[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT: MARITIME DOMAIN
AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 26, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-88
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
AL GREEN, Texas PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Alison Rosso, Director
Denise Krepp, Counsel
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress, and
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterrorism.................................................. 1
The Honorable Gus. M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress
from the State................................................. 2
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and CEO, The Mariner Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Colonel William H. Janes (U.S. Army, Ret.) Director, Florida
Office of Drug Control and Assistant Secretary, Substance Abuse
and Mental Health, Department of Children and Families:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Captain Karl Schultz, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Miami
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
For the Record
Dr. Fran Bohnsack, Executive Director, Miami River Marine Group:
Preapred Statement............................................. 24
HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING
----------
Monday, November 26, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., at
Miami City Hall, 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, Florida, Hon.
Loretta Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez and Bilirakis.
Ms. Sanchez. Good afternoon. I am pleased that this
Subcommittee is able to hold this Field Hearing in Miami, and I
would like to start by thanking Congressman Bilirakis for his
interest in this hearing, and to thank our witnesses today for
agreeing to testify, especially at the end of a Thanksgiving
holiday. Thank you for being here.
And I would also like to thank the City of Miami for
allowing us to use this space today to hold the hearing.
Maritime security is an incredibly important priority for
this Subcommittee. In fact, it is carried in our name. Our
nation's maritime ports play a critical role in America's
economy, and in our day-to-day lives for many of us.
But, as we have gone to take a look at different ports
this past year in particular, we have come across the
realization that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to
our port security. Every port that I have visited has been
incredibly interesting, and yet very diverse than the last one
I had been to.
Of course, the ports that I am most familiar with are the
Long Beach/Los Angeles ports, the largest system that we have
here in our nation. But, again, they have different challenges,
and opportunities, than the rest of the ports that we have here
in the United States. So it was a really great visit this
morning at the Port of Miami, take a look at the particulars
for that port.
And I want to thank everyone at the Port of Miami, Miami-
Dade County, the Coast Guard, our customs and border
protection, and all the related parties that helped us this
morning with respect to taking a look at the particulars of the
Port of Miami.
One of the distinctive characteristics of the Port of Miami
is the high volume of cruise ship vessel traffic, which has
earned the port this distinction of The Cruise Capital of the
World.
In addition to cruise ships, the Port of Miami is also the
largest container port here in Florida. And, given the diverse
vessel traffic at the Port of Miami, and the significant
pleasure boat presence in the region, this is a perfect place
to frame a discussion about Maritime Domain Awareness, or what
we call MDA, and Vessel Tracking.
MDA is an effective understanding of anything associated
with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, the
safety, the economy, or the environment of the United States.
And achieving and maintaining full Maritime Domain Awareness at
any port is a challenge, in particular here in Miami. And that
is one of the reasons why, for a long time now, I have been
wanting to come here and take a look at this port in
particular. Especially because of the small pleasure craft that
are here, and what it means to our country.
Remember that this Subcommittee not only does maritime, it
does all egress and ingress into this nation. And from that
standpoint, the type of people who come through here, through
Miami, through the coastal waters of Florida in particular are
of a great concern for us. We need to understand how best it is
that we protect our coastal--our shores from people and
contraband coming in.
And I say that because, while our focus, in a large
respect, from this Subcommittee and, of course, the Congress
and even America right now, is about people crossing our land
borders. The fact of the matter is, we have a lot more maritime
coastal borders than land borders to this United States. And we
have not really focused on that aspect.
And as we tighten up those land borders, people will find
different ways, or find the weaker link, to get in to the
United States. And this will be a big challenge, especially for
this area, Florida, and for Miami in particular.
I am interested in the collaboration between the Coast
Guard and The Mariner Group to enhance situational awareness in
the emergency response at Miami Sector Command Center.
And another issue that I think is very important for
maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness is the vessel
tracking systems. And I am concerned about whether the Coast
Guard and the ports have sufficient and accessible vessel
tracking capabilities. So I look forward to you, to our
witnesses discussing some of these and some of the other issues
related to the Maritime Domain Awareness.
And now, the Chair would like to recognize the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis----
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. --for an opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you
holding this hearing here today, particularly having to travel
all the way across the country to be here. You truly are a
great Chairperson, and I really am honored to serve under you.
I would also like to welcome you to the State of Florida. I
look forward to discussing the Maritime Domain Awareness and
Vessel Tracking by the United States Coast Guard.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here
today, and I look forward to your testimony.
The Florida district I represent includes the portions of
Clearwater, Tarpon Springs, Palm Harbor, and the Gulf Coast of
Pasco County, including New Port Richey, and also Hillsborough
County, where the Port of Tampa is located.
The people in my district understand firsthand the
important of maritime security. And I am very interested in the
progress being made by the Coast Guard, specifically in
tracking small boats, sharing intelligence, and establishing a
common operating picture.
To improve Maritime Domain Awareness, the Coast Guard must
be able to effectively locate, identify, and track maritime
targets of interest in U.S. waters and beyond.
The Safe Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security, requires him to develop and implement a long-range
automated vessel tracking system. To coordinate the Coast
Guard's vessel tracking program, the law authorized funding for
the creation of an Inter-agency Command Centers at all major
U.S. ports. The Vessel Tracking System would feed these command
centers using a common operating picture to insure that inter-
agency assets receive proper notice and have adequate time to
respond to inbound waterborne threats.
During today's hearing, I want to get a better
understanding of the Coast Guard's operational capabilities to
track approaching vessels. I would also like to examine what
the Coast Guard is doing to address the increasing small boat
threat.
It is critical that the Coast Guard be able to identify,
track, and analyze daily unreported threats, such as small
vessels smuggling terrorists, weapons, illegal narcotics, and
illegal aliens.
I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today,
especially Colonel Bill Janes, who can offer unique insight
into the impact of narcotics smuggling into the State of
Florida, and help us identify ways to improve drug interdiction
capabilities and information sharing.
I am especially interested in his testimony, and would like
to express my appreciation for Bill's participation here today.
Colonel Janes. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Integration and coordination across federal,
state, and local operations strategies and tactics is critical
to the Coast Guard's strategic mission.
And I want to thank Madam Chair again for having this
hearing. I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and I
would just like to put on the record that when I spoke to the
gentleman about doing a port visit down here to Miami, he said
that would be great, but Tampa would be better. So I just want
to put that in the record, because I know that he has asked,
and maybe--maybe when we get to--we will get to it, but I know
that you are looking out for your constituents.
Okay. So, normally, our witnesses would be in front of us,
but we will have to sort of lean over and look at you. If I
send in a bill for my neck, I will let you know. But it is
great to have you up here on the dais with us.
And let me welcome you and give a little background on each
of you, and then we will listen to your testimony.
Our first witness is Captain Karl Schultz. He is the
Commander of Coast Guard Sector of Miami. And the Captain
reports to Sector Miami from the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University, where he completed a one-year research
fellowship in National Security Studies. And from July, 2003 to
July of 2005, Captain Schultz served as Commanding Officer
aboard the United States Coast Guard Cutter Venturous, leading
diverse counter-drug, alien migrant interdiction, search and
rescue, and humanitarian operations in the maritime approaches
to the southeastern United States and throughout the Caribbean
Basin.
Captain Schultz has served in numerous other afloat and
ashore assignments since graduating from the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy in 1983.
Our second witness is Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and
CEO of The Mariner Group, a software company focused on
Homeland Security with particular emphasis in Maritime Domain
Awareness.
His current MDA efforts include working with the Department
of Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard's
Research and Development Center on the United States Coast
Guard Sector Command Centers of the future visualization and
response applications for Enhanced Watch-Stander Situational
Awareness Project. That is a long name there.
And our third and final witness is Colonel, U.S. Army
Retired, William Janes, Director, Florida Officer of Drug
Control. And he served in the U.S. Army for 24 years, commanded
at the Company, Battalion, and the Brigade levels.
We welcome all of you.
Oh, and after leaving the military, he was a counselor, a
manager, and Executive Director for the Drug Abuse
Comprehensive Coordinated Office in Tampa for ten years. And
from 2002 to 2006, he served as the Director, National
Terrorism Preparedness Institute at St. Petersburg College.
Welcome to all three of the gentlemen.
And without objection, the witnesses' full statements,
which they turned in, will be inserted in the record. And I
will now ask each of the witnesses to summarize his statement
for five minutes, beginning with Captain Schultz.
And let us know what you think we need to know about, and
maybe if you can address some of the issues in our opening
statements. For five minutes.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL SCHULTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. COAST GUARD
SECTOR MIAMI
Captain Schultz. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and
distinguished members of the Committee, Congressman Bilirakis.
It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast
Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South
Florida, and to address your specific questions pertaining to
vessel tracking and domain awareness.
As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I
have several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the
region's Federal maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and
Rescue Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine
Inspection; and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
To provide some context on the scope of Sector Miami's
maritime security workload, I note that the Sector is
responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles of
southeast Florida coastline. Within this region, there are five
seaports, collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel
arrivals. The region is home to two of three of the largest
cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4 million
passengers passing through each, Port Everglades and Port of
Miami, which you toured earlier today.
Additionally, more than 2 million shipping containers and
20 percent of Florida's gasoline and petroleum products
servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these same
ports.
Within our area of responsibility, the Coast Guard
regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act
facilities.
Our maritime security mission requirements are quite
complex, as we focus on securing our port and coastal waterways
against potential terrorist activities, as well as persistent
threats from illegal migrants, drugs and other commodities
trafficked via maritime means.
Miami is known as the Gateway to the Americas, and the
proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to
international points or origin or trans-ship for illegal
migrant and illicit narcotics smuggling, presents significant
operational challenges. The maritime border is complex, and
requires an integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism,
and immigration. We are committed to striking an optimal
balance between trade, travel, and security in all that we do.
The Committee's invitation noted, as you mentioned, Madam
Chairwoman, the specific interest in Maritime Domain Awareness
and Vessel Tracking. And I think, because of its importance, I
will restate exactly what Maritime Domain Awareness is. It is,
in fact, as you stated, the effective understanding of anything
associated with global maritime domain that could affect
safety, security, the economy, or the environment, and it is
essential to Sector Miami and our ability to accomplish our
broad portfolio of missions.
MDA supports all Coast Guard missions, and, more
specifically, our tactical, operational, and strategic
decision-making. MDA integrated global maritime intelligence
with global maritime situational awareness, and requires
collaboration across all layers of government, and with the
private sector, and with international stakeholders.
Miami, interestingly enough, is home of the Coast Guard's
first Sector Command, which was established back in 2004. And
our Sector Command Center serves as a site for two significant
Maritime Domain Awareness-related pilot projects. These are
conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate.
The first, Project Hawkeye, is a limited sensor network
that integrates radar, cameras, and automatic identification
system, or AIS, data feeds to provide automated vessel tracking
data, and port activity monitoring capability to our Command
Center watch-standers.
The second, the Visualization and Response Tools Project,
which you also mentioned, is a proof-of-concept effort designed
to help us understand how to visualize a tactical situation and
the security posture of the seaport by correlating sensor and
automated vessel tracking information with advanced
notification of arrival information and other port activities
and data sources.
These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's
proposed acquisition project called Command 21, and give the
Sector important perspective and visibility on the wide array
of threats to the maritime domain here in South Florida.
There is still a long way to go in managing all the
information required to support our daily operations and our
daily decision-making. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels
through programs like the Nationwide Automatic Identification
System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process, and the forthcoming
International Maritime Organizations Long Range Identification
and Tracking Initiative, which you mentioned, Congressman
Bilirakis, is just the start.
The small boat threat, for example, continues to present
technological and policy challenges, and remains a primary
maritime security concern, particularly in our area, where we
have over 100,000 registered recreational vessels just in Palm
Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties alone.
Collaboration across all layers of government, federal,
state, and local, as well as with the private sector and
international stakeholders is essential to achieve meaningful
MDA and, in turn, address the myriad of threats in our domain.
We work hard in southeast Florida to ensure interagency
collaboration, and insure that collaboration informs and
improves our layered approach to maritime security.
Coordinating bodies such as our Area Maritime Security
Committee and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of
Florida's Regional Domestic Security Task Force, which here
locally brings 100-plus first responder agencies together in a
coordinating framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and
operational coordination.
Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and
Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task
Force, as well as state and local agencies, private maritime
organizations such as CLIA, local shippers, the ports, terminal
operators, industry groups, these are all critical to the
success of our cooperation and that integration in the region.
The Sector Miami team works diligently to insure our
maritime borders and seaports are as secure as possible given
our available capabilities and resources. We place continuous
emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying
new technologies, and on delivering operational excellence in
all that we do.
We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale,
and are grateful for your interest in our operations.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I have
submitted my written statement for the record, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Karl L. Schultz
Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of
Coast Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South
Florida, and to address your specific interests in maritime domain
awareness and vessel tracking. I am grateful for your interest in our
unique operating environment and pleased to welcome you here.
As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have
several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the region's Federal
Maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission
Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal
On-Scene Coordinator. The Sector focuses on two major operational
processes--PREVENTION and RESPONSE--in support of our service's five
fundamental roles: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Maritime
Mobility, the Protection of Natural Resources, and National Defense.
