[House Hearing, 110 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] ------ REGULATORY FAILURE: MUST AMERICA LIVE WITH UNSAFE FOOD? ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ---------- MARCH 12, 2008 ---------- Serial No. 110-99 Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 00-000 WASHINGTON : 2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 energycommerce.house.gov REGULATORY FAILURE: MUST AMERICA LIVE WITH UNSAFE FOOD? For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RICK BOUCHER, Virginia EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey BART GORDON, Tennessee BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California BART STUPAK, Michigan ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland GENE GREEN, Texas DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado Vice Chairman LOIS CAPPS, California MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania JANE HARMAN, California TOM ALLEN, Maine JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois HILDA L. SOLIS, California CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas JAY INSLEE, Washington TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MIKE ROSS, Arkansas DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York JIM MATHESON, Utah G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana JOHN BARROW, Georgia BARON P. HILL, Indiana JOE BARTON, Texas Ranking Member RALPH M. HALL, Texas FRED UPTON, Michigan CLIFF STEARNS, Florida NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, Mississippi VITO FOSSELLA, New York STEVE BUYER, Indiana GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania MARY BONO, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon LEE TERRY, Nebraska MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey MIKE ROGERS, Michigan SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee_________________________________________________________________ Professional Staff Dennis B. Fitzgibbons, Chief of Staff Gregg A. Rothschild, Chief Counsel Sharon E. Davis, Chief Clerk David L. Cavicke, Minority Staff Director 7________________________________________________________________ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member Vice Chairman GREG WALDEN, Oregon HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey GENE GREEN, Texas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JAY INSLEE, Washington JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio) JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement.................................... 1 Prepared statement........................................... 3 Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, opening statement.................................... 5 Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement................................. 6 Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement....................................... 7 Prepared statement........................................... 8 Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, opening statement............................... 9 Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado, prepared statement................................ 10 Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, prepared statement...................................... 145 Witnesses Steve Mendell, president, Hallmark/Westland Meat Company......... 14 Prepared statement........................................... 15 Answers to submitted questions............................... 168 Danielle Lachman, divisional merchandise manager, Target Corporation.................................................... 69 Prepared statement........................................... 71 Daniel Wegman, chief executive officer, Wegmans Food Markets, Inc............................................................ 71 Prepared statement........................................... 75 Dennis G. Olson, Ph.D., professor, Iowa State University, College of Agriculture and Life Science, Department of Animal Science.. 83 Prepared statement........................................... 84 Stephan F. Sundlof, D.V.M., Ph.D., director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration..... 97 Prepared statement........................................... 100 Richard A. Raymond, M.D., under secretary for food safety, United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service........................................................ 117 Prepared statement........................................... 119 Submitted Material Westland/Hallmark Meat Company training documents, dated October 6 & November 12, 2007.......................................... 146 Accounts from Humane Society of the United States Investigator at Hallmark/Westland Meating Company.............................. 148 Food and Drug Administration, letter of April 17, 2008........... 149 Report, dated December 29, 2005, from United States Department of Agriculture on Westland/Hallmark Meat Company.................. 151 Westland/Hallmark Meat Company response...................... 152 FDA recall classification document............................... 155 ``FDA and Fresh Spinach Safety,'' report of March 2008, submitted by Hon. Henry A. Waxman........................................ 156 REGULATORY FAILURE: MUST AMERICA LIVE WITH UNSAFE FOOD? ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak (chairman) presiding. Members present: Representatives Stupak, DeGette, Melancon, Waxman, Green, Schakowsky, Dingell (ex officio), Shimkus, Whitfield, Walden, Burgess, and Barton (ex officio). Staff present: John Sopko, David Nelson, Kevin Barstow, Richard Wilfong, Scott Schloegel, Kyle Chapman, Krista Carpenter, and Alan Slobodin. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. Stupak. This meeting will come to order. Today we have a hearing entitled ``Regulatory Failure: Must America Live With Unsafe Food?'' Each Member will be recognized for an opening statement. I will begin. Since the 110th Congress began in January 2007, this subcommittee has been investigating the Food and Drug Administration's ability to protect Americans from unsafe food. This is the subcommittee's sixth hearing regarding the safety and security of the nation's food supply. While the previous five hearings have focused on a variety of topics including companies who have produced contaminated food, unsafe food imports, and the ability of the FDA and USDA to protect our Nation's food supply, today's hearing will focus on what steps the regulators have taken or need to take in order to ensure the safety of our food supply. Since our investigation began 14 months ago, there have been at least 163 recalls and health alerts associated with FDA-regulated products. Despite USDA's hefty budget and large inspection force, it too is not immune from problems. Since 2007, there have been at least 67 meat recalls totaling 180 million pounds of meat. There has also been an alarming jump in the number of recalls and illnesses associated with E. coli- contaminated meat. In 2007 alone, there were 20 recalls of meat products due to being tainted with the deadly pathogen E. coli. These recall efforts affected about 33 million pounds of meat. This compares with just 8 recalls and just over 155,000 pounds of meat in 2006 due to E. coli. These numbers alone indicate that there is a serious increasing problem with our food safety system. Still, there is even greater support for this assertion. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention now estimate that there are 76 million cases of food borne illnesses every year in the United States. These illnesses result in an estimated 5,000 deaths and 325,000 hospitalizations. It is clear that our food safety system is broken. We must address this stark reality and remedy this dire situation. The subcommittee has had the unfortunate experience of watching firms that have sold contaminated food falsely assure the American public that the safety problems have been solved only to learn that yet another outbreak or recall has occurred within a few months. Cargill and Dole both are repeat offenders and ConAgra has had three recalls this past year. On Monday the newly reopened Castleberry plant, whose parent company witness testified 2 weeks ago that Castleberry had learned its lesson from the botulism contamination, but on Monday they were shut down by FDA and USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service again. This shut-down was due to processing violations that could lead to pathogen contamination. Today we will hear from the company responsible for perhaps the most notorious recall over the past year. Steven Mendell, the President of Westland/Hallmark Meat Company, will testify regarding his company's recall of more than 143 million pounds of raw and frozen beef products. This was the largest meat recall in the history of the United States. The most troubling aspect of this recall is that approximately 50 million pounds of the beef were sold to the National School Lunch Program and other Federal nutritional programs for the poor and elderly. Thankfully, to date there have been no reported illnesses associated with this meat. Mr. Mendell was invited to testify at the subcommittee's previous food safety hearing on February 26 regarding the circumstances surrounding his company's recall. Despite extensive efforts by committee staff to reach out to Mr. Mendell, he avoided contact with the committee staff and chose not to appear at the February 26 hearing. Because of Mr. Mendell's unwillingness to appear voluntarily, the subcommittee was forced to issue a subpoena to comply Mr. Mendell's testimony here today. We look forward to finally hearing from him. Throughout our prior five food safety hearings, one thing has been evident. There are increasing concerns about the safety of the nation's food supply and it is necessary to utilize more technology to make our food supply safer. Due to the interest raised by our last hearing, today we will explore one such technology: food irradiation. Food irradiation is a technology which destroys organisms that cause foodborne illnesses. Proponents of food irradiation believe it is a safe and effective technology that can guarantee the safety of food. Some claim irradiation is the only sensible kill step for leafy greens and meats. Others, such as the president of Dole, claimed last month that it was not workable and harmed fresh produce. Today, we will hear testimony from Dr. Dennis Olson, a Professor of Animal Science at Iowa State University and an expert on the use of food irradiation. Dr. Olson will testify regarding the potential benefits of irradiation. We will also hear from Mr. Daniel Wegman, the CEO of Wegmans Food Markets. As a CEO of a supermarket chain that sells irradiated meat, Mr. Wegman will discuss why his company chooses to offer irradiated products to its consumers. While food irradiation will be the only technology discussed at this hearing, the committee is also exploring other food safety technologies. We hope to examine these as our food safety investigation continues. We will also hear today from Target Corporation. In November, Target sent a formal letter to USDA requesting approval for a label that would alert consumers that certain meat products Target sells are packaged in an atmosphere containing carbon monoxide. Amazingly, USDA did not approve the label. I look forward to hearing why USDA would not approve such a label, and I look forward to hearing what other efforts Target Corporation has made to inform their consumers of the carbon monoxide packaged meat they sell. Finally, we will hear from two primary regulators of our food supply, the FDA and the USDA. Dr. Stephen Sundlof, the Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at FDA, and Dr. Richard Raymond, the Under Secretary for Food Safety at USDA, are here. Each will testify about the steps their agencies have taken or need to take to ensure the safety of our nation's food supply. As I stated previously, today's hearing is our sixth hearing regarding the safety and security of our nation's food supply, and it probably will not be our last. The American public can be assured that we will continue to hold as many hearings as necessary to fix our country's broken food safety system. When we have companies, government agencies, or individuals before this committee, we expect them to follow through on the promises they make. We will do follow-up and we will bring them back before the committee to account for any failures on the promises they made to us and the American people. That concludes my opening statement. [The prepared statement of Hon. Bart Stupak follows:] Statement of Hon. Bart Stupak Since the 110th Congress began in January 2007, this subcommittee has been investigating the Food and Drug Administration's ability to protect Americans from unsafe food. This is the Subcommittee's sixth hearing regarding the Safety and Security of the Nation's food supply. While the previous five hearings have focused on a variety of topics including companies who have produced contaminated food, unsafe food imports, and the ability of the FDA and USDA to protect our Nation's food supply, today's hearing will focus on what steps the regulators have taken or need to take in order to ensure the safety of our food supply. Since our investigation began 14 months ago, there have been at least 163 recalls and health alerts associated with FDA-regulated products. Despite USDA's hefty budget and large inspection force, it too is not immune from problems. Since 2007, there have been at least 67 meat recalls totaling approximately 180 million pounds of meat. There has also been an alarming jump in the number of recalls and illnesses associated with E. coli-contaminated meat. In 2007 alone, there were 20 recalls of meat products due to being tainted with this deadly pathogen e-coli. These recalls affected about 33 million pounds of meat. This compares with just eight recalls and just over 155,000 pounds of meat in 2006 due to E. coli contamination. These numbers alone indicate that there is a serious problem with our food safety system. Still, there is even greater support to this assertion. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention now estimate that there are 76 million cases of food borne illness every year in the United States. These illnesses result in an estimated 5,000 deaths and 325,000 hospitalizations. It is clear that our food safety system is broken. We must address this stark reality and remedy this dire situation. The Subcommittee has had the unfortunate experience of watching firms that have sold contaminated food falsely assure the American public that the safety problems have been solved only to learn that yet another outbreak or recall has occurred within a few months. Cargill and Dole both are repeat offenders and ConAgra has had three recalls in the past year. On Monday the newly re-opened Castleberry plant--whose parent company witness testified 2 weeks ago that Castleberry had learned its lesson from the botulism contamination--was shut down by FDA and USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service again. This shut down was due to processing violations that could lead to pathogen contamination. Today, we will hear from the company responsible for perhaps the most notorious recall over the past year. Steven Mendell, the President of Westland/Hallmark Meat Company, will testify regarding his company's recall of more than 143 million pounds of raw and frozen beef products. This was the largest meat recall in the history of the United States. The most troubling aspect of this recall is that approximately 50 million pounds of the beef were sold to the National School Lunch Program and other Federal nutritional programs for the poor and elderly. Thankfully, to date, there have been no reported illnesses associated with this meat. Mr. Mendell was invited to testify at the Subcommittee's previous food safety hearing on February 26, 2008, regarding the circumstances surrounding his company's recall. Despite extensive efforts by Committee staff to reach out to Mr. Mendell, he avoided contact with Committee staff and chose not to appear at the February 26th hearing. Because of Mr. Mendell's unwillingness to appear voluntarily, the Subcommittee was forced to issue a subpoena to compel Mr. Mendell's testimony here today. We look forward to finally hearing from him. Throughout our prior five food safety hearings, one thing has become evident: there are increasing concerns about the safety of the Nation's food supply and it is necessary to utilize more technology to make our food supply safer. Due to the interest raised by our last hearing, today, we will explore one such technology--food irradiation. Food irradiation is a technology which destroys organisms that cause foodborne illness. Proponents of food irradiation believe it is a safe and effective technology that can guarantee the safety of food. Some claim irradiation is the only sensible ``kill step'' for leafy greens and meats. Others, such as the President of Dole, claimed last month that it was not workable and harmed fresh produce. Today, we will hear testimony from Dr. Dennis Olson, a Professor of Animal Science at Iowa State University and an expert on the use of food irradiation. Dr. Olson will testify regarding the potential benefits of irradiation. We will also hear from Mr. Daniel Wegman, the CEO of Wegmans Food Markets. As a CEO of a supermarket chain that sells irradiated meat, Mr. Wegman will discuss why his company chooses to offer irradiated products to its customers. While food irradiation will be the only technology discussed at this hearing, the Committee is also exploring other food safety technologies. We hope to examine these as our food safety investigation continues. We will also hear testimony today from Target Corporation. In November, Target sent a formal letter to USDA requesting approval for a label that would alert consumers that certain meat products Target sells are packaged in an atmosphere containing carbon monoxide. Amazingly, USDA did not approve the label. I look forward to hearing why USDA would not approve such a label and I look forward to hearing what other efforts Target Corporation has made to inform their customers of the carbon monoxide packaged meat they sell. Finally, we will hear from the two primary regulators of our food supply, the FDA and USDA. Dr. Stephen Sundlof, the Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at FDA, and Dr. Richard Raymond, the Under Secretary for Food Safety at USDA, are here. Each will testify about the steps their agencies have taken or need to take to ensure the safety of this Nation's food supply. As I stated previously, today's hearing is our sixth hearing regarding the Safety and Security of our Nation's food supply, and it probably will not be our last. The American public can be assured that we will continue hold as many hearings as necessary to fix our country's broken food safety system. When we have companies, government agencies, or individuals before the Committee, we expect them to follow through on the promises they make. We will do follow-up and we will bring them back before the Committee to account for any failures on the promises they made to the American people. ---------- Mr. Stupak. I would now like to turn to my friend, Ranking Member Mr. John Shimkus, for an opening statement. I would just caution everyone, it looks like we are going to have a vote here pretty quick, and we expect a number of procedural votes on the floor today. Tempers flare a little bit. It got a little late last night, and so I think we might be back and forth which disrupts our hearing, but I appreciate everyone's patience and we will try to get back and forth forthwith. There is also another hearing going on in the Energy and Commerce Committee. Mr. Shimkus, opening statement, sir? OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing. I believe that this hearing will serve two purposes. First, this hearing follows up on the hearing we held on February 26, and includes some key witnesses, including representatives from USDA and FDA not present at the earlier hearing. Second, this hearing highlights issues arising from the largest beef recall in U.S. history and focuses on advances in food technology, in particular the use of irradiation, and how this kill step could be added in food processing systems to increase the safety of our food supply. Of course, I am eager to hear testimony from Mr. Mendell, the CEO of Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company, and I hope that he can answer the questions we all have concerning the illegal and dangerous practices committed at his plant that we witnessed at the last hearing. On the same note, I am also eager to hear from Dr. Raymond, the Director of FSIS at the USDA and hope that he can answer questions concerning the conduct, responsibilities, and actions of USDA inspectors present at the plant as well as those stationed at other meat processing facilities across America. At some point during this year of food safety investigations, committee staff began to believe that the food safety model proposed may serve as an archetype for FDA. However, with over 60 meat recalls last year and with increase in reports of E. coli in meat, committee staffers are beginning to question whether or not the inspector based food safety model works as well as previously thought. The bottom line is, does having an inspector present at every meat processing plant actually decrease the likelihood of the presence of this pathogens in a finished product? If the inspectors cannot see the pathogens, what good does the physical inspection of that product do? Would the inclusion of a kill step like irradiation and more end product testing be a better use of our limited resources? These are the kinds of questions that these recent recalls and outbreaks raise, and we want to try to get some answers today. I look forward to hearing from Dr. Olson and Mr. Wegman about the advances in irradiation and the effective use of this technology. Former committee chairman Bliley requested that GAO complete a report on the beneficial use of irradiation on food products which was published in 2000. The report concluded that scientific studies conducted by public and private researchers worldwide over the past 50 years support the benefits of food irradiation while indicating minimal potential risk. However, when the report was published consumer acceptance of irradiation food products was extremely low. I look forward to Mr. Wegman describing his experience with consumer acceptances of irradiation food process. If consumer acceptance remains low but the science behind irradiation confirms that it kills these dangerous pathogens and increases the safety of our food, I want to know what can be done to improve consumer acceptance of this technology and what role, if any, FDA or USDA has to help convey that message. Lastly, Dr. Sundlof, the FDA Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, is here to answer some pending regulatory questions surrounding numerous aspects of food safety including the issuance of voluntary guidelines on leafy greens to private industry. The FDA's response to botulism scares at the Castleberry and New Era plants and discrepancies in the microbial testing results at the ConAgra plant in Sylvester, Georgia, and the ongoing concerns over imported seafood. Today is about getting answers for the American people. I thank our witnesses for coming, and I look forward to discussing this vital policy issues. I tried to go fast, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Stupak. You did, and I appreciate that. Mr. Dingell for an opening statement, please. We still have plenty of time, 10 minutes, on the floor yet. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN Mr. Dingell. Thank you. I commend you for holding today's hearing, and for your leadership in the committee's efforts to protect our Nation's food supply. You have been providing superb leadership in this matter and the Nation owes you great gratitude. Those who heard the testimony at our first food safety hearing of the parents of children who became sick or seriously injured from contaminated food understand how important these efforts are. So what have we learned from our work so far? First of all, CEOs of major food companies testified they will do better but we only find that they have not. Second, food and drug employees and our own staff investigators tell us that the FDA has little or no control over the quality of the food entering the United States because the agency is understaffed, underfunded, and lacks the technological capabilities that are necessary to address its problems. The FDA rewards headquarters bureaucrats with bonuses, scandalously so, while they systematically starve their field inspection and laboratory forces. The new FDA food czar, its enforcement chief, and the commissioner tell us that FDA can do more with less, a patently false claim that I have heard for 30 years, and very frankly I want to tell you this is probably one of the finest fairy tales I have heard, and I have been told it every day that I have talked to the heads of FDA and it is always proven to be false and probably deceitful and possibly actively so. FDA promises new technologies, yet they have delayed the deployment of irradiation, a technology that some experts say promises truly effective cure mechanisms for the pathogens that contaminate our food. Today we will have a chance to question those same regulators who are responsible for the safety of American foods. We will expect straight answers about what they intend to do and how they intend to halt the illness and economic waste associated with 168 recalls that have occurred since we began the inquiry last year. We might also inquire how many more recalls should have occurred that did in fact not occur. I am particularly pleased that Mr. Mendell of Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing is appearing before us today. I hope that he has learned that this committee has an adage of some age that it is important that our witnesses understand there is an easy way and there is a hard way to answer our questions and cooperate with the committee. Either way this committee has and will find out the truth, and the truth today that we want to know is how much money he made from illegally slaughtering so-called downer cows--cows so sick or injured that they could not walk or stand, cows universally viewed as potentially dangerous carriers of mad cow disease, and how he participated in a program which denied safety to the American public with regard to their food supply. The good news, however, is that no mad cow disease has yet been found, although the incubation period for this disease might be up to 20 years or longer for humans. Nevertheless, Mr. Mendell's firm has cost school districts and other companies greatly in replacing meat that was recalled. I am curious what Mr. Raymond of the U.S. Department of Agriculture is going to tell us that his inspectors were doing in the California plant while the downer cows were forced into the kill boxes. He must also tell us why he refuses to allow a major retail operator the right to tell his consumers how their meat is prepared and how their meat is preserved or treated. I am equally curious to hear how Mr. Sundlof of FDA will explain what he intends to do about the Office of Pre-Market Approval. This body appears to have botched the generally recognized safe, or GRS, applications for carbon monoxide packaging for meat and fish, yet the records are all mysteriously lost of how their meat review after the committee began its inquiries, and we will ask for the production of those papers. In closing, I want to remind colleagues that at our first hearing we heard the dramatic testimony of a mother of a 2-year-old who needed a kidney transplant because the spinach that the child ate was contaminated with E. coli. At our last hearing, Mr. Sundlof's predecessor told us that the mandatory regulations he prepared were ignored by Health and Human Services in the confusing surrounding melamine imports. I am curious to hear what Mr. Sundlof has done to resurrect these regulations that could protect other children from similar fate. I also will want to know what his resources are and what the agency intends to do to both get the resources and to reform its practices to protect the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. Mr. Barton for an opening statement, please. We still have time before we run to the floor to vote. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Stupak and Chairman Dingell, for holding this hearing on the food safety. I am very appreciative of what you are trying to do. There is no daylight between the Republicans and the Democrats on the issue of food safety for the American people. Americans have the right to know which people are raising their food, harvesting their food, processing it, packaging it, delivering it, selling it, and inspecting it. We are committed, we on the Republican side, to working on a bipartisan basis. Once we have completed our investigation there are legislative things that need to be done we will work on a bipartisan basis to enact new legislation in this area. Today we have several witnesses here that we are anxious to hear from. I especially want to hear from Dr. Raymond at the United States Department of Agriculture. I think there should be some questions asked about what the role of the inspectors for the USDA were at Hallmark/Westland, and why they apparently weren't able to catch what was going on before the famous videotape was released. I also would like to hear a little bit more about what a witness at our last hearing called an ``up- tick'' on the presence of E. coli in the meat and the resulting increase in the number of the recalls. I would also like to hear from Dr. Raymond explaining the process that the USDA goes through when deciding whether to initiate a recall or not and how it affects the consumers and the businesses as well as the customers involved. So I think we have a good witness list, and we are ready to participate as soon as we finish with the important work on the floor. There is also a hearing going on in the committee upstairs of Energy and Air Quality on Pipeline Safety so some of us will be going back and forth. Thank you, Mr. Stupak, and welcome our witnesses. We are ready to go to work. [The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:] Statement of Hon. Joe Barton Thank you, Chairman Stupak. Let me note at the outset that the Committee's oversight of food safety and its efforts to gather new information about problems and solutions are a valuable application of our jurisdiction, and I strongly support this mission. Americans have to know that the people who raise, harvest, process, package, deliver, sell and inspect what we eat are actually protecting the public from being sickened and killed by our food. As these hearings unfold, I'm committed to working with you and writing bipartisan legislation to ensure that buying and consuming food in this country is a safe process. There should be no daylight between Republicans and Democrats on this. Today we have the right witnesses here to answer some of the questions raised at our last food-safety hearing. I am particularly anxious to hear the testimony of Dr. Raymond from the USDA. I hope that he is prepared to explain what his inspectors at the Hallmark Westland Meat Plant were doing and whether those questionable actions are prevalent in other USDA-inspected meat processing facilities. I certainly hope the answer is no. I also hope that he can help us identify the source of what a witness at the last hearing called an ``uptick'' in the presence of e-coli in meat and the resulting increase in number of meat recalls. Lastly I hope that Dr. Raymond can explain the USDA recall process and how it affects both the consumer and the businesses involved. Several witnesses at the last hearing indicated that the latest recall of 143 million pounds of meat may have been an over-reaction and a misuse of USDA resources. I want to know if that assessment is valid. Secondly, I am anxious to hear from the witnesses on the second panel concerning their knowledge and use of irradiation on food products, including meat and produce. The inclusion of irradiation to eliminate the contamination of food is one that has been widely endorsed for years. In fact, the former Chairman of this Committee, Mr. Bliley, requested that GAO complete a report on the benefits and risk of irradiation which was published in 2000. The report concluded that a half-century's worth of research conducted by government and private scientists worldwide recognize and support the benefits of food irradiation and indicate that any potential risk is marginal. Back in 2000, the report noted that the major purchasers of irradiated foods were health care and food service establishments, which purchased them specifically to reduce the threat of food-borne illness. But, concerns on the part of food processors, retailers, and others about consumer acceptance of irradiated foods have limited their availability to date. We all know how easy it is for activists to sow fear, but real people are getting sick from bad food and the politics of fear won't make them well again. I think it's finally time to tell the public what we know about a food-processing technique that will keep them from getting sick. Back in 2000, FDA officials, including the Director of the Division of Product Policy, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, generally agreed with the findings presented in the GAO report. The question I have for Dr. Sundlof, the new Director of CFSAN, is what is the status of the recommended or mandatory use of irradiation by FDA? What is the FDA's official stance on this technology? If already FDA approved, then why aren't more processors using this technology? Lastly, I look forward to hearing the testimony of all our witnesses and in making progress on securing the safety of our food supply. Thank you Chairman. ---------- Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Barton, and a good job on Washington Journal today. Mr. Barton. Yes, I said some nice things about you so I hope you remember that. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Waxman, we still have some time if you want to get yours in. I am not sure if we are going to have one or two votes but why don't you start, and I think we have most of the openings done. When we come back, we will be able to move right in to testimony. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased you are holding these series of hearings on food safety. It is so important. The American people assume it is a given that when they sit down to eat, the food is going to be safe. But we are hearing reports every single day about another contaminated meat or produce item, and the public is getting very, very anxious about it. I was pleased that Mr. Barton talked about doing something on a bipartisan basis. I hope he will work with us to accomplish the goal of assuring the American people that food is safe. I want to focus on one issue. Several years ago there was a story about E. coli in spinach and that raised a lot of concerns. Representative DeLauro and I decided to do an evaluation of what was going on with the produce, and today we are issuing our report. The investigation reveals, I fear, a system that is incapable of preventing another outbreak in fresh produce. The findings of the report are stark. FDA is supposed to inspect every year. Instead they go every couple of years. When they find problems, and they are common, they don't make sure that the problems are corrected. Over 6 years of records we reviewed, FDA did not take a single meaningful enforcement action, not a single warning letter, seizure or injunction. We looked at this company called Natural Selections. That was the firm implicated in the 2006 outbreak of E. coli in spinach. FDA inspectors found multiple problems with that company and still no enforcement actions. Shockingly, the FDA currently has no real authority to require firms to grant the agency access to records, so they can't get the records, they don't go for the inspections, they don't find out what is happening, and then lo and behold, we get an outbreak of problems. This investigation revealed these serious problems with the FDA's system for protecting fresh produce. Some of this is because of lack of resources. Some of it is because of lack of authority at the FDA. And I must say I have been dismayed at the Bush Administration's failure to demand additional resources and to revamp the FDA itself to make sure they do a better job. I commend you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to this committee working on a bipartisan basis because we owe it to the American people to assure them with confidence that their food is safe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. That appears to be the end of the opening statements. We are going to recess for 15, 20 minutes. We are not sure if we have one or two votes. We will be back right after votes. We stand in recess. [Recess.] Mr. Stupak. The committee will come to order. I am sorry about the votes. It is going to be a disruptive day on the floor and 1 vote turned into about 4. The ranking member and I, Mr. Shimkus and I, have agreed that if they do any more of these votes where it is just to adjourn and no other votes, we are not going to go back. We want to get this hearing in. We are just going to stay and march through here. Before we left, I know Mr. Waxman wanted to submit this. I am going to ask unanimous consent to submit for the record Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff report March, 2008, FDA and the Fresh Spinach Safety, prepared by Mr. Waxman. Without objection be made part of his opening statement. Ms. DeGette, opening statement, if you would, please. [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent to put my full opening statement in the record. And I would just note that I am happy that our witnesses are here with us today. I am eager to hear an explanation of what happened in this situation on the heels of the hearing a couple of weeks ago. And in particular a couple of issues that I am interested in hearing about is how we can set up a system of traceability, which is a law I have been sponsoring for some years, and also if a mandatory recall system would help either get the product back or preferably to deter conduct like this. