[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONTAMINATED FOOD: PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-92
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
CONTAMINATED FOOD: PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-92
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-369 WASHINGTON : 2008
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,Chairman JOE BARTON, Texas
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Ranking Member
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia FRED UPTON, Michigan
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BART GORDON, Tennessee ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BART STUPAK, Michigan HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
GENE GREEN, Texas Mississippi
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado VITO FOSSELLA, New York
Vice Chairman STEVE BUYER, Indiana
LOIS CAPPS, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JANE HARMAN, California MARY BONO, California
TOM ALLEN, Maine GREG WALDEN, Oregon
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois LEE TERRY, Nebraska
HILDA L. SOLIS, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JAY INSLEE, Washington SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JIM MATHESON, Utah
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
Professional Staff
Dennis B. Fitzgibbons,Chief of Staff
Gregg A. Rothschild,Chief Counsel
Sharon E. Davis,Chief Clerk
David L. Cavicke,Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
BART STUPAK, Michigan,Chairman
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member
Vice Chairman GREG WALDEN, Oregon
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
GENE GREEN, Texas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAY INSLEE, Washington JOE BARTON, Texas(ex officio)
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan(ex
officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, opening statement....................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, opening statement.............................. 15
Prepared statement...........................................
Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Pennsylvania, opening statement................................ 16
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado, opening statement................................. 17
Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Tennessee, opening statement.......................... 18
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 179
Hon. Jan Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, prepared statement................................ 180
Witnesses
Michael Greger, M.D., Director of Public Health and Animal
Agriculture, The Humane Society of the United States........... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
John A. Williams, Executor Director, Southern Shrimp Alliance.... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 63
William D. Marler, Esquire, Marler Clark LLP PS.................. 74
Prepared statement........................................... 78
Gary M. Rodkin, Chief Executive Officer, Conagra Foods, Inc...... 104
Prepared statement........................................... 105
B. Keith Shoemaker, President and CEO, Butterbal, LLC............ 108
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Christopher D. Lischewski, President and CEO, Bumble Bee Foods,
LLC............................................................ 112
Prepared statement........................................... 113
Rick Ray, President and CEO, New Era Canning Company............. 115
Prepared statement........................................... 118
David A. DeLorenzo, President and Chief Executive Officer, Dole
Food Company, Inc.............................................. 122
Prepared statement........................................... 124
Answers to submitted questions...............................
David A. Eisenberg, Chairman, ANRESCO Laboratories............... 129
Prepared statement........................................... 132
Robert E. Brackett, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Chief
Science and Regulatory Affairs Officer, Grocery Manufacturers
Association.................................................... 141
Prepared statement........................................... 142
Submitted Material
Chart entitled ``Seafood Recall List''........................... 183
Chart entitled ``School Districts Given Recalled Meat''.......... 188
Subcommittee exhibit binder...................................... 194
CONTAMINATED FOOD: PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart
Stupak (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stupak, DeGette, Doyle,
Schakowsky, Inslee, Dingell (ex officio), Shimkus, Walden,
Murphy, Burgess, Blackburn and Barton (ex officio).
Staff present: Scott Scholegel, David Nelson, Kevin
Barstow, Richard Wilfong, John Sopko, Kyle Chapman, Alan
Slobodin, Krista Carpenter, Whitney Drew.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr.Stupak. This meeting will come to order.
Today we have a hearing entitled ``Contaminated Food:
Private Sector Accountability.'' Each member will be recognized
for a five minute opening statement. I will begin.
Today we hold the fifth subcommittee hearing on the safety
of our Nation's food supply. Although it was purely
coincidental that this hearing was set before the largest beef
recall in American history. It is not a coincidence that
recalls of this magnitude are escalating. Since starting our
investigations Americans have witnessed one food safety
disaster after another. In the last 18 months alone we have
seen in August and September of 2006, E. coli in bagged spinach
sickened 204 people and killed three. In September of 2006
salmonella found in tomatoes sickened 183 people. In December
2006 lettuce contaminated with E. coli at Taco Bell and Taco
John restaurants sickened 152 people. In February 2007 Peter
Pan peanut butter contaminated with salmonella sickened 425
people. In February and March 2007, 100 brands of tainted pet
food were recalled after sickening and killing thousands of
pets. In June 2007 Veggie Booties snacks contaminated with
salmonella caused 65 illnesses. In July 2007, 90 canned food
products with botulism contamination were recalled after
sickening eight people. In August 2007, almost a year and a
half after the last spinach E. coli outbreak, another
nationwide recall of fresh spinach occurred following discovery
of salmonella in test batches. In October of 2007 frozen pot
pies carrying salmonella were recalled after illnesses were
reported in 31 states. In September of 2007 nearly 22 million
pounds of beef were recalled after E. coli contamination was
found. And finally, just over a week ago, nearly 144 million
pounds of beef were recalled by Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing
Company after being determined to be unfit for human
consumption. Our food safety system is broken. So called
voluntary compliance, relying on the food industry to place
safety before profits, does not appear to be working. The
budgets and regulatory policies of this Administration have
crippled both the Food and Drug Administration and the Food
Safety and Inspection Service of the United States Department
of Agriculture. In fact, some 76 million Americans, almost one
out of every four Americans, are affected each year by
illnesses from contaminated food. Since sickness from
contaminated food is largely preventable this committee has
actively pushed the public and private sectors to focus on
preventing this epidemic.
What have we learned so far? We found a fragmented food
safety program suffering from willfully inadequate resources,
inconsistent oversights, and ineffective coordination. In
December the FDA's own science board report noted that FDA's
Food Safety Program has put American lives at risk, and the FDA
``does not have the capacity to ensure the safety of food for
our Nation.'' We have also learned that the problems are not
just limited to the FDA. The once vaulted USDA seal of
wholesomeness can no longer be relied upon to protect
consumers. USDA, despite having about four times the food
safety budget of FDA and a network of inspectors in many, if
not all meat processing facilities, is also failing to protect
Americans. Last week's extraordinary recall of over 143 million
pounds of beef by Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing Company
follows more than 20 other beef recalls in the preceding 20
months. Nearly two meat recalls per month. My colleagues and I
are fully aware that the product recalls by the USDA does not
indicate success, rather each recall means that the system has
failed. Recalls tell us that contaminated beef made it into the
marketplace, restaurants, schools and our kitchen tables. Last
fall our hearing drew attention to 22 million pounds of beef
that was recalled that was packaged in carbon monoxide,
deceiving consumers into thinking the meat was fresh, wholesome
and free of contaminants. I am troubled to tell my colleagues
that despite our investigation, and despite one major
retailer's request to label their meat as having been packed
with carbon monoxide, the USDA is still refusing to allow
retailers to label their meat as such.
Today's hearing focuses on the role of private industry and
protecting our Nation's food supply. Responsibility for
supplying safe and wholesome foods does not rest solely with
the government. It is always the food processor that has the
first opportunity to ensure the safety of their product and
prevent these tragic food illnesses. We intend to ask food
processors what they have learned from the food recalls,
illnesses and deaths of last year, what they are doing to
protect the American consumer and ensure their food is safe.
Some of the food processors whose products were recalled last
year will testify today. Eating vegetables, such as spinach,
was once every parent's refrain. But as we learned last year,
eating vegetables and spinach nearly led to the serious injury
and death of defenseless children. Unfortunately, the problems
associated with Salinas Valley, known as America's salad bowl,
continue to plague us. Is America any safer today? Hopefully
the CEO of Dole, the Nation's largest distributor of E. coli
spinach that sickened and killed people last year, will tell us
what he is doing to stop these problems. ConAgra, a firm that
blamed the problems relating to Peter Pan peanut butter on a
leaky roof in testimony before us last April, is also back to
explain why the same strain of salmonella got in their peanut
butter jars six months after the leak was fixed. ConAgra still
has to explain to the American people how salmonella infected
its Banquet brand turkey pot pies. We also need to understand
from ConAgra and their supplier Butterball how fully cooked
turkey could sicken people who ate their pot pies. We also
planned to have asked Steve Mendell, the CEO of Hallmark and
Westland Company, to explain how he could produce and ship over
143 million pounds of raw and frozen beef products that the
USDA determined was unfit for human consumption. Hallmark/
Westland's February 17 recall is the largest meat recall in the
Nation's history. Fifty-five million pounds of this meat was
shipped to feed children in federally sponsored school lunch
programs. How could children and seniors be fed beef from
cattle that could not legally be slaughtered. USDA inspectors
were at the plant. Where were they? Why didn't Federal
inspectors catch the illegal slaughter of downer cows before
millions of children were put at risk of mad cow disease and
other health problems from eating meat from cows that were too
sick to even stand up?
We will also hear from the CEO of Bumblebee and New Era
about the deadly botulism bacteria that were found in their
food. We need to know how botulism, a very deadly but rarely
found bacteria, survived the sterilization process required for
low acid canned foods in the Bumblebee plant in Georgia and the
New Era facility in Michigan. I believe this is the first time
in over 30 years that botulism has been discovered in our food.
If we can no longer trust our food companies to provide us with
food that is supposed to be pasteurized, then America's food
safety has sunk to a new low. How many other foods that are
supposed to be sterilized before they are being sent to the
grocery stores, but are not being pasteurized before being sold
to American consumers.
Today we will also have more testimony of banned
antibiotics found in imported seafood that the FDA is unable to
keep off our tables.
We will also have with us today a witness from a private
laboratory that tests imported food for safety. We expect to
learn how easily companies can manipulate the current
inspection system to allow contaminated imported food into our
supply. Fifteen years ago America's trust in the food supply
was shattered when four children died and more than 700 people
became sick after eating Jack-In-The-Box hamburgers. USDA
responded to this tragedy in 1995 with creation of an industry-
supported Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point, or HACCP. The
HACCP system was promoted as a science-based strategy for
protecting public health. Although the scientific principals of
HACCP remain sound, many experts contend that it actually
decreased Federal oversight, because of industry's self
reliance on self inspection under HACCP.
Today our food safety system is broken. The overarching
question for the corporate CEOs testifying today is simply how
do we fix our critical food safety net? Chairman Dingell,
myself, and a number of our colleagues are determined to
restore confidence in our food safety system. We need your
support. I hope today is a start to correct the problems that
created the litany of recalls and illnesses of food recalls
last year. Members of this committee look forward to working
with you in this effort.
My opening statement is complete. Next we turn to Mr.
Shimkus, from Illinois, for his opening statement, please, sir.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Bart Stupak follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you stated today
this hearing is fifth in a series of food safety hearings
conducted over the past year. And the hearing brings together a
number of recent food safety cases representing four or five
distinct issues. Import surveillance, adherence to good
manufacturing practices, the role of Federal guidance and
mandates and enforcement of and company adherence to existing
rules and regulations. As the hearing title suggests the
essential theme today is private sector accountability. Our job
today is to shine the light on these cases before us to
identify whether there were any deficiencies in private sector
actions, and to determine what changes, if any, by the
regulators or the regulated could have prevented the outbreaks
from occurring. We will be hearing some alarming stories about
food safety practices. We should keep some perspective on this.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
there are approximately 76 million food borne illnesses a year,
which result in an estimated 5,000 deaths and 325,000
hospitalizations. These numbers indicate that food safety
regulation standards and guidelines should be reviewed and
updated frequently and enforced to ensure that all Americans
are eating wholesome and safe food. While any death or
hospitalization is one too many, it is not so clear whether we
are experiencing a significant across the board spike in food
borne illness outbreaks compared with a decade ago. Date of
last April from CDC surveillance showed that illnesses from
consuming raw seafood, mostly oysters, have spiked well above
the late 1990s. But the relatively low rate of salmonella and
viral E. coli outbreaks, although rising in recent years, were
still below the 1996 to 1998 baseline. We should nevertheless
be constantly vigilant for ways to improve our food safety
regulatory system. The goal is to reduce the risks of food
borne illnesses while maintaining the wonderful variety,
abundance, and value of our Nation's food supply.
Imports are our special regulatory challenge. But
technology advances are providing tools that can help address
the risks domestically. Due to advances in information
technology such as pulsenet and foodnet the CDC and the State
Health Departments now have access to and can input
surveillance data into national databases that monitor and
track food borne illnesses. These technologies instituted in
the late 1990's serve as powerful investigative tools to help
uncover the source of food borne illnesses and outbreaks in our
country. Prior to these systems tracking food borne illnesses
and tracing the illnesses back to the root sources was more
cumbersome and incomplete. Now that we are doing a better job
of tracking food borne illnesses we should work to make sure
this information is put to maximum use to improve safety
systems.
This hearing focuses mainly on several companies that have
produced food products that have been contaminated by harmful
pathogens including E. coli, salmonella and botulism. These
contaminants can lead to human illnesses, especially in those
who are immune, such as children and the elderly. Our witnesses
today are divided into two panels, but are here for one reason.
We all want to discern what both the public and private sector
can do to reduce the risks of food borne illnesses. I
understand that the American public wants someone to be held
accountable, corporate or otherwise. However, before we can
determine what should be done, we need to answer some
fundamental questions. What is the source of contamination in
each one of these cases? Can it ever be identified? Can we
identify deficiencies in the company practices that would have
prevented or would prevent this harm in the future? Would
increased federal regulations address these deficiencies, or it
is merely a matter of closely adhering to existing rules and
practices? Are some of the cases representative of bad actors
that violated existing regulations and need penalties enforces
against them? I have a hunch, Mr. Chairman, that we will find
today a range of answers depending upon the case before us. For
that reason I think one of difficult, but useful goals of this
morning is to sort out clearly for the Director the separate
lessons we can draw from each of these cases.
I look forward to the witnesses this morning, and the
variety of perspectives and expertise. This promises to be an
informative hearing. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John Shimkus follows:]
Statement of Hon. John Shimkus
Thank you Mr. Chairman. As you stated, today's hearing is
the fifth in a series of food safety hearings conducted over
the past year. And the hearing brings together a number of
recent food safety cases, representing four or five distinct
issues: import surveillance, adherence to good manufacturing
practices, the role of federal guidance and mandates, and
enforcement of--and company adherence to--existing rules and
regulations.
As the hearing title suggests a central theme today is
private sector accountability. Our job is to shine a light on
these cases before us to identify whether there were any
deficiencies in private sector actions and to determine what
changes, if any, by the regulators or the regulated could have
prevented the outbreaks from occurring.
We will be hearing some alarming stories today about food
safety practices. We should keep some perspective on this.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) there are approximately 76 million food-borne illnesses a
year, which result in an estimated 5,000 deaths and 325,000
hospitalizations. These numbers indicate that food safety
regulations, standards, and guidelines should be reviewed and
updated frequently and enforced to ensure that all Americans
are eating wholesome and safe food.
While any death or hospitalization is one too many, it is
not so clear whether we are experiencing a significant across-
the-board spike in food-borne illness outbreaks compared with a
decade ago. Data last April from CDC surveillance showed that
illnesses from consuming raw seafood (mostly oysters) have
spiked well above the late 1990s, but that the relative rate of
salmonella and virulent E. coli outbreaks--although rising in
recent years--were still below the 1996-1998 baseline.
We should nevertheless be constantly vigilant for ways to
improve our food-safety regulatory system. The goal is to
reduce the risk of food borne illness, while maintaining the
wonderful variety, abundance, and value of our nation's food
supply.
Imports are a special regulatory challenge, but technology
advances are providing tools that can help address the risks
domestically. Due to advances in information technologies,
including PulseNet and FoodNet, the CDC and the state health
departments now have access to and can input surveillance data
into national databases that monitor and track food borne
illnesses. These technologies, instituted in the late 1990s,
serve as powerful investigative tools to help uncover the
sources of food borne illness outbreaks in our country.
Prior to these systems, tracking food borne illnesses and
tracing the illnesses back to root sources was more cumbersome
and incomplete. Now that we are doing a better job of tracking
food borne illnesses, we should work to make sure this
information is put to maximum use to improve safety systems.
This hearing focuses mainly on several companies that have
produced food products that have been contaminated by harmful
pathogens including E-coli, salmonella, and botulism. These
contaminants can lead to human illness especially in children
and the elderly.
Our witnesses today are divided into two panels, but are
here for one reason: we all want to discern what both the
public and private sector can do to reduce the risk of food
borne illness. I understand that the American public wants
someone to be held accountable: corporate or otherwise.
However, before we can determine what should be done, we
need to answer some fundamental questions: What is the source
of contamination in each one of these cases? Can it ever be
identified? Can we identify deficiencies in the company
practices that would have prevented and would prevent this harm
in the future? Would increased federal regulations address
these deficiencies or is it merely a matter of closely adhering
to existing rules and practices? Are some of the cases
representative of bad actors that violated existing regulations
and need penalties enforced against them?
I have a hunch, Mr. Chairman, that we will find today a
range of answers, depending on the case before us. For that
reason, I think one of the difficult but useful goals for us
this morning is to sort out clearly for the record the separate
lessons we can draw from each of these cases.
I look forward to the witnesses this morning, and their
variety of perspectives and expertise. This promises to be an
informative hearing.
###
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Dingell, for an opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr.Dingell. Good morning to the Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
I commend you for the vigor of your oversight of food and
drug and other important matters of concern to this Committee.
Oversight of food safety is one of the most important
undertakings of this Committee, and it appears that this is a
subject that needs the most vigorous attention of the
Committee.
Today we are going to hear from leading companies in the
food processing industry about what does or does not work in
safeguarding our food supply. Unfortunately we are forced to
return to issues and to hear from witnesses from our prior
hearing of last April. At that time ConAgra testified regarding
the discovery of salmonella in their Peter Pan peanut butter.
What we did not know then, due to FDA obfuscation and delay,
was that this problem was more serious than we had been told.
After the hearing we learned that many more jars containing the
deadly bacteria had been found, and that some had been
processed fully six months after ConAgra claimed that the
problem had been fixed. Since last April's hearings we have
learned of another problem with ConAgra. Apparently their
Banquet brand of pot pies have made hundreds of Americans sick.
While the source of this contamination is still in doubt,
ConAgra blames Butterball, who claims that the turkeys for the
pies was the source of the problem. Butterball disagrees and
claims that their turkey is fully cooked before it is shipped.
Ironically, the FDA has no opinion on the matter. Today we hope
that these companies can clarify this issue and assure the
consumer that their products are safe. We also hope that we
will hear something from the FDA, which will enable us to have
some confidence that they know what they are doing.
Last April we also heard testimony about contaminated
lettuce and spinach. We were assured then that the problem was
under control due to the issuance of new voluntary compliance
standards. Since then, however, we have had two more recalls of
leafy greens. We will hear from Dole Foods as well as from Mr.
Brackett of the Grocery Manufacturers Association who recently
retired as the head of food safety at FDA, and helped develop
these voluntary standards. Suffice to say that we have
questions about some of these proposals. And we also want to
hear how voluntary standards can be made to work to protect the
consumers. Apparently there is some evidence to the contrary
here before us this morning.
We also will hear from two firms where botulism has been
found in their low acid canned foods. This is very unusual. It
is the first time in more than 30 years that such products have
been infected with botulism in this country. One of these
plants even had a USDA inspector on the premises for full-time.
We also wanted to hear from the head of the California Meat
Packing Company who recently recalled 143 million pounds of
beef, including 55 million pounds destined for our school
children. It appears that the head of this company has refused
our offer to testify voluntarily. We will now have to consider
whether we need to compel his appearance to probe how on-site
USDA inspectors could have missed these safety problems and the
inhumane treatment of animals who were slaughtered there.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the broader
issue of industry responsibility. Under this Administration we
have experimented with voluntary health and safety regulations
to protect our food. Yet it appears that our food supply
becomes more dangerous all the time both from imported products
and from domestically produced products, sometimes contaminated
by unwise imports from China and other places. It is clear that
our regulatory system is broken. It is plain that Food and Drug
does not have the personnel. It does not have the money. It
does not have the resources to carry out its important
responsibilities. It is also appearing to me that they do not
have the leadership that is necessary to do the things that are
required for the protection of the American consumer.
I am going to urge industry to provide serious
recommendations today, and more importantly, to strongly
support legislation that will ensure food safety. The time has
passed for halfway measures or asking regulators to do more
with less. I began listening to the rather plaintive remarks of
the head of Food and Drug when Mr. Young was the head of that
agency. And he used to call me up and tell me, Dingell, we are
going to do a good job. We have a new system, which will make
it possible for us to do the job better with less money. It
turned out it was hooey, and he is no longer with the agency.
This is a situation, then, which is serious. The health of the
American people is at stake. I urge our witnesses and others in
the industry to join with us in changing the current system. I
can assure you that this will not be the last time that you
will be before us testifying about another recall and another
failure in protecting our Nation's food supply. I look forward
to an explanation of what you have done, why this has happened
and what you are going to do to assure us that this will not
occur again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John Dingell follows:]
Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. Oversight
of food safety is one of the most important undertakings of
this Committee.
Today we will hear from leading companies in the food
processing industry about what does or does not work in
safeguarding our food supply. Unfortunately, we are forced to
return to issues and hear from witnesses from our prior hearing
last April.
At that time, ConAgra testified regarding the discovery of
Salmonella in their Peter Pan peanut butter. What we did not
know then, due to FDA obfuscation and delay, was that this
problem was more serious than what we had been told. After the
hearing, we learned that many more jars contained the deadly
bacteria and some had been processed fully 6 months after
ConAgra claimed they had fixed the problem.
Since last April's hearing, we have learned of another
problem with ConAgra. Apparently, their Banquet brand pot pies
have made hundreds of Americans sick, while the source of the
contamination is still in doubt. ConAgra blames Butterball,
which supplies the turkey for the pies. Butterball disagrees
and claims their turkey is fully cooked before shipped.
Ironically, the FDA has no opinion on the matter. Today, we
hope those companies can clarify this issue and assure the
consumer that their products are safe.
Last April, we also heard testimony about contaminated
lettuce and spinach. We were assured then that the problem was
under control due to the issuance of new voluntary compliance
standards. Since then, however, we have had two more recalls of
leafy greens.
We will hear from Dole Foods as well as from Mr. Brackett
of the Grocery Manufacturers Association who recently retired
as head of food safety at FDA and helped develop those
voluntary standards. Suffice it to say, we have some questions
about those proposals.
We also will hear from two firms where botulism has been
found in their low acid canned foods. This is very unusual. It
is the first time in more than 30 years that such products have
been infected with botulism in this country. One of those
plants even had a USDA inspector on premises full time.
We also wanted to hear from the head of the California meat
packing company who recently recalled 143 million pounds of
beef, including 55 million pounds destined for our school
children. It appears he has refused our offer to testify
voluntarily. We now will have to consider whether we need to
compel his appearance to probe how on-site USDA inspectors
could have missed these safety problems and the inhumane
treatment of the animals that were slaughtered there.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to address the
broader issue of industry responsibility. Under this
Administration, we have experimented with voluntary health and
safety regulations to protect our food. Yet, our food supply
becomes more dangerous all the time.
It is clear our regulatory system is broken. I urge
industry to provide serious recommendations and, more
importantly, strongly support legislation that will ensure food
safety. The time has passed for half measures or asking
regulators to do more with less. Our health is at stake. If you
don't join us in changing the current system, I can assure you
that this will not be the last time you join us in testifying
about another recall and another failure in protecting our
Nation's food supply.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Barton, for an opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr.Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing on the contaminated food and private sector
accountability.
I want to say at the outset, and while there are partisan
differences in the Congress on various issues, on this issue,
the issue of food safety for the American people, there is no
daylight between Mr. Stupak, Mr. Dingell, Mr. Shimkus, myself
and the Republicans and Democrats on this oversight,
subcommittee and the full Committee.
If you go back not too many years ago most families, mine
included, grew most of what they consumed. My grandparents and
great-grandparents both grew up and lived on farms in central
Texas. They grew their own--they raised their own cattle,
chickens, pigs. Both of my great-grandmothers and grandmothers
had huge truck gardens. I can remember in the early 50s if I
wanted, when it was in season, if I wanted green beans or corn
I went out and picked them and brought them in. And my
grandmother shucked the corn and boiled it and split the green
beans and we had--that is what we had. I doubt they are many
families in America today that do that. We depend on a vast
network of producers and distributors and processors so that
when, like my 2\1/2\-year-old several days ago wanted a banana,
I did not go out in the backyard since banana trees would not
grow in Texas anyway. I went to the grocery store and bought
some bananas. I think I paid 20 cents a pound for them or
something.
It is absolutely imperative that the food safety, the food
products on the shelves of our grocery stores, is beyond
question. Now, I don't believe anybody in this room would say
that you do not support that. Yet, when we look at the record,
it is stunning how much impaired food is reaching our shelves
and the dinner tables of American families. If statistics are
to be believed in the last year 5,000 Americans died because
they consumed contaminated food products. Most of those
products were beef or seafood. A large number of the products
apparently were imported from overseas, and a fair amount of
that from the--from China.
I am working on a bipartisan basis to introduce legislation
in the very near future that would give the Food and Drug
Administration the authority to have jurisdiction outside the
United States when necessary to protect our food supply and do
food inspections. We have got a letter of support from the
Administration. The Clinton Administration supported this type
of legislation. There have been some court decisions that said
it was ambiguous, so I am hopeful that between myself and Mr.
Dingell, Mr. Stupak and Mr. Shimkus and others, we can
introduce that bill very soon. But in the meantime we will
continue to do, you know, aggressive investigative oversight. I
want to commend Mr. Stupak and Mr. Dingell and Mr. Shimkus for
their role in this effort, and I look forward to this hearing.
We have the National Governors downstairs in the big
committee room on the SCHIP program, so several of us are going
to be shuttling back and forth between food safety and SCHIP.
They are both important hearings and they both deserve the
committee's attention. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
Statement of Hon. Joe Barton
Thank you, Chairman Stupak. Let me note at the outset that
I support the Committee's continued oversight of food safety
and its efforts to gather new information on this issue. Nobody
should have to worry whether dinner will make them sick, and my
feeling is that most people will resent it if we let politics
get between us and good policy. So I look forward to working
with you and writing bipartisan legislation to ensure that
eating isn't going to become dangerous.
The various food-borne illness outbreaks, recalls, and
import alerts over the past year raise questions on how to
improve food safety even in the changing the realities of the
modern marketplace. As we do so, we should not forget that it
isn't the government, but the marketplace, that puts dinner on
the table. Cutting-edge technologies and global connections
have brought tremendous gains in variety and cost-savings to
the American consumer. Like ancient Athens, our country draws
the produce of the world into our markets, so that to the
American, the fruits of other countries are as familiar a
luxury as those of his own. We must preserve these benefits as
we detect and eradicate any deficiencies in safety.
The cases we are looking at today raise legitimate concerns
about failings in food safety oversight. Some of the health
hazards are known, but surely not all, and many of the exact
causes are not established.
Where we believe the facts and science support a safety
problem, we should ask what changes, including legislative
changes, could have prevented harm or at least reduced its
probability. For example, if a company's microbiological
testing misses traces of dangerous pathogens, but FDA's tests
on the same products detects them, it seems plain that
something at the company needs to change. But should the change
include mandating particular testing methods for all companies?
I don't know the answer yet, and I am not sure if one case
study can answer that question.
The truth remains that in some of the cases we are
examining today, the source of contamination simply isn't known
yet, at least not by us. I hope that we get more answers from
these companies today. And, I hope that these companies will
explain what they plan to do to reduce the likelihood of future
contamination in their products.
Our job is to find the right balance between federal
regulation and industry responsibility. As overseers of safety,
we want to protect the American public's health, but without
strangling industry's productivity, creativity, and ability to
supply Americans with the products they want to buy. I hope we
begin to understand today where that balance lies and that our
witnesses can offer their ideas on how to increase food safety.
No one here is going to tolerate lying, cheating, or
wantonly violating any federal statute or good manufacturing
practice, much less one that delivers food to be consumed on
dinner tables or school lunchrooms. If laws or regulations were
violated, the violators should be held accountable, and I can
assure everybody here today that both Democrats and Republicans
are of one mind about this. If laws or regulations are not
being adequately enforced, those agencies should also be held
accountable by us, and on a bipartisan basis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to listening to
our witnesses' testimony.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Barton.
And it is good to remind the members we will be moving back
and forth. This week alone I think we have seven hearings for
this committee, so it is going to be a busy week.
Mr. Doyle, for an opening statement, please.
Mr.Doyle. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make an opening
statement, but I do just want to reiterate what our
distinguished Chairman and ranking member both said.
We count on you folks to make sure this food supply is
safe. In the Pittsburgh City School District we were recipients
of some of this meat that had to be thrown away. It is a scary
thought, that any parent or child, when we go and buy things in
our stores should have to worry about whether or not this meat
is going make us sick or kill us. Something obviously has to be
done, and the industry needs to take this very, very seriously
because I can assure you we take it very seriously.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Doyle. Mr. Burgess, for an
opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr.Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the interest of time I will keep my remarks brief. I
think we have 10 witnesses that will testify before us today,
and it is an important topic, and I am anxious to get to the
matter at hand. This committee has aggressively pursued the
issue of safety of the Nation's food supply. And I think we
have made some progress in identifying some of the areas of the
law where perhaps we have some inadequacies. Since our
committee has jurisdiction over the Food and Drug
Administration we have jurisdiction over roughly 80 percent of
the food supply. In my opinion, especially for food imports, we
should try to get the Food and Drug Administration standards,
especially the equivalency standard up to a par with the United
States Department of Agriculture, which has jurisdiction over
the other 20 percent, specifically meat and poultry.
We have had a lot of hearings on this, and I think through
those hearings, at least my opinion, that is where the danger
primarily is. And I have actually introduced legislation that
will address some of the safety problems with imported foods,
specifically H.R. 3967. And we have rules in this country, but
clearly the rules are not always followed, and they are not
always enforced, but we have strict rules to keep our food
safe. Other countries don't have the same rules, and I do not
believe that we should accept food from other countries that do
not certify that they abide by our standards.
While today we are discussing a specific incident at a
specific plant history has proven that our meat is safe in this
country because of the rules the United States Department of
Agriculture has and the regulations that they have in place.
Unfortunately, those rules this time were not enforced in
California, but the rules were still there.
Mr. Chairman, as you know I am from Texas, and we like our
beef. However, we also realize the dangers to consumers if beef
products are not handled correctly. Our Nation has long
recognized that our meat and poultry industry needed specific
inspections and specific rules and regulations. Those
inspections and rules and regulations must be enforced. There
is simply no margin for error. There are no justifications to
not enforce the rules. I am grateful the Humane Society brought
this issue before us today, but I do have to wonder why they
waited so long. The video was taped during the fall in the
month of October, and they knew that the meat was going to
school children. So why wait until February to release the
video? Now, the Humane Society has friends on the hill. I count
myself as one of those. I worked with the Humane Society on the
issue of horse slaughter back in my home state of Texas, and
working to affect the horse slaughter ban. So they have friends
on the hill. Why wait until now to bring this to our attention?
Their delay in no way absolves the companies involved or the
United States Department of Agriculture for their part in this.
But I certainly would like the Humane Society to address this
issue.
Mr. Chairman, we must be thorough. We must be methodical as
we continue to approach the issue of food safety. I look
forward to continuing this important conversation today and
working with the leadership of this committee, and drafting
legislation regarding the safety of the food supply,
specifically the 80 percent that is under the jurisdiction of
the Food and Drug Administration and as a consequence under the
control of this committee.
I thank you for holding the hearing, and I will yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Burgess.
As to the video that you mentioned, we will have it right
after the opening statements here. The video was given to law
enforcement first. It took law enforcement some time to react.
That is why the Humane Society did not put it out publicly. It
was given to law enforcement so they could do their law
enforcement work. I agree. Yes. And I don't think anything
would have been done unless there had been the threat to
release it publicly, because I think law enforcement may have
fallen short here on this notification. We will have another
hearing. I guarantee you. The Humane Society is here though.