The seaports in Sector Miami's Captain of the Port zone are located
on shared-use waterways in densely populated areas. To provide some
context on the scope of Sector Miami's maritime security workload, I
note that the Sector is responsible for all Coast Guard missions
spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline and encompassing
numerous counties. Within this region there are five ports,
collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The
region is home to two of the three largest cruise ship ports in the
world, with nearly 4 million passengers moving through both Port
Everglades and the Port of Miami annually. Additionally, more than 2
million shipping containers (TEUs) and 20% of Florida's gasoline and
petroleum products servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these
ports. The region is also home to 2 nuclear power plants, and the local
commercial fleet includes 370 small passenger vessels. There are also
170,000 registered recreational boats in Palm Beach, Miami Dade and
Broward counties alone. Within our Area of Responsibility, the Coast
Guard regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act
facilities.
Our maritime security mission requirements, while only a subset of
our broader Coast Guard responsibilities, are quite complex as we focus
on securing our port and coastal waterways against potential terrorist
activities as well as potentially persistent threats from illegal
migrants, drugs and other commodities and implements trafficked via
maritime means. Miami is known as the ``Gateway to the Americas,'' and
the proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to international
origination or trans-shipment points for illegal migrant and illicit
narcotic smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. To be
certain, the maritime border is a complex national border requiring and
integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism and immigration. We
are committed to striking an optimal balance among trade, travel and
security in all that we do.
The Committee's invitation noted a specific interest in the areas
of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking. These issues
are relevant to Sector Miami and I am pleased to speak to them. MDA, or
the effective understanding of anything associated with the global
maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the economy or the
environment, is essential to the Sector's ability to accomplish its
broad portfolio of missions, including seaport and border security,
maritime safety, search and rescue, marine environmental protection,
and the facilitation of maritime commerce. Indeed, MDA supports all
Coast Guard mission areas, and more specifically, our tactical,
operational and strategic decision-making. MDA integrates global
maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness and
requires collaboration across all layers of government (federal/state/
local), the private sector, and with international stakeholders.
Miami is home to the Coast Guard's first Sector Command,
established in 2004. The Sector Command Center (SCC) coordinates Coast
Guard resources applied to the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions
found in Southeast Florida and serves as the hub, or central nervous
system, of the command. Sector Miami's SCC is also the site for two
significant MDA-related pilot projects conducted jointly with the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. The
first, ``Project Hawkeye,'' is a limited sensor network that integrates
radar, cameras and Automatic Identification System data (AIS) to
provide automated vessel tracking data and port activity monitoring
capability to the SCC. The second, the Visualization and Response Tools
project, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us understand
how to visualize the tactical situation and security posture of the
seaport by correlating sensor and automated vessel tracking information
with advanced notification of arrival information and other port
activity. These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's
proposed acquisition project called ``Command 21,'' and give the Sector
important perspective and visibility on a wide array of threats to the
maritime domain. The Command 21 project is conceptually designed to
provide port-level MDA and to highlight information gaps to provide
Sector Commanders with the ability to synthesize MDA information in the
SCC and to further share that information with federal, state and local
partners.
There is still a long way to go in managing all the information
required to support daily operations and decision-making. Tracking
large, ocean-going vessels through programs like the National Automatic
Identification System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process and the
forthcoming International Maritime Organization's Long Range
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) is just the start. The small boat
threat, for example, continues to present technology and policy
challenges and remains a primary maritime security concern,
particularly in the Sector Miami area of operations where, as I
mentioned earlier, we have over 170,000 registered recreational boats.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, we are working closely with
CBP to expand our efforts to secure the small maritime craft
environment.
Collaboration across all layers of government (federal, state and
local), as well as with the private sector and international
stakeholders is essential to achieving meaningful MDA and in turn
addressing the myriad of threats in the maritime domain. We work hard
in Southeast Florida to ensure interagency collaboration informs and
improves our layered approach to maritime security. Coordinating bodies
such as our Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) and its active
subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida's Southeast Regional
Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF-SE), which brings more than 100
first responder agencies together in a coordinating framework, are
pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination. Key
partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task Force; as well as state
and local agencies and private maritime organizations including the
Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), local shippers, terminal
operators and other industry groups are critical to the success of our
cooperation and integration in the region.
In my estimation, Sector Miami's focus on a risk-based approach to
layered maritime security is serving Southeast Florida well. The Sector
Miami team of active duty, reserve, civilian employees and Coast Guard
Auxiliarists (our volunteers) works diligently to ensure our maritime
border and seaports are as secure as possible given available
capabilities and resources. At Sector Miami, we place continuous
emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new
technologies and on delivering operational excellence in all that we
do. We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale and again
grateful for your interest in our operations.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.
And I now recognize Mr. Dryden to summarize his statement
for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN DRYDEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE MARINER
GROUP
Mr. Dryden. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman,
Congressman Bilirakis. I am Steve Dryden, CEO of The Mariner
Group. It is an honor to appear here today and talk about the
MDA and Vessel Tracking.
My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the
Coast Guard over the last three years to significantly improve
MDA and situational response. My goal is to basically review
the overall project mission, take you through the challenges we
have encountered, and then, at the end of this, is to also urge
full support of the Safe Port Act and the funding that has
already been put in for the President to sign.
As you know, the Safe Port Act directs the Coast Guard to
establish Interagency Operations Centers for enhancing port
security at locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is
working with the Coast Guard through the Visualization Tools
for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response, which is a
mouthful, I agree.
As part of the project, Mariner software application,
Command Bridge, has been employed as the primary underlying
technology to increase domain awareness in Sector Command
Center Miami.
I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I
believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to
insure safety and security.
Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more
important than gaining actionable situation awareness. In a
Coast Guard Command Center, or any complex border
infrastructure or transportation environment, watch-standers
must maintain an understanding of what is going on at all
times, while simultaneously working to predict and prevent
ever-changing threats.
The work of this Committee and the government as a whole
has allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in
maritime and other security areas. And more and more data is
being generated to help users make decisions. But an unintended
consequence of this is massive amounts of data, and the user
becomes overloaded with too much information. So it is harder
to focus on particular, important information.
Simply put, it is harder to find the needle in the haystack
when the haystack keeps getting bigger and bigger.
The goal of the Viz Tools Projects is to inform decision-
makers and then enable them to take action to prevent incidents
and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program
places strong emphasis on providing operational end-users with
the technology, the capabilities to detect and prevent
terrorist attack, counteract illegal activities, and to help
manage those response-related actions.
The project was funded by DHS S&T in collaboration with the
Coast Guard R&D Center. It is currently an operational
prototype in Sector Miami, here.
Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data,
better analyze that data to create knowledge, and then create
more effective ways to visualize and act upon the knowledge,
then disseminate that information internally to the Coast Guard
and well as externally to port partners.
Overall, the project objectives include develop and
maintain an accurate situational picture, identify threats
rapidly without the need for extensive manpower, and then plan
and manage those stages of response.
Prior to Viz Tools, watch-standers had to manually achieve
situational awareness by monitoring information from a lot of
sources, such as radar, the harbor pilots, internal Coast Guard
systems, weather, and there was just a litany of systems that
had to be identified and looked at all the time.
Getting true situational awareness requires advanced
technology that can focus on meaningful, relevant information.
Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefit,
but also can contribute to an overload, negatively affecting
the situation.
The Viz Tools Project not only fuses information from many
sources, it also analyzes the combined information for
anomalies, and then presents meaningful, actionable knowledge
without the clutter.
These capabilities keep the watch-stander focused on what
is important, while delivering the right information to the
right person at the right time.
We are making great stride, but critical gaps still need to
be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of developing
regional security should be properly incorporated into these
Interagency Command Centers.
Number one, the integration of cargo and vessel
information. Two, better sensor technology installed to track
small boats and non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to
spoof or turn off AIS transponders.
The current state of technology in ports today is really--
really falls short in their ability to do this.
Emerging projects such as DHS has with the Coast Guard, one
is called the Automated Scene Understanding Project, which is
showing a lot of potential benefit, and needs to be examined
more.
We need to foster a better sense of coordination with local
law enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security
in instant response.
We need to be able to conduct longer range vessel tracking
of transits that are out there, not necessarily headed to and
from the port, but are actually out there in the vicinity.
And lastly, we need to integrate information in response-
related activities related to high-interest, critical
facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard, but they
may be on, adjacent to, over or under U.S. navigable waters.
In conclusion, I would recommend that you and your
Committee provide full funding for the Safe Port Act
requirements. The President budget recommends only minimal
funding for the Command 21 Program. Fortunately, with your
leadership, Madam Chairman and Congressman Bilirakis, the House
has chosen to include $40,000,000 for the Command 21 Program,
and the Senate has proposed 60,000,000 in 2008 funding.
It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall behind
another year in this program. In my view, facilitating regional
maritime security coordination and response may be the most
important and the most difficult challenge we face in the
larger area of port security.
Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you
today, and giving me the opportunity to talk before you.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Dryden
Good afternoon Madame Chairwoman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. I am Steve Dryden, Chief Executive Officer of The Mariner
Group. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking.
My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the US Coast
Guard over the past three years to significantly improve MDA and
response throughout the nation. My goals today are to inform you of the
overall project mission, the challenges encountered in gaining true
MDA, and lastly, to urge support for full funding of the Safe Port Act
of 2006.
As you know, the Safe Port Act of 2006 directs the Coast Guard to
establish interagency operations centers for enhancing port security at
locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with the
Coast Guard through their Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness
and Emergency Response, or ``Viz Tools'', for Sector Command Centers to
help in this effort. As part of this project, Mariner's software
application, CommandBridge, has been employed as the primary underlying
technology to increase Maritime Domain Awareness at the Sector Command
Center--Miami. I would like to take a few minutes to share with you
what I believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to
ensure the safety and security of U.S. waters.
Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important
than gaining Actionable Situation Awareness. ``Situation awareness is
the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of
their status in the near future.'' \1\ In a Coast Guard command center,
or any highly complex border, infrastructure, or transportation
environment, watch standers must maintain an understanding of what is
going on at all times while simultaneously working to predict and
prevent ever changing threats.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered
Design by Mica R. Endsley,, Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones.
\2\ See Attachment ``The Mariner Group''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The work of this committee, and the government as a whole, has
allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime or
other homeland security areas, and more and more data is being
generated to help users make decisions. As examples, technologies
including RADAR, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems, and
perimeter detection systems have been implemented throughout our ports.
But an unintended consequence of massive amounts of data is that users
are overloaded with that data, making it harder to focus on the most
important information. Simply put, it's harder to find the needle-in-
the-haystack when the haystack keeps getting larger.
The goal of the Viz Tools project is to inform decision makers and
enable them to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately
coordinate incident response. The program places strong emphasis on
providing operational end-users with the technology and capabilities to
detect and prevent terrorist attacks, counteract illegal activities,
and to help manage response related actions.
The project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security
Science & Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) in collaboration with the
Coast Guard R&D Center and Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL). The
system is currently operational as a prototype in District Seven at the
Coast Guard's Sector Command Center in Miami. Viz Tools uses advanced
methods to collect and fuse data, better analyze the data to create
knowledge, create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the
knowledge, and disseminates information internally to the Coast Guard
and their appropriate partners.
Viz Tools' overall project objectives are to:
Develop and maintain an accurate situational picture;
Assimilate relevant sensor data and couple it with
amplifying information;
Identify threats rapidly without the need for
extensive manpower;
Comprehend the nature and gravity of the emerging
threat;
Maximize Blue Force Assets, operational capacity, and
readiness to offset the threat; and
Plan and manage the stages of emergency response.
Prior to Viz Tools, watch standers had to manually achieve
situation awareness by monitoring information from numerous sources
such as RADAR screens, harbor pilot websites, messaging, commercial
information sources, weather systems, internal Coast Guard systems,
etc.
Gaining true actionable situation awareness requires advanced
technology that can focus the user on meaningful, relevant information.
Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefits but can
also contribute to sensory overload negatively affecting the situation.
Viz Tools not only fuses information from many diverse sources, it also
analyzes the combined information for anomalies and then presents
meaningful, actionable knowledge without the ancillary clutter. These
capabilities keep the watch stander focused on what's important while
delivering the right information to the right person at the right time.
Viz Tools enables the Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies,
and Port Partners the ability to understand their current situation by
providing them the most relevant, actionable information and
implementing the most appropriate security protocols. Currently
envisioned, Viz Tools will promote the ability to leverage current
technology programs and allow easy adaption of additional technologies
as port security needs evolve.
Let me give you an illustration: If a container ship is heading for
the Port of Miami, Viz Tools tracks its progress. Before it has entered
the area, Viz Tools analyzes all relevant information, assessing
anomalies, safety, and terrorist potential. Information from the Coast
Guard, port authorities, harbor pilots, Lloyd's Register, and other
vital sources pour in, creating a federated view. In addition, we will
be working to incorporate information on cargo sensitivity with
relevant information collected about the vessel.
Correlating and verifying all information, Viz Tools can apply
anomaly detection to monitor information such as changes in ownership,
manifest discrepancies, inconsistent arrival information, and other
intelligence as it becomes available. These anomalies automatically
display on the user's screen as an alert that necessitates immediate
action. In addition, Viz Tools currently allows the Coast Guard to
maintain operational control such as alerting the watch stander that a
vessel operating under restriction has begun to move. Based upon the
situation, the watch stander can use Viz Tools to automatically contact
the appropriate resource to instigate an intervention, detaining the
ship until it achieves an all-clear status. Over time, Viz Tools will
evolve to incorporate changing security scenarios by assembling a
growing portfolio of alert circumstances and therefore continuously
increasing port security. While we are making great strides, critical
gaps still need to be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of
developing regional maritime security should properly be incorporated
into the interagency command centers, including:
1. The integration of cargo and vessel information into Viz
Tools.