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit and I yield back. [The prepared statement of Hon. Diana DeGette follows:] Statement of Hon. Diana DeGette Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to applaud you for holding this hearing today, and for the comprehensive investigation into food safety throughout your tenure as Chair of this subcommittee. Nothing is more important than the safety of our food. Today we continue our efforts to see what the private sector can do to help ensure that the food we put on our tables each day is as safe as it can possibly be. I think we all understand that restoring the confidence of the American consumer is simply not something the government can do alone. Two weeks ago we heard from the CEOs of some of the largest food processors in the country, some of whom were involved in outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. Many of us were dismayed that these CEOs, as they often do, came before us and simply apologized for the outbreaks. But our intent on this committee is not to receive apologies but to find out exactly what happened, why it happened, and what is being done to make sure it doesn't happen again. Several witnesses updated us on their plans to improve their internal processes for this or that product. But that's not good enough. Some of these companies have cleaned up the mess and implemented best practices following a recall, only to have yet another outbreak in a completely different product line a few months later. And then another, and then another. Ladies and gentlemen what we need on food safety is dramatic overhaul, not tinkering around the edges, in both the public and private sector. But while the testimony of these CEOs was far from adequate, I do want to applaud them for testifying in the first place. Our witness today has not been as cooperative. One of the fundamental roles of Congress is to conduct oversight. That oversight hinges on the ability to gather information on behalf of the American people, shine light on problems, and if necessary develop policy-based solutions. But, we cannot perform this function when information is being withheld. Mr. Mendell, you were contacted by this committee on numerous occasions to request that you appear before us. Just last month, your company was involved in the biggest meat recall in the history of this nation, after shocking undercover video footage at your plant was released. Your company acted responsibly and ordered a recall, but that is not the end of the story. The American people have the right to know what happened. As you know, this committee has been looking into cracks in the food safety system for quite some time now. I would think that the biggest recall in history is something that we should investigate further. But when this committee tried to invite you to testify, we did not hear back. In fact after 15 phone calls, we did not get a response from you, your counsel, or your company. We were forced to issue a subpoena to compel your testimony this morning. I hope you will be more cooperative with us today so we can get to the bottom of this. One of the things I hope you are forthcoming about is your company's system of tracing the meat products you sold. We have all heard the media reports that some of the recalled meat was sent to schools around the country, including to Jefferson County Schools near my district in Colorado. There are also reports that meat was sent to large wholesalers and retailers, who presumably distribute across the country. The fact is, we can never really know where all of the meat was sent because there is no effective traceability system in place in the United States. For years I have introduced legislation, H.R. 3485, to set up a system to trace food products from the farm to the fork. Right now there is no quick, reliable way to find out where food was produced and to where it has been sent. In the event of an outbreak of illness, or in this case, the introduction of sick cattle into the food supply, a traceability system would allow us to quickly identify the source, inform businesses along the supply chain, cease distribution of other tainted products, and notify potential consumers and business owners who may have this food in their homes, restaurants, and on their store shelves. Some companies already have an effective tracing system; indeed advances in technology make it achievable and cost effective nationwide. In addition to traceback, I'd like to ask the USDA and FDA about another piece of legislation I've sponsored, that would give them each the ability to recall tainted food, an authority they lack right now. In this case, it seems that Westland/Hallmark issued a recall immediately upon seeing the video we witnessed today, showing irrefutable and sickening evidence of its employees not only mistreating sick animals, but putting them into the nation's food supply. Would a voluntary recall have occurred without such convincing evidence? I think the government should have the authority to act in the case that a company does not act quickly enough. Obviously we should focus our efforts on preventing contamination in the first place, but we also need to have better procedures in place to deal with an outbreak, especially with regards to recalling and tracing food products. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ---------- Mr. Stupak. Thank you. That concludes the statements by members of the subcommittee. I will call our first witness to come forward. On our first panel is Mr. Steve Mendell, President of Hallmark/Westland Meat Company. It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised, sir, that you have the right under the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during the testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? Mr. Mendell, do you wish to be represented by counsel? OK. We are going to ask you to turn it on, and we recognize our former colleague Asa Hutchinson may be assisting you in this testimony, is that correct? Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Stupak. Let the record reflect that the witness replied in the affirmative. Mr. Mendell is now under oath. Before we begin, one of the reasons why we are here is this video that was played, so before we hear from our witness I would like to show a brief video that was produced by the Humane Society as part of their undercover investigation of the Hallmark/Westland Corporation's slaughtering house operation. We invited you, Mr. Mendell, to appear at our last hearing but for some reason you declined to appear. At our last hearing we showed this video, which is the basis for many of the members' questions, and I want to be sure you have had a chance to see it so you can accurately reflect upon our questions. Following the video, we will hear your opening statement. Before we run the video, as I did last time, I want to caution viewers it is quite graphic. Kyle, would you run the video for us, please? [Video.] Mr. Stupak. OK. We will now hear a 5-minute opening statement from Mr. Mendell. Mr. Mendell, you may submit a longer statement for the record, and please begin, sir. STATEMENT OF STEVE MENDELL, PRESIDENT, HALLMARK/WESTLAND MEAT COMPANY Mr. Mendell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you stated, I am the President of Hallmark/Westland Meat Company. The company is in the business of harvesting and processing beef under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Until a few weeks ago, my company was viewed as having an excellent record in the areas of humane handling and food safety. We took pride in this record. In early February, I was contacted by a Washington Post reporter. The reporter sent me an excerpt of the video taken by the Humane Society. I was shocked, I was horrified, and I was sickened. I agreed that the actions shown in the video were inhumane and completely reprehensible. The actions were a blatant violation of the company policies and procedures. These policies and procedures were not just documents but were implemented through training and regular compliance audits. The company has always been committed to best practices when it comes to humane handling and food safety. In 2007, the company passed 17 outside audits and twelve additional internal audits. The company has been regularly audited by the Audit, Review and Compliance Branch of USDA. The company has also been regularly audited by Silliker, as well as other independent third-party auditors. I ask that these reports be made part of the record. Mr. Stupak. I won't accept them right now but we will ask some questions when you are done, and then maybe they can be part of it, but please continue with your statement. Mr. Mendell. The company received the highest scores in the areas of humane handling and food safety. From the video I saw, two employees blatantly violated those policies and procedures. Our company has a zero tolerance policy for inhumane treatment. The video was apparently taken in October or November of '07. Had I known about the employees' actions sooner, I would have terminated the employees on the spot. I want to emphasize though the activities shown on the video that I saw are not food safety issues. The cows shown in the video could not walk, were designated to be euthanized and were not put into commerce. There is a question about the last cow I saw on that tape because I had not seen that tape. These cows would not have passed USDA inspection to enter the processing line. I also want to emphasize that it would be financial suicide for a company to harvest or process a cow that it believes to be sick. Generally, the company does not pay suppliers for the cost of a cow deemed unfit for human consumption. Therefore, there are no financial incentives to bypass regulations. It is for this reason that the company would have no interest in processing a non-ambulatory cow. In audit after audit, the USDA, and other outside auditors, and our internal audits found negative test results for the presence of E. coli 157 and salmonella. The audits also reported that the company with complying with humane handling laws and company policies. In February, my management team and I examined what steps we could take to ensure that no inhumane handling occurred. We reviewed our policies which are in accordance with the guidelines of Dr. Temple Grandin, a world-renowned expert in humane handling practices. We confirmed that the two fired employees, as well as the Humane Society employee, had participated in extensive training and retraining. We hired Dr. Erica Voogood to ensure that we had best practices. We hired all new pen employees and a new pen manager. We installed 17 cameras that would videotape unloading, pens and chutes areas so we could monitor compliance with humane handling practices. We were taking all the steps we could to ensure for USDA, our customers, and the public that the inhumane handling shown in the video would never recur. I then received a call from USDA indicating that they had a second video--that they had received a second video, a video which I asked to see, which was not provided and which I have never seen. At the urging of the USDA, however, our company voluntarily recalled all products containing any trace amounts of beef harvested by our company for the last 2 years. Our company is now the subject of the largest meat recall in U.S. history. To my knowledge, the USDA has not asserted that there is any evidence of contaminated food or any evidence of any illness. I am not aware that there has ever been--that there has ever before been a meat recall of this magnitude where there was no evidence of contaminated food and no evidence of any illness. Our company is ruined. We cannot continue. Approximately 220 employees have lost their jobs. The financial impact affects just not our company but many others. Because our company supplies beef that is commingled with other products and put into commerce, the financial impact of the two employee's actions and the recall is devastating. The conduct appearing in the video that I saw is sickening. That is not the company I know. I agree with everyone who is shocked and horrified at the video. I know that this committee was upset I did not appear before you earlier in response to the invitation sent a few weeks ago. I sincerely apologize for that. It had been a chaotic time for me, my company, and my family. I know that this committee deserves the respect of witnesses, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Mendell follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.025 Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Mendell. You have two reports you wanted to put in, and I objected. I just want to clarify a couple things. On the first report, the audit report from Silliker, the concern I have is the report dated November 21, 2007, the small print, fourth paragraph says the name of Silliker or its affiliates or any of its employees may not be used in conjunction with any marketing or promotion or in any publication concerning or relating to the client or its products and services without the prior written consent of Silliker. Do you have the prior written consent of Silliker to submit this? Mr. Mendell. I don't. Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, could you yield on that for a second, and maybe counsel can help us too on both sides. It is my understanding that you actually own this report. You paid for it. So I am not sure that application would apply to your ability to--it is a service rendered. It is not marketing. It is not---- Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, if I might, the disclaimer on the front says the report is furnished solely for the benefit of the above-named client in connection with the auditing services so it would be our view that this was an audit in the regular course of business that we paid for and it would be relevant to the committee's consideration when appropriate. Mr. Stupak. OK. So upon your advice you are having your client then submit this report? Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. Mr. Stupak. Despite the disclaimer, we don't have written notification? OK. I am just trying to protect the integrity of everybody here. OK. And then on the--I guess the other one doesn't have that disclaimer, just some general--would you take same advice that your client paid for it, it is his report, therefore, it would be appropriate to submit it for the record, Mr. Hutchinson? Mr. Hutchinson. Which one are you referring to? Mr. Stupak. The one dated, let me get the exact date, HACCP Consulting Group from Fairfax, Virginia, November 16, 2007. Mr. Hutchinson. Correct. Mr. Stupak. So these are 5 days apart, these two reports, and you would like them both submitted for the record. Mr. Mendell. Yes, indeed. Mr. Stupak. OK. Without objection. Hearing no objections they are part of the record. Mr. Hutchinson. There is one more letter that was attached to that package, a letter of February 1, 2008. Do you have that? Mr. Stupak. Yes, I do. Mr. Hutchinson. We would ask that to be made a part of the record as well. Mr. Stupak. This is the letter from Dr. Coiner, Meat Consultant? He is a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, that is correct. Mr. Stupak. That is the one? OK. It is dated February 1, 2008. Mr. Mendell. That is correct. Mr. Stupak. That is after these incidents. I didn't know if you---- Mr. Mendell. That is correct. That is after. Mr. Stupak. But you still want it? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. Without objection, February 1, 2008, letter from V.E. Coiner, Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, Meat Consultant, will be part of the statement. Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Let us begin questioning then. Mr. Mendell, you state your company according to what I have seen and read, the company began, at least you, in 1990 near Los Angeles, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. And then you bought this slaughterhouse later? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. Were you aware then in 1990 that the Humane Society in neighboring Panoma found recurring problems of the plant handling cows? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. Are you aware that in 1993 part of the Jack-in-the-Box where we had the E. coli and people were injured, your company settled part of that claim? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir, I was part of that recall. Mr. Stupak. OK. And then in 2003, 2004, your company aggressively went after the, I shouldn't say after, sought the hot lunch program providing meat to the Federal government for a hot lunch, right? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. And in 2005, you had a complete by U.S. Department of Agriculture for non-compliance in handling of animals? Mr. Mendell. Yes. We had one violation written by USDA, yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. Do you have that report with you today? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I believe we do. Mr. Stupak. Can you submit it for the record so we can see it? The downer cow issue, you agree they are not supposed to be put into the human food supply chain, food chain, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. And why is that? Mr. Mendell. Because they changed the regulation in '04, until '04 they were allowed in the food chain, not school lunch, but commercial trade. In '04 the regulation was changed. Mr. Stupak. And do you know why that was? Mr. Mendell. In abundance of caution for E. coli, salmonella and---- Mr. Stupak. And mad cow disease, right? Mr. Mendell [continuing]. Mad cow disease. Mr. Stupak. And it was established then, was it not, that of the 15 cases of mad cow disease in North America, U.S., and Canada, 12 of the 15 were downer cows. Eighty percent of those cows related to mad cow disease were downer cows, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. I don't know those exact numbers but they sound right to me. Mr. Stupak. Are you aware of the report, I think everybody has it, Canada confirmed a new case of mad cow disease on February 26, the day you were supposed to testify, confirm mad cow disease still available? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I was aware of that. Mr. Stupak. OK. Are you also aware that mad cow disease, including the Jack-in-the-Box case, they don't surface until on an average 13 years, but up to 20 years later before mad cow disease may surface in a human? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. So the statement that there has been no illness because of this recall, we don't know that for at least on an average 13 years later because of the incubation period, correct? Mr. Mendell. That would be correct. Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Mendell. But we have--we have safeguards in there, sir. Mr. Stupak. Well, let us talk about safeguards. Mr. Mendell. All right. Mr. Stupak. You said on the video we showed, you never saw the cow, we call it the water boarding cow, the last cow. Mr. Mendell. The water boarding cow I had seen. Mr. Stupak. You had seen? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. And that was put into the kill chute and that was made part of the human consumption, was it not? Mr. Mendell. No, I saw the video. Mr. Stupak. You saw the video. Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. So that cow that we referred to, it is at mark 435 in the video if you want to get it up, Kyle, that went into the food supply, did it not? Mr. Mendell. I am not sure if it did, sir. Mr. Stupak. Well, it went into the kill and it was killed. It showed that on the tape, does it not? Mr. Mendell. OK. Was that--yeah, I am not certain that was the cow, but yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. So that would be a direct violation, that cow as a downer cow could not go into the food chain, correct? Mr. Mendell. That would be a direct violation unless it was re-examined by a veterinarian. Mr. Stupak. Was it re-examined? Mr. Mendell. I don't know, sir. Mr. Stupak. In that video, did you see any veterinarian there? Mr. Mendell. No, it didn't look like it to me, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. Kyle, do you have a second clip? Let me show you this clip. You said there was a second video you never saw. Mr. Mendell. Right. Mr. Stupak. But you talked to the USDA about it, correct? Mr. Mendell. I am sorry? Mr. Stupak. You said you talked--in your written testimony you said there is a second video, USDA called you on it, and that is when you decided to do the recall. Mr. Mendell. That is when they decided to recall. Mr. Stupak. And you've never seen the video? Mr. Mendell. I haven't seen that one, and I don't know if there is another one. Mr. Stupak. OK. Kyle, show the second one. [Video.] Mr. Stupak. OK. Has your company ever illegally slaughtered, processed or sold a downer cow? Mr. Mendell. I didn't think we had, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. The first video shows a downer cow going in the kill box, right? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. This last one was a cow that never made it to the kill box. It was there, not quite in, and they shot it and they dragged it in, correct? Mr. Mendell. That is the video that I hadn't seen that USDA had called me on, sir. Mr. Stupak. I am curious, and I know my time is up, but when seeing these videos, the first video was on the Web weeks before we had our hearing. This one has been on for a couple of weeks, the one you just saw. We download them off---- Mr. Mendell. That one I never saw, sir. I thought it was-- -- Mr. Stupak. Wouldn't your own curiosity as president of the company and CEO you are responsible for, wouldn't you want to see what is being played out there, what they are saying about your company, what the videos are showing about your company? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I would, sir. Mr. Stupak. So the recalls of the 143 million pounds of meat based upon these two cows we know went in was a proper recall then because of mad cow disease, correct? Mr. Mendell. It was a regulatory violation for sure. It was inhumane treatment for sure. Mr. Stupak. Let me just be real clear. There is no doubt that a downer cow since 2004 according to your testimony cannot be put in the nation's food supply because of concerns of mad cow disease, which does not manifest itself in human beings on an average of 13 years later, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. That is correct, unless you have a vet there to examine it, and I did not see a vet. Mr. Stupak. So based upon what we saw, it would be logical to conclude then at least two downer cows went into the nation's food supply as we did not see a vet make a physical inspection before it was put in the kill box? Mr. Mendell. That would be logical, yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. So then let me take it one step further. The cow we just saw in video 2, the water board cow in video 1, they were illegally slaughtered underneath the rules and regulations of the United States? Mr. Mendell. Correct. Mr. Stupak. I have more questions, but my time is up. I will turn to Mr. Shimkus for questions, please. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So for the layman here, especially the second video, that was the kill box? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Shimkus. OK. We just wanted to clarify that. Because the real issue here--there are two big issues. The one is, and the chairman has just highlighted the point ,is that your statement says it is not a food safety issue, now after having seen the second video our issue is going to be downer cows in the kill box. The risk is greater than the ability to--I mean the risk is such that that is why we have the rules, no downer cows in a kill box because of the uncertainty of the food process. And so it is a food safety issue to us based upon the second film. Mr. Mendell. I believe those cows should be verified on a case-by-case basis by the USDA veterinarian. He has the authority to let that cow go or not. Mr. Shimkus. I just want to clarify that because I am assuming that if a vet, and I could be wrong, I am not in the business, but if a vet had inspected it that would still give the authority of a processor to drag a cow that has been inspected into the kill box? I would assume it would have to walk--it would still--you would inspect it, it is OK, and then we escort it in instead of the--I mean dragging, that is my concern. Mr. Mendell. I believe the regulation states that that cow must be ambulatory to the knock box. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Let me ask, the other concern is the whole idea is to protect the food safety of our citizens, and you go through a litany of regular training, compliance audits, interim audits, USDA audits, the review that was submitted and accepted for the record. The simple question is what went wrong, and if you have so many audits, and we have all be in businesses where we have audits and reviews. Is it a fact that heads-up were given to the processing facility so when the inspectors are there everything is above board, and when the inspectors leave everything returns to an operating process which is not acceptable? That is the follow-up question. You have done the auditing. What went wrong? Mr. Mendell. Well, obviously there was a breakdown in our training or our programs to allow that kind of behavior to occur. Mr. Shimkus. But there is also wrong in the audit that you paid for, there is something wrong in all these reviews that someone--the concern from my aspect as a supporter of business and industry is the corporate culture. And you have so many reviews. Was there a corporate culture change that effected a nod and a wink to all these audits and a heads--that is the problem. We have to figure out why you had so many reviews, so many internal audits, so many inspectors, and then the Humane Society does their undercover and, voila, it is pretty graphic and it is not defendable. Mr. Mendell. It is very graphic. It is very sickening to me also. We also put videos in there after this occurrence. I think the only answer to solve this kind of problem are video cams. We installed 17 video cams shortly after that that covered every square inch of that yard and the unloading area, and paid a company, Aero Sight was the name of the company, for 24/7 surveillance along with Dr. Grandin and Dr. Voogood looking at them on a weekly basis check-up. Mr. Shimkus. Let me just finish up because the major point is this has been devastating across the board. It is devastating to the treatment of the animals and we all accept that and are aggrieved by that. It is devastating because of the possible risk to the food supply, and again highlighting the mad cow disease and all the things that we are dealing with on food recalls we are under pressure to get this right. And it is devastating to you personally, your family, all the employees. Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Shimkus. The tax base, and we have to do what we can to try to make things right, so I lay that on the table that this is destructive to everybody and it is unfortunate and we got to try to find a way to fix it, so I appreciate the chairman--I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus. Before I turn you over to Ms. DeGette for questions--oh, sorry, Mr. Dingell is there. Let me just, a word of caution. On questions, your answers to my questions, page 2 of your testimony, you said I want to emphasize that thought that the activities shown on the video are not food safety. The cows shown in the video could not walk, were designated to be euthanized and were not put into commerce. I think we established that is not true based on your testimony. You also state these cows were not slaughtered, ground or sold. They were euthanized and removed. That may not have been true. That is what your written statement said, which is supposed to be under oath and part of the record, but I believe your oral testimony contradicted that. You may want to clarify that. Mr. Hutchinson. It is an important point. The testimony that was submitted referred to an excerpt of a video that my client saw, and so his testimony was accurate relating to the excerpt of the video that he saw and his testimony is correct in that regard. It has obviously been clarified today in further testimony. Mr. Stupak. The only hesitance I have, Mr. Hutchinson, is the top of page 2, shocked with an electrical prodder, and had water hoses sprayed in their nose in an effort to get them to their feet. That was the one that was euthanized and put in the food chain, the one where Mr. Mendell said I was not aware of it, but that is the same one he saw. He describes it in his testimony. That had to be video number 1. It is the same. So the written testimony and the oral testimony are not on the same parallel. And I just caution. The committee is under oath for a reason and I want to--before I unleash Mr. Dingell, I just want to give you that caution. Mr. Hutchinson. We appreciate the instruction of the chairman, and I think combined with what his statement has been for the record, both written and orally, I think he testified orally that provides a clarification and direct answers to the committee. Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is the custom for the committee to swear all witnesses, is that correct? Mr. Stupak. Yes. He was sworn in earlier with the---- Mr. Dingell. Mr. Mendell has been sworn. The other gentleman---- Mr. Stupak. He was identified and sworn early on, yes. Mr. Dingell. The other gentleman at the table, has he been duly sworn? Mr. Stupak. Mr. Mendell has. Mr. Hutchinson, have you been--you were sworn in the beginning, were you not? Mr. Hutchinson. No, I was not. Mr. Stupak. OK. Then we are going to have to do it right now then, OK? Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the practice of the committee that a witness has the privilege of being sworn and testifying. He has the privilege of having a lawyer and having the lawyer advise him during his appearance before the committee. I am not aware of any privilege that permits an individual to be sworn and to serve as a witness and yet at the same time to serve as an attorney or lawyer or legal advisor to the witness. I think Mr. Mendell has the privilege of being duly sworn and testifying. The gentleman there at the table, he is appearing here as a lawyer. It was always my practice when I ran the committee and this subcommittee that those who appeared as lawyers functioned as lawyers, and those who function as lawyers could not testify. Mr. Stupak. Point well taken, Mr. Dingell. Mr. Dingell. I believe that is the practice to which we should continue to adhere, and I think Mr. Mendell should be permitted to answer the questions, and if he can't then he should state so and we will decide whether or not we want to hear from his lawyer under oath at a suitable and proper time. Mr. Stupak. Very well taken, Mr. Dingell. In my sense of fairness in trying to make sure everybody is treated fairly here, I had asked Mr. Hutchinson a question or two. You are right, he cannot be a lawyer and a witness at the same time. Therefore, I would recommend and I would suggest to the committee with no objection that Mr. Hutchinson stays where he is at, not take the oath, but can advise Mr. Mendell. Before you answer a question if you want to consult with Mr. Hutchinson, we will give you that opportunity. I just want to make sure everybody is clear on where we are going, clear on the statements, clear on the facts because there are extenuating circumstances that may develop in this. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Shimkus. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman. The only thing that I just want to get a handle on the line of questioning and maybe because I don't understand what I am seeing. There is an assumption here that in the first tape that there is a clear indication that a downer cow went into a kill box. I don't know if I need a rerun. I have a hard time seeing that. I am not sure. And I don't have to see the whole thing. It is just that last section where--because that is where a lot of confusion is. And then obviously the second film we are clear, we are clear there is problems with. I just have trouble--we saw that first film in the other hearing. I don't know if our line of questioning went in that direction that there was concern about the food safety supply then. Mr. Stupak. The other caution I had, Mr. Shimkus, and point well noted, but I had asked Mr. Mendell directly based upon what we saw, the first video, second video, and no veterinarian had looked at this cow. Would it have been illegal to put this cow in, and he answered yes. So that sort of cleans that one up, I think. Go ahead. Mr. Shimkus. If the chairman would yield, I would like to pose--I think there is a lot of confusion and he has answered but I would ask it again for full clarification so we know on the first video food safety, kill box. Mr. Stupak. I had asked the question and let me take a minute and try to clarify this. Has your company ever illegally slaughtered, processed or sold a downed cow, Mr. Mendell? Mr. Mendell. Not that I was ever aware of. Mr. Stupak. Correct. And that was your answer earlier, you said not that you were aware of. And then I directed your attention to the video. Mr. Mendell. Correct. Mr. Stupak. And we discussed the fact that the water board cow went into the, I called it a kill box but I guess it is a knock box, and then once it went into that knock box it went into the food supply, and we established no veterinarian had looked at it which is required by law. And then we mentioned the second video where that cow was shot outside the knock box and then dragged into the kill box. That one went in on the second video. So the question I believe to the best of my memory I asked since 2004, since the rules changed in 2004, that downer cows could not go into the food supply for human consumption because of the concern of mad cow disease which manifests itself 13 years, maybe as high as 20 years later, as the reason why we do not allow downed cows into food supply, I think you answered affirmative to that, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. And then I said so in summation at least two of these cows then that we saw in the video, the two videos, were illegally slaughtered. I believe your response was yes. Mr. Mendell. OK, to clarify that. The cow getting the water sprayed in its nose, that is clearly inhumane treatment. I did not see an inspector there to reinspect that cow to allow it to go into the food chain. Mr. Stupak. And we saw it go in the kill box, therefore, it went into the food chain? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. And the second one, the second cow, that short video. Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. Where they shot it outside the kill box, and then it went into the kill box, then it went into the food supply. It was not inspected by a veterinarian. Mr. Mendell. Not that I saw, sir. Mr. Stupak. So it is fair to say then that these two cows went into the food supply and that would be illegal since at least 2004 to put a downer cow in the food supply for human consumption? Mr. Mendell. I would say that it is a rules violation for not calling a USDA veterinarian to inspect that cow to either let it or not let it go in. Mr. Stupak. The veterinarian, even though the veterinarian could have rectified the problem, the problem is we have a downer cow according to the video that saw no veterinarian there went into the food supply. That is what makes it illegal, the downer cow being in the food supply, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes. I don't have all the facts. I just see what I see on the video. I am not completely sure if that cow walked all the way in the knock box, or backed out of it, which is a common occurrence. There is a door that closes behind it. Mr. Stupak. But if the cow went into the food supply everyone can make their own conclusions from that video---- Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. We didn't see a veterinarian. If it went in the food supply that would be illegal. Mr. Mendell. Right. That would be illegal. It did go through postmortem inspection. Mr. Stupak. Right, but whether it went through postmortem or not, a downer can't go into the food supply. That is the law since at least 2004 in this country according to USDA and Federal law, correct? Mr. Mendell. Without approval of the vet. Mr. Stupak. Correct. And we didn't have a vet in---- Mr. Mendell. I didn't see one, sir. It is a case-by-case basis, and I did not. Mr. Stupak. And in these two cases we didn't see a veterinarian? Mr. Mendell. I did not. Mr. Stupak. OK. All right, you are going to find this a hard one to believe but we have an air code yellow meaning a plane is within our air space. We need to evacuate the building. But not yet, not yet. OK. They are cautioning not yet. If we do, I am going to give you a 2-second warning. Leave calmly, OK? If you want to leave now, you can. There is a plane in our air space. We may need to evacuate. Now, Ms. DeGette-- no, Mr. Dingell for questions, please. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Yes. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Mendell did have one clarification on that last question. Mr. Stupak. OK. Clarification before we go to Mr. Dingell. Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Mr. Dingell---- Mr. Stupak. Mr. Dingell, one minute, please. Mr. Mendell wants to clarify something for us before I turn it to you, sir. Mr. Mendell. Mr. Mendell. If that cow did not pass postmortem inspection it would not have gone in the food supply either. Mr. Stupak. That is fine. Mr. Dingell. Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy and I commend you again for these hearings. Mr. Mendell, in your statement--you make this statement at page 2. I want to emphasize though that the activities shown on the video are not a food safety issue. The cows shown in the video could not walk, were designated to be euthanized, and were not put into commerce. Then you said this. All these cows should be treated humanely. They were not. These cows were not harvested and they did not enter the food system. They were not slaughtered, ground or sold. They were euthanized and removed. Are we to believe that statement? The movie shows things rather differently. Mr. Mendell. Those were probably different videos, sir. Mr. Dingell. Sorry? Mr. Mendell. They were probably a different video, sir. I have seen clips of different videos, 50 of them. I have not seen what I saw here today. I saw pieces of it. I have never seen the whole thing. Mr. Dingell. So we have to assume then that your statement here is incorrect, is that right? Mr. Mendell. Not based upon the video that I saw, sir. Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, Mr. Mendell, I have got to say I have certain sympathy for you because you are not in a very pleasant place but I have a few questions more that have to be directed to you. You chose not to attend the hearing on the invitation of the committee on February 26, and despite substantial efforts by the committee staff to reach you, you avoided the committee staff. Now will you explain to me why you chose not to appear before the committee and why it was necessary for the committee to subpoena you for your presence today? Mr. Mendell. During the last--during the last committee meeting, I was on the recall team at Westland Meat Company. My company was in a crisis. It was next to impossible for me to leave, sir. I apologized to the committee earlier for that, and I deeply regret not being able to attend, but this was a very serious incident. I was trying to comply with USDA. Mr. Dingell. You did not so communicate this to the committee or the staff as they communicated to you, is that correct? You didn't advise the committee of these matters, did you? Mr. Mendell. I said that I was over-inundated with phone calls, news reporters, and my business was in the middle of the biggest recall in U.S. history, and I didn't want to leave my recall staff without me. Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Mendell, in your testimony you state, and I quote, ``The company does not pay suppliers for the cost of a cow deemed unfit for human consumption and there is therefore no financial incentive to bypass the regulations.'' I would note here that the pictures--so you are telling us here that you don't pay these people for these downer cows, so you got a whole bunch of downer cows going in, and we have pictures of them. I must assume then that you didn't pay for these downer cows but the downer cows were put into the food supply according to the pictures which we saw. Now that leaves me then with the assumption that you are not paying for these downer cows but the downer cows are winding up in the food supply and causing recalls of meat because of the improprieties that have been associated with the slaughter and with the slaughter of downer cows. Am I correct or incorrect with that? Mr. Mendell. That is incorrect, sir. Those cows---- Mr. Dingell. What are the facts then, if you please? Mr. Mendell. Those cows are--each one of those cows has a number on them. If that number--those numbers are recorded through that plant. If that cow goes in the plant it is paid for. If it is processed and it passes postmortem inspection it is paid for. Any cow that we euthanize in a truck, in a pen, any place outside the plant, usually most of the time those cows are bought as a subject or on the rail and they are not paid for. There are instances where our buyers buy some. They are euthanized or they don't pass inspection, we do pay. Mr. Dingell. Now in your statement, Mr. Mendell, you told us the number of times that you had been audited by USDA. Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Dingell. And I am assuming that in each one of those audits you got a clean bill of health, is that right? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Dingell. So you then--I would note, however, before you owned Hallmark Meat Packing Company, Hallmark faced scrutiny for the way it handled downer cows. Were you aware of the problems that the company had before your ownership of it? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Dingell. And I would note that during that time you owned Westland Meat Company, which bought beef from Hallmark, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. On occasion, yes, sir. Mr. Dingell. Did you have any awareness then of mishandling of downer cows and the handling of downer cows by Hallmark either through yourself and your own knowledge or that of your company, Westland Meat Company? Mr. Mendell. Not at that time, sir. Mr. Dingell. So all during that time the Department of Agriculture is giving you clean bills of health in its audits of your company and in its audits of Hallmark. I wonder if you could help us to understand why did they do that if we had all these problems that were going on during that period of time? Mr. Mendell. Well, the only problem I know we had, sir, was the inhumane treatment of animals and obviously my system broke down. I don't know how often USDA is supposed to be in a knocking box or examine the yard areas or loading or unloading. I am not really sure, sir. Obviously, my programs, which is very disappointing to me after extensive training and hours and hours and hours of training, obviously failed. Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Mendell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. Mr. Whitfield for questions. Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Mendell, thank you for being with us today. I want to, first of all, just go over a couple of things regarding the Washington Post article about this. Now you are the chairman or you are the owner of this slaughterhouse, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. I am the owner of Westland Meat Company and I manage Hallmark Meat Packing. Mr. Whitfield. OK. And how many plants do you have? Mr. Mendell. One plant. Mr. Whitfield. Just one. And what is the status of that plant today? Mr. Mendell. It is closed. Mr. Whitfield. And do you anticipate that it will be reopened? Mr. Mendell. I doubt it, sir. Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now I think it is very clear to everyone that there are a couple of issues here, 1, the humane slaughter of animals, and, 2, the food safety chain. And you have been pretty straightforward today in saying that this was inhumane treatment of these animals so there is no question about that. And I notice that when you first saw these videos you made the statement that it is impossible, electrical prods are not allowed on our property, and it is absolutely not true that water was sprayed at the nose of these animals and that we have a massive humane treatment program that we follow to the nth degree. All of those statements turned out not to be correct, but you have admitted today that whatever the procedures that you had in place, they simply did not work, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Evidenced by the audits that I received from USDA and all these third party audits, and I knew the programs we had in place. I knew the training that we had in place. I mean I couldn't believe that it was my plant until I saw the video. Mr. Whitfield. Now you mentioned that video cameras are really the only way to ensure a clean plant, a humane plant, and so forth, and you installed those cameras at this plant, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I did, sir. Mr. Whitfield. Now in your knowledge of other owners of slaughterhouses, do most slaughterhouses have cameras installed? Mr. Mendell. No, sir, they do not. I only know of one. Mr. Whitfield. And you know we have a lot of Federal laws relating to criminal charges against people who treat animals inhumanely, as an example, Michael Vick recently, and it is my understanding that current Federal law does not provide for criminal penalty even in cases of the egregious offenses for violation of humane handling at slaughterhouses. Is that your understanding as well? Mr. Mendell. I am not sure of that law, sir. Mr. Whitfield. So you don't know if there are any criminal violations here or not under existing Federal law? Mr. Mendell. I know that the county of San Bernardino has charged the two employees that we fired with criminal charges. Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now when a load of cattle arrives at the plant do they normally arrive in double deck trailers? Mr. Mendell. The majority, yes, sir. Mr. Whitfield. And these are cattle that you have buyers that have gone out and purchased or you have contracts with suppliers that just bring them in? Mr. Mendell. Both. Mr. Whitfield. And when the cattle arrive at the plant is there an inspector when they are unloaded from the trucks? Mr. Mendell. No. Not purposely, unless, not unless he is doing antemortem inspection. Mr. Whitfield. But the inspection is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, is that correct, or do you have the---- Mr. Mendell. I am not sure if that is the regulation for them or not, sir. Mr. Whitfield. Well, the postmortem and antemortem, whose responsibility is that? Mr. Mendell. That is theirs. Mr. Whitfield. OK. So you are saying you don't know if they have a responsibility to inspect the animals when they are unloaded from the trailers? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Whitfield. The only thing that you are really aware of is that they do have ante- and postmortem inspection responsibility? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Whitfield. And they also supply a veterinarian that even on the downer cow can approve that animal for slaughter, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Could you ask me that one more time, sir? Mr. Whitfield. The Department of Agriculture provides a veterinarian that comes to the plant and if they inspect a downer cow and decide that it is OK to be slaughtered then it can be slaughtered, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Whitfield. And the only mad cow--most of the mad cow disease that has occurred in the U.S., there hasn't been that many, has been directly related to downer cow, traced to a downer cow, so what would you think about--I recognize the monetary situation but it seems to me that maybe we should have a blanket policy that downer cows will not be slaughtered. Do you have an opinion on that? Mr. Mendell. Well, I think they should take them on a case- by-case basis but the vets--maybe they don't have enough vets. Maybe they aren't staffed properly. I am not sure. I couldn't answer that question. Mr. Whitfield. But on the downer cows at your plant on this particular day, we do not really know if a veterinarian was there or not, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. It didn't appear in the video, sir, but he could have been there earlier. We could have shot five earlier. We could have euthanized five earlier that day when he was there. I am just not positive. Mr. Whitfield. But the USDA inspectors, they do not stay at these plants. They just come and go? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. They are stationed at my plant, 5--4 or 5. Mr. Whitfield. And how many of the inspectors are stationed there? Mr. Mendell. I believe there are four inspectors and one vet, if I am not mistaken. Mr. Whitfield. And they are there all the time? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Whitfield. All day long? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Whitfield. OK. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Green for questions, please. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, Mr. Mendell, we appreciate you appearing today. And I guess all of us have been touched because I have two school districts in my district in Houston, Texas, Pasadena Independent School District and Houston Independent School District, who bought meat from your plant and were part of that recall. Now I have to admit why would a Texan buy meat from California but we will talk about that later. I do have some questions. One, in light of the videos that you saw was the recall justified especially considering the latency time for mad cow disease? Mr. Mendell. I think--I think the decision for the recall was made in a matter of 4 or 5 hours, if I am not mistaken. I think in my humble opinion that USDA could have contacted Alameda, our local area office, talked to the veterinarian in charge, talked to my area supervisor, and thought about this a little bit before the recall. We do have safeguards in place, sir, with specified risk material which are known to harbor the prion of Mad Cow. We do remove that from every beef that we slaughter. We are the--the USDA is currently trying to lift age limitations on beef going to Japan and Korea because of specified risk material removal. We have that same process in place. Do I feel it was enough of a safeguard? Yes, I do. That is why we have the program in process. That is why the USDA has it in process to move that specific risk material. So if a downer got into the system, that harmful part of that cow has been removed. Mr. Green. Let me ask you because again I haven't spent as much time maybe as you have but since the downer cows, the solution would be to put video out there and not just a supervisor overseeing those employees, how do you know that your program was carried through to remove that part of that cow? Mr. Mendell. It is documented inside the plant and audited as well, I see your point, it is audited as well inside the plant. I believe it is a lot easier to audit it inside than outside. Mr. Green. Well, I read your testimony and I know you had audits both inside and outside, but I also assume that the outside where those downer cows were taken in when they shouldn't have been that you had oversight and you had audits there? Mr. Mendell. Yes, we have. Mr. Green. OK. So that system failed, and I would be concerned about the latency period on mad cow disease, and I think that is the concern that the FDA--and we have learned now from the FDA that oftentimes they don't respond very quickly whether it be toy safety or other things--not toy safety, that is consumer product, but other issues. But let me ask another question. One of the pen workers who has been charged criminally in this case stated that he felt pressured to ensure that a certain number of cows were slaughtered each day. If he didn't meet that quota that management was angry. Is this true? Mr. Mendell. No. I mean we had a--we harvested 500 cattle a day. Yes, did he have to do his job, did he have to do it in a timely manner? Yes. I had pressure selling it too. Everybody that worked there, I mean, had pressure. Do I think it would be an excuse to inhumanely treat an animal? Absolutely not. Mr. Green. In 2005 USDA cited your company for non- compliance for being overly aggressive and using electric prods to move cattle. What corrective actions did you take? Mr. Mendell. Well, we rewrote our programs immediately, retrained our employees immediately, and we also used a different kind of--yes, it is not--I think the recommendation by Temple Grandin, the authority on this, was 50 volts. We use 6 volts, the battery packs. It is not--we used it excessively. I think we used it 8 percent more than we were supposed to, 8 out of 100 cows more, if I am not mistaken. You are allowed to hit 25 of them. I think we did 33. I believe, if I remember correctly. Mr. Green. OK. So that was the 2005 incident? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Green. Were there any other incidents of non-compliance from the USDA? Mr. Mendell. Not that I recall, sir, no. Mr. Green. I guess, having supervised employees and you had many more than I had to when I was in business, but I guess the supervisors are supposed to report--you can put video--videoing the employees, videoing the supervisors, but again it seems like somebody who was in management overseeing what was happening, and that should have been reported or maybe they were encouraged by the production too much because we see this in a lot of companies that are obviously in different types of businesses, and so I guess that is my concern about it. And the recall was maybe unjustified in your sense but I am not so sure any of those children in my district that consumed any of that meat if they did, 13 years from now or 10 years from now, you are not going to be around to deal with that so that is the concern that I think our whole committee and this Congress has on a bipartisan basis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I am out of time. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Green. Ms. DeGette, for questions. Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mendell, you said in your testimony that in 2005 you had a violation for mishandling of animals, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. That is correct. Ms. DeGette. Did you recall any of your product at that time? Mr. Mendell. No, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. So what was the financial result for your company of that violation in 2005? Mr. Mendell. Financially, none. Ms. DeGette. Yes, there was none. Did you install video cameras after that violation in 2005? Mr. Mendell. No, I didn't. Ms. DeGette. No, you didn't. What other further steps did you take in 2005 to increase the surveillance over the handling of the animals? Mr. Mendell. I don't believe we increased surveillance. We rewrote our programs and retrained our employees and went on an aggressive monthly training program with all of our employees. Ms. DeGette. OK. And then after the recall in 2007, what was the financial impact on your company then? I am sorry, 2008, this year. Mr. Mendell. It is devastated. Ms. DeGette. What is the price figure for devastated? Mr. Mendell. I couldn't imagine. Ms. DeGette. Hundreds of millions of dollars? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And after that, then you installed the video cameras, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And how much did that cost you? Mr. Mendell. Oh, yes, I did do the video cameras before I knew there was going to be a recall. I am sorry. Ms. DeGette. When did you do the video cameras? Mr. Mendell. When we realized there was inhumane treatment. Ms. DeGette. Well, when was that? You learned, I think, according to your written testimony, you learned about the videotape in early February of this year, so when did you install the cameras? Mr. Mendell. I think we ordered them within the next 3 or 4 days. Ms. DeGette. OK. And how long after you learned about the videotape did you hear from the U.S.--so at that time even though you knew about the videotape and the treatment of the animals, you did nothing, your company did nothing to voluntarily recall the beef, did you? Mr. Mendell. No. Ms. DeGette. In fact, it wasn't until you heard from the USDA about the second tape, and when they urged you to do a voluntary recall that you then complied with that voluntary recall, right? Mr. Mendell. That is correct. Ms. DeGette. So how long after learning of the first tape did you learn about the second? Mr. Mendell. I believe the second tape we didn't hear or see, and I haven't seen it until today. I don't think we heard about the second tape for about 10 days. Ms. DeGette. Ten days after the first tape? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And so what your testimony is that you ordered the video cameras after the first tape but before the second, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. When we realized there was an inhumane issue, we thought it was the only way that we could resolve it, and we went ahead and installed them. Ms. DeGette. OK. Now, so have you ever recalled product before, sir? Mr. Mendell. No. Ms. DeGette. And have you ever been advised by the U.S.--so in 2005 you didn't recall any product, correct? Mr. Mendell. I am sorry? Ms. DeGette. In 2005 when you received the citation from the USDA for mishandling of animals, you did not recall any product, correct? Mr. Mendell. No, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. OK. Now I want to ask you of the downed cows that we have seen in the videotapes today which at least the committee believes entered the food supply, would a consumer going into a grocery store be able to know or a school serving this beef in a school lunch be able to know whether meat from that cow or from that lot of cows was in the meat that was being served in their facility? Mr. Mendell. Not that exact cow, no. Ms. DeGette. Would they be able to know about the cows from that lot whether they were in the meat that was being served? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Ms. DeGette. How would they know that? Mr. Mendell. They would know--we have a lotting system that every 60 cows is a lot. Ms. DeGette. So what happens after that lot then goes to be processed? Mr. Mendell. Well, it is documented. We can tell where that lot came from. We know whose cows are in that lot---- Ms. DeGette. Well, you know which cows are in the lot when you send it to be processed, correct? Mr. Mendel. Yes. Ms. DeGette. And then what happens to that lot number after it is sent to be processed, say, into hamburger? Mr. Mendell. I believe we still maintain that lot. I think we can trace---- Ms. DeGette. OK. But do you know whether that lot information is contained--because when they make hamburger, I am sure you know this, you are in the business, and I am just a congressperson, but when they send the lots of cows to the processors to be processed into hamburger they take meat from a number of different lots, correct? Mr. Mendell. No, those lots--well, yes. Ms. DeGette. Yes, they do. Mr. Mendell. Four or five lots mixed in that one---- Ms. DeGette. Exactly. Mr. Mendell. Yes, exactly. Ms. DeGette. And there is no federal requirement right now that the numbers from those lots that are mixed into that hamburger be documented which lots went into that hamburger, did you know that? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I do know that. Ms. DeGette. So, therefore, when the person at the local elementary school or when the consumer at Safeway buys a package of ground beef they would have no idea whether the cows from the lot that were downed cows at your plant were contained in that package of hamburger, correct? Mr. Mendell. Correct. Ms. DeGette. And from what you are saying, you document which cows go into which lot, correct? Mr. Mendell. Correct. Ms. DeGette. And you document then which lots go to the processing facilities, correct? Mr. Mendell. Well, I have a processing--I make ground beef in-house. Ms. DeGette. OK. Mr. Mendell. The same building. Ms. DeGette. So you would have the ability then---- Mr. Mendell. To trace back. Ms. DeGette. To trace back, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And that would probably help you financially in your business because if some ground beef was discovered that had salmonella or E. coli or whatever it could be traced back to that particular lot and then you could figure out what happened and you could recall that amount, correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And that is probably easy to do within the industry, isn't it? Mr. Mendell. It is easy to do with a single source supplier like myself because I don't bring meat from the outside. It is all my beef. If it is a stand alone grinder, they might buy meat from 10 different people. Ms. DeGette. But they could still figure out those lots, couldn't they? Mr. Mendell. They could figure it out, and it would be a lot harder, yes. Ms. DeGette. OK. Thank you very much. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Burgess for questions, please. We have a vote on the floor. There is 12 minutes left. As far as I know, it is only a motion to adjourn. Mr. Shimkus and I are going to stay. We will skip that vote. We want to keep this hearing going. Mr. Burgess. What about the plane, where is it? Mr. Stupak. Now it is code green. I think they are sending up little drones or something. Mr. Burgess. Mr. Mendell, thank you for being here today. I know it hasn't been easy to do this. I certainly respect the fact that you could have declined to be here today or declined to testify but you willingly gave your testimony, and we on the committee are deeply appreciate of that. On the second tape which this morning I guess you saw for the first time, do you have any reason to believe that the USDA or the Humane Society didn't share that tape with you? Do you feel you had the availability to view all of the tapes beforehand that were collected in evidence? Mr. Mendell. No, I don't. Mr. Burgess. Why wouldn't you have? Why would that have not been made available to you by the USDA? Mr. Mendell. I don't know. I asked them for it the night that they suggested the recall, and they said we will see what we can do about getting you the tape. I have yet to get it. Mr. Burgess. Now the recall, according to testimony we are going to get a little bit later, that was February 4, is that right, so some time much earlier in the month? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. I can't really remember. Mr. Burgess. Well, obviously this story hit the press wires and you became aware of it before that time. Were you aware of how animals were--if animals were mistreated in the process of going through the line there at the slaughterhouse? Mr. Mendell. At my plant? Mr. Burgess. Yes, sir. Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Burgess. Do you ever go out and watch the process yourself? Mr. Mendell. Occasionally. Not very often. Mr. Burgess. Do you think other CEOs at other packing plants would frequent the yards where this activity is taking place? Mr. Mendell. I doubt it. Mr. Burgess. I do too. Now I think in response to a previous question, some of the blatant violations were missed by 17 outside audits. Was your company aware of when audits would take place? Did you have any special preparation to be able to get through those audits? Mr. Mendell. I think we were occasionally notified and occasionally not. I couldn't tell you exactly. It really wasn't something I dealt with but---- Mr. Burgess. Because it had never been a problem? Mr. Mendell. I don't think--no. I think USDA audits are sometimes announced, sometimes not announced, depending on where they want to go, what they want to--they might go to outside storage. They might want to--so they might call to arrange that. Mr. Burgess. On the subject of the violations that occurred, and you said they were blatant violations and not part of the company policy, I couldn't help but notice on the little bit of tape that we heard today the fact that I guess there might have been a language barrier. Were efforts made so that employee training was given in an appropriate language so that there would be no question about everyone understanding what their roles and duties were? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. We had bilingual supervisors. Mr. Burgess. Prior to this story breaking in February, and prior to the activity of this committee, at any point did you think there was a threat to public health at your plant? Mr. Mendell. No, I didn't, sir, not as evidenced by these audits and the amount of testing we were doing, no. Mr. Burgess. Do you think it was within your power as president of your company to prevent these activities from occurring? Mr. Mendell. The inhumane treatment? Mr. Burgess. Yes. Mr. Mendell. Yes, I think it should have. I think it was an oversight by me. Did I think I needed to with the training that I had in place? No. In hindsight, I wish I would have had cameras out there. Mr. Burgess. So your company cameras have now been placed were actually after the fact? Mr. Mendell. After the fact, sir. Mr. Burgess. Just one other observation that came up during earlier testimony when you weren't here in the previous hearing that there was some delay between the time that the Humane Society made the tapes available to the district attorney and the time that they then went public with their information and some concern on my part, and I think some other members had some concern about that delay that allowed more product to go into the stream of commerce. Had you been aware of those videos much earlier when they were made in October, early November, would that have diverted this material from the stream of commerce? Mr. Mendell. Would it have diverted---- Mr. Burgess. Would it have prevented the potentially defective product from entering into the lunch menu? Mr. Mendell. Absolutely. If I knew that that was going on and we--I mean I couldn't believe that it actually was until I saw the videos. I would have put the cameras in--I would have put the cameras in immediately. Yes. Yes, I think it would have diverted the whole thing. Mr. Burgess. So the delay for whatever reason, whether it was the DA telling the Humane Society not to go public, for whatever reason the delay then compounded the problem? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Burgess. Ms. Schakowsky for questions, please. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very concerned because Chicago public schools were among those that received the meat. I represent a good part of the city of Chicago. I am also concerned about your testimony which I think I understand now essentially you revised your testimony where you say that there was not a food safety issue, that they were not slaughtered, ground or sold. That is not correct based on what you have seen, is it? Mr. Mendell. On the videos that I have seen, no. They weren't processed on the videos that I had seen. The two I saw today, they did go in the plant. Ms. Schakowsky. What I am trying to understand is how you want to--you were so certain in your testimony having said that you yourself had not done any individual inspections. When you wrote this testimony you seemed absolutely certain that they were not slaughtered, ground or sold, that they were euthanized and removed, that there was not a food safety issue. How could you have felt so certain about that? Mr. Mendell. Based on the videos I have seen--that I saw, I did not think those cows went into the food supply, and I still say today that with our specified risk removal materials that is why it is a stage 2 recall with a remote possibility for health concern. They said that they played with a stage 3 recall was USDA's words, which I don't really know what the definition of that is. I know that the product has been fully tested and it has gone through every rigorous test that USDA had inside that plant. I think there is less than a minute chance of that product being contaminated. Ms. Schakowsky. Would you say unequivocally under oath on the record then that there has not been in the past--now, aside from those cows that were on the video--that your plant has not had any food safety issue? Mr. Mendell. Not that I have ever been aware of, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. Well, that is what I am concerned about. You say this is not the company I know. That is what you said in your testimony. Mr. Mendell. No, ma'am, it isn't. Ms. Schakowsky. But what I question is, is this a company that you know? And I want to ask a question about the training. You said according to your testimony ``the two fired employees as well as the Humane Society employee have participated in extensive training and retraining.'' However, according to the Wall Street Journal the Humane Society employee told the Chino police that he ``had received no formal training.'' According to the article, on his first day the Humane Society employee reported to Pablo Salas, a manager who told the new employee not to be cruel to animals, but Mr. Salas only came outside to the pens 15 to 20 minutes a day. It was also reported that Mr. Salas put intense pressure on the pen managers to meet a quota of 500 pounds per day. So I want to know what your definition of extensive training and retraining is and why there was--or is there, I understand there is no certification process to confirm that employees had been trained, and how can you argue that your compliance audits worked when it is so clear that they failed? Mr. Mendell. OK. The training--I have two training documents here from Sean Thomas, which was the Humane Society employee. One is dated 10/8 and one is dated 11/12. He worked there 6 weeks. He had orientation. He had gone through the training process twice, and I have his signature here stating that he did so. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Mendell, are you going to offer those as exhibits? Are you going to offer those? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. Kyle, can we get someone to make copies so we have them. You can go ahead, Ms. Schakowsky. [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] Ms. Schakowsky. And I appreciate copies of the documents. So you are saying that that statement was inaccurate and false that he was not trained? Mr. Mendell. He was trained, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. You have documents that say he was? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. OK, and that you are going to present. Let me ask one more question. According to their testimony on the Humane Society employee's first day on the job he saw a cow collapse on the way into the stunning box, and after she was electrically shocked and still could not stand, she was shot in the head with a captive bolt gun and then dragged on her knees into slaughter. I want to know, would you consume meat from a cow that was slaughtered in this manner? Mr. Mendell. No. It is against USDA regulation. Do we have video of that one or was that a statement he made? He made a statement that he didn't get training too, and we have documentation of that. Ms. Schakowsky. Assuming that it all jives together, that in fact when he signed that that he actually did go through that training. I understand. You say you have documentation. My concern is that you refer to audits, you refer to policies, you refer to documents, and yet in just over a month of someone taking videotape the experience on the ground there was quite different from what you said. And I understand, you say you regret now that there weren't cameras. I think what we are concerned about is the discrepancy between things that are on paper, statements that are part of your policy, but that in reality we are seeing something very different and it is our job to try and figure out how to jive those two together. Thank you. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. We will continue with questions, another round. Mr. Mendell, Mr. Burgess asked you about the Humane Society, and without the work of the Humane Society we never would have known what went on in those days, correct, in November there with the downer cows being put in--without their work, we never would---- Mr. Mendell. Without the tape, would I have known? No. Mr. Stupak. Anyone, no one would have known? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Stupak. You indicated in your statement that you would have terminated these employees immediately. In your employee handbook if they put a downer cow into the kill box or a knock box as you call it, does your discipline--is it very clear you are terminated? Mr. Mendell. They would have been terminated immediately for that too. Mr. Stupak. Is that in writing in your company policy? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. I don't think we have it with us, but I can gladly get the committee a copy. It is very clear, let us put it that way. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Burgess asked you about the health risk, and the safest way to protect Americans is just not put a downer cow into the human food chain, right? That is the safest way? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. You indicated that about the recall that you had 4 or 5 hours, you indicated earlier in testimony you might have seen 50 different videos, but yet the video we have seen today you hadn't seen those. Those were in the public domain a month before the--I shouldn't say that, a couple weeks before the February 26 hearing, and here we are, March 11, 12, so they have been out there for about a month. Mr. Stupak. Would there have been anything that would have prevented you from going online to look at these videos? You are the only one in America who hasn't seen it. Mr. Mendell. Maybe not. Maybe there wasn't anything that prevented me but I was in a crisis mode at that time. There were a million things going on with USDA. We were all being interviewed by USDA. Mr. Stupak. All right, but this is--the first video is 5 minutes. The other one we showed you is 1 minute. Six minutes. These videos were the accusations against your company. I would think you would want to say, man, what are they saying or what are they doing? Mr. Mendell. Well, I never saw the narrated video like that, not one time. I have never seen it. Like I said, I have seen---- Mr. Stupak. I just find it amazing you would never look at it, that is all. Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Yes. Mr. Hutchinson. May I just add perhaps as counsel, I was not aware that the last video---- Mr. Stupak. You can't testify though, remember? Mr. Hutchinson. I don't mean to testify. I am just saying we are not aware---- Mr. Stupak. It is called testimony though. OK. Tell Mr. Mendell and Mr. Mendell can relay your answer. Let me ask you this. You said it was a stage 3 recall, I think you said, and you said you didn't know what stage 3 was. Mr. Mendell. I didn't know the definition of a stage 3. Mr. Stupak. OK. Do you know what it is today? Mr. Mendell. No, sir. Mr. Stupak. That is the possible highest risk. That is why it is stage 3. That is my understanding. Let me ask you this. What did they say if you--that they would make you do the recall. You said you had 4 to 5 hours. You had never seen the video. They said they had more video. You said you didn't see it. What convinced you then to go along with the recall or was this a mandated recall by USDA that you had no choice? Mr. Mendell. Well, it is not mandatory, sir. Mr. Stupak. Right. Mr. Mendell. In 10 days it would be. That is what they told me the next morning. We consulted---- Mr. Stupak. Didn't you ask them what is the basis of you forcing me, USDA, why are you forcing my company to go under recall if there is no risk and you have never seen downer cows go into the food supply? Mr. Mendell. We did ask them. They said it was based on a video, based on testimony of an employee. We asked who the employee is. They said they couldn't tell us. We asked for a copy of the video. They said they would see what they could do about getting it to us. That they thought there was enough evidence to---- Mr. Stupak. And if this video and what they represented to you was going to devastate your company, as it has, as you have indicated---- Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak [continuing]. And you had a 10-day window period, why wouldn't you just wait to see the video to make sure that they are not blowing smoke? Mr. Mendell. Would you think USDA would do that, sir, in this kind of an arena? Mr. Stupak. Well, from where I sit, absolutely. Your whole future, your whole---- Mr. Mendell. Yes, my whole life up in smoke. Mr. Stupak. It just seems to me and some of us up here, there has to be something more there. I guess we are trying--is there something more? Are we missing something? You didn't see a video? You didn't go online? You didn't take time to even see the video and, say, at least present the video before I make a decision? Mr. Mendell. I had seen clips of the video, sir. I was called at 9:00 or 10:00 at night when this recall committee-- 9:00 or 10:00 west coast time. Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Mendell. They acted like I didn't have a choice, and I don't think I did. They said they would have sanctions in 10 days. It would be an involuntary recall and it would be worse. Mr. Stupak. How about then after you made your recall before you come to testify here, why wouldn't you have watched the videos then that were online to get prepared for testimony? Mr. Mendell. I had seen enough to be--I was regrettable enough with the videos that I had seen on the inhumane handling. I knew what the issue was. Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this because it is part of our hearing. Does your company use carbon monoxide in your packaging of meat? Mr. Mendell. No. Mr. Stupak. Has your company ever used irradiation? Mr. Mendell. One more time? Mr. Stupak. Irradiation, have you used it? Mr. Mendell. Do I know about it? Mr. Stupak. No. Have you used it in your---- Mr. Mendell. No, I haven't. We were about to. We never did. Mr. Stupak. Can a school district receive a refund? A number of the members mentioned refunds. They had to throw out their meat. Can they receive a refund from your company? I have probably about 20 school districts in my district. Mr. Mendell. I am not sure if that is going to be possible. Mr. Stupak. OK. In the Silliker report, this is one of these audit reports you want to put in there, on page 2 of the Silliker report it says animal welfare audit, beef. The video indicated that the inspections took place at 6:30 in the morning and 12:30 p.m. Do you remember that? Mr. Mendell. No. Mr. Stupak. OK. The narrative part of the first video. Mr. Mendell. 6:30 a.m. and 12? Mr. Stupak. Right. The video in the narrative said they started the inspections at 6:30 every morning. 6:30 was the inspection, and the next one was 12:30. Mr. Mendell. That was for antemortem inspections, yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. Right. But here your audit only takes place between 8:00 a.m. and noon. Mr. Mendell. OK. Mr. Stupak. So when the animals were going by for this inspection to see if you have downer cows this audit, they weren't present? Mr. Mendell. Who wasn't present? Mr. Stupak. This audit, the animal welfare audit of beef by Silliker, this audit you paid for. Mr. Mendell. Right. Mr. Stupak. The critical part of this testimony, or, I am sorry, of this hearing, is the downer cows having to move from here to there. Mr. Mendell. Right. Mr. Stupak. That occurs between 6:30 in the morning and again at 12:30 in the afternoon. According to this audit that you are relying upon to show your good practices they are only present between 8:00 and 12:00. They missed the critical phase we are talking about. Mr. Mendell. Is that what time those animals got moved? Mr. Stupak. It is right here. Mr. Mendell. That is what time the USDA went outside. Mr. Stupak. I am going off the audio of the video. Mr. Mendell. OK. Mr. Stupak. So what I am saying is if you are relying on this audit, the key times we are looking for your auditors weren't present? Mr. Mendell. Yes, obviously. Mr. Stupak. OK. And the other one didn't have times when they were present, just they were there November 13, 14. Mr. Mendell. It is just saying it is in that 8:00 to 12:00 period. Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this question. I indicated earlier that in both 2003 and 2004 you went after, or I shouldn't say after, you contracted for the national school lunch program. And in there because of the school lunch program there is greater scrutiny of your operation, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. So the risk of downer cows becomes more critical, correct? Mr. Mendell. Absolutely. Mr. Stupak. And the Wall Street Journal article I am reading says that the plants that slaughter animals are the major buyer of older, spent dairy cows from many dairy farms in the inland valley, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. That is correct. Mr. Stupak. Do you also buy cows from a 15-state area? Mr. Mendell. Fifteen? Mr. Stupak. Yes. Mr. Mendell. No. Probably six. Mr. Stupak. Six-state area. OK. I think that has been covered. What happened to Mr. Salas? Another worker told police Mr. Salas only came outside and he couldn't be reached for comment. Mr. Mendell. When this incident occurred, we suspended Pablo Salas until we reviewed all the documents that he had in place, and reinstated him to provide them all for USDA because I felt he did--he was doing his job. I wanted to make sure that all the paperwork was in order, that this gentleman did go through orientation and two training periods in a 6-week time, as well as documentation of backup for the rest of the people that worked there. Mr. Stupak. Are you ready for the next question? Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. I had asked you earlier about class 3, and I thought it was the serious adverse health. That is not true. Class 1 is adverse health. Class 2 is serious adverse health. Class 3 is likely to cause adverse health consequences--not likely to cause adverse health. I am going to put this as part of the record so we have it for the record in case any other member wishes to refer to it during their questions. Last question, these two audits, you had these audits, the two you have submitted as part of your testimony, do you know when auditors are coming, like this Silliker? Mr. Mendell. I personally don't but I am sure---- Mr. Stupak. Do they make arrangements with the company to come out? Mr. Mendell. I am sure these audits were scheduled. Yes, I am sure they were. Mr. Stupak. I have no further questions for this witness. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mendell, in your opening, your testimony, you testified receiving death threats, is that correct? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I did. Mr. Shimkus. And death threats at home, folks calling at home? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Shimkus. I just put that in the record to--I think a lot of us have been under crises modes. We have to put some stuff in perspective as far as shutting down the plant, putting a lot of people out of employment, going through the processes. Actually to some extent I am surprised and encouraged that you are here testifying today. When I was a county treasurer, I conducted the principle of management by walking around, brief familiar. Dr. Burgess kind of talked about that a little bit. You said you walked around occasionally. What is occasionally? Mr. Mendell. Obviously not as much as I should but I was-- my work was administrative mostly, sales, banking, collecting money, whatever. I was in the plant a lot more than I was out, outside of it. Mr. Shimkus. Yes, let me just follow up. If you were not out inspecting, who was? Did you trust him to inform you of any inhumane treatment being committed outside in the pens? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I trusted the personnel that were out there along with the training that we had given them, yes. Mr. Shimkus. Did you trust them and the other employees to alert you to any actions that would pose a threat to public health? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Shimkus. Had anyone ever alerted you to these kind of actions before? Mr. Mendell. Never. Mr. Shimkus. I want to follow up on this 500 cow issue. This came up in a first hearing, and the question that was posed, and we didn't have the ability to get answers, is the incentive for pushing to the 500 limit, what extraordinary actions would the employees go to to reach 500? Was there a financial incentive, and can you answer those questions? How are these folks paid? Are they paid hourly or are they paid by the process? You understand where the question---- Mr. Mendell. Yes. I believe most of the people there are paid by the hour. The supervisors are on salary. 500 a day was the optimum number for that plant based on economics, based on weight divided into fixed expenses. Mr. Shimkus. So there was no additional payment per cattle processed through a financial incentive to the employee---- Mr. Mendell. No. Mr. Shimkus [continuing]. To push product through that they may have believed was unsafe just for the financial aspect. Mr. Mendel. There were days we killed 493 and days we killed 510. Mr. Shimkus. And the last line for me is this whole spent dairy cattle issue. Mr. Mendell. Yes, sir. Mr. Shimkus. And it was raised also in the previous hearing, spent dairy cows or spent dairy cattle. They are at the end. And that is why they go to different processes other than others. I think by definition they are a cheaper meat because they are not beef cattle. They are spent dairy cattle. So that has additional challenges in the processing of these then healthy cattle that are going through the processes. Is that a correct assumption? Mr. Mendell. I think a lot more dairy cows get condemned per day than say in that steer plant, yes. Mr. Shimkus. So in this business model there is a larger risk of purchasing spent dairy cattle, can I make that assumption? Mr. Mendell. There are more condemned. There is more of a condemn rate, yes. Mr. Shimkus. That is the end of my questioning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. We have 11 minutes left on the floor, but before we continue with questions let me just--one of these documents you gave us, Westland/Hallmark Meat Company by Sean Thomas, saying that he signed or had training. It says trade secret. Do you want that in the record or not? Mr. Mendell. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. Ms. DeGette. Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to add my thanks, Mr. Mendell, for you coming today and giving the best and most honest answers that you could. I know that it is not an easy task. But as the consumer protection subcommittee develops our legislation around meat safety having this testimony from someone whose plant really had a terrible problem really helps us develop this legislation. Mr. Burgess asked you if you would have taken quicker action if the Humane Society would have given you the videotape at the time they gave it to the prosecutors, correct, and you said, yes, you would have taken quicker action? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I probably would have. Ms. DeGette. And then Ms. Schakowsky asked you about the whole sequence of events with the USDA, and you stressed to Ms. Schakowsky that in your company's opinion there was really no danger to this meat, correct? Mr. Mendell. To the best of my knowledge, I thought there wasn't, no. Ms. DeGette. Right. And so here is my question. What would you have done--you didn't recall the beef until the USDA told you to recall the beef, right? Mr. Mendell. Correct. Ms. DeGette. And that was about 10 days, according to your testimony, after you learned about the Humane Society videotape, right? Mr. Mendell. Correct. Ms. DeGette. So my question is if you would have learned about it right away, what is it that you would have done differently, install the cameras? Mr. Mendell. Yes, I would have. Ms. DeGette. Would you have done anything else? Would you have recalled the meat? Mr. Mendell. Not--no. Ms. DeGette. No, because you didn't recall the meat until 10 days after you learned about the video. Mr. Mendell. The first video that we received it was inhumane treatment of animals. That is what I was acting on. Ms. DeGette. So what would you---- Mr. Mendell. Till the last---- Ms. DeGette. So you would have tried to have more humane treatment of the animals but you wouldn't have done anything about the downed cattle? Mr. Mendell. I didn't know about the downed cows until later. Ms. DeGette. When did you know about the downed cows? Mr. Mendell. That is the tapes that the Humane Society held, the ones with the downed cows. Ms. DeGette. Right. But you didn't--so when you received those tapes you weren't told until 10 days later by the USDA to recall the beef, right? Mr. Mendell. I have never seen the downed cows going in the knocking box tapes until today. Ms. DeGette [continuing]. Oh, OK. Mr. Mendell. So I acted on animal---- Ms. DeGette. So your view was that seeing those downed cows on the videotapes that you received from the Humane Society, the only concern you had was the humane treatment concern, right? Mr. Mendell. That was my concern, ma'am. Ms. DeGette. And so really you would have never recalled this beef until you were told to by the USDA, right? Mr. Mendell. If I hadn't seen those videos there would have been no reason for it. Ms. DeGette. But you did see the videos and you still didn't think it was anything bigger than the--and there were downed cows in those videos but you didn't think it was a problem because you didn't see on the videos that they went into the processing---- Mr. Mendell. I reacted to the inhumane treatment of animals until---- Ms. DeGette. OK. You can answer my question. You thought it was an issue of inhumane treatment but you didn't think there was any kind of food risk because on the tapes you didn't see those going into the processing stream? Mr. Mendell. That is correct. Ms. DeGette. Thank you. So, Mr. Chairman, I guess that my conclusion from this line of testimony is that we really need to--most consumers in this country think that we have mandatory recall. The FDA does not have mandatory recall authority and the USDA recall authority is very long and involved. It is not an immediate mandatory recall authority. And this is what Congresswoman DeLauro had been working in our bill because what you get is you get people who even if they see the visual evidence that there are downed cows if they don't see the actual evidence that it goes into the food stream then they have got a business incentive not to voluntarily recall that meat, and so I think two things. Number 1, if you had mandatory recall authority by the USDA and the FDA, it would be more of an incentive on business owners to make that next leap to say if I see the downed cows there marching towards the processing, I am going to assume that those downed cows may go into the food stream, and I am going to take voluntary action. And the second thing is it would give the USDA an ability to actually take mandatory recall authority when the health of our citizens is at risk. And I yield back. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Mandatory recalls in the Dingell, Pallone, Stupak bill too. Jan, go ahead for questions. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask you, Mr. Mendell, how would you describe the training program? Mr. Mendell. The what program? Ms. Schakowsky. The training program. Mr. Mendell. I think it is--it is pretty intense. Ms. Schakowsky. Could you elaborate? Mr. Mendell. I don't have it with me. I can have copies sent to you. I will gladly have copies sent to you or to the committee. Ms. Schakowsky. Could you give us some sense of how long it is or is it hours, is it days? Mr. Mendell. I believe it is 50, 60 pages maybe. Ms. Schakowsky. The manual, but the program itself, the training program that---- Mr. Mendell. Yes. The training program itself that they go through on a monthly basis I believe is 50 to 60 pages, if I am not mistaken. It takes an hour, hour and a half probably to go through it. Ms. Schakowsky. And you prepared to say under oath that everyone who signed a paper like this actually went through that training program? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. And if we were to call on your employees, some employees, do you believe that every single one of them would say that before signing this paper that they actually went through that training program? Mr. Mendell. It is depending on management to put them through that training program, but as far as I am concerned, yes, everyone of them has gone through. Ms. Schakowsky. And so everyone that we might call or subpoena or whatever to come in, you feel confident that all of them would have gone through that program? Mr. Mendell. I feel confident that middle management has put every one of those employees through training. Ms. Schakowsky. Now I am looking through your attachments, quality management system, the QMSC committee members, and I notice, for example, that on that committee is Pablo Salas, the plant manager, and the Humane Society person said that he spent about 15 to 20 minutes a day actually by the pens. I wanted to ask you who among those on the quality management system actually were there. Mr. Mendell. Was the supervisor, Daniel Agardi was his name. Ms. Schakowsky. I don't see him on the--he is not a member of that committee or is he because I am looking at---- Mr. Mendell. I am not certain what you are looking at but he was the pen foreman. Ms. Schakowsky. OK. And is that person there full time? Mr. Mendell. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. I see. So is anybody who is on the quality management system, your name is on there, Pablo Salas, Tony Cuevas, Gustavo Manzo, Martin Laguna, Henry Wong, Martin Gonzalez, Tony Gonzalez, Tony Padilla, and Steve Sayer, are any of those people who are on the quality management system committee there to observe what goes on day-to-day? Mr. Mendell. I am sure they interact on a daily basis or bi-daily basis or intermittently, yes. Ms. Schakowsky. Intermittently, but are any of those people who are on that--because it says in the event of an audit the QMSC would meet to evaluate plant's conditions and practices, so one would assume that people that are assigned to that committee would have some sort of responsibility assigned to them to actually check out conditions. Do they have as part of their job description any prescribed times or assignments to observe this? Mr. Mendell. I know that Steve Sayer has done the in-plant audits, which included humane handling. I know that he does it. I know that Stan Mendell does it. Ms. Schakowsky. And so that means that he has to be on the--he has to be there to see it? Mr. Mendell. Well, Daniel Agardi could be off that list. I am not sure. He doesn't work there anymore. Ms. Schakowsky. All right. Thank you. We have a vote. And I appreciate your testimony. Mr. Stupak. We have a minute and 30 seconds left to get to vote. We are probably going to have 2 votes. We are going to stand in recess. And, Mr. Mendell, we are going to let you go. I think there are no other questions. And we will call our second panel as soon as we come back. You are free to go. We are going to probably be 20 minutes, I would think. It depends on how many parliamentarian inquiries we have. You are free to go. We will start the second panel as soon as we get back. [Recess.] Mr. Stupak. We will resume. I will now call our second panel of witnesses to come forward. On our second panel we have Danielle Lachman, Divisional Merchandise Manager of Target Corporation, Mr. Daniel Wegman, Chief Operating Officer of Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., Mr. Dennis Olson, Professor at Iowa State University's College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. As you know, it is the policy of this committee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right under rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their testimony. It looks like we are missing Mr. Wegman. I am sure he will be here in a second. We will hold a second, then we will do the oath, and we will get going. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? OK. We got you in the middle, Mr. Wegman. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Stupak. Let the witnesses reflect all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. They are now under oath, which includes the opening statement. We will begin. Let us start with Ms. Lachman, if you want to start, please. Turn your mike on there. Five minutes for an opening statement. You may wish to submit a longer statement for inclusion in the record. We look forward to your testimony. Please begin. STATEMENT OF DANIELLE LACHMAN, DIVISIONAL MERCHANDISE MANAGER, TARGET CORPORATION Ms. Lachman. Thank you. Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Shimkus, and other members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. My name is Danielle Lachman. I am pleased to be here today on behalf of Target Corporation. I am currently a Divisional Merchandise Manager for Target's Super Target grocery store operations. I have been in my current position since September, 2007, and with Target since 2003. As a Divisional Merchandise Manager for Super Target, I oversee the produce, meat, deli, and bakery departments. The merchant teams in these departments assess available products, select and buy the right assortment of products, and develop a Target-brand presentation for our guests in the store. The subcommittee has invited me here to relate Target's recent interactions on labeling with the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the USDA, as well as with suppliers of certain of Target's fresh meat products. On September 13, 2007, Target received a request letter from Chairman Dingell and Stupak seeking information regarding fresh meat products and methods employed to ensure freshness. In particular, the subcommittee sought information regarding the modified atmosphere packaging used by some of Target's fresh meat suppliers. Target responded to all of the subcommittee's questions by letter dated October 4, 2007. Target also provided documentation as requested. In addition, on November 9, 2007, in an effort to fully address the subcommittee's concerns regarding the labeling of products employing MAP technology, Target wrote to the Administrator of FSIS seeking direction regarding how to obtain approval for additional labeling on meat products using MAP. FSIS responded to Target on January 16, 2008. In its response, FSIS indicated that it was not possible for FSIS to provide direction to Target or approval of the proposed labeling language without additional information and documentation. Much of that documentation and information is not in the possession or control of Target as a retailer. Target has had no further contact with FSIS. In addition to working with the subcommittee and contacting FSIS, Target has also reached out to its suppliers. After receiving the FSIS letter of January 16, 2008, Target asked its primary provider, Precept, a joint venture between Cargill and Hormel, if it would include the language in Target's letter to FSIS on its packaging. Precept informed Target that it had already submitted an application with different language to FSIS, which had been approved by FSIS. Target understands that Precept will begin employing the FSIS-approved labeling as early as the end of March. We understand that the new packaging will include the following language: ``Color is not an indicator of freshness. Refer to use or freeze by'' and then the date. In addition, Target understands that Precept and Hormel have been actively working with a consumer group to develop additional labeling language. We understand the joint effort is aimed at ensuring that this consumer group is supportive of any additional labeling regarding the use of MAP technology. The fresh meat products sold at Super Target comply with all applicable labeling standards. Target is committed to ensuring that all food products sold at Super Target will comply with any new labeling requirements as well. We will only buy from suppliers that provide assurances that they will comply with all applicable laws and standards. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I would be pleased to answer any of your questions. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Ms. Lachman. Mr. Wegman, please, your statement, please, sir. [The prepared statement of Ms. Lachman follows:] Statement of Danielle Lachman Chairman Stupak, ranking Member Shimkus and other Members of the Subcommittee, Good morning. My name is Danielle Lachman. I am pleased to be here today on behalf of Target Corporation. I am currently a Divisional Merchandise Manager for Target's SuperTarget grocery store operations. I have been in my current position since September, 2007 and with Target since 2003. As a Divisional Merchandise Manager for SuperTarget, I oversee the produce, meat, deli and bakery departments. The merchant teams in these departments assess available products, select and buy the right assortment of products, and develop a Target-brand presentation for our guests in the store. Interaction with the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee and FSIS The Subcommittee has invited me here to relate Target's recent interactions on labeling with the Food Safety and Inspection Service (``FSIS'') of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (``USDA'') as well as with suppliers of certain of Target's fresh meat products. On September 13, 2007, Target received a request letter from Chairmen Dingell and Stupak seeking information regarding fresh meat products and methods employed to ensure freshness. In particular, the Subcommittee sought information regarding the modified atmosphere packaging (``MAP'') used by some of Target's fresh meat suppliers. Target responded to all of the Subcommittee's questions by letter dated October 4, 2007. Target also provided documentation as requested. In addition, on November 9, 2007, in an effort to fully address the Subcommittee's concerns regarding the labeling of products employing MAP technology, Target wrote to the Administrator of FSIS seeking direction regarding how to obtain approval for additional labeling on meat products using MAP. FSIS responded to Target on January 16, 2008. In its response, FSIS indicated that it was not possible for FSIS to provide direction to Target or approval of the proposed labeling language without additional information and documentation. Much of that documentation and information is not in the possession or control of Target as a retailer. Target has had no further contact with FSIS. Interaction with Suppliers In addition to working with the Subcommittee, and contacting FSIS, Target has also reached out to its suppliers. After receiving the FSIS letter of January 16, 2008, Target asked its primary provider, Precept (a joint venture between Cargill and Hormel), if it would include the language in Target's letter to FSIS on it's packaging. Precept informed Target that it had already submitted an application with different language to FSIS which had been approved by FSIS. Target understands that Precept will begin employing the FSIS-approved labeling as early as the end of March. We understand that the new packaging will include the following language, ``Color is not an accurate indicator of freshness. Refer to Use or Freeze By [date].'' In addition, Target understands that Precept and Hormel have been actively working with a consumer group to develop additional labeling language. We understand the joint effort is aimed at ensuring that this consumer group is supportive of any additional labeling regarding the use of MAP technology. Conclusion The fresh meat products sold at SuperTarget comply with all applicable labeling standards. Target is committed to ensuring that all food products sold at SuperTarget will comply with any new labeling requirements as well. We will only buy from suppliers that provide assurances that they will comply with all applicable laws and standards. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I would be pleased to answer any of your questions. ---------- STATEMENT OF DANIEL WEGMAN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WEGMANS FOOD MARKETS, INC. Mr. Wegman. Thank you for the opportunity. Mr. Stupak. Do you want to pull that up just a little closer to you, that mike? Mr. Wegman. OK. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I am Danny Wegman, and I am the CEO of Wegmans, which is a 70 store supermarket chain with stores in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland. We are a family-owned company, founded in 1916. Wegmans is committed to providing safe and wholesome food for our customers. We see the number of people who suffer from related illness each year and we need to do better for our customers. I am also the chairperson of the Food Marketing Institute's Food Safety Task Force. This task force was created to move food safety forward through the retail environment. It is the second time this task force has been formed. It was formed 10 years ago, first of all, and at the time the topic was E. coli and ground beef, the same topic, strangely enough. And it was back then when we as a retailer, one of our customers had a case of E. coli, and we were wondering where the E. coli came from. And they were a regular shopper. The health authorities looked in their freezer. Our ground beef was there. They had it tested for E. coli. There was no E. coli there. And nevertheless the customer had it. We don't know where he got it. We were very concerned, and we said there is no--we didn't know how to eliminate E. coli in our stores and so we said the only thing we can do is urge customers to cook ground beef to 160 degrees or risk fatal illness. My team thought it was better than saying risk dying, so we chose fatal illness. But we did this. We are in all of our stores. We introduced thermometers to our customers. We had them in all our stores. We gave actually a type of thermometer away to all our customers who wanted the ground beef, and told them what to do with it. Interestingly, ground beef sales went up, and I think the reason for that was they knew what to do with the ground beef and could eat it safely. Even at the height of our education, however, it turned out that only less than 40 percent of our customers really truly understood what we were talking about. So we had good results but we still didn't get where we wanted to be. In May of 2002, we introduced irradiated ground beef to our customers, and our sales got as high as between around--we averaged about 5 percent of our ground beef sales. The highest week ever would have been about 10 percent. Our retails were anywhere from 10 to 20 cents higher than normal beef, normal ground beef, and we found the program was good but we didn't quite get to the sales level that we wanted. This was in 2002. Then in 2004 our supplier went bankrupt, which was SureBeam, and that had to stop us from selling irradiated ground beef. So finally we introduced a product in August of 2006, and we didn't quite promote it in quite the same fashion because our cost was substantially higher. We had to ship the product around because it wasn't made in the same plant where our regular ground beef was, so today's date we are selling it at about 40 cents a pound higher than our normal ground beef, and the sales are only 1 percent. We still certainly believe in it. The product is tested for E. coli prior to irradiation and the irradiation is an additional step for safety. We have chosen a level of irradiation that kills E. coli O157:H7 and is equivalent to cooking the ground beef to 160 degrees, the recommended cooking temperature for non-irradiated, which is the same as for non-irradiated, so the irradiation is an additional step in the process. We use the word irradiated, and we use it right now in the front of our package because we felt it was--for our go to market strategy we try and be right up front with people. We are not afraid of that. We would rather tell them that it is irradiated and why we are doing it. So I guess as we sit here today in many ways we feel that we are really not getting the support of the government that we need to pursue food safety the way it should be pursued. We feel that the regulations, some of them, are out of date, need to deal with new pathogens, need to deal with new technologies. Number 1, recognize that if irradiation is effective in eliminating pathogens from ground beef and allowing labeling that will communicate this to customers. Number 2, USDA's caution about the cook to 160 degree message is understandable, but irradiated fresh ground beef should have different label--allow different wording or something to indicate that you have changed the process. We at one point, when we were reintroducing our ground beef started with traditional ground beef, must be cooked to 160 degrees to be sure that any illness causing bacteria that may be in the meat are killed. That isn't necessary with Wegman's irradiated fresh ground beef because dangerous micro-organisms have been killed or rendered incapable of causing illness. And we got a letter from the USDA that says FSIS advises consumers that for optimal safety all raw ground beef, including raw ground beef that has been irradiated, should be cooked to a minimum internal temperature of 160 degrees Fahrenheit. So if you take what they were telling us, the customers were right in only purchasing 1 percent of their ground beef because indeed it was a stupid test. Pay 40 cents a pound more and get nothing, and that is not what we know to be true, so that was a big concern to us. Next, we think it is important to have a minimum level of irradiation if we are going to use this because there is a maximum but there is no minimum, and if you don't apply enough irradiation you really don't get the desired results that you are looking for. You are not eliminating E. coli. And right now there is no minimum. And then, second of all, we would like this to be designated by some type of a word whether it is pasteurized or whether it is ready to eat or whatever you want to call it, but it needs to be differentiated from just plain random irradiation. Many products are available in pasteurized and non-pasteurized forms, and it is not confusing for consumers to tell the difference with labeling. An example of this is eggs. Pasteurized eggs are available for use in products that may not be fully cooked following the addition of egg, such as a Caesar salad or egg nog and customers are comfortable with it. Next, we are encouraging our customers to adopt healthy lifestyles by eating more fruits and vegetables, but these foods can pose a risk too. We believe that the list of products that can be irradiated should be expanded to include fruits and vegetables, as well as other ready-to-eat products. In today's world, I am not convinced at all the interventions we make will be able to stop E. coli in all lettuce. I have an example of a lettuce grower who has been there for I don't know how many years. He is next to a farm, a dairy farm. He has been there forever. It is his family business. Recently there was some kind of a problem with the irrigation pipes or something, and they caused E. coli in the lettuce. Now in theory this is just what you don't want done, but I am trying to think myself if I own a farm, and I have been there for years and the world is changing, are the right incentives there to get me to do the right things, and I am not sure they are. As an industry, we are going to try as hard as we can to audit our farmers and make sure that everything we can see is being done in anything the science can tell us, but I am not convinced that we may get there, and so I am not sure that we shouldn't be considering irradiation for vegetables that we are not going to--that we are not going to cook. Mr. Stupak. Let me have you finish up there. You are running a little bit over there. Mr. Wegman. OK. I guess we would ask that we help protect customers from foodborne illness by encouraging and approving the use of technologies that reduce pathogens. That is basically what we are after. And I guess if--I would like to have the government have as much passion about keeping people safe with the food they eat as we do as retailers because when people come in our store, we have an obligation that they do get safe food, and we find that there are some things in there that the government is doing that seems to be sitting on the sidelines instead of taking an active position. So thank you very much. I appreciate the chance to share my thoughts. