[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY FAILURES:
TWIC EXAMINED
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 31, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-81
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Georgia........................................... 50
The Honorable Michael N. Castle, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Delaware..................................... 41
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress
From the U.S. Virgin Islands................................... 45
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 40
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 39
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 37
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 51
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 43
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 54
Prepared Statement............................................. 55
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 57
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 53
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 36
Witnesses
Panel I
Ms. Cathy Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Edmond S. ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation security Administration, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Admiral Brian Salerno, Director, Inspection and Compliance, U.S.
Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
For the Record
Panel II
Prepared Statements:
Mr. Maurice Emsellem, Public Policy Director, The National
Employment Law Project, (NELP)............................... 61
Ms. Lisa B. Himber, vice President, Maritime Exchange for the
Delaware River and Bay....................................... 69
Ms. Judith Marks, President, Transportation and Security
Solutions, Lockheed Martin Corporation....................... 74
Mr. George A. Quick, Vice President, International Organization
of Masters, Mates and Pilots................................. 80
Ms. Bethann Rooney, Manager, Port Security, Port Commerce
Department, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey........ 84
Appendix
Additional Questions and Responses:
Responses from Ms. Cathy Berrick............................... 91
Responses from the Honorable Edmond S. ``Kip'' Hawley.......... 94
Responses from Admiral Brian Salerno........................... 103
HOMELAND SECURITY FAILURES: TWIC EXAMINED
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Wednesday, October 31, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Dicks, Harman,
DeFazio, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Christensen, Carney, Perlmutter,
King, Dent, Lowey, Etheridge and Broun.
Also present: Representative Castle.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order.
We would like to welcome the Congressperson from Delaware,
and I would like to ask unanimous consent that Representative
Castle be allowed to sit and participate in the hearing before
the committee today.
So ordered.
The committee is meeting today to do oversight on the
Department of Homeland Security's rollout of the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential.
I would like to also indicate that the ranking member
indicated he is en route and that we could begin. He should
arrive before I finish my remarks.
Good morning and thank you for being here today for the
oversight hearing of the Transportation Worker Identification
credential, commonly referred to as TWIC.
This hearing dovetails nicely with the hearing that was
held by Ms. Sanchez's subcommittee yesterday.
TWIC was mandated in law 5 years ago. It was supposed to
provide an extra layer of security at our nation's ports and
other critical transportation hubs.
However, it seems that even before this program gets off
the ground, it may have some fatal flaws that undermine its
ultimate effectiveness.
I look forward to hearing testimony on how the rollout has
been going in Wilmington over the past 2 weeks. It should be
very instructive for what other ports should expect.
Already we are hearing that organized crime is working to
develop a fake TWIC card to operate in our ports. It is time to
say enough is enough.
It is time for the Department of Homeland Security to step
up. The department needs to be straight with us and give us
specifics on when TWIC will be rolled out in all of our
nation's ports.
We also need to know how many people will need a TWIC card
and what resources will be necessary to process them. If the
estimates that I am hearing are correct, you have a real
problem on your hands with the estimates.
In the past, the department has projected that 750,000
workers would need cards in the entire nation. The port of
Houston alone expects 350,000 applicants, unless we are wrong
somehow, and Houston is not one of the largest ports, as you
know.
We also need to know how many transportation workers are
going to be disqualified from attaining a TWIC. We understand
that some estimates go as high as 40 percent of all truck
drivers could be disqualified.
The department's inability to correctly forecast these
numbers undermines this committee's confidence in you getting
the program right.
Ports are a vital part of ports commerce in this country
and if TWIC is not done right, ports could come to a virtual
standstill. This would have a real and direct impact on
commerce.
Similarly, I am concerned about the department's waiver and
appeal process. DHS is going to depend on the FBI records to
check names. FBI records, according to the Justice Department,
are flawed and incomplete. In fact, about half of all records
do not even have information on final disposition.
Finally, I am concerned about the possibility that the TWIC
credential is not going to be the one and only card that our
nation's transportation workers will have to obtain. The
department has decided not to preempt states' access card,
therein creating yet another layer of bureaucracy and
additional costs to our workers.
The department is already charging $132.50 for the TWIC.
How much more should we expect folks to pay?
We also see that Florida, for instance, has already created
its own access card. Our nation's transportation workers do not
deserve more bureaucracy and confusion. We owe them security.
We owe them accountability and, most importantly, we owe them
freedom from fear. Our workers deserve no less.
Prepared Remarks of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
Twic was mandated in law five years ago. It was supposed to provide
an extra layer of security at our nation's ports and other critical
transportation hubs.
However, it seems that even before this program gets off the
ground, it may have some fatal flaws that undermine its ultimate
effectiveness. I look forward to hearing testimony on how the roll-out
has been going in Wilmington, over the past two weeks. It could be very
instructive for what other ports should expect.
Already, we are hearing that organized crime is working to develop
a fake TwIC to operate in our ports. If time to say enough is enough.
It is time for the Department of Homeland Security to step up. The
Department needs to be straight with us and give us specifics on when
TWIC will be rolled out at all our nation's ports.
We also need to know how many people will need and TWIC and what
resources are necessary too process them. If the estimates that I am
hearing correct, you could have a real problem on your hands. In past,
the Department has projected that just 750,000 workers would need cards
in the entire nation. The port of Houston alone expects 350,000
applicants.
We also need to know how many transportation workers are going to
be disqualified from attaining a TWIC. We understand that some
estimates are that 10 to 40 percent of all truck drivers could be
disqualified.
The Department's inability to correctly forecast these numbers
undermines this Committee's confidence in you getting this program
right. Ports could come to a virtual standstill.
This would have a real and direct impact on commerce. Similarly, I
am also concerned about the Department's waiver and appeals process.
DHS is going to depend on the FBI records to check names. FBI
records, according to the Justice Department are flawed and incomplete.
In fact, about half of all records do not even have information on
final dispositions.
Finally, I am concerned about the possibility that the TWIC
credential is not going to be the ``one and only'' card that our
nation's transportation workers will have to obtain. The Department has
decided not to pre-empt State access cards--therein creating yet
another layer of bureaucracy and additional costs to our workers.
The Department is already charging $132.50 for the TWIC. How much
more should we expect folks to have to pay? Our nation's transportation
workers do not deserve more bureaucracy and confusion. We owe them
security. We owe them accountability. And most importantly, we owe them
freedom from fear. Our workers deserve no less.
Mr. Thompson. The chair now recognizes the ranking member
of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King,
for an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate the
hearing being held and thank you for holding it, scheduling it.
I also want to welcome Mr. Castle from Delaware. Obviously,
the port in Delaware is the first up and it is very thoughtful
of him to be here to give us the benefit of his insights, and
thank him for his service.
Obviously, the TWIC program is vital. We have been waiting
for it for years. It is a priority of the Congress that it be
done. It is also a priority that it be done the right way.
It would serve no purpose to rush it through and create
more problems. At the same time, DHS has to make sure that this
is implemented. While the scheduled dates are not being met,
the fact is every effort is being made to move it along as
quickly as possible.
The chairman recited a list of things that could go wrong
and potential problems, and that is true. Nobody said this
would be easy. And I think it is important for us to listen to
the testimony today, see what has been done, what is planned to
be done, what is happening with the pilot programs, when full
implementation is going to be inspected, what is going to
happen as far as the card reader pilot, what is going to happen
as far as the employees, as far as their backgrounds, how that
will impact, how many it is going to affect, whether or not DHS
is on target, close to being on target as far as the number of
cards that will have to be issued.
All of these are significant issues. I think it is
important, though, for us to realize that it serves no real
purpose just reciting what is wrong or what could be wrong. Let
us also see what can be done to address the deficiencies that
are there, to make sure that when the program is fully up and
running, that it is running at maximum effectiveness and that
we not just, again, try to harp on what could be possibly done
better at some time in the future.
Let us make a cooperative effort to work together. Where
the department needs help, let us give it to them. Where we
think the department is deficient, let us make it known to them
and deal with them in a very honest and straightforward way, as
I know they will deal with us in their testimony today.
I especially want to welcome Bethann Rooney from the port
of New York and New Jersey, who has been coming to these
hearings for a number of years now. I don't know how she
survives either the job or the hearings, but she does it and I
want to thank her for her constant work and dedication, and all
the witnesses, especially Kip Hawley, who I believe does an
outstanding job and against terrible odds and under dire
circumstances.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Other members of the committee are reminded that under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome the first panel of witnesses to the hearing. Our
first witness is the honorable Kip Hawley, administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration.
Our second witness is Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, director,
Inspection and Compliance, U.S. Coast Guard. Welcome.
Our third witness is Ms. Cathy Berrick, who is a senior
executive for the Government Accountability Office's homeland
security and justice team. We are happy to have you.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Administrator Hawley. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF EDMOND S. ``KIP'' HAWLEY, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King
and members of the subcommittee.
I have submitted the testimony for the record, and in the
spirit of plain talking, which is honored in this committee, I
would like to just address the issues.
I took six issues from the opening statement from both Mr.
Thompson and Mr. King that I think are the primary issues that
we need to address and I will just quickly hit them.
On the issue of the number of people who will need TWIC
cards, the business model, that is, a pay-as-you-go system,
allows for that to be scalable up to whatever number that is.
So whether it is a million, a million-two, a million-five is
not a constraint on the viability of the program, because the
contract is written that our provider gets paid by the card. So
there will be resources to flex to whatever that number is.
So the fact that we can't identify an exact number of
people who will want a card and who will get one, even though
it may not be specifically required of them, is not a
constraint on the program.
On the issue of the disqualifications, the data point that
we have is the HAZMAT endorsement on the commercial driver's
license and it has very similar requirements as the TWIC card,
and that has proven not to be a major problem.
Our interest is in finding terrorists and keeping them out
of our ports, not denying a card to somebody who had an issue
earlier in their career.
So we found essentially that of the 730,000 people that
have been vetted, less than 100 who have been willing to work
with us to resolve the issues have had an issue, which is about
one in 10,000.
So our sense is we are not going to have the problem that
is projected. We are going to make sure that this program does
not become a barrier for good people who are working to be
disqualified. Our interest is to get as many people as quickly
on board.
On the issue of the card readers, the Safe Port Act
requires us to do a pilot and then, within 2 years, issue the
final rule on what the card reader requirements are. So in
terms of us not having card readers out there when we are
issuing TWIC cards, that is directly responsive to the law that
was just passed by the Congress and I think that the
enforcement by the Coast Guard is, in fact, a good security
measure that we can elaborate as we go forward.
As to the when, we announced, for the 147 ports, we
announced a quarterly roll for when that should be expected. I
think the key point is the one that Mr. King made about that we
do it right, that this is the most advanced biometric system
that is flexible, with all employers, all ports.
And if we roll it out too quickly and, therefore, as Mr.
Thompson said, tie up commerce in these ports, that would
defeat the purpose. So our goal is to roll it out as
expeditiously as possible, but with a caveat that we are going
to make sure it observes all the privacy requirements, the
proper due process, the security requirements. We are going to
make sure it is a success as we go.
As to the issue of the organized crime thing, I think that
is a very good signal that they ought to be worried that the
TWIC card is coming, because they are not able to counterfeit
it.
When the Coast Guard shows up with their handheld biometric
readers, they will be caught. I think they should be worried
about it.
And the program has gone through an extensive period of
preparation and vetting and we have had a lot of criticism
that, frankly, has helped the program, both from the inspector
general's office, the Congress, and the GAO, that has
highlighted the issues with TWIC and we have addressed those
issues and now the program is, in fact, up and running and I do
not see a barrier why this program should not continue to be a
success, and I look forward to discussing those issues with the
committee.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Edmond ``Kip'' Hawley,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of
Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity
to share with you the significant progress we have made on the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. I would
like to acknowledge the leadership this committee has provided in
defining the vision for TWIC.
The TWIC program is moving towards its objectives while making
sound decisions focused on enhancing port security and a reasoned,
phased-in program implementation approach. I am happy to inform the
Committee that TWIC enrollments began in Wilmington, Delaware, on
Tuesday, October 16, 2007. After successful start-up in Wilmington, we
will now proceed to Corpus Christi in early November. By mid-November,
enrollment will start in Baton Rouge, Beaumont, Honolulu, Oakland, and
Tacoma. This group will be followed in late November by Chicago/
Calumet, Houston, Port Arthur, Providence, and Savannah.
In addition to announcing the implementation of the program, we
have made significant progress in other areas since our last appearance
before this sub-committee:
Implementation of the pre-enrollment capability;
Completing test milestones on the enrollment system;
Adding TWIC enrollment sites based on stakeholder
input;
Reducing the price of a TWIC card;
Establishing reader technical specifications; and
Identifying card reader pilot participants and holding
kick-off meetings.
Completing Test Milestones on the Enrollment System
TWIC will impact hundreds of thousands of American workers
essential to the smooth flow of global commerce. Once TWIC is up and
running, TSA will vet as many workers in one day as we did during the
entire year-long prototype. The importance and enormity of this task
within the maritime environment, with a dynamic and mobile workforce,
has demanded a methodical approach with rigorous testing.
TWIC will be one of the world's most advanced, interoperable
biometric credentialing programs and is powered by state-of-the-art
technologies. We have completed our ``flight test'' of the full TWIC
system, which has five main components:
Pre-Enrollment Web Site: allows workers to schedule
appointments and provide information ahead of time to make
enrollment easier.
Enrollment Center: captures a worker's biometric and
biographic information and submits the information for security
processing.
TWIC Core System: routes applicant information for
processing, conducts data integrity checks, and manages the
status of TWIC cards.
Screening Gateway: aggregates security threat
assessment data from the FBI, Citizenship and Immigration
Services, and watchlists. It is important to note that the
Screening Gateway is used across all of TSA's vetting programs.
Card Production: electronically loads an applicant's
information onto a TWIC smart card and then physically produces
the card.
All five of these parts were first tested individually. Next, these
pieces were integrated to ensure the functionality of the end-to-end
process of conducting accurate and timely security threat assessments
and producing high quality credentials. In addition, security and
privacy requirements were validated throughout the process. After our
contractor verified system readiness, TSA completed independent
verification before beginning final test enrollments in the field using
live vetting on government and trusted contractor personnel.
Today the switch has been turned on and the doors have opened with
the commencement of enrollment in Wilmington, Delaware. After we verify
successful enrollment operations in Wilmington, we will move forward to
expand TWIC across the nation.
Adding TWIC Enrollment Sites
The TWIC final rule established a network of 130 enrollment sites
located across the nation. Understanding the importance of making
enrollment as convenient and accessible as possible, we have worked
with maritime stakeholders, the Department, and our partners in the
United States Coast Guard to add additional locations for TWIC
enrollment centers. At this time, we will field 146 fixed enrollment
centers. In addition, we have worked with our contractor to add a
mobile enrollment capability to take TWIC to the workers.
Reducing the Price of a TWIC Card
TWIC is a fee-based program paid for by applicants. We fully
realize that these costs are significant, and we are mindful of the
need to identify areas for cost reduction. Recently, we announced that
the fee for a standard TWIC will now be $132.50, a decrease from the
price anticipated in the Final Rule. Workers with current, comparable
threat assessments including HAZMAT, Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)) will receive a discounted fee of $105.25.
The cost of a lost, damaged or stolen credential is $60.
Establishing Reader Technical Specifications
The TWIC technical architecture is compatible with the
credentialing standards established in Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) 201-1. This alignment is critical to support card and
reader interoperability within the maritime mode. In response to
comments received on the initial TWIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM), TSA and the Coast Guard decided to remove the requirement for
biometric readers from the TWIC final rule to allow time to establish
technology specifications to support maritime operations.
TSA and the Coast Guard sought the advice of the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC), which established a working group
to collaboratively develop new technical specifications that complement
FIPS 201-1 and add features that will support high-volume physical
access in the harsh maritime environment. The working group included
representatives from both the maritime and technology industries.
TSA recently published the TWIC reader hardware and card
application working technical specification. The working specification
establishes the requirements for biometric card readers for the pilot
projects required by the SAFE Port Act. These readers will be tested
during the pilot program. As the card and readers are envisioned to
operate when TWIC is fully implemented, use of a PIN will not be
necessary to release the biometric, unless the owner/operator chooses
to use contact readers and the contact side of the credential.
Identifying Card Reader Pilot Participants and Holding Kick-Off
Meetings
As required by the SAFE Port Act, we have initiated pilot programs
with five partners across the country to test card readers. The pilots
will test access control technologies in real world marine
environments. Our current list of participants includes the Port
Authorities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Brownsville, and New York/New
Jersey, in addition to Watermark Cruises in Annapolis, Maryland. As
part of the outreach efforts for the TWIC program and the Department's
Port Security Grant Program, we continue to seek additional
participants. Our objective is to include pilot test participants that
are representative of a variety of facility vessels which operate in a
variety of geographic locations and environmental conditions. There
appears to be sufficient interest from the maritime community to
achieve this objective.
We are in the process of finalizing the test approach for the
pilots. We are working with the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology component and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to establish a test plan that will
evaluate the card-reader interface under a variety of conditions and
assess its impact on operations. Through the pilot tests, we will
investigate the impacts of requiring biometric identity verification on
business processes, technology, and operational impacts on facilities
and vessels of various size, type, and location. As the program
proceeds, the pilots will inform the TWIC reader rulemaking process and
ultimately result in final regulations that require the deployment of
transportation security card readers consistent with the findings of
the pilot program.
Lessons Learned and Future Efforts
We are proud of the significant progress we have made in the past
six months and are mindful of the challenges ahead. As we move forward
in the TWIC program, we are committed to incorporating our lessons
learned to drive sound management decisions geared at improving all
aspects of the program, including:
Look for efficiencies by eliminating duplicative
regulatory processes. TSA and Coast Guard are developing
procedures for the sharing of fingerprints, identity
verification, criminal history, and photographs for TWIC which
is expected to save not only money but time. In addition,
merchant mariners will no longer be required to visit a
Regional Exam Center to obtain and renew their credentials,
resulting in substantial time and travel savings.
Place the highest value in stakeholder input; it is
time well spent. The public hearings, comments to the NPRM,
meeting with operators and associations, and contributions of
advisory councils all added great value. We came away from each
and every one of these efforts better informed about the
challenges, the unacceptable impacts, and the practicable
options for protecting our ports.
Address the impact on small businesses. TSA and the
Coast Guard worked closely with the Small Business
Administration to minimize the financial and operational impact
on small businesses wherever possible. The rule includes
provisions that allow MTSA-regulated passenger vessels
(excluding cruise ships) to establish employee access areas for
crewmembers that do not require unescorted access to secure
areas such as the pilot house and engine room. This provision
reduces the impact on those employees who rarely need to use
spaces beyond those designated for support of passengers while
maintaining the integrity of vessels' secure areas. We are also
producing and distributing a Small Business Compliance Guide to
assist small businesses in their implementation of the program.
When practical, preserve State regulatory flexibility.
Mariner regulations and port security plans preempt state
regulations. However, the TWIC regulations do not preempt
States from requiring background checks and badging systems for
non-security purposes in addition to TWIC. States may need to
set standards for important purposes other than terrorism
threats, such as theft or organized crime.
Plan for privacy. All data collected at an enrollment
center will be completely deleted from the enrollment center
work stations after transmission to TSA. The entire enrollment
record (including all fingerprints collected) is stored in the
TSA system, which is protected through role-based entry,
encryption, and segmentation to prevent unauthorized use. No
paper records with personal identification information are
created in the enrollment process.
Technical innovation requires adaptive contract
management. TWIC is attempting to develop a 21st century
technology that accommodates evolving IT standards suited to
emerging needs that span local, international, public, and
private interests. This requires continual reevaluation of the
scope and methods of contracting. The recent Lockheed Martin
performance-based contract award is a culmination of our
efforts to date. We will continue to look for and implement
adaptive program planning, contractor oversight, and metrics to
ensure the success of the program.
Plan to address what issues may arise during testing.
Evolving technology, such as card readers, create a changing
environment and program control constraints. This is especially
the case when the technology must be deployed to a vast
multitude of entities with remote connectivity challenges
(e.g., vessels) and varying degrees of access control system
capabilities.
Conclusion
The steps we are taking will be an extremely important aspect to
the security of our port facilities and vessels. TSA will continue to
work with our partners, the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime stakeholders,
to ensure that for the first time in history thousands of independent
businesses will have one interoperable security network and workers
will hold a common credential that can be used across that entire
network.
I appreciate the keen interest that the Committee has in an
effective implementation of TWIC, and I thank you for your support. Mr.
Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Rear Admiral Salerno to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL BRIAN SALERNO, DIRECTOR, INSPECTION AND
COMPLIANCE, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Salerno. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
King and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you this
morning on the current status and the way forward for the TWIC
program.
Since enrollment started in Wilmington, Delaware on October
16, we have been monitoring all aspects of the process in order
to identify any areas that need refinement as we move forwards
with enrollment in larger, higher consequence ports around the
country.
The Coast Guard is committed to working in partnership with
TSA and with our industry stakeholders to get this right. It is
in this spirit that we have already addressed many of the
concerns expressed by our stakeholders about TWIC
implementation.
For example, based on stakeholder input, we, and I mean TSA
and the Coast Guard collectively, have increased the number of
TWIC enrollment locations from 130 to 147. We have enhanced
mobile enrollment capabilities.
We have developed detailed guidance documents to assist
owners, operators and TWIC applicants. We have instituted new
special hire provisions. We have proposed regulations to
streamline merchant mariner applications and reduce the number
of credentials they are required to carry. And we have
developed and published a state-of-the-art contactless reader
specification, which lays the foundation for readers that will
maximize personnel throughput and meet the harsh environmental
conditions common to maritime operations.
This latter point also signals our way forward. Even as we
are working to implement the enrollment plan, we have
concurrently begun work on a rulemaking that will address card
readers, which will be used to verify a TWIC holder's identify.
We have sought the collaboration of our stakeholders in
this effort and have received recommendations on specific
potential reader provisions from the National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee, the Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory
Committee, and the Towing Safety Advisory Committee.
In the meantime, it is important to note that the
implementation of TWIC, even in the absence of reader
requirements, will have an immediate positive security benefit.
For the first time, we will have a universally recognized
tamper-resistant credential, backed by a robust threat
assessment, that will be checked before individuals are granted
unescorted access to facilities and vessels.
The Coast Guard also intends to procure handheld readers
for use during routine and unscheduled vessel and facility
security examinations, and we use these to randomly check the
validity of an individual's TWIC.
TSA and the Coast Guard continue to reach out to our
private sector stakeholders in the interest of fashioning a
regulation that strengthens American's maritime security, while
advancing commerce.
While the TWIC program is multifaceted and includes
numerous players, we are committed to developing an
operationally sound framework that maximizes the security
benefit that TWIC provides.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I
will be happy to take your questions.
[The statement of Admiral Salerno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Brian Salerno
Good Morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about how
the Coast Guard, in partnership with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), is implementing the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) program.
At the outset, I would like to note that with the commencement of
TWIC enrollment in Wilmington, Delaware on October 16th, this program
reached a major milestone where the plans and capabilities developed in
the past will start to yield the security benefits envisioned for the
future. In the 15 months since DHS proposed TWIC requirements in a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Coast Guard and TSA have been
laying a solid foundation in the form of regulation, policy, systems,
and capabilities which sets the stage to succeed with enrollment and
compliance. The deliberate process and careful steps taken to lay this
foundation have been absolutely crucial to ensure that we gain the full
security benefit from TWIC and minimize the negative impact of the
program on trade and the many hundreds-of-thousands of people who will
be enrolling.
Background
In understanding where we are today, I would like to review the
efforts of the past. The TWIC program builds on the security framework
established by Congress in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA). Coast Guard regulations stemming from the Act established
security requirements for maritime vessels and facilities posing a high
risk of being involved in a transportation security incident. The MTSA
also required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue a
biometric transportation security card to licensed and documented U.S.
mariners and those individuals granted unescorted access to secure
areas of MTSA regulated vessels and facilities. TSA was assigned this
requirement, and because of our overlapping responsibilities, the Coast
Guard and TSA formally joined efforts to carry out the TWIC program in
November 2004. In this partnership, TSA is responsible for TWIC
enrollment, security threat assessment and adjudication, card
production, TWIC issuance, conduct of the TWIC appeal and waiver
process, and management of government support systems. The Coast Guard
is responsible for establishing and enforcing TWIC access control
requirements at regulated vessels and facilities. Both agencies partner
daily to make sure that our collective efforts achieve the increased
security objectives which MTSA intended.
The TSA and Coast Guard published a joint TWIC Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on May 22, 2006. Following the publication of the NPRM and
the subsequent comment period, Congress enacted the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (the SAFE Port Act). The SAFE
Port Act created new statutory requirements for the TWIC Program,
including: the commencement of a pilot program to test the viability of
TWIC cards and readers in the maritime environment; deployment of the
program in priority ports by set deadlines; inclusion of a provision to
allow newly hired employees to work while the TWIC application is being
processed; and concurrent processing of the TWIC and merchant mariner
applications.
TSA and the Coast Guard published the TWIC final rule on January
25, 2007 in which the Coast Guard's MTSA regulations and TSA's
Hazardous Material Endorsement regulations were amended to incorporate
the TWIC requirements. Despite the original proposal in the NPRM, this
final rule did not require the installation of card readers at vessels
and facilities. This requirement is currently being addressed in a
second notice and comment rulemaking which I will discuss below.
Policy
The Coast Guard and TSA developed several supplementary documents
to help those who are required to comply with the regulation. To
explain in detail how the Coast Guard and TSA intend to apply TWIC
regulations, we established policy guidance in the form of a Navigation
and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC), which was made available to the
industry and general public on July 6, 2007. This cornerstone guidance
document will assist the maritime industry and general public with TWIC
compliance and is designed to ensure consistent application across all
of our MTSA regulated facilities and vessels. Two Small Business
Administration Compliance Guides, one for owners and operators and
another for TWIC applicants, were written to explain the program in
basic language intended for the general public. These guides are
available on our web sites. Internal guidance documents for training,
implementation, and enforcement for Coast Guard and TSA personnel
continue to be developed.
Stakeholder Engagement
From the outset, engagement with our affected stakeholders has been
crucial to the program's success. The comments during the NRPM comment
period provided valuable insight into the unique operational issues
facing labor, the maritime facilities and vessels which would have to
implement the program and comply with its requirements. Comments
questioning the technological and economic feasibility of employing the
TWIC cards and card readers in the maritime environment led to the
splitting of the rule and card reader requirements being addressed in a
separate rulemaking. Throughout February and March of this year, the
Coast Guard solicited comments from Coast Guard field units and
industry stakeholders while drafting the TWIC NVIC. We received over
400 comments voicing general support for the policy and highlighting
issues which needed more clarification. The stakeholder dialogue we
developed allowed us to include most of the recommended policy changes
into the NVIC. Since publication of the Final Rule, the Coast Guard,
TSA and TSA's contractor Lockheed Martin have conducted numerous
outreach events at national venues such as the Passenger Vessel
Association Conference, smart card and biometric industry conferences,
maritime union meetings, American Waterways Operators meetings and
American Association of Port Authorities conferences.
Reader Requirements
The Coast Guard, with the support of TSA, has commenced work on the
second TWIC rule which will address the requirement for TWIC readers in
the maritime environment. The Coast Guard and TSA solicited and
received valuable input and recommendations from the Towing Safety
Advisory Committee (TSAC), Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee
(MERPAC) and the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC)
on specific aspects of potential applications of readers for vessels
and facilities. As in all aspects of the TWIC program, our goal in this
is to enhance maritime security while balancing the impact upon the
stakeholders who are at the forefront of providing that security. As
this second rule will have a significant economic and operational
impact on the maritime industry, which is also a critical component of
our national maritime security efforts, we will continue to seek their
input and recommendations as we develop regulations for which they must
comply.
To move forward establishing these requirements, TSA and the Coast
Guard had to address a principal stakeholder concern that open slot, or
``contact'' readers are not appropriate for application in all maritime
environments or operations. To address this, the Coast Guard and TSA
chartered the NMSAC to recommend a specification which would enable the
TWIC and readers to function in a ``contactless'' fashion, without
having to insert a card into a reader. Combining the operational
experience of maritime stakeholders with the technical expertise of
members of the security and biometrics industry, the NMSAC produced
recommendations which resulted in a working specification published by
TSA and the Coast Guard on September 19th. This specification will
enable biometrics manufacturers to produce readers which can be applied
to the TWIC pilot and eventually towards future reader requirements
promulgated by the Coast Guard.
Redefinition of Secure Areas
An aspect of the TWIC program which provides flexibility in
implementation enables owners or operators of facilities containing
both a maritime transportation portion and a non-maritime
transportation portion, such as areas devoted to manufacturing or
refining operations, to request a redefinition of their secure area
where TWICs will be required for unescorted access. This process
includes an amendment to a facility's security plan. This process is
currently underway across the United States with owners and operators
engaging directly with their local Coast Guard Captains of the Port
(COTP) to determine how TWIC will be applied at their facilities.
Enrollment Sites by Port
Over the last several months, we have reviewed and reevaluated the
list of original TWIC fixed enrollment locations, which included
enrollment in 130 ports. With a goal of maximizing convenience and
service to the maritime community, we solicited input from Coast Guard
COTP and stakeholders, resulting in the addition of a number of fixed
enrollment sites and the shifting of others. Today, the list contains
147 port enrollment locations including key inland ports such as
Paducah, Kentucky as well as remote locations such as Saipan, where
MTSA regulated facilities and vessels routinely operate.
Reader Pilot Testing
In accordance with the SAFE Port Act of 2006, TSA and the Coast
Guard have identified geographically and operationally diverse port and
vessel locations willing to participate in the reader pilot testing. We
have been engaged in planning these pilot tests with the ports of Los
Angeles, Long Beach, New York, New Jersey, Brownsville and Annapolis,
Maryland, all of whom have volunteered to participate and have received
grants to purchase and install readers with associated equipment. The
initial planning and testing protocols have been developed and we look
forward to deploying and testing readers in real world environments in
the coming months. The data and lessons learned from the pilot tests
will be invaluable to inform the second proposed rulemaking in
accordance with Congressional intent.
The Way Ahead
As enrollment rolls out across the country, the Coast Guard is also
focusing on implementation and enforcement of TWIC provisions.
Compliance for regulated facilities will be staged for each COTP Zone
to gain the security benefits of the program at the earliest moment.
TSA and the Coast Guard will monitor enrollment progress and will
announce compliance in each zone at least 90 days in advance. Vessels
and mariners will have to have TWICs by the national compliance date of
September 25, 2008.