Let us see. Opening statement, next to go to Mr. Murphy,
please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr.Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And one of the things I realize in my time in Congress is
how--what a mess it is, the Federal Food Safety Program. I
believe there is over two, perhaps three, dozen laws and areas
that make up the Federal Food Safety Program and no single
agency oversees them all. This continues to be a nonsense gone
fragmented system. And I believe we saw the situation where the
Department of Agriculture and specs, open-faced meat sandwiches
and frozen pepperoni pizzas, and the FDA inspects closed-faced
sandwiches and cheese pizzas. We have had intensive hearings on
that. One of the most challenging scientific things of our
time. I say that tongue-in-cheek because sometimes it is
ridiculous of how this system here in Washington works. And one
of the things that I hope comes out of these hearings today is
hearing from the witnesses of the how we can help make it
better. That is critically important. Yes, we do have problems,
and they are significant with 5,000 deaths and 325,000
hospitalizations a year of people who have food poisoning. I
might add that also disturbing to me is we have two million
hospitalizations a year and 90,000 deaths a year from people
who pick up an illness in a hospital. Something that is
certainly far more severe in terms of the number of fatalities
we have, and also should demand the attention of this and other
committees and the Engineering Commerce committee. But,
nonetheless, in Pennsylvania where agriculture is our number
one industry, where we have high quality companies in
Pittsburgh, such as Heinz and Del Monte, we know the challenges
are ongoing in preventing outbreaks in food borne illnesses. It
has to be something that we all have to work at together. And I
know there is a great deal of motivation for us all to point
the fingers of blame. I want those fingers to point towards
solutions, and not just be a time of roderick for us to be
coming up with a tax. Every single statement made should be
pointed in some direction of how we can make this system work
better. The public demands it. The public deserves it, and this
committee needs to work on it. And I yield back.
Mr.Stupak. Ms. DeGette, for an opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO
Ms.DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am sure our witnesses have heard that we are all running
from hearing to hearing. I think there are seven subcommittee
hearings. And the Health Committee subcommittee hearing is also
an issue I have been working on a lot. The SCHIP bill, so
between food safety and SCHIP I want apologize to the witnesses
for running back and forth today.
Over the last year this subcommittee has had five hearings
examining the safety of our Nation's food supply. I am glad we
are continuing this investigation, which has brought to light
some serious inadequacies in our system, both in the public and
private sectors. But sadly the hearings have turned out more
questions than answers, and even more sadly, like just last
week, there have been more outbreaks every time we have a
hearing. What is absolutely maddening is that these incidents
are preventable. In almost every case we can trace the serious
threats to public health back to an agency that has been
starved for funding or to a corporation with substantial
agricultural or industrial practices.
I want to welcome the CEOs who are here with us today, and
I am looking forward to hearing your testimony. I want to focus
just a minute on ConAgra, because that is a major food producer
nationwide, which has operations in my state of Colorado. Six
years ago it was ConAgra which appeared before us to talk about
one of the biggest recalls in history, after E. coli was found
in its beef and so many people got sick. Last year they were
before this committee talking about the peanut butter that was
tainted with salmonella. Then it revealed that its popcorn
contained chemicals that could make workers and consumers sick.
And then this past fall citizens around the country were
poisoned by ConAgra made pot pies containing salmonella. You
can see how frustrating this is for us as representatives of
the consumers, because the companies come before us, apologize
profusely, and then they tell us about the new facilities they
are installing or the money they are spending to make sure
nothing like this happens again. So for example today, ConAgra
is going to talk about its fantastic progress in ensuring the
safety of Peter Pan peanut butter. Well, that is great news,
but what about the pot pies? What about the next thing? I am
sure the company has taken great pains at great expense to
ensure the safety of the product, but what the next outbreak?
And that is what we are worried about. With an organization
this large that touches so many segments of the marketplace
what can we do better to ensure these outbreaks do not happen
in the future, rather than just coming in and apologizing but
for the past? Now many of the companies before us today have
been involved in massive recalls of tainted products. The
members of this committee know that I have been introducing
legislation for many years, H.R. 3484, that would grant the
USDA and FDA mandatory recall authority. My constituents are
frankly shocked when they learn that right now these agencies
do not have mandatory recall authority. They think they do,
because they hear about the recalls. And they don't realize
that the recalls are as a result of voluntary recalls by these
companies. All of the recalls today, when they finally
occurred, were issued voluntarily. And it is my contention that
waiting on the company to make the decision is truly the fox
guarding the hen house. ConAgra, for example, did not order a
recall immediately upon learning of illnesses related to the
pot pies. They issued a consumer advisory instead. It was only
after days had passed, and even more people got sick, that the
company decided it was in its financial best interest, in
addition to the public interest, to recall the products. So
this legislation, H.R. 3484, would correct the conflict of
interest by allowing the USDA or FDA to order recalls as soon
as it became clear that an outbreak has occurred, and it
provides for the immediate notification of consumers and public
health officials.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for continuing to work
on these issues and I will pledge to be your partner, as
always, as we move along. I yield back.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Ms. DeGette.
Ms. Blackburn, for opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Ms.Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
the hearing today and to all of our witnesses as everyone is
saying.
We do have the SCHIP hearing that is going on downstairs,
and we are back and forth. But we appreciate the hearing and
the attention that is being put on this issue, because it is a
high priority issue. It is not only one of public health and an
issue that we are addressing on the public health front, but
also the National security front.
I had a really interesting episode occur recently or a
little occurrence. I was in my hometown in the grocery store
strolling my buggy down the aisle, and someone was passing me
and they said how do you know what to buy? How do you know what
is safe anymore? And they kind of chuckled and rolled on. They
had been watching the hearings. They were aware of what we were
doing, but to me it points out something very, very important.
There is a certain level of trust that the American public has
of the products that you all produce. And they want to know
with a certain degree of assurance that when they go to that
grocery store and they take something off the shelf and put it
into that buggy that it is safe. When they pull it out of the
freezer compartment that it is safe. And when they cook it and
serve it to their family, after having followed the directions,
that everybody is going to be OK.
And my hope is that we can get through this. This is our
fifth hearing as you have heard. It is something that we are
tremendously concerned about, and we want to be certain that
not only the FDA, but you all go from defense to offense. And
how do we best accomplish that? I have been just amazed that
only one percent of the 8.9 million shipments of imported food
are inspected. One percent. And we know from the USDA that we
are expected to import a record 70 billion in agriculture
products this year, which is double the nearly 36 billion
purchased in '97, and that we have seen total food imports. The
total imports have increased by 50 percent in the last five
years, and it is frustrating to us that the FDA does not have a
timeline for how they are going to change their practices to
address this issue. So that something we are focused on and we
are going to continue to work on.
I am not going to go through my full statement. You all
have been very patient with us. We are going to be up and down.
But I will tell you when we hear about recalls of pet foods and
toothpaste and pizza products and baby formula, this is
something that does get our attention. And we are going to seek
accountability, greater accountability, through reform of the
FDA system. We are looking for ways that we can make certain
that the food coming into our product streams is something that
is reliable and safe. They trust, the American consumers,
trusts that we will do that. I am looking forward to making
certain that everyone agrees to work together to make certain
we reach this goal. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time, and
I yield back.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. That concludes the opening statements
of members of the subcommittee.
I'd like to call our first panel of witnesses to come
forward.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr.Stupak. Before we hear the witness's testimony I would
like to show a brief video that was produced by the Humane
Society as part of their undercover investigation of the
Hallmark/Westland Corporation's slaughter house operation.
We invited Mr. Steve Mendell, the CEO of Hallmark/Westland
to appear to day, but he refused the Committee's invitation. I
do, however, plan to discuss this matter with the Chairman and
with ranking members Barton and Shimkus as to our next step in
compelling Mr. Mendell to appear before this committee to
explain his company's behavior. Before we run the video I must
caution viewers some parts of it is quite graphic. Kyle, run
the video. You may want to dim those lights. I don't know if
anyone can see it with these lights on. Then after the video we
will start with opening statements.
[Video shown.]
Mr.Stupak. That concludes the video. We will start with our
5-minute opening statement for our witnesses. You may submit a
longer statement if you wish, for inclusion in the hearing
record.
Mr. Greger, we will start with you, please. Dr. Greger.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GREGER, M.D., DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH
AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr.Greger. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to testify about the----
Mr.Stupak. Try pulling your mic up a little bit. Even up
here it sounds like we are having a little bit--had a little
bit of trouble here getting to project our voices. Go ahead.
Dr.Greger. Thank you for allowing me to testify about the
horrendous animal cruelty and food safety issues that we
uncovered in our extensive hidden camera investigation of this
dairy cow slaughter plant in California.
My name is Michael Greger. I am a medical doctor and serve
as director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The
Humane Society of the United States. That video you saw was
narrated from the perspective of our undercover investigator,
who worked at the Hallmark packing plant for 6 weeks at the end
of 2007 in both October and November. And personally witnessed
and documented the egregious mistreatment of animals,
particularly these downed cows to sick or injured to even stand
or walk. And I trust you can appreciate the identity of this
investigator must be kept confidential for his own safety and
to not compromise the efficacy of his current investigative
efforts and future efforts. It is critical to first point out
that the agency did not cherry pick this plant. This plant was
selected at random, and only during the course of the
investigation did we learn that Westland was the number two
beef supplier for the National School Lunch Program, that
Westland was a USDA supplier of the year, and that this
facility had been previously cited for mishandling animals,
with allegations going back over a decade.
The blatant cruelties highlighted in the video are not
isolated cases. They were daily happenings at this plant every
day the worker was there. The horrific treatment of animals we
documented is being downplayed as an aberration.
Unconscionable, yet the work of just a handful of rogue
employees. We don't think this is an accurate characterization.
It has since come to light that this plant, Hallmark/Westland,
has a long and well documented history of abusing downed cows.
In fact, FSIS cited Westland in 2005 for mishandling animals
and the local Pomona Valley Humane Society and SPCA had
notified USDA multiple times about possible violations dating
back to 1996. And this is not the only plant that has been
documented to have downer cows going into the food supply. The
USDA's own Office of the Inspector General chastised the agency
in 2006 for violating its own downer policy. The OIG sampled 12
slaughter plants over a 10 month period, and found 29 downed
cows going into the food supply. Again, violating the USDA's
own interim final rule passed in 2004 after the first case of
BSE was discovered in the United States.
Downed cattle are not only more likely to be infected with
BSE, bovine spongiform encephalopathy or mad cow disease, but
studies suggest they may also be more likely to harbor food
borne pathogens, such as E. coli 0157H7, and salmonella. No
surprise, perhaps, given the fact that many of these animals
may be wallowing in their own waste. Despite the potential
health risks, despite the legitimate animal welfare concerns,
and despite their own Inspector General finding violations, the
USDA in 2006, instead of strengthening the final downer ban
rule they critically weakened it. Codifying a loophole into it
that allowed some downed animals to continue to be slaughtered
for human food. Currently inspection personnel are allowed to
determine on a case-by-case basis the disposition of cattle
that go down after passing antemortem inspection. And this
loophole provides the incentive, the financial incentive, for
what you just witnessed on that video. Workers trying every
cruel tactic imaginable to get--to force downers up for the
inspection, knowing full well that should the animal then
collapse down for good the loophole allows the inspector to
pass downed animals. To pass that downed animal as USDA
approved beef. If, on the other hand, downers could not go into
the human food supply then there is no reason to prolong her
misery. Even if a cow is down even for just what appears to an
acute injury, like she breaks her leg, there may be an
underlying disease that caused her to fall and break it.
Indeed, at least three of the documented BSE cases in North
America, were injured cattle. These infected cattle were
identified as downed not due to illness, but due to injury.
One, indeed, just broke a leg. Another slipped on ice. All
right. And so the meat is safe, right? Because it is ``just an
injury,'' but it turned out it was more than just an injury.
They had mad cow disease. A truly comprehensive ban on the use
of any meat from downed animals in the human food supply is
needed to protect food safety and animal welfare, and with
vigorous enforcement, of course, to ensure compliance. USDA
must rewrite its rules to close the current loophole and
redirect resources to provide adequate oversight.
Finally, we urge Congress to enact swiftly two pieces of
legislation that will help prevent such abuses from
reoccurring. H.R. 661, the Downed Animal and Food Safety
Protection Act by Representatives Ackerman and LaTourette,
would implement a comprehensive ban on processing downed
animals, which the USDA has so far failed to do. And H.R. 1726,
the Farm Animal Stewardship Purchasing Act, by Representatives
DeFazio and Shays should set basic animal welfare standards for
producers who sell to the National School Lunch Program and
other federal programs, including no downed animals.
Thank you, again, for this opportunity to testify about
this important animal welfare and food safety issue.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Greger follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Williams, opening statement, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. WILLIAMS, EXECUTOR DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN
SHRIMP ALLIANCE
Mr.Williams. Good morning. My name is John A. Williams, and
I am here today both as someone with 30 years of experience in
the shrimp industry and as Executive Director of the Southern
Shrimp Alliance.
I operate a small business in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and
I am proud to have the privilege of representing the other
small business men and women in the shrimp industry. Thousands
of other small businesses of men and women in the shrimp
industry throughout the Gulf of Mexico and the south Atlantic.
Mr.Stupak. Would you pull that mic up a little bit closer,
please, sir?
Mr.Williams. Thanks. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify on the FDA's failure to protect Americans from harmful
seafood imports. I ask the committee to refer to my written
comments for more detail on the urgent need for meaningful FDA
reform.
There can be no denying that the FDA is broken. The essence
of FDA's approach to imported food safety is to accept
unverified representations of importers who have repeatedly
disregarded the safety of American consumers. We know and the
FDA knows that aquaculture in much of the developing world has
led to the introduction of harmful contaminants into our
imported seafood. Imported foreign raised shrimp are often
produced with minimal quality control in crowded ponds filled
with feces, banned antibiotics and toxic chemicals. And yet,
the FDA's only check on self-serving representations is the
inspection of one percent of seafood imports.
The FDA's failure to prevent importation of massive amounts
of contaminated shrimp has a number of negative effects on our
market. In addition to putting consumers at risk, contaminated
shrimp imports depress demand for all shrimp when consumers
fail to distinguish between safe and unsafe sources of shrimp.
Shrimp buyers know that shrimp sources from farms in countries
with lax controls are likely to be contaminated and, therefore,
offer lower prices.
In addition, the simple fact that large amounts of shrimp
enter the U.S. market that should not have been allowed to
enter further depresses prices for all shrimp. The combination
of stringent imported food safety regimes and other major
importing markets and lax enforcement of U.S. law encourages
the diversion of contaminated seafood to the United States.
Canada, Japan and the European Union all do significantly more
to protect consumers than the FDA to safeguard the American
public. As a result our Nation has become a dumping ground for
rejected and inferior seafood products that could not be
exported to other countries.
For example, when the EU imposed a complete ban of shrimp
from China in 2002 because of illegal antibiotic use, Chinese
shrimp imports to the United States shot up 30 percent in one
year, adding millions of additional pounds of shrimp to this
market. And the same thing happened when the EU decertified
Pakistani seafood products in April of 2007. In just 2 months,
Pakistani shrimp to the U.S. jumped from 0 to 165,000 pounds.
Now we are facing the same problem with Vietnam. While the EU,
Japan and Canada all have recently taken action against
Vietnamese shrimp for illegal antibiotic use the FDA has done
nothing. The FDA has sufficient evidence of the hazards of farm
raised seafood from Vietnam, both from its own investigation
and as we have been told by reliable sources from direct
admission by Vietnamese authorities, of the widespread use of
banned substances in the production of farm raised seafood. And
for some of those substances the FDA apparently has no testing
protocol to detect them. Concerns about the FDA's inability to
assure the safety of the imported seafood has risen to the
point that states have been doing their own testing of seafood
imports. And these states have repeatedly found harmful banned
substances in the imported seafood they test--seafood allowed
by the FDA to enter this country. While we are pleased that
state governments have attempted to step into the breech, the
burden of ensuring that imported seafood is safe to consume
should not be forced upon them. There is no substitute for a
strong federal food safety system. Unfortunately, the FDA
appears to take action only when facing a crisis or public
outrage.
We respectfully suggest that this committee should be
outraged. We have prepared a series of proposals for
legislative changes to improve the safety of imported seafood.
These proposals are discussed in detail in my written
testimony, but I will provide a couple of examples here.
The FDA should require, as a condition of importation, that
the country of origin of an imported seafood product administer
a system of food safety that is equivalent to that of the
United States. Also, the FDA should take note of the detection
by other major importing countries of contaminants in food so
that the FDA can focus its enforcement effort. For the health
of our consumers, for the integrity of our Nation's food supply
I ask you, members of this committee, to enact meaningful FDA
reform. The FDA has promised before that it can change on its
own, but the evidence demonstrates just how dangerous the FDA's
broken promises have become. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Williams.
Mr. Marler, opening statement, please, sir.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. MARLER, ESQUIRE, MARLER CLARK LLP PS
Mr.Marler. Thank you.
Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Bill
Marler. I am a trial lawyer. My law firm Marler Clark located
in Seattle, Washington specialized in representing victims of
food borne illness. Unfortunately for my clients and many of
the corporations that are going to come after me, I have been
in business too long. I thank you for the honor of being
allowed to testify before this committee. I am proud of the
work this committee has done to try to improve food safety
throughout the United States.
Although I have never had the honor to testify before
Congress, I have had the honor to be here before in 1994 for
Senate hearings about the lack of safety in our food supply. At
that time I was with Brianne Kiner, then 9 years old, who spent
6 months hospitalized, suffered acute kidney failure and
multiple strokes, had her large intestine removed, was in a
coma for over a month, and spent 100 days on dialysis, all from
eating a hamburger. Thirteen years later I was here again in
April of this year. This time with Ashley and Isabella
Armstrong, who I think the committee would all agree were the
cutest kids you have ever seen before any committee. Victims of
the more recent spinach outbreak that sickened 205, killing
five. I was with Sean Pruden, the victim of the E. coli
outbreak at Taco Bell, that sickened over 100, and with Terry
Marshall, whose mother-in-law has remained in a nursing home to
this day after eating a few spoonfuls of salmonella tainted
peanut butter. Since 1993 I have had the privilege to represent
thousands of Americans, some your constituents. In 2002, during
the middle of yet another E. coli outbreak, during the middle
of another visit to an ICU to watch a new client struggle for
life, attached to more tubes than you can imagine, I penned--
for the Denver Post. Here's part of it.
This summer scores of Americans, most of them small
children and senior citizens, have already or will become
deathly ill after eating ground beef boldly labeled USDA
approved. The now infamous outbreak started with a few sick
kids in Colorado and quickly spread coast to coast, eventually
triggering the recall of 19 million pounds of ground beef
tainted with E. coli 0157H7. Because their parents trusted our
government's food inspections several kids suffered kidney
failure and dialysis, or weeks hooked up to all sorts of
machines. For some the long-term prognosis is grim with the
risk of further kidney failure, dialysis, transplants or worse.
Most of these kids' parents' have hired me to help them get
compensation for hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical
costs, and the risk of future kidney failure. That may prompt
some readers to consider me a blood sucking ambulance chaser
who exploits other people's personal tragedies. If that is the
case, here is my plea. Put me out of business. For this trial
lawyer, E. coli has been a far too successful practice and a
heartbreaking one. I am tired of visiting with horribly sick
kids who did not have to be sick in the first place. I am
outraged with the food industry that allows E. coli and other
poisons to reach consumers and a President, Congress and
federal regulatory system that does nothing about it. Stop
making kids sick and I will happily move on. That, ladies and
gentlemen, was in 2002. The time has finally come to put me out
of business. The CDC estimates that there are still 76 million
Americans getting sick every year, each and every year, from
eating food. That means one in four Americans will contract a
food borne illness every year. Hundreds of thousands will be
hospitalized and thousands will die. That is the human
suffering part. There is also a business part. Billions of
dollars will be spent on medical treatment and many more
billions will be in lost wages, in recall costs, in the sale of
food and yes, in legal fees to defend and prosecute these
companies. Civil litigation in America is a blunt instrument
for change. It is better for the government and business to
work together to eliminate the need for lawsuits and lawyers.
When American business poisons its customers and when our
regulatory agencies do not have the manpower, willingness, or
ability to help businesses perform, people die and market share
is lost nationally and internationally. It is time to help
business and consumers to simply make me unnecessary. If you
fix the food safety system trial lawyers like me will become a
small irrelevant footnote in history, but you will be
remembered and honored for helping to fix a broken system.
The issue of food safety is not new, of course. A century
ago Upton Sinclair's book The Jungle exposed both contamination
of meat processing and corruption that led inspectors to look
the other way. What has changed since Upton Sinclair's time?
Are we better off than we were 100 years ago? A year ago I was
asked by the spinach and lettuce growers of California to
address them in Salinas. Considering that by then the leafy
green industry was on its knees financially and I had lawsuits
pending in several states, it was a bit of a tense lunch. Why
was I invited? I am frankly still not sure, but why I was suing
them was all too clear. In the prior 10 years there had been 21
outbreaks related to fresh leafy products with hundreds
sickened. In 2006 hundreds became sick and five died from
eating E. coli contaminated spinach, followed quickly by
lettuce outbreaks at Taco Bell and Taco John. The common
denominator, California lettuce and spinach and more lawsuits.
Mexico banned the importation of California spinach and
lettuce. I told the quiet audience of growers and producers a
story that I believe at the time to be true. I told them I had
seen, since the 1993 Jack-In-The-Box case, I told them what
seemed to have happened after the Jack-In-The-Box crisis was
the incidence of E. coli seemed to decline. In fact, the CDC
indicated by the year 2006 that E. coli cases tied to ground
beef had gone down by 42 percent. I told them that they should
immulate what the beef industry did. That the beef industry had
worked hard to put me out of business. And the reason I can say
that is because during that 2003 to early 2007 I had no
ambulances to chase because I simply had no E. coli victims
tied to E. coli--not tied to hamburger. And in the spring of
2007 started with an ominous uptick in E. coli recalls and
illnesses, and ended with hundreds sickened, 33 million pounds
of meat recalled. And guess what? More sick and dead children.
And guess what? More lawsuits. China banned the import of U.S.
beef. And if you ask the USDA and industry to explain this
uptick, they have none. It is unacceptable.
Although things are certainly different from Upton
Sinclair's time there are some big similarities, and certainly
some things that are new and different challenges. First, there
is a terrorist threat to our food system. Just as too many
could not imagine the horror in 9/11, too many cannot envision
the kind of food disaster today. When a terrorist attacks our
food system it will look eerily similar to any other outbreaks
of food borne illness. Second is the growth of imports.
Sinclair could not have imagined a world where the meat that
may be in one hamburger could originate in Argentina, Canada
and Colorado, or that we would have vegetables year round from
South America, Asia and Africa. It is with these two enormous
issues in mind I offer five suggestions of how to finally put
me out of business.
First, create a local, state and national public health
system that catches outbreaks before they balloon into personal
and business catastrophe. CDC pulsejet and food net, as one of
the members mentioned, were launched after the Jack-In-The-Box
outbreak and are rightly credited for helping reduce the size
of outbreaks by helping more quickly conclude the suspect
product was causing harm. But surveillance of human bacterial
and viral disease is lacking. For many food borne illnesses,
for every culture-positive case 20 to 50 other cases are missed
because of lack of surveillance. Most people who become ill
with a bacterial viral disease are either seldom seen or never
cultured. The more people are tested, the greater the
likelihood that a source, accidental or not, will be found
sooner.
Second, actually inspect and sample food before it is
consumed. At present local and state authorities, along with
the USDA and FDA, employ thousands of inspectors across the
nation and world to inspect tens of thousands of plants that
produce billions of pounds of food. The GEO has warned that our
food sampling and inspection system is so scattered and
infrequent there is little chance of detecting microscopic E.
coli, or other pathogens for that matter.
Third, consider mandatory recall authority on all food
products. Recalls must be completed transparent. If a recall is
ordered consumers need to know what in fact is being recalled.
Full disclosure must be the rule. Under the present system of
voluntary recalls, last September we saw the disastrous Tops
recall, where the company knowingly left E. coli contaminated
product on store shelves weeks after being confronted with an
ill customer, and his product both testing positive for E.
coli.
Fourth, merge and then adequately fund the three federal
agencies responsible for food safety. Right now USDA and FDA
share this mission with the CDC. The system is, in a sense,
trifurcated, which leads to turf wars and split
responsibilities. We need one independent agency that deals
with food borne pathogens. You have a moral responsibility to
consumers in your home town or anywhere U.S. goods are sold. It
is time to adequately fund our health and safety authorities to
help businesses protect the consumers.
Finally, we cannot completely regulate ourselves out of
this. Standards need to be set with the entire food chain at
the table, from farmer to manufacturer to retailer and
customer. Standards must also be based upon good science. We
must invest in solid research at our land grant institutions to
help producers manufacture food that is safe, nutritious, and
the envy of the world.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marler follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you.
We will begin with questions. Members will have 5 minutes
for questions.
Dr. Greger, if I may start with you. In your investigation
at the Westland/Hallmark, did you investigator ever observe the
company alerting USDA inspections or inspectors of the cattle
that went down after the 6:30, and I think you said, 12:30
inspection?
Dr.Greger. Never. The investigator did not witness it or
hear anyone talking about getting the inspector back to look at
these animals that had subsequently gone down after antemortem
inspection.
Mr.Stupak. And I take it from the video the person who did
the video here was fairly close to what was going on in order
to make those--that video.
Dr.Greger. The investigator is what was called a pen
worker, essentially doing exactly that. Unloading these
animals, getting them through the pens, and finally into the
kill chute.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Let me ask this, because it came up in the
opening statements. If your investigator was at the plant in, I
believe you said the Fall of 2007, why didn't the Humane
Society notify USDA, the School Lunch Program, about what was
happening at the plant before the end of January?
Dr.Greger. This investigation took over 2 months to
complete. It was shot--he worked at the plant in October,
November. We gave this evidence over to the local district
attorney's office the San Bernardino County district attorney,
and they asked us not to publicly release this information. To
hold off so they could carry out their own criminal
investigation into the animal cruelty that was witnessed. We
complied with that request, but by January, after a month had
occurred, we felt we had to go ahead, and so we indeed
contacted USDA and then made it public. But the fact that
downers were being slaughtered for human consumption, this is
something that is allowed under the 2007 USDA loophole, and
something that the USDA's own inspector general found was
happening across the country.
Mr.Stupak. I was going to ask you to explain that a little
bit more, the rule of antemortem inspections of downer cattle.
As long as the--when the inspector looks at it and/or sees the
animal, and if the animal is standing it can be used for
slaughter. If the inspector leaves, it falls over, it can still
be used for slaughter?
Dr.Greger. Let me----
Mr.Stupak. Or human consumption?
Dr.Greger. Let me kind of explain the chronology of this
loophole. In 2000 USDA declared that they would not be using
beef from downed animals. Evidently agreeing that this meat was
too risky to be fed to kids at school, but evidently not too
risky to feed the kids once they get home from school, or to
adults for that matter. We have for years been pushing for a
complete downer ban, but it took a case of mad cow disease in
the United States, December 23, 2003, before finally, then
Secretary Veneman, within a week, said we will have no downer
animals, downer cattle being allowed into the American food
supply, no exceptions. And a week after that they published
their interim final rule in the federal register, January 12,
2004, again no downers, no exceptions. And then even after, in
2006, when the Inspector General published their critique
saying that downed animals were, indeed, going to the food
supply. In July 2007 when this rule was finalized, instead of
strengthening the rule, realizing that there wasn't proper
enforcement, they critically weakened the rule codifying in a
loophole, which allowed for animals that went down after
antemortem inspection to on a case by case basis with the
inspector's approval be allowed into the American food supply.
So, you know, live cows can be fed to people, dead cows can
only go to pet food or animal feed: pigs, pets and poultry. But
you get more per pound if the animal can, indeed, enter the
National School Lunch Program, then can be just going to canned
pet food. And so if downed animals were indeed lumped in as
they should be with dead animals and only fed to pets, for
example, then if a downed animal arrives on a truck, just like
when a dead animal arrives on a truck they would be thrown--
they would be euthanized and thrown on the dead pile. There's
no incentive for the workers to kind of prolong their misery.
But if some downed animals may--if there is a loophole that is
saying some downed animals may indeed be passed for inspection
into the food supply, then you see the financial incentive for
the workers to, basically by any means necessary, force these
animals up to walk back and forth in front of the inspector.
And that knowing full well if the animal goes down after
inspection then the inspector can pass that downed animal into
the food supply. Even if the animal is down and completely non-
ambulatory, and even if it appears that this cow was just down
because they broke a leg, an animal shouldn't just break a leg
at slaughter plant. Either this animal is mishandled or maybe
the animal was sick, you know, confused, unsteady gait, and
that is why they fell down. That is why Linda Detwiler, the
head of the BSE Surveillance, the previous head of the USDA BSE
Surveillance Program, has explicitly written to the USDA saying
that injury and illness are interrelated. If a cow is down, if
a cow cannot walk to the kill box it should not be slaughtered
for human consumption. OK.
Mr.Stupak. My time is up and I still had questions for Mr.
Williams and Mr. Marler, but we are going to move right on. We
will go for a second round, and I am going to try to keep
members to five minutes, because I know you are bouncing back
and forth between the different hearings.
Mr. Shimkus, for questions.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is, again, a very
important day and very frustrating, very sad. So some
interesting points have been raised and what we want to follow
up on is--Mr. Marler, first of all, I appreciate that work you
have done, and your testimony is pretty interesting because--
and I have dealt with the trial bar quite a bit. And, you know,
I have a lot of friends. I am from southwestern Illinois,
Madison County, St. Clair County. Friends, but not always
allies in the debate. I mean they always remind me of, you
know, what the vast majority are trying to do is, you know, is
take up the cause for those who can't fight for themselves. And
I think your record has been one of doing that. But you also,
in your testimony, you also make some interesting statements
about how instead of the punitive adversarial relationship,
that if we really want to get to a place where, I think, we all
want to be regardless of what side of the dais we sit on. That
is a credible food safety environment where when, you know, it
is easier for our female members to talk about going to the
grocery store, talk about feeding their children. Men are less
compassionate, you know, neanderthal sometimes.
Ms.DeGette. Excuse me. But you don't go to the grocery
store?
Mr.Shimkus. I do. I'm a Jif guy though, OK, and a Banquet
Pot Pie guy, so I am limited in my purchases. The--but talk
about this relationship about government regulation and
corporate responsibility and how in working together. One of
your comments talks about how--the two things I want to focus
upon is that, and also the scientific research dollars that you
identify is kind of outside this whole purview. Because it
talks about the formation of pathogens, how they migrate and
how, you know, that is something that we may or may not be
doing that good of a job then. Can you address those two?
Mr.Marler. You know, in 15 years of taking the depositions
of, you know, many corporate leaders and workers very few of
them have I ever come away with a sense that they did it on
purpose. Mistakes happen, failure in their system happen. These
bugs are different. You know, in 1982 0157H7 didn't even exist
as a known pathogen. Many of the rules and regulations that
USDA goes by, you know, go back into the '50s and '40s and
'30s. They haven't caught up to somehow some of these pathogens
change. I think putting more money in research dollars in our
land grant institutions to figure out--and you'll hear this
from the corporations that follow me. Some of the outbreaks,
they don't even know how they happen. And, you know, to be
honest with you I don't even know how they happened. And a lot
of times in the litigation we explore the edges or sort of the
dirty edges of that. But the reality is that U.S. corporations,
it is bad for business to poison consumers. And to the extent
where, I think, government can be most helpful is not to try to
look for punitive action against corporations, but is really to
be sort of a--to work with them both in the research area. And
then to set aside good science based regulations that help
these corporations do the thing that they really want to do,
which is ultimately the right thing.
And I, you know, granted if you did those things you
wouldn't have a kind of trial bar, because we would have to go
with something else.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you. And Dr. Greger, I want to follow up
with my remaining time and appreciate what you have done. That
is very frustrating. From southern Illinois, a rural area,
beef, pork producing area, corn, soy beans, livestock of all
sorts, it is, I mean it is the same business types. And you
look at the time, effort and energy that is going on with these
individuals who try to move these downer cows, and you think
about real time processing you think they are losing time. I
mean the time and effort to move these instead of just
segregating them, getting them through the process.
