[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE
RESEARCH TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
MAY 22, 2008
----------
Serial No. 110-120
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE
RESEARCH TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-120
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-136 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOE BARTON, Texas
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts Ranking Member
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, . r., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
GENE GREEN, Texas CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado Mississippi
Vice Chair VITO FOSSELLA, New York
LOIS CAPPS, California ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JANE HARMAN, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
TOM ALLEN, Maine JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARY BONO MACK, California
HILDA L. SOLIS, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska
JAY INSLEE, Washington MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
______
Professional Staff
Dennis B. Fitzgibbons, Chief of Staff
Gregg A. Rothschild, Chief Counsel
Sharon E. Davis, Chief Clerk
David L. Cavicke, Minority Staff Director
_____
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member
Vice Chair ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
GENE GREEN, Texas MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio)
officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 1
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 3
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 5
Hon. Charles W. ``Chip'' Pickering, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, opening statement............... 6
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 196
Witnesses
Nancy R. Kingsbury, Ph.D., Managing Director, Applied Research
and Methods, U.S. Government Accountability Office; accompanied
by Sushil Sharma, Ph.D., D.R.P.H., Assistant Director of
Applied Research and Methods, U.S. GAO......................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Tim E. Carpenter, Ph.D., Professor and Co-director, Center for
Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance, University of
California, Davis.............................................. 44
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Ray L. Wulf, President and Chief Executive Officer, American
Farmers and Ranchers........................................... 81
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Howard Hill, D.V.M., Chief Operating Officer, Iowa Select Farms.. 97
Prepared statement........................................... 99
Leroy Watson, Legislative Director, The National Grange of the
Order of Patrons and Husbandry................................. 109
Prepared statement........................................... 111
Gary Voogt, President-elect, National Cattlemen's Beef
Association.................................................... 124
Prepared statement........................................... 126
Bruce I. Knight, Under Secretary, Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, U.S. Department, U.S. Department of Agriculture...... 141
Prepared statement........................................... 142
Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Techology Directorate,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 148
Prepared statement........................................... 150
Larry Barrett, D.V.M., M.S., D.A.C.V.P.M., Director, Plum Island
Animal Disease Center.......................................... 164
Prepared statement........................................... 167
Submitted Material
Letter of June 2, 2008, from American Farmers & Ranchers to
Chairmen Dingell and Stupak.................................... 197
Photograph of Plum Island........................................ 198
Comments by Senator Pat Roberts on Senate Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
hearing of March 14, 2003...................................... 199
Subcommittee exhibit binder...................................... 201
GERMS, VIRUSES, AND SECRETS: GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MOVE EXOTIC DISEASE
RESEARCH TO THE MAINLAND UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart
Stupak (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stupak, Green, Inslee,
Dingell (ex officio), Shimkus, Whitfield, and Pickering.
Also present: Representatives Moran and Boyda.
Staff present: Scott Schloegel, John Arlington, John Sopko,
Lisa Cody, Kyle Chapman, Alan Slobodin, and Krista Carpenter.
Mr. Stupak. This meeting will come to order.
Today we have a hearing entitled ``Germs, Viruses and
Secrets: Government Plans to Move Exotic Disease Research to
the Mainland United States.'' Each member will be recognized
for a 5-minute opening statement. I will begin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Stupak. Good morning. This is the second in a series of
hearings on biomedical research laboratories this committee has
held. The first hearing was on the proliferation of high-
containment bio labs in the United States. In future hearings,
we expect to look at the proliferation of high-containment labs
outside the United States including the role of government
funding these labs.
Today's hearing will focus on the Department of Homeland
Security's, DHS, proposal to close Plum Island Animal Disease
Center and build a new, much larger high-containment lab which
DHS calls the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF.
For 50 years, the Plum Island laboratory was owned and
operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was this
country's leading foreign animal disease research laboratory.
In June 2003, operational responsibility for Plum Island was
transferred to DHS under the Homeland Security Act. While the
research staff continued to be employed by Department of
Agriculture. The majority of research carried out at Plum
Island is concentrated on foot-and-mouth disease, which is a
very highly contagious disease.
The Plum Island lab was built on Plum Island in order to
isolate this extraordinarily hazardous virus and other diseases
handled at the lab. The natural barrier of water surrounding
the island along with its remoteness at the far eastern end of
Long Island were seen as an effective buffer zone between Plum
Island and farming activities in the rest of the country.
Now the Department of Homeland Security wants to close Plum
Island and build a new facility on the mainland. This proposal
is embodied in H.R. 1717, which would do three things:
authorize the building of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense
Facility, NBAF, which as proposed by DHS would be the world's
largest animal disease research center and include the world's
largest Biosafety Level 4 laboratory--the BSL-4 labs handle the
most deadly diseases for which there is no cure; delegate to
DHS broad new authority over animal disease research and
zoonotic disease research, including their human health
effects; and move live virus of foot-and-mouth disease to the
mainland United States for the first time in history.
In summary, DHS proposes to become the primary agency for
animal disease research and take over zoonotic disease
research, which is now carried out by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health.
DHS seems to have given inadequate consideration to the risk of
transferring foot-and-mouth disease to the mainland, which
prompted this committee to examine this issue ourselves.
As part of this subcommittee's investigation, we looked at
prior accidental releases of foot-and-mouth disease to see what
the economic consequences might be. A 2001 outbreak in the
United Kingdom was estimated to cost a little over $16.3
billion and nearly brought down their government. One of our
witnesses testifying today has estimated that a major outbreak
on the mainland United States could cost as much as $40
billion.
In 1978, there was an accidental release of foot-and-mouth
disease from the Plum Island lab, which infected animals kept
on the island. Fortunately, the virus never spread any further,
due in part to the fact that the lab is buffered by water. In
the investigative report that followed the 1978 outbreak, the
Plum Island director at the time, Jerry Callis, concluded that
the water barrier surrounding the island was instrumental in
containing the spread of the disease.
What the report did not say, however, was even more
significant. The Committee staff interviewed Dr. Callis and he
revealed that at the time of the 1978 outbreak, he and others
on the staff were able to persuade the World Animal Health
Organization, known as OIE, not to issue an embargo of American
meat products because the foot-and-mouth had not escaped from
the island. Had the OIE declared an embargo, as it would today
if such an outbreak occurred on the mainland, it would have
halted the export of all American meat products for at least 6
months and the cost to the livestock industry would have been
enormous. We will be interested to hear today how DHS and USDA
would seek to balance devastating consequences of this
magnitude with the convenience of opening a lab on the
mainland.
We will also be interested in examining the costs of the
proposed NBAF. The official DHS estimate is that NBAF will cost
approximately $450 million to build but the Committee has
learned that DHS engineers have also raised the estimate to
between $600 and $750 million. Moreover, this does not include
the cost of demolition, decontamination, and environmental
cleanup of the existing facility at Plum Island if it is
abandoned.
Earlier this year, DHS assured us that they had broad
support for their proposal from the private sector. To test
that theory, we sent letters to more than 100 livestock
associations asking their views of moving this disease to the
mainland. Today we will have with us representatives from some
of the larger associations which responded. These are the
farmers who have much to lose if something goes wrong, and I
understand they have strong opinions on the subject.
Let me be clear: I do not oppose the creation of a National
Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF, but I do oppose moving
the research of this devastating foot-and-mouth disease to the
mainland United States. For more than 50 years, foot-and-mouth
disease has been researched safely on Plum Island and moving it
to the mainland would be a foolish tempting of fate that could
cause countless farmers and ranchers their livelihoods and
cause billions of dollars should a foot-and-mouth disease
release occur.
I want to thank the witnesses appearing here today. I know
that some of you have come a long way to testify, and I want
you to know that we appreciate you taking the time to be here
with us.
That concludes my opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. I would next turn to my ranking member, my
friend, Mr. Shimkus, for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
convening this important hearing.
Today's hearing will expose several issues surrounding the
proposal and construction of the new National Bio- and Agro-
Defense Facility. We all agree that it is our responsibility to
protect the American public's health while ensuring the safety
of our agriculture and food infrastructure by maintaining an
up-to-date biocontainment facility capable of researching and
developing cures for deadly and contagious zoonotic and animal
diseases. The witnesses today will discuss the costs associated
with this facility and whether this new facility should remain
on Plum Island or be moved to the mainland.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred ownership of
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a small island off the coast
of New York owned by the Federal Government where current
research on both domestic and foreign animal diseases takes
place, to the Department of Homeland Security. Since the
transfer, DHS has been the lead agency for the center supported
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture researchers and
employees. The main issues surrounding the creation of a new
NBAF include ensuring that the Department of Homeland Security
and the United States Department of Agriculture have adequately
assessed the health and economic risks and costs-benefits
associated with the construction, operation, and maintenance of
this new biocontainment facility.
Today we want assurance from the government and industry
experts that the American public will remain safe independent
of where the new facility is located. We want Americans to know
that the proper precautions will be taken if a new biolab
facility is created in their community. Several witnesses,
including DHS, USDA, and livestock associations, will explain
how that safety is to be ensured. I look forward to hearing
from the witnesses about the advances in modern technology and
the importance of proper training in relation to the
construction and operation of a biocontainment facility of this
magnitude. In fact, the new NBAF would be the world's largest
animal disease research center and include the world's largest
BSL-4 laboratory. DHS estimates the cost of this facility to be
between $450 and $750 million.
Of particular interest to DHS and USDA and the livestock
industry is the continued research of the highly contagious
animal disease, foot-and-mouth disease. By statute, for the
past 60 years the research on live foot-and-mouth disease has
been limited to Plum Island. Releases of foot-and-mouth disease
in England led to an outbreak in 2001 that cost England's
economy an estimated $15 billion. The Government Accountability
Office will discuss its evaluation of DHS's evidence supporting
its decision that conducting foot-and-mouth disease research on
the mainland is as safe as conducting it on an island. Under
Secretary Cohen from DHS and Under Secretary Knight from USDA
are here to explain how the agencies determined that the
transfer of foot-and-mouth disease and other animal disease
research to the mainland is safe and what the next steps in the
NBAF process entail.
Today we are here to examine the facts, hear from
government officials, the industry insiders and the outside
experts that can explain the scope and needs for a new facility
and examine the advantages and disadvantages of creating this
facility on an island or on the mainland. I am not here to
advocate a particular site. I am here to support this
bipartisan oversight examination of the NBAF process and to
gain clarity on the issues surrounding the construction of the
facility while ensuring that we as lawmakers help protect the
U.S. agriculture and human health.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Stupak. I thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
As you can see, there is a lot of interest in this issue. I
expect Mr. Dingell will be here momentarily for an opening
statement. Mr. Pickering is a member of the Energy and Commerce
Committee, not of this subcommittee. At his option, we would
allow him, if he wants to give an opening statement, we would
allow that. Mr. Moran is not a member of this committee but is
a valuable member of this Congress. If you would like to stay
and at the end maybe have an opportunity to ask some questions,
you are welcome to. Ms. Boyda is also not a member of this
committee but is very interested in this issue, and I expect
there will be other members who are not part of this committee
who would come and we will show them the same courtesy and
respect afforded to all members.
Of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, chairman, for an
opening statement and then we will go to Mr. Pickering if he
chooses.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important
hearing, and I congratulate you for shining much-needed light
on the hidden world of bioresearch. I especially look forward
to shining some of that light on the bio research activities of
the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, today. It is a
curious body. They appear to be much concerned about the
efficiency of the agency but to care very little about the
safety of the American public with regard to movement of
diseases of animals into our society.
As I said at the first hearing on bio-labs, the DHS
proposal to close the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and
move the live foot-and-mouth virus to the mainland of the
United States is not only baffling but dangerous. Following
extensive investigation by the Government Accountability
Office, GAO, and the committee staff, 7 months later the DHS
proposal remains most curious. It also manifests significant,
not only incompetence but arrogance and secrecy, something
which should not be permitted by government agencies.
Foot-and-mouth is one of the most contagious diseases in
the world. We know from recent incidents in the United Kingdom
that it can escape from even a high-level biosafety lab. We
know that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease could have a
catastrophic effect on the livestock industry here in the
United States just as it did in the United Kingdom in 2001. In
fact, the U.S. Department of Agriculture told the committee
staff just 2 days ago that an accidental outbreak in the United
States could cause as much as $57 billion in damages.
Equally troubling, it appears that DHS is out of step with
the rest of the world. GAO investigators visited major labs
across Europe and found that in other developed countries, the
trend is to do just the opposite of what DHS has proposed.
Germany has built its new lab on an island. Denmark has built
its new lab on an island. The Parliament in the U.K. is
debating the relocation of its land to an island. Why? Because
of safety concerns and preventing escape of the agents that
bring these kinds of diseases into the broader world.
Why then would DHS propose to move live virus of foot-and-
mouth disease from Plum Island to the American mainland? GAO
was unable to find a scientific reason for the move. They found
apparent agreement that the current Plum Island lab needs
substantial renovation and it should be renovated, but they
found no justification for moving the lab to the mainland. They
also found no cooperation from DHS, which has refused to make
available to GAO the information that it needs to properly
carry out its responsibilities or to serve this committee or to
assist in this inquiry. Indeed, DHS has refused to make
available important parts of information sought by this
committee on the grounds that it is ``proprietary.'' I look
forward to hearing an explanation as to why that information is
proprietary at DHS.
In the end, DHS assures us that modern technology will make
it perfectly safe to handle foot-and-mouth disease in a high-
tech biolab in the heart of livestock country. I wonder if
history will confirm their judgment or will make them look like
a source of danger to the society. Mr. Chairman, on that score
I would note that history is littered with the smoking,
stinking wreckage of impregnable, indestructible, and
unsinkable.
Given the potentially catastrophic effects that a release
of foot-and-mouth could have on our livestock industry and on
the national economy and on the national budget, it seems to me
that DHS has the burden of showing to us why this is necessary
and why it is in the public interest and why they cannot be
open in answering the questions that this committee lays upon
them.
In that regard, I must regrettably point out that DHS has
not been forthcoming in providing the records and information
requested by the Committee as I mentioned earlier. In several
instances, the Committee has only been provided copies of
certain key records after the committee staff discovered their
existence despite the fact that the Committee has specifically
requested all such records. At this late date there are still a
number of relevant documents outstanding and missing after
being requested by the Committee including the statement of
work for the environment impact statement for Plum Island and
the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, NBAF. I
would note that the National Environmental Policy Act, of which
I am author, requires that this process be open and that the
public be included in the process. We want to know why it is
that DHS presumes itself above the law on this particular
matter and what question of national security here says that
that information and that process may be suppressed to meet the
convenience of DHS. Clearly this is unacceptable and grossly
improper.
Finally, I am interested in the testimony from ranchers who
own the livestock in this country on how they view the DHS
proposal. All the consultants and technical experts that DHS
can hire may stand behind this idea but it will still be the
farmers and ranchers who bear the risk and suffer the
consequences of they are wrong and the taxpayers will be called
upon to make whole the American people who are put at risk or
hurt by the follies of DHS.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Dingell.
Your option, Mr. Pickering as a member of this committee,
the option of giving an opening statement if you would like or
waive it.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. You will be recognized for 5 minutes then.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
make a brief statement. I want to thank you for allowing me to
participate in the subcommittee and for this hearing. It is of
critical importance that we get this right and I believe that
we can get it right.
I believe that there is agreement that we need to have a
new facility. The Plum Island facility is outdated. It is not
modern and we can do a better job of this vital research and a
new facility I believe is in everyone's best interest and there
is agreement to do so. So the question becomes, should we do
this on the mainland or should we continue to do it on an
island? The new biocontainment facilities that we currently
already do in places like Atlanta in the heart of Atlanta close
to Emory where the CDC's BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities are already
studying the same type of pathogens, very dangerous diseases,
very high risk to human health, and doing so safely. So we have
modern facilities that are doing similar research in mainland
facilities and around the world that is also the case, and as
we look at why we should do this, one, that it is more
economical, it can be done safely. This makes sense for the
taxpayer and it makes sense for animal and human health.
The Farm Bill that we just passed, in fact that we just
overrode the President's veto on, a majority of Republicans and
a majority of Democrats on that committee called for the
establishment of the new NBAF facility on the mainland, strong
bipartisan support, overrode the President's veto to do so. I
think the Congress has spoken very clearly in a very strong
political bipartisan consensus-based approach that this should
be the policy and it affirmed the policy that we have been
taking over the last 3 years to do so. There is also strong
support from the scientists and those most affected by this
research. The American Veterinary Medical Association has sent
a letter to both Congressman Stupak and Congressman Shimkus,
and this is what they say: ``The American Veterinary Medical
Association supports DHS's decision to build a National Bio-
and Agro-Defense Facility. A modern, well-designed and operated
facility does not present an unacceptable risk to animal or
human health and would be more economical to build, maintain
and operate on the mainland.'' The chief health official in
Mississippi makes the point that all the organisms to be
studied at the new NBAF are already being safely studied in
other biocontainment laboratories in the continental United
States including CDC's BSL-3 and -4 laboratories located in the
heart of a densely populated residential area of Atlanta and
adjacent to Emory University's main campus.
So it is being done today and it is being done safely. It
can be done more economically. We all agree a new facility
needs to be built. Those most closely associated, the cattlemen
and the farmers in the region of Mississippi and Louisiana, and
I am sure Mr. Moran will say that the farmers and the ranchers
and the scientists in Kansas believe that this can be done
safely, and we believe very strongly that Mississippi is a
better site. I think Mr. Moran may differ with that but we
agree that a facility can be done on the mainland and that this
is the wise and right policy of the United States that we have
undertaken over the last 3 years and just yesterday
overwhelmingly endorsed in the override veto of President Bush.
So I look forward to this hearing. There is strong
scientific and political support for the policy to establish on
the mainland a new NBAF, and I look forward to the testimony
today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Pickering.
Ms. Boyda is here from Kansas as well as Mr. Moran. They
are not members of the committee. Therefore, they would not be
allowed to do an opening statement under the Rules of the
Committee in this House. However, when we get to our
questioning rounds, both Mr. Moran and Ms. Boyda, if they would
like to speak, I would with the unanimous consent of the
Minority allow questions.
However, I am going to caution everyone right now, we are
not here today to make a decision where NBAF should go. We have
had requests from Mississippi, Texas, Kansas, Georgia, North
Carolina. They all want to sit in the hearing today and they
all want to advocate for their State. We are not here
advocating for any one State. We are here talking about NBAF,
should it be built or not built, and whether foot-and-mouth
disease should be moved to the mainland. That is the purpose of
this hearing. So I just want to put that forth so everybody
understands why we are here and what we are doing. This is an
investigative and oversight subcommittee. We want to make sure
if we are going to do this, it is done right.
So with that caution, we have our first panel before us.
Let me introduce them. Dr. Nancy Kingsbury, who is the Managing
Director of Applied Research and Methods at the Government
Accountability Office. Dr. Kingsbury is accompanied by Dr.
Sushil Sharma, who is the Assistant Director of Applied
Research and Methods at the Government Accountability Office,
and Dr. Tim Carpenter, who is Professor and Co-Director of the
Center for Animal Disease Modeling and Surveillance at the
University of California, Davis. We welcome you to our
committee.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony
under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right
under the Rules of the House to be advised by counsel during
their testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by
counsel at this time? Everyone is indicating no. Therefore, I
would ask you to please rise and raise your right hand to take
the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
replied in the affirmative. They are now under oath. We will
begin with their opening statements, 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
Dr. Kingsbury, if you don't mind, we will start with you,
please, and thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF NANCY R. KINGSBURY, PH.D., MANAGING DIRECTOR,
APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL SHARMA, PH.D., DRPH, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Dr. Kingsbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for your invitation to appear at this hearing. As you know, in
response to your request, we have been reviewing the evidence
that the Department of Homeland Security says it relied on to
make the decision to relocate NBAF on the mainland and in
particular foot-and-mouth disease research on the mainland.
We recognize that there have been significant advances in
the technologies of modern biocontainment laboratories and that
some BSL-4 laboratories have operated without significant
incidents on the mainland, indeed, in center cities. However,
the research undertaken at Plum Island is unique in at least
one respect and poses a special set of challenges because it
includes, among others, research on the live virus strains that
cause foot-and-mouth disease.
Foot-and-mouth disease is the most highly infectious animal
disease that is known. Infection can occur from exposure to a
small number of virus particles and nearly 100 percent of
exposed animals become infected. The virus can spread from
infected animals in various ways. In some circumstances, the
wind can spread the virus. The traditional response once an
infection is confirmed is to depopulate infected and
potentially infected herds, usually resulting in the slaughter
of tens of thousands of animals or more. From the research
perspective, FMD poses special challenges because of the need
to manage large numbers of large animals within biocontainment.
You asked us to evaluate the evidence DHS used to support
its decision that research on live foot-and-mouth disease
viruses can be done safely on the U.S. mainland, whether an
island location provides any additional protection over and
above that provided by modern high-containment laboratories on
the mainland, and the economic consequences of an outbreak of
foot-and-mouth disease on the mainland.
To address these questions, we interviewed officials from
DHS and USDA, and visited Plum Island. We obtained and reviewed
relevant legislation, regulations, literature on foot-and-mouth
disease and the economic effects of outbreaks, and other
documents including the study that DHS identified as the source
of evidence for its decision. We also talked to experts on
animal diseases and high-containment laboratories dealing with
animal, zoonotic, and human pathogens including the directors
of other facilities that do research on foot-and-mouth disease
viruses in Europe and Australia. We also met with
representatives of the American Society for Microbiology, the
National Grange, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association. and
the National Pork Producers' Council.
We found that DHS has not conducted or commissioned any
study to determine whether foot-and-mouth disease research can
be done safely on the U.S. mainland. Instead, DHS based its
decision that work with FMD virus can be done safely on a 2002
USDA-sponsored study that addressed a different question. We
found that the study was selective in what it considered, and
it did not assess the history of releases of FMD virus or other
dangerous pathogens. It also did not address in detail the
issues of containment related to research involving large
animals such as cattle. In addition, the study was inaccurate
in comparing other countries' experience with foot-and-mouth
disease with the situation in the United States.
Most of the experts we consulted during this work agree
that while location in general confers no advantage in
preventing an initial release of an infectious agent such as
FMD, location can help prevent the spread of pathogens and thus
a resulting disease outbreak if there is a release. The history
of work at biocontainment facilities suggests strongly that
there will always be some risk of a release because of failure
of technology or, more likely, human error. Thankfully, these
events are rare. While it may be possible to engineer a
facility to minimize that risk, the study that DHS told us it
relied on to reach the conclusion that the risk is acceptable
does not provide evidence of how that could be done
successfully. More recently, DHS told us that it plans to also
rely on the results of the environmental impact statements it
has commissioned for each of the six potential sites it has
identified to provide further evidence about the safety of
conducting FMD research on the mainland. As Mr. Dingell
mentioned, DHS would not provide us information about the
requirements for the environmental impact statements it has
commissioned so we cannot comment on whether the statements
will, for example, assess the risk of technical or human error
and the potential impact of the release of a dangerous virus
outside the facility.
The 2002 study that DHS has relied on describes several
facilities in other countries that do research on foot-and-
mouth disease as evidence that it is safe to do so on the
mainland setting. Some of the statements in the study about
these facilities are not correct. The Pirbright facility in the
United Kingdom is on the British mainland in an area of small
farms. As recently as last summer, however, FMD virus escaped
the facility and infected nearby animals. Both Denmark and
Germany have recently built new agricultural and human
pathogenic research centers but both countries chose to do so
on an island because of the additional layer of safety that
location provides. Australia has recently opened a facility on
the mainland that is recognized as the most advanced in the
world for research on dangerous pathogens, but at the present
time live foot-and-mouth disease cannot be used there so
Australia outsources its FMD research to Thailand. And Canada
has built a facility in Winnipeg that is to conduct research on
foot-and-mouth disease but the facility is located in an urban
area away from farmland and has a very small capacity to
conduct tests on large animals.
With respect to the potential economic impact, it is
important to note that the United States has been free of foot-
and-mouth disease since 1929. A single outbreak of the disease
on the U.S. mainland could have significant economic
consequences. Not only would it result in the slaughter of a
large number of animals, it would likely result in a ban on
imports of American beef by many countries. The value of U.S.
livestock sales was $140 billion in 2007 without about 10
percent of those sales accounted for by export markets.
Accordingly, this sector of the economy could be dramatically
affected should an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease occur.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe that more evidence is
needed to clearly demonstrate that research on live FMD viruses
can be conducted as safely on the mainland as on an island.
Release of a pathogen as infectious as FMD is likely to have
significant consequences that need to be explicitly taken into
account in making a location decision.
With that, I welcome any questions that you and the members
may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kingsbury follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thanks, Dr. Kingsbury.
Dr. Sharma, did you wish to make an opening statement?
Mr. Sharma. No.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Carpenter, your opening statement, please,
sir.
STATEMENT OF TIM E. CARPENTER, PH.D., PROFESSOR, CO-DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR ANIMAL DISEASE MODELING AND SURVEILLANCE, UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS
Dr. Carpenter. Thank you for the invitation, and what I
wanted to do is a little bit different. I am going to be
talking from some slides, and based on what I am hearing, I
think you have a fairly good knowledge of the disease but I
would like to walk through some of these to give you some
background for the modeling outputs ultimately.
[Slide shown.]
