    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME
                          ENVIRONMENT: MARITIME DOMAIN
                         AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING

    =======================================================================

                                 FIELD HEARING

                                   before the

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 26, 2007

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 110-88

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

    [GRAPHICS) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html

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    20402-0001

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                   BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman

    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          PETER T. KING, New York
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      LAMAR SMITH, Texas
    NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington          CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
    JANE HARMAN, California              MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             TOM DAVIS, Virginia
    NITA M. LOWEY, New York              DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    Columbia                             BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
    SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas            MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    Islands                              GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
    BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina         MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                 DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
    CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
    AL GREEN, Texas
    ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
    VACANCY

           Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
                        Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
                         Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                    Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director

                                     ______

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

                    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman

    JANE HARMAN, California              MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
    SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas            DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    AL GREEN, Texas                      PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
    BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex  Officio)
    Officio)

                             Alison Rosso, Director
                             Denise Krepp, Counsel
                           Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
            Mandy Bowers, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member

                                      (II)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   STATEMENTS

    The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress, and
      Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
      Counterrorism..................................................     1
    The Honorable Gus. M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress
      from the State.................................................     2

                                   Witnesses

    Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and CEO, The Mariner Group:
      Oral Statement.................................................     8
      Prepared Statement.............................................    10
    Colonel William H. Janes (U.S. Army, Ret.) Director, Florida
      Office of Drug Control and Assistant Secretary, Substance Abuse
      and Mental Health, Department of Children and Families:
      Oral Statement.................................................    16
      Prepared Statement.............................................    18
    Captain Karl Schultz, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector Miami
      Oral Statement.................................................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     6

                                 For the Record

    Dr. Fran Bohnsack, Executive Director, Miami River Marine Group:
      Preapred Statement.............................................    24

     HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING

                                  ----------

                           Monday, November 26, 2007

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
                              Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
                                   and Global Counterterrorism,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., at
    Miami City Hall, 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, Florida, Hon.
    Loretta Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Sanchez and Bilirakis.
        Ms. Sanchez. Good afternoon. I am pleased that this
    Subcommittee is able to hold this Field Hearing in Miami, and I
    would like to start by thanking Congressman Bilirakis for his
    interest in this hearing, and to thank our witnesses today for
    agreeing to testify, especially at the end of a Thanksgiving
    holiday. Thank you for being here.
        And I would also like to thank the City of Miami for
    allowing us to use this space today to hold the hearing.
        Maritime security is an incredibly important priority for
    this Subcommittee. In fact, it is carried in our name. Our
    nation's maritime ports play a critical role in America's
    economy, and in our day-to-day lives for many of us.
         But, as we have gone to take a look at different ports
    this past year in particular, we have come across the
    realization that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to
    our port security. Every port that I have visited has been
    incredibly interesting, and yet very diverse than the last one
    I had been to.
        Of course, the ports that I am most familiar with are the
    Long Beach/Los Angeles ports, the largest system that we have
    here in our nation. But, again, they have different challenges,
    and opportunities, than the rest of the ports that we have here
    in the United States. So it was a really great visit this
    morning at the Port of Miami, take a look at the particulars
    for that port.
        And I want to thank everyone at the Port of Miami, Miami-
    Dade County, the Coast Guard, our customs and border
    protection, and all the related parties that helped us this
    morning with respect to taking a look at the particulars of the
    Port of Miami.
        One of the distinctive characteristics of the Port of Miami
    is the high volume of cruise ship vessel traffic, which has
    earned the port this distinction of The Cruise Capital of the
    World.
        In addition to cruise ships, the Port of Miami is also the
    largest container port here in Florida. And, given the diverse
    vessel traffic at the Port of Miami, and the significant
    pleasure boat presence in the region, this is a perfect place
    to frame a discussion about Maritime Domain Awareness, or what
    we call MDA, and Vessel Tracking.
        MDA is an effective understanding of anything associated
    with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, the
    safety, the economy, or the environment of the United States.
    And achieving and maintaining full Maritime Domain Awareness at
    any port is a challenge, in particular here in Miami. And that
    is one of the reasons why, for a long time now, I have been
    wanting to come here and take a look at this port in
    particular. Especially because of the small pleasure craft that
    are here, and what it means to our country.
        Remember that this Subcommittee not only does maritime, it
    does all egress and ingress into this nation. And from that
    standpoint, the type of people who come through here, through
    Miami, through the coastal waters of Florida in particular are
    of a great concern for us. We need to understand how best it is
    that we protect our coastal--our shores from people and
    contraband coming in.
        And I say that because, while our focus, in a large
    respect, from this Subcommittee and, of course, the Congress
    and even America right now, is about people crossing our land
    borders. The fact of the matter is, we have a lot more maritime
    coastal borders than land borders to this United States. And we
    have not really focused on that aspect.
        And as we tighten up those land borders, people will find
    different ways, or find the weaker link, to get in to the
    United States. And this will be a big challenge, especially for
    this area, Florida, and for Miami in particular.
        I am interested in the collaboration between the Coast
    Guard and The Mariner Group to enhance situational awareness in
    the emergency response at Miami Sector Command Center.
        And another issue that I think is very important for
    maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness is the vessel
    tracking systems. And I am concerned about whether the Coast
    Guard and the ports have sufficient and accessible vessel
    tracking capabilities. So I look forward to you, to our
    witnesses discussing some of these and some of the other issues
    related to the Maritime Domain Awareness.
        And now, the Chair would like to recognize the gentleman
    from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis----
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Sanchez. --for an opening statement.
        Mr. Bilirakis. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you
    holding this hearing here today, particularly having to travel
    all the way across the country to be here. You truly are a
    great Chairperson, and I really am honored to serve under you.
        I would also like to welcome you to the State of Florida. I
    look forward to discussing the Maritime Domain Awareness and
    Vessel Tracking by the United States Coast Guard.
        I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here
    today, and I look forward to your testimony.
        The Florida district I represent includes the portions of
    Clearwater, Tarpon Springs, Palm Harbor, and the Gulf Coast of
    Pasco County, including New Port Richey, and also Hillsborough
    County, where the Port of Tampa is located.
        The people in my district understand firsthand the
    important of maritime security. And I am very interested in the
    progress being made by the Coast Guard, specifically in
    tracking small boats, sharing intelligence, and establishing a
    common operating picture.
        To improve Maritime Domain Awareness, the Coast Guard must
    be able to effectively locate, identify, and track maritime
    targets of interest in U.S. waters and beyond.
        The Safe Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland
    Security, requires him to develop and implement a long-range
    automated vessel tracking system. To coordinate the Coast
    Guard's vessel tracking program, the law authorized funding for
    the creation of an Inter-agency Command Centers at all major
    U.S. ports. The Vessel Tracking System would feed these command
    centers using a common operating picture to insure that inter-
    agency assets receive proper notice and have adequate time to
    respond to inbound waterborne threats.
        During today's hearing, I want to get a better
    understanding of the Coast Guard's operational capabilities to
    track approaching vessels. I would also like to examine what
    the Coast Guard is doing to address the increasing small boat
    threat.
        It is critical that the Coast Guard be able to identify,
    track, and analyze daily unreported threats, such as small
    vessels smuggling terrorists, weapons, illegal narcotics, and
    illegal aliens.
        I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today,
    especially Colonel Bill Janes, who can offer unique insight
    into the impact of narcotics smuggling into the State of
    Florida, and help us identify ways to improve drug interdiction
    capabilities and information sharing.
        I am especially interested in his testimony, and would like
    to express my appreciation for Bill's participation here today.
        Colonel Janes. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Integration and coordination across federal,
    state, and local operations strategies and tactics is critical
    to the Coast Guard's strategic mission.
        And I want to thank Madam Chair again for having this
    hearing. I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and I
    would just like to put on the record that when I spoke to the
    gentleman about doing a port visit down here to Miami, he said
    that would be great, but Tampa would be better. So I just want
    to put that in the record, because I know that he has asked,
    and maybe--maybe when we get to--we will get to it, but I know
    that you are looking out for your constituents.
        Okay. So, normally, our witnesses would be in front of us,
    but we will have to sort of lean over and look at you. If I
    send in a bill for my neck, I will let you know. But it is
    great to have you up here on the dais with us.
        And let me welcome you and give a little background on each
    of you, and then we will listen to your testimony.
        Our first witness is Captain Karl Schultz. He is the
    Commander of Coast Guard Sector of Miami. And the Captain
    reports to Sector Miami from the Kennedy School of Government
    at Harvard University, where he completed a one-year research
    fellowship in National Security Studies. And from July, 2003 to
    July of 2005, Captain Schultz served as Commanding Officer
    aboard the United States Coast Guard Cutter Venturous, leading
    diverse counter-drug, alien migrant interdiction, search and
    rescue, and humanitarian operations in the maritime approaches
    to the southeastern United States and throughout the Caribbean
    Basin.
        Captain Schultz has served in numerous other afloat and
    ashore assignments since graduating from the U.S. Coast Guard
    Academy in 1983.
        Our second witness is Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and
    CEO of The Mariner Group, a software company focused on
    Homeland Security with particular emphasis in Maritime Domain
    Awareness.
        His current MDA efforts include working with the Department
    of Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard's
    Research and Development Center on the United States Coast
    Guard Sector Command Centers of the future visualization and
    response applications for Enhanced Watch-Stander Situational
    Awareness Project. That is a long name there.
        And our third and final witness is Colonel, U.S. Army
    Retired, William Janes, Director, Florida Officer of Drug
    Control. And he served in the U.S. Army for 24 years, commanded
    at the Company, Battalion, and the Brigade levels.
        We welcome all of you.
        Oh, and after leaving the military, he was a counselor, a
    manager, and Executive Director for the Drug Abuse
    Comprehensive Coordinated Office in Tampa for ten years. And
    from 2002 to 2006, he served as the Director, National
    Terrorism Preparedness Institute at St. Petersburg College.
        Welcome to all three of the gentlemen.
        And without objection, the witnesses' full statements,
    which they turned in, will be inserted in the record. And I
    will now ask each of the witnesses to summarize his statement
    for five minutes, beginning with Captain Schultz.
         And let us know what you think we need to know about, and
    maybe if you can address some of the issues in our opening
    statements. For five minutes.

    STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL SCHULTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. COAST GUARD
                              SECTOR MIAMI

        Captain Schultz. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and
    distinguished members of the Committee, Congressman Bilirakis.
    It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast
    Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South
    Florida, and to address your specific questions pertaining to
    vessel tracking and domain awareness.
        As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I
    have several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the
    region's Federal maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and
    Rescue Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine
    Inspection; and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
        To provide some context on the scope of Sector Miami's
    maritime security workload, I note that the Sector is
    responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles of
    southeast Florida coastline. Within this region, there are five
    seaports, collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel
    arrivals. The region is home to two of three of the largest
    cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4 million
    passengers passing through each, Port Everglades and Port of
    Miami, which you toured earlier today.
        Additionally, more than 2 million shipping containers and
    20 percent of Florida's gasoline and petroleum products
    servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these same
    ports.
        Within our area of responsibility, the Coast Guard
    regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act
    facilities.
        Our maritime security mission requirements are quite
    complex, as we focus on securing our port and coastal waterways
    against potential terrorist activities, as well as persistent
    threats from illegal migrants, drugs and other commodities
    trafficked via maritime means.
        Miami is known as the Gateway to the Americas, and the
    proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to
    international points or origin or trans-ship for illegal
    migrant and illicit narcotics smuggling, presents significant
    operational challenges. The maritime border is complex, and
    requires an integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism,
    and immigration. We are committed to striking an optimal
    balance between trade, travel, and security in all that we do.
        The Committee's invitation noted, as you mentioned, Madam
    Chairwoman, the specific interest in Maritime Domain Awareness
    and Vessel Tracking. And I think, because of its importance, I
    will restate exactly what Maritime Domain Awareness is. It is,
    in fact, as you stated, the effective understanding of anything
    associated with global maritime domain that could affect
    safety, security, the economy, or the environment, and it is
    essential to Sector Miami and our ability to accomplish our
    broad portfolio of missions.
        MDA supports all Coast Guard missions, and, more
    specifically, our tactical, operational, and strategic
    decision-making. MDA integrated global maritime intelligence
    with global maritime situational awareness, and requires
    collaboration across all layers of government, and with the
    private sector, and with international stakeholders.
        Miami, interestingly enough, is home of the Coast Guard's
    first Sector Command, which was established back in 2004. And
    our Sector Command Center serves as a site for two significant
    Maritime Domain Awareness-related pilot projects. These are
    conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security
    Science and Technology Directorate.
        The first, Project Hawkeye, is a limited sensor network
    that integrates radar, cameras, and automatic identification
    system, or AIS, data feeds to provide automated vessel tracking
    data, and port activity monitoring capability to our Command
    Center watch-standers.
        The second, the Visualization and Response Tools Project,
    which you also mentioned, is a proof-of-concept effort designed
    to help us understand how to visualize a tactical situation and
    the security posture of the seaport by correlating sensor and
    automated vessel tracking information with advanced
    notification of arrival information and other port activities
    and data sources.
        These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's
    proposed acquisition project called Command 21, and give the
    Sector important perspective and visibility on the wide array
    of threats to the maritime domain here in South Florida.
        There is still a long way to go in managing all the
    information required to support our daily operations and our
    daily decision-making. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels
    through programs like the Nationwide Automatic Identification
    System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process, and the forthcoming
    International Maritime Organizations Long Range Identification
    and Tracking Initiative, which you mentioned, Congressman
    Bilirakis, is just the start.
        The small boat threat, for example, continues to present
    technological and policy challenges, and remains a primary
    maritime security concern, particularly in our area, where we
    have over 100,000 registered recreational vessels just in Palm
    Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties alone.
        Collaboration across all layers of government, federal,
    state, and local, as well as with the private sector and
    international stakeholders is essential to achieve meaningful
    MDA and, in turn, address the myriad of threats in our domain.
    We work hard in southeast Florida to ensure interagency
    collaboration, and insure that collaboration informs and
    improves our layered approach to maritime security.
        Coordinating bodies such as our Area Maritime Security
    Committee and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of
    Florida's Regional Domestic Security Task Force, which here
    locally brings 100-plus first responder agencies together in a
    coordinating framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and
    operational coordination.
        Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and
    Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task
    Force, as well as state and local agencies, private maritime
    organizations such as CLIA, local shippers, the ports, terminal
    operators, industry groups, these are all critical to the
    success of our cooperation and that integration in the region.
        The Sector Miami team works diligently to insure our
    maritime borders and seaports are as secure as possible given
    our available capabilities and resources. We place continuous
    emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying
    new technologies, and on delivering operational excellence in
    all that we do.
        We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale,
    and are grateful for your interest in our operations.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I have
    submitted my written statement for the record, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The information follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Captain Karl L. Schultz

        Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the
    Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of
    Coast Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South
    Florida, and to address your specific interests in maritime domain
    awareness and vessel tracking. I am grateful for your interest in our
    unique operating environment and pleased to welcome you here.
        As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have
    several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the region's Federal
    Maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission
    Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal
    On-Scene Coordinator. The Sector focuses on two major operational
    processes--PREVENTION and RESPONSE--in support of our service's five
    fundamental roles: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Maritime
    Mobility, the Protection of Natural Resources, and National Defense.
        The seaports in Sector Miami's Captain of the Port zone are located
    on shared-use waterways in densely populated areas. To provide some
    context on the scope of Sector Miami's maritime security workload, I
    note that the Sector is responsible for all Coast Guard missions
    spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline and encompassing
    numerous counties. Within this region there are five ports,
    collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The
    region is home to two of the three largest cruise ship ports in the
    world, with nearly 4 million passengers moving through both Port
    Everglades and the Port of Miami annually. Additionally, more than 2
    million shipping containers (TEUs) and 20% of Florida's gasoline and
    petroleum products servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these
    ports. The region is also home to 2 nuclear power plants, and the local
    commercial fleet includes 370 small passenger vessels. There are also
    170,000 registered recreational boats in Palm Beach, Miami Dade and
    Broward counties alone. Within our Area of Responsibility, the Coast
    Guard regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act
    facilities.
        Our maritime security mission requirements, while only a subset of
    our broader Coast Guard responsibilities, are quite complex as we focus
    on securing our port and coastal waterways against potential terrorist
    activities as well as potentially persistent threats from illegal
    migrants, drugs and other commodities and implements trafficked via
    maritime means. Miami is known as the ``Gateway to the Americas,'' and
    the proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to international
    origination or trans-shipment points for illegal migrant and illicit
    narcotic smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. To be
    certain, the maritime border is a complex national border requiring and
    integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism and immigration. We
    are committed to striking an optimal balance among trade, travel and
    security in all that we do.
        The Committee's invitation noted a specific interest in the areas
    of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking. These issues
    are relevant to Sector Miami and I am pleased to speak to them. MDA, or
    the effective understanding of anything associated with the global
    maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the economy or the
    environment, is essential to the Sector's ability to accomplish its
    broad portfolio of missions, including seaport and border security,
    maritime safety, search and rescue, marine environmental protection,
    and the facilitation of maritime commerce. Indeed, MDA supports all
    Coast Guard mission areas, and more specifically, our tactical,
    operational and strategic decision-making. MDA integrates global
    maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness and
    requires collaboration across all layers of government (federal/state/
    local), the private sector, and with international stakeholders.
        Miami is home to the Coast Guard's first Sector Command,
    established in 2004. The Sector Command Center (SCC) coordinates Coast
    Guard resources applied to the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions
    found in Southeast Florida and serves as the hub, or central nervous
    system, of the command. Sector Miami's SCC is also the site for two
    significant MDA-related pilot projects conducted jointly with the
    Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. The
    first, ``Project Hawkeye,'' is a limited sensor network that integrates
    radar, cameras and Automatic Identification System data (AIS) to
    provide automated vessel tracking data and port activity monitoring
    capability to the SCC. The second, the Visualization and Response Tools
    project, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us understand
    how to visualize the tactical situation and security posture of the
    seaport by correlating sensor and automated vessel tracking information
    with advanced notification of arrival information and other port
    activity. These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's
    proposed acquisition project called ``Command 21,'' and give the Sector
    important perspective and visibility on a wide array of threats to the
    maritime domain. The Command 21 project is conceptually designed to
    provide port-level MDA and to highlight information gaps to provide
    Sector Commanders with the ability to synthesize MDA information in the
    SCC and to further share that information with federal, state and local
    partners.
        There is still a long way to go in managing all the information
    required to support daily operations and decision-making. Tracking
    large, ocean-going vessels through programs like the National Automatic
    Identification System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process and the
    forthcoming International Maritime Organization's Long Range
    Identification and Tracking (LRIT) is just the start. The small boat
    threat, for example, continues to present technology and policy
    challenges and remains a primary maritime security concern,
    particularly in the Sector Miami area of operations where, as I
    mentioned earlier, we have over 170,000 registered recreational boats.
    Within the Department of Homeland Security, we are working closely with
    CBP to expand our efforts to secure the small maritime craft
    environment.
        Collaboration across all layers of government (federal, state and
    local), as well as with the private sector and international
    stakeholders is essential to achieving meaningful MDA and in turn
    addressing the myriad of threats in the maritime domain. We work hard
    in Southeast Florida to ensure interagency collaboration informs and
    improves our layered approach to maritime security. Coordinating bodies
    such as our Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) and its active
    subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida's Southeast Regional
    Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF-SE), which brings more than 100
    first responder agencies together in a coordinating framework, are
    pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination. Key
    partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and Border
    Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task Force; as well as state
    and local agencies and private maritime organizations including the
    Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), local shippers, terminal
    operators and other industry groups are critical to the success of our
    cooperation and integration in the region.
        In my estimation, Sector Miami's focus on a risk-based approach to
    layered maritime security is serving Southeast Florida well. The Sector
    Miami team of active duty, reserve, civilian employees and Coast Guard
    Auxiliarists (our volunteers) works diligently to ensure our maritime
    border and seaports are as secure as possible given available
    capabilities and resources. At Sector Miami, we place continuous
    emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new
    technologies and on delivering operational excellence in all that we
    do. We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale and again
    grateful for your interest in our operations.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.
        And I now recognize Mr. Dryden to summarize his statement
    for five minutes.

      STATEMENT OF STEPHEN DRYDEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE MARINER
                                 GROUP

        Mr. Dryden. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman,
    Congressman Bilirakis. I am Steve Dryden, CEO of The Mariner
    Group. It is an honor to appear here today and talk about the
    MDA and Vessel Tracking.
        My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the
    Coast Guard over the last three years to significantly improve
    MDA and situational response. My goal is to basically review
    the overall project mission, take you through the challenges we
    have encountered, and then, at the end of this, is to also urge
    full support of the Safe Port Act and the funding that has
    already been put in for the President to sign.
        As you know, the Safe Port Act directs the Coast Guard to
    establish Interagency Operations Centers for enhancing port
    security at locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is
    working with the Coast Guard through the Visualization Tools
    for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response, which is a
    mouthful, I agree.
        As part of the project, Mariner software application,
    Command Bridge, has been employed as the primary underlying
    technology to increase domain awareness in Sector Command
    Center Miami.
        I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I
    believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to
    insure safety and security.
        Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more
    important than gaining actionable situation awareness. In a
    Coast Guard Command Center, or any complex border
    infrastructure or transportation environment, watch-standers
    must maintain an understanding of what is going on at all
    times, while simultaneously working to predict and prevent
    ever-changing threats.
        The work of this Committee and the government as a whole
    has allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in
    maritime and other security areas. And more and more data is
    being generated to help users make decisions. But an unintended
    consequence of this is massive amounts of data, and the user
    becomes overloaded with too much information. So it is harder
    to focus on particular, important information.
        Simply put, it is harder to find the needle in the haystack
    when the haystack keeps getting bigger and bigger.
        The goal of the Viz Tools Projects is to inform decision-
    makers and then enable them to take action to prevent incidents
    and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program
    places strong emphasis on providing operational end-users with
    the technology, the capabilities to detect and prevent
    terrorist attack, counteract illegal activities, and to help
    manage those response-related actions.
        The project was funded by DHS S&T in collaboration with the
    Coast Guard R&D Center. It is currently an operational
    prototype in Sector Miami, here.
        Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data,
    better analyze that data to create knowledge, and then create
    more effective ways to visualize and act upon the knowledge,
    then disseminate that information internally to the Coast Guard
    and well as externally to port partners.
        Overall, the project objectives include develop and
    maintain an accurate situational picture, identify threats
    rapidly without the need for extensive manpower, and then plan
    and manage those stages of response.
        Prior to Viz Tools, watch-standers had to manually achieve
    situational awareness by monitoring information from a lot of
    sources, such as radar, the harbor pilots, internal Coast Guard
    systems, weather, and there was just a litany of systems that
    had to be identified and looked at all the time.
        Getting true situational awareness requires advanced
    technology that can focus on meaningful, relevant information.
    Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefit,
    but also can contribute to an overload, negatively affecting
    the situation.
        The Viz Tools Project not only fuses information from many
    sources, it also analyzes the combined information for
    anomalies, and then presents meaningful, actionable knowledge
    without the clutter.
        These capabilities keep the watch-stander focused on what
    is important, while delivering the right information to the
    right person at the right time.
        We are making great stride, but critical gaps still need to
    be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of developing
    regional security should be properly incorporated into these
    Interagency Command Centers.
        Number one, the integration of cargo and vessel
    information. Two, better sensor technology installed to track
    small boats and non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to
    spoof or turn off AIS transponders.
        The current state of technology in ports today is really--
    really falls short in their ability to do this.
        Emerging projects such as DHS has with the Coast Guard, one
    is called the Automated Scene Understanding Project, which is
    showing a lot of potential benefit, and needs to be examined
    more.
        We need to foster a better sense of coordination with local
    law enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security
    in instant response.
        We need to be able to conduct longer range vessel tracking
    of transits that are out there, not necessarily headed to and
    from the port, but are actually out there in the vicinity.
        And lastly, we need to integrate information in response-
    related activities related to high-interest, critical
    facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard, but they
    may be on, adjacent to, over or under U.S. navigable waters.
        In conclusion, I would recommend that you and your
    Committee provide full funding for the Safe Port Act
    requirements. The President budget recommends only minimal
    funding for the Command 21 Program. Fortunately, with your
    leadership, Madam Chairman and Congressman Bilirakis, the House
    has chosen to include $40,000,000 for the Command 21 Program,
    and the Senate has proposed 60,000,000 in 2008 funding.
        It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall behind
    another year in this program. In my view, facilitating regional
    maritime security coordination and response may be the most
    important and the most difficult challenge we face in the
    larger area of port security.
        Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you
    today, and giving me the opportunity to talk before you.
        [The information follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Dryden

        Good afternoon Madame Chairwoman and distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee. I am Steve Dryden, Chief Executive Officer of The Mariner
    Group. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Maritime
    Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking.
        My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the US Coast
    Guard over the past three years to significantly improve MDA and
    response throughout the nation. My goals today are to inform you of the
    overall project mission, the challenges encountered in gaining true
    MDA, and lastly, to urge support for full funding of the Safe Port Act
    of 2006.
        As you know, the Safe Port Act of 2006 directs the Coast Guard to
    establish interagency operations centers for enhancing port security at
    locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with the
    Coast Guard through their Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness
    and Emergency Response, or ``Viz Tools'', for Sector Command Centers to
    help in this effort. As part of this project, Mariner's software
    application, CommandBridge, has been employed as the primary underlying
    technology to increase Maritime Domain Awareness at the Sector Command
    Center--Miami. I would like to take a few minutes to share with you
    what I believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to
    ensure the safety and security of U.S. waters.
        Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important
    than gaining Actionable Situation Awareness. ``Situation awareness is
    the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time
    and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of
    their status in the near future.'' \1\ In a Coast Guard command center,
    or any highly complex border, infrastructure, or transportation
    environment, watch standers must maintain an understanding of what is
    going on at all times while simultaneously working to predict and
    prevent ever changing threats.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered
    Design by Mica R. Endsley,, Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones.
        \2\ See Attachment ``The Mariner Group''.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The work of this committee, and the government as a whole, has
    allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime or
    other homeland security areas, and more and more data is being
    generated to help users make decisions. As examples, technologies
    including RADAR, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems, and
    perimeter detection systems have been implemented throughout our ports.
    But an unintended consequence of massive amounts of data is that users
    are overloaded with that data, making it harder to focus on the most
    important information. Simply put, it's harder to find the needle-in-
    the-haystack when the haystack keeps getting larger.
        The goal of the Viz Tools project is to inform decision makers and
    enable them to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately
    coordinate incident response. The program places strong emphasis on
    providing operational end-users with the technology and capabilities to
    detect and prevent terrorist attacks, counteract illegal activities,
    and to help manage response related actions.
        The project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security
    Science & Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) in collaboration with the
    Coast Guard R&D Center and Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL). The
    system is currently operational as a prototype in District Seven at the
    Coast Guard's Sector Command Center in Miami. Viz Tools uses advanced
    methods to collect and fuse data, better analyze the data to create
    knowledge, create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the
    knowledge, and disseminates information internally to the Coast Guard
    and their appropriate partners.
        Viz Tools' overall project objectives are to:
             Develop and maintain an accurate situational picture;
             Assimilate relevant sensor data and couple it with
            amplifying information;
             Identify threats rapidly without the need for
            extensive manpower;
             Comprehend the nature and gravity of the emerging
            threat;
             Maximize Blue Force Assets, operational capacity, and
            readiness to offset the threat; and
             Plan and manage the stages of emergency response.
        Prior to Viz Tools, watch standers had to manually achieve
    situation awareness by monitoring information from numerous sources
    such as RADAR screens, harbor pilot websites, messaging, commercial
    information sources, weather systems, internal Coast Guard systems,
    etc.
        Gaining true actionable situation awareness requires advanced
    technology that can focus the user on meaningful, relevant information.
    Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefits but can
    also contribute to sensory overload negatively affecting the situation.
    Viz Tools not only fuses information from many diverse sources, it also
    analyzes the combined information for anomalies and then presents
    meaningful, actionable knowledge without the ancillary clutter. These
    capabilities keep the watch stander focused on what's important while
    delivering the right information to the right person at the right time.
        Viz Tools enables the Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies,
    and Port Partners the ability to understand their current situation by
    providing them the most relevant, actionable information and
    implementing the most appropriate security protocols. Currently
    envisioned, Viz Tools will promote the ability to leverage current
    technology programs and allow easy adaption of additional technologies
    as port security needs evolve.
        Let me give you an illustration: If a container ship is heading for
    the Port of Miami, Viz Tools tracks its progress. Before it has entered
    the area, Viz Tools analyzes all relevant information, assessing
    anomalies, safety, and terrorist potential. Information from the Coast
    Guard, port authorities, harbor pilots, Lloyd's Register, and other
    vital sources pour in, creating a federated view. In addition, we will
    be working to incorporate information on cargo sensitivity with
    relevant information collected about the vessel.
        Correlating and verifying all information, Viz Tools can apply
    anomaly detection to monitor information such as changes in ownership,
    manifest discrepancies, inconsistent arrival information, and other
    intelligence as it becomes available. These anomalies automatically
    display on the user's screen as an alert that necessitates immediate
    action. In addition, Viz Tools currently allows the Coast Guard to
    maintain operational control such as alerting the watch stander that a
    vessel operating under restriction has begun to move. Based upon the
    situation, the watch stander can use Viz Tools to automatically contact
    the appropriate resource to instigate an intervention, detaining the
    ship until it achieves an all-clear status. Over time, Viz Tools will
    evolve to incorporate changing security scenarios by assembling a
    growing portfolio of alert circumstances and therefore continuously
    increasing port security. While we are making great strides, critical
    gaps still need to be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of
    developing regional maritime security should properly be incorporated
    into the interagency command centers, including:
            1. The integration of cargo and vessel information into Viz
            Tools.
            2. Better sensor technology installed to track small boats and
            non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off
            required AIS transponders. The current state of technology in
            today's ports falls short in their ability to track non-
            cooperative vessels and small boats. For example, a vessel may
            be deemed non-cooperative if its Automatic Identification
            System (AIS) tracking isn't turned on. Small boats that don't
            have AIS tracking technology are also a potential threat.
            Emerging projects such as DHS S&T / USCG R&D Center's Automated
            Scene Understanding project offers the potential to mitigate
            this shortfall.
            3. Foster a better sense of coordination with local law
            enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security and
            incident response.
            4. Ability to conduct longer range vessel tracking of transits.
            5. Integrate information and response related activities
            related to high-interest, critical facilities that are not
            regulated by the Coast Guard that are on, adjacent to, over, or
            under, U.S. navigable waters.
        In conclusion, I would also recommend that you and your committee
    provide full funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The
    President's Budget recommends only minimal funding for the Command/21
    program. Fortunately, with your leadership Madame Chairman and
    Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include $40 million
    dollars for the Command/21 program, and the Senate has proposed $60
    million in 2008 funding. It will be critical to ensure that we do not
    fall behind another year on this program. In my view, facilitating
    regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most
    important and most difficult challenge that we face in the larger area
    of port security.
        Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you today
    and for giving me the opportunity to talk to you about Maritime Domain
    Awareness and Vessel Tracking I'm proud to be associated with this
    project and am happy to answer any questions you may have.

