[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
=======================================================================
REPRINTED
from the
2008 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio Chairman
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California CARL LEVIN, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor
CHRISTOPHER PADILLA, Department of Commerce
DAVID KRAMER, Department of State
Douglas Grob, Staff Director
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Deputy Staff Director
Freedom of Expression
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully
exercise their rights to free expression.
The government and Party's efforts to project
a ``positive'' image before and during the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games were accompanied by increases in
the frequency and extent of official violations of the
right to free expression.
Official censorship and manipulation of the
press and Internet for political purposes intensified
in connection with both Tibetan protests that began in
March 2008 and the Olympics.
Chinese officials failed to fully implement
legal provisions granting press freedom to foreign
reporters in accordance with agreements made as a
condition of hosting the Olympics, and which the
International Olympic Committee requires of all Olympic
host cities.
The government and Party continued to deny
Chinese citizens the ability to speak to journalists
without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
Officials continued to use vague laws to
punish journalists, writers, rights advocates,
publishers, and others for peacefully exercising their
right to free expression. Those who criticized China in
the context of the Olympics were targeted more
intensely. Restraints on publishing remained in place.
Authorities responsible for implementing a new
national
regulation on open government information retained
broad discretion on the release of government
information. Open government information measures
enabled officials to promote images of openness, and
quickly to provide official versions of events, while
officials maintained the ability at the same time to
censor unauthorized accounts.
Recommendations
Support Federal funding for the study of press
and Internet censorship methods, practices, and
capacities in China. Promote programs that offer
Chinese citizens access to human rights-related and
other information currently unavailable to them.
Sponsor programs that disseminate through radio,
television, or the Internet Chinese-language ``how-to''
information and programming on the use by citizens of
open government information provisions on the books.
Support the development of ``how-to'' materials
for U.S. citizens, companies, and organizations in
China on the use of the Regulations on Open Government
Information and other records-access provisions in
Chinese central and local-level laws and regulations.
Support development of materials that provide guidance
to U.S. companies in China on how the Chinese
government may require them to support restrictions on
freedom of expression and best practices to minimize or
avoid such risks.
In official correspondence with Chinese
counterparts, include statements calling for the
release of political prisoners named in this report who
have been punished for peaceful expression, including:
Yang Chunlin (land rights activist sentenced to five
years' imprisonment in March 2008 after organizing a
``We Want Human Rights, Not Olympics'' petition); Yang
Maodong (legal activist and writer whose pen name is
Guo Feixiong, sentenced to five years' imprisonment in
November 2007 for unauthorized publishing); Lu Gengsong
(writer sentenced to four years' imprisonment in
February 2008 for his online criticism of the Chinese
government); and other prisoners included in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, the Chinese government and Communist
Party continued to deny Chinese citizens the ability to fully
exercise their rights to free expression. In its 2007 Annual
Report, the Commission noted that China lacked a free press and
that Chinese officials provided only limited government
transparency, practiced pervasive censorship of the Internet
and other electronic media, and placed prior restraints on a
citizen's ability to freely publish.\1\ This past year, the
Commission has observed little to no improvement on these
issues. To the contrary, censorship and manipulation of the
press and Internet for political purposes worsened due to major
events, including Tibetan protests that began in March 2008 and
China's hosting of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. The
Chinese government continued to impose prior restraints on the
publication of printed and online material. Authorities
continued to punish religious practitioners for publishing or
distributing religious materials without government permission.
[See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Controls Over Religious
Publications.] Officials continued to use vague laws to punish
journalists, writers, rights advocates, and others for
peacefully exercising their right to free expression,
particularly those who criticized the government or Party in
the context of the Olympics. Officials also continued to
restrict the freedom of expression of Uyghurs [see Section IV--
Xinjiang--Controls Over Free Expression in Xinjiang] and to
harass foreign journalists, despite a pledge to grant them
greater press freedom for the Olympics [see Section II--2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games--Commitment to Foreign
Journalists].
Over the past year, the government continued its gradual
policy of increasing citizen access to government-held
information. Officials, however, maintained broad discretion on
the release of government information. Open government
information measures
enabled officials to promote images of openness, and quickly to
provide official versions of events, while officials maintained
the ability at the same time to censor unauthorized accounts.
The spread of the Internet and cell phones as mediums for
expression continued to pose a challenge to the Party, a trend
noted in the Commission's 2007 Annual Report.\2\ Internet and
cell phone use continues to grow. By the end of June 2008, the
number of Internet and cell phone users in China had risen to
253 million\3\ and 601 million,\4\ respectively, increases of
56 percent and 20 percent over the previous year.\5\ As the
Commission noted in its 2007 Annual Report, Chinese citizens
used these technologies to raise public awareness and protest
government policies,\6\ a trend that continued this past
year.\7\ Officials, however, continued to punish citizens who
used these technologies to organize protests or to share
politically sensitive information.\8\
CHINESE CITIZENS ENTITLED TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, SPEECH, PRESS
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and committed
to ratify, provides:
``1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.'' \9\
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a
similar provision.\10\ Article 35 of China's Constitution
states: ``Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,
of procession, and of demonstration.'' \11\
International human rights standards allow for restrictions
on freedom of expression under limited circumstances. Article
19 of the ICCPR provides that such restrictions must be
``provided by law'' and ``necessary'' for the ``respect of the
rights or reputations of others,'' ``protection of national
security or of public order (ordre public),'' or ``of public
health or morals.'' \12\ Chinese officials say that their
restrictions on freedom of expression are ``in accordance with
law,'' \13\ and at times cite national security or public
safety concerns.\14\ Chinese law, however, does not require
officials to prove that their actions are ``necessary'' to
protect ``national security'' or ``public order'' and only
vaguely defines crimes of ``endangering national security'' or
``disturbing public order,'' allowing officials broad
discretion to punish peaceful activity.'' \15\
GOVERNMENT'S LIMITED STEPS TOWARD OPENNESS
Over the past year, the government continued its gradual
policy of increasing citizen access to government-held
information. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
issued statements endorsing greater government transparency,
echoing similar calls in recent years.\16\ As noted in the
Commission's 2007 Annual Report, the first national Regulations
on Open Government Information (OGI regulation) went into
effect in May 2008, giving citizens the right to request
government information and calling on government agencies at
all levels to proactively disclose ``vital'' information to the
public in a timely manner.\17\ [See addendum at the end of this
section for Commission analysis of the OGI regulation.] The
government and Communist Party reportedly increased media
access to the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 and the March
2008 meetings of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference and National People's Congress (NPC), although
official media appeared to exaggerate the actual
improvement.\18\ In April 2008, the NPC Standing Committee
announced that it would begin releasing draft laws to the
public for review.\19\ The Standing Committee generally does
not have the power to draft criminal and civil legislation,
however, meaning such important laws are not covered by the new
policy.\20\
Systemic obstacles to obtaining information from the
Chinese government have limited the impact of the OGI
regulation. The Commission noted a few of these obstacles, such
as China's state secrets laws and the lack of a free press, in
its 2007 Annual Report.\21\ As noted in that report, the OGI
regulation contains a state secrets exception giving officials
broad discretion to withhold information.\22\ Since the
regulation took effect, mainland Chinese and Hong Kong news
organizations reported that some officials have been evasive or
uncooperative when handling information requests and have cited
the ``state secrets'' exception in refusing to disclose
information.\23\ The central government issued an opinion in
April 2008 imposing a purpose test on information requests,
saying that officials could deny requests for information not
related to the requesting party's ``production, livelihood and
scientific and technological research.'' \24\ China's lack of
an independent judiciary has further hindered effective
implementation of the OGI regulation. Chinese courts have been
reluctant to accept disclosure cases and had not ordered any
government agencies to release information as of September
2008.\25\
With few checks on their power to withhold information,
officials continued to keep critical information from the
public. In September 2008, for example, officials in
Shijiazhuang city, Hebei province, reportedly waited more than
a month before informing provincial officials about complaints
of contaminated milk, which resulted in at least four deaths
and injuries to thousands of infants.\26\ An editor of the
Southern Weekend, a Chinese newspaper with a reputation for
more independent reporting, revealed on his blog that the paper
had discovered cases of sick children in July but were unable
to publish the stories because of censorship before the 2008
Olympic Games.\27\ In the run-up to the Olympics in August,
propaganda officials issued several directives to domestic
journalists, one of which warned editors that ``all food safety
issues . . . is off limits.'' \28\ After the milk scandal broke
open, officials ordered journalists to follow the ``official''
line and banned commentaries and news features about the
tainted milk products.\29\ At least one Chinese journalist
publicly criticized this censorship and called for press
freedom.\30\ [For more information on the government's handling
of the milk crisis, see Section III--Commercial Rule of Law--
Food and Product Safety.]