You know about the virus. It is highly contagious, survives
in meat, milk, et cetera, in the environment and it affects
cloven hoofed animals, so beef, cattle, et cetera. Its lesions
and clinical signs, it can be detected fairly easily if they
are obvious or it may not. It may be relatively unapparent in
sheep and goats and may be missed. It depends. It can be
confused with other diseases as well, diseases that are endemic
in the United States. Transition, there are four routes: direct
contact, animals moving, contacting one another, being shipped
across the country; indirect contact, maybe human vehicles
contacting infected environments or animals; airborne spread,
it has been shown that possibly it can be spread for over 100
miles; and local area spread is a relatively obscure way of
transmission to a neighbor close by.
[Slide shown.]
OK. These numbers, you have heard about FMD has not been in
the United States for about 80 years and it has been in the
U.K. a number of times. What I wanted to point out here is how
variable it can be. In the United States, we had two outbreaks
in the 1920s. The size of those outbreaks ranged from over
130,000 animals being killed to 3,000 or 4,000. In the U.K.,
there are four outbreaks that I have there. The most recent we
have been talking about, it only affected eight farms. Previous
to that in 2001, there were over 2,000 infected premises and a
total of about 9,000 to 10,000 affected animals slaughtered. So
the range of animals slaughtered ranges from 1,500 or so to
over 6.5 million, same disease, a different serotype possibly
but same disease.
[Slide shown.]
Geographically, going from left to right here, shows the
1967, 2001 and 2008 epidemics. You can see the 2001 in the
center is much larger, extends up into southern Scotland, into
Wales, compared with the western part of England in 1967, and
in the most recent 2008, this area here is the area that was
infected and that is where Pirbright is and that is where the
eight farms occurred, and that was a very, very short-lived
epidemic.
[Slide shown.]
Here is the devastation. In March of 2001, there were, I
believe, about 3 million animals slaughtered, or about 80,000 a
day in various ways: burial, burning. None of them, I don't
think, are satisfactory.
[Slide shown.]
Economic impact, we have heard a lot of talk about that in
the U.S. and in California. In the U.S., maybe $40 billion.
These are old estimates, updated in 2001 dollars. In
California, maybe it is around $8 to $10 billion estimated. And
in the U.K., it was estimated about $15 billion U.S.
[Slide shown.]
OK. Here is what we are doing at Davis. We have got a model
we have been working on for about 10 years and we are still
going to keep working on it. We have collected data from
different organizations around the country and collected
information from the USDA on locations of premises. We have
talked with experts to get their impression or subjective
opinion of potential for transmission, for instance, or
effectiveness of control strategies and we have collected
information on animal movements, where do they go, how
frequently are they moved and how many animals are moved. We
put all that information in the model and do simulations, and
that is what I want to show you some examples of now.
[Slide shown.]
And what I am showing you is focusing in California but at
the end I have got a movie of what might happen if FMD were
introduced into Kansas. So in California, I think the important
points here are, it depends where the index, the first case is.
If we are looking at a small backyard of beef, it is going to
be a relatively small impact. If we are looking at an intensive
dairy, it is going to be large. If we are looking at a sales
yard, it is going to be very extensive. These are results that
we did for California and I think the important point is that
we estimated that if there were FMD, we would have
approximately 400,000 or more animals infected. That could be
reduced dramatically by a statewide movement ban, which would
mean shutting down movement of animals within the State. Also,
it could be reduced dramatically by vaccination. The important
here I want to show is in the bottom slide with the figure with
the little dots there, what they represent is number of
carcasses that would have to be disposed on a daily basis, and
it peaks there around 10,000 or 12,000, which is an incredibly
large number of animals, much, much smaller than what they saw
in the U.K. but these are cattle as opposed to sheep. OK. Time
for the movie.
[Movie shown.]
Now, what I have got here is, when we do a simulation, we
do maybe 1,000 of these runs. We try and recreate 1,000
epidemics, and this is just one and it is not meant to be a big
one or a small one. It is just a random one, with the exception
that it simulates that four animals being shipped to a sales
yard and then dispersed. If it were a backyard, we may not ever
see it. So here we go. We start off, and you can't really
appreciate the coloring but it is showing the spread down to
Texas, up to Nebraska, and it is going to be spreading out to
Idaho, and then the black represents, we have got movement
control. So we are not really sure what is going to happen with
movement control. It could be on a statewide basis. It could be
nationally for the first few days. That is one problem the U.K.
had. They waited 3 days until they put in the movement ban, but
we can evaluate that if it were on a nationwide level or on a
statewide level. So that is what I have got.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you. We will start with questions. I will
begin. We will go 5 minutes so we can get through this.
Dr. Kingsbury, if I may, you indicated that in Winnipeg,
Canada, they were going to do it at a lab in a somewhat
isolated area. Is that correct? They were going to put a hoof-
and-mouth disease lab in Winnipeg, Canada?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. And it was going to be small?
Dr. Kingsbury. Well, we understand that they have
relatively small capacity to handle animals like one or two at
a time, so that is in comparison to what I understand is the
plan for NBAF where that would be tens of animals managed at
the same time.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Did GAO find with regard to its
investigation that DHS has conducted or commissioned any study
to determine whether foot-and-mouth disease work can be done
safely on the mainland?
Dr. Kingsbury. They rely on a 2002 study that was
originally commissioned by the Department of Agriculture that
looked at the question of whether it was technically feasible
to have foot-and-mouth disease research conducted on the
mainland. That is a very different question from whether it can
be done safely, and none of the actual evidence that is
presented in that report goes directly to the question of how
they assure the safety under these conditions. We talked----
Mr. Stupak. Well, did they do a risk assessment?
Dr. Kingsbury. There is nothing in this study that looks
like a risk assessment.
Mr. Stupak. Did they do anything like a--by ``they'' I mean
the Department of Homeland Security--cost-benefit analysis,
something like Dr. Carpenter did, where----
Dr. Kingsbury. Not that we are aware of.
Mr. Stupak. In your research, you can still do NBAF without
having foot-and-mouth disease as part of that program. Is that
correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. Certainly.
Mr. Stupak. DHS and Department of Agriculture both say that
thanks to modern technology, the location of a high-containment
laboratory performing foot-and-mouth disease research is no
longer important. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Kingsbury. I am not sure I understood that question.
Mr. Stupak. OK. The way I understand it, DHS and Ag say
that location of a high-containment lab performing foot-and-
mouth disease is no longer important, you can do it anywhere
because of modern technology.
Dr. Kingsbury. Well, modern technology certainly reduces
the risk and the comparisons that have been made including even
here this morning between BSL-4 laboratories in the heart of
Atlanta and the risks associated with foot-and-mouth disease
research I think are not quite comparing apples and apples. The
risk of a release from a facility is non-zero. It may be very,
very small. The question is, is it smaller or larger if you are
doing research on large numbers of animals inside a
biocontainment zone. It may be possible to do that. We are not
saying it is not. We are just saying, we have not seen any
evidence that that has been fully evaluated.
Mr. Stupak. Well, your testimony also seems to indicate
that other countries have moved back or moved their research on
foot-and-mouth disease to an island. I think you mentioned
Germany and Denmark. Is the U.K., which we both highlighted,
Dr. Carpenter, are they looking at any other way of doing their
foot-and-mouth disease research, Dr. Sharma or Dr. Kingsbury or
anybody?
Dr. Kingsbury. I don't think we know that, although there
may be some debate about that going on. I think the case of
Germany is instructive because the original island facility was
built in East Germany, and when East and West Germany came
together, they built one on the mainland, but now that--rather
West Germany built one on the mainland. When East and West
Germany came together, they made a conscious decision to put it
back on the island.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Sharma, do you want to add anything on
that?
Mr. Sharma. No.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Carpenter, if I may, you talk about the
statewide movement. Who is responsible for the restrictions of
a movement if there is a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak? Is it
the State or would it be the Federal Government?
Dr. Carpenter. That is a good question. Actually, when I
was watching some of the hearings on the Commerce Committee, I
was thinking maybe it was the committee that was in charge of
that. But as I understand it, and others can correct me, it is
the State until they call in the Federal Government, and if it
is a national-level emergency, it would be the national
government, I assume.
Mr. Stupak. What would the effect of a major foot-and-mouth
disease outbreak be on our exporting?
Dr. Carpenter. The only numbers I have seen on that were
from the Parlberg study, and the estimate was 13 percent
decrease in exports.
Mr. Stupak. Because it seems to me we have trouble trying
to get our beef into Japan and some of these other Asian
countries now. If there is any----
Dr. Carpenter. Yes, and if there are any politics involved
in import-export, I think it would be a very good excuse to
stop the importation of U.S. meat. We are doing that with other
countries that cannot export to the United States because they
have FMD.
Mr. Stupak. The pictures you showed us in your presentation
of animals slaughtered that took place in England in 2001,
those weren't isolated instances, were they? Isn't it true that
they had to kill millions of cattle, pigs and sheep and it took
days to accomplish this?
Dr. Carpenter. Right. It is estimated 6 to 10 million.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this. In the Senate Armed
Services Committee, this was ``Emerging Threats'' on the Senate
Armed Services Committee. The title of the hearing was
``Emerging Threats,'' March 14, 2003, Senator Roberts
indicated, and he said the ``Crimson Sky'' study, are you
familiar with that?
Dr. Carpenter. Yes, I am.
Mr. Stupak. And he said that if we had a hoof-and-mouth
disease put forth in this country, we could end up losing as
many as 50 million head of livestock, would have to be
terminated, and he went on to say that he would actually have
to extend, if you are going to bury it or even if you burn it,
you have to have like that of a football field 25 miles long
just to take care of Kansas. Is that correct? Are you familiar
with his testimony?
Dr. Carpenter. I have no idea. I know that when we first
started working on this in 2001, one of the first meetings was
with people interested in carcass disposal and there were a lot
of novel ideas, but there is a real problem associated with
foot-and-mouth disease and moving animals that have been
condemned, slaughtered, because of the potential for spreading
the pathogen that way. So disposing of them onsite would be
very difficult to do, and there would be major problems, I am
sure, with EPA and the alternatives.
Mr. Stupak. OK. I will submit for the record that Senator
Roberts, when he said that if we had to terminate 50 million
head of livestock just in Kansas, there would be a ditch 25
miles long and half a football field wide in Kansas alone just
to handle the herds. That is if you are burying them. Does that
sound realistic?
Dr. Carpenter. Again, I really can't. I think the 50
million might be a bit of a higher number but----
Mr. Stupak. I will move for the Senate Armed Services
Committee Emerging Threats subcommittee, March 14, 2003, be
part of the record.
Mr. Shimkus. No objection, Mr. Chairman.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Stupak. Questions, Mr. Shimkus?
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to start with you, Dr. Carpenter, for the first
question. I noticed that when you talked about exports and you
said if politics were in the equation. I always tell folks
politicians are the most honorable profession because we
readily admit there is a political equation in everything we
do. So you are at the right place if you want to talk about,
are there political equations. We definitely have them here.
And so I like that grin that you had on your face. But to the
point of your presentation, we know foot-and-mouth disease is
very contagious, we got that. What do you want me to extract
from your presentation with respect to Plum Island?
Dr. Carpenter. I don't want you to extract anything really.
Seriously, I have never been to Plum Island and I don't really
know that much about it. I do know basically what they are
doing. You know, it sounds like there is always potential for
escape, but personally, I would be more concerned with
accidental introduction of contaminated meats or intentional
introduction through terrorism.
Mr. Shimkus. So you are going to take a pass on this?
Dr. Carpenter. Yes, I can't comment on Plum Island.
Mr. Shimkus. Because if I looked--and I am going to go to
Dr. Kingsbury, but on your testimony, I have not been to Plum
Island either, the chairman and I were talking. I have been to
New York so it would probably be easy to get over there. But if
you look at the picture in the GAO report, you have a picture
of Plum Island and you have, there is another little land mass
in that photo that looks very near. Because pathogens travel
100 miles. Dr. Carpenter, is that what you said?
Dr. Carpenter. Right.
Mr. Shimkus. So Dr. Kingsbury, in the report, there is just
a picture, and maybe that is Long Island. And how far is Plum
Island from Long Island? Three miles?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. So, I mean, if we are talking about pathogens
traveling, yes, I guess the issue is, if the pathogens travel
over water, is that making any damage to the pathogens that
they will expire over saltwater or something?
Dr. Carpenter. And that was the cause of the 1981 outbreak
in the U.K. It traveled, I don't know, over 100 miles up to an
island actually, the isle of Wight.
Mr. Shimkus. Yes, so I mean, that is kind of the debate. I
want to go back to the Germany facility. How far is the German
facility off the mainland, the German island? Do we know?
Mr. Sharma. About the same distance.
Mr. Shimkus. Three miles?
Mr. Sharma. Yes. What I would like to comment on is how far
travel is a function of many different things. From a modeling
perspective, the temperatures, the humidity, daytime,
nighttime, all of these factors affect how far the virus or the
bacteria is going to move; also, about their survivability if
it is during the daytime. The island does offer some advantages
in that respect because there is, especially in Plum Island, we
know a lot about the direction in which the air flows. We have
been doing a lot of studies, monitoring of the air flow, and it
typically flows toward the ocean rather than toward Long
Island. The second factor is, if it escapes to the mainland,
the location of the susceptible animal population. While we
have not presented that information but we have looked at the
number of animal data by county that USDA collects, Plum Island
has the least number of animals in the immediate surrounding
counties, whether it is the Connecticut side, the New Jersey
side or Long Island.
Mr. Shimkus. And let me end with this. I am probably more
concerned--we can never engineer a facility that human error
will not undo. I mean, you can have all the failsafes you want.
I believe we are a sinful human world and we make mistakes and
some are--most of them are unintentional. Some are intentional.
You look at data breaches and stuff, it is most people stealing
data.
So let me just end with this. Dr. Kingsbury, would you
respond? Is there a comparison between the CDC facilities in
Georgia and Plum Island? Can we equate the two equally, being
that the CDC is in the Atlanta area?
Dr. Kingsbury. We don't believe they are equivalent because
while both have high-containment areas, Plum Island deals with
numbers of large animals that become infected, that become
slaughtered at the end, that have to be disposed of and the
like, and all of the research done with animals, as I
understand it, at CDC are small animals inside containers.
Mr. Shimkus. That is all my questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Pickering for questions.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kingsbury, you said that Australia contracts out foot-
and-mouth disease research to Thailand. Is that correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Pickering. And what is your research on the Thailand
facility? Where is it located and have there been any breaches
of disease?
Dr. Kingsbury. We haven't looked into that.
Mr. Pickering. Have you ever heard of any outbreak in
Thailand?
Dr. Kingsbury. There have been outbreaks in a number of
Southeast Asia countries.
Mr. Pickering. But you don't know if there is----
Dr. Kingsbury. But we have not studied the details of them.
Mr. Pickering. Now, in the German island scenario, it is
connected by a road. Is that correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. A causeway, yes, sir.
Mr. Pickering. A causeway, and so that really, there is no
distinction between the mainland site and an island site----
Dr. Kingsbury. It is still----
Mr. Pickering [continuing]. As far as the road connection?
Dr. Kingsbury. It is still largely surrounded by water.
Mr. Pickering. Yes, but it is connected by a road and so
you would agree that it is a mainland connected site?
Dr. Kingsbury. It is connected to the mainland by a
causeway, yes, sir.
Mr. Pickering. And the possible outbreak scenarios, if it
is connected by a road, are really not that much different. Is
that correct? I mean, one of your concerns is that an
individual or a car would be a carrier of a disease, but in the
German example, do you have any examples of that occurring?
Mr. Sharma. The only area where the road would affect would
be the movement of people and transportation so yes, they
have--if there is an epidemic or an outbreak----
Mr. Pickering. But there is not----
Mr. Sharma [continuing]. There is a risk.
Mr. Pickering. But your study has shown in that case that
has never occurred. Is that correct?
Mr. Sharma. That is correct.
Mr. Pickering. Now, you said that Germany constructed a
facility at the end of the Cold War when East Germany and West
Germany reconciled, and that was a mainland site. That would
have been around 1990. Is that--or when was the other site in
Germany?
Mr. Sharma. After World War II when Germany got divided,
the West Germans had to make a decision where to locate. They
located on the mainland but in an urban area where they were
not in close proximity to the susceptible animals.
Mr. Pickering. Were there any outbreaks in the German
facility?
Mr. Sharma. I think there was one but they could not
associate it with the lab.
Mr. Pickering. So a fairly extensive period of time in
Germany where a mainland site operated safely?
Mr. Sharma. Correct.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you. The Canadian site, remote, do we
have any examples of the Canadian site having any outbreaks?
Mr. Sharma. Two things. First of all, they are, relatively
speaking, new, and their scale is small.
Mr. Pickering. So they are new, kind of like the new NBAF
would be new?
Mr. Sharma. Yes.
Mr. Pickering. And modern.
Mr. Sharma. The scale is very small, not comparable to even
the current work, and----
Mr. Pickering. Any outbreaks in Canada?
Mr. Sharma. No.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much.
Dr. Carpenter, your concern over terrorism--really,
terrorism, whether it is on an island or mainland, there is
really no distinction or difference, is there?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, actually I am not thinking terrorism
of a facility. I am thinking terrorism of somebody infecting
livestock on the mainland.
Mr. Pickering. So the terrorism risk is really not an issue
here of whether we have a mainland site or a Plum Island site?
Dr. Carpenter. That is what I was talking about. Right.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Pickering.
Mr. Dingell for questions, please. Mr. Dingell?
Mr. Dingell. Yes, and thank you for your courtesy.
These are all questions that I would appreciate a yes or no
answer to, Dr. Kingsbury and Dr. Sharma, as I go through
because we have very limited time here. Foot-and-mouth disease
is one of the most highly infectious and dangerous animal
diseases known, and nearly 100 percent of exposed animals
become infected. Is that so, yes or no?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Isn't it also true that you found from your
research that a single outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease on
U.S. mainland could cause significant economic consequences to
our economy with possible losses of as high as $30 billion to
$50 billion?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes to there being significant economic
consequences. We didn't actually try to quantify it.
Mr. Dingell. Now, isn't it true that the cost to our
economy would not only be the thousands of animals that would
have to be killed but the devastating effect upon the Nation's
transportation system, exports, not only in meats but also
other food products because protective embargoes would be
imposed by other countries on U.S. farm goods?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And isn't it true that you found that since we
moved all of the research of this dangerous disease to Plum
Island, we have not had an outbreak like other countries?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Isn't it true that your research found that
the United Kingdom, which has a lab on their mainland, has had
numerous outbreaks costing billions of dollars including one
last year that was linked to their own government research
laboratory?
Dr. Kingsbury. In general, there have been outbreaks. I
wouldn't use the word ``numerous.'' I think it is more likely
several, but the statement is correct.
Mr. Dingell. Now, as a matter of fact, your research
documented release of foot-and-mouth disease from labs in the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany,
Spain, and Russia, to name a few. Is that true or false?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, true.
Mr. Dingell. And didn't you also find that Germany and
Denmark have moved their foot-and-mouth research to islands
because of safety concerns at the same time DHS is
contemplating moving our lab to the mainland?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And isn't it also true that you talked to the
Australian officials who have one of the newest and most
advanced labs for the study of animal diseases, that their
government refuses to let them do live virus foot-and-mouth
research in it but requires them to have some other country to
take the risk for them?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, let me understand your testimony. When
you asked DHS for any reports on cost-benefit analysis that
justified their decision to move live virus research on foot-
and-mouth disease to the mainland of the United States being
done on Plum Island for almost 50 years they had none?
Dr. Kingsbury. We have seen no cost-benefit analyses and we
have asked for everything they have.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Dr. Kingsbury, let us talk about the 2002
SAIC study that DHS claims justifies this risky move. Isn't it
true that you analyzed it and talked to its authors and
concluded that it did not support DHS's risky decision for a
number of critical reasons?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, let me highlight your findings about this
SAIC report. You concluded this report could not support the
conclusions that this research could be done safely on the
mainland because it, one, addressed a different question; two,
was selective in what it considered; three, did not assess the
history of releases of foot-and-mouth disease virus or other
pathogens either in the United States or elsewhere; four, did
not address the issues of containment related to large animal
work; and five, was inaccurate in comparing other countries'
foot-and-mouth disease work experience with the situation in
the United States.
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Dr. Kingsbury, isn't it true that rather than
supporting moving Plum Island to the mainland, the authors of
the SAIC study actually concluded that if you included the cost
of cleaning up the Plum Island site, it made economic sense to
keep the research on Plum Island?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. So the bottom line is that someone at DHS
either never read the report or is not being forthcoming and
truthful in reporting to this committee or the Congress when
they say the report justifies this move?
Dr. Kingsbury. I am not going to speak for DHS, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And I can assume that you are of the view that
this is a risky move. Is that correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I have about exhausted my time.
Mr. Shimkus. Would the chairman yield for one second?
Mr. Dingell. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. Shimkus. Just to follow up on this, when did GAO share
this report with DHS and USDA?
Mr. Sharma. Tuesday.
Mr. Shimkus. Tuesday?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. That is all my questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Let me just ask a question, Dr. Kingsbury or
Dr. Sharma. The committee was disturbed to learn, as Mr.
Dingell alluded to in his opening, that DHS was refusing to
provide you with documents such as the statement of the work
for the environmental impact statement. What excuses do they
give for not providing you the documents you requested to do
your analysis for this committee?
Dr. Kingsbury. I believe they said that they were not going
to give them to us because the documents were not yet public,
but as you know, our access allows us to get access to that
kind of information. We just haven't had the time to fully have
the argument yet.
Mr. Stupak. So there are still documents you would like to
have from DHS?
Dr. Kingsbury. If you want us to continue to look at this
matter, yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. We may go another round of questions, but
without objection, I will turn to Mr. Moran for questions.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you for
the courtesy that is being extended to me and Ms. Boyda for the
opportunity to join you on this panel today, and I fully
understand the desire of the Chair and the nature of this
hearing to limit our discussion to the idea of moving the
facility from Plum Island to the mainland.
Dr. Carpenter, the risks that you describe, what caught my
attention, of course, was the episode that begins in the 1st
Congressional district in Kansas in your slide presentation.
Dr. Carpenter. Oops.
Mr. Moran. But the reality, it seems to me, would be that
the risks are minimized at a high-tech new facility and that
when you do the model as if there is going to be an episode of
hoof-and-mouth disease, the implication is that the risks are
increased by the presence of a new facility located on the
mainland, and it seems to me that the risks are actually higher
from the natural or intentional introduction of hoof-and-mouth
disease and so I just want to make sure that the suggestion is
not, at least I would hope the suggestion is not that the
facility would be the cause and effect or increasing the risk
of hoof-and-mouth disease in cattle country as compared to
hoof-and-mouth disease occurring naturally or----
Dr. Carpenter. Right. Absolutely not. I went to my program
and I said select a place in Kansas, so there was no intention
to say that there was a release from a facility. It was just if
it were there and it were in four or five animals, what might
happen.
Mr. Moran. And I don't know that that is an appropriate
question for you but just common sense tells me that the risk
is higher for a natural occurrence or for intentional
introduction of hoof-and-mouth disease for nefarious reasons
than it is for its escape from a facility?
Dr. Carpenter. One would think based on history, but based
on history, there has been no intentional introduction that we
know of in the United States, which is surprising but
fortunate.
Mr. Moran. So that assumption, is my suggestion correct,
that the risks are not increased necessarily by a facility?
There are other factors that may introduce hoof-and-mouth
disease to the continental United States?
Dr. Carpenter. Right, there are definitely other factors.
As I said earlier, until 2007 I wasn't really thinking about
the potential of a leak. More so, I think it is important for
contaminated food coming into the country or intentional
actions.
Mr. Moran. It is sad that we would have to talk about the
possibility of intentional introduction. And then finally, I
know that the State of Kansas including colleagues of yours at
the Kansas State University have done extensive studies on the
introduction of hoof-and-mouth disease to our State, have done
modeling and scenarios and actually have acted out the--I just
was wondering if you are familiar with those studies and
included them in your analysis or discussion?
Dr. Carpenter. Yes, I am familiar with them. I didn't
include those in the analysis though.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me this
opportunity.
Mr. Stupak. Ms. Boyda for questions.
Ms. Boyda. Thank you very much, and thank you for letting
Mr. Moran and me join this hearing.
I am from Kansas as well, and, all of the ``It's What's for
Dinner'' commercials, that is Kansas. You are seeing Kansas. So
all of the discussion about how dangerous this is, we find to
be something that certainly we all are very, very, extremely
cognizant of. And I think what Mr. Moran was talking about and
asked if you had taken into account, we have a procedure set up
if anything happens in Kansas to get it to be under control
within hours, not days, because again, this is something that
we deal with. If you are in California, you know what you are
going to do in the case of some kind of a disaster there. So we
live and breathe this everyday. And having this whole
discussion about how dangerous hoof-and-mouth is, I am glad
everybody in the country knows about it, but I hope everybody
hear understands that Kansas lives and breathes this danger
every day. We export more beef than anybody in the country. We
are the beef producer. So everything that you are talking about
is nothing we haven't considered. It is what we consider each
and every day, and keeping our herds safe is the most important
thing that many of us would wake up and say is very important
to Kansas.
