[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AVIATION SECURITY: ARE WE TRULY PROTECTED? PART I AND A FRONTLINE
PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEED FOR ENHANCED HUMAN RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT,
PART II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2007 AND NOVEMBER 1, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Columbia GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado Officio)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Mathew Washington, Director
Erin Daste, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Senior Counsel
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas, a Chairwoman, subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Yvette Clarke, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York.......................................... 42
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California................................... 3
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 47
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress from
the District of Columbia....................................... 97
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in congress
from the State of New Jersey................................... 44
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress from
the State Colorado............................................. 54
WITNESSES
Part I
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Franklin Hatfield, Director, System Operations Security
Office, Federal Aviation Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
The Honorable Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Witnesses
Thursday, November 1, 2007
Part II
Ms. Patricia A. Friend, International President, Association of
Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-IO:
Oral Statement................................................. 75
Prepared Statement............................................. 77
Mr. John Gage, National President, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO:
Oral Statement................................................. 69
Prepared Statement............................................. 71
Mr. Rogert Hesselbein, Chairman, National Security Committee, Air
Line Pilots Association, International:
Oral Statement................................................. 82
Prepared Statement............................................. 84
For the Record
Part II
November 1, 2007
Mr. Marcus W. Flagg, President of Passenger-Cargo Security Group,
and The Federal Flight Deck Officers Association:
Prepared Statement............................................. 91
Appendix
Attachments:
A. Air Line Pilots Association International, White Paper:
Recommendations to Improve the Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program, July 2007............................................. 103
B. Air Line Pilots Association International, White Paper:
Secondary Flight Deck Barriers and Flight Deck Access
Procedures, A Call for Action, July 2007....................... 113
AVIATION SECURITY: ARE WE TRULY PROTECTED?
PART I
----------
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:23 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Markey, DeFazio,
Clarke, Perlmutter, and Lungren.
Also present: Representative Pascrell.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the Transportation Security Administration coordination with
the Federal Aviation Administration when incidents move from a
safety incident to a security incident and general aviation
security. We also have the Government Accountability Office,
GAO, before us today as well.
However, before I begin, I ask for unanimous consent that
Mr. Pascrell, a member of the full committee, to sit and
question the panels during today's hearings. Without objection:
so ordered.
Welcome, Mr. Pascrell. You have never left us and we are
delighted to have you here with us today.
Let me acknowledge the presence as well of Mr. Perlmutter,
a member of the subcommittee, and Mr. DeFazio, a member of the
subcommittee, and of course, the ranking member.
As we all know, the Congress, and specifically this
committee, continue to have serious concerns regarding aviation
security in the United States since September 11. The ensuing
debates in Congress continue to focus on the degree of federal
involvement needed to improve aviation security and maintain
public confidence in air travel. This ongoing debate started
with the Aviation Transportation Security Act, which
established the Transportation Security Administration in
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. I might add, long overdue.
At the beginning, TSA was headed by an under secretary of
transportation for security within the Department of
Transportation. Within 3 months after enactment of the ATSA,
the responsibilities for aviation security were transferred
from the Federal Aviation Administration to the TSA. It was no
longer FAA, but TSA was charged with managing a federal
screening workforce and requiring screening of checks bags
using explosive detection systems.
Now, let me say that I am very proud and pleased at the
work of our chairman, Chairman Thompson and Chairman Oberstar,
for we have coordinated and collaborated. I have good working
relationships with the chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation,
Mr. Costello, and we have indicated that we look forward to
working together. But it is a responsibility of the TSA to
address the question of aviation security. However, it is a
collaborative effort and it must be done with the two principal
witnesses that are here that will offer their thoughts and
testimony as to the effectiveness of that collaboration, of
course, with the insight of the GAO.
ATSA also significantly expanded the Federal Air Marshal
Program requiring that all cockpit doors be strengthened and
provided for various other aviation security measures. Let me
also indicate that in our next hearing, we will address the
question of the issues of the Federal Air Marshal Program,
training, other personnel matters, effectiveness, the marshals'
insight into whether or not the program is as strong as it
should be, and how we can strengthen their service so that they
can strengthen aviation security.
We will also look at flight attendants and the training
that is necessary that still has not been accomplished these
many years later.
This was not the final step in the transformation of the
TSA. Later, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the
Department of Homeland Security and completely removed the TSA
from DOT in placing it in DHS. While there has always been a
distinction between TSA and the FAA, these two entities will
always have a connection. The aviation community relies on FAA
for safety and TSA for security. However, today I want to
explore, as I previously said, how these two distinctive
agencies coordinate when an accident or incident goes from
being a safety concern to a security concern.
The committee wants to make sure that the FAA and the TSA
are aligned and work very closely together in terms of
understanding and implementing their respective roles in
responding to aviation security threats. In addition to the
coordination between the FAA and the TSA, I am very interested
in how air traffic controllers are trained to deal with
security incidents and what steps we can take to make sure that
air traffic controllers have the training to be able to deal
with the security threat.
As you know, training of frontline workers is of paramount
importance to this committee. In all modes of transportation,
we must ensure that workers have the knowledge and skill to
respond to a multitude of security issues. We need assurances
from the TSA that aviation TSOs are indeed getting this
training.
But it is not just coordination I am worried about. Many
believe that the risk-based approach implemented by the TSA
places an overemphasis on allocating resources to screening
airline passengers and have left the system vulnerable to
attacks in other areas, namely air cargo operations, airport
access controls, and protecting airliners from shoulder-fired
missiles.
In essence, these critics argue that the implementation of
aviation security policy since September 11, 2001 has focused
too heavily on protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios
such as suicide hijackings and luggage bombs carried out by
airline passengers, and has not given enough attention to other
potential vulnerabilities, which speaks to the question of air
traffic controllers and certainly speaks to the question of
whether we are fully staffed and trained, and what are the
vulnerabilities of the numbers of air traffic controllers that
we have today.
Supporting our suspicions that TSA is missing the mark, the
GAO identified seven performance expectations which have not
been achieved, specifically airport perimeter security, control
access to airport secured areas--the Phoenix incident,
biometric identifier systems, international passenger pre-
screening process, and technologies to screen air cargo.
As members of Congress, and more specifically as members of
the Committee on Homeland Security, we have a responsibility to
make sure our planes and airports and other modes of
transportation are safe. I would venture to say that if, as we
have all speculated the possibility, a horrific incident
occurs, I would imagine Americans would ask the question,
``What did the Committee on Homeland Security and what did the
Department of Homeland Security do to prevent this horrific
incident?''
We are at a crossroads where we must take action to find
out what is the best way to provide a safe, secure and
functional aviation system. If we do not put effective security
measures in place, our nation may very well be the victim of
another attack, which in turn will cause a major economic
disruption and an avoidance of commercial aviation. We saw what
happened after 9/11. We must continually earn the confidence of
the flying public in order to ensure that the public continues
to enjoy the freedom of mobility that flying provides. We must
demonstrate to them that our nation's airports are secure.
Let me finally say that we understand there have been
significant incidences of slowdowns and a number of problems
that have occurred to the traveling aviation public as it
relates to the services, as has been pointed out by airlines,
of air traffic controllers. Many argue that that is a safety
question or a question of logistics. I argue that it is as much
a security concern as it is a safety concern, not because of
the witnesses who are here today, but I believe the system is
broken and we have an obligation to fix it in order to secure
the American public.
With this, I am delighted to yield to the ranking member of
the subcommittee to deliver his remarks, Mr. Lungren of
California.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Maybe I
can be king for a day.
[Laughter.]
I want to thank you for scheduling today's hearing on this
important issue, aviation security. When you started talking
about the public's view of things, I am reminded of a recent
poll that I saw in which 73 percent of the American people
believe that the U.S. government has been effective in
preventing a terrorist attack in America since 9/11.
At the same time, the same poll shows that 56 percent of
the American people believe that they are less safe today, that
is, that we are becoming less safe, rather than safer. How do
you put those two things together? I think it is because they
recognize that we have taken steps that have been effective,
that we are indeed in many ways safer, but that the threat
remains and the threat is every bit as intense.
That is why I think it is incumbent on those of us in the
Congress to have the urgency that seems to be indicated by the
American people's attitude both towards the effective job that
we have done in the past, but the continuing threat that
remains. The airplane has been and continues to be the
terrorists' weapon of choice when carrying out attacks on our
country. The 2006 liquid explosives plot uncovered in London
reminded us that commercial aircraft remains a favorite weapon
of the terrorists.
We in Congress are often quick to criticize our government
agencies and their employees. Today, however, I am pleased to
congratulate TSA and its many dedicated employees on achieving
17 out of the 24 GAO aviation security performance expectations
in their most recent report. Maybe it is just I like to see the
glass half full rather than half empty.
It shows progress, in my estimation, although much more
remains to be done. Congress has provided substantial funding
for aviation security. While much remains to be done, it is
reassuring to see the progress TSA has made in securing our
airlines. One of Congress's first mandates after 9/11 was for
TSA to screen 100 percent of airline passengers and their
baggage. This goal has been achieved. While Americans still
don't like the inconvenience, they I think understand
intuitively that it is necessary to do that in order for us to
have safer skies.
Now, TSA is strengthening its focus on passenger pre-
screening, Secure Flight. It plans to take control of passenger
information matching from the airlines against the terror watch
list prior to the aircraft's departure. That is improvement.
This involves effective use of intelligence sources to identify
possible terrorist threats, and I fully support these efforts.
I might just say parenthetically, the whole idea of
intelligence is why the vote that we are going to have this
week on Pfizer is so important. If you look at a risk-based
assessment, it is threat vulnerability and consequence.
Vulnerability and consequence are things within our domain of
information. Threat is only within our domain of information
based on the amount of intelligence we have, how effectively we
identify it, and how we put it together, i.e. connecting the
dots. That is why this vote this week is so important.
Registered traveler--another TSA change that would
immeasurably improve the travel experience for airline
customers, and at the same time provide security, in my
judgment, is a fully implemented registered traveler program.
Congress directed TSA in 2002 to establish a registered
traveler program, allowing passengers who provide their
biometric and biographic information, access to expedited
security processing at the checkpoint.
Now, 5 years later, the promise of expedited processing for
registered travelers is at best a mirage. I find it difficult
when my wife says to me at home, ``What is the matter with you
guys? It seems to me that is a relatively simple thing to do.
We would like to get it done. Why can't you get it done?'' I am
still trying to get the answer so that I may go home and answer
my wife. I want to tell you, that is a high priority in my
life.
Instead of facilitating travel for participants, TSA is
making it more difficult, in my judgment, by requiring double
identification for the registered traveler, while demanding
only a single government photo ID from the guy off the street.
I have heard the arguments that have been made. I don't
understand them.
I am a strong believer that intelligence is our best weapon
against terrorism, as I previously said. The more personal
passenger information we have, the better our chances for
identifying travelers who may pose a threat. Shouldn't we be
encouraging programs that provide us with greater intelligence,
particularly when that information is given voluntarily?
I am also disturbed by the trend of some in this Congress
away from the risk-based security model that we have followed
in this committee since 9/11. New screening proposals advocated
by some for passenger air cargo, maritime cargo containers, and
airport employees seem to think that the magic of 100 percent
by some definitions is just that, magic. I am concerned about
whether or not we are looking for the silver bullet that we can
never find.
I am convinced that we need to send valuable TSA funding
and personnel resources in a layered approach, the most
effective approach, the smart approach. We will not be able to
defeat those who want to destroy us by out-manning them. We
will by the intelligent use of our technology, our information,
and our analysis.
We need to ensure that as we do this, we do not allow them
either to destroy us or to destroy our commerce in the process.
We can do this, I am absolutely convinced. Multi-layered, risk-
based security guided by intelligence is still the best defense
against the evolving threat of terrorism.
I thank the chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman for
his comments.
Let me also acknowledge the presence of the distinguished
gentlelady from New York, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke.
At this time, I would like to welcome our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness will be Ms. Cathy Berrick,
Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the
General Accountability Office. In this capacity, she oversees
the GAO's reviews of aviation and surface transportation
security matters, and has developed broad knowledge of
transportation security practices and related federal policies,
and federal and private sector roles and responsibilities.
She has leveraged this expertise to lead numerous reviews
of the department and TSA initiatives to strengthen the
security of U.S. transportation systems and to interpret the
complex array of legislation passed and policies instituted in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Ms.
Berrick, welcome.
Our second witness is Assistant Secretary for
Transportation Security Kip Hawley. Assistant Secretary Hawley,
as usual, it is always a pleasure to have you, and we always
look forward to your forthright testimony. We thank you very
much for your presence here today. Let me just suggest to you
that your very presence and your very position allows us simply
to introduce you as the Assistant Secretary of Transportation
Security, so the shortness of your introduction does not in any
way measure your importance.
The final witness of this panel is Mr. Franklin Hatfield,
Director of the Operations Security Office for the FAA. Mr.
Hatfield is responsible for integrating all aviation and
aerospace security into the national airspace system. He serves
as the nexus between operational intelligence and the NSA, and
is responsible for balancing the needs of national security
with the operational and economic demands of aviation commerce.
Let me say, Mr. Hatfield, that we are delighted that you
are here. Let me make a personal statement that we will look
forward to the administrator's presence at some future time
before this committee. The absence of the administrator is
certainly not one that is going to be accepted on a long-term
basis, but we thank you for the responsibilities that you have
and your presence here today.
I am now asking that the witnesses, without objection, will
have their full statements inserted into the record. I now ask
each witness to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes,
beginning with Director Berrick from the Government
Accountability Office.
Thank you very much again.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, Representative Lungren
and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me here to
discuss GAO's work assessing TSA's progress in securing
commercial aviation.
In August, 2007, shortly after the Department of Homeland
Security's 4-year anniversary, we reported to this committee on
DHS's progress in satisfying its key mission and management
functions, including TSA's efforts in securing aviation and
surface modes of transportation.
We based our assessment on over 400 reports and testimonies
we have completed assessing DHS's operations, and by
determining whether DHS generally achieved or generally did not
achieve key performance expectations set out for them by
Congress, the administration, and the department itself.
Overall, we reported that TSA has made moderate progress in
securing commercial aviation. More specifically, we found that
TSA generally achieved about 70 percent of the 24 performance
expectations established for them.
In terms of progress, TSA is taking considerable action in
hiring, deploying, training and measuring the performance of
its aviation security workforce. These efforts include the
development of robust training programs for TSOs or screeners,
including enhanced explosives detection training and standards
for determining appropriate TSO staffing levels at airports.
TSA has also made significant progress in balancing
security and efficiency in developing checkpoint screening
procedures, deploying checked baggage screening equipment, and
enhancing covert testing to assess vulnerabilities in the
screening of passengers and checked baggage.
TSA is also researching and developing more effective and
efficient screening technologies, and has taken action to
strengthen the security of domestic air cargo through the
development of security requirements and other initiatives.
However, we find that DHS and TSA has made less progress in
securing airport perimeters and access to restricted areas,
deploying technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and
to screen air cargo, and building a system to pre-screen
airline passengers against terrorist watch lists for domestic
flights, although progress is being made in all of these areas.
One of the most critical areas in which limited progress
has been made is in the deployment of technologies at airport
checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers and in their
carry-on bags. Although DHS is developing and testing
technologies, the department has reported that the extensive
deployment of new checkpoint technologies will not be realized
for another 2 years.
In addition, although TSA has taken action to strengthen
the security of airport perimeters and access controls, covert
tests continue to identify weaknesses in this area, and DHS did
not identify to us how its actions have addressed all relevant
legislative requirements, as well as respond to our prior
recommendations.
A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS's and
TSA's efforts in implementing its mission and management
functions. These include developing results-oriented goals and
measures to assess performance, developing and integrating a
risk-based approach to guide investment decisions, and
establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing
information and coordinating with stakeholders. It will be
important for the department to continue to address these
issues as it moves forward.
In closing, TSA has made considerable progress in securing
commercial aviation and its efforts should be commended.
However, the agency still has more work to do in some key
areas, most especially related to the deployment of
technologies to screen for explosives at checkpoints and in air
cargo, and with respect to the security of surface
transportation modes, more fully defining its regulatory role.