In some cases this past year, officials and the state-
controlled media provided information about politically
sensitive events more quickly than they might have in the past,
but such moves were not necessarily a sign of greater openness.
As noted in a Newsweek article by Jonathan Ansfield, Xinhua's
English news service reported an attack that killed at least 16
policemen in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on August 4,
2008, more than an hour before the Chinese version and little
more than three hours after the event occurred.\31\ Ansfield
notes, however, that Chinese journalists told him that this
unusual speed was ``no fluke,'' but rather the result of a top
Party propaganda official ordering journalists at central news
organizations to take the initiative to report ``major sudden
incidents'' in order to ``get the official scoop on events
before overseas media do, particularly around the time of the
Olympic Games.'' One journalist called it a ``form of
progress'' as it allowed them to report sensitive news before
receiving specific instructions from propaganda authorities,
but it only applied to central media outlets like Xinhua, and
journalists were aware that they must still toe the Party line
and that not all stories could be covered this way.\32\
In May 2008, foreign observers noted that Chinese officials
responded to the devastating Sichuan earthquake with unusual
openness.\33\ The more open response of China's media, however,
was in part due to large numbers of domestic reporters defying
an initial ban on traveling to the disaster areas and other
factors beyond the government's control.\34\ Nevertheless,
officials sought to take credit for the ``openness'' for
propaganda purposes. A Xinhua article described the response as
showing ``unprecedented transparency,'' gave credit to recent
reforms including the OGI regulation, and noted the ``positive
response from domestic and international observers alike,''
making no mention of the original ban on travel or subsequent
orders by Party and government officials dictating how the
media should cover the event.\35\ [For more information on
Party and government censorship of the media following the May
2008 Sichuan earthquake, see box titled Tibetan Protests,
Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics below.]
CENSORSHIP OF THE MEDIA AND INTERNET SERVES THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT'S
INTERESTS
Censorship of Media and Publishing
The Communist Party continues to control what journalists
may write or broadcast. In a June 2008 speech, President and
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reiterated the Chinese
media's subordinate role to the Party, telling journalists they
must ``serve socialism'' and the Party.\36\ The Party's Central
Propaganda Department (CPD) issues directives that Chinese
journalists must follow. The directives do not meet the
international human rights standard requirement that they be
``prescribed by law'' since they are issued by a Party entity,
rather than pursuant to legislation issued by one of the organs
authorized to pass legislation under the PRC Legislation Law.
Reporters have no legal recourse to challenge such
restrictions. Those that cross the line are subject to firing
or removal of content. In November 2007, the CPD ordered the
dismissal of a journalist who wrote about a major railroad line
built with substandard materials.\37\ In July 2008, officials
pulled the Beijing News from stands after it published a photo
of injured protesters at the 1989 Tiananmen Square
demonstrations.\38\
The Chinese government relies on prior restraints on
publishing, including licensing and other regulatory
requirements, to restrict free expression.\39\ Anyone wishing
to publish a book, newspaper, or magazine, or to work legally
as a journalist, must obtain a license from the government's
press regulator. The Chinese government forbids private
publishing of religious materials and restricts the production
of religious publications to state-licensed enterprises. Such
restrictions have a chilling effect, and officials use them as
a pretext to punish free expression. Shi Weihan, owner of a
Christian bookstore in Beijing, was detained in November 2007
and accused of illegally printing and distributing religious
literature.\40\ In June 2008, authorities detained Ha Jingbo
and Jiang Ruoling, two middle school teachers from Dongfeng
county in Jilin province, for distributing educational leaflets
about Falun Gong.\41\ In November 2007, a court in Guangdong
province sentenced legal activist and writer Yang Maodong (who
uses the pen name Guo Feixiong) to five years' imprisonment for
``illegal operation of a business,'' for using another book's
publication number, the quantity of which the government
limits, to publish his own book. Local officials were
apparently angry at Guo's book, which concerned a political
scandal.\42\
In May 2008, new book publishing regulations went into
effect. Similar to other publishing regulations in China, the
new regulations require book publishers to ``insist on Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought'' and ``the correct guidance of
public opinion,'' to have a government-approved sponsor and
meet financial requirements, and to abide by the government's
plans for the ``number, structure, and distribution'' of
publishing units.\43\ Officials continued to target political
and religious publications as part of an ongoing campaign to
``clean up'' the publishing industry.\44\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to control the
Internet through an effective and pervasive system that relies on
government regulation and public officials and Internet companies
monitoring and censoring online content. China's measures to control
the Internet do not conform to international standards for freedom of
expression because they not only address issues of public concern such
as pornography, privacy protection, and spam, but also content
officials deem politically unacceptable. China's top officials continue
to signal that its control over the Internet is motivated by political
concerns. In his June 2008 speech, President Hu Jintao reiterated the
importance of co-opting the Internet as a ``forward position for
disseminating socialist advanced culture.'' \45\
All Web sites hosted in China must either be licensed by or registered
with the government,\46\ and sites providing news content or audio and
video services require additional license or registration.\47\
In September 2007, the Shanghai Daily reported that officials
shut down 9,593 unregistered Web sites, in a move that occurred just
before the 17th Party Congress in October.\48\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2008, officials reportedly ordered a domestic human
rights Web site to shut down for failing to have the proper
license.\49\
This past year, Chinese officials also targeted audio and video
hosting Web sites, whose content is increasingly popular but more
difficult to censor, as well as online maps.