2. Better sensor technology installed to track small boats and
non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off
required AIS transponders. The current state of technology in
today's ports falls short in their ability to track non-
cooperative vessels and small boats. For example, a vessel may
be deemed non-cooperative if its Automatic Identification
System (AIS) tracking isn't turned on. Small boats that don't
have AIS tracking technology are also a potential threat.
Emerging projects such as DHS S&T / USCG R&D Center's Automated
Scene Understanding project offers the potential to mitigate
this shortfall.
3. Foster a better sense of coordination with local law
enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security and
incident response.
4. Ability to conduct longer range vessel tracking of transits.
5. Integrate information and response related activities
related to high-interest, critical facilities that are not
regulated by the Coast Guard that are on, adjacent to, over, or
under, U.S. navigable waters.
In conclusion, I would also recommend that you and your committee
provide full funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The
President's Budget recommends only minimal funding for the Command/21
program. Fortunately, with your leadership Madame Chairman and
Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include $40 million
dollars for the Command/21 program, and the Senate has proposed $60
million in 2008 funding. It will be critical to ensure that we do not
fall behind another year on this program. In my view, facilitating
regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most
important and most difficult challenge that we face in the larger area
of port security.
Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you today
and for giving me the opportunity to talk to you about Maritime Domain
Awareness and Vessel Tracking I'm proud to be associated with this
project and am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Attachment
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Dryden. And I thank you for
your testimony.
And I now recognize Colonel, is it Janes or Jannis?
Colonel Janes. Janes.
Ms. Sanchez. Janes. Okay. Colonel Janes, to summarize your
statement for five minutes or less, please.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM G. JANES, (U.S. ARMY, RET.),
DIRECTOR, FLORIDA OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL STATEMENT OF KARL
SCHULTZ
Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership;
Congressman Bilirakis, for your outstanding leadership in
Florida and terrific support of my office; fellow panelists. I
am delighted to testify.
On behalf of Governor Charlie Crist and the state, port,
and community leaders involved in the combined efforts to
secure our ports, Florida, and our nation from a transportation
security incident, drug trafficking, I thank Congress, and
particularly this Subcommittee, for the opportunity to talk
about our ports, particularly Florida ports, the global supply
chain, and how to protect the citizens of Florida.
In terms of geography demography, Florida has many features
which make it exceptionally attractive for drug trafficking
organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an
extremely diverse population with strong representation from
the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico.
Florida has approximately 1350 miles of largely unprotected
continental coastline, and the Florida Keys archipelago, that
lies astride some of the major drug trafficking routes into the
United States.
During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the
daunting task of seaport security. We began initially focused
on crime, cargo theft, drug trafficking, but expanded to
terrorism after the horrific events of 9/11.
Our emergency responders in ports are superbly trained and
prepared for an incident, but, most importantly, to prevent it.
We have implemented Regional Domestic Security Task Forces
across our state to respond to an all-hazards threat.
Most states have two to three ports to secure. Florida has
14 deep, public deepwater seaports. Our coastlines are dotted
with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas
and ports engaged in intra--as well as interstate and
international business. These present horrific challenges to
secure from drug trafficking.
Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports,
even as we better secure them from a transportation security
incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is a
primary concern for our governor, congressional delegation,
legislators, and citizens.
The challenge of securing Florida ports, Madam Chair, you
noted with the differences in port governance, organizational
structure, geography, law enforcement support, labor issues,
fundamental funding mechanisms, and commercial operations.
Drug trafficking is now recognized as a nexus for
terrorism. Drug trafficking is facilitated when cargo volume
exceeds monitoring capabilities. Vessels remain for lengthy
stays; access control is superficial; physical security is
limited; security planning is incomplete; law enforcement
presence is inadequate; and information security is poor.
Our security standards address these as best we can at this
point.
Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major
illegal maritime activity. Certainly, heroin moves in large
quantities through Florida. Columbians continue to dominate
drug and money laundering operations. However, Jamaican,
Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact
drug trafficking in Florida.
In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels, with
27,204 commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. Monitoring these
would not be unlike trying to secure a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device in one of our major cities. These vast numbers
of watercraft, combined with superb navigational technology,
greatly assist small vessel drug smugglers moving into Florida.
Specifically, you asked me to address vulnerabilities. I
believe the drug trafficking vulnerabilities include a regional
threat versus a state response. Drug trafficking is
international, yet our response is often local, to a sheriff,
local law enforcement. We need a regional response that
includes adjacent states, waterways, air, land, and sea
approaches. There are inadequate resources at the federal,
state, and local level to address the volume of drug
trafficking that occurs in our state and across our nation.
As you indicated, the shift of emphasis to the southwest
border will push resources to this corridor again. Arguably,
that happened as we moved them away from this corridor ten to
fifteen years ago, but a lot of those resources have been
diverted to the war in Iraq.
Internal conspiracies present a threat, where a vessel
crew, passenger, stevedores, checkers, anyone, can be involved
in the lucrative business of drug trafficking.
There is a tension between commerce and security. Security
costs these ports great amounts of dollars, yet it is very
important. Security can slow commerce. These tensions have to
be addressed.
Poor information sharing. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence
sharing was well documented. Law enforcement sharing of
information today is impeded with privacy concerns. Though very
important, have to be addressed as law enforcement background
information and other intelligence is shared.
There is imprecise tracking of cargo, which presents
problems. Federal and state planning must be enhanced into
local planning, regional planning that is unified.
The law enforcement response must be preventive, proactive.
Historically, our law enforcement have responded to criminal
activity, investigated, traced the source all the way back, in
some cases, to a drug trafficking organization. We must become
proactive.
There is a nexus between drug traffic and transportation
security incidents, but I don't believe it is operationalized
today.
We should be sharing lessons learned, best practices.
Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. The current
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, has not
been aligned with the Florida Credential adequately; we are not
sharing information.
How to close these vulnerabilities. Fix responsibility for
regional, state planning, that includes air, land, sea, and
geographic areas I mentioned. Develop regional counter-
terrorism and counter-drug strategies. Produce a regional drug
threat analysis. State-wide drug threat analyses do not exist
today. We believe we will have the first truly state-wide drug
assessment next year.
We must share information from law enforcement; involve our
port directors and port security staff in intelligence
information sharing on a daily basis; include them in
operations; prioritize Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos,
which has been an interdiction resource in past years, that
reduction in resources has affected that.
Finally, include a national plan with regional emphasis
and, for me, of course, a state-wide focus.
Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security
among our great partners throughout the country. We have
implemented one of our nation's first drug control strategies.
Your hearing today enables us to unify these systems. I am
honored to have the opportunity to present this testimony,
which is expanded in my written comments.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Janes
Good afternoon, it is my distinct honor to testify before the
esteemed members of the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism. On behalf of Florida
Governor Charlie Crist and state and community leaders involved in our
combined efforts to secure Florida and our Nation from a transportation
security incident and drug trafficking, I thank Congress and, in
particular, this committee for the high level of interest in protecting
our nation's ports, the global supply chain, and the citizens of
Florida. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today.
Specifically, today I will address, per Congressman Gus Bilirakis'
request, the diversity of Florida's ports, my assessment of vessel
tracking initiatives, critical maritime vulnerabilities as they impact
Florida, observations regarding narcotics smuggling, and challenges we
currently face.
Background
In terms of geography and demography, Florida has many features
which make it exceptionally attractive to drug trafficking
organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely
diverse population with strong representation from the Caribbean Basin,
Central and South America, and Mexico. Additionally, Florida has
approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline
and the Florida Keys archipelago (that lie astride some of the major
drug-trafficking routes into the United States), geographical proximity
to ``source'' countries, and strong cultural ties to countries
throughout the region. Florida's international ports of entry must,
therefore, be considered critical in the national as well as regional
counter-terrorism/counter-drug efforts. Importantly, our counter-
terrorism and counter-drug efforts must be considered concurrently in
any threat assessment or response planning.
During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the
daunting task of seaport security. Florida's ports have long been
regarded as among the most secure in the nation. Our state and local
partnerships are strong; our security standards are well understood;
and the implementation of security planning is effective. Our emergency
responders are superbly trained having faced the horrific hurricanes in
recent years. We are ahead of the nation in developing a biometric port
access credential, which if supported by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) can be implemented immediately. We have
implemented an aggressive all hazards, counter-terrorism response
concept with seven (7) Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF)
encompassing all of our state including our seaports and a statewide
Domestic Security Oversight Board. Since September 11, 2001, we have
expanded our prevention, preparedness, response, and crisis management
capabilities to address terrorism in addition to our initial focus on
crime, cargo theft, and drug trafficking.
Most states have two or three ports to secure; Florida has fourteen
(14) public deepwater seaports. In addition, our coastline is dotted
with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas and ports
engaged in intra-state as well as inter-state and international
business. Florida is home to four of the busiest container ports in the
nation, and the top three cruise ports in the world. These ports
operate within an exceptionally complex inter-modal transport system
that must be carefully considered in counterterrorism and counter-drug
operations and planning. Florida enjoys a vibrant and growing economic
benefit from these points of entry. Ensuring the continued growth and
prosperity of our ports, even as we better secure them from a
transportation security incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal
activity is of primary concern to Governor Crist, our Congressional
Delegation, our legislators, and the citizens of Florida.
The challenge to the security of Florida's seaports is exacerbated
by the noteworthy differences from port to port. Each is quite
different from the others in terms of parameters of the establishing
charter of the port, governance, organizational structure, geography,
law enforcement support, labor base, funding mechanisms, and commercial
operations. Some provide a full range of cargo and cruise operations.
Others offer only specific types of cargo and/or cruise operations.
Such diversity may well be regarded as a key contributor to the state's
overall economic posture, but it also significantly complicates efforts
to standardize security preparedness.
Florida is well served by the Florida Ports Council, the Florida
Seaport Transportation Economic Development (FSTED) Council and the top
management in each of Floridas deepwater ports. They comprise a
community of highly skilled, dedicated, and professional public
servants, who are integral in maintaining the balance between commerce
and security on our ports. They provide strategic input for the
planning, security, and operations of our ports. I am also privileged
to chair the legislatively-mandated Seaport Security Standards Council,
which is charged to review the existing minimum seaport security
standards. This council has also provided an effective forum for
discussion of concerns and issues for Florida ports and tenant
agencies.
Illegal Drug Trafficking (Includes Drug Smuggling)
As mentioned earlier, the nexus between terrorism and drug
trafficking is now well established. However, the nature of the drug
trafficking threat is substantially different from a terrorist act.
Rather than a major, horrific event or events that typify a terrorist
act, drug trafficking is ongoing. Drug-trafficking is facilitated when
cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities, vessels remain for
lengthy stays, access control is superficial, physical security is
limited, security planning is incomplete, law enforcement presence is
inadequate, or information security is poor. Accordingly, Florida's
minimum security standards emphasize strong access control, law
enforcement presence, effective operational guidelines and plans, cargo
tracking by tenant partners, and other countermeasures. Despite Florida
leading the nation in port security, we remain concerned with our
ability to prevent large quantities of drugs from entering our state.
Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal
maritime activity. The fact that our cocaine drug overdose rate has
climbed steadily in recent years provide indisputable evidence that
cocaine is still available in abundant quantities. Drug trafficking
organizations impacting Florida are largely international. Their
distribution schemes include multi-state transportation and
distribution of illicit drugs at the wholesale level. They supply local
drug market areas with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA (Ecstasy),
diverted pharmaceuticals and methamphetamine. These illicit drugs vary
in demand across Florida as evidenced by higher demand for
methamphetamine in rural areas of the state. Colombians continue to
dominate drug and money laundering operations; however, Jamaican,
Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact drug
trafficking in Florida. Interrelated to the drug trafficking problems
are violence, human trafficking, and the proliferation of gangs
profiting from drug sales. Venezuelan influence and involvement in drug
trafficking and money laundering continue to increase. Drug threat
assessments at the federal, state, and local levels consistently
mention the maritime accessibility to Florida. Our ports, coastline,
and waterways provide major access points for drug traffickers.
In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels with 27,204
commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. These figures do not include out
of state commercial, pleasure fishing, and other vehicles that utilize
Florida's waterways, often traveling to Caribbean ports. These vast
numbers of watercraft, combined with superb navigation technology
widely available today, greatly assists small vessel drug smugglers
moving around the immense Florida and Caribbean littorals with relative
ease and great precision. While the cooperation among federal, state,
and local law enforcement is excellent, the sheer volume of vessels and
smaller watercraft present a major concern.
Drug seizures and subsequent investigations document that
frequently, crewmembers aboard freighters and passengers or crewmembers
on cruise ships routinely smuggle drugs into Florida through a ``body
carry'' after the drugs have been concealed aboard the vessel. Cruise
ships leaving and entering Florida ports routinely call on drug source
and transit countries throughout the Caribbean and Central America. The
volume of cargo being moved through our ports is evidenced clearly in
Jacksonville. The Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) is one of the largest
ports in the nation. It ranks among the top containers ports and one of
the busiest vehicle handling ports in the United States. In 2005,
JAXPORT's three public marine terminals handled a total of 8.4 million
tons of cargo, a new tonnage record for the port. JAXPORT now ranks
only behind Tampa and Port Everglades in total tonnage. Additionally,
nearly 20 privately-owned Marine terminals also operate in
Jacksonville's harbor without support or management from JAXPORT. These
independent port operations are not under the Florida minimum standards
for seaports and are regulated by the US Coast Guard.