We are currently reviewing many of these key areas for this
committee and will continue to report to the Congress and the
public on the results of our work.
Madam Chair, this concludes my opening statement. Thank
you.
[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your insightful
testimony.
It is now my pleasure to recognize Assistant Secretary Kip
Hawley to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hawley. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson
Lee and members of the subcommittee. It is a great pleasure to
be here today to talk with you about how TSA is doing in its
mission to improve aviation security. It is also a pleasure to
be here to share the panel with Cathy Berrick from GAO and
Frank Hatfield from the FAA.
I didn't refer to it in my submitted remarks about the
ongoing, very close work that we do with the FAA, but I look
forward to discussing the nature of that partnership. It is one
that is very close at all levels, and I would like to publicly
thank Frank Hatfield and his team for the outstanding
leadership and cooperation and coordination that we do
together.
I would also like to thank the committee for its continued
support for our mission and your leadership in the area of
improving aviation security. I particularly appreciate this
committee's detailed understanding of TSA's operational needs
and the committee's focus on practical solutions to complex
problems.
The challenges of implementing all the provisions of the 9/
11 Act are formidable, but TSA is committed to achieve the
objectives of this committee, the Congress and the 9/11
Commission. With all that we do, we must keep our focus on the
highest priority items, priorities informed and driven by the
current threat environment. Since last June, we have witnessed
disrupted attacks in London, Denmark, and Germany, as well as a
completed attack on Glasgow's airport in Scotland. There is no
reason to think that we are exempt from that kind of attack
planning.
The national intelligence estimate indicates that over the
next 3 years, the threat will continue, with terrorists
attempting transportation sector attacks on a grand scale. We
must use our security measures that are unpredictable, agile
and adaptable to put us one step ahead of evolving threats. As
I have said in previous meetings with this committee, TSA has
added layers of security and additional technology to our
airport operations. We have continued to provide more training
and real-threat testing of our frontline officers. Federal air
marshals move invisibly to protect Americans wherever they fly
around the globe, and VIPR teams are deployed every week in
support of our shared mission with our stakeholders.
That is our focus every day. It is on that base of daily
operations that we address the new requirements from the 9/11
legislation. When I was before this committee recently, we
talked about Secure Flight. I promised that we would complete
the re-baselining of the program, build in privacy protections,
and publish the rule. We have done these things and we are
ready to go.
The rule for Secure Flight has been published, and after a
public hearing in September that was available live on the
Internet, the comment period is open now. It closes next week
and we expect to get the final rule out in spring, 2008. Should
the Congress choose to fully fund the program in fiscal year
2008, we can begin testing in 2008.
I am mindful that despite the progress TSA has made across
the board, much is left to do. I look forward to our work
together to further strengthen security throughout our
transportation network.
I look forward to the chance to discuss these issues with
you. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security
October 16, 2007
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this
opportunity to share with you the ongoing efforts of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to improve security in the aviation
system by providing a better experience for travelers.
Ongoing Threat
The effort to ensure the security of the aviation system remains as
important now as it ever has been in the past six years. Since August
10, 2006, the nation's threat level for all commercial aviation
operating in or destined for the United States has been High, or
Orange. The National Intelligence Estimate on threats to the U.S.
Homeland issued in July confirmed publicly that the terrorist threat is
real. This threat is persistent and evolving. Terrorists maintain an
undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and show a continued effort
to adapt and improve their capabilities. They are innovative in
overcoming security obstacles. They are training to use improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). Terror groups continue to focus on prominent
infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties. The
aviation threat level Orange remains operationally required based on
the very real threats posed by those who wish to do harm to our
aviation system.
Keeping Ahead of Terrorists
TSA's security strategy is based on flexible, mobile, and
unpredictable methods. To counter the evolving threat and adaptive
capabilities of terrorists, we are staying ahead by rethinking the
entire screening process and changing the legacy systems that
originated in the 1970s. We are going on the offense to address current
threats. We will be more proactive and we must anticipate the threats.
We recognize that we cannot protect every person or all property
against every possible threat to the system. Given the nature of the
threats to aviation, we must manage risk consistent with what we
understand of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We will
prioritize our resources to protect against the high-threat, high-
consequence events.
I previously shared with this Subcommittee an overview of the many
layers of security protecting aviation. We continue to change what we
do, how we do it, and where we do it. We have significantly increased
the layers of security throughout the airport environment. Risk-based
security means that we share resources across all risks, both high and
low, in strategic proportions.
The discussion of aviation security almost always starts at the
familiar TSA security checkpoint. For the two million travelers a day
who fly, that is TSA to them. However, TSA looks at the checkpoint as
but a piece--an important piece--of a much larger picture. Therefore,
before discussing checkpoint issues, I would like to point out that TSA
looks at the entire transportation network in evaluating risk,
including threat information. A large part of TSA's work involves
working closely on a daily basis with the intelligence and law
enforcement communities and our global partners to try to stay ahead of
the current threat.
We have to be strong at the checkpoint, but also many other
places--including the back, front, and sides of the airport. Risk-based
security means that we take the whole picture into account and
implement selective and unpredictable security measures. We must first
deny the terrorist a stationary target where a planner can take the
time to map an attack with high odds of success. Nothing can be
uncovered, but likewise, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that
fixed, robust security is impenetrable. Our security needs to play
offense, not just defense.
TSA is focusing beyond the physical checkpoint--to push our borders
out, so to speak--to look more at people and to identify those with
hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even if they are not
carrying a prohibited item. By spreading our layers of security
throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple
opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our
workforce, our partners, and our technology.
Travel Document Checking
We are placing specially trained Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs) at the front of the checkpoint to review travel documents to
find fraudulent identification (IDs) and also to look at behavior. The
9/11 Commission recognized that travel documents are akin to weapons
for terrorists. We will make it harder for dangerous people to use
fraudulent documents and IDs by raising the standard of inspection and
providing additional equipment for our TSOs to perform this function.
We ask this Subcommittee to fully support the President's budget for
this program so that TSA can make a seamless transition from the
airlines and continue the program with as little disruption as possible
to the flow of passenger screening.
Behavior Observation
We continue to expand the Screening Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program, which utilizes non-intrusive behavior
observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk
passengers. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors may be
referred for additional screening at the checkpoint that may include
handwanding, pat down, or physical inspection of their carry-on
baggage. SPOT adds an element of unpredictability to the security
screening process that is easy for passengers to navigate but difficult
for terrorists to manipulate. It serves as an important additional
layer of security in the airport environment, requires no additional
specialized screening equipment, can easily be deployed to other modes
of transportation, and presents yet one more challenge for terrorists
attempting to defeat our security system. The SPOT program has already
added great value to our overall security system. For example, a
Behavior Detection Officer recently identified an individual at a
ticket counter carrying a loaded gun and more than 30 rounds of
ammunition.
Aviation Direct Access Screening Program
We continue to expand the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program--deploying TSOs and Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs)
to locations throughout airports to screen airport employees, their
accessible property, and vehicles entering a direct access point to
secured areas of airports. The random screening at unexpected locations
is a valuable measure to increase the protection on the ``back side''
of airports.
This random and unpredictable screening allows airport workers to
perform their duties with minimal interruptions and keeps the aviation
industry operating. TSA's approach is both practical and effective.
Requiring 100% screening of all airport workers, even in a pilot
program, is contrary to this philosophy; it unnecessarily diverts
resources from higher risk operations without providing the
improvements in security that we need. We would like to continue to
work with the Subcommittee to craft a pilot program that will test
varying methods of improving an airport worker screening program that
will offer better security.
Bomb Appraisal Officers
We are continuing to hire and deploy Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO)
who provide advanced training for the workforce on explosives and IEDs
and resolve alarms beyond the TSO capability. BAOs have extensive
backgrounds and experience in IEDs as well as in Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear threats. They work closely with local law
enforcement, bomb squads, and military Explosive Ordnance Disposal
personnel to satisfy TSA's explosives detection needs.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams
Over this past summer we began to more broadly deploy Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. Comprised of TSOs,
TSIs, and Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), VIPR teams collaborate with
local law enforcement agencies to intensify the visible presence of
security personnel at various points throughout the transportation
system. At airports, we use VIPR teams in locations away from the
screening checkpoint. VIPR teams have proven that TSA and our
stakeholders can greatly improve security by altering and enhancing
security measures at airports.
This strategy of active, nimble, flexible security depends on the
quality of the people involved. TSA has had a major focus on improving
security by improving the capabilities of its people. Better recruiting
and hiring, better training, better incentive systems, career
progression opportunity, more involvement in decisions effecting the
workforce, and more recognition of the critical role played by our
people--these efforts all have a positive effect on the security result
TSA delivers. The success of all these programs in increasing the
layers of security would not be possible without the incredible effort,
professionalism, and dedication shown by TSA's workforce. Our highly
trained and highly motivated workforce--TSOs, TSIs, FAMs, and other
professionals--have proven to be a nimble, adaptable workforce that can
quickly adjust to counter an emerging terrorist threat. In August of
2006, TSOs employed new standard operating procedures within hours to
deal with the threat identified as part of the United Kingdom plot to
blow up commercial aircraft with liquid explosives. TSA has rapidly
deployed FAMs to international destinations to support its mission
coverage based on new threats. We are constantly reviewing and
adjusting our procedures and strategies to ensure our personnel are
ahead of the next threat. TSA's workforce has met every challenge in
the past five years and I am confident they will continue to do so.
Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also critical to
TSA's mission. We improved workplace safety through a series of
aggressive initiatives, including nurse case managers, Optimization and
Safety Teams, automated injury claims filing process, involvement of
the National Advisory Council in planning and implementing the Safety
Week Campaign and other aspects of the Safety Program, deployment of
contract safety specialists to support TSA field operations, and speedy
investigations to correct safety problems. Through these programs, TSA
has reduced the rate for employees losing time from duty due to injury
by almost half from 11.56 per 100 employees in FY2005 to 6.75 for the
3rd Quarter of FY2007.
We are also adding significant new technology. A lesson from 9/11
is that we must be proactive--we must anticipate threats that continue
to grow in sophistication and complexity. This effort includes
leveraging the skills of our TSOs with new technology. This next
generation of technology will assist our TSOs in separating friend from
foe, increasing efficiency, and helping minimize the impact to
travelers and businesses:
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We will begin
deploying AT X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage. It provides
TSOs with a better capability to identify and detect threats
through improved imagery and analysis tools.
Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection
Systems (Auto-EDS). We are exploring Auto-EDS for inspecting
carry-on items. Auto-EDS may provide additional detection and
automation opportunities.
Whole Body Imagers. We are pilot testing whole body
imagers, such as the backscatter and millimeter wave
technologies, to quickly and safely screen passengers for
prohibited items without the need for physical contact.
Cast & Prosthesis Scanner. We are testing new cast and
prosthesis scanners to provide a safe, dignified, and non-
invasive way to identify potential threats and clear passengers
wearing casts, braces, and prosthetic devices.
Bottled Liquids Scanners. We have begun deploying
liquids scanning devices at checkpoints, and are now using a
hand-held liquids scanner for non-checkpoint screening
locations.
New Explosives Detection Systems. We are evaluating
several new products that will greatly increase the speed of
handling and screening checked baggage, particularly when
integrated into an airport's baggage handling system, while
reducing the size of the footprint of the baggage screening
location.
Improving Security By Improving the Security Experience
Despite the critical need for enhanced security measures, such as
the requirement to remove all shoes and the restrictions on liquids,
gels, and aerosols, we know we need to improve the checkpoint screening
process so it is less stressful for the traveling public.
Working with our stakeholders, we are pursuing programs and
processes that improve the security screening process. We are moving
from the legacy approach of simply looking for weapons to a more fluid
process focused on the goals of: (1) improving detection of explosives;
and (2) developing the capability to evaluate travel documents as well
as detect hostile intent or possible surveillance.
Looking Ahead
Implementation of Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act)
TSA appreciates the leadership of this Subcommittee for the
exceptionally difficult work in melding together the transportation
security provisions in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (P. L. 110-53). I also would like to thank the
Subcommittee staff for its professionalism and the hard work and
cooperative spirit they displayed in working with the Department of
Homeland Security and TSA to finalize these provisions.
A large proportion of the requirements in the 9/11 Act directly
affect all aspects of transportation security, including strategic
planning, aviation security, rail security, security of public transit
facilities, pipelines, over-the-road buses, and trucking security. TSA
has a big task in continuing the implementation of the 9/11 Act and in
working with the many stakeholders in the transportation sector to
assure the level of security that Congress and the 9/11 Commission
envisioned.
We will now need to integrate the many mandates in the 9/11 Act
into our current priorities and resources to enable key initiatives to
progress without delay while not losing focus on our threat-based
operations. I also ask the Subcommittee to recognize that many of the
mandates propose implementation schedules that will be especially
challenging, given requirements in other laws for sufficient time to
allow the Federal regulatory process to fully play out. We are working
with our partners in the Department and other federal agencies to begin
this process and will report our progress at the request of the
Subcommittee.
Screening of Air Cargo
As you know, the 9/11 Act requires the establishment of a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft within 3
years. As we proceed towards meeting the cargo screening requirement,
TSA will stress effective security management of the air cargo supply
chain. This process will require substantial collaboration with
stakeholders. This Subcommittee was a leader in including key language
in the bill that authorizes TSA to develop and implement a process to
certify the security methods used by shippers as a means of complying
with the screening requirement. This is a critical element in enabling
the improved security for air cargo on passenger aircraft that Congress
requires. I am grateful to the Committee for its recognition that
better screening occurs when shipments are screened and secured at
various points along the supply chain. Waiting until the freight is
dropped at the airport, often in large pallets, to begin screening
would result in less effective screening as well as defeat the whole
purpose of the air cargo system that strives to provide expeditious
delivery of goods from origin to destination. We expect to work closely
with all aspects of the air cargo supply chain to develop an effective
and robust air cargo security program in accordance with the bill's
requirements while continuing the free flow of commerce that our
economy relies upon. TSA will build upon our established programs: air
cargo security regulations; Security Directives; the Known Shipper
Management System; and increased use of TSA-certified explosives
detection canine teams and Transportation Security Inspectors for
Cargo.
In addition, the $80 million dollars appropriated to TSA this year
for air cargo security as part of the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28) will contribute to our increased
efforts through the hiring of at least 150 additional cargo inspectors
and expansion of the National Explosives Detection Canine Program by no
fewer than 170 teams.
Secure Flight
TSA has taken a significant step toward implementing the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the requirement of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to enhance the
vetting of aviation passengers against terrorist watch lists. On August
23, 2007, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
proposing implementation of the Secure Flight program. Secure Flight,
if implemented as proposed, will bring the process of comparing
passenger names against the watch list, now performed by aircraft
operators, into the government, and will align domestic and
international passenger pre-screening. By establishing a more
consistent and effective watch list matching process, TSA will
strengthen a key layer of security and enhance its ability to stop
terrorists from being allowed through the passenger screening
checkpoint. The program is designed to better focus enhanced passenger
screening efforts on individuals likely to pose a threat to civil
aviation, and to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast
majority of the traveling public by distinguishing them from
individuals on the watch list.
We have taken the time to build the Secure Flight program right,
and we believe that the NPRM and associated Privacy Act System of
Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment demonstrate that TSA has
built a program with the operational requirements necessary to enhance
aviation security while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of
the traveling public.
Over the next few months, TSA intends to begin a testing period
using data from aircraft operators that volunteer to participate.
During testing, air carriers will continue conducting watch list checks
for domestic flights, and TSA will compare the results of its watch
list matching with air carrier results to ensure the validity of the
Secure Flight system.
It is therefore extremely critical that Congress provide the
necessary funding for Secure Flight requested by the President in the
FY 2008 budget. Without the necessary funding, the program will have to
scale back benchmark testing with airlines, Secure Flight system to
airline system testing, parallel operations with airlines, and the
stand up of the Secure Flight Service Center or Secure Flight
Operations Center. In short, the program would have a system with no
ability to connect, communicate, or test with airlines for the purposes
of implementation. Important contract awards would be postponed. From a
schedule perspective, rollout of the Secure Flight program would be
severely delayed. An immediate concern is the significant budget
constraint imposed on the Secure Flight program due to the enactment of
H.J. Res 52, providing for continuing appropriations for fiscal year
(FY)2008. The restrictions on funding under H.J. Res 52 will inhibit
TSA's ability to implement this critical program to improve aviation
security and fulfill a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Now
that we have demonstrated major progress on the Secure Flight program
through the issuance of the NPRM and associated privacy documents, we
need your support to fund this vital program.