So I want to follow up on just one of the reports that you
cite, which is the audit report from January 2006. Dr. Greger,
you claim that the slaughter of downed cattle is a widespread
problem. That 29 were put to slaughter, however, in this report
that you rely for this information, and it indicates that only
2 of the 12 plants inspected allowed downer cattle to be
slaughtered. To me that would, you know--here is a little chart
right here. We want to go after bad actors. I mean we really
want to make sure that people who are abusing the system, the
available laws, the rules and regulations for whatever reasons,
that they are held accountable to the fullest extent of the
law. Especially in the report--the film, you keep highlighting
California law, you know, this is going on. The law is being
broken. And this report highlights two processors, but then it
also highlights the other 12--10 that are in compliance. So I
guess our question will be focus in on the bad actors and
making sure that those who we think are good actors remain
good. But is it a systematic world problem of this country, or
is it a problem of a few bad actors that we need to be
concerned about?
Dr.Greger. It is a problem with these dairy cow slaughter
plants. And that is what the IG report found, and that is what
we found at this plant. This was essentially, what we found out
later, a magnet plant for what are called ``spent'' dairy cows.
Dairy cows under current production only last about 4 years
before being kind of ground to hamburger. So this plant brought
downer cows from states surrounding California to this plant.
In fact, between 90 and 95 percent of the cows at this plant
were dairy cattle, not beef cattle. And it is these--and USDA
estimates, perhaps, 295,000 downed cattle every year. It is
probably more, maybe half a million is the latest estimate. But
these are predominately dairy cattle at the end of production
who are spent, who may have metabolic problems, who may have
mastitis, infections of the utters, who may be lame for other
reasons who are transported long distances to get to these
plants. If we had a complete downer ban, if these cows--if it
wasn't worth transporting these animals, then presumably they
would be euthanized on the farm. And even better there would be
an incentive for producers to prevent these animals going down
in the first place by providing adequate bedding. Up to 90
percent--for example, according to Dr. Grandin, a livestock
consultant, up to 90 percent of downers are preventable. And so
if you can't get money from a downer cow then there won't be
this incentive to continue to send them and process them.
Mr.Shimkus. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Mr. Doyle, for questions, please.
Mr.Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple
questions.
I am really intrigued by this financial incentive. It makes
a lot of sense to me to ban downer cows. I am trying to
understand. When you saw that video and these workers spending
all that time and effort to get these cows to stand up--I don't
know much about the slaughter business. What is that--I mean is
there a financial incentive to those workers? Are they somehow
paid on how many--to go through that extra effort to shock and
forklift and roll and do all that stuff we saw on the film. And
where does that financial incentive sit? At the supervisor's
level? I mean do these workers have some financial interest in
getting those cows to stand up?
Dr.Greger. Well, finally the criminal testimony has been
published from the San Bernardino district attorney's office.
The Chino police did the investigation, and we actually have
the kind of written transcript. And these workers claim that
this was a company policy. That they were under pressure from
supervisors to get these cows into the slaughter plant. Again,
if they are irreparably down then they may have to just be
thrown on the dead pile, and not get those kind of extra
pennies per pound that they would be if they were allowed into
human consumption. And so they claim that they were just kind
of being pressured from above. But if you see more extended--I
mean there are hours of videotape. You can see some of the
online workers coming out, you know, because the line is
stopped because there is a cow actually downed in the kill
shoot. And so we have footage where they are shocking animals,
actually getting cows to trample over downed cows to get into
the kill box. And so when you have an animal that is actually
down in these very narrow pens it may actually stop the line
completely. And so they are coming out saying, what's the
holdup? And so tremendous amount of human resources is used.
And the only thing I can imagine is, this industry has kind of
a razor thin profit margin and that losing literally hundreds
of pounds of beef, even though some of these dairy cattle were
quite skinny. I mean potentially losing all that weight and you
would hear comments from supervisors saying this cow is too big
to be down, because there is weight there that could be sold.
Mr.Doyle. Well, what is troubling is the pressure seems to
be coming from the top. So it is more a culture in that
particular corporation at least, which says, you know, we are
going to get as many cows into that kill box as we can
regardless what condition they are in. It seems rather
troubling that that philosophy is going up higher than just at
some lower lever. What is the percentage? I am just trying to
understand to downer cattle to the total that go into the kill
box. What are we talking about in terms of lost, you know,
production?
Dr.Greger. Because of the kind of unique cattle population
that was going to this plant, and similar plants like it across
the country, our investigator witnessed literally downed cattle
every day coming off trucks.
Mr.Doyle. Ten percent, 20?
Dr.Greger. He said that typically on a truck there would be
at least one downed cattle per truck.
Mr.Doyle. And how many cows on a truck?
Dr.Greger. And so 30, 35 animals coming down. And so now
this plant slaughtered 500 cows a day. Had the capacity to hold
about 1,000, so there was this constant, you know, trying to
move these animals through the system, and as you can see, just
extraordinary methods used to try to kind of squeeze every last
penny out of these decrepit animals.
Mr.Doyle. Well, it seems to me if you change the financial
incentive to keeping cows being able to stand by treating them
better. You know, if that is the incentive that seems a much
better way to save money to increase production and certainly
is a much more humane way to deal with the situation. And maybe
that is one of the things we should be looking at. How do we
create an incentive to do it the right way instead of to do it
the wrong way?
Mr. Marler, I just have less than a minute. I just have two
questions. You said in your testimony between 2003 and 2006
that E. coli outbreaks linked to tainted meat had declined
dramatically. But since last year there has been this uptick in
E. coli illnesses and recalls again. Why do you think this is
the case and what can companies or the government do to reverse
the trend? I mean why do we get--it looked like we got it right
for three years and all of the sudden it seems we are headed in
the wrong direction?
Mr.Marler. I think probably unfortunately, my answer might
require a full committee hearing on that. And I think there
really is a need for a committee hearing on that particular
issue. I think if you reach out to the industry and to USDA
they won't really have a great answer, but I think I can give
you at least--I have reached out to industry. I have reached
out to academics, and I think there are a couple of things that
are going on. One is that back in 2006 INS rated a lot of
slaughter plants throughout the United States, and a lot of
really highly qualified, but illegal workers, were forced out
of their jobs. And a lot of unqualified, but legal workers, got
into their jobs. So that was happening in late 2006. At the
same time with the increased gas prices, oil prices, there is
more ethanol being used in the system. There is a lot of
collocation of ethanol plants with feed lots. There are some
studies that have come out of Kansas State University that show
that cattle fed the by-product of ethanol production,
distillers grain, have a higher quantity of E. coli 0157H7 in
their guts than normal cows. So I think you have a number of
things happening simultaneously. You have less qualified
workers, more E. coli coming into the system, and then I think
there is an aspect of just, you know, frankly that some of
these companies I think became complacent. It had gone so well
for so long. But I can tell you that I have never had more
severely injured children in my office in 2007 than I have had
since 2002. So something is really wrong. Somebody needs to get
to the heart of it. I am not a scientist, but those are some of
the things that I have seen that I think you have to look at.
Mr.Doyle. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time
is up.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Doyle. Mr. Walden, questions.
Mr.Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. I think all of us are concerned about our
food safety in America, especially as we see the rise of
imports coming in, and so I appreciate the testimony of all the
witnesses.
I am troubled, though, as a parent of somebody who is in
public school in Oregon in the northwest. I don't know if the
beef from this plant made it into the food chain there, but I
assume some of it probably did. And I remember when we had the
hearings on Ketek here, which is a drug, there was a lot of
concern about the fact that the FDA sort of put criminal
investigations ahead of patient safety. And I feel a similarity
here that, perhaps, the Humane Society didn't do that, perhaps
did, but maybe in coordination with San Bernardino. Did you say
the sheriff's office don't tell----
Dr.Greger. The district attorney's office.
Mr.Walden. So the district attorney of San Bernardino
County told you don't tell USDA there is a food problem here?
Dr.Greger. They told us to wait on any kind of public
release of this information.
Mr.Walden. Is that different than notifying USDA?
Dr.Greger. Frankly, the reason we did not go to USDA first
is because USDA has a history of not responding to----
Mr.Walden. But I want to get to the point here. So the
district attorney didn't tell you not to go to USDA. They just
said don't make the video public or--is that right?
Dr.Greger. They asked us----
Mr.Walden. Because I would like to know for the DA, Mr.
Chairman, if--well, I guess Mr. Chairman's magically
disappeared. But is that what happened?
Dr.Greger. They asked us to hold onto the information while
they completed their investigation and----
Mr.Walden. Did they notify USDA?
Dr.Greger. I am not aware.
Mr.Walden. Well, it just strikes me. Here we have got the
largest beef recall in American history. I think that is
correct, 143 million pounds. Secretary Schafer felt that it was
a big enough issue to recall it all, even though most of it now
has been consumed. So while kids are eating this meat that may
or may not be bad, certainly slaughter conditions were
unacceptable, and mostly illegal I think under USDA rules.
Nobody--so you didn't tell USDA, the district attorney didn't
tell USDA. So even if in the past USDA's been bad about doing
recalls on a timely basis, they didn't even know in this case?
Dr.Greger. Well, in fact this plant's behavior had been
brought----
Mr.Walden. Right.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. To USDA multiple times.
Mr.Walden. A couple of times. I have read that.
Dr.Greger. And evidently they--nothing was done.
Mr.Walden. But you had evidence something was wrong on
tape, right?
Dr.Greger. Well, evidence from the Pomona Valley Humane
Society--and SPCA, they also had evidence, which they provided
to the USDA. This was back in 1996, 1997.
Mr.Walden. No. But I mean in this case?
Dr.Greger. Yes.
Mr.Walden. You had your Humane Society here or locally had
the video----
Dr.Greger. Yes.
Mr.Walden [continuing]. Evidence. But that never got to
USDA until after the district attorney--or in January. You
waited a couple of months.
Dr.Greger. Until January, and we contacted the USDA before
releasing it.
Mr.Walden. Let me ask you this. And I wish--I know our
jurisdiction doesn't go out to USDA, so I guess that is why we
don't have a witness here. But it seems to me that part of the
fault clearly is the faults with the company. I mean at least
from--allegedly with the companies who are all not getting sued
by trial attorneys for, you know, whatever. But clearly USDA,
it seems to me, didn't do their job in the plant. Are they not
supposed to have inspectors there throughout this entire
process observing? And, Mr. Marler, you have got to be an
expert on this, and you have done great work for injured kids
and families, and I applaud you for that. But isn't USDA
supposed to have an inspector watching as the cattle are
unloaded?
Mr.Marler. The short answer is yes, but you have also seen
in the last--just last week about the lack of inspectors, the
numbers of inspectors, I think.
Mr.Walden. Right.
Mr.Marler. There is a shortage and----
Mr.Walden. What we get at is, because some of what has
occurred and Dr. Greger you may insight it as a good service to
the public by exposing this problem. But part of what has
occurred in each of these has already violated existing rules
and regulations. I think----
Dr.Greger. Right.
Mr.Walden [continuing]. Mr. Marler, you said we can't
regulate our way out of this. How do we get it so we can trust
our food supply? I mean I am just about----
Mr.Marler. I think the answer is the economic incentive.
You have got to figure out the economic disincentive to shove
these cows through the system. And whether that is a complete
ban on downer cows, a way of, you know, figuring out some sort
of tax credit to get rid of the cows humanely. There are
certain things to do. With respect to inspectors one of the
things I think that needs to be discussed is whether or not
more inspectors are necessary.
Mr.Walden. Right.
Mr.Marler. Whether or not some of the new technologies that
are available, both in testing and video cameras and all of
that, would be available and useful as we all face, you know,
difficulties with tax dollars.
Mr.Walden. And one other question just for my own sake. Was
the meat--do you feel that the meat that was recalled posed a
health risk to those who consumed it? Have you had a chance to
look at that?
Mr.Marler. Let me say that I think that this recall,
although the video is shocking----
Mr.Walden. Yes.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. There are no ill people.
Mr.Walden. Right.
Mr.Marler. And the risk of BSE is so exceedingly low in
this instance that I sort of feel that we could use these
resources that we are spending on this recall and the amount of
meat that is being recalled. And now it is being expanded into
products that might have some trace element of this meat. I
think we could probably spend those resources wisely in other
areas.
Mr.Walden. All right. My time has expired. I really
appreciate your work in these areas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. Ms. DeGette for questions.
Ms.DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, part of the
reason we have to do these recalls on such a broad level like
this one is because we don't really have traceability with our
meat supply. Is that correct, Dr. Greger?
Dr.Greger. We----
Ms.DeGette. I mean we can't trace back which lots of meat
may have contained the meat from those downed cows that we saw
on the video, right?
Dr.Greger. My colleague, Mr. Marler, is probably best able
to answer that question in terms of the traceability and in
terms of the kind of proprietary----
Ms.DeGette. Yes.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. Of this data. I mean----
Ms.DeGette. But I am correct, right, Mr. Marler?
Mr.Marler. Correct.
Ms.DeGette. And so if you can't trace which exact lots
these downed cows were in you have to have these broad recalls.
That is another piece of legislation I have got, the Trace Act,
that I am doing with Congresswoman DeLauro. Because we feel
like when Mr. Shimkus goes to the grocery store because his
wife sent him and he buys a package of hamburger he can't
tell--and this is part of the problem we have with these
recalls. He can't tell if he goes to you because his kid gets
sick and you, his lawyer, look at the package that the meat
came from we can't trace that back to what lots that came from.
So we don't know if those lots contained those downed cows,
correct?
Mr.Marler. For the most part that is true.
Ms.DeGette. Now you have done a lot of litigation around
food safety, and you know that there are some manufacturers
actually do have traceability, correct?
Mr.Marler. Correct.
Ms.DeGette. So we could actually technologically do it with
meat, right?
Mr.Marler. My friends at Dole now have instituted some of
the most far reaching traceability on their lettuce.
Ms.DeGette. And we have heard from them in some of these--
--
Mr.Marler. Right.
Ms.DeGette [continuing]. Hearings. They do have great
traceability and that would help. That would both help
consumers have more confidence, but it would also help industry
not have to do these massive recalls. And yet unbelievably, Mr.
Marler, every time I bring industry in to talk with me about
traceability they oppose it. You don't even have to respond to
that. You were talking earlier about economic incentives, and I
completely agree with that, which is why I think mandatory
recall is also a good idea. Let me talk for a minute about
the--one of the things you talked about in your testimony was
the Tops beef recall from last year, and how E. coli
contaminated products were on the shelves for three weeks. Why
do you think it took Tops so long to recall that beef?
Mr.Marler. Well, it was a combination really of Tops and
the USDA working or not working in concert. There was an ill
child in Florida that tested positive in her stool for E. coli
0157H7. Meat in her freezer tested positive for E. coli 0157H7.
It was a genetic match, but the USDA had a rule at the time.
They no longer have that rule. The rule at the time was that
if, if the meat came from an opened box of--and this was
preformed patties----
Ms.DeGette. Right.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. With plastic covers. If it came
from an open box they would not institute a recall.
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Mr.Marler. But what happened was they waited. They waited
weeks until more victims piled up, and that is when the recall
happened.
Ms.DeGette. Yeah. Well, OK. So in the ConAgra peanut butter
recall this is what happened. There was a couple of years, I
think 2004, there was a whistle blower complaint about the
peanut butter contamination at the ConAgra plant in Georgia.
And so the FDA investigators went in to check it out, and they
asked ConAgra to give them some documentation, and ConAgra said
no. Because not only do we not mandatory recall, we don't have
apparently mandatory document production unless they have got
you to subpoena them or us----
Mr.Marler. But they have given those documents.
Ms.DeGette. Well, yes, they have. Because you know why? We
had a congressional hearing then in this subcommittee and low,
right before the subcommittee hearing ConAgra changed its
policy and they did give over the document. Well, then what
happened was they actually had complaints and they had a
shutdown in 2006, I believe, of the plant from the contaminated
peanut butter. But so all of this time you have the complaint,
then you have this kind of gray area where people are going
back and forth, then finally you actually get people sickened.
Then you finally shut--you had the CDC shut the plant down.
That was several years later. My view all along has been that
if you had the USDA and the FDA with authority to do mandatory
recall with hope you wouldn't have to use that very much. That
just the threat of a mandatory recall, economically, would make
the producers act much more quickly on a voluntary basis. What
is your view on that?
Mr.Marler. I think mandatory recall is in a sense what
everybody believes happens. Everybody in the--if you go out to
some of the----
Ms.DeGette. Just what I said in my opening statement.
Mr.Marler. Exactly. Everybody believes it, but it is not
really the case. In 15 years of representing victims I can tell
you unequivocally that there have only been a handful of cases
where companies did not quickly do the recall when confronted
with the facts. It is--so most companies, in fact----
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. Ninety-five percent of all
companies will act responsibly. Whether or not the government
wants to take on that responsibility of mandatory recall is
something, I think, frankly the government has to think about
pretty hard.
Ms.DeGette. Thanks.
Mr.Stupak. Mr. Burgess, for questions.
Mr.Burgess. Thank you. Mr. Marler, can we just continue on
that thought for a second, because this comes up too with the
Consumer Product Safety Commission. Another subcommittee where
this statement or the philosophical approach that the voluntary
recall is, perhaps, the more nimble or agile way to go about
getting an unsafe product off the shelf. Because as you just
pointed out the companies are themselves anxious if there is
what--I got to believe if I am faced with the possibility of a
mandatory recall, are you swearing out of rit, that I will be
more frightened of the rit that you swear out than I would be
of the USDA or the FDA issuing a mandatory recall. So if I am a
company and I am told that there is going to be--the likelihood
of voluntary recall I go to take that very, very seriously, I
think, because of the blunt instrument that you wield out
there. Is that--in the food safety arena is there any parallel
with the consumer product area where they say we can be more
nimble and more quick with a voluntary recall, rather than
going to mandatory route where now we have got to--someone has
got to hire counsel. We have got to go in front of an
administrative law judge to get this thing proved up. Where it
is going to take weeks to get that done, and where as a
voluntary recall can be done within days. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr.Marler. I think there is a place for where government
investigators and government regulators and companies can find
sort of a happy medium on having the stick of mandatory recall,
but the opportunity for a voluntary recall. And in an essence,
that is what I think for the most part in the food industry
that is what happens. There is sort of a----
Mr.Burgess. I think so too.
Mr.Marler. And so I think it is one of those sort of things
that, I think, that there are some issues, especially with
respect to bioterrorism. I think those are some things that I
think we have to have a fallback position. The government can
ultimately have that responsibility to pull product off the
shelf.
Mr.Burgess. And I can't help myself. I have got to ask you
this question. When you had that lunch with the spinach growers
what did they serve you?
Mr.Marler. We had spinach salad and spinach and chicken. I
actually--there were about 50 more photographers here in front
of me watching to see whether or not I ate the spinach. And I
have to tell you I did and it was delicious.
Mr.Burgess. All right. Well, good. Again, I couldn't help
myself. I just had to know. Now, on this issue that is before
us this morning with the issue of the Humane Society brought to
the floor is--if this had been E. coli in this meat in October
would the justification of waiting until the DA had his ducks
in a row, would that be something that you would have seen as a
positive response to a crisis this order of magnitude?
Mr.Marler. Well, I think the fact of the matter is that E.
coli 0157 is an--and under the USDA food code. And so any time
a product has 0157H7, as long as it is hamburger, there are
some quirks in the law that allow E. coli 0157H7 to be on other
meat products. And that is another thing the hearing probably
should be about. But the fact of the matter is that if, in
fact, there was a 0157H7 positive it would have been recalled,
and so there wouldn't have been a lag. And so I----
Mr.Burgess. Well, I guess what I am getting at is the issue
of scaling. I mean an E. coli contaminate, people on dialysis,
people in the ICU. BSE, nobody gets sick----
Mr.Marler. Right.
Mr.Burgess [continuing]. Except for three people and there
is an issue of scale there. And I guess what concerns me, Dr.
Greger, is, you know, you didn't want to go public with it
because the DA wasn't ready. But you don't have to go public to
go to the USDA. I mean you could do that confidentially, can
you not?
Dr.Greger. We have had experience with the USDA not
following up on animal cruelty charges, even when they have
potential public health implications. It wasn't illegal to
process downed animals. It is illegal to not tell the inspector
about it after antemortem. It is illegal to treat the animals
like we saw. These were criminal charges, so we went to the
state and local authorities, which did the criminal
investigation.
Mr.Burgess. But at the same time there was a public health
issue where, in your opinion, some of these were downer cows
that should never have made their way into the stream of
commerce for school lunches. And, I guess, what is really
bothering me is that gap of time where all these lunches are
served in November, December and January, and the product is
consumed. If you are concerned about the public health aspect,
even though the incidents of BSE is far less than if you truly
had an outbreak of something as devastating as E. coli, but
still if you are concerned about that why not do something? I
mean it seems like the USDA could handle that confidentially
where it wouldn't mess up the DA's case down the road.
Dr.Greger. The USDA has procurement policies that disallow
downed animals into the National School Lunch Program. But when
we were at this plant we didn't know----
Mr.Burgess. With all due respect that sounds like a
bureaucratic answer. I mean I think what the American public
wants to know is how can they in the future feel safe knowing
that here the Humane Society had some data that is pretty darn
important. Important enough for you to come to this
subcommittee this morning and show us an emotional film, and
not important enough that we don't stop it going into the
stream of commerce. That is what the American people don't
understand. I mean I realize there can be bureaucratic reasons,
but to be quite frank with you I just say those are not
acceptable.
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I know I have gone a little
bit over. I will yield back.
Mr.Stupak. Do you want the gentleman to answer?
Mr.Burgess. If he has----
Mr.Stupak. Do you want to answer his last----
Dr.Greger. We were not aware that this was a supplier to
the National School Lunch Program while we were doing the
investigation. The USDA does not disallow downer meat, but we
know that the National School Lunch Program does. So had we
known that, perhaps, we would have been able to get that
information. But downed animals continue to this day. It is
unfathomable to the American public that we continue to allow
any downed animals as USDA inspected meat. And so we are hoping
that this investigation will not only shore up food safety
across the board, but that we will finally have a downer ban.
We knew downed animals were going to the food supply, but that
is legal. It is legal for downed animals to go into the food
supply thanks to the July 2007 USDA loophole.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Thank you. We are going to go another round
of questions here as members. Mr. Inslee, you have not asked
questions yet. I'm sorry. And we will after, Mr. Inslee, we
will go the second round.
Mr.Inslee. Thank you. I want to welcome my constituent
neighbor, Bill Marler. And, Bill, I want to thank you for your
work. You have done as much, perhaps, as Congress in trying to
assure food safety over the last decades, and I want to thank
you for it. And that work is just beginning, and we thank you
for your efforts.
We are talking about the difference between voluntary
standards and regulatory legal enforcement standards. My staff
handed me a quote from 1906 from Sinclair Lewis and he says,
``it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his
salary depends on his not understanding it.'' And it seems to
me that that 1906 observation might apply. You and I have
talked about the need for standards regarding vegetables and
leafy products, and we have talked about the success we have
had in the meat industry. Even though we have got a problem
here today there were improvements in part because of your
litigation, and in part because some of the things Congress
did. Can you talk about what you think we ought to be doing as
far as leafy vegetables, non-meat products, to try to learn
from the experiences in meat to improve our food safety?
Mr.Marler. I think the first thing that you have to do is,
really in many respects, really partner with consumer groups
and industry, and your governmental agencies, as well as
academia. There is a lot of research that still needs to be
done as to how these pathogens get on these products, and why
they are able to be transported for a long period of time and,
you know, exactly how they operate. And the thing about these
bugs too is that they morphin change over time. So whatever
regulatory scheme, whatever standards you set, will always be
things that will have to be in somewhat fluid motion. But I
think the most important thing is to work with industry, to
work with consumers, to build safety nets and to create a
culture of food safety. There is a real big lack of both solid
research, a lack of funding at research institutions, there is
a lack of enforcement simply because you don't have enough FDA
inspectors. I mean we talked about the ConAgra plant. That
inspector was in there in 2005. Most FDA inspectors very
seldom, maybe once a year, once every other year, will get to
major manufacturing facilities. Those are the sorts of things
that really need to change. But, again, it has to do I think
first with good solid working relationships with these partners
in this room, but also good research.
Mr.Inslee. You have suggested consolidation of these
agencies into one single purpose agency. And I assume because
in regard to USDA you think that there is a conflict between
the promotional responsibilities of this agency and the
regulatory food safety. I am assuming that. Maybe you can
comment on that.
Mr.Marler. As Tommy Thompson said, certainly before he
left, it is just really a matter of not whether, it is a matter
of when we have a bioterrorism act against our food supply. A
bioterrorism act against our food supply will look absolutely
exactly like these things on your charts, but it will be
somebody that did it on purpose. And my view is that that
really should be where Congress needs to focus its energy and
attention. And I think that is why, in my experience,
especially in cases where FDA, USDA and the CDC are all in a
sense in the same pot, there are so many conflicts between
those agencies about information sharing, information gathering
that sometimes they stumble over each other for trying to do
the right thing. But they just simply stumble over each other,
and it slows the process down of being able to figure out what
the cause of an outbreak is sooner, rather than later.
Mr.Inslee. Let me ask you something that may not be a
headline grabber, but grabbed my family a few months ago when I
had a family member get, you know, sort of violently ill
suddenly, which we thought may have been food related. No long-
term lasting damage. I didn't have to give you a call. Just
some days of great distress. And I suspect that is going on in
thousands of occurrences across the country with no sort of
reporting system, because there is no real medical
intervention. Is this a problem? And number one, what can we do
about that sort of lesser severity issues?
Mr.Merle. I think that--and that is probably something that
this committee and Congress is, you know, acutely aware of.
That our public health system has some real challenges. And the
fact is that even with our concern about bioterrorism we
haven't put the money in on the ground for investigators to do
testing of victims of potential food borne illnesses. Because,
again, that is where you are going to catch it. You are going
to catch it in the ER's. You are going to catch it in doctors'
offices. And that is where you are going to catch these
outbreaks before they balloon into something that is worse. So
I think looking at how our public health system operates or
doesn't operate, and giving physicians the tools, specifically
with respect to stool cultures for vital and bacterial
illnesses, would get us a long way there to stopping some of
these outbreaks before they get bigger.
Mr.Inslee. We hope the wisdom from Bainbridge Island
becomes the national policy. Thanks, Bill, for being here.
Mr.Marler. Thanks.
Mr.Stupak. Going to a second round of questions here.
Mr. Marley, let me ask you this. It is my understanding,
you know, we talked about the other recalls. Jack-In-The-Box,
we got Tops, and now we got this Westland/Hallmark hamburger
area. When you do hamburger, when they go through these
slaughter houses, they trim from different animals that are
going down and load up the burger, and it is put in a box, and
the box can weigh up to 2,000 pounds. And the way we inspect
it, you reach in, you take a little bit out, you inspect it. If
it passes that whole 2,000 pounds go, correct?
Mr.Marler. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. So how do you then really do an inspection of
the quality of the meat or the hamburger that is being
produced? And as you said earlier it is the dairy cows that
sort of is the basis for our hamburger in this country, right?
Mr.Marler. Seventeen percent of----
Mr.Stupak. Seventeen percent.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. Hamburger in the country is from--
--
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. Dairy cows.
Mr.Stupak. So how do you really get at it if--how do you
get at these microorganisms, E. coli, whatever may be there?
Mr.Marler. When the inspecting system was created in the
United States most of the people didn't understand how
bacterial or viral illnesses sickened people anyway. You were
looking for things. You were looking to see if the cow had
tumors or if it was tubercular. You were looking for those
sorts of things. It is a new day now, and these pathogens are
out there. Some of them, you know, morph. We have seen new
forms of E. coli. Pathogenic E. coli show up in our food system
just in the last few years. We have the technology to do
scientifically based testing. In fact, one would argue that
many of the retail outlets, the Jack-In-The-Boxes, McDonald's,
the big retails outlets forced random testing onto suppliers.
Which was what I think one of the reasons why E. coli 0157H7
cases went down so dramatically after 2002, because we were
testing. It is not a perfect system, but random scientifically
based 0157H7 testing can get us a long way to making our food
supply safer.
Mr.Inslee. But after Jack-In-The-Box we came up with the
HACCP Program for hazardous detection. But then, as you said
here, here is the meat recall that is just in the last 12
months there have been 91 recalls, 63 of them are meat alone.
Mr.Marler. Right.
Mr.Inslee. So has government then said well, we have this
HACCP system, therefore, industry is self regulating itself. We
won't have to do it.
Mr.Marler. I think that is why that is the problem. You
have got to not only--it is not only a partnership with
industry to help set the standards so they are actually
workable standards that make sense, but I do think that there
has to be ultimately your people on the ground in the plants
making sure that the kinds of abuses that we saw at Westland/
Hallmark don't occur. The sort of follow-up that didn't occur
by FDA officials at the ConAgra plant--to make sure that those,
in fact, do occur. It is a resource issue. It is a manpower
issue.
Mr.Inslee. Any reason why we should not label meat products
that is treated with carbon monoxide or seafood with carbon
monoxide to let the consumer know?
Mr.Marler. No, I see no reason why.
Mr.Inslee. Mr. Williams, let me ask you this. In your
testimony you are talking about shrimp and you are talking
about when Pakistan went from 0 to 165,000 pounds. China
dumping it here.
Mr.Williams. Yes.
Mr.Inslee. What is the danger here? You are saying the FDA
isn't inspecting it. Explain this, especially when we are
talking a little bit about pathogens and all that in shrimp and
other--and you said Vietnam's next on our list we got to watch
for?
Mr.Williams. Right. Well, when another importing nation,
such as European, Japan or the European Union, Canada,
increases their inspection rates when they find problems, which
they do. They inspect up to 25 percent. We inspect less than
one percent. When they increase their inspection rate the
imports suddenly stop going to those countries and they----
Mr.Inslee. So in other countries increase their inspections
the imports stop, and they get shifted to the United States. So
we become the dumping ground.
Mr.Williams. Exactly, exactly.
Mr.Inslee. We have had other hearings where it indicates,
let us say, like seafood especially, they will bypass our
inspections in San Francisco where we have a very good lab and
go, let us say, to Las Vegas and bring it in the back door. Is
that a continuing problem?
Mr.Williams. That is the term they use. They call it port
shopping. They will send this product to a port that will be
the less likely to inspect their product, and if they do
inspect it they don't--they have the option of taking it back
out of the country or it will be destroyed. Of course they will
take it back out of the country and send it to another port
with what may not get inspected. You ought to have a 99 percent
chance of getting it in without being inspected.
Mr.Inslee. What are the fungi and antibiotics that may be
found in shrimp and other seafood? We had one report that
summed the seafood being treated with carbon monoxide. About 20
percent of it was already rotted before it was ever sent to the
United States, but the carbon monoxide, of course, masked the
problems with the seafood.
Mr.Williams. Right.
Mr.Inslee. So what are the fungi and antibiotics we look
for?
Mr.Williams. In seafood there is malachite green. There is
a host of nitrofurans, chloramphenicol, which is--causes
several irreversible blood diseases such as aplastic anemia.
And what is particularly troubling with some of these diseases
is you will not see this for probably 10 years down the road.
We don't know what amount causes these diseases. That is why we
have a zero tolerance on it, and it is banned worldwide for use
in food consumption.
Mr.Inslee. OK. Thank you. Dr. Greger, my time is up at
this--what did your undercover--if you know, what did your
undercover investigator tell you USDA inspectors were doing?
You said 6:30 and 12:30 was their inspections. What were they
doing in between?
Dr.Greger. There are on-line and off-line inspectors. So by
law a plant cannot operate without on-line inspectors looking
at the carcasses. However, the plant can continue to work if
there aren't these off-line inspectors. They are the ones that
are looking at the pens and supposedly doing random checks. Not
in this case. Not looking at the unloading of animals. Not
looking at them antemortem, before the slaughter of these
animals. And so the plant can continue to operate. So in a
situation of understaffing the inspectors are in the plant on
the line and others, you know, may get out or maybe between
multiple plants. I mean in some areas of the country there are
more severe understaffing issues than others.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Thank you. Mr. Shimkus, questions.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you. Let me just follow up Dr. Greger one
more time on the whole terminology of downer. These are dairy--
spent dairy cattle?
Dr.Greger. Yes.
Mr.Shimkus. Spent dairy. And they are shipped from multi-
state regions, so they arrive--downer means they are down,
right? That is kind of the definition. They could be down for a
lot of different reasons?
Dr.Greger. Correct.
Mr.Shimkus. We--obviously mad cow. People--we know that.