Florida has three High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's)
funded by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The three
HIDTA's develop annual drug threat assessments and coordinate federal,
state, and local law enforcement operations in 22 of Florida's 67
counties. Drug threat assessments for the remaining 45 counties are
being developed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and
Florida National Guard. Florida also has a significant presence from
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). We also are
assisted by the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which
has responsibility for the sea approaches to Florida. Collectively,
these agencies routinely document and interdict significant quantities
of drugs moving in our region.
Vessel tracking poses complex issues involving a myriad of federal
and state actors, to include U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Patrol (``CBP'') and, for smaller vessels, the Florida Fish & Wildlife
Conservation. CBP requires that 24 hours before a U.S. bound container
is loaded onto a ship in a foreign port that an electronic manifest of
that container's contents is sent to the CBP by the shipping company.
The Coast Guard in turn must be notified 96 hours before a cargo vessel
is scheduled to arrive in a U.S. port of call. During that 96 hour
period, the Coast Guard uses an intelligence driven, risk-based process
to determine what the appropriate level of engagement should be for any
given commercial vessel arriving at a U.S. port: should that vessel be
denied entry? Should the vessel be boarded at sea well outside the U.S.
port of call?
For the tracking of smaller vessels, to include the one million or
so pleasure craft registered in Florida, Florida Fish & Wildlife
Conservation supports the funding of the ``America's Waterways Watch''
program as opposed to the installation of an electronic tracking system
on each craft. The tracking of such a large volume of pleasure craft in
Florida waterways presents very great electronic challenges, and more
importantly, almost insuperable challenges to attempting anything like
applying timely analysis and risk-based processes for determining the
threat posed by any given small vessel.
As discussed previously Florida's location and geography create a
lucrative target for smuggling illegal drugs through our ports. These
illegal drugs can then be repackaged or transshipped across the United
States. Ongoing efforts to tighten the US/Mexican border create an
opportunity for drug-traffickers to increase shipments through the
Florida corridor. Nationally, there is increasing evidence that drugs
are being transshipped from our region to Europe. Again, the
international aspect of drug trafficking impacts Florida, which sits
astride these distribution routes. The drug threat assessments are
further complicated by current vulnerabilities:
a. Regional threat versus state response. Florida is in the
middle of a major drug trafficking corridor that includes air,
land, and sea approaches. Adjacent states and countries, major
transportation hubs, and large bodies of water are part of the
corridor. While Florida has many federal, state, and local
partners striving to prevent and to interdict drug trafficking,
we do not have a regional strategy for response.
b. Inadequate Resources. While our federal, state, and local
partnerships are strong and effective, there are insufficient
staffing at all levels to adequately cover the large geographic
area and the volume of vessels, imports and exports, and daily
transactions. Non-intrusive inspection technology is being
increased, but again is not in sufficient quantities to meet
the increasing volumes of goods being moved through our ports.
This technology is seldom available outside Florida's 14 public
ports.
c. Internal conspiracies: Drug trafficking is an illegal, high
profitable activity. The insertion or extraction of illegal
drugs can occur at any point along the route that otherwise
legitimate cargo is being moved. Involvement in this illegal
activity is not limited to port personnel but could easily
include the vessel's crew or others able to access the cargo on
the port (longshoremen, stevedores, checkers, pier
superintendents, or communications workers). Unsupervised
access to cargo presents opportunities for internal
conspiracies.
d. Tension between commerce and security. Security costs impact
the bottom line for our ports. Perfect security would shut down
our ports. There are tradeoffs that must be weighed each day.
The tension between maintaining strong security and allowing
free flow of commerce is real and a concern for government and
port leadership.
e. Poor information sharing. Despite the lessons on 9/11,
intelligence sharing on our ports is limited. Port directors
and security directors seldom have access to intelligence
reports. This effort is being addressed by the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, which is implementing a Florida
Fusion Center concept, which will only be successful if
information is shared by federal, state, and lanks only behind
Tampa. This is not the case today.
f. Imprecise cargo trafficking. As discussed, the large volume
of cargo traffic overwhelms ports across our country.
International agreements, non-intrusive inspection technology
and security staffs are all important in addressing the
problem. However the volume of cargo being moved exceeds our
ability to inspect it.
g. Federal Agency and State Level Planning. As I have
consistently stated, our federal, state, and local partnerships
are effective. However, we do not have a national/regional plan
that unifies the drug threat assessments and response plan at
all levels of government. These assessments and plans must
involve our port directors and leadership.
h. Proactive Law Enforcement Response. Law enforcement has
traditionally responded to criminal activity immediately and
then investigated to determine who/what caused the illegal
activity. To prevent a transportation security incident or drug
trafficking, law enforcement must be proactive with
intelligence based policing. Threat assessments that result in
actionable intelligence are necessary to prevent illegal
activity. This also requires information sharing and
coordinated operations at all levels.
i. Nexus between drug-trafficking and a transportation security
incident is not operationalized. The connection between drug
trafficking and a transportation security incident has been
recognized; however, we must improve sharing of lessons learned
and analysis of drug trafficking as it might be useful to
prevent a future transportation security incident. Sharing of
intelligence will be important here also.
j. Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. Military
requirements and competing priorities have reduced the emphasis
on counter-drug operations in this section of the United
States. This is evident in the recent removal of US Army
helicopters from the Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos
(OPBAT) mission that has been successful in interdicting drug
trafficking through the Caribbean. Previously, surveillance
capabilities were reduced to meet operational requirements
worldwide.
k. Transportation Worker Identification Credential fielding is
not optimizing existing technology. Florida is prepared to
implement a biometric credential (TWIC aligned) today.
Difficulties in collaboration with TSA are preventing this from
being realized.
How to Close the Gap
a. Fix Responsibility. Drug-trafficking organizations are
international. Too often, our response is local or community
based. While states are funded by DHS for counter-terrorism, we
do not have a regional counter-drug strategy that addresses
air, land, and sea approaches to our state. Federal partners,
adjacent states, and local agencies must be included in our
strategy. We must fix responsibility at the national and
regional levels to develop and implement the plan. Someone must
be in charge. This will result in synergistic successes in
preventing drug trafficking and a transportation security
incident.
b. Develop a regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug
strategy. As mentioned previously, drug-trafficking is an
ongoing process with potential to be used as an avenue for
terrorists to create a transportation security incident. Many
federal, state, and local agencies are involved in counter-drug
operations. Most efforts are local. We do not have a
coordinated, multi-state, air/land/sea, and law enforcement
focused regional strategy to prevent and to respond to a
transportation security incident. Regional strategies across
the United States should cascade from a national strategy.
c. Produce a regional drug threat analysis. While there are
multiple drug threat analyses available, we lack a unified
assessment that could drive coordinated action in our region.
Drug trafficking into Florida occurs through the states that
border the Gulf of Mexico (responsibility of the Gulf Coast
HIDTA), highway systems from Atlanta (Atlanta HIDTA), water
approaches (Joint Interagency Task Force South), and air
transportation routes. A common drug threat assessment would
assist a more unified federal, state, and local response. An
excellent way for this to happen is federal and local support
of the important fusion center initiative being implemented by
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
d. Share information. The sharing of information among federal,
state, and local law enforcement can be improved. The Florida
Department of Law Enforcement is taking the lead to address
this problem. The Florida Fusion Center protects our state by
incorporating an all crimes/all hazards approach to information
sharing. Intelligence ``Stovepipes'' that contributed to the
September 11, 2001 attack on America must be reduced. Privacy
considerations and agency policies adversely impact the sharing
of law enforcement intelligence today. This is evident each day
as Florida struggles with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to align federal and state port access
credential. TSA has cited federal laws that preclude sharing
criminal background information.
e. Involve Port Directors and Port Security Staff. Port staff
are not provided daily intelligence updates. They should be
screened for security clearance and included in daily
intelligence and operations updates that affect ports in
Florida and the United States. They should also receive
relevant operations planning information that involved ports or
the maritime environment. Port staff are included in exercises
conducted by our Regional Domestic Security Task Forces.
However, this must expand to include intelligence sharing and
daily operations interaction.
f. Prioritize OPBAT. Operations Bahamas, Turks and Caicos has
been an important deterrent of drug-trafficking into Florida
for many years. Resources reductions have severely reduced
operational capability. Most recently, the United States Army
removed its Blackhawk helicopters to support other operations.
Prior to the military deployments, significant resources were
dedicated to preventing the movement of drugs from source
countries. We should return to this level of interdiction as
soon as possible. In the interim, we should coordinate existing
strategies and resources among all partners.
g. National Efforts with Regional Emphasis. The global problem
of drug trafficking requires a national and international
solution. A formal strategy must be created with fixed
responsibilities that involve our seaports, but also the entire
inter-modal transportation systems of seaports, airports,
railways, highways, and remote entry points. Lessons learned
from counter-drug operations must be analyzes for counter-
terrorism. Sharing of information from this national initiative
is imperative.
Conclusion
Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security.
Florida has implemented one of our nation's first drug control
strategies. This strategy clearly emphasizes the importance of port
security as part of our law enforcement response. We continue to
emphasize and to resource drug prevention and drug treatment as equal
to law enforcement in our strategic efforts against drugs. While we
have strong, effective programs across the state and we have enjoyed
significant success in many of our initiatives, drug trafficking
continues at an unacceptable level. It will only be reduced with
efforts that are synergistically applies with federal, state, and local
resources. We thank this Subcommittee for its interest in Florida's and
our Nation's security. Your efforts help create the conditions to
reduce the illegal drug supply, secure our ports and transportation
systems from a transportation security incident, and most importantly,
protect our neighborhoods and families. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And I thank all the witnesses for
their testimony. And I will remind each member that he or she
will have five minutes to question the panel. And now I will
recognize myself for questions.
I think what we will do is we will go through a series of
questions and, since it is just the two of us, I will say to my
colleague we will have plenty of time to ask our questions of
the group.
I would like to begin by putting into this statement for
the record a Unanimous Consent Request to enter from the Miami
River Marine Group, their statement with respect to South
Florida Regional Maritime Exchange, Promoting Growth of
Waterborne Commerce.
Without objection, it is entered into the record.
For the Record
Prepared Statement of Dr. Fran Bohnsack
Executive Director, Miami River Marine Group
for the
United States House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism
Regarding
South Florida regional Maritime Exchange
Promoting Growth of Waterborne Commerce
CHAIRWOMAN SANCHEZ, RANKING MEMBER SOUDER, AND DISTINGUISHED
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS, it is my honor to have the opportunity to submit
a statement for the record about what the maritime industry is doing to
enhance maritime domain awareness around the country, and how a
Maritime Exchange would benefit the Southern Florida port business
community. My name is Fran Bohnsack and I am the Executive Director of
the Miami River Marine Group.
The Miami River Marine Group (MRMG) is a private port cooperative
of cargo carriers and marine related industry dedicated to preserving
the Miami River as a working river. In the past ten years, improvements
in local and international economies have been reflected by an increase
in the activity and vitality of the working river.
The Miami River is the fourth largest port in the state of Florida,
serving as economic catalyst for the South Florida region and providing
vital shipping links to the shallow draft ports of the Caribbean and
Central and South America. As a working river, the Miami River's
navigation and commercial shipping directly generates millions of tons
of cargo each year and thousands of direct and indirect jobs.
Goods shipped from the Miami River are sent to over 80 ports of
call in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Just as Miami
serves as the gateway to the Americas, the Miami River serves as the
shallow draft port for foreign flag vessels coming from similar shallow
ports in this part of the world (shallow drafts are necessary for the
Miami River which is only 15 feet deep). Economic projections for cargo
movement indicate that Miami River shipping growth is expected to
continue at a healthy rate.
Among the keys to any successful seaport, including the Miami
River, are deep water, adequate storage and berthing facilities, and
access to inland transportation networks. Equally important--and often
overlooked--to the efficient, cost-effective and safe movement of goods
is the information network which ensures that all partners in the
transportation chain are aware of the shipping and transit information
necessary to promote the flow of commerce.
One of the principal indexes of good management in the maritime
field is the turnaround a ship receives in port. Simply stated, the
shorter the period between arrival and departure, the better the
turnaround; and the lower the costs. Ports which offer faster
turnaround times will have an economic advantage over other ports. Yet
a great deal of communication is required to ensure a ship is serviced
quickly and safely: a berth must be available, pilots must be ordered,
tugs must be scheduled, linemen must be in place to handle the lines as
the ships come alongside, labor must be available, and federal agency
inspections must be closely coordinated with the vessel's arrival to
eliminate unnecessary delays. All of these activities depend on up-to-
the minute communication of any changes in the vessel movement
schedule.
These are just a few of the activities which must take place each
time a ship arrives in port. In addition, storage and transportation
must be arranged, entry must be made on the merchandise, chandlers must
deliver food and other supplies, the crew must be paid, and so on. The
list of people who must be kept apprised of ship movements is a lengthy
one, and given the number of factors which can conspire to delay a
commercial cargo vessel, the schedules are often outdated the moment
they are reported. Keeping the interested parties informed of changes
is often a full-time job for those who are charged with the
responsibility to do so.
Many port communities have addressed this need by forming trade
associations to acquire, preserve, and disseminate maritime and other
business information. These organizations, known as Maritime Exchanges,
are non-profit organizations which develop expertise in the areas of
Ship Reporting and conduct other activities designed to promote trade
and commerce in their regions.
Maritime Exchanges are dedicated to providing information,
communications and other services in order to ensure safe, secure,
efficient and environmentally sound maritime operations. These maritime
information service organizations represent the commercial maritime
community's shared commitment to proactively address the challenges
faced by the maritime industry, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Maritime Administration
(MARAD), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and other federal and
state agencies in a cooperative and cost efficient manner.