General Aviation
TSA is working closely with the general aviation (GA) community to
develop reasonable, feasible, and effective security for GA operations
while ensuring that these measures support continued operations and
increased growth of the industry.
TSA is also working with aircraft operators and Fixed Base
Operators directly to develop voluntary programs of verifying the
identification of passengers on board aircraft and maintaining facility
security in and around GA aircraft. TSA is working closely with our
interagency partners to improve GA security. The U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) recently issued a NPRM that will require GA
operators to submit comprehensive manifest data about passengers, crew,
and flight information electronically to CBP, as part of its Electronic
Advance Passenger Information System (e-APIS), at least 60 minutes
before the aircraft departs for the United States.
Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft
coming into the United States, such as who is and is not a U.S.
citizen. That is not enough. Having this information an hour before
departure will give CBP inspectors more time to fully pre-screen
travelers and crews and take necessary actions to resolve threats.
Conclusion
Although the threats and challenges to the security of the aviation
system are numerous, so are the solutions and efforts of TSA to
continue to successfully carry out our mission. We will continue to use
our personnel, information, and technology in innovative ways to stay
ahead of the evolving threats and facilitate passenger travel and the
flow of commerce.
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to thank the traveling
public and our stakeholders for their continued cooperation which helps
TSA effectively manage high travel volumes through the screening
process. I am hopeful that the same level of cooperation from the
traveling public and our stakeholders will make the upcoming holiday
travel season a success as well. TSA has shown that in partnership with
our stakeholders we can implement enhanced flexible security measures
while maintaining the flow of passenger and baggage screening.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. I am happy to respond to the Subcommittee's questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Assistant Secretary Hawley, thank you for
your testimony as well.
I now recognize Director Franklin Hatfield to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT FRANKLIN HATFIELD, DIRECTOR, SYSTEM OPERATIONS
SECURITY OFFICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hatfield. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Congressman Lungren, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased
to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the role of the
FAA in supporting the Transportation Security Administration's
response to aviation security threats and incidents.
I want to assure the subcommittee that FAA and TSA are
aligned and work very closely together in terms of
understanding and implementing our respective roles in
responding to aviation security threats. The FAA supports TSA
through a broad range of standing mechanisms, some of which are
continuous in nature and some of which are activated in
response to a specific incident.
We agree with the chairwoman's assessment that FAA's
primary mission is aviation safety and efficiency, but we also
agree with the chairwoman's assessment that our support of
TSA's security role is equally important.
Accordingly, we work with TSA, the Department of Defense,
and other key partners to effectively respond to any potential
threat without compromising the safety of the national airspace
system, and while attempting to mitigate the impacts on the
system's efficiency. In the aftermath of 9/11, the FAA
established the domestic events network, a continuous 24-hour-
a-day communication capability that includes over 100 agency
partners. Through the DEN, agencies monitor ongoing activity in
the national airspace system, along with their respective areas
of expertise, to identify anomalies to determine whether they
could pose a threat, and to coordinate operational responses to
defeat any such threats.
It is our first line of defense that provides ongoing
information-sharing on a real-time basis. For example, FAA
manages day-to-day operations of the national airspace system.
Based on information provided by our air traffic controllers,
our security watch officer may use the DEN to alert TSA and
other partner agencies about aircraft that are flying where
they shouldn't be, or aircraft that are not responding to
controllers' attempts to contact them.
In the vast majority of cases, the identified aircraft
turned out not to be a security threat, but providing this
early information via the DEN gives our other partners in the
government the opportunity to input their area of expertise in
order to provide a more complete picture of what may or may not
be happening. The level of interest a flight receives would
obviously be determined through shared information about the
situation, triggering higher levels of scrutiny as appropriate.
In addition to the DEN, the FAA supports the TSA in a
variety of operational elements, including a newly named
Freedom Center out in Herndon, Virginia. The Freedom Center is
staffed with TSA personnel as well as representatives from
various federal agencies, including the FAA, and we have air
traffic controllers assigned to the facility's National Capital
Region Coordination Center at the Freedom Center. If an
incident arises, FAA personnel are immediately available to
provide their expertise.
In addition, should the situation warrant, TSA activates a
telephone bridge with ranking officials throughout DHS. This
permits DHS to make quick, comprehensive, decisive decisions
about a particular security threat. Usually--and I say
``usually,'' and it is almost always--as soon as that bridge is
activated, the FAA administrator's representative, myself, will
immediately be joined in the network discussion. In this
manner, the merits of different options can be discussed and
informed decisions made and implementation of those decisions
can be done expeditiously. This means of communication has been
very effective, and we will talk probably more about that a
little bit later on.
We also exchange technology with one another. The FAA
supports TSA through this shared technology. For example, FAA
provided the traffic situational display, the TSD, at key
facilities operated by TSA and other partners. While TSD was
designed by the FAA as an air traffic management tool, the
system's ability to share situational information reduces the
potential for miscommunication between our two agencies, and
enhances our ability to make a rapid decision in a crisis
situation.
We are actively working with TSA now and in the short term
and in the long term on new technological platforms which will
support TSA's aviation security responsibilities. We are also
cooperating with TSA on longer-range plans for the FAA's Joint
Planning and Development Office, which is currently working to
integrate security capabilities into the architecture for the
next generation air transportation system.
Finally, FAA and TSA partner on all the special events,
most recently the United Nations General Assembly, the Super
Bowl, and the upcoming World Series. These are just a few
examples of the many ongoing interagency efforts designed to
optimize our nation's security.
In conclusion, the FAA is committed to supporting fully TSA
in its efforts to improve aviation security. While we
continually look to refine and improve these efforts, I am
confident that both agencies agree that our working
relationship is a strong one.
This is the conclusion of my prepared statement. I will be
happy to answer questions at this time. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hatfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Franklin Hatfield
October 16, 2007
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Congressman Lungren, Members of the
Subcommittee:I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon to
discuss the role of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in
supporting the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response
to aviation security threats and incidents. I want to assure the
Subcommittee that FAA and TSA are aligned and work very closely
together in terms of understanding and implementing our respective
roles in responding to aviation security threats. The FAA supports TSA
through a broad range of standing mechanisms, some of which are
continuous in nature, and some of which are activated in response to an
identified threat. FAA's mission is aviation safety and efficiency. FAA
supports TSA's aviation security mission. Accordingly, we work with
TSA, the Department of Defense (DoD), and other key partners to
effectively respond to any potential threat without compromising the
safety of the National Airspace System (the NAS) and while mitigating
impacts of system efficiency.
The FAA is uniquely qualified, trained, and equipped to operate the
NAS and manage the nation's airspace. This is why FAA retains control
of the airspace, even when security incidents arise. While other
entities have missions and skill sets that are essential to responding
to security threats, the FAA's understanding of the complexity of the
NAS makes it uniquely suited to recognizing aviation threats and
identifying the options available based on the facts of a given
situation without compromising operational safety and unduly impacting
NAS efficiency and the nation's economy.
As security has become a greater focus of managing air traffic, and
responsibility for transportation security rests with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), it is helpful to understand the legislative
history of why the FAA was given and retains operational control of the
airspace. The FAA was created almost 50 years ago in 1958 to provide a
centralized focus for aviation, replacing an ineffective system of
diffused authorities that had evolved over time. Prior to 1958, the
functions of the FAA were splintered, with the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (under the Department of Commerce) possessing day-to-day air
traffic control responsibilities; the Civil Aeronautics Board
possessing accident investigation and safety regulatory
responsibilities; and an Airways Modernization Board having the
responsibility for planning and developing a system of air navigation
facilities. On top of that, there was an inter-agency Air Coordinating
Committee which reviewed all matters involving use of the airspace.
This approach to managing the NAS was clearly inefficient and
ineffectual.
The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAAct)
makes it clear that Congress wanted one independent agency with
``plenary authority'' over the nation's airspace. The FAA Act was
intended to address two fundamental deficiencies in the Federal
Government's aviation responsibilities, one of which was a ``lack of
clear statutory authority for centralized airspace management.'' When
it was unclear which civilian agency or the military had authority over
air traffic, airspace and other aviation safety issues, the confusion
led to aviation accidents, including mid-air collisions. The current
statutory framework for the Administrator's airspace authority and the
accompanying legislative history confirm that the FAA continues to be
the sole authority for airspace management, air traffic regulatory
authority, and use of the airspace.
To more fully understand how FAA supports the security
responsibilities of the TSA and other agencies on a daily basis and in
response to a perceived threat, I will review the communications and
technological initiatives that are currently in place and how they
work. I will also briefly summarize the ongoing government exercises to
ensure that all the requisite individuals throughout government know
what is expected of them should a crisis arise.
Communications
In the aftermath of 9/11, the FAA established the Domestic Events
Network (DEN)--a continuous, twenty-four hour a communications
capability that includes over a hundred agency partners. Through the
DEN, agencies monitor ongoing activity in the National Airspace System
(NAS) along with their respective areas of expertise to identify
anomalies to determine whether they could pose a threat and to
coordinate operational responses to defeat any such threats. The DEN
enables all of the key aviation security stakeholders to connect the
dots and ensure that responses reflect the risk-based decisions of the
Government. It is a first line of defense that provides ongoing
information sharing on a real-time basis. For example, FAA manages day-
to-day operations in the NAS. Based on information provided by
controllers, our watch officer may use the DEN to alert TSA and other
partners about aircraft that are flying where they shouldn't be or
aircraft that are not responding to controllers' attempts to contact
them. In the vast majority of cases, the identified aircraft turn out
not to be a security threat, but providing early information to the DEN
gives other parts of the government the opportunity to input their
areas of expertise in order to provide a more complete picture of what
may or may not be happening. The level of interest a flight receives
would obviously be determined through shared information about the
situation, triggering higher levels of scrutiny as appropriate.
In addition to the DEN, the FAA supports the TSA in a variety of
operational elements, including the Freedom Center (formerly known as
the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)) in Herndon,
Virginia. The Freedom Center is staffed with TSA personnel as well as
representatives from various partner agencies, including the FAA, which
has air traffic control specialists assigned to the facility's National
Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC). If an incident arises, the
FAA personnel are immediately available to provide air navigation
services related input to the interagency response decisions, including
information on flight behavior (e.g., flight path and communication
with air traffic control (ATC)); aircraft registration; pilot history;
and critical safety factors such as the FAA's ability to safely divert
the aircraft to alternate landing locations while mitigating potential
threats. These personnel also are able to leverage the FAA's ATC
capabilities to communicate with the suspect flight and provide
security driven instructions.
Should the situation warrant, TSA can activate a bridge telephone
conversation with high ranking officials throughout DHS. This will
permit DHS senior officials to immediately understand the situation at
hand in order to make informed, coordinated decisions from the top for
their immediate implementation. Usually, if this bridge is activated,
the FAA Administrator's representative will immediately be joined to
the network discussion. In this manner, the merits of different options
can be discussed, informed decisions can be made, and implementation of
those decisions can occur expeditiously.
It is important to understand that the range of potential scenarios
that may unfold means that a standard protocol or checklist is neither
and optimal or practical solution. When a problem is identified, the
facts of any given situation will dictate how the situation is handled
and what decisions get made. For example, if it is discovered that a
passenger enroute to the United States is on the no-fly list, the
decision of where and/or whether to divert the flight could be impacted
by the actions of the passenger in question. Is the passenger
exhibiting signs of anxiety or restlessness? Or is the passenger sound
asleep? The specific facts around the situation could lead to different
conclusions, different decisions and consequently, different results.
The important thing is that the conclusions and decisions are made at
the appropriate level of government with all the players in the
decision making process basing those decisions on the same coordinated,
integrated, real-time information.
These means of communicating have proven to be very effective in
ensuring the level of response is appropriate to the threat at hand,
while avoiding unduly impacting the nation's aviation system, which is
already the most complex and busy system in the world, and creating
unwanted economic consequences.
Technology
In addition to effective inter-agency communication, new and better
technology is also an essential tool in the war against terror. The FAA
supports TSA through sharing technology. For example, FAA provides the
Traffic Station Display (TSD) system at key facilities operated by TSA
and other partners. While TSD was only designed to support air traffic
management activities, the system's ability to share situational
information reduced the potential for miscommunication or
misunderstanding among agencies sharing information, which, past
incidents have demonstrated, is essential in reacting to developing
situations appropriately.
We are actively working with TSA now both in the short and long
term on new, shared and interoperable technological platforms, which
will support TSA's aviation security responsibilities. We are also
cooperating with TSA on longer range plans through the FAA's Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO), which is currently working to
integrate security capabilities into the architecture for the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
Joint Planning/Coordination Groups
The FAA and TSA also work in close partnership through a variety of
interagency planning groups. For example, the FAA and TSA co-chair an
interagency airspace procedures working group that meets every week to
discuss, resolve and ensure that positive communication and
coordination continues between all agencies. We co-chair an interagency
working group working on improving the Government's ability to counter
and respond to Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) threats posed
by terrorists. We partner on event specific task forces such as those
established to protect National Special Security Events (NSSE) such as
the recent UN General Assembly. These are just a few examples of the
many ongoing inter-agency efforts designed to optimize our nation's
security.
Exercises
Improved communication and technology is further enhanced by
regular joint TSA-FAA as well as national level, Government wide
exercises. These exercises, which are built around various threat
scenarios identified by the Intelligence Community and/or real world
events (e.g., the August 2006 UK terror plot), enable the FAA and TSA
to explore and refine our cooperation at all levels ranging from policy
decisions to tactical operations. The FAA and TSA senior officials
regularly conduct exercises led by each agency's Administrators. The
last such exercise, held earlier this year in April, enabled us to
explore and significantly clarify how we would work together to
effectively respond to a terrorist attack premised on the UK plot
scenario, in which the terrorists intended to blow up flights from
Heathrow bound for the U.S.
In addition to these bilateral exercises, we participate in
partnership with TSA in broader, Government wide exercises such as Top
Officials 4 (TOPOFF 4), which is being conducted this week. TOPOFF 4
will help the participating agencies identify gaps and strengthen
cooperation on responses to terrorist attacks using Radiological
Dispersal Devices (RDD) or ``dirty bombs''.
In conclusion, the FAA is committed to supporting fully TSA in its
efforts to improve aviation security. While we continually look to
refine and improve these efforts, I am confident that both agencies
agree that our working relationship is a strong one.
This is the conclusion of my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer your questions at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you, director, for your
forthrightness, and really setting the tone for this hearing. I
think as I look at Assistant Secretary Hawley, and I think he
lit up when he said ``sharing situational information,'' which
is key to all of our security.
At this time, I will remind each member that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for such questions, and as I do so,
let me ask unanimous consent to place into the record several
articles, ``The FAA Alerted on al-Qa'ida in 1998, 9/11 Panel
Said,'' and that is dated September 14, 2005; ``Air Traffic
Cell Towers: FAA Centers Communication Breakdown Should Worry
Congress,'' October 14, 2007; and then ``Flyers Beware, 2007
Said to be Worse Year for Delays, Report Says,'' September 26,
2007. Without objection so ordered.\1\
[See committee file.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Some would ask why I would raise these
questions. As I listened to the director from GAO, I heard a 70
percent compliance. I think it is important to first thank my
subcommittee members because as fast as we can review and
schedule hearings, we are attempting to be broad-based in our
oversight over transportation modes, and we are methodically
making our way through a number of transportation modes.
Of course, aviation seems to draw the bounty of attention.
But this is the reason why, and I will just read this:
``According to the 9/11 panel, the American aviation officials
were warned as early as 1998 that al-Qai'da could seek to
hijack a commercial jet and slam it into a U.S. landmark,
according to previously secret portions of a report.'' Those
aviation officials were the FAA.