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wegman follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.035 Mr. Stupak. Thank you for coming. Professor Olson, if you would, please, sir, for your opening statement, 5 minutes, and if you have a longer statement, part of the record. STATEMENT OF DENNIS G. OLSON, PH.D., PROFESSOR, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND LIFE SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL SCIENCE Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee. I am Dennis Olson, Professor of Animal Science and Professor in charge of our Linear Accelerator at Iowa State University, which is the first food irradiation facility at a university in the United States. After World War II and President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program, the U.S. Army developed a strong research program in food irradiation. That was in 1951. Thirteen years later in a joint Congress committee on atomic energy a statement from the Surgeon General said in summary it can be stated that foods irradiated up to absorbed doses of 5.6 Mrads, which would be equivalent to 56 kGy today with a cobalt-60 source of gamma radiation or with electrons with energies up to 10 million electron volts have been found to be wholesome, i.e., safe and nutritionally adequate. That was in 1965. Interest in irradiation grew internationally, and a joint coordinated international program to look at the safety and wholesomeness of irradiated foods ensued. And a joint expert committee for the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Atomic Energy Agency or the International Atomic Energy Agency joint committee, and they issued a report in 1981 that said in their landmark report the committee conducted the ``irradiation of any food commodity up to an overall average dose of 10 kGy presents no toxicological hazard,'' hence toxological testing of food so treated is no longer needed. That was that report, and it was a monumental report because shortly thereafter in 1983 the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which is the highest legal authority for international food standards, issued rules for irradiated foods that says any food up to 10 kGy could be irradiated. And after that was issued, there are now 59 countries that have some irradiated foods that are approved for use with different maximum doses on those. The concern, however, was the 10 kGy because since 1973 we have been irradiating foods for our astronauts that have gone up to about 30 kGy, and so the question is, is a 10 kGy an actual limit? And so again a series of research projects ensued and in 1999 another joint expert committee with the World Health Organization, the FAO and IAEA, formed and their conclusion was foods that are appropriately prepared, packaged, and irradiated to high doses under proper conditions to sterilize them should be deemed safe. And after that report was issued again the Codex changed their rules and removed the 10 kGy limit. So irradiated foods are safe and in fact there are now 15 countries in the world that have no limit on any food that can be irradiated and several of that 15 group restrict no dose. But the U.S. is not one of those. Even though there has been no indication FDA has ever disagreed with the joint expert committee reports, we still have very severe restrictions. We were in a catastrophe here in the United States in 1998 in December and then January and February of 1999 where we had 35 million pounds of Billmar frankfurters and deli meats that were recalled, and the recall was due to 100 illnesses that occurred in 22 states resulting in 21 deaths, and with that occurrence, that catastrophe, 30 different organizations related to agriculture and food formed and submitted a petition to FDA for ready to eat foods, and essentially it would cover almost all foods in the U.S. except for seafood. That was in 1999. We are still waiting for that petition to be approved. And we had another catastrophe in the fall of 2006 when we had spinach that was recalled where--that was in September and October of 2006, 199 illnesses in 26 states, 102 hospitalizations, and 3 deaths. And as I got contacted by the media, my question was is this a big enough catastrophe for FDA to issue their ready to eat approval, and a year-and-a-half later, I guess not. One issue I wanted to address is there has been some concern about does irradiation destroy the quality of the product, and so thanks to the courtesy of SADEX Corporation in Sioux City, Iowa, we have brought a number of products here that we have irradiated. I was there Monday and I watched that. As you inspect these, you will see we have a non-irradiated and an irradiated one. Every irradiated one will have a little label on it with my initials that I personally put on there, and I also have dosimetry sheets to indicate what doses those received. So I hope you take a chance to look at those and even open it up and taste it. The quality is excellent. The last point I wanted to make is that we have some pillars of public health in the United States. About 100 years ago we were debating about whether cooking milk was appropriate, and a lot of debate on that. We now know that pasteurization of milk and juices is a pillar of public health in preventing illness. Likewise, when we chlorinate our water supply, we are preventing illness by that treatment and also by vaccinating for viruses for protecting our population. I believe that when we have widespread use of irradiation in our food supply, it will also be listed as a pillar of public health. Thank you, Chairman. I will be happy to answer questions you might have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:] Statement of Dennis G. Olson Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the committee for inviting me to offer my views on food irradiation. My career has been devoted to this subject through teaching, research and commercial applications. In 1993, I commissioned the first electron-beam food irradiation facility at Iowa State University and developed an extensive program in food irradiation research and education in cooperation with many other universities. Irradiation can be a powerful weapon in the nation's food safety arsenal. It destroys pathogenic bacteria without changing the nature of the treated food. The effect is similar to pasteurization, in that food is made safer, while maintaining the taste and appearance of the untreated product. Of course, the absence of heat means that, in comparison with pasteurization, irradiation can be applied to a much wider range of fresh or ready to eat foods. Food irradiation cannot make food radioactive. The equipment used for food irradiation does not have sufficient energy to cause radioactivity in any treated material, including food, regardless of the amount of irradiation absorbed. Irradiation is not a new technology, and food irradiation is not a new topic, even in these halls. In June 1965, following more than twenty years of research by the Army, the US Army Surgeon General testified before Congress and concluded that ``foods irradiated up to an absorbed dose of 5.6 Mrad (56 kGy) with a cobalt-60 source of gamma radiation or with electrons with energies up to 10 million electron volts (MeV) have been found to be wholesome, i.e. safe and nutritionally adequate.'' \1\ The Surgeon General, in that report more than 40 years ago, concluded that irradiated food is safe regardless of the dose. \2\ Since then, decades of increasingly sophisticated research have affirmed that conclusion. Now, more than forty years later, I welcome the opportunity to repeat that message. Irradiated food is safe. In recent decades, irradiation has been increasingly adopted to sterilize medical products, and is now considered state of the art in medical sterilization. That same evolution should have occurred in food irradiation, and that it did not happen is quite literally a tragedy. The millions of pounds of contaminated ground beef, lettuce and spinach that have been recalled in the last eighteen months, and the sickness and death that accompanied those recalls, would have been prevented if those products had been irradiated. The companies and the trade groups involved in these recalls, many of whom have testified before this Subcommittee, have all promised to do better. But they have also said, in a variety of ways, that despite their best efforts there is no ``Kill Step'' that will ensure their customers do not become sick in the future. Those assertions are simply not true. The pathogens responsible for these recalls, E. coli O157:H7, salmonella and Listeria monocytogenes, can be killed by proven, available and safe technology. Food irradiation is that ``Kill Step.'' I am convinced that food irradiation should be, and ultimately will be, broadly used in the food industry. As that occurs, food irradiation will become one of the Pillars of Public Health, along with chlorination of water, pasteurization of milk and juices, and vaccination, in the prevention of illness. I urge Congress to advance the application of irradiation in the food industry. To that end, approved uses of irradiation need to be expanded, regulatory agencies and public health professionals need to actively engage with consumers to educate them about the benefits of the technology. Labeling requirements, if needed, should be informative not alarming. Food processors need to be encouraged to adopt irradiation, or alternative food safety interventions that guarantee a comparable reduction in risk. The first step needs to be an immediate increase in the scope of governmental approved uses for food irradiation. Of the products involved in the recent recalls, only ground beef has adequate approval from FDA and USDA. Irradiated ground beef is currently available in the marketplace, but in limited amounts. None of the major ground beef producers market an irradiated product. With regard to leafy greens, which include spinach and bagged salads, the FDA allows irradiation for insect control and shelf-life extension, but does not allow it to be used for pathogen reduction. In order to allow irradiation for pathogen reduction in leafy greens, the FDA needs to approve both the use and the increased dose necessary for effective pathogen control in these products. That approval should have been granted years ago. In late 1999, a petition to allow irradiation for pathogen reduction in fruits and vegetables and other ready to eat foods (FAP 9M4697) was submitted to FDA. Eight years later, that petition is still pending. Two petitions submitted to FDA by USDA, its sister agency, also remain ``pending'' after more than eight years (FAP 0M4695 and FAP 9M4696). Yet, these petitions are being considered under the agency's ``expedited'' review process. The FDA's review responsibility with regard to irradiation petitions is to evaluate safety. Safety in this context involves assessment of microbiological risk, potential toxicity and nutritional adequacy. Although it sounds complicated, after decades of research this evaluation should be a simple task. There is no longer any question about the safety of irradiated foods. In fact the kind of case-by-case review that the FDA requires has been irrelevant and unnecessary for more than a quarter century. In 1980, the World Health Organization published a report summarizing all of the research to that date, \3\ and concluded that any food, even if irradiated to a moderately high dose, would be wholesome. In other words, safe and nutritionally adequate. The same conclusion reached by the US Army Surgeon General fifteen years earlier. The WHO report further concluded that further research on the safety of food irradiation at moderately high doses was unnecessary. In response to the WHO report, the Codex General Standard for Irradiated Food was adopted in 1983. Those standards provided that irradiation of any food up to an average dose of 10 kiloGray (kGy) presented no concern. The FDA did not adopt the Codex recommendations. In 1999, the World Health Organization issued a subsequent report on high dose irradiation and concluded there is no irradiation dose where foods become unsafe. \4\ In 2003, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which is the highest international body on food standards, revised its 1983 Standard to lift all restrictions on food categories or dose limits for irradiated foods. The Codex standard does provide that doses above 10 kGy should only be used when needed to achieve a technological purpose. There are now 15 countries that permit the irradiation of any food, and several allow irradiation at any dose. The U.S. is not one of them. The limited approvals of irradiation in the U.S. has continued despite the support of the American Medical Association, American Dietetic Association, American Veterinary Medical Association, Center for Disease and Protection, Public Health Service, Council of Science and Technology, Institute of Food Technologists, National Association of State Departments of Agriculture and others recognizing the safety and benefits of food irradiation. \5\ The FDA apparently believes that the 1999 WHO report considered all of the studies the FDA considers relevant, \6\ and has expressed no disagreement with the conclusions in that report. Nonetheless, FDA continues its outdated petition by petition review. Perhaps, in light of the evidence outlined above, the time has come to consider whether the classification and regulation of irradiation as a food additive should be changed. When food processors discuss irradiation they often claim either that they have not studied its use, or have determined that it will damage the product, making it unacceptable in the marketplace. I believe the quality issue is not a real issue, but in any case it should not be a regulatory concern. The marketplace will ultimately decide if quality is compromised by irradiation. For my part, I have confidence in the capacity of the food industry to develop packaging, product configuration, processing temperature and irradiation dose to offer high quality and safe irradiated foods. If there is a quality hurdle, it is a very low one. Several irradiated food products, and the non-irradiated controls, are available today for your evaluation. These products were purchased off the shelf, and irradiated in their retail packages without any intervention to improve quality. I believe they demonstrate that quality does not have to be sacrificed in an irradiated product. Adoption of irradiation technology in the food industry is impeded by lack of timely and adequate FDA approvals, warning- style labeling requirements, the lack of engagement of public health officials to promote the safety of irradiated foods to consumers, and of course, the food industry's desire to avoid increased cost. The cost of irradiation is a valid concern. In addition, there are only a few irradiation facilities in the U. S. currently capable of irradiating food in commercial volumes. The limited number of irradiation facilities can mean high transportation costs, but that is not unusual to a developing technology. Increased demand will lead to more, better located, irradiation facilities. Nonetheless, even with the current limited capacity, it should cost only cents per pound, including transportation. The offsetting benefits of irradiation are no recalls, no illnesses, no deaths and avoided litigation awards. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify on the application of this important pillar of public health technology; food irradiation. I solicit your help to get all foods approved for irradiation and to and eliminate the unwarranted warning-type label requirements. We should not accept the fact that a number of our citizens will get sick, be hospitalized or die because the government has not allowed the food industry to adopt food irradiation for all foods to prevent those catastrophes. Dennis G. Olson, Ph. D. Professor-in-Charge Linear Accelerator Facility Iowa State University --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Radiation Processing of Foods. Hearings before the Congress of the UnitedStates, 9 and 10 June, 1965. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office,1965, pp. 105-106. \2\ Wholesomeness of irradiated food. Report of a Joint FAO/IAEA/ WHO Expert Committee. Geneva, World Health Organization, 1981 (WHO Technical ReportSeries, No. 659). \3\ A dose of 56 kGy is more than 10 times the maximum dose currently approved for fresh meat, and higher than the dose approved for sterilizing foods to be used by NASA in the space program. [21CFR 179.26(b)(8)] \4\ Joint FAO/IAEA/WHO Study Group on High-Dose Irradiation (Wholesomeness of Food Irradiated with Doses above 10 kGy) (1997: Geneva, Switzerland) Wholesomeness of food irradiated with doses above 10 kGy: report of a Joint FAO/IAEA/WHO Study Group--WHO technical report series: 890 \5\ Food Irradiation: Available Research Indicates that Benefits Outweigh Risks. GAO Report (GAO/RCED-00-217) to the Committee on Commerce, Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, August, 2000. \6\ 70 FR 48057 August 16, 2005 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary Points 1. Food irradiation cannot make food radioactive. 2. Irradiated food is safe. 3. Food irradiation can be the ``Kill Step'' to prevent pathogens from causing illness. 4. When widely adopted, irradiation will be a Pillar of Public Health along with chlorination, pasteurization and vaccination in preventing illness. 5. More FDA approvals to irradiate all foods are needed immediately. 6. Quality of irradiated foods is not a regulatory concern and industry can overcome any quality issues. 7. Labeling of irradiated foods, if needed, should be informative not alarming. 8. Cost to irradiated foods is cents per pound and will lower as more facilities are built. 9. Expanded use of irradiation for food will decrease illness. ---------- Mr. Stupak. Yes, we are going to try to get some questions in. We are going to have two votes on the floor so let us start. Let me start with you, Professor, as you are grabbing a drink of water. You say in your testimony, and you alluded to it, but in your written testimony, page 3, the FDA apparently believed that the 1999 WHO report considered all the studies the FDA considers relevant and had expressed no disagreement with the conclusions in that report. This is on irradiation of foods, correct? Mr. Olson. That is correct. Mr. Stupak. And then you go on to say nonetheless FDA continues its outdated petition by petition review. Perhaps in view of the evidence outlined above, it is time to consider-- and you said you are still waiting. What is the delay? It has been 1999. We are now 9 years later, almost 10 years later. Why aren't they ruling on the petition that you all put together? Mr. Olson. Well, there are some issues that came up with furans, and there had to be some research done on that and some market basket tests. But we need to have some common sense because we have found acrylamides in potato chips and French fries that we have been eating for decades and acrylamide is listed as a carcinogen. We felt furans in maybe slightly elevated levels in irradiated products that have high carbohydrate content, slight elevation. Mr. Stupak. Is that harmful? Would that be harmful? Mr. Olson. Well, in a pure form it would but the greatest content that we have in our market basket study that FDA did is in baby food, and so if anybody is going to be susceptible, it should be young children and baby foods have by far the highest amount of furans as any of the other foods that have been tested, but it is still a delay that has prevented the petition from coming forward. Mr. Stupak. Is it because the FDA doesn't have the science foundation to address the issue raised in the petition? Mr. Olson. I think they are fully capable of the science part. I have no doubt about that. What other issues has caused that from not being issued especially in light of what we have seen around the world, you know, it is---- Mr. Stupak. Do other countries use irradiation, like the European Union and others, do they use it in their products? Mr. Olson. Frankly, we have an explosion of facilities being built, especially in the Southeast Asia area where we are going to be experiencing this spring a tremendous amount of irradiated fruits, tropical fruits coming into the United States. That is the biggest area of activity that is occurring. We have a lot of shrimp that are irradiated in that area as well. Mr. Stupak. But your petition didn't include seafood, isn't that what you said, the WHO, World Health Organization, the petition you guys submitted on that behalf did not include seafood? Mr. Olson. That is correct because there were other petitions submitted that did include seafood. Mr. Stupak. So there are petitions pending before the FDA on seafood? Mr. Olson. The last one was in molluscan and shell fish which was approved in '95 or '97, I think it was. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Wegman, if I may, you said you began selling your irradiated ground beef when a consumer got sick. It wasn't necessarily traced back to your beef but that is how you got interested in this. And I have one of yours right here, Wegmans 9010 irradiated ground beef. Why did you feel it was important to put irradiated on the product itself? Mr. Wegman. We just wanted to be very clear with our customers. We weren't trying to pull a fast one on them. Mr. Stupak. OK. To put irradiated on there, did you get approval from the FDA? Mr. Wegman. We must have or we wouldn't have it on there, I guess. He can answer it better. Mr. Stupak. OK. I am sorry. I said FDA. It is USDA. Mr. Olson. USDA requires the label to say irradiated, generally irradiated for food safety with a symbol on that but that statement may be no larger than the ingredient statement on any package. But Wegmans took another step and put a billboard of it. Mr. Stupak. OK. As a retailer then, Mr. Wegman, did you have to work with the supplier to get the USDA to approve your label? Mr. Wegman. I believe we do. If you need further exact yes or no, I can ask somebody behind me. Mr. Stupak. OK. On this committee we have had past hearings on carbon monoxide. Do you use carbon monoxide packaging for any of your beef or anything, Mr. Wegman? Mr. Wegman. No, we don't. Mr. Stupak. Just irradiation? Mr. Wegman. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. Let me go to Ms. Lachman then. Do you use-- in your beef products? Ms. Lachman. We use MAP package products, yes. Mr. Stupak. Carbon monoxide. Ms. Lachman. I believe that is the tri-gas in there. Mr. Stupak. OK. If Wegmans can use irradiation on their packaging and it is rather pronounced, and I looked earlier before on the spinach and all that, and there is pretty good size labels on there. Why won't you just call it carbon monoxide as opposed to modified packaging or whatever? Ms. Lachman. Quite honestly, we have to--we did submit the letter to FSIS. The language was not approved. We have worked with Hormel and Precept, or Precept who is our primary vendor. Precept declined to pursue our language as they already had a label approved by FSIS for that packaging. Mr. Stupak. And what is that label that is approved by FSIS? Ms. Lachman. One moment, and I can read it. Mr. Stupak. Is that the one that is in your testimony about it doesn't change the color or whatever? Ms. Lachman. ``Color is not an adequate indicator of freshness. Refer to use or freeze by'' date. Mr. Stupak. And the reason why it doesn't change color because it has been treated with the carbon monoxide, right? Ms. Lachman. I believe that is on the package. I am not an expert on that. Mr. Stupak. OK. I guess what I am trying to figure out, Wegmans have done the right thing to let the consumer know but when it comes to carbon monoxide we get all kinds of push back, and if Wegmans can do it successfully why can't we just put carbon monoxide. Ms. Lachman. I am sorry. I can't speak for what Wegmans has done but we have been working with Hormel to pursue labeling. Mr. Stupak. But it doesn't say carbon monoxide on it? See, we still think the consumer has the ultimate right to know whatever it is. So I am going to go to Mr. Shimkus. We have a couple of votes on the floor. I know I got plenty more but go ahead. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to go to Dr. Olson. Your testimony implies that when it comes to irradiation private industry is waiting for the FDA golden stamp of approval. If the FDA approved the use of irradiation for food in higher doses, do you think that more technological advances in this area by private industry would follow, ultimately reducing the costs to irradiate the food and resulting in a more affordable product to consumers? Mr. Olson. I think there are several factors involved. The red meat petition was approved, final rules, by USDA on February 23, 1999, and were first allowed February 23, 2000. Industry offered irradiated ground beef in May just a few months later, and so certainly industry is not going to invest until rules are in place. The second is that the high cost that Mr. Wegman talked about is a lot related to transportation. You make the product one place. You transport it to an irradiation facility. You transport it back to a distribution center. Then it gets to the retail store. And when we get an infrastructure in place even where you have an irradiation facility in line or in plant, then we are talking instead of that 40 cents it might be 5 cents. Mr. Shimkus. Yes, I really believe in competitive market principles, and there is always a debate about when we intervene and the initial intervention is very costly but then I think the business tries to streamline it to make sure that they can bring a competitive product, you know, for the consumer because I think, Mr. Wegman, you know that you had sold previously irradiated beef but that company went out of business. It probably went out of business because it couldn't compete on cost. Do you know the reason? Mr. Wegman. I apologize. I don't know the entire reason. My belief was that there were---- Mr. Shimkus. It is not your company so you don't have to-- -- Mr. Wegman. So I can say things about it. There were some lines of business that were never allowed to be irradiated that they couldn't run through their system and the fixed costs were very high. But we are looking to see if it would be around a dime, and that is what the folks say to us. But we got to get volume going through it. We would like permission to go after this thing and if I get thrown in jail can you at least bring me some water? Because we got to tell our customers that you can eat a good tasty, juicy hamburger if it is irradiated, otherwise, we would love to try that and see if this thing will really fly and get back to where we were or even higher. Mr. Shimkus. Well, it is part of our challenge to because we have--I mean we will have individuals here that will say irradiate it? Radiation, no. And part of the hearing process is to get on the record the safety and efficacy so if and when we move a bill and we put this in that we don't hit these walls that will develop here, much like the whole question of the packaging, whether it is--and we just want clarity for the consumer so the consumer can choose. I have another question I want to make sure I ask of Mr. Olson. Mr. Olson, in your testimony you state that there is no longer any question about the safety of irradiated foods. However, committee staff was told about scientific studies in Europe that claim that the irradiation processes with meat and some produce, in particular mangoes, result in the production of chemicals. You addressed this earlier to some extent in the carcinogens. But the question really deals with why do these studies don't hold merit in your eyes or do they? Mr. Olson. No, they don't for a couple of reasons. One is that Europe has spent a great deal of time trying to identify irradiated foods. Part of that mission is so that they can deny it but they want to be able to detect irradiated foods so you are looking at compounds that may have formed in the product that has not formed in non-irradiated foods, and there are a number of those that have been detected. But then you take the next step and you try and purify that, and then you try and see if there are any carcinogenic or any toxicological issues. And some have suggested in a pure form they might but you look at how do you approve any food additive in this country, and that is you go through extensive animal testing. And we did that for many, many years. There has been no food additive that has ever had such thorough animal testing done as this process. In fact, if we look at other non-thermal technologies for processing technologies, they have never had to undergo the scruples of a food additive petition. In 1958 we have a food additive that is in fact either the cobalt or the linear accelerators the additive. And that is what has forced this whole issue of going through these great strides and any hence of any kind of things that might suggest they are wrong, delays, delays, delays the implementation. Maybe we need to think in terms of let us look at irradiation as any other process, microwaving, hydrostatic pressure pulse, electric fields, on and on and on. We got to quit doing this delaying factor and get it into the public health sector. And the last point I wanted to make before, and that is what brought along chlorination of water, pasteurization of milk and juice, vaccinations, is strong continuous support from the public health professional. It is not the industry that brought in pasteurized milk. It wasn't the equipment manufacturers of pasteurizers that got this into the market place. It wasn't consumers demanding it. It was the public health professionals, and that is where we need to move forward with getting irradiation accepted into this market. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much. And I think the other focus, what helps us is it has got to be science based. It has to go through the regular scientific process, and then we have to trust that and we have to lead by example to move in the direction that I think we think we both need to go. Thank you, and I yield back. Mr. Stupak. We have four votes on the floor. It is probably going to take us until 3:15. I am going to ask this panel to stay. I have questions about the tomatoes, the spinach, and the mushrooms there, and a number of other things that I want to ask about because I think it is very important in the education process, so if you will stay. We are in recess until 3:15. [Recess.] Mr. Stupak. OK. The committee will come to order. We are going to go a second round of questions. I said I had a number of questions. And, Mr. Olson, Professor Olson, if I can start with you. On February 26, the CEO of Dole Foods testified that they tried irradiation and it fried their vegetables, and they said it just made them soggy and it just doesn't work. Comment on that because I see we have spinach. Explain what you got, you got spinach, you got mushrooms, you got tomatoes. Mr. Olson. Yes. We have spinach and we have lettuce. And even when we were getting irradiated ground beef in May, 2000, and past that, there was some reluctance and often quality was used as an issue of not moving forward. I know one company that we worked with almost 9 months until they had a ground beef recall. All of a sudden the quality is not an issue. So I think there is a little reluctance to move forward. They don't want to bother. Mr. Stupak. I think those mushrooms, can I irradiate them and can I put it too strong where I wreck the quality in the taste of the food? Mr. Olson. No, I don't think we have had anything deteriorated from irradiation on the table. Mr. Stupak. OK. The testimony was that Mr. Wegmans product, 40 cents more per pound of beef, and that is transportation cost mostly? Would that be fair? Mr. Olson. I would say most of it would be transportation costs. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Wegman. Mr. Wegman. Eighty cents. Mr. Stupak. Eighty cents. Mr. Wegman. Eighty cents. Mr. Stupak. It is 80 cents more? Mr. Wegman. It is a little less. It is probably 60, 70 now but we can fix that. Mr. Stupak. But is that mostly transportation costs because you got to send it one place to another place to another place? Mr. Wegman. It is combined, yes. It is the handling. Mr. Stupak. So if we use more irradiation of meat, vegetables, that would bring that cost down of it because other companies would get into irradiation, would it not? Mr. Olson. Yes. Mr. Stupak. Professor Olson, what is the downside other than maybe consumer conception? Is there a downside to irradiation? I understand when you irradiate something with E. coli it breaks the molecule and therefore it can't manifest in humans. Explain it to us a little bit, and what is the downside of it? Mr. Olson. Let me--just because you brought that one issue up-- basically when we are controlling bacteria, we are damaging DNA. Now we can do that with electron beams. We can do that with X-ray. We can do it with gamma ray. We do it by fast moving electrons regardless of what source, and so they all have the same effect on that. But the downside, and I said it many times, the only downside is cost. Mr. Stupak. The cost of irradiating it or the extra handling that is involved because you put another step in it. It is my understanding you take that spinach right there. If Dole would send you a box of spinach you laid out on a belt, and I saw your public TV special on irradiation by Iowa State University, you put it on a belt and use that right in the bag, right? Mr. Olson. Correct. Mr. Stupak. And then at the end you just ship it back to Dole? Mr. Olson. That is correct. Mr. Stupak. So the cost then would be just that extra step you have to put in, but if we had more--it is cost basically then? Mr. Olson. That is right. And say if Dole had their own irradiation facility in their own plant, it is pennies. Mr. Stupak. Let us say Salinas Valley, where we got 21 outbreaks of E. coli in the last 10 years. Every 6 months we have a new outbreak in Salinas Valley, which is supposed to be America's salad bowl. Why wouldn't those growers then get together in that area and just irradiate the fruits and vegetables and be done with this problem we have? Mr. Olson. I think if we had a public health professional that is saying we need to ensure that we have a safe food supply and irradiation would be doing that, I think that would help a great deal. It is a little bit like metal detection. Every one of these bags have gone through a metal detector. Is it because we have a lot of metal? No. But occasionally we have that metal so to ensure that we don't have the consumer experience any metal in their product it goes through a metal detector, and that is the irradiation should be looked at as an insurance that we are not going to have E. coli or other pathogens in those products. Mr. Stupak. But what food borne illnesses could be prevented specifically besides E. coli if we used irradiation? Mr. Olson. salmonella, and in fact we can list a whole bunch of things like E. coli, salmonella, Yersinia, Listeria. There is a wide range of those. If we gave a product a dose that would control salmonella just like when we have process controls for heating to control salmonella, we control everything else. So that is the benchmark in terms of our ultimate control to make sure that we don't have any of these pathogenic bacteria survive. salmonella is the most resistant to irradiation and the most resistant to heat. Mr. Stupak. The opponents of irradiation argue or they sort of believe that if we were to use more irradiation in fruits, vegetables, meat, it would be used as an alternative to prevent food borne illness such as sanitation. In other words, you wouldn't have to sanitize. You wouldn't have to worry about your sanitation. Mr. Olson. I have a great example for you. Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Olson. A hundred years ago when we were talking about pasteurization of milk, let us say the opponents of that said let us clean up the farms and let us go with certified rather than pasteurized milk, so a lot of attempts were made to do that. And one of the chief arguments against pasteurization is we are just going to let these dairy farms be dirtier. If you compare a dairy farm today versus a dairy farm 100 years ago, it is thousands of times more sanitary. So there is no incentive to be dirty. That is--it sounds maybe logical but there is no incentive to be dirty. Mr. Stupak. Ms. Lachman, I had asked you before but let me try to rephrase the question this way. I am still trying to get at why you are just not putting carbon monoxide on treated packages, why you just don't say carbon monoxide. Will Target comment to write to Precept, and I understand Precept was sort of a stumbling block here, will Target commit to write to Precept and request that carbon monoxide be added to labels on meat for sale at Target? Ms. Lachman. As I understand it, for labeling we need governmental approval, and we have been working with Precept/ Hormel to pursue language, and they already have language in place or they have language approved by FSIS. Mr. Stupak. But does it include carbon monoxide? Ms. Lachman. No, it does not. Mr. Stupak. All right. In this committee and in our legislation, we have all been very clear, the consumer has the right to know. You can use fancy words but we like it like here, irradiation, carbon monoxide. Cargill and Hormel supplies your meat. Wouldn't you just easier call them and say, look, we want to include carbon monoxide. You are our supplier. If you don't want to do it, fine. We will go to a supplier who will provide us the food that we can put the labeling on it that says carbon monoxide. You really don't need FDA approval to put the carbon monoxide labeling on your food, do you? Ms. Lachman. It is my understanding we need to have FSIS approval to put any labeling on regulated meat packaging. Mr. Stupak. How about just a sign in the store? Ms. Lachman. I am not sure what is required to put a sign in the store. Mr. Stupak. Kyle, can you give me that exhibit? Here is at one of your stores for the public. We see it all the time, and I think we have it on the table there for you, our fresh meat and seafood set the standard for naturally fresh unlike other stores that may use carbon monoxide to preserve a product's color even after--never has and never will. Why don't you just put the sign? You wouldn't need to get FDA approval to put the sign up there saying this meat may be treated with carbon monoxide or we will not use it. That is what we have asked you to do, not use carbon monoxide. Ms. Lachman. I am not sure what is required to put up a statement with content that relates to regulated product but for a technical sign about a process or a specific product, we would certainly rely on our expert vendors to help craft language that would make sense for a consumer, but we will of course comply with all applicable laws. Mr. Stupak. OK. So basically the only way Target is going to do it then is if we have Hormel or Cargill put carbon monoxide on the packaging. You are not going to use your financial leverage to get them to do it for you? Ms. Lachman. We continue to work with Hormel and have conversations about labeling. And what Hormel has told us is that they have been partnering with consumer groups to develop additional language for MAP product, and as late as when I spoke to them on Monday, I think as late as Friday they submitted additional language to FSIS, and they have worked with consumer groups. Mr. Stupak. They can, excuse the pun, they can work until the cows come home. It is not going to fly with this committee until they use carbon monoxide. And I would think that Target, like Wegman, would want to inform their consumers, not fancy words, not all this stuff we have seen, that modification that they want to put modified atmosphere packaging, MAP, as they call it, has been rejected many times by the committee. I would hope you would use your influence and just say carbon monoxide, we either use it or we don't. Let the consumer make their decision. Wegman did it. It certainly hasn't hurt them, and I think the consumer certainly has that opportunity to know that. Mr. Shimkus for questions. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think the whole carbon monoxide debate is words have an impression and you have to overcome the GMO, genetically modified organisms, has been a scourge of the European community, and now we slowly, after years, the European community is now understanding the safety. We are using real science to understand GMOs. Likewise, irradiation, there have been years we don't have anything irradiated, but we have to do an educational process. And I think there is probably the same thing with the packaging issue. So I am following this debate. I am pretty new to the committee with interest, and that is just my 2 cents worth. There is this whole real science quality of the food supply and honesty in advertising, and somehow we are going to have to work through this. Mr. Chairman, I am going to double dog dare you because I believe in leadership by example, and I know that you had Kevin actually partake in a food test of irradiated food, so I am going to ask my staff or the committee staff on our side to go down and grab those mushrooms, and we will have a taste test. Would you be up to that? Mr. Stupak. I am allergic to mushrooms. Mr. Shimkus. I was going to do the tomatoes but I was afraid we would spray them all over the place. Mr. Stupak. I will do tomatoes. Mr. Shimkus. You will do the who? Mr. Stupak. The tomatoes. Mr. Shimkus. But we might spray them. He is allergic to mushrooms. Maybe that will help with our floor vote. No, we can't use this. He can't eat these. OK. We will do whatever. Dr. Olson, what do you recommend? Mr. Olson. Do spinach. Spinach was a big problem a year and a half ago. Mr. Shimkus. And then we are going to go out to the flag pole. Mr. Wegman. I don't know that I would eat spinach that is not irradiated. Mr. Shimkus. That has not been irradiated? Oh, it has been irradiated for food safety. Have you done this, Dr. Olson? Mr. Olson. Now with these particular pages. Mr. Shimkus. All right. Mr. Olson. The point was that since the non-irradiated ones have been sitting out here for several hours that maybe---- Mr. Shimkus. Come on now. We don't want qualifications. No difference. I think Popeye would approve. Mr. Olson. So how was the product? Mr. Shimkus. Not bad. I am not an expert but I know that is how people are buying packages now. I think that is part of the problem of packaging in that manner. I had a friend call me unexpectedly, going to drop by, a college buddy, so I run to the store. The thing that I can do is put steaks on the grill. I can get a package of salad and zap some potatoes. And that is a quick meal but that salad is all in a bag. It makes it easy. I do this for two reasons. We are moving from meat to vegetables, and that is why I followed up on the taste test, which is fine by me. Mr. Wegman, the selling of vegetable products, the cost of vegetable products, the consumer debate, what are your comments? Mr. Wegman. Let me start with the cost. I think that we have got a long journey but I think we should get started on the journey. As far as I know, to irradiate today costs $25 million. We wanted to do that. We wanted to do our own meat plant and put irradiated ground beef in it which is too expensive for us to do it. We went with Cargill. So I think it is going to be a while before it gets down to that incremental dime whether it is ground beef, whether it is vegetables or lettuces. I think we need to be realistic about it. Mr. Shimkus. Can I follow up on that? So we want to protect business. We don't want to drive folks. We want to do things safe. So in movement to this, if we are going to move in this direction how do we do that without affecting real cost? Mr. Wegman. What I think we need is simply to take the barriers away. Let us figure out the economics. I mean we can do that with Sadeck and Cargill. Mr. Shimkus. But if we do a certain date like, say, 6 months you can't do it. We can't turn. We don't have the equipment, we don't have the machines. The big entities will be buying forward so the small entities will be disenfranchised. So there has to be a process by which we move this through our economy and our food system in a gradual process so that we don't pick winners and losers by this process. Mr. Wegman. I think we accomplish it by taking away the barriers. Let us do it on produce. Let us take away if we want to talk about rare ground beef and being able to eat it. I mean we are going to do it this summer. We are going to find a way that is legal, and we are going to do it. We want to get this moving. I think that is--you had another question too about---- Mr. Stupak. But let me follow up on that though. But as chairperson of the Food Marketing Institute you said, right, Food Marketing Institute safety task force, are you moving toward some kind of rules or regulations you would recommend to the Congress as we move this food safety legislation for irradiation? Is your task force doing something along those lines that could give us some insight? Mr. Wegman. At the moment, no. And what we are working on, frankly, is trying to get the growers to adhere to an audit process that we think takes them to a higher level without irradiation. Mr. Stupak. Sure, but the last recall we had in '06 was a micro-organism. E. coli was found there. You can't just clean it up by washing it and all that. You almost need something like irradiation. I think E. coli has developed strains where now you need more science as opposed to just the old 100-year process that we have done in the past. Mr. Wegman. That is my belief, and I think there are some things we can do but that is my belief. Mr. Stupak. Mr. Shimkus, did you have some more? Thanks for the gourmet lunch. Mr. Shimkus. No, but I would just say that you may want to double dog dare Mr. Whitfield because I don't think he has partaken. Mr. Stupak. You are allergic to spinach, but it is your time for questions. Mr. Whitfield. I want to thank the panel. I actually have just one question, Dr. Olson. Will your irradiation kill prions in BSE or mad cow disease? Mr. Olson. No. Prions are mineralized protein. They are not DNA or RNA and so we cannot destroy those. They are just too small. Mr. Whitfield. OK. But does that present a safety issue? Mr. Olson. Well, there are other mechanisms are in place, the rule on feed bans, the downer cow issue, the symptoms, the sampling programs, all those to detect and actually prevent is almost a public health issue again. We are going to prevent that problem, not try and intervene or solve the problem by treatment. Mr. Whitfield. That is all the questions I have. Mr. Stupak. No further questions of this panel. We will excuse you, and thank you again for your testimony and your products and your lunch. Professor Olson, let me congratulate you. On Monday we actually put in the 150th anniversary of the founding of Iowa State on the first land grant colleges. Of course, the first one was Michigan State University but Iowa State was right there too. We had that vote on Monday. We were just talking about it when you came up. Yes, Mr. Wegman. Mr. Wegman. Chairman Stupak, could I thank you and your committee for your work, please? This is very important to us. It is our life. And we are very appreciative that you are putting this effort into it. Thank you. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, but as the task force I would encourage you guys to develop something that we can look at, your task force on food safety with the food, that group you head up, OK? We are real interested in that. And when I mention Salinas Valley it makes sense. Every 6 months we are having an E. coli recall. Why can't we put irradiation right there where it is all being processed? It just makes sense to me. And I ask the FDA all the time do you do a epidemiology study on what is going on there. Oh, it might be the cow farm down there. Well, let us solve it. One way you can solve it is irradiation, it sounds like. Mr. Wegman. And I just wanted to add one more statement, and that is if we are going to deal with raw product there is almost no kill step except for irradiation, and so I think that we need to zero in on this as a public health issue where we can have a kill step without changing the nature of the product. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. And thank you again, everyone on this panel. I would now like to call up our third panel of witnesses to come forward. On our third panel, we have Dr. Stephen Sundlof, Director of FDA's Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, and Dr. Richard Raymond, Undersecretary for Food Safety at USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, FSIS. Gentleman, it is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that witnesses have the right under rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? Mr. Raymond, Mr. Sundlof? OK. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Stupak. Thank you, and witnesses are under oath. Dr. Sundlof, do you want to start with your opening, please, sir? STATEMENT OF STEPHEN F. SUNDLOF, D.V.M., PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION Dr. Sundlof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am Dr. Stephen Sundlof, Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the Food and Drug Administration. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the agency's efforts to enhance food safety. I am pleased to be here today with my colleague from USDA, Dr. Raymond. Food can become contaminated at many steps along the path from farm to fork. In recent years, FDA has done a great deal to prevent both deliberate and unintentional contamination of food at each of these steps. However, changes in consumer preferences, changes in industry practices, and the rising volume of imports have posed challenges that required us to adapt our current food protection strategies. The outbreaks in the last year and a half have underscored the need to develop multi-disciplinary and integrated product safety strategies. To address these challenges, last November FDA released the Food Protection Plan, which provides a framework to identify potential hazards and counter them before they can do harm. Also at that time, Health and Human Services Secretary Michael O. Leavitt presented to the President an Action Plan for Import Safety. Together these plans provide an updated and comprehensive approach to ensure that the U.S. food supply remains one of the safest in the world. The plans encompass three core elements: prevention, intervention, and response. The prevention element means promoting increased corporate responsibility so that food problems do not occur in the first place. The intervention element focuses on risk-based inspections, sampling, and surveillance at all points in the food supply chain. The response element bolsters FDA's emergency response efforts by allowing for increased speed and efficiency. We are working with all of our food safety partners to achieve the food safety enhancements identified by these plans. To implement the Food Protection Plan, FDA is requesting 10 new authorities, and we seek the assistance of members of this subcommittee to help obtain passage of these. For example, FDA is requesting the authority to require entities in the food supply chain to implement measures solely intended to protect against intentional adulteration of food by terrorists or criminals. We also request explicit authority to issue regulations requiring preventive food safety controls for high-risk foods. Such authority would strengthen FDA's ability to require manufacturers to implement risk-based Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point, or HACCP, or equivalent processes to reduce foodborne illness from these foods. Some of the other legislative proposals include: authorizing FDA to accredit and use highly qualified, independent third parties to evaluate compliance for voluntary inspections; allowing the FDA to move the inspection of high- risk products of concern upstream by requiring the exporting countries' regulatory authority or third party inspector to certify each shipment for compliance with FDA standards prior to shipment; giving FDA authority to issue mandatory recalls if a voluntary recall is not effective, authorizing the FDA to refuse admission of imported food if inspection access has been delayed, limited, or denied. In addition to numerous other outreach activities underway to engage our stakeholders in implementing the Food Protection Plan, FDA is planning to host a meeting in August with regulatory, epidemiology, and laboratory officials from the Departments of Health and Agriculture from all 50 states. This will provide a forum for local, state, and federal partners to exchange information and ideas about implementing the plan and enhancing domestic food safety. To address the ongoing issue of safety of lettuce and leafy greens, FDA is continuing to work with officials in California and with industry to assess the prevalence of factors in and near the field environment which may contribute to the potential contamination of leafy greens with E. coli O157:H7, and the extent to which good agricultural practices and other preventive controls are being implemented. In the fall of 2007, in cooperation with industry, state and local governments, and academia, FDA conducted assessments on farms. By identifying practices and conditions that can lead to product contamination, FDA and its food safety partners hope to improve guidance and policies intended to minimize the potential for future disease outbreaks, as well as to ascertain future food safety research, education, and outreach needs. As part of its Tomato Safety Initiative, FDA is continuing its collaboration with the state health and agricultural officials from Florida and Virginia, the produce industry, and several universities to prevent foodborne illnesses associated with tomatoes from those states. FDA is leading the effort to conduct assessment of the factors most likely to be associated with the previous salmonella contamination. Last summer, assessments were conducted in the field and at packers. Similar assessments will be conducted in Florida this spring. Information from these assessments will help inform appropriate preventive measures. With regard to imported food safety, in December, the Department of Health and Human Services and the People's Republic of China signed a Memorandum of Agreement or MOA to enhance the safety of food and animal feed products exported from China to the United States. The MOA establishes a bilateral mechanism to provide greater information to ensure that products from China meet U.S. standards for quality and safety. The key terms of the agreement include enhanced registration and certification requirements, greater information sharing, faster access to production facilities, and the implementation of key benchmarks to evaluate progress. FDA has also made a commitment to station inspectors and other agency representatives in China to increase our ability to carry out foreign inspections and to facilitate cooperation between FDA and its counterpart regulatory authorities. FDA is considering similar endeavors in other countries. Last month FDA briefed representatives from 48 embassies to discuss both plans and to engage their assistance in implementation. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss FDA's food safety activities. We look forward to working with you to obtain passage of the requested legislative authorities identified in the Food Protection Plan and the Import Safety Action Plan. And I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Sundlof follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.052 Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Mr. Raymond, your opening statement, please, sir. STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. RAYMOND, M.D., UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOOD SAFETY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE Dr. Raymond. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to address the ongoing investigation of the Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company in Chino, California, among other issues that you have. I want to assure you that I am deeply concerned about the inhumane handling of non-ambulatory, disabled cattle in that facility. As soon as we learned of the problems at Hallmark/Westland we took immediate steps to determine if the allegations made public by the Humane Society of the United States were accurate. The USDA's Office of the Inspector General is leading this investigation with support from FSIS and AMS. Pending the conclusion of the investigation, the Secretary announced 2 weeks ago that we will be implementing a series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly analyze humane handling activities in all federally inspected establishments. We have already begun those actions. The Federal government has an interlocking system of controls to protect against BSE. The FDA's ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban which began in 1997 is the most significant step that the Federal government has taken to protect animal health. The single most important thing we can do to protect human health regarding BSE exposure is the removal from the food supply of specified risk materials or SRMs. These are tissues that, according to the available scientific evidence, could be effective in a cow with BSE. According to the Harvard risk assessment, the SRM removal process alone reduces the risk of BSE exposure to consumers by 99 percent. After the first case of BSE was detected in the United States, the USDA conducted an enhanced BSE surveillance testing program for 2 years. During this time, only two animals were detected with BSE and that is out of over 759,000 high risk animals that we have tested to date. It is important to note that both of those animals were born prior to the initiation of the FDA's feed ban and neither of those animals did enter the food supply. The rule prohibiting non-ambulatory cattle from entering into the food supply is simply one of the multiple measures that we have in place. Because of these measures, we can be confident of the safety of our beef supply in regards to BSE exposure. I would like now to briefly highlight our efforts to further protect human health from foodborne pathogens. Based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's annual food net data report, we are making some progress towards meeting the Healthy People 2010 goal regarding the incidents of foodborne illness, but we do know that we still have work to do to further reduce foodborne illness in foods that we regulate. Following an increase in positive product test results and recalls of E. coli O157:H7, which I will just refer to E. coli from now on. Last fall, the Food Safety and Inspection Service announced several new ongoing actions to protect the public against the risk of E. coli including expanded testing. It is important to keep things in perspective, however. Although we ended 2007 with 21 recalls due to E. coli and the percentage of FSIS E. coli positive samples for 2007, which was 0.23 percent, is still well below the percentage of positives as recently as 2001 when it was 0.87 percent. FSIS also collects and analyzes samples of raw meat and poultry product for salmonella. Because of 4 years of steady increase in salmonella positive product testing results, the FSIS announced an 11-point risk-based strategy for salmonella reduction in raw products in February, 2006. We can easily see the positive result of this risk-based strategy. The percentage of plants that fall into the best performing category has increased dramatically from 35 percent when we announced the plan to 74 percent at the end of 2007. On March 28, 2008, the agency will begin posting on its Web site completed verification test results from establishments with salmonella rates in other categories beginning with young chicken slaughter establishments. Very briefly, we have gone from approximately 17 percent of chicken carcasses testing policy for salmonella to about 7.4 percent in these 2 years. At FSIS we rely on the efforts of our partners to help us in our mission to protect the public's health. FSIS works in collaboration with the sister agencies on multi-jurisdictional food safety issues, whether those agencies are Federal, state or local entities. Two examples of these successes of the foodborne disease active surveillance network are Food Net and Pulse Net. These two systems allow agencies to collaborate and bring their specialized knowledge together to better protect public health. I know another area of interest for this subcommittee is how the agency ensures the safety of imports. FSIS uses a comprehensive system to ensure that imported meat, poultry, and processed egg products are safe and secure. Our three-part system includes a thorough analysis of each country's food laws and inspection systems to determine initial equivalence before they can ever export. We do on site audits of each country's food safety system to verify the system is implemented in accordance with what is in writing and then to ensure that equivalence is maintained on an annual basis, and our port of entry inspection on all FSIS-regulated meat, poultry, and processed egg products coming into the United States with very few exceptions. Before I conclude, if I might, I have 20 seconds left, I want to try to clarify something I heard earlier today regarding the USDA's recall classifications. I am not sure it still was entered in exactly correct so I am just going to read for you. A class 1, this is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death. Class 2 is the health hazard situation where there is a remote probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product, and class 3, this is a situation where the use of the product will not cause adverse health consequences. So in conclusion, I will just stay that FSIS remains committed to improving its approach to inspection, to focus on public health and risk. And as a medical physician and a public health professional, I believe that what all of us here with a stake in food safety must accomplish is further protecting the people, especially those most vulnerable to a foodborne illness which includes the very young, the elderly, the immune compromised, and pregnant women. Again, thank you for the opportunity to be before you and the committee today, and along with Dr. Sundlof, I am happy to try to respond to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Raymond follows:] Statement of Dr. Richard Raymond Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to address the ongoing investigation of the Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company (Hallmark/Westland) in Chino, California, and other related issues. I want to assure you that I am deeply concerned about the inhumane handling of non-ambulatory disabled cattle in that facility. I am Dr. Richard Raymond, Under Secretary for Food Safety at USDA. While there are a number of agencies at the Department working together on this matter, the Agency for which I have responsibility is the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). FSIS is the public health regulatory agency responsible for ensuring that meat, poultry, and processed egg products are safe, wholesome, and accurately labeled. FSIS enforces the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act, which require Federal inspection and regulation of meat, poultry, and processed egg products prepared for distribution in commerce for use as human food. FSIS also enforces the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, which requires that all livestock at federally inspected establishments be handled and slaughtered in a humane way. As soon as the Humane Society's video was released on January 30, Secretary Schafer called for an investigation into the matter. USDA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is leading that investigation, with support from FSIS and the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). As the Secretary announced last week, pending the conclusion of the investigation, we are implementing a series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly analyze humane handling activities in federally inspected establishments. I remain confident in the safety of the U.S. food supply. To help ensure its safety, we take a number of steps to prevent food-borne illness. FSIS employs over 9,000 personnel, including 7,800 full-time in-plant and other front-line personnel protecting the public health in approximately 6,200 federally-inspected establishments nationwide. FSIS personnel must be continuously present for slaughter operations and must inspect processing plants at least once per shift per day. Under the FSIS verification sampling program, FSIS samples meat, poultry, and processed egg products and analyzes them for the presence of microbial pathogens. In addition to its targeted sampling for Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat products, the Agency has paid particular attention to E. coli O157:H7 in raw ground beef through the initiative announced last fall and salmonella in raw meat and poultry products through the ongoing salmonella improvement plan. To protect against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the federal government also has an interlocking system of safeguards, which I will describe in more detail later. Initial USDA Actions As soon as we learned of the problems at Hallmark/Westland, USDA took immediate steps to determine if the allegations made public by the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) were accurate. On February 1, 2008, Hallmark/Westland voluntarily stopped slaughter operations. As a result of FSIS findings, FSIS suspended inspection at the plant on February 4, 2008. This action was based on FSIS findings that the establishment failed to prevent the inhumane handling of animals at the facility, as required by FSIS regulations and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. This suspension of inspection will remain in effect, and Hallmark/Westland will be unable to operate, until corrective actions are submitted in writing and verified through a full review by FSIS. This verification process will ensure that all animals will be handled humanely and none will be allowed to proceed to slaughter until Hallmark/Westland complies fully with FSIS regulations. Evidence from the ongoing investigation demonstrates that, over the past 2 years, this plant did not always notify the FSIS public health veterinarian when cattle became non- ambulatory after passing ante-mortem (prior to slaughter) inspection, as is required by FSIS regulations. It is important to note that certain cattle, while ambulatory when they pass ante-mortem inspection, may later become non-ambulatory from an acute injury or another circumstance. If such a situation occurs, FSIS regulations require the public health veterinarian to inspect the animal again and determine that the animal did indeed suffer from an acute injury before the animal is permitted to go to slaughter. This failure by Hallmark/Westland led to the company's February 17, 2008, voluntary recall of 143 million pounds of fresh and frozen beef products produced at the establishment since February 1, 2006. While it is extremely unlikely that these meat products pose a risk to human health, the recall action was deemed necessary because the establishment did not comply with FSIS regulations. The recall was designated Class II because the probability is remote that the recalled beef products would cause adverse health effects if consumed. This recall designation is in contrast to a Class I recall, which is a higher-risk health hazard situation where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or death. Safeguards Against BSE I am aware that this situation has raised questions about the risk of BSE. I would like to take this opportunity to give you a brief summary of the safeguards against BSE that we have in place to protect our food supply. Since the discovery of the first case of BSE in Great Britain in 1986, we have learned a tremendous amount about this disease. That knowledge has greatly informed USDA's regulatory systems and response efforts. It has also given us the opportunity to examine our own cattle herd, which is why we know that the risk of BSE in the United States is extremely low. As noted earlier, the federal government's interlocking system of controls to protect the food supply from BSE includes a ban on non-ambulatory disabled cattle. But that is simply one of the multiple measures in place. We have learned that the single most important thing we can do to protect human health regarding BSE is the removal from the food supply of specified risk materials (SRMs)--those tissues that, according to the available scientific evidence, could be infective in a cow with BSE. FSIS requires that all SRMs, including the brain and spinal cord, are removed from carcasses so that they do not enter the food supply. Slaughter facilities cannot operate their slaughter operations without the continuous presence of FSIS inspection personnel to ensure safe and wholesome product, including the removal and segregation of SRMs. According to the 2005 Harvard Risk Assessment, SRM removal alone reduces the potential exposure to consumers of BSE by ninety-nine percent. FSIS line inspectors are stationed at key points along the production line where they are able to directly observe certain SRM removal activities. Other off-line inspection personnel verify additional plant SRM removal, segregation and disposal. Moreover, FDA bans SRMs in FDA-regulated human foods (and cosmetics). Likewise, another significant step we have taken to prevent the spread of BSE and bring about its eradication in the animal population is the ruminant feed ban. In 1997, the FDA implemented a mandatory feed ban that prohibits feeding most mammalian protein to ruminants, including cattle. The feed ban is a vital measure to prevent the transmission of BSE to cattle. Another step is BSE testing, which is best used as a surveillance tool. By testing high-risk animals, including those that show possible clinical signs of the disease, we can document the effectiveness of our security measures. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has conducted targeted BSE surveillance testing since 1990, including an enhanced surveillance effort that was initiated after a cow tested positive for the disease in December 2003. The goal of the enhanced effort, which began in June 2004, was to test as many animals in the targeted population as possible over a 24-month period. This intensive effort detected only two additional animals with the disease, out of over 759,000 animals tested. Both of those animals were born prior to initiation of the FDA feed ban and neither entered the food supply. This testing confirms an extremely low prevalence of the disease in the United States. The enhanced surveillance program provided sufficient data to allow USDA to more accurately estimate the prevalence or level of BSE within the U.S. cattle population. Based on this analysis, we can definitively say that the incidence of BSE in the United States is extremely low. APHIS continues to conduct an ongoing BSE surveillance program targeted to high-risk animals that samples approximately 40,000 high-risk animals annually. This level of surveillance significantly exceeds the guidelines set forth by the World Animal Health Organization, which has affirmed that U.S. regulatory controls against the disease are effective. It is because of the strong system that the United States has put in place that we can be confident of the safety of our beef supply from BSE and that the spread of BSE has been prevented in this nation. Further Actions The investigation led by OIG with support from FSIS and AMS is ongoing. However, we are not waiting for the completion of the investigation to act. USDA has already taken a number of steps to strengthen our inspection system. As I mentioned above, pending the conclusion of the investigation, USDA has implemented a series of interim actions to verify and thoroughly analyze humane handling activities in all federally inspected establishments. FSIS has increased the amount of time allocated per shift by inspection program personnel to verify humane handling activities and to verify that animals are handled humanely in ante-mortem areas. FSIS is also conducting surveillance activities to observe the handling of animals outside the approved hours of operation from vantage points within and adjacent to the official premises. A notice has been issued to all FSIS inspection program personnel to reinforce the work methods for conducting humane handling verification activities at all levels and to ensure the greatest utility of the Humane Activities Tracking System (HATS) program. This began on March 3. Surveillance and inspection activities are being prioritized and focused based on existing data such as the category of livestock handled at the facility, humane handling data, observations made at the facility during regular inspection and a plant's operating schedule. FSIS will continue to collect information in HATS, which provides an accounting of the time spent by FSIS inspection program personnel performing specific tasks and the results of that inspection related to humane handling and slaughter. Starting on March 4, 2008, FSIS inspection program personnel assigned to Federally inspected livestock slaughter establishments increased the amount of time that they spend conducting HATS activities from anywhere between 50-100 percent. This increased HATS inspection will continue for 60 days and will be closely measured during that time. Prioritization will help to ensure the optimal use of resources to ensure humane handling and food safety. FSIS is focusing surveillance and inspection activities at establishments where older or potentially distressed animals are slaughtered, such as facilities that handle dairy or veal cattle. At these facilities, the time spent performing HATS activities will be doubled. At facilities with contracts from the AMS for nutrition assistance programs, regardless of the type or class of the animal slaughtered, HATS verification time is being doubled. At facilities where non-ambulatory livestock are infrequently presented, such as in slaughter facilities that handle young market classes including steers, heifers, market hogs, and lambs, an additional 50 percent of HATS verification time may be required. At least once every two weeks, a District Veterinary Medical Specialist or a district analyst is verifying that inspection personnel at each official livestock slaughter establishment are conducting the appropriate increase in HATS verification time. Any plant found not to be in compliance will be reported to the in-plant supervisor and the frontline supervisor. Meanwhile, FSIS will begin reviewing the HATS to determine what, if any, adjustments are needed to maximize its utility as a tracking tool to improve compliance. FSIS is currently auditing all 19 beef slaughter establishments that participate in AMS's nutrition assistance program. This is the first in a set of audits we will be conducting. We expect to complete that audit by the end of the week, when we will begin to analyze the results. The investigation being led by OIG with support from FSIS and AMS is ongoing. Once the investigation has concluded, we will have additional information that, along with the results of the additional verification activities, will determine the actions for FSIS oversight, inspection and enforcement that may be required. Efforts to Fight Foodborne Pathogens In addition to BSE, I wanted to take this opportunity to report to the Subcommittee some of the Agency's activities regarding some specific foodborne pathogens. Based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) annual FoodNet data report, we are making some progress toward meeting the Healthy People 2010 goals regarding the incidence of foodborne illness, though we know we still have work to do to further reduce foodborne illness. FSIS' verification sampling is a critical method the agency uses to collect data and is a good example of how we have taken a more risk-based approach. The agency's verification sampling program, FSIS samples meat, poultry and processed egg products and analyzes them for the presence of microbial pathogens. However, the agency has paid particular attention to E. coli O157:H7 in raw ground beef and salmonella in raw meat and poultry products through the E. coli O157:H7 initiative announced last fall and its ongoing salmonella strategy. The new, ongoing actions we have undertaken to protect the public against the risk of E. coli O157:H7 include expanded testing. By March 2007, FSIS had already begun testing trim, the primary component in ground beef, in addition to ground beef itself. However, as a result of an increase in E. coli O157:H7-positive samples, the subsequent increase in the number of E. coli O157:H7-related recalls, and the increase in human illnesses linked to these recalls, FSIS implemented a number of initiatives to combat E. coli O157:H7. In July 2007, after an unusual number of E. coli O157:H7 positives the month before, FSIS substantially increased the number of raw ground beef samples scheduled for July from 1,100 to 1,943--an increase greater than 75 percent. After seeing nothing unusual in the positive sample rate in July, FSIS began scheduling samples for every raw ground beef establishment once per month (i.e., approximately 1,350 samples per month). On October 26, 2007, FSIS inspection program personnel began testing additional components of ground beef. By testing earlier in the production chain, FSIS minimizes the likelihood that this contaminated source material will be used in ground beef that is available to consumers. FSIS began requiring countries whose beef is imported to the United States to conduct the same trim and beef component sampling or an equivalent measure, and the agency has begun verification sampling of trim at ports of entry to supplement the agency's sampling of ground product at ports of entry. We will be analyzing imported and domestic product test results to determine whether we need to make further changes to FSIS policies and programs. Other key initiatives targeted to Federally-inspected plants that produce raw beef products include verifying control of E. coli O157:H7, the creation and use of a new checklist for verifying control, targeted sampling for E. coli O157:H7 at slaughter and grinding facilities based on production volume and pathogen controls, follow-up sampling of 16 samples and conducting food safety assessments for plants with a Federal or State positive E. coli O157:H7 test result, and refinement of the agency's E. coli O157:H7 test method to provide a more sensitive test that will detect E. coli O157:H7 at even lower concentrations. All of these policy changes mean that FSIS will be better able to identify an emerging problem as early as possible and will be able to prevent contaminated product from entering commerce. The agency is completing a more in-depth analysis of the data captured in responses to questions, filled out by FSIS inspection program personnel, about reassessment of HACCP plans related to E. coli O157:H7. Our preliminary data, completed in November 2007, shows that almost 96 percent of all beef slaughter and processing establishments reassessed their HACCP plans. We are analyzing these responses, and we anticipate that the analysis will lead to new policies, directives, or possibly rules and regulations. In the wake of these progressive E. coli O157:H7-related policy changes, FSIS determined that steps were also needed to ensure that inspection program personnel and the industry fully understand the nature of the challenge presented by E. coli O157:H7. We are developing a strong, ongoing strategy to evaluate the success of our training program. Through the In- Plant Performance System, AssuranceNet management controls, and reports from district analysts, the agency is ensuring that inspection program personnel are doing their jobs correctly, are held accountable, and have appropriate workloads and supervision. As with any policy or program change, FSIS is making sure that we educate and receive feedback from our public health partners and stakeholders regarding our E. coli initiatives. For example, on October 17, 2007, FSIS, FDA, and CDC hosted a public meeting regarding E. coli serotypes other than O157:H7 that are related to foodborne illness. In October and November, 2007, FSIS targeted outreach and training sessions around the country for small and very small raw beef processors. On January 23, 2008, FSIS participated in a meeting with the American Meat Institute Foundation and the National Meat Association about E. coli O157:H7 surveillance and prevention. We will continue to work to identify the cause of the recent increase in E. coli O157:H7 illnesses and recalls, and to find a permanent, workable solution to the issue. Thus, we are planning a public meeting for April 2008, focused on a discussion with representatives from science, academia, industry, consumer groups and government, about the increase in illnesses and recalls attributed to E. coli O157:H7. This meeting will provide updates on FSIS initiatives and build a foundation for establishing solutions to address the challenges posed by this pathogen. In mid-May, FSIS will hold a meeting with its State and local public health partners, including FDA, CDC, industry and consumer groups, about how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of