But downer doesn't mean that all these are mad cow. They could
be just fatigue and major fatigue. They could have been going
without food and water for multi-hours over the road haul. So,
and you mentioned one per tractor trailer load. What should
have this processor done? Should they have--and think if he was
processed. Just segregate the downed cattle? Could they have
allowed that downed cattle then time to recover if it was just
fatigue and water to then, without assistance, get up on its
own and then process through the veterinarian check and then--
or by definition once down, always down regardless of the
reason it was down?
Dr.Greger. Well, what should have happened--I mean downer
animals are veterinary emergencies and should be treated as
such, and they should receive individual veterinary treatment
or they should be humanely euthanized. But there is a system in
which one can segregate so-called ``suspect'' animals, and see
if indeed they can perk up and are able to walk on their own.
And then by definition they are no longer downer cattle. At
this plant there was no suspect pen. There were no suspect
stickers.
Mr.Shimkus. If they would have just moved all these downed
cattle to a pen, a suspect pen, and then monitored those and
those that were able to revive processed back through, and
those who can't then deal with them as per law.
Dr.Greger. The problem is, is it is very difficult to
humanely transport these downed animals. Hundreds of pounds and
so how are you going to do it? As you can see----
Mr.Shimkus. Right.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. Forklifts and chains. I mean there
are humane ways to do it via these sleds and--but it is
something that is, you know, much more intensive and----
Mr.Shimkus. Right.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. It may just make more sense to
euthanize them on the spot certainly.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you. The--and, Mr. Williams, thank you
for your patience. I am glad the Chairman directed some
questions. On this whole imported shrimp, who makes the
wholesale purchases of this imported shrimp?
Mr.Williams. I am sorry?
Mr.Shimkus. Who makes the wholesale purchases of the
imported shrimp?
Mr.Williams. That would be mostly the importers and
distributors.
Mr.Shimkus. And what obligations do the firms who are
purchasing through the wholesalers have in testing the shrimp?
Mr.Williams. I am sorry. Say that again.
Mr.Shimkus. Well, here is my frustration in the food
processing perspective. It is not a cost benefit to business,
especially with the ability of litigation, food recalls, you
know, to--I actually have a hard time believing that companies
willfully, for a profit margin, allow unsafe foods to the
market. I believe, I think, that there are mistakes and errors.
There is evolution to these pathogens. We need to do more
science to figure out how to stop this stuff. In the
manufacturing process if you are building a car and you are
going to a--you got a wholesaler who is creating the widget and
has to be one millimeter of inch, it is tested before it is
exported to the assembly line. And when the person receives it
they are testing to make sure it is within the specifications.
So isn't there testing on both? Shouldn't there be testing on
both ends?
Mr.Williams. There is testing on both ends. We are under
strict Federal, State and local guidelines, or health
guidelines, to test our product whether they are imported or
not. But once they reach these shores and the FDA allows them
in because of their lack of testing we don't test for
chemicals. Our shrimp are not tested for illegal antibiotics or
chemical contamination. We are tested on the safety and the
quality of it going out to the consumer.
Mr.Shimkus. Should we?
Mr.Williams. I don't know. They shouldn't be allowed in
because there are no chemicals in domestic shrimp.
Mr.Shimkus. Right.
Mr.Williams. Those shrimp should be tested before they
leave the foreign nations.
Mr.Shimkus. Right.
Mr.Williams. And here also before they come into our
market.
Mr.Shimkus. And I think there is credible debate on the--we
definitely don't want to be the dumping ground when other
countries have established some standards, you know. Not always
when you set standards--hopefully they are scientifically
based. That makes sense. And then we don't want to be the
overflow and the dumping ground for that. But I also think it
is just not good business if you know that there are additives
in foods that affect the people that you are trying to sell
your product to. To not test--establish those standards and not
purchase it if it doesn't meet those standards.
Mr.Williams. Well, I agree. And therein lies the problem
that, you know, these shrimp should be tested. We should have
at least equivalence with the foreign countries as we do here.
Have it at least the same amount of testing over there as they
do here. In 2006, for example, the FDA tested 2,480 inspections
of domestic fish and fishery products here in the United
States. Only 200 in the foreign nations, and we imported over a
billion pounds of shrimp that year. And we produced 200
million.
Mr.Shimkus. And so your basic premise is our domestic
standards are much higher than our imported standards.
Mr.Williams. Well, yeah. We think the--yeah, the health
standards are. Yes, but like I said we don't test for
chemicals.
Mr.Shimkus. Right, OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Mr. Walden, questions.
Mr.Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make a point
that getting back to this issue of the malachite green, which
was the carcinogen in eels. Which, I guess, South Korea banned
in July of '05, and then Canada in January of '06. And it took
our FDA another 8 months after, or 7 to figure it out. But what
do we need to do here?
Mr.Williams. Well, I think we have put together what we
think is a very comprehensive food safety program that the FDA
should adopt and put in place. And, you know, I have heard that
we can't inspect our way out of this mess. That may be true,
but we can certainly do a better job than what we are doing.
But I think if they look at our--in our written comments if you
will look at our safety program that we think is very
comprehensive and would take us out of this mess.
Mr.Walden. OK. I guess as a consumer, you know, and I have
supported country of origin labeling and all, and then been
shocked as I go down the seafood display at my local grocery
store just where stuff comes from. I wanted assurance that what
I am buying for my family is safe.
Mr.Williams. Yeah.
Mr.Walden. And I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, every time I
come to one of these hearings you are holding I walk away
thinking what can I eat, you know, or what vitamins should I
take, or what prescription should I avoid. And it is just very
troubling, and yet we know overall our food supply is pretty
darn safe and secure. But so I think we are trying to find out
where the hole is. Where are the breaches? What do we need to
fix here? When you think of how much food is produced and
consumed without any problem. I mean these are kind of along
the edges, but it is not along the edge when it is your son or
daughter that is hooked up to feeding tubes or dies. And that
is--we want to get to zero tolerance. And it sounds like most
importantly we need a better inspection regime and more
inspectors. It sounds like, at least with FDA and probably
USDA, we need more real time intelligence capabilities. It
shouldn't take eight months after Canada figures it out and
probably a year after South Korea figures it out. Far after
data reaches similar conclusion on a known carcinogen. I mean
we are not the legislative committee. We are just the oversight
committee, but we all serve on the committee that has
legislative authority. What else can you offer us that you
haven't already in terms of what we need to do?
Mr.Williams. Well, I think just about everything in our 11
point program would--we feel it would be very--would take care
of this.
Mr.Walden. All right.
Mr.Williams. As far as seafood, imported seafood. And I
think another example would be Cambodia. When the European
Union went over there and found they had no, absolutely no,
safety standards at all and would not allow their shrimp into
the European Union, we continued to accept them.
Mr.Walden. We did what?
Mr.Williams. The FDA allowed them into this country. Our
imports went up most like the Pakistani issue.
Mr.Walden. See, that is encouraging. That is encouraging.
We haven't touched on the issue of radiation in beef. Does
somebody want to tackle that one? Because I hear a lot that,
you know, that could actually eliminate a lot of the disease.
Mr. Marler, would that help?
Mr.Marler. Yes.
Mr.Walden. Should we be doing that?
Mr.Marler. Yes.
Mr.Walden. Is there any consumer issue with that?
Mr.Marler. I think the consumer issue with it, I think the
science isn't there to support the fear, but there is a fear.
But we----
Mr.Walden. Right.
Mr.Marler [continuing]. Radiate a lot of products.
Mr.Walden. And the practical effect of that is what?
Mr.Marler. None.
Mr.Walden. Other than that?
Mr.Marler. I mean other than eliminating or certainly
reducing pathogens. The gentleman who talked about, you know,
getting corn out of his field and eating the way we ate in the
'50s and '60s, those days are long gone.
Mr.Walden. Right.
Mr.Marler. And I think when our food chain is longer and
more complex we have to look at interventions to protect us
from pathogens that change on a daily basis.
Mr.Walden. You know those days are long gone, but perhaps
our inspection regime is still stuck there.
Mr.Marler. I would agree with you on that.
Mr.Walden. It is sort of like a car in Cuba, you know, they
have got the best mechanics in the world because they keep
those 50-year-old cars running, and or more. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I am going to yield back to get onto the next panel.
Mr.Stupak. On your radiation this committee has a joint
request in right with GEO just waiting for the report back. It
is something that we have looked at as part of the total food
safety issue.
Mr.Walden. Perfect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Ms. DeGette, for questions.
Ms.DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Williams, your testimony got me to thinking about something I
say quite often in these hearings. And that is it seems--and I
think the shrimp industry's probably one of the best examples
of how our entire food--or actually all of our consumer goods
including food. Thirty years ago most of that food was
domestically produced, and now a huge percentage is coming from
overseas. And I frankly think that is one of the main reasons
why our oversight agencies, like the FDA and the USDA, have
broken down, because they are being asked to inspect things
that they weren't asked. Would you agree with that statement?
Mr.Williams. Somewhat, yes.
Ms.DeGette. In your industry, over the last say 30, 40
years, what is the percentage--how have you seen the percentage
of imports change?
Mr.Williams. It is since--actually since the late '90s we
have been losing----
Ms.DeGette. If you can move that microphone a little.
Mr.Williams. Since the late '90s we have been losing more
market share, especially since 2000, because of we feel like
the lack of inspection for the imports. These products--this
product is allowed to come in and capture our market. We are
down to about 10 percent of our entire market now. We feel like
if those shrimp were inspected they would not be allowed to
come into the Nation, because they are contaminated. They are
contaminated with illegal antibiotics, and they shouldn't be in
this market.
Ms.DeGette. And one reason why people are buying them is
they are cheaper than domestically produced shrimp.
Mr.Williams. That is right.
Ms.DeGette. Correct? And I would assume your industry's
position is they're cheaper because they are not raised under
the same strict standards your industry sets forward, correct?
Mr.Williams. That is right. We are wild caught domestic
industry. We can produce and compete with anyone in the world.
We always have until they started breaking the rules. And that
is what they have done is break the rules and put our industry
in jeopardy. We have----
Ms.DeGette. And do you think that there is more consumer
risks to these imported shrimp as well.
Mr.Williams. Oh, yes, definitely. I had a--and this may be
extreme, but I had a gentleman--when we started this early on
we filed these trade petitions against these countries, and one
of them was because of the chemicals. I had a rep from a
chemical company. He was a salesman for years and years. And he
told me that some of these chemicals such as chloramphenicol
you really don't want to touch this product without rubber
gloves on.
Ms.DeGette. Great. Now, Dr. Greger, one thing. I hope no
one asked this, and I apologize, in my absence. You--one thing
that struck me about that really horrifying video is that the
USDA inspectors were actually at that plant twice a day. I
think they said what, 6:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. Were those
inspectors on site?
Dr.Greger. There have to be inspectors on site----
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. One-hundred percent of the time
inside on the line, but not necessarily off-line inspectors or
in the holding pens or in that area. And that is why something
like closed circuit television----
Ms.DeGette. Right.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. Camera or random checks.
Ms.DeGette. But let me stop you right there.
Dr.Greger. Yes.
Ms.DeGette. What were those inspectors doing the rest of
the time between when they went out there?
Dr.Greger. And so inspectors were either inspecting other
plants or were inside.
Ms.DeGette. So those two inspectors--or however many
inspectors there were, they weren't on that particular site all
day long?
Dr.Greger. That--there was one inspector came the same
time, same two times every day, but I am not sure where that
inspector was at other times. Whether they were at that plant
or looking at other plants.
Ms.DeGette. I see. OK. We had been under the impression
there were inspectors on site during the whole work day. That
is not correct.
Dr.Greger. There are USDA inspectors inside the plant
watching the carcasses.
Ms.DeGette. But they are different inspectors?
Dr.Greger. There are on-site inspectors and on-line
inspectors.
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Dr.Greger. Excuse me. And off-line inspectors. For a plant
to operate there has to be someone--there has to be a federal
inspector looking at the carcasses, but there does not
necessarily have to be an inspector watching the unloading and
treatment of the animals before slaughter.
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Dr.Greger. They have a mandate to do that, but evidently
they don't have the----
Ms.DeGette. The resources.
Dr.Greger [continuing]. Personnel.
Ms.DeGette. But both you, and also Mr. Marler, said that
you could solve some of these problems with technology. And I
would suspect too, Mr. Williams, in the shrimp industry we are
going to have to get--this is true. We have been doing all
these consumer product hearings and food hearings, and I mean
frankly our food inspection and consumer products inspection
systems are completely broken. But there is also no way we
could ever have enough of a budget for every single lot of meat
or every single lot of shrimp to be inspected. So I think one
of the challenges that we have to face, we are in the 21st
century, is to find innovative testing that is like these video
surveillance cameras and other types of testing. Wouldn't you
agree with that, any of you?
Mr.Williams. I would agree, but also agree that it should
begin in the exporting nations. That is where it should begin.
Ms.DeGette. Yeah. Well, the last I heard the U.S. Congress
doesn't have very much jurisdiction over the Chinese food
business. But if we can figure that out I think we will be a
big step ahead.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Well, thank you. That concludes all the
questions for this panel. We want to thank this panel. Before
we leave, you know, we learned a lot about--this is our fifth
food safety hearing, and a lot about imports. And Richard
Wilfong, who is a detainee from another department agency, ICE,
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, will be leaving us.
And, Richard, I just want to thank you for all your work in
helping us understand the import business as you do. It makes
all of us members who ask questions--the brains behind the
operation are really sitting behind us and helping us out. And
that goes on both sides. We have got a great staff. So I want
to compliment the staff before we dismiss this panel and before
we call up our next panel. And thank you to this panel for all
of your insight. Thank you.
Mr.Wilfong. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr.Stupak. I will now call up our second panel of
witnesses. On our second panel we have Mr. Gary M. Rodkin,
Chief Executive Officer of ConAgra Foods. Mr. B. Keith
Shoemaker, President and CEO of Butterball. Mr. Christopher D.
Lischewski, President and CEO of Bumblebee Foods. Mr. Rick Ray,
President and CEO of New Era Canning Company. Mr. David
DeLorenzo, President and Chief Executive Officer of Dole Food
Company. Mr. David A. Eisenberg, Chairman of ANRESCO
Laboratories, and Dr. Robert E. Brackett, PhD., Senior Vice
President and Chief Science Regulatory Affairs Officer at the
Grocery Manufacturers Association.
I think we are just waiting for one more. OK.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr.Stupak. You are now under oath, and we will begin
opening statements. Please, limit it to 5 minutes. If you have
a longer statement we will include it in the record.
Mr. Rodkin, we will start on my left, if you would like to
start. I am going to ask you to pull that mic up. Pull it
towards you. If we get it closer we can hear it a little
better. It is not the best system in this room. Thanks.
STATEMENT OF GARY M. RODKIN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CONAGRA
FOODS, INC.
Mr.Rodkin. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
My name is Gary Rodkin, and I am the chief executive
officer for ConAgra Foods. Thank you for the invitation to
testify today about the safety of our Nation's food supply. I
became ConAgra Foods' CEO in October of 2005, and during my
tenure we have made food safety a top priority throughout our
company. We fully agree with the committee's objective of
ensuring that our Nation's food supply is among the safest in
the world.
I am pleased to report back to the committee on progress
made with our Peter Pan peanut butter since our vice president
for operations testified before you in April of last year, and
how we have responded to new challenges with other products. I
want to assure you how seriously we take our food safety
responsibilities, and that this is a top priority throughout
our company. As the CEO of the company whose core mission is to
provide the consumers with safe, nutritious and wholesome food,
the very possibility that one of our products could cause
anyone harm is the very last thing that I would want to happen.
I want to reiterate how truly sorry we are for any harm that
our recalled peanut butter or pot pie products may have caused
any consumer.
Today I want to convey three main messages to the
committee. One, ConAgra Foods has followed through on our
commitments made here last spring regarding steps needed to
resume production of our Peter Pan peanut butter by creating a
state-of-the-art manufacturing facility in Sylvester, Georgia.
In fact, that plant successfully resumed operations in August
2007. Two, ConAgra Foods addressed a completely different type
of food safety concern with our Banquet and store brand pot
pies in October 2007. We have since resumed operations after
making enhancements to that product line. And three, ConAgra
Foods has undertaken a complete revamping and modernization of
our food safety practices companywide with the benefit of
outside experts and the full commitment from all our food
safety program managers. Our foremost goal is to prevent food
safety problems from occurring, but should they ever occur we
will continue to act quickly and responsibly to protect
consumers and make any needed safety improvements.
Throughout this process we have cooperated with the
committee's investigation and will continue to do so. We have
provided the subcommittee with written testimony that contains
additional detail on the first two product specific messages so
I will not repeat those here. Rather, I would like to focus my
time speaking to you directly on our final message regarding
our companywide food safety modernization efforts. Namely, that
ConAgra Foods is conducting a companywide upgrade of our food
safety programs and will make continuous improvements to ensure
that we provide safe food to consumers. As we reported to the
committee last spring ConAgra Foods is committed to a
companywide process to continuously improve our food safety
programs starting with our hiring of a new chief global quality
officer and the establishment of a food safety advisory
committee. We have since taken the process much further and
have undertaken the following steps. First, we are making a
major investment in facility upgrades and in hiring additional
quality personnel throughout the company. Specifically we have
earmarked millions of dollars in capital for our facilities for
projects that will further enhance the safe manufacture of our
products. We are also in the process of hiring an additional
250 quality personnel companywide primarily to support our
enhanced food safety standards at our facilities. Second, we
have made a major commitment to enhanced training in our food
safety requirements for all of our plant personnel and
suppliers. Specifically, in September of last year we convened
a meeting of every plant manager and every quality manager at
our headquarters facility in Omaha, which I attended, to launch
an enterprise-wide set of food safety improvements. We are
conducting continuous food safety and quality training for all
plant employees companywide. We have also reached out to our
co-packers and plan to hold a food and safety quality
intervention event with all key supervisors and contract
packers in the very near future. Finally, we are conducting
continuous safety audits across all plants with a particular
focus on one, incoming ingredient quality programs; two,
allergen and sanitation programs; three, foreign material
control programs; and four, overall infrastructure. By the end
of the year we will have reassessed every HACCP plan across all
of our platforms. We have also created within ConAgra Foods a
new microwave center of excellence--center of expertise, and
have begun a review of cooking instructions across all of our
products.
In conclusion, we appreciate the committee's interest in
food safety, and we fully support the committee's goals. At
ConAgra Foods we have met the commitments we made to the
committee last spring regarding the process to be followed
before resuming operations of peanut butter manufacturing at
our Georgia facility. We responded quickly to an unexpected
outbreak related to our pot pies, and we are well into a
companywide process to review and upgrade our food safety
programs for our entire business.
I want to emphasize that these improvements are ongoing and
will continue. I personally will ensure that we will
continuously challenge and improve our food safety programs and
make certain that food safety is the centerpiece of our
corporate culture. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodkin follows:]
Statement of Gary M. Rodkin
Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My
name is Gary M. Rodkin, and I am the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) for ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra Foods). Thank you for
the invitation to testify today about the safety of our
nation's food supply. I became ConAgra Foods' CEO in October of
2005 and, during my tenure, we have made food safety a top
priority throughout our company. We fully agree with the
Committee's objective of ensuring that our nation's food supply
is among the safest in the world.
ConAgra Foods is one of North America's leading packaged
food companies, serving grocery retailers, as well as
restaurants and other foodservice establishments. Popular
ConAgra Foods consumer brands include: Chef Boyardee, Egg
Beaters, Healthy Choice, Hebrew National, Hunt's, Marie
Callender's, Orville Redenbacher's, PAM and many others,
including Peter Pan and Banquet. We operate more than 100
manufacturing facilities in 30 states, as well as facilities in
several international locations.
I am pleased to be able to report back to the Committee on
progress made with our Peter Pan peanut butter since our Senior
Vice President for Operations testified before you in April of
last year, and how we have responded to new challenges with
other products. I want to assure you how seriously we take our
food safety responsibilities and that this is a top priority
throughout our company. As the CEO of a company whose core
mission is to provide consumers with safe, nutritious and
wholesome food, the very possibility that one of our products
could cause anyone harm is the very last thing that I would
want to happen. I want to reiterate how truly sorry we are for
any harm that our recalled peanut butter or pot pie products
may have caused any consumer.
Today, I want to convey three main messages to the
Committee. One, ConAgra Foods has followed through on our
commitments made here last spring regarding steps needed to
resume production of our Peter Pan peanut butter by creating a
state-of-the-art manufacturing facility in Sylvester, Georgia.
In fact, that plant successfully resumed operations in August
2007. Two, ConAgra Foods addressed a completely different type
of food safety concern with our Banquet and store brand pot
pies in October 2007. We have since resumed operations after
making enhancements to that product line. And three, ConAgra
Foods has undertaken a complete revamping and modernization of
our food safety practices company wide, with the benefit of
outside experts and the full commitment from all our food
safety program managers. Our foremost goal is to prevent food
safety problems from occurring, but should they ever occur, we
will continue to act quickly and responsibly to protect
consumers and make any needed safety improvements. Throughout
this process, we have cooperated with the Committee's
investigation and will continue to do so. Let me now describe
these three points in greater detail.
1. ConAgra Foods has followed through on its commitments to
this Committee by making its peanut butter manufacturing plant
in Sylvester, Georgia a state-of-the-art facility before
resuming operations in August 2007.
When ConAgra Foods testified before this Committee in April
2007, we committed to addressing the suspected causes of the
contamination at our Sylvester, Georgia facility that
manufactures Peter Pan peanut butter, and to implement
significant changes in the plant, including new, state-of-the-
art machinery, technology, and designs throughout the facility.
We further committed, prior to resuming operations, to obtain
an independent review by an expert third-party and seek the
concurrence of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as to the
adequacy of the measures implemented. We have met each of these
commitments, and our Sylvester plant resumed operations in
August 2007 as a state-of-the-art facility.
Specifically, with the assistance of our outside experts,
we took the following steps:
a. We made a significant capital investment (approximately
$40 million) to substantially upgrade the Sylvester facility.
This included: (1) installation of a new roaster; (2)
installation of a new roof; (3) physical separation and
segregation of raw material and finished product areas and
activities (each with dedicated employees and equipment) to
minimize possible cross-contamination; (4) dedicated equipment
wash rooms for raw and finished areas; (5) upgraded air flow
systems; and (6) enhanced quality control systems supported by
additional quality personnel.
b. We enhanced both the frequency and sensitivity of our
environmental and finished product testing programs for this
facility, and assigned responsibility for sample testing to an
independent, accredited laboratory.
As we made these changes, we kept FDA informed of our
progress. Once the plant was fully operational, FDA conducted a
multi-day, on-site inspection of the Sylvester facility and was
satisfied with the overall condition of the facility. We
believe that we have created an industry-leading, state-of-the-
art facility for manufacturing peanut butter. We have also used
this process as a springboard to assess and improve our food
safety operations throughout the company.
2. ConAgra Foods responded quickly to a government finding
in October 2007 that its Banquet and store brand pot pies had
been implicated in a salmonella outbreak and has implemented
necessary steps to improve the safe consumption of this
``ready-to-cook'' product.
In October 2007, we faced a very different kind of food
safety challenge with our Banquet and store brand pot pies
produced at our Marshall, Missouri plant which manufactures,
among other products, pot pies in the turkey, chicken and beef
varieties. Unlike peanut butter which is sold to consumers as a
``ready-to-eat'' product, pot pies are sold to consumers as a
``ready-to-cook'' product, meaning the product needs to be
fully cooked prior to consumption. This cooking process,
whether in a conventional or microwave oven, further assures
the safety of the product by effectively killing any bacteria
that may possibly be present. We were therefore surprised to
learn from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
that this product line had been implicated in a salmonella
outbreak.
Nevertheless, we responded quickly. We suspended our pot
pie manufacturing and distribution operations immediately upon
learning of the outbreak on October 8, 2007. We promptly
commenced environmental sampling and testing within the plant,
followed by our issuance of a consumer advisory and,
ultimately, a voluntary recall of all of our Banquet and store
brand turkey, chicken and beef pot pie products. All of these
actions were taken in close cooperation with USDA's Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS), which has primary jurisdiction
because these pot pies are meat and poultry-based.
Our investigation into the root cause started with
extensive laboratory testing of both environmental and finished
product samples. Each of our 577 environmental samples tested
negative for salmonella. We also conducted 219 laboratory tests
of our ingredients, which were also all negative. We undertook
testing of 2968 samples of finished product, which yielded 17
positives for the outbreak strain. All of those positives
related only to Banquet turkey pot pies from the production
dates July 13, 2007 and July 31, 2007.
As noted, because pot pies are a ``ready-to-cook'' product,
salmonella had never been deemed a ``hazard'' in the context of
our Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) plans, and
we believe this to be so throughout the industry. Following
this incident, however, we revised our HACCP plans to recognize
salmonella as a potential hazard and to require Certificates of
Analysis from our suppliers demonstrating that all ingredients
are free of salmonella. We also instituted finished product
testing for salmonella by an independent laboratory. Finally,
we have instituted a multitude of process and equipment changes
at the plant.
Our investigation also led us to learn a great deal more
about microwave ovens and to determine that consumers needed
much clearer directions for use on the product labels. In
particular, we learned there is both a greater variability in
the performance of microwave ovens than we were previously
aware, as well as a lack of full understanding with respect to
microwave cooking efficacy. Consequently, we made major changes
to our on-pack cooking instructions to address these learnings
with considerable specificity. These changes include a more
prominent statement on the front and side panels that the
product ``Must Be Cooked Thoroughly. See Back for Directions.''
In addition, we have devoted most of the back panel to step-by-
step microwave cooking instructions that include: (a) minimum
wattage for microwave ovens (1100 watts); (b) proper cooking
time (4-6 minutes); and (c) consumer-friendly ways to know when
the product is cooked thoroughly, such as the visual cue
``Crust is golden brown and steam rises from filling.'' To
reinforce these messages, we added safe microwave cooking
guidance on our website, conducted a satellite media tour that
encouraged news stations to carry a news feature that further
educated consumers about safe cooking in microwaves, and
provided further training on the subject to our consumer
affairs representatives who field calls from consumers.
Moving forward, we have engaged the National Center for
Food Safety Technology at the Illinois Institute of Technology
(often referred to as the Moffett Center) to undertake cooking
tests and research on the use of microwaves to cook frozen
foods. We have also engaged the American Frozen Food Institute
in the process and have urged the food industry as well as
microwave manufacturers to address the cooking issues
associated with microwave ovens through improved cooking
instructions and clear information regarding microwave oven
wattages.
Throughout the investigation, we were in constant
communication with the USDA and the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC). We shared with them on a real time basis
all of our test data and the results of our investigative
efforts. We worked closely with USDA on improvements that
needed to be made. With the concurrence of USDA, we resumed
production of our Banquet brand pot pies in November, 2007.
Having now been involved in two very different food safety
outbreaks, we are more determined than ever to follow through
on our commitment to improve our systems company wide to ensure
we are producing safe, wholesome, quality products, whether
they are ``ready-to-eat'' or need to be further cooked by
consumers.
3. ConAgra Foods is conducting a companywide upgrade of our
food safety programs and will make continuous improvements to
ensure we provide safe food to consumers.
As we reported to the Committee last spring, ConAgra Foods
is committed to a company wide process to continuously improve
our food safety programs, starting with our hiring of a new
Chief Global Quality Officer and the establishment of a Food
Safety Advisory Committee. We have since taken the process much
further and have undertaken the following steps.
First, we are making a major investment in facility
upgrades and in hiring additional quality personnel throughout
the company. Specifically, we have earmarked millions of
dollars in capital for our facilities for projects that will
further enhance the safe manufacture of our products. We also
are in the process of hiring an additional 250 quality
personnel company wide, primarily to support our enhanced food
safety standards at our facilities.
Second, we have made a major commitment to enhanced
training in food safety requirements for all of our plant
personnel and suppliers. Specifically, in September of last
year, we convened a meeting of every plant manager and every
quality manager at our headquarters facility in Omaha to launch
an enterprise-wide set of food safety improvements. We are
conducting continuous food safety and quality training for all
plant employees, company wide. We have also reached out to our
co-packers and plan to hold a food safety and quality
intervention event with all key supervisors and co-packers in
the very near future.
Finally, we are conducting continuous food safety audits
across all plants, with a particular focus on: (1) incoming
ingredient quality programs; (2) allergen and sanitation
programs; (3) foreign material controls programs; and (4)
overall infrastructure. By the end of this year, we will have
reassessed every HACCP plan across all of our platforms. We
have also created within ConAgra Foods a new Microwave Center
of Expertise and have begun a review of cooking instructions
across all products.
In conclusion, we appreciate the Committee's interest in
food safety, and we fully support the Committee's goals. At
ConAgra Foods, we have met the commitments we made to the
Committee last spring regarding the process to be followed
before resuming operations of peanut butter manufacturing at
our Sylvester, Georgia facility. We responded quickly to an
unexpected outbreak related to our pot pies. And we are well
into a company wide process to review and upgrade our food
safety programs for our entire business. I want to emphasize
that these improvements are ongoing and will continue. I
personally will ensure that we continuously challenge and
improve our food safety programs, and make certain that food
safety is a centerpiece of our corporate culture.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. Mr. Shoemaker, your testimony please.
STATEMENT OF B. KEITH SHOEMAKER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUTTERBALL,
LLC
Mr.Shoemaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Keith
Shoemaker, Chief Executive Officer of the Butterball, LLC.
Butterball was formed in 2006 when Carolina Turkey purchased
the Butterball brand from ConAgra Refrigerated Food. Butterball
is the best known brand in the turkey industry. Food safety is
to be job one. Let me make it clear that the food safety
investigation regarding salmonella in ConAgra turkey pot pies
suggested that Butterball turkey was not the source of
production contamination. I would like to clarify information
reported in the media. No Butterball, LLC product has been
recalled. Butterball complies with all USDA requirements. USDA
food safety officers are present in Butterball facilities on a
daily basis. However, my company does not rely on federal
inspection to ensure the safety of our products. At Butterball
we go beyond federal regulations by using the latest food
safety technologies, comprehensive food safety practices and
stringent microbiological surveillance.
Permit me to explain how our food safety practices apply to
ingredients, cooking, packaging and handling. Our requirements
include stringent food safety practices for the handling of raw
materials. It is generally recognized that raw meat, especially
poultry meat, may contain salmonella. Science states salmonella
does not grow below 44 degrees Fahrenheit, and will not
typically grow below 50 degrees. That is why Butterball
monitors and controls the temperature of our meat to less than
40 degree Fahrenheit and the room temperature to less than 44
degrees. This is a common industry practice to slow or stop the
growth of bacteria in raw turkey. The fact that Butterball raw
materials are received from one of our own slaughter and debone
facilities allows us to assure temperature control throughout
the supply chain. Serving to keep the level of bacterial growth
at a minimum prior to meat being cooked. Data generated by USDA
from Butterball facilities indicates a very low presence of
salmonella. In fact, facilities supplying the raw product have
been identified by FSIS as demonstrating the best control for
salmonella. The turkey products supplied to ConAgra is fully
cooked, ready to eat, cooked in a bag turkey logs. Cooked in a
bag products are generally considered one of the lowest risk
meat products. Possible contamination of the product after
cooking is prevented by the fact that the product is protected
from environmental exposure subsequent to cooking.
That should help explain why the investigations regarding
the ConAgra recall found no data to support that Butterball
turkey meat is the likely source of salmonella identified in
the outbreak. The turkey log we provided to ConAgra was made
from our own raw materials, stuffed into packaging material,
thorough cooked to kill bacteria that may be present. By
packaging prior to cooking we prevent possible contamination
after cooking. The food safety investigation regarding the
recall confirms the effectiveness of these systems. No
salmonella of the type that contained within the pot pies has
ever been found in a Butterball facility. With cooked in the
bag product the cook step is critical to the safety of the
product. To ensure maximum food safety USDA requires a minimum
of 160 degrees Fahrenheit instantaneously. At Butterball we do
more. Specifically, these turkey logs are exposed to 162
degrees Fahrenheit for between 15 to 20 minutes. Our ovens
include four computerized temperature probes that provide
continuous readout. A calibrated hand held thermometer serves
to verify product temperature as well. After cooking the cooked
in the bag log is then shielded in temperature controlled as
long as we have it.