And so, we have a calamity of occurrences here, and I think
Director Hatfield made it very clear. We certainly didn't have
situational exchanges prior to 9/11 in an effective manner, and
I question whether or not we have situational exchanges now. I
hope as we proceed in this hearing, I will be able to highlight
for the record really the crisis in air traffic controllers,
both in terms of personnel and equipment. This is a hearing to
reflect on information, and I have already stated that I
believe that the committees are certainly attempting to work
together--TI and the Homeland Security. We recognize that we
have joint responsibilities.
So my questions are not in any way to undermine
jurisdictional territories. But it is important--I can't seem
to grab enough of the vocabulary--to speak to the need for
coordination between TSA and FAA, and to really highlight that
when there is a breakdown in an FAA tower--Memphis Center was
the one that was referred to, and FAA controllers had to use
cell phones--the security of America is in jeopardy.
So I want to first begin with that focus between Director
Hatfield and Assistant Secretary Hawley. That is, what is the
status of situational exchange? What impact between the two
agencies, TSA and FAA--what is the impact of what I think is an
infrastructure problem, an upgrade problem for air traffic
controllers as it relates to security? What kind of technology,
what do we need to put in place to improve situational exchange
and better exchange so that the pictorial scene that many of us
saw in the movie that depicted 9/11, when there was certainly
great heart shown by the air traffic controllers, but there was
also great confusion, can projecting into the future be solved?
Director Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I think first of all the real-time
communication is extraordinary, as Mr. Hatfield mentioned.
There are FAA air traffic experts at the Freedom Center, which
is TSA's operations center. We have a variety of formal
mechanisms and informal mechanisms that go up and down the
chain. I think one of the most important things to mention is
that we have shared intelligence analysis sessions at which Mr.
Hatfield is invited, along with the administrator and deputy
administrator of the FAA, with me and my deputy to go over all
the intel at the highest classification level to make sure that
we are all on the same page, so that if something happens, we
don't have to explain what is going on; that we maintain real-
time awareness on the intel front, and then we back that up
with a real-time conversation when something is happening.
It is a well-practiced thing. We do formal drills, but we
do so many real world situations that overlap security and
safety. For instance, if we have a security concern about a
flight and we are interested in a particular routing, Mr.
Hatfield with the FAA will think about weather, will think
about fuel load, will think about impact on air traffic in that
area. And the two really have to go hand in hand, and we have
to have the same information and real-time communications. I
think that is the case.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to suspend and recess, and it
is in the middle of my question--Mr. Hatfield, you have not
answered, and Ms. Berrick--so that members could go vote. There
are a series of votes. Rather than go until the end, we will
suspend and the committee will be in recess, and we will be
back. We apologize to the witnesses, and I will continue to
hear from you, Mr. Hatfield and Ms. Berrick.
The hearing is in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. The hearing will now come to order. Thank
you.
Mr. Hatfield, if you remember, in your testimony you
mentioned the situational exchange. Mr. Hawley has indicated
that there are some preliminary systems in place. I want to be
more pointed. I think we are owed a great deal more affirmation
and, if you will, detail in this idea of exchanges. So in your
response, you might want to respond how the FAA is working with
TSA in terms of the situational exchanges, which I think are
very important. I would also like you to answer this question
of the existence of infrastructure and the level of
sophistication of that infrastructure with respect to air
traffic controllers that relates to security.
Mr. Hatfield. Okay, certainly. As I said in my opening
statement, TSA and FAA work very closely together. Let me
address that to begin with. In my 40 years as an air traffic
controller both in the military and the FAA, the primary
problem when you encounter a security issue is the common
situational awareness with those other people you are trying to
talk to.
On September 11, 2001, I was in New York City as the Air
Traffic Division Manager for the entire east coast. During
those first few hours, our major problem was trying to figure
out what it was we were dealing with. And then when we thought
we had an idea, reaching out to the Department of Defense or
another government agency, and then trying to share with them
our thoughts, and then even to find a way to be talking about
the same thing.
So on that morning, a telephone conversation began. It
started out with me from eastern region to the FAA headquarters
telling them what was occurring in New York, what my thoughts
were, where we were tracking planes, what we thought the
situation was. We slowly added other FAA facilities around the
country to that. So after about 1 hour, almost all of the FAA
was hooked up. But it became apparent that there were other
people that had a different perspective on what was occurring,
specifically the Department of Defense. So we said, let's pull
the Department of Defense up on this telcon with us, from a
security perspective, terrorism, obviously the FBI; let's pull
the FBI up.
In essence, chairwoman, that telephone has not been hung up
since September 11. It has been formalized in the domestic
events network. It is 24/7. There are over 100 government
agencies continuously that monitor that telcon from an aviation
perspective, everyone from the Pentagon police force to the
Capitol police, 100 government entities.
As a direct result of that real-time instantaneous
communication, let me give you a scenario. A scenario might be
that Albuquerque Center calls us up and says, ``Hey, we are no
longer talking to United 123, and he is deviating off-course.''
Instantaneously, the TSA watch-stander says, ``All right, let
me give you what information we have on that particular
airplane.'' The Department of Defense says, ``We are going to
put some jets at runway alert right now.''
So all of the various elements in the federal government
are talking about the same airplane, the same place in time,
with the same identical information. To me, that is the biggest
step forward that we have taken in security since September 11.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time is far spent. Let me just quickly
have a quick question. Did you act quick enough on 9/11 and are
you acting quicker now?
Mr. Hatfield. It is very difficult for me to judge. Did we
act quick enough or not quick enough? Did we act quicker than
anyone would ever have expected us to? That, to me, is
something that it would be very difficult for me to quantify.
But I can absolutely say, we are acting light-years quicker
today than we were on that day and time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me let you think about it.
Ms. Berrick, what do you think about this situational
exchange, and if you have any reflection on the 9/11 question,
or more importantly the technology, and where we are today with
the air traffic overload that seem to have?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. With respect to technology, we haven't
looked at that particular piece, but we did look at situational
awareness and how TSA and FAA and a lot of other agencies and
departments work together when there are security threats
onboard an aircraft while it is in flight. Generally, we found
that the coordination worked very well. The agencies were
communicating. The DEN network has been up and running since 9/
11.
We found a couple of issues where we made recommendations.
They were related to the agencies' having policies and
procedures for coordination, because although coordination was
working well, a lot of it was based on the individuals that
were in place. They knew each other. They knew how to work
together and to communicate, but not all of the agencies had
documented these procedures down so if somebody new came in, it
would be apparent how to act in certain situations. So we had
recommendations that agencies document and share these
procedures.
And also related to exercises, that the agencies have in
place exercises where they go through different scenarios and
talk about how they would deal with these different scenarios,
which is very positive and we said that that was a very good
step. It was follow up from some of these exercises that we
felt more could be done in terms of the agencies' identifying
what the action items were and actually following up on those.
But overall, we found that coordination worked very well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will follow up with you. I thank you.
Let me acknowledge the presence of Mr. Markey of
Massachusetts.
And now let me yield to Ms. Clarke, a member of the
committee, at this time for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I want to direct my questions to Assistant Secretary
Hawley. It is good to see you back here again. I probably boast
of one of the most diverse districts in the country. My home of
Brooklyn, New York contains more people from more countries
than just about anywhere else in America. This means, of
course, that many of my constituents travel frequently, making
great use of New York's busy airports.
When I travel home each weekend, one of the complaints
about travel which I hear most is that many people are
routinely delayed or detained each time they try to fly.
Earlier this year, the department initiated a DHS TRIP program,
in part to address these exact types of complaints.
Can you let me know whether TSA has been able to
successfully transition into using this new program from
previously having run its own redress process within the
agency? And was it difficult for TSA employees to transition to
the new system?
Mr. Hawley. It is actually a very smooth transition in that
we are using the same technology for DHS TRIP as we have for
TSA Redress. So the process is very similar. The key point that
you raise is that regular travelers who have names similar to
those on a watch list are sometimes inconvenienced when they
try to check in, say, at home or at a kiosk.
The solution to that is the Secure Flight program that I
mentioned in my opening. When that comes into place and takes
the watch list matching inside the government, that problem
should virtually go away. Until that time, we do depend on the
airlines' systems to be able to say, ``That is the person who
went through DHS TRIP.'' So we provide that information to the
airlines, but the issue is for the airline to be able to use
that in its boarding process.
Ms. Clarke. Has using DHS TRIP helped improve the
efficiency of security screeners at airports, allowing
officials to spend less time on misidentifications and more
time looking for actual problems?
Mr. Hawley. I think it has definitely helped with
passengers who have one face to DHS--I came into the country,
and was that a Customs and Border Protection issue or was it a
TSA issue? So now there is just one place to go. To the extent
that we resolve the issues up front, it saves everybody time--
customer, airline, and TSA. So the ultimate answer is Secure
Flight.
Ms. Clarke. So since the implementation of DHS TRIP, have
you noticed any improvement in the overall travel experience
for passengers? If so, has TSA done any analysis on this? Or do
you have any anecdotal evidence?
Mr. Hawley. I think it clearly has helped a number of
people, but it is too sporadic for me to really say it solved
the problem. It is an effort to communicate with the public to
make it easier for us to do what we can with the current
system, but honestly, until we fix the system and get Secure
Flight in place, it will be patchy at best. Some airlines are
able to manage it quickly; others, it is more of a challenge.
Ms. Clarke. And TSA has probably the most experience with
the DHS TRIP of any agency within the department. Based on your
experience, has TSA benefited overall from using DHS TRIP? And
do you feel that other government agencies outside of DHS that
routinely perform screening of the public could benefit from
this or similar programs?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I think that is a very good point, that
with the visibility of watch list programs, that it is
important to the public to be able to quickly resolve
misidentifications. I think the idea of one-stop shopping is an
excellent idea and we certainly have learned from that.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick, do you feel DHS has benefited from DHS TRIP?
And is it a program from which other government screening
agencies outside of DHS could benefit?
Ms. Berrick. We actually are looking at that right now as a
part of the 9/11 mandate. GAO was asked to look at how Secure
Flight, using their redress process, how that is working and
will they be able to quickly correct misidentified and
recognize misidentified passengers. So we don't have any
conclusions yet. We will be reporting on this in January of
2008.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me yield now to the distinguished
member from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, and a beloved former
member of this committee.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. It is
great to be back. Thank you for letting me sit in on this
subcommittee, which I am not officially a part of.
While I was away from this committee, Madam Chairwoman, in
January we put our heads together and wrote a letter, drafted a
letter to Mr. Hawley, the assistant secretary for TSA. We
expressed our deep concern about a number of administrative
failings and security vulnerabilities at Newark Airport.
Among those concerns were a series of articles that were
written in the Star-Ledger, including a report on October 27,
2006 that showed failure by TSA screeners in 20 of 22 screening
tests--that is interesting, I have to read things in the paper
to find out what is going on these days--as well as violations
of standard operating procedures. In the letter, we asked a
series of questions about: Have you been able to determine the
causes for the poor performance at Newark?; Were the policies
and protocols followed at Newark?; Have subsequent covert tests
at Newark indicated any changes in the level of performance?
You sent a response back to that letter in March, addressed
to me, ``Dear Congressman Pascrell,'' et cetera. Your response
did not really address your answer to any of these very
specific questions. So I would ask that you answer this
committee about TSA's response to this issue in regards to
these questions which were asked. That is my first question.
My second question will be on the subject of whistleblowing
protection.
Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. On the covert testing results, we
have done classified briefings on those, and would be happy to
do one for you as well. That is the forum to discuss the
specific issues.
Mr. Pascrell. You don't think the public has a right to
know at least some very basic principles about the findings at
any particular airport? Why must everything be the subject of
classified information? If it was classified, and if I found it
in the past to be classified, I could find some level of
agreement. I do not. I think the public needs to know, has a
right to know what is going on in any airport in this country.
Don't you agree with that?
Mr. Hawley. I think on the policy level, yes. As to
specific vulnerabilities, no. However, I think the points
raised are good ones. Let me address them without getting into
the classified part.
Mr. Pascrell. Sure.
Mr. Hawley. We fundamentally changed the way we look for
improvised explosive devices. We moved from training and
testing of completely assembled bombs, which are a lot easier
to find, to go down to the small component parts which are, for
instance, like detonators that would be the size of my pen cap.
So we went to a much, much, much more difficult regime of
training and testing. And then we have since then deployed
5,800 of our covert testing kits. We literally have 2,500 tests
a day, covert tests a day, 2,500 a day. In that, we look to see
how we can challenge the system. We use people from the inside
of the system who know its vulnerabilities, to test it and
probe it and use it as a training example.
So I do not have a problem. If the results were the ones
that you describe--and I am not going to confirm or deny that--
but if they were accurate, it would be evidence of the covert
testing program. When you get to the whistleblower thing, I
think it raises another very important point, which is we need
to be open and transparent with our workforce about our
failings, about our vulnerabilities, so we can fix them. And if
there is a concern about harassment or intimidation up the
chain of command, that is a security issue because it covers up
things that you need to know about.
Mr. Pascrell. Before you answer the second question, very
briefly, are you saying that there have been since the first
tests in 2006, there have been similar screening tests of
employees at the Newark Airport, and you have results of those
tests?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know specifically. I know they are
doing these covert tests that I just mentioned today at Newark
and every day.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay. I want to get to the second part. Thank
you.
The report of screening failures at Newark Airport include
the troubling news the Newark Airport personnel, including
TSOs, the officers there, were interrogated by federal agents
who were investigating the source of these leaked test results
that reflected poor performance by the Newark screening staff
in 2006. My impression at that time was they were more
concerned about the whistleblowers than the deficiencies. That
was my perception. I could be wrong. Right, Mr. Hawley? Or I
could be right.
Mr. Hawley. Both are possible. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Both possible. Okay.
These screeners and security personnel are our first line
of defense against terrorism. They are the people on the ground
who witness first-hand every day the implementation of the
security procedures we put in place. Their observations, the
information we gather from them can be an invaluable resource.
But it seems clear that TSA is more interested in silencing
them in the interests of not being embarrassed, than they were
in listening to their own employees.
Just today in the Star-Ledger, in an entitled editorial,
``Give Airport Screeners Whistleblower Protection,'' they cited
very specific examples--Air Marshal Robert MacLean, very
specific examples in this editorial brought forth by a
reporter, Ron Marsico from the Star-Ledger. It would seem to
me, don't you think they should be protected? Don't you think
employees should be protected?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, no question.
Mr. Pascrell. How are we going to get to that point?
Mr. Hawley. We have those protections today. They are
slightly different than under the Whistleblower Protection Act.
I believe we said before Congress in other situations that we
would not oppose changing to the other system. I agree
wholeheartedly with the premise of your question, which is
workplace intimidation, particularly in the security field, is
a sickness, a vulnerability, and has to be stopped.
Mr. Pascrell. So we have come a long way in the last few
months, then, in implementing this.
Mr. Hawley. No. I think the issue is that if it is
classified information that is given out publicly, that kicks
it into a different realm in terms of investigation than merely
a so-called ``leak.''
Mr. Pascrell. Are you familiar with the Robert MacLean
case?
Mr. Hawley. No.
Mr. Pascrell. Robert MacLean was an air marshal. He was
fired for alerting the public that the TSA was going to save
money by removing marshals from the very kinds of flights
targeted by the 9/11 hijackers. He was fired for that. You are
not familiar with that case?
Mr. Hawley. No.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Hatfield, are you familiar with that
case?
Are you familiar with that case, Ms. Berrick?
Ms. Berrick. No, I am not.
Mr. Pascrell. You are not familiar with that case. Could
you get familiar with the case and get back to us about what
your perception is of this? Because this, to me, is
unacceptable. I would hope the chairwoman would also agree this
is unacceptable.
Two security training officers in Buffalo, New York were
bounced for telling superiors that bags were being put on
planes without proper explosive screening. An acting assistant
federal security director was ousted after she complained that
her boss was illegally flashing an assault rifle at an Oregon
airport. You are not familiar with any of those cases?
Mr. Hawley. No, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, I wasn't making these up.