outbreak investigations and recalls conducted by FSIS in collaboration with these partners. Every E. coli O157:H7-related recall last year showed me something that we can improve, and I hope that these meetings will get everyone to start thinking about how to improve the coordination, accuracy, and timeliness of communication and food safety activities, specifically outbreak investigations and recalls. Another important step in that direction is USDA's announcement on February 5, 2008, that the Department agreed to grant a conditional license to Bioniche for its E. coli O157:H7 Cattle Vaccine. This is the world's first vaccine that may be used as an on-farm intervention to reduce the amount of E. coli O157:H7 shed by cattle. It is important to keep things in perspective. Although last year we observed a rise in E. coli O157:H7-positive samples and recalls, because of new policy implementation and closer oversight and by working with industry, USDA has made tremendous progress in controlling E. coli O157:H7 overall. In fact, between 2002 and 2006, FSIS testing shows the percentage of samples testing positive for E. coli O157:H7 declined by 78.3 percent. During this time there was also a reduction in illnesses attributed to E. coli O157:H7. There was a slight increase in 2006, but several of those illnesses were attributed to food outbreaks that were not related to meat products. FSIS instructed plants to reassess their food safety plans in 2002. As a result of industry's hard work and commitment to making safer products, we saw the rates of positive samples decrease in 2002, 2003 and 2004, remaining at 0.17 percent for 2005 and 2006. To put that percentage into perspective, out of 12,000 samples taken in 2006, only 20 were positive for E. coli O157:H7. Although we ended 2007 with 21 recalls due to E. coli O157:H7, the percentage of E. coli O157:H7 positive samples for 2007--0.23--was still well below the percentage of positives during the 2000--2003 timeframe. As another part of the agency's verification sampling program, FSIS collects and analyzes samples of raw meat and poultry product for salmonella. In response to this continued foodborne threat, in February 2006, FSIS announced an 11-point, risk-based strategy for salmonella reduction in raw products. The initiative included targeting resources at establishments with higher levels of salmonella and changed the reporting and utilization of FSIS' salmonella verification data test results. We can easily see the positive results of this risk-based strategy. If we compare the plant categories based on broiler carcasses analyzed for salmonella in 2006 to 2007, we see that the percentage of plants in Category 1, or those with sampling results amounting to half or less than half of the current standards, increased dramatically, from 49 percent to 74 percent. Likewise, the percentage of plants in Category 3 decreased significantly from 10 percent to two percent. Essentially, the percentage of young broiler carcasses that tested positive for salmonella decreased by 50 percent--from 16 percent to 8 percent. Earlier this year, FSIS announced further changes in its salmonella policy to continue driving down the incidence of salmonella in poultry. On March 28, 2008, the agency will begin posting on its Web site completed verification test results from establishments performing in Category 2 or 3, beginning with young chicken slaughter establishments. The agency will also offer specific waivers to Category 1 establishments. With these waivers, those establishments with the lowest salmonella rates will be able to test new procedures, equipment, or processing techniques that will facilitate improvements in the ongoing control of salmonella. Coordination with Public Health Partners In conjunction with CDC, FDA, and epidemiologists and public health laboratories in several States, FSIS continues to build upon existing data in the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, or FoodNet, which conducts active surveillance of foodborne diseases, case-control studies to identify risk factors for acquiring foodborne illness, and surveys to assess medical and laboratory practices related to foodborne illness diagnoses. FoodNet data are also used to evaluate progress toward meeting CDC's Healthy People 2010 national objectives for foodborne infections. A sister system of FoodNet is PulseNet, a collaborative national computer network of public health laboratories that link seemingly sporadic illnesses together and enable public health officials to more quickly identify and respond to multi- State illness outbreaks. In fact, through the use of PulseNet, we are able to identify seemingly unrelated foodborne illnesses as actual outbreaks more quickly. Prior to PulseNet, many of these outbreaks would not have been recognized as outbreaks. These two systems allow agencies to collaborate and bring their specialized knowledge together to better protect public health. FSIS also takes every opportunity to diversify and improve the data submitted to CDC's PulseNet. On August 30, 2007, FSIS and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) signed a memorandum of agreement in order to share data on salmonella. Specifically, the cooperative agreement served to set requirements related to the submission of salmonella strains and carcasses from the FSIS/Pathogen Reduction, HACCP Verification, Baseline, and other programs to ARS for testing. ARS tests include Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis, which helps to determine the so-called DNA fingerprint of a pathogen; antimicrobial susceptibility tests; and other laboratory sub- typing procedures. We are committed to working with all of our food safety and public health partners to use the data that is available and seek more data to be able to attribute illnesses to specific foods. To cite one important example, we held a public meeting in April 2007 with our stakeholders and partners and engaged them in a discussion about the importance of foodborne illness attribution data, how this data is being developed, and how it is being used. Because we believe attribution is important in public health decision making, we are pioneering the use of attribution data in our evolving public heath risk-based approach to inspection. How FSIS Ensures the Safety of Imports I know another area of interest for the Subcommittee is how the Agency ensures the safety of imports. FSIS uses a comprehensive system to ensure that imported meat, poultry, and processed egg products are safe and secure. The three-part system includes a thorough analysis of each country's food laws and inspection systems to determine initial equivalence; on- site audits of each country's food safety system to verify that the system is implemented in accordance with what is in writing, and then to ensure equivalence is maintained; and port-of-entry inspection on all FSIS-regulated meat, poultry, and processed egg products coming into the United States, with a few exceptions. The amount of FSIS-regulated meat and poultry imports has remained approximately the same over the past five years, hovering around four billion pounds of meat and poultry from 29 of the now 34 eligible countries, approved through rulemaking. In addition to the initial re-inspection of product entering the United States, FSIS performs intensive random re- inspection on approximately 10 percent of the shipments of meat and poultry products. These re-inspection tasks include product examinations, microbiological analysis for pathogens, and/or a test for chemical residues. Approximately five percent of shipments of imported meat and poultry products receive microbiological and chemical verification testing. This system is enhanced by FSIS' Import Surveillance Liaison Officers, who conduct a broad range of surveillance activities at import facilities and in commerce, and serve as liaisons to improve coordination with other agencies like U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Access to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) database has provided FSIS a more targeted approach to identifying and controlling ineligible entries of FSIS-regulated product closer to the entry point, rather than after its release into commerce. In FY 2005, prior to FSIS' use of the ACE system, the amount of ineligible product removed from commerce that did not pass through import houses was a little over 36,000 pounds. In FY 2006, this amount increased to 1.6 million pounds, and in FY 2007, 2.1 million pounds was identified, destroyed, or redirected to FSIS for re-inspection. Interagency Working Group on Import Safety Recently, I represented USDA in the Interagency Working Group on Import Safety, helping to determine which aspects of the U.S. food safety system can be strengthened. The President formed this Working Group to conduct an across-the-board review of import safety by U.S. importers, and by Federal, State, and local governments. It was also given the task of providing recommendations to the President that will help to further improve the safety of imported products. In September 2007, the Working Group issued a strategic framework for doing more to ensure the safety of imported products. This framework outlines a risk-based approach that includes the principles of prevention, intervention, and response. The framework supports USDA's long-standing approach to evaluating and verifying the ability of foreign food safety systems to meet food safety requirements for meat, poultry, and processed egg products exported to the United States. On November 6, 2007, the Working Group released an implementation action plan containing 14 recommendations and 50 action steps. The Working Group provided specific short- and long-term recommendations for import safety improvements and reflected stakeholder input received through several outreach activities, as well as from a public meeting that was held on October 1, 2007, at USDA headquarters here in Washington. The Administration is working toward implementation of the Working Group's recommendations. Progress is being measured by each action step. Continued Evolution of Inspection and Use of Risk Because of my medical background and passion for public health, I have pursued the issue of how best to use risk in inspection. It has been a healthy debate. I believe this open and frank debate on risk needs to be expanded to include all foods. We need to continue to pursue these looming questions: Where is the risk greatest and where do inspection and other resources belong? Not all food products are equal from a risk standpoint. I am encouraging all food safety partners to join together and assess all foods and ensure that we are getting the best return for the Federal investment in food safety for the American public. Higher risk products and processes would appear to warrant a higher level of effort to ensure measures are in place and put into action to control pathogens, lowering the likelihood of foodborne illness. While inspection may be critical for some plants and products, a system of audits may be acceptable for products with less inherent risk, or processes with less risk or hazards, where established methods have proven effective to control pathogens. We need to develop a uniform, consistent process to determine when and where inspection is warranted, based on the inherent risk of the product and a plant's demonstrated control of that risk, and when and where audits are sufficient. I hope that we will collectively ask the tough questions and come up with answers for a new approach to inspection based on public health and risk. Conclusion FSIS is committed to improving its approach to inspection to focus on public health and risk. As a medical doctor and a public health professional, I believe that what all of us with a stake in food safety must accomplish is protecting people, especially those most vulnerable to a foodborne illness--the very young, the elderly, the immune-compromised and pregnant women. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am now happy to take your questions. ---------- Mr. Stupak. Thank you. The Federal Register which had those classifications were made part of the record earlier because there was some confusion on different classes so thank you. I said in my opening though that one of the things I try to do as chairman and members of this subcommittee, when we have companies, government agents, and agencies and other individuals come before the committee we expect them to follow through on promises they make. And we will do a follow-up. We will bring them back if we have to. So let me start, Mr. Raymond, with a matter last year in November, at our hearing last November. Mr. Inglejohn, who is here today, testified about approving carbon monoxide packaging. And we pointed out that the studies that microbial submitted as part of the approval process were flawed, and we were told that Mr. Inglejohn said he would re-examine FSIS approval and get back with us because there was denial and it wasn't--whether it was treated with carbon monoxide or not the microbials were going down and the studies were flawed. We acknowledged that on the record. So whatever happened, how come you haven't got back with us? Have you reviewed that study that we brought up in November? Dr. Raymond. I don't know why we didn't get back to you but I commit to you and promise to you that we will very shortly. I know we have re-looked at all the data between that testimony and today, and we have found continuing evidence that the microbials do go down in number and time in products treated with the MAP program. Mr. Stupak. But it showed the same thing without the MAP program too, so that was the flaw we were showing. But anyway, when will you get back to us? Give me a date. When can you get back to us on this? Dr. Raymond. Two weeks. Mr. Stupak. Two weeks. OK. I am going to hold you to that. In early February you mentioned Westland/Hallmark. How did you learn about this Westland/Hallmark? Were you notified by the Humane Society? How did USDA learn of this? Dr. Raymond. The Washington Post informed us, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Raymond. That they had the videotapes. Mr. Stupak. OK. And did you see the videotapes? Dr. Raymond. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. Have all the videotapes been turned over to USDA? Dr. Raymond. I don't know that all videotapes they have in their possession have been turned over. I cannot say that. Mr. Stupak. Were you here today when we showed the earlier videotapes? Dr. Raymond. Yes, I was, sir. Mr. Stupak. You have seen those prior to today's hearing? Dr. Raymond. Yes, I have. Mr. Stupak. They have been in the public domain for some time, right? Dr. Raymond. I know the first one has. I will be honest with you, I have not seen the second one in the public domain. That is not to say that it is not. I don't mean to be---- Mr. Stupak. Sure. Did USDA find that Westland/Hallmark illegally slaughtered downed cattle? Have you made that finding? Dr. Raymond. If I might, I would also like to clarify the definition of downer. A downer cow is a cow that when it presents for antemortem inspection cannot rise on its own and ambulate. That technically is a downer cow. Cattle that have been inspected by the veterinarian, both at rest and in ambulation, in movement, to be fit for the food supply may for whatever reason not be able to get up later, and as you heard earlier, if the veterinarian inspects that animal and can determine that it is due to an acute--it can go in the food supply. Mr. Stupak. Correct. Dr. Raymond. That is not what we would call a downer. We would call that a non-ambulatory. Mr. Stupak. OK. During USDA's inspection, did you find Westland/Hallmark illegally slaughtered non-ambulatory cattle? Dr. Raymond. Yes, we did, sir. Mr. Stupak. And since 2004, I think the records showed earlier, that has been U.S. law, you cannot slaughter---- Dr. Raymond. January, 2004, an interim rule was put into action. Mr. Stupak. OK. Let me ask you this. You saw the videos today. Were any of the cattle that we saw or cows in the video today, were they slaughtered illegally based on the videos you saw today? Dr. Raymond. They were slaughtered in non-compliance with our regulations, yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. OK. At our previous hearing, we heard testimony that the USDA veterinarian who conducted the antemortem inspections at Westland/Hallmark only inspected cattle twice a day, 6:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. That was on the first video we saw today. Further, he performed these inspections the same time every day according to the videos. What was that inspector doing then the rest of the day? Dr. Raymond. First of all, the statement that he inspected the animals only 6:30 and 12:30 comes from the Humane Society. We are doing our own investigation to determine the accuracy of that statement. Our inspectors, veterinarians and other inspectors, are instructed to go out into the pen area periodically during the day at different times unannounced to observe handling. But to answer your question, the public health veterinarian in this particular plant also has other duties that are off line that take him into the plant not the least of which is examining all the carcasses postmortem. And it wasn't mentioned this morning but about 20 carcasses per day in that plant are condemned postmortem because he sees things once the hide is off that would pull that animal out, so that is one of the very important things that he does plus other, the HASA procedures, the SOSP procedures. Mr. Stupak. How many inspectors did you have at Westland/ Hallmark? Dr. Raymond. Five, sir. Mr. Stupak. And have some of them been disciplined as a result of your investigation at Westland/Hallmark? Dr. Raymond. I cannot talk about personnel issues at this particular point in the investigation. Mr. Stupak. The question was were they disciplined, yes or no. Dr. Raymond. I can't discuss personnel issues at this point in time in the investigation. Mr. Stupak. According to the newspapers, three of them were disciplined. Any reason to say that newspaper was wrong? Dr. Raymond. I really can't discussion personnel issues. Mr. Stupak. All right. What type of surveillance was there in the cattle pens when the inspector was not there? Do we have any--if an inspector isn't there, is there any USDA inspection going on in these cattle pens? Dr. Raymond. Not on a continual basis, no. Mr. Stupak. You mentioned you were a professional public health officer. Professor Olson mentioned that before FDA--I know it is an FDA question but for 9 years they have had this petition going since 1999 on irradiation. As a professional health public official, wouldn't you want to see that petition acted upon on irradiation? Should it take 9 years? Dr. Raymond. The beef are USDA also so I find a lot of things about the Federal government as a public health official to be slow and sometimes that is good because everybody gets a chance to have a voice and explain their thoughts and so forth. I do find it problematically slow as a public health official, including at the USDA. Mr. Stupak. Right. And now you are part of the government so---- Dr. Raymond. Yes. Mr. Stupak [continuing]. Wouldn't you expedite and try to get that process moving forward instead of 8 or 9 years? Dr. Raymond. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. Because I think as the professor said if it wasn't for public health officials, we probably wouldn't have had pasteurization and other advances in science and technology. It has been reported that--it is going into a personnel issue again but let me try it. Supervising veterinarian at Westland/Hallmark had worked on site for 20 years. It has also been reported that in the 1990s Hallmark faced scrutiny for the way it handled downer cattle. Further, in 2005 as testimony showed today USDA cited the company for non-compliance for being overly aggressive in using electric prods to move cattle. If the veterinarian was present during these times why wasn't he putting forth these complaints or being more diligent to make sure that downer cows or cattle were not being mistreated or illegally slaughtered? Dr. Raymond. If our veterinarian had seen any of these actions that plant would have been--the inspection would have been suspended, and that plant, as we did in 12 plants last year when our public health veterinarians or other inspectors did see egregious inhumane handling, we do take it serious and we did shut 12 plants last year because of it. He evidently did not see it in this plant, but again that is part of the investigation. Mr. Stupak. I mentioned he has been there for 20 years. So, Dr. Raymond, USDA inspectors are often assigned to facilities for years on end. Do you believe that this practice can compromise their role as a regulator? In other words, does their loyalty shift from the government to the company they are supposed to regulate? Dr. Raymond. I understand your question, and I would certainly hope that would not because of the levels of supervision that they have. They are not out there all by themselves. They have supervisors that overlook their work. The in-plant inspector in charge is overlooking a line inspector. We have the district managers, deputy district managers all the way to the assistant administrator for the office of field ops. Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this, and then I will it turn over to my friend, Mr. Shimkus, for questions. There has been an alarming jump in the number of recalls and illness associated with E. coli contaminated meat. In 2007 alone there were 21 recalls of meat products due to being tainted with this deadly pathogen. These recalls affected about 33 million pounds of meat. And then you look back one year to 2006 with E. coli contamination, we had 8 recalls and just over 155,000. Why the dramatic increase? Dr. Raymond. I think that is a multi-part answer, sir, and it does concern me greatly, and that is why we have announced several new E. coli initiatives including several meetings with other experts, scientists, industry, consumers, et cetera. But to try to answer your question, there are several factors. One, we have a more sensitive test when we test for E. coli. Half of those 21 recalls were due to product tested positive. We tested, and we have a more sensitive test now. I think you are going to continue to see that part of recalls increase as this test gets more widely used, number 1. Number 2, we changed the way we do recalls last year. I was unhappy with some of the--I don't know if you want to call them policies--that FSA has had in place, that they did not do recalls until certain things all lined up. And I said that is too long. As a public health official, I can't wait that long. We are going to do them quicker, and so we did some recalls last year that would not have happened the year before. I think we do a better job of linking seemingly unrelated illnesses together because of Pulse Net, which I referenced very briefly in my opening comment. That is a technique that allows us to take a case of E. coli foodborne illness in Minnesota and link it to one in Michigan and hopefully find the product and we do the recall. We couldn't have done that 10 years ago. That didn't all happen last year. I am not saying that is why last year, but we do a better job there. I do believe the health professionals are doing much more testing than they used to when people do have signs and symptoms of foodborne illnesses. We work hard with them for 3 years telling them the more tests you do the better attribution we can get, the better attribution we have the better we can find what the solutions are to fix this problem. A lot of physicians and other health care professionals were reluctant to order a stool culture for the cost if the patient didn't look that ill so we are seeing twice as many tests being done as we did just a couple years ago, and, quite frankly, the patients are more concerned about this, the victims. The people that get the GI symptoms are thinking foodborne illnesses because of all the publicity and they run to the health care provider more quickly and they get attention more quickly, so I think the numbers are up because of those reasons. All that said, the product testing went up last year, pure and simple. It went up last year. I believe personally, and I have no science to back this up. I will tell you right now this is Raymond's theory that the E. coli load on the cattle has gone up, and I believe the interventions that we have in place in the plants are now being overwhelmed by a higher number of contaminants of E. coli on the hides and ultimately on the carcasses and in the intestines of these animals. We need to get that number down or find better in-plant interventions or use irradiation as you have already heard. I don't believe industry got sloppy and I sure don't believe our inspectors fell asleep at the switch. I do believe the load became higher because of changes in the feed, changes in the environment, maybe changes in the bug itself. Maybe it has developed a resistance. Some of the lactic acid washes, for instance, that we use, same as staphylococcus has developed a resistance to penicillin. Bugs do do that. Mr. Stupak. OK. That was Raymond's theory. Answer me this one, Stupak's theory. What happened here with Westland/Hallmark here? What happened? You call them up. You gave them 4 to 5 hours the testimony was and they agreed to the recall even though you had a 10-day period. And they asked for the video that you said that USDA had, and according to Mr. Mendell he never saw that video. What convinced Hallmark to do the 140 million pound recall based on a phone call? What else did the USDA have that would a company where this gentleman spent his whole life building up basically go down based on a phone call, what else is there? How are you that convincing? What are we missing? Dr. Raymond. There are no smoking guns if that is what you are after. We obviously interviewed many employees and also not just employees, the plant and our employees, but also the truck drivers that hauled the cattle there, the buyers that bought the cattle. We threw out a wide net and interviewed a lot of people, and we found evidence. Allowing an animal that became acutely disabled to go into the food supply without being inspected by the public health veterinarian was not an isolated incident. It was not a common incident but it happened enough that we knew we had a problem. We told the gentleman that. We did not show him the film that day. We had to look at it because of the investigation but he didn't ask a second time. But I want to clear up the 10-day thing also. We didn't say do it in 10 days or it will be worse. What we said was you can do a voluntary recall now or tomorrow we will detain the product and in 10 days we begin the process to detain it. But we would have gone into action the next day. Mr. Stupak. So it was based upon your investigation that it was more than just the 2 cows we pointed out today. Dr. Raymond. Yes. Mr. Stupak. OK. Thank you. Mr. Shimkus. Sorry I went over my time there. Mr. Shimkus. You are the chairman and you have the gavel. A couple questions, and as prepared as I want to be because of the questioning and answering, I am scattered all over the place, so let me start with this. The 12 plants that were closed down last year, what is their status today? Dr. Raymond. They are operating. Mr. Shimkus. And have you, the USDA, have you--in the last hearing I talked about there was I think from USDA 12 facilities operating, 10 were positive, I mean 10 were found to have problems, 2 had slaughtered downed cattle. In the OIG inspector's report, that issue. I mean it does make the case that 10 were fine. There are always problems. Let me go to the question my chairman mentioned. I understand you can't answer personnel questions but a follow-up on this. Is the investigation ongoing? Dr. Raymond. Yes, sir. Mr. Shimkus. That is why you are not going to answer it? Dr. Raymond. Yes, sir. Mr. Shimkus. OK. Then that is a better response than it is over and we just don't want to tell you. Let me go to it. This is also another follow-up question. What specific evidence did USDA have in early February against Westland/Hallmark to warrant this recall? Was it just the public videos we have seen today or did USDA have conclusive evidence that these downed cows were slaughtered and that their meat entered the food supply and was sold to customers? Dr. Raymond. Our decision to ask them to do a voluntary recall was based on not only the video but also on multiple interviews with plant employees, our employees, and other providers around the plant. The video, when we saw the video what that really did was authenticated the interviews that we had done which at that point in time was sworn testimony but yet to shut a plant down of that size and do what we did the video authenticated the interviews and that is when we took action. Mr. Shimkus. Do you have any evidence that the meat entered the food supply and was sold to customers? Dr. Raymond. Yes, sir. I mean Mr. Mendell made the comment that some of those animals may have been condemned postmortem. Of course, I don't know which ones were in those 20 but we certainly cannot say it did not enter commerce. I think it is a reasonable statement to assume it did enter commerce, some of it. I don't know that. Mr. Shimkus. You don't know that either. You don't know that it entered. You don't know that it did not enter. And is that why it is a class 2 versus a class 1? Dr. Raymond. No. The reason it is a class 2 is because the risk of that--the animal you saw in the video, let us just assume for a moment that it went into commerce. Mr. Shimkus. But we don't know that. That is the whole point. We don't know that it actually went in. I mean you are making an--part of my other line of questioning was it would be better for me to have a tape that said here is the cow coming off the truck, they are doing everything bad and evil and malicious and inhumane. They drag it into the kill box. The animal gets killed. The animals gets processed. It goes past the postmortem inspection and it has been ground up and it is in hamburger. But we don't know that. I hear there are more tapes but I don't--it is a You Tube generation but I can guarantee you I am not You Tubing for meat processing recall. Maybe I should as ranking member. Maybe that is what I should be doing at night. But I hadn't seen that second tape. Dr. Raymond. If I may. When the investigation is complete, you will see evidence that will assure you we did what we had to do, number 1. Number 2, this product entered that establishment in violation of our regulations, and our regulations are there for a reason and that is to protect the food supply as well as we can. It entered the food chain in violation of our regulations. That is why it is a class 2. Mr. Shimkus. Does a class 2 mean that it is a public health threat? Dr. Raymond. There is a remote probability that consumption of this product may cause serious adverse health events. Mr. Shimkus. I will give back the balance of my time. Mr. Stupak. OK. Mr. Whitfield for questions, please. Mr. Whitfield. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Raymond, in your testimony on page 1 you indicate all of the various acts that FSIS enforces, and you also say that it enforces the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, which requires that all livestock at federally inspected establishments be handled and slaughtered in a humane way. Now all of the testimony indicates that this Hallmark plant was closed at Chino because it violated FSIS regulations and there was a class 2 recall because there was a remote possibility that the meat was contaminated, is that correct? Dr. Raymond. We initially suspended inspection at this plant on February 4 because of violation of the Humane Handling Act. It was subsequent to that that we suspended the inspection because of the illegal entry of the---- Mr. Whitfield. OK. So initially it was suspended because of the Humane Handling Act? Dr. Raymond. That is correct, sir. Mr. Whitfield. OK. And so you all take the Humane Handling Act very seriously just as well as you do the food safety? Dr. Raymond. Absolutely. Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now what kind of training do inspectors receive as it relates to humane handling? Dr. Raymond. Depending what their inspection level is and where they would be working, there is variable degrees. First of all, the public health veterinarians, of course, that are mostly the ones that are going to be noting these activities are trained professionals. They have gone to veterinary medical school where they have been taught humane handling methods throughout their education and probably practiced them in the field for a while before they came to work with us. The other non-veterinarian inspectors are going to go through I don't know how many hours. I can find out for you and get back to you. I don't know the exact--but they all receive training. The on-line inspector is going to do a whole lot less looking for inhumane activities because he or she is in the plant and not out---- Mr. Whitfield. And how many inspectors are in that plant in Chino, how many inspectors were there? Dr. Raymond. There were five inspectors, sir. Three were on-line and two were off-line. Mr. Whitfield. So three on-line, two off-line, and then one veterinarian? Dr. Raymond. I included the public health veterinarian in the two off-line. Sorry. Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now you said that a downer cow is a cow that at the point of antemortem inspection cannot be ambulatory, is not ambulatory. Dr. Raymond. That is correct, sir. Mr. Whitfield. At what point is the antemortem inspection made? Dr. Raymond. It is made before the animal is allowed to enter the knock box. It is generally made some time the day of slaughter. It may be a few hours before the animal actually goes to the knock box. Mr. Whitfield. So that point is right next to the knock box, it is right there? Dr. Raymond. It is in the yard. It is in the pens. Depending on the size of the plant. There may be a plant that slaughters 10 cows a day and it would be right next to it. In a large plant it might be 10 pens away. Mr. Whitfield. But if a cow went past that point and was ambulatory and then for some reason the leg was broken and went down in order to get it to the knock box they would have to move it some way. Dr. Raymond. It would have to be humanely handled after the veterinarian came out and examined it at the spot where it went down and determine---- Mr. Whitfield. And how would they move it after the leg had been broken to the knock box? Dr. Raymond. They would stun it and then basically move it while it was unconscious into the knock box. Mr. Whitfield. So they would make it unconscious and move it? Dr. Raymond. Yes. Mr. Whitfield. OK. Now on March 3 you all initiated this new program called Humane Activities Tracking System, is that correct? Dr. Raymond. Did you say on March 3? Mr. Whitfield. That it began on March 3. Dr. Raymond. It actually began several years ago. March 3, what we did was we gave directives to our work force to increase the amount of time they spent on the humane animal treatment tracking system, humane animal tracking system. But we did that in an effort to find out if what happened at Hallmark was an isolated incident or whether it was something that was more pervasive, so we doubled the amount of time that we spend on these HATS activities, that is humane handling activities. There are nine things we look at. Mr. Whitfield. So this activity's tracking system is an old program but you just beefed it up on March 3? Dr. Raymond. Yes. Mr. Whitfield. All right. And what does that mean, beef up, what does that mean? Dr. Raymond. For the plants that are producing product for the school lunch programs, for instance, or any other federal commodity programs, we will spend twice as much time doing these HATS activities in those plants for the next 60 days. For plants that deal with primarily old cows like this plant they will also increase the amount of activity from 50 to 100 percent a time, and then in the fat cattle we will increase it up to 50 percent of the time because---- Mr. Whitfield. How does this system relate to the computerized tracking system? Dr. Raymond. This is it. Mr. Whitfield. This is the computerized tracking system. OK. All right. One other question. Dr. Sundlof, if you were a Rotary Club in my home town, for example, how would you explain the interaction between FDA and the Department of Agriculture as it relates to food safety? You are responsible for food safety. They are responsible for food safety. So what is the interaction here? Dr. Sundlof. Thank you, Congressman. Well, the simple answer is that the USDA is responsible for the safety of meat and poultry, and FDA is responsible for virtually everything else. I think there are some processed egg products that USDA is also responsible for, and I hope I got that all right, Dr. Raymond. Mr. Whitfield. But how often is it, I know I am going over my time a little bit, but I know that FDA has some regulations that certain animals will not be slaughtered for human consumption if it is found that they contain 1 of 12 or 13 chemicals, for example. Dr. Sundlof. Right. The law says, and this is how we interact with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, that drugs can only be used in food-producing animals if, first of all, they are approved by the Food and Drug Administration. And, secondly, if the remaining residues of those drugs in the animal fall below a predetermined level after a certain time period which we regulate by assigning what is called withdrawal time, so after the last time the drug is given there has to be a waiting period before those animals can be processed into food. The animals at slaughter are actually tested by the Department of Agriculture, Food Safety Inspection System. They are analyzed for the presence of several, many more---- Mr. Whitfield. You mean when they arrive they are---- Dr. Sundlof. At slaughter they are usually--swabs are taken of the kidneys or liver or fat samples so---- Mr. Whitfield. In the postmortem? Dr. Sundlof. Post-mortem. Mr. Whitfield. And then those are analyzed? Dr. Sundlof. Those are analyzed. Mr. Whitfield. For every animal? Dr. Sundlof. Pardon me? Mr. Whitfield. For every animal? Dr. Sundlof. Not for every animal. There are really two different programs, and I should let Dr. Raymond talk about this but there is a random sampling where we try and get an idea what the total population is and then there is a surveillance type sampling in which there are animals that look like they are high risk animals, and a lot of times dairy cattle are generally considered to be higher risk because oftentimes they are at the end of their life and they have been treated with drugs for disease. But the USDA does the testing. If they find a residue violation then it is up to the Food and Drug Administration to take the enforcement action. And what we do is we go out to the establishment where the animal came from and try and trace that animal back to the farm of origin and try and understand why there was a residue issue, and if it is serious then we will take enforcement action and have often in the past. Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Raymond, if I may, in earlier testimony, or I should say the hearing, we had 2 weeks ago they talked about downer cow loophole. Some people feel, humane societies and others feel, that once it is a downer cow it should not go into the food supply at all even if inspected by a veterinarian. Your comment on that? Dr. Raymond. I believe that an animal that has passed inspection, has been seen to ambulate in motion, does not appear to have any chronic health problems that then falls and breaks its leg, there is no reason that that presents a threat to the food supply of this country, and I believe they should be allowed to enter into the food supply. We have had this rule, as you mentioned yourself, since January of 2004. That is 4 years. This company violated the rule. I do not believe we should change the rule to affect 800 companies because one company violated the rule. Mr. Stupak. OK. I think I speak for all parents of school- age children and seniors and the elderly when I say that in light of the videos we saw today and Mr. Mendell's admissions today, I guess we feel safer knowing that the meat has been recalled, and there is some testimony or comments were made that mad cow disease, that won't surface, or the incubation period could be as high as 13 years, is that right? Dr. Raymond. That is correct. Mr. Stupak. So we may not know the outcome of all this for some time. We could have---- Dr. Raymond. There is that remote possibility which defines a class 2. Mr. Stupak. And let us say some surface 12 years from now, we wouldn't know if it was from Hallmark or wherever it came from, right, if someone came down with mad cow disease? Dr. Raymond. Let me remind you that no one in this country has ever come down with a variant CJ disease from eating cattle that came from this country. We only had 2 cows test positive in the herd out of 759,000. It is extremely rare. Those cows were both born before the feed ban went into effect, which went into effect over 10 years ago. These cows were 4 to 7 years of age. That is when a dairy cow quits producing milk. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, in follow-up can we ask him when was that, what year? Mr. Stupak. What year is that? Dr. Raymond. The 2 confirmed cases, the 2 confirmed cases have come since the cow went down in December, 2003. I don't know the exact dates but it has been since December, 2003, actually since June, 2004 when APHIS began their enhanced surveillance. Mr. Stupak. We just had one in Canada too actually on the day of the hearing, right? Dr. Raymond. I am just talking to the American herd right now. Mr. Stupak. Pardon? Dr. Raymond. I am just talking to the American herd right now. The American herd has not had any cattle found that have BSE that were born after the feed ban went into effect. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, can I follow up? Mr. Stupak. Sure. Mr. Shimkus. And the age of the cows at that time? We are going back to these two. What was the age of the cows? Dr. Raymond. They were born before the feed ban. That is what is really important. It is not the age. But I can sure get the age for you. I don't know the age. Mr. Shimkus. You answered the question, maybe I asked it wrong, but it was before the feed ban? Dr. Raymond. Yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. Let me go back, Mr. Raymond. Would the USDA have discovered this problem without the Humane Society's sting operation? Dr. Raymond. I would like to say yes but obviously it was going on and we had not, so I don't know. Mr. Stupak. Prior to this being notified or receiving these videos or notification of the sting operation by I think you said the Washington Post, had USDA been investigating this plant for downer animals? You said there were rumors and this video just verified what you had---- Dr. Raymond. No, no. After we became aware of the video the things we had to do was confirm that this action actually took place at this plant. We had to make sure that there was non- humane handling at this plant before we took action, which we did on the Monday morning, the 4th. At the same time, we are interviewing because we felt if this happened, if this plant had that kind of wanton disregard for our Federal statutes, then how did we know they had the same--placed the same emphasis on SRM removals, for instance, which would be most important or the downer rule. So we began a very thorough investigation of this particular plant, and we had interviews that indicated that this process of allowing an animal that became disabled to go to slaughter had been going on for 2 years. The video gave us irrefutable evidence, and that is when we did the recall. Mr. Stupak. OK. Thank you. Mr. Sundlof, Dr. Sundlof, I don't want to leave you out. In your opinion, does the proposed 2009 budget for FDA provide adequate resources for the Center for Science and Applied Nutrition to protect the Nation's food supply? Dr. Sundlof. Well, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that we look at it as more or less a down payment. We have said last fall that we are starting out a new approach to food safety and that is really focusing on the prevention side looking at our import programs and starting to ramp up to a different way of approaching food safety. We received somewhere in the order of $42 million in addition to our fiscal year '08 budget in '09, that is what the President has requested. This is going to go to trying to get those programs to the state where we need to start to really build the programs after that. Mr. Stupak. So it is a down payment so it doesn't adequately address the financial needs we have for food safety? Dr. Sundlof. We have a lot to do under the new food protection plan and the Import Safety Action Plan, and we haven't even begun to put pen to paper to determine what that budget is going to look like. Mr. Stupak. OK. Under the 1997 FDA Modernization Act, Congress required the FDA to implement an expedited status for food safety petitions. In 1999, the agency stated that the top priority would be given to petition design to decrease the risk of foodborne illness, is that correct? Dr. Sundlof. I believe that is correct, yes. Mr. Stupak. FDA has approved irradiation for reducing pathogens in meat and poultry and for insect control and shelf life extension of fruits and vegetables. However, the FDA does not allow irradiation to be used for pathogen reduction in fruits and vegetables. In 1999 a petition to allow irradiation for path reduction in fruits and vegetables and other ready to eat foods was submitted to the FDA. Eight or 9, well, almost 9 years later now the petition is still pending. Why hasn't the FDA acted on that petition on irradiation? Dr. Sundlof. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that the original petition, the 1999 petition, involved virtually all foods. As we start--and we took the approach that we were going to evaluate that petition and look at all foods under that petition. During the process of reviewing the information, we did find that in certain foods the process of irradiation did result in the production of furans which are cancer-causing chemicals. So what the approach is now is that we are looking at specific types of foods under that petition. Our first one, the one of highest importance right now is leafy green vegetables, and we are working--it is our Number 1 priority to get that out. There is work being done. Mr. Stupak. When will that be done on leafy green vegetables? Can you give us a commitment it is going to be done here in the next few months? Dr. Sundlof. Well, I can tell you that we will complete our review, the center will complete its review within the next several--I can't tell you exactly how many months but certainly this fiscal year and we will try and do much better than that. Mr. Stupak. Well, this fiscal year is until September 30. You had it for 9 years. Dr. Sundlof. We are talking here just about the---- Mr. Stupak. Right, leafy. Dr. Sundlof. Right. Mr. Stupak. Yes, leafy was there in 1999 and it is still there. Dr. Sundlof. Right. Mr. Stupak. What about the suggestion that you put an irradiation plant by Salinas Valley? You had that 21 outbreaks in 10 years. Why weren't you--would that help solve this problem? Why couldn't we put an irradiation plant to get that leafy vegetables and the spinach crop that we seem to have an outbreak every 6 months. Why won't we do that? Dr. Sundlof. Well, we don't--that would be up to the industry if they wanted to do that but first obviously they need---- Mr. Stupak. FDA won't even do an epidemiology study to try to figure out the source. Every time we come someone thinks it is the water, someone thinks it is the cows around there. I mean that is our salad bowl as you guys all referred to it. After 21 outbreaks you would think you would be a little bit more aggressive in trying to figure this out and solve the problem. Dr. Sundlof. Actually, Mr. Chairman, we are doing that. We have been working with the State of California, with the academic community in California, and with the industry to try and better understand how E. coli is transferring from the environment into the spinach and other leafy greens. We are also looking at GIS systems, so we are looking at the topography using satellite imaging to determine where the outbreaks have occurred in the past so that we can have a better idea from an epidemiological approach to understanding what are the conditions that led to this contamination so we can prevent it in the future. Mr. Stupak. OK. Let us go back to the irradiation of food. It is used in over 30 countries. It is endorsed by the World Health Organization, CDC, Codex, even the FDA has stated that irradiation is safe and effective in decreasing or eliminating harmful bacteria. Did FDA in its 9 years or 8 years they have had this petition find any science to justify these delays? Dr. Sundlof. Again, the finding that irradiation does produce this cancer-causing substance, furans in some foods, is one of the things that has prevented us from moving forward, and I don't believe that information was available to those international organizations when they did make their decision. Mr. Stupak. Are there furans in leafy greens? Dr. Sundlof. My information that I have indicates that irradiation of leafy greens at the rate that they would normally be irradiated would create minimal furans, so it would be very, very small. Mr. Stupak. So there would be no health risk? Dr. Sundlof. So that is the direction we are proceeding, yes. Mr. Stupak. Well, if there is no health risk then why not approve the petition then? Dr. Sundlof. Again, Mr. Chairman, we are working on it. There are a lot of administrative hurdles that we have to cross. Mr. Stupak. Yes, 9 years worth. Let me ask you this one. Canada and Japan have repeatedly found that seafood exports from Vietnam have tested positive for banned antibiotics. We have been told that every major importing country has found repeated shipments of Vietnamese shrimp tainted with banned antibiotics. It came up at our last hearing 2 weeks ago. We are also told that the FDA has known about the problem since at least 2003, but has yet to issue an import alert regarding Vietnamese shrimp imports. Is shrimp from Vietnam a problem? If so, why don't we have a Vietnamese shrimp import alert? Dr. Sundlof. Mr. Chairman, we do analyze shrimp coming from Vietnam and other Asian countries. I think we have taken action in the past on Vietnamese fish, especially catfish, I know. I am not sure about the shrimp at this point but---- Mr. Stupak. Could you get back with us on that? Dr. Sundlof. We can certainly get back with you on that. Mr. Stupak. I mean the last testimony is we get Pakistani shrimp that is rejected in Europe, it comes here. They don't export anything here but in the last couple months they have done 165,000 pounds and it has got fungi and bacteria and that is why it is rejected in the EU, but we seem to have it here and the same with Vietnamese shrimp. As soon as it gets pushed out of another country, it seems to be dumped here because we are not checking for it. And there is no import alert around it even though we know the problems existed since 2003. Dr. Sundlof. I do know that we have been testing imported shrimp and other seafood products from a variety of countries, and we have not seen an increase in the residues of those drugs. There hasn't been--you know, over the years, there has not been a spike. We don't see that so the---- Mr. Stupak. But the bacteria found there is a health concern, is it not? Dr. Sundlof. Bacteria? Mr. Stupak. Yes. Dr. Sundlof. Bacteria certainly is, yes. Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this. During the last hearing on February 26, a witness testified that in June, 2006, former Director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Dr. Robert Brackett, stated that the FDA did not consider pesticide residues in food a serious matter and would no longer monitor them. As the new director of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, do you believe pesticide residue in food is a serious problem, and will the FDA monitor them under your direction? Dr. Sundlof. Well, we certainly will monitor them, and we look at pesticide residues in light of all of the things that we consider to be risks associated with foods, and we try to prioritize. We normally analyze between 4,000 and 6,000 imported and domestic products per year for pesticides so it is not like we are not doing it. We are doing about between 4,000 and 6,000 pesticide analyses per year. Mr. Stupak. So which ones are most harmful of the analysis you have been doing? Which ones should the American people be on the lookout for on the pesticides and the amounts that are of concern? Dr. Sundlof. Well, let me just say that 93 percent of the pesticides that we are finding are not because they are--we don't know if they represent a safety hazard. We think they probably are minimal. We don't have tolerances for them in the United States so any amount that we find would be a violation of our laws, and that is 93 percent of them so it is difficult to say which are the most important from a hazardous point of view but we do--when we do a screen we screen for over 300 different pesticides, and any one of those that is determined to be violative, we can take action. We have import alerts on, for instance, Dominican Republic produce right now because of pesticides. Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you this. At our last hearing on February 26, the CEO of a private lab that tests food under the import alert told the committee that we, and we already learned this from testimony last summer, that labs, private labs, will discard bad results at the request of the importer and the same private lab will keep testing the product until a positive result is obtained or the importer will hire another lab to test the product until a positive result is obtained. You were advised by our staff to review this testimony, were you not? Dr. Sundlof. I don't know. Mr. Stupak. OK. Did you ever review that testimony? Dr. Sundlof. I don't know if we did or not. Mr. Stupak. Do you realize that is a problem that if you put an import alert they go to a lab that will give them the results they want and then it comes in? Dr. Sundlof. I do recognize that. I do recognize that that is an issue, and we can get back to you on that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. OK. We have legislation moving on food safety. We are going to make that a requirement. Don't you think all lab tests if there is an import alert, if I am a private lab, I test whether it is a positive test or a negative test, you should have access to it, you should have---- Dr. Sundlof. We would like to have access to that. Mr. Stupak. So you would like to have that authority then? Dr. Sundlof. We would like to have the information. Whether it requires legislation or not--it would be nice if we had the information from---- Mr. Stupak. Having the information is one thing. Doing something about it is another thing. I mean just giving you the information isn't going to do anything. If you get a negative test, you can't lift the import alert, right? Dr. Sundlof. If we get a negative--the way the import alert works is that if a company provides us with documented evidence that they no longer---- Mr. Stupak. Had the problem. Dr. Sundlof. Then they can---- Mr. Stupak. But you don't know how many tests they take before they get one that shows that or which batch they are taking it from, correct? Dr. Sundlof. That I don't know. Mr. Stupak. Wouldn't it be like in drugs, wouldn't it be better to get all the tests so you can make a determination whether or not this batch of food or shrimp from Vietnam is actually safe for human consumption, not just the ones that the private labs want to give you? Dr. Sundlof. We would like to have as much information as we can get. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Mr. Shimkus has some questions. Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Raymond, would the USDA provide to this committee all the footage of films that you have on Westland/ Hallmark? Dr. Raymond. Yes, we would be glad to. Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Sundlof, what is the risk of BSE from non- ambulatory cattle in the meat supply? Dr. Sundlof. Well, in the United States---- Mr. Shimkus. In the United States. Dr. Sundlof. In the United States, as Dr. Raymond said, it is very, very small testing. Mr. Shimkus. What is a good word for very, very small? Dr. Sundlof. Well, the phrase that has been used is vanishingly small but---- Mr. Shimkus. Vanishingly small. Dr. Sundlof. Vanishingly small. Mr. Shimkus. Percentage wise on a scale of 1 to 100, what would be vanishingly small? The point it, and I don't want to be trivial, but I want to--in 0 to 100 using decimals, what is vanishingly small? Dr. Sundlof. Let me just say that I can't answer the question exactly but let me give you an example of how I believe USDA APHIS, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, set up their survey in such a way that they would be able to detect one cow in 10 million. OK. They actually sampled well beyond what they had originally set out to do so rather than a couple hundred thousand, they sampled almost three-quarters of a million and they found two animals. Those animals were born before the 1996 feed ban. It implies that the number is somewhere below 1 in 10 million. So that is as close as I can get, and I would defer to Dr. Raymond if he has better numbers. Dr. Raymond. I am sorry. I was trying to get myself out of a hole that I just dug. Mr. Shimkus. I was thinking you might have got yourself in a hole but I will let you try to dig out when I---- Dr. Raymond. You are talking about how much we---- Mr. Shimkus. Why don't you let me just go, and I got some questions that follow up on this line anyway. It is really yours to answer, Dr. Raymond, but it deals with BSE. Is there a postmortem testing for BSE? Dr. Sundlof, do you know? I know the testing is done by you all, but I want to ask the expert here. Dr. Sundlof. My understanding is that postmortem testing is done when there is a suspect animal but not as a routine method. Mr. Shimkus. Dr. Raymond. Dr. Raymond. It is all postmortem because what we are doing is looking at the brains of these cows. We don't test them in the plant. There is no instantaneous test in the plant but animals that present to this particular plant and any other plant that are wobbly or appear to have central nervous system diseases are going to be sampled, and a sample of the downers are going to also be sampled so they are going to be tested. We are still testing 40,000 high risk cattle a year in this country. Mr. Shimkus. And the result of the testing so far? Dr. Raymond. Just the two animals since the enhanced surveillance started. The enhanced surveillance stopped---- Mr. Shimkus. They were born prior to---- Dr. Raymond. They were all born prior to the feed ban going into effect. Mr. Shimkus. Post that time, none? Dr. Raymond. No animals born after the feed ban have been found to have BSE in this country. Mr. Shimkus. In this country. Any of these two in Hallmark/ Westland plant? Dr. Raymond. No. The two that we are talking about were downers on the farm. They were not even at a processing plant or a slaughter plant. Mr. Shimkus. So they were no challenge to the food supply? Dr. Raymond. The two that we have found since the first one went down in the State of Washington were on farm animals. Mr. Shimkus. You went through the classes, so for the processing facility what is their response class 2 versus a class 3 recall? What would be the difference or is there? Dr. Raymond. There is a difference. There is a difference between a 1 and a 2 and a 3 because of the severity of the risk, the threat to the American public. Mr. Shimkus. And 2 is--I mean you know these. Can you restate 2 for me? Dr. Raymond. A remote probability of adverse health consequences. If it is a class 1, we are going to do everything we can as quickly as we can to get all that product out of commerce and to alert the American public. A class 2 we are going to do the same thing but when you are dealing with a recall as big as this one it takes longer to get that product out and we have to use our resources to go out and verify the product has been removed. And we may be able to verify it a little quicker as a class 1. Mr. Shimkus. My challenge is this, that I have already gone through the chain of command concerns that I have, the chain of custody issue, which I am not sure we understand yet. And then point two, if BSE is vanishingly remote, class 2 versus class 3, 1 in 10 million. Vanishingly remote, I can't quantify that. Dr. Raymond. If we could say zero risk, we would have done a class 3. We cannot say zero risk. Those regs were put into place in January of 2004 to mitigate the exposure, the risk of exposure to BSE for the American consuming public, and each one of those regulations is important. Some are more important than others. I would state to you that the SRM removal is absolutely the Number 1 most important thing we do to protect human health. The feed ban is the Number 1 thing we do to protect animal health. Those two together give us good safety but we also man mechanical separation of meat in cattle 30 months and over. We also ban downer cattle from entering the food supply. They are part of the interlocking steps that we have. And any time one of those steps is violated, we are going to have to take action. Mr. Shimkus. If you would have done a class 3 to this facility, tell me the difference. Dr. Raymond. It is still a recall. A recall is a recall. Mr. Shimkus. So there is no difference? Dr. Raymond. Not really. A sense of urgency within the department maybe or within the consuming public but a recall is a recall. Mr. Shimkus. Is there any alternatives? Dr. Raymond. They produce this product in non-compliance with our regulations and therefore by definition it becomes unfit for human consumption. Mr. Shimkus. And I asked this earlier, of the facilities that were closed, they have reopened so Westland/Hallmark would have--what would they have to do to reopen? Dr. Raymond. They would have to, A, assure us that they have steps in place that humane handling will be guaranteed, and that what happened with the humane handling won't happen again, and then they have to address the issue of the violation of the compliance with the laws and give us the things that have been into place to make sure that they are in compliance with all of our regulations. Mr. Shimkus. You know, I guess the concern is we get the inhumane handling part. We understand that. The concern is that we want to make sure that what you did in the recall was based upon a concern of health and safety of the food supply versus using that process--there are other things to do to address inhumane handling than a class 2 or class 3 recall if the vanishingly small risk, which is 1 in 10 million. That is what a lot of us will struggle with, that the process was used-- there are probably other legal aspects to be able to go after people who have a process by which there is inhumane treatment. My concern is that the health and safety of the food supply and that we don't use that as an excuse to attack people for being inhumane. There are other rules and regulations and laws that we can then enact. Dr. Raymond. If it had just been inhumane handling, I have no doubt that that plant would be up working slaughtering animals today and processing them, but it was more than just inhumane handling. Our investigation showed that they produced a product in violation of our regulations. Mr. Shimkus. One last question. Why didn't you show them the video when they asked for it? Dr. Raymond. At that particular point in time when he asked, we were trying to determine how much of this is going to have to be kept confidential because of the ongoing violation. We were trying to figure out a way to get him to be able to see it, but he never asked us a second time. I do believe some of his plant management did see it when we talked to them about recall. They had seen the 4-minute video. Mr. Shimkus. I think there is a hole in the debate when you are talking about the immediate health and safety of the food supply, you are telling a person you are going to close them down. You probably owed it to him if he asked for the video to show him the video. And I will yield back my time. Mr. Stupak. But there was no reason why Mr. Mendell couldn't go online like the rest of America and viewed it online, right? Dr. Raymond. No. Mr. Stupak. A lot of us are glad you did the recall. It was a clear violation. We don't want downer cows in our food supply so I think the USDA acted appropriately. Let me ask you this though, because--just a couple quick questions if I may-- because I want to go back to carbon monoxide, Dr. Raymond. Target sent a formal letter to USDA asking to approve a label to alert consumers that packaging certain meat products that they would sell, Target would sell, are packaged in an atmosphere containing carbon monoxide. USDA did not approve this label, thereby essentially forbidding Target from telling the truth about its products to consumers. Is that true? Dr. Raymond. For the record, I would like to read the letter, a portion of the letter, that was sent to us. Mr. Stupak. And can you provide it for the committee after you read it? Dr. Raymond. Absolutely. Mr. Stupak. OK. Dr. Raymond. ``Target requests direction as to how best to submit information required in 9 C.F.R. 317.4 for the sketch labeling and for the FSIS form application for approval of labels, markings and devices.'' The letter--they asked us for direction twice, and they start out the letter in the first sentence says we are sending you this letter to request direction from FSIS. They didn't send us a label. Mr. Stupak. I see. Dr. Raymond. And we provided a response to them for the direction. We have not heard back from them. Mr. Stupak. Could Target without USDA approval put on their meat packaging that the meat was packaged using carbon monoxide, color is not an accurate indicator of freshness, refer to use or freeze by date? Could they do that or do they need your approval to say this meat was packaged using carbon monoxide? Dr. Raymond. All labels need our approval. Mr. Stupak. OK. Kyle, put up that sign. Were you here when we showed that sign earlier? I think there might be a copy right there on the desk. See right in front of you, Dr. Raymond, as you direct yourself towards the dais here. It is right there. Could in the meat area where Target sells their meat, could they put in there our fresh meat and seafood set standards, and basically it says we do not use carbon monoxide. Can they do that, just put a sign up? Dr. Raymond. As long as it is truthful and not misleading, they can. Mr. Stupak. They don't need your permission to put a little sign up? Dr. Raymond. As long as it is truthful and not misleading. Mr. Stupak. But if they put it on the label of that meat right there then they have to have your approval? Dr. Raymond. That label has met our approval, yes, sir. Mr. Stupak. Right. Right. OK. So would you approve a label then which would say this meat is packaged using carbon monoxide, color is not an accurate indicator of freshness, refer to use or freeze by date? Would the USDA have a problem with that? Dr. Raymond. I am not going to answer that today for you, sir, because I would want to see the whole label and we are making an assumption here. I would be glad to have our labeling team take a look at that request and get them an answer as quickly as we can. Mr. Stupak. Well, what I just read you is already used. Basically I think you have already approved, USDA has approved, ``color is not an accurate indicator of freshness, refer to use or freeze by date,'' that has been approved by USDA. Dr. Raymond. That language evidently has. Mr. Stupak. Right. Dr. Raymond. If you are reading it, and I am sure it has. But, if I might, it could be in little teeny tiny letters. That is why we would have to see the whole label. Mr. Stupak. So your rejection is just--they are asking for guidance. You are saying basically show us what you want to put on your label. Dr. Raymond. Exactly. Mr. Stupak. OK. So due diligence sort of fell apart, not on USDA part but on Target's part, is it fair to say? Dr. Raymond. We responded to them in January and have not heard back from them since. Mr. Stupak. OK. And get us a copy of that letter there that you read from back to Target and we will make a copy of it. OK. They just informed me they have a copy of it. Mr. Shimkus, anything further? Mr. Shimkus. Real briefly. You may not know the answer. Where are the cows, the spent dairy cows that used to go to Westland/Hallmark, where are they going? Do we know? Dr. Raymond. No, I don't know. Mr. Shimkus. Last question for you, Dr. Raymond. When you did your interviews based upon the receipt of this information, and you did interviews, did you interview the undercover Humane Society operative? Was that part of---- Dr. Raymond. Yes, it was, sir. Could I just before we go off of this just for the record because I did misspeak, any of the videotapes that we have that are on our Web page, of course we will share with you, but there have been some that the OIG perhaps has subpoenaed and obviously I cannot share theirs with you, so I just wanted to clarify that if I might. Mr. Shimkus. Yes, I think we are interested in--unless it is any of those that are subject to the parameters you just mentioned. If there were videos that you would not show to Mr. Mendell, we would like to see those unless those are the ones that are under subpoena or whatever. Dr. Raymond. I assure you that I will talk to my legal folks and we will share with you everything I can share with you. Mr. Shimkus. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stupak. Thank you. That concludes questioning. I want to thank all the witnesses for coming today, and thank you for your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for additional questions for the record. Without objection, the record will remain open. I ask unanimous consent that the contents of our document binder be entered in the record. Without objection, the documents will be entered in the record. That concludes our hearing. Without objection, this meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] Statement of Hon. Gene Green Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the Nation's food supply. I think it is important that we continue to have these hearings to address the issue food safety in the US. This is the sixth hearing this committee has held on the issue of food safety and regulatory failure. These hearings have continuously highlighted the fact that the FDA and industry need to do more to make sure our food is safe to eat. Each year in the US there are approximately, 76 million cases of foodborne illness and in the past year there have been numerous high profile food product recalls involving meat, fish, and vegetables. Today we will focus primarily on the safety of our meat and poultry supply. The hearing today focuses on the need of the FDA and USDA to improve their food inspection system. I believe that many of the outbreaks that have recently occurred can and have been directly linked to a poor inspection system. During these hearings on food safety, I have spoken many times of the need for more FDA inspectors at our ports. I represent the Port of Houston and I actually spent one day on the docks as they unloaded cargo and saw how the products are inspected. It is clear to me, after observing activity at the Port of Houston and through these hearings, that the FDA and the USDA do not have enough inspectors protect our food supply. If the FDA needs to hire third party inspectors or partner with another agency like the Department of Agriculture, then the FDA should do so to ensure product safety. However, as this hearing will show today, even though the USDA has third party inspectors, there are not enough inspectors to ensure food safety. It is our responsibility to make sure that the FDA and the USDA have the resources they need to protect us from contaminated food products. We can't point out the problem without offering some solution as well. If we need to provide more funding to allow the FDA and the USDA to protect our food supply then we should do just that. Consumers should be able to purchase food without worrying about botulism, E. coli, salmonella, or pesticides in their food. The Westland/Hallmark beef recall, the largest food recall in the US, is an example of what our food inspection system lacks and how the lack of proper inspection directly affects the most vulnerable members of the population- children. Westland/Hallmark was not consulting with USDA on downer cattle and consequently, this diseased beef entered the supply chain. Some of this recalled beef was supplied to schools in my district including Houston Independent School District and Pasadena School District. The blatant disregard for proper handling of cattle and allowing the diseased cattle to enter the food supply highlights just how little regulation is actually in place at these food plants. Clearly, this is a problem that isn't improving on its own and is only getting worse in my opinion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing and I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the committee today. I yield back my time. ---------- [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0332.027 Accounts from HSUS Investigator at Hallmark/Westland Meating Company 1. I am employed as an investigator with The Humane Society of the United States. 2. Between October 3 and November 14 2007 I was employed as a pen worker for Hallmark Meat Packing Company which supplies beef to Westland Meat Company, Inc. My duties included unloading cattle from livestock trailers, handling cattle, driving cattle into the kill chute for slaughter, and stunning cattle prior to slaughter. 3. During my 6 weeks at Hallmark I witnessed and documented acts of extreme cruelty to cattle who were too sick or injured to stand up or walk to slaughter on their own power. I observed these illegal and inhumane animal handling practices on a daily basis. 4. I video-recorded numerous instances where animals too sick or injured to walk on their own, were tortured until they rose to their feet, and once they stood they were shocked and/ or held by their tails to keep them up and moving into the chute to be slaughtered for human consumption. 5. I video-recorded a cow collapsing in the chute leading to the kill box. This cow never stood up again. She was shocked extensively, then shot in the head and dragged into the kill box by a chain attached to her neck. 6. On another instance I video-recorded a Jersey cow collapsing in the chute on the way to the kill box. Workers shock her and lift her by her tail to get her into the box. One worker holds her tail while the other shocks her face and then sides to keep her moving into the plant. 7. I video-recorded two workers holding up a cow that can not walk on her own. A hotshot is used continuously to get the cow up and then they hold her by her tail and move her up the chute into the kill box. Another worker grasps the tail while standing alongside the chute to keep the cow upright. As soon as the cow enters the kill box the workers let go of her and she collapses. The door is quickly slammed shut to keep her from falling back into the chute. The workers then proceed back to the alley where another downed cow is lying and one shocks her while the others stand behind her pushing to get her to stand. Workers continue to shock the cow along her side and then her face causing her to vocalize. Eventually they push her to her feet and walk her up the chute. Workers hold her up and another shocks her from alongside the chute. They put her into the kill box and quickly shut the door. 8. I video-recorded the pen manager shocking a down cow in the covered pen outside the crowd pen; he uses a pocket sized hotshot to apply electricity to her face and body. He then sprays water from a high pressure hose into her mouth and nose causing the cow to stand while workers hold her tail and walk her up to the kill box while continuously shocking her to keep her on her feet and moving. 9. I video-recorded the pen manager and a worker approach a cow that has collapsed in the alley leading to the chute. She is unable to walk to the chute. The manager shocks the cow while another worker lifts her by her tail and then walks her up the chute. Another worker stands above the chute grasping the cows tail so that she cannot collapse again. The hotshot is continuously applied to keep the cow upright and moving. 10. I video-recorded workers shocking a large cow with an electric cattle prod and dragging her from a truck by a chain attached to a forklift operated by an experienced worker. The pen manager then drags the cow some more and then rams her into the pen with the forklift trying over and over to get her to stand by using the forklift until she is held up by workers and is put in the alley in line for slaughter. 11. I video-recorded an experienced worker pushing a cow down the stairs inside a truck instead of euthanizing her. The cow then collapses on top of a forklift at the truck's rear exit, which the worker moves, causing the cow to fall several feet to the pavement. He then pushes and drops her with the lift until she is placed in a pen with other healthy cows, blood is running from her vagina and rectum. 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