To leverage TWIC's biometric capability, the Coast Guard is in the
process of procuring handheld biometric card readers which will enable
us to verify the identity of an individual and the validity of their
credential during our vessel and facility inspections and spot checks.
We are also on track with developing the systems necessary to implement
the provision for newly hired employees to work while they await
issuance of a TWIC. Internally, we are crafting policy for enforcement
of the TWIC program in our ports and will seek enforcement
collaboration with other law enforcement agencies.
Conclusion
The TWIC program is a complex endeavor. However, we are working
with TSA to set a solid foundation upon which to execute enrollment and
implementation. We have accomplished important milestones, strengthened
working relationships with public and industry stakeholders, and held a
steadfast commitment to protecting the maritime transportation system
while facilitating commerce. While we acknowledge much has been
accomplished to set the stage for this program, we cannot guarantee a
trouble free process. Inevitably, we will continue to encounter
additional challenges, as happens in any major endeavor of this
complexity. As we have in the past, we will address each of these in
turn, to the best of our ability, in keeping with the best public
interest, and we will keep you informed on our progress. I would be
happy to take any questions you have at this time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Ms. Berrick to summarize her statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CATHY BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King
and members of the committee, for inviting me here to discuss
GAO's work assessing TSA's efforts in implementing the TWIC
program.
My testimony will focus on the progress TSA has made in
implementing TWIC and in responding to GAO's prior
recommendations and key remaining efforts that TSA and the
maritime industry will need to address to help ensure the
program's successful implementation.
In September 2006, we reported that TSA and industry
stakeholders faced several challenges in implementing TWIC.
These challenges related to the enrollment and issuance of TWIC
cards to a significantly larger population of workers than had
been previously tested, ensuring that the access control
technology required to operate TWIC works effectively in the
maritime sector and ensuring that background checks, appeals
and waivers for applicants of TWIC cards are processed in a
timely manner.
We also reported on problems TSA experienced in planning
for and overseeing the contract to test TWIC. Based on our
work, we recommended that TSA develop and test solutions to
problems identified during initial testing, strengthening
contract planning and oversight practices, and improved
stakeholder coordination and outreach.
Since our review, TSA has made much progress in addressing
our prior recommendations and in meeting legislative
requirements to test and implement the program.
For example, TSA reported conducting performance testing of
the technologies that will be used to enroll workers and has
begun planning a pilot program to test TWIC access control
technologies, as required by legislation.
TSA also hired additional staff with program and contract
management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment
contract and developed additional controls to help ensure that
contract requirements are met.
TSA has also taken actions, along with the Coast Guard, to
improve communication and coordination with maritime
stakeholders.
However, given the complexities of the program in its early
stage of implementation, it will be important that TSA and the
Coast Guard continue to work with industry stakeholders to test
and monitor the program and to effectively address any
challenges that arise.
This focus is especially important given that key aspects
of the program have not yet been fully tested or implemented.
For example, TSA and its contractor will need to transition to
full-scale enrollment, covering at least 700,000 workers at
about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels.
While TSA and the contractor have begun initial
enrollments, it remains to be seen how the TWIC enrollment and
card issuance systems will perform during full-scale
implementation.
TSA and its enrollment contractor will also need to educate
workers on new TWIC requirements and effectively and
efficiently process numerous background checks, appeals and
waivers.
Finally, TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure
that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in
the maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that
will be issued, and ensure that the facilities and vessels can
effectively and economically obtain information on workers that
may pose a threat.
In closing, TSA has taken many steps to strengthen the
development, implementation and the oversight of the TWIC
program and we commend their efforts.
While additional testing and other actions TSA have taken
should address the problems we have previously identified, key
aspects of the program have not yet been fully tested or
implemented and the effectiveness of these efforts will not be
known until the program further matures.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I would
be happy to respond to any questions.
[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
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Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I would like to
thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Hawley, we have two members from Florida on this
committee who have raised, at different points, the issue of
access cards and whether or not a policy by the department
preempting access cards by states will, in effect, happen.
Are you looking at it? Do you have a position? Can you
share the department's position at this point?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. On the issue of federal security
requirements, that is what the TWIC card is. It says this
individual is--we establish who the individual is by the
biometric. We establish that individual is not a security risk
for operating in sensitive areas of ports.
That is the federal security requirement and that is
sufficient for those purposes.
Other entities, including states, may have other purposes
for issuing credentials and the TWIC card does not get into
that. So I actually don't think it is a preemption issue. It
just is that our TWIC card is a limited purpose card for the
purpose of security.
Chairman Thompson. But you do understand that, in most
instances, that card would also give you access to the
facility.
Mr. Hawley. Clearly, there are cases, particularly in
Florida, where there are other cards that they use for access.
One of the opportunities in TWIC is that when the access
control portion comes in after the next rulemaking, that that
will then unify them together and then they will also be able
to be granted access for that purpose.
And specifically with Florida, we are working very closely
with them. They took a leadership position a couple of years
ago, stepping out on security in their ports and issued
identification for that and we want to honor that work and work
as closely as we can with them to make the two programs work in
concert.
Chairman Thompson. But you do understand that a trucker,
for instance, might have to have five or six different access
cards under this more or less open access rule.
Mr. Hawley. Well, not from a security point of view. The
point is that for security purposes of granting access, the
Coast Guard designates where the secure access part is. We do
the background check, issue the card, and then that is it for
that trucker or anybody anywhere in the country.
Since they are private entities, the private entities can
require perhaps differing things that we don't get into, but
for a security purpose, this card does all for all employees at
all facilities in the U.S.
Chairman Thompson. I will come back to it.
Are you aware that a laptop was stolen from TSA on or about
October 18?
Mr. Hawley. There was a laptop or laptops(I am not sure
whether it was a laptop or a desktop, but that was stolen from
a contractor and I believe that that is in the process of
notifications being made.
Chairman Thompson. I guess my point is that that
contractor's job was to credential HAZMAT individuals. Am I
correct?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. And I guess I am going toward
vulnerability. How have you set up a system under TWIC so that
these kinds of situations won't happen where laptops or other
devices will be stolen and those credentials compromised?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. I think that is a critical question
and the example you cited, the hard drive on the stolen
computer was encrypted, as required by TSA.
From the learnings of previous incidents, we have required
all contractors with access to personal data, that those drives
be encrypted.
So while there was a criminal act of breaking and entering,
stealing the computer, the computer hard drive, the information
on it will be useless to them because of the encryption.
And the TWIC program has the most advanced security. It is
NSA standard security of encryption across the system. So I
think that is one of the things that took so long with TWIC was
to get the security requirements very tight so that even in the
event of criminal activity, it can't be compromised.
Chairman Thompson. You also testified that if, in fact, the
number of individuals needing credentials would double or
triple, that would not slow down the credentialing process.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I can't say that it won't slow it down,
but we will meter the rolling out to meet the demand. So we
will have the capacity in place.
When we say we are going to show up at your port, we will
show up with the required resources to do that. If it is vastly
more people than anybody predicted, it could have the effect of
lengthening the enrollment period.
But New York-New Jersey, for instance, that enrollment
period we are keeping open for 9 months. So I expect that it is
just an issue of putting in more enrollment centers and the
contractor adding additional enrollment stations to meet the
demand.
So the short answer is I don't think it is a capacity
problem at all.
Chairman Thompson. Just for the record, we asked Ms. Fanguy
yesterday to provide us information on who the contractor that
the department used to provide these projections that have come
in significantly below expectation, and I will have to renew
that of you, too.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. I can provide you the answer to that
and should you wish to do it during the hearing or afterwards,
we have that information.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Salerno, Chairman Thompson, in his opening
statement, made reference to the fact that organized crime is
now attempting to compromise the TWIC program.
On the one hand, to me, it is a tribute, in a way, that
organized crime is that concerned that they want to compromise
the system. They realize this is a threat to them.
On the other hand, it would be fatal if they were able to
compromise the system, if they were able to produce
counterfeits or duplicates.
So is let me ask you a two-part question. One, is there any
evidence yet or any instance yet where the program has been
compromised and, secondly, how confident are you that this
program will be able to resist any attempts by organized crime
or other criminal elements to compromise the program?
Admiral Salerno. Sir, there is no evidence that organized
crime has compromised the TWIC program. As far as our ability
to prevent that, we would and have anticipated that there would
be attempts by criminal elements of society to counterfeit this
credential and for that reason, the card is equipped with
state-of-the-art tamper-resistant features, holograms, special
inks that change color when the card is silted and so forth.
I believe you are referring to a notice sent out by one of
our units on the west coast, reporting some information that
organized crime may seek to tamper with or counterfeit these
cards.
The idea was to give a heads-up to our facilities, our port
partners, to be on alert for that and make sure that they check
those tamper-resistant features of the cards when they are
presented for entry into a facility.
We are very confident that these cards are highly resistant
to any type of tampering or counterfeiting and all it will take
in the interim is alert security guards to make sure that they
do due diligence when they grant access to people who are
holding these cards.
Mr. King. Mr. Hawley, how confident are you?
Mr. Hawley. Highly confident. This is the best that we have
access to in the U.S. government and I am very confident it
will resist attempts by organized crime or anyone else to
successfully counterfeit the documents.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick, anytime the GAO is here, we have always tried
to make parts of their testimony to use to prove a particular
point. But I want to thank you for(I think putting this issue
in some perspective, even, I guess, the title of your remarks,
that TSA has made progress, but challenges remain.
And in your concluding observations of the prepared
testimony, you say that since you reported in September of
2006, TSA has made progress toward implementing the program and
you list a whole series, including a TWIC rule, implementing
requirements of the SAFE Port Act, awarding a contractor to
enroll workers in the program, beginning to enroll workers in
the program, and also taking actions to implement and test the
program, and several other points.
Let me ask you, how do you rate that type of progress? How
cooperative do you see the department being and what is your
best estimate as to how successful this is going to be and what
the timeframe is going to be?
Ms. Berrick. Sure, sir. In terms of the department's
responsiveness to our work, I am pleased with that. We made
about five recommendations in our prior work and TSA has taken
action to implement those and we are following-up and working
with them to assess those actions. So we are pleased with that.
In terms of our forecast on the success of the program, I
guess I would characterize it as cautiously optimistic. Again,
TSA has taken some good steps in terms of contractor oversight,
doing more system testing, reaching out to stakeholders, as
well as the Coast Guard.
However, key aspects of the program still haven't yet been
fully tested or implemented, the big one being the biometric
access card reader, which will not be implemented probably for
another 2 years or longer.
Also, just the need to process background checks quickly,
process the waivers, process the appeals can be a challenge
given the number of workers.
So I would say cautiously optimistic, good steps so far. We
are pleased with their responsiveness to our recommendations,
but just that key challenges are still out there, given the
stage of this program and until the program further matures, it
will be hard to determine whether or not it will be successful.
Mr. King. One final question. What is your impression of
the outreach conducted by TSA and Lockheed Martin to the
trucking industry as to what the requirements are and what the
trucking industry has to do to comply with those requirements?
Ms. Berrick. We have actually done some follow-up work
where we have contacted some of the ports. We didn't contact
the trucking industry specifically recently on that follow-up
work.
But during the follow-up work, the ports have been
favorable about TSA's and the Coast Guard's outreach with them.
We talked to about five additional ports since our work was
completed.
When we had done our initial work, we visited 15 port
facilities, talked to trucking operators and a lot of other
stakeholders, and, universally, they were not pleased with the
outreach at that time. This was about a year ago.
But since that time, we have talked about some of the steps
TSA and the Coast Guard have taken to strengthen outreach. We
have gone back to some of these ports and they have seen an
improvement.
But in terms of the trucking industry, we haven't talked to
them recently to find out their level of satisfaction.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The chair now recognizes other members for questions they
may wish to ask the witnesses.
In accordance with our committee rules, I will recognize
members who were present at the start of the hearing based on
seniority on the committee, alternating between majority and
minority. Those members arriving later will be recognized in
the order of their arrival.
The chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
all of you for being before us and, in particular, to the
administrator, who I think has listened to our recommendations,
has been talking to us, and we are all trying to get this done.
Mr. Hawley, do you think that waiting for 2 years to have
the readers is going to compromise the card in the sense of--I
mean, I had people yesterday come and testify that said when a
trucker comes through, the guard at the gate sits there and the
guy flashes the card and he doesn't really even look at it and
moves on.
Quite frankly, I have seen this at TSA to me, you know.
Sometimes the guys really look at what the card is and
sometimes the guys never look at the card. They just flash it
by them.
So if we don't have the reader, couldn't someone
counterfeit a card and we would be compromised?
Mr. Hawley. Well, as to the airports, I can't resist and
just say that there is a program that the Congress has
supported for TSA to take over the document checking at the
airports. Those are now TSA----
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, I had that done this week.
Mr. Hawley. So that is all happening. So on the issue you
raise, I think it is an interesting issue and, frankly, when we
came out with the proposed rulemaking, we had paired the card
reader with the card issuance and it was a result from the
stakeholder feedback, which was loud and clear, that we
separated the two and then the Congress, in the Safe Port Act,
came back and made that part of the law.
So I think it is an interesting issue. I had been
personally on the other side of it a year or so ago, but I
think when you consider the total risk to the program and
rolling out the cards that are now ready to go out and the
advanced technology that is required to do the interoperable
card reading, that it is, in fact, prudent to not take the
technology risk--I mean, not wait to issue the cards for 2
years until the technology risk is done.
So I think that, as Admiral Salerno said, that the Coast
Guard enforcement of the NHTSA standards in these ports is an
excellent security measure. These are Coast Guard officers
going around the ports with biometric readers and that is for
people who--there may be people who get in on a flash pass, but
they are subject to being arrested by Coast Guard officers if
their card----
Mr. Dicks. Would you yield just for 30 seconds?
Ms. Sanchez. I will.
Mr. Dicks. You know what? What bothers me is all of our
defense bases have gotten into ID checkers. We have it at
Andrews Air Force Base, and they work.
Why aren't we using those in the interim so we have some
capability?
Mr. Hawley. Because this is a vastly different card than
that kind of access reader. The TWIC card has more processing
power on it than--actually, twice as much processing power as
that which the Apollo program used to put a person on the moon
and it fits in your shirt pocket.
So that the technology on this thing is extremely advanced,
because it has to allow any truck driver anywhere in the United
States at any port, any NHTSA facility, to get in.
So that is massive in terms of the flexibility required and
the scalability. It is very different from a federal government
Trident submarine base card and that is the complexity of the
program.
Ms. Sanchez. I have two questions I am going to try to get
in. The first one is this whole issue of my longshoremen
working up and down the state of California, in different
ports, coming on at different times, and maybe one of them--you
know, they move around quite a bit depending on where the work
is.
So the first question I will have is what are you going to
do about that. And the second issue has to do directly with the
L.A. and Long Beach port, where they have decided to fund--the
department has decided to find the reader pilot program for
them through the port security grant.
And the port recently sent a letter to the secretary, to
Chertoff, asking him to waive the 25 percent cost-share
requirement for the pilot, since all the TWIC pilots were fully
funded by the government.
So my question, the second question is, do you know where
the secretary is on waiving the 25 percent cost-share for the
TWIC reader pilot?
Mr. Hawley. The short version on the second part of the
question, then Admiral Salerno can do the first part.
We have about $22 million in the port security grants. We
are putting that out there to try to provide support to the
ports that are doing the implementation. That is enough for
about 25 percent.
I should also note that we don't have separate money within
TSA to do the port pilots either and we are working within our
resources to try to make it happen.
So it is a typical debate about money. They are right, we
want to support them as much as we can, but how do you spread
the $22 million and it basically is a 25 percent match. That is
our view of what the security piece is.
They have got to do access control anyway. So that is the
issue and it has not yet been resolved.
Ms. Sanchez. Admiral, back to what do you do about my
longshoremen? Let us say Long Beach is already credentialed and
has everything but--he is coming from, I don't know, Sea-Pac
and it hasn't been done yet. Therefore, he comes to the port
for 7 days and he doesn't have a card.
Admiral Salerno. Ma'am, the outreach to that community is
to suggest that they obtain the TWIC card earlier than would be
required in their home base. Because they are mobile and they
will be going to facilities that will have these access
controls in place, if they know that that is----
Ms. Sanchez. But if you are not going to have something at
Sea-Pac for them to be able to do it.
Admiral Salerno. They would need to enroll and I believe
there would be a facility up there for them to do that. I can
verify on the locations for you on the west coast.
Ms. Sanchez. You really haven't given us an--we haven't
gotten a real good indication really of when the start dates
are at the different ports, but I can just envision, I mean,
that I will have workers who will be--and it is on a weekly
basis.
I mean, sometimes they show up and there is no work on
Monday and there is work down in Long Beach. So they drive down
from Oakland down to Long Beach. So they end up at Long Beach
and they don't have the TWIC card.
Mr. Hawley. The way the process works is the captain of the
port issues a statement saying you have 90 days to comply and
they won't do that in a port until they have had significant
time to enroll anybody who reasonably is likely to have been
there.
So there is the deployment of the enrollment of the cards,
which, in Seattle, I just looked up, is also starting this
year. But the real teeth to it won't come until a captain of
the port issues the requirement and says 90 days from now, you
have got to have a card to get in here.
So that is exactly what they will be taking into account is
the operational feasibility and how many people at a given port
have had a chance to get their TWIC card and if they are not
able to, either through pre-enrollment or showing up earlier,
they will be able to at these large ports, particularly L.A.
and Long Beach, for months and months and months going into
2008.
Ms. Sanchez. I see that my time has run out. I am sorry,
Mr. Chairman, but I want to follow up at some point with that.
Chairman Thompson. Okay, thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hawley, one of the requirements of the SAFE Port Act
that we passed last year was to conduct a threat assessment of
all truck drivers entering the port.
We understand that TSA plans on meeting this requirement by
doing a check against a terror watchlist and the immigration
status database of all commercial driver's license holders.
What is the status of that requirement?
Mr. Hawley. We are working out MOUs with the individual
states who are the holders of the CDLs and there are different
formatting issues and different legal and privacy issues for
each of those states.
So we are working that on a parallel track with TWIC and
the TWIC card has already got the operational issues worked
out, the privacy issues worked out. So that when we go port by
port, it will, by definition, pick up the truckers who service
those ports.
When we get the MOUs done with a substantial number of
states and are able to run the CDLs independently, then we will
have a much broader check. So to meet the requirements in the
Safe Port Act, I suspect the way this is going to roll out is
in accordance with the TWIC rollout.
However, we are cognizant of the larger population of CDLs
and wanting to run that as soon as we practically can, given
the data.
Mr. Dent. As a follow up, I know my friend, Governor
Castle, is here, but what issues have there been in the first 2
weeks of enrollment at the Port of Wilmington and how have you
at TSA responded to those challenges?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think the cooperation of the port and
local community has been outstanding. All the parties,
including the unions, it has so far been successful.
I think there are a lot of miniature issues that show up in
terms of the card issuance and technical things that we are
working through, but as far as I know, there are not
significant issues that have come up to this point.
Mr. Dent. We have been hearing that there have been some
difficulties with fingerprints, activating the TWIC card in
Wilmington. Is that a minor thing that can be resolved?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. A lot of times, it has to do with
educating the individuals as to what is required in terms of
getting the prints down. My understanding, in some particular
cases, that a quick refresher in how to do it have resolved the
questions.
There is no technological problem with it. It is the
standard user issue.
Mr. Dent. And, finally, as you know, the TWIC card provides
an individual with unescorted access to secure areas of the
facility. However, an individual adjudicated by TSA to be a
threat at the point where a TWIC card is denied, but that
person could be escorted by a TWIC'd individual into a secure
area.
To what extent would an escort be liable for the non-TWIC'd
individual who is entering that secured area?
Mr. Hawley. The short is I don't know on the legal
liability. So we will check on the answer to that.
I should point out, though, that the FBI has a fairly
robust investigatory process. So anybody who is an active
terrorist that is known to the U.S. government is already well
in the FBI process.
So as soon as one is identified, it would be resolved
principally by the FBI.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Oregon for 5
minutes, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. Defazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank Ms. Harman
for letting me precede her. I have to go to a markup.
A very quick question regarding the cost, Mr. Hawley. I
don't quite understand and they aren't exactly congruent, so it
is hard for me to tell, but generally the cost of issuing a
background--doing background checks and a card are background
checks $27 and a card can be zero to $50 for airport workers,
and here we are up to $132.50.
And I guess I am just curious what accounts for the
discrepancy, because we have the $43.25 for information
collection and credential issuance at Lockheed Martin and then
we have the $72 for a complete security threat assessment and
card production.
What is different here?
Mr. Hawley. It is the biometric and the security measures
that are on top of it. The TWIC card is state-of-the-art with--
--
Mr. Defazio. Right. So we are basically recouping the cost
of the physical card and-or taking the photograph and getting
the other biometrics into the card and all those sorts of
things.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, and the contractor cost for doing it.
Mr. Defazio. Right. So the difference might--again, I just
would point to the fact that it seems a bit high and I am not
quite certain, since the $72.50 then would account for that,
but the credential--information collection and credentialing
issuance is about 16 bucks more by Lockheed Martin than it is
for the airports.
I don't know. I guess that is profit.
Mr. Hawley. Well, it is the technology. It is all the
sophisticated protection that Admiral Salerno mentioned, plus
the technology embedded on the chip.
Mr. Defazio. Okay. I am still not quite certain. But with
that, I would yield the balance of my time to Ms. Harman.
But I do think you have managed yourself well and answered
a number of questions here today. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman, what I would prefer is just to
ask questions next when you come back to our side.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Delaware, Mr.
Castle.
Mr. Castle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for the opportunity of being here. I appreciate that and I
appreciate the testimony of the witnesses.
We are very concerned at how this is working out at
Wilmington. We are the largest banana importer and obviously
have a lot of people there with a lot of concerns.
But one of the questions I would like to raise is the card
readers, which--did you testify it will not start until next
summer? Is that correct?
[Mr. Castle statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Michael N. Castle, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Delaware
Thank you chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King for allowing me
to join your committee today for this very important hearing on a
critical security issue. I would also like to thank Administrator
Hawley and the rest of today's panel of distinguished witnesses for
appearing before us.
As all of you know, in July of 2004, the 9/11 Commission issued an
extensive report detailing the challenges facing our government in the
wake of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The 9/11 report
contains critical recommendations, and port security has emerged as a
significant part of this debate. While the report underscores the
importance of securing our nation's airports, the Commission also noted
that the increased security efforts around air travel have led to
concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to ``softer''
targets, such as maritime and surface transportation. In fact, the 9/11
Commission identified several chilling scenarios, in which terrorists
could exploit holes in our commercial shipping system to smuggle
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons into the country.
On the Delaware River, the Port of Wilmington is among the busiest
terminals, handling hundreds of vessels and millions of tons of cargo
annually. Wilmington is the world's largest fruit port and with
overnight access to one third of all U.S. and Canadian consumers, it is
well established a critical source of commerce in the northeast.
Once these ships reach our ports, it is critical that we have
effective procedures in place for screening personnel and ensuring the
integrity of critical infrastructure. The Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program is one such initiative, which will
use cutting edge biometric technology to ensure security officials can
protect against unauthorized use of our nation's seaports. As a former
member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I am a firm
believer in the potential of TWIC and other biometric technologies to
improve security and protect Americans.
In 2002, the Port of Wilmington was one of the locations selected
to participate in the TWIC pilot program and this month we became the
first port to officially begin TWIC enrollment. This has been a long
process and I am extremely thankful to all of the men and women who
have taken part in this important testing phase. Over the last several
months, my staff has been in close contact with port representatives,
industry stakeholders, and local officials to facilitate communication
with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and to help make
certain that employees are provided every opportunity to comply with
these new requirements.
As this program moves forward at the Port of Wilmington, it is
imperative that TSA work closely with port workers and local leadership
to address all possible concerns and questions that may arise during
the enrollment process. This is an enormous undertaking and it will
take a real team effort to see it through to the finish.
In the end, a truly successful international maritime security
strategy will effectively increase security, while minimizing the
impact on trade. One key lesson learned from the mass confusion of
September 11th and Hurricane Katrina is that our government has a
significant information-sharing problem. From the TSA down to state and
local security personnel, timely information-sharing and communication
with private industry is crucial to improving our ability to accurately
identify and respond to threats.
Today's hearing is an important part of this process, and I look
forward to hearing from each of our distinguished witnesses. Thank you
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Hawley. The reader pilot is going on in the early part
of 2008. There will not be requirements to implement them until
probably 2 years after the----
Mr. Castle. Could the individual ports do this on their own
or does it have to be coordinated through homeland security and
if so, could they use homeland grant funds to do so?
Mr. Hawley. Access control systems today can be used with
TWIC cards, depending on the port and the kind of technology
being used.
The key thing that has to wait is the interoperability--we
just issued the technical standards in September that will go
for interoperability and that won't be available until that
final rule is done.
Mr. Castle. The chairman mentioned, I think, in his opening
statement, the concept of organized crime getting involved with
this.
When you have the card readers, would that(it would seem to
me that that would reduce the possibility of crime. Just having
a card, it could be replicated in some way or another, but it
seems to me the card reader would offset that and that you
would have to be entered in that.
Am I correct in that assumption?
Mr. Hawley. The card reader would definitely be effective,
but we also are using, as Admiral Salerno said, handheld card
readers by the Coast Guard. So that is effective security and
that will be----
Admiral Salerno. And if I could add to that, sir. The
situation today is that a facility can grant access to an
individual with a variety of IDs. It could be a driver's
license, which, of course, does not have a background check or
any biometrics, and any type of photo ID can be used in most
cases.
So we are compressing this down from a plethora of cards to
one that is standard with features on it that make it tamper-
proof. So it is a quantum leap in security just by having this
one card, even without the readers.
Mr. Castle. In my state of Delaware, at the port of
Wilmington, I went down there the first day and learned that
enrollment has been fairly high. I thought they were going to
try and enroll me at one moment there.
But my concern then, and it was stated by a couple people
there, is individuals who might have a background issue and,
therefore, may choose to wait or be a little leery about
registering or whatever it may be.
What are we doing with respect to those individuals? The
statement was made that we are looking for terrorists, not
people that may have had a background problem sometime in the
distant past.
And what are we doing to accommodate and to give assurance
to make sure they are stepping forward so those problems can be
resolved and they don't all come upon us at the end of any
enrollment period at a particular port?
Mr. Hawley. I think hearings like this are excellent at
getting the word out. This is not something to be concerned
about for all but a very small handful of people.
And the thing I would say is if you get something that
indicates there might be a problem, call back and come in and,
as the chairman mentioned at the beginning, if the data that is
in the government system does not include that you have a
favorable disposition, just come back and document that and the
issue goes away.
So this is really the principal point of trust we have to
earn as we go through here that people's experience matches
what I just said.
Mr. Castle. We have, at our port, and it is probably true
of a lot of other ports, too, we have rushes on things. I
mentioned food already and during fruit season, we will have
casual seasonal labor, which is basically picked up and comes
to the port to work.
Will these people need to be escorted or could there be
temporary seasonal passes or will they have to go through the
full TWIC process? How will that be handled?
Admiral Salerno. Sir, if they are operating in the secured
area of the facility, handing cargo on a regular basis, we
would expect them to obtain TWICs. If there are people that are
operating maybe on a one time only case, maybe doing repair
work at the facility, we can cordon off a portion of that
facility and make it non-secure, in effect.
Mr. Castle. So they might be able to work. It is just there
is certain access they would not have, because they don't
have----
Admiral Salerno. That is correct.
Mr. Castle. --the full TWIC clearance and all of that.
Just very quickly, in just working with the officials at
the Port of Wilmington and working with the unions and people
there, it seemed to me they had a lot of valuable input in
terms of what we are doing.
Do you have a full communications system with them to make
sure you are picking up their ideas and concepts and reviewing
them?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir, and that is part of the learning that
we use to base the rest of the program on. And, again, they
have been really spectacular in terms of working with us and
openly engaging.
Admiral Salerno. And I will add to that, sir, obviously,
there is outreach through national level organizations that
have constituencies throughout all the states, but, also, at
the port level, there are entities we call area maritime
security committees, where the people who operate in that
particular port get together and they work through security
issues, and that is a conduit of information back to our
headquarters level.
Mr. Castle. I thank the panel and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentlelady from California for 5
minutes, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
series of hearings, including the one that Ms. Sanchez held
yesterday which, unfortunately, I could not attend because I
had a markup in another committee.
I want to thank the witnesses, as well, especially Mr.
Hawley for his great effort to be responsive to requests, at
least from this member, for help and aid and for his risk-based
approach to transportation safety, which has made him a target
from time to time, but I think he is on the right path.
My district, as I think most people on this committee know
and the panel knows, surrounds the port of L.A. and is adjacent
to the port of Long Beach. That port complex is the largest
port complex in the country. Almost 50 percent of our container
traffic goes through it and we absolutely have to get TWIC
right.
I am also a coauthor of the Safe Ports Act with Mr.
Lungren. This committee was enormously helpful in moving that
legislation, which passed the House 421-2 and the Senate 98-0,
which I would call a near miracle in these times.
So the Safe Ports Act connects to TWIC by insisting that it
be part of a layered approach to port safety.
Having said all that and having listened to you and
listening to the questions by members, my question is, have we
made this too complicated? Have we made it too complicated in
our legislation or are you making it too complicated in your
rollout?
Obviously, all of us agree that we need these cards. I
think all of us would agree we need the biometric feature in
these cards. All of us agree we need portability.
But is there something now we or you or we and you together
could do to make this easier and maybe even less costly?
Mr. Hawley. I think that is an excellent question and I
think the answer is it is complex and we have paid the price
for it in terms of how long it has taken to get it right.
So I think the point is a very strong one and we had this
conversation with Secretary Chertoff as we were going through
this plan a year ago and that is why we did the watch list
checking on all the port workers at that time.
So he asked exactly the question you asked, which is what
can we do right now that is simpler and can increase security,
and it was the watch list checks. We have also, with the Coast
Guard, cooperated with what we call these viper teams, where we
have different parts of DHS come in in support of the Coast
Guard as they do their NHTSA enforcement.
So these are programs that are ongoing that provide
additional security and, frankly, now, we have got the
legislative requirements of what the TWIC card has to be. We
have gone down the path.
We are not out of the woods yet in terms of particularly on
the card reader, what the complexity of that is going to end up
being, and we are going to have the same issue again on do we
move forward fast or do we take the time and the heat to get
the technical issues resolved.
Ms. Harman. Well, let me just--we have seen a program done
wrong, SBInet. We had a hearing on that a week or so ago, where
the contractor took it to the field before it was ready.