Provisions that went into effect in January 2008 reiterated
the licensing requirement for audio and video Web sites and now
require them to be state-owned or state-controlled.\50\
In March 2008, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and
Television reported the results of a two-month crackdown, saying that
it shut down 25 video Web sites and warned 32 others for, among other
things, failing to have the proper license or ``endangering the
security and interests of the state.'' \51\
Following the Tibetan protests that began in March, access to
the U.S.-based video sharing Web site YouTube.com was reportedly
blocked after dozens of videos about the protests showed up on the
site.\52\ No footage of the protests was found on the Chinese-based
video Web sites 56.com, Youku.com, and Tudou.com.\53\
In February 2008, the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping
issued an opinion telling online map providers that they must obtain
the appropriate licenses and avoid ``geographical information that
could harm national security.'' \54\
In April 2008, officials began a year-long campaign to remove
``illegal'' maps on the Internet, including those that commit
``errors'' such as identifying Taiwan as separate from China.\55\
Officials continued to use their control over the connection between
China and the global Internet to block access to politically sensitive
foreign-based Web sites, while also policing domestic content.\56\ Over
the past year, media reports and testing done by OpenNet Initiative
indicated that access within China to the Web sites for foreign or Hong
Kong news organizations such as Guardian, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Hong
Kong-based Apple Daily, Radio Free Asia, and Voice of America, human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Reporters Without
Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights in China, and
Human Rights Watch, and sites relating to Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwan,
Chinese activists, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests was
blocked at various times.\57\ In response to foreign reporters'
complaints over blocked Web sites, a Chinese Olympics official publicly
acknowledged in late July 2008 that sites relating to Falun Gong were
blocked and would remain blocked despite the Olympics. Following those
complaints, foreign media reported that some previously blocked sites,
including those for Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
Radio Free Asia, became accessible at the Olympic village.\58\ Domestic
Web sites continued to be targeted as well. In the first half of 2008,
officials reportedly ordered several HIV/AIDS Web sites to shut down or
remove content.\59\ In addition, the Commission has received no
indication that access to its Web site has become available in China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government compels companies providing Internet services in China,
including those based in other countries, to monitor and record the
online activities of its customers, to filter and delete information
the government considers ``harmful'' or politically sensitive, and to
report suspicious activity to authorities.\60\ An October 2007 report
on Chinese Internet censorship released by Reporters Without Borders
and Chinese Human Rights Defenders and written by an unnamed Chinese
employee of an Internet company said that there were between 400 and
500 banned key words and that companies censored these words to avoid
fines.\61\ Internet users in China frequently complain that censors
remove their postings or prevent them from appearing at all.\62\
Such censorship is particularly evident before or after events
perceived by the Party to be politically sensitive. After Tibetan
protests began in March 2008, foreign media reported that searches on
the popular Chinese search engine Baidu and Google for news stories on
Tibet turned up no protest news in the top results or inaccessible
links.\63\ In April 2008, Chinese media reported that Baidu, Google,
and Yahoo China were censoring searches that contained the word
``Carrefour,'' a French department store, amid public outcry over
protests during the Paris leg of the Olympic torch relay.\64\ In the
run-up to the Olympics, public officials across China ordered hotels to
ensure that they had installed Internet security systems capable of
monitoring and censoring users' Internet activities.\65\ In October
2008, Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia issued a report
detailing a large-scale surveillance system of Internet text messages
sent by customers of Tom-Skype, a joint venture between a Chinese
company and eBay, which owns Skype. They found that text messages
relating to Falun Gong, Taiwan independence, the Chinese Communist
Party, and words such as democracy, earthquake, and milk powder had
been censored, and that customers' personal information, text messages,
and chat conversations between users in China and outside China had
been recorded.\66\ Skype's president said that the company was aware
that the Chinese government was monitoring chat messages but not that
its Chinese partner was storing those messages deemed politically
sensitive.\67\
The Communist Party also continued to directly order the removal of
content or hire citizens to go online to influence public debate. In
September 2008, Party propaganda officials ordered major financial Web
sites to remove ``negative'' reports regarding China's stock markets
amid a sharp downturn.\68\ According to one expert on Chinese media,
the Party has funded training for an estimated 280,000 Web commentators
whose task is to promote the Party's views in online chat rooms and
forums, and to report ``dangerous'' content to authorities.\69\
Rebecca Mackinnon, an expert on China's Internet controls, said in
August 2008 that Internet users in China now faced a ``more targeted
and subtle approach to censorship than before.'' \70\ She said blog
postings about politically sensitive events were quickly taken down,
while controlled reporting in Chinese media was allowed. She said the
``strategy seems clear: Give China's professional journalists a longer
leash to cover breaking news even if it's not positive--since the news
will come out anyway and unlike bloggers, the journalists are still on
a leash.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrictions Bolster Image of Party and Government
The Chinese government and Communist Party continue to use
the media and Internet to project an image of stability and
harmony and ensure that the Party and central government are
reflected positively. Such measures increase in the run-up to
major political meetings and public events and following
disasters and incidents of civil unrest or citizen activism.
Three events this past year--Tibetan protests that began in
March, the devastating Sichuan earthquake in May, and China's
preparations for and hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games in
August--illustrate the ways the Party and government restrict
free expression in an attempt to manipulate public opinion in
their favor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests, Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests
Chinese media initially devoted little coverage to a series of
protests in Tibetan areas that began in March 2008.\71\ Web sites
censored searches for news reports and footage of the protests, and
some foreign Web sites and foreign satellite news telecasts about the
protests were blocked.\72\ [See Censorship of the Media and Internet
Serves the Party and Government's Interests--Internet Censorship
earlier in this section.] When Chinese media stepped up reporting on
the protests, they focused on violence committed against the ethnic Han
population and denounced the Dalai Lama as a ``wolf with the face of a
human and the heart of a beast.'' \73\ Chinese media also described
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi as a ``disgusting figure'' and
attacked the foreign media for its ``biased'' coverage.\74\ Officials
expelled foreign journalists from Tibetan areas where reported protests
had occurred and barred them from entering those areas, a move the head
of the International Olympic Committee said contravened China's Olympic
promise to provide greater press freedom to foreign journalists.\75\
Cell phone, landline, and Internet transmissions were also reportedly
disrupted in Tibetan areas of western China, adding to the difficulty
of accessing information.\76\ [See Section V--Tibet for more
information on the protests.]
Sichuan Earthquake
Media access in the immediate aftermath of an 8.0 magnitude earthquake
that hit Sichuan province on May 12, 2008, and killed nearly 70,000,
was more open compared to previous natural disasters. Chinese
television aired extensive and graphic live coverage from disaster
areas and foreign reporters operated with few restrictions.\77\
Propaganda officials, however, had initially ordered most journalists
not to travel to disaster areas.\78\ After the order was ignored,
public officials rescinded the original order, but instructed the
domestic media to highlight the government's proactive response, avoid
``negative'' stories, and promote ``national unity'' and ``stability.''
\79\ Officials later ordered domestic media not to report on protests
by grieving parents, forcibly removed parents from protest sites, and
briefly detained foreign reporters trying to cover the protests.\80\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibetan Protests, Sichuan Earthquake, Olympics--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing Olympics
In his June 2008 speech, President Hu Jintao told journalists to pay
special attention to their coverage of the Olympics and said their
first priority is to ``correctly guide opinion.'' \81\ In a January
2008 speech to propaganda officials, Hu urged them to improve China's
international image.\82\ From November 2007 to July 2008, propaganda
officials issued several directives ordering journalists to avoid
numerous topics for the Olympics, including air quality, food safety,
protest zones designated for the games, and the performance of Chinese
athletes.\83\ One directive ordered them to counter the ``negative''
publicity stemming from protests along the Olympic torch relay by
quickly producing reports that toed the Party line, as part of an
``unprecedented, ferocious media war against the biased western
press.'' \84\ An ongoing campaign to weed out ``illegal publications''
focused this past year on creating a ``positive public opinion
environment'' for the Olympics.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELECTIVE USE OF LAWS TO PUNISH POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVISTS
Officials continued to use vague laws to punish
journalists, writers, rights advocates, and others for
peacefully exercising their right to free expression,
particularly those who criticized the Chinese government and
Communist Party in the context of the Olympics. In 2006, the UN
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that China's vaguely
defined crimes of endangering state security, splittism,
subverting state power, and supplying state secrets left
``their application open to abuse particularly of the rights to
freedom of religion, speech, and assembly,'' and recommended
the abolition of such ``political crimes.'' \86\ Among the most
popular of these provisions to punish peaceful expression
continued to be the ``inciting subversion of state power''
crime under Article 105(2) of the Criminal Law.\87\ Among those
punished for this crime included outspoken health and
environmental activist Hu Jia and land rights activist Yang
Chunlin, after each tied their criticisms of the government and
Party to the Olympics, and freelance writer Lu Gengsong, for
his online essays. [See box titled Inciting Subversion:
Punishment of Activists and Writers below.] Hu and Yang's
arrests came despite claims by the Chinese foreign minister in
February that it is ``impossible'' for someone in China to be
arrested for saying ``human rights are more important than the
Olympics.'' Officials targeted others for criticizing the
government's response to the Sichuan earthquake. Sichuan
officials detained retired professor Zeng Hongling in June 2008
on charges of ``inciting subversion'' after she posted articles
online alleging corruption and poor living conditions in areas
affected by the earthquake.\88\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inciting Subversion: Punishment of Activists and Writers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 105(2) of the PRC Criminal Law reads in part: ``[w]hoever
incites others by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to
subvert the State power or overthrow the socialist system shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years'' \89\
Hu Jia\90\
Background: Well-known HIV/AIDS and environmental activist who for years
has been an outspoken advocate for human rights and chronicler of
rights abuses and who made extensive use of the Internet in his work.