Mr. Hawley. No. I appreciate that.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, where did they come from? I mean, you
are not familiar. You are supposed to know these things that
are violations and deficiencies within the system itself. You
know, I don't agree--and I am sorry the ranking member, my
friend, Mr. Lungren is not here, from California--we can't
accept a half-a-glass. That is not acceptable when it comes to
the safety of human beings. That is not acceptable. We are not
talking about other issues. We are talking about the protection
of those folks who choose to use our airlines. I hope someday
we will be talking about those who choose to use our mass
transit system, which 50 times more people use that every day
as well.
I thank you, Madam Chairlady, for your indulgence, and I
thank you, Secretary Hawley.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have been somewhat lenient with our
members. We know that it is difficult to hold these hearings,
and there are a lot of concerns that members have. I thank Mr.
Markey for his indulgence, and now I am pleased to yield to the
distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts 5 minutes for his
questioning.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Hawley states in his testimony that, ``TSA will build
upon established programs to comply with the cargo screening
requirements of the law implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission.'' This is very troubling because TSA's
established program, such as Known Shipper, have been widely
criticized for failing to adequately protect the American
people from another 9/11-style attack.
The purpose of the air cargo provision in the 9/11
Commission Act is to fundamentally change the status quo and
overhaul TSA's established programs. The status quo is
unacceptable. I have a pile of reports here that point out the
problems with TSA's established cargo security programs. GAO
reported in October of 2005 that TSA's air cargo policies have
significant problems.
Today, GAO's testimony identifies some of the same cargo
security gaps that it uncovered 2 years ago, such as TSA's
failure to complete assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or
critical assets, which GAO believes undermines TSA's ability to
focus its resources on the most critical security needs.
My question you first, Ms. Berrick, is has TSA completed
assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets
such as cargo facilities and airports?
Ms. Berrick. The report you are referring to was our review
of domestic air cargo security. We have since done an
additional report that we issued in April of this year on in-
bound cargo coming into the United States. So we have looked at
both sides of this, and CBP also plays a role on in-bound
cargo.
What we found most recently was TSA is continuing to do
threat assessments. They are doing vulnerability assessments of
air cargo facilities. They haven't yet completed these as of
the date that we did our work in April of this year. So we made
a recommendation that TSA move forward and work to complete
those assessments.
Mr. Markey. So they have not completed them. Is that what
you are saying, as far as you know at this point as you sit
here, Ms. Berrick?
Ms. Berrick. As far as I know, up to the date that we did
our work and issued our report in April, yes.
Mr. Markey. Okay.
Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think the bottom line is I think we
have closed the gap that may be perceived between what you
think on air cargo and what we do, in that we have moved to
close these vulnerabilities. On the Known Shipper program, I
would just like to specifically hit that because I do know that
in the law it specifically calls out and says that you cannot
count Known Shipper as part of what is in the bill. We accept
that. We understand that.
The reason I had in there the part about building on the
existing was more about the K9 Program and the inspectors, and
that we don't feel like we should pull Known Shipper out, but
we are in agreement with, I believe, you, and certainly what is
reflected in the law here, is that in the system of screening
that is required under the law, that under the definition it
makes that clear.
So I just want you to know that we are under no confusion
that we cannot accomplish what is in the law by relying simply
on the existing Known Shipper.
Mr. Markey. I understand that. But in your testimony today,
Mr. Hawley, you say TSA will build upon our established
programs, air cargo security regulations, security directives--
the Known Shipper management system, and so, again, by using
that terminology and giving that kind of direction to your own
employees.
Mr. Hawley. We are just saying we are not going to pull it
out. It doesn't make sense to pull out that level of security.
It is not enough by itself, but it does add some value and
therefore should be retained.
Mr. Markey. All right. Let me move on. The GAO reported in
April of this year that air carriers in some foreign countries
inspect air cargo for potential weapons of mass destruction
prior to loading the cargo on U.S.-bound flights. But TSA and
Customs and Border Protection does not require such screening
for WMDs for flights heading to our country.
Mr. Hawley, is it still the case that TSA does not require
foreign airlines to screen their cargo bound for our country
for nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Hawley. They have screening requirements similar to
what we have in the U.S. I don't believes our specifically call
out weapons of mass destruction. You are talking about
radiation portal monitors, probably. But in the course of the
inspection for the regular TSA assignments, anything that would
qualify as a WMD would certainly show up.
Mr. Markey. Ms. Berrick, do you believe that TSA should
require that such screening for nuclear bombs be done?
Ms. Berrick. We didn't recommend that TSA require that.
What we recommended was that TSA consider some of the practices
that foreign countries were using. One of those was the use of
radiation detection equipment to screen cargo. Another practice
was more stringent verification of known shippers. Some
countries have a very rigorous process for verifying known
shippers before they recognize them as ``known.'' Some
countries are using technology more than in the United States
to screen air cargo.
So because of these practices, we recommended to TSA that
they systematically look at what other countries are doing to
see whether or not they could apply some of those practices in
the U.S.
Mr. Markey. Well, let me just say this. I am very concerned
on an ongoing basis, knowing that al-Qa'ida has placed nuclear
weapons at the top of their terrorist target list, along with
aircraft. I just want to make this point, Mr. Hawley, that when
Congress passed the language implementing the recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission, it did so with an intention in the
cargo screening area to fundamentally and dramatically change
the way in which business was being done.
Congress did not intend for these regulations to have
tinkering around the edges. It wanted a fundamental change that
put in place the kind of air-tight security that Americans
expect when they are boarding planes. My concern is in reading
comments in the newspapers and even in looking at some of the
language in your testimony, that there has not yet been a full
appreciation for the extent to which I, and I think I can speak
for the chair of this subcommittee and other members, are going
to be paying very close attention to the kinds of programs that
you put in place.
Mr. Hawley. Thank you. I would just like to say to you
personally, so there is no doubt, we do understand and worked
with the committee, and I truly appreciate the opportunity to
work with the committee during drafting. We fully expect and
intend to meet the requirements under the law passed by the 9/
11 Commission. We do understand the changes that are included
here. We are also grateful for the 170 K9 teams added in the
supplemental. We are continuing to add security for air cargo.
Let there be no doubt, we intend to fully meet these deadlines.
Mr. Markey. Well, again, as the author of the language on
the air cargo issue and on the screening for nuclear weapons on
ships coming into the United States, I can tell you that I, for
one, am going to watch very closely to make sure that you have
put in place the kinds of protections which this law has passed
to ensure would be done at the Department of Homeland Security.
I look forward to working with you in the months ahead.
I want to thank you all. I want to thank Ms. Berrick and
GAO for the excellent work they have done for the committee.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to offer a second round, but
let me thank Mr. Markey for the line of questioning. I
appreciate the witnesses in the manner in which they have
received them.
I am going to follow up on his line of questioning, because
I want him to know that this chairwoman joins him in working to
monitor the work that he has led on. Here is the question, and
don't think, Assistant Secretary Hawley, that I am not mindful
of the deadlines that have been put in place, in fact, the
compromises that have been put in place on air cargo
inspection.
But let me ask you today, do we inspect 100 percent of air
cargo today, Tuesday, October 16, 2007? Does America do 100
percent today as we speak?
Mr. Hawley. We are very close to it, in that we have the
airlines requirement that has been out there for a long time.
It is a classified number that you know what it is. So there is
that as the basic starting point.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But I think, and I will let you answer, do
we do 100 percent today?
Mr. Hawley. We are pretty close in that--
Ms. Jackson Lee. But not 100 percent?
Mr. Hawley. I don't want to say here today we are meeting
100 percent. We have 3 years to meet the 100 percent under the
new law.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand that.
Mr. Hawley. But the reason I am optimistic on that is today
we screen 100 percent of freight at the small airports to the
same standard as checked baggage, so that is 250 airports right
off the top. We take what the airlines screen, and then we have
the equivalent of 100 K9 teams dedicated to cargo that go
specifically at the freight that is not cleared by airlines,
and that is at the bigger airports. Then we have additional
security measures in place for items that used to be so-called
``exempt,'' but used not to have specific security measures to
them that now have those added on.
So from the security point of view, we have very definitely
closed down on vulnerabilities that may have existed a year or
more ago, and that does not take away from the fact that we
still have more to do and look forward to doing that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask unanimous consent that the
hearing be allowed to continue past the time of the losing of a
quorum. I ask unanimous consent. Do I hear any objection? I do
know that the ranking member had intended to return and I am
trying to be respectful to see if that opportunity occurs. I
thank the committee.
Let me just state for the record that there is not 100
percent screening, and I do recognize what the 9/11 bill, H.R.
1, allowed you. The reason for making that point is the basis
of this hearing. We are not where we need to be as the
traveling public continues to travel. So I am obviously trying
to create a sense of urgency that as we speak today, we have
the traveling public flying on commercial airlines and there is
not 100 percent screening, which gives us the added sense of
urgency, one, to expedite even sooner than the 3-year
timeframe, which really was a compromise; and two, to recognize
the need for this hearing and the importance of collaboration
between the agencies.
Let me continue my line of questioning to ask again,
assistant secretary, whether or not one of the issues that Mr.
Markey is made is a technology question, particularly as it
relates to nuclear. We have said over and over again to many of
his inquiries that it is really questionable whether we have
the technology or questionable whether or not we are
determining whether or not, and this has to do of course with
the ship, but radioactive material, for example, that could be
shipped or could be transported by airlines. It could be in a
suitcase.
My question to you, because this is so significant, are you
engaged with stakeholders in the private sector to solicit that
expertise to be of help in developing technology that can speed
along the 100 percent air cargo inspection that we are looking
to? Since we have engaged previously with the private sector,
where are we in making sure that we are astutely looking for
new technologies to assist in moving quickly on 100 percent air
cargo inspection?
Mr. Hawley. The process for that is the Science and
Technology Group at DHS, which has responsibility for new
technology. So they are very heavily engaged with that, as is
the DNDO, the nuclear office at DHS. So they have
responsibility for the new technology. But I do have to add
that the screening that we do for the regular cargo, as well as
for checked baggage, is also good security for anything, even
without the radiation monitor, that would represent a threat of
any kind.
So I think we are all striving for more and better
technology, but the existing process is a good security system
that would pick up threats of any kind.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, could I ask you on the record to be
diligent. We have just asked you and Mr. Hatfield and the FAA
administrator to coordinate. May I ask you to engage your
colleague, because it has come to our attention that that is a
very slow process, and that technologies from the private
sector are moving more slowly than they should. That is why I
wanted to have on the record that we in fact today do not have
100 percent screening of cargo.
Let me quickly ask these questions of Mr. Hatfield. Would
you go over for us--again I use the term ``quickly,'' and I
apologize because there are a series of questions that I have--
the general guidelines that the FAA adheres to in responding to
a terrorist-related incident? And let me appreciate your
service on 9/11. I could not imagine not being in your shoes
what that experience was about, or what it was like, rather.
I will say that we need to do better in hindsight, and you
just offered an additional thought for this committee, is the
Department of Defense, because we believe in jurisdiction, but
we also believe in security. And you have said you added them
at a later time, and they were certainly a strong component of
that day. We thank you for your service. I would like to know
what guidelines you engage in now if a terrorist incident, you
needed to respond to that.
Let me ask Assistant Secretary Hawley what and how often do
you engage with the FAA in tabletop exercises addressing in-
flight security? One of the issues, of course, is to make sure
that we are addressing security issues, as opposed to
unfortunate missteps by passengers who may travel in-flight. I
wanted to know what kind of training do we have addressing in-
flight security.
Ms. Berrick, you have been kind with respect to how far TSA
has gone. You said 70 percent, but I am still uncomfortable
with your answer in terms of whether or not the situational
exchanges are enough. I will ask you the question. Are we at
100 percent perfection? Because as you well know, you have 70
percent, if you will, success, but 30 percent vulnerability.
That is a terrorist act.
So I would really like you to be pointed in your answer. I
think you have on the record that they have made strides, but
are we at a point where we are at a sufficient level of
communication? Is it quick enough, frankly? Because terrorist
acts don't make appointments, and they don't move slowly.
So if you would, Mr. Hatfield, answer the questions that I
have just raised with you, and Mr. Hawley.
Mr. Hatfield. Certainly. Your question is what have we done
to basically document the procedures and the guidelines that we
use during a crisis. Our primary tool is the domestic events--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Within limits, can you address what are
the guidelines? How do you move forward in responding to a
terrorist-related incident, obviously, without venturing on
classified information?
Mr. Hatfield. I know on the surface that appears to be a
simple question, but it is not. It is very complex. Any
situation that we encounter starts out, the vast majority, as a
nonterrorist threat. It starts out with an anomaly that is
being observed usually by an air traffic controller, or a piece
of information that TSA has passed to us about a particular
airplane.
The protocols for working aircraft from hijacked aircraft
to aircraft with lost radios, all of those used to be in a lot
of different locations. They have all been consolidated and put
into a training package which is obviously a very sensitive
thing to be discussing openly. Those procedures are
memorialized, but a typical scenario develops from one where we
might have a no-fly individual onboard an aircraft.
Immediately, the DEN is engaged with the FAA-DOD-TSA.
At the same time, concurrent with that, Kip Hawley and I
are on a telephone personally with one another and our staffs.
He is telling me what he knows about the airplane, and I am
telling him what I know about the airplane. And we make a
decision. Are we going to divert the aircraft? Are we going to
allow it to continue to its destination? Are we going to turn
the airplane around? Are we going to send it to another
country?
It is a number of variables that are very difficult to
package into a set of guidelines. Is the person asleep? Is the
target individual on the aircraft awake, agitated, walking
around? All of those variables are weighed, and a decision is
made collectively between TSA, FAA, and if necessary, DOD, as
to the appropriate course of action. Those procedures from the
domestic events network are documented. Training has been given
to the air traffic controllers, in follow up to an earlier
question or observation that you had made. Computer-based
training, CBI, was administered in February of this year. Round
two of that training will be administered in November of this
year.
So I hope in some way I am addressing your question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you. I am going to hold. We
are in our second round.
Ms. Clarke, would you care for a second round?
Mr. Pascrell?
Excuse me, I will be in a third round, so let me ask Mr.
Hawley and Ms. Berrick to hold those questions that I gave.
Mr. Hatfield, you have given me a fair answer. Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell?
Mr. Pascrell. I would like to ask a question about the
airport perimeter security, if I may. GAO identified 24
performance expectations at TSA, of which 17 were generally
achieved and seven were rated as generally not achieved. The
performance expectations that were generally not achieved
included the failure to establish standards and procedures for
effective airport perimeter security.
In 2006, it was reported at Newark Liberty Airport, an
inebriated passenger briefly got onto the tarmac by improperly
walking down a jetway staircase after arriving from Puerto
Rico. In addition, two homeless people wanted for parole
violations in Georgia were able to enter the airport secure
area by lifting the bottom of a chain link fence and getting
through that way.
These are just two reports at one airport which simply
highlight the vulnerability of our nation's airports to
intrusion through breaching the perimeter. The Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey has tried to address this
vulnerability through a $138 million system that would surround
Newark Liberty International, JFK, LaGuardia and Teterborough
Airports with a mix of radar, infrared sensors, video motion
detectors, closed-circuit TV monitors, and fiber optics as
well.
This system would be designed to detect human motion and
help prevent potential intruders from breaching the perimeter
of the airport. This system is modeled after others already in
use in Baghdad and sections of the Israeli border. However,
apart from the efforts of the port authority, as well as a
similar system at Logan Airport in Boston, I am not aware of
any other perimeter defense system at any other airport in the
United States.
So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is if any other
airports have a similar perimeter security system in place?
More importantly, where is TSA's plan to address this clear
vulnerability to the integrity of our nation's airports?
Mr. Hawley. The issue of perimeter security is addressed
individually at each airport with their airport security plan,
where it does specifically address that. I think what you are
getting at is the issue of the economic model that we are
operating under, which is the airports themselves are
responsible for the costs, and it is a shared responsibility on
security, and that falls in their bailiwick. The federal
government picks up the cost of the security operations in
terms of what you normally see at the checkpoints and some
other things.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, what about the model? Shouldn't that
come from the federal government as to what are the minimum
requirements needed around each of these airports?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. This is a very serious situation.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, and that is the case. When you get to the
more advanced type of equipment, as you are describing, then
cost does become an issue. I should just say the port authority
is a fabulous partner in this, and we are working with them
very closely on all the security matters. The major thing is we
need to have layers. It is not just the fence. It has to be
layers all the way through, and you have to have overlapping
systems where you are not just building a Maginot line, so to
speak.