But this member is very worried that tomorrow morning we
could easily have a major terrorist attack by someone who
should not be at one of our ports and if a major port complex
like L.A.-Long Beach has an attack and closes, that is a
devastating impact on our national economy, not just our local
southern California economy.
So we have to be smart about this. Perfection is not an
option, but trying to take the right steps quickly is the
requirement.
I would like to ask the other witnesses to comment on my
question. Are we making this too complicated? Are we making
this too complicated or are you making this too complicated?
Ms. Berrick. Sure, I could start here. I would make two
points. One, there are a lot of complexities with this program.
Each port is unique, as you very well know, and this is a
sophisticated program that involves complexity.
The second point I wanted to make is equally important is
the management of the program and our past work has identified
that there have been problems in that area.
The contract requirements, at the beginning of this
program, weren't fully defined. The contract costs doubled.
There was very limited oversight over the contract itself. The
prototype testing for TWIC, when this program started, was very
limited.
Very little testing had been done. There was virtually on
testing of access control technology. So that, I think, is also
a problem that needs to be----
Mr. Dicks. If the gentlelady would yield.
Why was that? Why didn't they test access control? It is
out there.
Ms. Berrick. During the prototype testing, the reason that
we heard during our site visits was that there weren't a lot of
volunteer ports that were signing up to do that during the
initial testing.
They didn't want to invest a lot of money not knowing what
the final requirements would be. So the testing was really
limited on the access controls.
But if I could just add one more point. We made
recommendations, based on our work, that TSA go back, do the
testing, work with the stakeholders, which was another issue we
had identified, and they have taken lots of actions in those
areas.
We haven't gone back to assess the effectiveness of those
efforts. We have gotten some positive feedback on the
coordination side.
Ms. Berrick. Reclaiming my time, which has expired. I would
just like to say to Ms. Berrick, in particular, I know you are
a Virginia Tech graduate, therefore, you are very talented.
I think it is important not to point fingers about what
went wrong. I think it is very important to take a deep breath,
be sensible and get this right as soon as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from the
Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Before I ask a question, I would like to just say to the
Coast Guard representative, Admiral Salerno, that I noticed
that Saipan, in the Northern Marianas, is one of the enrollment
sites scheduled to come online mid next year.
And as chair of the Subcommittee on Insular Affairs and
Natural Resources, which is in the process of bringing federal
immigration laws to Saipan, I would be very interested in
hearing how that process unfolds in Saipan and any issues that
may arise or problems that may arise as you do so.
I have a question on this Florida issue, because I am
afraid I am not understanding something. It is my understanding
that the Department of Homeland Security does not intend to
preempt the Florida FUPAC. Yet, there are a number of crimes
that disqualify an applicant under TWIC, but do not disqualify
under FUPAC, such as sedition, espionage, improper
transportation of a hazardous material. Those are not
disqualifying in the Florida program, but they are
disqualifying in TWIC.
Could you, Mr. Hawley, and maybe, Admiral Salerno, explain
why you are not preempting it?
Mr. Hawley. The list of crimes is statutorily fixed. So we
are set with that. We have the requirement of what we enforce.
So the security requirement for the federal security
clearance is set. The issue of preemption is complicated in
that there is nothing that prevents Florida or any state from
having its own requirements and that is what we are working
with the state of Florida on now, and there are some privacy
issues and data exchange issues to try to harmonize that.
But we do have the(the federal law is what it is on that
and that is what will prevail on the actual convictions. But
the card itself, they have the authority to issue cards for a
variety of purposes.
Mrs. Christensen. But for qualifying to work at the ports,
which is going to be required?
Mr. Hawley. If you are disqualified----
Mrs. Christensen. In Florida.
Mr. Hawley. Yes. So if you are disqualified and go through
the appeals process and don't make it, then you would not have
access to those secure areas.
Mrs. Christensen. So having a FUPAC card will not qualify
you if you don't qualify under TWIC.
Mr. Hawley. The FUPAC card won't replace TWIC. In other
words, the TWIC requirements have to go in, but we are very
cognizant of the work Florida has already done and, in fact,
leading area in many respects and don't want to disincent them
or otherwise cause difficulty for them based on their getting
out in front.
So we are trying to work with them to get the solution that
meets our legislative need or statutory need and their
operating need.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, we would like to hear when you
reach that point how that has happened.
Also, Administrator Hawley, it is my understanding that the
homeland security department is considering how to fit TWIC
standards into requirements it is developing for the western
hemisphere initiative, for people's access security service
card.
The commissioner of Customs and Border Protection recently
said that CBP sees significant benefits for TWIC card holders
to be able to use the credentials to enter the United States.
So is the department going to implement a plan whereby the
TWIC card could be used as a credential to enter the United
States?
Mr. Hawley. I think that that is why we have the screening
coordination office at the department and that is one of the
things they look at is what--once you have done vetting in one
scenario to make sure you get the same result in all the
others, and it deals with the so-called DHS trip, which gets to
redress issues.
So the answer is anybody vetted in any one part of DHS,
according to what those standards are, would get the benefit of
that approval or that consistent answer anywhere else.
Now, there are a lot of operating issues. As we mentioned,
TWIC is complicated in and of itself and the WITI is its own
issue.
So I think on the threat resolution area, that is the easy
part. The hard part would be on aligning the technologies.
Mrs. Christensen. I would be interested in hearing how that
works out in its final implementation or what the decision is,
as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Washington for 5
minutes, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I want to go back to the reader aspect of this
thing. I happen to have a company in my district called
Mobilesa and they are one of a number of companies that does
this, and I just--we have been just e-mailing them and they do
it for cards of this complexity. They can do the TWIC card.
What I am having a hard time understanding is why would we
not want to get the readers as quickly as possible, when there
is technology out there that has already been demonstrated at
all of our defense bases, Andrews, where the president flies in
and out of, Fort Dix didn't have this, now they have got it,
West Point.
I mean, this is not rocket science. And they check these
things against all of the databases and they can tell whether
it is a fake card or a real card.
Why wouldn't we at least go out and get some of this
technology and test it? I don't get this. It just seems like a
major flaw in what you are doing.
Mr. Hawley. That is why the pilot is----
Mr. Dicks. We don't need a pilot.
Mr. Hawley. Well, we just had the conversation about the
need--one of the requirements and the recommendations of the
whole process is that before we issue the technology, we have
got to test it to----
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Why don't you test it? Why haven't you
done that? You were supposed to have done it by April. April
was the deadline in the legislation. It hasn't been done.
Why was it not done? If the technology is out there, this
isn't like you have to invent something, Mr. Hawley. It is
already there. Why haven't we gotten started?
Can you tell me, Admiral Salerno, why we haven't gotten
started on this?
Admiral Salerno. Well, sir, we have gotten started. We----
Mr. Dicks. Do you know about these companies that are out
there that have handheld technology that could check these
TWICs right now?
Admiral Salerno. We do know that there is technology out
there. What had to happen was the publication of a standard so
that manufacturers can build to that standard.
Mr. Dicks. Wait a minute. Why do you have to--this is a
typical military approach to this. Why don't you tell them what
you want and let them come back and respond and give you what
they have got and you can then see if it is up to your
standards?
Admiral Salerno. Well, that, in effect, is what the
publication of the standard does, sir. So it will allow
commercial companies to build capability to that standard.
Mr. Dicks. But I am just saying they are already out there.
Why don't you have--why haven't you brought them in? Why
haven't you talked to them? Why haven't you let them
demonstrate their technology already? Why didn't you have a
fair--the Defense Department has finally figured this out--and
bring all these companies in and see what they have got and see
if you can use it right away?
I am with Ms. Harman. I think you guys are making this too
complex. Now, I am worried that it is about who pays for it
that is the real underlying issue here and that you want them
to pay for it, they don't want to pay for it. Therefore, we are
not doing it, and that is what is worrisome here to me.
We should be having these readers. This is a major problem
with this program, and they are out there.
Admiral Salerno. Sir, I would just point out that we do
have constraints based on the law.
Mr. Dicks. What are the constraints?
Admiral Salerno. The law requires that we conduct a pilot
program, specifically for readers.
Mr. Dicks. Does it tell you exactly how to do it? Why
wouldn't you bring them in? Have you had these companies come
in and talk to you? Have you interviewed them to see what
capabilities currently exist off the shelf that might meet your
requirement?
No, you haven't done that, have you?
Mr. Hawley. The standards just went out for the first time
and this is the leading technology. There is nobody else on
earth that has got a program as advanced as this.
So we are absolutely talking to all comers and there are a
lot of people who say they have it ready. The answer is show up
in the port and demonstrate it that it works, and that is all--
--
Mr. Dicks. When is that going to be, Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. It will be in early 2008 and----
Mr. Dicks. I think that is way too long. If you could do it
now, why wouldn't you do it now?
Mr. Hawley. Because it depends on the companies being able
to come back and say, ``Yes, we can meet these standards.''
They look at the standards published in September. They have
got to do the programming. They have got to do the assembly.
They have got to do the testing and they have got to show up.
So it is not the government who is doing this. This is
actually the model that you were suggesting.
Mr. Dicks. I think it is the right model, except I think
the people are there already and this is a lot of complexity to
get started when we could have gotten started already by
bringing them and see what they have got and see if they can
meet your requirements already, without going through all of
that.
I mean, Congress--I think we could reconsider this in
either the appropriations bill or in other bills if that is a
constraint.
I would rather see you get the(now, Ms. Berrick, do you
know anything about this? Are you aware of these companies that
are out there that say they have got the technology to do this,
to check these cards, these TWIC cards?
Ms. Berrick. We didn't look at that aspect during our work.
We focused on the prototype testing and related to the access
control card readers, we said that there was very limited
testing during the prototype and we actually recommended that
some additional testing be done before implementation.
So we think testing is important. We didn't look at the
different ways that TSA and the Coast Guard could approach
that, though.
Mr. Dicks. Couldn't they start this right now if they
wanted to?
Ms. Berrick. I am sorry. I really don't know based on the
work that we have done.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Just for the record, I think, Mr. Dicks, the TWIC card was
5 years in the making. At some point, you would expect, along
that 5-year wait, if the reader was also to be a part of it,
that you could have had a dual system in place.
And I think the concern of the committee is that the 5-year
rollout starts, now we have another 2, 2.5 years before the
reader is complete, and so we have probably got an 8-year
process before we get----
Mr. Dicks. Would you ask them if they would answer that
one, Mr. Chairman, why they didn't do that?
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Well, it has to do with the government-wide
biometric standard that is interoperable, as described, as
HIPS-201 and we made the decision that we wanted to abide by
the government-wide standards on biometric interoperability.
So that was the first step, that we said that the card has
got to be FIPS-201 compliant. Then the next issue is on the
readers, whether the reader has got to be compatible just with
a contact card or whether you can allow contactless, which is
much more efficient, sort of a proximity pass, to speak.
So that we elected to go, based on the comments that we
got, to get the contactless cards interoperable. That is what
we just published in September. So these are standards that
don't exist anywhere in the world. NIST only has come out with
the contact ones.
So this is leading edge stuff here, and that is why it is
not available off the shelf.
Chairman Thompson. Ms. Harman?
Ms. Harman. Thank you for yielding to me just for a follow-
up question on this.
Did you know, Mr. Hawley, when you made these decisions,
that it would take this long to get this implemented? And I am
sure you are aware of the threats against us. So I am just
wondering if you chose to spend 5 to 7 years trying to get this
right.
Mr. Hawley. The key point is we are not waiting on TWIC
card issuance or reader issuance for port security, and Admiral
Salerno can address that.
Admiral Salerno. I agree with your concerns and sympathize
with your concerns, Congresswoman, about port security. That is
very much a concern of the Coast Guard, and TWIC is a big part
of the solution to that.
But there are certainly other measures that have been in
place since MTSA and even prior to MTSA to improve port
security. This will be a significant step forward.
Would we have liked to have had it sooner? Absolutely, but
getting it right I think is the correct approach.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Broun.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just prior to coming over here, I had some folks from
Louisiana who are involved in offshore boat operations and they
were real concerned about the Baker amendment to the Coast
Guard reauthorization bill.
Are you all familiar, Admiral, with this amendment? It has
to do with TWIC cards and it has to do with their people, Mr.
Secretary, being able to do some private 90-day background
checks that I understand are going to go through the same
process that the TSA would go through or that our department
would go through.
Can you all tell me about that and is there some mechanism
of allowing not only them, but other private sources at least
to get temporary authorization to allow port security that is
going to maintain the port security?
Admiral Salerno. Yes, sir, I am familiar with the proposal.
Let me back up a little bit, though. The regulations that
were published several months ago do contain a new hire
provision. So that a new employee, if he applies for a TWIC,
will be allowed to go to work on an interim basis. They need to
be monitored in the workplace, but can go to work and that was
in response to requests from industry to include a provision of
that nature.
What Mr. Baker is proposing is somewhat different in that
it would allow people to go to work for up to 90 days without
having to first apply for a TWIC. So there is no security check
pending the issuance of the card itself. He could work for 90
days without any check whatsoever.
We have significant problems with that. It creates a
vulnerability that, quite honestly, we have not a good means to
address.
Mr. Broun. Well, from what I understand from the folks that
I was just talking to, they do an internal security check. They
use the same Internet process of doing it in an internal
company base check.
Is there some mechanism of being able to do that for new
hires so that if they have some kind of mitigation about these
new employees, so that we are absolutely certain that we are
not hiring terrorists, we are not hiring thugs, we are hiring
people who will be secure, but that they will have 90 days or
60 days or some reasonable period of time that the new hires--
that they can see, but we can see, also, from a homeland
security perspective, that these people are safe?
Is there some way of working this out so that when
industry, whether it is in Louisiana or New York or Los
Angeles, can hire a truck driver or hire an individual, is
there some way of having private security background checks
that is acceptable to the department that will allow these
people to come on board while they are in the process of
getting their TWIC card or without having to pay the fee to be
able to get the TWIC card over a reasonable period of time,
whatever that might be?
Admiral Salerno. The regs in place now, sir, do, in fact,
include a provision where the employer does a background check.
That is part of the new hire provision.
But I think the key distinction is that, as currently
constructed, there is a requirement to apply for TWIC. The name
goes into the federal system. There is a quick check against
some databases to make sure that there is no obvious problems,
against the terrorist watch list and so forth. And once we have
that, which can be accomplished relatively quickly, then the
person is allowed to work.
Under this other provision, that federal check does not
take place and we do not necessarily have the same visibility
of who is actually out there in the workplace.
Mr. Broun. Excuse me, Admiral, for interrupting you,
because my time is about out.
How long does it take you to go through the quick check
process and that you can get the information back to the
employer about these new hires?
Mr. Hawley. I think we are estimating a couple of days. The
business that you are referring to I think is contemplated that
we can do the terror watch list check that the government has
to do and not inhibit the guy starting while that process goes.
So they have got some provision for that.
But we do need to run the terror watch list check before
having the person----
Mr. Broun. I certainly want that, too, and it is just--Mr.
Chairman, if you don't mind, just a few more seconds here.
But I certainly want anybody who is working in secure areas
in ports to make sure--for us to make sure that they are not a
hazard to this nation, but I think there may be some reasonable
way of doing this and getting people to work, whether they are
working offshore boats or whether they are driving a truck or
something else.
So I am out of time and I thank you all for coming and I
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a few extra moments.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
for being here this morning and for your answers.
Mr. Hawley, as you know, there currently is a shortage of
labor available at ports, the working ports, as well as in
surface transportation.
And as it has been described today in your testimony and
others, there are some burdens that we are trying to overcome,
this hurdle of TWIC, and let me just go through them very
quickly among them and then ask my question.
Number one is the cost, because in the case of some of
these people, it may be equivalent to a day's wage. For some of
us, that may not sound like a lot, but for some, it is. You
touched on that a little bit earlier.
The shortage of enrollment sites and the staff to process
those applications. The underestimating of the number of TWIC
cards required and possibly delays due to incorrect information
in the criminal database and the watch list.
So my question is, in developing this, did you consider the
burden of regulation and the procedure on the industry itself
at the port and if you did or didn't, what steps have been
taken to mitigate these efforts? Because sometimes you find out
you have got a problem and then what have you done to correct
that problem as you moved along in the process.
Mr. Hawley. Sir, I think those all raise good points. On
the issue of the cost, is one of the things clearly that came
up early and the mitigation for that is we have, in fact,
reduced the cost from when we first came out with it, and it
is, I should point out, a 5-year period, which is about 26
bucks a year.
So it is--yes, 132 bucks is not something trivial, but over
a 5-year period, it is at least in the ballpark.
On the issue of the enrollments, we covered that a little
bit earlier, but essentially the way the contract is written,
the cost model incents the provider who is doing the enrollment
to get as many enrollments as fast as possible and it can be
scaled up because they get paid for the cards. So that is built
into the mechanism. And the same thing on the enrollment
stations.
As far as the criminal checks, the current process on
hazardous material endorsement came through a lot of the
credibility problems when that was rolling out. Hey, is this
going to slow down the business? And, in fact, it has not and I
think it probably is the number one issue for us going forward
to demonstrate to particularly this population that getting a
TWIC card is not onerous and it is not going to be a problem of
people fishing around in your background.
We are basically saying are you a terrorist risk and
limited criminal history information and we are not trying to
figure out all possible problems.
Mr. Etheridge. Well, turnaround is critical, but at the
same time, you need to make sure you have got the information
right.
Ms. Berrick, did you, in looking at this, see any evidence
that the stakeholder community was involved or had any input in
the development of the TWIC requirements that were put in
place?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. And, again, to reiterate, the focus of
our review was on the prototype for the TWIC program, which
ended about a year ago.
And one of the areas we looked at was stakeholder
coordination and outreach. We visited 15 ports, talked to all
the involved stakeholders. The message we were getting at that
time a year ago was that they wanted more involvement in the
requirements. They wanted to work more closely with TSA and the
Coast Guard.
So that was their position at that time. Since that time,
TSA and the Coast Guard have put in several measures to improve
coordination. They established a coordination steering
committee. They have frequently asked questions posted, a whole
series of actions----
Mr. Etheridge. So the answer is yes.
Ms. Berrick. Well, we went back to follow up. We spoke with
a few ports and they did indeed say they thought stakeholder
coordination had improved.
We haven't done a comprehensive review to see how effective
all of these procedures were, but the limited input we got was
that it was favorable.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Ports have invested significant resources in developing
credential systems over the years and as a result of
legislation, both in response to the internal threat
assessments and to comply with state, as well as federal
regulations.
Mr. Hawley, how has this been taken into consideration with
the federal TWIC regulations and requirements and how will that
be compatible, if at all possible, with what is already in
place or requirements that some of these ports already have and
have had for a while?
Mr. Hawley. I think your comment is consistent with what we
heard from the community during the rulemaking process and we
did, in fact, change the whole process to separate out the
reader part from the card issuance and the reader part is the
substantial cost to the ports as they implement what is
required.
So we originally said, ``You have got do it at the same
time as we issue the cards.'' Based on the technology issues
and the feedback, we separated the two.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Colorado for 5
minutes, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And, Mr. Hawley, I won't talk about baseball, since my team
didn't fare very well against yours. But I do want to just get
some basics again and I am not(I haven't been around here for
all of the TWIC discussion for 5 years.
You said that the card has double the information as we had
in the Apollo program in terms of the computerized information.
What are some of the things that are on that card?
Mr. Hawley. It has got a computer chip inside and it has
all the identity information and it is storing the biometric
information. So it has got the prints, which, as you know,
is(if you just have the list of information about somebody, it
takes up a tiny amount of computing process.
But having the actual fingerprints in there, as well, takes
up a lot of space. So both in terms of the amount of data
stored and the quickness with which it can be processed and fed
back is principally what is in there.
There is also encryption and security measures that are
built on, as well. So there is the chip itself, which is the
most expensive part of the technology. Then there are the
additional pieces of security on the plastic itself. There are
also a mag stripe and a visible barcode on the card.
Mr. Perlmutter. And I would assume that, over time, if
there are other things that your agency thinks might be
appropriate, there is room to add that.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. On the mag stripe, I think a third of
it is kept empty for use of ports or people who want a dual
use. It also is what is called backward compatible, meaning
that if things change in the future, it is capable of
accommodating that, if that is necessary.
Mr. Perlmutter. I know one of the things we have been
talking about is how many people are going to be issued these
cards. What is the number that the TSA thinks?
And then, Ms. Berrick, what is the number that GAO thinks
are going to be using this card and is that just ports or is it
ports and airports? Who is it?
Mr. Hawley. We have got a range of, low side, 750,000, high
side, maybe 1.5 million. But as far as the practical capacity
of the program, it is scalable to 1.5 million or higher than
that, should that be necessary.
Mr. Perlmutter. And is that just seaports?
Mr. Hawley. No. That includes the truckers, as well as
mariners and the port workers.
Mr. Perlmutter. Not airports.
Mr. Hawley. Not airports.
Mr. Perlmutter. Is it possible that it would be used at
airports at some point?
Mr. Hawley. It is possible. That is something that we are
working with the airports. The question is whether we can
accommodate the biometric on the existing CITA badge and
whether that is the right business process for doing it.
Mr. Perlmutter. Ms. Berrick?
Ms. Berrick. In terms of the port population, we didn't do
an independent assessment of the number. I can say, however,
talking to the stakeholders, they did raise some concerns that
the population was higher. But we didn't do an independent
assessment of how higher that might be or if, in fact, that is
true, if it was low.
Mr. Perlmutter. I will just change the subject a little
bit. This was a question from Mr. Carney and it goes back to
the laptop that was taken.
His question was we assume that the encryption software
protects, but has the hard drive been recovered and have
forensics been done on the hard drive?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know, is the short answer. So we will
have to get back to you on that.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We have two members left for questions and the plan is to
recess for the three votes and reconvene after that.
Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much.
Let me quickly proceed and say that I know that this scheme
is one that Congress gave you, and we know that you are
carrying forward a roadmap. So we thank you for your service,
but at the same time, we are quite perplexed as to why it is in
the state that it is today, even as you have answered questions
on some of our concerns.
My question is whether or not we will, in fact, be ready
for the rollout, again, and I will, under that umbrella, ask
these questions very quickly.
I am delighted that Houston is one of the selectees, but,
in fact, your witness yesterday, Maurine Fanguy, said that this
process, with ports like Houston, is to get it right.
So my question is, why is Houston and why are the other
ports being used at this stage of the game as a guinea pig?
We are also concerned that a number of the workers
mentioned yesterday that they have had no training,
particularly ILA workers. They are concerned about the FBI rap
sheet and its accuracy.
What has been done to make sure that that occurs?
And we have talked about the state proposals and we have
sort of accepted it, but it seems like a double standard. Why
do you have--and this is for both Admiral Salerno and Mr.
Hawley.
Why do you have this double standard of allowing states to
go forward and then allowing TSA or requiring the TSA TWIC
card, where then the state, as well, can require additional
procedures? It seems like this is a double standard and it is
an excessive burden.
Finally, let me note that you suggested there are 750,000
potential enrollees. We have been told by one of your providers
or contractors it may be more and, frankly, we don't feel that
you are prepared for more, because you haven't acknowledged it.
I also want to thank the Coast Guard for their work on this
project, but I ask the question, as TSA rolls this out and the
Coast Guard is responsible for enforcement, I don't see why we
don't have a relationship with Customs and Border Protection.
In fact, who is going to be the arresting officer, if it is
necessary, if it is a terrorist, if you found a terrorist? I
don't think you have a coordinated program. I don't know how
the Coast Guard, with its basic duties, can be involved in the
law enforcement aspect of it and I think that is a major
problem.
So we can begin, Mr. Hawley, with you on the double
standard question and Admiral Salerno and then the enrollee
question, as well as the guinea pig issue and what you are
doing about training the employees and helping them, as well.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
``Examinging the TWIC Program is Crucial to Identifying Potential
Security Loopholes in Our Nations Airports.''
Statement in regards to examining the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) implementing the Transportation Worker Program
Identification Credential (TWIC Program.
In wake of the horrific events of September 11, 2001, TSA realized
that in order to secure the homeland, we must better protect areas of
the nation's key transportation facilities. In doing so, the TWIC
program was created to ensure the security of these facilities by
``issuing identification cards only to workers who are not known to
pose a terrorist threat, and allow these workers unescorted access to
secure areas of the transportation system.
While the TWIC program is designed to enhance security through the
use of components such as enrollment, background checks, TWIC card
production, and card issuance, five years and millions of tax-payer
dollars later, this card has yet to be implemented. Furthermore, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on the progress and
shortcomings of the TWIC program in December 2004k September 2006, and
April 2007. The GAO report states, `Some maritime organizations are
concerned many of their workers will be disqualified from receiving a
TWIC card by the background check.
As the Chair of the House Homeland Security subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, I will be
working to ensure that all concerns surrounding the TWIC Program are
being properly addressed by TSA. Five years and millions of tax dollars
later, that time and money must be accounted for.
Mr. Hawley. On the double standard, on that issue, the
state of Florida moved out to put in security measures on its
own, while talking to us. They did so knowing that the TWIC
program was coming.
They elected to go forward and implement security measures
in Florida ports, which is a laudable decision and laudable
result.
It did not and does not meet all of the subsequently
developed requirements under TWIC. So what we are trying to
do--it is not a double standard. There is one standard. It is
the TWIC standard.
What we are trying to do is work with Florida to have a
common sense solution that recognizes the work they have
already put in, but doesn't compromise our statutory
responsibility.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I quickly go to Admiral Salerno or
either you can continue on about the FBI rap sheet, and if you
want to continue, because the time is going.
Mr. Hawley. On the FBI rap sheet, that is something that
came up a little earlier. The answer is that is why we have the
process that the person, if they do get a response back that
says there is a problem, they just need to get back to us and
say, ``But it has been resolved,'' and this has worked well in
the HAZMAT endorsement issue. We expect it to work----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think we need to have something more
secure than that.
Admiral Salerno, do you have an answer to the question of
the double standard and, also, your enforcement ability?
Admiral Salerno. On the double standard issue, the Coast
Guard enforces MTSA on the facilities and what we will enforce
on facilities is the TWIC. That is our standard. That is what
we will hold the facilities----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you have enough resources to have
personnel on the ground in these ports across America.
Admiral Salerno. Not on a continuous presence basis, but on
a roaming basis. They will make frequent visits to these ports
and spot check.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is a concern, Mr. Chairman,
not because the admiral is not dedicated, but because I don't
think there are enough resources, and I don't think that there
has been planning for enough resources on this matter.
Admiral Salerno. If I might add, ma'am, you asked a
question, too, about arrests and so forth.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Admiral Salerno. We are working with other law enforcement
agencies to establish agreements, memorandums of understanding
so that we can leverage this requirement out across the board,
including with local law enforcement authorities, as well.
So there may, in fact, be a law enforcement presence from
other agencies there that can act if the Coast Guard is not
present.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will get a briefing on that. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. If you have more questions, Ms. Jackson
Lee, if you submit them, we would be happy to get them
answered.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey,
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief,
because I know we have the votes waiting.
Before I get to my question, I just want to ask
Administrator Hawley, I am puzzled. You keep saying as an
excuse for the delays that there is twice as much technology in
a TWIC card than the Apollo mission.
The Apollo mission was 40 years ago. I would hope that
there is a lot more technology today that you would have access
to and that the technology would have improved. So I don't
think that is a good excuse.
But let me go to the question that I have. With regard to
the ports of New York, New Jersey, Long Beach and Los Angeles,
as part of the initial rollout of the TWIC program, if the
overall purpose, Administrator Hawley, of the TWIC program is
to secure our ports, why was the decision made to exclude the
ports servicing New York and Los Angeles during the initial
rollout? And could you detail the risk factors used to identify
the ten priority ports?
And, Ms. Berrick, do you believe the country would be
substantially safer had the initial TWIC rollout included the
largest and highest risk ports in the country?
Since I have 3 minutes and 46 seconds, perhaps we will
begin with Administrator Hawley and then if Ms Berrick has
time, you can respond.
Mr. Hawley. Sure. The answer is on the importance of New
York, New Jersey and L.A.-Long Beach, we announced yesterday
the 147 port schedule and, as you may have seen, New York-New
Jersey is scheduled to begin this year.
The risk factor is there are also program risks. We talked
about some of the learnings we are having in the port of
Wilmington and we don't want to start out in the toughest of
the environments, the largest scale of the environments. We
want to learn as we go and control the program so that when we
get at the major largely scalable ports, we have worked out
the----
Mrs. Lowey. If I could just interrupt for 1 second, because
I noticed your schedule. It is scheduled for a partial rollout
at the end of the year. The full rollout will not be complete
in the region until the start of spring 2008.
I don't get it. Isn't there an inherent security risk by
having part of the port system involved in the program while
the other parts of the same port operations are not bound by
similar procedures?
Mr. Hawley. We talked earlier in the hearing on the issue
of we have already run the terror watch list checks on all
those ports and we have also--the existing security measures
that are in place. So from the real world of security, the
security measures are in place. Now we are locking it down with
the biometric credential.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. I will just add that in our work of
looking at the development of similar systems, we have always
concluded that testing upfront, having a prototype phase is
very important, where all the key elements are tested.
And, typically, we find it is reasonable that that is done
at easier locations. So the problems, if you will, can be
worked out before it is implemented on a wide-scale basis.
And I would also add that if initial testing were to be
done at a large more complex port, where difficulties could
surface maybe more easily, it could be difficult to address
those in that kind of environment and, as a result, it could
result in the program being further delayed.
So we think that more diligent work up front is important
so you can maybe avoid that down the line when you have bigger
challenges with some of these larger ports.
Mrs. Lowey. Let me just say this, because we are running
out of time. So perhaps Administrator Hawley could provide me
in writing the risk factors used to identify the ten priority
ports.
And I would also like to say that you and I have had many
discussions about a card such as this at the airports and you
feel it would impede commerce, et cetera.
I wonder if you have done some analysis of the lost labor
time and lost revenue as a result of the potential delays this
system will cause. Right now, instead of being able to take a
card and swipe it, they have to look at the card, and you know
that is not accurate.
This TWIC card is what is going to work. So I wonder if you
can give me some information about all the delays and what it
means in lost revenue, not necessarily at the airports, but for
this program.
And the time is up. Maybe you can let me know about it.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. And we will definitely pay you back for
releasing your time early.
We want to thank this panel of witnesses. The committee
will recess for votes and we will return 5 minutes after the
last vote for the second panel.
Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
SANCHEZ [Presiding.]: The committee will come to order.
As you can see, my colleagues are all currently involved in
markups or, unfortunately, on the House floor, as we have some
important bills there. And so we were not able to round up any
other members, and I apologize to our witnesses.