Hu had numerous run-ins with police, including spending more than 200
days under virtual house arrest before his formal detention in December
2007.\91\ A month before his January 2008 arrest, Hu provided testimony
before the European Parliament and criticized China's human rights
record and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX
Olympiad.\92\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On April 3, 2008, the Beijing
No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Hu to three years and six
months' imprisonment.\93\ Alleged ``subversive'' activities included
posting essays online critical of the government's harassment of rights
defenders and approach to governing Hong Kong, and making
``subversive'' comments to foreign reporters.
Yang Chunlin\94\
Background: Land rights activist who gathered more than 10,000
signatures for a petition titled ``We Want Human Rights, Not the
Olympics,'' which was also posted on the Internet. Most of the
signatories were farmers seeking redress for land that officials
allegedly took from them. Fellow petition organizers Yu Changwu and
Wang Guilin were sentenced to reeducation through labor for two years
and one-and-a-half years, respectively, for their advocacy on behalf of
farmers in Fujin city, Heilongjiang province.\95\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On March 24, 2008, the Jiamusi
Intermediate People's Court in Heilongjiang sentenced Yang to five
years' imprisonment for inciting subversion. Prosecutors accused Yang
of writing essays critical of the Communist Party and alleged that the
petition received heavy foreign media coverage that harmed China's
image abroad. Prosecutors also accused Yang of accepting 10,000 yuan
(US$1,430) from a ``hostile'' foreign group.\96\
Lu Gengsong\97\
Background: Freelance writer who has written about corrupt local
officials who seize land in deals with property developers.\98\
Sentence and Alleged Criminal Activity: On February 5, 2008, the
Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court affirmed Lu's four-year sentence.
Alleged ``subversive'' activities included publishing on foreign Web
sites essays that questioned the legitimacy of the Party-led government
and called on activists, intellectuals, and religious activists to join
together in opposition. The court made no attempt to determine the
actual threat posed by the essays, none of which specifically called
for violence.\99\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials also relied on vague charges of disturbing public
order, inciting a disturbance, possessing state secrets, or
inciting splittism, to punish free expression. Officials in
Hubei province sentenced petitioner Wang Guilan to 15 months'
reeducation through labor for disturbing social order after she
spoke with a foreign reporter during the Olympics.\100\ In June
2008, officials in Sichuan province detained and later
sentenced Liu Shaokun, a middle school teacher, to one year of
reeducation through labor after he posted photos of collapsed
schools online and criticized their construction in a media
interview.\101\ In another earthquake-related case, Sichuan
officials arrested Huang Qi in July after he posted an article
on his Web site detailing parents' demands for compensation and
an investigation into the collapse of schools that took their
children's lives.\102\ Officials charged Huang, founder of the
rights advocacy Web site 64tianwang.com, with illegally
possessing state secrets.\103\ In another state secrets case,
officials released Hong Kong journalist Ching Cheong in
February 2008, after he served almost two years of a five-year
sentence.\104\ Ching was convicted of passing state secrets to
a Taiwan foundation in a case that critics said lacked
transparency and relied on weak evidence.\105\ Officials in
Chengdu city, Sichuan province, detained freelance writer and
journalist Chen Daojun in May 2008 on charges of inciting
splittism,\106\ a crime under Article 103 of the Criminal
Law,\107\ after he published an article on a foreign Web site
calling for a halt in construction of a chemical plant, citing
environmental concerns.\108\
In its 2007 Annual Report, the Commission noted that
Chinese officials' application of Article 25 of the Public
Security Administration Punishment Law,\109\ which prohibits
spreading rumors to
disturb public order, threatened the free flow of
information.\110\ Officials continued to apply this provision
broadly to detain citizens for sharing information following
emergencies\111\ or for organizing protests over the
Internet.\112\ After a train collision in Shandong province,
officials sentenced one citizen to five days of administrative
detention for posting another person's Internet message, which
contained what turned out to be inaccurate claims about the
collision, even though few people viewed the post.\113\
Following a May 2008 protest against a chemical plant in
Chengdu, officials put three activists under administrative
detention pursuant to Article 25 for using the Internet to
spread rumors and incite an illegal demonstration.\114\ In May,
a top editor at Southern Metropolitan Daily wrote an editorial
criticizing the Chinese public security's application of
``spreading rumors'' provisions, saying it had a chilling
effect on people's willingness to share information during
public emergencies such as the Sichuan earthquake.\115\
Officials also restricted individuals' freedom of
expression by placing conditions on their release on bail or
suspended sentence. Officials in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region accused Internet essayist Wang Dejia of ``inciting
subversion,'' and released him on bail in January 2008, only
after he agreed to stop posting online essays critical of the
Chinese government and speaking with foreign journalists.\116\
Officials in Hubei province detained essayist Du Daobin in July
for allegedly violating the terms of his suspended sentence by
publishing articles overseas, days before his sentence was to
expire.\117\
HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF CITIZENS TO PREVENT FREE EXPRESSION
Officials continued to harass citizens and warn them not to
express opinions, particularly to foreign journalists and
dignitaries. Plainclothes officers seized legal activist and
law professor Teng Biao outside his home in Beijing in February
2008, placed a sack over his head, and drove him away to be
questioned.\118\ They warned him to stop writing articles
criticizing China's human rights record and the Olympics or
risk losing his university post and going to jail.\119\ In May,
security personnel warned Zeng Jinyan, rights activist and wife
of imprisoned human rights activist Hu Jia, that she would be
prevented from leaving her home because ``a U.S. delegation
wants to meet with you,'' referring to U.S. officials who had
traveled to Beijing for the U.S.-China Human Rights
Dialogue.\120\ Officials warned two human rights lawyers, Mo
Shaoping and Zhang Xingshui, not to attend a May 27 lunch with
Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, who was taking part
in the dialogue.\121\ In late June, officials detained or put
under house arrest a group of human rights lawyers to prevent
them from attending a dinner in Beijing with U.S.
Representatives Chris Smith and Frank Wolf.\122\
CHINESE GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT RESTRICTIONS ON FREE EXPRESSION ARE
BASED IN LAW
Officials continued to justify restrictions on freedom of
expression with an appeal to laws, without regard to whether
such laws or their application violate international human
rights standards:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Human Rights
Official Claim Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Censorship: In April 2008, after The government's Internet
the International Olympic Committee regulations prohibit
expressed concern about Internet content such as
censorship following the Tibetan pornography, online
protests, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs gambling, invasions of
spokesperson said the Chinese privacy, and intellectual
government's regulation of the Internet property violations.\124\
is ``in line with general international Such regulations, however,
practice'' and ``the main reason for also allow Chinese
inaccessibility of foreign websites in officials to censor
China is that they spread information politically sensitive
prohibited by Chinese law.'' \123\ content through provisions
that prohibit information
vaguely defined as
``harmful to the honor or
interests of the nation''
or ``disrupting the
solidarity of peoples.''
\125\ The result is that
the government continues to
block access to a number of
foreign news Web sites and
Web sites promoting human
rights and, along with
Internet companies in
China, frequently removes
and censors political
content.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Human Rights
Official Claim Standards--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imprisonment of Critics: In March 2008,
Premier Wen Jiabao described as
``totally unfounded'' the allegation
that the government is cracking down
on dissidents before the Olympics. He
said ``China is a country under the
rule of law'' and that cases such as
Hu Jia's would be ``dealt with in
accordance with the law.'' \126\
The UN Working Group on
Travel Restrictions on Foreign The travel ban to Tibetan areas
Reporters: In March 2008, a foreign appeared much broader than
ministry spokesperson defended a necessary to protect foreign
travel ban to Tibetan areas following journalists. The borders of
reported protests as a measure the closed-off areas extended
intended to ensure the safety of far beyond reported protest
journalists and added ``it is legal sites.\129\ The government's
and responsible for local governments attempts to otherwise censor
to take some restrictive measures.'' and manipulate information
\128\ about the protests on the
Internet and in Chinese media
strongly suggest that the near
total ban on foreign
journalists except for a few
unsupervised tours was
motivated by political rather
than safety concerns.