So I would rather have a number of different layers
conducted by different people with different systems, than to
just place all my bets on one.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, how many airports have these?
Mr. Hawley. This kind of a system?
Mr. Pascrell. Yes, of the major airports.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think there are probably components of
them. I am not aware of actually what the one you are
describing is in all of its attributes, but I think the $138
million you mentioned sounds to me like I would be very
surprised if any airport has on its own put out that money for
that kind of a system.
Mr. Pascrell. So in other words, if the port authority put
up this money, if other airports don't have that money, then
they just will not get the perimeter----
Mr. Hawley. Well, they may be not be able to get that
particular one in that particular configuration, but what we
would require, and you just said it a minute ago, was that we
require the minimum configuration and we have to deliver the
security that says, just as you describe, that does not let
terrorist acts occur in this airport.
Mr. Pascrell. Is that public information?
Mr. Hawley. The airport security plan is not public
information, but is something clearly we would be most welcome
to brief with you anytime.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Thank you, Madam Chairlady.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, the few times that we would say that. Thank you for your
questions.
Mr. Perlmutter of Colorado. I yield the gentleman 5
minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. I appreciate your letting me
ask questions here at the end.
I will start with something that Mr. Hatfield mentioned in
his opening remarks, and that is the World Series. We have the
World Series coming to Denver, Colorado. We are very proud of
that fact. Having the World Series coming to Denver, Colorado
means there is going to be a lot of pressure on the Denver
International Airport, the DIA.
So Mr. Secretary, I have a couple of questions for you to
start with. The first is, staffing levels. With that kind of a
crowd coming, and the fact that there will be so much. It is
not a national security event or national security special
event, or whatever those are called, but it is close. What
steps is the TSA going to take to move people through the
airport? Because as much as you and I have talked about it,
there has been some improvement, but then we see our wait times
growing because we are not adding people to the TSA staff. Can
you please answer that?
Mr. Hawley. The short answer is whatever it takes to make
the World Series a success. We do this for the Super Bowl,
World Series. We bring in extra people. We understand the major
importance. It is an international event. That is not an issue.
I think the issue you mentioned after that, which is the
sustainability and to get the staffing right at Denver, as you
know that is something that we are triggered on. You may know
that we have just recently added in the 2008 allocations some
significant new resources for Denver.
So the key thing, as you know, is opening early. And so
yes, we are dialed-in on that. But as far as the World Series
is concerned, we are going to support Denver totally, except
that I am a Red Sox fan.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Perlmutter. I was going to quote you. I was going to
put that you were going to support us. I appreciate that.
Let me move now to something, though, that causes some
delays from time to time, and that is the no-fly list and the
Terrorist Screening Center and its lists, whether it is the
terrorist watch list, no-fly list, selectee list. What steps do
you know--and this applies to Ms. Berrick, too, if you could
talk about this--what kinds of scrubbing of the no-fly list is
occurring so that we don't have misidentifications or delays
for folks who clearly don't fit the profile?
Let's take Sam Smith, you know, who had done something bad
in Northern Ireland 15 years ago, and a Sam Smith who is 10
years old in Denver, Colorado is being stopped and screened
twice. How are we dealing with scrubbing these lists or making
them better and less inconvenient for folks?
Mr. Hawley. I can answer the first part of that, which is
we went through every name on the no-fly list with the
Terrorist Screening Center and cut the list in half. And that
was part of the effort to prepare for Secure Flight. So that is
an ongoing effort. We are now addressing the selectee list,
which will also get at a significant number of people.
Mr. Perlmutter. Is this something you are doing on an
ongoing basis, always going back and looking at these lists to
make sure that they are applicable?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. And the other piece is that whenever a
name comes up, because obviously when one pops up, we are
always look at it for, is this the right level of attention? Is
it a no-fly? Is it a selectee? I think we had one yesterday
that was a no-fly, but in the post-mortem we all decided let's
move it back to a selectee. So that is something we do real-
time. We want to get as many people who shouldn't be on that
list off that list.
Mr. Perlmutter. Ms. Berrick?
Ms. Berrick. Yes. The Department of Justice IG, and in fact
GAO also just recently issued reports on this topic. We would
be happy to come and give you a lot of details on those. But
generally we reported similar information that TSC, working
with the agencies, including TSA, have done scrubs of the list,
including the no-fly list.
We have identified some issues with the scrubbing process
and still identified some hurdles that TSA had to overcome, but
generally the list had been reduced and they had been scrubbed.
It is a continual process that TSC is going through to do that.
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay. Here is the bottom line for the
traveling public, and I think for members of Congress. We spend
billions of dollars for equipment and staffing and zillions of
dollars in wait-times of passengers. Is all of this worthwhile?
Or is it window dressing?
Mr. Hawley. It is critical. I think the whole issue of the
threat level we are facing and the plots that we know are
ongoing in the world, and the interest in attacking the United
States is absolutely critical. I think the experience really
since June abroad is instructive to us, and last year, the
liquid plot. These are people bringing liquids on planes to
blow them up by the dozen.
So it is absolutely critical. I think that Ms. Jackson Lee
at the beginning of the hearing mentioned a little bit of the
fatigue factor of how do you keep up the vigilance this far out
of 9/11 when the public doesn't see it every day. We sure see
it and our officers see it. I would just draw attention to the
toy cars thing that we put out a couple of weeks ago, which is
this is the first time we have done it.
In a low-key way, we briefed our officers on the
intelligence related to that. And we said, ``You know what?
Let's just say it to the public that we have some information
on this, that we are taking into account in our security
measures.'' We are not prohibiting anything. We are not getting
hysterical over it, but we just want you to know we are paying
attention, and if you notice something different with the way
we screen these things, it is for a good reason.
So I can tell you absolutely for certain it is necessary
and clearly, as has been pointed out, we can continue to do a
better job, but we feel it every minute.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Hatfield or Ms. Berrick, do you have
any comments?
Ms. Berrick. I can just add that during the course of our
work, we always look at the intelligence information for
different aspects of aviation security, and how TSA uses
intelligence to drive its security decisions. I would agree
that there is incredible intelligence information that they are
using to try to identify where they are vulnerable and what
actions they should take to address that. So I think that is a
very important role.
And then secondly, the security measures also act as a
deterrent to persons intending to do harm. They see the
measures that are in place. They see that some of these
measures are changing. They see that there are layered security
measures. All of those are obstacles that they would have to
overcome to act. So I think that serves an important function,
too.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Hatfield, any comments? Or do you go
along with those two?
Mr. Hatfield. No, sir. I would go along with those two
comments. Thank you.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank both Mr. Perlmutter and Mr.
Pascrell.
I yield myself 5 minutes for a third round, and cognizant
of the time.
This has been a burden on the subcommittee in terms of
trying to get to a sense of wholeness on the aviation. I am
going to quickly ask you to quickly answer the questions that
remained. Mr. Hawley, that was on in-flight security, FAA and
tabletop exercises. If you could just do that very, very
quickly, and Ms. Berrick. And then I am going to go into some
other very what I consider questions that remain on the table.
If you would, Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. We do two formally a year at the administrator
level--the FAA administrator and myself, as well as our key
staff, twice a year formally. I would venture to say we
probably do about one a month of the type that Frank mentioned,
something that comes up during the day or night. You asked the
question, how quickly do we respond, and I would say it is
immediate. We always have a duty officer, either Doug sitting
back there in the front row, or Frank is on duty 24/7. We
frequently talk in the middle of the night if required.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Berrick, remember I asked you about
how perfect is the situational exchange, because that is a
question of life and death.
Ms. Berrick. Right. You referred to the 70 percent. I just
wanted to clarify. That is our overall assessment, the degree
to which TSA has met the requirements that were laid out by
Congress and the administration, and that is covering all
aspects of aviation security. Again, the key areas that weren't
being addressed that we reported on were technologies at
checkpoints and to screen air cargo. There was also perimeter
security and access controls. And there was also a system to
pre-screen passengers on domestic flights.
With respect to communication and coordination between TSA
and other agencies, again we reported that from what we looked
at, it was generally working well. We looked at over a 3-year
period. There were some breakdowns in communication, but
generally the process was working well. That has been put in
place since 9/11. But we did identify the importance of each of
the agency's involved documenting their policies and
procedures. I know the FAA has documented the procedures. Some
agencies don't.
When we are talking about 15 agencies--DOD was mentioned--
but there are a lot of other agencies involved in this
coordination effort, too. Even though the people in place may
know how to respond in situations, they have built
relationships. If they have to leave those positions, it is
important that these procedures be documented and memorialized.
With respect to the exercises, we did review that and saw
that the agencies were holding exercises to look at different
scenarios and how they would respond. The one area for
improvement we saw there was the need to follow up on action
items from the exercises. So for example, issues may be raised
during the exercises, but there always wasn't that follow up
afterward to make sure that the loop was closed so any issues
raised were addressed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you had to assess how quickly today
they coordinate, versus before 9/11, do you have that ability?
How quickly does it occur? There is an incident in the sky. We
don't know what it is. How quickly can these different entities
gather and begin to respond?
Ms. Berrick. I would say it is almost immediately because
the domestic events network, the DEN, is up 24/7. Everybody is
tied into it, all the agencies that have roles and
responsibilities related to coordinating these incidents. So
information is broadcast over the DEN for all to hear. People
are brought into have that discussion. They can share
information.
In terms of how it is different now versus before 9/11,
before 9/11 the DEN didn't exist. It was created on 9/11.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So an incident occurs, and you are saying
almost immediately the coordination occurs or one agency knows
about it?
Ms. Berrick. Almost immediately the communication occurs,
because all relevant agencies are tied into the DEN, because it
is a 24-hour network. So they can get information immediately
as it is relayed to them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you. I assume the agencies
are monitoring that, and your one addition is that they need to
document in more detail on how that is occurring.
Ms. Berrick. Exactly--how they would respond under
different scenarios.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I am going to do a rapid series of questions. I would
appreciate if the witnesses would take notes, so that then I
will yield to you to answer the question.
Just for you, Mr. Hawley, I have an issue that is similar
to Mr. Pascrell. Would you please investigate, as I have asked
you previously, Mr. Roy Ray, a TSA screener--I would like to
put that on the record--who has had some similar issues that
Mr. Pascrell has mentioned. His name is Mr. Roy Ray. I would
like to have that investigated, if I could.
Let me just say that this committee hearing and the one
that will come will include, or is including the question of
general aviation. I want to cite in particular an investigative
report done by Channel 11 News in Houston that found the
airport security at small airports to be very lax. In response,
I wrote a letter to Inspector General Skinner to investigate
these breaches in security. Further, when I questioned
Secretary Chertoff he admitted in a hearing that we needed, you
needed, to turn up the temperature on general aviation.
Today, unfortunately, it has been 8 months and no
investigation has occurred. General aviation airports across
America remain vulnerable as it relates to perimeter intrusion
and they are still flying in and out, and some of them large
planes that have the capacity for much damage.
Moreover, the inspector general's office has claimed that
they do not have the funds to conduct an investigation this
year. Why is that? And I will be asking a series of questions
on that question. Security at small airports continues to be
unacceptably lax. We would like to know what steps TSA is
taking.
Now, we understand that there is a jurisdictional question
in law, and a question where TSA is not present at general
aviation airports. I would hope that we are laying the ground
work--and Ms. Berrick, this question is for you--on possibly
having expanded legislation to address the question of general
aviation airports.
Let me just speak directly to the perimeter question. One
of the indicia or reports that you gave that said generally not
achieved had to do with the perimeters, where you asked TSA to
establish standards and procedures to effective airport
perimeter security, That is obviously the larger airports;
establish standards and procedures to effectively control
access to airport secured areas, not achieved; establish
procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems for
airport secured areas access control.
This could be similarly connected to general aviation if
you were looking at it, and I don't know if you were, but I
would appreciate a response. It says that in perimeter issues,
the TSA has not achieved what it should achieve. That is one
question.
The second question goes--Mr. Hatfield, if you would just
listen--I maintain that you all, the air traffic controllers
and the FAA as it relates to air traffic controllers--do a
yeoman's task, a very important task. However, I am disturbed
by numbers that I would like to share with you. In 1985, there
were 34,000 air traffic controllers. In between that, there was
the Reagan issue in 1987. In 1990 there were 36,000. I am now
looking at a document that says that now today, 2005 and 2006,
we have approximately 14,000. In fiscal year 2006, we have
16,000 air traffic controllers. In fiscal year 2004, we had
17,000, which was already half of the 34,000.
Now, I imagine that you will give me an answer that might
suggest that we have great technology and so we don't need it.
I think it is a travesty. I think the lack of air traffic
controllers experienced and trained from my perspective, which
is one of the reasons why you are here, Mr. Hatfield, has a
definitive impact on the security of this nation and the
traveling public. I might suggest that you have an answer to
that, and these are my final questions.
Let me thank you, Mr. Hawley, for the work you have done
and tried to do with respect to racial profiling, in particular
dealing with headdress. I want to make sure that every
traveling person is given the dignity of who they are and not
being a terrorist, or not being felt that they are terrorists
by their, if you will, prayers or their headdress. So I would
like you to comment on that and how you have been able to
address that question.
I would add to this in a very tragic way, a reference--and
let me make it distinctive so that we don't have a
misunderstanding of media or anyone else--I would like to at
the same time have a full report on the situation dealing with
Ms. Gotbaum. I raise that because there was language that said
``I am not a terrorist.'' There was also some reporting that
TSA employees did either encounter or ask questions. I am not
sure what occurred, but we want terrorists to be found and
arrested. We want the traveling public to be addressed in
whatever human condition they need to be addressed in.
So I would like to ask on the record for a full
investigation as it relates to any TSA involvement in that
second incident that I mentioned, and you can respond to the
issue dealing with the headdress that I believe is an
announcement that was made today.
Let me start with Mr. Hatfield on this question of half of
the size of, as I understand it, of air traffic controllers
some 10 or so years ago, compared to today of 16,000--a number
that has been going down. Mr. Hatfield? As it impacts security?
Mr. Hatfield. Well, you asked this question, chairwoman,
earlier. I have to tell you it is a very tough question. I have
never looked at in the terms that you have asked. The way I
interpret it, how many controllers do you need to make sure you
have enough controllers so the sky is secure. Quite frankly,
that is never something I have ever thought about before.
I think the best way I could answer that is, my core
mission is safe. Certainly, if I have enough controllers to
keep the skies safe, then certainly I have enough controllers
to keep the sky secure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you think you have enough, compared to
34,000 10 years ago and now 16,000? Haven't you lost a large
number of experienced controllers?
Mr. Hatfield. Certainly, I can't contest the fact that
there has been a loss of experienced controllers in the sense
that people normally retire. But what I can say is I know for a
fact that for the last 3 years, the FAA has had a target goal
of hiring. They have hit it for the last 3 years. I know in
fiscal year 2007, 1,800 controllers were hired. I also know
that system-wide right now, we are running with overtime of
less than 1 percent, which is a pretty amazing statistic for a
company that big.
So I will contend that the system is safe, and if the
system is safe, then certainly the system is secure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask that you give more thought to
that, and possibly respond in writing. I thank you for your
answer on that.
Mr. Hawley?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. On Mr. Ray, I have had the chance to look
into that. I believe I am writing you a letter, but I have
looked into that and can respond to you specifically on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hawley. On the general aviation perimeter--and I will
put that in with general aviation security generally--we are
looking at on a risk basis the GA community, and separating by
the threat presented by aircraft. The critical issue is the
identity of the pilot. That, to me, is the most important
thing. There are a lot of other physical security and other
matters that have to be in there, but understanding so that the
FAA knows who is the actual pilot in that aircraft positively,
other than just the honor system, I think is the critical
point. We are working with our international colleagues to get
that.