From the time the disease was first identified Butterball
cooperated with ConAgra Foods and USDA in investigating the
possible source of the salmonella. Between August and October
of '07, USDA conducted three major reviews of the Jonesboro
facility and ConAgra conducted two more. There were no
significant food safety findings in any of these reviews.
In our own inquiry, Butterball conducted intense
microbiological testing. Again, all results were negative. In
short, at the conclusion of the investigations, logs were fully
cooked and the product in the package was likely not the source
of outbreak.
Mr. Chairman, we at Butterball are eager to take every
practical step to assure food safety for our customers. We have
worked cooperatively with this committee and all other
investigators and highly respect the experts. We remain eager
to continue such efforts in the interest of future food safety.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the committee
for its efforts to advance food safety and interest in learning
about food science principals that guide our practices. We at
Butterball would be pleased for you to tour one of our
facilities to learn more about our operations. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shoemaker follows:]
Statement of Keith Shoemaker
Summary
1. BUTTERBALL TURKEY NOT IMPLICATED. The food safety
investigations regarding Salmonella in ConAgra turkey pot pies
suggest that the Butterball turkey ingredient in those pot pies
was NOT the source of product contamination.
2. INGREDIENT CONTROL. The turkey log Butterball provided
to ConAgra was made from our own raw turkey, controlled to keep
the level of bacterial growth at a minimum prior to the meat
being cooked. Butterball facilities supplying the raw product
have been identified by FSIS (USDA) as category one--
``demonstrating the best control for Salmonella.''
3. SPECIAL PACKAGING. Cooked in bag products are considered
one of the lowest risk meat products because cooking destroys
pathogens and the product is not subject to environmental
exposure subsequent to cooking.
4. FULLY COOKED. Butterball cooks its turkey log to a
higher temperature and holds that temperature longer than food
safety requirements. Elaborate monitoring systems assure
adherence to Butterball procedures to destroy pathogens.
5. INVESTIGATIONS. The food safety investigations regarding
the pot pie recall confirmed the effectiveness of these
systems. Further, no Salmonella of the serotype that
contaminated the pot pies has ever been found in a Butterball
facility. Indeed, only once has that Salmonella serotype been
found in turkey.
6. BUTTERBALL COOPERATION. Butterball thanks the committee
for its attention to food safety and invites Members and staff
to tour a Butterball facility.
Testimony
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Keith Shoemaker, and I
am Chief Executive Officer for Butterball, LLC (Butterball).
Butterball was formed in 2006 when Carolina Turkey of Mt.
Olive, North Carolina, purchased the Butterball Brand from
ConAgra Refrigerated Foods. Butterball produces over 1.4
billion pounds of turkey meat annually.
At the outset, permit me to make clear that the food safety
investigation regarding Salmonella in ConAgra turkey pot pies
suggests that the Butterball turkey ingredient in those pot
pies was NOT the source of product contamination.
All Butterball products bear the mark of Federal
Inspection, noting compliance with all United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) regulatory requirements. USDA Food Safety
Officers are present in all Butterball facilities on a daily
basis. However, my company does not rely on Federal Inspection
to ensure the safety of our products. At Butterball, we go
beyond federal requirements by using the latest food safety
technologies, comprehensive food safety practices, and
stringent microbiological surveillance.
Food safety is top priority at Butterball, and I would like
to focus my remarks today on our food safety practices. With
specific reference to the turkey product used in the ConAgra
turkey pot pies, permit me to explain how our food safety
practices apply to ingredients, cooking, packaging, and
handling. That should help explain why the investigations
regarding the ConAgra recall have found no data to support the
Butterball turkey meat is a likely source of the Salmonella
identified in the pot pie illness outbreak. In short, the
turkey log we provided to ConAgra was made from our own
carefully controlled raw turkey, thoroughly cooked to kill
Salmonella and other bacteria that may be present and packaged
prior to cooking to prevent possible contamination after
cooking has made the product safe. The food safety
investigations regarding the pot pie recall confirmed the
effectiveness of these systems. Further, no Salmonella of the
serotype that contaminated the pot pies has ever been found in
a Butterball facility. Indeed, only once has that Salmonella
serotype been found in turkey.
INGREDIENT CONTROL
Our requirements include stringent food safety practices
for the handling of the raw materials. It is generally
recognized that raw meat, especially poultry, may contain
Salmonella. Scientific literature states Salmonella does not
show growth below 44 F and will not typically grow below 50
F. That is why our company monitors and controls the
temperature of the meat (<40F) and the room (<44F). This is a
common industry practice and has been recognized to slow or
stop growth of bacteria in raw turkey. The fact that Butterball
raw materials are received from our own slaughter and debone
operations allows us to assure temperature control throughout
the supply chain, serving to keep the level of bacterial growth
at a minimum prior to the meat being cooked.
USDA data confirms the effectiveness of Butterball
Salmonella control procedures. Raw materials coming from our
own slaughter facilities undergo USDA Salmonella testing. Data
generated from Butterball facility indicate a very low presence
of Salmonella. In fact, facilities supplying the raw product
have been identified by FSIS as category one--``demonstrating
the best control for Salmonella.''
SPECIAL PACKAGING
The turkey product supplied to ConAgra is fully cooked,
ready to eat, cooked in bag turkey log. To make this product,
raw turkey meat is stuffed into the log packaging material and
fully cooked in steam ovens. Packaging material for the turkey
log is of a special design to allow the product to be fully
cooked in the packaging without disrupting package integrity.
Thus, it is called cooked in bag product.
Cooked in bag products are generally considered one of the
lowest risk meat products because pathogens (bacteria that
cause illness) that may commonly be found on raw product are
destroyed by cooking. Possible contamination of the product
after cooking is prevented by the fact that the product is
protected from environmental exposure subsequent to cooking.
Listeria monocytogenes is generally considered the leading risk
for environmental bacteria contamination from exposure after
cooking.
FULLY COOKED
With the cooked in bag product, the cook step is critical
to the safety of the product. The leading pathogen risk for raw
poultry is Salmonella. All cook temperatures of products are
targeted at reducing Salmonella 7 logs (a ``log'' is 10
organisms per centimeter squared; 7 logs is 10,000,000
organisms per centimeter squared). Studies conducted by
industry, USDA, FDA, and other scientific bodies, both
internationally and domestically, recognize this as the
necessary safety level to destroy the maximum amount of
organisms. To achieve a 7 log reduction in products like turkey
logs, USDA requires a minimum of 160 F <1 min. At Butterball,
we do more. We cook our turkey logs to a higher internal
temperature for a longer period of time. Specifically, our
turkey logs are exposed to 162 F for between 15-20 minutes.
This extra time and temperature is actually destroying far more
than 7 logs of Salmonella required.
To be sure we actually meet our cooking specifications, our
ovens include four computerized temperature probes that provide
continuous read-out. Alarms sound on the oven when all probes
reach 162 F. A calibrated hand-held thermometer serves to
verify product temperature, as well.
PRODUCT HANDLING
Immediately after cooking, the cooked in bag turkey log is
then taken into coolers and chilled to the appropriate
temperature and maintained at that temperature as long as we
have it.
FOOD SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
From the time the foodborne disease outbreak was first
identified, Butterball cooperated with ConAgra Foods and USDA
to investigate the possible source of the Salmonella. Several
audits of records, facility, cooking, and food safety practices
were conducted.
A review of the inspectional record was reassuring.
August 2007--The Jonesboro facility had only recently
undergone the USDA Food Safety Assessment, completed, with no
major finding.
October 6, 2007--USDA came back into the facility for
another review, again with no findings reported.
October 25, 2007--USDA took fifteen microbiological swabs
of the processing environment, all reported negative for the
presence of the Salmonella.
In our own inquiry, Butterball conducted intensified
microbiological testing including turkey logs ready for
shipment, combo bins used for shipping the log and the trailers
used for shipping again, all results were negative.
A ConAgra review team came to the facility October 14 and
15 to review records and production practices. No adverse
findings were identified. On October 31 another team of ConAgra
representatives, including outside experts, came to the
facility to further investigate production practices associated
with the oven operation. Butterball routinely calibrates the
ovens and shared this information and the finding with the
ConAgra review team. Again, there were no adverse findings
noted.
Additionally, at the request of ConAgra, a third party went
into Jonesboro and validated each oven in the facility. The
results of the third-party testing indicated that the ovens
were functioning as they should, and the cooking cycles were
far exceeding the lethality targets outlined in the food safety
plan.
Finally, a review of Salmonella testing data serotypes from
USDA illustrates that no Salmonella of the serotype that
contaminated the ConAgra turkey pot pies (Salmonella I
4,[5],12:i:-) has ever been identified in a Butterball
facility. Scientific literature available on this particular
serotype notes it is commonly associated with chickens. USDA
data shows only one incident of this serotype in turkey over
several years of testing. That was not a Butterball turkey.
In short, the conclusion of the investigation: the logs
were fully cooked, and the product in the package was likely
not the source of the outbreak.
****
Mr. Chairman, we at Butterball are eager to take every
practical step to assure food safety for our consumers. We have
worked cooperatively with this committee and all other
investigators and highly respected experts. We remain eager to
continue such efforts in the interest of further improving food
safety.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the committee
for its efforts to advance food safety and interest in learning
about the food science principles that guide our practices. We
at Butterball would be pleased for you to tour one of our
facilities to learn more about our operations.
Thank you.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. Mr. Lischewski.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER D. LISCHEWSKI, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
BUMBLE BEE FOODS, LLC
Mr.Lischewski. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
my name is Chris Lischewski, President and CEO of Bumblebee
Foods and Castleberry's Food Company.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide my
testimony and to respond to the committee's questions related
to the recall of canned products of Castleberry's Food Company
due to the risk of botulism contamination.
First, I would like to say that we are in the business of
providing wholesome food products to the public and making sure
that our food is safe is always our first priority. Previously
food that had to be recalled was the worst thing we could have
faced, and we deeply regret that it occurred. We have tried to
deal with the situation in a manner that reflects our sense of
responsibility, our understanding of the gravity of the
situation, our desire to make whole all the purchases of our
recalled products and our continuing commitment to ensuring
that all of our products are safe for consumers.
Upon learning of possible botulism contamination from FDA
and the CDC Castleberry's immediately instituted a voluntary
recall of 10 products. To further minimize the risk to public
health we quickly expanded the recall to extend beyond the
specific products and production dates linked to apparent cases
of illness. And ultimately our product recall included over 90
products produced over a two year period. We also voluntary
ceased production at our operating facility in Augusta. We
informed the public about the recall through extensive public
awareness programs in both English and Spanish. Frequent press
releases and advisories were issued and multiple press
conferences were held. The consumer hotline was established and
staffed around the clock with call center professionals. Our
website was updated. Advertisements ran in regional and
national newspapers, direct mailing were sent to consumers and
warnings were even printed on cash register receipt printouts.
And including and in addition to that we engaged in numerous
interviews with the media. As of October of last year there had
been nearly 5,000 broadcast stories on the recall, in large
part generated by the company to drive public awareness. And we
also made it very easy for consumers to obtain refunds. No
proof of purchase or return of product was required, and we
just trusted the people to be honest with us.
Retrieving recalled products in the marketplace was a large
task, and we mobilized vast resources. I believe both FDA and
USDA will confirm that we did everything they asked of us and
more in order to notify retailers and consumers of the recall,
and to quickly and safely remove product from the shelves. Upon
announcement of the recall we immediately began by telephoning
and e-mailing the contacts of all of our direct retail
customers who had purchased any of the recalled products at any
time during the previous two years. In addition to these
ongoing telephone calls we sent nine company bulletins to these
customers between July 18 and August 15 to update them on the
recall. In addition to our direct contact to retail customers
we engaged a company called RMX to physically visit 18,619
stores during the 10 day period following the recall to confirm
removal of the product from the store shelves. And we followed
that up with another company called RMX to over the next 60
days to cover 22,000 stores again. In less than one percent of
the stores visited were recalled products on the shelf. We
worked with customers that had loyalty card programs to send
letters directly to consumers who had purchased recalled
products. And, again, also engaged Catalina Marketing to run a
program where by consumers who had previously purchased any
recall product would receive on their register tape with the
next purchase a warning notifying them of the recall.
Throughout the recall we were in constant communication
with the regulatory agencies establishing a daily conference
call during the first few weeks of the recall to keep the
agencies apprised of our efforts, to seek their input, and to
provide answers to their questions. We also engaged an
experienced consultant to advise us in any additional measures
we might take. We worked openly and diligently to cooperate
with FDA, USDA and this committee to facilitate all
investigations including granting interviews and providing all
documents requested. Together with processing authorities and
regulatory experts we conducted an extensive, intensive
investigation and identified the cause of the contamination. We
have taken effective steps to prevent an occurrence and have
also taken the opportunity to elevate our safety practices and
procedures to an even higher level. In addition, we completed
independent third party audits at all of our other facilities
to ensure that appropriate procedures are in place.
I truly appreciate the opportunity to come before you to
discuss the recall, and hope that this can be a learning
experience for all those involved in the industry where we work
together to ensure that these types of incidents never happen
again. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lischewski follows:]
Statement of Chris Lischewski
I'm Chris Lischewski, President and CEO of Bumble Bee Foods
and Castleberry's Food Company. I appreciate the opportunity to
be here today to provide my testimony and to respond to the
Committee's questions related to the recall of canned products
by Castleberry's Food Company due to the risk of botulism
contamination.
First, I would like to say that we are in the business of
providing wholesome food to the public. Making sure that our
food is safe is always our first priority. Producing food that
had to be recalled was the worst thing we could have faced, and
we deeply regret that it occurred. We have tried to deal with
the situation in a manner that reflects our sense of
responsibility, our understanding of the gravity of the
situation, our desire to make whole all of the purchasers of
our recalled products, and our continuing commitment to
ensuring that all of our products are safe for consumers.
Upon learning of possible botulism contamination from FDA
and CDC, Castleberry's immediately instituted a voluntary
recall of ten products. To further minimize the risk to the
public health, we quickly expanded the recall to extend beyond
the specific products and production dates linked to apparent
cases of illness. Ultimately, over ninety products produced
during a two-year period were recalled. The factory voluntarily
ceased all production and distribution.
We informed the public about the recall through an
extensive public awareness program in both English and Spanish.
Frequent press releases and advisories were issued, multiple
press conferences were held, a consumer hotline was established
and staffed around the clock with call center professionals,
the Castleberry's website was regularly updated (in both
English and Spanish), advertisements ran in regional and
national newspapers, direct mailings were sent to consumers,
warnings were printed on cash register receipt print outs, and
we engaged in numerous interviews with the news media. As of
October of last year, there had been nearly 5,000 broadcast
stories on this recall in large part generated by the company
to drive public awareness. Also, we made it very easy for
consumers to obtain refunds-no proof of purchase or return of
product was required. We trusted people to be honest with us.
Retrieving the recalled product from the marketplace was a
large task, and we mobilized vast resources. I believe FDA and
USDA will confirm that we did everything they asked of us, and
more, in order to notify retailers and consumers of this
recall, and to quickly and safely remove products from store
shelves. Upon announcement of the recall, we immediately began,
by telephone and e-mail, to contact all of our direct retail
customers who had purchased any of the recalled products at any
time during the previous two years. In addition to these
ongoing personal telephone calls and emails, we sent nine
company bulletins to these customers between last July 18 and
August 15, to update them on the recall and to provide
additional information on things such as procedures for product
retrieval and destruction. We engaged a contractor to retrieve
and dispose of recalled product to avoid it being returned to
the factory or to any of our distribution centers.
In addition to our direct contact with our retail
customers, we engaged a company called RMX to physically visit
18,619 stores during the ten-day period following commencement
of the recall, to confirm removal of recalled product from
store shelves. Then, as a follow-up to the RMX visits, we
engaged the CORE retail team division of Advantage Sales &
Marketing to further assess the effectiveness of the recall by
visiting more than 22,000 stores during the next 60 days. In
the less than 1% of the stores visited where recalled product
was found on a shelf, the CORE team worked with the stores to
dispose of the product. We worked with customers that had
loyalty card programs to send letters directly to consumers who
had purchased recalled products. We also engaged Catalina
Marketing to run a program at approximately 22,000 stores
whereby consumers who had previously purchased any recalled
product would receive on their register tape, at their next
purchase, a warning notifying them of the recall and directing
them to our website and hotline. Throughout the recall, we were
in constant communication with the regulatory agencies,
establishing a daily conference call during the first few weeks
of the recall to keep the agencies apprised of our efforts, to
seek their input and to provide answers to their questions. We
also engaged an experienced consultant to advise us on any
additional measures we might take. We did everything we
reasonably could to get the recalled products off of store
shelves and out of consumers' kitchens.
We worked openly and diligently to cooperate with FDA,
USDA, and this Committee to facilitate all investigations,
including granting interviews and providing all documents
requested. Together with processing authorities and regulatory
experts, we conducted an intensive investigation and identified
the cause of the contamination. We have taken effective steps
to prevent a recurrence, and have also taken the opportunity to
elevate our safety practices and procedures to an even higher
level. We also completed independent third-party audits at all
of our other facilities, to ensure that appropriate safety
procedures are in place.
Following the completion of our investigation and
implementation of improved preventative safety procedures, we
prepared submissions to USDA and FDA documenting the findings
of our investigation and seeking their approval of our plan to
re-open the facility. Our SVP of Technical Services and other
management from Augusta met with FDA officials in Washington on
September 5, 2007, to discuss our submission and to address any
questions or concerns. At FDA's request, we set up a conference
call the next day with our process authority to address FDA's
questions. We received approval to re-open from FDA on
September 12th and from USDA on September 14th. On September
17th, the plant re-opened. The line on which the recalled
product was manufactured is not and will not be run until a
further in-depth review has been completed and additional
operational control systems have been reviewed for possible
installation to provide more robust operating and monitoring
systems for these complex retorts.
I want to reiterate our deepest regret that this incident
occurred. Consumer safety is of the utmost importance to our
company and to its employees, including me. We have taken, and
continue to take, this matter extremely seriously and
personally. As we try to move forward from this experience, we
do not forget those who were most affected. We are working with
those individuals who contracted botulism to resolve their
claims in a fair and amicable manner.
I truly appreciate this opportunity to come before you to
discuss the recall, and I hope that this can be a learning
experience for all those involved in the industry as we work
together to ensure that these types of incidents never happen
again.
Thank you.
Major Points:
Upon learning of possible botulism contamination from
FDA, Castleberry's immediately instituted a voluntary recall,
which was quickly expanded to extend beyond the specific
products and production dates linked to apparent cases of
illness, in order to minimize any potential risk to the public.
The factory was voluntarily shut down.
With the assistance of a team of process authorities and
regulatory experts, Castleberry's conducted an intensive
investigation and has identified the cause of the
contamination, has taken effective steps to prevent a
recurrence, and has taken the opportunity to elevate its safety
practices and procedures to an even higher level. Bumble Bee
initiated independent third party-audits of all of its other
facilities. Those audits were all successfully completed last
year, with no issues of significance.
Following the completion of our investigation, we worked
together with FDA and USDA to obtain their approval to re-open
the plant (other than the line on which recalled product was
produced.
Castleberry's worked diligently to cooperate with FDA,
USDA and this Committee to facilitate all investigations,
including granting interviews and providing documents.
Castleberry's has gone beyond what was required by FDA,
USDA and state agencies to ensure an effective recall. Efforts
included website communications (both Spanish and English),
media coverage (press releases, advertisements, press
conferences and media interviews), customer calls, direct
mailing to consumers, RMX/ASM-CORE retail coverage, Catalina
program, third-party product retrieval/destruction service.
Refunds were made easily available for consumers via our
website without requiring return of product.
Castleberry's is working with consumers who claim they
contracted botulism from recalled products to resolve the
claims.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Ray, your testimony, please.
STATEMENT OF RICK RAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NEW ERA CANNING
COMPANY
Mr.Ray. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. My name is Rick Ray and I serve as president of the
New Era Canning Company. Thank you for your invitation to
testify today.
New Era Canning Company is a small fourth generation family
owned fruit and vegetable canning operation located in New Era,
Michigan. For the past 98 years New Era Canning has been
serving customers in the retail and food service industry with
high quality canned fruits and vegetables. The New Era name is
not widely known because we serve primarily the private label
or store brand market. We operate a single facility and employ
50 full-time people as well as 100 to 200 seasonal employees
during our processing seasons. We process asparagus, green
beans, wax beans, applesauce, sliced apples, pumpkin and a
variety of dry bean items.
We have a long tradition of providing safe food products to
our customers. We fully realize that we are accountable for
every case of canned food that we produce. We take that
responsibility seriously. Today New Era's in the midst of a
recall of our low acid canned vegetable products. The reason is
that FDA discovered C. botulinum spores in New Era's canned
vegetables.
In New Era's 98 year history we have never previously
experienced anything such as this. Permit me to explain what my
scientific experts have told me about the classic concern
regarding the C. botulinum contamination of canned foods,
especially low acid canned foods. C. botulinum spores are
ubiquitous. They originate in soil and, therefore, they are all
around us. The spores are not harmful, but in the proper
environment they can produce C. botulinum toxin which is highly
toxic. In simple terms we are prudently assuming that C.
botulinum spores will be naturally present in canned vegetable
products. Thus, the most important step in canning is to bring
the canned product to a sufficiently high temperature to kill
the C. botulinum spores. Then to prevent overcooking the canned
vegetables the cans are promptly cooked using water. The
classic C. botulinum problem in canned vegetables occurs when
some part of the product does not reach a killing temperature.
In that situation the spores have been shocked, but not killed
by the cooking. The shock to the spores prompts them to start
growing and producing toxins. Unfortunately, low acid canned
foods are a suitable environment for the growth of C. botulinum
spores and the production of toxin.
While our investigation is still under way and we have not
yet received key information from the FDA about their findings,
our scientific experts tell me that it appears that the classic
C. botulinum situation is not what occurred at New Era. In the
extensive sampling of New Era production, most of which we had
on hold due to production irregularities, the C. botulinum
spores, but not toxin was found. At least to date the C.
botulinum found appears not to be a result of insufficient
canning temperature to kill C. botulinum spores. Instead, it
appears the presence of C. botulinum spores, but not toxin, in
New Era canned vegetables is due to the entry of spores into
cans during the cooling of the product after the can has been
sealed and the product cooked. If the can seam is not to
specification or becomes damaged microscopic--of cooling water
can enter the can. This is why the industry has long used only
safe drinking water in the can cooling.
There are several reasons why this is the leading theory
for the presence of C. botulinum in New Era canned vegetables.
First, FDA tests of drinking water wells used by New Era for
cooling water found that C. botulinum spores were present in
the water. Second, the New Era processes that produced the
contaminated product appear to have been achieving appropriate
canning temperatures. Third, the presence of C. botulinum
spores, but not toxins, suggests that the spores were not
shocked by cooking temperatures, which corresponds with the
theory that the introduction of the spores was in the cooling
water.
In the scant scientific literature on the subject C.
botulinum spores are regarded as so unlikely to be found in
water that testing is not a standard procedure.
Mr. Chairman, the investigations, however, are still under
way, so this conclusion must be regarded as preliminary. The
FDA investigation of our company began 11 weeks ago. Working
with technical experts we are addressing all issues raised by
the FDA, as well as investigating additional opportunities to
improve our overall operation. While it appears that the spores
that entered New Era products in this manner have not been
shocked and did not produce toxin, that fact is not
satisfactory to New Era, and for that matter the FDA. No C.
botulinum spores that have the capacity to produce toxins
should ever be present in our products.
This has been a resource intensive and difficult process
for New Era to experience. But it is our intent to determine
the cause of the current problem and to take whatever measures
are necessary to ensure a safe product. We are very thankful
that, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no reported
illnesses from any of our canned vegetables. Again, we are and
always have been committed to our responsibility to produce
safe and wholesome products. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ray follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. Mr. DeLorenzo.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. DELORENZO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is that on?
Mr.Stupak. Yes, it is. It sounded good.
Mr.DeLorenzo. OK. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee.
My name is David DeLorenzo and I am the CEO of the Dole
Food Company residing in Westlake Village, California.
Our mission at Dole is to provide healthy, nutritious
products to consumers. Food safety and consumer confidence in
the safety of the food chain is not only vital to the mere
existence of our firm, but we believe to the health of the
Nation. We are pleased to participate in this hearing, and any
other forums that might work toward ensuring food safety and
with it the dietary habits of America.
I would like to address the two vegetable recall events
that touched our vegetable division during the past two years,
and the steps that we and industry have taken to respond to
those food safety incidents. First was the industry-wide halt
of all spinach sales that occurred in September of 2006, after
Natural Selection Foods recalled all packaged fresh spinach
that it has produced and packaged. These packages were sold
under 28 different brand names, one of which was ours. Our name
was on the product, but it was produced and packaged by Natural
Selection Foods, a highly regarded company that I believe has
already testified before this subcommittee. Dole did perform
regular audits of their operations and accepted the product
into the Dole label and responsibility for their good
practices. Dole has no ownership or other economic interest in
Natural Selection Foods. Federal and state regulators reported
that the source of the problem came from a specific spinach
farm that was being farmed organically. At that time Dole did
not internally farm or package spinach. We did not have the
necessary specialized machinery to produce spinach and,
therefore, had contracted with Natural Selections Foods to
produce and package these products for us. Since that time we
have invested in the machinery to package spinach and other
tender leaf products ourselves, and are in the process of
moving all of this activity under our own farming and into our
own plants.
The other incident I wish to address involved the recall of
some of our salad product in Canada in September of 2007. On
September 14 the Canadian Health Ministry told us that they had
randomly pulled a number of bags of our salad from a store
shelf in Canada, and that one had tested positive for E. coli.
We immediately announced a recall. None of the other Canadian
bags, nor any other bags of the same production batch that we
had retained, nor any of the bags turned in by consumers tested
positive for E. coli or any other pathogen. Our processing
plant and the farms in which the produce was grown were
carefully inspected by Canadian, U.S. federal and state
regulators, and there is nothing negative to report there
either. More significantly, there were no illnesses reported
that were associated with this product in Canada or the United
States. The source of this incident, unfortunately, remains a
mystery, which is disconcerting and I believe unacceptable.
And I will second what was said earlier in testimony, and
I would recommend later in my testimony the urgent need for
more research about bacteria, E. coli 157. I'm sorry, 155.
Despite the need for more research I do believe that the
reaction to this spinach problem by the industry and Dole was
swift and did show an unprecedented commitment to food safety.
The leafy greens industry in California studied, prepared and
adopted the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement within four months
of inception. The backbone of the program is mandatory testing
and audits by California state inspectors using such food
safety metrics as irrigation water tests, employee hygiene,
harvesting equipment sanitation, buffer zones, soil amendments,
wildlife intrusion and previous land use. We have taken a
leading role in this statewide initiative and remain part of
its ongoing board. We are now working with the Arizona industry
to establish a similar agreement. Dole supports national
regulatory food safety standards for all fresh produce items,
and the California and Arizona programs could be the starting
point toward designing and implementing these standards for
both domestic and imported items. As a company Dole fresh
vegetables has undertaken some key initiatives aimed at
providing a higher level of food safety. First is our
implementation of a trace back system that is RFID driven. RFID
stands for radio frequency identification. This process
involves placing a unique tag on every bin of lettuce harvested
in the field. The tag is scanned using the global positioning
system so that there is a tracking record of where in the field
the product originated, how far and how long it traveled after
that and how soon each bin was cooled and processed. RFID
tracking is not a firewall for food safety. It does, however,
provide real time field locations to within approximately 100
feet of where the product was harvested in the even trace back
is needed. The inability to quickly trace back to a specific
field location hampers the ability to determine the root cause
of a problem, and has been a major impediment to regulatory
investigators, not because our industry is unwilling, but
because the technology available until now was not adequate as
we mentioned earlier.
In addition Dole and its growers have implemented testing
for pathogens in the field prior to harvest, as well as testing
at our produce centers, our processing plants and as it leaves
a spinach product. Since the spinach incidences we have
completed approximately 4,000 of these tests for pathogens.
Thus far we have not had any positive tests for pathogens.
Other Dole fresh vegetable risk reduction activities
include a full-time staff of quality assurance and food safety
specialists. All of our fields in California are irrigated by
water from deep wells or city water. We test the wells once a
month during the growing seasons when the water is used. We
will not grow, harvest or purchase crops from fields that get
flooded with run off from other fields, let alone from cattle
pastures, nor from fields that are too close to a place where
cattle have been. We also contract with third party food safety
companies to supplement our auditing processes in addition to
the state inspectors that are part of the California Leafy
Greens Agreement. All of our salad processing plants have full-
time quality assurance staffs on site, and all operate under a
defined HACCP plan, and our fields operate under defined GAP or
Good Agriculture Practices plan, as well as the leafy greens
audit.
The produce industry needs to continue to move forward with
refining agricultural practices as science and technology
advance. We need government support for more research
activities in understanding how pathogens survive and migrate
in the natural environment, especially E. coli. We also need
research in developing microbial kill steps that will work on a
perishable product. The amount of research needed is
significant in both time and dollars. Dole supports
standardized regulations in the food industry to ensure food
safety. Food safety begins at the farm and continues through
the supply chain to manufacturing plants, transportation,
handlers, retail outlets and the hands and homes of the
consumer. We encourage and support efforts to establish
industry-wide protocols and procedures, as well as consumer
education. Due to the perishability of fresh produce and the
exactitude necessary for proper laboratory testing we would
encourage all funding necessary for the state-of-the-art
laboratories that can provide quick turn around of tests with
exactitude of findings.
Private companies such as Dole will continue to accelerate
and champion new practices and technologies aimed at
eliminating food safety risks. Produce is a living, breathing
organism grown for the most part in the open air that requires
specialized care. It will continue to take a concentrative and
significant effort in time, funding and regulation from both
the government and the private sector to make our food system,
already the safest in the world, even safer. We commit
ourselves to work with your subcommittee and help in any way
possible with improving future food safety regulation. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeLorenzo follows:]
Statement of David A. DeLorenzo
Two E. coli recall events touched our Vegetables Division
during the last two years:
1. September 2006 industry-wide halt of all spinach sales,
after Natural Selection Foods LLC recalled packaged fresh
spinach it had produced and packaged. These packages were sold
under 28 different brand names, one of which belonged to Dole.
Dole has no ownership or other economic interest in Natural
Selection Foods. The source of the problem appeared to be in a
spinach farm field, owned by a reputable grower, that was being
farmed organically.
2. September 2007 recall of some of our salad product in
Canada. Canadian Health Ministry told us that a bag of our
salad randomly picked from a store shelf in Canada had tested
positive for E. coli. None of the other Canadian bags, nor any
other bags of the same production batch, nor any of the bags
turned in by consumers, tested positive for E. coli. Our
processing plant and the relevant farms were inspected by
Canadian, US Federal and State regulators--no problems were
found. More significantly, no illnesses were reported that were
associated with this product in Canada or the United States.
Responses to the 2006 spinach issue: The California Leafy
Greens Marketing Agreement, covering 99% of California leafy
greens handlers, was implemented. The backbone of this
Agreement is mandatory testing and audits by California state
inspectors using such food safety metrics as: irrigation water
tests, employee hygiene, harvesting equipment sanitation,
buffer zones, soil amendments, wildlife intrusion, and previous
land use. Our Vegetables' division President sits on the
governing boards of both the California and the proposed
Arizona programs.
We view these industry programs as only a starting point.
Dole supports national regulatory food safety standards for all
fresh produce items.
Dole has made significant investments in developing and
applying RFiD technology to leafy greens; we have made this
program available to the all companies in the industry, without
any payment whatsoever to Dole. RFiD tracking allows trace-back
to within approximately 100 feet of where the produce was
harvested. The inability to quickly trace back to a specific
field location has been a major impediment to regulatory
investigators, until now.
We have implemented testing for pathogens in the field
prior to harvest; we also test produce as it enters our
processing plants and as it leaves as finished product. We have
completed approximately 4,000 of these tests for pathogens.
Thus far we have not had any positive test results for
pathogens.
We need government support for more research activities in
understanding how these pathogens survive and migrate in the
natural environment, as well as in developing microbial kill
steps that will work on perishable produce. The amount of
research needed is significant in both time and dollars. We
believe that the federal agency best suited to oversee this
research effort is the USDA. We also encourage more funding for
state-of-the-art laboratories that can provide quick turn
around of tests with exactitude of findings.