But in order for us to hear your testimony, we must have
more than just me. I am not enough.
So I want to thank the witnesses for their time. I know
many of you traveled pretty far to come here.
I will tell you that your written statements will be
included in the record of this hearing, and the members of the
committee will probably have additional questions for the
witnesses, and we will send it to you in writing, and you will
have 10 days to submit in writing your answers.
Having no further members and hearing no further business,
the committee stands adjourned. My apologies. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Maurice Emsellem
Chairman Thompson and members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify on the subject of the new Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) required of the nation's port workers
and the background checks which began earlier this month.
My name is Maurice Emsellem, and I am the Policy Director for the
National Employment Law Project (NELP), a non-profit research and
advocacy organization that promotes a more fair and effective system of
employment screening for criminal records. Over the past two years,
NELP has been training truck drivers subject to the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) hazmat background checks and helping
them access the appeal and waiver process. In recent months, we have
also been reaching out to port workers to apply the experience with the
hazmat program to help port workers negotiate the TWIC process.
At this critical stage in the TWIC program, when especially large
numbers of port workers and truck drivers will begin enrollment all
across the country, it is important to evaluate TSA's implementation of
the key worker protections of the Maritime Transportation Security Act
of 2002 (MTSA) (46 U.S.C. Section 70105). While we applaud TSA for
taking seriously their responsibility to implement these worker
protections, there are several key areas that fall short of the law's
spirit and intent. Our testimony includes a description of the
following key concerns and several recommendations for reform of the
TWIC process.
By failing to adequately verify the accuracy of the
FBI's rap sheet before issuing an initial threat assessment,
TSA is disqualifying large numbers of workers based solely on
old arrests that have never led to a conviction (TSA's
determination relies primarily on the FBI rap sheets, which the
Attorney General has reported are 50% incomplete due to the
failure of the states to update their arrest records after the
disposition of the case).
Given the limited number of ``waivers'' filed under
the hazmat program, TSA and Lockheed Martin should do more to
promote the TWIC waiver process. The TWIC waiver is the core
feature of the MTSA that protects those workers who have turned
their lives around from being unfairly designated as a
terrorism security risk due to an isolated drug offense or
other disqualifying crime.
TSA and Lockheed Martin have not complied with federal
safeguards that provide meaningful access to the ethnically
diverse workforce whose limited-English proficiency requires
translation and interpretive services to negotiate the criminal
record and immigration background checks which are so critical
the TWIC process.
I. The Basics of the TWIC Background Check Process
Like the TSA criminal background check now required to qualify for
a hazmat endorsement, the TWIC process described below incorporates
several procedural protections required by the MTSA to ensure that
workers are treated fairly as part of the background check.
In addition, the federal law sets forth the specific TWIC
disqualifying offenses, which include especially serious ``permanent''
disqualifying offenses (like espionage and treason) and more common
``interim'' disqualifying crimes (like drug dealing and weapons
possession). Both categories are limited to felony convictions, not
misdemeanors, and the ``interim'' disqualifications apply to offenses
that date back seven years from the date of the application, or five
years from when the individual was released from incarceration
(whichever is the more recent event).
1. TWIC Pre-Enrollment: TSA has created an optional pre-enrollment
process (available by phone or on-line) which allows the worker to
enter his or her basic biographical information with TSA before
officially enrolling in-person at the designated port facility. The
pre-enrollment process is intended to help save time by providing the
individual with an appointment for the in-person enrollment.
2. Enrollment at Designated Locations: On October 16th, TSA and its
contractor Lockheed Martin began enrolling individuals at the
Wilmington port for the TWIC. Upon enrollment, all the necessary
information is collected on the individual to qualify for the TWIC,
including the fingerprints required to generate an FBI rap sheet. Under
penalty of perjury, the applicants must sign a disclosure form
(attached) indicating that they have accurately responded to a series
of questions related to their criminal history, their immigration
status and any adjudication or commitment due to mental capacity.
Depending on the size of the port, TWIC enrollment will take several
weeks or months to process all those determined to require unescorted
access to secured areas of the ports. TSA will maintain an additional
presence after the initial process to enroll new applicants.
3. Threat Assessment Determination: Based on the background
information provided by the applicants and the resulting search of the
various criminal record, terrorist watch-list and immigration status
databases, TSA will issue an initial threat assessment determination.
According to TSA, a web-based system first ``scores'' the application.
Then, the case is reviewed by at least four adjudicators (first two
contractors, then two TSA staff) resulting in the threat assessment
determination.
a. TWIC Approved: If TSA fails to identify any disqualifying
information, the individual is notified that he or she
qualifies for a TWIC, usually within 5 to 10 days according to
TSA.
b. Interim Denials Subject to ``Appeal:'' When TSA makes a
determination that the individual has committed a disqualifying
offense set forth in the SAFE Port Act, he or she receives an
``Initial Determination of Threat Assessment'' (IDTA) listing
the disqualifying crime. If the information reported by TSA is
incorrect, the individual can ``appeal'' the case within 60
days by providing the official court documentation to correct
the information. If the FBI rap sheet is incomplete due to an
arrest where the disposition has not been reported, then the
individual must provide the missing information to TSA or their
application will be automatically denied after 60 days. The
individual is not provided a copy of their FBI rap sheet along
with the IDTA, although her or she may request a copy before
appealing.
c. Interim Denials Subject to ``Waiver'': If the individual has
a disqualifying criminal record that is accurate and complete,
then he or she can seek a ``waiver'' of the initial threat
assessment determination based on evidence of rehabilitation, a
solid work history and other relevant factors. Selected
``permanent'' disqualifying offenses are not subject to the
waiver process.\1\ If the waiver request is denied by TSA, the
worker has the right to review of the decision by an
administrative law judge.
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\1\ The offenses that are not subject to waiver include espionage,
sedition, treason, terrorism, or conspiracy to commit these crimes. (49
C.F.R. Sections 1515.7, 1515.103(a)(1)-(a)(4)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, the optional TWIC pre-enrollment process is the only
stage where information is to be made available in any language other
than English (Spanish). There are apparently no plans to provide
interpreter services at the time of actual enrollment at the ports, nor
are any materials to be translated as part of the interim determination
or the waiver or appeal process. TSA has authorized the family and
friends of applicants to serve as translators during the enrollment
process, requiring them to also be signatories under penalty of perjury
to the TWIC application.\2\
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\2\ Specifically, the ``Helper/Translator'' must sign the following
statement contained on the enrollment form: ``I certify that I assisted
in the completion of this form at the request of the applicant named on
this TWIC enrollment document, that the responses provided are based on
all information which I have knowledge, or which were provided to me by
the applicant, and that the completed enrollment form has been read to
the applicant in the language the applicant speaks fluently for
verification before he or she signed the application in my presence. I
understand that a knowing and willful false statement or an omission of
a material fact on this enrollment document can be punished by fine or
imprisonment or both, and may be grounds for denial of a TWIC.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As distinct from the TWIC enrollment deadlines recently published
by TSA,\3\ TSA has not indicated when the ports will have to actually
start using the TWIC cards. Presumably, that will follow sequentially
from when the TSA set up the enrollment process at each of the ports.
The regulations require at least 90 days notice for the port to start
implementing the TWIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``DHS Agencies Announce
Progress on TWIC Program'' (October 3, 2007).
II. The Serious Limitations of the FBI's Rap Sheets Undermine the
Integrity of the TWIC Process
The TWIC criminal background check is dependent on the rap sheet
provided by the FBI, which is an accumulation of the criminal records
generated by the states. However, there are serious flaws in the FBI's
rap sheet that threaten to deny employment to large numbers of law-
abiding workers and undermine the integrity of the criminal background
check process.
Incomplete State Arrest Records: Of special concern to TWIC
applicants, the FBI rap sheets are routinely out-of-date and
incomplete. Indeed, according to the U.S. Attorney General, the FBI's
rap sheets are ``still missing final disposition information for
approximately 50% of its records.'' \4\ Mostly, that includes arrest
information which is never updated electronically by the states to
reflect whether the charges have dropped, dismissed, or successfully
prosecuted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Attorney General, The Attorney General's Report on
Criminal History Background Checks (June 2006), at page 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, in 15 states (out of 39 that reported data in response to a
national survey), more than one-third of the arrests in the past five
years have no final dispositions reported in the state criminal record
repository, which means that the FBI's records are similarly incomplete
for those states.\5\ That includes large port states like Florida,
where 40% of the arrests in the state's system do not include the final
disposition. Only nine states have more than 90% of the arrests in
their databases updated to reflect the final outcome of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Criminal History
Information Systems, 2003 (2006), at Table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Felony Offenses: In addition, the FBI's rap sheets often do not
distinguish between felonies, misdemeanors and lesser categories of
offenses, which is significant because the TWIC disqualifying offenses
are expressly limited to felonies. Instead, the FBI rap sheet generally
reports the specific offense as expressed in the state's penal code
without characterizing the severity of the crime. For example, we
handled the case of hazmat driver who was disqualified when his FBI rap
sheet indicated he was convicted in California of ``Charge 245A1 PC-
FORCE ADW-NOT FIREARM,'' meaning assault with a deadly weapon not
involving a firearm. Based on the FBI's rap sheet, TSA wrongly
concluded that this was a felony offense when, in fact, it was a
misdemeanor based on an assault involving a fingernail clipper.
Early Incarceration Release Dates: Under the MTSA, workers may not
be denied a TWIC based on an interim disqualifying offense that took
place more than seven years before the application or more than five
years since the individual was released from incarceration. However,
many states do not report the date when the individual was actually
released from incarceration, thus that information does not appear on
the FBI's rap sheet. As a result, large numbers of workers who have
been released for good behavior before their minimum sentence expired
will incorrectly show up as having been incarcerated within the five-
year period based on the original sentence entered on the rap sheet.
That is what happened to hazmat driver we represented, who received a
10-year sentence although he was released more than five years before
the date of his hazmat endorsement application.
III. Priorities for Reform of TWIC Background Check Process
Based on our experience representing workers negotiating the TSA
hazmat endorsement program and our understanding of the new TWIC
process, several key reforms would substantially improve the integrity
of the TWIC and protect large numbers of hard-working employees against
unfair denials and the loss of quality jobs in their community.
1. TSA Should Verify Incomplete & Unreliable Records Before Denying
the TWIC
Under the current TWIC and hazmat criminal background check, the
workers end up paying the price for the routine failure of the FBI's
rap sheets to provide complete information on old arrests. That is
because the policy of TSA (49 C.F.R. Section 1572.103(d)) is to
automatically deny the TWIC to all those whose arrest information has
not been updated unless official court documentation of the disposition
is provided by the applicant in 60 days. Because literally 50% of the
FBI's records are incomplete, we are concerned that very large numbers
of workers fall in this situation of receiving an initial threat
assessment based solely on the fact that they have an arrest, not a
conviction as required by the MTSA.
When the burden to fill the gaps in the FBI's rap sheet falls
almost entirely on the TWIC applicant in such significant numbers, far
too many innocent workers will fall through the cracks of the system,
especially in states like Florida where the state records are most
often incomplete. In order to provide the complete or up-to-date arrest
information required by TSA, workers have to navigate the court system
where the judgment was entered, typically requiring the individual to
appear in person at a local court that could be located in another
state or county. In contrast, a call to the local courts by TSA or an
on-line inquiry will often be enough for TSA to verify that the charge
has been dismissed, thus precluding the need to require actual court
documents from the applicant.
In addition, many hazmat endorsement applicants have been issued an
initial threat assessment simply because TSA has not adequately
verified that their offense rises to the level of a felony versus a
non-disqualifying misdemeanor. It is not clear that TSA has devoted
sufficient attention to identifying and correcting these cases before
issuing an IDTA. Similarly, there is the problem of the FBI rap sheet's
failure to indicate the date of release from incarceration, which often
results in an initial threat assessment when the individual was
released prior to the full sentence listed on the rap sheet. While the
hazmat and TWIC enrollment forms include a space for the individual to
indicate when he or she was released from prison, it is not clear that
TSA adequately incorporates this information into the TWIC background
check process.
According to TSA, literally 99% of the appeals filed under the
hazmat program have successfully documented that the initial threat
assessment was based on incomplete or incorrect information. One-third
of the over 10,000 successful appeals were related to incorrect
criminal records and the other two-thirds were attributed to
immigration status issues. The overwhelming rate of success on appeal
is a sure sign that there is a serious problem with the FBI's rap
sheets and TSA's current policy, which puts the burden on the worker to
track down the missing information. However, because of the problems
described above, these 3,000 to 4,000 successful criminal record cases
are probably just the tip of the iceberg. To determine the true
magnitude of the problem, it is necessary for TSA to provide more
complete data documenting the total number of IDTAs issued due to the
absence of complete arrest information and the other routine errors
described above.
Recommendations: TSA and Lockheed Martin can take several
significant steps to produce a determination that is based on accurate
information and protect the rights of TWIC applicants.
a. Track Down Missing Arrest Dispositions: The first priority
should be for TSA and Lockheed Martin to track down missing
dispositions before issuing an initial determination of threat
assessment. In the case of federal gun checks required by the Brady
Act, the FBI tracks down 65% of the missing dispositions within three
days rather than simply denying the license based on old arrest
information.\6\ Similarly, in California, the law precludes the state
criminal records repository from releasing state rap sheets for
employment and licensing purposes unless it has been verified within
the past 30 days that the case is still active in the courts or in the
local District Attorney's office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Attorney General's Report on Criminal History Background
Checks, at page 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here too, when there is a potentially disqualifying offense that
lacks a disposition, TSA and Lockheed Martin should make a serious
effort to determine the outcome of the case before issuing an initial
determination. For example, any case that has been pending in the court
system for more than one or two years without a disposition is far more
likely to have been dismissed, thus such cases should be prioritized
for follow-up inquiries by TSA. These verification procedures should be
incorporated into the current review process, which now includes four
levels of review by TSA and contractor adjudicators.
b. Identify Misdemeanors and Incarceration Release Dates: Prior to
issuing an IDTA, TSA should prioritize those cases like drug offenses,
weapons charges, and robberies, which will routinely result in non-
felony convictions that are often presumed to be felonies by TSA. TSA
should develop specific contacts with each state criminal history
repository to clarify questions regarding offense levels reported on
the FBI rap sheets. Similarly, in all cases where an applicant has
indicated on the enrollment form that he or she has been released from
incarceration more than five years before the date of the TWIC
application, TSA and Lockheed Martin should verify the release date
with the state corrections authorities, not deny the application based
on the original sentence imposed.
c. Provide a Copy of the Rap Sheet with the IDTA: To help
applicants evaluate the merits of their appeal and prevent unnecessary
delays, all those who are issued an initial threat assessment based on
a potential disqualifying criminal record should receive a copy of
their FBI rap sheet when they receive the IDTA. This proposal
corresponds to the protections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act which
apply to private screening firms that conduct criminal background
checks for employers (15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(3)(A)).
Although the FBI rap sheet has already been paid for as part of the
TWIC application, it is still not available to the workers unless they
request a copy after the IDTA is issued, which makes it more difficult
to evaluate the merits of the appeal thus creating unnecessary and
prejudicial appeal delays. Not unlike a credit check report, TWIC
applicants should be automatically provided a copy of the rap sheet to
immediately verify that the information is complete and accurate.
Accordingly, TSA should continue to identify the disqualifying offense
in the IDTA, while also providing the FBI rap sheet if authorized by
the individual when he or she enrolls for the TWIC. The limited costs
associated with this process, including copying and additional postage,
should not be prohibitive.
d. Evaluate the Immigration Status Appeals Generated by the
``SAVE'' System: As part of the TWIC process, TSA must verify the
immigration status of applicants to determine if they are lawfully
present in the United States according to specific criteria (49 C.F.R.
Section 1572.105).
In addition to the immigration documentation provided when they
enroll, we are told by TSA that the applicant's immigration status is
checked against a federal database called the Systematic Alien
Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system, which is used by the
Department of Human Services to verify eligibility for various benefit
programs. However, the SAVE systems relies on automated data from
immigration authorities which the U.S. Department of Justice has
characterized as ``flawed in content and accuracy.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service's Ability to Provide Timely and
Accurate Alien Information to the Social Security Administration,
Report No. 1-2003-001 (November 2002), at page 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the serious concerns with the accuracy of the SAVE system and
the fact that two-thirds of successful hazmat endorsement appeals were
the product of errors related to immigration status, we urge TSA to
evaluate the source of the errors identified on appeal and adopt
alternative procedures, if necessary, to verify immigration status
under the TWIC program.
2. TSA Should More Actively Publicize the TWIC Waiver Process
When Congress adopted the waiver process in the MTSA for workers
who have been convicted of a disqualifying crime, it created a
promising model for all federal and state employment screening laws to
follow to promote and reward rehabilitation. Indeed, for thousands of
current workers with a criminal record who pose no terrorism security
threat, the MTSA waiver is the only protection that keeps them employed
in a good job after turning their lives around. Absent an effective
waiver process, they risk being kicked back out on the streets where it
is becoming harder and harder to find quality work with a criminal
record.
To fully appreciate the significance of the TWIC waiver process,
consider the impact of the record rates of incarceration of the past
two decades on local communities, especially many urban communities
where the ports employ large numbers of workers. For example, a record
700,000 people were released from U.S. prisons last year, and three out
of four them served time for non-violent offenses.\8\ Of special
significance, drug sales, a TWIC disqualifying offense, represents over
20% of all the felony convictions handed down by the state courts each
year.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the
United States, 2005 (2007).
\9\ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts,
2002 (December 2004), Table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nearly half of all non-violent offenders are African American (48%)
and another 25% are Latino.\10\ Indeed, one-third of African-American
men (32%) are likely to serve a prison sentence according to the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, which is six times the rate of white men.\11\
Large numbers of these men of color are struggling to turn their lives
around and find work in the urban communities where major ports are
located, including Los Angeles, Oakland, New York, Miami and elsewhere.
For example, in Oakland, where our offices are located, African
Americans account for 40% of the maritime workforce and another 22% are
Latino.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of Imprisonment in
the United States, 1974-2001 (August 2005), Table 1.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Carol Zabin, et al., Living Wages at the Port of Oakland
(Center for Labor Research & Education, December 1999), at page 45,
Table 3.3b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the significance of the TWIC waiver process is underscored
by the latest research documenting that those with a criminal record
who have found steady work are especially unlikely to commit another
crime. For example, a recent study found that people with a prior
record who have not been arrested over a period of five years are
statistically no more likely than someone with no prior record to
commit a crime.\13\ The likelihood of committing a terrorist act is
even more remote, especially for port worker who are paid good union
wages and have successfully turned their lives around despite the
serious challenges in their communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Kurlycheck, et al., ``Scarlet Letters & Recidivism: Does An
Old Criminal Record Predict Future Criminal Behavior?'' (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To its credit, TSA has granted 92% of the waiver requests submitted
under the hazmat program, thus recognizing the large numbers of workers
with a disqualifying offense who have an isolated felony that often
dates back several years and a solid work history. However, we are
concerned that the absolute number of waivers granted (about 1,000) is
quite low compared to the likely number of deserving workers (of the
700,000 drivers screened by TSA) who have waivable disqualifying
offenses. As applied to the TWIC program, with so many major ports
located near urban areas where more workers may have drug convictions
and other crimes common to the city streets, many more workers may have
a disqualifying criminal record who would be serious candidates for a
TWIC waiver.
Recommendations: We urge TSA to adopt the following measures to
promote and clarify the TWIC waiver process.
Expand the Waiver Outreach & Education Process: To significantly
expand the number of TWIC waiver requests, TSA and Lockheed Martin
should do far more to publicize the process. For example, the various
fact sheets designed to publicize the TWIC program at the ports (``TWIC
is Coming,'' ``TWIC is Here,'' ``Enroll for TWIC Today'') only make a
casual reference to the appeal and waiver process (one sentence),
including the specific fact sheet listing all the disqualifying
offenses. We urge TSA to distribute a ``know your rights'' fact sheet
at the ports that specifically describes the waiver process and the key
considerations that argue in favor of a waiver. TSA should also urge
the ports to partner with local non-profit organizations that can help
deserving workers prepare the TSA waiver application.
In addition, more can be done to help workers prepare the waiver
applications at the critical stage when they are notified of the
interim threat assessment. To TSA's credit, the IDTA now comes with a
four-page fact sheet (``How to Request Releasable Materials, Appeal a
Security Threat Assessment, and File a Waiver'') which is especially
helpful in describing the waiver process and the material necessary to
support the waiver applications. In addition, we have urged TSA to
adopt a checklist as part of the cover sheet that accompanies the
waiver request, allowing the worker to readily identify the major
arguments favoring a waiver in their case.
3. TSA Should Provide Translation and Interpreter Services for the
Diverse Population of Limited-English Speaking Port Workers
Today's workforce employed in the nation's ports and with the
trucking firms they do business with is more diverse than ever before,
representing large numbers of workers born in Spanish-speaking
countries (Mexico and Central America), South Asian-speaking countries
(India, Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) in
particular. Accordingly, the TWIC process should embrace this diversity
by taking reasonable measures to accommodate the language needs of port
workers.
To appreciate the special need for TWIC translation and interpreter
services, consider the ethnic diversity of the West Coast port workers,
especially those who drive trucks in and out of the ports. In the Port
of Seattle, 54% of the drivers are foreign born, and 44% speak a
language other than English at home (mostly a combination of Southeast
Asian languages and Spanish predominantly).\14\ In the Los Angeles and
Long Beach ports, more than 90% of the truck drivers were born outside
the U.S., mostly from Spanish-speaking countries.\15\ In the Port of
Oakland, 93% of the truck drivers were born outside the U.S., typically
from Southeast Asian, South Asian and Latin American countries.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Port Jobs, ``Big Rig, Short Haul: A Study of Port Truckers in
Seattle'' (2007), at page 19.
\15\ Kristen Monaco, Lisa Grobar, ``A Study of Drayage at the Ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach'' (California State University Long
Beach, December 2004), at page 17.
\16\ East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy, ``Taking the Low
Road: How Independent Contracting at the Port of Oakland Endangers
Public Health, Truck Driver, & Economic Growth'' (September 2007), at
page 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Executive Order 13166 and a U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) guidance, all federal agencies, including TSA, are expected to
``take reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access to the programs and
activities by limited-English proficient (LEP) persons.'' \17\ Each
program is called on to undertake a specific analysis of the following
factors to determine the level of required services: (1) the number or
proportion of LEP persons to be served or likely to be encountered; (2)
the frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the
program; (3) that nature and importance of the program, activity, or
service provided by the program to people's lives; and (4) the
resources available to the grantee/recipient and costs.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Executive Order 13166, ``Improving Access to Services for
Persons with Limited English Proficiency'' (August 11, 2000), at page 1
(requiring all federal agencies to develop a plan ``to improve access
to its federally conducted programs and activities by eligible LEP
persons.''); Department of Justice, ``Guidance to Federal Financial
Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National
Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons''
(67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459, n.4, June 18, 2002) (The DOJ directive
applies the Title VI standards to Federal agencies, as follows:
``Pursuant to Executive Order 13166, the meaningful access requirement
of the Title VI regulation and the four-factor analysis set for the in
the DOJ LEP Guidance are to additionally apply to the program and
activities of Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice.'')
\18\ 67 Fed. Reg. at 41459.
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We not aware of a specific analysis by TSA or Lockheed Martin of
the TWIC program based on the factors described in the DOJ guidance.
However, it is clear that the TWIC program satisfies the first three
factors given the importance of the TWIC to the future likelihood of
the workers, the large numbers of LEP workers employed in major U.S.
ports, and the resulting frequency that LEP persons must apply for the
TWIC. As described in the recommendations below and the DOJ guidance,
the costs of providing the necessary TWIC translation and interpreter
services can be minimized with adequate planning and current
technologies.
Other federal agencies, including the Social Security
Administration (SSA), routinely provide a broad range of translation
and interpreter services to access their programs. For example, SSA's
``Multilanguage Gateway'' (http://www.ssa.gov/multilanguage/) includes
scores of forms and documents required to access SSI benefits, Social
Security numbers, and other critical materials that are available on-
line in 15 languages (Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, Korean, Italian,
Haitian-Creole, Greek, French, Farsi, Chinese, Armenian, Arabic,
Vietnamese, Tagalog, Russian). SSA also provides free interpreter
services where necessary to help workers access these programs, using a
nationwide contract for telephone interpreter services in more than 150
languages and dialects.\19\
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\19\ Social Security Administration, DI 230490.001 (January 31,
2006), DI 33010,030 (June, 9, 2004), DHU & DSS Directives,
``Interpreters for Individuals with Limited English Proficiency (LEP)
or Individuals Requiring Language Assistance.'' In addition to
providing access to SSI benefits and Social Security documents, SSA
translates key documents that explain the forms required to access the
Medicare Prescription Drug Program (www.ssa.gov/prescription help/).
For more detail on other federal agency policies, see the Limited
English Proficiency Federal Interagency Website which is specifically
devoted to federal agency compliance with Executive Order 13166
(www.lep.gov).
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Recommendations: Thus far, the only LEP services made available by
TSA and Lockheed Martin include the optional pre-enrollment form
(available on-line in Spanish) and outreach material translated only in
Spanish to help publicize the TWIC program at the ports. We believe
these policies are insufficient to meet TSA obligations to provide LEP
services. Thus, we urge TSA to adopt several cost effective LEP
services to help port workers navigate the TWIC enrollment, appeal and
waiver process.
a. Oral Interpretation at TWIC Enrollment: The ability to negotiate
the TWIC enrollment process at the ports--requiring the applicant to
provide criminal history record, immigration documentation and other
technical information--will often determine the fate of the worker's
future employment. Rather than provide professional interpreter
services at this critical stage in the process, TSA has authorized
workers to bring family or friends (called ``helpers'' on the TWIC
disclosure form) to provide translation services.
Studies have shown that the reliance on family members and other
informal interpreters is detrimental to the LEP person's ability to
obtain services.\20\ Indeed, the DOJ guidance contains an entire
section on the use of family members and friends as interpreters,
cautioning that they are often ``not competent to provide quality and
accurate interpretations. Issues of confidentiality, privacy, or
conflict of interest may arise. LEP individuals may be uncomfortable
revealing or describing sensitive, confidential, or potentially
embarrassing medical, law enforcement. . .family, or financial
information to a family member, friend, or member of the local
community. (Emphasis added).\21\
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\20\ For a helpful summary of the research, see National Health Law
Program, ``Why Relying on Family Members, Friends and Children as
Interpreters is Dangerous and Should be Discouraged'' (undated).
\21\ 67 Fed. Reg. at 41462.
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These concerns are especially relevant to the TWIC enrollment
process, where applicants are asked for specific information about
their criminal history, immigration status, and mental health--all of
which are sensitive, confidential and potentially embarrassing to
reveal to family and friends. Family and friends are rarely qualified
to translate this technical and sensitive information, including the
following questions required by the TWIC disclosure form: ``I meet the
immigration status requirements described in 49 CFR 1572.105,'' ``I
have been adjudicated as lacking mental capacity, or committed to a
mental health facility involuntarily,'' and I was convicted, or found
not guilty by reason of insanity, of a disqualifying crime listed in 49
CFR 1572.103(b).''
Indeed, TSA's decision compromises the TWIC process further by
requiring the applicant's family and friends to verify under penalty of
perjury that they have provided all the information they know about the
individual, not just the relevant information that they have been
specifically asked to translate. Specifically, as set forth in the TWIC
disclosure form signed by the translators, they must verify that ``the
responses provided are based on all information of which I have
knowledge, or which were provided to me by the applicant.''
Recognizing the inherent limitations of family and friends serving
as interpreters, DOJ recommends that competent interpreter services be
provided free of charge to persons with limited-English proficiency.
According to the DOJ guidance, ``when particular languages are
encountered often, hiring bilingual staff offers one of the best, and
often most economical options.'' \22\ Other federal agencies, including
the Social Security Administration, also require professional
translators while only authorizing family and friends to interpret when
specifically requested as an alternative by the applicant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ 67 Fed. Reg. at 41461.
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Thus, in the case of Spanish and the languages most commonly spoken
by port workers, an adequate number of staff employed by the TSA/
Lockheed Martin enrollment centers should be bilingual in those
languages. Of course, these enrollment staff will also be qualified to
process English-speaking workers when necessary. In the case of
languages spoken often by workers at certain ports and not others
(including Southeast Asian and South Asian languages), Lockheed Martin
could move specialized personnel to various ports as the enrollment
process rolls out in different locations. Where necessary due to more
limited demand and to save costs, the DOJ guidance also recommends
contracting with professional interpreters and using telephone
interpretation lines provided by AT&T and other major contractors.
b. Translation of ``Vital'' TWIC Documents: The TWIC program should
include written translation of critical documents, including the TWIC
disclosure forms, the form consenting to the FBI criminal background
check and the Initial Determination of Threat Assessment (IDTA), which
includes the description of the TWIC appeal and waiver rights. To our
knowledge, none of these documents have been translated by TSA.
The DOJ guidance recommends that such ``vital'' written material be
translated where each LEP language group constitutes 5% of the
population served or 1,000 people, whichever is less.\23\ Given the
large numbers of foreign-born workers employed in many of the nation's
largest ports, the TWIC forms clearly rise to the level of DOJ's
recommended thresholds for multiple languages, not just Spanish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 67 Fed. Reg. at 41464.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, TSA should take the following specific steps to
translate vital TWIC documents:
1. TSA should undertake an analysis of the languages spoken
most often by port workers and truck drivers servicing the
ports.
2. TSA should translate the TWIC enrollment and consent forms
in multiple languages before enrolling individuals at the ports
where the largest population of LEP workers are employed.
3. Without delay, TSA should prepare ``know your rights''
flyers in multiple languages containing information on the
waiver and appeal process to distribute when applicants enroll
for the TWIC.
4. TSA should translate the IDTAs and match them when issued
with the language spoken by the applicant as determined upon
enrollment.
5. Once translated, the IDTAs should be made immediately
available on the Internet with other translated material as
part of a ``Multilanguage Gateway'' to the TWIC program.
6. Finally, all IDTAs issued in the interim should include a
``tag line'' in multiple languages directing the individual to
the translated material on the TSA website.
These are mostly one-time investments that will go a long way to
create a more fair and accurate TWIC process for the diverse population
of U.S. port workers.
* * *
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify on this critical
issue of concern to thousands of port workers and truck drivers and
their communities. We looking forward to working with the Committee to
help workers access the rights guaranteed by the MTSA and to ensure a
more fair and effective TWIC process.
