as well as other populations.\133\
restrictions on the freedom to make overseas pilgrimages
XUAR authorities continued in the past year to support
measures to prevent Muslims from making pilgrimages outside of
state channels, following the confiscation of Muslims'
passports in summer 2007 to restrict private pilgrimages.\134\
Officials also reportedly imposed extra restrictions on
Uyghurs' participation in state-sanctioned pilgrimages.\135\
According to overseas media, authorities reportedly gave prison
sentences to five Uyghur clerics for arranging pilgrimages
without government permission.\136\
The central government continued to maintain limits on all
Muslims' pilgrimage activities, after intensifying state
controls over the hajj in 2006.\137\ While the government
permitted more than 10,000 Muslims to make the pilgrimage to
Mecca under official auspices in 2007,\138\ pilgrims had to
abide by state controls over the trip. Among various controls,
participants have been subject to ``patriotic education'' prior
to departure\139\ and to restrictions on their activities
within Mecca in a stated effort to guard against contact with
``East Turkistan forces'' and other ``enemy forces.'' \140\
continuing controls over internal affairs and doctrine
The government continued to tightly control the internal
affairs of Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic
Association of China aligns Muslim practice to government and
Party goals by
directing the confirmation and ongoing political indoctrination
of religious leaders, publication of religious texts, and
content of sermons.\141\ In the past year, authorities called
for continued measures to control religious doctrine. In a 2008
interview, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for
Religious Affairs, justified state interference in the
interpretation of Islamic doctrine on the grounds of ``public
interests.'' \142\ According to a 2008 report from the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, a Communist Party official who took part
in leading ``study classes'' for Muslim personnel in the region
called for ``creatively interpreting and improving'' religious
doctrine.\143\
Endnotes
\1\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 106-108;
CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 90-91; CECC, 2005 Annual
Report, 11 October 05, 21-23.
\2\ For detailed information, including information on China's
domestic and international obligations toward ethnic minorities, see
Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, as well as the section on ``Ethnic
Minority Rights'' in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 105-108 and ``Special
Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,'' CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 13-23.
\3\ The government has long claimed the continued existence of
terrorist and separatist threats through spurious statistics and shoddy
factual support. For an analysis of Chinese reporting on terrorist
activity, see ``Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official
Statements on Terrorism Conflict,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, May 2006, 12.
\4\ For an analysis of Chinese reporting on one of the alleged
terrorist plots and on the aircraft attack, see ``Xinjiang Authorities
Pledge Crackdown Against `Three Forces,' '' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 2. For more information on two of
the alleged terrorist plots, see ``Ministry of Public Security
Circulates Notice on Recently Cracking 2 Cases of Plots To Carry Out
Terrorist Activity'' [Gong'anbu tongbao jinqi pohuo de liangqi cehua
shishi baoli kongbu huodong anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 10 March
08.
\5\ For reporting from local Xinjiang government Web sites, see,
e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), ``Let Society Be Stable and
Harmonious, For the People To Be Without Fear--Work Report on Poskam
County Striving To Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County''
[Rang shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye--zepuxian zheng chuang
zizhiquji ping'an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; Qumul District
Government (Online), ``Gulshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education
Work Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment'' [Gulixiati
Abudouhade'er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru
youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Kashgar District Government (Online),
``Yengi Sheher County Takes Forceful Measures to Strengthen Carrying
Out of Current Stability Work'' [Shulexian caiqu youli cuoshi jiaqiang
zuohao dangqian wending gongzuo], 31 March 08; Kashgar District
Government (Online), ``Firmly Grasp Stability Work without Slackening,
Protect Smooth Carrying Out of the Olympics'' [Hen zhua wei wen
gongzuobuxiedai bao aoyunhui shunli juban], 31 March 08; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``122 Members of `Work Team Dispatched to
Rural Posts for Olympics Safety and Security' Go to Countryside in
Yorpugha County'' [Yuepuhuxian 122 ming ``ao yun an bao paizhu xiangcun
gongzuo duiyuan'' xiacun], 28 March 08. For an example of a security
measure aimed at XUAR residents living in other parts of China, see
``Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission Enters into
Friendly Cooperation with Wuhan City Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Commission'' [Kashi diqu minzongwei yu wuhanshi minzongwei jiewei
youhao xiezuo danwei], China Ethnicities News (Online), 28 February 08.
Overseas organizations reported on the imposition of martial order
within Ghulja in late March and April and on curfews in multiple
cities. Local government Web sites within China appear not to have
publicized the curfews. International Campaign for Tibet (Online),
``Tibetan Students Hold Vigil in Beijing; Curfew Imposed in Xinjiang
Towns,'' 17 March 08; ``FYI--Kashgar, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed
To Report Alleged Curfew,'' Open Source Center, 19 March 08; ``FYI--
Hotan, Xinjiang PRC Media Not Observed To Report Alleged Curfew,'' Open
Source Center, 19 March 08; ``Chinese Government Exercises Martial
Alert in Ghulja'' [Xitay hokumiti ghuljida herbiy halet yurguzuwatidu],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 April 08; ``Curfew in Xinjiang Town After
Police Raids,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 March 08.
\6\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
3.
\7\ ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, August 2008, 2-8.
\8\ For information on these attacks as reported by official
Chinese media, see, e.g., ``Police Station Raided in West China's
Xinjiang, Terrorist Plot Suspected,'' Xinhua, 4 August 08 (Open Source
Center, 4 August 08); ``Xinjiang Official Calls Monday's Raid on Border
Police a Terrorist Attack,'' Xinhua, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center, 5
August 08); ``Bombings Kill Eight, Injure Four in China's Xinjiang,''
Xinhua, 10 August 08 (Open Source Center, 12 August 08); Mao Yong and
Zhao Chunhui, ``(Explosions in Xinjiang's Kuqa) Violent Terrorism in
Kuqa County, Xinjiang, Effectively Dealt With,'' Xinhua, 10 August 08
(Open Source Center, 10 August 08); ``Three Security Staff Killed in
Attack at Road Checkpoint in Xinjiang,'' Xinhua (Online), 12 August 08.
For an updated report by foreign media on one of the events, see Edward
Wong, ``Doubt Arises in Account of an Attack in China,'' New York Times
(Online), 28 September 08.