Statement
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is
David DeLorenzo and I became the CEO of Dole Food Company, Inc.
last June, having worked for Dole for the last 37 years. Thank
you for allowing Dole the opportunity to be a part of the
ongoing discussions on food safety.
Our mission at Dole is to provide healthy, nutritious
products to consumers. Food safety, and consumer confidence in
the safety of the food chain, is not only vital to the mere
existence of our firm, but, we believe, to the health of the
Nation. We are pleased to participate in this hearing and in
any other forums that might work toward ensuring the safety of
the food chain and with it the improved dietary habits of our
constituents.
We take great pride in our people, the quality of our
products and our commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility,
including food safety, the environment, and the welfare of our
workers. We also believe in transparency, and welcome any
audits and scrutiny of our own operations and that of the
industries in which we operate, to ensure that we and others in
the industry are doing everything possible to deliver healthy,
safe products to the consuming public. Toward that end, we
would certainly welcome and encourage any Member of this
Subcommittee and its staff to please come and visit any of our
operations, to see our farms, refrigerated supply chain and
manufacturing plants. Our salad manufacturing plants are in
California, Arizona, Ohio and North Carolina, but we source
from most of the fruit and vegetable growing areas in the
United States, including California, Arizona, Oregon,
Washington, Michigan, Texas, Colorado and Florida, to mention a
few. Being this diverse requires us to establish strict and
important relationships with farmers across a wide spectrum of
crops who join us in adhering to good agricultural practices
and strict protocols.
We have been around as a company for more than 150 years,
and we always are willing to exchange views and share our
experience. The work this Subcommittee is doing is vital to our
Nation, and to our industry, and we want to help in any way we
can.
Dole Fresh Vegetables is one of our divisions in North
America; it is headquartered in Monterey, California. This is
our division that has been affected by two E. coli recalls in
the last two years. As I will discuss in a minute, in the first
of these recalls, our name was on the product but it was
produced and packaged for us by an unrelated, but highly-
regarded company that has an excellent name in the production
of spinach and tender leaf salads and in organic salads. In the
more recent and much smaller recall, originating in Canada, one
bag of our salad, pulled at random from a store shelf in
Canada, tested positive, but no other bags tested positive in
Canada or the U.S., our farms and processing plant were found
to be totally clear and no one was reported sick or injured.
Because these two recalls involved leafy greens, I will focus
on our Vegetables business. Our Vegetables business is a
provider of leafy greens, as well as other commodity vegetables
to retailers and wholesalers in North America. The main
products on a tonnage basis that make up the leafy greens
category are spring mix, spinach, romaine lettuce, iceberg
lettuce and cabbage. Our Vegetables business supplies these
items both in a commodity form and in a prepackaged form.
Our Vegetables business on average ships over 5,000,000
servings each and every day of nutritious products in a
prepackaged form. This number of servings almost doubles when
you add in our commodity produce.
When it comes to food safety, one illness is one too many.
All of us at our company and in this industry have families
that consume these products, and we understand first hand our
responsibility to deliver products that are as safe and
nutritious as possible.
Two Recalls
The Subcommittee staff requested that I address the two
vegetable E. coli recall events that touched our Company during
the last two years. First was the industrywide halt of all
spinach sales that occurred in September of 2006. On September
15, 2006, Natural Selection Foods LLC recalled all packaged
fresh spinach that Natural Selection Foods produced and
packaged with Best-If-Used-By dates from August 17 through
October 1, 2006, because of reports of illness due to E. coli
O157:H7 following consumption of packaged fresh spinach
produced by Natural Selection Foods. These packages were sold
under 28 different brand names, only one of which was owned by
Dole. At that time, Natural Selection Foods was our sole
supplier of spinach items, under a contract we had with them.
On September 15, 2006, Dole announced that it supported the
voluntary recall issued by Natural Selection Foods. Dole has no
ownership or other economic interest in Natural Selection
Foods. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced on
September 29, 2006 that all spinach implicated in the outbreak
had been traced back to Natural Selection Foods. The FDA stated
that this determination was based on epidemiological and
laboratory evidence obtained by multiple states and coordinated
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
From what the federal and California state regulators
reported after the incident, it appears that there was no
problem at Natural Selection Foods' processing plant; instead
the source of the problem was in one spinach farm field, owned
by a reputable grower, that was being farmed organically. I
understand that the Subcommittee received the testimony given
last April by Charles Sweat, who is the President of Natural
Selection Foods, so I will assume the Subcommittee needs no
further detail on the Natural Selection recall from September
2006. At that time, we did not internally farm or package
spinach. We did not have the necessary specialized machinery to
produce spinach salad products and therefore had contracted
with Natural Selection Foods to produce and package these
products for us. Since that time, we have invested in the
machinery to package spinach and other tender leaf products
ourselves.
The spinach recall galvanized an industry that already
approached food safety as a top priority into becoming an
industry with a heightened sense of urgency of the need to
understand what steps we need to take to reduce this risk even
further in the future. Some of this effort has involved
strengthened good agricultural practices and some has involved
more testing of produce in the field, at the processing plant
door and of finished product. We recognize that we are an
industry that still needs to do more, and we strongly believe
that government has an important role to play, particularly in
supporting needed scientific research on the causes of
outbreaks and in developing nationwide food safety regulation,
which I will discuss further in a moment.
The other incident I wanted to talk about involved a recall
of some of our salad product in Canada in September of 2007. On
September 14, 2007, the Canadian Health Ministry told us that
they had randomly pulled a number of bags of our salad from a
store shelf in Canada, and that one had tested positive for E.
coli. We immediately announced a recall of the affected lot
code. We expanded the Canadian recall to parts of the United
States since some of the same raw materials were used in
product sold in those parts of the U.S. and Canada. None of the
other Canadian bags, nor any other bags of the same production
batch that we still had, nor any of the bags turned in by
consumers, tested positive for E. coli or any other pathogen.
Our processing plant and the farms on which the produce was
grown were carefully inspected by regulators--and there was
nothing there, either. More significantly, there were no
illnesses reported that were associated with the product in
Canada or the United States.
Moving Forward--Efforts Undertaken and Needed Research and Regulation
The fact our industry has had recalls should not be viewed
as an indication of complacency. Research is the key to
understanding the following scientific questions that need to
be answered: where does this E.coli O157:H7 microorganism
survive in the natural environment, other than inside cattle,
which is the primary host organism; how does E.coli O157:H7
survive in the natural environment; how is E.coli O157:H7
transferred from one location to another; and how do we kill or
otherwise eradicate it, without destroying a highly perishable
product? From a government support viewpoint, we believe there
is severe under-funding in the area of applied research and
science-based mitigation strategies. At times we are forced as
an industry to react to anecdotal, or bench-top tests which
cannot be replicated in real world field conditions.
You may ask: why is this so difficult a scientific problem
to solve? The answer lies in how extremely rare it is to find
the virulent E.coli O157:H7 on crops. For example, since the
September 2006 spinach event, we instituted raw crop testing in
the fields before harvesting, as well as testing of raw crops
as they enter our processing plants and testing of finished
product. Since September 2006, we have run approximately 4,000
of these tests to date, using state-of-the-art tests, and we
have not yet had a single positive test for E.coli O157:H7.
We strongly feel that research is where the lion's share of
any extra resources allocated by Congress should go. Please
note that we don't have any objection to spending more federal
dollars on inspections and audits. Adding more inspectors to
regulatory agencies or giving them mandatory recall authority
is a good thing. However, having more inspectors will not get
to the root cause of how pathogens like E.coli O157:H7 survive
and transfer from one location to another, and it will not
address the science needed to develop a true kill step or other
prevention. It's the old question of where you can get the most
bang for the buck. We'd recommend that Congress put most of
that extra money into well thought-out research. This
Subcommittee can play an invaluable role in taking testimony
from public/private panels of the best scientific minds to
figure out what specific research should be funded, and in what
priority order. We at Dole would be happy to share our best
thoughts on this topic, too.
I want to highlight for the Subcommittee some of the
additional steps that have been taken since September of 2006,
in both our company, and in the industry as a whole. The leafy
greens industry in California has adopted the Leafy Greens
Marketing Agreement (for purposes of this hearing this is
referred to as the CA-LGMA). The CA-LGMA is an unprecedented
commitment to food safety. Although it is in theory voluntary,
the backbone of the program is California state inspectors in
the fields of CA-LGMA signatories, auditing against a set of
food safety metrics established by some of the sharpest
scientific minds from industry, academia, and the public
sector. For example, some of the specific areas the California
state inspectors audit against include irrigation water tests,
employee hygiene, harvesting equipment sanitation, buffer
zones, soil amendments, wildlife intrusion, and previous land
use. We take pride that, not only was our Vegetables business
one of the companies instrumental in driving this state-wide
initiative, but our Division President is currently the Vice-
Chairman of the CA-LGMA Board. Arizona has a similar LGMA
program under development which is almost identical to the
California program. Our Vegetables' division President also
sits on the Arizona governing board, which is tasked with
developing and implementing a complete audit program.
Some would criticize this program as voluntary, but please
understand that the only thing voluntary about it is whether to
join or not. Once you're in, compliance and government
inspection are mandatory. Ninety nine percent (99%) of the
leafy greens handlers in California have signed onto the
program--and some got encouraged into ``volunteering'' by big
customers who would not buy their products unless they
``volunteered.'' So compliance and inspection are, for all
intents and purposes, mandatory for the whole industry in
California. The CA-LGMA program, including state inspectors, is
funded by assessments paid by signatory members.
Some would argue that federal or state regulations would
have been the proper avenue, instead of the CA-LGMA program. If
time had not been of the essence, that route might well have
made sense. The industry felt, however, that it couldn't wait
for government to act. As a testament to our industry
commitment to food safety, private industry developed this
field audit program, from absolutely nothing to having
California state inspectors in our fields performing audits, in
less than four months.
The fact that our industry did not have the luxury of
waiting for government to act does not mean that we think the
job is finished or that there is no role for government now. On
the contrary, Dole supports national food safety standards for
leafy greens, and the California and Arizona programs should be
the starting point toward designing and implementing these
standards. In the past, leafy greens food safety was considered
a West Coast problem. However, as fuel costs continue to
escalate, more Midwest and East Coast states, and Canada, are
learning how to grow leafy greens in climates outside of
California and Arizona.
I also would like to bring to your attention another
important industry initiative--the Center for Produce Safety,
headquartered at the University of California, Davis. Trade
groups, private companies, the University of California, and
the California Department of Food and Agriculture, have funded
the launch of this Center through grants. This Center is
intended to be the clearing house for available produce food
safety research, and to fund new scientific studies focused on
strategies to mitigate risks. As discussed above, we very
strongly believe that the federal government should play a key
role in the research efforts.
As a company, Dole Fresh Vegetables has under taken some
key initiatives aimed at providing a higher level of food
safety. First is our implementation of a trace back system that
is RFid driven. RFiD stands for Radio-Frequency-Identification.
The process involves placing a unique tag on every bin of
lettuce harvested in the field. Once a bin is filled, the tag
is scanned using the global positioning system and attached so
that there is a tracking record of where in the field a product
originated and where it traveled after harvest. RFiD tracking
is not a fire wall for food safety. It does, however, provide
real time field locations to within approximately 100 feet of
where the product was harvested in the event trace back is
needed. The inability to quickly trace back to a specific field
location hampers the ability to determine the root cause of a
problem and has been a major impediment to regulatory
investigators, not because our industry is unwilling, but
because the technology available until now was not adequate.
Although Dole has made significant investments in
developing and applying the RFiD technology to leafy greens, we
have made this program available to anyone in the industry who
wishes to use it, without any payment whatsoever to Dole. We
believe that the members of our industry should compete with
each other on quality and service, not on food safety.
As I mentioned a few moments ago, a second initiative we
implemented is testing for pathogens in the field prior to
harvest. Similar to the HACCP (Hazard Analysis of Critical
Control Points) principles developed for NASA, we believe that
testing needs to be a part of an overall risk reduction
strategy and that prevention before the product leaves the
field is a critical and proactive step. We are also testing
produce as it enters our processing plants and as it leaves as
finished product. To date we have completed approximately 4,000
of these tests for pathogens. As noted, thus far we have not
had any positive test results for pathogens--at times it seems
like we are looking for the proverbial ``needle in a
haystack.'' With research help from government, a lot more
testing should be done, by many more companies, and when the
pathogens are found in this broader effort, science will have
the data on the basis of which we can eradicate this problem.
Other Dole Fresh Vegetables risk reduction activities
include a full time staff of quality assurance and food safety
specialists. Their primary function as it relates to food
safety is to develop and implement science-based risk reduction
strategies, as well as seek out and evaluate best practices
within our industry as well as other food industries.
All of Dole's fields in California are irrigated by water
from deep wells or city water. We test the wells once a month
during the growing season, when the water is used. We will not
grow, harvest or purchase crops from fields that gets flooded
with runoff from other fields, let alone from cattle pastures,
nor from fields that are too close to a place where cattle have
been.
In addition, we contract with third-party food safety
companies to supplement our auditing process, in addition to
the state inspectors that are part of the California leafy
greens agreement. One third-party company provides us with
independent oversight to our field operations, and another is
used to provide independent oversight to our salad processing
plants. All of our salad processing plants have full time
quality assurance staffs on site anytime the plant is
operating. All of our plants operate under a defined HACCP
plan, and our fields operate under a defined, formal GAP (Good
Agricultural Practices) plan, as well as the CA-LGMA audit
program.
We are also working with outside vendors in developing even
more reliable pathogen testing kits. Because of the amount of
naturally occurring beneficial bacteria that is found on all
produce, rapid test kits to detect pathogens that were
developed in other industries, such as the meat or poultry
industries, tend to give a high rate of false positives on
lettuce.
Conclusion
The produce industry needs to continue to move forward with
refining agricultural practices as science and technology
advance. We need government support for more research
activities in understanding how pathogens survive and migrate
in the natural environment. We also need research in developing
microbial kill steps that will work on a perishable product.
The amount of research needed is significant in both time and
dollars. The first agenda item for any research program is to
determine the right questions to ask. We believe that the
federal agency best suited to address the important issues
related to leafy greens is the USDA. The USDA already has a
research station set up in Salinas, California, which is in the
heart of the industry, and has extensive experience with
various leafy greens products. USDA also has conducted some
limited applied research on pathogens, but they have been
limited in scope by funding.
A group of over seventy technical experts from academia,
government regulatory and research, and the private sector, met
in Washington, D.C., at a research symposium co-sponsored by
Dole, this past September, focusing on understanding how
pathogens survive and migrate in the natural environment.
Everyone present agreed that there is a daunting task ahead of
us, and we just do not yet have enough science-based answers to
some very practical questions. But we have to start somewhere,
and we have to remain committed to the research.
We respectfully ask this Subcommittee, and, more generally,
the Energy and Commerce Committee, to do whatever it can within
its power to influence significant funding of pathogen research
for produce. Private companies such as Dole will continue to
accelerate and champion, as fast as possible, new practices and
technologies aimed at eliminating food safety risks. Produce is
a living, breathing tissue that does not hold up to most
conventional food safety practices that work in other
industries. We cannot inspect our way out of food safety
problems any more than we can test our way out of it. It will
continue to take a concerted and significant effort in time and
funding and regulation from both the government and private
sector, to make our food system--already the safest in the
world--even safer. We heartily agree with this Subcommittee
that we--all of us--can, in good conscience, do no less.
----------
Mr.Stupak. Thank you. Mr. Eisenberg, please.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. EISENBERG, CHAIRMAN, ANRESCO LABORATORIES
Mr.Eisenberg. Thank you for inviting my testimony.
My name is David Eisenberg. I am chairman of ANRESCO
Laboratories, founded in 1943. I have been with the company 34
years.
While ANRESCO was a USDA accredited meat laboratory for 30
years, from 1976 to 2006, we surrendered our accreditations
this past year because we were rarely analyzing regulatory
samples, and most of all because the USDA dramatically
increased the cost for accreditation.
The regulatory work we perform today relates to FDA
regulated imports, and it is to this role I speak today.
ANRESCO has performed sampling and analytical work for
importers to meet FDA requirements since 1981. Such work
represents 40 percent of our business. We run almost every
analysis the FDA runs routinely. Private laboratories in total
employ possibly 50 people nationwide to service this very small
specialized market. ANRESCO's sampling and analytical work is
equivalent to that performed by the FDA's own laboratories. The
FDA regulates the food in regulated imports by reviewing import
entries, releasing imports it considers low risk, and sampling
and analyzing at its own laboratories, imports it believes may
be unsafe or otherwise violate U.S. food standards. This work
is performed under its Surveillance Program.
When the FDA finds an imported product violates its
standards it may place the product on Detention Without
Physical Examination, DWPE, where the FDA considers the
products violative until the importer proves it meets FDA
standards. The importer does so by retaining a private
laboratory such as ANRESCO to sample and analyze the product
and to submit such results to the FDA. Only a very small
proportion of FDA regulated imports are subject to DWPE.
With this as background I am pleased to offer suggestions
to improve the FDA's regulation of imports. Relating to its
Surveillance Program the FDA should provide an organized forum
where industry can provide advice into what imports the FDA
selects for sampling. The import industry could have possibly
advised the FDA that melamine was being added to wheat gluten
meal in China. The FDA should reallocate its import staff so
enforcement of its regulations is uniform among its 15
districts. For years the FDA has been understaffed in New York
and in Los Angeles and overstaffed at smaller ports. This leads
to port shopping. The FDA should allow importers to use private
laboratories that it accredits to sample and analyze samples
under its surveillance program. This could significantly
increase the number of shipments analyzed. The FDA should
eliminate its current line by line review of private laboratory
submissions that waste extensive FDA staff time. The FDA must
have the legal authority to audit the accredited laboratories
whenever it wants to and for whatever reason it believes
necessary. The incentive for importers to use private
laboratories for surveillance sampling and analysis is that
such laboratories will perform the work more quickly than the
FDA does itself. Shipments can then be released into commerce
more quickly, critical to importers. Private laboratories would
be willing to pay a fee to FDA for FDA accreditation as this
will provide them additional work. ISO 17025 accreditation is
not an adequate basis for assuring private laboratories are
competent to perform work to FDA standards. The FDA must itself
accredit private laboratories and only then will it have
confidence in their work and then rely on it.
Relating to the DWPE Program, while this program is
excellent in concept and works well in practice for most
imports, it is greatly weakened by inadequate FDA
implementation. The FDA's Southwest Import District in Dallas
has procedures that assure the honesty of the DWPE Program.
These procedures should be adopted nationwide immediately. They
include a requirement that DWPE shipments are sampled by the
private laboratory. The New York district still allows
importers to take their own samples. This is akin to the wolf
guarding the sheep. The importer must advise the FDA in advance
what private laboratory they intend to use for a given import.
In the other districts when ANRESCO finds a violative import
the importer usually advises us not to submit the result to the
FDA. The importer may then find another private laboratory to
take new samples to reanalyze the product to get the shipment
released.
In June of 2006 Dr. Robert Brackett, then director of FDA's
CFSAN, at the Institute of Food Technologists meeting at
Orlando, Florida advised the FDA did not consider pesticide
residues in foods a serious matter and it would no longer
monitor them. This sent a message to the produce industry that
it was not important to comply with EPA, FDA regulations. If
the FDA considers its regulations governing pesticide residues
in foods unnecessary it should request Congress to change the
law, not ignore its responsibility to enforce it.
Twice during 2005 I met with senior FDA staff to complain
the FDA was not enforcing its pesticide residue requirements on
snow peas imported from Guatemala. I presented data for 25
samples ANRESCO had taken at retail and had analyzed finding 13
violative. I pleaded for FDA to take more surveillance samples.
Instead the FDA reduced the number of surveillance samples it
took. I was flabbergasted when I saw President George Bush on
television talking from a Guatemalan farm last year praising
that industry for developing an export business for produce
when his appointees knew a high percentage of the product
violated FDA standards, and they had facilitated its
importation.
Other suggestions, the FDA should allow the electronic
submission of all private laboratory reports relating to food
imports, especially perishables. It is critical that the import
process be as quick as possible to assure compliance with it.
The FDA should not allow importers to place their products in
commerce before having a release, as has been the case in south
Florida. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenberg follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Eisenberg.
Dr. Brackett, your testimony, please.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. BRACKETT, PHD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF SCIENCE AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS OFFICER, GROCERY
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Dr.Brackett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon to the rest of the committee.
I am Robert Brackett, Senior Vice President and Chief
Science and Regulatory Affairs Officer at Grocery Manufacturers
Association.
Food companies recognize our responsibility to ensure that
the food we provide to consumers is safe. To address the
challenges posed by rising imports and changing consumer
preferences we constantly identify under duress potential
sources of contamination throughout each product's life cycle.
We have made significant new investments in food safety,
identifying and adapting a range of practices in programs to
reduce the risk of contamination. Food safety is our top
priority.
Ultimately, the burden of providing safe food falls on our
industry, but this responsibility is shared by federal, state
and local agencies. By setting and enforcing tough food safety
standards agencies like FDA and USDA's food safety inspection
service help the food industry to ensure that the safety of our
food supply is as safe as it can be.
Providing these agencies with adequate resources is
critical to their ability to help the food industry ensure the
safety of our food. As director of FDA's Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition between 2004 and 2007 I routinely stated
to the agency the critical need for more resources. In my view,
FDA's food safety and food related programs were willfully
inadequate and I shared that view with the agency. But despite
my best efforts funding for FDA food related programs barely
kept pace with inflation. As a result more than 800 scientists,
inspectors, and other critical staff have been lost in the last
four years, including some of FDA's most experienced experts.
Recent nationwide recalls remind us how devastating food borne
illness can be and how critical it is for FDA to respond
quickly to safety problems. It is important to maintain this
level of response, but there is a need--but there needs to be
an increased focus on prevention and intervention to stop these
outbreaks from happening in the first place. The adoption of
preventative controls to prevent contamination, the use of
modern testing strategies to detect pathogens before the
product is released and application of innovative new
processing technologies to destroy pathogens all have a role in
improving the safety of our foods.
While at CFSAN we recommended a variety of options to
address the safety of foods, including the proposal to improve
produce safety that could include a requirement for tough, but
enforceable produce safety standards. A position that is not
only shared by, but has actually been requested by, the food
industry and many farm organizations. The overall goals of the
plan were to prevent contamination, minimize public health
impact in the event that contaminated product did get into the
marketplace, to enhance the capability to provide safe
products, and also to improve communications to both domestic
as well as foreign suppliers. And also facilitating and
supporting the science that should always be the underpinning
of any food safety effort.
Interestingly, these recommendations contained elements
that specifically addressed actions that were recommended later
in the same year in GMA's four pillars document, as well as
FDA's Food Protection Plan. Unfortunately, the Administration
did not seek funds for the plan and Congress failed to provide
adequate funding as well. Consequently, the industry decided to
act on its own through promoting their and statewide
regulations and marketing orders.
In addition to requiring tough, but enforceable produce
standards, Congress should also require FDA to complete their
proposed modernization of good manufacturing practice
standards, or GMPs, and require food importers to document the
food safety efforts of their foreign suppliers. In the highly
unlikely situation that a company refused to voluntarily recall
a product that poses a severe health consequence, FDA should be
given the power to order a recall. FDA could also do much more
to rebuild FDA's scientific and information technology
capacity, and could do more to build capacity of foreign
governments to ensure the safety of our imported foods.
The food industry supports giving FDA new responsibilities
that would help ensure the safety of our food, but new
responsibilities without new resources will not improve the
safety of our food supplies. In fact, new responsibilities
without requisite resources to carry out those responsibilities
has just the opposite affect. It dilutes out existing efforts
in safety and makes FDA less able to address the real food
safety issues. Likewise, new restrictions on ports of entry,
new penalties or any new labeling requirements will also not
result in a safer food supply for the American people. By
focusing our efforts on prevention, by increasing FDA resources
and by leveraging the expertise in resources of the food
industry itself Congress can help us meet the challenges posed
by rising imports and changing consumer preferences.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brackett follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, and thank you to everyone on this
panel.
We are expecting votes. We are going to get going and see
how many we can through here before we have to run off for our
votes.
We are going to go five minutes and we will probably go a
second or third round if necessary.
Mr. Shoemaker, we got Mr. Rodkin there. I am a little
confused on what happens, especially on the pot pies, because
tests performed by ConAgra or Banquet showed that all the meat
pies were prepared with the same equipment. Since the turkey
pot pies contained salmonella where else could the bacteria
have come from but the turkey? I'm sorry. Yeah, go ahead.
Mr.Shoemaker. I can only address what has happened within
the Butterball facilities, the four walls there. I have no
knowledge of ConAgra's facilities. But within our four walls we
met the kill step, we met the low bacterial level and then also
all tests within that facility have proven that it was negative
for salmonella.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Shoemaker. Also the salmonella strain that was found was
a strain that has been found in chickens in all but one
incident----
Mr.Stupak. But not in the pot pies?
Mr.Shoemaker. And in turkey only once, and that was not
within our system.
Mr.Stupak. Right. But there was the vote. Son of a gun. OK.
Let me ask you this. You said you monitor and control
temperature. Why don't you test for salmonella and other
bacteria right after the product is cooked instead of waiting
until it is chilled?
Mr.Shoemaker. Whenever you look at a cook in the bag
product, a low risk product, we have specifications from all of
our customers how you want to check it. What are the
specifications, whether it is a size, whether it is the regime
on checking the product, there was not a test to check because
it being a low risk and had gone through the kill step and----
Mr.Stupak. So if your customer would ask you to----
Mr.Shoemaker. In other words----
Mr.Stupak [continuing]. Check right after the cooking, you
would do it then before you chilled it?
Mr.Shoemaker. Yes, we would. We would do whatever our
customer asked.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Does that make sense, Mr. Rodkin, then? Let
us say on turkeys to test for salmonella after it is cooked,
before it is cooled?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not an expert----
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Rodkin [continuing]. On that, but I believe that is one
of the steps that we have implemented subsequently. I also will
agree with Mr. Shoemaker that they cooperated fully and we
never were able to say exactly, precisely that it was an issue
with the Butterball turkey. So I want to agree with that, but I
can also--yes?
Mr.Stupak. Where does it come from then?
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. I mean I guess that is----
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. And being a consumer and not a scientist I guess
I am asking the same question.
Mr.Rodkin. Sure.
Mr.Stupak. You are telling me it is not you. You are
telling me it is not you. Where does it come from?
Mr.Rodkin. Well, on the first day that we became aware of
the issue we knew very little about the source, but we did know
as Mr. Shoemaker has said that any possible salmonella would be
killed through proper cooking, because salmonella can't survive
past--beyond 165 degrees.
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.Rodkin. So consumers are not at fault. They should
expect safe product. This generated an intensive analysis of
our cooking directions and microwave performance. But also
because it was our absolute responsibility to find the root
cause in the product we took over 3,000 samples of product we
had from finished pot pies and were able to isolate salmonella
in just 17. Those all happened to be Banquet turkey pot pies
from two dates in July of 2007. But despite very intensive
investigations and analysis and cooperation we were not able to
determine the exact, precise source of the contamination. It
was not absolutely proven and, therefore, we had our people
take the broadest possible approach and assume that all
possible sources were or could be the source. And as a result
we have made some extremely----
Mr.Stupak. Well, let me ask you this. If it is not the
packaging, if it is not the turkey, if it is not the machine,
could it come from the gravy? Is the gravy made from a separate
firm that comes into your pot pies?
Mr.Rodkin. We have checked every last ingredient and have
found no source of salmonella. And, therefore, because we care
very deeply about making the safest food possible. We took a
number of steps across the board in that facility to make sure
that all raw materials now have tighter specifications----
Mr.Stupak. Sure. Let me put my consumer hat back on.
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. So if you have tested everything and Butterball
says not our fault, but yet we have salmonella, then how can
Americans be sure that the next pot pie they buy won't have
salmonella in it? If it is not the gravy, it is not the
packaging, it is not the turkey, it is not the cooking, it is
not the microwave, it is not nothing. How do we know then?
Mr.Rodkin. Again, having made all of these changes----
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.Rodkin [continuing]. That I was describing and in
working in conjunction with the USDA I did mention that in the
slightest possible chance that any salmonella could come
through the process it would be killed with proper cooking.
And, therefore, we took a very intensive look at our
instructions and at microwaves.
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.Rodkin. And found much greater variability than we had
historically in microwaves and, therefore--this was our old
package. Sorry it is so small. I hope you can see that. But
importantly on the back are where the instructions are. We have
made changes before we reintroduced the product into the
marketplace. Took off where it says ready in four minutes in a
microwave.
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.Rodkin. Said microwaveable, but must be cooked
thoroughly. See back for directions. And now the directions
have been changed----
Mr.Stupak. So the answer is to cook it longer for the
consumer then, in other words?
Mr.Rodkin. That is what----
Mr.Stupak. I guess I am trying to--my time is up and they
are calling us for votes. Let me ask you one more. On the Peter
Pan peanut butter for salmonella, again, ConAgra didn't find
it, but the FDA did. What changes were made in Peter Pan then?
I mean I think Peter Pan you have the salmonella and said it
was a leaky roof. That was repaired and we still found it after
that, after a new batch, so----
Mr.Rodkin. That is a question I need clarification on,
because we have not found any salmonella subsequently.
Ms.DeGette. If the gentlemen will yield. It was the FDA
that found the salmonella.
Mr.Rodkin. Right.
Ms.DeGette. Not you.
Mr.Stupak. After----
Mr.Rodkin. And I need some clarification on that, because
with this we are unaware of that.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Rodkin. We are unaware of that because we closed the
facility down immediately and only reopened last August. And it
is an extremely different facility, totally redone, totally
remade. And, again, it is because we are extremely concerned
about, as Mr. Marler said, food safety risk is a bad business
decision.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Our votes are up. We got three votes on. I
think now is probably appropriate time, Mr. Dingell, unless you
want to go. All right. Let us--yeah. Well, we are going to
adjourn for--until 12:50, one o'clock?
Mr.Dingell. Yeah.
Mr.Stupak. One o'clock, two o'clock? How about 1:50? 1:50.
That will give us 40 minutes and we are going to have votes.
And the first one is just up that usually extends more than 15
minutes, so I think with three votes we better give it 40
minutes. We will recess until then. We will be back at 1:50.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr.Stupak. The Committee will come back to order. Oh, mics
are much better. Thanks.
Mr. Shimkus, for questions, please.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panelists for being here. I had to make
sure I got my own processed food while I am going back and
forth to vote. It is a glamorous lifestyle we have here, and
this is our lunch.
So a couple things. First of all, especially with the CEO's
who are present. Can you maximize shareholder wealth by
producing unsafe foods and having recalls? Yeah?
Mr.Rodkin. First, if I might. I would just like to clarify
when before we left for lunch there was a question on peanut
butter. And I wanted to clarify to let you know that the
product that was discussed that FDA found salmonella was
recalled product. That was product that they found in our plant
that we had already recalled. The plant had been shut down for
six months, so this was not product out in the marketplace. It
is the reason that we did the recall, and it is the reason that
we had such a major renovation, total remake of our facility.
We did not just fix the roof. It was a total facility. All the
equipment, all the testing procedures, additional personnel. I
can tell you it is many, many millions of dollars and it is now
the state-of-the-art facility from a peanut butter
manufacturing standpoint. So I wanted to just make sure I
clarified that.
Onto your question. Taking any kind of food safety risk is
a really bad business decision as Mr. Marler talked about.
There is nothing worse than thinking that one of your products
could cause someone harm. It does damage to your brands,
consumer perception, and that is our most valuable asset on our
books. It harms relations with your customers. By that I mean
our retailers, because you have to remove product from their
shelves. And it is a big, big financial burden I can tell you
from a peanut butter standpoint, and the corrections that I
just talked about and all the costs of that recall are many
multiple years of the brand's profit.
Mr.Shimkus. And I am sure that will really kind of be a
similar answer as far as, you know, name ID, a product line,
safety of food, and your reliable customers. I mean it really
does take a dive when things like this happen. I mean so
everyone agrees with that. I mean it is not a marketing ploy to
want to do this. In fact, it is damaging across the board. And
I think it is also important that we understand raising a
capital formation for the risks involved, the return on the
investment and all those challenges that operate. Of all, we
were talking about some on the walk over to the votes. I mean
we do have lapses, and that is kind of what we are trying to--
the folks who are on now, because we do have a safe food
supply. We are consuming a multitude of pounds of food in this
country by the second, and but we do have lapses.