So when we hear that Plum Island is 3 miles away and the
virus can easily spread for 100 miles, it doesn't, and knowing
that Plum Island has not been well taken care of or maybe it is
taken care of. It is old; it puts fear in our hearts knowing
that in fact there could be a release from Plum Island and it
could very, very easily get over to the mainland. And I just
again very quickly would like you to address what, we all
understand that there could be some politics playing with this.
Is there a chance that putting it in some island is more for
political reasons so that people feel some sense of safety
because some way or another there is some water between the
mainland, but in fact, is that a false sense of security for
people and maybe that in fact might have some political edge to
it?
Dr. Carpenter. Is that a question?
Ms. Boyda. Yes.
Dr. Carpenter. Yes. Well, I am sure it would make people
feel safer if they see a body of water out there. As far as the
airborne spread, I am not sure of this but I know about the
spread in 1981 in the U.K., that pigs are very effective
producers of the virus, shedders of the virus in the air and
that cattle are very good receptors. So if you have infected
pigs producing the virus and shedding it and you have receptive
cattle receiving it, that is a real problem. But airborne
spread from a few infected cattle, I don't think would be a
major problem.
Ms. Boyda. I am talking about a release from Plum Island,
and I only have a couple of minutes. I would like to ask just
another question or two. In Kansas we are deeply concerned. We
haven't had an outbreak since 1929, but if there were, then
what do you do with those carcasses and how do you get them? Do
they need to be transported off to Plum Island so that there
can, in fact, be some research done on them? What are the risks
of actually having to transport animals that are infected out
to an island in New York versus being able to have an immediate
chance to take these animals into a laboratory? Is there any
benefit in that?
Dr. Carpenter. No, but I----
Ms. Boyda. And this is for Dr. Kingsbury as well.
Dr. Carpenter. I couldn't visualize transporting 5,000 or
10,000 cows----
Mr. Boyda. No, no, no, but would you need to transport some
of the animals affected into the laboratory to see if there is
any----
Dr. Carpenter. I would assume that they would just take
samples from the animals for confirmation.
Ms. Boyda. But you are still having to take those samples,
which are still going to house that and take them off to New
York. I just wonder if there is any advantage in saying the
laboratory is right there. If you needed to do anything, you
would be within an hour of being able to begin a study in this
country.
Dr. Carpenter. Actually, that is a very good point that I
forgot to make, that I think there would be a good move to put
facility wherever it is that is doing the diagnostics in a
location that is easily accessible because we are looking at
millions of dollars for every hour of delay that----
Ms. Boyda. That is right, my point being minutes. This is
an instant. Kansas understands that this isn't about days, it
isn't even about hours. It is about minutes and being able to
react so quickly and making sure that you are containing
things.
Let me just finalize by saying, Mr. Chairman, I am deeply
appreciative of what you are saying about DHS, and from a
political standpoint versus just making a good decision,
ultimately Kansans want the right decision made here. We have
so much at stake here that we want the right decision made, and
if DHS is not forthcoming with things, that will cause everyone
so much trouble politically but in making the best decision as
well. And I certainly am very, very appreciative of hearing
what you are saying DHS is. We need the transparency to make
sure that the best decisions really are being made but that the
American people and the cattlemen in Kansas also know that this
process is something that was open and transparent and the best
possible decision.
So I certainly appreciate what you are doing in that
regard. I yield.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Dingell, questions?
Ms. Boyda. Oh, I am sorry. I have a letter from the
delegation that I would like to give to the Committee, if that
is all right. This is from the Kansas delegation, Chairman
Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You alluded to a
proceeding involving my good friend, Pat Roberts, who held a
hearing with Admiral Jembresky and G.M. Bastiani and it
occurred on March 28, 2003. I would like to read from it. Here
are comments coming from Senator Roberts. He said, ``I played
the President under an exercise called Crimson Sky with the
Department of Agriculture. Now, Crimson Sky was the misnomer
label of what would happen if Iraq had launched a hoof-and-
mouth disease infestation in the United States in 7 States.
Now, that doesn't sound like much on the surface of it but if
you have an infestation period of 6 days and on the 7th you
have got to make some decisions and we didn't do it very well.
We ended up with 50 million head of livestock that had to be
terminated. Now, how do you do that? Just on the surface of it,
how on earth do you do that and what do you do with the
carcasses? Well, obviously it was the National Guard, and then
obviously the National Guard couldn't handle it, so it was all
active duty. And then we found we didn't have enough
ammunition, and we found that you don't burn the carcasses
because that we learned in Great Britain, that is not what you
do. So you had to bury them, and there was a ditch 25 miles
long and half a football field wide in Kansas alone just to
handle the herds there. Then we had to put up a stop order on
all shipments because you were having states and National
Guards being activated by all the governors to stop other
states and transportation of livestock, all export stock. The
market went nuts and the people in the cities finally figured
out that their food did come from farms, not supermarkets, and
they rioted in the streets and there was a mess. And it was not
only for 1 year but for several years. Then add in the problem
of food security, that if you put a little anthrax in some
milk, you have really got a problem on your hands. Now, I want
to know, I know that at that particular time when different
events happen, that DOD will be there. They are going to have
to be there because they are the only outfit that can do it. I
prefer the National Guard because people know them, trust them.
They are the home forces and they are working toward it.''
Now, I want to understand one thing, and this is a question
to any of our panel, particularly to our two witnesses from
GAO. You told the DHS that you were conducting an official
congressional investigation for this committee. Is that
correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And that Under Secretary Cohen or other
members of his staff told you that you could not have the
documents until after it was made public. Is that correct?
Dr. Kingsbury. Yes, referring specifically to the statement
of work for the environmental impact statement.
Mr. Dingell. What did you just say?
Dr. Kingsbury. We were asking for the statement of work for
the ongoing environmental impact statement, and that is what
they said was not public.
Mr. Dingell. What was the reason they told you you could
not have those documents?
Dr. Kingsbury. They said they were going to be released at
the end of the month, and when they were public we could have
them.
Mr. Dingell. But you couldn't have them before?
Dr. Kingsbury. That is what they said.
Mr. Dingell. Did they set forth a reason why you could not
have that information or those documents?
Dr. Kingsbury. I think I just said everything they said.
Mr. Dingell. What was the reason? Was there a statutory
reason or constitutional reason on which they set forth that
they could deny you access to those documents?
Dr. Kingsbury. OK. Dr. Sharma has just clarified that the
argument that the statement of work could not be given to us
was that it was proprietary and----
Mr. Dingell. Why was it proprietary?
Dr. Kingsbury. They did not say.
Mr. Dingell. They did not cite any reason why those were
proprietary?
Dr. Kingsbury. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Can you tell us why they are proprietary?
Dr. Kingsbury. No, sir, and under our rules of access, I
don't think there is any reason for them to deny them.
Mr. Dingell. Is GAO denied any documents on grounds that
they are proprietary?
Dr. Kingsbury. Occasionally that issue arises, but once we
have time for our lawyers to discuss the matter, we usually----
Mr. Dingell. Why are these documents proprietary?
Dr. Kingsbury. I am sorry, sir. I don't believe they are.
But----
Mr. Dingell. Well, is it because a contractor is doing it?
The contractor has got some proprietary interests in the work
that he is doing for the government?
Dr. Kingsbury. I don't know why that word was used. It is
not appropriate to deny GAO access.
Mr. Dingell. We will ask those folks to explain their
secretary.
Now, isn't it true that you had other problems getting
records from DHS and USDA and that they even delayed your trip
to Plum Island until this committee sent a letter threatening
them with contempt?
Dr. Kingsbury. It is true that it took us 6 weeks to
arrange the trip to Plum Island and there have been occasional
delays in getting documents. The most recent issue over the
environmental impact statement statement of work is the most
recent case in point.
Mr. Dingell. Now, isn't it true that while our own DHS is
delaying giving GAO documents and access to the Plum Island
facility, you were having no problem getting information from
foreign countries and visiting their facilities?
Dr. Kingsbury. That is correct.
Mr. Dingell. And you were received with courtesy and given
full assistance and cooperation by Germans, Danes, and British
as well as other countries?
Dr. Kingsbury. Germans, Danes, and British, and the
organization in France, yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your courtesy.
Mr. Stupak. I thank the gentleman.
Let me ask a question if I may, Dr. Kingsbury or Dr. Sharma
or Mr. Carpenter; maybe I will start with you, Dr. Kingsbury.
The exhibit book right there in front of you, tab number 12,
you alluded to in your testimony, Dr. Kingsbury, and others
have referred to it, the SAIC report, that is Science
Application International Corporation, and it is tab 12 in our
exhibit binder. And I understand you had concerns about this
report, but I want to ask you, if I may, on page 16, second
full paragraph, it says, ``Biosafety lapses at any facility
location likely have an equal risk of occurrence.'' Would you
agree with that?
Dr. Kingsbury. The document at tab 12, sir, only has about
5 pages in it.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Page 16 is not included in that?
Dr. Kingsbury. Not that I can see. It is just a table of
contents.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Let me ask you this then from it. My
binder had it. I thought yours had it. ``Biosafety lapses at
any location have an equal risk of occurrence.'' Would you
agree with that statement or not? In other words, the risk
occurs really from lapse in biosafety practices resulting in
the release of an agent or intentional removal by someone with
access to the facility. That is how security lapses occur.
Dr. Kingsbury. That is how these things occur. I wouldn't
say it is the same at every facility because different
facilities would have different levels of training and concern
about the matter.
Mr. Stupak. Correct. And let me ask Dr. Carpenter this
question. When you showed your map up here, the United States
and the animal populations, it looked like about the only place
you could do it, and I just took a quick look at it while you
had it up there, was basically Nevada. That is the only place
in the United States, correct?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, they have livestock in Nevada.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Well, it looks pretty bare in your picture
there.
Dr. Carpenter. Right. I think what was happening was you
didn't see infected premises because animals were not shipped
there.
Mr. Stupak. A way for this to occur, foot-and-mouth
disease, either it is intentionally introduced or we have a
lapse in safety, and this committee has done enough oversight
and investigations at the labs, whether it is the nuclear labs,
Los Alamos, wherever, or Lawrence Livermore as we have an issue
going on today with them; those are mistakes. They occur. Is it
the key to your testimony then; since we know there is human
error and these things occur, you would want foot-and-mouth
disease where there is the least amount of animal population to
infect, if there is a release, however it occurs. Is that fair
to say, Dr. Carpenter?
Dr. Carpenter. That makes sense.
Mr. Stupak. And in all the sites we have seen, Plum Island,
because they do not have animals in the immediate area, is
probably about the safest spot we have in this country for the
past 50 years for hoof-and-mouth disease research. Is that
correct?
Dr. Carpenter. I don't know. I don't know if there is
access of animals to the island.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Sharma, Dr. Kingsbury, you were both at
Plum Island. Is that fair to say?
Dr. Kingsbury. Dr. Sharma was there, yes.
Mr. Sharma. There are no animals on the island other than
the animals that are brought there for specific experiments.
DHS has told us that occasionally, we don't know the frequency
and the numbers, that deer swim from Long Island to the island
and they shoot them.
Mr. Stupak. Sure, to keep them off Plum Island?
Mr. Sharma. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. So you don't have spread of disease, correct?
Mr. Sharma. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. In my home State of Michigan, we have bovine
TB, and Dr. Carpenter, it is in the small northwest part of
lower Michigan, but all of Michigan, we are not allowed to
transport dairy without numerous inspections, and some states
still won't accept our dairy from Michigan because of bovine
TB. So if you have an outbreak, and I think I asked you this
before, who is responsible then for determining. In Michigan,
it is bovine TB, but if it is hoof-and-mouth disease, who would
make that determination? Since this is under the jurisdiction
of DHS, is it going to be Department of Homeland Security,
United States Department of Agriculture, State Department of
Agriculture? Where would it be?
Dr. Carpenter. I believe to a point it is the State, then
it is the USDA, and we have the same situation happening in
California with our second herd of TB.
Mr. Stupak. Very good. Mr. Shimkus, then we will go around
to the members who have just come in who would like to ask
questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be short.
I just want to follow up on just some of the details, and
Dr. Kingsbury or Dr. Sharma or Dr. Carpenter, it doesn't really
matter who answers as long as it is consistent. What are the
details of the last foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the
United States, the 1929 outbreak? And what I am looking at, how
did it happen, did it involve human error, did it involve a
laboratory, what the cause of the outbreak determined and where
did it occur? Can anyone update me on the 1929----
Dr. Carpenter. I will embarrassingly say California, and I
don't know the rest of the answer to that. It is in a document
that I could look up but I don't know offhand.
Dr. Kingsbury. We haven't gone back that far. We do report
on some incidences in our testimonial statement but we didn't
go back to the 1929 event.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, my colleague, Jerry Moran, is here from
Kansas, and Congresswoman Boyda kind of mentioned Kansas. Were
you guys involved with the 1929 outbreak at all? I am just
asking. I am not trying to be goofy.
Mr. Moran. I appreciate Mr. Stupak, the chairman's
courtesy, extended to me. I am less enamored with yours, Mr.
Shimkus. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Well, I would have to put Jerry under oath and
we don't want to do that.
Dr. Kingsbury. I think it is fair to say there were no
laboratories at that time so it had to have been a naturally
occurring outbreak.
Mr. Shimkus. OK. I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Inslee for questions.
Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
This GAO report is very disturbing to me in concluding that
there really has been no study done of the safety. It is kind
of mind boggling to me, frankly, because obviously you lose a
degree, another series of barriers if there is a release and we
know there are releases on occasion from these facilities, try
as we might. So I am kind of flummoxed as to why this decision
has gone on.
Let me just ask you at the table, what type of cost-benefit
analysis has been done. For instance, has there been any
assessment of any additional costs for operating on an island
compared to the costs to the U.S. economy if in fact there is a
hoof-and-mouth outbreak in the United States? What is the ratio
of those two numbers?
Dr. Kingsbury. As far as we know, that study has not been
done.
Mr. Inslee. Now, if you are going to remove a pathological
laboratory like this and remove one barrier of protection of
Americans, which is the water, which works really, really well
if there is a release, wouldn't you want to have that kind of
assessment before you make a decision like this?
Dr. Kingsbury. I think the point of our testimony is that
there should be more analysis done before this decision is
made.
Mr. Inslee. And what additional costs were there in
construction or operation that were considered? Did anyone
present any ballpark figures?
Dr. Kingsbury. There have apparently been estimates of what
it would cost to build a facility although those estimates
appear to be changing, and the costs of closing down the
facility on Plum Island seem not to have been included in that
analysis.
Mr. Inslee. Which is a huge mistake, given the enormous
costs for closing facilities like this, particularly with toxic
material involved. I live on an island. I am an islander. I
live on Bainbridge Island, Washington, so I have some sense of
what it is like to live on an island, and I can tell you, life
goes on on an island. You get your business done. You get
across the water. It is just stunning to me that without a real
solid assessment of the costs that we would remove a layer of
protection for Americans given the enormous economic
consequences of an outbreak including apples from Washington
State. You know it could even involve the apple products. We
don't think of that in those terms.
So what would you recommend, if you could, to a department
to really thoroughly evaluate this issue? You have told us that
they need to evaluate whether or not they can safely do this,
number one, but number two, what would you suggest on a full-
scale evaluation involving costs or benefits?
Dr. Kingsbury. Well, clearly, in our view, there needs to
be more assessment of the specific risks involved, and then
once you assess and estimate what the risks are, then you have
to look at the consequences, and the consequences get at the
economic issues that you raised. We are not in the position to
say how such an analysis would come out. I can imagine an
analysis and a particular laboratory structure and all that
could be deemed to be sufficiently safe. Our point is, those
analyses have not been done.
Mr. Inslee. Was this island at one time used as a
quarantine facility of some sort? I have this weird historical
memory that this island was involved in this. Does that ring a
bell?
Mr. Sharma. No, but I think it will be very illustrative to
talk about the 1978 outbreak and that would shed some light
onto what you are asking. At the time Plum Island had a
practice of keeping animals in the holding areas, and when the
release occurred, these animals became infected, and this point
is extremely important. There are two things that happened. The
virus didn't escape to the mainland, and we were able to
convince OIE that island is serving as the second
recontainment. It is an extension of the lab and therefore OIE
did not impose any sanctions on our exports. We asked them if
there is a single case of an outbreak in the United States,
would OIE impose a ban, and their answer was yes. So it is a
matter of taking risks, but OIE's position is that an outbreak,
if contained on the island, would not lead to a ban on our
exports.
Mr. Inslee. Well, given that enormous impact on the U.S.
economy should that occur, I certainly would hope that somehow
we put this decision off until there is a full cost-benefit
analysis and we do have access to the environmental study.
Would any of you disagree with that?
Dr. Carpenter. No.
Mr. Inslee. Then we are all of like minds. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Whitfield for questions, please.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am sorry I was
late getting here. But it seems to me, and I think our friend
from Washington State pointed this out, the GAO in their report
says very emphatically that the Department of Homeland Security
has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine
whether FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland and
instead they have looked at a study about is it technically
feasible. So it seems to me that until Homeland Security has a
more comprehensive look at this, that it is really premature
for us to be discussing this issue.
With that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stupak. I thank the gentleman.
Let me just ask one question, we will let this panel go,
and I think we are going to have votes on the Floor here pretty
quickly. We mentioned, and it has been placed in the record,
Mr. Dingell read from it, this statement from Senator Roberts
in which he played the President of the United States. So let
me have each of you play that role for a moment and let me ask
you this question. If you were the President of the United
States, they came to you and said we are going to do this NBAF,
part of it is going to be hoof-and-mouth disease, we have Plum
Island or we can move it to the mainland. In your personal or
professional opinion, would you move, the foot-and-mouth
disease part from Plum Island, Dr. Kingsbury?
Dr. Kingsbury. I would not want to answer that question
without more analysis than we have seen today.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Sharma?
Mr. Sharma. Same.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Carpenter?
Dr. Carpenter. Well, when we were trying to get it to
Davis, I was in favor of it and I live right next to where the
lab would be.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, can I----
Dr. Carpenter. I feel comfortable with it.
Mr. Stupak. Where it is now, you mean?
Dr. Carpenter. In Davis, California.
Mr. Stupak. You do hoof-and-mouth there?
Dr. Carpenter. No, no. They were--Davis was one of the
sites that was talked about early on.
Mr. Stupak. Right. OK.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. If I can just follow up, would you advocate
outsourcing, as Australia does, since Australia does have BSL-3
and -4 and they are highly--that they outsource? I mean, is
that an option?
Dr. Kingsbury. Having our work done in Australia?
Mr. Shimkus. Well, I am just--outsourcing like they do in
Australia.
Mr. Sharma. We had talked to some experts, and they had
analyzed this issue and there are certain aspects of this work
which are more risky than others. The riskier parts are if you
are working with large animals, doing some challenging studies,
they obviously are shedding a lot of virus, and that kind of
work, if you want to minimize, you can outsource it. The
diagnostic capabilities, present lower level of risk. That is
the kind of expertise you want to have in-house because you
need to diagnose as soon as possible. So there are aspects. It
is not total or all.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Pickering, any questions before I leave
this panel?
Mr. Pickering. Just a couple brief questions.
Dr. Kingsbury, to sum up your testimony, tell me if this is
correct. You are not saying that the decision to put a facility
on the mainland is riskier than keeping one on Plum Island. You
are simply saying that more analysis needs to be done to
determine that risk. Is that accurate?
Dr. Kingsbury. It is close. Most of the experts that we
have talked to have said that an island provides an additional
level of protection. The risks would be the same of a release
but it is the risk, the downstream risk of an actual outbreak
that the island provides a further layer of protection for
Mr. Pickering. Dr. Carpenter, Plum Island is, I think, 3
miles from Long Island, 6 miles from Connecticut. Airborne
pathogens can travel over 3 and 6 miles, can they not?
Dr. Carpenter. Yes.
Mr. Pickering. So really, Plum Island is a false sense of
security, isn't it? So maybe if we had an island 20 miles or 50
miles offshore, that might be correct, Dr. Kingsbury, but the
close proximity to shore, Plum Island really does give little,
if no, additional protection. Would that be--and Dr. Carpenter,
you said that you are in support of it. You live within
minutes. There is no--and this is very, very important. There
is a risk, an economic risk to our animal health and the
economy based on that but there is no risk at all to human
health. Isn't that correct?
Dr. Carpenter. Virtually no risk, yes.
Mr. Pickering. And again, there is not much difference
between a site that is 3 to 6 miles offshore than one that
would be at UC-Davis a few minutes from your home, and the
other thing that I think that is important, Dr. Kingsbury, is
that the U.K. facility where you had an outbreak, is you have
apples and oranges comparisons. The U.K. facility is outdated,
similar to the Plum Island facility, and as you look at modern
facility to modern facility, probably the closest example would
be Canada where there has been no outbreak, so I think from a
policy point of view, a modern facility is most important. Plum
Island is a false security because it really is close to
population centers.
Dr. Kingsbury. The issue is not population centers. The
issue is, how close is it to susceptible populations of the
animals that become diseased, and in addition to being an
island, and we have to say, there has been no spread of the
virus from that island in its history----
Mr. Pickering. But you could also find other facilities,
mainland facilities in countries where there have been no
outbreaks as well.
Dr. Kingsbury. That is correct.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Moran, any questions?
Mr. Moran. No.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask just one. You used false sense of
security. It is really not a false sense of security, it is a
proven sense of security, is it not, that you have had an
outbreak there and it never spread to the mainland?
Dr. Kingsbury. There have been releases on Plum Island.
They have not left the island and therefore they haven't spread
to animal populations, and as Dr. Sharma said earlier, part of
that has to do with the prevailing winds in that area.
Mr. Stupak. Sure, it blows it out and----
Dr. Kingsbury. And those have been studied and understood,
so I think it is not quite false that it is safe.
Mr. Stupak. Now, Dr. Kingsbury, you have not gone to Plum
Island but----
Dr. Kingsbury. I have not, no, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And Dr. Sharma, you have?
Mr. Sharma. Yes, I have.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Carpenter, have you?
Dr. Carpenter. No, I haven't.
Mr. Stupak. Then Dr. Sharma, do you know, having been
there, is there any reason why you could not build the new NBAF
on Plum Island? Is there any reason why you cannot build a new
research facility for foot-and-mouth disease on Plum Island?
Mr. Sharma. Well, there is plenty of land. As a matter of
fact, the islands in Denmark and Germany are significantly
smaller in size. In addition to that, there are some assets on
the island that would lower the costs and DHS since 2002 has
invested significant amount of money, in particular, things
like they have power generators, backup power generators. They
are expensive. They are assets that can be used if they decide
to build a new facility there.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you. That will conclude questions of this
panel. I want to thank the three doctors for being here and
thank you very much for your testimony. You are welcome to stay
for the rest of the hearing.
I would like to call up our second panel of witnesses. We
have Mr. Ray Wulf, who is President and CEO of the organization
American Farmers and Ranchers; Dr. Howard Hill, who is Chief
Operating Officer of Iowa Select Farms; Mr. Leroy Watson, who
is Legislative Director for National Grange of the Order of
Patrons of Husbandry; and Dr. Gary Voogt, who is President-
Elect of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony
under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right
under the Rules of the House to be advised by counsel during
their testimony. OK. We have been asked to hold for a minute
for Mr. Voogt. We will hold for a minute or two until he comes
back.
As I was saying, Mr. Voogt, it is the policy of this
subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be
advised that you have the right under the Rules of the House to
be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do any of our
witnesses wish to be advised by counsel during their testimony?
Everybody is indicating no. Therefore, I am going to ask you to
please rise and raise your right hand to take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
replied in the affirmative. You are now under oath. Mr. Wulf, I
am going to start with you, but I am going to ask you to wait
30 seconds because I think they are going to call us for a
number of votes here. All right, Mr. Wulf, go ahead, start,
your opening statement, please, 5 minutes. If you have a longer
one, please submit it for the record.
STATEMENT OF RAY L. WULF, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICAN FARMERS
AND RANCHERS
Mr. Wulf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Shimkus and the rest of the Committee. I am Ray Wulf, President
and CEO of American Farmers and Ranchers. We are based in
Oklahoma City.
Mr. Stupak. Go ahead.
Mr. Wulf. We are a general farm organization.
Mr. Stupak. Our timing is not good today. All right, sir.
Let us try it again.
Mr. Wulf. American Farmers and Ranchers Insurance Company.
We do business in 24 States, and as I said, we are located in
Oklahoma City. Running through the questions that were posed to
us, we are absolutely against and opposed to movement of the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center to the mainland United
States. As you may know, already we have heard, this is the
only facility where certain highly infectious foreign animal
diseases are studied, such as the foot-and-mouth disease. Foot-
and-mouth disease is a highly contagious virus that affects
cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and
deer.
Foot-and-mouth disease can be carried by wind, clothing,
footwear, skin, through nasal passages and any equipment. As a
matter of fact, I am not aware of anything that this will not
adhere to and can be transmitted. There are simply too many
possibilities for error, either by negligence or accident, and
could impose extreme economic impacts on U.S. agriculture, U.S.
agriculture producers and our consumers. When dealing with this
particular type of risk, it is better to deal with a known
probability of an occurrence than to move a facility to a new
location where you have no history and an unknown probability
of an occurrence that can happen. Any event with or without
history, there is a probability that can be assessed to a
particular outcome and one certainly needs to be assessed here.