On the headwear----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Hawley, you answered part of the
question. The Channel 11 investigation in one city, it happened
to be Houston, showed the rapid and continuous piercing of
general aviation perimeter, meaning that it is a vulnerable
target because it has none of the security measures of regular
airports, even though as you well know, I just noted that you
generally had not achieved perimeter security on airports that
are under your supervision. Would you not think that
legislation might be warranted to include general aviation
airports in some sort of security control, in as much as larger
airlines, large airplanes land at general aviation airports?
Mr. Hawley. We will look at that. I think another key is
the physical security of the aircraft and the ability to turn
on the aircraft, basically, if you don't own it, and then there
is another way to get at some of these problems. Certainly,
physical security is an important part of which perimeter
control plays a role as well. That I will have to look at, but
I will look at that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You will provide a report back to this
committee?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hawley. On the headwear, we had some issues with
members of the Sikh community who were concerned that the
effect of TSA screening of headwear would single them out for
extra treatment. They have entered into a conversation with us
that I think was very healthy on a number of fronts. It helped
us set up, and now we have a Diversity Council that we work
through with these issues. We do understand that the Sikh
community is on our side. We are on the same side, and we have
some up with a headwear screening method that meets the
security and also the dignity and common sense, not only for
people with religious headwear, but medical or other needs as
well. So that we have put out today.
And then the last one, the tragedy in Phoenix, we will
investigate it. The initial reaction is that there was one
transportation security officer in Phoenix who had contact, but
it was only to render assistance when it looked as if the
individual was having a problem. I believe we have the video
for that and we will do an investigation, as you suggest.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate it.
Mr. Berrick, if you would conclude by focusing on the
question dealing with general aviation, on perimeter security,
and whether or not you have a study that deals specifically
with general aviation perimeter vulnerabilities.
Ms. Berrick. Okay, sure. We have looked at both areas. The
general aviation work we did was 3 years ago when we looked at
it. At that time, TSA was in the early stages of looking at GA
security. They had developed a voluntary self-assessment
vulnerability tool that GA airports could apply, but that was
in the early stages. Some of the states had more stringent
requirements for GA airports. Some of the states were pretty
active. Others were less active.
There are security requirements for foreign students that
take flight training at U.S. flight training schools. We looked
at that process and the checks that are conducted of these
students. We identified some problems there and made some
recommendations. The specifics are classified and we could
certainly brief you on that.
And then, of course, there are some security requirements
for larger GA aircraft. We are not doing any follow-up work
right now on general aviation, although some committees have
expressed an interest in GAO maybe doing some additional work.
In perimeter security and access controls, we did a review
again in 2004. Recently, as a part of our report card on DHS,
we got updated information from the department on its efforts
to secure perimeters and access controls. The area where we
identified DHS was primarily lacking was related to
technologies, providing information on technologies to the
airports. There are lots of legislative requirements that
require TSA and DHS to do that. There is no widespread
biometric system at the airports, so it is primarily focused on
technology. And there are some other legislative requirements
also that weren't met.
We are actually doing follow-up work now on airport
perimeter security and access controls for you and for some
other committees that we have recently kicked off. We can come
and brief you or your staff at any time on what we are finding
on that. But that work is underway right now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would welcome that. Ms. Lowey of New
York has been a champion of that issue. So we would like you to
finish your work.
I want to go back to general aviation as I conclude. Is
there a state that is a model for general aviation security?
You mentioned that there might be some states.
Ms. Berrick. There are some states that are stronger. I
will have to get back with you on the specific names because I
am not remembering them right now. There were a few states that
stood out in terms of requirements in locking the aircraft and
fencing and some other requirements at some GA airports. So I
can follow up with your staff, if you would like, and provide
that information.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In your general assessment, one, I think
the committee and I will certainly raise this with the chairman
of the full committee, that we would like to have. As I
indicated, the inspector general has not responded to the
inquiry on the vulnerabilities of general aviation airports. So
we have a real problem.
My question is, just in the overview that you did 3 years
ago, and you can reflect on it, do we still have some gaping
security, if you will, holes in, as you can reflect, on general
aviation perimeters and general aviation sites in the United
States?
Ms. Berrick. I would say based on the work we did 3 years
ago and some limited updated information, I would say that more
work is needed to assess what the vulnerabilities are and what
the options are for addressing those vulnerabilities. Again, at
the time in terms of doing vulnerability assessments, TSA had
developed this tool and was sharing it with the operators, but
that was in the very early stages. So I think more assessment
and attention is appropriate. I think it would be worthwhile to
look to see to what degree it is happening today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So general airports or aviation sites
could be vulnerable to terrorist acts?
Ms. Berrick. I think so, as a lot of other sites and
locations could be vulnerable as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just, we would appreciate your
response back on states that might be a model. Frankly, a
number of us believe that legislative intervention is necessary
on general aviation airports, and we want to be as detailed as
we possibly can be in that consideration.
Let me ask if any of my colleagues have a question. Let me
thank them very much for their presence here today. Let me
suggest that any members will have 5 days to submit any
additional comments for this hearing.
I want to take the chair person's privilege to particularly
give these witnesses the award for stick-to-itness and
presence. This is something that has been mounting. It is very
difficult to hold hearings and to gather people and to get the
questions that are necessary for what we are attempting to do
in securing America.
So let me thank all of the witnesses for their valuable
testimony, and the members for their questions. The members of
the subcommittee may have additional questions for the
witnesses, and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions. I would also ask, because we simply
sometimes leave questions on the table to the witnesses, and
sometimes there is a delay. We raised very important questions
today that have a lot to do with moving forward. We would
appreciate as expeditious a response as possible in the light
of what we have posed to you.
Therefore, hearing no further business, a thank you, and
the subcommittee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
AVIATION SECURITY: A FRONTLINE
PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEED FOR
ENHANCED HUMAN RESOURCES
AND EQUIPMENT
PART II
----------
Thursday, November 1, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Norton, Clarke
Lungren and Brown-Waite.
Also present: Representative Pascrell.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order. As I
do that, let me again thank you for your patience, but also
your presence here today. I acknowledge the presence of the
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security
and Infrastructure Protection, Mr. Lungren of California, and
acknowledge the presence of the distinguished--the
distinguished gentleman from California, and the distinguished
gentlelady from New York, Congresswoman Yvette Clarke of
Brooklyn, New York. And I say that because this is an important
hearing, and sometimes our schedules are not our own, and it
happens to be that way today.
And so the subcommittee is meeting today to receive
testimony on the training of transportation security offices,
flight attendants and Federal flight deck officers. However,
before I begin, I ask for unanimous consent ahead of time that
Mr. Pascrell, a member of the full committee, to sit and
question the panel during today's hearing. Hearing no
objection, so ordered.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you all for
joining us this afternoon. I cannot express the appreciation
because of the responsibility that this committee has. And it
was designed in particular to delve into areas that heretofore
had not been looked at as keenly as we might have wanted to do.
And that is not only transportation security and infrastructure
protection, but the front-liners that address these particular
entities.
As we all know, civil aviation security exists to prevent
criminal activity on aircraft and in airports. This activity
includes acts such as highjacking, air piracy, damaging or
destroying aircraft in nearby areas with bombs, and assaulting
passengers and aviation employees. Today aviation security is
high on the list of priorities of air travelers, the Federal
Government and the international air community. In the earliest
days of aviation, however, aviation security was only a minor
concern.
Since September 11th all of us have changed our outlook and
perspective, and we have made many improvements in the backdrop
of 9/11 in the security of our Nation's transportation
infrastructure. It is a work in progress, but there is more
work to be done.
However, our job is far from over. Whether it is more
improvement to be made or gaps to close in matters of security,
we must not become complacent. As our enemies adapt, so must
we, and we did. We now have a Federal screening workforce. We
screen 100 percent of the checked baggage. We are in the
process of moving to 100 percent screening of air cargo. And we
are constantly trying to find new technology to help all of
these functions; however, it is important to note that there
are challenges, and that we should address those challenges. In
addition, we armed pilots and barricaded the cabin door.
Some may have agreed or disagreed on some concepts, but the
effort was in place; that we must protect the employees and the
traveling public. TSA has taken steps to secure the plane and
the passenger, but has left the system vulnerable to attacks.
In essence, I believe that our focus has only been on
protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios, such as suicide
hijackings and baggage and luggage bombs carried by airline
passengers, and has not given enough attention to other
potential vulnerabilities.
Flight attendants, Federal flight deck officers and Federal
air marshals are the last line of defense when it comes to
security of a plane; however, flight attendants do not receive
any meaningful training to protect themselves or other
passengers or to thwart a terrorist attack. In the case of the
Federal flight deck officer, they do receive training; however,
this training does not provide the Federal flight deck officer
with the support and mentoring that other Federal officers
receive to accomplish their respective missions. These officers
should have the same level of training and support that other
Federal officers receive so that they will succeed in their
mission. This includes post-basic training mentoring and
ongoing training.
Finally, there is no comprehensive training or explanation
of what the three components of in-flight security flight
attendants, pilots and air marshals are trained to do in case
of an attack. Clearly these three groups must be trained on how
to work together as a team to be effective as possible, because
determining how to handle an attempted hijacking should not
happen at the moment it occurs, but rather during training
events on the ground.
As you can see, coordination is extremely important when
securing our planes. We must make sure that these groups are
aligned to work very closely in terms of understanding and
implementing their roles when responding to an aviation
security, a threat.
It has also come to my attention that TSA that designs the
scheme, if you will, of how we handle airport screening and
where resources are utilized may, in fact, though they are not
present at this hearing, need oversight by this Congress. There
is representation that with the movement of TSA screeners, with
the assignments being given, opportunities that appeared in
Phoenix and other places where the GAO has made studies about
intrusion of undetected bombing equipment, that there may be a
problem that we have to address.
Additionally, I would like to offer into the record a
letter sent to me by a member of the air traffic control,
Houston Air Route Traffic Control Center, and an individual who
is vice president of the local at Houston ARTCC. I would ask
unanimous consent. Hearing no objection, it will be submitted.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But let me just focus briefly as I
conclude my remarks. The absent individual or entity today are
the air traffic controllers. We recognize that their vital role
deals with the safe travel of airplanes throughout the Nation's
skies, but anyone who focused on 9/11 recognizes their
frontline responsibility as relates to security as well. And so
I am going to state on the record that we expect to have the
air traffic controllers present at a hearing prospectively so
that we can focus on the needed enhanced security equipment
that might make them better qualified and equipped to address
any potential threat that might come.
The record should note that I am disappointed, this
committee is, of the lack of recognition of their importance in
this process, and we hope that that lack of recognition can be
quickly amended, and that they will be before this committee,
as will the air marshals, who I know are a component of law
enforcement present at this hearing. But the comment of this
particular individual was expressing concern that I will
utilize further in my testimony or my statement as I question
the witnesses. But it should be noted that this is in the
record, and that the air traffic controllers are not present
today, and we expect for them to be present before this
committee in the very near future.
Finally, as Members of Congress, and more specifically as
members of the Committee on Homeland Security, we have the
responsibility to make sure our planes and airports are secure
and also our general aviation airports are secure as well,
which is an issue that we will be looking at in this committee.
Throughout these hearings I have reiterated that we are at
a crossroads where we must take action to find out what is the
best way to find a safe, secure and functioning aviation
system. In essence, what are the best practices? And if we do
not put effective security measures in place, our Nation may
very well be the victim tragically of another attack, which in
turn will cause a major economic disruption and avoidance of
commercial aviation.
We must continually earn the confidence of the flying
public in order to ensure that the public continues to enjoy
the freedom of mobility that flying provides. We must
demonstrate to them that our Nation's airports are secure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Chair is now pleased to recognize the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from
California, for an opening statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and
thank you for scheduling this hearing.
I would also like to thank the witnesses and the men and
women that you represent. We cannot do what we are attempting
to do in terms of providing safety in our skies and at our
airports without the great work of the people that you
represent. We can talk about it, and we can set out rules and
regulations, and we can hope that people will act the right
way, but it is your folks that actually make the difference.
We have said this time and time again here, as have others,
that since 9/11 we have invested billions of dollars to secure
our aviation industry. These security investments are necessary
because of the continuing terrorist threat to our aviation
security. A good example is the improved screening technology
we now employ for both checked and carry-on baggage, although
we know we have got to keep up with new advances in technology.
It is all part of the Homeland Security mission to develop the
best technologies, procedures and methods which will deny the
terrorist his goal of causing, quote, death and destruction in
America.
While technologies, as I say, are important, are necessary
to detecting and preventing terrorist attacks, the technology
is only as good as our frontline employees who operate it. The
better trained these employees are, the better our aviation
security will be.
The importance of training was highlighted in a recent news
story on covert testing for bomb parts at several U.S.
airports. The airport receiving the best grade is just outside
my district in San Francisco. The reason for their success is
they test their screeners continuously and use the testing as a
training tool. The TSA has now adopted this approach in their
training programs throughout the country.
Another example of our frontline employees making us more
secure is the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, as referred
to by the chairwoman. Arming our qualified and trained pilots
has provided another layer of aviation security. Terrorists
will now think twice before entering the flight deck of any
aircraft. If they attempt to penetrate the locked cabin door,
an armed pilot may be waiting to greet them.
There are other things that have been done, but we all know
that we can do better, and this hearing is an effort for us to
get a status report on how well we are doing in training our
frontline employees, what more needs to be done, and also I
think to recognize the tremendous role that they play in the
overall security for our flying public. And once again, I would
like to thank the witnesses, and I would hope that you would
let your members know how much Members of Congress appreciate
what they are doing and what they continue to do for all of us.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Ranking Member.
Again, let me acknowledge the presence of Mr. Pascrell of
New Jersey. We welcome him.
And let me remind other members of the subcommittee that
under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted
for the record.
And I join with my colleague Mr. Lungren in again thanking
you all for the service that you give.
At this time I would like to welcome our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness will be Mr. John Gage, the
national president, American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO. In his capacity he stands watch over the
rights of some 600,000 Federal and D.C. Government employees.
Mr. Gage leads the Nation's largest union for government
workers. Mr. Gage has long been involved in the AFGE and the
labor movement. He has a commitment of over 20 years of service
as president of AFGE, Local 1923, and as national vice
president of AFGE's fourth district.
And we certainly had a long-standing relationship, Mr.
Gage, and I do thank you for your presence here this afternoon.
Our second witness is Ms. Patricia A. Friend, international
president of the Association of Flight Attendants. For the past
12 years Ms. Friend has become a respected leader in the
airline industry and throughout the labor movement. Following
the September 11th terrorist attacks, Ms. Friend was appointed
by Secretary of Transportation, Secretary Norm Mineta, to serve
as the DOT Rapid Response Team for Aircraft Security, or serve
on that committee, a group of industry experts assembled to
recommend aircraft security improvements. Since then she has
tirelessly lobbied Congress, the Federal Aviation
Administration and the public for their support of more
stringent security measures.
The final witness of this panel is Captain Robert
Hesselbein, chairman of the Airline Pilots Association National
Security Committee. Captain Hesselbein has an extensive
background in security. He performed airborne counterdrug
intelligence duties in support of the diverse law enforcement
agencies and later researched and created the current standard
crew member procedures for countering a chemical-biological-
radiological, CBR, weapon in flight. Captain Hesselbein has
flown at Northwest for 19 years, is a graduate of the
prestigious U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record, and I now ask each witness to
summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with
Mr. Gage from the AFGE.
Again, welcome to all of you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN GAGE, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
Mr. Gage. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and members of the
subcommittee.
Among those 600,000 Federal Government workers that we
represent are included transportation security officers at
airports across the United States. Many times I have testified
before Congress of their dedication to doing the best possible
job they can to thwart air terrorism. Even as they are
wrongfully denied the fundamental collective bargaining rights
and labor protections of other Department of Homeland Security
workers, the Aviation Transportation Security Act mandated that
TSOs receive 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of
on-the-job training before they begin to perform screening
duties, and 3 hours of training per week averaged over a fiscal
quarter once they begin working. TSOs also train for
proficiency tests that they must pass each year to be
recertified. TSA is required by law to provide remedial
training to TSOs who do not pass the proficiency tests.