While not all of the 351 seaports throughout the U.S. enjoy the
benefits of a Maritime Exchange, it is certainly noteworthy that all of
the top ports, and several of the smaller ones, have recognized the
need to centralize the collection and distribution of maritime
information through an Exchange. Maritime Exchanges are vital to the
maritime industry and their government partners in Baltimore, British
Columbia, Jacksonville, Alaska, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Hawaii,
Southern California, New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River and
Bay, New Orleans, Virginia, Texas and Portland, Oregon.
Several of the people who oversee the operations of these maritime
exchanges are former Coast Guardsmen and have served as Captains of the
Port at various places, and all the people who run these maritime
exchanges have extensive maritime experience, including as licensed
master mariners, and senior maritime industry executives. For those
ports in which no Exchange is located, undoubtedly much of the same
work is being performed, yet in many instances, those who receive the
inquiries or create the reports--pilots, harbor masters, port
authorities, agents, and others--must do so in addition to their normal
responsibilities.
Although the majority of Maritime Exchanges were formed in the
latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the need for
Exchanges is equally evident today. While information sharing was
certainly challenging in the era of the telegraph and telegram, the
average ship transit was several times longer than today's voyages.
Today, transit times are shorter, and communicating information among
transportation partners is light years faster. With the advent of new
technologies, changes in shipping patterns, ever larger vessels, and
increasingly stringent maritime security measures, the challenges to
the maritime sector are progressively more complex. As a result, two
new Exchanges have formed in the last few years, and several other port
communities are considering forming Exchanges, as well.
Exchanges exist to keep members informed on a variety of matters,
not the least of which are the ever-important vessel schedules. Yet
most Exchanges also address the myriad issues surrounding commercial
port operations, such as pending legislation, new regulatory
requirements, the growing federal agency information reporting
requirements, increasing crew, passenger, and cargo inspections, and
advances in technologies associated with vessel, cargo and crew
processing. These are just a few of the reasons why the Miami River
Marine Group has been working to establish a Maritime Exchange in
Southern Florida.
Like any trade association, Exchanges serve as a venue under which
often competing port interests can come together to address issues of
mutual concern, or to identify opportunities for improvement to the
overall community.
Exchanges can also help identify trends in shipping that can be
used to both facilitate daily operations and undertake long-term
strategic planning. They can coordinate training programs, such as
hazardous material transportation or security, and in some cases, they
will lobby for the rights of industry. Often tagged ``the voice of the
port,'' an Exchange will unite members under a single umbrella to
oppose or support initiatives as they arise. Like other trade
associations, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: with each
additional member, the Exchange voice is strengthened exponentially.
And of course, Exchanges can be good opportunities for networking,
putting members in touch with others who have similar interests to find
or obtain new business relationships and share ideas.
Why is a Maritime Exchange needed in Southern Florida? Although
some of the activities described above are consistent with other trade
associations, Marine Exchanges are unique because of their day-to-day
operating role in their communities. Although the full scope of
activities undertaken by each Exchange in the U.S. differs based on the
unique needs of its port community, all provide the same basic Ship
Reporting services:
Ship Reporting: Exchange watchstanders, most of whom operate 24/7,
track vessel movements via traditional means, such as contact with the
vessel agents, pilots and others with vessel schedule information, as
well as through AIS or satellite technologies. They enter the
information into their databases and make it available on a real-time
basis to those with a right or a need to know. With the information
consolidated into a central community database, Exchanges can then
distribute reports of historical, current and estimated ship movement
activities to their members. Using a neutral organization such as an
Exchange alleviates concerns over sharing what might be considered
proprietary commercial information.
In addition, vessel agents use Exchanges to transmit instructions
or other information to their ships while en route, and the ships'
masters or pilots will contact the Exchange with a variety of
questions, such as whether water is available at the berth, what time
tugs will be alongside, etc.
Unlike their federal counterparts who rotate in and out of ports on
a frequent basis, Exchange staff members are specifically trained in
local port operations and develop institutional memories. As a result,
they often serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of the port community and law
enforcement agencies, and can detect and report anomalies when
appropriate.
Vessel Particulars: Private and public sector port operators often
have a need to obtain detailed information about ships as they enter
port. From length, breadth and weight, to owners, previous names, P&I
Club, and safety certificate expiration dates, Exchanges are
repositories for a wide-range of vessel information.
Community Information Clearinghouse: Exchanges are often conduits
between federal agencies or state authorities and the local
communities. They collect, broadcast and store navigation restriction
notices, security bulletins, bridge openings, dredging schedules, and a
host of other information.
Answering Services: Many Exchanges also operate 24-hour answering
services for their members. In addition to traditional message taking
functions, often Exchanges are prepared to respond to the questions or
messages from callers--many of which are related to a particular
vessel's schedule. These answering services can be utilized during
lunchtimes, holidays, nights, weekends or any combination of the above.
Subscribers have the choice to have callers patched through to their
cell phones, messages emailed, or messages held for pickup.
Publications: Newsletters, port directories, and other publications
keep members informed and present revenue opportunities through
advertising and/or subscriptions.
Other Services: There are any number of roles Exchanges can play in
support of their port communities. Some may manage job posting bulletin
boards, serve as harbor safety or area maritime security secretariats,
or offer boarding agent services. The list of programs and services can
be as long or as short as needed by the local community.
Other Automation Services: These may include:
Cargo manifesting: Exchanges, like port authorities,
may operate community-based cargo manifesting and release
systems for their communities. In addition to helping port
customers comply with reporting regulations mandating the use
of the CBP Automated Manifest System, these types of community-
based systems centralize receipt and distribution of messages
pertaining to cargo status (inspection required, cargo
released, cargo held, etc.).
eNOA/D: With the June 05 requirement for electronic crew/
passenger manifesting via the Coast Guard's electronic Notice
of Arrival/Departure system, several Exchanges have stepped in
to help their communities achieve compliance in a cost-
effective manner.
PORTS: In partnership with the National Ocean Service,
Exchanges serve as local sponsors for their regions' Physical
Oceanographic Real Time Systems.
In order for an Exchange to succeed in Southern Florida, it must
have the buy-in of the local maritime constituencies. These may include
both private-sector port businesses, public port authorities, and
federal, state, local agencies, and elected officials, if appropriate.
Specific organizations may include:
Pilots
Container and bulk carriers
Cruise ship operators
Steamship agents
Port Authorities/terminal operators/stevedores
Warehouse operators
Tug/barge companies
Trucking/rail companies
Importers/exporters
Brokers/forwarders
Labor
Admiralty law firms, banks, insurance companies
Surveyors, fumigators, and other service providers
U.S./State/County legislators
Law Enforcement
Key Federal Agencies: CBP, Coast Guard, USDA, FDA,
COE, etc.
Needless to say the initial organizational issues will take some
period of time to resolve. Once these issues are resolved, however,
members of the Southern Florida port business community will be well-
positioned to launch an organization that will benefit all maritime
stakeholders in the region.
While a pool of initial start up funds will be necessary to open
the doors, the distinct advantage of a Maritime Exchange over other
types of associations lies in the fact the Exchange can develop a suite
of programs and services which can be offered on a for-fee basis to
ensure the continued viability of the organization over the long term.
While membership dues remain an important component of an association's
revenue stream, the organization is funded primarily by those who use
its many services.
There will be individuals who resist the concept. These persons may
believe they are getting the services they need today at no cost, so
why should they pay to fund a new organization. The response is clear:
Southern Florida ports are doing well today, but could they do better?
Conversely, can these same ports be kept from slipping in the face of
an ever-increasing competitive global shipping industry? Can steps be
taken to ensure that costly new federal regulations do not over-burden
port businesses?
The answer to all these questions is yes, and an Exchange is one
mechanism to achieve those important goals.
I would like to thank you, Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the
Subcommittee for the opportunity submit this statement today. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Let's see, what questions do I have for
you all?
I would like to begin with asking about, now, Captain, that
we have so much of an emphasis going on terrorism and counter-
terrorism efforts, how are your resources? Is the Coast Guard
in this area still getting to the things it used to do, before
we put all these other responsibilities on you? You know,
pleasure craft, safety issues, search and rescue. Or has that
affected your performance? Resources, have they been drawn away
from the original things that the Coast Guard used to do? Do
you need more help in that area?
Captain Schultz. Madam Chairman, here, locally, Coast Guard
Sector Miami and the entire Seventh District has always been a
very operationally fast-paced location within the Coast Guard.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was in 2004 that
we created the first Sector Command here. And I think that move
has actually served us incredibly well. We married together
what was the former Group Operations, which did the boating
safety, the boardings, the search and rescue, with the former
Captain of the Port functions, which involved the full spectrum
of marine safety, pollution response. We put that under one
command.
We have had some synergies that have stemmed from that. The
operational resources and the regulatory authorities are all
nestled in one place.
Our missions have clearly grown, as you indicated, since 9/
11. Maritime Homeland Security was a smaller slice of what we
do. Today it constitutes probably a quarter or so of our total
allocation of effort.
Our operations have grown with those new responsibilities.
The Coast Guard has grown at large, close to 4,000 billets on
the macro sense. Here, locally, I couldn't give you the exact
specifics on our bodies. I jumped onto the organization here in
2006, in the new framework we are operating in.
We are well staffed and funded for our responsibilities. We
are busy, but I don't think we have had any letdown in service
delivery to the public down here.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you, Captain.
Here is the problem that I have, and one of the reasons I
wanted to visit the Miami Port and see and get your testimony
on record. I don't know which one of you mentioned that there
are probably over a hundred thousand pleasure boats registered
here, between the three or four ports just in the immediate
area.
You know, when were talking about identifying ships, boats,
whatever, most of the pleasure--almost all the pleasure craft
don't have a tracking monitor to them, or what have you.
What do we do? I mean, what is your best concept? And I
will ask all three of you about what we do with these pleasure
craft with respect to going off to some island and picking up
people who shouldn't be in this country that are being brought
in, or drug trafficking, or contraband smuggling. I mean, what
is the best idea you all have come up with? Because I know you
haven't done it yet. I mean, you have done layering, you have
done some projects, some pilot projects, but what do you think
in the long run? What do we do about a port like Miami, that
has so many pleasure craft attached to it?
Captain Schultz. Well, Madam Chairman, I threw out the
number of 170,000 vessels here in southeast Florida in three
counties alone, so I will take the first stab at that question.
I guess what we are doing is we do employ a layered
defense, and there are many different threats. We have the
threat of a terrorist type of activity in a seaport, we have
the threats of illegal migrant smuggling, illegal drug
smuggling. The other missions we have down here, people
violating our living marine resources; we have a lot of rich
resources out here, fishes and coral reefs and things. We are
involved in all those missions.
What we do currently is we try to get our arms around the
domain as best we can with the available sensor information we
have. We employ a layered strategy to that. We have cutters;
Sector Miami has Coast Guard cutters. We don't control the
aviation assets, the airplanes and helicopters directly, but we
have an air station that services two sectors down here. We
have flights most every day of the week. We partner with
Customs and Border Protection, who has an air marine operation
down here.
So, generally, we have maritime patrol aircraft flying over
the Straits of Florida, with the outer approaches, looking for
vessels of interest coming across. We have our small boat
stations. We have four multi-mission small boat stations that
fall under my command here. We have those vessels on patrol.
Our state partners, such as the Fish and Wildlife Commission,
our local partners, have marine units that are on the water.
And through those layered vessels, we are trying to stop those
vessels that stand out as possibly intending mal-intent over,
you know, legitimate business.
That does get very challenging. The recreational vessel
versus the vessel that is posing a threat, look the same down
here. Do we have visibility on all the smaller vessels? As I
mentioned in my statement, that clearly is an area where there
is room for improvement. I think we have the challenge of the
larger vessels, the commercial vessels; we have good domain and
awareness on them through our classified and unclassified
common operational pictures. There are new initiatives
mentioned, such as Long-Range Identification Tracking that will
come and bring even added value to that.
But there is a legitimate challenge on small vessels. But
we are employing day-to-day layered security. And it is
presence, it is maritime cops on the beat on the water, it is
intelligence. Intelligence is clearly a key component of that,
too. And then we respond within the best of our capabilities to
those threats.
Ms. Sanchez. But, Captain, I have friends who have pleasure
boats here who say it is very rare to see a Coast Guard cutter
out there in the bay or, if there is, there is one, and most
people know what time it goes out. And, I mean, these friends I
have, and various say, you know, we could take our boat, go
pick somebody up off an island, come back in. They have told me
about the fact that, you know, if they were to do such a thing,
they are supposed to go up the river and pick up the phone at
some given spot and call in to the airport and talk to who is
ever on the other end, I guess, of CVP and tell them they are
in town. They say, yeah, Xerox a copy on Monday of your
passport and send it in to us by mail.
I mean, do we need more resources, or is just putting a
station closer or easier for people to follow? I mean, even my
friends say, why should we do that? Why should we go upriver
six miles or eight miles and go and do that, only to get
somebody out at the airport and it doesn't really matter? I
mean, we could be telling them there is only four of us on the
boat, versus ten of us on the boat. And they could care. They
don't really know.
Captain Schultz. Well, Congresswoman----
Ms. Sanchez. What do we do? What do we do? What do we do--
can we do anything about it?