\9\ For an overview of these reported measures, see box titled
Increased Repression in Xinjiang During the Olympics in this section,
which is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in
Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 7 October 08. See specific sources at, e.g., Uyghur
Human Rights Project (Online), ``A Life or Death Struggle in East
Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in post-Olympic
Period,'' 4 September 08, 4-7; ``Homes Raided in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 23 July 08; Jume, ``Public Security Office Police in
Ghulja City Ransack Uyghurs' Homes'' [Ghulja shehiri j x idarisi
saqchiliri uyghurlarning oylirini axturmaqta], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 17 July 08; ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update; Dan Martin, ``Uyghurs Discouraged
From Air Travel Amid China's Olympic Security Clampdown,'' Agence
France-Presse, 31 July 08 (Open Source Center, 31 July 08); Malcom
Moore, ``China Tightens Grip on Western Province Xinjiang,'' Telegraph
(Online), 8 August 08; Gulchehre, ``Chinese Authorities Close Some
Uyghur Discussion Web Sites During Olympics'' [Xitay dairiliri olimpik
mezgilide bir qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free
Asia (Online), 14 August 08; ``Crackdown on Xinjiang Mosques,
Religion,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08; ``Mongghulkure
County `Protect Olympics, Protect Stability' Supervision Group Reports
Work to Ili Prefecture'' [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou ``bao ao yun cu
wending'' dudao xiaozu huibao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July
08; ``Mongghulkure County Promptly Arranges Implementation of Spirit of
Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting'' [Zhaosuxian xunsu anpai luoshi yili zhou
``7.13'' wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace Net (Online), 16 July 08;
Kashgar District Government, ``Usher in the Olympics and Ensure
Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and Mind,'' 8 August 08 (Open
Source Center, 8 August 08). See also Controls over Free Expression in
Xinjiang in this section for more information on controls over Web
sites.
\10\ Jake Hooker, ``China Steps Up Scrutiny of a Minority in
Beijing,'' New York Times (Online), 13 August 08; Josephine Ma,
``Beijing Security Already High, With More Police Checks on Uygurs
And,'' [sic] South China Morning Post, 5 August 08 (Open Source Center,
5 August 08); ``Hotels in All Locations Must Report Tibetans, Uyghurs
and Other Ethnic Minority Guests'' [Gedi luguan dei tongbao jiangzang
deng shaoshu minzu zhuke], Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 July 08;
``Beijing and Shanghai Strengthen Inspection and Control of Uyghurs and
Tibetans on Eve of Olympics'' [Ao yun qianxi jing hu jiaqiang dui weizu
zangzuren de jiankong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 July 08; ``Olympic
Terror Clampdown Targets Beijing Uighurs After Attacks,'' Bloomberg
(Online), 18 August 08.
\11\ ``Nur Bekri's Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary
Session'' [Nu'er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua],
Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08. For an example of mention of
Rebiya Kadeer in local government reports, see ``Firmly Grasp the
Overall Situation, Unite the Masses, Conscientiously Forge Firm
Foundation to Protect Stability'' [Bawo daju tuanjie qunzhong qieshi da
lao weiwen jichu], Ili News Net (Online), 21 September 08.
\12\ For reports from local offices and governments, see, e.g.,
``Zhang Yun Stresses: Make Firm Push To Deepen Educational Activities''
[Zhang yun qiangdiao: zhashi ba zhuti jiaoyu huodong tuixiang shenru],
Ili News Net (Online), 25 September 08; ``Must Have Vigorous Education
Propaganda'' [Zhuti jiaoyu xuanchuan bixu honghonglielie], Ili Daily
News reprinted in Ili News Net (Online), 16 September 08; ``Autonomous
Region Youth League Committee Launches Ethnic Unity Education Practicum
Activities'' [Zizhiqu tuanwei kaizhan minzu tuanjie jiaoyu shijian
huodong], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12 September 08. For Wang's
comments, see ``Autonomous Region Convenes Cadre Plenary Session on
Making Concerted Efforts to Safeguard Xinjiang's Social and Political
Stability'' [Zizhiqu zhaokai ganbu dahui qixinxieli weihu xinjiang
shehui zhengzhi wending], Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08;
``Wang Lequan's Speech at Autonomous Region 5th Commendation Meeting on
Advancement of Ethnic Unity'' [Wang Lequan zai zizhiqu di wu ci minzu
tuanjie jinbu biaozhang dahui shang de jianghua], Tianshan Net
(Online), 16 September 08.
\13\ For an overview of incarceration trends from the mid-1990s
onward, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107 and accompanying footnotes.
\14\ According to the head of the XUAR High People's Court, since
2003, XUAR courts have accepted a yearly average of roughly 150 cases
involving endangering state security. ``Work Regarding Courts
Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts is Launched'' [Quanguo fayuan
duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14
August 07. Nationwide, the number of arrests between 2003 and 2006 for
endangering state security numbered 336, 426, 296, and 604
respectively, and the number of such cases that authorities began to
prosecute in 2005 and 2006 were 185 and 258 respectively, indicating
that cases from the XUAR constituted a significant total percentage
both of arrests and prosecutions for endangering state security. The
Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``New Statistics Point to Dramatic
Increase in Chinese Political Arrests in 2006,'' 27 November 07; The
Dui Hua Foundation (Online), `` `Endangering State Security' Arrests
Rise More than 25% in 2004,'' Dialogue Newsletter, Winter 2006.
\15\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
is Launched,'' Xinhua.
\16\ Yan Wenlu, ``Xinjiang Higher People's Court To Sternly Crack
Down on Crimes of the `Three Forces' in Accordance With the Law,''
China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).
\17\ Except where otherwise noted, information in this boxed
subsection is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang
in Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission
on China.
\18\ Information in this bulleted item, other than information on
Ramadan, is drawn from ``Authorities Increase Repression in Xinjiang in
Lead-up To and During Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China. For information on controls over Ramadan, see, e.g., Shayar
County Government (Online), ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County
Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures To Strengthen Management During Ramadan''
[Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang ``zhaiyue''
qijian guanli], 28 August 08; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security'' [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi
tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang
(Online), 23 August 08; ``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard
Stability During Ramadan'' [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen
gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08. See also Section
II--Freedom of Religion--China's Religious Communities--Islam.
\19\ ``Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 8 September 08; ``Supplementary Information on Prisoner
Mehbube Ablesh'' [Tutqun mehbube ablesh heqqide toluqlima melumatlar],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 September 08; ``Uyghur Staff Member in
Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is Arrested'' [Xinjiang weizu yuangong
piping zhengfu bei jubu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 September 08.
\20\ While ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications'' campaigns targeting a range of materials exist
throughout China, authorities in the XUAR target religious and
political materials also as part of broader controls in the region over
Islamic practice and other expressions of ethnic identity among the
Uyghur population. ``Xinjiang Government Strengthens Campaign Against
Political and Religious Publications,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4.
\21\ In May 2006, for example, XUAR authorities launched a month-
long campaign aimed at rooting out ``illegal'' political and religious
publications in which they reported finding `` `the existence of books
with seriously harmful religious inclinations,'' and Uyghur-language
religious materials with ``unhealthy content.'' ``Xinjiang Government
Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 7-8. In February 2006,
authorities confiscated ``illegal'' religious materials during a
surprise inspection of the ethnic minority language publishing market,
as part of a campaign that included focus on materials of an
``illegal'' political nature, those that propagate ethnic separatism,
or those of a religious nature. ``Xinjiang Cracks Down on `Illegal'
Religious Publications,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, April 2006, 9.