United States infrastructure for moving livestock, second
to none. We allow livestock to move rapidly across the United
States. As a matter of fact, in 5 days, cattle trucking out of
Oklahoma City National Livestock Market arrive in 39 States.
Infrastructure is really good here in the United States, in a
matter of days livestock can be transported hundreds of
thousands of miles and intermingled with other livestock. If we
move the facility we have the potential risk of an outbreak
inside the mainland United States, whereas currently it is not
a high risk of probability of transporting at Plum Island.
The economic impact for AFR members would no doubt be
severe, devastating, and reach far beyond the livestock
industry. Direct economic losses would result from lost
production, the cost of destroying disease-ridden livestock, as
we have already heard, indemnification and costs of disease
containment measures such as drugs, diagnostics, vaccines,
veterinary services, and more. Indirect costs and multiplier
effects from dislocations in agriculture sectors would include
the feed and inputs industry, transportation, retail and
certainly loss of our export markets, which is already a very,
very sensitive issue.
A foot-and-mouth outbreak would not only be a problem in
agriculture but in Britain in 2001, as we have already heard
with that outbreak, and I have a CD disc, Mr. Chairman, that I
would like to leave that documents that one-on-one account of
that outbreak for you and the other members to view at your
convenience.
Mr. Stupak. Without objection, it will be accepted.
Mr. Wulf. Thank you. Outbreak in 2001, as we know, resulted
in postponing a general election for one month, cancellation of
many sporting events, leisure activities, cancellation of large
events likely to be attended by those from the infected areas.
And we talked about dollars and impacts from that alone. In
an Oklahoma 1979 study that we saw, the economic impact could
be anywhere from $2.4 billion, and that B as in bill--I have to
put it that way for me because I am cowboy and don't count that
high--anywhere up to $27.6 billion, as in B. California, we
have already heard testimony about that alone, could be
anywhere from $8.5 billion to $13.5 billion. We have had a lot
of conversation regarding Kansas and those studies up there.
Three scenarios were considered on the economic impacts of a
foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Kansas alone, and one was
where the disease was introduced to a single, small cow-calf
operation; another one, a medium-sized feedlot, 10,000 to
20,000 head. We had another one with five large feedlots, and
there are a lot of feedlots in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. As a
matter of fact, there are some 6 million head of cattle in
Kansas, some 5 million head of cattle in Oklahoma, and 14
million cattle when we get into Texas. Under those scenarios,
the small calf scenario, 126,000 head of livestock were
infected and needed to be destroyed. In the medium-sized
operation, 407,000 head in 39 days had to be put down. In five
large feedlots, we had 1.7 million head of livestock that
needed to be destroyed in the event of an outbreak that would
last nearly up to 3 months. For the State of Kansas as a whole,
those numbers could climb somewhere to the cost-economic
benefit and loss of $945 million.
Other things--livestock markets are not the only impact
from the outbreak. Feed and grain, potential feed mills would
also be impacted. We know half of all of our grain goes toward
U.S. feed for animal consumption. Total trade impact certainly
has to be looked at here. Over 94 percent of our consumers for
our livestock markets are outside the United States. We
certainly cannot afford to lose that. Japan, Mexico, Canada,
Korea already account for 75 percent of all the U.S. exports,
10 percent total production. Foot-and-mouth certainly is a
trade disease that needs to be seriously looked at with the
probability of occurrence. Global competition is fierce, as we
all know, in agriculture, for dollars. In the event a foot-and-
mouth outbreak occurred in the United States, life as we know
it would cease to exist, not to mention the already highly
sensitive trade issues that I mentioned earlier in regards to
Korea and Japan alone with our beef.
In any outbreak of any magnitude, as I previously
mentioned, there is a drastic drop in consumption. We only know
that too well when we look at the episode with Food Lion, when
we look at what has happened with trying to describe to the
soccer mom with the 12-year-old out there the difference
between mad cow disease and hoof-and-mouth disease and E. coli.
Now, what does that do to the economic impact of an outbreak of
any kind? You are looking at a barrier somewhere in the
neighborhood of 20 miles and everything being destroyed within
that 20 miles in the event that there is an outbreak and then
another buffer zone outside of that 20-mile area. Nobody is
going in and nobody is going out. And then you are going to
inject with vaccine outside of that buffer, and once the
disease has been totally eradicated, you then are going to have
to destroy those animals that were also vaccinated at that
point in time to totally eradicate it. It is serious.
When you look at the map on my testimony----
Mr. Stupak. May I ask you to summarize, please? We are way
over.
Mr. Wulf. OK. I appreciate the opportunity. I am sorry. I
was trying to find a clock here and I didn't see it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wulf follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. I will tell you what. We have got 5 minutes
before we have to go down and vote. That is when the bells are
going to go off here in about 20 seconds, so we are going to go
down and vote. We will be back in, we have 3 votes,
approximately; let us shoot for 30 minutes so that will give
you time to stretch your legs. We will be back here at 12:25.
We will be in recess until 12:25.
[Recess.]
Mr. Stupak. The meeting will come to order.
Dr. Hill.
STATEMENT OF HOWARD HILL, D.V.M., PH.D., CHIEF OPERATING
OFFICER, IOWA SELECT FARMS
Dr. Hill. Good afternoon, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member
Shimkus, and members of the subcommittee, my name is Howard
Hill. I am a doctor of veterinary medicine and I spent more
than 30 years in the pork industry researching animal diseases.
I have spent the past 7 years as a chief operating officer for
Iowa Select Farms and was on the faculty at Iowa State
University for 20 years. I am testifying today on behalf of the
National Pork Producers Council, an association of 43 State
pork producer organizations that represents the country's
67,000 pork producers.
The U.S. pork industry represents a significant value-added
activity in the agricultural economy and the overall U.S.
economy, adding nearly $30 billion of gross national product
and supporting more than 550,000 mostly rural jobs.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Long Island has
long been a centerpiece for the country's foreign animal
disease diagnostic system and it is our understanding that the
proposed NBAF will continue to fulfill this mission. The U.S.
pork industry believes that NBAF should be located on the
mainland. In its current state, the facility on Plum Island
cannot continue its mission of foreign animal disease research,
diagnostics, and education. While Plum Island is thought to be
ideal from a risk mitigation standpoint, there are serious
drawbacks to having the facility there. Constructing a new
facility on the island would be prohibitively more expensive
than on the mainland. It also has been difficult to recruit
high-caliber scientists to Plum Island because of the area's
high cost of living and inconvenience of boating to work every
day. NBAF will require world-class scientists to conduct
research and diagnostic work so the location needs to be
appealing to these individuals.
Five sites for the new NBAF are now under consideration
excluding Plum Island. The area for the new facility must be
picked based on an assessment of risk which would include the
following four areas: the existence of susceptible animal
populations that could be exposed to an outbreak should disease
organisms escape from the facility; two, the ability of the
Federal and State governments to quickly control and eradicate
a disease; three, the environmental consequences and impact on
wildlife populations of an outbreak; and four, the economic
consequences to the livestock industry if an outbreak were to
occur.
Most of the current debate is focused on location and cost
of the facility but very little has been said about the
anticipated scope of work to be carried out at the NBAF. From
our industry's perspective, it seems more prudent to define the
capacity needed for the kinds of research and diagnostic work
to be completed and to build the facility to meet those needs
and objectives. The U.S. pork industry would request that DHS
work with the animal agriculture industry to define the scope
of work.
NBAF's mission is multidisciplinary and focusing on human
and animal health, particularly zoonotic diseases. While we
support the need for a high-containment Biosafety Level-4
facility for researching zoonotic diseases in large animals,
the swine industry is concerned that the animal health portion
of this mission will be subordinated to the more publicly
supported human health agenda. Our industry needs assurance
that USDA and DHS will work together to allocate to the NBAF
the resources necessary to achieve and enhance its mission to
protect U.S. animal industries and meat export against
catastrophic economic losses caused by foreign animal diseases.
To illustrate the importance of this to the U.S. pork industry,
it is estimated that a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak would
cost the U.S. livestock producers between $40 and $60 billion.
Such an outbreak would immediately shut down our export
markets.
In summary, we believe the location of NBAF must be based
on assessed risk rather than on which entity is willing to
build such a facility. Locations need to be reexamined to see
if the island effect can be recreated by siting the facility in
an area with low densities of livestock and wildlife, and we
need the new facility to enhance the capabilities of our
industry with regards to research, diagnostics, and treatment
for all foreign animal diseases.
Thank you for the opportunity to share the views of the
U.S. swine industry. I would be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hill follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Dr. Hill.
Mr. Watson, your opening statement, please, sir.
STATEMENT OF LEROY WATSON, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, THE NATIONAL
GRANGE OF THE ORDER OF PATRONS OF HUSBANDRY
Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shimkus, members
of the Committee, the National Grange would like to commend the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for holding this
hearing on proposals by the U.S. government to relocate the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center to a location on the mainland
United States as part of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense
Facility, NBAF. We appreciate the opportunity to present our
views opposing the development of an animal disease research
facility on the U.S. mainland that will work with live strains
of foot-and-mouth disease as well as other virulent foreign
animal diseases anywhere near existing concentrations of
commercial livestock.
While there are many scenarios for economic, social, and
environmental damage from the outbreak of animal diseases, few
come close to the nightmare of an outbreak of FMD. According to
a 2004 USDA paper entitled ``Economic Impact of Foreign Animal
Disease Outbreak,'' the paper calculated that the direct cost
to the domestic livestock industry of an FMD outbreak would
exceed $60 billion. We believe those costs would come much
higher when we add in all of the costs to the rest of society.
America's family farmers and ranchers have become
unfortunately accustomed to the fact that after 9/11, our
operations are considered soft targets for terrorist attacks.
In 2006, the National Institute of Justice, which is the
research arm of the Department of Justice, published a research
and policy brief entitled ``Agroterrorism: Why We're Not
Ready,'' that identified FMD as the greatest agroterrorist
threat facing our Nation today. For a number of years, the
National Grange has called on government to address this
threat. We commend DHS and USDA and other Federal agencies for
moving to upgrade our Nation's bioresearch capacity but we are
puzzled as to why the introduction of these dangerous pathogens
on the mainland should be facilitated by Federal policy,
especially in light of the successful record of research and
containment that the existing geographically isolated Plum
Island facilities have demonstrated for 50 years.
First of all, the National Grange is worried that the
bioresearch facility management procedures that will be built
into NBAF will be insufficient to guarantee that FMD is not
accidentally or incidentally released into the environment. A
better course, we believe, would be to combine all of the bio
facility and management procedures and protocols, all the
lessons learned from domestic and foreign operations of these
types of facilities into the design and operation of an NBAF
with significant geographic isolation such as the existing Plum
Island facility. However, even if we accept that FMD can never
be accidentally released from an NBAF, we remain concerned that
the facility will become an inviting target for espionage,
terrorists or criminal attacks aimed at getting those pathogens
out of the laboratory and into the environment. We are also
concerned that a mainland NBAF would become an inviting
vicinity for the criminal release of FMD. Not every terrorist
takes public credit for their action. If FMD was released in
the vicinity of NBAF, the assumption would be that the release
came from the facility. Investigations could disrupt or delay
research activity indefinitely. It would divert resources from
apprehending those responsible and it would call into question
DHS's management of the facility all in a dynamic political and
media climate of economic and environmental disaster.
The National Grange has a high degree of respect for our
Nation's counterespionage, antiterrorist, and law enforcement
agencies. Our concern, however, is that a mainland NBAF
facility will attract an extremely broad universe of potential
terrorists or criminal organizations who could use an attack
against this facility to advance their goals. The National
Grange believes that geographic isolation of NBAF at a location
such as Plum Island would add security to the facility and the
vicinity. It would remove significant incentives to make the
facility an active target. The National Grange is also
concerned that NBAF will discourage private investment around
the facility and reduce the viability of family farm and ranch
operations in the vicinity as well as the social and economic
fabric of local farming communities.
Perceived risks arise from general preparedness from FMD
outbreaks. As the 2006 NIJ report points out, the laws in most
States would place the responsibility for coordinating primary
first response on State and local law enforcement. When,
however, a Federal facility becomes the focal point for the
outbreak, there will be inevitable jurisdiction and
responsibility issues related to investigating the outbreak.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify. We believe that the site selection process for NBAF
has underappreciated the need for geographic isolation of this
facility and it would be a prudent and cost-effective security
measure to incorporate that that would assure our Nation that
we can have a world-class bio- and agro-research facility and
the assurance that this facility will not pose an undue risk
potentially to tens of thousands of family farmers and
ranchers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Watson.
Mr. Voogt, am I saying that right? Voogt?
Mr. Voogt. Voogt.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Voogt, time for your opening statement,
please, sir.
STATEMENT OF GARY VOOGT, PRESIDENT-ELECT, NATIONAL CATTLEMEN'S
BEEF ASSOCIATION
Mr. Voogt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Gary Voogt
and I am a cattle producer from Michigan. I appreciate the
opportunity to visit with you about what has been known today
as NBAF.
The introduction of foreign animal diseases, whether by
accident or intentionally, is a huge threat to the U.S. cattle
industry. We talked about foot-and-mouth disease. It is the
most contagious animal disease known. An outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease in the United States could devastate the cattle
industry. Our figures show a cost of $10 billion to $34 billion
with an outbreak. There is an indirect cost that we haven't
talked about here today and that is if the livestock industry
is lost in this country, how are we going to feed our people?
This country cannot afford to rely on foreign countries for our
food. Oil is teaching us that lesson.
The need for diagnostic activities, prevention, and
treatment research and the development of effective
countermeasures is critical to the health and welfare of the
domestic cattle herd. It is critical to cattle producers and it
is critical to national security. This is why the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association supports the construction and, as
importantly, the ongoing maintenance of a state-of-the art
foreign animal disease research center.
NCBA has had more than 100 years of experience working
closely with local, State and Federal animal health officials
to control and eradicate animal diseases and to prevent the
introduction of foreign animal diseases into the United States.
Facilities such as Plum Island have created strong barriers to
foreign diseases. Because of that work, the United States has
been free from foot-and-mouth disease for more than 70 years.
The Federal Government is a vital partner in combating foreign
animal disease but you should appreciate, we are not relying
solely on the government to protect our industry. We have
incident planning for disease outbreaks all over the country.
Take many farms in Kansas, for example, and I know my home
State of Michigan involves the FBI, the state police, the
highway department, the sheriff department, livestock markets,
anybody. We practice what would happen if there is an incident,
and this plume does not go across the country unchecked. There
is a virtual lockdown of all transportation facilities
immediately. We don't have to call somebody. It is ready to go
today. It is in place.
Now, Plum Island is old and worn out. We have established
that. Over the years funding has not been adequate to keep up
with today's technologies or today's research needs.
Incidentally, we believe Plum Island is not the fortress many
people think it is. The island has always had a problem with
wildlife swimming over from the mainland at low tide. Boaters
can get far too close without warning or consequences. It is
critical that the United States have a state-of-the-art large
animal biologically secure lab to conduct research on all the
foreign diseases that could sicken or destroy the food animal
population. We believe modern biocontainment technology is
adequate to protect our industry and to allow for safe research
and diagnostics on the mainland. The Canadian center in
Winnipeg is a good example of how mainland facilities can be
safe.
In conclusion, NCBA supports and encourages the
construction of this new facility. We have not, however, and we
are not going to take a position on where the facility should
be built. Our support for the new facility is contingent on two
things. First, we need a commitment from the Congress and the
Administration that this facility will be properly funded and
maintained for the long haul. The United States cannot afford
to let this facility become run down like Plum Island. The
second contingency of our support is, we encourage your
committee to work with the House Committee on Agriculture and
the House Committee on Homeland Security. It is imperative that
the needs of the agricultural community not be lost in the
expanding focus of homeland security. Homeland security must
curb their mission creep. They should not be doing animal
research. We would be more comfortable with USDA doing animal
research. USDA, on the other hand, must be retained and
supported to continue their responsibility of conducting
research on all foreign animal diseases.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voogt follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Voogt.
We will begin questions. Mr. Wulf, let me start with you,
if I may. In your testimony, you state your organization is
opposed to moving the foot-and-mouth disease from Plum Island
to the mainland. Does this mean that you are opposed to
building a modern lab on Plum Island?
Mr. Wulf. We certainly support the research and additional
dollars for research there on Plum Island. It certainly needs
to be done.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask all of you this one. In 2003, the
Department of Homeland Security took over the operational
responsibility for Plum Island and is now proposing a broad
expansion of its responsibilities for animal disease research.
In your view as representatives of your organizations, should
DHS be leading this country's animal research or do you think
your members would be more comfortable if the responsibility
for this research was conducted by Department of Ag. as opposed
to the Department of Homeland Security? Let us just go down
right down the line. Mr. Wulf, we will start with you and go
right down the line.
Mr. Wulf. Obviously, we would love to see the Department of
Ag highly involved in this particular type of research. My
opinion on DHS, I don't know that I had an opinion prior to
coming here to the question, Mr. Chairman. However, due to the
questions that were raised earlier in the first panel, I have
serious concerns.
Mr. Stupak. So you would rather see it stay with Department
of Ag, the research on disease?
Mr. Wulf. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Hill?
Dr. Hill. I am confident that our members would be more
comfortable with the research being done by the Department of
Agriculture.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Watson?
Mr. Watson. Grange policy has historically supported
keeping this type of research under the purview of the
Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Voogt?
Mr. Voogt. That was my testimony as well.
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this, Mr. Voogt, because you
lost me a little bit there. On page 3 of your written
testimony, you say you believe that modern technology is
adequate to protect the livestock industry no matter where the
lab is located, but on the 5th page of your written statement,
you then say, and I am quoting now, ``We have not and will not
take a position on where the facility is to be built.'' So does
your organization support the transfer of hoof-and-mouth--I
keep calling it hoof-and-mouth because I am old guy--foot-and-
mouth virus to the mainland or do you prefer to see it stay on
Plum Island?
Mr. Voogt. We prefer that a modern facility be built with
all the safeguards in it. If the decision is to leave it on
Plum Island, we are OK with that, but we are very comfortable
that it can be brought to the mainland, but we are not going to
make that evaluation.
Mr. Stupak. A little bit of confusion comes in, in the
exhibit book; take a look at tab number 17. There is a Jay
Truitt writing a letter on behalf of your organization
indicating they have concerns about foot-and-mouth disease
being moved. So I guess I am a little confused. It sounds like
you are unwilling to move it but it looks like Jay Truitt sort
of doesn't feel that way.
Mr. Voogt. If I am looking at the right page, the question
was, does your organization support moving foot-and-mouth
disease from Plum Island. The answer was yes.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And then when you go on to it, other parts
of it, we get the impression they are not in the same position
you are, like it is neutral almost. All right. Let me ask you
this question. GAO testified earlier about the risk assessments
not being done. Are you still comfortable with moving foot-and-
mouth disease off Plum Island onto the mainland?
Mr. Voogt. Yes, I am.
Mr. Stupak. Do you think those studies should be done first
before we move foot-and-mouth disease off Plum Island?
Mr. Voogt. Well, there are a lot of studies that have to be
done first before we are ready to go. The risk assessment, I
learned this morning, has not been done, but that doesn't mean
that when it is done it will prove that it is a bad idea. So we
don't have that answer yet.
Mr. Stupak. You don't have the answer yet so I guess that
is where my confusion comes in between Mr. Truitt's letter and
your testimony. Even without knowing the end results of a cost-
benefit analysis, the environmental impact statement, the risk
assessment, your organization, the cattlemen's association, is
in favor of moving the foot-and-mouth to the mainland?
Mr. Voogt. We are not going to tell you where to put it but
we are not afraid of moving it to the mainland. That is the
testimony.
Mr. Stupak. OK. You mentioned the deer swimming across. Did
you ever see deer swimming across to Plum Island, or did
someone just tell you that?
Mr. Voogt. I have heard that. I have not been to Plum
Island, Mr. Chairman, but I have been to Mackinaw Island, so
have you, and it happens to be exactly the same distance.
Mr. Stupak. Sure, but the deer usually come across on the
ice.
Mr. Voogt. And they cross on the ice. I also live on Beaver
Island, and there are animals there that came across and so
that is why I said, I don't believe an island by itself is the
fortress that we thought it was, especially if the carrier is
the wind.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Hill, let me ask you this question,
because on page 30--tab 30, I am sorry--we have a letter from
your organization there, a Jill Appell, immediate past
president, National Pork Producers Council. On page 2, while
they support the immediate building of an NBAF, its location
should be determined through assessment of potential risk with
disease spread to susceptible livestock and wildlife
population. The risk assessment of the six remaining sites
should be conducted as part of final selection process. So on
behalf of pork producers, are you saying we can move forward
with it before we do these assessments or----
Dr. Hill. Absolutely not. The pork producers are very
adamant about the fact that risk analysis needs to be done for
any site including Plum Island. And in regards to the deer,
deer have swum across and have multiplied on the island, and
there has been depopulations. At one point there were over 50
deer that were depopulated. So that is a major concern.
Mr. Stupak. If the risk assessment came back and said that
foot-and-mouth should stay on Plum Island, would your
organization have a problem with that?
Dr. Hill. If the risk assessment came back and it said that
it wasn't safe to put it on the mainland, I don't believe that
our organization would oppose putting it on Plum Island. The
problem we have is that we have had 25 years of not really
being able to fund Plum Island to the extent that it needs to
be funded to be a first-class operation. I have been on Plum
Island. I have seen the facilities. The facilities are in very,
very bad repair. I know there has been money spent recently
since I have been there but we had a delegation of pork
producers that were there and the researchers were talking
about water dripping onto the lab bench.
Mr. Stupak. Any reason why you couldn't build a new
facility at Plum Island?
Dr. Hill. Cost.
Mr. Stupak. OK.
Dr. Hill. A major problem is cost.
Mr. Stupak. Well, isn't the cost going to be the same on
Plum Island or Georgia or Kansas?
Dr. Hill. No.
Mr. Stupak. What is the difference in cost?
Dr. Hill. Everything there has to be boated across. I am
not an expert on building costs but I have heard figures as
much as 25 percent increase to operate the operation and as
high as 35 percent to 40 percent increase to build the
operation because it all has to be boated across, cement,
lumber, everything.
Mr. Stupak. But it has worked well for 70 years, I think
one of you said, since we have had an outbreak of hoof-and-
mouth disease. And I think your testimony was it might be $40
to $60 billion. Isn't that cheap insurance for the possible
outbreak they could have for this country's livestock?
Dr. Hill. It would be cheap insurance if you assume that we
were going to have an outbreak from a mainland facility, but I
think we can build a mainland facility that is just as secure
or possibly even more secure than Plum Island.
Mr. Stupak. I don't disagree. I mean, Plum Island is in bad
disrepair. I agree with you. Anything you build is going to be
better than Plum Island. The issue is where should it be, the
safety and the risk assessment and the environmental impact
statement, cost-benefit analysis, and if you build a new one on
the mainland, you still have to clean up Plum Island, take down
the buildings, environmental assessment. I think those costs
would be greater than anything we can imagine. No one has given
us an estimate on that yet.
Dr. Hill. And we need that estimate.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. OK.
Dr. Hill. The other point which I make in my testimony is
that we need first-class researchers and it is very, very
difficult to attract people to that area.
Mr. Stupak. But you also said in your testimony too, and I
wrote it down. You said to recreate island effect with low
animal population nearby, right?
Dr. Hill. Exactly. We wouldn't want to put it in Kansas
right next to a big feedlot, for example. There are places in
the States that are up for the possible location that would be
isolated from large populations of livestock.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My staff did just a
little work on historical outbreaks in the United States: in
1924 in Texas, sailors from ships carrying live animals; 1924
in California due to ships' garbage; the last outbreak in 1929
due to Argentine meat scraps from cruise ships that docked in
California. Because we want safety. We all have different views
now as to how we are going to be safe. Obviously there is
opinion on both sides. I think my opening statement says I am
not weighing in on one side or the other but I am trying to get
an understanding of the whole debate. I think what we haven't
talked about is, I think we get the idea that Plum Island has
been successful, it has been isolated. The question is, can you
use something on the continental United States, not an island,
that would be as safe? People are saying yes. Some people are
saying no. Let us talk about the timeliness debate. Now, I
would have asked the one who did the--Dr. Carpenter about the
exponential aspects of the disease and once it gets to a herd,
how quickly it spread and how quickly it grows. The question
would be transportation of the virus, isolating it and
location, is it quicker for that--is there a quicker response
because of a new facility within the continental United States.
I guess that the island would be considered CONUS, but I am an
old military guy so I use those terms.
But can you address that, the timeliness of a Plum Island
versus a facility in Kansas or a facility in Texas? Mr. Wulf, I
will just go right down the line.
Mr. Wulf. We look at it from technological advances that we
have in communications today.
Mr. Shimkus. But I am talking about testing and getting
the--and just getting it to the location. I said before, I know
we are going to take a sample and we are going to send it to a
location. Even with corporate jets or the Lear jet, it is still
going to--in cattle country, it is going to still take some
time, is it not?
Mr. Wulf. I agree with you, and I agree with your comment.