                                   Attachment

        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Dryden. And I thank you for
    your testimony.
        And I now recognize Colonel, is it Janes or Jannis?
        Colonel Janes. Janes.
        Ms. Sanchez. Janes. Okay. Colonel Janes, to summarize your
    statement for five minutes or less, please.

       STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM G. JANES, (U.S. ARMY, RET.),
      DIRECTOR, FLORIDA OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL STATEMENT OF KARL
                                SCHULTZ

        Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership;
    Congressman Bilirakis, for your outstanding leadership in
    Florida and terrific support of my office; fellow panelists. I
    am delighted to testify.
        On behalf of Governor Charlie Crist and the state, port,
    and community leaders involved in the combined efforts to
    secure our ports, Florida, and our nation from a transportation
    security incident, drug trafficking, I thank Congress, and
    particularly this Subcommittee, for the opportunity to talk
    about our ports, particularly Florida ports, the global supply
    chain, and how to protect the citizens of Florida.
        In terms of geography demography, Florida has many features
    which make it exceptionally attractive for drug trafficking
    organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an
    extremely diverse population with strong representation from
    the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico.
    Florida has approximately 1350 miles of largely unprotected
    continental coastline, and the Florida Keys archipelago, that
    lies astride some of the major drug trafficking routes into the
    United States.
        During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the
    daunting task of seaport security. We began initially focused
    on crime, cargo theft, drug trafficking, but expanded to
    terrorism after the horrific events of 9/11.
        Our emergency responders in ports are superbly trained and
    prepared for an incident, but, most importantly, to prevent it.
    We have implemented Regional Domestic Security Task Forces
    across our state to respond to an all-hazards threat.
        Most states have two to three ports to secure. Florida has
    14 deep, public deepwater seaports. Our coastlines are dotted
    with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas
    and ports engaged in intra--as well as interstate and
    international business. These present horrific challenges to
    secure from drug trafficking.
        Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports,
    even as we better secure them from a transportation security
    incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is a
    primary concern for our governor, congressional delegation,
    legislators, and citizens.
        The challenge of securing Florida ports, Madam Chair, you
    noted with the differences in port governance, organizational
    structure, geography, law enforcement support, labor issues,
    fundamental funding mechanisms, and commercial operations.
        Drug trafficking is now recognized as a nexus for
    terrorism. Drug trafficking is facilitated when cargo volume
    exceeds monitoring capabilities. Vessels remain for lengthy
    stays; access control is superficial; physical security is
    limited; security planning is incomplete; law enforcement
    presence is inadequate; and information security is poor.
        Our security standards address these as best we can at this
    point.
        Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major
    illegal maritime activity. Certainly, heroin moves in large
    quantities through Florida. Columbians continue to dominate
    drug and money laundering operations. However, Jamaican,
    Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact
    drug trafficking in Florida.
        In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels, with
    27,204 commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. Monitoring these
    would not be unlike trying to secure a vehicle-borne improvised
    explosive device in one of our major cities. These vast numbers
    of watercraft, combined with superb navigational technology,
    greatly assist small vessel drug smugglers moving into Florida.
        Specifically, you asked me to address vulnerabilities. I
    believe the drug trafficking vulnerabilities include a regional
    threat versus a state response. Drug trafficking is
    international, yet our response is often local, to a sheriff,
    local law enforcement. We need a regional response that
    includes adjacent states, waterways, air, land, and sea
    approaches. There are inadequate resources at the federal,
    state, and local level to address the volume of drug
    trafficking that occurs in our state and across our nation.
        As you indicated, the shift of emphasis to the southwest
    border will push resources to this corridor again. Arguably,
    that happened as we moved them away from this corridor ten to
    fifteen years ago, but a lot of those resources have been
    diverted to the war in Iraq.
        Internal conspiracies present a threat, where a vessel
    crew, passenger, stevedores, checkers, anyone, can be involved
    in the lucrative business of drug trafficking.
        There is a tension between commerce and security. Security
    costs these ports great amounts of dollars, yet it is very
    important. Security can slow commerce. These tensions have to
    be addressed.
        Poor information sharing. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence
    sharing was well documented. Law enforcement sharing of
    information today is impeded with privacy concerns. Though very
    important, have to be addressed as law enforcement background
    information and other intelligence is shared.
        There is imprecise tracking of cargo, which presents
    problems. Federal and state planning must be enhanced into
    local planning, regional planning that is unified.
        The law enforcement response must be preventive, proactive.
    Historically, our law enforcement have responded to criminal
    activity, investigated, traced the source all the way back, in
    some cases, to a drug trafficking organization. We must become
    proactive.
        There is a nexus between drug traffic and transportation
    security incidents, but I don't believe it is operationalized
    today.
        We should be sharing lessons learned, best practices.
    Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. The current
    Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, has not
    been aligned with the Florida Credential adequately; we are not
    sharing information.
        How to close these vulnerabilities. Fix responsibility for
    regional, state planning, that includes air, land, sea, and
    geographic areas I mentioned. Develop regional counter-
    terrorism and counter-drug strategies. Produce a regional drug
    threat analysis. State-wide drug threat analyses do not exist
    today. We believe we will have the first truly state-wide drug
    assessment next year.
        We must share information from law enforcement; involve our
    port directors and port security staff in intelligence
    information sharing on a daily basis; include them in
    operations; prioritize Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos,
    which has been an interdiction resource in past years, that
    reduction in resources has affected that.
        Finally, include a national plan with regional emphasis
    and, for me, of course, a state-wide focus.
        Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security
    among our great partners throughout the country. We have
    implemented one of our nation's first drug control strategies.
        Your hearing today enables us to unify these systems. I am
    honored to have the opportunity to present this testimony,
    which is expanded in my written comments.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        [The information follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of William H. Janes

        Good afternoon, it is my distinct honor to testify before the
    esteemed members of the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
    Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism. On behalf of Florida
    Governor Charlie Crist and state and community leaders involved in our
    combined efforts to secure Florida and our Nation from a transportation
    security incident and drug trafficking, I thank Congress and, in
    particular, this committee for the high level of interest in protecting
    our nation's ports, the global supply chain, and the citizens of
    Florida. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today.
        Specifically, today I will address, per Congressman Gus Bilirakis'
    request, the diversity of Florida's ports, my assessment of vessel
    tracking initiatives, critical maritime vulnerabilities as they impact
    Florida, observations regarding narcotics smuggling, and challenges we
    currently face.

    Background
        In terms of geography and demography, Florida has many features
    which make it exceptionally attractive to drug trafficking
    organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely
    diverse population with strong representation from the Caribbean Basin,
    Central and South America, and Mexico. Additionally, Florida has
    approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline
    and the Florida Keys archipelago (that lie astride some of the major
    drug-trafficking routes into the United States), geographical proximity
    to ``source'' countries, and strong cultural ties to countries
    throughout the region. Florida's international ports of entry must,
    therefore, be considered critical in the national as well as regional
    counter-terrorism/counter-drug efforts. Importantly, our counter-
    terrorism and counter-drug efforts must be considered concurrently in
    any threat assessment or response planning.
        During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the
    daunting task of seaport security. Florida's ports have long been
    regarded as among the most secure in the nation. Our state and local
    partnerships are strong; our security standards are well understood;
    and the implementation of security planning is effective. Our emergency
    responders are superbly trained having faced the horrific hurricanes in
    recent years. We are ahead of the nation in developing a biometric port
    access credential, which if supported by the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) can be implemented immediately. We have
    implemented an aggressive all hazards, counter-terrorism response
    concept with seven (7) Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF)
    encompassing all of our state including our seaports and a statewide
    Domestic Security Oversight Board. Since September 11, 2001, we have
    expanded our prevention, preparedness, response, and crisis management
    capabilities to address terrorism in addition to our initial focus on
    crime, cargo theft, and drug trafficking.
        Most states have two or three ports to secure; Florida has fourteen
    (14) public deepwater seaports. In addition, our coastline is dotted
    with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas and ports
    engaged in intra-state as well as inter-state and international
    business. Florida is home to four of the busiest container ports in the
    nation, and the top three cruise ports in the world. These ports
    operate within an exceptionally complex inter-modal transport system
    that must be carefully considered in counterterrorism and counter-drug
    operations and planning. Florida enjoys a vibrant and growing economic
    benefit from these points of entry. Ensuring the continued growth and
    prosperity of our ports, even as we better secure them from a
    transportation security incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal
    activity is of primary concern to Governor Crist, our Congressional
    Delegation, our legislators, and the citizens of Florida.
        The challenge to the security of Florida's seaports is exacerbated
    by the noteworthy differences from port to port. Each is quite
    different from the others in terms of parameters of the establishing
    charter of the port, governance, organizational structure, geography,
    law enforcement support, labor base, funding mechanisms, and commercial
    operations. Some provide a full range of cargo and cruise operations.
    Others offer only specific types of cargo and/or cruise operations.
    Such diversity may well be regarded as a key contributor to the state's
    overall economic posture, but it also significantly complicates efforts
    to standardize security preparedness.
        Florida is well served by the Florida Ports Council, the Florida
    Seaport Transportation Economic Development (FSTED) Council and the top
    management in each of Floridas deepwater ports. They comprise a
    community of highly skilled, dedicated, and professional public
    servants, who are integral in maintaining the balance between commerce
    and security on our ports. They provide strategic input for the
    planning, security, and operations of our ports. I am also privileged
    to chair the legislatively-mandated Seaport Security Standards Council,
    which is charged to review the existing minimum seaport security
    standards. This council has also provided an effective forum for
    discussion of concerns and issues for Florida ports and tenant
    agencies.