\22\ ``Atush Launches Clean-up Operation in Publishing Market''
[Atushi shi kaizhan chubanwu shichang zhuanxiang zhili xingdong],
Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Peace Net (Online), 11 July 08;
Jume, ``Chinese Government Starts Urgent Search Activities on Streets
of Atush'' [Xitay hokumiti atush shehiridiki dukan-restilerde jiddiy
axturush herikiti bashlidi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 July 08.
\23\ Gulchehre, ``Chinese Authorities Close Some Uyghur Discussion
Web Sites During Olympics'' [Xitay dairiliri olimpik mezgilide bir
qisim uyghur munazire tor betlirini taqidi], Radio Free Asia (Online),
14 August 08. In a review of Uyghur Web sites carried out on August 18
and 19, 2008, Commission staff found that the bulletin board services
(BBS) on the Web sites www.diyarim.com, www.orkhun.com, and
www.alkuyi.com blocked normal message-posting functions and carried
messages calling for stability during the Olympics games or noting the
closure of the site's BBS. In June, 2008, overseas media noted the
closure of the Web site Uyghur Online due to perceived ties with
overseas ``extremists.'' See ``Uyghur Web Site Shut Down,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 12 June 08. See also ``Notice Concerning the Closure of
Uyghur Online'' [Guanyu weiwuer zai xian bei guanbi de tongzhi],
available at http://www.uighuronline.cn/ (last visited 19 May 2008). As
of September 11, 2008, Commission staff observed that the site was in
operation again.
\24\ For information on the Islamic Association of China's
publishing activities and state controls over the interpretation of
religious texts, see ``SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 8, and ``Islamic Congress Establishes Hajj Office, Issues New
Rules,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 12-
13.
\25\ ``Teacher and 37 Students Detained for Sudying [sic] Koran in
China: Rights Group'' Agence France-Presse, 15 August 05 (Open Source
Center, 15 August 05); ``Three Detained in East Turkistan for `Illegal'
Religious Text,'' Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), 3 August 05;
Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online), ``Devastating
Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' April 2005, 70
(pagination follows ``text-only'' pdf download of this report).
\26\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use
Through Bilingual Education,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 17-18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic
Affairs Commission (Online), ``This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track
Middle Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try `Bilingual' Education'' [Jin
qiu xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi ``shuangyu''
jiaoyu], reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9
May 08.
\27\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4, 121, and Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art.
10, 21. Chinese law also promotes education in ethnic minority
languages. See REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL
affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also
place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual''
education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing
Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi ``Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.
\28\ ``Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6
Years'' [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nien zengzhang 50 bei],
Xinjiang Economic News, via Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October 06.
\29\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 107; CECC, 2006 Annual
Report, 91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 22-23.
\30\ The Xinjiang High People's Court rejected his appeal in
February 2000, but changed the ``stealing'' state secrets charge to
``unlawfully obtaining'' them. In 2001, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment arbitrary and in violation
of his right to freedom of thought, expression, and opinion. See the
CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on Tohti Tunyaz's
case and the other cases cited in this section.
\31\ The precise charges levied against Abduhelil Zunun are
unavailable, but Human Rights Watch reported that his sentence took
place at a mass sentencing rally to punish terrorist and separatist
activities. Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China Human Rights Update,''
15 February 02. See also the CECC Political Prisoner Database.
\32\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
Sentencing information on the case and Abdulla Jamal's current
whereabouts are not known.
\33\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ ``Uyghur Radio Worker Sacked, Detained,'' Radio Free Asia;
``Supplementary Information on Prisoner Mehbube Ablesh,'' Radio Free
Asia; ``Uyghur Staff Member in Xinjiang Criticizes Government, Is
Arrested,'' Radio Free Asia. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database
for more details.
\36\ For a discussion of these groups, known as meshrep in Uyghur,
see, e.g., Jay Dautcher, ``Public Health and Social Pathologies in
Xinjiang,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick
Starr (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285-6.
\37\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\38\ The editor has surmised that the charge may have been based on
e-mail correspondence the China Development Brief initiated with a
Uyghur diaspora organization while conducting research. Nick Young,
``Message from the Editor,'' China Development Brief (Online), 12 July
07; Nick Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit,'' Christian
Science Monitor (Online), 4 December 07.
\39\ Authorities also accused the publication's English-language
editor of conducting ``unauthorized surveys'' and forced the
publication's closing during a period of heightened scrutiny over local
and foreign civil society organizations throughout China. Nick Young,
``Message from the Editor,'' China Development Brief (Online), Nick
Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.'' For more information
on civil society groups in China, see Section III--Civil Society as
well as CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 141-143.
\40\ In the course of an interview with Chinese officials, the
editor of the China Development Brief (CDB) critiqued repressive
policies in the XUAR, comments which he believes might have shut down
further negotiations with authorities on ways to salvage CDB. Nick
Young, ``Why China Cracked Down on My Nonprofit.''
\41\ While the government continues to impose hukou, or household
registration requirements, that place restrictions on citizens' ability
to formally change their place of residence and receive social services
and other benefits in their new homes, limited hukou reforms and other
policies have nonetheless given citizens more leeway to migrate
internally within China than in previous decades. For more information
on freedom of residence, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and CECC,
2007 Annual Report, 111-113.
\42\ See, e.g., REAL Implementing Provisions, art. 29. For
additional information, see, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in
Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' East-
West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 24-26.
\43\ Earlier government policies, including forced resettlement to
the region, have already resulted in broad demographic shifts in the
XUAR. According to an official government census, in 1953, Han Chinese
constituted 6 percent of the XUAR's population of 4.87 million, while
Uyghurs made up 75 percent. In contrast, the 2000 census listed the Han
population at 40.57 percent and Uyghurs at 45.21 percent of a total
population of 18.46 million. Scholar Stanley Toops has noted that Han
migration since the 1950s is responsible for the ``bulk'' of the XUAR's
high population growth in the past half century. Stanley Toops,
``Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949,'' East-West
Center Washington Working Papers No. 1, May 04, 1. See also ``Xinjiang
Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to Curb Population
Growth,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006,
15-16; ``Xinjiang Reports High Rate of Population Increase,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 16-17.
\44\ State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), ``Important
Meaning'' [Zhongyao yiyi], 13 July 04.
\45\ See Development Policy in Xinjiang in this section for more
information.
\46\ Scholar Gardner Bovingdon notes that ``Han immigration and
state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to
assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the
explicit protections of the constitution and the laws on autonomy[.]''
Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and
Uyghur Discontent,'' 47.
\47\ As noted above, Han migration has resulted in high population
growth in the region. Stanley Toops, ``Demographics and Development in
Xinjiang after 1949,'' 1.
\48\ ``Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas to
Curb Population Growth,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update.