Furthermore, officials
initially allowed foreign
journalists open access to
disaster zones following the
May 2008 Sichuan earthquake,
areas that also posed a threat
to the physical safety of the
journalists.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHINESE CITIZENS CONTINUE TO SEEK FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Citizens continue to seek ways to freely express their
ideas and share information over the Internet and in the press.
So many Chinese journalists rushed to the disaster areas
following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake that propaganda
officials rescinded an earlier prohibition on such travel.\130\
Despite restrictions on reporting the controversy surrounding
the collapse of shoddily constructed schools, investigative
journalists at Southern Weekend and Caijing continued to report
the story.\131\ Chinese citizens organized demonstrations
against a chemical plant in Chengdu in May and against the
proposed extension of the maglev train line in Shanghai using
text messages.\132\ [For more information on these protests,
see Section II--Environment.] Dozens of Chinese lawyers,
academics, and writers signed an open letter condemning the
arrest of human rights activist Hu Jia.\133\ In June 2008,
Radio Free Asia reported that dozens of rights lawyers and
scholars had begun an online free speech forum.\134\
Citizens and some Chinese media and editorialists continue
to question government measures that restrict freedom of
expression.\135\ A January 2008 Southern Metropolitan Daily
editorial criticized the regulations calling for state
ownership of audio and video hosting Web sites as ``restraining
the civil right of social expression in the era of the
Internet.'' \136\ At the trial of land rights activist Yang
Chunlin, defense lawyers argued that Chinese officials'
application of the inciting subversion provision was likely to
result in punishing free speech because of its vagueness and
that neither the Supreme People's Court nor the National
People's Congress Standing Committee had interpreted the law to
provide guidance to citizens on the boundaries of free
speech.\137\ More than 14,000 Chinese citizens signed an open
letter released to the public on January 1, 2008, urging the
Chinese government to ratify the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights before the 2008 Olympic Games
``without reservations.'' \138\ One of the letter's
recommendations called on the Chinese government to allow
freedom of speech and to protect the press and publishing.
Addendum
CHINA COMMITS TO ``OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION'' (OGI) EFFECTIVE MAY 1,
2008
In a move intended to combat corruption, increase public
oversight and participation in government, and allow citizens
access to government-held information, the State Council on
April 5, 2007, issued the first national Regulations on Open
Government Information (OGI Regulation), which took effect May
1, 2008.\139\ Implementation begins at a time when the need for
greater transparency in the areas of environmental health, land
disputes, disease, and food, drug, and product safety has
become apparent. The time lag between issue and effective date
provided citizens and government departments a one-year
preparatory period.
The national regulation may alter relations between
citizens and traditionally protective government bureaucracies.
But it is not entirely a new development. While the overall
impact of the national regulation remains unclear, over 30
provincial and city-level governments throughout China as well
as central government agencies and departments have adopted OGI
rules in the last several years. Guangzhou, which was the first
municipality to do so in 2002, and Shanghai, which issued its
regulations in 2004, are but two examples. As implementation of
the national OGI Regulation proceeds, a number of issues merit
attention, the following among them:
Two Main Features of OGI
Government agencies at all levels have an affirmative
obligation to disclose certain information, generally within 20
business days. This includes information that ``involves the
vital interests of citizens,'' with emphasis on information
relating to, among other items, environmental protection,
public health, food, drug, and product quality, sudden
emergencies, and land appropriation and compensation.
Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations
(Requesting Parties) may request information and are entitled
to receive a reply within 15 business days and no later than 30
business days. Requesting Parties can challenge a denial of
access to information by filing a report with a higher-level or
supervisory agency or designated open government information
department or by applying for administrative reconsideration or
filing an administrative lawsuit.
Areas To Watch During Implementation
No clear presumption of disclosure. Premier Wen Jiabao
urged officials to proceed with implementation ``insisting that
disclosure be the principle, non-disclosure the exception.''
Chinese scholars and international experts, however, note that
the national OGI Regulation does not set forth a clear
presumption of disclosure. On this point it differs from
earlier local-level OGI regulations and similar measures in
other countries.
Certain provisions may discourage officials from disclosing
information. Under the OGI Regulation, officials who withhold
information the disclosure of which is required under the
Regulation may face both administrative and criminal penalties.
At the same time, however, the OGI Regulation stipulates that
officials must not disclose information involving ``state
secrets, commercial secrets, or individual privacy,'' and must
set up mechanisms to examine the secrecy of information
requested. This emphasis on safeguarding secrecy and the
breadth and vagueness of the definition of ``state secrets''
under Chinese law may encourage officials to err on the side of
non-disclosure. The regulation also prohibits officials from
disclosing information that might ``endanger state security,
public security, economic security, and social stability.''
Agencies and personnel who fail to ``establish and perfect''
secrecy examination mechanisms or who disclose information
later deemed exempt from disclosure under the OGI Regulation
may face administrative or criminal punishment.
Requesting Parties may be denied access if the request
fails to meet a recognized purpose. An opinion issued by the
State Council General Office on April 29, 2008, states that
officials may deny requests if the information has no relation
to the Requesting Party's ``production, livelihood and
scientific and technological research.'' This reflects language
in Article 13 of the OGI Regulation that says Requesting
Parties may request information ``based on the special needs of
such matters as their own production, livelihood and scientific
and technological research.'' This introduction of an apparent
purpose test differs from earlier local-level OGI regulations
and international practice. Furthermore, another provision in
the OGI Regulation which sets forth the information to be
included in a request, does not instruct the Requesting Party
to indicate the purpose of the request.
Requesting Parties lack an independent review channel to
enforce the OGI. Some Chinese scholars have noted that the OGI
Regulation's relief provisions constrain citizens from using
the courts to challenge decisions that deny requests for
information. Because China's courts are subordinate to the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and the Communist
Party, ``it can be anticipated that enforcement of emerging
information rights in China, even with the adoption of the
State Council OGI Regulations, will continue to face high
hurdles within the existing court system.'' While it is still
too early to tell, one scholar notes that it may be possible,
however, to achieve some independent review of non-political
cases through creation of tribunals or commissions designed to
handle OGI cases.
Sufficiency of funding, preparedness, and public awareness.
For many departments, OGI implementation may amount to an
unfunded mandate. Many agencies face resource constraints or
rely on funding sources predisposed to favor non-disclosure.
Local governments may not favor information disclosure that
could negatively impact local business. Local environmental
protection bureaus, for example, which are funded by local
governments, may not receive funding adequate to implement OGI
effectively. Already, a number of localities failed to meet a
March 2008 deadline to make catalogues and guides intended to
assist parties in requesting information available to the
public. This resulted in part from inadequate funding and
technical expertise. While the government has focused on
training officials, it has been less active in raising public
awareness.
Access to information may not apply to media, whether
foreign or domestic. The national OGI Regulation applies to
``citizens, legal persons, and other organizations.'' This
suggests its applicability to foreigners remains open to
interpretation during implementation. It also remains unclear
whether journalists in general may request access to
information under the national regulation. Some Chinese experts
argue that the regulation clearly applies to news
organizations, which have the status of ``legal persons or
other organizations,'' and journalists, who have the status of
``citizens,'' although foreign journalists may not be covered
because they are not citizens. Some local-level OGI regulations
in existence prior to the national regulation made clear its
applicability to foreigners. The Guangzhou regulation, for
example, provides that foreigners, stateless persons, and
foreign organizations have the same rights and obligations to
request information, limited to the extent that the requesting
party's country or region of origin imposes restrictions on
government information access to Chinese citizens. It remains
to be seen whether the national OGI Regulation will be
implemented so as to trump local OGI rules that are broader in
application or whether the national regulation will be
interpreted in a similarly broad fashion.