    Illegal Drug Trafficking (Includes Drug Smuggling)
        As mentioned earlier, the nexus between terrorism and drug
    trafficking is now well established. However, the nature of the drug
    trafficking threat is substantially different from a terrorist act.
    Rather than a major, horrific event or events that typify a terrorist
    act, drug trafficking is ongoing. Drug-trafficking is facilitated when
    cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities, vessels remain for
    lengthy stays, access control is superficial, physical security is
    limited, security planning is incomplete, law enforcement presence is
    inadequate, or information security is poor. Accordingly, Florida's
    minimum security standards emphasize strong access control, law
    enforcement presence, effective operational guidelines and plans, cargo
    tracking by tenant partners, and other countermeasures. Despite Florida
    leading the nation in port security, we remain concerned with our
    ability to prevent large quantities of drugs from entering our state.
        Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal
    maritime activity. The fact that our cocaine drug overdose rate has
    climbed steadily in recent years provide indisputable evidence that
    cocaine is still available in abundant quantities. Drug trafficking
    organizations impacting Florida are largely international. Their
    distribution schemes include multi-state transportation and
    distribution of illicit drugs at the wholesale level. They supply local
    drug market areas with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA (Ecstasy),
    diverted pharmaceuticals and methamphetamine. These illicit drugs vary
    in demand across Florida as evidenced by higher demand for
    methamphetamine in rural areas of the state. Colombians continue to
    dominate drug and money laundering operations; however, Jamaican,
    Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact drug
    trafficking in Florida. Interrelated to the drug trafficking problems
    are violence, human trafficking, and the proliferation of gangs
    profiting from drug sales. Venezuelan influence and involvement in drug
    trafficking and money laundering continue to increase. Drug threat
    assessments at the federal, state, and local levels consistently
    mention the maritime accessibility to Florida. Our ports, coastline,
    and waterways provide major access points for drug traffickers.
        In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels with 27,204
    commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. These figures do not include out
    of state commercial, pleasure fishing, and other vehicles that utilize
    Florida's waterways, often traveling to Caribbean ports. These vast
    numbers of watercraft, combined with superb navigation technology
    widely available today, greatly assists small vessel drug smugglers
    moving around the immense Florida and Caribbean littorals with relative
    ease and great precision. While the cooperation among federal, state,
    and local law enforcement is excellent, the sheer volume of vessels and
    smaller watercraft present a major concern.
        Drug seizures and subsequent investigations document that
    frequently, crewmembers aboard freighters and passengers or crewmembers
    on cruise ships routinely smuggle drugs into Florida through a ``body
    carry'' after the drugs have been concealed aboard the vessel. Cruise
    ships leaving and entering Florida ports routinely call on drug source
    and transit countries throughout the Caribbean and Central America. The
    volume of cargo being moved through our ports is evidenced clearly in
    Jacksonville. The Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) is one of the largest
    ports in the nation. It ranks among the top containers ports and one of
    the busiest vehicle handling ports in the United States. In 2005,
    JAXPORT's three public marine terminals handled a total of 8.4 million
    tons of cargo, a new tonnage record for the port. JAXPORT now ranks
    only behind Tampa and Port Everglades in total tonnage. Additionally,
    nearly 20 privately-owned Marine terminals also operate in
    Jacksonville's harbor without support or management from JAXPORT. These
    independent port operations are not under the Florida minimum standards
    for seaports and are regulated by the US Coast Guard.
        Florida has three High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's)
    funded by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The three
    HIDTA's develop annual drug threat assessments and coordinate federal,
    state, and local law enforcement operations in 22 of Florida's 67
    counties. Drug threat assessments for the remaining 45 counties are
    being developed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and
    Florida National Guard. Florida also has a significant presence from
    the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). We also are
    assisted by the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which
    has responsibility for the sea approaches to Florida. Collectively,
    these agencies routinely document and interdict significant quantities
    of drugs moving in our region.
        Vessel tracking poses complex issues involving a myriad of federal
    and state actors, to include U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border
    Patrol (``CBP'') and, for smaller vessels, the Florida Fish & Wildlife
    Conservation. CBP requires that 24 hours before a U.S. bound container
    is loaded onto a ship in a foreign port that an electronic manifest of
    that container's contents is sent to the CBP by the shipping company.
    The Coast Guard in turn must be notified 96 hours before a cargo vessel
    is scheduled to arrive in a U.S. port of call. During that 96 hour
    period, the Coast Guard uses an intelligence driven, risk-based process
    to determine what the appropriate level of engagement should be for any
    given commercial vessel arriving at a U.S. port: should that vessel be
    denied entry? Should the vessel be boarded at sea well outside the U.S.
    port of call?
        For the tracking of smaller vessels, to include the one million or
    so pleasure craft registered in Florida, Florida Fish & Wildlife
    Conservation supports the funding of the ``America's Waterways Watch''
    program as opposed to the installation of an electronic tracking system
    on each craft. The tracking of such a large volume of pleasure craft in
    Florida waterways presents very great electronic challenges, and more
    importantly, almost insuperable challenges to attempting anything like
    applying timely analysis and risk-based processes for determining the
    threat posed by any given small vessel.
        As discussed previously Florida's location and geography create a
    lucrative target for smuggling illegal drugs through our ports. These
    illegal drugs can then be repackaged or transshipped across the United
    States. Ongoing efforts to tighten the US/Mexican border create an
    opportunity for drug-traffickers to increase shipments through the
    Florida corridor. Nationally, there is increasing evidence that drugs
    are being transshipped from our region to Europe. Again, the
    international aspect of drug trafficking impacts Florida, which sits
    astride these distribution routes. The drug threat assessments are
    further complicated by current vulnerabilities:
            a. Regional threat versus state response. Florida is in the
            middle of a major drug trafficking corridor that includes air,
            land, and sea approaches. Adjacent states and countries, major
            transportation hubs, and large bodies of water are part of the
            corridor. While Florida has many federal, state, and local
            partners striving to prevent and to interdict drug trafficking,
            we do not have a regional strategy for response.
            b. Inadequate Resources. While our federal, state, and local
            partnerships are strong and effective, there are insufficient
            staffing at all levels to adequately cover the large geographic
            area and the volume of vessels, imports and exports, and daily
            transactions. Non-intrusive inspection technology is being
            increased, but again is not in sufficient quantities to meet
            the increasing volumes of goods being moved through our ports.
            This technology is seldom available outside Florida's 14 public
            ports.
            c. Internal conspiracies: Drug trafficking is an illegal, high
            profitable activity. The insertion or extraction of illegal
            drugs can occur at any point along the route that otherwise
            legitimate cargo is being moved. Involvement in this illegal
            activity is not limited to port personnel but could easily
            include the vessel's crew or others able to access the cargo on
            the port (longshoremen, stevedores, checkers, pier
            superintendents, or communications workers). Unsupervised
            access to cargo presents opportunities for internal
            conspiracies.
            d. Tension between commerce and security. Security costs impact
            the bottom line for our ports. Perfect security would shut down
            our ports. There are tradeoffs that must be weighed each day.
            The tension between maintaining strong security and allowing
            free flow of commerce is real and a concern for government and
            port leadership.
            e. Poor information sharing. Despite the lessons on 9/11,
            intelligence sharing on our ports is limited. Port directors
            and security directors seldom have access to intelligence
            reports. This effort is being addressed by the Florida
            Department of Law Enforcement, which is implementing a Florida
            Fusion Center concept, which will only be successful if
            information is shared by federal, state, and lanks only behind
            Tampa. This is not the case today.
            f. Imprecise cargo trafficking. As discussed, the large volume
            of cargo traffic overwhelms ports across our country.
            International agreements, non-intrusive inspection technology
            and security staffs are all important in addressing the
            problem. However the volume of cargo being moved exceeds our
            ability to inspect it.
            g. Federal Agency and State Level Planning. As I have
            consistently stated, our federal, state, and local partnerships
            are effective. However, we do not have a national/regional plan
            that unifies the drug threat assessments and response plan at
            all levels of government. These assessments and plans must
            involve our port directors and leadership.
            h. Proactive Law Enforcement Response. Law enforcement has
            traditionally responded to criminal activity immediately and
            then investigated to determine who/what caused the illegal
            activity. To prevent a transportation security incident or drug
            trafficking, law enforcement must be proactive with
            intelligence based policing. Threat assessments that result in
            actionable intelligence are necessary to prevent illegal
            activity. This also requires information sharing and
            coordinated operations at all levels.
            i. Nexus between drug-trafficking and a transportation security
            incident is not operationalized. The connection between drug
            trafficking and a transportation security incident has been
            recognized; however, we must improve sharing of lessons learned
            and analysis of drug trafficking as it might be useful to
            prevent a future transportation security incident. Sharing of
            intelligence will be important here also.
            j. Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. Military
            requirements and competing priorities have reduced the emphasis
            on counter-drug operations in this section of the United
            States. This is evident in the recent removal of US Army
            helicopters from the Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos
            (OPBAT) mission that has been successful in interdicting drug
            trafficking through the Caribbean. Previously, surveillance
            capabilities were reduced to meet operational requirements
            worldwide.
            k. Transportation Worker Identification Credential fielding is
            not optimizing existing technology. Florida is prepared to
            implement a biometric credential (TWIC aligned) today.
            Difficulties in collaboration with TSA are preventing this from
            being realized.

    How to Close the Gap
            a. Fix Responsibility. Drug-trafficking organizations are
            international. Too often, our response is local or community
            based. While states are funded by DHS for counter-terrorism, we
            do not have a regional counter-drug strategy that addresses
            air, land, and sea approaches to our state. Federal partners,
            adjacent states, and local agencies must be included in our
            strategy. We must fix responsibility at the national and
            regional levels to develop and implement the plan. Someone must
            be in charge. This will result in synergistic successes in
            preventing drug trafficking and a transportation security
            incident.
            b. Develop a regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug
            strategy. As mentioned previously, drug-trafficking is an
            ongoing process with potential to be used as an avenue for
            terrorists to create a transportation security incident. Many
            federal, state, and local agencies are involved in counter-drug
            operations. Most efforts are local. We do not have a
            coordinated, multi-state, air/land/sea, and law enforcement
            focused regional strategy to prevent and to respond to a
            transportation security incident. Regional strategies across
            the United States should cascade from a national strategy.
            c. Produce a regional drug threat analysis. While there are
            multiple drug threat analyses available, we lack a unified
            assessment that could drive coordinated action in our region.
            Drug trafficking into Florida occurs through the states that
            border the Gulf of Mexico (responsibility of the Gulf Coast
            HIDTA), highway systems from Atlanta (Atlanta HIDTA), water
            approaches (Joint Interagency Task Force South), and air
            transportation routes. A common drug threat assessment would
            assist a more unified federal, state, and local response. An
            excellent way for this to happen is federal and local support
            of the important fusion center initiative being implemented by
            the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
            d. Share information. The sharing of information among federal,
            state, and local law enforcement can be improved. The Florida
            Department of Law Enforcement is taking the lead to address
            this problem. The Florida Fusion Center protects our state by
            incorporating an all crimes/all hazards approach to information
            sharing. Intelligence ``Stovepipes'' that contributed to the
            September 11, 2001 attack on America must be reduced. Privacy
            considerations and agency policies adversely impact the sharing
            of law enforcement intelligence today. This is evident each day
            as Florida struggles with the Transportation Security
            Administration (TSA) to align federal and state port access
            credential. TSA has cited federal laws that preclude sharing
            criminal background information.
            e. Involve Port Directors and Port Security Staff. Port staff
            are not provided daily intelligence updates. They should be
            screened for security clearance and included in daily
            intelligence and operations updates that affect ports in
            Florida and the United States. They should also receive
            relevant operations planning information that involved ports or
            the maritime environment. Port staff are included in exercises
            conducted by our Regional Domestic Security Task Forces.
            However, this must expand to include intelligence sharing and
            daily operations interaction.
            f. Prioritize OPBAT. Operations Bahamas, Turks and Caicos has
            been an important deterrent of drug-trafficking into Florida
            for many years. Resources reductions have severely reduced
            operational capability. Most recently, the United States Army
            removed its Blackhawk helicopters to support other operations.
            Prior to the military deployments, significant resources were
            dedicated to preventing the movement of drugs from source
            countries. We should return to this level of interdiction as
            soon as possible. In the interim, we should coordinate existing
            strategies and resources among all partners.
            g. National Efforts with Regional Emphasis. The global problem
            of drug trafficking requires a national and international
            solution. A formal strategy must be created with fixed
            responsibilities that involve our seaports, but also the entire
            inter-modal transportation systems of seaports, airports,
            railways, highways, and remote entry points. Lessons learned
            from counter-drug operations must be analyzes for counter-
            terrorism. Sharing of information from this national initiative
            is imperative.

    Conclusion
        Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security.
    Florida has implemented one of our nation's first drug control
    strategies. This strategy clearly emphasizes the importance of port
    security as part of our law enforcement response. We continue to
    emphasize and to resource drug prevention and drug treatment as equal
    to law enforcement in our strategic efforts against drugs. While we
    have strong, effective programs across the state and we have enjoyed
    significant success in many of our initiatives, drug trafficking
    continues at an unacceptable level. It will only be reduced with
    efforts that are synergistically applies with federal, state, and local
    resources. We thank this Subcommittee for its interest in Florida's and
    our Nation's security. Your efforts help create the conditions to
    reduce the illegal drug supply, secure our ports and transportation
    systems from a transportation security incident, and most importantly,
    protect our neighborhoods and families. Thank you.

        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And I thank all the witnesses for
    their testimony. And I will remind each member that he or she
    will have five minutes to question the panel. And now I will
    recognize myself for questions.
        I think what we will do is we will go through a series of
    questions and, since it is just the two of us, I will say to my
    colleague we will have plenty of time to ask our questions of
    the group.
        I would like to begin by putting into this statement for
    the record a Unanimous Consent Request to enter from the Miami
    River Marine Group, their statement with respect to South
    Florida Regional Maritime Exchange, Promoting Growth of
    Waterborne Commerce.
        Without objection, it is entered into the record.