Prepared Statement of Lisa B. Himber
Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Congressman King, and members of the
Committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
importance of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TIC)
program. My name is Lisa Himber, and I am Vice President of the
Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River and Bay, a non-profit trade
association representing the Delaware Valley port community. I am also
a member of the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC)
and have chaired its TWIC working group since the committee's inception
in March of 2005.
Having been involved with the program since February of 2002, my
organization and its members are all too keenly aware of the massive
challenges facing our ports as we seek to implement the TWIC related
provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Acts. We appreciate this Committee's
understanding of this important program and its efforts toward keeping
TWIC in the public spotlight.
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have created
any number of programs since the events of 9/11 forced us to re-examine
our approach to border security. MTSA required security plans which
have hardened our vessels and facilities, and the Trade Act and
Bioterrorism Acts of 2002 spawned programs such as the 24-hour advance
cargo manifest rule and advance electronic notice of food imports,
which have provided greater visibility into the cargo supply chain. And
while both the maritime industry and the government agencies which
regulate it were forced to make radical changes in their business
processes to successfully implement these far-reaching programs, none
of these so dramatically changed the landscape as TWIC has the
potential to do. With the implementation of the TWIC program, we will
begin to focus on that last component of maritime security: the people
who work on our vessels and piers.
Our industry has long supported the TWIC concept, and we have
continued to demonstrate that support over the last five years.
Undoubtedly, it has been a long and hard road to get us to where we are
today, and as we stand on the brink of bringing the program from the
pilot stage to a full production environment, it is paramount that we
learn from the mistakes of the past and take all conceivable steps to
ensure the program is implemented in such a way as to meet all its
stated goals.
We fully understand the difficulties Transportation Security
Administration is facing as it seeks to deploy a program of this
complexity and magnitude. And it is our sincere hope that the agency
will not only listen to the concerns of its stakeholders--those very
people who have the most to gain from a more secure maritime
environment--but that they will act on the recommendations of the many
maritime professionals who have dedicated their time, resources, and
expertise to making this program a success.
So while we look forward to working with TSA and its contractors to
resolve the unexpected bumps in the road we are certain to encounter,
we believe it is appropriate to highlight those concerns that, if not
addressed, may unnecessarily impede our progress.
I will focus my comments today in two key areas. The Phase I/Card
Issuance and Phase II/Reader Deployment.
PHASE I/CARD ISSUANCE
Let me begin by saying that since the October startup in
Wilmington, Delaware, the initial TWIC deployment appears to be going
fairly well. Though there have been a few minor complications, these
were not unexpected, and we remain confident that TSA and its
contractors will quickly resolve issues as they arise. One issue which
has surfaced as having the potential to cause significant problems
relates to the capture and verification of the biometric, which I will
discuss shortly.
That being said, there are several specific areas which we believe
need further attention.
Communication--Throughout the pilot program, both Congress maritime
stakeholders expressed their belief that TSA had done a poor job of
communicating information and project status. We were pleased when TSA
and Lockheed Martin announced the formation of a TWIC Stakeholder
Communication Committee which would serve as a forum for TWIC managers
to provide information and obtain industry feedback. The Committee has
met many times since its formation last spring, yet unfortunately it
has not served its purpose. For example, when TSA announced it would
not start program rollout in March as planned, stakeholders were not
provided with information as to the cause of the delay or provided with
updates over the intervening months.
We do not understand why information such as the deployment
schedule, enrollment center locations, and other important information
concerning the TWIC rollout must remain a secret from those who will be
affected by decisions TSA makes. As the agency should have learned,
failure to provide timely and relevant information only leads to
speculation, poor planning, and an overall inability for stakeholders
to help TSA achieve success.
In addition, many port operators and others remain concerned that
many truck drivers and other workers are largely unaware of the
requirement. We acknowledge that TSA and its contractors have worked to
broaden outreach and awareness efforts, but it appears more needs to be
done in this area.
The Enrollment Process--For reasons which were never made entirely
clear, the third phase of the TWIC pilot program, which was designed to
test the business processes of applying for, obtaining, and using the
TWIC, was severely abbreviated. In addition to issuing only a limited
number of cards, only about 2,000 cards were produced in the East Coast
Pilot program, very few of the actual processes to be followed to
obtain a TWIC were tested in the field. Most of these related to the
use of the card readers, however neither were several of the enrollment
and card issuance processes fully examined.
Having been through the process, I can attest to the fact that,
while it could be streamlined somewhat, overall the experience was not
overly burdensome. I applied for my card on Monday, October 15, and
received notification that my card was available for pick up within
five days. The pre-enrollment, enrollment and card activation processes
were fairly simple and took only about 45 minutes in total.
Impact on the Workforce--Foremost among the open questions relates
to the lack of a background check for the volunteer pilot program
participants. We were told that TSA did not have the regulatory
authority to conduct a background check during the pilot program; as a
result no empirical data are available to determine what, if any,
impact this program will have on the workforce. What we do know is that
there are maritime workers who have disqualifying criminal offenses in
their backgrounds, yet we do not know their numbers or whether those
workers will be able to obtain the necessary waivers.
We are heartened by the statistics provided by TSA regarding the
number of individuals who have successfully applied for waivers in the
Hazardous Materials endorsement program. Yet we are concerned that TSA
has indicated that the majority of people who were initially
disqualified from receiving a Hazmat endorsement did not apply for
waivers. Whether this is because they were unaware of the opportunity,
intimidated by or unable to understand the process, or felt they would
not be eligible is unknown. It is clear, however, that TSA must do all
it can to help these individuals through the process. No one wants to
see a qualified maritime worker deprived of his or her livelihood.
The Casual Worker--Over the last five years, there has been a great
deal of concern and discussion surrounding how ports and vessels will
accommodate the need to hire casual workers to process cargoes during
peak operating times. While the regulation allows for workers without
TWICs to enter under escort, a practical method to implement an escort
program has yet to be developed.
First, there are safety concerns that must be addressed to
effectively implement an escort program. Certainly, a worker cannot
effectively monitor both his own work and the activities of others. In
addition, the physical layout of the facility or type of cargo being
moved (such as automobiles, which are driven onto the port) may prevent
the implementation of an escort policy. It is certainly easy enough to
stipulate as policy that all workers must have TWICs--until there is a
shortage of eligible workers and cargo does not move.
Some believe ports should be allowed to create a program to
grandfather casual workers if they so choose. For example, eligibility
could be restricted to individuals who have a history of working at a
given port, and a ceiling set on number of hours worked prior to
requiring a TWIC. Facilities could be given the option to create a
``temporary'' credential or visitor's pass in lieu of requiring
escorts. If appropriate, when the individual's identification
documentation is validated, his photograph could be taken and other
information entered into the facility access control system. If
necessary, this information could be submitted to DHS for recordkeeping
purposes.
While some believe this would circumvent the TWIC process, and
certainly such concerns are legitimate, allowing a program of this
nature in the short term would ensure a more smooth transition to the
new requirements. The ultimate outcome of TWIC, for better or worse,
will be a change in maritime industry hiring practices. We must take
advantage of the opportunity TWIC will afford to ``professionalize''
the workforce, as we anticipate that various trade and other unions
will develop a cadre of members ``certified'' to work on regulated
areas. At the same time, however, it is necessary that we take measures
to ensure commerce can continue to flow smoothly in the interim.
Use of Biometrics--The prototype did not test use of biometrics
with workers at port facilities. This is a significant concern as there
is no evidence that the fingerprint will suffice as a biometric in a
maritime environment. Although the potential adverse impact is less
severe than it will be after use of card readers is phased in, there
are still unanswered policy questions. For example, how will TSA issue
a credential to an individual whose biometric cannot be captured? What
will be used for verification of such individual during a random spot
check by the Coast Guard?
Of the 16 people who applied for their TWICs at Wilmington on
Monday October 15, at least three of those encountered problems in
activating the cards because the biometric verification failed. This is
an alarmingly high percentage and could point to a significant flaw in
the system that must be contained before the program is expanded. It is
important to note that this was in an office environment where
conditions are fairly clean and could be more problematic in a weather-
exposed port or vessel environment.
This is particularly puzzling since each enrollee was able to
successfully scan their two index fingers immediately after enrollment
of their ten fingerprints. As a result of the initial problems observed
during card activation, I'm concerned that there could be a technical
issue with the method used by the contractor for generating the
fingerprint data stored on the TWIC card and how that data is being
verified at activation. We hope that TSA will investigate this matter
and take corrective action before they issue a significant volume of
TWIC cards that might result in excessive biometric verification
failures for legitimate card holders.
Phase-In Schedule--When the final TWIC rulemaking was promulgated
in January of this year, TSA anticipated a late March startup and
mandated that initial rollout must be completed by September of 2008,
an 18-month schedule we believed was ambitious at the outset. Yet
enrollment did not begin until October, leaving only an 11-month window
to complete the initial enrollment process. While we applaud TSA's
desire to complete the process quickly based on the original schedule,
we do not believe this timetable is realistic and suggest consideration
be given to planning for an extension. Without proper planning, making
the decision at a later date could create real problems for both the
contractors and for maritime workers.
In addition, we recommend that TSA and Coast Guard begin compliance
at all ports simultaneously. First, staggering TWIC compliance dates
can cause competitive disadvantages for those areas which have earlier
dates--as can any program which makes it more difficult, costly or
cumbersome to move cargo through one port over another. In addition,
because the maritime worker population is largely mobile, it will be
difficult for the ports where TWIC has been declared mandatory to
escort mariners, or truck drivers arriving from areas where TWIC is not
yet available or mandatory.
In any event, it is crucial that there is concurrence between the
Captains of the Port and and key port stakeholders when the decision is
made to begin to enforce compliance in any given region.
Enrollment Center Locations--A sufficient number and convenient
locations of TWIC enrollment centers will be critical to successful
program deployment. While TSA has guaranteed there will be enrollment
sites in at least 140 port cities, we have yet to learn the number of
locations within those ports, nor how long they those sites will be
operational. Further, we have not been provided with any information on
the locations of centers beyond September of 2008.
Decisions on locations of enrollment centers beyond the initial
rollout should not be left to the contractor's discretion but must be a
cooperative agreement between TSA and the maritime community to
facilitate the TWIC enrollment and card replacement processes.
Further, the enrollment process is not geared toward mobile
populations, particularly truck drivers. The program is designed in
such a way that individuals must retrieve their TWICs after production
at the same location as they applied. Many drivers arrive at Delaware
River ports from other parts of the country. Until the program is fully
implemented, these drivers will not have their TWIC cards. With the
sheer volume of trucks moving through facility gates every day, it is
not feasible that facilities, importers, or others could provide
resources to escort these individuals.
Trusted Agents--Because of the sensitive nature of the data these
individuals have access to, we have suggested that TWIC trusted agents
be subject to higher scrutiny than TWIC applicants. In addition to
undergoing the same threat assessment procedure as a potential TWIC
holder, we have recommended that trusted agents also be subject to
financial history and other relevant background checks. To date, we
have not received any assurances in this regard.
Based on our experience during the pilot program, we also
recommended that trusted agents receive relevant customer service and
``business'' training, such as how to appropriately swipe a credit
card, as well as comport themselves in a professional manner. The
Trusted Agents I have encountered in Wilmington have certainly been
friendly and polite. However, when I arrived at the enrollment center
after completing the pre-enrollment process, the Trusted Agent could
not access my information. As it turned out, there was not a system
problem, but rather it was a training issue with that particular Agent.
Further, when I went to retrieve my card, there was a lengthy process
while information was uploaded from the system to the card. The Agent
was unable to answer my questions regarding what information was being
encoded into the card.
Needless to say, it is critical that Trusted Agents receive
thorough training on the TWIC program itself. While we recognize that
it is still early in the process, given that the Trusted Agents have
been onsite and undergoing training in Wilmington for several months,
we are extremely concerned to hear that there are training problems
right out of the gate. If indeed the population estimate of 750,000
workers is as understated as many port officials believe, and Lockheed
Martin is compelled to quickly fill Trusted Agent positions to
accommodate a greater than anticipated demand, how will these issues be
handled?
Applying for an obtaining TWICs will take time and will cost, in
some cases, a great deal of money. It is incumbent upon TSA to ensure
these issues are anticipated and addressed.
Use of Readers During Phase I--The TWIC regulations require that
individuals seeking unescorted access to a restricted area present
their cards for visual inspection. Many facilities have invested in
electronic card readers which allow access through automated gates. In
addition to the increased throughput time and personnel costs
associated with visually inspecting each card, many believe that
eliminating the electronic read in favor of the human review is in fact
taking a step backwards in terms of security.
The TWIC cards being issued today are machine readable. We have
suggested to TSA and Coast Guard that the visual inspection should be
considered a minimum standard; vessels and facilities should have the
option to exceed that standard by using TWIC readers for access during
Phase I, even though readers are not yet required.
Lost or Stolen Credentials--We appreciate that TSA has provided a
mechanism to accommodate access for workers whose cards may have been
lost or stolen. Yet this mechanism is only available to direct
employees of a facility or vessel, and it should be made available to
all credentialed workers. Further, the process to verify/enforce this
provision is unclear. While the request for a replacement card can be
made on-line, ostensibly eliminating the need to make two trips to the
enrollment center, the guidance provided stipulates that proof during
the 7-day grace period must be provided in the form of a receipt, which
can only be obtained by visiting the enrollment center. Further, since
TSA cannot guarantee that a replacement card will be issued in the 7-
day time frame, we suggest the guidance be modified to allow for a 30-
day grace period.
These are just a few of the outstanding concerns related to the
TWIC issuance process. Others include questions about liability--to the
vessel or facility operator, to a TWIC holding escort, to companies
whose employees may be injured while en route to or from an enrollment
center--to a lack of ``batch enrollment'' capability--to concerns about
protecting the data collected and stored during enrollment--to the lack
of integration between TWIC and merchant mariner and other existing
credentials--or questions surrounding access for law enforcement or
emergency personnel.
There are a similar number of open issues and questions surrounding
the use of card readers when Phase II of the program begins.
PHASE II/READER DEPLOYMENT
Most maritime professionals applauded the TSA and Coast Guard
decision to segregate the rulemaking processes related to card issuance
and reader usage. Taken separately, each of these components of the
TWIC program is extremely intricate and creates multiple possibilities
to unduly hamper maritime operations if not implemented in a thoughtful
and deliberate manner. We appreciate that DHS is allowing sufficient
time to address the challenges of card issuance prior to introducing
the reader component. This is particularly relevant given that many of
the critical technologies, such as communication with the central
database, use of biometric readers, or using the ``hotlist'' were not
tested, or were tested insufficiently, during the original TWIC pilot
program.
We are pleased that DHS, as required by the SafePort Act, will
conduct a separate TWIC pilot program to test reader technology and
processes. It is our understanding that Coast Guard will publish a
proposed rule prior to commencement of the pilot program, and we
appreciate the opportunity to provide early comment. And while we
recognize that TSA and Coast Guard must complete their planning well in
advance of pilot startup, policy decisions must be made prior to
choosing technology solutions to be tested. Further it is absolutely
crucial that policy decisions are made in concert with maritime
stakeholders and that the maritime industry has a voice in the design
and development of the pilot program--particularly those ports and
vessels who will be participating.
At this point there are two primary concerns technology to be used.
The first involves the encryption of the biometric as it is validated
during an access request.
Contactless Biometric Read--The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
published in May of 2006 regarding reader usage dictated that contact
cards would be used in the TWIC program. Requiring that a card be
swiped at a TWIC reader would not only significantly delay maritime
operations, but contact readers are more susceptible to failure and
present an easy and attractive target to vandals. In response to
stakeholder comments, DHS agreed to utilize a contactless card and
asked the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee to develop
recommendations for a contactless reader specification which could be
used at ports and on vessels.
The NMSAC completed its work in February of 2007, and in September
DHS published the technical specification for the reader it selected.
Despite the fact that the recommendation of its advisory committee,
which was supported by a large majority of the comments to the public
docket, that the fingerprint template not be encrypted, DHS elected to
require such encryption. This is one of the single most important
issues DHS will have to address as it enters the second phase of the
TWIC rulemaking process.
A. Privacy and Security Considerations--We support the inclusion of
measures to protect individual privacy and acknowledge that this
prerequisite is as critical to the success of TWIC as are the need to
enhance commerce and improve transportation security. It is our
understanding that all personally identifiable information about an
individual gathered during enrollment will be retained by TSA in its
central data bank. The card itself is expected to show and/or contain a
photo, a unique cardholder identification number, and the individual's
biometric fingerprint template only.
In its design, TSA wisely elected to utilize the fingerprint
template rather than a full fingerprint image specifically to address
both privacy and operational efficiency concerns. Since only a
fingerprint template will be passed between the card and the TWIC
reader, the information cannot be reverse-engineered to a full
fingerprint image.
Even if the template were ``stolen'' during contactless
transmission to a TWIC reader, and even if somehow it could be used to
replicate the original fingerprint, for which we understand no
technology currently exists, the ``thief'' would not be able to use
this illegal TWIC as the fingerprint image would not match his own when
presented to a biometric reader in conjunction with a TWIC. In
addition, an individual interested in ``stealing'' a fingerprint would
meet much less technical resistance and obtain a more accurate
representation by lifting it from an object in a public place such as a
car door, window or drinking glass.
B. Operational Considerations--There are several concerns with
encrypting the fingerprint template. First, every transaction will
require encryption and decryption, each of which takes time and affords
an opportunity for problems to arise. In addition, prior to encryption
and decryption, some form of authentication or ``handshake'' between
the card and reader is necessary to validate that the transaction about
to take place is legitimate. In order for such authentication to take
place, some form of key management must be in place. Thus, if a key is
compromised at one instance, it affects every reader in that ``key
community.''
In summary,
Adding encryption generally makes the TWIC system more
complex and therefore more difficult to develop, use, manage,
and maintain.
Adding encryption will slow processing time to read
cards at vessels/facilities.
The use of keys places an administrative burden and
certain liabilities (e.g., responsibility to ensure the key is
not compromised) on those charged with key management. Vessel
and facility operators are neither prepared nor able to accept
these responsibilities.
Adding encryption will increase TWIC costs.
The NMSAC TWIC Working Group closely studied the issue and as a
group concluded that the operational complexities increase by a level
of magnitude and to the point where they are not proportionate with any
perceived benefit of encrypting the biometric template. In short, there
is no empirical evidence that encrypting the fingerprint template
affords any additional protection of personal privacy. Despite this,
TSA plans to require that the template be encrypted.
This is an area where industry and government are clearly not in
agreement. Prior to finalizing this policy decision, TSA and Coast
Guard should revisit this issue with industry stakeholders to determine
a mutually acceptable solution.
Use of the ``Hot List''--To date, TSA has not provided any
information on the hotlist to port and vessel operators. Several
questions, such as what data will be provided, file transfer protocols,
frequency of updates, and method of system query should be discussed
well in advance of the pilot program start up.
Reader Manufacturing--One of my members is a manufacturer of card
readers and shared the following concerns. ``Meeting policy
requirements and TWIC technical reader requirements as published means
manufacturers and integrators must create a custom product; there is no
off the shelf product that meets the control requirements,
environmental requirements and system requirements specified. As a
result:
a. Manufacturers and integrators have to evaluate the Return on
Investment that can be predicted for expending engineering and
manufacturing resources to rework existing products to meet the
requirements as stated. The fact is that most manufacturing
plants require sales in the amounts of 50,000 or more to cost
justify the re-engineering and re-tooling effort. There are no
guarantees that purchases made by maritime operators and the
Coast Guard will reach these volumes, thus cost justifying the
customization of product to meet the specified TWIC
requirements.
b. The Personal Identity Verification requirements and the TWIC
policies continue to be modified, posing additional challenges
to engineering efforts both on the software side and the
firmware side to meet the TWIC control requirements.''
The concern for the maritime industry is of course that readers
will be difficult to obtain, and those which may be available will be
priced unnecessarily high such that manufacturers can recoup their
engineering costs.
There are several other outstanding questions and concerns
surrounding the selection and use of card reader technology. These
include where readers will be required (e.g., on all vessels or just
those meeting certain criteria), the use of a PIN during the TWIC
verification procedures, integration with legacy access control
systems, whether positive access control will be required, and future
expansion of the card.
These are all important issues and it is unclear how DHS plans to
work with stakeholders to address them in advance of and during the
pilot program.
CONCLUSION
Several years from now, obtaining a TWIC will be standard operating
procedure, and its issuance and use will be a matter of routine. But it
is clear the next few years will be challenging ones. Now that the
process is underway, successful implementation will be dependent on a
great deal of communication, understanding, and patience. There is a
lot yet to be done, and we must work together to address the many
outstanding issues.
Over the years, the maritime sector has implemented new programs
and practices in an effort to enhance the security of our homeland. We
look forward to continuing to work with TSA and Coast Guard on the TWIC
program to ensure there are no unintended consequences and that the
TWIC will be deployed in the most secure and efficient manner possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Prepared Statement of Judith Marks
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the
Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential, or TWIC, program. I look forward to sharing
the progress we have achieved on this important program. This testimony
will provide a background on the TWIC program, the Lockheed Martin
contract and the steps we have taken to begin enrollment of the
maritime community.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is a
Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Coast Guard initiative.
The TWIC program provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential to
maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port
facilities, outer continental shelf facilities, and vessels regulated
under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, and to all
U.S. Coast Guard credentialed merchant mariners. An estimated 750,000
individuals will require TWICs. Enrollment and issuance will take place
over a 13-month period beginning in October 2007. To obtain a TWIC, an
individual must provide biographic and biometric information (such as
fingerprints), sit for a digital photograph, and successfully pass a
security threat assessment conducted by TSA.
The TWIC final rule, published in the Federal Register January 25,
2007, reflects input obtained through four public meetings and over
1,900 comments from the maritime industry. While TWIC may be
implemented across other transportation modes in the future, the TWIC
Final Rule sets forth regulatory requirements to implement this program
in the maritime mode first. This rule does not require maritime owners
and operators to purchase or install card readers compatible with TWIC
at this time. A second rulemaking is anticipated in calendar year 2007
and will propose additional access control requirements and the use of
electronic readers. The public will have opportunities to comment on
the proposed standards.
The program's goals are:
Positively identify authorized individuals who require
unescorted access to secure areas of the nation's maritime
transportation system;
Determine the eligibility of an individual to be
granted unescorted access to secure areas of the maritime
transportation system;
Enhance security by ensuring that unauthorized
individuals are denied unescorted access to secure areas of the
nation's maritime transportation system; and,
Identify individuals who fail to maintain their
eligibility qualifications after being permitted unescorted
access to secure areas of the nation's maritime transportation
system and revoke these individuals' permissions.
TIMELINE
The TWIC program began in the Spring of 2002 with Phase I, which
was a planning phase conducted by TSA personnel. This phase concluded
in Spring of 2003. Phase II was the technology evaluation phase,
performed by Maximus, Inc. under contract to TSA. Phase II ran from
Fall 2003 to Fall 2004. Phase III of the TWIC program was the prototype
phase, performed by BearingPoint under contract to TSA. Phase III began
in the Fall of 2004 and concluded with the prototype report which was
issued in the Fall of 2005.
The current phase of the TWIC program, the production phase, was
competitively awarded to Lockheed Martin in January of 2007 and is
currently underway.
Relevant legislation includes the Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA) of 2002 and the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE)
Port Act of 2006.
LOCKHEED MARTIN'S PHASE IV CONTRACT AND TSA OVERSIGHT
Lockheed Martin was awarded the TWIC Phase IV contract on January,
29, 2007. The initial task order, Task Order 1, provides for initial
enrollment of the maritime population, as well as support of the
Information Technology (IT) system that collects applicant information
and manages the lifecycle of the TWIC Credentials. The term of the
initial contract award is through October of 2008. Four additional
options, if exercised, would extend the contract to a total of five
years to January 2012.
The TWIC Phase IV contract is performance-based, with financial
incentives and disincentives tied to measurable performance goals.
Lockheed Martin developed a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)
which contains specific metrics negotiated with TSA. As part of our
contract, these metrics will be used to determine whether we are
meeting the performance goals and whether we receive award fees or if
we must remit penalties. TSA has identified a specific quality
assurance monitor to track the following key performance parameters:
On-time Port Mobilization
On-Time Completion of Maritime Population Enrollment
Customer Satisfaction
Enrollment Wait Time
Enrollment Processing Time
Fingerprint Reject Rates
Helpdesk Response Time
Helpdesk Resolution Time
Enrollment Failure Rate (Enrollments that Fail to
Process)
The TWIC fee, as of October 1st, 2007, is $132.50 for a new
credential, for an applicant who does not possess a current qualifying
background investigation. This fee breaks down as follows:
$43.25 for Information Collection / Credential
Issuance (Lockheed Martin)
$72 for Complete Security Threat Assessment (STA) and
Card Production (TSA)
$17.25 FBI Criminal History Records Check
The $43.25 collected by Lockheed Martin covers the cost of
enrollment facilities, personnel, travel, and fixed and mobile
enrollment equipment. This fee also covers the cost of the card stock,
which is delivered by Lockheed Martin to TSA's card printing facility
in Corbin, KY. This card production operation is run by the US Customs
and Immigration Service (USCIS) and is outside the scope of Lockheed
Martin's contract. In addition, the background vetting of TWIC
applicants, selection and schedule of port enrollments, the
Consolidated Screening Gateway (CSG), adjudication of eligibility,
appeals, and the card readers are also outside the scope of Lockheed
Martin's contract; the responsibility for these activities rests with
TSA.
Lockheed Martin brings a number of relevant strengths to the Phase
IV contract. The two most significant challenges that we face are as
follows:
(1) Rapid deployment of personnel and equipment to facilities
that we must locate and secure on a very tight timeline, and,
(2) Support, maintenance, and evolution of a complex
information technology system involving advanced biometric
identification systems and protection of sensitive personal
information.
Lockheed Martin is fortunate to have had significant experience in
dealing with large rapid-deployment projects. One of the most relevant
is our leadership of the Strategic Airport Security Rollout (SASR)
program undertaken for TSA in 2002. The SASR program involved
deployment of 2,900 personnel, to 429 US airports, in just three
months. These personnel facilitated the transition to the federal
passenger screening workforce, and also undertook the responsibility to
survey and redesign over 1500 passenger security screening lanes.
We have also spent many years evolving our biometric and
credentialing expertise. Dating back to the 1980's when Lockheed Martin
began development of the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), we have had decades of experience in the
biometric field. Over the past five years we have supported the federal
government in advancing their HSPD-12 employee credentialing
activities, including collaborative work with DHS, HHS, and GSA to name
a few. As the lead systems integrator, we also provide core technology
to the Registered Traveler initiative.
LEADERSHIP AND OUTREACH
Our leadership team has been carefully selected to include
individuals with extensive experience and understanding of TSA, the
Coast Guard, the port environment, and biometric credentialing
technology. Key program personnel are as follows:
Jon Rambeau--TWIC Program Executive, Lockheed Martin
As Program Executive, Jon has the primary responsibility for
management of Lockheed Martin's relationship with TSA and the Coast
Guard, and for ensuring that the mission objectives of the program are
satisfied. Jon has managed Lockheed Martin's credentialing business
since 2005, and has been involved in the TWIC program since that time.
Jon was a program manager for a portion of the field operations on
TSA's SASR program in 2002 and 2003, and has also managed Lockheed
Martin's Physical Access Control business, lending direct experience to
TSA's next focus area of integrating TWIC with port access control
systems.
Richard Hatton--TWIC Deputy Program Manager for Field Operations,
Lockheed Martin
As Deputy Program Manager, Richard is responsible for managing our
field staff of more than 400 trusted agents and supervisory personnel,
as well as our field office facilities, equipment, and logistics
network. A retired US Coast Guard Captain, Richard brings a wealth of
experience spanning policy development, operations management, and
emergency preparedness.
Cliff Link--Manager for Stakeholder Outreach and Communications,
Deloitte Consulting
As lead for Stakeholder Outreach, Cliff provides the critical
interface point for a diverse community of national, regional and local
port stakeholders all of whom are eager for information on this
important program. Cliff's selection for this position was based
largely on his extensive maritime experience, which includes over 26
years as a Special Agent and Executive with the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, during which Cliff executed missions and
assignments at ports throughout the nation and the world.
While TWIC is a complex logistical undertaking and an advanced
technology activity, we recognize that it is more than just another
large, complex project management task. This is a program that will
touch hundreds of thousands of Americans' lives, and we have taken
steps to ensure that the experience is as positive as possible for
those affected. We have included, as part of our rollout strategy a
Communications and Stakeholder Outreach Team led by Deloitte
Consulting, LLP. There are two key elements to this team's strategy as
follows:
(1) National-Level Stakeholder Leadership Communications and
Feedback--As part of the Lockheed Martin proposal to TSA, we recognized
that effective stakeholder outreach and communications would be
critical for success. This activity is facilitated primarily through
the formation of the TWIC Stakeholder Communications Committee (TSCC).
The TSCC is facilitated by Lockheed Martin and Deloitte Consulting. TSA
and the Coast Guard take a leadership role in our monthly TSCC
meetings, which are attended by representatives from 49 organizations
including labor unions, industry associations, and other related
groups. The TSCC provides a forum for communication about the program
status and key features, and allows an opportunity for stakeholders to
provide feedback and voice concerns. Each TSCC meeting features at
least one special topic, such as an overview of the TWIC technology, or
a briefing from an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the Appeals &
Waivers Process. Each meeting covers rollout status, review of action
items, and an open forum for members to ask questions on topic of
interest. The TSCC is an important channel for dissemination of
information to the maritime population.
(2) Local Port Outreach--At the local level, the Outreach Team
has been working since the Phase IV contract was awarded to
meet directly with local stakeholders either by telephone or in
person. The purpose of these meetings is to educate the local
population on the key elements of the TWIC program, and to
obtain their support in communicating with the local
population. Where possible, these outreach sessions are a
collaborative effort between the Lockheed Martin Team, TSA, and
the Coast Guard. We begin the outreach process by working
through the Coast Guard Captains of the Port, and attempt to
reach all key stakeholders. We provide leave-behind materials
in the form of flyers and posters, so that local stakeholders
can continue to act as a--communications force multiplier''
with the local population.