Endnotes
\1\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 73, 74.
\2\ Ibid., 85-87.
\3\ China Internet Network Information Center (Online) [hereinafter
CNNIC], ``CNNIC Releases the 22nd Statistical Report on the Internet
Development in China,'' 31 July 08.
\4\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (Online),
``Nation's Cell Phone Users Breaks 600 Million, Telecommunications
Industry Increases by 25.9%'' [Wo guo yidong dianhua yonghu tupo liuyi
hu dianxin yewu zongliang tongbi zengzhang 25.9%], 23 July 08.
\5\ In June 2007, the number of Internet users in China reached 162
million. CNNIC, ``The 20th CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the
Internet Development in China,'' July 2007, 9. The change from 162
million to 253 million is a 56 percent increase. In June 2007, the
number of cell phone users in China was 501 million. Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (Online), ``June 2007
Telecommunications Industry Statistics Monthly Report'' [2007 nian 6
yue tongxin hangye tongji yuebao], 25 July 07. The change from 501
million to 601 million is a 20 percent increase.
\6\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 86.
\7\ David Eimer, ``Mobile Dissent,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 14 May 08; Quentin Sommerville, ``Well-Heeled Protests Hit
Shanghai,'' BBC (Online), 14 January 08.
\8\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Cyber
Activists Detained for `Inciting' Anti-Pollution March in Chengdu,'' 12
May 08; Zhang Dongfeng, ``Shandong Top Secret: Netizen Who Forwarded
Inaccurate Post About Jiaoji Railway Train Collision Is Detained by
Police'' [Shandong gaomi yi wangyou zhuanfa jiaoji tielu huoche
xiangzhuang shishi tiezi bei jingfang juliu], Southern Metropolitan
Daily (Online), 5 May 08.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by General Assembly resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 19 [hereinafter ICCPR]. In March 2008, Premier
Wen Jiabao reiterated China's commitment to ratify the ICCPR, saying
``we are conducting inter-agency coordination to address the issue of
compatibility between China's domestic laws and international law so as
to ratify the Covenant as soon as possible.'' Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Online), ``Premier Wen Jiabao Answered Questions at Press
Conference,'' 18 March 08.
\10\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 19
[hereinafter UDHR].
\11\ PRC Constitution, art. 35. Article 51, however, states: ``The
exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their
freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state,
of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and
rights of other citizens.'' PRC Constitution, art. 51.
\12\ ICCPR, art. 19. Article 29 of the UDHR states the following:
``everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.''
\13\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Premier Wen Jiabao
Answered Questions at Press Conference.''
\14\ See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 25,
2008,'' 26 March 08.
\15\ Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention noted that the vague definition of crimes of
endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state
power, and supplying state secrets ``leaves their application open to
abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and
assembly.'' It recommended that political crimes ``that leave large
discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as
`endangering national security,' `subverting State power,' `undermining
the unity of the country,' `supplying of State secrets to individuals
abroad,' etc. should be abolished.'' Manfred Nowak, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, para. 34,
82(s). In a January 2008 report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders studied
41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which officials used the ``inciting
subversion'' provision of the Criminal Law (Article 105(2)) to punish
Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of expression.
It found that in such cases ``[t]he `evidence' often consists of no
more than the writings of an individual or simply shows that he/she
circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, without any
effort to show that the expression had any potential or real subversive
effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is interpreted as
constituting incitement of subversion. . . .'' Chinese Human Rights
Defenders (Online), ``Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal Tool
for Prosecuting Free Speech in China,'' 8 January 08.
\16\ ``Analysis: PRC--Despite Claims, Limited Transparency Seen at
`Two Sessions,' '' Open Source Center, 26 March 08 (Open Source Center,
26 March 08); ``Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government,''
Xinhua (Online), 19 March 08; ``Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17th
Party Congress'' [Hu jintao zai dang de shiqi da shang de baogao],
Xinhua (Online), 24 October 07.
\17\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 75; ``China Commits to `Open
Government Information' Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\18\ ``Analysis: Limited Transparency Seen at `Two Sessions,' ''
Open Source Center; ``CPC Promises Broader Information Access to Media
During Crucial Congress,'' Xinhua (Online), 14 October 07.
\19\ ``New Measures To Promote Scientific Issuance of Laws,
Democratic Issuance of Laws'' [Tuijin kexue lifa, minzhu lifa de xin
jucuo], Xinhua (Online), 19 April 08.
\20\ PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 7.
\21\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 73.
\22\ Ibid., 75.
\23\ David Bandurski, ``China Newsweekly: Government `Cold' on
`Information Openness,' '' China Media Project (Online), 31 July 08;
Han Yong, ``Open Information: Citizens' `Hot' and the Government's
`Cold' Stand in Stark Contrast'' [Xinxi gongkai: gongmin ``re'' he
zhengfu ``leng'' xingcheng xianming dui bi], China News.com, reprinted
in Xinhua Baoye Net (Online), 22 July 08; Owen Fletcher, ``China's
Transparency Is Just Thin Air,'' Asia Times (Online), 12 September 08.
\24\ Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People's Republic
of China Regulations on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli ruogan wenti de yijian], issued
30 April 08, art. 14. This apparent purpose test differs from
international practice. Jamie P. Horsley, ``China Adopts First
Nationwide Open Government Information Regulations,'' Freedominfo.org
(Online), 9 May 07.
\25\ Fletcher, ``China's Transparency Is Just Thin Air.''
\26\ Edward Wong, ``Mayor in China Fired in Milk Scandal,'' 18
September 08.
\27\ Jim Yardley and David Barboza, ``Despite Warnings, China's
Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk,'' New York Times (Online), 26
September 08.
\28\ ``Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions on Domestic
Coverage of Olympics,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Online), 22 August 08.
\29\ Raymond Li, ``Censorship Hammer Comes Down Over Scandal,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 16 September 08.
\30\ Xin Yu, ``Ling Cangzhou Writes Essay Criticizing Toxic Milk
Powder Scandal and Calling for Press Freedom,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 18 September 08.
\31\ Jonathan Ansfield, ``Even the Propaganda Dept Wants Records
Broken,'' Newsweek (Online), 4 August 08. For an English article from
Xinhua on the day of the incident, see ``Police Station Raided in West
China, Terrorists Suspected,'' Xinhua (Online), 4 August 08.
\32\ Ansfield, ``Even Propaganda Dept Wants Records Broken.''
\33\ See, e.g., Ching-Ching Ni, ``China Saw New Freedoms With TV
Quake Coverage,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 23 May 08.
\34\ Howard W. French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on
Media,'' New York Times (Online), 18 May 08; ``China's Earthquake
Coverage More Open But Not Uncensored,'' CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\35\ Meng Na, Lu Chuanzhong, ``Gov't Transparency in Quake
Relief.''
\36\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao Delivered While Inspecting the Work of
Renmin Ribao'' [Zai renmin ribao she kaocha gongzuo shi de jianghua],
People's Daily (Online), 21 June 08.
\37\ Edward Cody, ``Chinese Muckraking a High-Stakes Gamble,''
Washington Post (Online), 12 November 07.
\38\ ``China Paper Censored for Breach,'' BBC (Online), 25 July 08.
\39\ As noted in the Commission's 2006 Annual Report: ``The Chinese
government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news and information
media that includes oversight by government agencies with discretion to
grant, deny, and rescind licenses based on political and economic
criteria.'' CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 25.
\40\ See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Religious Prisoners and
the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about Shi's
case.