                                 For the Record

                    Prepared Statement of Dr. Fran Bohnsack

                  Executive Director, Miami River Marine Group

                                    for the

                     United States House of Representatives

                         Committee on Homeland Security

          Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism

                                   Regarding

                    South Florida regional Maritime Exchange

                    Promoting Growth of Waterborne Commerce

        CHAIRWOMAN SANCHEZ, RANKING MEMBER SOUDER, AND DISTINGUISHED
    SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS, it is my honor to have the opportunity to submit
    a statement for the record about what the maritime industry is doing to
    enhance maritime domain awareness around the country, and how a
    Maritime Exchange would benefit the Southern Florida port business
    community. My name is Fran Bohnsack and I am the Executive Director of
    the Miami River Marine Group.
        The Miami River Marine Group (MRMG) is a private port cooperative
    of cargo carriers and marine related industry dedicated to preserving
    the Miami River as a working river. In the past ten years, improvements
    in local and international economies have been reflected by an increase
    in the activity and vitality of the working river.
        The Miami River is the fourth largest port in the state of Florida,
    serving as economic catalyst for the South Florida region and providing
    vital shipping links to the shallow draft ports of the Caribbean and
    Central and South America. As a working river, the Miami River's
    navigation and commercial shipping directly generates millions of tons
    of cargo each year and thousands of direct and indirect jobs.
        Goods shipped from the Miami River are sent to over 80 ports of
    call in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Just as Miami
    serves as the gateway to the Americas, the Miami River serves as the
    shallow draft port for foreign flag vessels coming from similar shallow
    ports in this part of the world (shallow drafts are necessary for the
    Miami River which is only 15 feet deep). Economic projections for cargo
    movement indicate that Miami River shipping growth is expected to
    continue at a healthy rate.
        Among the keys to any successful seaport, including the Miami
    River, are deep water, adequate storage and berthing facilities, and
    access to inland transportation networks. Equally important--and often
    overlooked--to the efficient, cost-effective and safe movement of goods
    is the information network which ensures that all partners in the
    transportation chain are aware of the shipping and transit information
    necessary to promote the flow of commerce.
        One of the principal indexes of good management in the maritime
    field is the turnaround a ship receives in port. Simply stated, the
    shorter the period between arrival and departure, the better the
    turnaround; and the lower the costs. Ports which offer faster
    turnaround times will have an economic advantage over other ports. Yet
    a great deal of communication is required to ensure a ship is serviced
    quickly and safely: a berth must be available, pilots must be ordered,
    tugs must be scheduled, linemen must be in place to handle the lines as
    the ships come alongside, labor must be available, and federal agency
    inspections must be closely coordinated with the vessel's arrival to
    eliminate unnecessary delays. All of these activities depend on up-to-
    the minute communication of any changes in the vessel movement
    schedule.
        These are just a few of the activities which must take place each
    time a ship arrives in port. In addition, storage and transportation
    must be arranged, entry must be made on the merchandise, chandlers must
    deliver food and other supplies, the crew must be paid, and so on. The
    list of people who must be kept apprised of ship movements is a lengthy
    one, and given the number of factors which can conspire to delay a
    commercial cargo vessel, the schedules are often outdated the moment
    they are reported. Keeping the interested parties informed of changes
    is often a full-time job for those who are charged with the
    responsibility to do so.
        Many port communities have addressed this need by forming trade
    associations to acquire, preserve, and disseminate maritime and other
    business information. These organizations, known as Maritime Exchanges,
    are non-profit organizations which develop expertise in the areas of
    Ship Reporting and conduct other activities designed to promote trade
    and commerce in their regions.
        Maritime Exchanges are dedicated to providing information,
    communications and other services in order to ensure safe, secure,
    efficient and environmentally sound maritime operations. These maritime
    information service organizations represent the commercial maritime
    community's shared commitment to proactively address the challenges
    faced by the maritime industry, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Maritime Administration
    (MARAD), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and other federal and
    state agencies in a cooperative and cost efficient manner.
        While not all of the 351 seaports throughout the U.S. enjoy the
    benefits of a Maritime Exchange, it is certainly noteworthy that all of
    the top ports, and several of the smaller ones, have recognized the
    need to centralize the collection and distribution of maritime
    information through an Exchange. Maritime Exchanges are vital to the
    maritime industry and their government partners in Baltimore, British
    Columbia, Jacksonville, Alaska, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Hawaii,
    Southern California, New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River and
    Bay, New Orleans, Virginia, Texas and Portland, Oregon.
        Several of the people who oversee the operations of these maritime
    exchanges are former Coast Guardsmen and have served as Captains of the
    Port at various places, and all the people who run these maritime
    exchanges have extensive maritime experience, including as licensed
    master mariners, and senior maritime industry executives. For those
    ports in which no Exchange is located, undoubtedly much of the same
    work is being performed, yet in many instances, those who receive the
    inquiries or create the reports--pilots, harbor masters, port
    authorities, agents, and others--must do so in addition to their normal
    responsibilities.
        Although the majority of Maritime Exchanges were formed in the
    latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the need for
    Exchanges is equally evident today. While information sharing was
    certainly challenging in the era of the telegraph and telegram, the
    average ship transit was several times longer than today's voyages.
    Today, transit times are shorter, and communicating information among
    transportation partners is light years faster. With the advent of new
    technologies, changes in shipping patterns, ever larger vessels, and
    increasingly stringent maritime security measures, the challenges to
    the maritime sector are progressively more complex. As a result, two
    new Exchanges have formed in the last few years, and several other port
    communities are considering forming Exchanges, as well.
        Exchanges exist to keep members informed on a variety of matters,
    not the least of which are the ever-important vessel schedules. Yet
    most Exchanges also address the myriad issues surrounding commercial
    port operations, such as pending legislation, new regulatory
    requirements, the growing federal agency information reporting
    requirements, increasing crew, passenger, and cargo inspections, and
    advances in technologies associated with vessel, cargo and crew
    processing. These are just a few of the reasons why the Miami River
    Marine Group has been working to establish a Maritime Exchange in
    Southern Florida.
        Like any trade association, Exchanges serve as a venue under which
    often competing port interests can come together to address issues of
    mutual concern, or to identify opportunities for improvement to the
    overall community.
        Exchanges can also help identify trends in shipping that can be
    used to both facilitate daily operations and undertake long-term
    strategic planning. They can coordinate training programs, such as
    hazardous material transportation or security, and in some cases, they
    will lobby for the rights of industry. Often tagged ``the voice of the
    port,'' an Exchange will unite members under a single umbrella to
    oppose or support initiatives as they arise. Like other trade
    associations, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: with each
    additional member, the Exchange voice is strengthened exponentially.
        And of course, Exchanges can be good opportunities for networking,
    putting members in touch with others who have similar interests to find
    or obtain new business relationships and share ideas.
        Why is a Maritime Exchange needed in Southern Florida? Although
    some of the activities described above are consistent with other trade
    associations, Marine Exchanges are unique because of their day-to-day
    operating role in their communities. Although the full scope of
    activities undertaken by each Exchange in the U.S. differs based on the
    unique needs of its port community, all provide the same basic Ship
    Reporting services:

        Ship Reporting: Exchange watchstanders, most of whom operate 24/7,
    track vessel movements via traditional means, such as contact with the
    vessel agents, pilots and others with vessel schedule information, as
    well as through AIS or satellite technologies. They enter the
    information into their databases and make it available on a real-time
    basis to those with a right or a need to know. With the information
    consolidated into a central community database, Exchanges can then
    distribute reports of historical, current and estimated ship movement
    activities to their members. Using a neutral organization such as an
    Exchange alleviates concerns over sharing what might be considered
    proprietary commercial information.
        In addition, vessel agents use Exchanges to transmit instructions
    or other information to their ships while en route, and the ships'
    masters or pilots will contact the Exchange with a variety of
    questions, such as whether water is available at the berth, what time
    tugs will be alongside, etc.
        Unlike their federal counterparts who rotate in and out of ports on
    a frequent basis, Exchange staff members are specifically trained in
    local port operations and develop institutional memories. As a result,
    they often serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of the port community and law
    enforcement agencies, and can detect and report anomalies when
    appropriate.

        Vessel Particulars: Private and public sector port operators often
    have a need to obtain detailed information about ships as they enter
    port. From length, breadth and weight, to owners, previous names, P&I
    Club, and safety certificate expiration dates, Exchanges are
    repositories for a wide-range of vessel information.

        Community Information Clearinghouse: Exchanges are often conduits
    between federal agencies or state authorities and the local
    communities. They collect, broadcast and store navigation restriction
    notices, security bulletins, bridge openings, dredging schedules, and a
    host of other information.

        Answering Services: Many Exchanges also operate 24-hour answering
    services for their members. In addition to traditional message taking
    functions, often Exchanges are prepared to respond to the questions or
    messages from callers--many of which are related to a particular
    vessel's schedule. These answering services can be utilized during
    lunchtimes, holidays, nights, weekends or any combination of the above.
    Subscribers have the choice to have callers patched through to their
    cell phones, messages emailed, or messages held for pickup.

        Publications: Newsletters, port directories, and other publications
    keep members informed and present revenue opportunities through
    advertising and/or subscriptions.

        Other Services: There are any number of roles Exchanges can play in
    support of their port communities. Some may manage job posting bulletin
    boards, serve as harbor safety or area maritime security secretariats,
    or offer boarding agent services. The list of programs and services can
    be as long or as short as needed by the local community.