When we talk about a recall, a voluntary recall, from the
amount of the lot and the batch, whatever you all decide to
finally--it is voluntary so you are going to recall a product
that has been produced from one of your factories. That occurs
after the fact that the product has been on the shelf. Someone
has purchased it, and there has been in essence an adverse
reaction. So if you take the lot, the 100 percent of the
product line, from whatever window you decide the recall needs
to occur, how much--what percentage actually returns? How much?
What percentage actually consumed and gone? So when--if you
were to receive everything back. Say you say, OK, let us do a
voluntary recall of peanut butter, and it is going to be this
lot of whatever. What percentage actually would come back? And
in this case you were given the answer to the question of the
Chairman of the reinspected of the lots that had returned. But
how much? What is it, 10 percent of a product line that once
you recall after it has been out in the consumer sector and
some of it had been consumed, some of them purchased and
probably in some--on some shelf somewhere? What is the
percentage? Why don't we just go to the top four food
processors here.
Mr.Rodkin. I can't give you an exact percentage. I can tell
you it is significant. And, I guess, the most----
Mr.Shimkus. What is that, 50--what is it? I mean----
Mr.Rodkin. Well, I think the most important thing is in the
case of our two recalls, we recalled total production,
everything, 100 percent. And that meant destroying all of our
own inventory, taking all the product, 100 percent of the
product, off the retailer's shelves.
Mr.Shimkus. But a lot of that had been consumed and
purchased in the food chain, correct?
Mr.Rodkin. It is possible that some of it could have. I
mean----
Mr.Shimkus. I am a big peanut butter eater.
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Shimkus. All right. So we go through peanut butter
pretty quick in our household. So a lot of that, if it is--my
question is--and I don't want to be simplistic. But, yeah, how
much product, if you are just doing a basic percentage of any
type of product, how much is actually returned to you all in a
recall?
Mr.Rodkin. Yeah. In the case of peanut butter it was very
significant. I don't know exactly what the numbers were. I
can----
Mr.Shimkus. As significant at 30 percent?
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Shimkus. Twenty-five percent?
Mr.Rodkin. Yes, at least that.
Mr.Shimkus. At least. Is that normal? Why don't we--Mr.
Shoemaker?
Mr.Shoemaker. I think that when you are talking about this
I think there is different types of premises you have got to go
by. We have never had a recall at Butterball, but we do mock
recalls. And within our mock recall it goes back to do you know
where your product's coming from? We have the ability by daily
lots on some products to break where the lots are. And on some
of the products, depending on their risk level, might be test
and hold. So 100 percent of that product might be in our own
facility, but it just depends on your category of risk as to
what our percentage of products would be that we would capture
back.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Lischewski?
Mr.Lischewski. We have a--our example is a bit more
specific. When we did the Castleberry's recall we recalled over
two years worth of product until we isolated the problem. When
we isolated it down to two product codes, to this date we have
been able to pull back approximately 74 percent of the product
under our control. Now, on top of that we allowed retailers,
rather than return it to us, to destroy product at their
location. And consumers were allowed to destroy product at home
and just send in for a refund regardless of whether it was one
of the actual product codes involved, or any of our other
products. So 74 percent of ours are able to track absolutely.
The other 26 percent, again, we are not sure how much of that
would have been destroyed by retailers, consumers, or it would
have been consumed.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Ray?
Mr.Ray. Congressmen, our situation, our recalls required
our--recommended that consumers destroy the product and not
return it. And so we had a very low percentage of product
returned.
Mr.Shimkus. How do we know that the consumers comply? I
mean the reality is you have--the postal service clerks can--
canned foods for food shelters and stuff. How--we just don't
know do we?
Mr.Ray. No.
Mr.Shimkus. I mean we all hope that they do. We are hoping
that they, first of all, know about it. Even though our best
efforts, we don't--our best effort is to educate the consumers
that they have trouble. But then we don't, we really don't know
where, especially when you are asking the consumer to destroy
it.
Mr.Ray. In our particular situation most of our products
that have been affected have been food service products, so we
have been able to go to the distributor. The distributor then
can go to their consumer. And I think it can get good
withdrawal in that scenario.
Mr.Shimkus. Let me finish. And Mr. DeLorenzo, I'm sorry. I
didn't want to leave you out there. Yeah, the camera is
blocking mine.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes. On the--we have perishable products for
the most part that we are talking about here, and so we even
have a--percent actually returned, but----
Mr.Shimkus. Can you check and see if there should a button
or two?
Mr.DeLorenzo. There is a green light. I thought it was on.
So the bags that were actually returned are few. How much is
destroyed as we say? I will say though, Congressmen, that from
what I could see from this last recall there was very, very
good coverage in the media. The radio--I think it must be by
law that every radio station, every television station. So I
think at least from that perspective there was very, very good
coverage. But in terms of what is actually returned it is a
small amount.
Mr.Shimkus. The--and finally, all these cases are
different. They have, you know, different criteria. It is great
for the panel to understand the enormity of the problem, but it
is very difficult to, you know, get into each little--I am not
going to get into each little manufacturing problem or stuff,
so I would like to end this. Obviously there we have had
problems, and we would like to get to zero defects. We know we
don't live in a perfect world, but everybody wants this, and it
is good for you, it is good for your shareholders, it is good
for the safety of our constituents. How many of these--and I
also, from a military background having watched the Army IG and
inspector general come down and say I am from, you know, the
IG. I am here to help you. Usually that is not always a good
sign. And though I think they are intended to be helpful,
sometimes we feel them as not being as helpful as they can be.
So what, in your estimation, is the aspect of some of these
problems either in good manufacturing practices or the lack
thereof? Lack of federal regulations or legislation, or
nominally that we are talking about with these changes in
pathogens that is unidentifiable? I mean a lot of these things
there is a valve that didn't close or didn't open. We have
other issues. What do we need to do to be--we would like to be
from the Federal Government. We would like to be helpful. We
would like not to be harmful. So give us your things on how we
can be helpful, and go with Mr. Rodkin.
Mr.Rodkin. One thing I would say is that while I don't
really want to speak for the regulatory bodies, FDA, USDA or
CDC, I would tell you that if we could have, we as the
manufacturers, could have access to the information earlier in
the process, rather than right at the very end it would help us
to protect consumer health. It would allow us to take any kind
of necessary actions sooner, rather than having it dumped all
at once and then have to spring into action. So we would like
to be brought into the process much sooner.
Mr.Shimkus. I think that is a great response. Thank you.
Mr. Shoemaker, anything?
Mr.Shoemaker. I think it goes back to your HACCP Program
and your processes and procedures, and how strict you have your
HACCP Program. The industry writes their HACCP Program. I have
had a lot of people come into our facilities and say, you do
not manufacture product for productivity the way you
manufacture product and overcooked product and do things for
lethality of bacteria. That is what you work for, and that is
what we do focus on. It is for food safety. And it depends on
the degrees within your HACCP Program as to how tight you want
to do it. You can overdo and you can do at a marginal level.
Our philosophy is to overdo.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Lischewski?
Mr.Lischewski. I think one of the areas where we see an
opportunity is really more consistency. You know, if you look
at our Augusta factory, we run both USDA and FDA products and
so in some cases we are under two different types of criteria
in terms of the product that we are producing.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Ray?
Mr.Ray. I would say a very important issue for us is
research, continued research in food safety. In our particular
situation as we are dealing with an issue that we have not
gotten to the conclusion at this point in time, some of the
research that we are looking at goes back into the early
1980's. And to be able, as an industry, to fund research to
learn more about food safety of canned and canned low acid
vegetables would be very important to us.
Mr.Shimkus. And, Mr. DeLorenzo?
Mr.DeLorenzo. I think that there has to be a clear
regulation and very definitive regulation as to procedures of
processes and testing that entire industries have to follow.
And there has to be complete transparency, and it should work
on both sides on part of the FDA, USDA and the industry so that
any and all records are immediately available. There is no such
thing as Mr. Eisenberg testified earlier that someone could
take a test and then hide it somehow. So this transparency is
very important and I think clear and definitive guidelines are
important. I think on the one big issue that concerns me the
most is this E. coli problem, and their research is definitely
necessary.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you. And I am going to end with that, but
I was just going to follow up with a statement. That I found
interesting about both panels is the fact that this really goes
back to real time information. If we are talking about the
health and safety of the public food source then I don't care
who has information. That information needs to go to folks that
can take action on that. There shouldn't be a delay, you know,
whether it is law enforcement or whether it is proprietary
information based upon the people that you are contracted to do
testing for. We have got to have a way to have the information.
The sooner the information, the better.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous
with the time. I yield back.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Dingell, for questions, please.
Mr.Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Eisenberg, when a food importer employs your lab to
take samples and analyze that for submission to FDA, to satisfy
the agencies requirements under import rules, who owns the
rights to the results?
Mr.Eisenberg. The importer.
Mr.Dingell. The importer?
Mr.Eisenberg. We are working for the importer.
Mr.Dingell. What are the rights of FDA with regard to that
information?
Mr.Stupak. Mr. Eisenberg, put your mic on, would you
please, sir?
Mr.Dingell. Does FDA have the right to that information or
not?
Mr.Eisenberg. The FDA, in its procedures, requires that we
sign a laboratory director's statement that we are submitting
all work that we have done on a sample. And if an FDA district
requires that statement we research our records and provide all
the work that we did.
Mr.Dingell. But automatically get that information or not?
Is there a great toe dance that goes on before they get it or
do they get it right away as a matter of rights?
Mr.Eisenberg. Well, in that situation they would get all of
it right away, however, if the importer tells us not to submit
the information to the FDA, the FDA never sees it.
Mr.Dingell. Under what circumstances do they keep this from
FDA? When, how and why?
Mr.Eisenberg. Well, sometimes they may want to keep a clean
record on their item, on their food item, with the FDA.
Mr.Dingell. So they don't send it to Food and Drug?
Mr.Eisenberg. That is right. They don't submit--they advise
us, tell us, not to submit the work.
Mr.Dingell. Food and Drug doesn't know what the situation
is?
Mr.Eisenberg. That is right. The importer may re-export the
product. We don't know.
Mr.Dingell. And that could be something coming in with
salmonella or mercury or----
Mr.Eisenberg. Sure.
Mr.Dingell [continuing]. PCBs or some kind of bacterial or
viral contamination, right?
Mr.Eisenberg. Yes.
Mr.Dingell. OK. Now, if somebody imports, for example,
shrimp from China, which is currently under import alert and
you test for antibiotics or fungicides and find excessive
levels what happens to your report?
Mr.Eisenberg. If the importer tells us not to submit it to
the FDA we don't submit it to the FDA. If we see something that
we view as being an imminent hazard to public health, which is
very, very rare, we advise the importer of this and then we
check with the importer to make sure that they have reported
the problem to the FDA. And if they had not reported the
problem, then we would. We had two situations where importers
took our laboratory reports and whited out information on our
reports that was harmful to the entry of the import. In those
cases we had no choice. We went to the FDA and immediately
advised them of what had happened.
Mr.Dingell. So it is perfectly legal for you, then, to
discard the analysis without informing the FDA?
Mr.Eisenberg. Yes.
Mr.Dingell. And you can do that at the instigation or
request of the importer. Is that right?
Mr.Eisenberg. Yes.
Mr.Dingell. All right. Now, the FDA has made a big point to
say that it is the private lab, and not the importer, that
decides from the place in a shipment, that is which bag, box
location in the container, or where in the warehouse the
samples are taken. Is it your experience that the importers
make such a decision for you and/or for your competitors? They
decide which parts of the, you know, the lot from the import
that is going to be scrutinized?
Mr.Eisenberg. An analysis is only as good as the sample
taken.
Mr.Dingell. That is correct, because it is not----
Mr.Eisenberg. And if we take a sample we will sign a
collection report that we sampled the shipment without bias. We
are not saying that we sampled it in a random way. And if we
sign that report that we took it without bias then we were
responsible for the sampling, and no one directed us as to what
the sample, and we did our best----
Mr.Dingell. But you are never----
Mr.Eisenberg [continuing]. To make sure the sample is
representative.
Mr.Dingell. But you are not required to make a random
sampling are you?
Mr.Eisenberg. No. And if you have 40 pallets of product it
is unrealistic to ask the importer to bring down all 40 pallets
to look at.
Mr.Dingell. All right. Now, in your statement you say that
you lost your Miami business, because you could not--rather you
would not give the importers the results they wanted. Would you
supply, then, for the records of the committee either publicly
or privately the names of the importers that chose to move to
less reputable competitors and have you not delivered that kind
of information to Food and Drug and the public? To--either
publicly or privately? I leave the choice to you.
Mr.Eisenberg. I could try to provide it.
Mr.Dingell. All right. Don't try to provide it, do provide
it. And we will expect to have it.
Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask that that be inserted
in the record, but I do want to have it. I do want to receive
that.
Mr.Eisenberg. Our Florida laboratory was a branch
operation. I was advised by our manager of the laboratory on
various occasions when this occurred, but I was not directly
involved. And our manager is now elsewhere, because we closed
the Florida laboratory due to lack of business and due to the
corrupt situation in south Florida.
Mr.Dingell. All right. Now, in the same vein, will you
please supply us with the names and the circumstances
surrounding each instance where you were asked to discard
violative findings by a client? You can do that either for the
record or privately to the committee.
Mr.Eisenberg. That we should be able to do.
Mr.Dingell. OK.
Mr.Eisenberg. And we can simply see all the violations that
were never reported.
Mr.Dingell. We would like to receive that, and we will put
it in the record or use it in other fashion.
Now, Mr. Rodkin, you did test the lots of Peter Pan peanut
butter that were found to contain salmonella that sickened over
600 people. Is that correct?
Mr.Rodkin. That is correct.
Mr.Dingell. And your microbiologic testing found two jars
contained this toxin, but you failed to inform Food and Drug of
the finding. Is that right?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not aware of that specific instance. Can
you give me the details on that? The timing?
Mr.Dingell. It was October.
Mr.Rodkin. Of?
Mr.Dingell. October 2004.
Mr.Rodkin. I am somewhat aware of that situation, but that
was prior--I arrived a year later.
Mr.Dingell. OK.
Mr.Rodkin. So I don't really know the details of that.
Mr.Dingell. Now, from October 2004 forward your in-house
product testing found no salmonella. Is that correct?
Mr.Rodkin. That is correct.
Mr.Dingell. Now, but CDC identified Peter Pan peanut butter
as the source of the 2007 outbreak. Is that correct?
Mr.Rodkin. That is correct.
Mr.Dingell. Now, in the staff briefings, in the ConAgra
testimony of last year, your company blamed the salmonella
incident on a roof that leaked for a week over late July and
early August in 2006. Is that correct?
Mr.Rodkin. Everything that we know points to water being
the source of the salmonella issue. The roof leak was cited as
one possibility and the other was a malfunction in a sprinkler
system.
Mr.Dingell. Now, after the hearing was over, however, the
committee learned that FDA took jars of Peter Pan peanut butter
from ConAgra warehouses in February of last year, that's 2007,
and found 14 out of the 130 jars sampled contained salmonella
Tennessee. Can you explain why such a large percentage of jars
tested by Food and Drug discovered the toxin, but ConAgra's
tests did not?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not a scientific expert, but I can tell you
that salmonella requires water to germinate, to grow, and it
takes time for that to develop. And our product testing had
been done on the line when the product was produced. So it is
possible to take a significant amount of time for that
salmonella to show up.
Ms.DeGette. Will the Chairman yield?
Mr.Dingell. Certainly. I would be glad to yield.
Ms.DeGette. That testing that the FDA did though last year
was after you fixed the roof and the sprinkler system, correct?
Mr.Rodkin. That testing was on product that had been
recalled, not on new product that had been produced.
Mr.Dingell. So you say this is with regard to product that
was recalled and not new product for distribution?
Mr.Rodkin. That is correct. And, in fact, the plant was
shut down for over six months and totally redone. We did not
just repair the roof. We totally remade the plant at a cost of
many, many millions of dollars, changed all the processes. That
is a totally different plant today.
Mr.Dingell. Now, we seem to have a difference of opinion
here. FDA said that this was out of the warehouse and was not
from samples of the product that was recalled. How do we
explain that?
Mr.Rodkin. Our product--my understanding of that timing
that you are talking about our plant had been closed, and all
product had been recalled, and the FDA came in and tested
product that we had recalled. Potentially that came out of a
warehouse and was returned to us.
Mr.Dingell. Now, I am told that the production dates on
this particular lot were as late as January 2007, which is some
six months after the leak in the roof was fixed. How do we
explain that?
Mr.Rodkin. I need to make sure I have my dates right. But
all of--yes. All of the product prior to shutting the plant
down was recalled, so that fell into that timeframe.
Mr.Dingell. I don't quarrel with that statement, sir, but I
note that some of the jars that FDA labs found positive for
salmonella Tennessee had production dates as late as January
2007. Some six months after the leak in the roof was fixed.
Now, did ConAgra know of the FDA lab results on April 24, 2007,
when your vice president for manufacturing testified before
this subcommittee?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not aware of that.
Mr.Dingell. All right. Does FDA share the results of these
kinds of tests with ConAgra?
Mr.Rodkin. That is the normal procedure.
Mr.Dingell. And when did they do that here? Do you know?
Mr.Rodkin. I do not know that specifically.
Mr.Dingell. Now, if you got results prior to 4/24/07, then
can you explain to us how you can blame a leaky roof for
samples which were marked with a production date after the date
that the roof was fixed?
Mr.Rodkin. I'm sorry, sir. I am--I do not know the answer
to that.
Mr.Dingell. Now, what other questions.
Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your
courtesy.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr.Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. DeGette, for questions, please.
Ms.DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, Mr. Rodkin, I want to thank you for coming personally
today. I know it can't be a happy experience for you, and I am
not happy myself, because since the beef recall in 2002 we have
had ConAgra in front of this committee talking about E. coli,
salmonella in peanut butter. In your opening statement you
didn't talk about the popcorn line, but one of those people
actually lives in Colorado, my home state. And now here we are
with salmonella in the pot pies. And the thing that is
frustrating to us, as members of the Oversight and
Investigations Committee, most of us have been on this
committee for some years now, is every 6 months or a year you
folks are in with some new problem. And our constituents are
stopping us and saying, what can you do to make our food safer?
So it seems to us that many of the industries represented here
really are making a good faith effort, including ConAgra, to
improve the situation, but it is all done in a reactive way.
The peanut butter's contaminated, so you fix the roof. So the
popcorn line is making people sick, so you take that additive
out of the popcorn, and on and on. What I am interested in, and
I think what Mr. Stupak and the Chairman are interested in and
the folks on the other side of the aisle, is how can we stop
food from being contaminated. And one thing that you talked
about and that we have talked about is these recalls, and so
let me ask you first about the recalls in the pot pie outbreak
and the subsequent recall. Now, ConAgra heard about people
getting sick on October 8. Is that correct?
Mr.Rodkin. We first learned of that on Monday, I believe
October 11. It was whatever Columbus Day was.
Mr.DeGette. OK. So you learned on October 11. And then you
said that you immediately issued--that is not right? OK. Staff
says that is not right. They are saying it is October, Friday,
October 8. But be that as it may, what happened next was there
was a consumer advisory issued, correct?
Mr.Rodkin. A consumer advisory was, which means telling
consumers not to eat the product, and telling----
Ms.DeGette. And how was that disseminated?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not aware of the exact details.
Ms.DeGette. OK.
Mr.Rodkin. But I can tell you it was done in conjunction
with the USDA.
Ms.DeGette. Now, why wasn't a recall issued instead of a
consumer advisory, which is the next step up?
Mr.Rodkin. We were working with the USDA and they asked us
to do a consumer advisory. The next day----
Ms.DeGette. So it was because the USDA asked you to do it?
Mr.Rodkin. We were working collaboratively with the USDA.
Ms.DeGette. Well, you know, that is kind of a lawyerly
answer. Did ConAgra say to the USDA, well, we think we will
issue a consumer advisory, and they said OK, or did the USDA
say we want you to issue a consumer advisory?
Mr.Rodkin. The----
Ms.DeGette. That makes a difference to me.
Mr.Rodkin. We worked together with the USDA.
Ms.DeGette. And you decided jointly to issue a consumer
advisory and not a recall?
Mr.Rodkin. The USDA asked us to do that, and we agreed.
Ms.DeGette. OK, thank you. Now, at some point then was
the--the pot pies were recalled, correct?
Mr.Rodkin. The next day after the advisory we at ConAgra
decided there might possibly be some consumer confusion, so we
decided to make it a total recall of all of our pot pies.
Ms.DeGette. So why did you decide there would be consumer
confusion?
Mr.Rodkin. Because we were doing our own analysis and
investigation with our customers and consumers, and decided
that----
Ms.DeGette. What did you think they would be confused
about?
Mr.Rodkin. That they might not get the full impact of the
advisory, and we wanted to go all the way to a total recall.
Ms.DeGette. OK. And so then you recalled all the pot pies?
Mr.Rodkin. Correct.
Ms.DeGette. Now, I have introduced legislation the past
couple years giving the USDA mandatory recall authority. What
is ConAgra's position on that legislation?
Mr.Rodkin. We believe that mandatory recall for any company
that is not cooperating is fine. We would agree with that.
Ms.DeGette. But you think that the company should have the
ability to do voluntary recall first?
Mr.Rodkin. We believe that a company should do what is
right.
Ms.DeGette. Right, OK. But your answer, again, was kind of
a hedge answer, because you said we believe in mandatory recall
authority if they don't do the right thing.
Mr.Rodkin. If we are presented with the----
Ms.DeGette. But my question is let us say the USDA is
presented with a situation where they have a serious problem
with some food. And let us say they have a manufacturer who
says, well, we are going to do some more testing, we are going
to do some different things, and then we will decide what to
do. Do you think that the USDA should have the ability to come
in and say, this is such a public health risk, we are going to
mandatorily recall this product?
Mr.Rodkin. I can't speak for other companies, but----
Ms.DeGette. No, I am asking you as the chairman of ConAgra.
Mr.Rodkin. If it was ConAgra and they presented us with
that information----
Ms.DeGette. No, no. I am asking you should they have the
ability to do that? Yes or no?
Mr.Rodkin. For any company that is not cooperating we
believe mandatory--we would support mandatory.
Ms.DeGette. But if--now, who defines are they cooperating?
You, the company?
Mr.Rodkin. In the instance that you just talked about I
would consider that not cooperating.
Ms.DeGette. OK. Well, who decides that? The company or the
USDA?
Mr.Rodkin. The USDA.
Ms.DeGette. Thank you. Now, one last thing. I think a lot
about this mandatory recall issue, and the problem with
mandatory recall is once you--or a consumer advisory, once you
are doing it that horse is out of the barn. That product is out
there on the shelves, and the mothers are buying the jars of
peanut butter and putting them on the sandwiches for their
kids. They may not--you know, I tell you they may not see the
consumer advisory, which we don't even know to disseminate it.
They may not even know about the recall, so this is my
question, and I just want you to think about this. And if
anybody else wants to try me, and I would be happy to hear your
view. What can we do to beef up the FDA's and the USDA's power
in cooperation with industry to make sure that that product is
safe when it goes out, so we don't have to rely on recalls,
which are a faulty way of getting products back?
Mr.Rodkin. I think it is incumbent upon the industry to act
responsibly, and I believe that we have. We have taken very
prompt actions as soon as we learned of any issues, spent
significant resources proactively. That is time and money to
raise our standards, made very proactive precautionary change
across the entire company. And, in fact, in our approximate
$450 million capital budget, the number one priority on a go
forward basis is safety.
Ms.DeGette. So you don't really think anything in addition
can be done, except for the industry making a commitment?
Mr.Rodkin. I think the primary responsibility is on the
industry, and also to cooperate 100 percent are priorities.
Ms.DeGette. Because they have done such a swell job so far.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mr.Stupak. I hate to say this to this panel, but we have
got votes again. They told us it would be awhile, but obviously
they were wrong in their guesstimation. We have got about three
minutes left--the votes. And we got a Motion to Recommit, so it
is probably going to be 3:15 by the time we get back, so we are
going to stay in the recess until 3:15. Other members have
expressed interest about asking the panel's questions of this
panel. So we are going to ask the panel to hold.
3:15, see you back here at this time. We will stand in
recess.
[Recess.]
Mr.Stupak. OK. The Committee will be back in order.
Let me remind all witnesses we are still under oath. Sorry
about the delays. We thought we were just going to have a few
votes, and it ended up being more than what we thought. But the
good news is we are done with votes, so hopefully we can get
this panel done, and we can finish up today. The bad news is
the SCHIP hearing is done so members may be coming in for more
questions.
Let me go with the questions. Again, everyone is under
oath.
Mr. Rodkin, if I may, I hate to continue to bring up this
about the salmonella, but we were just getting conflicts in
answers up here from facts of what we know. And then as you
know this came up at a previous hearing, so we are getting
conflicting information.
In response to the peanut butter contamination outbreak has
ConAgra gone back and tested products for salmonella on peanut
butter?
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Rodkin. We certainly have on an ongoing basis with much
more rigorous testing in a totally renovated and revamped new
plant.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And in that testing ConAgra found, have they
not, they found salmonella in peanut butter produced in 2004,
2005, 2006, 2007?
Mr.Rodkin. The only peanut butter that I am aware of that
was tested for salmonella was in 2006. I am not aware of the
other dates.
Mr.Stupak. So you don't know in 2004, 2005 or 2007? You are
not aware of it?
Mr.Rodkin. I am not aware of those dates, just 2006.
Mr.Stupak. OK. For the record would you go back and check
with your folks----
Mr.Rodkin. Yes.
Mr.Stupak [continuing]. And get this thing cleared up once
and for all?
Mr. Eisenberg, if I may. In your testimony, page 2, it says
the purpose of the PICSC, Pacific Import Community Steering
Committee, right, was to provide a conduit for information from
the FDA to the regulated import community, and from that
community back to the FDA in the public interest to assure and
improve FDA's regulation of imports. The three sections would
meet three times a year by televideo conference. It says the
FDA ended its involvement or sponsorship of the PISCA in early
2006. Is that correct?
Mr.Eisenberg. Yes, that is correct.
Mr.Stupak. Why did they end this relationship where private
industry is trying to work with you and others to detect import
problems and imports with food?
Mr.Eisenberg. Well, they advised me that they were meeting
with different groups, and that they were creating different
groups that they wanted to meet with. And they were no longer
interested in meeting with the PISCA group.
Mr.Stupak. Did they give you any indication of what these
other groups--who these other groups were?
Mr.Eisenberg. No.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Who terminated this? Who did you learn this
from at the FDA?
Mr.Eisenberg. Mark Rowe, the acting regional director.
Mr.Stupak. OK. In a question--in your answer to a question
that Chairman Dingell, that because of the corrupt situation in
south Florida you closed your office. Explain that.
Mr.Eisenberg. Well, first of all, the FDA had deregulated
or was not enforcing their regulations with regard to
pesticides residues, especially in snow peas. So a significant
part of the market, of the business down in south Florida, had
evaporated. It no longer existed. But also we were the first
people to open a laboratory in south Florida, and we worked, we
spent a lot of money, we tried--we did excellent work. But
along the way a gentleman who had actually worked for us for
six months left and set up his own laboratory with two leased
gas chromatographs. A Dunn and Bradstreet report indicating $68
is the maximum amount of his assets or whatever, and the FDA
accepted his reports on an equal basis. And I, you know, his--I
cannot prove it, but I do not have confidence that all the work
that he did was honest.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Is your lab certified by the FDA?
Mr.Eisenberg. The FDA does not certify any laboratories. It
doesn't accredit. What it has done is it will disqualify labs
that it finds due to deficient work.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Eisenberg. And we are not disqualified. We do work
nationwide and we are not disqualified.
Mr.Stupak. Well, when there is an alert and you are asked
to test a product, a company comes to you and says I got to get
this import alert lifted, I have to test this product. It has
to be tested, what three times, before it is allowed to
continue on?
Mr.Eisenberg. At least five times, then the importer must
file various paperwork that I am not----
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Eisenberg [continuing]. Knowledgeable about. Sometimes,
though, the FDA may say, well, we are not satisfied with five
clean shipments. We want 10 before we even go and review the
paperwork.
Mr.Stupak. Well, whatever the number is.
Mr.Eisenberg. Normally a minimum of five shipments.
Mr.Stupak. And when you do tests, the test results go to
who? The FDA or their client who asked you to do their tests?
Mr.Eisenberg. We generate the results and then we request
in writing from the importer confirmation that we should submit
the results to the FDA.
Mr.Stupak. OK. If you do not get a confirmation from the
importer what do--are you allowed to ship those results into
the FDA or not?
Mr.Eisenberg. We are afraid of--we have a fiduciary
relationship to our client, so if they tell us not to submit
the results we don't submit them.
Mr.Stupak. Do you know of any reason why any tests your or
any other lab does should not simultaneously, whether it is a
positive or a negative, go to the FDA and to the client
shipper?
Mr.Eisenberg. I think it absolutely should go to the FDA
concurrently with when it goes to the shipper, but this is not
the--this is not in the FDA rules at this point in time.
Mr.Stupak. Right, correct. OK.
Mr. Lischewski, if I may, a couple questions. You indicated
in testimony that Castleberry products were recalled due to
risk of possible botulism contamination, correct?
Mr.Lischewski. Correct.
Mr.Stupak. Aren't there about 90 products that were looked
at possibly that might have been contaminated?
Mr.Lischewski. Correct.
Mr.Stupak. And, I think, you said in your previous
testimony that two products were found to have problems?
Mr.Lischewski. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. And these two products you had the lot codes and
you were able to recall what they were. Is that correct?
Mr.Lischewski. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Botulism typically occurs in low acid canned
foods when those cans are not heated long enough and to high
enough temperatures that kill the spores that could cause
botulism, correct?
Mr.Lischewski. Correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And did you tell our committee staff that
botulism contamination on your products occurred when certain
products were not heated to a high enough temperature to kill
the spores which cause botulism?
Mr.Lischewski. Yes, that is correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And is it true that under the heating
process was caused by a malfunction of a valve at the bottom of
your retort system? A system that heats the canned foods?
Mr.Lischewski. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. And because of the type of food that you produce
both FDA and USDA would be in your Augusta, Georgia plant where
this botulism problem may have occurred, correct?
Mr.Lischewski. USDA was at the factory every day.
Mr.Stupak. USDA.
Mr.Lischewski. But FDA was also there. We produce products
and they are both jurisdictions, but FDA only comes on an
inspection basis.
Mr.Stupak. OK. This malfunctioning valve, explain that to
us. If FDA's there and if that is one of the areas or USDA--if
that is one of the areas you check, I'm curious, why didn't
anyone catch it?
Mr.Lischewski. The valve basically, the type of equipment
that we used for sterilization, is produced by a company called
Malo. And what happens is these tanks are full of water,
product--canned product goes in, water is pumped out----
Mr.Stupak. Correct.
Mr.Lischewski [continuing]. Through this valve and steam is
applied to sterilize.
Mr.Stupak.
Mr.Lischewski. The malfunction of the valve allowed some
water to stream back into the bottom of the container such that
some of the cans were submerged in water. The design of these
particular retorts did not allow for any reporting of
temperatures at the bottom of----
Mr.Stupak. How about visually? I mean visually wouldn't you
see the water in the cans?
Mr.Lischewski. No, these are stainless steel containers.
Mr.Stupak. Right, these retorts.
Mr.Lischewski. You can't see inside of them.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Lischewski. So, again, normally we look at pressure
gauges and we look at temperature gauges to monitor the
performance of the retort. The small amount of water in the
retort didn't allow us to see any deviations in the pressure.
And the fact that there weren't temperature gauges throughout
at the bottom of the container we couldn't see the difference
in temperatures.
Mr.Stupak. So in your situation it was both the water plus
temperature?