Captain Schultz. Well, I think what we do do is we put our
best capabilities forward. You mentioned a program that is
actually run by Customs and Border Protection. It is their
arrivals, vessels that come in from overseas that, typically,
down here, it is a lot of times the Bahamas. That is about 50
miles away at its closest point. And they have a local boater
option. It is one scenario where they can call in and they are
pre-screened and there is a certain level of legitimacy that
goes with their registry in that program.
But the small vessels, there isn't sufficient resource when
you are talking 170,000 small boats alone in this reason, and
that is a small sub-set of our region, where you are going to
see every boat, every day.
And I think as we look forward and try to get our arms
around this thing called Maritime Domain Awareness, hopefully,
you know, we are looking in the Coast Guard at a future major
acquisition called Command 21, that will hopefully bring better
sensors, better information management systems to integrate
information from those sensors and databases, intelligence
sources, to a product.
Ideally, we need to see what is out in the area, we need to
understand the threats it posed, we need to be able to share
that information with our partners.
So the short answer to your question is do we have--are
there sufficient resources in my area every day to look at
every boat coming in? Clearly not.
Ms. Sanchez. Where I am headed with this is, you know, as
the Chairwoman who also oversees all entry into the United
States, and exits from the United States, as we tighten other
areas, people will look for the areas that are least protected.
And this seems to be pretty wide open, from my standpoint. So
getting you all to really think about three, four years down
the line, when we have actually got other places under control,
this is going to be a sector that is going to be hit, I think.
Hit in the sense of getting people into this country that we
probably don't want here.
I see that Colonel over there has----
Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, your question, I would offer
two responses. One, the integrated strategy that I talked about
before, I will bet your friends have, in some cases, seen a
sheriff's craft patrolling the water. And I think an integrated
approach that takes all the law enforcement, all resources, is
something that drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, should be
unified with all resources that we have, and not just put it on
the Coast Guard.
The second point, I believe, as a vehicle-borne, improvised
explosive device, a suicide/homicide bomber, we are going to
have to have an awareness effort in our communities, our
neighborhoods. Likewise, those who have small crafts need to be
alerted to the threat, and, when there is unusual or
threatening behavior, a system to report it.
The Fish and Wildlife Conservation group here in Florida
expressed some concern to me about funding that may be taken
away from Americas Waterway Watch Program, which was intended
to do that, to provide that awareness, to encourage the
dialogue that these 1,000,000 pleasure craft in Florida, that a
lot of them would be sensitive, as good citizens, to that
threat and might report something.
I think it is far beyond the Coast Guard or any local law
enforcement to check all this. But, as in a neighborhood,
collectively, we as citizens, I think, can do something about
it, to prevent it.
Ms. Sanchez. Did you have any comment?
Mr. Dryden. Yes, I do. I think there is really three areas.
It is a very complex problem. Just knowing that a vessel is
coming in, a pleasure craft is coming in, in a free and open
society like we have, it is almost impossible to be able to
take every pleasure craft, vet it, understand who is on board
and what their intent is. It really just isn't going to happen
that way in the real world.
It would be nice if we could solve it with technology and
we could solve it with just, you know, applying more people to
it.
I think what you have to do, there is several things to
help along the way, but it doesn't quite get you all the way.
One is you have to be able to free up the people that are busy
doing the grunt work, that can focus and use their talents on
looking for anomalies. And, again, not to say technology-
generated things here, but things that are suspicious.
Suspicious behavior. Whether it is from the sheriff's office or
from the Coast Guard, or whoever is out there.
The second is, you have to start applying technologies and
trying to push the state of the art of some of these
technologies. Which I believe the Coast Guard is doing. They
are working pretty hard on things. I have referenced in my
statement this Automated Scene Understanding. To be able to
classify and understand who are these vessels. But not just
that they exist there, but what is the pattern. Are they doing
something that is unusual? You know, is there something
happening at a period of time at night? What is going on? A
particular size craft.
Those might be the things that, if you could automatically
sense that and alert watch-standers, that would go a long way
to look into anomalous behavior. Because, again, just knowing
that they are a sport fisher really doesn't gain us anything.
And, lastly, I think the other big thing is there has to be
a more effective way to share information between all the port
partners. There has to be a way where we can get past they are
trying to unclassify or keep so many things close to the vest.
And I think there is a willingness. At least, what I have seen
in the Coast Guard, as well as in Florida, there is a
willingness to do that. The question now is trying to figure
out the proper way to make that happen, and make it happen
fairly rapidly.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I will defer some questions and give some time to my
colleague from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
I want to follow up on Chairman Sanchez's question. Does
the Coast Guard have policies--and this is addressed to Captain
Schultz, of course--does the Coast Guard have policies and
procedures for identifying, tracking, and responding to the
increasing small vessel threat? If not, are there plans to
develop these policies and procedures in the near future?
Captain Schultz. Congressman, we, as I mentioned in
response to the Madam Chairman, we are very concerned with any
vessel posing any type of a threat. The small vessels, I think,
bring a unique challenge in that our current suite of sensors
is best suited for larger vessels, the radars that we employ.
Obviously, when we are talking about flying airplanes,
maritime patrol aircraft at sea, larger vessels are easier to
detect than a small, unlit, fast vessel. Those are the type of
vessels that we are challenged with right now, that are
smuggling illegal migrants or smuggling drugs.
Do we have a plan or a policy? I am going to leave the
policy aspects, I think, to the folks in Washington. Here,
locally, our plan is to apply the given resources we have
generic to the Coast Guard, force-multiply that, as Colonel
Janes talked about, with our state and local partners through a
coordinated effort. We have many coordinating bodies. We
coordinate some of the seaport aspects through the area of
Maritime Security Committee and Subcommittees. We coordinate
some of the other waterfront and coastal-type activities in
support of migrant interdiction or drugs through entities like
the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, where we meet on a
recurring basis with our state and federal law enforcement
partners. As a matter of fact, we are meeting tomorrow here.
And that is all my state and local partners on the waterfront;
we will get together and talk about what the current threats
are, what has happened since we last met.
So, again, the policy piece, I think is best addressed at
the National Coast Guard level. Here, locally, we are employing
tools like the Hawkeye System, which I mentioned we were the
initial test site. I think that is at five or six other Coast
Guard locations.
We have the Visualization Tools Project, which is helping
us automate some of those functions where there used to be a
watch-stander thumbing through databases or flipping switches
on different types of sensors. Now these the
Visualization Tools brings some automation to that. There is
alerts we can set. If a vessel with automatic identification
system comes in--I am talking a bigger vessel now--if that
vessel comes in early, and we have some rules established with
those tools, an alert goes off that that vessel is here before
we expected it. That is very much simplified than an individual
flipping through lists to see when those vessels are due and
then correlating that to what he sees in the radar and all the
different AIS depictions on the screen.
So we are doing things. We are embracing those technologies
we have. There clearly is room for enhanced technologies,
better sensors, better integration of sensor data and other
sources of information to make us more effective. But here,
locally, we are applying what we have generic to the Coast
Guard, partnering it up with state and local partners,
Department of Defense assets that come in on occasion to
support us with maritime patrol aircraft. And we are doing, you
know, due diligence to the task at hand.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Captain.
Captain, what is the status of the Coast Guard's Long-Range
Identification Tracking Program?
Captain Schultz. Sir, as I understand the status, it is,
you know, there are requirements set forth in the Safe Port
Act. Here, locally, I am not on the cutting edge of the status
of that rollout. My understanding is, you know, when that
comes, that will bring some enhanced information on long-range
tracking of vessels, vessels that are transiting within a
thousand miles of our coastline. We will be aware of that.
Right now, here, locally, I have visibility with Hawkeye,
through the ability to detect and analyze AIS tracks out to 30,
40, 50 miles into the Straits of Florida.
Long-range tracking will bring us visibility, as I am sure
you are aware, on all U.S. vessels anywhere in the world; on
other vessels 300 gross tons or larger making approaches to
U.S. ports.
As far as the actual specific status, the funding, that is
a little bit out of my lane down here, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Well, I will look into that further.
Colonel Janes, I have a few questions, if I may. Would you
please briefly explain some of the differences between
Florida's diverse ports and the challenges those differences
present in securing them?
Colonel Janes. Certainly, Congressman.
The--I chair the Florida Seaports Security Standards
Council, and we look at the minimum standards, but also have
talked many issues across our state.
The different governing structures will indicate how ports
are funded, the private businesses that they orchestrate. In
some of our ports, they have security personnel that come from
the local sheriff's office. In other cases, they are hired.
The standards of certified law enforcement versus hired
security and who should be manning different checkpoints, all
come up to be critical issues that costs the ports funding, but
also get into the interpretation of the standard and how well
it is being applied.
The involvement of local government in the ports, again, if
the county is heavily participating in the funding, the local
governance could be a board that is comprised of different
members across the state.
The bottom line, Congressman, is there is no standard model
for 14 ports. And the fact that we do have 14 ports, the
governance is varied, the businesses that they transact, some
do all, cargo, cruise, all business that a major port would do.
Others do a very focused level. So each port has to be
adjusted.
The great discussion that addresses your question is in the
Seaport Security Standards Council, we just had a major
discussion about should versus shall. And in many of the
standards, the word from the Florida statute is should. And
that recognition is the ports vary significantly, that you
cannot put a uniform standard on every port. The inspector who
is checking with compliance must go in and determine has that
port done everything possible within the intent of the
standard.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I am please that you highlighted the importance of the
America's Water Watch Program in your written testimony. I am a
strong proponent of that.
Would you please briefly explain the benefits of this
program--and you did go through it--and its importance in
increasing Maritime Domain Awareness?
Colonel Janes. Again, Congressman, my understanding, and,
again, working with our Fish and Wildlife partners who we look
to for the small craft security in Florida, in addition to our
local partners, the focus of the program that they have made me
aware of, that if we lose it, I would be concerned, is that it
really is an awareness, an education of what are the
expectations of navigation in Florida's waterways, and what
could be the different threats. What are illegal actions,
suspicious action? And it also helps to translate to our boat
operators, vessel operators, that they, too, have a
responsibility in security. It is not just the funded, the
governmental aspect. That they can prevent a terrorist act, a
transportation security incident, and an illegal act, drug
trafficking, by reporting it.
So it is awareness, involvement, not unlike what we would
want in our community neighborhoods.
Mr. Bilirakis. Are you in favor of expanding the program?
Colonel Janes. Absolutely. I think it is essential to what
we do, both air, land and sea. We--we can't fund enough
protection against drug trafficking and a terrorist act.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much. Appreciate it
very much. Thank you.
Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. We will go to second round of questions.
I have some questions on--to both Captain Schultz and to Mr.
Dryden.
Viz Tools. Can you expand on how Viz Tools operates and
what components make the Viz Tools, and what role does The
Mariners Group/Command Bridge Software have within Viz Tools?
Captain Schultz. Defer to you first, then talk----
Mr. Dryden. All right.
Captain Schultz. ----about our applications or----
Mr. Dryden. Yeah, I will shy away from the operational
side, and let you do that.
But just from a technology standpoint, one of the big
problems, as I talked about, was there is a lot of information
flowing into a Command Center. Some of that could just be
manual and telephonic, other is electronic from all these new
systems.
One of the major problems is how do you take something--how
do you take all that and put it together into something
meaningful. Just the fact that you have a lot of blips out
there doesn't really mean anything. So trying to get to this
actionable situation awareness is a real issue.
So, to your question about how is it made up, there is
really multiple parts. The first one is how do you fuse all
that information together. Once you have that, so instead of
just radar standing stand-alone, and AIS stand-alone, and all
these other systems out there, once you find a way to bring
those together, then you can start applying the second part,
which is anomaly detection. So you can create business rules,
as Captain Schultz was mentioning earlier, you can create those
business rules, or doctrine, to go look for certain
circumstances, for anomalies.
So if you can find those anomalies with those business
rules, A, you are going to do two things. One is you will find
it when it happens, but the other is you are not going to have
to divert your watch-standers from always looking for those
situations, because you have another way to achieve that. So
the watch-standers, then, are free to take action and look
around for other things that are happening.
And as the Coast Guard has increasing mission areas, you
know, it becomes more and more of an issue of if you have a lot
more to do, how do you figure a way to get there quickly.
Ms. Sanchez. So what are the data points? I mean, how--is
that coming off the radar? Is it only ships that have automated
systems? I mean, wha----
Mr. Dryden. Well, it is very--it really depends on the
sensors and the systems. For instance, the today AIS, it really
is the large vessels that have that. The commercial vessels
coming in and out of here. So you are going to see those. And
then you may see it on radar, but you are not going to know who
they are, you know, if it is a small boat. You will know who
all the big guys are. We correlate a lot of that information.
But when it becomes a small craft, you really don't know. You
may be able to tell that it is a particular type of vessel or
so many feet. Even then, you are really using cameras to figure
that kind of stuff out.
So one of the big problems in the big exposures, I think,
that exist in the nation, is figuring a way around that. To
figure out which ones, A, are small boats, but then, do they
have behavior that would require us to take action, number one.
And number two is, the other piece of this, is intel. You
have to be able to find a way to funnel intel, outside of just
looking at the tactical operation. You have to know in advance,
by intel, which is generally local intel. It could be from
overseas, but in a small boat thing, you are generally going to
look at the local law enforcement and what they hear on the
streets and whatnot. You have to have a conduit.
Ms. Sanchez. So they are calling it in or they are--the
local intel.
Mr. Dryden. If it is----
Ms. Sanchez. It is called in, it is coming over the fax or
the wires, something? How----
Mr. Dryden. Right. I will let the Captain speak to the
operational side of how they physically receive it, but,
generally, yeah, you are getting manual intel that comes in, or
you are getting phone calls that happen from-from--port
partners.