        Other Automation Services: These may include:
             Cargo manifesting: Exchanges, like port authorities,
            may operate community-based cargo manifesting and release
            systems for their communities. In addition to helping port
            customers comply with reporting regulations mandating the use
            of the CBP Automated Manifest System, these types of community-
            based systems centralize receipt and distribution of messages
            pertaining to cargo status (inspection required, cargo
            released, cargo held, etc.).
            eNOA/D: With the June 05 requirement for electronic crew/
            passenger manifesting via the Coast Guard's electronic Notice
            of Arrival/Departure system, several Exchanges have stepped in
            to help their communities achieve compliance in a cost-
            effective manner.
            PORTS: In partnership with the National Ocean Service,
            Exchanges serve as local sponsors for their regions' Physical
            Oceanographic Real Time Systems.
        In order for an Exchange to succeed in Southern Florida, it must
    have the buy-in of the local maritime constituencies. These may include
    both private-sector port businesses, public port authorities, and
    federal, state, local agencies, and elected officials, if appropriate.
    Specific organizations may include:
             Pilots
             Container and bulk carriers
             Cruise ship operators
             Steamship agents
             Port Authorities/terminal operators/stevedores
             Warehouse operators
             Tug/barge companies
             Trucking/rail companies
             Importers/exporters
             Brokers/forwarders
             Labor
             Admiralty law firms, banks, insurance companies
             Surveyors, fumigators, and other service providers
             U.S./State/County legislators
             Law Enforcement
             Key Federal Agencies: CBP, Coast Guard, USDA, FDA,
            COE, etc.
        Needless to say the initial organizational issues will take some
    period of time to resolve. Once these issues are resolved, however,
    members of the Southern Florida port business community will be well-
    positioned to launch an organization that will benefit all maritime
    stakeholders in the region.
        While a pool of initial start up funds will be necessary to open
    the doors, the distinct advantage of a Maritime Exchange over other
    types of associations lies in the fact the Exchange can develop a suite
    of programs and services which can be offered on a for-fee basis to
    ensure the continued viability of the organization over the long term.
    While membership dues remain an important component of an association's
    revenue stream, the organization is funded primarily by those who use
    its many services.
        There will be individuals who resist the concept. These persons may
    believe they are getting the services they need today at no cost, so
    why should they pay to fund a new organization. The response is clear:
    Southern Florida ports are doing well today, but could they do better?
    Conversely, can these same ports be kept from slipping in the face of
    an ever-increasing competitive global shipping industry? Can steps be
    taken to ensure that costly new federal regulations do not over-burden
    port businesses?
        The answer to all these questions is yes, and an Exchange is one
    mechanism to achieve those important goals.
        I would like to thank you, Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the
    Subcommittee for the opportunity submit this statement today. I am
    happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Let's see, what questions do I have for
    you all?
        I would like to begin with asking about, now, Captain, that
    we have so much of an emphasis going on terrorism and counter-
    terrorism efforts, how are your resources? Is the Coast Guard
    in this area still getting to the things it used to do, before
    we put all these other responsibilities on you? You know,
    pleasure craft, safety issues, search and rescue. Or has that
    affected your performance? Resources, have they been drawn away
    from the original things that the Coast Guard used to do? Do
    you need more help in that area?
        Captain Schultz. Madam Chairman, here, locally, Coast Guard
    Sector Miami and the entire Seventh District has always been a
    very operationally fast-paced location within the Coast Guard.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was in 2004 that
    we created the first Sector Command here. And I think that move
    has actually served us incredibly well. We married together
    what was the former Group Operations, which did the boating
    safety, the boardings, the search and rescue, with the former
    Captain of the Port functions, which involved the full spectrum
    of marine safety, pollution response. We put that under one
    command.
        We have had some synergies that have stemmed from that. The
    operational resources and the regulatory authorities are all
    nestled in one place.
        Our missions have clearly grown, as you indicated, since 9/
    11. Maritime Homeland Security was a smaller slice of what we
    do. Today it constitutes probably a quarter or so of our total
    allocation of effort.
        Our operations have grown with those new responsibilities.
    The Coast Guard has grown at large, close to 4,000 billets on
    the macro sense. Here, locally, I couldn't give you the exact
    specifics on our bodies. I jumped onto the organization here in
    2006, in the new framework we are operating in.
        We are well staffed and funded for our responsibilities. We
    are busy, but I don't think we have had any letdown in service
    delivery to the public down here.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you, Captain.
        Here is the problem that I have, and one of the reasons I
    wanted to visit the Miami Port and see and get your testimony
    on record. I don't know which one of you mentioned that there
    are probably over a hundred thousand pleasure boats registered
    here, between the three or four ports just in the immediate
    area.
        You know, when were talking about identifying ships, boats,
    whatever, most of the pleasure--almost all the pleasure craft
    don't have a tracking monitor to them, or what have you.
        What do we do? I mean, what is your best concept? And I
    will ask all three of you about what we do with these pleasure
    craft with respect to going off to some island and picking up
    people who shouldn't be in this country that are being brought
    in, or drug trafficking, or contraband smuggling. I mean, what
    is the best idea you all have come up with? Because I know you
    haven't done it yet. I mean, you have done layering, you have
    done some projects, some pilot projects, but what do you think
    in the long run? What do we do about a port like Miami, that
    has so many pleasure craft attached to it?
        Captain Schultz. Well, Madam Chairman, I threw out the
    number of 170,000 vessels here in southeast Florida in three
    counties alone, so I will take the first stab at that question.
        I guess what we are doing is we do employ a layered
    defense, and there are many different threats. We have the
    threat of a terrorist type of activity in a seaport, we have
    the threats of illegal migrant smuggling, illegal drug
    smuggling. The other missions we have down here, people
    violating our living marine resources; we have a lot of rich
    resources out here, fishes and coral reefs and things. We are
    involved in all those missions.
        What we do currently is we try to get our arms around the
    domain as best we can with the available sensor information we
    have. We employ a layered strategy to that. We have cutters;
    Sector Miami has Coast Guard cutters. We don't control the
    aviation assets, the airplanes and helicopters directly, but we
    have an air station that services two sectors down here. We
    have flights most every day of the week. We partner with
    Customs and Border Protection, who has an air marine operation
    down here.
        So, generally, we have maritime patrol aircraft flying over
    the Straits of Florida, with the outer approaches, looking for
    vessels of interest coming across. We have our small boat
    stations. We have four multi-mission small boat stations that
    fall under my command here. We have those vessels on patrol.
    Our state partners, such as the Fish and Wildlife Commission,
    our local partners, have marine units that are on the water.
    And through those layered vessels, we are trying to stop those
    vessels that stand out as possibly intending mal-intent over,
    you know, legitimate business.
        That does get very challenging. The recreational vessel
    versus the vessel that is posing a threat, look the same down
    here. Do we have visibility on all the smaller vessels? As I
    mentioned in my statement, that clearly is an area where there
    is room for improvement. I think we have the challenge of the
    larger vessels, the commercial vessels; we have good domain and
    awareness on them through our classified and unclassified
    common operational pictures. There are new initiatives
    mentioned, such as Long-Range Identification Tracking that will
    come and bring even added value to that.
        But there is a legitimate challenge on small vessels. But
    we are employing day-to-day layered security. And it is
    presence, it is maritime cops on the beat on the water, it is
    intelligence. Intelligence is clearly a key component of that,
    too. And then we respond within the best of our capabilities to
    those threats.
        Ms. Sanchez. But, Captain, I have friends who have pleasure
    boats here who say it is very rare to see a Coast Guard cutter
    out there in the bay or, if there is, there is one, and most
    people know what time it goes out. And, I mean, these friends I
    have, and various say, you know, we could take our boat, go
    pick somebody up off an island, come back in. They have told me
    about the fact that, you know, if they were to do such a thing,
    they are supposed to go up the river and pick up the phone at
    some given spot and call in to the airport and talk to who is
    ever on the other end, I guess, of CVP and tell them they are
    in town. They say, yeah, Xerox a copy on Monday of your
    passport and send it in to us by mail.
        I mean, do we need more resources, or is just putting a
    station closer or easier for people to follow? I mean, even my
    friends say, why should we do that? Why should we go upriver
    six miles or eight miles and go and do that, only to get
    somebody out at the airport and it doesn't really matter? I
    mean, we could be telling them there is only four of us on the
    boat, versus ten of us on the boat. And they could care. They
    don't really know.
        Captain Schultz. Well, Congresswoman----
        Ms. Sanchez. What do we do? What do we do? What do we do--
    can we do anything about it?
        Captain Schultz. Well, I think what we do do is we put our
    best capabilities forward. You mentioned a program that is
    actually run by Customs and Border Protection. It is their
    arrivals, vessels that come in from overseas that, typically,
    down here, it is a lot of times the Bahamas. That is about 50
    miles away at its closest point. And they have a local boater
    option. It is one scenario where they can call in and they are
    pre-screened and there is a certain level of legitimacy that
    goes with their registry in that program.
        But the small vessels, there isn't sufficient resource when
    you are talking 170,000 small boats alone in this reason, and
    that is a small sub-set of our region, where you are going to
    see every boat, every day.
        And I think as we look forward and try to get our arms
    around this thing called Maritime Domain Awareness, hopefully,
    you know, we are looking in the Coast Guard at a future major
    acquisition called Command 21, that will hopefully bring better
    sensors, better information management systems to integrate
    information from those sensors and databases, intelligence
    sources, to a product.
        Ideally, we need to see what is out in the area, we need to
    understand the threats it posed, we need to be able to share
    that information with our partners.
        So the short answer to your question is do we have--are
    there sufficient resources in my area every day to look at
    every boat coming in? Clearly not.
        Ms. Sanchez. Where I am headed with this is, you know, as
    the Chairwoman who also oversees all entry into the United
    States, and exits from the United States, as we tighten other
    areas, people will look for the areas that are least protected.
    And this seems to be pretty wide open, from my standpoint. So
    getting you all to really think about three, four years down
    the line, when we have actually got other places under control,
    this is going to be a sector that is going to be hit, I think.
    Hit in the sense of getting people into this country that we
    probably don't want here.
        I see that Colonel over there has----
        Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, your question, I would offer
    two responses. One, the integrated strategy that I talked about
    before, I will bet your friends have, in some cases, seen a
    sheriff's craft patrolling the water. And I think an integrated
    approach that takes all the law enforcement, all resources, is
    something that drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, should be
    unified with all resources that we have, and not just put it on
    the Coast Guard.
        The second point, I believe, as a vehicle-borne, improvised
    explosive device, a suicide/homicide bomber, we are going to
    have to have an awareness effort in our communities, our
    neighborhoods. Likewise, those who have small crafts need to be
    alerted to the threat, and, when there is unusual or
    threatening behavior, a system to report it.
        The Fish and Wildlife Conservation group here in Florida
    expressed some concern to me about funding that may be taken
    away from Americas Waterway Watch Program, which was intended
    to do that, to provide that awareness, to encourage the
    dialogue that these 1,000,000 pleasure craft in Florida, that a
    lot of them would be sensitive, as good citizens, to that
    threat and might report something.
        I think it is far beyond the Coast Guard or any local law
    enforcement to check all this. But, as in a neighborhood,
    collectively, we as citizens, I think, can do something about
    it, to prevent it.
        Ms. Sanchez. Did you have any comment?
        Mr. Dryden. Yes, I do. I think there is really three areas.
    It is a very complex problem. Just knowing that a vessel is
    coming in, a pleasure craft is coming in, in a free and open
    society like we have, it is almost impossible to be able to
    take every pleasure craft, vet it, understand who is on board
    and what their intent is. It really just isn't going to happen
    that way in the real world.
        It would be nice if we could solve it with technology and
    we could solve it with just, you know, applying more people to
    it.
        I think what you have to do, there is several things to
    help along the way, but it doesn't quite get you all the way.
    One is you have to be able to free up the people that are busy
    doing the grunt work, that can focus and use their talents on
    looking for anomalies. And, again, not to say technology-
    generated things here, but things that are suspicious.
    Suspicious behavior. Whether it is from the sheriff's office or
    from the Coast Guard, or whoever is out there.
        The second is, you have to start applying technologies and
    trying to push the state of the art of some of these
    technologies. Which I believe the Coast Guard is doing. They
    are working pretty hard on things. I have referenced in my
    statement this Automated Scene Understanding. To be able to
    classify and understand who are these vessels. But not just
    that they exist there, but what is the pattern. Are they doing
    something that is unusual? You know, is there something
    happening at a period of time at night? What is going on? A
    particular size craft.
        Those might be the things that, if you could automatically
    sense that and alert watch-standers, that would go a long way
    to look into anomalous behavior. Because, again, just knowing
    that they are a sport fisher really doesn't gain us anything.
        And, lastly, I think the other big thing is there has to be
    a more effective way to share information between all the port
    partners. There has to be a way where we can get past they are
    trying to unclassify or keep so many things close to the vest.
    And I think there is a willingness. At least, what I have seen
    in the Coast Guard, as well as in Florida, there is a
    willingness to do that. The question now is trying to figure
    out the proper way to make that happen, and make it happen
    fairly rapidly.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        I will defer some questions and give some time to my
    colleague from Florida.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
        I want to follow up on Chairman Sanchez's question. Does
    the Coast Guard have policies--and this is addressed to Captain
    Schultz, of course--does the Coast Guard have policies and
    procedures for identifying, tracking, and responding to the
    increasing small vessel threat? If not, are there plans to
    develop these policies and procedures in the near future?
        Captain Schultz. Congressman, we, as I mentioned in
    response to the Madam Chairman, we are very concerned with any
    vessel posing any type of a threat. The small vessels, I think,
    bring a unique challenge in that our current suite of sensors
    is best suited for larger vessels, the radars that we employ.
        Obviously, when we are talking about flying airplanes,
    maritime patrol aircraft at sea, larger vessels are easier to
    detect than a small, unlit, fast vessel. Those are the type of
    vessels that we are challenged with right now, that are
    smuggling illegal migrants or smuggling drugs.
        Do we have a plan or a policy? I am going to leave the
    policy aspects, I think, to the folks in Washington. Here,
    locally, our plan is to apply the given resources we have
    generic to the Coast Guard, force-multiply that, as Colonel
    Janes talked about, with our state and local partners through a
    coordinated effort. We have many coordinating bodies. We
    coordinate some of the seaport aspects through the area of
    Maritime Security Committee and Subcommittees. We coordinate
    some of the other waterfront and coastal-type activities in
    support of migrant interdiction or drugs through entities like
    the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, where we meet on a
    recurring basis with our state and federal law enforcement
    partners. As a matter of fact, we are meeting tomorrow here.
    And that is all my state and local partners on the waterfront;
    we will get together and talk about what the current threats
    are, what has happened since we last met.
        So, again, the policy piece, I think is best addressed at
    the National Coast Guard level. Here, locally, we are employing
    tools like the Hawkeye System, which I mentioned we were the
    initial test site. I think that is at five or six other Coast
    Guard locations.
        We have the Visualization Tools Project, which is helping
    us automate some of those functions where there used to be a
    watch-stander thumbing through databases or flipping switches
    on different types of sensors. Now these  the
    Visualization Tools brings some automation to that. There is
    alerts we can set. If a vessel with automatic identification
    system comes in--I am talking a bigger vessel now--if that
    vessel comes in early, and we have some rules established with
    those tools, an alert goes off that that vessel is here before
    we expected it. That is very much simplified than an individual
    flipping through lists to see when those vessels are due and
    then correlating that to what he sees in the radar and all the
    different AIS depictions on the screen.
        So we are doing things. We are embracing those technologies
    we have. There clearly is room for enhanced technologies,
    better sensors, better integration of sensor data and other
    sources of information to make us more effective. But here,
    locally, we are applying what we have generic to the Coast
    Guard, partnering it up with state and local partners,
    Department of Defense assets that come in on occasion to
    support us with maritime patrol aircraft. And we are doing, you
    know, due diligence to the task at hand.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Captain.
        Captain, what is the status of the Coast Guard's Long-Range
    Identification Tracking Program?
        Captain Schultz. Sir, as I understand the status, it is,
    you know, there are requirements set forth in the Safe Port
    Act. Here, locally, I am not on the cutting edge of the status
    of that rollout. My understanding is, you know, when that
    comes, that will bring some enhanced information on long-range
    tracking of vessels, vessels that are transiting within a
    thousand miles of our coastline. We will be aware of that.
        Right now, here, locally, I have visibility with Hawkeye,
    through the ability to detect and analyze AIS tracks out to 30,
    40, 50 miles into the Straits of Florida.
        Long-range tracking will bring us visibility, as I am sure
    you are aware, on all U.S. vessels anywhere in the world; on
    other vessels 300 gross tons or larger making approaches to
    U.S. ports.
        As far as the actual specific status, the funding, that is
    a little bit out of my lane down here, sir.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Well, I will look into that further.
        Colonel Janes, I have a few questions, if I may. Would you
    please briefly explain some of the differences between
    Florida's diverse ports and the challenges those differences
    present in securing them?
        Colonel Janes. Certainly, Congressman.
        The--I chair the Florida Seaports Security Standards