\49\ ``Last Year, 65,000 Fewer People Were Born in Xinjiang''
[Qunian xinjiang shao chusheng 6.5 wan ren], Xinjiang Metropolitan
News, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 28 February 08. Although the
government has implemented policies throughout China to reward families
who comply with various population planning dictates, it also continues
to punish non-compliance. See Section II--Population Planning, for more
information. The XUAR regulation on population planning allows urban
Han Chinese couples to have one child, urban ethnic minority couples
and rural Han Chinese couples to have two, and rural ethnic minority
couples to have three. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on
Population and Family Planning [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 28 November 02, amended 26 November 04
and 25 May 06, art. 15. While this legislation indicates some
flexibility to adapt national legislation to suit ``local conditions,''
as stipulated in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, XUAR residents
nonetheless lack the autonomy to choose not to implement any limits at
all on childbearing. REAL, art. 4, 44. For information on the limits of
the legal framework for autonomy, see, e.g., CECC, 2005 Annual Report,
15-17. Scholar Gardner Bovingdon discusses the role of population
planning requirements within the context of the regional ethnic
autonomy system in Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist
Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' 26.
\50\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Rural East
Turkistan To Be `Focus' of China's Family Planning Policies,'' 15
February 06; Human Rights in China: Improving or Deteriorating
Conditions? Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Operations, Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives, 19 April 06, Testimony of Rebiya Kadeer.
\51\ For more details, see the CECC Political Prisoner Database as
well as the sources cited below.
\52\ ``Chinese Police Attempt to Take into Custody Son of Uighur
Activist Rebiya Kadeer,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2005, 10; ``Rebiya Kadeer's Employees Released After
Seven-Month Detention,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2006, 4-5.
\53\ ``Xinjiang Police Form Special Unit To Investigate Exiled
Activist Rebiya Kadeer,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, October 2005, 7-8.
\54\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Question Rebiya Kadeer's Son, Name Him
a Criminal Suspect,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
May 2006, 5-6.
\55\ ``Rebiya Kadeer's Sons Charged With State Security and
Economic Crimes,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July
2006, 3-4.
\56\ ``Rebiya Kadeer's Sons Receive Prison Sentence, Fines, for
Alleged Economic Crimes,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, December 2006, 15-16.
\57\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Son of Rebiya Kadeer
Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison on Charges of `Secessionism,' '' 17
April 07.
\58\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Rebiya Kadeer's
Imprisoned Son in Urgent Need of Medical Treatment,'' 11 December 07.
\59\ See, e.g., Calla Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' in
Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, 188 (noting improvements in
transport and communications that have produced ``broad benefits'' in
the region.); Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist
Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' 38.
\60\ State Administration for Ethnic Affairs (Online), ``Important
Meaning.''
\61\ Stanley W. Toops, ``The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on
Water,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, 270-271.
\62\ Although the Chinese government does not aggregate economic
data by ethnic group, scholars who have looked at other indicators have
noted that the most prosperous regions in the XUAR are those with
majority Han populations. Areas in the XUAR with overwhelmingly ethnic
minority populations remain the region's poorest. Weimer, ``The Economy
of Xinjiang,'' 177-180; David Bachman, ``Making Xinjiang Safe for the
Han? '' in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165-168.
\63\ Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 179-180; Bachman,
``Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? '' 167-168; Ildiko Beller-Hann,
``Temperamental Neighbors: Uighur-Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest
China,'' in Gunther Schlee, ed., Imagined Differences: Hatred and the
Construction of Identity (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 65.
\64\ See Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 163 (noting strong
government control over both oil and gas reserves and over the general
economy).
\65\ Scholar Calla Weimer has noted that ``in an effort to ensure
stability in a frontier area,'' the central government ``has more
actively asserted its control over development in Xinjiang than in any
other region.'' Weimer, ``The Economy of Xinjiang,'' 164. For
statements connecting development projects to stability, see, e.g.,
``While Joining NPC Deputies From Xinjiang in Discussing and Examining
the Government's Work Report, General Hu Jintao Stresses That It Is
Necessary To Firmly Grasp the Opportunity To Carry out the Large-Scale
Development of the Western Region and Continuously Create a New
Situation in the Development of Various Undertakings in Xinjiang,''
Xinjiang Daily, 9 March 08 (Open Source Center, 15 March 08); ``State
Council Made Major Strategic Plans To Further Promote Xinjiang's
Economic, Social Development,'' Xinjiang Daily, 3 October 07 (Open
Source Center, 3 October 07); Kashgar District Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Commission (Online), ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chair
Ismail Tiliwaldi Attends Ceremony for Laying Foundation for Kashgar-
Hoten Highway'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu zhuxi simayi tieliwaerdi
chuxi kashi zhi hetian gaodengji gonglu dianji yishi], reprinted on the
State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 20 November 07.
\66\ In 2007, the government announced that it had invested over
231 million yuan from 2001-2006 in funds to support ethnic minority
development, using the money for healthcare, education, cultural
undertakings, and broadcast communications. It also announced plans to
increase funds for 2007. ``State Invests 300 Million Yuan in 7 Years to
Support Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Economic Development'' [Guojia 7 nian
tou 3 yi yuan fuchi xinjiang shaoshu minzu jingji fazhan], Xinjiang
Daily (Online), 17 September 07.
\67\ For Chinese media reports on the programs, see, e.g., ``Money
From Our Kids Has Come'' [Zan haizi jiqian laile], Tianshan Net
(Online), 25 June 07; Qarghiliq County Government (Online), ``Leaving
Home for the Wide World, Qarghiliq County's Second Batch of 313 Young
Girls Go to Tianjian To Start Their Undertakings'' [Zouchu jiamen
tiandi kuan yecheng xian di er pi 313 ming nu qingnian fu tianjin
chuangye], 17 April 07. For statistics on the makeup of the labor force
and number of people transferred from Kashgar district, see ``160 Rural
Women from Kashgar Go to Tianjin To Apply Their Labor'' [Xinjiang kashi
160 ming nongcun funu fu tianjin wugong], Urumqi Evening News,
reprinted in Tianshan Net, 19 March 07.
\68\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Deception, Pressure,
and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,'' 8
February 08; Trafficking in China, Briefing of the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 October 07, Testimony
of Rebiya Kadeer, President of the Uyghur American Association;
``Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local Chinese
Officials,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 July 07.
\69\ For information on forced labor (hashar, also sometimes
translated as ``corvee labor'') in English, see Radio Free Asia's blog
``RFA Unplugged.'' ``Forced, Unpaid Labor for Uyghurs in China's Almond
Groves,'' RFA Unplugged (Online), 9 April 07. For Uyghur-language
reporting on the topic, see Gulchehre, ``Forced Labor Started Once
Again in Kashgar Countryside'' [Qeshqer yezilirida hashar yene
bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 February 07; Gulchehre,
``100,000 Farmers in Yeken [Yarkand] Caught Up in Wide-Scale Forced
Labor'' [Yekende yuz ming dehqan keng kolemlik hashargha tutuldi],
Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 07; Gulchehre, ``Wide-Scale Forced
Labor Started Again in Kashgar Countryside'' [Qeshqer yezilirida keng
kolemlik hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
For Chinese government reporting on the topic, see Kashgar District
Government (Online), ``Yeken [Yarkand] County Starts Springtime Wave to
Cultivate Desert Land'' [Shachexian xianqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian
rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar District Government (Online), ``100,000
Rural Laborers Build Pistachio Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County''
[Shachexian shi wan nongmingong jianshe kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.