However, we are approaching it from the standpoint of, it is
not a question that there is never going to be a leak from any
of these facilities. We are approaching it as a matter of when
and then assessing that probability----
Mr. Shimkus. Let me segue into that, but that is that whole
debate of whether there is going to be a release from a
facility wherever it is versus an intentional activity by--or a
mistake like garbage on a cruise ship or something to that
effect or nefarious activity by enemies of our country to
insert this, so why don't we go to Dr. Hill, just the same,
your response to that----
Dr. Hill. I worked in a diagnostic lab for 20 years. I am a
virologist by training. We sent samples to Plum Island. We
never had to send a priority one when I was there but when you
have a priority one sample you have clinical signs that could
be foot-and-mouth or it could be some other disease. Those are
either couriered by an individual, USDA, state individual,
state health regulatory individual, or they are flown with a
National Guard jet or whatever and taken to Islip Airport and
transported out to the island. I don't know that the timing is
a big difference. If we did have a facility in the central part
of the United States. The timing would be obviously less than
if it was in California and the sample had to get all the way
to the tip of Long Island. Is that answering your question?
Mr. Shimkus. Yes. Timeliness in a vector or a disease that
is exponential in growth, I am assuming based upon the analysis
of the first panel, that is a lot.
Dr. Hill. Well, that all depends on what is the index case.
Let us just take an example of air carrying the virus from Plum
Island to a sale facility in New York, and if those animals got
dispersed to 50 different farms the explosion is huge.
Mr. Shimkus. Yes, I am more concerned--I think we have
established that a release from a facility may happen, but I am
more concerned about intentional by enemies of the state going
to beef production areas, and Illinois is part of that, and
going to a feedlot or going to a large sector and then how do
you control that as fast as possible? It would probably speak
to not a Plum Island site.
Dr. Hill. The key to that, which you have made the point
very well, I think, is the timeliness of the diagnosis because
there are a lot of things that kick in once that diagnosis is
made. We stop movement of the animals immediately, all that
kicks in.
Mr. Shimkus. Who makes that call and how does that happen?
Dr. Hill. That is a good question, and is probably
something that we need to work on in the animal health
communities. But the State veterinarian has the jurisdiction
first. He can stop all movements. If it becomes a foreign
animal disease, the Federal Government, USDA, and Homeland
Security get involved immediately. So there is a little bit of
difference there of whether it is diagnosed or if it is a
suspect.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Watson?
Mr. Watson. Sure, and I think if I understand your question
correctly, time is of the essence in sort of being able to
control the vector process. As testimony we have heard this
morning indicates, is that once the disease sort of presents
and manifests itself, the possibilities of what it is fall
fairly quickly, particularly for veterinary professionals who
have a pretty good idea of recognizing what this is. Eventually
there will be important necessity to do analysis on tissue and
things like that. One of the things that we have learned in
more discussion of FMD, one of the reasons it is so dangerous
is because it mutates so fast. It is like the common cold. The
reason we always have the common cold is because it is always
changing. Flus are always changing. FMD is always changing and
there are a number of strains, not just one strain but a number
of strains, which is under confinement right now at Plum
Island. And so eventually we would be looking at trying to
figure out what strain we were dealing with, determining
vaccination protocols and things like that, whether or not
those vaccinations were available would be necessary. But in
almost any transportation of a biohazardous material like this,
you are going to have to have a series of protocols built in.
That means you are not just going to sort of throw it in the
back of a car and drive it out to wherever you are going to be.
So you have a time of the essence issue also related to
protocols in making sure that you don't inadvertently spread
the pathogen in your attempt to try and get it to the research
facility, and that is going to be----
Mr. Shimkus. Yes, and then you----
Mr. Watson [continuing]. Whether or not you go to the
mainland or an island facility.
Mr. Shimkus. Just because of time constraints, let me go to
Mr. Voogt real quick.
Mr. Voogt. I think the answer is that if you are going to
have a heart attack, you want to have it close to the hospital,
and I think people in the cattle, in hog country are more
sensitive than somebody offshore in New York to be ready and
prepared for a lockdown. This analysis takes a while, but if
there is lockdown, the people that have the most to risk are
going to be most attendant to that.
Mr. Shimkus. And the disease itself, since I am not
familiar, I am not a veterinarian, do you have it when--we saw
the slides of the hooves that were scarred and broken open. We
saw the tongue. We saw the lesions. How long does it take for
an animal to get the virus and then for an outward sign?
Dr. Hill. I have never dealt directly with foot-and-mouth.
They are excreting virus during the incubation period before
they show clinical signs and then it is probably 3 or 4 days,
or 5 days before they show the blisters.
Mr. Shimkus. And I see a lot of heads shaking so there is a
lot of people that know that, and again, that ties into the
timing factor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Watson, I want to get this point. In your testimony on
page 2, you refer to a 2004 research paper by USDA that
estimated foot-and-mouth outbreak on the mainland United States
would cost the livestock industry as much as $60 billion.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And that would just be the direct costs; that
is not the indirect costs, right?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. OK. When we asked USDA for studies like that,
they said they didn't have any. Do you have that study?
Mr. Watson. I can see if we can find it. That actually was
a reference material in the National Institute of Justice's
policy program. They had reference directly to that. They had
referenced their estimate to the USDA study in 2004. But I
can----
Mr. Stupak. So you took it from a Department of Justice
report?
Mr. Watson. Right. The Department of Justice is laying out
their criteria, and it is somewhat interesting that again we
are trying to point out that those who think they understand
what the Federal Government or what the government response is
going to be, this particular Department of Justice report,
which is designed to advise local and state law enforcement.
They are basically telling local and state law enforcement as
of 2006, if you see this, treat it as a crime, treat it as a
terrorist attack, do not treat this as an incidental event or
something like that. And that is one of the reasons they are
trying to provide this education to local law enforcement,
saying if we see it, we need to move as if this is a crime. So
they go back and say important this is and the----
Mr. Stupak. Well, I was just curious about----
Mr. Watson [continuing]. Citation in that report was to
this USDA----
Mr. Stupak. Right. I was curious about the validity of the
USDA report because they claim there isn't such a report.
Mr. Watson. Well, we will go back and I will see if I can--
--
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this. You all talked about
costs; Mr. Voogt, I think you said that the costs and all this
is inadequate and Congress has to pay for it and adequately
fund it year after year in the future. Should your industries
pay part of it since you seem to benefit from that? Should the
cattlemen, should the pork and the Grange and all that,
should----
Mr. Voogt. Well, our industry is the consumer. That is who
we are working for and so the consumer is either going to pay
for it in the price of the meat or in support of the
government, but it is not free. So that is not important. As to
cost, I do have some experience. I built approximately $5
million worth of stuff on Beaver Island with Federal funds,
airports, and the cost was approximately 40 percent more than
it was on the mainland.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Watson, any comments on costs to your
organization to pay part of it?
Mr. Watson. We don't have any estimates on that, sir.
Mr. Stupak. We have a couple votes on the Floor. We are
going to have to recess again. We will recess until quarter to.
We will dismiss this panel. Thank you for coming. Sorry to
interrupt this hearing again with votes. It is one of these
days and a lot of crazy stuff is going on on the Floor. So we
will stand in recess for approximately 30 minutes.
[Recess]
Mr. Stupak. We have our third panel of witnesses. On this
panel, we have the Hon. Bruce Knight, Under Secretary for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs at U.S. Department of
Agriculture; the Hon. Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for the
Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and Dr. Larry Barrett, Director of Plum
Island Animal Disease Center.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. We will start with
opening statements. Mr. Knight, if you would like to go first,
5-minute opening--oh, I have to swear you guys in. It is the
policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath.
Please be advised that witnesses have the right under the Rules
of the House to be advised by counsel during their testimony.
Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? All are
indicating no. All right. Then I am going to ask you to rise
and raise your right hand, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Stupak. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
replied in the affirmative. You are now under oath. Mr. Knight,
if you would like to start with your opening statement, please,
5 minutes. Your full statement will be part of the record.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE I. KNIGHT, UNDER SECRETARY, MARKETING AND
REGULATORY PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Mr. Knight. Good afternoon, Chairman Stupak, members of the
committee, my name is Bruce Knight. I am Under Secretary for
marketing and regulatory programs at USDA and I want to thank
you for the opportunity to share USDA's views on the importance
of establishing the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility,
NBAF.
Agriculture, as we have heard repeatedly today, is vital to
the U.S. economy. We expect record exports of $101 billion this
year along with increase in imports that have already risen
from $58 million in 2005 to an estimated $76.5 billion this
year. As goods move back and forth across the border, we must
remain vigilant to safeguard U.S. agriculture from unwelcome
pest and disease threats which do not respect State or national
borders. Intentionally or unintentionally contaminated products
could quickly spread a pest, disease or other agent that could
not only devastate our agriculture industry but also cause
numerous animal casualties.
While I appreciate the focus today on the laboratories, I
do want to note that USDA has many activities to prevent the
introduction of FMD into the United States. We share import
policies that ensure that we trade safely both in products and
in live animals. We have a rigorous process to evaluate disease
risks with the countries we trade with. We work with our
colleagues at DHS to ensure port inspections and passenger
traffic is safe. Historically, we know worldwide that outbreaks
of FMD have been primarily traced to meat importations,
mishandling of garbage, livestock importation, and that has
been the primary focus.
Now, today, we are talking mostly about the need for NBAF
and how vital it is to us being able to move forward. To guard
against new diseases and potential bioterrorist releases, USDA
must continually conduct research and diagnostics to better
understand those pathogens. We recognized, even before the
Department of Homeland Security was created, that there was a
need for additional space and upgraded biosecurity measures to
work on foreign and emerging animal diseases.
The current research facility located on Plum Island is
aging, inadequate, and outdated. Since the Plum Island facility
was transferred to DHS in 2003, we have developed a strong
collaborative partnership with DHS that enables both
departments to achieve our similar goals while making the most
of each other's specialized expertise. More than 50 years ago,
the Plum Island facility was built on an island to create
physical separation from susceptible livestock. Today, with
more advanced technologies including redundancies and the
latest biosecurity and containment systems, coupled with
employee training and monitoring, NBAF could safely operate on
the mainland. A mainland facility would be less expensive to
operate, more easily accessible than an island location, better
enable quick response to potential disease threats, and offer
the opportunity for innovative collaboration if located near an
established research community.
Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the selection of
an NBAF site, USDA has been closely involved throughout this
process. We support the criteria used to select the sites and
are committed to the next steps in the process. DHS is
currently preparing an environmental impact statement for the
six site alternatives including Plum Island and the mainland
locations. We need to move forward in a timely manner on NBAF
to develop the diagnostics and the tools needed to protect U.S.
agriculture from the threats of dangerous foreign animal
diseases.
Lastly, I would like to mention that the Administration
included in our Farm Bill proposal a suggestion of an
authorization for USDA to conduct research and diagnostics for
highly infectious disease agents on the U.S. mainland. This
provision is included in the recently passed Farm Bill.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
important issue with the Committee today. We believe the
planned NBAF is necessary to replace the aging Plum Island
facility and protect U.S. agriculture and American citizens
against foreign animal diseases.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knight follows:]
Statement of Bruce Knight
Synopsis
Agriculture is vital to the U.S. economy. We
expect record exports of $101 billion this year along with
increasing imports that have already risen from $58 billion in
2005 to an estimated $76.5 billion this year.
As goods move back and forth across the border, we
must remain vigilant to safeguard U.S. agriculture from
unwelcome pest and disease threats. Intentionally or
unintentionally contaminated products could quickly spread a
pest, disease, or other agent that could not only devastate our
agricultural industry but also cause numerous casualties.
To guard against new diseases and potential
bioterrorist releases, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) must continually conduct research and diagnostics to
better understand these pathogens. We recognized, even before
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created, that
there was a need for additional space and upgraded biosecurity
measures to work on foreign and emerging animal diseases. The
current research facility located on Plum Island is aging,
inadequate, and outdated.
In response to Presidential Homeland Security
Directive 9, USDA is working closely with DHS to develop the
National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to replace the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), after a construction
and transition period of 7-10 years. NBAF would provide the
facility we need to carry out BSL-4 activities not currently
possible at PIADC, such as addressing diseases like Nipah and
Hendra, as well as Rift Valley Fever (which requires vaccinated
personnel; however vaccine is in short supply).
Since the Plum Island facility was transferred to
DHS in 2003, we've developed a strong, collaborative
partnership with DHS that enables both Departments to achieve
our similar goals while making the most of each other's
specialized expertise.
More than 50 years ago, the Plum Island facility
was built on an island to create physical separation from
susceptible livestock. Today, with more advanced technologies,
including redundancies and the latest biosecurity and
containment systems, coupled with employee training and
monitoring, NBAF could safely operate on the mainland.
A mainland site would be less expensive to
operate, more easily accessible than an island location, better
enable quick response to potential disease threats, and offer
the opportunity for innovative collaboration if located near an
established research community.
A 2002 study completed by the Science Applications
International Corporation and commissioned by USDA concluded
that there was a valid USDA need for a BSL-4 facility, and that
a BSL-4 facility for large animal work could be safely located
on the mainland.
Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the
selection of a NBAF site, USDA has been closely involved
throughout this process. We support the criteria used to select
the sites and look forward to the next steps in the process.
DHS is currently preparing an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for the six site alternatives, including Plum
Island and mainland locations. We need to move forward in a
timely manner with NBAF to develop the diagnostics and tools
needed to protect U.S. agriculture from the threats of
dangerous foreign animal diseases.
The Administration included in our Farm Bill
Proposal an authorization for USDA to conduct research and
diagnostics for highly infectious disease agents on the U.S.
mainland. We recognize DHS' interest in the Secretary being
directed, via statute, to issue a permit for live foot-and-
mouth disease virus at the NBAF. We believe this direction will
provide clarity as DHS moves forward in selecting a site and
constructing the NBAF.
Testimony
Good afternoon. I am Bruce Knight, Under Secretary for
Marketing and Regulatory Programs at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before the Committee today to present the Department's views on
the establishment of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF). Today, the Committee raises a timely and
important issue--agriculture security--that we at USDA consider
essential to our mission, which is to provide leadership on
food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based
on sound public policy, the best available science, and
efficient management.
Agriculture is a vital component of our Nation's economy.
Of particular importance to homeland security is the
significant increase in agricultural trade. This year, we
expect agriculture exports to reach approximately $101 billion,
making it the highest export sales year ever in our history--
and significant to our balance of trade. Agriculture imports
are rising as well--increasing from nearly $58 billion in 2005
to an estimated $76.5 billion this year.
We face many challenges in protecting this important
infrastructure. As goods move back and forth across the border,
we must remain vigilant to safeguard U.S. agriculture from
unwelcome pest and disease threats. Our sector is particularly
concerned about security because food production is not
constrained by political boundaries, and as we all know,
diseases and pathogens do not respect state or national
borders. The interconnected nature of the global food system is
our strength and allows us to feed the world, but it is also a
disadvantage in the event of attack or natural disease
outbreak. Additionally, one of the agricultural sector's
greatest contributions to the quality of life is the fact that
products flow quickly through interstate commerce--one of our
greatest assets is also one of our greatest concerns because
intentionally or unintentionally contaminated products could
quickly spread a pest, disease, or other agent.
USDA works diligently to protect U.S. agriculture from the
potential introduction of human and animal disease agents,
whether unintentionally or through agroterrorism. Many of these
pathogens such as the Nipah and Hendra viruses are zoonotic,
that is, they cause both human and animal disease, and can pass
from animals to humans. If a significant zoonotic or animal
disease were to penetrate our borders, it could devastate the
agricultural industry, cause numerous casualties, and harm the
economy.
We've seen just how disastrous the effects of a foreign
animal disease outbreak can be in the 2001 foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom. In that case,
over 6 million pigs, sheep, and cattle were destroyed, with the
epidemic costing the U.K. economy an estimated $13 billion.
This example highlights the need for the best tools and
diagnostics to safeguard the U.S. livestock industry from
significant foreign animal disease threats such as FMD. At the
same time, the 2007 suspected release of live FMD virus from
the Pirbright campus in England amplifies the balance needed in
undertaking such work. This is why USDA and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) will use the most modern biosafety
practices and procedures, and stringent and rigorous safety
measures within NBAF.
Because of the continued emergence of new animal diseases,
the leaping of dangerous animal diseases across species, and
the possibility of a bioterrorist release, it is even more
essential that USDA have a sufficient understanding of these
diseases and be well prepared to protect the U.S. livestock
industry from their damage. To achieve this, USDA works through
its Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to meet its responsibilities
in animal health. ARS is the primary intramural science
research agency of USDA, operating a network of over 100
research laboratories across the nation that work on all
aspects of agricultural science. APHIS is responsible for
safeguarding U.S. agricultural health from foreign pests and
diseases of plants and animals.
In order to be able to rapidly identify, respond to, and
control outbreaks of foreign animal and zoonotic disease, USDA
needs secure, state-of-the-art biocontainment laboratories with
adequate space for advanced research, diagnostics, and
training. Recognizing this need, the President directed USDA
and DHS, via Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9:
``Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food,'' to
develop a plan to provide for such facilities. As I will
explain further, USDA is working closely with our partners in
DHS to fulfill this important need.
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
In 1954, USDA began work at the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC) in research and diagnostics on foreign animal
diseases that, either by accidental or deliberate introduction
to the United States, pose significant health and/or economic
risks to the U.S. livestock industry. The Plum Island Animal
Disease Center has served U.S. agriculture well. It's no
accident that this country has the healthiest and most abundant
livestock populations in the world. Producers and all of us at
USDA work hard every day to keep this up.
An integral part of maintaining animal health is preventing
the entry of exotic pest and disease threats. The Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, through its diagnostic, research, and
reagent production and distribution activities, has stood as
American agriculture's bulwark against potentially devastating
foreign animal diseases. Each working day since the facility
opened over 50 years ago, the dedicated and highly skilled Plum
Island Animal Disease Center staff has equipped veterinarians,
scientists, professors, and other animal health professionals
here and around the world with the tools they need to fight
exotic disease incursions that threaten livestock. In addition
to FMD and classical swine fever, other livestock diseases that
our scientists have studied at the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center include African swine fever, rinderpest, Rift Valley
fever, West Nile fever, vesicular stomatitis, and Capri pox
(sheep pox and lumpy skin disease).
As you know, in June 2003, operational responsibility for
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center transferred from USDA to
DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Since the
transfer, we've developed a strong, collaborative partnership
with DHS and put in place an interagency agreement to clarify
roles and responsibilities. A Board of Directors and Senior
Leadership Group were created to facilitate decision-making
regarding facility operations and policies, while also allowing
the three agencies to focus on accomplishing their specific
missions and goals. I believe our relationship with DHS is a
very positive one that allows both Departments to achieve our
similar goals while making the most of each other's specialized
expertise.
After the Plum Island Animal Disease Center transfer, USDA
remained responsible for conducting basic and applied research
and diagnostic activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center to protect U.S. agriculture from foreign animal disease
agents. DHS, in turn, assumed responsibility for coordinating
the overall national effort to protect key U.S. resources and
infrastructure, including agriculture. Science programs at the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center now include the APHIS Foreign
Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL), ARS' Foreign
Animal Disease Research Unit, and DHS' Targeted Advanced
Development Unit.
APHIS' work at the FADDL aims to protect the U.S.
agricultural system by providing the capabilities for early
detection and diagnosis of foreign animal diseases. The FADDL
is also the custodian of the North American FMD Vaccine Bank
(owned by Canada, Mexico and the United States), which stores
concentrated FMD antigen that can be formulated into a vaccine
if a FMD introduction occurs. As such, FADDL employees are
responsible for performing safety testing of new antigen lots
and periodically testing the quality of stored antigen.
APHIS scientists perform diagnostic testing of samples
collected from U.S. livestock that are showing clinical signs
consistent with an exotic disease, as well as testing animal
products and live animals being imported into the United States
to ensure that unwanted diseases are not accidentally
introduced through importation. APHIS scientists at the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center have the capability to diagnose
more than 30 exotic animal diseases, and perform thousands of
diagnostic tests each year. They also prepare diagnostic
reagents and distribute them to laboratories throughout the
world, and test the safety and efficacy of vaccines for
selected foreign animal diseases. Other APHIS activities
include improving techniques for the diagnosis or control of
foreign animal diseases and validating tests for foreign animal
diseases that are deployed to the National Animal Health
Laboratory Network (NAHLN). Through the use of these tests in
surveillance, the NAHLN provides for early detection and the
surge capability needed in the case of an outbreak.
In addition, FADDL staff, in conjunction with APHIS'
Professional Development Staff, train veterinarians,
scientists, professors, and veterinary students on recognition
of clinical signs and pathological changes caused by foreign
animal diseases. This training provides the backbone of APHIS'
animal disease surveillance and safeguarding programs. These
foreign animal disease diagnosticians trained by FADDL are
located throughout the country, and can be on-site to conduct
an investigation and collect samples within 16 hours of
receiving a report of a suspect foreign animal disease. Based
on their assessment of the situation and prioritization of the
threat, APHIS can then take appropriate steps if necessary to
protect the U.S. livestock industry.
Through its involvement in the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, ARS develops new strategies to prevent and control
foreign or emerging animal disease epidemics through a better
understanding of the nature of infectious organisms,
pathogenesis in susceptible animals, host immune responses, and
the development of novel vaccines and diagnostic tests. The ARS
Foreign Animal Disease Research Unit focuses on developing
vaccines that can be produced safely in the United States and
used safely on U.S. farms, diagnostic techniques to
differentiate between a vaccinated and an infected animal, and
methods for identifying carrier animals. Currently, ARS' work
at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center includes active
research programs working with FMD, Classical Swine Fever, and
vesicular stomatitis viruses.
ARS scientists have recently carried out extensive work on
FMD, including early development of a FMD vaccine that is safe
to produce on the mainland; discovery of an antiviral treatment
that prevents FMD replication and spread within 24 hours; and
determination of many key aspects of FMD virus structure,
function, and replication at the molecular level, leading to
highly specific diagnostic tests.
Meeting the Needs of American Agriculture
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center has played a critical
role in developing the tools and expertise needed to protect
the country from the deliberate or unintentional introduction
of significant foreign animal diseases. However, much has
changed since the Plum Island Animal Disease Center was first
built, and we are even more cognizant of the threat from
foreign animal diseases due to the increasingly interconnected
world we live in. This need is echoed by our American livestock
industries that could be devastated by the introduction of a
significant foreign animal disease. Groups such as the United
States Animal Health Association and National Institute for
Animal Agriculture have appealed for accelerated research to
protect their industries. Also, the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association, Animal Agriculture Coalition, and National Milk
Producers Federation have written to Congress, to show their
support for NBAF.
To continue providing U.S. agriculture with the latest
research and technological services, as well as world-class
approaches to agricultural health safeguarding and foreign-
animal disease diagnostics, USDA needs additional space and
upgraded biosecurity measures to work on those animal-borne
diseases that pose the greatest risk to U.S. livestock
industries, and those that can also be transmitted to humans.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center is aging and nearing the
end of its lifecycle, and the state of current facilities has
created a backlog of needed space for important experiments,
diagnostic development, and training efforts.
In particular, USDA is in need of enhanced research and
diagnostic capabilities for animal diseases, particularly
zoonotic diseases of large animals that require agriculture
BSL-3 and BSL-4 capabilities. However, since we cannot
currently carry out BSL-4 activities at the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, the Nation is left lacking a large animal
facility to address high-consequence animal diseases that can
be transmitted to humans, such as Nipah and Hendra, as well as
Rift Valley Fever (which requires vaccinated personnel; however
vaccine is in short supply).
Specifically, USDA would utilize the BSL-4 space to develop
diagnostic assays for Rift Valley Fever and Nipah and Hendra
viruses, using specimens collected from animals in the BSL-4
lab. In addition, in the event of an emerging pathogen, it
would often be necessary to inoculate animals in a BSL-4 suite
in order to determine the clinical course of the disease,
determine appropriate diagnostic specimens, isolate the agent,
and develop diagnostic tools.
In order to protect U.S. agriculture and human health, it
is critical that USDA have the capability of diagnosing and
working with the disease agents I have mentioned, as well as
any new highly infectious pathogen that may emerge. In
response, our agencies have begun planning for the next
generation facility which we call the NBAF, to replace the
current structures at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
NBAF will integrate research, development, and testing in
foreign animal diseases and zoonotic diseases, which will
support the complimentary missions of USDA and DHS. NBAF will
address USDA needs that are currently not being met by the
facilities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, including
inadequate lab space for processing diagnostic samples,
limitations in diagnostic capability for BSL-4 agents, and lack
of space to expand to include the development, feasibility
testing, and validation of new and emerging technologies for
detection of exotic and emerging diseases. In addition, it will
provide room to grow as we further enhance our abilities to
respond to increasing threats to the U.S. livestock industry.
The NBAF will also have a synergistic effect, to the
benefit of each of our agencies, by utilizing the expertise of
the academic and scientific community in the area. In addition,
we expect that by sharing a well-equipped core facility, we
will see a more cost effective utilization of funding. This
will also continue to provide a number of opportunities for
enhanced interaction among the three agencies. For example,
research done by ARS and DHS may identify possible new
diagnostic tools that APHIS can use; APHIS' repository of
foreign animal disease agents obtained from outbreaks around
the world will provide a resource for ARS and DHS research and
bioforensics; and APHIS' diagnostic investigations and
surveillance will help identify emerging or re-emerging
diseases in the field, in turn helping set research priorities
for ARS and DHS.