    Council, and we look at the minimum standards, but also have
    talked many issues across our state.
        The different governing structures will indicate how ports
    are funded, the private businesses that they orchestrate. In
    some of our ports, they have security personnel that come from
    the local sheriff's office. In other cases, they are hired.
        The standards of certified law enforcement versus hired
    security and who should be manning different checkpoints, all
    come up to be critical issues that costs the ports funding, but
    also get into the interpretation of the standard and how well
    it is being applied.
        The involvement of local government in the ports, again, if
    the county is heavily participating in the funding, the local
    governance could be a board that is comprised of different
    members across the state.
        The bottom line, Congressman, is there is no standard model
    for 14 ports. And the fact that we do have 14 ports, the
    governance is varied, the businesses that they transact, some
    do all, cargo, cruise, all business that a major port would do.
    Others do a very focused level. So each port has to be
    adjusted.
        The great discussion that addresses your question is in the
    Seaport Security Standards Council, we just had a major
    discussion about should versus shall. And in many of the
    standards, the word from the Florida statute is should. And
    that recognition is the ports vary significantly, that you
    cannot put a uniform standard on every port. The inspector who
    is checking with compliance must go in and determine has that
    port done everything possible within the intent of the
    standard.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
        I am please that you highlighted the importance of the
    America's Water Watch Program in your written testimony. I am a
    strong proponent of that.
        Would you please briefly explain the benefits of this
    program--and you did go through it--and its importance in
    increasing Maritime Domain Awareness?
        Colonel Janes. Again, Congressman, my understanding, and,
    again, working with our Fish and Wildlife partners who we look
    to for the small craft security in Florida, in addition to our
    local partners, the focus of the program that they have made me
    aware of, that if we lose it, I would be concerned, is that it
    really is an awareness, an education of what are the
    expectations of navigation in Florida's waterways, and what
    could be the different threats. What are illegal actions,
    suspicious action? And it also helps to translate to our boat
    operators, vessel operators, that they, too, have a
    responsibility in security. It is not just the funded, the
    governmental aspect. That they can prevent a terrorist act, a
    transportation security incident, and an illegal act, drug
    trafficking, by reporting it.
        So it is awareness, involvement, not unlike what we would
    want in our community neighborhoods.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Are you in favor of expanding the program?
        Colonel Janes. Absolutely. I think it is essential to what
    we do, both air, land and sea. We--we can't fund enough
    protection against drug trafficking and a terrorist act.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much. Appreciate it
    very much. Thank you.
        Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. We will go to second round of questions.
    I have some questions on--to both Captain Schultz and to Mr.
    Dryden.
        Viz Tools. Can you expand on how Viz Tools operates and
    what components make the Viz Tools, and what role does The
    Mariners Group/Command Bridge Software have within Viz Tools?
        Captain Schultz. Defer to you first, then talk----
        Mr. Dryden. All right.
        Captain Schultz. ----about our applications or----
        Mr. Dryden. Yeah, I will shy away from the operational
    side, and let you do that.
        But just from a technology standpoint, one of the big
    problems, as I talked about, was there is a lot of information
    flowing into a Command Center. Some of that could just be
    manual and telephonic, other is electronic from all these new
    systems.
        One of the major problems is how do you take something--how
    do you take all that and put it together into something
    meaningful. Just the fact that you have a lot of blips out
    there doesn't really mean anything. So trying to get to this
    actionable situation awareness is a real issue.
        So, to your question about how is it made up, there is
    really multiple parts. The first one is how do you fuse all
    that information together. Once you have that, so instead of
    just radar standing stand-alone, and AIS stand-alone, and all
    these other systems out there, once you find a way to bring
    those together, then you can start applying the second part,
    which is anomaly detection. So you can create business rules,
    as Captain Schultz was mentioning earlier, you can create those
    business rules, or doctrine, to go look for certain
    circumstances, for anomalies.
        So if you can find those anomalies with those business
    rules, A, you are going to do two things. One is you will find
    it when it happens, but the other is you are not going to have
    to divert your watch-standers from always looking for those
    situations, because you have another way to achieve that. So
    the watch-standers, then, are free to take action and look
    around for other things that are happening.
        And as the Coast Guard has increasing mission areas, you
    know, it becomes more and more of an issue of if you have a lot
    more to do, how do you figure a way to get there quickly.
        Ms. Sanchez. So what are the data points? I mean, how--is
    that coming off the radar? Is it only ships that have automated
    systems? I mean, wha----
        Mr. Dryden. Well, it is very--it really depends on the
    sensors and the systems. For instance, the today AIS, it really
    is the large vessels that have that. The commercial vessels
    coming in and out of here. So you are going to see those. And
    then you may see it on radar, but you are not going to know who
    they are, you know, if it is a small boat. You will know who
    all the big guys are. We correlate a lot of that information.
    But when it becomes a small craft, you really don't know. You
    may be able to tell that it is a particular type of vessel or
    so many feet. Even then, you are really using cameras to figure
    that kind of stuff out.
        So one of the big problems in the big exposures, I think,
    that exist in the nation, is figuring a way around that. To
    figure out which ones, A, are small boats, but then, do they
    have behavior that would require us to take action, number one.
        And number two is, the other piece of this, is intel. You
    have to be able to find a way to funnel intel, outside of just
    looking at the tactical operation. You have to know in advance,
    by intel, which is generally local intel. It could be from
    overseas, but in a small boat thing, you are generally going to
    look at the local law enforcement and what they hear on the
    streets and whatnot. You have to have a conduit.
        Ms. Sanchez. So they are calling it in or they are--the
    local intel.
        Mr. Dryden. If it is----
        Ms. Sanchez. It is called in, it is coming over the fax or
    the wires, something? How----
        Mr. Dryden. Right. I will let the Captain speak to the
    operational side of how they physically receive it, but,
    generally, yeah, you are getting manual intel that comes in, or
    you are getting phone calls that happen from-from--port
    partners.
        Ms. Sanchez. Captain?
        Captain Schultz. Congresswoman, he talked about the
    Visualization Tools product. The product that were testing, the
    Command Bridge from Mariner Group, as a proof-of-concept, that
    type of product does bring some of the automation to what
    before was a human-intensive project. We have a Watch Center,
    with a team of five watch-standers in there, and we have a
    sensor operator. We have folks that are working different
    systems, database systems.
        A visualization-type tool can bring to that Command Center
    those automatic alerts. It can integrate sensor data,
    information, present a visual, a graphic visual for the watch-
    stander. If there is a search and rescue case going on, it can
    automatically populate, based on rules, that case, up on a
    status board. It can show us, if you fold in the capabilities
    of something called Blue Force Tracking, where our friendly
    forces, their positions are updated. Right now, we have that
    and it is manually updated. The watch-stander can look at that
    visual depiction and see where the Coast Guard resources are,
    partner law enforcement resources are, see the challenge at
    hand, better connect the dots, and get the right resource to
    the challenge.
        From the security in the seaport standpoint, I mentioned
    9,000 vessel arrivals here. In Port Everglades, in Port of
    Miami, where we have cameras with the Hawkeye system, we can
    feed the radar signature of that vessel. The bigger vessel, we
    may pick up on radar 20 miles out. We can see the AIS
    signature. We can see the radar signature.
        The Visualization Tools Project will take that AIS signal,
    and I mentioned an example before, if that vessel is in before
    its advance notice of arrival, with some parameters that are
    established in there in terms of alerts, we will get an
    automatic alert that that vessel is here early, before its
    intended arrival. That--the watch-stander will be immediately
    keyed to that. Otherwise, that watch-stander will be flipping
    through reams of paper, flipping through drop-down screens on
    computers, and trying to get to that same outcome. This is
    using automation to put more information, better situational
    information, at the fingertips of our watch-standers for,
    hopefully, you know, better security out the back side.
        Ms. Sanchez. You mentioned proof-of-concept. Can you tell
    me how far along you are and if this is going to have a--if you
    think it is going to have a positive outcome?
        Captain Schultz. Well, this--the proof-of-concept, we had
    the Command Bridge product for a couple months, and then some
    of the--some of the feeds were turned off. We have just
    recently been informed from the Department of Homeland Security
    Science and Technology Directorate that we have a six-month
    assessment--extension of our period to assess the product. And,
    based on our initial assessments of the Visualization Tools,
    the watch-standers, I as the Sector Commander, we did see value
    there. The ability to take information and better process
    sensors and databases, and bring that together, versus just one
    more box in the Command Center, it is clearly a good utility.
        So some type of visualization tool, some type of
    information management system, I think will be a key component
    in our Command 21 way forward, where we are hoping to bring
    greater capabilities to our Command Centers.
        Ms. Sanchez. Do you see, if, in fact, you get through the
    concept and you--do you see the Coast Guard maybe applying it
    in other ports?
        Captain Schultz. I think the--I think some type of a
    visualization tool product, some type of an information
    management system will clearly be part of our--of our, you
    know, way ahead with regards to Command Centers.
        This is one prototype, proof-of-concept beta test we are
    doing with this product. I am not really privy to what we are
    doing elsewhere in the country for trying comparable products,
    but, you know, feedback on what we have in hand, it has been a
    value add.
        We are excited about--we just got the extension for six
    more months here, so we are excited to put it through its paces
    for a few more months. And probably six months from now, I
    could be able to report out a lot more detail about exactly
    what it does bring to the table.
        Ms. Sanchez. Maybe we will bring you to Washington to do
    that.
        Colonel Janes, do you think that the Coast Guard has enough
    assets in South Florida? And if the Coast Guard had more
    resources in South Florida, how do you think they should use
    them? And would more resources help us in effectively
    decreasing drug trafficking in the region?
        Colonel Janes. Unquestionably, more resources would help
    us.
        Ms. Sanchez. What type of resources?
        Colonel Janes. I would defer to the professionals in the
    Coast Guard. As a former Army officer, and having watched the
    major expansion of the Coast Guard mission in recent years, I
    would take great hesitancy in trying to define for the Coast
    Guard what they need, if I didn't serve in the Coast Guard.
        But I do know their resources, they are stretched. Every
    time I watch with their different mission requirements and what
    they have been asked to do, funding, I am sure that they would
    agree they would do better had they had more resources. But I
    would not offer a specific example.
        Ms. Sanchez. The reason I ask is because you are sort of in
    charge of sort of trying to take a look at that, and, as you
    know, somebody who sits under the administration, Coast Guard,
    for example, isn't really allowed to tell us they need more
    resources unless the administration wants them to tell us they
    need more resources. Of course, they don't want them to tell us
    that, because the budget is already put forward.
        So I am just asking you, as an observer, what is going on
    down here. Do you think they could use more resources?
        Colonel Janes. Oh, I don't think there is any question.
        Ms. Sanchez. Would they be put to good use?
        Colonel Janes. I think it is absolutely imperative that we
    try to resource them for their mission. Their missions been
    expanded, but I have not seen a similar expansion of their
    resources in recent years. And their ability to respond would
    be, in my thinking, in conjunction with the local and national
    partners who could work in the region as they do.
        But certainly, one of the major points of my testimony is
    we are under-resourced to respond to the threat that we have.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        Captain, the Coast Guard dry-docked the 123-foot cutters
    that would have been used in the waters off of south Florida
    last year. Has this impacted your operational readiness here in
    South Florida? And, again, do you have enough resources to
    properly fulfill your mission?
        Captain Schultz. Madam Chairman, kind of two questions in
    there, and I will deal with following the--Colonel Janes here.
        Regarding the resources, the administration budget as
    proposed does, in fact, ensure our ability to do all our
    missions. Were additional resources to be directed to the Coast
    Guard, I am clear that there is good applications we could make
    of those, and deliver more service.
        Regarding the 123-foot cutters, as you mentioned, that were
    taken out of service a handful of months ago, actually, close
    to a year ago now, we have come up with what we think are some
    fairly creative strategies to mitigate that gap. Here at Sector
    Miami, I have eight patrol boats that work under our tactical
    control, that are home port in our region. Four of those are
    110-foot cutters. The other four are 87-foot coastal patrol
    boats.
        We have worked with my fellow Sector Commanders in Key West
    and St. Petersburg. We have actually taken those platforms,
    those 110-foot platforms, that had a 16-person crew before, and
    we have actually married them us with the crews from those
    eight decommissioned, or eight out-of-service 123-foot cutters.
    We are now multi-crewing those vessels.
        A patrol boat that used to give us 2200 operational hours a
    year is now delivering 3500 operational hours through multi-
    crewing. So the vessel is out more, the crews, the burden on
    the crews is no further time away from home. We are pushing the
    vessel harder. Obviously, the maintenance side of it, we have
    to sink a few more dollars into it. We have to really have a
    good strategy in place to deal with the challenges of running
    what are already old vessels harder. But I think we have hit
    that pretty well.
        Are we anxiously looking forward to new cutters coming
    through our recapitalization efforts? Absolutely. But here, in
    the interim, I think we have managed to close that gap and deal
    with that challenge fairly well.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Mr. Dryden, your testimony says that the
    current state of technology in today's ports is not sufficient
    to track non-cooperative vessels and small boats. What steps do
    you think should be taken to address that issue?
        Mr. Dryden. Well, from a technology standpoint, you really
    have to have technology that can do things like pattern
    analysis, that can look, when they turn off--the cooperating
    vessels are going to turn on all their sensors. You are going
    to see them, and it is, you know, well-behaved vessels coming
    in are going to come in, and it is not going to be a problem.
        The legislation currently, I can't speak to. But I can
    speak to the projects that I know are underway that are
    partially funded at this point. And those projects are seeking
    to identify all of those, and look for anomalous behavior. So
    that, in fact, when you find something, somebody that should
    have--that should have their transponders on and they don't,
    that is the kind of thing that needs to light up in a Command
    Center, so they can take the action, when you have the small
    boats that aren't, in the first place, going to have those
    sensors.
        But, you know, the Coast Guard has attempted to push down
    the requirement and to get cooperation from small boaters. But,
    really, it is a daunting task without getting in the small
    boater's way.
        So, as they work through that to figure what is the right
    compromise, you really have to solve it with technology. And,
    again, I would--I would offer that, with the Safe Port Act and
    with the funding of the Safe Port Act, it really allows the
    Coast Guard to spend more consistent dollars over time to reach
    those objective.
        But when they are having to piecemeal it together, you
    know, when DHS and S&T apply dollars to do projects they think
    have value, you know, we are really taking too much time
    getting from start to finish, because they only have a certain
    number of dollars to use.
        So the promise of the Safe Port Act, and, hopefully,
    Command 21, being an acquisition program, is they are going to
    be able to lay all that out and actually execute on those.
    Today, what they are having to do is they are having to work
    around and find the dollars and, you know, kick and scream and
    figure out a way to fund some of these things.
        And the net result is it just takes too long to achieve it.
    They have the will to do it; it is just a matter of getting the
    dollars aligned with that to make it happen.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have another set of
    questions?
        Mr. Bilirakis. Just a couple. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Sanchez. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Again, Colonel Janes, do you believe it is
    possible to track small vessel threats in a meaningful manner,
    given the sheer volume of pleasure crafts in Florida's
    waterways?
        Colonel Janes. I don't believe we can do it with
    technology. I think it goes back to an awareness, and everybody
    in the waterways cooperating. I think technology has a role,
    but it would take an integrated system. And it would be very
    complex, not unlike a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive
    device that I mentioned before. Just too many, too spread, too
    hard.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Maybe, briefly, the rest of the panel
    can comment on that?
        Mr. Dryden. I would agree with that. I think that--I think
    that is correct.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Yes, sir?
        Captain Schultz. And I would add, Congressman, I think we
    can bring greater visibility, greater awareness to that
    population. Can you resolve all challenges with small boats?
    Probably not. But you can--we can do better than we are now
    with enhanced technologies. And, again, I mentioned the Command
    21. I think that is kind of where we are hoping to go, and, you
    know, the Coast Guard is looking at ways, partnering with all
    the stakeholders in that small arena. There is obviously
    strong--strong views there, but I think we can do more there.
        Can we completely solve it? You know, that will--that is
    yet to be determined, I guess.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Dryden. Congressman, can I make one point? The
    Interagency Operational Centers that--that Command 21 or that
    the Safe Port Act dictate, that is exactly the kind of thing, I
    think, where it becomes the venue, it becomes the forum in
    which to do that. And there has already been test beds, for
    lack of a better work, but project through DOJ, such as Seahawk
    in Charleston, that have anticipated and kind of worked through
    a lot of the issues of, you know, what are the procedures, what
    are the lessons learned from trying to get a lot of different,
    disparate organizations to work together and share intel. I
    think with layer--and it is targeted as, you know, at least in
    part, as a model going forward for these Command Centers, for
    the Interagency Command Centers.
        So I think there is a lot to be learned there, where we can
    apply it and, hopefully, get closer to solving the problem by
    using that.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
        Mr. Dryden, would you please explain how Command Bridge
    helps improve and facilitate actionable situational awareness
    and help watch-standers differentiate between what is important
    and what is not?
        Mr. Dryden. Sure. The biggest thing is being able to take
    all those disparate systems and fuse them together, because
    once you have done that, now the sum of these things, when you