Ms. Sanchez. Captain?
Captain Schultz. Congresswoman, he talked about the
Visualization Tools product. The product that were testing, the
Command Bridge from Mariner Group, as a proof-of-concept, that
type of product does bring some of the automation to what
before was a human-intensive project. We have a Watch Center,
with a team of five watch-standers in there, and we have a
sensor operator. We have folks that are working different
systems, database systems.
A visualization-type tool can bring to that Command Center
those automatic alerts. It can integrate sensor data,
information, present a visual, a graphic visual for the watch-
stander. If there is a search and rescue case going on, it can
automatically populate, based on rules, that case, up on a
status board. It can show us, if you fold in the capabilities
of something called Blue Force Tracking, where our friendly
forces, their positions are updated. Right now, we have that
and it is manually updated. The watch-stander can look at that
visual depiction and see where the Coast Guard resources are,
partner law enforcement resources are, see the challenge at
hand, better connect the dots, and get the right resource to
the challenge.
From the security in the seaport standpoint, I mentioned
9,000 vessel arrivals here. In Port Everglades, in Port of
Miami, where we have cameras with the Hawkeye system, we can
feed the radar signature of that vessel. The bigger vessel, we
may pick up on radar 20 miles out. We can see the AIS
signature. We can see the radar signature.
The Visualization Tools Project will take that AIS signal,
and I mentioned an example before, if that vessel is in before
its advance notice of arrival, with some parameters that are
established in there in terms of alerts, we will get an
automatic alert that that vessel is here early, before its
intended arrival. That--the watch-stander will be immediately
keyed to that. Otherwise, that watch-stander will be flipping
through reams of paper, flipping through drop-down screens on
computers, and trying to get to that same outcome. This is
using automation to put more information, better situational
information, at the fingertips of our watch-standers for,
hopefully, you know, better security out the back side.
Ms. Sanchez. You mentioned proof-of-concept. Can you tell
me how far along you are and if this is going to have a--if you
think it is going to have a positive outcome?
Captain Schultz. Well, this--the proof-of-concept, we had
the Command Bridge product for a couple months, and then some
of the--some of the feeds were turned off. We have just
recently been informed from the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate that we have a six-month
assessment--extension of our period to assess the product. And,
based on our initial assessments of the Visualization Tools,
the watch-standers, I as the Sector Commander, we did see value
there. The ability to take information and better process
sensors and databases, and bring that together, versus just one
more box in the Command Center, it is clearly a good utility.
So some type of visualization tool, some type of
information management system, I think will be a key component
in our Command 21 way forward, where we are hoping to bring
greater capabilities to our Command Centers.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you see, if, in fact, you get through the
concept and you--do you see the Coast Guard maybe applying it
in other ports?
Captain Schultz. I think the--I think some type of a
visualization tool product, some type of an information
management system will clearly be part of our--of our, you
know, way ahead with regards to Command Centers.
This is one prototype, proof-of-concept beta test we are
doing with this product. I am not really privy to what we are
doing elsewhere in the country for trying comparable products,
but, you know, feedback on what we have in hand, it has been a
value add.
We are excited about--we just got the extension for six
more months here, so we are excited to put it through its paces
for a few more months. And probably six months from now, I
could be able to report out a lot more detail about exactly
what it does bring to the table.
Ms. Sanchez. Maybe we will bring you to Washington to do
that.
Colonel Janes, do you think that the Coast Guard has enough
assets in South Florida? And if the Coast Guard had more
resources in South Florida, how do you think they should use
them? And would more resources help us in effectively
decreasing drug trafficking in the region?
Colonel Janes. Unquestionably, more resources would help
us.
Ms. Sanchez. What type of resources?
Colonel Janes. I would defer to the professionals in the
Coast Guard. As a former Army officer, and having watched the
major expansion of the Coast Guard mission in recent years, I
would take great hesitancy in trying to define for the Coast
Guard what they need, if I didn't serve in the Coast Guard.
But I do know their resources, they are stretched. Every
time I watch with their different mission requirements and what
they have been asked to do, funding, I am sure that they would
agree they would do better had they had more resources. But I
would not offer a specific example.
Ms. Sanchez. The reason I ask is because you are sort of in
charge of sort of trying to take a look at that, and, as you
know, somebody who sits under the administration, Coast Guard,
for example, isn't really allowed to tell us they need more
resources unless the administration wants them to tell us they
need more resources. Of course, they don't want them to tell us
that, because the budget is already put forward.
So I am just asking you, as an observer, what is going on
down here. Do you think they could use more resources?
Colonel Janes. Oh, I don't think there is any question.
Ms. Sanchez. Would they be put to good use?
Colonel Janes. I think it is absolutely imperative that we
try to resource them for their mission. Their missions been
expanded, but I have not seen a similar expansion of their
resources in recent years. And their ability to respond would
be, in my thinking, in conjunction with the local and national
partners who could work in the region as they do.
But certainly, one of the major points of my testimony is
we are under-resourced to respond to the threat that we have.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Captain, the Coast Guard dry-docked the 123-foot cutters
that would have been used in the waters off of south Florida
last year. Has this impacted your operational readiness here in
South Florida? And, again, do you have enough resources to
properly fulfill your mission?
Captain Schultz. Madam Chairman, kind of two questions in
there, and I will deal with following the--Colonel Janes here.
Regarding the resources, the administration budget as
proposed does, in fact, ensure our ability to do all our
missions. Were additional resources to be directed to the Coast
Guard, I am clear that there is good applications we could make
of those, and deliver more service.
Regarding the 123-foot cutters, as you mentioned, that were
taken out of service a handful of months ago, actually, close
to a year ago now, we have come up with what we think are some
fairly creative strategies to mitigate that gap. Here at Sector
Miami, I have eight patrol boats that work under our tactical
control, that are home port in our region. Four of those are
110-foot cutters. The other four are 87-foot coastal patrol
boats.
We have worked with my fellow Sector Commanders in Key West
and St. Petersburg. We have actually taken those platforms,
those 110-foot platforms, that had a 16-person crew before, and
we have actually married them us with the crews from those
eight decommissioned, or eight out-of-service 123-foot cutters.
We are now multi-crewing those vessels.
A patrol boat that used to give us 2200 operational hours a
year is now delivering 3500 operational hours through multi-
crewing. So the vessel is out more, the crews, the burden on
the crews is no further time away from home. We are pushing the
vessel harder. Obviously, the maintenance side of it, we have
to sink a few more dollars into it. We have to really have a
good strategy in place to deal with the challenges of running
what are already old vessels harder. But I think we have hit
that pretty well.
Are we anxiously looking forward to new cutters coming
through our recapitalization efforts? Absolutely. But here, in
the interim, I think we have managed to close that gap and deal
with that challenge fairly well.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Mr. Dryden, your testimony says that the
current state of technology in today's ports is not sufficient
to track non-cooperative vessels and small boats. What steps do
you think should be taken to address that issue?
Mr. Dryden. Well, from a technology standpoint, you really
have to have technology that can do things like pattern
analysis, that can look, when they turn off--the cooperating
vessels are going to turn on all their sensors. You are going
to see them, and it is, you know, well-behaved vessels coming
in are going to come in, and it is not going to be a problem.
The legislation currently, I can't speak to. But I can
speak to the projects that I know are underway that are
partially funded at this point. And those projects are seeking
to identify all of those, and look for anomalous behavior. So
that, in fact, when you find something, somebody that should
have--that should have their transponders on and they don't,
that is the kind of thing that needs to light up in a Command
Center, so they can take the action, when you have the small
boats that aren't, in the first place, going to have those
sensors.
But, you know, the Coast Guard has attempted to push down
the requirement and to get cooperation from small boaters. But,
really, it is a daunting task without getting in the small
boater's way.
So, as they work through that to figure what is the right
compromise, you really have to solve it with technology. And,
again, I would--I would offer that, with the Safe Port Act and
with the funding of the Safe Port Act, it really allows the
Coast Guard to spend more consistent dollars over time to reach
those objective.
But when they are having to piecemeal it together, you
know, when DHS and S&T apply dollars to do projects they think
have value, you know, we are really taking too much time
getting from start to finish, because they only have a certain
number of dollars to use.
So the promise of the Safe Port Act, and, hopefully,
Command 21, being an acquisition program, is they are going to
be able to lay all that out and actually execute on those.
Today, what they are having to do is they are having to work
around and find the dollars and, you know, kick and scream and
figure out a way to fund some of these things.
And the net result is it just takes too long to achieve it.
They have the will to do it; it is just a matter of getting the
dollars aligned with that to make it happen.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have another set of
questions?
Mr. Bilirakis. Just a couple. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Uh-huh.
Mr. Bilirakis. Again, Colonel Janes, do you believe it is
possible to track small vessel threats in a meaningful manner,
given the sheer volume of pleasure crafts in Florida's
waterways?
Colonel Janes. I don't believe we can do it with
technology. I think it goes back to an awareness, and everybody
in the waterways cooperating. I think technology has a role,
but it would take an integrated system. And it would be very
complex, not unlike a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive
device that I mentioned before. Just too many, too spread, too
hard.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Maybe, briefly, the rest of the panel
can comment on that?
Mr. Dryden. I would agree with that. I think that--I think
that is correct.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Yes, sir?
Captain Schultz. And I would add, Congressman, I think we
can bring greater visibility, greater awareness to that
population. Can you resolve all challenges with small boats?
Probably not. But you can--we can do better than we are now
with enhanced technologies. And, again, I mentioned the Command
21. I think that is kind of where we are hoping to go, and, you
know, the Coast Guard is looking at ways, partnering with all
the stakeholders in that small arena. There is obviously
strong--strong views there, but I think we can do more there.
Can we completely solve it? You know, that will--that is
yet to be determined, I guess.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dryden. Congressman, can I make one point? The
Interagency Operational Centers that--that Command 21 or that
the Safe Port Act dictate, that is exactly the kind of thing, I
think, where it becomes the venue, it becomes the forum in
which to do that. And there has already been test beds, for
lack of a better work, but project through DOJ, such as Seahawk
in Charleston, that have anticipated and kind of worked through
a lot of the issues of, you know, what are the procedures, what
are the lessons learned from trying to get a lot of different,
disparate organizations to work together and share intel. I
think with layer--and it is targeted as, you know, at least in
part, as a model going forward for these Command Centers, for
the Interagency Command Centers.
So I think there is a lot to be learned there, where we can
apply it and, hopefully, get closer to solving the problem by
using that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Dryden, would you please explain how Command Bridge
helps improve and facilitate actionable situational awareness
and help watch-standers differentiate between what is important
and what is not?
Mr. Dryden. Sure. The biggest thing is being able to take
all those disparate systems and fuse them together, because
once you have done that, now the sum of these things, when you
look at it, you can start applying those rules across
everything.
As an example, if you have a--if you have a vessel that you
are just looking at with AIS, and you know where they are, you
don't have the ability, without using something like Viz Tools,
you don't have the ability to then take other amplifying data
about who owns the vessel and things that may be out there.
When did they file their 96-hour Notice of Arrival? Who are the
crew? Who are the owners? All that other information that
really isn't related to the sensor, not to the blip of AIS. It
is related, really, to the bigger picture.
So the whole idea behind achieving actionable situational
awareness is light up the things, get the watch-standers who
are in there all day long, get them to light up and say, okay,
here is something you need to look at. Then they use their
talents to determine is this something they need to explore
further or not.
But by doing that, and getting rid of all those manual
processes, you have a lot fewer things get missed, because they
are spending their time, you know, doing the grunt work. What
you really want is light it up, apply those business rules.
And if you think of it as a portfolio of rules, the old
adage, when you have seen one port, you have seen one port. As
you go to different AORs and different environments, 80 percent
of it might be the same, or maybe 50 percent is the same. You
have to have a way to be able to create rules for them, for
those particular ports that may be different. You may not have
a lot of drug trafficking that is going on in Seattle, where
you have a lot going on in Miami.
It is those kind of nuances that you have to be able to
give them the ability to do themselves. And without some sort
of tool, you have to--you are not going to achieve it. So the
whole idea behind Viz Tools is to prove some of those things,
and figure out the best way to, A, create the rules, but also
to visualize that information.
Whether it is Command Bridge or some other product really
isn't the driver here. The driver is lessons learned, figuring
out what works, what doesn't. And hopefully being able to apply
the process going forward.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome.
Captain Schultz, according to your written testimony,
Sector Miami is responsible for all Coast Guard missions
spanning 165 miles southeast of Florida coastline and
encompassing numerous counties. And within that region, there
are five ports collectively handling more than 9,000 annual
vessel arrivals. And the region is also home to two of the
three largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly
4,000,000 passengers moving through both Port Everglades and
the Port of Miami annually.
So how many boats are currently assigned to Sector Miami?
Captain Schultz. We have nine Coast Guard cutters assigned
to Sector Miami, and then I have four multi-mission small boat
stations, with various levels of small boats assigned.
Here in Miami Beach, I have--I think it is six hulls
assigned to Miami Beach. I have actually seven in Miami, four
up in Fort Lauderdale, I believe it is. Three in Lake Worth,
three up in Fort Pierce. And we have some, you know,
maintenance response hulls to support them when one goes out to
service.
Ms. Sanchez. So how many of these boats are currently at
sea?
Captain Schultz. Well, on a typical day, Madam Chair,
generally we have one to two, on occasion three, patrol boats
that are actually pushing the border out of the ports, you
know, patrolling in the Straits of Florida.