\41\ See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Religious Prisoners and
the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about these
cases.
\42\ ``Guo Feixiong Sentenced to Five Years for Illegal Business
Operation,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January
2008, 5.
\43\ Provisions on the Administration of Book Publishing [Tushu
chuban guanli guiding], issued 21 February 08, arts. 3, 9.
\44\ See, e.g., ``Institutional Structure Has New Breakthrough,
Great Achievement for 2007 `Anti-Pornography, Illegal Material'
Campaign, Noticeable Change in Market Practices'' [Gongzuo jizhi qude
xin tupo yanli chachu yi pi da'an yanan 2007 nian ``shaohuang dafei''
chengxiao xianzhe shichang mingxian gaiguan], Sweep Away Pornography
and Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force (Online), 14 January
08.
\45\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao While Inspecting Renmin Ribao,''
People's Daily.
\46\ All commercial Web sites must obtain a government license.
Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services
[Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00. All non-
commercial Web site operators must register. Registration
Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information
Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa],
issued 28 January 05. Because the MII's registration system gives the
government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e.,
whether the Web site operator intends to post ``news,'' and if so,
whether it is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively different from
registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain
registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme.
\47\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25
September 05, arts. 5, 11, 12; Provisions on the Administration of
Internet Video and Audio Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu
fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, art. 7.
\48\ Lydia Chen, ``China Disconnects 18,400 Illegal Websites,''
Shanghai Daily (Online), 11 September 07.
\49\ ``Mainland's `China Rights Defense' Shut Down'' [Dalu
``weiquan zhongguo'' zao guanbi], Boxun (Online), 11 May 08.
\50\ ``New Internet Regulations Tighten State Control Over Audio
and Video Content,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March/April 2008, 3.
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ Opinion Regarding Strengthening Monitoring of Internet Maps
and Geographic Information Services Web Sites [Guanyu jiaqiang
hulianwang ditu he dili xinxi fuwu wangzhan jianguan de yijian], issued
25 February 08, art. 5.
\55\ ``Problem That Most Online Maps of China Involves Secrets and
Other Problems Are Prominent, Eight Departments Administering''
[Dabufen wangshang zhongguo ditu shemi deng wenti tuchu ba bumen
zhili], People's Daily (Online), 5 May 08.
\56\ OpenNet Initiative (Online), ``Internet Filtering in China in
2004-2005: A Country Study,'' 14 April 05; ``Censorship of Internet and
Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\57\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Restrictions on Net Access in China Seem
Relaxed,'' New York Times (Online), 1 August 08; ``Censorship of
Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following Tibetan Protests,'' CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2; OpenNet
Initiative (Online), ``ONI Analysis of Internet Filtering During
Beijing Olympic Games: Week 1,'' 19 August 08. OpenNet Initiative
comprises researchers at the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for
International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, the Advanced Network Research
Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge, and
the Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University.
\58\ ``The Human Toll of the Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, August 2008, 2.
\59\ ``China Continues to Crack Down on HIV/AIDS Web Sites and
Activists,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008,
3.
\60\ See, e.g., Provisions on the Administration of Internet News
Information Services, arts. 19, 20, 21; ``Officials Order Hotels To
Step Up Monitoring and Censorship of Internet,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (Online), 1 August 08.
\61\ Reporters Without Borders and China Human Rights Defenders
(Online), Journey to the Heart of Internet Censorship, October 2007;
``Censor's Grip Tightening on Internet in China,'' Reuters (Online), 10
October 08.
\62\ ``PRC Netizens on Major BBS Complain of Censorship,'' Open
Source Center, 20 August 08 (Open Source Center, 20 August 08).
\63\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\64\ ``A Number of Search Engine Web Sites Screen `Carrefour' ''
[Duojia wangluo sousuo yinqing pingbi ``jialefu''], Southern
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 30 April 08.
\65\ ``Officials Order Hotels To Step Up Monitoring and Censorship
of Internet,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 1
August 08.
\66\ John Markoff, ``Surveillance of Skype Messages Found in
China,'' New York Times (Online), 2 October 08; Nart Villeneuve,
Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia (Online), Breaching Trust: An
Analysis of Surveillance and Security Practices on China's Tom-Skype
Platform, 1 October 08.
\67\ Marguerite Reardon, ``Skype: We Didn't Know About Security
Issues,'' CNet (Online), 3 October 08.
\68\ Daniel Ren, ``Beijing Censors Financial Websites,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 10 September 08.
\69\ David Bandurski, ``China's Guerrilla War for the Web,'' Far
Eastern Economic Review (Online), July/August 2008.
\70\ Rebecca MacKinnon, ``The Chinese Censorship Foreigners Don't
See,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 14 August 08.
\71\ Loretta Chao, ``News of Protests Is Hard to Find In China--in
Media or Online,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 18 March 08.
\72\ ``Censorship of Internet and Foreign News Broadcasts Following
Tibetan Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May
2008, 2.
\73\ Ibid.
\74\ Ibid. See also, ``China's Propaganda on Tibet a Verbal Blast
from the Past,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 16 April 08;
``Commentary: On Hypocricy of Pelosi's Double Standards,'' Xinhua
(Online), 13 April 08.
\75\ ``China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan
Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
2-3; Maureen Fan, ``Olympic Chief Vows Free Speech Defense,''
Washington Post (Online), 11 April 08.
\76\ ``Communication Disruptions in Tibetan Areas Impede Flow of
Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June
2008, 3.
\77\ Andrew Jacobs, ``A Rescue in China, Uncensored,'' New York
Times (Online), 14 May 08; Tini Tran, ``China Media Unusually
Aggressive in Covering Quake,'' Associated Press (Online), 14 May 08;
Nicholas Zamiska and Juliet Ye, ``Xinhua Goes Beyond Propaganda,'' Wall
Street Journal (Online), 14 May 08.
\78\ French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on Media.''
\79\ ``Central Propaganda Departments and Main News Media To Do
Good Reporting on Anti-Earthquake Disaster Relief'' [Zhongyang
xuanchuanbumen he zhuyao xinwen meiti zuohao kangzhen jiuzai baodao],
Xinhua (Online), 14 May 08; ``Kong Yufang Demands News Media to
Conscientiously Perform Reporting on Quake Aftermath and Relief
Efforts'' [Kong yufang yaoqiu xinwen meiti zuohao kangzhen jiuzai
baodao gongzuo], Xinhua (Online), 15 May 08; ``Li Changchun Visits,
Salutes Journalists on Quake Resistance, Disaster Relief'' [Li
changchun kanwang weiwen kangzhen jiuzai xinwen gongzuozhe], Xinhua
(Online), 17 May 08; ``Liu Yunshan's Condolences and Instructions
Regarding News Reporting Work on the Quake Relief Efforts'' [Liu
yunshan guanyu kangzhen jiuzai xinwen baodao gongzuo de weiwen he
zhishi], Sichuan Daily (Online), 15 May 08.
\80\ Geoffrey York, ``Beijing Can't Muzzle Outrage over Deadly
Collapsed Schools,'' Globe and Mail (Online), 16 June 08. Central
officials have noted their concern about local officials denying access
to certain areas and promised foreign reporters to ``resolve it.''
James Areddy, ``China Stifles Parents' Complaints About Collapsed
Schools,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 18 June 08.
\81\ ``Speech by Hu Jintao While Inspecting Renmin Ribao,''
People's Daily.
\82\ Christopher Bodeen, ``China Calls for Stepped-Up Propaganda,''
Associated Press (Online), 23 January 08; ``Hu Jintao's Speech Before
National Propaganda and Ideological Work Meeting of Representatives''
[Hu jintao tong quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi daibiao
zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 22 January 08.
\83\ ``Central Propaganda Department Restricts Reporting on Air
Quality, Food Safety,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
January 2008, 3; ``Propaganda Officials Issue 21 Restrictions,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
\84\ Peter Simpson, ``Screws Tighten on Mainland Journalists,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 12 August 08.