    look at it, you can start applying those rules across
    everything.
        As an example, if you have a--if you have a vessel that you
    are just looking at with AIS, and you know where they are, you
    don't have the ability, without using something like Viz Tools,
    you don't have the ability to then take other amplifying data
    about who owns the vessel and things that may be out there.
    When did they file their 96-hour Notice of Arrival? Who are the
    crew? Who are the owners? All that other information that
    really isn't related to the sensor, not to the blip of AIS. It
    is related, really, to the bigger picture.
        So the whole idea behind achieving actionable situational
    awareness is light up the things, get the watch-standers who
    are in there all day long, get them to light up and say, okay,
    here is something you need to look at. Then they use their
    talents to determine is this something they need to explore
    further or not.
        But by doing that, and getting rid of all those manual
    processes, you have a lot fewer things get missed, because they
    are spending their time, you know, doing the grunt work. What
    you really want is light it up, apply those business rules.
        And if you think of it as a portfolio of rules, the old
    adage, when you have seen one port, you have seen one port. As
    you go to different AORs and different environments, 80 percent
    of it might be the same, or maybe 50 percent is the same. You
    have to have a way to be able to create rules for them, for
    those particular ports that may be different. You may not have
    a lot of drug trafficking that is going on in Seattle, where
    you have a lot going on in Miami.
        It is those kind of nuances that you have to be able to
    give them the ability to do themselves. And without some sort
    of tool, you have to--you are not going to achieve it. So the
    whole idea behind Viz Tools is to prove some of those things,
    and figure out the best way to, A, create the rules, but also
    to visualize that information.
        Whether it is Command Bridge or some other product really
    isn't the driver here. The driver is lessons learned, figuring
    out what works, what doesn't. And hopefully being able to apply
    the process going forward.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome.
        Captain Schultz, according to your written testimony,
    Sector Miami is responsible for all Coast Guard missions
    spanning 165 miles southeast of Florida coastline and
    encompassing numerous counties. And within that region, there
    are five ports collectively handling more than 9,000 annual
    vessel arrivals. And the region is also home to two of the
    three largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly
    4,000,000 passengers moving through both Port Everglades and
    the Port of Miami annually.
        So how many boats are currently assigned to Sector Miami?
        Captain Schultz. We have nine Coast Guard cutters assigned
    to Sector Miami, and then I have four multi-mission small boat
    stations, with various levels of small boats assigned.
        Here in Miami Beach, I have--I think it is six hulls
    assigned to Miami Beach. I have actually seven in Miami, four
    up in Fort Lauderdale, I believe it is. Three in Lake Worth,
    three up in Fort Pierce. And we have some, you know,
    maintenance response hulls to support them when one goes out to
    service.
        Ms. Sanchez. So how many of these boats are currently at
    sea?
        Captain Schultz. Well, on a typical day, Madam Chair,
    generally we have one to two, on occasion three, patrol boats
    that are actually pushing the border out of the ports, you
    know, patrolling in the Straits of Florida.
        Closer to home, our small boat stations have resources on
    the water every day. They are not on the water 24 hours of
    every day, but they are on the water a certain portion of every
    day, doing various types of missions. They may be out doing a
    search and rescue case in the morning or the afternoon; they
    may be on a ports and waterway coastal security patrol, out
    looking at maritime critical infrastructure and key resources
    up the Miami River; they may be involved escorting a cruise
    ship out here in a patrol with model automatic weapons, doing
    what we call our ports, waterways and coastal security mission.
        So there is a presence on the water from those stations
    just about every day of the year, absent, you know, a bad day
    or two where weather precludes that. But there is a presence. I
    can't give you a specific number, because it varies, depending
    on the time of the day and the day of the week.
        Ms. Sanchez. How many people are currently assigned to
    Sector Miami?
        Captain Schultz. We have approximately 500 active duty
    Coast Guard men and women, about 150-plus Coast Guard
    Reservists, and then our auxiliary or volunteer ranks number
    somewhere between 1000 and 1100.
        Ms. Sanchez. And how many people and assets did Sector
    Miami contribute to the Coast Guard's efforts in Iraq?
        Captain Schultz. Technically, I don't have any assets
    that--that are contributing to Iraq. We had--there are two
    patrol boats, Coast Guard Cutter Baranof and Coast Guard Cutter
    Maui, that were home ported previously here in Miami.
        I am not sure exactly how they are reported on--on our
    books regarding their operating facility codes and things, but
    they have been deployed for--deployed to Operation Iraqi
    Freedom for some time now.
        Ms. Sanchez. Does the Coast Guard currently have the
    ability to track all of the vessels carrying illegal migrants
    and narcotics destined for south Florida?
        Captain Schultz. No.
        Ms. Sanchez. What percentage of these vessels do you think
    are tracked?
        Captain Schultz. Well, there is a two-part answer, Madam
    Chair, to that question. I guess when it comes with Cuban
    migrants here in south Florida, the Cuban migrants that we
    interdict at sea, we obviously can contain that number, know
    that number. Cuban migrants that make landfall here in south
    Florida come forward and they start their clock once they are
    here in the States, and certain rights are afforded to them.
    They can apply for citizenship a year and a day later, I
    believe it is.
        With migrants from other countries, generally, when they
    reach our shores, they tend to go underground. They don't self-
    declare, so we really don't know the denominator in that
    equation. I couldn't give you a number, because I don't know
    the answer to that number, outside of the Cuban migrants.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Colonel----
        Colonel Janes. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Sanchez. --you said in your testimony that port staff
    should receive daily intelligence updates from the Department
    of Homeland Security. Why?
        Colonel Janes. If there were a threat of a security
    incident, I don't think it is fair to all of a sudden start
    sending them information. I think if we have a system in place,
    that we share the information, our ports would get into a mode
    of routinely processing it, how they would handle it with their
    staff, and would probably talk through responses.
        If they learned of a threat that would be presented to a
    port in Seattle, I think our port--our ports are security
    conscious, that they would, in many instances, sit down and
    discuss how they might respond.
        I don't think that you can all of a sudden turn an
    intelligence-sharing process on and off. It ought to be on. The
    information they have a need to know, we should share with them
    so that they can develop their own internal apparatus on how to
    share it within the port and what they might do to respond.
        To me, it is a start of best practices and lessons learned,
    if they are able to participate.
        Ms. Sanchez. Does your have staff have the security
    clearances necessary to receive daily intelligence briefs? And
    what assistance has the Homeland Security Department given you
    in trying to attain those clearances?
        Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, I am in the process of getting
    my own clearance in place. So some of that, I could not truly
    answer. And each port would have to----
        Ms. Sanchez. And how long have you been trying?
        Colonel Janes. I am probably into two months now, to apply.
    And I have turned in the paperwork, fingerprinted, and
    whatever. And, again, I had a security clearance, Top Secret
    Cosmic Atomal, years ago. But when I left the Army, it expired,
    so I have to go through the process again. And I understand
    that.
        Ms. Sanchez. And how long do you anticipate, or have they
    told you that it would take, to get you cleared, if everything
    was according to as it should be?
        Colonel Janes. I--I cannot answer that. I will tell you
    when I receive it, from the--the time when I applied, when I
    get it. But right now, I couldn't tell you.
        Ms. Sanchez. In your testimony, you talked about
    regionalizing the government's national strategies. How would
    regionalization--can you sort of talk to that, and what you
    think that would look like? And I am interested in how it would
    improve the federal government's response to drug trafficking
    and terrorism down here in this sector.
        Colonel Janes. Madam Chair, as indicated when you read my
    bio, I worked four years in the National Terrorism Preparedness
    Institute, and work with the Department of Homeland Security.
        I am unaware of planning that--that goes down into a region
    or a state that would indicate how a drug threat assessment,
    which could be used to provide a terrorism weapon into our
    country, how those are discussed locally. I don't believe they
    are. And if they are, it is stovepipe within a particular law
    enforcement agency.
        Prior to 9/11, we had a problem sharing national
    intelligence. I submitted in my testimony, I think we have a
    similar problem sharing law enforcement information today. DEA,
    our high intensity drug trafficking areas, they communicate and
    share information, but it is not unified into one plan.
        Our three HIDTAs in Florida encompass 22 counties. We have
    67 counties. Next year, with the help of our Florida Department
    of Law Enforcement, and the Florida National Guard, we will
    capture a drug threat assessment for the other 45 counties.
    That will give us a state-wide drug threat assessment.
        A drug threat assessment could be used to parallel what
    could be a terrorism route through drug trafficking. And,
    likewise, our law enforcement, looking proactive, okay, what
    might we do about that.
        The reason I said regional, if you look at the State of
    Florida, it is not just the land that we physically occupy. Our
    Coast Guard has a major role. DEA, ICE, the Immigrations,
    Customs Border Protection, all of these are important players.
        I think a strategy that encompasses the Gulf Coast states
    that take I-10, where we know drugs are moving from Mexico and
    the western United States into Atlanta and right down into our
    state. The HIDTA that is located in Atlanta, I have talked to
    the Office of National Drug Control Policy, also with JIATF
    South, the Joint Interagency Task Force South, Admiral Nimick,
    we plan to meet with them in January and look at each other's
    different intelligence capabilities, merge those, I hope, and I
    believe, under our Florida Department of Law Enforcement
    leadership, into a unified law enforcement assessment of what
    the threat is. And then we can begin to operationalize what do
    we do about it.
        Because right now, it is kind of piecemeal. It is reactive,
    rather than proactive. The drug trafficking organizations are
    international. If there is a problem in Palm Beach County, and
    law enforcement in Palm Beach County turns up the heat on the
    drug trafficking organization, they will come north into
    Tallahassee, into Leon County. And as I talk to sheriffs in
    both counties, they are aware of that.
        There is not a unifying strategy in Florida to deal across
    the state. We are working on doing that. I believe Florida
    needs to be a part of a regional strategy. Likewise, the
    national response needs to be looked at regionally, nationally.
    And these resources, intelligence, and response, should be
    unified in a regional, national effort. And that is not done
    today.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. My last question, and it is for all
    three of you, I have a Chief of Port Police in Los Angeles,
    Chief Cunningham. He has since left. But when I initially
    started several years ago on this Committee, he said there are
    three things you need to worry about at a port. One, what is in
    the box? What is in the container? Two, who is on the port? Who
    should be there and who shouldn't be there? And three, how are
    the different layers of government working together?
        And I am very interested to hear from you how are the
    layers of government working together here in South Florida.
    And I ask that because, of course, we saw the problems we had
    in Katrina, with local and state and federal denying each other
    access, or not talking to each other. And we recently saw what
    could be the same problem in the oil spill response in the Bay
    area in California just two weeks ago.
        So my question to you is: How do you all really get along?
    Are you talking to each other? Are you talking to all the
    different agencies that are involved if something should happen
    here or if we should try to stop something that we know may
    happen? And what do we need to work on?
        And maybe I will start down there and we will go down here.
        Colonel Janes. I, of course, do not work on a port on a
    daily basis, but I visit our ports and listen to them in the
    Council. I--uniformly, I hear that the cooperation on the port
    is strong.
        There is a resourcing issue; competition between security
    and commerce that gets to be a big issue.
        To your chief who responded to you in California, Madam
    Chair, I would add that I do believe you need a plan, a unified
    plan. And that is the point that I have made to you, that I
    don't believe we have. The partners and the cooperation is
    there, and they share information, but I think that we are
    doing better. Our ports are doing quarterly threat assessments.
    They have a port security plan that addresses their port.
        But it doesn't regionalize, and it looks only at the port.
    But the threat that impacts these points is air, land, and sea.
    And it goes back to the point that I think I have stressed.
    Cooperation is there, but I don't think we have fixed
    responsibility and have an adequate plan to address it.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        Mr. Dryden. I think I should defer to the operators in the
    local area on this one.
        Captain Schultz. Madam Chair, I think the answer to that is
    a very strong positive message here in South Florida. I am
    personally involved with the Port Directors, with their
    designated Assistant Port Directors for Security. We meet on an
    at least monthly basis at an executive level.
        Here in the Port of Miami, up in Port Everglades, and Palm
    Beach, I have folks on my staff, port teams, as we call them,
    that come to work in the seaport. Here in the Port of Miami,
    which you visited this morning, there is a physical presence.
    They have office space there. They walk the docks. They are
    rubbing elbows with the Port Security Enforcement Specialists.
    They are there with the port staff. They are there with the
    Miami-Dade Police Department, who is actually a security
    provider under contract with the port.
        At the State level, my regional counterpart, the Major here
    in this part of the country, you know, we talk probably a
    couple times a week. As I mentioned earlier, we will meet with
    the Regional Domestic Security Task Force tomorrow. I co-chair
    the Maritime Working Group there with my State partner from
    Fish and Wildlife Commission. And we--that will be all the law
    enforcement agencies down here, and first responders that have
    a maritime component to their mission. We will get together,
    and we talk. We share e-mails.
        When there are new challenges, when the State in Florida
    Statute 311.11, 311.12 came out with some new requirements on
    quarterly threat assessments, this Maritime Working Group
    element of the RDSTF, the Regional Domestic Security Task
    Force, came up with a Seaport Security Assistance Team function
    to help, you know, work through those processes.
        So I think we are very well connected in that regard. There
    is always room for improvement, but with--you link this back to
    the cruise ships and the number of passengers here. There is
    more work than any one of our agencies can do alone. Miami is
    very much a maritime city. You mentioned meeting Admiral
    Stavridis recently, and he will talk about Miami, he will put
    the picture on the overhead and show you just how maritime it
    is, just from a visual standpoint.
        We, day-to-day, we had the Super Bowl 2007 here; Super Bowl
    is back in 2010. We have had the Governors' Conference on
    Global Warming. We had the State Department/FBI Conference on
    Combating Global Terrorism with 23, 25 minister-level folks in
    from foreign countries.
        We do water site security every day down here. And we don't
    just train, we actually live it. And it forces us to have
    mature relationships. So I would say a good part of my duties
    as Sector Commander, at my level, is working those
    relationships at my counterparts, you know, with them, and
    making sure my folks have that same level of connectivity.
        And, again, it is commitment. If you backed out the number
    of folks I have on the Port Teams, that is probably close to 20
    percent of my Sector staff. Not my outlying field units, but 15
    to 20 percent of my staff is out, deployed in the seaports.
    They are working with Fran Bonesack from the Miami River. Her
    folks come in for a weekly meeting.
        So, again, we can always do better, but we take that part
    very seriously down here. That is a part of the Domain
    Awareness that I think is probably something we can do and
    continue to build on.
        Lastly on that, we are working very closely with Customs
    and Border Protection. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, and
    the Commissioner of CBP signed a memorandum, an MOU, back in
    2006, looking at better cooperation. I have got--Monday
    morning, I had a CBP officer in my Command Center, briefing
    their activities in the port. My people are over there briefing
    the seaport, the CBP folks.
        CBP is building a joint fusion center down here, and we
    have committed bodies to be in that, to further enhance that
    sharing of information, intelligence, cooperation,
    collaboration.
        So I think there is a good new story there, and we are very
    focused on building on that good new story.
        Ms. Sanchez. All right. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have any
    questions left?
        Mr. Bilirakis. Just one last question.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. We will let you have the last question,
    then.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Colonel Janes, in your opinion,
    how do we stand on aligning the TWIC card, aligning it with
    Florida's Port Access Control Credential? And how important is
    this to the State of Florida? And what can we do as a Committee
    to make this happen?
        Colonel Janes. We have made progress, Congressman, in the
    last month, but I am very concerned that we do not have
    positive steps from Transportation Security Administration to
    unify the two credential requirements before they begin to
    issue the TWIC in Florida.
        I think the issue is of paramount importance. I cannot
    overstate it, because it affects every port worker, it doubles
    costs, it is huge morale issues.
        Florida has been ready to issue a biometric credential
    since--since March of this year. We have actually delayed that
    in our efforts to align, because if we did not, it would double
    the cost, duplicate costs, cause inconvenience for everyone
    working on the port.
        Only recently, with the help of former Deputy Secretary
    Jackson, was he able to facilitate a discussion with TSA that
    the National Criminal Investigative Check information could be
    shared from the federal to the state level.
        Now, TSA still has concerns with how to make that happen.
    The privacy concerns, and my concern, is that they show up in
    January to begin to issue the TWIC, which meets the federal
    rule, but does not meet the Florida statute.
        So the concerns are very great. And there is a solution at
    hand.
        The way you could help is to ask TSA to align their
    schedule with the alignment of the credential. We do not need
    two credentials in Florida. We don't need to jeopardize
    commerce, force our businesses to go elsewhere, but just cause
    a break-down in bureaucracy between the federal and state level
    to align the systems.
        And anything you can do to encourage TSA to make this
    happen, because they have now been given the wherewithal, I
    believe, with the intervention of the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thanks for that update.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the panel testifying.
    Thank you, Madam Chair, for bringing this Committee to the
    State of Florida. Appreciate it.
        Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from Florida, and I thank
    the witnesses for your testimony, and my colleague for his
    questions.
        And, as you know, we may ask you additional questions. We
    will do so in writing, and we expect that you will quickly get
    back to us on that.
        And hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands
    adjourned.
        Once again, thank you to the people of Florida, Miami in
    particular, all the different government agencies who hosted us
    so graciously today. Thank you.
        Hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]