Site Selection
At the time Plum Island was built, biosecurity was much
different than it is today. Agriculture biosecurity was defined
by biological isolation, so that if there was a problem at the
laboratory, there was physical separation from susceptible
livestock populations and any breaches were localized. Today,
with much more advanced technologies, the ability to manage
effective biosecurity and biosafety practices is not dictated
by location or physical barriers.
We recognize that there is concern about building the NBAF
on the mainland. Since the determination was made over 60 years
ago to build the Plum Island Animal Disease Center on an
island, assessments have shown that technological advances
would allow for safe research and diagnostics of foreign animal
diseases to take place on the U.S. mainland. A 2002 study
completed by the Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) and commissioned by USDA found that the FMD virus and
other exotic foreign animal diseases of concern to the
Department could be fully and safely contained within a BSL-3
laboratory, as was being done in other countries at the time
including Canada, Germany, and Brazil. A second SAIC study also
concluded that there was a valid USDA need for a BSL-4
facility, and that a BSL-4 facility for large animal work could
be safely located on the mainland.
In planning for the NBAF, we recognize the absolutely
essential need for state-of-the-art biosafety practices and
procedures, including stringent and rigorous safety measures
within the laboratories themselves, to prevent disease
organisms from escaping into the environment. Situations such
as the recent suspected release of live FMD virus from the
Pirbright campus in England only serve to highlight this
importance. We can use that example as a learning opportunity
and make sure that the design and maintenance of the NBAF
facility enables us to carry out the essential activities
needed to protect the Nation from foreign animal diseases while
ensuring the highest level of biosafety.
This is why the NBAF will utilize the redundancies built
into modern research laboratory designs and the latest
biosecurity and containment systems, coupled with continued
training and monitoring of employees, to effectively minimize
any risks. Personnel controls for the NBAF will include
background checks, biometric testing for lab entry, and no
solitary access to BSL-4 microorganisms. The NBAF will also
feature biological safety cabinets in the wet labs designed to
meet the needs of BSL-3 labs, while in BSL-4 labs, these
biological safety cabinets will include additional security
measures or be used in combination with full-body, air-supplied
personal protective suits.
In terms of facility design, the BSL-4 lab at the NBAF will
employ a box-in-box principle with a pressure-controlled
buffer. All water and air leaving the lab will be purified-that
is, no research microorganism will enter the sewage system or
outside air. All critical functions will have redundant
systems. The design of the BSL-4 laboratories and animal space
will comply with the appropriate recommendations and
requirements of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Institutes of Health, Department of Defense, and
National Research Council.
I would also like to note some potential advantages to
locating the NBAF on the mainland. For example, the lower cost
of living, as compared to that in the communities surrounding
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, would likely make
recruiting personnel easier for our agencies. This would also
eliminate the costs of moving people on and off an island every
day, as we currently do. A mainland facility would be more
accessible if air traffic is shut down due to weather
conditions or an emergency situation, and would not be subject
to the occasional wind closures that we experience at the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center due to rough waters. And, as I
mentioned earlier, locating the facility near an established
research community would facilitate innovative collaboration.
A key advantage to locating NBAF on the mainland would be
the ability to quickly respond to a potential foreign animal
disease threat. Placing the NBAF on the mainland could
eliminate the need for additional transport of samples to the
island via boat or aircraft, as is currently done at Plum
Island. Having a more accessible location, where diagnostic
capabilities could be utilized within the first 24 hours of an
emergency, is essential. For example, in June 2007, APHIS
conducted an investigation into swine showing signs consistent
with a significant foreign animal disease. In such a situation,
every hour counts when it comes to being able to quickly rule
out major diseases. Incidents such as this can have a
significant impact on the economy, stop movement and trade in
multiple species of livestock, and spread fear throughout the
industry.
Although DHS is ultimately responsible for the selection of
a NBAF site, USDA has been closely involved throughout this
process. APHIS and ARS have provided detailed program
requirements to DHS, and have representatives on the site
selection committee and site inspection team. We support the
criteria used to select the sites: proximity to research
capabilities linked to the NBAF mission requirements, site
proximity to a skilled workforce, as well as acquisition/
construction/operations, and community acceptance, and look
forward to the next steps in the process.
DHS is currently preparing an environmental impact
statement (EIS) looking at the six sites, which include Plum
Island and five mainland locations. The EIS, on which USDA and
DHS are working, will consider the risk and potential
consequences of an accidental release of a foreign animal
disease, and will be integral to moving forward with a sound
NBAF site selection.
It is important that we move forward in a timely manner
with planning and construction of NBAF so that we can develop
the diagnostics and tools needed to protect U.S. agriculture
from the threats of dangerous foreign animal diseases. Just as
the science behind bioterrorism has advanced in recent years,
and new and changing diseases continue to emerge, so too must
we arm ourselves with more sophisticated ways of preventing
harm to the U.S. livestock industry. If we don't, then
bioterrorists will continue to find innovative ways to attack
our livestock, new diseases will continue to emerge, and U.S.
agriculture will be left vulnerable to these dangers. This is
why USDA is committed to working with DHS to move forward with
plans for NBAF, after a thorough analysis of the options and
development of plans to ensure the utmost biosafety and
biosecurity.
Authority to Conduct FMD Research on the Mainland
Lastly, I would like to briefly mention recent legislative
activity related to live FMD virus. Current statute (21 U.S.C.
113a) restricts research involving live FMD virus and other
animal diseases that present a significant risk to domestic
U.S. livestock to laboratories on coastal islands separated
from the mainland United States by deep water. Research
involving live FMD virus is carried out at the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center under this statute, which dates back to
the 1950s. The statute was amended by the 1990 Farm Bill to
authorize the Secretary of Agriculture, when necessary, to
allow the movement of live FMD virus, under permit, to research
facilities on the U.S. mainland.
USDA recognizes DHS' interest in the Secretary being
directed, via statute, to issue a permit for live FMD virus at
the NBAF. This direction will provide clarity in this important
area as DHS moves forward in selecting a site for the NBAF and
then in contracting for the construction of the facility. For
these reasons, the Administration included in our Farm Bill
Proposal an authorization for USDA to conduct research and
diagnostics for highly infectious disease agents, such as FMD
and rinderpest, on the U.S. mainland. Consistent with the
Administration's proposal, section 7524 of the Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 directs the Secretary to
issue a permit for live FMD virus at NBAF, while preserving the
Secretary's discretion and ensuring that all biosafety and
select agent requirements are being met at the facility.
Conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this
important issue with the Committee today. We believe the
planned NBAF is necessary to replace the aging Plum Island
Animal Disease Center and provide additional capacity for much
needed animal disease research, diagnostics, training, and
countermeasures development. The NBAF will play a crucial role
in protecting against the future introduction of foreign animal
and zoonotic diseases, and ensuring the continued health and
vitality of our agricultural industries. We are committed to
continuing our work in partnership with DHS in planning the
NBAF and making the facility a reality.
----------
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Cohen, your opening statement, please.
STATEMENT OF JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Chairman Stupak and members of the committee and
staff, I have had the privilege of being here from the start of
the hearing and so Chairman, I wanted to thank you for your
stated support for the NBAF facility. It is an honor to appear
before this committee, and I thank the committee for bringing
these very important issues before the American public.
I especially appreciate the testimony of the first two
panels and I can assure you, we will incorporate, as we have
been, their concerns as we move forward with this important
NBAF initiative, the purpose of which is to make the Nation
safer.
I am very pleased today to be joined not only by Under
Secretary Knight representing the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, who has already addressed the partnership that we
enjoy, the productive partnership, but also Dr. Larry Barrett,
who is the director of Plum Island. I look forward very much to
your questions.
I would like to just add, if I may, there have been
discussions relative to the age and the condition of Plum
Island. I had the privilege of going up there and having an
all-hands with the good people, the scientists, the animal
workers, et cetera, on Plum Island. The Department of Homeland
Security has put tens of millions of dollars into that
facility. When we are done, it will be over $50 million, and in
a recent morale survey conducted within the Department of
Homeland Security, I am here to tell you that of all my
laboratories, the Plum Island laboratory facing possible
closure had the highest morale, and in two areas, including job
satisfaction, all of the workers ranked Plum Island 100
percent. So the legacy of Plum Island will be, and we hope it
will be, an efficacious vaccine to prevent foot-and-mouth
disease, which is what we are talking about today.
I am so pleased that Chairman Dingell is here, and
Chairman, I just wanted to say, as a member of the greatest
generation, and my mother-in-law was a World War II Navy nurse,
she was just up here for the 100th anniversary of the Navy
Nurses Corps, and Senator Inouye and Senator Cleland had a
chance to speak. I thank you so much for your service. It is a
special privilege to be here in front of your subcommittee, and
we thank you also for the NEPA legislation, which is the
overriding legislation by which we are conducting the
environmental impact as we go forward, and has been indicated
by the panels, this is a work in progress, and so this is an
important hearing.
For Chairman Dingell, I know you know that words matter and
for 42 years I had the privilege of serving in the United
States Navy and then was asked to serve in Homeland Security,
and public service, like you, is a great calling. We don't get
rich in this business but words do matter, and the words
``incompetent,'' ``arrogant,'' and ``secretive'' were used. In
the Department of Homeland Security, if I were to allow those
to go unanswered, the 180,000-plus government service workers
who are dedicated to making the Nation safer would believe that
I either hadn't heard those or I agreed with them. And so sir,
if at a convenient time you would just share with me who you
think is incompetent, arrogant or secretive, I will certainly
root them out because that is unacceptable in public service.
So Chairman, thank you so much and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Dingell. Happy to do so.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, I know you will.
Mr. Dingell. I think I will enjoy that discussion more than
you will.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Dr. Barrett, your opening statement, please.
Dr. Barrett. I was asked to be a witness, not to provide an
opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. So you have no opening statement then?
Dr. Barrett. I have no written opening statement. I can
make a statement.
Mr. Stupak. It is entirely up to you. It is at your
discretion, you are under oath, and if you would like to make
one, fine.
STATEMENT OF LARRY BARRETT, D.V.M., M.S., D.A.C.V.P.M.,
DIRECTOR, PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER
Dr. Barrett. I would like to make a few comments. Good
morning, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Whitfield, I am
pleased to be here before you today to discuss the important
mission of Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is to
protect the U.S. livestock from the accidental or deliberate
introduction of high-consequence foreign animal diseases.
I was raised on a cattle ranch in Oklahoma and I became a
veterinarian due to my desire to protect public health and
animal health. I have worked as California's state public
health veterinarian and as a program manager for the State's
food safety programs. I also served on active duty in the
military as a veterinarian and just retired as a reserve
colonel. I applied for the position of director of PIADC due to
my strong support for protecting the Nation's livestock from
high-threat foreign animal diseases with vaccines and
biological countermeasures, and today we are working on a
vaccine that next year hopefully we will have the first
licensed vaccine that we can use in the United States,
manufactured in the United States and with the ability to tell
infected from vaccinated animals. This will hopefully move on
to where we can put it in the national stockpile and the USDA
will have the option then to vaccine animals in this country to
live and not be slaughtered.
As Center director, I support USDA on a daily basis in its
important mission. It is an important mission to protect the
Nation from foreign animal diseases. As an example, if foot-
and-mouth disease is suspected in the United States, the
samples are shipped to Plum Island for confirmatory testing by
the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. What we do
is provide operational support from DHS for these activities.
We want to ensure the testing is conducted immediately. In
addition, we support the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service of the USDA in training its over 200 veterinarians a
year in the Nation's only foreign animal disease diagnostic
training classes. These are the veterinarians who would be the
Nation's first responders in a foot-and-mouth disease or other
foreign animal disease outbreak.
I also support USDA Agriculture Research Services at Plum
Island, which is involved in basic and applied research on
foreign animal diseases including classical swine fever and
foot-and-mouth disease. As an example of their important work,
ARS conducted research in early development of a new foot-and-
mouth vaccine that does not use live virus as part of its
production and can therefore be manufactured in the United
States, as I mentioned previously.
The one thing that we also do in addition to providing
operational support to the USDA to allow them to focus entirely
on their mission now is, we are able to provide the additional
support in taking vaccine products developed by the USDA and
moving them onto manufacturing, and we have a Targeted Advanced
Development unit established there of DHS scientists who now
have the expertise for vaccine development. This is something
unique that we didn't have before DHS came to the island. We
are working with industry, USDA, ARS, and APHIS and the U.S.
Center for Veterinary Biologics for obtaining licensing for
this vaccine. It is an important step for this Nation and
critical in responding to the things that we saw today because
I totally agree, this is a highly contagious disease and
probably the most catastrophic disease that is facing our
animal industry.
DHS is committed to maintaining positive proactive
relations with our surrounding communities too. We established
a community forum with 28 members from the local New York and
Connecticut communities, which meets on a quarterly basis. We
use this method to keep the public informed of the important
scientific work and other activities we do. We also just
recently scheduled a Plum Island community day where we are
having 25 people from the local community come out, and we want
to explain to them the important things we do at Plum Island.
It is time that we stopped having secrets and let the community
know the important work that we are doing.
In addition, we have an industry stakeholders working group
that I put together with representatives from agencies and
organizations such as the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association, which you heard speakers here today from, and the
National Milk Producers Federation. I provided presentations to
these organizations and communicated with other stakeholder
working groups to keep them apprised of the important work we
do at Plum Island.
At Plum Island, we also have a senior leadership group
which, besides myself, is comprised of the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service's director of the Foreign Animal
Disease Diagnostic Lab and also the chief of research from USDA
ARS. We work closely on a daily basis and meet regularly to
ensure communication and partnership in supporting our
important scientific activities. We also elevate issues as
appropriate to our Plum Island board of directors, which is
comprised of the administrator of Agriculture Research Services
and APHIS, and a senior representative from the Department of
Homeland Security S&T also sits on that committee. Senior
leadership is conducting--right now we are doing strategic
planning, working together in our senior leadership group at
Plum Island identifying our current research strategies and how
we are going to address future needs with the facilities we
have but also moving into the future, and we will report these
and coordinate those with the Board too.
We also have made many other improvements addressing other
GAO findings of security violations, which we have corrected
now. We have memorandums of understanding with local
communities for support, and on a daily basis I work closely
with the USDA.
In summary, Plum Island plays a critical role in the daily
protection of our Nation against foreign animal diseases. As
director, I am committed to providing support to the USDA in
fulfilling their important mission at Plum Island as well as
providing a sense of urgency and support for the Department of
Homeland Security and USDA's development of a new, improved
foot-and-mouth vaccine for the protection of this Nation's
livestock and nothing is more important to me, coming from a
cattle ranch, than having that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Barrett follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Dr. Barrett. Dr. Barrett, I will
need you to submit that. It looks like you read a written
statement there so I will need you to submit that for the
record. Kyle will make a copy and give it back to you. Thank
you.
Mr. Dingell, do you wish to go first?
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Cohen, I want to thank you for your kind words. Please
tell me where is the environmental impact statement and when
are you going to make it available to this committee at the
request of this committee and at the request of GAO?
Mr. Cohen. I will be pleased to make it available to this
committee, as I have made all other information----
Mr. Dingell. Pardon me?
Mr. Cohen. I say again, I will be pleased to make it
available to the Committee, as I made all other----
Mr. Dingell. We would like to see first of all the state of
this and we would like to see the statement of work that goes
into that. When will that be made available to the Committee?
Mr. Cohen. It is my understanding that the statement of
work was provided to the Committee either late last year or
early this year.
Mr. Dingell. I am informed that that is not true, and I am
informed that GAO has been denied this because that is a
proprietary document. Is that statement true?
Mr. Cohen. The statement of work is not a proprietary
document, and I will find out why the Committee and the GAO
does not have it. As to the draft environmental statement,
while we are not required to conduct this selection for the
NBAF location under the Federal acquisition regulations, I felt
as the responsible individual that the closest we could come to
those processes would give the most transparency and fairness
and so in doing that----
Mr. Dingell. This is all fine, but let me just repeat my
question so that you understand it. When are you going to make
available to us the statement of work? When are you going to
make available the environmental impact statement? When are you
going to make it available to GAO? Why have you refused it to
GAO? Why have you stated that this is a proprietary document?
Mr. Cohen. I will see that the statement of work is
delivered to your committee and the GAO this afternoon and then
we will determine whether they had it----
Mr. Dingell. Why have you withheld it from the GAO and why
have you withheld it from this committee?
Mr. Cohen. I don't have----
Mr. Dingell. You are the witness on behalf of the
Department and said this is a proprietary document. Is it a
proprietary document, and if so, what is a proprietary document
and why it is a proprietary document not available to GAO and
to this committee?
Mr. Cohen. Chairman, I have no personal knowledge that the
word ``proprietary'' was used. I will accept the GAO----
Mr. Dingell. You have heard----
Mr. Cohen. I will accept the GAO's testimony that they did
to that effect, but the GAO nor did the Congressional Research
Service at any point request to see me as part of their
studies.
Mr. Dingell. Dear friend, they are asking to have the
document. I have 2 minutes and 26 seconds so I don't want to
get into a long argument over this. I just want you to tell us
why you have been withholding this from us at this committee
and why you have withheld it from GAO and which is functioning
at our request.
Mr. Cohen. We have not withheld a statement of work. I will
make sure you have a copy on the draft environmental statement.
We will make that available to the Committee. We will make it
available to the public just as if it were a contract action.
Mr. Dingell. We want the document now. We don't want it at
some future time.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And if you have a reason for withholding it
from us, I want you to tell us what that is and why you are
withholding it from us, and we want to know why we have to wait
and why you are treating it as a contract action rather than
seeing to it that it is made available to us forthwith and why
did you not make this available to GAO on their request? Now,
what are the answers to my questions? You mentioned the word
``arrogant'' and it sounds rather arrogant to me.
Mr. Cohen. It sounds arrogant to me that neither the
Congressional Research Service nor the GAO would show me, the
deciding official, the courtesy to even visit with me. We have
heard testimony from the GAO that they couldn't get onto Plum
Island, and who did they contact to get into Plum Island?
Mr. Dingell. They had to wait 6 weeks.
Mr. Cohen. Me?
Mr. Dingell. Please explain why they had to wait 6 weeks to
get on the island.
Mr. Cohen. Because Dr. Sharma, I am informed, contacted the
wrong people. Your staff has been on the island. In fact, my
staff and your staff have bathed together on the island.
Mr. Dingell. This sounds to me as if almost anybody in that
department of yours is the wrong people. It sounds like you are
speaking on behalf of the most profound disorganization and
confusion. Why is it that the wrong people couldn't refer him
to the right people? Is that incompetence or is that arrogance?
Mr. Cohen. As I said, if Dr. Sharma will share with me who
he contacted, if we have a problem with customer service, I can
assure you I am committed to improving the customer service.
Mr. Dingell. On February 21, I had to send this letter to
Secretary Chertoff: ``Your failure to make complete response to
our records request is troubling. Despite assurances of
cooperation from Under Secretary Jay Cohen in a letter to this
committee dated October 25, 2007, we continue to discover the
existence of records directly related to our requests but which
are not included in your response. For example, it was in the
course of a visit to Plum Island by the committee investigators
in November we became aware that DHS possessed two studies
performed by SAIC analyzing Plum Island and NBAF issues.
Similarly, it was only as a result of this committee staff
interviews of certain DHS officials that we became aware of a
study on Plum Island performed by the Homeland Security
Institute in 2007. The SAIC studies have now been provided but
despite staff requests, the HSI study has not yet been
produced.'' Why is it not produced and where is it and when are
we going to get it?
Mr. Cohen. Well, Chairman, I am pleased, and Chairman
Stupak, these are all of the studies that I have and I am glad
to give them. I believe you will find that the staff already
has those.
Mr. Dingell. Let me inform you, Mr. Secretary, that the
delivery of lots of paper is not the delivery of the specific
requested documents, and I expect better cooperation from your
department. You are not giving it, and it may be that you can
treat other committees with arrogant disregard for their
requests but you are sure not going to do it here because I am
going to see to it, and I am sure Mr. Stupak, our chairman,
will see to it that we lay subpoenas on you so that we get your
cooperation willingly or otherwise.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, and to the extent I control the
documents, I have directed their release in a timely manner to
the Committee. To the extent that they are shared amongst
departments, as you have heard today earlier, USDA, Department
of Justice, et cetera, it is appropriate that I ask those
departments for clearance because I did not generate them. But
I have nothing to hide here. This process is being done in an
open and fair manner to the best of my ability, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I have to say that you are giving me
quite a different impression, and you are giving this committee
quite a different impression.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I hope we will have a
second opportunity to raise these questions.
Mr. Stupak. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Cohen, you brought up this study on the economic impact
of an outbreak in this country that the last panel brought up,
and why wasn't that supplied to the Committee? Why wasn't that
study supplied to the Committee?
Mr. Cohen. I am sorry. Is this the 2002----
Mr. Stupak. The 2004 USDA estimate of what an outbreak
would cost this country. Direct cost was $60 billion from the
last witness. Why wasn't that report supplied our committee?
Mr. Cohen. I will refer that to Under Secretary Knight. It
is a USDA study.
Mr. Knight. I have had staff scrambling since the testimony
to find that because I do know earlier this week----
Mr. Stupak. Yes, they should scramble when we write letters
though and ask for those reports, not when you come to the
Committee. So where is the report and when can we have it?
Mr. Knight. My best knowledge right now is that that study
was in fact a PowerPoint presentation given by the chief
economist's office. I am working to get confirmation on that.
When I have got that tracked down, I will provide that fully to
the Committee.
Mr. Stupak. We want it, and we want it soon.
Let me ask you this. Have you done any risk assessment on
Plum Island, Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Well, we have done numerous studies.
Mr. Stupak. I am talking about risk assessment on Plum
Island. Have you done one, yes or no?
Mr. Cohen. Risk assessment is being done under NEPA as part
of the environmental impact statement.
Mr. Stupak. Has risk assessment been done in the State of
Texas on the proposed site, State of Kansas----
Mr. Cohen. It is being done as part of the environment
impact statement for the San Antonio site as is the case in all
six sites.
Mr. Stupak. All right. So it is being done. When is it
going to be done?
Mr. Cohen. Well, the draft environmental impact statement
should be out no later, in my opinion, than mid-June, and the
final environmental impact statement should be out this fall,
either October or November.
Mr. Stupak. Does it include economic impact as to what
happens when foot-and-mouth disease would hit this country?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. Stupak. All right. How about the cost-benefit analysis?
Have you done that?
Mr. Cohen. We will do that as part of the economic----
Mr. Stupak. Have you done it?
Mr. Cohen. It is in progress as part of the environmental
impact statement. Many of these issues are very site-specific
and require knowledge of the community. We couldn't even start
these until we had down-selected to the six most probable
sites.
Mr. Stupak. And when did you narrow it down to six probable
sites?
Mr. Cohen. Last July.
Mr. Stupak. So it has been over a year?
Mr. Cohen. And we have been in progress with town halls,
public hearings. We have over 2,000 documents that have been
submitted by various interested parties including some of the
representatives from panel number two.
Mr. Stupak. All right. You indicated that the morale is
very high at Plum Island. Do you have trouble recruiting
scientists to go work at Plum Island?
Mr. Cohen. I will refer that to Dr. Barrett since he is the
responsible individual.
Dr. Barrett. When we recruit scientists at Plum Island, we
usually go out and try to get post-docs and other people like
that, like we recently hired one of our scientists----
Mr. Stupak. Sure, but do you have trouble recruiting
qualified people?
Dr. Barrett. As senior-level scientists, we are trying to
hire a research veterinarian now. That is difficult, and I know
ARS is too. But most positions we can fill.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Well, we have been told that your
scientists are among the best in the world in their field. Is
that correct?
Dr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And your scientific missions and goals are
being accomplished at Plum Island, are they not?
Dr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. So there is not a concern then that if we put
the new foot-and-mouth disease facility on Plum Island, you
would have trouble recruiting people to work there?
Dr. Barrett. No.
Mr. Stupak. You indicated you grew up on a cattle farm or a
ranch?
Dr. Barrett. A ranch.
Mr. Stupak. Do you still have family in----
Dr. Barrett. Yes. I go back and visit my father and we go
out and look at the cows, and one of the things that I am so
interested in getting this vaccine out is because they are
registered heifers and he can tell me, the mother for every cow
and I have to listen to it every time.
Mr. Stupak. Did you ever talk to him about moving foot-and-
mouth research off Plum Island?
Dr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. What did your father say to that?
Dr. Barrett. He didn't think it was a good idea. At the
same time, I didn't have time to----
Mr. Stupak. Well, let me ask you this. How many releases of
foot-and-mouth disease have been from Plum Island?
Dr. Barrett. Releases? We have only had the one release in
1978.
Mr. Stupak. OK. DHS--and maybe Secretary Cohen or Director
Cohen would like to answer this. DHS can either renovate the
existing facility on Plum Island or build a new facility there,
correct?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And is Plum Island being considered as one of
those sites?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely.
Mr. Stupak. DHS could still build NBAF but leave foot-and-
mouth disease on Plum Island. That is another option, right?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. OK. A new NBAF would include animals that would
be kept on the property, right?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. No matter where it is at?
Mr. Cohen. No matter where it is at, but those animals
would be kept within the facility, not outside the containment.
Mr. Stupak. OK. In 1991, 13 years after the 1978 outbreak,
Plum Island stopped keeping animals outside the lab on the
island. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Cohen. I was up there on Monday. I spoke with Dr.
Callis, who was the director in 1978, and both Dr. Barrett and
I tried to get an exact date, and Dr. Callis indicated that it
was about that time.