Closer to home, our small boat stations have resources on
the water every day. They are not on the water 24 hours of
every day, but they are on the water a certain portion of every
day, doing various types of missions. They may be out doing a
search and rescue case in the morning or the afternoon; they
may be on a ports and waterway coastal security patrol, out
looking at maritime critical infrastructure and key resources
up the Miami River; they may be involved escorting a cruise
ship out here in a patrol with model automatic weapons, doing
what we call our ports, waterways and coastal security mission.
So there is a presence on the water from those stations
just about every day of the year, absent, you know, a bad day
or two where weather precludes that. But there is a presence. I
can't give you a specific number, because it varies, depending
on the time of the day and the day of the week.
Ms. Sanchez. How many people are currently assigned to
Sector Miami?
Captain Schultz. We have approximately 500 active duty
Coast Guard men and women, about 150-plus Coast Guard
Reservists, and then our auxiliary or volunteer ranks number
somewhere between 1000 and 1100.
Ms. Sanchez. And how many people and assets did Sector
Miami contribute to the Coast Guard's efforts in Iraq?
Captain Schultz. Technically, I don't have any assets
that--that are contributing to Iraq. We had--there are two
patrol boats, Coast Guard Cutter Baranof and Coast Guard Cutter
Maui, that were home ported previously here in Miami.
I am not sure exactly how they are reported on--on our
books regarding their operating facility codes and things, but
they have been deployed for--deployed to Operation Iraqi
Freedom for some time now.
Ms. Sanchez. Does the Coast Guard currently have the
ability to track all of the vessels carrying illegal migrants
and narcotics destined for south Florida?
Captain Schultz. No.
Ms. Sanchez. What percentage of these vessels do you think
are tracked?
Captain Schultz. Well, there is a two-part answer, Madam
Chair, to that question. I guess when it comes with Cuban
migrants here in south Florida, the Cuban migrants that we
interdict at sea, we obviously can contain that number, know
that number. Cuban migrants that make landfall here in south
Florida come forward and they start their clock once they are
here in the States, and certain rights are afforded to them.
They can apply for citizenship a year and a day later, I
believe it is.
With migrants from other countries, generally, when they
reach our shores, they tend to go underground. They don't self-
declare, so we really don't know the denominator in that
equation. I couldn't give you a number, because I don't know
the answer to that number, outside of the Cuban migrants.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Colonel----
Colonel Janes. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. --you said in your testimony that port staff
should receive daily intelligence updates from the Department
of Homeland Security. Why?
Colonel Janes. If there were a threat of a security
incident, I don't think it is fair to all of a sudden start
sending them information. I think if we have a system in place,
that we share the information, our ports would get into a mode
of routinely processing it, how they would handle it with their
staff, and would probably talk through responses.
If they learned of a threat that would be presented to a
port in Seattle, I think our port--our ports are security
conscious, that they would, in many instances, sit down and
discuss how they might respond.
I don't think that you can all of a sudden turn an
intelligence-sharing process on and off. It ought to be on. The
information they have a need to know, we should share with them
so that they can develop their own internal apparatus on how to
share it within the port and what they might do to respond.
To me, it is a start of best practices and lessons learned,
if they are able to participate.
Ms. Sanchez. Does your have staff have the security
clearances necessary to receive daily intelligence briefs? And
what assistance has the Homeland Security Department given you
in trying to attain those clearances?
Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, I am in the process of getting
my own clearance in place. So some of that, I could not truly
answer. And each port would have to----
Ms. Sanchez. And how long have you been trying?
Colonel Janes. I am probably into two months now, to apply.
And I have turned in the paperwork, fingerprinted, and
whatever. And, again, I had a security clearance, Top Secret
Cosmic Atomal, years ago. But when I left the Army, it expired,
so I have to go through the process again. And I understand
that.
Ms. Sanchez. And how long do you anticipate, or have they
told you that it would take, to get you cleared, if everything
was according to as it should be?
Colonel Janes. I--I cannot answer that. I will tell you
when I receive it, from the--the time when I applied, when I
get it. But right now, I couldn't tell you.
Ms. Sanchez. In your testimony, you talked about
regionalizing the government's national strategies. How would
regionalization--can you sort of talk to that, and what you
think that would look like? And I am interested in how it would
improve the federal government's response to drug trafficking
and terrorism down here in this sector.
Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, as indicated when you read my
bio, I worked four years in the National Terrorism Preparedness
Institute, and work with the Department of Homeland Security.
I am unaware of planning that--that goes down into a region
or a state that would indicate how a drug threat assessment,
which could be used to provide a terrorism weapon into our
country, how those are discussed locally. I don't believe they
are. And if they are, it is stovepipe within a particular law
enforcement agency.
Prior to 9/11, we had a problem sharing national
intelligence. I submitted in my testimony, I think we have a
similar problem sharing law enforcement information today. DEA,
our high intensity drug trafficking areas, they communicate and
share information, but it is not unified into one plan.
Our three HIDTAs in Florida encompass 22 counties. We have
67 counties. Next year, with the help of our Florida Department
of Law Enforcement, and the Florida National Guard, we will
capture a drug threat assessment for the other 45 counties.
That will give us a state-wide drug threat assessment.
A drug threat assessment could be used to parallel what
could be a terrorism route through drug trafficking. And,
likewise, our law enforcement, looking proactive, okay, what
might we do about that.
The reason I said regional, if you look at the State of
Florida, it is not just the land that we physically occupy. Our
Coast Guard has a major role. DEA, ICE, the Immigrations,
Customs Border Protection, all of these are important players.
I think a strategy that encompasses the Gulf Coast states
that take I-10, where we know drugs are moving from Mexico and
the western United States into Atlanta and right down into our
state. The HIDTA that is located in Atlanta, I have talked to
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, also with JIATF
South, the Joint Interagency Task Force South, Admiral Nimick,
we plan to meet with them in January and look at each other's
different intelligence capabilities, merge those, I hope, and I
believe, under our Florida Department of Law Enforcement
leadership, into a unified law enforcement assessment of what
the threat is. And then we can begin to operationalize what do
we do about it.
Because right now, it is kind of piecemeal. It is reactive,
rather than proactive. The drug trafficking organizations are
international. If there is a problem in Palm Beach County, and
law enforcement in Palm Beach County turns up the heat on the
drug trafficking organization, they will come north into
Tallahassee, into Leon County. And as I talk to sheriffs in
both counties, they are aware of that.
There is not a unifying strategy in Florida to deal across
the state. We are working on doing that. I believe Florida
needs to be a part of a regional strategy. Likewise, the
national response needs to be looked at regionally, nationally.
And these resources, intelligence, and response, should be
unified in a regional, national effort. And that is not done
today.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. My last question, and it is for all
three of you, I have a Chief of Port Police in Los Angeles,
Chief Cunningham. He has since left. But when I initially
started several years ago on this Committee, he said there are
three things you need to worry about at a port. One, what is in
the box? What is in the container? Two, who is on the port? Who
should be there and who shouldn't be there? And three, how are
the different layers of government working together?
And I am very interested to hear from you how are the
layers of government working together here in South Florida.
And I ask that because, of course, we saw the problems we had
in Katrina, with local and state and federal denying each other
access, or not talking to each other. And we recently saw what
could be the same problem in the oil spill response in the Bay
area in California just two weeks ago.
So my question to you is: How do you all really get along?
Are you talking to each other? Are you talking to all the
different agencies that are involved if something should happen
here or if we should try to stop something that we know may
happen? And what do we need to work on?
And maybe I will start down there and we will go down here.
Colonel Janes. I, of course, do not work on a port on a
daily basis, but I visit our ports and listen to them in the
Council. I--uniformly, I hear that the cooperation on the port
is strong.
There is a resourcing issue; competition between security
and commerce that gets to be a big issue.
To your chief who responded to you in California, Madam
Chair, I would add that I do believe you need a plan, a unified
plan. And that is the point that I have made to you, that I
don't believe we have. The partners and the cooperation is
there, and they share information, but I think that we are
doing better. Our ports are doing quarterly threat assessments.
They have a port security plan that addresses their port.
But it doesn't regionalize, and it looks only at the port.
But the threat that impacts these points is air, land, and sea.
And it goes back to the point that I think I have stressed.
Cooperation is there, but I don't think we have fixed
responsibility and have an adequate plan to address it.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Dryden. I think I should defer to the operators in the
local area on this one.
Captain Schultz. Madam Chair, I think the answer to that is
a very strong positive message here in South Florida. I am
personally involved with the Port Directors, with their
designated Assistant Port Directors for Security. We meet on an
at least monthly basis at an executive level.
Here in the Port of Miami, up in Port Everglades, and Palm
Beach, I have folks on my staff, port teams, as we call them,
that come to work in the seaport. Here in the Port of Miami,
which you visited this morning, there is a physical presence.
They have office space there. They walk the docks. They are
rubbing elbows with the Port Security Enforcement Specialists.
They are there with the port staff. They are there with the
Miami-Dade Police Department, who is actually a security
provider under contract with the port.
At the State level, my regional counterpart, the Major here
in this part of the country, you know, we talk probably a
couple times a week. As I mentioned earlier, we will meet with
the Regional Domestic Security Task Force tomorrow. I co-chair
the Maritime Working Group there with my State partner from
Fish and Wildlife Commission. And we--that will be all the law
enforcement agencies down here, and first responders that have
a maritime component to their mission. We will get together,
and we talk. We share e-mails.
When there are new challenges, when the State in Florida
Statute 311.11, 311.12 came out with some new requirements on
quarterly threat assessments, this Maritime Working Group
element of the RDSTF, the Regional Domestic Security Task
Force, came up with a Seaport Security Assistance Team function
to help, you know, work through those processes.
So I think we are very well connected in that regard. There
is always room for improvement, but with--you link this back to
the cruise ships and the number of passengers here. There is
more work than any one of our agencies can do alone. Miami is
very much a maritime city. You mentioned meeting Admiral
Stavridis recently, and he will talk about Miami, he will put
the picture on the overhead and show you just how maritime it
is, just from a visual standpoint.
We, day-to-day, we had the Super Bowl 2007 here; Super Bowl
is back in 2010. We have had the Governors' Conference on
Global Warming. We had the State Department/FBI Conference on
Combating Global Terrorism with 23, 25 minister-level folks in
from foreign countries.
We do water site security every day down here. And we don't
just train, we actually live it. And it forces us to have
mature relationships. So I would say a good part of my duties
as Sector Commander, at my level, is working those
relationships at my counterparts, you know, with them, and
making sure my folks have that same level of connectivity.
And, again, it is commitment. If you backed out the number
of folks I have on the Port Teams, that is probably close to 20
percent of my Sector staff. Not my outlying field units, but 15
to 20 percent of my staff is out, deployed in the seaports.
They are working with Fran Bonesack from the Miami River. Her
folks come in for a weekly meeting.
So, again, we can always do better, but we take that part
very seriously down here. That is a part of the Domain
Awareness that I think is probably something we can do and
continue to build on.
Lastly on that, we are working very closely with Customs
and Border Protection. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, and
the Commissioner of CBP signed a memorandum, an MOU, back in
2006, looking at better cooperation. I have got--Monday
morning, I had a CBP officer in my Command Center, briefing
their activities in the port. My people are over there briefing
the seaport, the CBP folks.
CBP is building a joint fusion center down here, and we
have committed bodies to be in that, to further enhance that
sharing of information, intelligence, cooperation,
collaboration.
So I think there is a good new story there, and we are very
focused on building on that good new story.
Ms. Sanchez. All right. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have any
questions left?
Mr. Bilirakis. Just one last question.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. We will let you have the last question,
then.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Colonel Janes, in your opinion,
how do we stand on aligning the TWIC card, aligning it with
Florida's Port Access Control Credential? And how important is
this to the State of Florida? And what can we do as a Committee
to make this happen?
Colonel Janes. We have made progress, Congressman, in the
last month, but I am very concerned that we do not have
positive steps from Transportation Security Administration to
unify the two credential requirements before they begin to
issue the TWIC in Florida.
I think the issue is of paramount importance. I cannot
overstate it, because it affects every port worker, it doubles
costs, it is huge morale issues.
Florida has been ready to issue a biometric credential
since--since March of this year. We have actually delayed that
in our efforts to align, because if we did not, it would double
the cost, duplicate costs, cause inconvenience for everyone
working on the port.
Only recently, with the help of former Deputy Secretary
Jackson, was he able to facilitate a discussion with TSA that
the National Criminal Investigative Check information could be
shared from the federal to the state level.
Now, TSA still has concerns with how to make that happen.
The privacy concerns, and my concern, is that they show up in
January to begin to issue the TWIC, which meets the federal
rule, but does not meet the Florida statute.
So the concerns are very great. And there is a solution at
hand.
The way you could help is to ask TSA to align their
schedule with the alignment of the credential. We do not need
two credentials in Florida. We don't need to jeopardize
commerce, force our businesses to go elsewhere, but just cause
a break-down in bureaucracy between the federal and state level
to align the systems.
And anything you can do to encourage TSA to make this
happen, because they have now been given the wherewithal, I
believe, with the intervention of the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thanks for that update.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the panel testifying.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for bringing this Committee to the
State of Florida. Appreciate it.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from Florida, and I thank
the witnesses for your testimony, and my colleague for his
questions.
And, as you know, we may ask you additional questions. We
will do so in writing, and we expect that you will quickly get
back to us on that.
And hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands
adjourned.
Once again, thank you to the people of Florida, Miami in
particular, all the different government agencies who hosted us
so graciously today. Thank you.
Hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]