ENROLLMENT POPULATION
One of our key focus areas as we begin deployment operations is to
understand the size and geographic distribution of the maritime
population. Initial projections developed under contract to TSA were
provided to Lockheed Martin as part of the TWIC IV solicitation
process. These projections indicate an estimated 750,000 applicants
will be enrolled during the initial 16-month term of the Lockheed
Martin contract. Since contract award, the Coast Guard, TSA, and
Lockheed Martin have received reports from a number of ports indicating
that the actual population may be significantly larger in some areas
than was initially anticipated. We are responding to these concerns in
two ways:
(1) Under the leadership of the Coast Guard, TSA and Lockheed
Martin have participated in a series of conference calls with
each Coast Guard District to discuss specific population
discrepancies and to request data that would support increased
estimates at specific ports. As of October 10th, all of these
conference calls have taken place. Once we have obtained any
revised population figures, facilities, equipment, and
personnel will be adjusted as appropriate in our deployment
plans. It should be noted however, that the results of this
recent round of calls have not yielded any significant data in
terms of specific population count, but we do continue to hear
concerns that the current population projections are low in
some areas. Lockheed Martin will continue to follow up with
each port's stakeholder community as launch dates approach and
ensure that we have surge capacity on hand to respond to
greater than expected turnout.
(2) Because we will always have some level of uncertainty in
the anticipated enrollment population, we have taken a very
flexible approach to planning our operations. We will focus
first and foremost on use of mobile enrollment workstations
that can be taken directly to stakeholder facilities. This
provides an additional level of convenience for the individual
workers, and also allows for more effective management of
applicant throughput, by minimizing lines at fixed facilities
and easing the burden on major employers. In addition to use of
mobile units, we have developed a national surge plan that will
allow for rapid expansion of capacity at any of the 147 port
locations. The first step would be to extend the hours or add
additional work shifts with our existing enrollment staff.
Second, we would add additional staff and increase hours and
shifts. The third step would be to increase the number of
enrollment stations by bringing in mobile enrollment stations.
Lastly, Lockheed Martin would secure additional fixed facility
space. We have already taken steps to prepare for these
potential events.
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY
We recognize that the information provided by TWIC applicants is
personal in nature and subject to privacy restrictions. TWIC program
processes of both physical and IT handling of personal data are
designed around privacy. We have engaged Deloitte Consulting's Privacy
Practice to review the data handling of the TWIC program and design and
document a comprehensive privacy system for TWIC. Deloitte is
recognized as a leading global provider of privacy and data protection
services, having privacy practitioners around the globe. Deloitte
employs over 185 privacy professionals in the US and Canada, over 30%
of whom are Certified Information Protection Professionals (CIPPs).
The TWIC Privacy System addresses the following:
Transparency in privacy practices to the applicants
for the TWIC program in the handling of applicant's Personally
Identifiable information (PII);
Outlines the individual rights and privileges of
applicants and card holders;
Supports applicant's consent for collection, use, and
disclosure of PII;
Outlines acceptable use and handling of applicant and
card holder's PII by the TWIC Program;
Identifies the key security safeguards to support the
privacy and confidentiality of PII; and,
Enables change management for the privacy system to
reflect changes in laws, regulations or TWIC program
requirements.
The TWIC program has applied the preceding features across four key
elements of the overall program:
IT Security--All TWIC applicant data is protected
electronically from the moment it is obtained. All of our data
communications are processed over secure network connections
and all data is encrypted, both in transit and at rest.
Applicant data is only stored on a local enrollment station
until it is transmitted to the central database. Provided a
secure connection exists at the time of enrollment, the
applicant's data is erased from the local machine immediately
upon completion of the transaction. For added security and
accountability, all persons processing a system transaction
must digitally sign that transaction using a digital
certificate from their own TWIC credential.
Physical Security--The central TWIC system is housed
in a secure government facility, and can only be accessed by
individuals possessing a TSA security clearance and a
demonstrated need for system access. Our enrollment facilities
are secured after hours, and any TWIC credentials located on
premise are stored in a GSA-rated safe when the center is not
open for business. When enrolling a TWIC applicant, we ensure
that a physical barrier exists between enrollment stations and
the waiting area, so that applicant data is kept confidential
to the applicant and the trusted agent performing the
enrollment.
Privacy Officer--We have identified an individual who
is the privacy advocate for the Lockheed Martin elements of the
TWIC program. This person will act as an advisor for
disposition of issues raised by any TWIC applicant who has
concerns about Lockheed Martin's handling of their personal
information. This person has extensive privacy experience,
having dispositioned legal matters related to legislation such
as the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), as well
as providing counsel on privacy matters to a number of DHS
programs.
Helpdesk Security--When an applicant calls our
helpdesk, it is important that they quickly obtain useful
information about the status of their account. Equally
important, however, is verifying the caller's identity, before
any personal data is divulged. For this reason, our privacy
program includes helpdesk authentication procedures for
validation of identity during helpdesk calls.
STAFFING
We anticipate employing over 400 field personnel at the peak of the
maritime population enrollment period. The selection and training of
these personnel is of paramount importance to our success. We are
selecting personnel local to each port enrollment location to maximize
local familiarity and to provide for a long-term base of trained
personnel after the initial enrollment period. Our personnel are
selected based on behavioral interviewing techniques focused on the
capability to perform a customer service-oriented function. Once hired,
our personnel must complete the TWIC credentialing process, including
the same Security Threat Assessment (STA) that a transportation worker
must undergo. No access to the TWIC system is granted without the STA
being successfully completed. All of our personnel must successfully
complete 40 hours of classroom training. This includes technical
training and customer service training. We deliver both lecture course
materials and scenario-based role-playing techniques. Of the 40 hours
of classroom training, 21 hours are dedicated to customer service-
related topics.
MINIMIZING INCONVENIENCE
As we recognize that the TWIC credentialing process will be an
added burden on a population that is already working hard to support a
constantly-growing maritime transportation system, we have taken steps
to make this process as convenient as possible. Features of the TWIC
deployment approach include:
(1) Mobile Enrollment and Card Issuance--As mentioned earlier
in this document, we will work with major stakeholders at all
ports to enroll as much of the population as possible at
stakeholder facilities. These may be employer facilities, union
halls, or industry association offices. We will also coordinate
the issuance of cards at these locations wherever possible,
again to provide convenience.
(2) Pre-Enrollment Options--To minimize the time a worker must
be onsite at an enrollment location, we offer multiple pre-
enrollment options. Pre-enrollment involves advance provision
of biographical information so that this information does not
need to be collected at the time of enrollment. Pre-enrollment
may be accomplished online, via the TWIC Helpdesk phone number,
or, at larger ports, via laptop-based self-service kiosks. Pre-
enrollment also provides an opportunity to schedule an
appointment at the TWIC enrollment facility, further reducing
an applicant's wait time.
(3) Multilingual Support--We recognize that certain parts of
the country have significant populations of non-native English
speakers. In these locations we will have trusted agents who
speak other languages. Our pre-enrollment website and helpdesk
are both bilingual (English/Spanish), as is our enrollment
center workstation software.
(4) Fingerprint Rejects--As with any FBI background fingerprint
check, a percentage of the population will have their
fingerprints rejected by the FBI as unreadable. This represents
an inconvenience for the applicant because, in this scenario,
another set of prints must be collected. While we cannot
eliminate this situation, we can minimize and educate in the
process. To minimize the number of rejects, we are applying
quality algorithms to each set of fingerprints captured in our
enrollment centers. This provides trusted agents with an
immediate indicator if prints are of low quality, and provides
an opportunity to recapture them on the spot. If repeated
attempts to capture high-quality prints are unsuccessful, the
applicant can be educated at the time of enrollment on the
possibility of an FBI rejection, and can plan in advance for a
possible resubmission. The use of the advance quality check on
other programs, specifically the TSA HAZMAT driver endorsement
program, has kept FBI rejects to 1.5-2% of the applicant
population, less than half of the 4% average seen by the FBI.
PORT OF WILMINGTON, DELAWARE
As you know, our first enrollment activity began at the Port of
Wilmington in Delaware two weeks ago. We expect that we will enroll
5000--6000 individuals at this location. Prior to this official
enrollment date, the maritime community was able to pre-enroll on the
TWIC website, www.tsa.gov/twic. In the first two days of online pre-
enrollment, we had over 550 individuals begin the enrollment process
on-line. To date, more than 3000 people have utilized the pre-
enrollment option. In Wilmington, we have a fixed enrollment location,
near the entry to the port, with four enrollment stations. In addition,
in an effort to make enrollment as convenient as possible, we will be
taking mobile enrollment stations to the offices of thirteen
stakeholders, including Valero Oil and ILA Locals 1694-1 and 1883, to
enroll their employees and members on site. We are also in discussions
with Chiquita about a similar approach for their employees. With these
mobile enrollment activities, we hope to cover roughly 3,700 people.
PORT OF CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
Tomorrow, we will begin enrollment activity in Corpus Christi,
Texas. At this port, TSA's estimates indicate we will enroll roughly
6000--7000 individuals. In Corpus Christi, we have both fixed and
mobile enrollment capability. As we ramp up local operations, we will
be working with local stakeholders to schedule onsite enrollments
similar to those planned in Wilmington. We look forward to the next 10
locations going ``live'' in November and working towards beginning
enrollment at all 147 locations identified by TSA.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, as you know, Lockheed Martin is involved with a
number of homeland security programs. With each of these, the goal of a
less vulnerable, more secure nation gives us true purpose; it drives
our every action. With TWIC, we are particularly proud to have the
opportunity to work on a program that will protect the engine of
America's economy: her ports. In so doing, and in strong partnership
with TSA, we bring to bear our technical skill and resources to
implement this initiative in a manner that is both secure and
convenient. We will continue to serve our customer with pride and
dedication, doing all that we can to minimize inconvenience to port
workers while striving for the best in maritime security.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony for the
record.
Prepared Statement of George Quick
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
My name is George Quick. I am Vice President of the Pilot
Membership Group of the International Organization of Masters, Mates &
Pilots (MM&P) and a member of the MM&P's General Executive Board. The
MM&P represents Ships' Masters, Licensed Deck Officers and unlicensed
mariners working aboard United States-flag commercial vessels operating
in the foreign and domestic trades and on the inland waterways. We also
represent mariners working aboard civilian crewed ships in the
government's Ready Reserve and Military Sealift Command fleets, as well
as harbor pilots in ports throughout the United States. The seafaring
and pilot members of the MM&P are among those who are required to
obtain a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). As
such, we have a direct interest in the implementation of this program
and the effect it will have on the ability of our members and all
maritime labor to continue to do their jobs.
There should be no question that the MM&P and all the American
seafaring and longshore unions have a vital interest in, and an
unwavering commitment to, the enhancement of America's maritime
security. America's maritime workforce is on the front lines in the war
against maritime-related terrorism. It is American maritime workers who
will almost certainly be among the first American citizens directly
affected, injured and killed in the event of such an incident or breach
of maritime security. It is America's maritime workforce which should
therefore be regarded by our government as an ally here at home, in the
same way that we sail and work in support of our armed forces overseas
in the war against terror.
We also have another obligation to our nation: to safely and
economically move America's foreign and domestic commerce. We strongly
believe strengthening maritime security and facilitating the movement
of cargo to protect our economic security are not mutually exclusive
goals and objectives. Rather, we believe the United States can achieve
both goals provided the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
understands that a poorly designed and implemented program will
unnecessarily burden our industry and seriously diminish our ability to
do our jobs without providing any real maritime security benefits to
our nation.
Interoperability with International Standards
We have consistently argued that there is a simpler, quicker and
more efficient way to implement a TWIC program than the way currently
proposed. After the terrorist attacks against our country on September
11, 2001, government, industry and labor turned their attention to ways
to prevent maritime-related terrorist incidents. The United States,
recognizing the international nature of maritime commerce, looked to
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations body
that regulates international shipping, for support. In 2002, the IMO,
relying most heavily on principles put forward by the United States,
developed an international maritime security regime that applies to
ships and ports.
This IMO security regime has been incorporated into a mandatory
international convention, the International Ship and Port facility
Security Code (ISPS Code). The Coast Guard's maritime security
regulations contained in 33 CFR 104 and 105 are based upon the ISPS
Code to ensure that our country meets its international obligations
under the Code.
The IMO member states collectively realized that identity documents
and access control are essential elements of an effective maritime
security system. They requested that the International Labor
Organization (ILO), another United Nation's body, develop a uniform
international standard for a seafarer's identity document to be used
for access control in conjunction with the ISPS Code. With the
participation of the United States, the ILO adopted the Seafarers'
Identity Document (SID) Convention (C-185) in June 2003.
C-185 establishes international standards for an identity document
based on the biometric identifier standards of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations entity responsible for
the regulation of international air transport. In fact, the ICAO
biometric identifier standards are already being utilized by the United
States in the Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) systems used to
read the new electronic passports held by foreign visitors entering our
country through airports.
Unfortunately, rather than use the internationally accepted ICAO
standards as the basis for the TWIC, the TSA made the decision to use
the U.S.-specific Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), which
was developed for Federal ID cards used by Federal workers and which
has never been used in the commercial sector. We believe that many of
the problems that have plagued the TWIC program and delayed its
implementation can be attributed to TSA's decision to adopt the
inappropriate FIPS standard as the basis for the TWIC card.
We wish to point out that Congress has strongly suggested the use
of an international standard for transportation worker identity cards.
For example, the MTSA encouraged the U.S. Coast Guard to:
``. . .negotiate an international agreement, or an amendment to
an international agreement, that provides for a uniform,
comprehensive, international system of identification for
seafarers that will enable the United States and another
country to establish authoritatively the identity of any
seafarer aboard a vessel within the jurisdiction, including the
territorial waters, of the United States or such other
country.''
In addition, section 303(b) (1) of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act) very clearly
establishes Congress's intent that the U.S. system of machine readable,
tamper-resistant travel documents conform to international standards.
The section reads, in part:
``The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly
establish document authentication standards and biometric
identifier standards to be employed on such visas and other
travel and entry documents from among those biometric
identifiers recognized by domestic and international standards
organizations.''
Given what we believe to be the unambiguous intent of Congress as
expressed in the MTSA and the Border Security Act that the TWIC and
U.S. travel documents conform to international standards, it is clear
that Congress recognized the value of globally interoperable systems
and directed the relevant Federal agencies to pursue interoperability.
What is not clear is why TSA and the Coast Guard have ignored this
aspect of the Congressional mandate and have chosen instead an internal
federal government standard for the TWIC that will never be
interoperable with international standards and is untested and unproven
on the massive scale required for the TWIC program.
The ICAO standards are a proven and internationally accepted
technology for identity documents. The readers and other supporting
hardware have also been proven at airports around the world. We believe
TWIC should start with this established system and build upon it as
technology advances and new capabilities emerge. By starting from a
straightforward and uncomplicated foundation--by adopting the same
proven technology that is widely used for access control of foreign
visitors to the United States as well as at international airports and
in foreign ports--we can dramatically reduce the problems with the
present TWIC program and increase the ease and speed of implementation
of the TWIC.
Federal Preemption
There is another aspect of the current TWIC program that we believe
must be addressed if the TWIC program is to achieve its maritime
security objectives without unnecessarily disrupting and impeding the
flow of commerce. Specifically, we believe that the Federally-issued
TWIC must take precedence over all other state, local and private
identification card requirements for maritime workers. It is, in our
opinion, critical that state and local and private entities no longer
be able to subject our nation's U.S. citizen maritime workforce to
additional application requirements, background checks and fees or to
demand that our nation's workforce obtain multiple and duplicative
maritime port and vessel access control credentials.
We believe it is possible under a properly structured and
implemented TWIC program to enhance security within America's ports and
aboard vessels in such a way that there is a minimal disruption to the
movement of goods in domestic and foreign commerce and the rights of
transportation workers are protected. Unfortunately, unless the
Congress acts to ensure that the Federally-mandated TWIC program
preempts all other state and local and private entity access control
procedures and requirements, our maritime workforce and transportation
system and our national economy will be adversely affected without any
corresponding increase in national security benefits. Equally
important, unless Congress acts our nation's security may be weakened
as Americans are discouraged by excessive regulatory burdens from
entering and remaining in the maritime industry, reducing the civilian
maritime manpower base relied upon by the Department of Defense.
Maritime workers are a mobile workforce, moving between different
states, ports and facilities. The imposition of multiple additional
requirements beyond those mandated by the Federal TWIC program will
force maritime transportation workers to file numerous applications,
undergo repetitive, time-consuming background checks and pay all the
fees associated with possibly dozens of identification credentials. If
Congress does not act, and the TWIC regulations continue to allow each
state and local government and port and maritime facility to develop
and implement its own access control system above and beyond what the
Federal government has deemed necessary to protect the national
interest, then the access control identification credential system as a
whole will become an unjustifiably burdensome and costly administrative
impediment to the efficient flow of commerce.
America's maritime workforce must have an access control
identification credential that they can present at every state, port or
facility their employment takes them. If they do not, and if our
government allows numerous additional requirements to be imposed,
America's maritime workforce will be unduly and unfairly burdened,
America's efficient and reliable waterborne transportation systems will
be undermined, and America's commercial seapower capability will be
weakened. In addition, in the absence of a national TWIC program that
supersedes all others, mariners who do not also possess an identity
card issued by a particular state, port or facility may find themselves
forbidden to take shore leave or prohibited from transiting between
vessels without first paying ``escort'' fees. The result will be
American citizen mariners imprisoned aboard their vessels in American
ports.
Consequently, Mr. Chairman, maritime labor is united in our
position that Congress must act to ensure that the Federal laws and
regulations governing the TWIC program preempt all other state and
local access control requirements for maritime transportation workers.
We do not believe that this request is inconsistent with the goals and
objectives of the TWIC program or with our nation's efforts to prevent
a maritime-related terrorist incident. Rather, we believe that the war
against terror is and should be treated as a national effort, and the
national standards and system put in place through the TWIC program to
combat terrorism should take precedence over all others and not be
secondary to the systems of each individual facility, port, city or
state. America's maritime workforce must have an access control card
that they can present at whatever state, port or facility their
employment may take them. If they do not, and our government allows
numerous additional local requirements to be imposed upon them, we will
be unfairly and unjustifiably burdening this American workforce while
undermining our country's efficient and reliable interstate and foreign
commerce maritime transportation system.
Disqualifying Crimes
Concerning the crimes that would disqualify an American worker from
obtaining a TWIC, we feel that Congress had it right in the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). MTSA sets the standard for
denying a person a TWIC based upon that person's potential as a
terrorism risk. Yet, TSA has chosen through regulation to disqualify an
individual who has committed crimes that do not predispose an
individual to be a terrorism risk. We are troubled by the prospect that
a large number of workers might be disqualified from obtaining a TWIC
or become entangled in the process for past offenses that are not
terrorism or national security related. It is essential that there be a
fair and robust appeals process, monitored closely, to ensure that
workers who pose no threat are not unjustly denied a TWIC and therefore
denied the opportunity to pursue their livelihoods. We ask this
Committee and the Congress to ensure that there are sufficient
resources available to administer the waiver and appeals process fairly
and in a timely fashion.
Our concerns about the background check process are fueled by
problems encountered by workers who requested a HAZMAT endorsement. In
her October 4 Senate Commerce Committee testimony, TWIC Program
Director Maurine Fanguy stated, ``On the HAZMAT program, we have
processed over 10,000 appeals, and [in] 99 percent of them. . .we've
discovered that we had incorrect information and we gave the person
their endorsement.'' While we commend TSA's HAZMAT appeal process,
which obviously looked at workers' appeals without prejudice, we would
note that over 10,000 people were initially denied an endorsement
because of errors or omissions in the initial determination of security
threat assessment (IDTA). Obviously, this aspect of the TWIC program
warrants careful oversight.
Competitiveness Issues
It is also important to note that approximately 95 percent of all
the cargo entering and leaving the United States is carried aboard
foreign flag vessels operated by foreign crews. What is even more
important is that none of these vessels and none of these foreign crews
are subject to the same requirements as those imposed by our government
on U.S.-flag vessels and their American crews. Foreign crews are not
covered by the TWIC program. Foreign crews operating vessels in and out
of American ports are not subject to U.S. government imposed background
checks. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of maritime personnel
responsible for the carriage of hazardous and other cargoes in and out
of our country will not have to obtain a TWIC or obtain an access
control credential issued by American states, ports and facilities--
only American mariners will be subjected to these numerous and onerous
requirements.
Combining the Merchant Mariner Credential and TWIC
All mariners employed aboard U.S.-flag merchant vessels greater
than 100 gross register tons (except for those operating exclusively on
the rivers) are required to have a U.S. government issued Merchant
Mariner's Document (MMD). An MMD is a card that serves as both an
identity credential and as a qualification credential. They are issued
to shipboard officers and to unlicensed personnel who work in support
of the operation of the vessel. In conjunction with this requirement,
and long before the events of 9/11 and the enactment of legislation
authorizing the establishment of the TWIC program, individuals seeking
employment as a licensed or unlicensed merchant mariner were subject to
extensive background checks. In addition, the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) requires transportation workers, including
individuals who hold a merchant mariners document, to undergo a
criminal background check.
Currently, when an individual submits an application to the Coast
Guard for evaluation for an MMD, he must include a copy of proof of
citizenship and establish proof that he has a Social Security Number.
The individual must further undergo a drug test, and is also
fingerprinted so that the Federal Bureau of Investigation can perform
the necessary criminal background checks. Finally, the individual must
agree to a check of the National Driver Register so the Coast Guard can
determine if there are any offenses relating to the operation of a
motor vehicle which may render the individual unsuited for the duties
and responsibilities associated with shipboard employment.
We believe that the merchant mariner document (MMD) that is
currently issued to seafaring personnel should be updated in order to
comply with the requirements of the MTSA in order to allow the MMD to
serve as a TWIC for all merchant mariners, licensed and unlicensed. We
believe that the MMD can and should be upgraded to include the
biometric identifier standards of the TWIC and that a combined MMD/TWIC
should be issued after the requirements of both statutes are met. Doing
so, and giving the Coast Guard exclusive jurisdiction to provide the
requisite background checks, will eliminate the need for two or more
Federal agencies to perform separate background checks; will eliminate
redundancies in the vetting process; will streamline the credentialing
process for mariners; and will eliminate the need for mariners to carry
more than one Federal identification credential for maritime
employment.
We understand the Coast Guard is concerned that combining the MMD/
TWIC and a license on one card would exceed the space available for
printing on the TWIC card and that the amount of information may exceed
the storage capacity of the chip under current technology. We agree and
believe very strongly that this problem can be overcome by continuing
to issue a merchant mariner's license as a separate document in its
current format. It is easy to print all the information pertaining to a
licensed officer's qualifications on a license in its current form
which would be available for inspection by port control officers.
Under this system, an unlicensed mariner would be required to hold
only one document: a combined MMD/TWIC that would serve as a
certificate of qualification, an identity document and as a biometric
transportation security card. Licensed officers would hold the same
combined MMD/TWIC and also be issued a separate license which would
serve as the individual's certificate of qualification with all
endorsements clearly indicated.
Conclusion
We thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present
our comments on the TWIC program. We stand ready to work with you and
your colleagues and with other concerned and affected parties to
achieve a safer and more secure maritime transportation network.
Prepared Statement of Bethann Rooney
Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the importance of maritime
and port security and the challenges that industry is facing in
implementing the TWIC (Transportation Workers Identification
Credential) program. My name is Bethann Rooney and I am the Manager of
Port Security for The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey.
Since the attacks of September 11th our collective attention has
been focused on the need to protect our borders at major international
gateways like the Port of New York and New Jersey and small ports
alike. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 and the
Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act are two
pieces of landmark legislation that have had a positive impact on our
homeland security. We commend the House of Representatives and this
Committee in particular, for its work on ensuring the security of our
ports and the people that work in them.
Section 102 of the MTSA requires background checks and the issuance
of biometric transportation security cards (TWIC) to all personnel who
require unescorted access to secure areas of regulated vessels and port
facilities. The SAFE Port Act subsequently required a TWIC technology
pilot program and other program milestones. Fundamental to our nation's
security is the ability to ensure that individuals who pose a security
threat do not gain access to our nation's ports. TWIC helps provide
that insurance. Therefore, we fully support TWIC, the need for positive
access control at port facilities and the creation of a national
identification program.
We also recognize that the TWIC program is one of the world's most
ambitious interoperable biometric credentialing programs and that
rolling it out in the most complex transportation industry is a
monumental undertaking. Therefore, we also commend both the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the United States
Coast Guard (USCG) for their commitment and dedication to this program
and particularly for their willingness to engage industry stakeholders.
Nonetheless, I would like to briefly discuss four broad elements of
the TWIC program and a number of outstanding issues and concerns that
may unduly impact the objectives of the TWIC program, maritime
operations and port security if not implemented in a decisive and
thoughtful manner. These include: (1) enrollment; (2) card reader
technology; (3) the pilot program; and (4) enforcement.
OUR NATION'S PORT ARE VITAL TO THE ECONOMY
Ninety-five percent of the international goods that come into the
country come in through our nation's 361 ports; approximately 13% of
that volume is handled in the Port of New York and New Jersey alone,
the third largest port in the country. The Port generates over 230,000
jobs and $12.6 billion in wages throughout the region. Additionally,
the Port contributes $2.1 billion in state and local tax revenues and
more than $3.8 billion in federal tax revenues. Cargo that is handled
in the Port is valued at over $150 billion and serves 80 million
people, or thirty five percent of the entire US population. In 2005,
the port handled over 5,500 ship calls, 86 million tons of general
cargo, 852,297 autos, and 2.9 million containers, approximately 8,200
containers each day. Today, international trade accounts for
approximately thirty percent of the US economy. Considering all this,
it is easy to understand how a terrorist incident in one of our ports
would have a devastating effect on our nation and its economy.
TWIC ENROLLMENT
Enrollment Schedule
The Port of New York and New Jersey lies within what is considered
the two most dangerous miles in the country and, as such, the
implementation of the TWIC in this region is of up-most importance.
Therefore we were very disappointed when the Port of New York and New
Jersey was not selected as one of the first ports in which enrollment
would begin. In fact just a portion of the highest risk Tier I ports in
the country are included in the initial enrollment period, while five
Tier II and Tier III ports are already scheduled to begin enrollment.
It is even more baffling that none of the pilot project locations, all
of which require a critical mass of transportation workers to be
enrolled before the pilot projects can begin are scheduled for
enrollment yet. Not including our facilities as part of the first roll
out of the TWIC enrollment does not make sense from a risk based
security or program management standpoint.
Need for Accurate Enrollment Estimates
The initial enrollment phase of the TWIC program is referred to as
Phase I. TSA estimates that 750,000 workers will need to obtain a TWIC
card in Phase I. Unfortunately, the industry feels that number will be
significantly higher and it is concerned about the TWIC contractor's
ability to provide the requisite level of enrollment service without
increasing the cost of the TWIC card to the end user or creating
unnecessary delays in enrollment of processing. In the Port of New York
and New Jersey alone, the TSA estimated that there would be 60,256
individuals who would need a TWIC. With just a seventy percent return
on a survey of all stakeholders in our port, our population counts are
closer to 125,000 people, more than double the TSA's estimates. The
disparity in estimates is even more acute in the Port of Houston where
the TSA's estimates were off by a factor of twelve (35,000 vs.
435,000)! In Savannah, the TSA's estimates were for 15,000 people and
port officials there believe that it is closer to 30,000. Admittedly,
Lockheed Martin has been responsive to estimates by the individual
ports and has committed to providing the resources that are necessary
to appropriately support TWIC enrollment. However, it is unclear
whether the necessary level of service is sustainable within the
framework of a fixed-price contract.
Enrollment Locations
An equally significant problem has to do with the ability to locate
suitable facilities for fixed enrollment sites in close proximity to
the port infrastructure. There are several requirements for these
facilities that have proven to be problematic including ensuring
sufficient truck parking, an inability or unwillingness to enter into a
contract for more than a year and provisions to satisfy the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements which are very difficult to
find in the aged port infrastructure around the United States. For
example, in the Port of New York and New Jersey, Lockheed Martin has
yet to find a suitable location that meets the above requirements on
the New Jersey side of the Port, where the vast majority of all port
activity occurs. While this is being accommodated for the initial
enrollment period with mobile enrollment capabilities that will be
available to employers with more than fifty employees requiring a TWIC,
it does not provide a viable long-term solution Convenient permanent
sites for TWIC enrollment and renewals must be identified and
established. The sites should be strategically located in each port
region. The Department of Homeland Security must take whatever steps
necessary, to the ensure that the 146 TWIC enrollment sites around the
country continue to be the minimum that are supported after the initial
enrollment period is deemed to be completed. If suitable facilities
can't be identified, then consideration must be given to make TWIC
enrollment available at State Department of Motor Vehicles offices,
truck rest stops or US Post Offices.
Liability
While Lockheed will be accommodating initial TWIC enrollment with
mobile capabilities, under current plans, the port worker would still
need to go to a fixed location in order to pick up and activate his/her
TWIC card. While the process of obtaining the TWIC and activating it
may only take a few minutes, the reality is that the worker could be
unproductive for two to three hours or more as he or she travels to and
from the fixed enrollment site. This potential need for extensive
travel to complete the TWIC enrollment process has created liability
concerns on the port of employers who may face potential tort liability
if an employee gets injured in the process of obtaining a TWIC. The
government should indemnify employers for any damages that the may
incur arising out of an employee's TWIC enrollment process.
Truck Driver Screening & Enrollment
The most difficult population of port workers to enroll in TWIC is
going to be the truck drivers. In the Port of New York and New Jersey
we have an existing truck driver identification system, called SEA
LINK_ in which over 25,000 individuals are actively registered to pick
up and deliver cargo at our seven container terminals. Due to the
general nature of this business, we issue over 400 new SEA LINK_ cards
a month to drivers that have never hauled cargo to or from our maritime
facilities. There are an equally large number of individuals that work
in multiple ports around the country. Therefore, enrollment and
enforcement on a port-to-port basis will have severe impacts on port
productivity.
Additionally, if a trucker enrolls for a TWIC during his first
visit to the Port of New York and New Jersey, the current process
requires that he return to the same enrollment site to retrieve and
activate his TWIC after the security threat assessment has been
completed. It could be weeks or months before the driver is able to
return to New York and New Jersey and in the meantime he is unable to
access other ports without an escort, which doesn't need to be
provided.
We have made a number of suggestions to address this issue
including: allowing TWIC applicants to designate that cards be returned
to a different enrollment center than that where they originally
applied; or a mechanism wherein the TWIC is mailed to an applicant's
office or home. Once the applicant has the TWIC card, the individual
could return to an enrollment center of his choice anywhere in the
country to activate the TWIC.
Under the SAFE Port Act, DHS was required to implement a threat
assessment screening for all port truck drivers with access to secure
areas of a port and who possess a commercial driver's license but not a
hazardous materials endorsement. This program would be very similar to
the interim-screening program in which all facility owners and
operators were required to participate in early 2006. Although this
program hasn't been rolled out yet, we feel strongly that DHS comply
with this requirement so that industry has a better understanding of
what the impact of TWIC might be on the truck driver community. Current
estimates indicate that anywhere from 10-40% of truck drivers may not
be eligible for a TWIC, which could seriously impact port productivity
and ultimately security.