Mr. Stupak. OK. So you stopped keeping animals on the
outside, and that was after 1978?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, somewhere between 1978 and 1991. I
think it was progressive.
Mr. Stupak. Do you know how many outbreaks since 2004 of
the biolabs 3 and 4? Do you know how many outbreaks there have
been since 2004 through 2007?
Mr. Cohen. I will take for the record, but there have
been--you are talking more than just----
Mr. Stupak. I am talking accidents----
Mr. Cohen. BSL-3, BSL-4?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Mr. Cohen. There have been a handful and they are
documented.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Well, actually with accidents and
outbreaks, there have been 103. Would that surprise you?
Mr. Cohen. No.
Mr. Stupak. OK. And----
Mr. Cohen. I assume you are talking worldwide?
Mr. Stupak. No, I am talking about here in the United
States.
Mr. Cohen. I don't have knowledge of that number. That
would come under CDC and HHS and NIH and----
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Let me give you one right there. There
were 103 outbreaks since January 2004 through halfway through
2007. That is 3\1/2\ years, 103 of them. Ninety are caused by
human error.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. So the issue here is not necessarily human
error, but once the outbreak happens, how will it spread? Is
that fair to say?
Mr. Cohen. I just didn't hear the----
Mr. Stupak. Sure. If 90 percent of the errors or outbreaks
or mistakes are human errors at these BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs, you
are going to have that whether it is on Plum Island or Texas or
North Carolina.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And the critical issue then is how quickly it
could spread to a surrounding population. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Cohen. If it would spread, and then at what speed, yes,
sir.
Mr. Stupak. If you had an outbreak that got out, one of the
previous panelists said that you had to cordon off 20 miles;
then there is another buffer, and then you might have to
vaccinate the outer area. So the less impact, the less risk
there would be in areas where there is less of an animal
population to be infected. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Cohen. I don't know the basis for the 20 miles.
Obviously people have shared with you, Plum Island is 1\1/2\
miles off the eastern end of Long Island and so that is viewed
as the customary barrier. But certainly proximity, as was
stated with a feed house or whatever, is certainly a
consideration.
Mr. Stupak. Sure, and in the books there, in fact, I think
you handed some of those SAIC reports to Mr. Dingell. You were
indicating in the one on tab 12, if you will, that is that SAIC
report of August 15, 2002, and for the record, SAIC means
Science Applications International Corporation. On page 16,
third paragraph, it talks about biosafety lapses at any
facility location likely to have an equal risk of occurrence,
and I think you would agree with that statement, would you not?
Mr. Cohen. I do, sir.
Mr. Stupak. OK. It goes on and says, ``In this respect, not
all locations can be considered equal, that is, facilities
located where significant animal populations exist that are
susceptible to agents under investigation have a greater degree
of risk.'' Is that true?
Mr. Cohen. I agree with that, and that is exactly why under
NEPA we are doing the EIS at all of the six sites.
Mr. Stupak. Right, and even though this is a faulty report,
according to GAO, because you only looked at limited
circumstances, they still concluded, did they not, in the next
paragraph that Plum Island was considered to have the lowest
risk should accidental release from an agent from the facility
occur in part because of its island location but mainly due to
lack of commercial livestock farming in Long Island and
surrounding areas. Is that true?
Mr. Cohen. As you have heard in prior panels, we have had--
--
Mr. Stupak. Isn't that what it says? Isn't that what this
report says, that paragraph right there?
Mr. Cohen. It does say that, and----
Mr. Stupak. So it sounds like Plum Island would be the
preferred location because of the island location and the lack
of livestock to be infected if there is a contagious outbreak
when you have had 103 in the last 3\1/2\ years.
Mr. Cohen. I certainly, Chairman, will stipulate that Plum
Island is an island, it is remote, it is separated by water,
but as you have heard from prior panels, there are deer that
swim. I am a New York City boy. I was brought up in Manhattan
Island. I thought wildlife was squirrels, rats, and pigeons.
Then I moved to Long Island, close to Plum Island. So deer are
susceptible to foot-and-mouth. Now, I was just out there on
Monday----
Mr. Stupak. And have we had any deer come back with hoof-
and-mouth disease and infect the area? Even if they did,
according to this report that you paid for, there is less
chance of an infection because there is not enough livestock in
that area to have a significant impact.
Mr. Cohen. Well, Chairman, you know I was just----
Mr. Stupak. So your risk-benefit analysis, I think we just
did it for you.
Mr. Cohen. I was just on eastern Long Island on Monday and
I found out that their economy has changed and they are now
doing an awful lot of shrubbery, decorative shrubbery because
of the construction that is going on, and there is a real, just
like in Maryland and other states, a deer population boom, and
so deer can transmit this as well as any other of the cloven-
hoof animals. So this will all be part of the EIS. I agree with
you, it is an island and it makes sense from the testimony, as
you have heard----
Mr. Stupak. I am just trying to help you because apparently
you have been having trouble getting it done and getting the
documents to us, and your own documents sort of indicate Plum
Island is the preferred place from a risk-benefit analysis.
Mr. Cohen. If those documents were the end-all, I would not
have been working on this with a team of government service,
DHS, USDA, and HHS----
Mr. Stupak. It is not the end-all.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. Going to every site for the last
year and a half and continuing this for the next 9 to 10
months.
Mr. Stupak. It is not the end-all. That is why we want
these other reports.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Even as flawed as it is, they still came with
the conclusion.
Mr. Shimkus for questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To both secretaries,
welcome, and I appreciate you sitting in to observe the other
panels. We have learned--I have learned a lot and you all have
been involved a lot in this process. Let me ask both of you,
and Secretary Knight, I would like you to answer first and then
Secretary Cohen, just because left to right, kind of easy, Dr.
Hill from the National Pork Producers gave testimony today
stating that the location of the facility on the mainland
should be based on an assessment of risk and that an assessment
of the proximity of susceptible animal populations that could
be exposed to an outbreak should be one of the factors
considered when calculating that risk. Is that risk examined in
the EIS, and if not, why?
Mr. Cohen. That is my responsibility, and the answer is
yes, it is considered, absolutely.
Mr. Shimkus. Was it a consideration on picking the five
finalists?
Mr. Cohen. It was not as direct a consideration as it is
now that we are with the finalists and have a full-blown
environmental impact statement. We have listed the public
criteria by which we did that down-select and we used both
numerical and adjectival scoring, and the Committee has been
provided with that record of decision for their review.
Mr. Shimkus. Did either you, Secretary Knight, or Secretary
Cohen, either from USDA or DHS, consult with or ask for input
from the livestock associations when selecting the final sites
for the NBAF?
Mr. Cohen. We took again in a very public way with public
hearings, et cetera----
Mr. Shimkus. We like public hearings.
Mr. Cohen. We took input from everybody including people
with protest signs on the side of the road when we visited the
consortia proposed sites.
Mr. Shimkus. Secretary Knight?
Mr. Knight. We were in a supporting role with DHS in that
and everything was done in as open a process as possible with
public participation.
Mr. Shimkus. As the process moves forward, will we continue
to be in consultation with the industries affected?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely, and I would say based on the
information I received today and we continue to learn that we
will to be more closely involved with them because under the
economic impact, they know best.
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Barrett, also welcome to you. As director
for the past year, what have been the most common complaints
made by current USDA employees at Plum Island about the
facility and its location?
Dr. Barrett. The most common complaint is about space. We
just had our last senior leadership group. We spent the entire
meeting talking about how we were going to be sharing one room
because we only have one room to hold 26 animals for the large
studies and we spent a lot of the meeting deciding which of the
three of us would get to use it.
Mr. Shimkus. And obviously I walked in late, I missed some
questions. Was there a follow-up question by the chairman about
the assertion made about the inability to get qualified people
at Plum Island versus other locations around the country? I
mean, is that a----
Dr. Barrett. I responded to that and I said that we do work
just like any other scientific institution. We bring in post-
docs and build our own. At the same time, we do have difficulty
in hiring senior scientists as you would at other locations.
One of the things is because it would be nice if we were closer
to a research institution so that you could do cooperative
projects.
Mr. Shimkus. And a research institution, you are referring
to associated with a major university?
Dr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have right now.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Secretary, where is the cost-benefit analysis for this
move?
Mr. Cohen. It is in process with the environmental impact
statement.
Mr. Dingell. You do not have it now?
Mr. Cohen. I do not have it now.
Mr. Dingell. Will that be made available to the Committee
as soon as it is available?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Now, let us talk about the SAIC
study. Where in the SAIC study does it support the move of Plum
Island to the mainland? What is the language? Where is it in
that study?
Mr. Cohen. I have not memorized that study so I will take
for that record, but that study was done under the auspices of
the Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Dingell. Where in the study is that language?
Mr. Cohen. I will take it for the record, sir. I will get
back to you.
Mr. Dingell. All right. Please submit it for the record
with great specificity.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, you have referred to HSPD-9 as supporting
the move. What language in that study supports this move?
Mr. Cohen. As I read HSPD-9, it does not specify a move. It
requires in coordination with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture that we establish suitable facility in order to
mitigate or prevent bioterrorism in this area.
Mr. Dingell. Does it say that that should be moved, that
Plum Island should be moved to the mainland?
Mr. Cohen. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Dingell. OK. Now, where does the study that in the 2003
White House Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism show either a
cost-benefit analysis or a reason for moving Plum Island to the
mainland?
Mr. Cohen. I have read that blue ribbon study. I appreciate
the work that went into it, and as I read it, it specifies
neither of those, sir.
Mr. Dingell. So it doesn't show that. Now, what document do
you have at the Department which justifies the move of this
facility from Plum Island to the mainland?
Mr. Cohen. I do not have a document because we have not
made the decision to move from Plum Island.
Mr. Dingell. But you will have obviously decisionmaking
documents which will be presented to you. Do you have any
such----
Mr. Cohen. As they----
Mr. Dingell. Please.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Do you have any such documents that you can
present to the Committee today?
Mr. Cohen. We have presented to the Committee the record of
decision----
Mr. Dingell. I am asking----
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. The five plus Plum Island that
shows the methodology----
Mr. Dingell. Reply, if you please, to my question.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Do you have any documents which support this
move? Any----
Mr. Cohen. The document that I have submitted----
Mr. Dingell. Pardon?
Mr. Cohen. The document I have previously submitted, which
is the record of decision, which shows the methodology that got
us to the existing six. I will give you the----
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Secretary, you are not being very helpful.
What I want from you is any documents which you have which
justifies the move.
Mr. Cohen. Sir, I am not presuming that there will be a
move. I am in the process of the down-select of which Plum
Island is one of the six finalists.
Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, this question then to the
witness from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. What documents
do you have anywhere in the Department of Agriculture which
justify or support the movement of this facility from Plum
Island to some onshore position?
Mr. Knight. I do not believe we have any documents other
than what have already been provided.
Mr. Dingell. What studies do you have that support that
move?
Mr. Knight. We have some experience in the logistical
difficulties associated with testing in the event of a
potential disease trace-back which has shown that there are
logistical hurdles associated with getting samples to Plum
Island in a timely manner.
Mr. Dingell. Please present that study to the Committee,
and please see to it that it is annotated to show where you
have anything in that study which supports the move. And please
also tell me whether you are telling me that this study tells
you that there are large costs associated with the move and
whether you are telling us that this study also makes the point
that there is risk in moving. Now, what are the facts with
regard to this study?
Mr. Knight. I do not have a study to that effect. I replied
to you, sir, that we had some experience on those logistical
challenges.
Mr. Dingell. You have experience. I am asking for studies,
not pious statements. I want to know what studies you have that
will tell us. I don't like people coming before this committee
to say, oh, this is a great thing to do, and that is what I am
hearing this afternoon about what a great thing this is to do
and we have got a head of steam. Let me read to you something.
I would like to have you hear what my friend Pat Roberts had to
say in this, and he was referring to his experience, and this
is in regard to an exercise where he played the President in
something called Crimson Sky. Now, Crimson Sky was a misnomer
label of what would happen if Iraq had launched a hoof-and-
mouth disease infestation in some seven States. He goes on to
say this: ``Now, that doesn't sound like much on the surface of
it but you have an infestation period of 6 days and on the 7th
you have got to make some decisions, and we didn't do it very
well. We ended up with 50 million head of livestock that had to
be terminated. Now, how do you do that? Just on the surface of
it, how on earth do you do that and what do you do with the
carcasses? Well, obviously it was the National Guard, and then
obviously the National Guard couldn't handle it all, so it was
active duty. And then we found we didn't have enough ammunition
and we found that you don't burn the carcasses, because that we
learned in Great Britain, that is not what you do. So we had to
bury them, and there was a ditch 25 miles long and half a
football field wide in Kansas alone just to handle the herds
there.'' And he goes on to say, ``And then we had to put out a
stop order on all shipments because you were having States and
National Guards being activated by the governors to stop other
States and transportation of livestock, all export stock. The
markets went nuts and the people in the cities finally figured
out that their food did come from farms and not from
supermarkets, and they rioted in the streets and there was a
mess. And it was not only for 1 year but for several years.
Then add in the problem of food security, and if you put a
little anthrax in some milk, then you have probably got a
problem on your hands. Now, I want to know, I know that at that
particular time when different events happen, that DOD will be
there. They are going to have to be there because they are the
only outfit that can do it. I prefer the National Guard because
people know them and trust them. They are the home forces and
they are working toward it.''
This is what happens when anthrax, rather than foot-and-
mouth disease, gets loose. So I want to be sure that you folks
down there are protecting yourself. We had have had all kinds
of releases from onshore facilities. You have had none at Plum
Island, and I have got here a list of the instances where these
kinds of things have gotten loose, but none has gotten loose at
Plum Island. Plum Island became the place where we put things
like foot-and-mouth because it is exquisitely dangerous. All
there has to be is one contact and the disease moves from one
animal to another and it goes like a wildfire across Kansas,
and I don't want to see the same thing going across Kansas
because we have made a bad judgment, and I want to see--that is
why this committee wants to see your environmental impact
statement.
You folks down at DHS have the idea that because you are
charged with protecting the country, anything you do is right,
and that you can go ahead and do whatever you want in whatever
high-handed fashion you so choose. And I don't see any sign
that you have been cooperative with the Committee in enabling
us to evaluate what is going on or in seeing to it that you are
carrying out your responsibilities in a proper fashion. You
have been high-handed and arrogant in your dealing with the
Government Accountability Office, and you have been
uncooperative in assisting this committee with the information
that we have sought from you. This has to stop, and I will
inform you that there are pleasant ways to work with this
committee and there are unpleasant ways. We will give you the
choice but you, sir, are going to work with this committee and
we are going to see to it that the people are safe from the
Department of Homeland Security whether you people like it or
not. Now, you have already got a fine record on Katrina and I
want to see to it that you don't have a fine record on foot-
and-mouth disease.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cohen. Chairman, may I have just a moment to respond,
please?
Mr. Stupak. That is your choice. It is your risk.
Mr. Cohen. And I thank you for that guidance.
Mr. Stupak. This is a risk assessment I am giving you.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, and I won't ask you for it in writing,
sir.
Chairman, I believe you get more flies with honey than
vinegar and I have enormous----
Mr. Dingell. We have asked for stuff and we have done it in
a nice way and we haven't got it. So now we are going to use
either the nice way or the nasty way. Your choice is before
you. I must tell you, we are going to get the information.
Mr. Cohen. And I vote for the nice way, sir. Having said
that, I appreciate your sharing the Crimson Sky. I am familiar
with that. I have read that and I have had long discussions
with Senator Roberts on that, and I will stipulate that the
release of foot-and-mouth in the United States would have a
very significant effect, tens of billions of dollars and years
of impact, and we take that very, very seriously. I hope that I
am not hearing you presuming or believing that I as the
deciding official have made a decision to select any of the
six, five on the mainland or Plum Island. I have not, sir, and
I am under oath and I will only take that decision when the
appropriate information and analysis is done in consultation
with the six committees as well as the agriculture committees
and your committee as you desire and with the leadership of
Department of Homeland Security, HHS and USDA, and that is how
we got to the down-select. Everything I have done has been
testified to in other committees and the appropriations
committees, which fund me and USDA, have found it in their
heart in a bipartisan way to provide the tens of millions of
dollars necessary to do this important work.
Mr. Dingell. You are running around promising these
facilities to a whole array of states. Every time I run over to
the Floor, there is somebody saying to me, oh, we want this
facility in our state. I have the governors of two states in to
see me about this. They are saying oh, we want you to get out
of the way so we can get this facility, and it sounds to me
like what they are trying to do is to take a gamble on getting
a lot of money or maybe foot-and-mouth getting loose. So Mr.
Secretary, you can do a lot for yourself and for the trust that
this committee has in you and in the Department, and right now
it is a rather low level----
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell [continuing]. By seeing to it that your people
cooperate with us in producing the information that this
committee asked for.
Mr. Cohen. And I will do my very best, sir.
Mr. Dingell. That will be a remarkable improvement, and I
thank you.
Now, what are you going to do about this? GAO is reviewing
these people. Are you going to make your decision before we
have the GAO's review of your decisions and review of the
papers that they have been not receiving from your department?
Mr. Cohen. They will receive them in a timely manner, as I
indicated, when the Committee does and the public does. I have
great respect for the Congressional Research Service and the
GAO, and in fact, the GAO helped us significantly when they
identified security and other problems previously at Plum
Island, 24 areas that needed improvement. Eighteen have already
been corrected and the other six are in process. So I respect
the process. I respect the GAO. I would ask that they
communicate a little bit more with me, but I respect the
process and we will work with them, of course.
Mr. Dingell. So are you going to wait on your decision
until we have had the GAO review this matter or are you going
to go right on ahead and make the decision before that occurs?
Mr. Cohen. We will share the information in a timely manner
with the GAO but I will make the decision as I am authorized to
either by the enabling legislation or by Secretary Chertoff and
the secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and then of
course the Congress controls all of this either by the Farm
Bill, which I am very pleased to see you voted for, or by the
appropriations, which the Founding Fathers gave you the power
to stop whatever the Executive branch----
Mr. Dingell. Your answer is yes or no?
Mr. Cohen. I do not put the Government Accountability
Office in my decisionmaking chain. I will share with them.
Mr. Dingell. I accept that as a no. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Pickering, questions?
Mr. Pickering. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Is there any statutory language requirement that GAO's
recommendation to you be considered in your decision? Is there
any law, regulation or proceeding that GAO's recommendation is
binding or directive and a government's decision authorized
under law and in the Farm Bill that you are the deciding
official?
Mr. Cohen. I will have to take that for the record, sir. I
think that is a question for the lawyers.
Mr. Pickering. I am not aware of any statutory language,
and I have been on Senate staff and here for a long time. I
have never seen GAO be given the decision. They are to report
to agencies and to us and based on their information, we take
that information and then make our best decisions upon that.
The GAO is not the deciding entity here. Is that correct? As
you consult with your lawyers, is GAO, have they been tasked by
any act of Congress to make this decision?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I am going to have to take that for
the record. I am not a lawyer.
Mr. Pickering. I think the answer is clear. But the
Department of Homeland Security is the deciding entity as
designated by law. The GAO as well as communities across the
country are making public comment in a very open and
transparent process, and you are doing studies, and I think
that will all be part of the record of the draft EIS. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cohen. To the extent that we have completed those
studies, yes, sir, and this process has been ongoing for
several years. I have been personally involved now for nearly 2
years in a full and open manner around the country.
Mr. Pickering. Now, one of the questions here is cost-
benefit. The other question, major question, is risk
assessment. On a cost-benefit basis, would it cost more to
build and operate and maintain a new facility on Plum Island?
Mr. Cohen. We would have to determine the exact
differential, but as you heard from the second panel, an
individual from--Mr. Voogt, I think, from Michigan indicated
that his experience building on an island was 30 to 40 percent.
Our best estimate is, it would be about a 25 percent premium to
build on Plum Island. Having said that, we would save on the
transition from Plum Island to a mainland facility. I don't
know what that differential would be. And then of course you
have, as was indicated----
Mr. Pickering. But that would be----
Mr. Stupak. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Pickering. But all that would be in the EIS, would it
not?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Will the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Pickering. Yes, if it doesn't take any of my time.
Mr. Stupak. I will give you back the time. How is that?
You mentioned Mr. Voogt. You mentioned your estimation.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. But you have your own report, your SAIC report
there, that says it is only 17 percent, 140 versus 130, so
which one are you going to use to make your determination, the
report you commissioned, Mr. Voogt, or your own estimation?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I am not making the decision at this
hearing and I am not making the decision any time soon. I will
make the decision----
Mr. Stupak. In response to----
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. When I have all of the information
in front of me and I can then come in front----
Mr. Stupak. Well, in your answer, it sounded like you were
relying on what Mr. Voogt said because he----
Mr. Cohen. Oh, no, I was using his----
Mr. Stupak [continuing]. Has something to do with Beaver
Island in Michigan and in your own judgment but----
Mr. Cohen. I apologize. The only reason I referenced that
was to indicate that there is an additional cost to
transporting building material, workers to an island. How much
that it, we will find out. I also indicated----
Mr. Stupak. Page 31 of tab 13, I would suggest you read it.
It says 17 percent.
Mr. Cohen. I don't accept the 17 percent. I don't accept
the 40 percent. I don't accept the 26 percent that Dr. Barrett
has given to me. I will accept the validated real-time 2008
number based on the facts as we know them.
Mr. Stupak. That is why we hope you have GAO, Government
Accountability Office, help you with that before you make the
decision because they are more the experts on it since you seem
to have some confusion what number we should use.
Mr. Cohen. I think we have a number of experts available
and I certainly welcome GAO to the process.
Mr. Stupak. Thanks to the gentleman for yielding. We will
make sure you get the time there.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Going to the GAO study, on page 6, and I realize this just
came out, you probably didn't have time to review it, and
again, I don't think anybody is saying that a decision has been
made one way or the other. I think that we are getting upset
about something that is really not time to be upset about or
the anxiety is premature, and the reason I say that, and
correct me if I am wrong, we are going through an EIS over the
next months. You are supposed to make a decision in October.
But even after the site selection, the research done on a new
facility, whether Plum Island or on the mainland, does not
begin until 2015. Is that correct? So the analysis of getting
this right, we have--this is part of making sure that we get it
right, but no decision has been made and the analysis will be
done.
But going back to the GAO study, it says previously DHS had
stated categorically that the SAIC study allowed them to
conclude that foot-and-mouth disease work can be done safely on
the mainland, and they go on in the next sentence to say that
the EIS analysis in supplementing are validating your studies
will also be part of that. But for some reason GAO sees it in
conflict. How do you interpret it?
Mr. Cohen. Well, GAO has not contacted me personally. I
have no knowledge of who or when the statement relative to the
2002 SAIC USDA study was made and I stand by the testimony I
have consistently made over the last year and a half before my
committees and the testimony I am giving here today.
Mr. Pickering. When is the draft EIS scheduled to be
released?
Mr. Cohen. I would say about mid-June, sir.
Mr. Pickering. Mid-June?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pickering. Are you providing the draft EIS to the
Committee before the publication of the draft EIS?
Mr. Cohen. It was my intent to provide it to the Committee
similar to a contracting action with the release to the public.
If there is law that indicates that I can provide it to the
Committee in advance of public release, I welcome that input. I
am not aware of that, sir.
Mr. Pickering. Is this the issue, the proprietary issue of
whether you can--when you view it as a contracting issue that
you can give it to this committee prior to release to the
public? Is that what we are----
Mr. Cohen. Well, for instance in Department of Defense, we
inform the Committee one hour before public release. The
Appropriations Committee and Homeland Security requires 4
working days notice of all responsible committees before there
is a commitment of funds because I have not previously dealt
with the Energy and Commerce Committee or Oversight Committee
in this case, I don't know if there is similar law. If the
Committee can produce that, I will certainly comply with the
law.
Mr. Pickering. So this is not a question of whether you are
going to be fully open and transparent, it is a question of
when you can release the information to the Committee and to
the public. Is that correct?
Mr. Cohen. That is exactly right, sir.
Mr. Pickering. The last thing, sometimes we have a failure
to communicate with agencies, with interagency processes or
from the Hill to the agencies. It seems to me a meeting with
GAO may clarify some of the concerns and give them a fuller
understanding so that everybody can have greater confidence in
the process as well as in the outcome. Would you be willing to
meet with anybody from GAO?
Mr. Cohen. I am pleased to meet with anybody from GAO at
any time, anywhere, and I will even host them, as I have hosted
CRS investigators to lunch.
Mr. Pickering. Well, I think that that could go a long way
to resolving some of the anxiety and the concerns, and I thank
the chairman for my time. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Pickering.
Mr. Moran, did you have some questions?
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again for your
courtesy extended to me as a non-member of this committee. I
just wanted to explore with both under secretaries what are the
deficiencies with Plum Island that you anticipate correcting
with a different site or a new facility?