\70\ ``Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5. See also ``Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial `Work-
Study' Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
November 2006, 11.
\71\ ``Civil Servant Recruitment in Xinjiang Favors Han Chinese,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2006, 6;
``Xinjiang Government Says Ethnic Han Chinese Will Get 500 of 700 New
Civil Service Appointments,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Online), 7 April 05; CECC Staff Interviews. In addition, new
requirements imposed through the government's ``bilingual'' education
policies disadvantage the job prospects of ethnic minority teachers.
For more information, see Addendum: ``Bilingual'' Education in Xinjiang
at the end of this section.
\72\ According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant
that ``there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority
languages to carry out litigation.'' ``Meticulously Picking Talent:
Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at
Improvement'' [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti
chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also ``Lack
of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially
Prominent'' [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzu youwei
tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; ``Courts throughout Country to
Join Forces to Help Xinjiang'' [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang],
Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel
and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal
proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People's
Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied
within China. See ``China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators
Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty,'' Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open
Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial
proceedings conducted in one's native language, see, e.g., PRC
Constitution, art. 134; REAL, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted
1 January 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure
Law, enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April
91, amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], adopted 25 September 93, amended
20 September 02, art. 12.
\73\ Information within is based on CECC Staff Interviews except
where otherwise noted.
\74\ For background information, including reports from China and
neighboring countries along with reports from overseas observers, see,
e.g., Li Zhongfa, ``Hu Jintao Holds Talks With Kyrgyz President
Bakiyev,'' Xinhua, 9 June 06 (Open Source Center, 11 June 06);
``Cooperation With China Strengthened: Uzbek President,'' Xinhua, 19
June 06 (Open Source Center, 10 June 06); ``China's `Uyghur Problem'
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,'' Hearing on China's Role in
the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?, U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 3-4 August 06, Testimony of Dru Gladney,
Professor of Asian Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa; ``China
Tightly Controls the Cradles of the `Xinjiang Independence' Forces,''
Ta Kung Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source Center, 26 August 06); ``China
To Urge Tougher Counter-Terrorism Measures at SCO 22 Sep Session,''
Agence France-Presse, 21 September 06 (Open Source Center, 21 September
06); Tao Shelan, ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chairman Ismail
Tiliwaldi: Clamping Down On Terrorism Is Common Aspiration of Peace-
Loving People,'' China News Agency, 16 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19
May 07); ``SCO Nations End Consultations on Anti-Terrorism Military
Exercise,'' Xinhua, 19 May 07 (Open Source Center, 19 May 07); Yu Sui,
``Hu's Visit Set To Boost Regional Cooperation,'' China Daily, 14
August 07 (Open Source Center, 14 August 07); Erica Marat, ``Chinese
Migrants Face Discrimination in Kyrgyzstan,'' Jamestown Foundation
(Online), 28 February 08; Robert Sutter, ``Durability in China's
Strategy Toward Central Asia--Reasons for Optimism,'' China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 1, 2008, 3-10. See also the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Web site at www.setsco.org.
\75\ CECC Staff Interviews. Barriers to local asylum proceedings
have resulted in problems including statelessness. For more
information, see, e.g., Refugees International (Online), ``Kazakhstan:
Neglecting Refugees, Engendering Statelessness,'' 21 December 07;
Refugees International (Online), ``Kyrgyz Republic: Powerful Neighbors
Imperil Protection and Create Statelessness,'' 20 December 07; Refugees
International (Online), ``Refugee Voices: Uighurs in Kyrgyz Republic,''
9 January 08.
\76\ CECC Staff Interviews; Amnesty International (Online),
``Central Asia Summary of Human Rights Concerns January 2006-March
2007,'' 2007; Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China (Online),
``Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,'' 24;
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
(Online), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2005, China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 8 March 06.
\77\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July
51 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 33.
\78\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).
\79\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2).
\80\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Promotes Mandarin Chinese Use
Through Bilingual Education,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, January 2006, 17-18; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic
Affairs Commission, ``This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle
Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try `Bilingual' Education'' [Jin qiu
xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu],
reprinted on the State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 9 May 08.
\81\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang's First Round of Love My China Ethnic
Minority Youth Bilingual Oral Speech Contest Opens'' [Xinjiang shoujie
ai wo zhonghua shaoshu minzu shao'er shuangyu kouyu dasai qimu],
Tianshan Net (Online), 15 September 06; Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Love My China Bilingual Speech Contest Enters Semi-Finals''
[Ai wo zhonghua shuangyu dasai jinru fusai], 31 October 06.
\82\ ``Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of
Politicians Managing Education'' [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jianding
luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinhua Economic News, reprinted
in Xinhua, 26 April 05.
\83\ Cited in Arienne M. Dwyer, ``The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur
Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse,'' East-West Center
Washington 2005, Policy Studies 15, 37.
\84\ For these and other protections, see, e.g., PRC Constitution,
arts. 4, 121 and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May
84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21.
\85\ REAL, art. 37. 2005 Implementing Provisions for the REAL
affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also
place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual''
education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL Implementing
Provisions) [Guowuyuan shishi ``Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, art. 22.
\86\ `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages
in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, March/April 2008, 3; ``Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to
Expand Use of Mandarin in Minority Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 13.
\87\ ``Decision Concerning the Vigorous Promotion of `Bilingual'
Education Work'' [Guanyu dali tuijin ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue gongzuo de
jueding], cited in e.g., `` `Eight Questions' About Xinjiang
`Bilingual' Education Work'' [Xinjiang ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue gongzuo
``ba wen''], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 March 08.
\88\ ``Results of Xinjiang's Promotion of `Bilingual Education'
Remarkable'' [Xinjiang tuijin ``shuangyu jiaoxue'' chengxiao xianzhu],
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 7 December 05.
\89\ ``City in Xinjiang Mandates Exclusive Use of Mandarin Chinese
in Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September
2006, 9-10.
\90\ ``Xinjiang Bilingual Education Students Increase 50-fold in 6
Years'' [Xinjiang shuangyu xuesheng liu nian zengzhang 50 bei],
Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 31 October
06.
\91\ Xinjiang Education Department (Online), ``Notice Concerning
Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable
Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary
``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)' ''
[Guanyu zhengqiu ``guanyu jiji, wentuode tuijin shaoshu minzu xueqian
he zhongxiaoxue `shuangyu' jiaoxue gongzuo de yijian (zhengqiu
yijian)'' yijian de tongzhi], 5 May 08.
\92\ ``Results of Xinjiang's Promotion of `Bilingual Education'
Remarkable,'' Xinjiang Daily.
\93\ Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning Soliciting
Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of
Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual''
Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\94\ Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, ``Language Blow for China's Muslims,''
BBC (Online), 1 June 2002.