CARD READER TECHNOLOGY
Earlier this year, the TSA and USCG decided to break the
implementation of the TWIC program into two phases; the enrollment
phase, Phase I, which I have discussed and which is beginning in the
Port of Wilmington this week and Phase II which requires the
installation and use of biometric card reader technology at both the
truck and pedestrian gates of regulated facilities and at ingress to
regulated vessels. Throughout the course of the past ten months, we and
several of our industry partners, through participation in the National
Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) TWIC Working Group, have
been working with the federal government and biometric technology
industry to develop the functional requirements for these biometric
card readers. This has culminated with the publication of the TWIC
Biometric Reader Specification last month. While this is a ``working
draft'' that may be updated once the pilot projects have been
completed, it begins to answer a number of the questions that facility
and vessel owners and operators have.
However, as with the implementation of any technology, it is
important to understand how the technology will be deployed and what
the government's concept of operations is before the technology
solution is identified. Regrettably, the Coast Guard still hasn't
answered a number of critical policy questions, the answers to which
could have a significant impact on port operations, our cost to
implement the TWIC program and the card reader manufacturers'
willingness to participate in the program.
The two most significant questions that haven't been answered yet
are ``how often will the biometric need to be verified?'' and ``is
positive access control required?'' These policy decisions must be made
before the pilot projects begin so that they can be adequately tested
and evaluated during the pilot projects.
Biometric Verification
In June 2007, the Coast Guard asked the NMSAC TWIC Working Group to
assist with the development of the draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
for the TWIC Biometric Reader Requirements. To assist with this effort,
they provided a set of specific questions that they wanted answered.
After reviewing the totality of those questions, it has been suggested
that the Coast Guard may not require that the biometric data stored
within the TWIC be verified for every access control transaction
regardless of the MARSEC level. While this may be the minority opinion,
the Port Authority views the failure to verify the biometric 100% of
the time as a point which would defeat the purpose of a biometric-based
credential and would do little to ensure that we can positively
identify an individual seeking to gain access to a secure area of our
port facilities and vessels.
100% biometric verification is the only way to ensure identity of
the individual. If the ultimate decision is to require biometric
verification at elevated MARSEC levels only, then the rate of
verification should be consistent with the additional screening and
inspection rates that are already required, a random 25%-50% at MARSEC
II. That way, facility operators would not be required to purchase and
maintain biometric readers at access points that are rarely used.
Rather, during heightened security levels, security guards could verify
biometrics using handheld readers at those access control points. This
would reduce the need for significant capital expenses for component
equipment that would rarely, if ever be used. In the Port of New York
and New Jersey for example, we have been at an elevated MARSEC level
for just twelve hours in the six years since 9/11. It would make little
sense to invest in approximately $10 million in infrastructure that
might not ever get used, as opposed to $50,000 in handheld card
readers.
Positive Access Control
An equally important policy decision that must be made is whether
or not ``positive access control'' is required. Positive access control
means that you know who is on your facility or vessel at all times.
This would require the owner/operator to have two readers at each
access control point, one each on both the secure and non-secure side.
Operationally this is also very difficult to achieve in several
port activities in which personnel regularly move between a secure and
non-secure area numerous times during a typical work period. An example
of this can be seen at a cruise terminal. The porter may come in and
out of the baggage claim area (secure) to help passengers move luggage
to a waiting vehicle (non-secure). The same is true for Roll On/Roll
Off operations, where longshoremen exit the secure area with a vehicle
that they have driven off of the ship and return to the secure area in
a passenger van with a dozen of their colleagues. Requiring these
workers to scan in and out of the secure area, thus establishing
positive access control would be a significant barrier in terms of
efficiency with little buy down in risk. In fact in the aviation
environment, which is arguably higher risk than the maritime industry,
positive access control is not currently a regulatory requirement.
``Hotlist'' Verification
Regulated entities must be provided with an electronic access
(direct download, searchable database or telephonic system) to the
national database in order to readily verify the validity of a TWIC
that is presented at our facilities. The ``hotlist'' also needs to be
able to indicate whether the TWIC has been revoked, lost or stolen so
that the owner/operator can make a decision whether or not to allow a
person access. Additionally, when an individual reports his/her card as
being lost or stolen, they must be issued a receipt that can be
presented at the access control point in order to continue to gain
unescorted access.
In addition to the ``hotlist'' provisions, we also need a provision
that prohibits an individual that has been determined to pose a
security threat from gaining access to a restricted area, even with an
escort. To do otherwise would undermine the purpose and intent of the
TWIC program. Provisions must be made to prohibit any and all
individuals that pose a security threat from gaining access to a
restricted area regardless of whether or not there is an escort. This
means that the names and biographical information of anybody that has
applied for a TWIC and been denied, must be available to all owners/
operators on a real time basis so that we don't permit access to these
individuals with an escort.
ENFORCEMENT
TWIC Applicability
Current regulations fail to appropriately and clearly enumerate the
specific types of individuals that are required to obtain a TWIC. Thus,
significant populations of individuals needing TWICs will not have
appropriate notice of their need to obtain one. The Coast Guard
attempted to address this in their Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC 03-07) wherein they provided an illustrative list of ten
communities of people that would likely need a TWIC. The problem is
that the NVIC is a Coast Guard guidance document only and it is not
enforceable by law. Similarly, it is likely that some individuals,
perhaps those who aren't able to get a TWIC because of a disqualifying
event in their background, may expect to be provided an escort. This
will place the owners and operators in a difficult position and could
lead to disputes. Congress should amend the SAFE Port Act to clearly
enumerate the class of workers that must obtain and use a TWIC.
Non-MTSA Facilities
The Port Authority operates numerous transportation facilities in
the New York and New Jersey region including all of the tunnels and
bridges that connect the two states, an interstate passenger rail
system and five airports. The Port Authority Police Department has
1,600 sworn officers who have jurisdiction in both states and provide
24/7 law enforcement for some of the nation's most critical and iconic
transportation systems. The actions that a law enforcement officer can
take at an MTSA facility if a fraudulent, tampered with or revoked TWIC
is presented are clear. What is not clear, however, is what if any
action a police office can take if a fraudulent or revoked TWIC is
presented at a non-MTSA regulated facility. For example, if a Port
Authority Police Officer stops an intermodal container truck at one of
our bridges, can the office ask if the driver has a TWIC and if so
verify the identity and validity? Similarly, if someone is questioned
at one of the airports and voluntarily presents a TWIC as a form of ID,
can the officer verify the identity and validity of the TWIC? In both
cases, if a discrepancy is found (on the ``hotlist'', no biometric
match, obvious tampering with the TWIC) what action if any can the
officer take? The federal government needs to provide state and local
law enforcement officials with additional information and clear
guidance on what action they are permitted to take at both MTSA and
non-MTSA facilities.
Escort Requirements
In addition to an owner/operator's liability if an employee is
involved in an accident while going to and from the TWIC enrollment
site, there are additional concerns about an escort's liability and
responsibility that must be addressed before the enforcement period
begins. If an individual under escort causes a Transportation Security
Incident or violates other regulations and laws, what are the
consequences for the escort? The answer could impact the willingness of
certain individuals to act as an escort.
Emergency Access
The Coast Guards Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
adequately addresses the TWIC requirements for uniformed law
enforcement and emergency response personnel. However, the entire TWIC
program missed an opportunity to provide a visual identifier on the
TWIC card for essential non-uniformed port personnel that might require
access on local roadways and to the port for critical response and
recovery operations. For example, in the Port of New York and New
Jersey, we have established a Recovery Advisory Unit (RAU) that is made
up of senior level industry stakeholders that would advise the Captain
of the Port on critical issues in the aftermath of a transportation
security incident. Nonetheless, if these individuals weren't able to
travel on a portion of the New Jersey Turnpike because it is shut down
for anything other than emergency vehicles, as it was for several weeks
after 9/11, these individuals would be unable to fulfill their
essential recovery duties. The TSA should revisit the physical design
of the TWIC card to include an indicator that would designate certain
individuals as essential personnel that would require access.
PILOT PROJECT
The SAFE Port Act requires DHS to establish a pilot program to test
TWIC card readers at five geographic locations in order to evaluate
business processes, technology and operational impacts. As we
understand it, the pilot project will be conducted in three to four
phases and include both laboratory bench tests and field-based tests.
Veil of Secrecy
The Port Authority as well as other port authorities and vessel
operators have agreed to participate in these pilot programs.
Unfortunately, there has been what I call a ``veil of secrecy'' over
the details of the pilot program that make it very difficult for the
Port Authority to make risk based decisions on which of our facilities
will be used for the pilot and the finances, personnel and
infrastructure that we need to support the pilot project. Our offer to
have staff involved in discussions with TSA and USCG to sign a Non-
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) have been turned down, citing an inability
to discuss details with even the pilot project participants while the
rulemaking process is underway. It is critical that the Testing and
Evaluation Master Plan and pilot project schedule be shared with the
pilot project participants as early as possible so that we have
sufficient time to plan.
Cost Share
While the SAFE Port Act mandated these pilot projects, the
Department has not funded them. We and other port authorities and
vessel operators are committed to assisting the Department in achieving
its goals relative to the implementation and deployment of TWIC in the
maritime industry. Accordingly, we have agreed to work with TSA to use
our facilities and vessels, as well as use a portion of our federal
grant monies (FY 2006 and FY 2007), to test the equipment that will be
used to read the TWIC cards. The federal grant monies, however, require
a 25% cash match.
In order to devise a meaningful pilot project, considerable initial
disruption will occur at each participating facility and vessel and
both capital and operating funds will be expended that will not be
recoverable at the end of the pilot, whether or not it is successful.
We would suggest that the cost to the participants to plan, manage and
implement this program already represents a significant contribution,
even without an obligation for a cash match. Therefore, mandating a 25%
cash match for purchase of infrastructure and equipment required for
participation in the pilot project will place an undue burden on us,
and will only serve to reduce the amount of resources we will have at
our disposal to ensure that a complete implementation of TWIC is a
success. We have therefore requested that Secretary Chertoff recognize
the in-kind contribution that our organizations will be making and
waive the cash match requirement pursuant to his authority under 46 USC
70107, section (c), (2), (b). We would appreciate the Committee's
support of this request as well. All previous TWIC pilot projects were
fully funded by the TSA, and the pilot project required under the SAFE
Port Act should receive the same level of support.
Biometric Technology Performance Requirements
Finally, it is absolutely essential that the card reader and
biometric authentication capabilities be tested and proven to meet or
exceed the TWIC Reader Hardware and Card Application Specifications
during the TWIC pilot projects before deployment can begin in the
maritime environment. In the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
we just completed a one-year Limited Early Deployment (LED) of
fingerprint biometric technology. In the outdoor environment we
experienced a false rejection rate of 9.5% as opposed to 1% that is
called for in the TWIC Specifications. We also experienced an average
transaction time of 6 seconds, which is twice as long as the maximum
transaction time that is required in the maritime industry.
Additionally, despite manufacturers published environmental
requirements, biometric reader performance suffered greatly in both the
rain and severe cold and 71% of the readers needed to be replaced
within a year due to hardware and display failures. Our experience with
this project clearly indicates that fingerprint biometric technology
simply does not perform as well as advertised in an outdoor
environment. The fingerprint reader manufacturers must improve the
design to include protection against harsh weather environments and
further field verification must be conducted.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the issue of port and maritime security is an enormous
challenge given the complexity of the international transportation
network. The implementation of a robust credentialing program at
maritime facilities remains critical to the security of our nation's
ports. We are encouraged by the start of TWIC enrollment earlier this
week and the publishing of the card reader specification but much more
remains to be done.
I hope my comments today have provided some helpful insight into
this complex matter. The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey is
prepared to offer any additional assistance that you may require. Thank
you.
Appendix: Additional Questions and Responses
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Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from Cathleen A. Berrick
Questions 1.: GAO has completed several reports on TWIC, please
provide us with information on some of the challenges faced by the
Administration in implementing this program.
Response: We have reported that TSA and maritime industry
stakeholders will face several challenges in their efforts to
successfully implement the TWIC program. First, TSA and the enrollment
contractor will need to transition from limited testing of the TWIC
program to successful implementation of the program on a much larger
scale covering an estimated 770,000 workers at about 3,200 maritime
facilities and 5,300 vessels. We previously reported that TSA enrolled
and issued TWIC cards to only about 1,700 workers at 19 maritime
facilities during program testing. TSA and industry stakeholders must
also ensure that TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric
TWIC card readers, will work effectively in the maritime environment,
be compatible with TWIC cards that are currently being issued, ensure
that facilities and vessels can effectively and economically obtain
information on workers who may pose a threat to security, and balance
security requirements with facilitating maritime commerce. We
previously reported that TSA conducted limited testing of biometric
TWIC card readers and obtained limited information on their
effectiveness, particularly when these readers are used in the harsh
maritime environment. In addition, TSA did not test the use of
biometric card readers on vessels. TSA is currently planning a pilot
program to test TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric
card readers, at 5 maritime locations to address requirements of the
SAFE Port Act. It will be critical that TSA ensure that this pilot
program tests all aspects of the TWIC program in the maritime
environment and that the results be used to help ensure a successful
implementation of these technologies in the future. It will also be
important that the pilot measure the impact that the TWIC program may
have on the flow of maritime commerce and use this information in
developing future program requirements.
Question 2.: Has TSA fully addressed the recommendations in your
September 2006 report on the TWIC program?
Response: TSA recognized many of the problems we highlighted in our
September 2006 report and reported that they have initiated actions to
address our recommendations. For example, we previously reported that
TSA enrolled and issued TWIC cards to only about 1,700 workers at 19
facilities during testing--well short of its goal of 75,000--due to
technical problems in enrolling workers. We recommended that TSA
conduct additional testing to ensure that the TWIC program will be able
to efficiently enroll and issue TWIC cards to large numbers of workers.
TSA has since reported that it and its contractor conducted performance
testing of the systems and software that will be used to enroll workers
in the TWIC program and issue TWIC cards to these workers. According to
TSA officials, such testing helped to ensure that these systems will
work effectively when implemented and will be able to handle the
capacity of enrolling as many as 5,000 workers per day, conducting
background checks on these workers in a timely manner, and efficiently
producing TWIC cards for each worker. We have not independently
verified or assessed TSA and its contractor's testing efforts.
TSA has also taken actions to address our recommendation regarding
contract oversight and stakeholder communication and coordination.
Specifically, TSA added additional staff with program and contract
management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract, and
developed additional controls to help ensure that contract requirements
are met, such as a TWIC quality assurance surveillance plan, which
includes contractor performance metrics. In addition, TSA has taken
actions to address our recommendation that it more closely coordinate
with the maritime industry and establish communication and coordination
plans. Specifically, TSA has established a TWIC stakeholder
communication committee and has also required the TWIC contractor to
develop a plan for communicating and coordinating with maritime
stakeholders and educating workers regarding TWIC requirements. In
addition, some maritime industry stakeholders with whom we spoke
identified that communication and coordination with TSA regarding the
program has improved. While these actions are steps in the right
direction, TSA and the TWIC contractor must transition from limited
testing to successful implementation of the program on a much larger
scale, covering 770,000 workers at about 3,200 maritime facilities and
5,300 vessels.
Question 3.: How confident are you that, six years after the TWIC
program was initiated and repeated delays, the program is now on its
way toward successful implementation?
Response: We are cautiously optimistic. Over the last year, we have
seen a gradual shifting in TSA's approach regarding the management of
this program in an effort to correct past problems. For example,
although TSA missed the July 1, 2007 SAFE Port Act deadline to begin
implementing the program at the 10 highest risk ports because of the
need to conduct additional testing, it is important that the TSA test
the TWIC technologies to ensure that they work effectively before they
are implemented across the maritime sector.
Although we have not yet evaluated TSA and its contractors' testing
of the enrollment and card issuance systems, such testing may help to
ensure a smoother implementation and could help to avoid problems that
occurred in the past. TSA has also taken action to implement our
recommendations regarding contract oversight and stakeholders
coordination. Nevertheless, enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards is
only the first component of the TWIC program. TSA, Coast Guard, and the
maritime industry face another major challenge in ensuring that TWIC
access control technologies that will be installed throughout the
maritime sector, such as biometric card readers, will work effectively
in the marine environment and will be compatible with TWIC cards that
are currently being issued. TSA must also ensure that facilities and
vessels can effectively and economically obtain information on workers
that may pose a threat, and balance security requirements while
facilitating maritime commerce. As a result, it is critical that TSA's
TWIC access control pilot program, which TSA has begun planning, test
all key aspects of TWIC access controls to ensure that they work
effectively before the program is implemented.
Question 4.: What assurances are there that TSA will more
effectively monitor the performance of the TWIC implementation
contractor than was done during TWIC prototype testing?
Response: Although we have not independently assessed the
effectiveness of TSA's efforts to strengthen contractor oversight since
prototype testing, TSA has taken actions that should help to address
the contract oversight problems that we previously identified. For
example, TSA added staff to the TWIC program office with expertise in
technology, acquisitions, and contract and program management, and
plans to conduct monthly performance reviews and periodic site visits
to TWIC enrollment centers to verify performance data reported by the
contractor. In addition, TSA developed a TWIC quality assurance
surveillance plan that allows TSA to track contractor performance in
comparison to acceptable quality levels. Further, TSA plans to provide
financial incentives to the TWIC contractor for exceeding acceptable
quality levels and disincentives for not meeting these levels, and is
requiring the contractor to survey customer satisfaction as part of
contract performance. While the steps that TSA has taken should help to
address the contract planning and oversight problems that we have
previously identified, since we have not independently evaluated these
actions, we cannot comment regarding assurances that these steps will
result in more effective monitoring of the TWIC contractor as the
program moves forward.
Question 5.: GAO previously reported that TSA did not effectively
communicate and coordinate with stakeholders during TWIC program
testing. What steps, if any, has TSA taken to fix these problems?
Response: During our prior work, stakeholders we spoke with at all
15 maritime locations that tested the TWIC program told us that TSA did
not effectively communicate and coordinate with them during prototype
testing of the program. TSA acknowledged that the agency could have
better communicated with stakeholders and has since reported taking
actions to strengthen communication and coordination. For example, TSA
officials reported that the agency developed a TWIC communication
strategy and plan that describes how the agency will communicate with
maritime industry stakeholders, and required the TWIC contractor to
establish a plan for communicating with stakeholders. In addition, TSA,
Coast Guard, and contractor officials are taking other steps to
strengthen communication and coordination with stakeholders, including
participating in maritime stakeholder conferences and briefings and
creating a TWIC stakeholder communication committee comprised of
members from 15 maritime industry groups that will meet twice per
month. While we have not assessed TSA's efforts to coordinate with the
maritime industry since our review of TWIC prototype testing,
stakeholders from three port facilities with whom we recently spoke
told us that TSA and contractor officials have placed a greater
emphasis on communicating and coordinating with stakeholders. It will
be important that TSA and contractor officials continue to make
communication and coordination a priority to ensure that all
individuals and organizations affected by the TWIC program are aware of
program requirements and their responsibilities.
Question 6.: GAO reported in September 2006 and again in April 2007
that TSA and maritime industry stakeholders faced significant
challenges in ensuring that TWIC access control technologies work
effectively in the maritime sector. What steps is TSA taking to address
these challenges?
Response: TSA is currently planning a pilot program to test TWIC
access control technologies, such as biometric card readers, at 5
maritime locations to address our prior recommendation and requirements
in the SAFE Port Act. It will be critical that TSA ensure that this
pilot program tests all key aspects of the TWIC program in the maritime
environment, including how facilities and vessels will obtain
information on workers that may pose a threat to security, and ensure
that the results of the pilot are used to help ensure the successful
implementation of these technologies in the future. It will also be
important that the pilot measure the impact that the TWIC program may
have on the flow of maritime commerce and consider this information in
developing future program requirements.
Question 7.: Since September 2006, has GAO identified additional
challenges to implementing the TWIC program?
Response: Although we have not conducted a follow-on review of
challenges currently facing the TWIC program, during recent discussions
with stakeholders from 3 port facilities, stakeholders raised some
additional challenges they foresaw in implementing the TWIC program.
For example, these stakeholders told us that TSA and contractor
officials must ensure that they appropriately identify the entire
population of workers that are required to obtain a TWIC card, educate
these workers about how to enroll and receive a TWIC card, and ensure
that the workers enroll and receive a TWIC card by the deadlines to be
established by TSA and the Coast Guard. In addition, as we have
previously reported, these stakeholders remain concerned that some of
their workers may be disqualified from receiving a TWIC card by the
background check, and that TSA and Coast Guard may not be able to
ensure that appeals and waivers for the potentially large population of
workers that do not pass the check are processed in a timely manner.
TSA officials told us that they believe that their efforts to educate
and inform workers of their responsibilities related to obtaining a
TWIC card will be successful in reaching the worker population, and
that they have the capacity to handle all enrollments, appeals, and
waivers. While the effect of these challenges remains to be seen, it
will be important for TSA and its contractor to ensure that they have
developed strategies for addressing these issues as the program moves
forward.
Question from the Honorable Paul Broun, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Georgia
Responses from Cathleen A. Berrick
Question 8: Does GAO have any upcoming reports or studies planned
on TWIC implementation? Will there be a status report on the enrollment
process midway?
Response: GAO has not yet been requested or mandated to conduct a
follow-on review of the TWIC program.
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from the Honorable Edmond ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration
Question 1.: According to Ms. Himber's written testimony, the TWIC
Stakeholder Communication Committee is not doing its job--it is not
promoting the sharing of information. Why has the communication between
TSA and the maritime community been so limited?
Response: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) Stakeholder Communications Committee is comprised of
approximately 35 industry and labor representatives and has held 6
meetings to date. These meetings are well attended, useful information
is presented and distributed to the membership and valuable feedback is
received from the membership. To illustrate the effectiveness of this
committee, membership requests continue to be received from
stakeholders interested in participating. We are very pleased with the
workings of this committee, the two way flow of information it fosters,
and participation from industry.
Additionally, as cited in recent Government Accountability Office
(GAO) testimony (October 31, 2007 to the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has taken steps to address previous GAO
recommendations regarding improving communications and coordination
with maritime stakeholders, including posting frequently asked
questions, participating in numerous conferences and briefings,
conducting outreach with maritime facility operators and port
authorities, and disseminating informational bulletins and fliers. The
testimony states that stakeholders from the Ports of Wilmington,
Delaware, Los Angeles, California and the Maritime Exchange of the
Delaware River and Bay Authority, with whom GAO spoke in October 2007,
stated that TSA and its enrollment contractor have placed a greater
emphasis on communicating and coordinating with stakeholders and on
correcting past problems. An official from the Port of Wilmington
stated that, thus far, communication, coordination, and outreach by TSA
and its enrollment contractor have been excellent and far better than
during TWIC testing.
Question 2.: I have heard repeatedly that many truck drivers and
other workers are still largely unaware of the TWIC requirement. Why
are they still unaware of a program that you rolled out two weeks ago?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration has made a
concerted effort to educate maritime stakeholders and industry through
the creation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Stakeholder Communication Committee which includes representatives from
the American Trucking Association, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers
Association, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, facility
operators, and other interested stakeholders. TSA has also posted
frequently asked questions, participated in numerous conferences and
briefings, conducted outreach with maritime facility operators and port
authorities, and disseminated informational bulletins and fliers, all
in an effort to increase awareness of the program and participation.
Question 3.: Why is the TWIC card so expensive? Why does it cost
more than $100 dollars to attain this card?
Response: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program is a fully fee funded program that provides an interoperable
smart card valid for a period of five years that can be used by the
holder at 3,200 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)-regulated
facilities and on board over 10,000 MTSA-regulated vessels. The fee
provides for pre-enrollment and enrollment capability, a security
threat assessment and redress process, card production and
personalization, card activation and issuance, help desk services, and
program expenses. The cost of the credential compares favorably to
other credentials such merchant mariner documents. We have made every
effort to balance the costs of the card with our security objectives
and programmatic costs.
Question 4.: We have heard from numerous stakeholders that as many
as 35-40% of truck drivers nationwide might not qualify for a TWIC card
because of either their criminal background or immigration status. For
this reason, we required that the TSA conduct a threat assessment
screening for all port truck drivers that have a Commercial Drivers
License within 90 days of the SAFE Port being enacted so that we might
all understand the potential impact this might have on the maritime
transportation system. What is the status of that pre screening program
and when do you expect that it will be competed?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
anticipates completion of the threat assessments for port truck drivers
by summer 2008. Collection of driver information from all state motor
vehicle licensing agencies is underway at this time. There is
substantial variation in the technological capabilities of the states,
leading some to respond to TSA's request earlier than others. Also, as
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential is deployed across
the country we will enroll these drivers and they will go through a
much more thorough check than the name-based check, and it will be done
perpetually.
Question 5.: According to Ms. Rooney's written testimony, Lockheed
Martin has not found a suitable enrollment location on the New Jersey
side of the Port. How do you expect to roll-out the Port of New York
and New Jersey if you haven't found a suitable location?
Response: All locations in New York have been identified. A
facility in South Hackensack, New Jersey has been identified and other
locations are being worked as well.
Question 6.: I am very concerned about the limited number of
enrollment sites. TSA only plans on rolling out the TWIC at 146
locations around the country. I have heard repeatedly from constituents
that this number will not be sufficient. Do to the limited number of
sites, many port workers will have to drive hours each way to apply for
a TWIC card. This is unacceptable. What steps are you going to take to
minimize the impact on our nation's port workers?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
originally released a list of 134 enrollment sites that was expanded to
147 enrollment sites based on stakeholder input. When TSA and the
United States Coast Guard established its overall deployment plan we
took into account a number of factors, including security risk,
population estimates, and geographic distribution of this population,
logistics, program risk, and operational efficiencies. These are all
important factors TSA must consider in order to minimize program costs
and inconvenience to applicants.
Although we originally only planned for `fixed' enrollment
capability, as an added feature to the contract, Lockheed Martin
offered `mobile' enrollment capability. While the detailed process for
this capability is being finalized, it is designed to be adjustable
based on enrollment surges and owner/operator demands.
Question 7.: In addition to the limited number of enrollment sites,
I am also concerned about the limited number of employees that Lockheed
Martin hired. Lockheed has hired only 400 employees. Four hundred
employees for 146 locations averages out to little more than two
employees per site. Do you find this an acceptable average?
Response: The projected staff is over 400 and is more than adequate
for the current phases as well as future phases of the rollout. The
rollout utilizes a phased approach across the Nation. Lockheed Martin's
staffing plan to support the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential rollout is designed to have a Full-Time Equivalent employee
available to operate each enrollment workstation located at the
enrollment centers during all hours of operations. Lockheed Martin has
developed an escalation plan to address greater than anticipated demand
at any given location that allows for an immediate surge capacity to 60
hours of enrollments per workstation per week. Further, Lockheed Martin
has identified prospective reserve labor pools that can be utilized to
staff each site and to further expand the operating hours of an
enrollment center to meet the demand of the local population.
Question 8.: Please provide us with information on the rollout--
specifically, we are interested in learning more about the roll-out
centers. I've been told that many people will have to drive several
hours in order to reach these centers. What methodology did TSA use
when determining the location of these roll-out centers?
Response: All ports are important to us from both a commercial and
security standpoint. Ports were chosen based on the need to balance our
security goals with our need to minimize the impact of the program on
workers and commerce. When the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and the United States Coast Guard established its overall
deployment plan we took into account a number of factors, including
security risk, population estimates, and geographic distribution of
this population, logistics, program risk, and operational efficiencies.
These are all important factors TSA must consider in order to minimize
program costs and inconvenience to applicants.
Question 9.: Why do transportation workers have to pick up the TWIC
at the same place that they applied for it? Our nation's transportation
workers, including those in the trucking and barge industries move
around frequently. It could be many weeks or months before they are
able to return to that one location. Why can't they pick up their TWICs
at different location?
Response: In order to minimize the cost to the individual, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is produced and
shipped in a batch process that requires the shipment of the credential
to the original site of enrollment. Although the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is considering the shipment of the
credential to locations other than that of the original enrollment,
this process would increase costs due to required software and system
changes, as well as an increase in processing and shipping costs.
Shipping a credential to an enrollment center other than the one at
which enrollment took place was considered during the planning stages
of the program. Mailing cards directly to the applicant was also
considered. Mailing cards directly to the individual raised security
concerns as the TSA would not be able to ensure the individual
receiving the card was in fact the individual that applied for the
card. Although these methods were excluded as part of our original
business plan, TSA may reconsider these options as experience is gained
with the current system and processes in order to reduce the burden on
the affected population.
Question 10.: TWIC applicants are still not receiving adequate
information. At a recent rollout meeting, Lockheed Martin
representatives recommended that TWIC applicants pre-enroll. However,
the Lockheed Martin was unsure whether or not a pre-enrollee could
choose their own appointment time. What is the answer to this basic
question?
Response: Pre-enrollment is a very important part of the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program that reduces
the time required to enroll, thereby reducing the burden on the
applicant. An applicant can pre-enroll at anytime. Applicants can
schedule an in-person enrollment time at a particular port (on the pre-
enrollment website) after the Transportation Security Administration
announces the start of enrollment at that port via a Federal Register
Notice.
Question 11.: Many maritime facilities run on a shift basis. Will
enrollment centers be open to accommodate those individuals who do not
work from 9am-5pm?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration continues to
monitor enrollment services provided to applicants and will adjust
these services as appropriate.
Question 12.: It is my understanding that TSA has woefully
underestimated the number of TWIC applicants. In Houston alone, the
estimation was off by more than 320,000. Who came up with the 750,000
and how much were they paid to come up with this blatantly incorrect
number?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office
of Finance and Administration led the effort to develop the original
population estimates, with contractor support from International
Business Machines Corporation (IBM). The estimated cost for this
support is $48,000. In developing this estimate, TSA consulted with the
following government and industry authorities: United States (US)
Department of Transportation / US Maritime Administration, Army Corps
of Engineers (Waterborne Commerce), Journal of Commerce, American
Association of Port Authorities, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
A. Strauss-Wieder Inc., Martin Associates, Economic Research
Associates, International Longshoremen's Association, International
Longshore and Warehouse Union, United States Maritime Alliance, Pacific
Maritime Association, American Waterways Operators, Maersk, Wallenius-
Wilhemsen, American Trucking Association, Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Port
Division), US Census (Vehicle Information), University of Michigan,
University of Minnesota, California State University at Long Beach,
University of Central Florida, American Shipbuilding Association,
Shipbuilders Council of America, Cruise Industry News, International
Council of Cruise Lines, Minerals Management Service, National Ocean
Industries Association, Independent Petroleum Association of America,
American Petroleum Institute, and the National Petrochemical and
Refiners Association.