Mr.Lischewski. Correct. The fact that cans were in the
water----
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.Lischewski [continuing]. And the steam was going onto
the regular cans, but that particular water caused a partial
sterilization. So that when we went through our normal quality
protocol post processing where we normally would have picked up
an under processed product the fact that some heat had been
applied meant it went through our normal process, and didn't
basically grow the botulism bacteria until after it has been
released.
Mr.Stupak. So when your finished product was done----
Mr.Lischewski. Yes.
Mr.Stupak [continuing]. Before you shipped is there testing
then that you do?
Mr.Lischewski. Yeah, we basically----
Mr.Stupak. Or does it----
Mr.Lischewski. Once the product is finished, the day after
processing, we do an organ analeptic evaluation of the product.
And we also put the product on a three day incubation, so if a
product had not been sterilized then that product would swell
and we would pick it up before it ever went into our
distribution channel. Given that it was partially sterilized
and there were no control mechanisms within the Malo retort
that allowed us to see that or see variations that product
actually made it through our process.
Mr.Stupak. And you said swell. You mean the can itself
would swell?
Mr.Lischewski. The can itself. If it wasn't sterilized the
protein inside would swell and you would be able to notice it
in the product.
Mr.Stupak. And that would occur within three days?
Mr.Lischewski. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr. Ray, let me ask you then, because in the FDA reports I
saw you actually had swelling in the cans from what the FDA
said. Right in front of you is a book there, sir. You may want
to go to Tab No. 41. This is--and the reason why I want you to
go there is it is form No. 483 of the FDA. Because in your
testimony you stated our investigation is still underway and we
have not yet determined--have not yet--excuse me. Have not yet
received key information from the FDA about their findings. But
when I look at this reform here, this form 483----
Mr.Ray. Um-hum.
Mr.Stupak. It looks pretty clear to me. You received form
483, right? You are familiar with that form?
Mr.Ray. Yes, we did on February 15.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And the FDA confirms that botulism spores
were found in four cans, correct?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And is it not true that the botulism spores
were found in four water wells that the company uses?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. And before you use these water wells didn't
you use to use water that was treated with chlorine?
Mr.Ray. That is correct. Well, we used----
Mr.Stupak. Chlorine would kill the botulism spores, right?
Mr.Ray. No, that is not correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. But, OK, so they found it in cans and they
found it in the wells. Then the company used the water from
these wells to cool the cans after they have been cooked,
right?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Then is it not true that the FDA believes
that botulism spores entered the cans through loose seams after
being cooked while the cans were being cooled?
Mr.Ray. That is correct. You had asked about the
chlorination. The chlorination for the drinking water levels
would only be probably one to two parts per million.
Mr.Stupak. Sure.
Mr.Ray. To actually destroy the C.bot spore----
Mr.Stupak. Sure.
Mr.Ray [continuing]. It would have to be probably 10 to 20
times that.
Mr.Stupak. But to use these wells you had to check to see
if they contained any spores or any bacteria that might be
harmful in your food process did you not?
Mr.Ray. No, we did not. That is not normal process. We
would do potability testing. We would test the water every four
months and return the information to the district health
department.
Mr.Stupak. Then how did the botulism spores then get in
these four wells then?
Mr.Ray. We did not anticipate or did not test for--in
history prior to FDA drawing samples we had never tested, nor
is it industry practice, to test--to have botulism in water
wells, or botulism spores, I should say.
Mr.Stupak. The FDA stated that the post process botulism
contamination in low acid canned food products has only
occurred about four times since 1940. It is very rare for this
to happen.
Mr.Ray. Right.
Mr.Stupak. But the FDA determined that you manufactured
multiple lots of low acid canned foods with lose seams, and
that was--and the company was aware of the lose seams before
the FDA investigation was it not?
Mr.Ray. No, we were not, sir.
Mr.Stupak. Well, in that form right there at observation
#6.
Mr.Ray. OK.
Mr.Stupak. Does it not indicate that the company was aware
of the lose seam problem?
Mr.Ray. Observation #6. The observation I see in front of
me was that the FDA came in and made an observation that they
felt that some of our technicians were not properly evaluating
the double seams.
Mr.Stupak. Right. And that, therefore, you didn't have any
many as you should have in these cans which would cause
problems with it?
Mr.Ray. As many--I don't understand the question.
Mr.Stupak. You were supposed to have somebody crimping the
cans are you not?
Mr.Ray. Well, the condition of the seam itself is evaluated
by a technician.
Mr.Stupak. And you didn't have a qualified individual who
could detect that. Is that not what they found?
Mr.Ray. We felt--they--we felt we had qualified
technicians.
Mr.Stupak. You felt that, but the FDA did not?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. OK. In your testimony you stated that botulism
spores are regarded as so unlikely to be found in water that
testing was not a standard procedure. But isn't there a
regulation that states that low acid canned food manufacturers
must chlorate their water or sanitize the cooling water used in
the process?
Mr.Ray. I believe it does depending on the use of the
water, sir.
Mr.Stupak. And it is also on that finding that you didn't
consistently do this. Either use the chloride water or sanitize
cooling water used in your process, correct?
Mr.Ray. There was a point in time that our former quality
service manager had through some corrosion studies ceased using
chlorine. That was a mistake.
Mr.Stupak. Right, it is observation no. 7 there. So the
bottom line on this whole thing was number one, you didn't have
a qualified person to check on the cans and the crimping that
which led to lose seams, which is susceptible to botulism
contamination. And you didn't treat or test the water that
might enter the cans through these lose seams, which could have
lead to botulism, correct? Those are the two findings of the
FDA.
Mr.Ray. Well, I think the one thing to make clear about is
that chlorination, that the chlorination of drinking water, it
was not sufficient enough to destroy the C. botulism spores.
Mr.Stupak. Well, again, looking at Exhibit 41 there, here
is what the FDA observed. That you failed to properly evaluate
defective lots in a timely manner to assure that there are no
potential public health hazards associated with your finished
products. Your firm's employees did not conduct a complete
spoilage diagnosis to determine whether spoilage was due to
under processing or post process leakage. Corrective action was
not taken in a timely manner to remove and destroy defective
spoiled cans, to fix the problem causing the spoilage, whole or
portions of effective lots were observed with swells, buckled
or defective seams in the warehouse. Isn't that correct?
Mr.Ray. That is what the work order says, sir.
Mr.Stupak. You don't feel your company was responsible for
that? Well, I think I would like to ask--maybe you don't want
to admit it.
But Mr. Lischewski was telling us about the can would swell
within the three days. Your company actually had employees take
the swelled cans and put them in a process where they pressed
the can back to basically hide the swollen cans, right?
Mr.Ray. We had debuckled--back several years ago there was
some debuckling of cans by some employees. I think in 2005.
Mr.Stupak. Well, according to the FDA your firm, and again
I am reading from the report now, reshaped cans of LACF
products that exhibited evidence of buckling by using a hand
press to push the can ends back into place. These debuckled
cans were then released from the hold status and made available
for sale to your customers. Isn't that true?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. So I mean if you didn't know about the water,
you didn't know about crimps or the seams, you certainly knew
about the buckling. You certainly knew you had a problem, but
you continued to sell them to your customers.
Mr.Ray. The circumstances of what you are talking about
were two very different points in time. The buckling of the
cans occurred based on recommendation of our can supplier back,
I believe, in 2005. The situations in which we are talking
about in these observations are defective lots that were--
observation 1C, for example, that we had defective lots that we
did not handle on a timely basis. Those defective lots were
lots that we had identified as processed deviations.
Mr.Stupak. Right. But this is from November 26, 2007 to
February 15, 2008, top right-hand corner. I mean that is when
this report is, and that is when they found these cans and your
debuckling.
Mr.Ray. We would to--I'm sorry, sir. Could you repeat the
question?
Mr.Stupak. Sure. You said that they were from some time,
but this report, this 483, Exhibit----
Mr.Ray. Um-hum.
Mr.Stupak [continuing]. Report 483. Actually date of report
is 11/26/2007 it looks like 2/16/2008, right?
Mr.Ray. That is correct.
Mr.Stupak. So these findings were during that period of
time, so they weren't from 2005.
Mr.Ray. The debuckling was from a prior time.
Mr.Stupak. So you still had the cans on the premises?
Mr.Ray. No, we did not, sir. We had them at a prior time.
Mr.Stupak. Mr. Lischewski, the buckling of cans and them
pressing them back is that a standard procedure within the
industry?
Mr.Lischewski. No.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Mr. DeLorenzo, let me ask you this. We had
testimony here--and I think last we were talking about E. coli
spinach and lettuce and all this. That we have had about 20
outbreaks in the Salinas Valley within the last 10 years,
correct?
Mr.DeLorenzo. I am not sure how many.
Mr.Stupak. Somewhere around there. About every 6 months we
seem to have one of these. I'm sorry. You got to turn on your
mic. Has Dole--you are the largest producer in that area, or
processor. Have you done anything to try to figure out what is
going on here? It seems like if you have one of these salad
problems, E. coli, problem, every 6 months you want to do
something. I mean I have asked the FDA the same question, and
they just look at me like, you know, what to do. I mean an
epidemiology study I have suggested to them. Have you suggested
anything like that?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes. I think the industry is desperate to
make sure there are no more incidents or recalls. As I
described, the industry got together and has put a very, I
think, significant food safety processing and protocol in place
for the farming and processing. I personally co-funded just a
few months ago a seminar here in Washington, because I wasn't
satisfied either with the answers that we are getting. That
this E. coli is prevalent and nobody has a kill step, and
nobody is exactly sure where it is coming from. So we had a
seminar----
Mr.Stupak. And what did you learn from that seminar?
Mr.DeLorenzo. I learned that we----
Mr.Stupak. No answer?
Mr.DeLorenzo. No answer. We had 70--we had approximately 70
scientists from Academia. We had the USDA, FDA scientists. And
my, perhaps naively, agenda was to come away from that after
two days of being here with all these people who had studied
this for many, many years, mostly out of the meat industry--
that is where most of the E. coli studies have come from.
Basically what they--the conclusion was A, that they are not
sure where it comes from. Obviously cattle is the primary--
cattle droppings is the primary cause. They are not sure how it
migrates. They are not sure how it lives, is able to live in
the environment that we have. They are not sure how it avoids
the kill step in the chlorine wash that we have.
Mr.Stupak. Well, then we would--irradiation that we talked
a little bit about today. Would that help solve this problem in
the Salinas Valley?
Mr.DeLorenzo. We have an irradiation--we had an irradiation
expert from, I think, he was from Texas, and we are still
working with him. Unfortunately, with irradiation of fresh
produce it tends to cook the product so we haven't gotten over
that one yet. But we are actually going to be funding some work
that he is going to be doing. And I will admit it is very, very
disconcerting when it comes to E. coli.
Mr.Stupak. Well, let me ask you this. The produce industry
had called on the FDA to enter tough new regulations regarding
the handling of fresh produce; however, the FDA has not done
this. It has been reported that earlier this year the FDA came
up with new regulations on handling of fresh produce. These
regulations were intended to replace existing voluntary
guidelines. That is what is in place now, right? And according
to the Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2007, the FDA proposal, and
I am quoting now, went nowhere after it got a cold reception
from the Department of Health and Human Services. The article
states the FDA plan, which would have cost $76 million over
three years was rejected after it was presented in February at
HHS headquarters. Would you want to see mandatory regulations?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes, I would.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Were you involved in helping to put together
any of these mandatory, or Dole or anyone, putting together
these mandatory regulations that were presented to the
secretary in 2007?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Let me--do you mind if I just ask a question,
because I wasn't----
Mr.Stupak. Sure.
Mr.DeLorenzo [continuing]. At the company at that time? I
guess we were involved indirectly through the trade groups, and
then directly in California with the Leafy Greens Agreement
that the industry put in place.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.Shimkus. Can I----
Mr.Stupak. Sure, go ahead. Jump in. Mr. Shimkus wants to
jump in, and we might go back and forth here for a bit. Go
ahead.
Mr.Shimkus. I was just going to give you a chance to get
your breath.
Mr.Stupak. I am just getting warmed up. Go ahead.
Mr.Shimkus. That is what I am afraid of. The--just going
back, Mr. DeLorenzo, just on the timeline. The spinach that we
are talking about, you were a purchaser of that, correct, and
then have you now changed the processes where you are the
producers now? It is more in-house where you are attempting to
try to get control?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes, we agree.
Mr.Shimkus. That is kind of the timeline then I heard.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Right. We are taking everything in-house now.
Mr.Shimkus. And that--why are you doing that?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Well, I am doing it more just to make sure
that we have complete control over the processes. And I am not
trying to blame the other company, because I think it was a
reputable company. But there is enough--in the fresh business
there is enough variables that I just felt it was important to
have everything in-house.
Mr.Shimkus. I mean I heard that in the opening and the
questions, and I think that when you--I mean you have better
control of the operation when it is yours. And obviously there
are risks in----
Mr.DeLorenzo. Can I jump in?
Mr.Shimkus. Yes.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Are you talking about the Natural Selection
one? The hearing we had last time, Natural Selection?
Mr.Shimkus. Yes.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Natural Selection have seen then testified
that they have gone through and testified the leaf as they
process it now.
Mr.Shimkus. Yes. Did you do that or do you still rely upon
Natural Selection or----
Mr.DeLorenzo. We are doing our own testing. As I said since
that incident we have done over 4,000 tests on our products
both field and in processing, and so far they have all come up
negative.
Mr.Shimkus. OK. What you and Natural Selection are doing,
is that the exception to the rule or do most producers now do
that?
Mr.DeLorenzo. No, I think most producers. The Salinas
Valley is very, very motivated to eliminate this problem,
because every farmer's livelihood is based on this. And so I
think that there has been a very good industry movement. More
than I----
Mr.Shimkus. OK. Natural Selection said they were the only
one, you would be second. So this would all be since September
of 2007, I think, was the last recall.
Mr.DeLorenzo. I am not sure how much testing every company
is doing, but I am pretty sure all the large companies are
testing.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you.
The--Dr. Brackett you have been on the end there, quiet,
and just a couple questions to you. Mr. Eisenberg testified
that when you were assistant and director you advised, in June
2006, that FDA would no longer monitor pesticide residues in
foods because the agency did not consider the residues a
serious matter. Can you comment on this?
Mr.Eisenberg. Yes, Mr. Shimkus. I am glad I have the
opportunity to respond to that. In fact, I never did say that
we didn't consider it a serious matter. Any violation of the
law was a serious matter. And it wasn't just IFT, but in other
locations I said with the limited amount of resources we were
going to focus on those things that had the biggest public
health impact at that time. So if it was a matter of testing
for something that was killing children, like E. coli 157H7 or
a violative pesticide, we were going to go on saving children.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Eisenberg, you state you lost business
because of this. Can you restate that for us, please?
Mr.Eisenberg. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?
Mr.Shimkus. You--I am just restating that you, because of
the decision, you closed down operations, lost business. I mean
I am just----
Mr.Eisenberg. That is correct. The FDA had substantially
reduced the number of shipments that it stopped for detention
without physical examination, analysis and sampling. And then
what little work was left was being taken by a laboratory that
we could not compete with.
Mr.Shimkus. Mr. Brackett, based upon the testimony you have
heard today, do you believe that the case studies and, you
know--that is what we have in a multitude of different aspects.
Do you believe that the case studies are representative of
general problems found in the food processing arena?
Dr.Brackett. Well, I think it is a good selection of the
type of problems that could be found. You have got a variety of
different commodities oriented here, and they all have
similar--well, they all have differences because of the science
involved, but they all have some similarities too, and they all
point to five different things that we can think of. One of
which is that we have got to resource the regulatory agencies
so they can oversee the industry the way that would help them.
Secondly, we think that it would help if the industry as a
whole was mandated to have a plan where they actually looked
down the line what was going to happen and then had remediation
steps to deal with those. Thirdly, also to be able to, as Mr.
DeLorenzo said, we do believe that they should have some sort
of mandatory baseline safety rule for produce industry, again,
to make sure that that is taken care of. And secondly, also,
which was in our pillar one at the Grocery Manufacturers
Association, to make sure that importers require of the
companies that are importing to them documentation of the
safety practices that they are engaged in so that we can
facilitate commercial. And then of course part of this that we
have talked about too is supporting mandatory recall when the
manufacturer delays or refuses to do it.
Mr.Shimkus. And finally, just going back, Mr. Brackett, and
you kind of mentioned it on the import end, because on the
first panel we had the--Mr. Williams talked about some of those
challenges that they are facing. Anything in that first panel
that you could respond to, to help clarify some of the
testimony there?
Dr.Brackett. With respect to which part are you asking?
Mr.Shimkus. Well, I mean obviously formerly with the FDA
there was a lot of--while you served, you know, there. And I
was just giving you the opportunity to respond to anything that
you thought that you may need to respond to out of the first
panel.
Dr.Brackett. Well, I think out of the first panel probably
what Mr. Marler said was probably the most significant is there
is a lot of calls for regulations, and while I was there were
called for regulation standards, and in some cases they are
needed. But a regulation based on no or bad science is going to
be more problematic for the industry than putting something out
there. We do have to have more science. We need to have that as
a foundation of our regulations, but there are things that we
can do now, and some of the things I just mentioned a moment
ago are some of them.
Mr.Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. Thanks.
Mr. DeLorenzo, if I may, 2005 Dole had a recall. What was
that on? Spinach? Do you know? E. coli? It was something. I
forget what it was.
Mr.DeLorenzo. We did have a recall on E. coli in 2005 also.
Mr.Stupak. Was that on spinach or lettuce or----
Mr.DeLorenzo. No. I think it was other leafy greens.
Mr.Stupak. OK, OK. In your testimony you gave me the
impression that Canadians had a recall on your product there in
2007, possible E. coli, on packaged salad. And you didn't
believe the Canadians or----
Mr.DeLorenzo. No, we----
Mr.Stupak. I got the impression. I mean----
Mr.DeLorenzo. No, no, no. We immediately had a recall. What
happened is that when you have a--when we had the recall we
pulled in product and we tested everything that--all product
that came in from consumers.
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.DeLorenzo. From the Canadians that they had, and from
whatever products we retained in the plant. Whenever we run the
plants we retain products off the line----
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.DeLorenzo [continuing]. So that we have the bags that we
can go back to. So all of those came up negative. There was no
sight of the E. coli. There was also no sign of E. coli when
the different federal and state agencies came through and the
Canadian government came through. Our plants and our farms. So
the only thing I said is it remains a mystery of where this
came from and how it happened and how we could prevent it
again. And so there is a possibility it could be a laboratory
error. That is always a possibility, but we are not taking it
as a laboratory error. We are saying that science says that
this is possible. There could be one cell out there----
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.DeLorenzo [continuing]. In one bag at any time.
Mr.Stupak. Well, the----
Mr.DeLorenzo. That is what we really need to do the
research.
Mr.Stupak. And I think that is a good point based upon your
earlier testimony. This Canadian example, because all this
costs, all the follow-up with bags that were out there could
have been a laboratory error, right?
Mr.DeLorenzo. It is always possible, yes.
Mr.Stupak. I mean so there--that was a huge response.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yeah. I think that one thing that we would
like to do in any regulation is that I think that there should
be transparency on both the regulating side and the company's
side. I think the company's records should be an open book on
any kind of--we did ask the Canadian government if we could go
look at the tests just to double check them.
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Mr.DeLorenzo. And we weren't allowed access to it. But that
is--we are not saying it wasn't.
Mr.Stupak. Well, have you ever done a recall and then found
out later the tests were all wrong? I mean before there is a
recall, let us face it, there are tons of tests, right?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Well, in this case there was just one bag
of--they had----
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.DeLorenzo. As I understand it there is a number of bags
of lettuce that they did, and in one bag they found E. coli.
And when we went back to double--we did go back and asked can
you do more testing on that bag, but there was nothing left.
They said it had been destroyed.
Mr.Stupak. Well, let me ask you this. Because you said in
your testimony, you talked about Dole's testing for pathogens.
You said you test for pathogens in the field prior to harvest.
You test pathogens that enter your processing plant, and you
test produce as it leaves as a finished product. How many
companies do that? I mean you got three testing processes going
on here, right?
Mr.DeLorenzo. And we test water also in the field.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.DeLorenzo. So it is four.
Mr.Stupak. All right.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Let me--may I just ask our----
Mr.Stupak. Sure.
Mr.DeLorenzo. He is saying that all of the major--he
believes that all of the major vegetable companies in the
Salinas Valley are doing it.
Mr.Stupak. That is all since about 2007 then, right?
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Since the spinach.
Mr.Stupak. When you test the water do you test the water
you use in other countries? I mean some of your products come--
--
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes.
Mr.Stupak [continuing]. From Mexico and other areas.
Mr.DeLorenzo. Yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Mr. Brackett, just a couple of questions if
I may. You were at the FDA and the agency essentially, from our
point of view, set back in a passive position and relied on
companies to follow voluntary guidelines to ensure the safety
of food. Do you believe in relying on voluntary guidelines is
still a sufficient means to protect our Nation's food supply?
Dr.Brackett. Well, Mr. Chairman I think it depends on what
you are talking about the voluntary guidelines do. I think
there is a role for a baseline set of mandatory standards that
can be done if you have got the scientific information done.
But then there are----
Mr.Stupak. But what do we have right now? We have voluntary
standards, right?
Dr.Brackett. Well, there are still some----
Mr.Stupak. As a general rule it is a voluntary standard.
Dr.Brackett. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. So----
Mr.Stupak. Right.
Dr.Brackett [continuing]. For adulterated food that is
mandatory. The specifics is where really guidance fits in
better and where you are going to have a change in some of the
knowledge. That is where guidance needs to be used.
Mr.Stupak. So is--you are now with the Grocery
Manufacturers. Are you for voluntary or do you want to see
mandatory guidance in this area?
Dr.Brackett. Both. I think that there is a place for
mandatory standards on which you place voluntary guidelines.
Mr.Stupak. OK. So Grocery Manufacturers, like Dole is doing
right now.
Dr.Brackett. Um-hum.
Mr.Stupak. They are testing the field, testing the plant,
testing the finished product and they test all water sources.
Do you think that should be mandatory or voluntary?
Dr.Brackett. No, I don't think that part should be
mandatory. I think that----
Mr.Stupak. Why not?
Dr.Brackett [continuing]. Testing is sort of a mistaken way
of protecting the product if you have no other preventative
controls to rely on.
Mr.Stupak. What point should it be tested then?
Dr.Brackett. Well, I think----
Mr.Stupak. If it is not in the field, if it is not in the
processing plant, if it is not in the water, if it is not in
the finished product, where should we test it?
Dr.Brackett. Well, the place for testing that is not the
issue here. The issue is it shouldn't become contaminated in
the first place. The work has to be done to prevent
contamination. If you have no kill step, if you have no other
way then you should be testing the water and----
Mr.Stupak. But we don't live in a perfect world.
Dr.Brackett. No.
Mr.Stupak. OK.
Dr.Brackett. But until we get to a point where we can use
irradiation or something else there is a role for testing, but
being----
Mr.Stupak. Well, what testing would your organization,
Grocery Manufacturers Association, what testing would you
support? I mean the only testing we really have right now are
people getting sick.
Dr.Brackett. Well, that is right, and we can't have people
getting sick. But the point is, is that testing is such a
prescriptive action that if you mandate that, any particular
type of test, that prevents better tests from being developed.
We want whatever is used to be the very best that science
provides, and that is a moving target.
Mr.Stupak. It is a moving target?
Dr.Brackett. Right.
Mr.Stupak. So these 91 recalls we have had in the last 14
months since it is a moving target we can continue to expect
it?
Dr.Brackett. No. I think we need to drop that. I want to
Mr. Marler out of business. The way you use testing is in
conjunction with the regulations that you talked about together
with the best processing practices that you talk about. There
is a role for testing, but putting that into a rule is not the
most appropriate use for it.
Mr.Stupak. And you can't articulate what testing should be?
Dr.Brackett. Well, you should--well, there is different.
There are five different ways that you can test. You can test
for quality standards. That is not going to help you. You can
test for a specific pathogen. You are going to miss some and it
is going to get out there, and then consumer confidence is
going to be eroded again.
Mr.Stupak. Sure.
Dr.Brackett. So you want to have a series of barriers. You
want to have prevention. You want to have preventative controls
to eliminate them. You want to have the testing to make sure
that those are working.
Mr.Stupak. And whose responsibility should that be? The
government or the manufacturers of this?
Dr.Brackett. That should be the manufacturers. We are
responsible for the product.
Mr.Stupak. Would you agree with the Science Board when they
recently testified before the committee that the FDA does not
have the capacity to ensure the safety of the food for our
Nation?
Dr.Brackett. Well, let me just state for the record also
that being an employee of GMA now I can't really respond from
the FDA's side. What I can say is that the FDA's comprised of
some of the most talented people I have ever worked with, and
they have every bit of ability to do something. If you have
more than one something at a time, and that is where the races
are done, they spend probably more time than they need to
responding to things, rather than being able to plan ahead and
build a system that they would like to build.
Mr.Stupak. Right. So Science Board says they don't have the
capacity to protect our Nation's food supply. Do you agree with
that or not?
Dr.Brackett. Again, they have the ability to protect one
event, or maybe two, but when you build--or protecting is not
the same.
Mr.Stupak. Do they have the ability to be pro-active?
Dr.Brackett. They have the knowledge and the ability. They
don't have the resources to do that.
Mr.Stupak. I asked Mr. DeLorenzo about the Wall Street
Journal article and FDA's proposal went nowhere. Did you
present that to the secretary of Health and Human Services at
the time in your role as FDA?
Dr.Brackett. Yes, I did, and in fact that was a proposal.
That was at a time when we noticed the number of outbreaks of
produce related illnesses going up. And it was an informational
meeting. We went and presented this to the Department of Health
and Human Services and provided several different options that
could be done, one of which was mandatory standards. We also
made sure that we----
Mr.Stupak. So what happened to mandatory--why did mandatory
standards get turned down?
Dr.Brackett. Well, it wasn't turned down. That was not a
decision making meeting. It was really to lay out before HHS
what the problem is, what some of the solutions might be, and
then that is the point at which----
Mr.Stupak. Well, did you expect HHS to get back with you
then with the options that were laid out at that meeting?
Dr.Brackett. At some point, yes,
Mr.Stupak. Have they ever responded? HHS ever respond back?
Dr.Brackett. Well, there was never a response back for
that. What happened in the intervening time is we had other
outbreaks that occurred. In the meantime we had melamene, we
had all of the other things----
Mr.Stupak. Well, wouldn't all these other outbreaks then
reinforce your request to the secretary of HHS that you have
some mandatory standards if you are having more and more
outbreaks? As the problem was growing wouldn't you go with your
strongest recommendation as opposed to not?
Dr.Brackett. Well, I think at that point that was something
that we needed to enter in the discussion. We had no idea
exactly what that meant to our regulation, other than the fact
that there had to be some baseline level of mandatory
protection for our produce.
Mr.Stupak. Was the implementation of $76 million to
implement this program over three years? Was that one of the
reasons why it was rejected?
Dr.Brackett. Well, it wasn't rejected. We presented it
before them. And I asked our staff when we prepared that plan
to put a budget and a timeframe together so that decision
makers would know what it would take to do it right and what
resources would be required in a timely way.
Mr.Stupak. Let me ask you this. We are talking about
regulations here. The Food Safety Inspection Service has
announced plans to change its policy in identifying co-signees
in a food recall, but the rule seems to have become bogged down
in the bureaucracy at the United States Department of
Agriculture and the OMB. Is the industry, Grocery
Manufacturers, fighting the rule and what are the merits and
problems with telling customers that they may have potentially
dangerous food on their shelves?
Dr.Brackett. Well, I have to be honest I am not familiar
with that whole issue. A lot of that happened before I came to
GMA, so I am going to have to defer on that.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Is there someone in your organization who
could comment on that?
Dr.Brackett. There would be, but I am not sure who the best
person is. I can get that information to you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.Stupak. OK. Well, let me ask you one more. A statement
by Mr. Eisenberg bothered some of us on the committee. He told
us in his testimony that twice during 2005 he met with the
senior FDA staff. The second time with Margaret Glavin,
Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, to complain the
FDA was not adequately enforcing its pesticide residue
requirements on snow peas imported from Guatemala. You are
familiar with that?
Dr.Brackett. I--yes.
Mr.Stupak. OK. The testimony goes on to say I presented the
data for 25 samples that they had taken at a retailer in the
greater Miami area during 2004 and analyzed with 13 being
violative of FDA standards. I pleaded with the FDA to take more
surveillance swabs and then to place violative shippers on the
import alert status as they had done in prior years. Even
though the FDA had found a high percentage of violations itself
the result of my pleading was FDA reduced by 50 percent the
number of surveillance samples analyzed. Does this represent
the FDA sort of surrendering in the war against unsafe food
imports from other countries?
Dr.Brackett. No, I don't think it represents surrendering.
I think it really represents a prioritization under limited
resources. Again, having the right amount of resources to both
food safety as well as pesticide analysis. And again, what I
said, making sure that we put some plans in place to make sure
that we can document what is being done in other countries to
make sure that those pesticides are not applied. But again, it
ultimately comes down--and I am not sure why Ms. Glavin made
that decision. But it probably had to do with fact, what are
you going to do with your resources? Are you going to spend it
on something that is immediately public health significance or
something that is a violation, a technical violation, of the
regulation?
Mr.Stupak. Should the FDA--and I am asking you because you
were there for quite awhile. Should the FDA be encouraged to
apply strict liability standards to food processing operations?
Specially should executives be criminally prosecuted for
repeated failures to supply food free of contamination to their
customers?
Dr.Brackett. No, I don't think that that is going to make
the food supply any safer at all. As was stated earlier by some
of the others it is really bad business for companies to be
involved in outbreaks. If, unless of course, the person has
knowingly and wantonly allowed a product to go out in----
Mr.Stupak. Well, what about those cattle today? Downer
cows? So far two people who were at that plant have been
charged. The people working in the yards, but no one higher up
is taking any responsibility for this.
Dr.Brackett. Well, not being familiar with the USDA side,
but I really can't comment other than that they violated the
law and legal action was taken.
Mr.Stupak. OK. I can go a little longer if you want me too.
OK.
I think that should probably conclude this panel for now. I
don't see any other members present. But I should also note for
the record that during our hearing today FDA sent out yet
another recall notice on imported fish products that may be
contaminated with botulism spores. So we have yet another
recall to add to our charts.
And with that I will dismiss this panel. Thank you very
much all of you for being here. Some of you even promised us
some information. We look forward to seeing it as we will
continue our hearings on food and drug safety. With that I will
dismiss this panel. Thank you all for being here.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today and
for their testimony. I asked unanimous consent that the hearing
record will remain open for 30 days for additional questions
for the record. Without objection the record will remain open.
I ask unanimous consent that the contents of our document
binder on the desk there be entered in the record. Without
objection the documents will be entered in the record.
That concludes our hearing. Without objection this meeting
of the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Statement of Hon. Gene Green
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on
food contamination in the private sector. I think it is
important that we continue to have these hearings to address
the issue food contamination in the US.
Each year in the US there are approximately 76 million
cases of foodborne illness and in the past year there have been
numerous high profile food product recalls involving meat,
fish, and vegetables.
This committee has held numerous hearings on the issue of
contaminated food and the safety of our food. These hearings
have continuously highlighted the fact that the FDA and
industry need to do more to make sure our food is safe to eat.
While the hearing today focuses on incidents in private
sector and industry responsibility, I want to point out that
the FDA needs to improve their food inspection system. I
believe that many of the outbreaks that have recently occurred
can be directly linked to a poor inspection system.
During these hearings on food safety, I have spoken many
times of the need for more FDA inspectors at our ports. I
represent the Port of Houston and I actually spent one day on
the docks as they unloaded cargo and saw how the products are
inspected.
It is clear to me that the FDA does not have enough
inspectors to inspect the food and products that are entering
our country.
If the FDA needs to hire third party inspectors or partner
with another agency like the Department of Agriculture, then
the FDA should do so to ensure product safety.
It is our responsibility to make sure that the FDA has the
resources it needs to protect us from contaminated food
products. We can't point out the problem without offering some
solution as well.
If we need to provide more funding to allow the FDA to do
its job then we should do just that. Consumers should be able
to purchase food without having to worry about botulism, E.
coli, salmonella, or pesticides in their food.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
committee today and thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this
hearing. I yield back my time.
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