\95\ ``Xinjiang Vocational Schools To Implement Two-Year Education
System, Basic Courses Taught in Mandarin'' [Xinjiang zhiye yuanxiao
jiang shixing liang nian zhi jiaoyu jichuke shiyong hanyu jiangke],
Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 27 July 2005.
\96\ In contrast, an undated description of the college, available
on the XUAR Personnel Department Web site, describes the institution as
a combined ethnic minority-Han school that teaches in Mandarin, Uyghur,
and Kazakh. `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority
Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update.
\97\ Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of Ethnic Minority
Preschool ``Bilingual'' Education [Guanyu jiaqiang shaoshu minzu
xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as cited in ``
`Eight Questions' About Xinjiang `Bilingual' Education Work,'' Tianshan
Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the original text of this
opinion. See also Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning
Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable
Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary
``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\98\ ``Xinjiang Makes 5-Year 430 Million Yuan Investment To Develop
Rural Preschool `Bilingual' Education'' [Xinjiang 5 nian touru 4.3 yi
fazhan nongcun xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Economic News,
reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 10 October 06; `` `Bilingual'
Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang
Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update. These
plans may have stemmed from direction in the 2005 opinion on preschool
``bilingual'' education. See Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of
Ethnic Minority Preschool ``Bilingual'' Education [Guanyu jiaqiang
shaoshu minzu xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu de yijian], issued 2005, as
cited in `` `Eight Questions' About Xinjiang `Bilingual' Education
Work,'' Tianshan Net. Commission staff was unable to locate the
original text of this opinion.
\99\ ``[XUAR] Department of Finance Allocates 70.39 Million Yuan To
Support Preschool `Bilingual' Education'' [Caizhengting xiabo 7039 wan
yuan zhichi xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 12
November 07; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic Minority
Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update. The subsidies include 1.5 yuan each day per child for daily
expenses, 20 yuan yearly per child for teaching materials, and a 400
yuan monthly subsidy per teacher. The government had announced
subsidies for ``bilingual'' preschool education at least as early as
2005. ``Xinjiang Official Describes Plan to Expand Use of Mandarin in
Minority Schools,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\100\ ``105 Teachers College Students Go to Kashgar, Xinjiang To
Support Educational Undertakings'' [105 ming shifansheng fu xinjiang
kashi zhijiao], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted in Tianshan Net
(Online), 28 February 08; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces Use of Ethnic
Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update.
\101\ ``State To Invest 3.75 Billion Yuan To Support Xinjiang
`Bilingual' Preschool Education'' [Guojia jiang touru 37.5 yi yuan
zhichi xinjiang xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted
in Tianshan Net (Online), 12 September 08.
\102\ In June 2007, official media reported that 42.8 percent of
rural preschool-age children in Yengisheher county, Kashgar district,
were enrolled in ``bilingual'' preschool programs. ``40 Percent of
Rural Youngsters of Appropriate Age Attend `Bilingual' Preschools,
`Bilingual' Preschool Education Welcomed by the Farmers of
Yengisheher'' [Si cheng nongcun shiling ertong jiudu ``shuangyu''
you'eryuan xueqian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu shou shule nongmin huanying],
Xinjiang Daily (Online), 22 June 07. In December 2007, official media
reported that in 2008, all urban ethnic minority children and 90
percent of rural preschool-age ethnic minority children in Bayin'gholin
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture--which has a predominantly Uyghur ethnic
minority population--would receive ``bilingual'' education. ``Ethnic
Minority Youngsters of the Appropriate Age Receive `Bilingual'
Education'' [Shaoshu minzu shiling ertong jieshou ``shuangyu''
jiaoxue], Tianshan Net (Online), 26 December 07. The article also noted
that all urban elementary school students in first grade and higher
would receive ``bilingual'' education, as would over 80 percent of
their rural counterparts. For statistics on the ethnic minority
population within the prefecture, see ``Introduction to the General
Situation in the Bayin'gholin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture''
[Bayinguoleng menggu zizhizhou gaikuang jianjie], Xinjiang Investment
Net (Online), 24 December 07.
\103\ Xinjiang Education Department, ``Notice Concerning Soliciting
Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of
Ethnic Minority Preschool and Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual''
Education Work (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).' ''
\104\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Uyghur
Language Under Attack: The Myth of `Bilingual' Education in the
People's Republic of China,'' 24 July 07, 8-9; ``Atush Starts Mandarin
Chinese-Strengthening Training Class in Shenyang'' [Atushi kaiban fu
shenyang jiaoshi hanyu qianghua peixunban], Qizilsu News, reprinted on
the Qizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Government Web site, 16 August
06; ``China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools,'' Radio Free
Asia (Online), 16 March 04. See also Xinjiang Education Department,
``Notice Concerning Soliciting Opinions on `Opinion Concerning the
Vigorous and Reliable Promotion of Ethnic Minority Preschool and
Elementary and Secondary ``Bilingual'' Education Work (Draft for
Soliciting Opinions).' '' The opinion calls for giving ``appropriate
placements'' to older teachers with poor Mandarin skills.
\105\ ``Autonomous Region Chair Nur Bekri Responds to Separatists'
Attack on Bilingual Education'' [Zizhiqu zhuxi nu'er baikeli huiying
fenlie fenzi dui shuangyu jiaoyu gongji], Xinjiang Metropolitan News,
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 5 March 08; `` `Bilingual' Policy Reduces
Use of Ethnic Minority Languages in Xinjiang Preschools,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update.
\106\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Deception, Pressure,
and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China,'' 8
February 08, 4-6.
\107\ ``Uyghur Girls Forced Into Labor Far From Home By Local
Chinese Officials,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 July 07.
\108\ Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that the government announced
in 2004 that all forced labor (hashar, sometimes also translated as
``corvee labor'') would be abolished by the end of 2005. While one
government official whom RFA broadcasters contacted said that workers
were paid and would become owners of the base, another official
contacted by RFA said that the laborers would not be paid. The spouse
of a third official, who answered a telephone call from RFA, surmised
that workers would not be paid. A farmer contacted by RFA reported that
20 laborers per small village were required to work at the site without
pay, and were required to pay a fine if they refused. For information
in English, see RFA's blog ``RFA Unplugged.'' ``Forced, Unpaid Labor
for Uyghurs in China's Almond Groves,'' RFA Unplugged (Online), 9 April
07. For Uyghur-language reporting on the topic, see, e.g., Gulchehre,
``Forced Labor Started Once Again in Kashgar Villages'' [Qeshqer
yezilirida hashar yene bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 February
07; Gulchehre, ``100,000 Farmers in Yeken [County] Involved in Wide-
Scale Forced Labor'' [Yekende yuz ming dehqan keng kolemlik hashargha
tutuldi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 07.
\109\ Kashgar District Government (Online), ``Yeken [Yarkand]
County Starts Springtime Wave To Cultivate Desert Land'' [Shachexian
xianqi chunji gebi kaihuang zaotian rechao], 9 March 07; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``100,000 Rural Laborers Build Pistachio
Base in Yeken [Yarkand] County'' [Shachexian 10 wan nongmingong jianshe
kaixinguo jidi], 20 March 07.