Mr. Cohen. Well, again, as I said in my opening statement,
I am very proud of the work that the people do at Plum Island,
and our goal and my dream is that they will shortly develop an
efficacious vaccine for foot-and-mouth disease because that is
really what we are talking about, and we are investing over $50
million, have been over the last several years with the help of
the Congress, we appreciate that very much, to expand the
facility that exists at Plum Island for foot-and-mouth disease
as well as making it more secure, but the goal is to be able to
work on more than one vaccine at a time. Now, having said that,
when the opportunity presented itself and the directions of
HCPD 9 and 10 and working with the Congress, and also looking
at other zoonotic diseases, foreign animal diseases, we have
just focused--and I appreciate that, Chairman, so much. You
focused on the foot-and-mouth, and I heard loud and clear your
support and I know your committee feels that way about the need
for the other developing potential diseases that go from animal
to humans and cause a pandemic and great loss of life, as it
has overseas. We need a BSL-4, this is where you don't have a
cure or vaccine, for those studies. We don't need that for
foot-and-mouth disease. There we use BSL-3 agricultural
standard and we think that that has been sufficient. That is
the standard around the world.
And so what we are looking to do to see if there are
synergies, and we have made this very clear in the public in
the offering by locating near veterinary schools, and I have
learned there are only 30 veterinary schools in the country.
That was a surprise to me. I thought there would be more.
Locating near to medical research facilities, locating where
the cost of living is such. In the five mainland sites, the
median cost of a home is on the order of half to a third the
median cost of a home on the tip of Long Island or Connecticut.
Now, how does that affect us? Dr. Barrett has indicated that we
are successful in getting world-class scientists, and we are
because we are doing such exciting work. But I have to hire
dozens of large-animal handlers. They can't afford to live
proximate to Plum Island, and if they are rushing to get home,
will they make mistakes in their long commute, or they might be
tired. So what we tried to do was see, could we in a holistic
way come up with the best solution, be that on the mainland or
on Plum Island. But that decision remains to be made.
Mr. Knight. If I could augment from the USDA perspective,
the attractiveness of a new NBAF facility has to do with the
ability to conduct more research, to stay ahead of zoonotic
diseases. We are very constrained on space today, need the
additional work regardless of where that facility would be
located, to be able to handle more diseases. We are primarily
focused on FMD, almost exclusively on that today. There needs
to be the ability to respond very quickly in the event of
another foreign animal disease outbreak or to do basic applied
research on those particular things.
The second thing that is highly important for us is the
ability to have a state-of-the-art facility that we can go to
for diagnostics because the frontline work that we do as it
pertains to FMD or any foreign animal disease is when we have
an accredited veterinarian, has a suspicious animal, be able to
pull those samples and get that test run in a very quick manner
so that we can contain the outbreak of any disease, whether it
is a fast-acting disease like FMD or a low-acting disease like
bovine tuberculosis.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, if I may just add, I was so pleased
with the second panel, I don't think you were here for it, but
they indicated that in a terror world, and of course, before 9/
11, we thought the United States was an island. I mean, we may
have land borders on the north and the south but the blessings
of geographically we thought protected us. We now understand
that is not true. And so a comment that was made, and I think
we have to reflect on this, is no matter where the site is, if
a terrorist were to release FMD, it didn't come from the
facility but we then have to prove a negative, and I want to
share with the Committee how easy it is to transmit FMD, and
this does not have FMD in it, sir. But this handkerchief, if I
were in a country where there was an FMD-infected animal and I
put it under their nose and I put it in my pocket and I flew
across any of the oceans and I went up to a susceptible animal,
there is a very high probability that animal would now be
infected. That is how easy it is and that is why whenever we
come back to the United States on our declarations form, we
state have you been on a farm, ranch or pasture, and because of
the problems that have been well stated here in England, have
you been in close proximity such as touching or handling of
livestock? So the concerns that this committee have raised are
very valid and, candidly, sir, keep me up at night. Thank you.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question, please?
Mr. Stupak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. We have asked through the staff of both
departments that we have made available to us any studies of
costs of housing for employees at Plum Island or at any other
facility. Again, those studies have not been made available to
this committee. Do you have such studies? If so, where are
they? And what do they say and when will they be made available
to the Committee?
Mr. Cohen. Chairman, by the end of the day, you will have
whatever information I have. It comes from the Department of
Housing, obviously, because that is not my lane, and if that is
not satisfactory, I will see as part of our EIS that we have
definitive studies and we will make those available.
Mr. Dingell. Now, let me ask you--you work for the
Department, I gather. I sent a letter on September 20, 2007,
almost 1 year ago, requesting this kind of information. None
has made been available to the Committee. How am I to assume
that this committee you are making is any better than your
refusal to deliver the information requested on September 20?
Mr. Cohen. Well, Chairman, refusal is a very strong word. I
actually have a picture in my office of me standing next to the
cartons and cartons on pushcarts of the information that I have
gladly provided----
Mr. Dingell. Beloved friend----
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. To this committee.
Mr. Dingell [continuing]. Let me explain to you the volumes
of papers and the wonderful pictures that you might have of
them do not move me.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. It is whether you are delivering to us those
things which we are requesting.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. There is a substantial difference. I don't
want a lot of your waste paper. I want the answers to the
questions that the Committee asks you. You seem to have some
difficulty in understanding that. If I am being unclear, please
inform me so that we may be of greater assistance to you.
Mr. Cohen. Chairman, I don't believe there is anyone who
does not understand your clarity, sir, and I do.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
Just so the record is clear, there is no law indicating
there has to be an NBAF; is there?
Mr. Cohen. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
Mr. Stupak. And there is no law that says we cannot keep
Plum Island doing foot-and-mouth research on Plum Island but
make your NBAF anywhere else; is there?
Mr. Cohen. That is correct.
Mr. Stupak. In my opening statement, I said that the
Department of Homeland Security had estimated it would cost
approximately $450 million to build NBAF, and then I said the
Committee has learned that your engineers, DHS engineers, have
already raised that to between $600 and $750 million. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cohen. I don't know what their estimate is. I don't
know what the price of oil will be at the end of this hearing.
This is going to be an expensive facility. You heard Under
Secretary Knight talk about being world-class. This is one of
the reasons why in our solicitation we have asked States and
locals for offsets, incentives in kind and we are looking at if
we were to move off Plum Island to utilize the sale of that
land to save the taxpayers money to pay for the facility, but I
assure you that in the end, this facility will cost less than a
Navy destroyer.
Mr. Stupak. Well, that is not real reassuring. We are
familiar with the cost of a Navy destroyer. It is quite a bit
of money.
Let me ask you this. It seems like this process started
without giving a lot of thought to it. Wouldn't it have been
logical to say do we keep Plum Island or not,; do we renovate,
build new, then start looking on the mainland? It seems like
you starting looking to the mainland and then after objections
from committee and elsewhere, you went back to Plum Island,
throw that in the mix again. Did we sort of get off on the
wrong foot on this process?
Mr. Cohen. I can't address all of the history. I can tell
you that I was sworn in on the 10th of August 2006. That was a
memorable day. You may remember, that was the day the liquid
explosives plot with British Airways and no carry-ons and the
impact it had on the airlines. I do remember that on Friday, 11
August, the Congress contacted me bipartisan as to why I had
not solved the liquid explosives problem. Now, we have the 3-1-
1 rule, which is risk mitigation. It is not the solution. So on
day 2 of my tenure, I understood the responsibility I had to
the American public and to the Congress. That is the same
responsibility that I put in place for NBAF. On 10 August, I
had 12 States and 18 sites.
Mr. Stupak. That is fine, August 10, 11, 12. My question
didn't ask about any of that. My question was, don't you think
we should have made the decision about what we were going to do
with Plum Island before we move to the mainland? It appears
from where we sit and the work we have done on this, this is
our second hearing on biolabs and we are going to have more
hearings on biolabs, that DHS received money to do biolabs and
they didn't start making biolabs without cost-benefit analysis,
risk assessment, whether they are necessary. The more labs you
have and the more harmful materials you deal with, the more
chance of human error, which leads to more problems. It seems
like a bunch of money was given to DHS and they just started
spending money without knowing if it is even necessary, and
that is sort of what my question is being asked.
Mr. Cohen. Well, I think in the aftermath--and I think it
is a very good question, Chairman. I think in the aftermath of
9/11, both the Administration and the Congress--I was in the
Navy at the time but I watched this and I know going to New
York right after 9/11, speaking with the police and dealing
with Arlington police, there was a feeling that the major
threats to us were nuclear, whether that was a dirty bomb or
nuclear weapon, or biological, radiological. You know, right
after 9/11, we were delivering death by the U.S. mail, anthrax.
Now, while this facility won't look at anthrax, because it is
naturally occurring, the 9/11 Commission report said that we
suffered from a lack of imagination. I can tell you based on my
10 August story to you, sir, that while I am responsible, my
component will not suffer from a lack of imagination.
And so there is a focus on bio. What has issued from that
is the NBAC, which is at Fort Dietrich. We are going to
commission that this fall with the full support, bipartisan, of
the Congress and in cooperation with the FBI. This is a CSI-
like facility but it is a biological laboratory. If we had had
that, I believe, in operation on 9/11, we might very well know
who was responsible for the anthrax. We are also partnered with
the Department of Defense and others at Aberdeen for receipt
facility----
Mr. Stupak. What basis----
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. The third one----
Mr. Stupak. What basis do you say if we would have had
these labs available that we would have been able to trace the
source of the anthrax? What this committee has shown through
our hearings so far, and this is our second one, money was
given to DHS. You started building labs before anyone even
considers if it is necessary to build more labs, or can the
work be done at the current labs we have in this country?
Instead, we are building labs all over the place where the
experts are warning us, the more labs you build, the more
people handling it, whether it is the Ebola, whether it is
foot-and-mouth disease, the more problems you are going to
have.
Mr. Cohen. First of all, I don't have an unlimited number
of labs that I am building. I have just shared with you the
three laboratories----
Mr. Stupak. Well, I know at least four or five you have
built already, DHS has built, without even a benefit or if it
is even necessary. It seems like we are throwing money and
building labs and hoping the problems will come. It should be
the other way around. We should identify the problems and then
build the labs we need.
Mr. Cohen. I am only knowledgeable of the labs which I have
shared with you but I will tell you, as stated in the second
panel, there is great concern that these laboratories might be
terror targets, and for that reason, inherently governmental,
we have a responsibility not only to make them efficacious but
to make them secure, and that is why NBAC is on Fort Dietrich.
Mr. Stupak. And the second panel unanimously said to a
question I asked each one of them, they would rather not have
Department of Homeland Security deal with this. They would
rather have USDA deal with it because they feel they have more
expertise.
Mr. Cohen. And Chairman, I agree with them. I am the
tenant. I am the caretaker. I am the steward. Because the
reason I believe we created the Department of Homeland
Security, this incredible experiment in nuclear fusion of 22
very disparate agencies, was to eliminate or minimize seams. I
am very pleased to be the steward for my tenant, USDA, who does
the research at Plum Island. I think that has significant
advantages in a terror-enabled world.
Mr. Stupak. And it also under H.R. 1717 which expands your
authority in areas of agriculture. We think that, at least some
of us feel, Ag. should do it, not DHS.
Mr. Knight. And from the Department of Agriculture, if I
might add, we are very comfortable with the relationship that
has evolved since the authorities were provided in the creation
of DHS. This has worked very well with them as the landlord
taking care of many of those logistics. Adding the skills that
DHS brings to the table has freed up our USDA folks to focus on
the core research needs, especially on FMD.
Mr. Stupak. I am not arguing that. What we are arguing is,
shouldn't you have made the decision on Plum Island before you
started going to mainland and everything? It seems like we got
the cart before the horse, the disease before the animal,
whatever it is.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Knight, you were here for all the other panels. I
posed a question about the timeliness of information and the
exponential risks that could occur. Can you speak to that or--
am I right, or just kind of add to----
Mr. Knight. We have had some real-life experiences in the
last year that are worthy of consideration in this process.
About a year ago, we had a potential concern that we may have
had FMD at a packing facility. The hogs were found with lesions
on their face. It had all the signs, the visible signs of FMD.
We needed to extract samples, get those to a lab to be--for
diagnosis. We can only do that at Plum Island, and so we then
lost many hours in the effort it took to actually get those
physical samples to Plum Island. If I recall correctly, we had
fog at the airport, closure there. Then we had the logistics of
getting it over there. So there are some legitimate concerns
associated with that facility and its ability to get samples to
and bring out the results very quickly.
Mr. Shimkus. The new facility will not be operational until
at least 2015. What do you propose to do in the meantime to
ensure that America is protected from foreign animal diseases?
So that brings in a lot of options--renovate Plum Island, begin
preliminary research elsewhere, and then the follow-up question
is, why the immediate need for a new NBAF? Secretary Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. You know, terror doesn't take a
holiday and they don't want for our building schedule, and this
is why we have invested and are investing with the help of the
Congress, and I appreciate that very much, over $50 million in
Plum Island. We are doubling their capacity hopefully to get--
and Dr. Barrett may want to address this more--possibly
investigation for two efficacious vaccines and continue to
build the workforce that is so critically important because it
is about the people.
In terms of other diseases, we will have to look hard at
what BSL facilities exist, what authorities we have. As was
indicated earlier in the testimony, some of the BSL-4 that are
looking at smaller primates already exist at universities and
elsewhere. CDC, NIH, HHS, of course, are focused on those but
these would be responsibilities that we would pursue once we
had the NBAF.
Mr. Knight. From a USDA perspective, certainly the
potential of the disease risk is a constant. That is what keeps
all of us in the Administration up at night and worried about
that. Our first line of defense is generally border security,
the work that is done. USDA provides an underlying information
policy in support to Customs and Border Protection for that
first line of defense. Then if there is a potential outbreak,
we are building at USDA systems to be able to respond quickly,
a national animal ID system that has been highly controversial
but extremely important in being able to build the baseline to
be able to notify farmers and ranchers of a disease outbreak in
a very quick manner. We also work in capacity building with our
partners at the state level, the state veterinarians who are on
the front line of making decisions with us, putting barriers up
for movement of animals, each of those things. So we make that
investment on a daily basis, on a weekly basis. That will
continue to be there. That is one of the most important things
we need. We need NBAF so that we can anticipate what are the
next dangerous diseases out there that we need diagnostic tests
for, be able to develop those tests. We need NBAF to be able to
do the research for eradication of those diseases around the
globe, not just in the United States.
Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Barrett, do you want to add to this?
Dr. Barrett. Well, I was just wanting to make a comment
that this is going back to the question, is it safe to move
this to the mainland, and I would just like to say that there
is risk in any operation, but if you go to the GAO report and
you look at the listings of the 15 or so laboratories where
there has been release of FMD. They took that from the
Pirbright report and they left out one column. The column that
they left out was the column that identified that every one of
those releases except the top two that occurred in 1960 were
the result of the production of live virus vaccine for foot-
and-mouth disease. We don't even make live virus for foot-and-
mouth disease because of that. We don't make foot-and-mouth
disease vaccine in this country. So all of those were
associated with the production of foot-and-mouth disease
vaccine. In the new NBAF, we will not be producing foot-and-
mouth disease vaccine. In fact, there will be a small vaccine
capability in it, about 8 gallons, and that will be used for
basically new vaccines going into development and then our
scientists can test it there and then take them on into
production. So the danger in these labs and the reason you had
all these releases, because of making live virus vaccine with
foot-and-mouth. In the future, we are not going to do that. Our
new vaccine that we are producing right now and we are making
in the United States, if it escapes, it doesn't infect the cow;
it doesn't cause foot-and-mouth disease.
So I feel that you can move this safely to the mainland,
and the reason is it is just like Under Secretary Knight is
saying, this laboratory is part of this nation's emergency
response system. If you see cattle out on the field and they
have blisters on them, and as a veterinarian, you want to get
that tested, you have to send it to this lab. I was in
California working on the foot-and-mouth disease plan. I was at
a meeting and the USDA veterinarian was there, and I had also,
because I worked in public health, I was involved in developing
our bioterrorism response plans. We can diagnose smallpox in
California in 24 hours. In California, to get a diagnosis of
foot-and-mouth disease, you have to send it to Plum Island
across the country. We need to get the technology and the
diagnostics out to these States so they can test it, but right
now until we get that capability and that science, it exists at
Plum Island. Plum Island is a great facility. As the director,
I am proud to work there. My goal is to get a vaccine out and
protect the livestock of this country. At the same time, to
move this facility on the mainland provides a lot of protection
too.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. The same would be true no matter where it is.
There could be a hurricane in Texas or the Carolinas or
wherever we are going to put it, right?
Dr. Barrett. Yes, there are always things that you have to
take a risk. I mean, I basically took risk management off the
Air Force flight line, put it in a model for food security that
the FDA adopted and they use it for food security in this
Nation. I am very well aware of risk assessment.
Mr. Stupak. So there is a guarantee against 103 different,
90 percent being human errors.
Dr. Barrett. We had seven cross-contaminations in Plum
Island. Those cross-contaminations were within our primary
laboratory environment. That is a box in a box. To get out of
that facility, our researchers who work in there, to leave
that, they have to take a shower and they have to change their
clothes and they have to blow their nose. Our animal caretakers
get two showers a day and get to blow their nose twice.
Mr. Stupak. And that is no matter where they are located.
Dr. Barrett. Right, and one of the things I wanted to add
in of why I am so--about this issue earlier when I was giving
my testimony, when I go out and see my dad's cattle, they are
registered Herefords, and he tells me when he looks at those
cows, I have to listen to him tell me the mother that was 20
years ago that was that cow, and so if you go in and you kill
that herd off it is not coming back. You cannot--that is 50
years of genetic improvement. It is not coming back. We need to
move forward in this country and develop a vaccine that we can
effectively vaccinate our cattle to live with. Dr. Carpenter,
who was sitting in this chair today, pointed out that in his
paper, in his publication, he showed that if you vaccinate
cattle, you can reduce this by 98 percent an outbreak.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. That is why maybe we should leave it at
Plum Island and continue the good work we are doing there.
Dr. Barrett. I would love it to be at Plum Island. I just
want a vaccine.
Mr. Cohen. Chairman, if I may, I would just like to share
with the Committee that we resource Dr. Carpenter's research.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Pickering, questions?
Mr. Pickering. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Barrett, I just want to understand what you just said
just a little bit back in your answer. GAO raised the question
of outbreaks but in those cases, it dealt with the outbreaks
related to an FMD vaccine or doing the research. Is that
correct?
Dr. Barrett. Yes. What they left out, they left out one
column in that report. They took that from the Pirbright report
and they left out the one column. The column they left out was
the one that showed that the outbreaks were related to live
virus vaccine manufacturing release, which occurs. At
Pirbright, the release didn't occur from their laboratory. It
occurred from Merial, who was producing vaccine there because
it matched that strain, and if somebody takes and releases----
Mr. Pickering. Dr. Barrett, would you say the GAO leaving
that out or not understanding that and that distinctive
difference and the fact that whether at Plum Island or any of
the new sites, we are not going to be doing vaccines, that is
extremely significant in the GAO review?
Dr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Pickering. I think that is probably one of the most
significant things that we have heard today, that the hype of
the risk was really based on a misunderstanding of the causes
of outbreaks in other cases that has nothing to do with the new
NBAF, whether it is at Plum Island or another site.
Mr. Knight, you talked about working with veterinarians and
I know, Dr. Barrett, you are a veterinarian. The American
Veterinary Medical Association has come out, and I would think
that these are the most knowledgeable, the most involved, the
ones with the most practical experience, the ones working with
your father and building up his herd, and they are saying that
you can do this site safely on the mainland. Dr. Barrett, what
I hear from Mr. Cohen is that he is looking for the cost
effectiveness of doing the research so that we can get to the
vaccine that you hope for, and if we spend more money on
facilities than in research, we are delaying that day of
getting to the prize.
Dr. Barrett. And I would just like to add in that Dr. Ron
De Haven, he used to be the administrator for APHIS, now works
for AVMA. He is in charge of those programs that helped make
that decision.
Mr. Pickering. Well, thank you, and I think it is extremely
significant that GAO misunderstood and they increased their
assessment of risk based on not knowing what the research is
all about, and with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. That is fine. What GAO missed, I guess we
should let GAO speak for themselves on that one.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have known since I
arrived in Congress 12 years ago the desirability of serving on
the Commerce Committee, and it has been highlighted for me
today. I have missed something and probably too late in my time
in Congress to start over in building up my seniority, but I
understand the value of this committee and particularly this
Oversight Subcommittee, and again I express my appreciation to
you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to join you. I just had----
Mr. Stupak. Well, let me interrupt you one minute. Back to
Mr. Pickering's point, GAO report, page 13, they didn't leave
it out. They didn't miss it. Table 2 lists known and attributed
releases of FMD viruses from laboratories worldwide including
those that produce vaccines, so GAO did take it into
consideration. I knew that wasn't right.
Mr. Pickering. Would the chairman yield?
Mr. Stupak. You bet.
Mr. Pickering. Did they know that the new NBAF would not be
doing the vaccine?
Dr. Barrett. We told Dr. Sharma and the GAO that when they
visited us.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Stupak. Go ahead, Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will now recognize
that when I provide a compliment to you that you are not paying
any attention, so I will forego any compliments.
But I want to follow up, and in part it is in regard to
questions that you were raising that caused me to think about
this. Recently I had a member of my staff visit Plum Island to
get an understanding of what transpires there, how it operates,
and I hope to do that myself, but one of the things that my
staff member reported upon his return was that the workers, the
local folks that they visited with were unwilling or
uninterested in having the facility at Plum Island upgraded or
its abilities enhanced from the BSL-3 to BSL-4 and reported
that their Members of Congress would oppose that kind of
upgrade. Is that anything that is of the record or is that just
speculation? And I can understand perhaps where that comes from
with its location so close to New York City and Connecticut
that there obviously--maybe it is not obvious--that there could
be concern with that about increasing the nature of that
facility. Is that something that is an accurate assessment of
local sentiments and Members of Congress who represent that
sentiment?
Dr. Barrett. We had recently a community forum as part of
the NBAF process because Scott Russell, who is Southold Town
Supervisor, wanted us to have it to speak to the community.
When we spoke there, there were a lot of concerned citizens
about having it there, and Congressman Bishop, I visited with
him. He is concerned with his constituents having those
concerns. One of the things that we are doing at Plum Island is
we are having community day.
Mr. Stupak. But did you explain to them you don't need a
BSL-4 lab to foot-and-mouth disease, you only need a level 3
lab?
Dr. Barrett. That is a concern that the community has is
BSL-4.
Mr. Stupak. And you don't need 4 to do foot-and-mouth?
Dr. Barrett. No, we don't need 4 to do foot-and-mouth.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, that was in a sense my follow-up
question, which was that there is a consensus that we need a 4
laboratory. I mean, that is what this process is all about?
Dr. Barrett. We definitely need a biolevel-4 laboratory for
this, yes, we do. We do not have one in this country for
livestock.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Well, I thank both of you for sitting through
this day, and you are always welcome at the Committee, so
thanks.
Let me just ask one last question. Zoonotics, who is in
charge of that, DHS, HHS, CDC? Who is in charge?
Dr. Barrett. Two agencies, because zoonotic means
communicable from animals to people. CDC will take care of the
person. We take care of the animal side of it.
Mr. Stupak. By ``we'' do you mean USDA or DHS?
Dr. Barrett. Centers for Disease Control does the humans.
USDA does the animals.
Mr. Stupak. OK.
Dr. Barrett. But they have to work together as partners
because these diseases like avian influenza, West Nile, you
have to work together and use the animal model. And basically
zoonotic diseases, you prevent them by keeping it out of the
animals.
Mr. Stupak. Well, Secretary Cohen had mentioned it, so I
just wanted to make sure that was clear. I was a little
confused on that one. OK.
Any other questions? If not, I will thank and dismiss this
panel. Thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Cohen. And Chairman, we thank you for being part of
this process.
Mr. Stupak. It is a process that is going to go on a little
longer, I am afraid.
That concludes all questioning. I want to thank all of our
witnesses for coming today and for their testimony. I ask
unanimous consent that the hearing record will remain open for
30 days for additional questions for the record. Without
objection, the record will remain open.
I ask unanimous consent that contents of our document
binder be entered into the record. Without objection, the
documents will be entered in the record.
This concludes our hearing, and without objection, this
meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Statement of Hon. Gene Green
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on
moving the study of foot and mouth disease from Plum Island,
New York to the mainland US.
Food and mouth disease is the most contagious animal
infection. It can travel by the air, through saliva, and on a
person. It affects cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, pigs,
sheep, goats, and deer. Food and mouth disease is not usually
fatal, but it will cause severe weight loss, hoof deformation,
breeding problems, and diabetes.
When animals become infected with hoof and mouth disease,
the usual course of action to stop the inevitable spread of the
virus is to slaughter all of the animals in the infected area
because it is almost guaranteed that all animals in the area
will contract foot and mouth disease and it will spread at an
alarming rate.
For 60 years researchers have been studying food and mouth
disease at Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Everyone agrees
the facility is outdated and in need of updating.
The Department of Homeland Security proposed opening a new
National Bio and Agro Defense Facility (NBAF) on the mainland
US instead of updating the Plum Island facility.
Supporters of the move to the mainland cite increased costs
in shipping supplies to an island, updated technology to
contain the disease, and difficulty recruiting scientists to
work on Plum Island.
However, supporters of the Plum Island location cite the
water barrier as the only way to keep foot and mouth disease
safely contained.
The proposed NBAF would be the world's largest animal
disease research center and have a Biosafety Level 4 Lab.
Currently, 5 sites are being considered for the new NBAF lab
including one associated with UT in San Antonio.
I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today so
that we may gain a greater understanding of the risks and
benefits associated locating an NBAF lab on the mainland US.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
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