\85\ Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications
Task Force (Online), ``Continue the Spirit of the Rescue Effort, For
the Olympics Create a Wonderful Cultural Environment and Promote
Positive Public Opinion'' [Dali fayang kangzhen jiuzai jingshen wei
Beijing aoyunhui chenggong juban chuangzao lianghao shichang wenhua
huanjing he yulun fenwei], 29 May 08.
\86\ Manfred Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture,
para. 34, 82(s).
\87\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 105.
\88\ Minnie Chan, ``Activist Held for Subversion After Accusing
Officials of Graft,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 19 June 08.
\89\ PRC Criminal Law, art. 105.
\90\ ``Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months'
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/
April 2008, 1.
\91\ Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, ``Hu Jia Formally Arrested:
Human Rights in Olympic Spotlight,'' 31 January 08.
\92\ Ibid.
\93\ ``CECC Translation: Hu Jia's Criminal Judgment,'' CECC China
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2008, 2.
\94\ ``Land Rights Activist Yang Chunlin Sentenced to Five Years,''
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March/April 2008, 1.
\95\ Ibid.
\96\ Ibid.
\97\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\98\ Evan Osnos, ``In China, Uncovering Crime Is Also One, As It
Cracks Down on Corruption, Nation also Rounds Up a Writer Who Condemned
the Offense,'' Chicago Tribune (Online), 30 January 08.
\99\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\100\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Olympics Crackdown
Continues as Another Activist is Sent to Labor Camp,'' 31 August 08.
\101\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Press Release: Family
Visits Still Denied to Sichuan School Teacher Punished after Quake-Zone
Visit,'' 29 July 08. In September 2008, Human Rights in China reported
that Liu was released on September 24 and allowed to serve his sentence
outside of the labor camp. Human Rights in China (Online), ``Sichuan
Teacher, Liu Shaokun, Was Released To Serve His Reeducation-Through-
Labor Sentence Outside of Labor Camp,'' 26 September 08.
\102\ Jake Hooker, ``Voice Seeking Answers for Parents About a
School Collapse is Silenced,'' New York Times (Online), 11 July 08.
\103\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Human Rights
Defender Huang Qi Formally Charged with Illegally Possessing State
Secrets,'' 18 July 08.
\104\ David Lague, ``China Frees Hong Kong Journalist,'' New York
Times (Online), 6 February 08.
\105\ ``Beijing Court Rejects Ching Cheong's Appeal, Affirms Five-
Year Sentence,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
December 2006, 4-5.
\106\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet To Spread Rumors
About Sichuan Petrochemical Project'' [Chengdu jingfang chufa liyong
Sichuan shihua xiangmu wangshang sanbu yaoyanzhe], Sichuan Daily
(Online), 10 May 08; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists
Detained.''
\107\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, art. 103.
\108\ Pen American Center (Online), ``Chen Daojun Detained as
Crackdown Intensifies in China During Olympic Torch Relay,'' 12 May 08;
Chen Daojun, ``Quickly Together, People of Chengdu Facing Extinction''
[Gankuai qilai, mianlin juezhong de chengde ren], China EWeekly
(Online), 5 May 08.
\109\ Article 25 of the Public Security Administration Punishment
Law provides for detention of five to 10 days for, among other things,
``spreading rumors; making false reports of dangerous conditions,
epidemics, or police situations; or using other means to intentionally
disturb public order.'' PRC Public Security Administration Punishment
Law, enacted 28 August 05, art. 25.
\110\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 76.
\111\ ``Chongqing Police Detain Two for Spreading Rumors About
Earthquake Disaster Conditions'' [Chongqing jingfang juliu liangming
sanbuo dizhenqing yaoyan renyuan], Xinhua (Online), 14 May 08.
\112\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet To Spread Rumors
About Sichuan Petrochemical Project'' [Chengdu jingfang chufa liyong
Sichuan shihua xiangmu wangshang sanbu yaoyanzhe], Sichuan Daily
(Online), 10 May 08; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists
Detained.''
\113\ Zhang Dongfeng, ``Shandong Top Secret.''
\114\ ``Chengdu Police Punish Those Using Internet,'' Sichuan
Daily; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Cyber Activists Detained.''
\115\ Chang Ping, ``When Encountering a Strong Shock, Please Make
Allowances for the Masses' Demand for Information'' [Zaofeng qiangzhen,
qing tiliang minzhong de xinxi keqiu], Southern Metropolitan Daily
(Online), 13 May 08.
\116\ ``Wang Dejia, Shi Weihan Released on Bail,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 5.
\117\ ``Dissident Jailed Ahead of Olympics,'' Radio Free Asia
(Online), 22 July 08.
\118\ ``Foreign Minister `Freedom of Speech' Comments At Odds With
Arrests, Detentions,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
March/April 2008, 2-3.
\119\ Ibid. In September, Teng and Hu co-wrote a letter titled
``The Real China Before the Olympics,'' which criticized Beijing for
failing to live up to its promise to improve human rights for the
Olympics.
\120\ ``Harassment of Beijing-based Activists During the U.S.-China
Human Rights Dialogue,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 3.
\121\ Ibid.
\122\ Jill Drew and Edward Cody, ``Chinese Lawyers Arrested Before
Meeting with Congressmen,'' Washington Post (Online), 1 July 08.
\123\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 1, 2008,'' 2
April 08.
\124\ See, e.g., Measures for the Administration of Internet
Information Services, art. 15.
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Premier Wen Jiabao Answered
Questions at Press Conference.''
\127\ ``Zhejiang Court Affirms Lu Gengsong Sentence; CECC
Translation of Decision,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, June 2008, 5.
\128\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Spokesperson Qin Gang's Press
Conference on March 25, 2008.''
\129\ ``China Blocks Foreign Reporters From Covering Tibetan
Protests,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008,
2-3.
\130\ French, ``Earthquake Opens Gap in Controls on Media.''
\131\ Yang Binbin, Zhao Hejuan, Li Zhigang, Chang Hongxiao, Zhang
Yingguang, Chenzhong, Xiaolu, and Zhang Bolin, ``Why Did So Many
Sichuan Schools Collapse? '' Caijing (Online), 17 June 08; York,
``Beijing Can't Muzzle Outrage.''
\132\ Eimer, ``Mobile Dissent''; Sommerville, ``Well-Heeled
Protests Hit Shanghai.''
\133\ Lindsay Beck, ``China Hits Back at Critics of Activists'
Arrest,'' Reuters (Online), 8 January 08; ``Statement on the Criminal
Detention of Hu Jia,'' Boxun (Online), 7 January 08. Also, six
prominent activists and writers spoke candidly of the problems they
faced in a July 6 interview with the Observer. Lijia Zhang, ``China's
New Freedom Fighters,'' Observer (Online), 6 July 08.
\134\ ``Tens of Beijing Rights Lawyers and Scholars Start Online
Discussion on the Freedom of Speech'' [Shushiwei beijing weiquan lushi
ji xuezhe zhaokai wanglu yanlun ziyou taolunhui], Radio Free Asia
(Online), 23 June 08.
\135\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Journalist Calls for Press Freedom on
Release from Jail,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 April 08. (New York
Times researcher calls for greater press freedom upon release from
three-year sentence.)
\136\ ``Editorial: Cold Wind Blows On the Internet, Regulation
Mistakenly Targets Competition'' [Shelun: lengfeng chuixiang wangluo
jianguan mowu jingzheng], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 4
January 08.
\137\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Yang Chunlin
Inciting Subversion of State Power Criminal Defense Pleading'' [Yang
chunlin Shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui bianhu ci], 19 February
08.
\138\ ``Thousands of Chinese Citizens Call for Ratification of
ICCPR Before Olympics,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, February 2008, 3.
\139\ Information in this addendum is drawn from ``China Commits to
`Open Government Information' Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.