\110\ Gulchehre, ``Forced Labor Begins Again on Wide Scale in
Kashgar Villages'' [Qeshqer yezilirida keng kolemlik hashar yene
bashlandi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 March 08.
\111\ ``Work-Study Programs Using Child Labor Continue in
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5; ``Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial `Work-Study'
Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November
2006, 11.
\112\ According to one report, personnel shortcomings have meant
that ``there is no way to guarantee the use of ethnic minority
languages to carry out litigation.'' ``Meticulously Picking Talent:
Problem of Faultline in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at
Improvement'' [Jingxin linxuan rencai xinjiang faguan duanceng wenti
chubu huanjie], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 06. See also ``Lack
of Ethnic Minority Judges in Xinjiang Basic-Level Courts Especially
Prominent'' [Xinjiang jiceng fayuan shaoshu minzu faguan buzu youwei
tuchu], Xinhua (Online), 22 November 07; ``Courts Throughout Country To
Join Forces To Help Xinjiang'' [Quanguo fayuan jiang heli yuan jiang],
Tianshan Net (Online), 20 August 07. The shortage of legal personnel
and interpreters who speak ethnic minority languages also impacts legal
proceedings outside the XUAR, especially since the Supreme People's
Court returned to the process of reviewing all death sentences levied
within China. See ``China Exclusive: More Ethnic Judges, Translators
Needed To Cope With Stricter Death Penalty,'' Xinhua, 13 March 07 (Open
Source Center, 13 March 07). For legal bases to have judicial
proceedings conducted in one's native language, see, e.g., PRC
Constitution, art. 134; Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May
84, amended 28 February 01, art. 47; Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1
January 79, amended 17 March 96, art. 9; Administrative Procedure Law,
enacted 4 April 89, art. 8; Civil Procedure Law, enacted 9 April 91,
amended 28 October 07, art. 11; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work [Xinjiang weiwu'er
zizhiqu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 September 93, amended 20
September 02, art. 12.
\113\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
Is Launched'' [Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo
qidong], Xinhua (Online), 14 August 07; ``Xinjiang Actively Constructs
Troops of Ethnic Minority Lawyers'' [Xinjiang jiji jianshe shaoshu
minzu lushi duiwu], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 15
October 07. There were 316 ethnic minority lawyers, or 15 percent of
the total population, in 2006. ``Xinjiang Bilingual Lawyers and Courts
Develop with Grace'' [Xinjiang shuangyu lushi fating zhan fengcai],
Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 2006. For information on conditions in an
individual prefecture, see a description of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture, which has 23 ethnic minority lawyers out of a total of 163,
in ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic Minority
Lawyers'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shaoshu minzu lushi qique], Uyghur
Online, 20 April 07.
\114\ ``First Bilingual Law Firm in China Hangs Out Its Shingle''
[Guonei shoujia shuangyu lushisuo jiepai], Xinjiang Legal Daily
(Online), 30 March 06.
\115\ For an example of efforts to promote staffing in underserved
areas, see, e.g., ``Meticulously Picking Talent: Problem of Faultline
in Xinjiang Courts Makes First Steps at Improvement,'' Tianshan Net.
\116\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Sorely Lacks Ethnic
Minority Lawyers,'' Uyghur Online.
\117\ ``Our Region Acts to Train Minority-Han High-Level Bilingual
Talent'' [Woqu chutai jucuo peiyang minhan jiantong gao cengci shuangyu
rencai], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 27 September 07.
\118\ ``Work Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts
Is Launched,'' Xinhua.
\119\ Ibid.
\120\ Supreme People's Court, ``National Forum Opens To Discuss
Courts' Work To Assist Their Counterparts in Xinjiang--Jiang Xingchang
Calls For Forming a Long-Term Mechanism To Assist Xinjiang and Raise
the Judicial Capability of Its Courts,'' 14 August 07 (Open Source
Center, 20 August 07).
\121\ Yan Wenlu, ``Xinjiang Higher People's Court To Sternly Crack
Down on Crimes of the `Three Forces' in Accordance With the Law,''
China News Agency, 15 August 08 (Open Source Center, 15 August 08).
\122\ The government describes religious extremism as one of the
``three forces'' against which it has launched a ``strike-hard''
campaign. The other forces are separatism and terrorism. Local
government reported maintaining surveillance of religious practice
through a ``two-point system,'' which has been in force in recent years
and is described by local government sources as a mechanism for
maintaining regular contact with mosques and carrying out ``chats''
with religious figures. For a basic description of the two-point
system, see Aqsu Party Building (Online), ``32nd Installment'' [Di 32
qi], 18 January 05; Onsu Party Building, ``United Front Embraces the 2
Systems, Perfects the 3 Kinds of Mechanisms'' [Tongzhanbu weirao liang
xiang zhidu gaishan sanzhong jizhi], 5 April 06. For reports from the
past year on the two-point system and other measures to control
religious practice in the region, including via increased controls over
mosques and religious leaders, see, e.g., Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Yengisar County Speech on Its Current Stance''
[Yingjishaxian biaotai fayan], 5 January 08; Qumul District Government
(Online), ``Gulshat Abduhadir Stresses at District Education Work
Meeting, Enlarge Investments for Optimal Environment'' [Gulixiati
Abudouhade'er zai diqu jiaoyu gongzuo huiyishang qiangdiao jiada touru
youhua huanjing], 9 March 08; Yeken [Yarkand] County Government
(Online), ``Yeken County Almaty Village Implements `8 Acts' To
Establish Safe and Sound Village'' [Shachexian alamaitixiang shishi
``baxiang jucuo'' chuangjian pingan xiangzhen], 16 October 07; Kashgar
District Government (Online), ``Let Society Be Stable and Harmonious,
For the People To Be Without Fear--Work Report on Poskam County
Striving to Establish a Region-Level Quiet and Stable County'' [Rang
shehui wending hexie wei baixing anjuleye--zepuxian zheng chuang
zizhiquji ping'an xian gongzuo jishi], 3 December 07; ``Crackdown on
Xinjiang Mosques, Religion,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 August 08;
``Mongghulkure County `Protect Olympics, Protect Stability' Supervision
Group Reports Work to Ili Prefecture'' [Zhaosuxian shang yili zhou
``bao ao yun cu wending'' dudao xiaozu huibao gongzuo], Ili Peace Net
(Online), 16 July 08; Monghulkure County Promptly Arranges
Implementation of Spirit of Ili 7.13 Stability Meeting [Zhaosuxian
xunsu anpai luoshi yilizhou ``7.13'' wending huiyi jingshen], Ili Peace
Net (Online), 16 July 08; Kashgar District Government, ``Usher in the
Olympics and Ensure Stability; Jiashi People Are of One Heart and
Mind,'' 8 August 08 (Open Source Center, 8 August 08).