TSA is continually working with the United States Coast Guard and
industry stakeholders to gather additional data on the maritime
population. However, there is sufficient flexibility and capacity in
the system to accommodate unforeseen fluctuations in the population.
Question 13.: Do you know how many current port workers will be
disqualified from getting a TWIC because they are illegal?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration does not have
data on the number of individuals that may be disqualified from holding
a Transportation Worker Identification Credential because of their
citizenship or immigrant status.
Question 14.: Ms. Fanguy told us that the Department was not going
to pre-empt State access cards such as those issued in Florida. Why
not? Why are you going to force truckers and others to pay more money
and undergo the same background checks?
Response: Under this rulemaking, States will not be preempted from
instituting their own background checks or badging systems in addition
to the TWIC. We note that a State may be the proprietor of ports or
port facilities, and as the proprietor is free to set standards for who
may enter onto their facilities, as does any other proprietor. In
addition, States may have set standards for reasons other than guarding
against the threat of terrorism, such as to combat drug smuggling or
organized crime. As such they are not regulating in the areas that DHS
is regulating.
Question 15.: On October 15th, TSA began notifying Hazardous
Materials Endorsement (HME) applicants (via letter) that two enrollment
work station laptop computers used process applications of drivers
applying for the TSA security threat assessment were stolen in separate
incidents from a TSA contractor. 3,930 applicants were notified. What
assurances can you give the Committee that this will not happen with
the TWIC computers?
Response: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes data
security very seriously. TSA and its contractors are committed to
maintaining the privacy of personal information and take many
precautions to protect it. The Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) system incorporates a 256-bit Advanced Encryption
Standard for whole disk encryption on all enrollment workstations,
encryption of the enrollment package during transmission through a
virtual private network, and encryption of the data in the TWIC system,
which is located at a secure government facility. This standard is a
National Institute of Standards and Technology standard that is
approved by the National Security Agency for the transmission of Top
Secret information and reflects Federal Information Processing Standard
197. TSA recognizes that data security is an ongoing process, and will
continue to monitor our systems and practices to enhance the security
of personal information.
Question 16.: We learned at an earlier hearing exactly how easy it
will be to attain a fake TWIC--a card that could be used fraudulently
until the readers are put in place. When are you going to implement the
TWIC reader pilot? How long will the pilot run? What is your tentative
schedule for deployment of readers?
Response: Vendors are currently developing contactless readers to
operate with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. After
independently testing the readers for compliance with the
specification, we plan to deploy readers at test sites early in
calendar year 2008 and begin gathering test data. Delivery of the final
pilot test report is scheduled for the end of 2008. The test will
extend through 2008 to achieve all test objectives. However, the test
is structured to provide data early in the pilot and throughout the
test.
As required under the SAFE Ports Act, DHS will implement final
reader requirements through a rulemaking action and will take into
consideration the data obtained during the pilot tests in development
of those requirements.
Question 17.: According to Ms. Marks testimony, TSA is going to
release the TWIC reader regulation this year. Is she correct? When is
TSA going to roll-out the reader pilot?
Response: Vendors are currently developing contactless readers to
operate with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. After
independently testing the readers for compliance with the
specification, we plan to deploy readers at test sites early in
calendar year 2008 and begin gathering test data. Delivery of the final
pilot test report is scheduled for December 2008. The test will extend
through 2008 to achieve all test objectives. However, the test is
structured to provide data early in the pilot and throughout the test.
Once all pilot test data has been reviewed, we will finalize the
rulemaking on reader requirements. We anticipate that the regulation to
establish the requirements for TWIC reader will be promulgated to meet
the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act deadline of April
2009.
Question 18.: According to Ms. Rooney's testimony, TSA has
maintained a ``veil of secrecy'' around the pilot program. How can you
expect the Port of New York and New Jersey to adequately participate in
the pilot if TSA is talking to them?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration strives to
maintain good communications with the Port Authority of New York/New
Jersey (PANYNJ). During our conversations with PANYNJ, we confirmed
their willingness to participate in the pilot, identified Port Security
Grant funds to support testing and focused on the first phase of the
pilot program consisting of technical testing of readers. Through our
Independent Test Agent, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
Charleston, we are reaching out to our pilot participants to develop
site-specific test plans and gather site-specific baseline data.
Question 19.: According to Ms. Rooney's testimony, the false
rejection rate for the readers if 9.5 % and 71% of the readers need to
be replaced within a year due to hardware and display features. It has
been five years since TWIC was mandated, why does the program continue
to suffer from such significant flaws?
Response: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) Final Rule does not require owner/operators to purchase,
install, or maintain card readers. Industry is currently developing
readers for use in the TWIC pilots where these parameters will be
tested in the maritime environment.
Question 20.: The SAFE Port Act required a pilot program on the
TWIC readers. The Department has decided to fund this program through
the Port Security Grant program, although this was not required in the
law. The pilot participants recently sent Mr. Chertoff a letter asking
him to waive the 25% cost-share requirement for the pilots since all
other TWIC pilots were fully funded by the government and he has the
authority under MTSA to waive the cost-share. What is Mr. Chertoff's
position on waiving the 25% cost-share on TWIC reader pilots?7
Response: The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of
2006 (SAFE Port Act) instructed the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct a pilot program to test the business processes, technology, and
operational impacts required to deploy transportation security card
readers at secure areas or the marine transportation system. The
overall Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program
and this TWIC Pilot Program are managed by TSA. However, the Pilot
Program is funded through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP);
therefore all of the requirements of PSGP must be met, including the 25
percent match. Waiver requests for these projects have been submitted
to the Secretary; however, no decision has been made to date.
Question 21.: The Port Security Grant program is already providing
funds for TWIC implementation. One key problem in determining costs is
the fact that DHS has failed to make certain policy decisions (1) will
all facilities be required to have use TWIC card reader; (2) At what
MARSEC level and rates will facilities be required to have biometric
checks, and (3) Will facilities be required to conduct PIN
verifications and at what MARSEC levels? What is DHS' timeframe for
making some of these policy decisions in light of the funding from the
Port Security Grant program?
Response: Currently, there are no regulatory requirements
pertaining to the use of TWIC readers. However, initial testing and
evaluation of TWIC readers is expected to begin in calendar year 2008
as part of our pilot phase. Data from the pilot tests will be used to
inform the second rulemaking which is intended to propose regulations
related to the use of readers aboard MTSA-regulated vessels and
facilities.
DHS intends to complete the TWIC pilot tests and final rule by
April 2009, which is consistent with the Safe Port Act deadline for
implementation of a final rule no later than two years after
commencement of the pilot program that initially was scheduled for
April 2007.
Question 22.: We have heard from the biometric card reader
manufacturers that virtually none of them have commercial off the shelf
readers that currently meet the TWIC Specifications that were published
last month and that it could take an average of 3 months for them to
re-engineer their products. We have also heard claims that the pilot
projects would not be completed to mid-2009 which would leave us to
believe that port workers would be using a very expensive ID card as
nothing more than a flash pass for at least the next 3 years. What is
the schedule for all phases of the pilot project and what is the latest
that you expect biometric readers to be deployed in ports?
Response: Currently reader vendors are developing contactless
readers to operate with the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC). After independently testing the readers for
compliance with the specification, we plan to deploy readers at test
sites early in calendar year 2008 and begin gathering test data.
Delivery of the final pilot test report is scheduled for December 2008.
We anticipate that DHS will issue a rulemaking action to establish the
requirements for TWIC reader; and that DHS anticipates promulgating a
final rule implanting the reader requirements by April 2009 consistent
with the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006
requirements.
Question 23.: TWIC was originally required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. Why did it take 5 years and a
Congressional mandate in the SAFE Port Act before TSA finally rolled-
out the TWIC program?
Response: While we are anxious to deploy the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) program quickly, we are doing so
carefully in order to provide assurance that each element of the
program meets our security goals while minimizing the impact on
individuals and industry.
TWIC is one component of the comprehensive port security
enhancements put into place by the Department of Homeland Security.
TWIC implementation has presented unique challenges, which have been
compounded by a rapidly changing technology landscape and the added
demands of operating in the maritime environment.
During the past three years, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) developed technology and tested the processes to
collect and protect personal data, conduct security threat assessments,
issue credentials, and provide for sustained screening operations. In
May 2006, TSA and the United States Coast Guard began the rulemaking
process by laying out the government's proposal for how the program
would be administered. Over 1,900 comments were received and while the
process traditionally takes more than a year, the final rule was issued
in just eight months.
It is important to note that the maritime environment is very
different from other modes of transportation. There is no central
owner, and there are diverse employee populations, multiple points of
access, and extreme working environments.
Question 24.: It is my understanding that at least four different
individuals--Elaine Charney, Justin Oberman, Lolie Kull, and now
Maurine Fanguy have been in charge of the program. This averages out to
little over a year per person. Is the high rate of turnover the cause
of the delay?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
provided strong, consistent leadership during the development and
implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program and continues to do so, in what is a challenging and
complex program.
While we are anxious to deploy the TWIC program quickly, we are
doing so carefully in order to provide assurance that each element of
the program meets our security goals while minimizing the impact on
individuals and industry.
TWIC is one component of the comprehensive port security
enhancements put into place by the Department of Homeland Security.
TWIC implementation has presented unique challenges, which have been
compounded by a rapidly changing technology landscape and the added
demands of operating in the maritime environment.
During the past three years, TSA developed technology and tested
the processes to collect and protect personal data, conduct security
threat assessments, issue credentials and provide for sustained
screening operations. In May 2006, TSA and the United States Coast
Guard began the rulemaking process by laying out the government's
proposal for how the program would be administered. Over 1,900 comments
were received and while the process traditionally takes more than a
year, the final rule was issued in just eight months.
It is important to note that the maritime environment is very
different from other modes of transportation. There is no central
owner, and there are diverse employee populations, multiple points of
access, and extreme working environments.
Question 25.: In the SAFE Port Act, Congress mandated that TSA
roll-out the TWIC program at the top ten ports. I have seen your list
and I do not think that it meets the Congressional mandates? How did
TSA select the first 10 ports for the rollout? What roll did contractor
resources play in this decision?
Response: All ports are important to us from both a commercial and
security standpoint. Ports were chosen based on the need to balance our
security goals with our need to minimize the impact of the program on
workers and commerce. When the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and the United States Coast Guard established its overall
deployment plan we took into account a number of factors, including
security risk, population estimates, and geographic distribution of
this population, logistics, program risk, and operational efficiencies.
These are all important factors TSA must consider in order to minimize
program costs and inconvenience to applicants.
Question 26.: Please provide us with information on how TSA
selected Lockheed as the prime contractor.
Response: The Transportation Security Administration selected the
prime contractor through an open, competitive process that included a
solicitation for qualified vendors, a down select of those qualified
vendors, and a technical and cost evaluation of submitted proposals by
teams that included personnel from various Federal agencies.
Question 27.: Has TSA hired the administrative judges that will be
needed to adjudicate waivers and appeals?
Response: The United States Coast Guard's (USCG) Administrative Law
Judges (ALJs) hear administrative matters for the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), and pursuant to a Memorandum of
Understanding between TSA and the Coast Guard, will review denials of
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) appeals and
waivers.
The USCG ALJ Docketing Center assigns ALJs to cases based on
geographic areas of responsibility and caseload. While the USCG
recently hired two additional ALJs, all seven ALJs are available to
preside. USCG ALJs have been hearing TSA civil penalty cases and airman
certificate revocation cases for several years and have begun reviewing
denials of Hazardous Material Endorsements for Commercial Drivers
Licenses under the same rules that will be used for review of TWIC
appeal and waiver denials.
Question 28.: According to a recent report by the U.S. Attorney
General, the FBI's rap sheets are ``still missing final disposition
information for approximately 50% of its records.'' As a result, the
rap sheets used by TSA to assess the criminal history record of TWIC
applicants routinely fail to include critical information like the
results of arrests and dismissals of charges. And, in contrast to other
federal agencies, TSA does relatively little to track down the
information. The incomplete nature of FBI rap sheets is an area of
special concern, especially as it impacts large numbers of workers who
receive an initial negative determination by TSA based on incomplete
information.
Is it true that large numbers of workers are initially
disqualified based on incomplete information on the FBI rap sheet, like
the disposition of an arrest?
Response: Only a small number of workers should be affected by this
issue. It is TSA's experience working with HME drivers that less than 2
percent of all cases received required further information from the
applicant based on an open disposition for a potentially disqualifying
offense(s).
Can TSA tell us how many initial determinations of
security threat assessment (IDA) were based on old arrest information
that had not resulted in a conviction? And how many of these cases were
appealed and then reversed by TSA?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
specially track the number of initial determination of threat
assessments (Iotas) that were issued based on old arrest information
that had not resulted in a conviction; however it does track the total
number of IDTAs issued. As of November 25, 2007, TSA has issued 21,197
Hazardous Materials Endorsement IDTAs for a total population of over
700,000 applicants. As a result of the IDTAs issued, TSA has received
11,622 appeal requests, of which 11,513 were granted and 109 were
denied, and 1,104 waiver requests, of which 902 were granted and 78
were denied.
Is it true that the FBI rap sheets often do not say when
someone was released from incarceration, which means they may have been
disqualified even thought they were released more than five years from
when they applied for the TWIC contrary to the federal law? Can you
tell us how many initial determinations were reversed on appeal based
on information indicating that the individual was released from
incarceration outside the required 5-year time period?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration does not
specifically track the released from incarceration date. Appeals are
granted when an applicant provides valid documentation showing that
their potentially disqualifying offense was dismissed, reduced from a
felony to a misdemeanor, did not result in a disqualifying offense, was
expunged, and/or falls outside of the 5 year time period.
How often was an initial determination reversed on appeal
based on information indicating that the individual was convicted of a
misdemeanor, not a felony?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration does not
specifically track convictions that were initially adjudicated based on
a felony conviction but later determined to be misdemeanor convictions.
Question: If nearly all the appeals being filed with TSA
are resolved in favor of the workers because the information from the
FBI raps sheets is inaccurate or incomplete, what can TSA do to change
its process to reduce the burden on workers to file appeals and go to
great lengths to provide copies of relevant court information? Has TSA
looked at the process required by the Brady Act, where the FBI tracks
down most missing dispositions before making a gun check determination?
[Note: TSA/Lockheed Martin could call the local courts or the state
criminal records agencies for the missing records, they could call
state departments of correction to find out date of release from
incarceration for people who indicate they were released more than 5
years before the date of the application, calling state criminal record
repository staff to ascertain the level of offenses listed on the FBI
rap sheet.]
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
participates in a working group created to identify national solutions
to facilitate the more efficient and complete uploading of state
criminal history records to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
thereby improving the quality and quantity of records that can be
accessed through one consolidated national data set in order to reduce
the burden on the applicant. This working group includes the Compact
Council, FBI-CJIS (Criminal Justice Information Services), TSA and
various state representatives.
TSA makes every effort to contact applicants and collect
information in a timely fashion being mindful of overall program costs
on the entire applicant population and not just those utilizing the
appeals and waiver process.
Question 29.: Large numbers of workers employed at the ports may
have a criminal record, like a drug offense, dating back to when they
were young and were not employed. The federal law provides that they
may qualify for a ``waiver'' of the disqualifying crime if they can
show they have been rehabilitated, they have a strong work history and
no record of other major crimes. In fact, most of the waivers submitted
to TSA are granted, but the number of requests under the hazmat program
has been very low compared to the legitimate need.
What has been TSA's experience with the hazmat program
with workers who have applied for waivers after receiving an initial
threat assessment based on a showing that they have been rehabilitated
as authorized by the federal law?
Response: When applying for a waiver, applicants are asked to
provide documentation that demonstrates their rehabilitation including
certificates from drug/alcohol treatment facilities, certificates from
anger management courses, certificates from sex offender treatment
programs, letters of recommendation from probation/parole officers,
and/or lack of further criminal activity.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received 1,104
waiver requests from the applicants in the hazmat program of which, 902
were granted and 78 were denied.
Is it true that most waivers are decided in favor of the
workers based on their work history and an isolated or older criminal
record?
Response: When applying for a waiver, applicants are asked to
provide documentation that demonstrates their rehabilitation, including
certificates from drug/alcohol treatment facilities, certificates from
anger management courses, certificates from sex offender treatment
programs, letter of recommendation from probation/parole officers, and/
or lack of further criminal activity.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received 1,104
waiver requests from the applicants in the hazmat program of which, 902
were granted and 78 were denied.
Do you think that the number of waiver requests coming in
to TSA accurately reflects the potential number of candidates who
likely qualify for a waiver? Is there more that could be done by TSA,
Lockheed Martin or others to help promote the waiver process?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
have data on the number of potential candidates who likely qualify for
a waiver versus the number that have actually applied. TSA has, and
continues, to work with industry stakeholders to provide information
and education on the appeals and waivers process. Information is
provided on our website, during meetings and briefings, and the
corresponding letters and informational materials provided with the
letters are clear and concise.
Question 30.: There are federal policies and procedures regarding
the need to provide meaningful access to services for persons with
limited English proficiency (LEP). These are governed by Executive
Order 13166 and the Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance that carries
out the Executive Order, DOJ Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed.
Reg. 41455 (2002). As DOJ has explained, these polices apply to the
Department of Homeland Security and TSA: ``Pursuant to Executive Order
13166, the meaningful access requirement of the Title VI regulation and
the . . . analysis set forth in the DOJ LEP Guidance are to
additionally apply to the programs and activities of Federal agencies,
including the Department of Justice.'' DOJ Guidance, 67 Fed. Reg. at
41459 n.4. Appropriate language access is a serious concern for the
TWIC application, waiver and appeal processes given that immigrants
make up a large segment of the port and trucking workforce, especially
in major port states like California, Texas, Florida, and New Jersey/
New York.
Has TSA looked at Executive Order 13166 and the Department of
Justice guidance that lays out the translation and interpreter services
to be provided by federal agencies, like TSA, when they implement
activities like the TWIC program?
Response: Yes. Section 2 of the Executive Order, entitled
``Federally Conducted Programs and Activities'' provides that each
Federal agency must work to ensure that persons with limited English
language proficiency (LEP) have meaningful access to the agency's
programs and activities. The Department of Justice guidance on the
Executive Order (Limited English Proficient (LEP Guidance)) discusses a
variety of tools that agencies may use to meet the spirit of the Order,
including translating important documents and permitting LEP persons to
use their own interpreters. In the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) program both of these suggested tools have been
incorporated into the enrollment process. The TWIC program provides
communications materials in Spanish and English. Our pre-enrollment
website and our help desk services are offered in Spanish and English.
The TWIC Disclosure Form accommodates the use of a translator in order
to assist individuals who are not proficient in English. The LEP
Guidance does not require the use of government interpreters, and
because the TWIC program is entirely fee-based, we do not believe that
hiring interpreters to work at enrollment sites is advisable at this
time. Such services would be costly and would undoubtedly increase the
cost of the credential for all TWIC applicants.
Question: Has TSA surveyed the number of potential number of TWIC
applicants employed in any of the ports who are likely limited English
proficiency? If so, can you tell us the results of these efforts?
[Note: The DOJ guidance contains a ``safe harbor'' provision which
requires written translation of any ``vital'' documents for limited
English proficiency language groups that constitute either 5% or 1,000,
whichever is less, of the population affected.]
What translation or interpreter services, if any, are
provided by TSA when workers appear in person to enroll for a TWIC or
when they seek to negotiate the appeal or waiver process?
Response: The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) Program provides communications materials in Spanish and in
English. Our pre-enrollment website and our help desk services are
offered in Spanish and in English. The TWIC Disclosure Form
accommodates the use of a translator in order to account for
individuals who are not proficient in English.
Additional translation and/or interpreter services would subject
the program to additional costs, and would, since the TWIC Program is
fee-based, increase the cost of the credential.
Is it TSA's position that family members and friends are
qualified to translate for workers as part of the TWIC enrollment
process? Has that been communicated to the ports or the workers? Is
that position consistent with the Department of Justice guidance on
federal activities regulating limited English speakers? [Note: DOJ
Guidance recommends that professional interpreters be provided free of
charge rather than having friends and family members interpret because
friends and family are ``not competent to provide quality and accurate
interpretations. Issues of confidentiality, privacy, or conflict of
interest may arise. LEP individuals may be uncomfortable revealing or
describing sensitive, confidential, or potentially embarrassing
medical, law enforcement . . . family, or financial information to a
family member, friend, or member of the local community.'']
Response: We permit any Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) applicant to use an interpreter in the pre-enrollment
and enrollment processes, and do not place restrictions on who the
interpreter must be. In addition to the Limited English Proficiency
(LEP) Guidance language you cite in your question, the LEP Guidance
also states that where LEP persons desire, they should have the
discretion to use friends or family members as interpreters because LEP
persons may feel more comfortable when a trusted family member or
friend acts as an interpreter.
The TWIC Program provides communications materials in Spanish and
in English. Our pre-enrollment website and our help desk services are
offered in Spanish and in English. The TWIC Disclosure Form
accommodates the use of a translator in order to account for
individuals who are not proficient in English.
Additional translation and/or interpreter services would subject
the program to additional costs, and since the TWIC Program is fee-
based, would increase the cost of the credential.
Question 32.: It is my understanding that the Homeland Security
Department is considering how to fit TWIC standards into the
requirements it is developing for the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative's People Access Security Service card. Ralph Basham,
Commissioner of DHS' Customs and Border Protection agency, recently
said that his directorate sees significant benefit for TWIC card
holders to be able to use the credentials to enter the United States.
When is the Department going to implement this new plan?
Response: The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is the
plan to require all travelers, U.S. citizens and foreign nationals
alike, to present a passport or other secure document or combination of
documents that denote identity and citizenship when entering or
reentering the United States.
The Department has selected Vicinity RFID technology for its land
border management system, believing that it affords the most benefits
for travelers while balancing security. Vicinity RFID technology will
be incorporated into new WHTI-compliant documents, such as the Passport
Card issued by the Department of State and the Enhanced Driver's
License issued by the States. The Border Crossing Card will also be
upgraded to include vicinity RFID technology.
DHS is looking and will continue to look at harmonizing programs
and identification documents used by its agencies in their various
missions. However, at present, the Department does not believe that the
TWIC card would be suitable as an alternative to the passport because
it does not denote citizenship and is not intended as a travel
document. Accordingly, CBP has no current plans to accept the TSA-
issued TWIC cards as a secure WHTI-compliant document for entry through
a port of entry.
A media report of Commissioner Basham's remarks slightly
misconstrued his response about looking at future harmonization of the
Department's secure documents and trusted traveler programs as an
eventual goal and instead portrayed it as a statement that TWIC cards
would or could be used as WHTI compliant documents.
Question from the Honorable Paul C. Broun, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Georgia
Responses from the Honorable Edmind ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration
Question 33.: One of the requirements of the SAFE Port Act was to
conduct a threat assessment of all truck drivers entering a port. We
understand that TSA plans on meeting this requirement by doing a check
against the terrorist watchlist and the immigration status database of
all CDL holders. What is the status of this requirement?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
anticipates completion of the threat assessments for port truck drivers
by summer 2008. Collection of driver information from all state motor
vehicle licensing agencies is underway at this time. There is
substantial variation in the technological capabilities of the states,
leading some to respond to TSA's request earlier than others. Also, as
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential is deployed across
the country we will enroll these drivers and they will go through a
much more thorough check than the name-based check, and it will be done
perpetually.
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from Admiral Brian Salerno
Question 1.: It is my understanding that the enforcement of TWIC is
going to be delegated to each Captain of the Port--setting up a
patchwork quilt of enforcement. Why did you make this decision?
Response: Section 70103 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act
of 2002 (MTSA) required the Secretary to prepare a National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP). MTSA required the NMTSP to, among
other things, designate ``a Coast Guard official who shall be the
Federal Maritime Security Coordinator for each such area''. The NMTSP
met this requirement by designating 45 Coast Guard Captains of the Port
(COTP) as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) for their
areas of responsibility. The FMSC is required to enforce all MTSA
regulations (Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter H.),
which include vessel and facility security requirements. TWIC
implementation will modify these requirements, and Coast Guard COTP/
FMSCs will continue to be responsible for their oversight and
enforcement throughout their local areas of responsibility. When
coupled with nationwide enforcement guidance and standards from Coast
Guard headquarters, this system in fact creates not a patchwork quilt,
but a robust web of enforcement.
Question 2.: When is the Coast Guard going to begin enforcing the
TWIC card?
Response: The Coast Guard will begin enforcing the TWIC regulations
for regulated facilities after the compliance date is announced for
each Captain of the Port zone. Currently, enforcement is expected to
begin for regulated vessels and all Coast Guard credentialed mariners
nationwide on September 25, 2008.
Question: Absent readers, does the Coast Guard currently have the
technology to differentiate between real and fake TWICs?
Response: Absent readers, the Coast Guard and other Federal
agencies, security personnel, and owners/operators of regulated
facilities and vessels will rely upon physical inspection of the TWIC's
state-of-the-art, tamper-resistant, security features to determine a
TWIC's authenticity.
Question 4.: The Coast Guard issued an advisory notice to the
maritime community last week notifying them that criminal elements were
trying to attain information that could be used to create fake TWICs in
the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. What steps have you taken to
minimize this possibility?
Do you know if criminal elements are trying to obtain information
at other ports around the nation? If so, which ones?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration has designed,
developed and produced TWICs to minimize the possibility of
counterfeiting. In addition to incorporating physical security
features, color shifting ink, holograms, micro-text, fluorescent
markings, and other state-of-the-art, tamper-resistant features into
the TWIC card and laminate, the TWIC system incorporates a chain-of-
trust that addresses multiple levels of security throughout the
application, vetting, production, issuance, and data maintenance
phases. These are all based on existing Federal credentialing
standards. Beyond the instance cited in the advisory notice, the Coast
Guard is unaware of any organized attempt to obtain information for
counterfeiting the TWIC.
Question: We understand that there are critical policy questions
like how often the biometric must be verified and whether or not port
workers will need to scan in and out of a secure area, that haven't yet
been addressed yet, which arguably should have been done before the
technical solution was identified. What is your timeframe and plan for
addressing these critical issues with industry?
Response: The Coast Guard is conducting a risk assessment to
determine whether and how often ports workers would need to scan in or
out of secure areas and will include that assessment in its future
rulemaking action to implement the TWIC reader requirements. The Coast
Guard will continue to engage industry and labor throughout this
rulemaking process. DHS is also conducting SAFE Port Act-required pilot
tests of electronic TWIC readers, which involves implementation of
readers with industry to test business processes, technology, and
operational impacts. As required under the SAFE Ports Act, the final
TWIC reader regulations will consider the information obtained from
these pilot tests.
Question: I am concerned about the recommendations recently
submitted to the Coast Guard by the Maritime Transportation Security
Advisory Committee (NMSAC) that suggest that the biometric verification
feature of the card should only be required at elevated maritime
security (MARSEC) threat levels. If the TWIC is not used for biometric
verification 100% of the time on a routine basis to verify identity,
then the whole purpose of a biometric credential is undermined. Any one
can pick up a card and flash it to gain access to secure areas.
Biometric verification is the only way to ensure that the person
presenting a credential is the person to whom it was issued. Congress
did not authorize this program and the resource investment only to
create an expensive flash card that does not enhance security. Do the
Coast Guard and TSA TWIC Program Office agree that they will perform
biometric verification on a day-to-day basis as part of normal
operations--subject of course, to validation of the effectiveness of
the technology during the pilot test?
Response: The Coast Guard is considering a variety of options for
use of TWIC readers and will propose specific requirements in a future
rulemaking action. DHS intends to test a number of TWIC reader
scenarios during the pilot, including biometric verification on a day-
to-day basis as part of normal operations. The results of these tests
and associated lessons-learned will be used to inform rulemaking policy
before any rule is finalized.
Question 7.: You mention that facilities will be able to redefine
their secure areas, limiting the number of employees that would be
required to have a TWIC (as an employee is only required to have a TWIC
to gain access to secure areas).
Can you give some examples of where this is appropriate? Who makes
the ultimate decision as to what the secure area is?
Can a facility completely eliminate all secure areas (and thus the
need for TWICs)? Doesn't this undermine the intent of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002?
Response: When the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
regulations were first implemented, many facility owners/operators
defined the regulated area of their facilities based on pre-existing
infrastructure. For instance, a large facility with an existing
perimeter fence may have defined the entire area inside the fence as
the MTSA regulated area, and wouldn't, in turn, have to buy additional
fencing. They did so even though significant portions of the facility
may not have had a marine transportation nexus. Now that TWIC is being
implemented, some facility owners, (i.e. facilities with significant
non-transportation related manufacturing or processing operations),
have the opportunity to refine their original definitions of the MTSA-
regulated areas and establish secure areas where the TWIC will be
required for employees with maritime transportation job functions.
Redefining secure areas for the purposes of the TWIC will bring many
facilities closer to the original intent of the MTSA regulations by
identifying those areas specific to maritime transportation. The
existing regulated areas defined in the Facility Security Plans will
continue to be governed by the requirements of 33 CFR 105, but TWIC
access will be required only for the transportation-related operations
areas as are being defined by the facilities.
As such, in accordance with regulation and policy, owners or
operators with significant non-maritime related portions of their
facility have the option of requesting a redefinition of their secure
areas (where the TWIC will be required) to include only the maritime
transportation-related portions of the facility. The local Coast Guard
Captain of the Port reviews (and approves or disapproves) requests to
redefine secure areas in their zone. Since facilities cannot eliminate
all secure areas under this provision, the act of redefining secure
areas does not undermine the intent of MTSA.
Questions from the Honorable Paul Broun, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Georgia
Responses from Admiral Brian Salerno
Question 8.: What role does the Coast Guard have in the Card Reader
pilot?
Response: The Coast Guard is assisting TSA with the planning,
scenario development and execution of pilot tests. The Coast Guard will
use the pilot results to inform the second rulemaking which is planned
to propose the use of readers for owners and operators of regulated
vessels and facilities. The Coast Guard and TSA formally joined efforts
to carry out the TWIC program in November 2004. In this partnership,
TSA is responsible for TWIC enrollment, security threat assessment and
adjudication, card production, TWIC issuance, conduct of the TWIC
appeal and waiver process, and management of government support
systems. The Coast Guard is responsible for establishing and enforcing
TWIC access control requirements at regulated vessels and facilities.
Both agencies partner daily to make sure that our collective efforts
achieve the increased security objectives which MTSA intended.