\123\ ``Nur Bekri's Speech at Autonomous Region Cadre Plenary
Session'' [Nu'er Baikeli zai zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang de jianghua],
Tianshan Net (Online), 11 September 08.
\124\ ``Uyghur Mosque Demolished,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 23
June 08; Jume, ``Mosque in Kelpin County Destroyed by the Government''
[Kelpin nahiyisi tewesidiki bir meschit hokumet teripidin
cheqiwetildi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 June 08. In response to a
question about the demolition, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesperson described the mosque as part of two ``unlawfully built
structures'' used ``without authorization'' for religious activity and
said that local residents tore down the structures on their own after
learning their construction violated Chinese law. Lin Liping and Rong
Yan, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says the Report Alleging the
`Demolition of a Mosque in Xinjiang' Grossly Untrue,'' Xinhua, 8 July
08 (Open Source Center, 8 July 08). See also ``AFP Reporters Barred
From China Village Where Mosque Was Razed,'' Agence France-Presse, 30
July 08 (Open Source Center, 30 July 08).
\125\ For examples of reported measures, see, e.g., ``Religious
Repression in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3; Shayar County
Government (Online), ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang
Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During Ramadan''
[Shayaxian yingmaili zhen caiqu jiu xiang cuoshijiaqiang ``zhaiyue''
qijian guanli], 28 August 08; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security'' [Zhaosuxian wu cuoshi
tiqian zuohao zhaiyue guanli bao ao yun wending], Fazhi Xinjiang
(Online), 23 August 08; ``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard
Stability During Ramadan'' [Xinhexian bushu zhaiyue qijian weiwen
gongzuo], Xinjiang Peace Net (Online), 2 September 08; Yopurgha County
Government (Online), ``Our County Carries Out Plans for Work on
Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'' [Wo qu dui zhaiyue
qijian zongjiao shiwu guanli gongzuo jinxing anpai], 1 September 08;
Kuytun City Government (Online), ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work
to Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day'' [Kuitunshi zhaokai wei wen
gongzuo huiyi dui can'aohui, zhaiyue he guoqingjie qijian anquan
gongzuo jinxing anpai], 3 September 08; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's
Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 September 08.
\126\ ``Xinjiang Uyghurs Committed to Ramadan Are Detained, Retired
Han Official Criticizes Corruption'' [Xinjiang weizuren jianchi
fengzhai beiju hanren tuixiu guan pi zhengfu tanfu], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 16 September 08.
\127\ See generally Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi
Mehelle in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen
Management During Ramadan''; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County
Ensure Ramadan Management and Olympics Security,'' Fazhi Xinjiang;
``Toqsu County Deploys Work to Safeguard Stability During Ramadan,''
Xinjiang Peace Net; Yopurgha County Government, ``Our County Carries
Out Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'';
Kuytun City Government, ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to
Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day''; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's
Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia.
\128\ Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi Mehelle in Shayar
County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management During
Ramadan''; ``Five Measures from Mongghulkure County Ensure Ramadan
Management and Olympics Security,'' Fazhi Xinjiang; ``Ramadan Curbs on
China's Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia; Weli, ``Chinese Government Now
Forcing Women in Xoten to Expose Their Faces'' [Xitay hokumiti hazir
xotende ayallarni yuzini echiwetishqa mejburlimaqta], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 27 August 08.
\129\ ``Authorities Block Uighur Protest in Xinjiang, Detain
Protesters,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
3.
\130\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of
the Law on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shishi
``Weichengnianren baohufa'' banfa], issued 25 September 93, art. 14. No
other provincial or national regulation on minors or on religion
contains this precise provision. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in
China (Online), ``Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in
Xinjiang,'' April 2005, 58 (pagination follows ``text-only'' pdf
download of this report).
\131\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``A Life or Death
Struggle in East Turkestan; Uyghurs Face Unprecedented Persecution in
post-Olympic Period,'' 4 September 08, 4.
\132\ See, e.g., Shayar County Government, ``Town of Yengi Mehelle
in Shayar County Xinjiang Adopts Nine Measures to Strengthen Management
During Ramadan''; Yopurgha County Government, ``Our County Carries Out
Plans for Work on Management of Religious Affairs During Ramadan'';
Kuytun City Government, ``Kuytun City Convenes Meeting on Work to
Safeguard Stability, Carries Out Plans on Safety Work During
Paralympics, Ramadan, and National Day''; Kashgar District Government
(Online), ``Maralbeshi Launches Activities for Developing and
Cultivating National Spirit in Elementary and Secondary Schools Month''
[Bachu kaizhan zhongxiaoxue hongyang he peiyu minzu jingshen yue
huodong], 26 September 08; ``Qorghas County Langan Village `Attaches
Importance, Propagates, Arranges, Examines, Protects, Strikes, and
Prevents' to Do Various Work Regarding Muslim Population During
Ramadan'' [Huochengxian langan xiang ``zhong, xuan, pai, cha, bao, yan,
fang'' zuo hao musilin qunzhong zhaiyue qijian ge xiang gongzuo],
Qorghas Peace Net (Online), 27 August 08; ``Religious Repression in
Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, January 2008, 3; ``Ramadan Curbs on China's Muslims,''
Radio Free Asia.
\133\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Government Continues Restrictions on
Mosque Attendance,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March 2006, 8; U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report--2008, China.
\134\ See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government
(Online), ``Nur Bekri's Work Report at First Session of the 11th
Xinjiang Autonomous Regional People's Congress'' [Zai zizhiqu shiyi jie
renda yi ci huiyi shang nu'er baikeli suo zuo zhengfu gongzuo bao], 16
January 08; Yeken County Government, ``Yeken County Almaty Village
Implements `8 Acts' To Establish Safe and Sound Village.'' For
information on the 2007 passport restrictions, see the CECC, 2007
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 99.
\135\ U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom
Report--2008, China.
\136\ ``China Jails Clerics for Planning Mecca Trips, Group Says,''
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), reprinted in Taipei Times (Online), 25
June 08. According to the DPA article, authorities also reportedly
punished the group for distributing copies of the Quran at a criminal
sentencing rally.
\137\ For more information on recent controls, see CECC 2007 Annual
Report, 99.
\138\ ``Record Number of Chinese Muslims To Make Mecca
Pilgrimage,'' Xinhua, 14 November 07 (Open Source Center, 14 November
07).
\139\ Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage
Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce],
(Ningxia People's Publishing Company), 121.
\140\ Ibid., 106-107.
\141\ For more information on recent controls imposed on Muslim
communities across China, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September
06, 89-91, and CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 98-100.
\142\ Wen Ping, ``How Was the Problem Between Religion and
Socialism Cracked--Exclusive Interview With Religious Affairs
Administration Director Ye Xiaowen.''
\143\ United Front Work Department (Online), ``Ningxia's `2008
First-Term Study Class for Muslim Personnel' Opens'' [Ningxia ``2008
nian di yi qi yisilanjiao jiaozhi renyuan dushuban'' kaixue], 14 March
08.