However, TSOs routinely report chronic understaffing at
airports, the lack of relevant and low quality of training TSA
provides, TSA's failure to fully invest in technology to
facilitate the ability of TSOs to evaluate potential threats to
aviation travel and TSA's institutional disdain for comments
and suggestions from TSO that can help spot and prevent threats
to air travel.
First, staffing shortages of TSOs have made it difficult
for workers to carry out their duties much less receive
statutorily mandated training. TSA has adopted a staffing model
that it calls its Staffing Allocation Model or SAM. SAM does
not adequately take into account the statutorily mandated
training time or other duties TSOs may be assigned, such as
administrative work or time to master new standard operating
procedures. Even FSDs have consistently reported to GAO and TSA
that because of insufficient staffing, TSOs have difficulty in
meeting the recurrent training requirement within regular duty
hours.
SAM also does not take into account the effect of the
incredibly high TSO attrition rate on its staffing assumptions.
The first 8 months of 2007 resulted in a TSO attrition rate of
19.6 percent, much higher than the attrition rate of other
agencies.
TSA should simply request from Congress funding to fully
staff its TSO workforce at every airport. And FSDs should
establish personnel schedules at each airport that ensure that
every TSO will receive the training required by law while on
duty.
The second concern of TSOs regards the quality of training
they receive. Much of the training TSOs receive is self-taught,
using resources and on-line learning centers. TSOs report that
many of these programs are several years old, and often no
training instructor is present.
There are striking inconsistencies in the availability and
quality in training from airport to airport. One example would
be the training offered by bomb appraisal officers, or BAOs.
BAOs are deployed at airports and are specifically trained in
the detection of explosives. At some airports TSOs report that
the BAO occasionally builds a simulated improvised explosive
device, an IED, and runs it through the checkpoint to see if
TSOs can spot the components. Despite the obvious merits of BAO
training to the TSO workforce, at other airports TSOs state
that while they are aware that there is a BAO assigned to their
airport, the person does not conduct trainings for the TSO
workforce.
Over the past few weeks there have been media articles
referring to the leak of a classified TSA report that found a
high percentage of simulated explosives and bomb parts that
were missed by TSOs at three large airports. The reported test
results are not in and of themselves indicative of individual
TSO or TSO workforce performance. The report does point to a
third area of concern to TSOs, that there is an urgent need for
TSA to make available updated technology for both passenger and
baggage screening. Unlike the covert test of several years ago
that involved the detection of fully assembled simulated bombs,
these tests often involve very small components that are easily
hidden in items that TSA has chosen not to ban. AFGE TSO
members report that even in trainings where TSOs themselves
disassembled a simulated explosive and hid its parts in carry-
on baggage, they were unable to find the parts by sight alone.
Simply put, TSOs cannot be expected to detect what the human
eye cannot see.
The technology that would enable TSOs to detect potential
weapons not readily apparent to the human eye is available and
is currently in use in a number of airports. Repeatedly both
GAO and the DHS inspector general have called on TSA to invest
in the deployed technology that will assist TSO in performing
their screening duties.
Finally, AFGE TSO members report that they have yet to feel
that they are a partner working with TSA to ensure aviation
safety. According to the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, 54
percent of the TSA workforce, overwhelmingly comprised of TSOs,
stated that creativity and innovation are not rewarded at TSA.
Half of TSA workers report that they do not have a feeling of
personal empowerment regarding work processes. Clearly many
TSOs feel the agency ignores or discounts their input despite
the fact that they serve on the front lines of safety every day
at 450 airports across the country.
No worker at DHS should be hesitant to point out a
shortcoming that could impact public safety because he or she
feels retaliation from management. This is a very real threat
to the TSO workforce because TSA refuses to be bound by the
Office of Special Counsel's recommendations when TSOs are
retaliated against for blowing a whistle on security breaches.
AFGE calls or Congress to pass H.R. 3212, a bill introduced by
Representative Nita Lowey that would provide TSO collective
bargaining rights and workplace protections, and ensure that
they are treated the same as other workers at TSA and within
DHS.
Madam Chairwoman, the availability and level of training
and deployment of technology is incredibly inconsistent among
our Nation's airports. But even if the resources necessary to
get the job done quickly and effectively and with the valuable
input from the TSOs doing the tough job of keeping the public
safe, TSA can further accomplish its mission.
That concludes my statement, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your instructive
testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Gage follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Gage
November 1, 2007
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: My name is John
Gage, and I am the National President of the American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE), which represents over 600,000
federal government workers, including Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs) at airports across the United States. I welcome the opportunity
to convey to you the concerns about training that have been a priority
issue for our TSO membership since those jobs were federalized over
five years ago. Many times I have testified before Congress about the
frustrations our TSO members deal with every day as they do everything
that they can to keep the flying public safe. I have also testified
time and again of their dedication to doing the best possible job they
can to thwart air terrorism, even as they are wrongfully denied the
fundamental collective bargaining rights and labor protections of other
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) workers. The apparent consensus
among AFGE's TSO membership is that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has made many critical decisions that have created
or exacerbated obstacles to the ability of TSOs to carry out their
duties, including the availability and quality of training.
The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) mandated that TSOs
receive 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job
training before they begin to perform screening duties. After hire,
ATSA requires that incumbent TSOs receive 3 hours of training per week
averaged over a fiscal quarter. TSOs are also required to pass
proficiency tests each year. TSA is required by law to provide remedial
training to TSOs who do not pass the proficiency tests. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) described that at least one of the 3 hours
is ``to be devoted to X-ray image interpretation and the other 2 hours
to screening techniques, review of standard operating procedures, or
other mandatory administrative training, such as ethics and privacy act
training.'' \1\ Our TSO members have reported to AFGE that other than
the training they received prior to beginning their jobs screening
passengers and baggage, TSA has consistently failed to provide the
training they are required to provide under ATSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO-05-457, Aviation Security: Screener Training and
Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSOs must deal with the consequences of decisions made by TSA
management, from policy decisions made at TSA headquarters, to
personnel and scheduling decisions made by the airports' Federal
Security Directors (FSD). In summary, TSOs point to chronic
understaffing at airports, the lack of relevance and low quality of
training TSA provides, TSA's failure to fully invest in technology to
facilitate the ability of TSOs to evaluate potential threats to
aviation travel, and TSA's institutional disdain for comments and
suggestions from TSOs--who stand on the frontlines of air security--
that can help spot and prevent threats to air travel.
TSO Shortages
TSA has adopted a staffing model that it calls its Staffing
Allocation Model, or SAM. Under the current SAM, TSA's goal is for
airports to have a ratio of 80% full-time TSOs and 20% part-time TSOs.
SAM does not does not adequately take into account the statutorily-
mandated training time TSOs are required to complete or other
collateral duties TSOs may be assigned, such as administrative work.
Instead, according to the GAO February 2007 report to Congress on TSA's
staffing model, SAM assumes staffing levels that ``allow most
passengers on most days to experience 10 minutes or less wait time,''
and ``that training is relegated to times when there is surplus
staffing and should occur during `less busy times.' '' In other words,
rather than construct a model that specifically allows times for TSOs
to receive the training they are required to have under law, much less
time to master new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and technology,
this important task is relegated to whatever time is left, even if that
time is none at all. FSDs have consistently reported to GAO and TSA
that because of insufficient TSO staffing, TSOs have difficulty in
meeting the recurrent training requirement within regular duty hours.
SAM also does not take into account the effect of the incredibly
high TSO attrition rate on its staffing assumptions. The first eight
months of 2007 resulted in a TSO attrition rate of 19.6%, much higher
than the current 2.2% attrition rate of the federal workforce. The
recent spate of largely cosmetic TSA personnel policy changes have not
provided the sort of meaningful change required to maintain the
current, dedicated TSO workforce. Since January, 151 TSOs have left
Boston Logan, one of the nation's largest and busiest airports. AFGE's
TSO members report that at many airports the priority of FSDs is to
provide training for new hires and part-time staff at a cost of $10,000
per hire. Training for full-time TSOs is an afterthought. The recently
enacted 9-11 Commission Report Act lifted the artificial and arbitrary
cap on TSOs. TSA should simply request from Congress funding to fully
staff its TSO workforce at every airport. The FSD should establish
personnel schedules at each airport that include accommodations for
every TSO to receive the training required by law while on duty, and
also provide opportunities for TSOs to receive training on new
screening technologies.
In addition, TSA can do much to retain and invest in the current
full time TSO workforce by dropping its opposition to collective
bargaining rights and labor protections for TSOs, by treating them the
same as other workers in DHS and the federal workforce. By restoring
fundamental fairness to the workplace and addressing those important
work-life issues that are pivotal to workers, including training, TSOs
will be able to perform with confidence and learn new skills that could
lead to promotions and improve safety.
Quality of Training
Online Training--Much of the training TSOs currently receive is
self-taught using on-line resources, or is conducted in the Online
Learning Center that provides self-guided training courses. Although
initially TSOs reported that there were some airports that lacked
access to the high-speed internet capabilities required to run the
programs on computers, TSOs now report that at the very least the
equipment is available. However, TSOs also report that many of the
programs they train on are several years old. Occasionally a Training
Instructor (TI) is present, but is relegated to being more of a monitor
who can answer questions, and does not provide instructions or
elaborate on the online training program. In fact, one TSO told AFGE
that he had not participated in a training session led by a TI in over
two years.
AFGE's TSO members at several airports have also raised concerns
about the qualifications of some TIs. TSOs state that they are aware of
individuals who were chosen for the position of TI, but saw no evidence
that they were given any sort of training for the job. Multiple TSOs
reported that as with other promotions or desirable jobs within TSA at
airports, the choices for TI were based on favoritism over merit with
friendships, cronyism, and cliques taking priority over training or
experience. According to several TSOs, those chosen by TSA management
for TI positions had no apparent qualifications for the job, and were
chosen over other TSOs who had backgrounds in security, law
enforcement, and the military or had previous teaching or instructional
experience. Many of AFGE's TSO members came to TSA with those
backgrounds, and a belief that their previous experience would be an
asset in this country's war against terrorism. Not only is TSA's
current policy of favoritism over merit taking its toll on the TSO
workforce morale, it is also depriving both TSA and the flying public
of the full utilization of all available assets.
``Hands-On'' Training--There is no substitute for practical, hands-
on experience. This is especially true when it comes to the operation
of the X-ray and scanning equipment currently in use at airports. Many
TSOs report that they have participated in Threat Image Projection
(TIP) where TSOs are required to detect images projected on an X-ray
monitor. TSOs consistently report that TIP and other practical training
are found mostly at the passenger checkpoint. Despite the fact that
TSOs assigned to baggage screening use X-ray and scanning machines just
as their colleagues on passenger checkpoint, they are much less likely
to receive training on the machines they use everyday. Once again, due
to incredibly high turnover rates, at some airports, new hires are the
only TSOs who receive hands-on training.
There are striking inconsistencies in the availability and quality
in training from airport to airport. One example would be the training
offered by Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO). BAOs are deployed at airports
and are specifically trained in the detection of explosives. At several
airports TSOs report that the BAO regularly visits both checkpoint and
baggage screening and that the BAO occasionally builds a simulated
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and runs it through the checkpoint to
see if TSOs can spot the components. At another airport TSOs state that
at least twice in the last five years the BAO has conducted a training
where TSOs built their own simulated IED and tested each other by
running it through the X-ray machine. This type of hands-on experience
is invaluable. Yet, despite the obvious merits of BAO training to the
TSO workforce, at other airports TSOs state that while they are aware
that there is a BAO assigned to their airport, the person does not
conduct trainings for the TSO workforce.
Investment in Technology
Over the past few weeks there have been media articles referring to
the leak of a classified TSA report that found a high percentage of
simulated explosives and bomb parts that were missed by TSOs at three
large airports. AFGE does not accept the leaked results as evidence
that TSOs are doing anything other than a very good job protecting the
flying public under very difficult conditions. The reported test
results are not, in and of themselves, indicative of individual TSO or
TSO workforce performance. The report should, however, be used as an
early warning signal of problems that need to be resolved as quickly as
possible.
The specific tests were covert where testers attempted to slip
simulated explosives and bomb parts past passenger checkpoints. Unlike
the covert tests of several years ago that involved the detection of
fully assembled simulated bombs, these tests often involved very small
components that are easily hidden in items that TSA has chosen not to
ban. AFGE TSO members report that even in trainings where TSOs
themselves disassembled a simulated explosive and hid its parts in
carry-on baggage, they were unable to find the parts by sight alone.
Simply put, TSOs cannot be expected to detect what the human eye cannot
see.
The technology that would enable TSOs to detect potential weapons
not readily apparent to the human eye is available, and is currently in
use at three airports. According to published reports, TSA has
purchased 20 of the machines and plans to test them at other airports
over the next few months. For years, in report after report, both GAO
and the DHS Inspector General have called on TSA to invest in and
deploy technology that will assist TSOs in performing their screening
duties in response to the ever-changing efforts of determined
terrorists. In a February 2007 report to Congress, GAO wrote, ``TSA
does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its efforts to acquire and
deploy screening technolgies.'' \2\ In an October follow-up discussion
of the issue, GAO found that TSA ``generally'' did not achieve the goal
of deploying checkpoint technologies to address vulnerabilities.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-07-448T, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic
Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains.
\3\ GAO-08-139T, Aviation Security: DHS Has Made Progress in
Securing the Commercial Aviation System, but Key Challenges Remain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, it should be noted that TSA has put tremendous
emphasis on ``customer satisfaction''. The customer could be either the
carriers who want their planes to depart on schedule, or the flying
public, who want to get through the screening checkpoint and on the way
to their gate as quickly as possible. In fact, the goal of TSA
(according to SAM) is to ``provide the necessary level of aviation
security and ensure that the average aviation security related delay
experienced by passengers is minimized''.\4\ The reality is that there
are many sources of delay to air travelers, including highway traffic,
long lines at tickets counters and the sheer volume of passengers. All
too often though, the blame for passenger delay is assigned to the
checkpoint screening process. Although a goal of screening is to move
passengers along as quickly as possible, it is not the only goal. TSOs
report that they fear they may miss items that should receive
additional scrutiny because they are under constant pressure to work
quickly--at times, too quickly. TSA management should work with TSOs to
test technology and develop protocols that keep the public safe while
meeting the needs of passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO-07-299, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model
is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions
Should be Systematically Reassessed.
Lack of TSO Input
AFGE TSO members report that they have yet to feel that are a
partner working with TSA to ensure aviation safety. According to the
2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, 54% of the TSA workforce,
overwhelming comprised of TSOs stated that creativity and innovation
are not rewarded at TSA and only 38% of the workforce believed they had
``sufficient resources'' to do their jobs. Half of TSA workers report
they do not have ``a feeling of personal empowerment'' regarding work
processes. Too often TSOs report they were laughed at by supervisors
when they requested additional training. At many airports, speaking up
about an alternative process or pointing out a problem was a certain
path to retaliation, which could include either actual termination or
harassing the worker until they quit. This attitude among TSA
management runs counter to the mission of the agency by ignoring or
discounting the input of over 43,000 TSOs on the frontlines of safety
every day at 450 airports across the country.
TSOs have implemented SOPs that sometimes change on a daily basis.
As the ``face'' of TSA, they have to listen to passenger complaints
about removing their shoes, emptying containers, removing laptops from
cases, as well as complaints from parents who don't want to take their
babies out of strollers to proceed through the detectors. When a new
SOP is communicated by management, TSOs must almost instantly grasp and
implement it. Too often TSOs state that they receive no or incomplete
feedback from supervisors as to whether their implementation is correct
or not.
There should be a true and respectful discourse between TSA
management and TSOs. No worker at DHS should be hesitant to point out a
shortcoming that could impact public safety because they fear
retaliation from management. This is a very real threat to the TSO
workforce, because TSA refuses to be bound by the Office of Special
Counsel's recommendations when TSOs are retaliated against for blowing
the whistle on security breaches. TSOs do not have the right to appeal
serious harmful personnel decisions to the Merit Systems Protection
Board--even though their managers have that right. AFGE calls on
Congress to pass H.R. 3212, a bill introduced by Representative Nita
Lowey that would provide TSOs collective bargaining rights and
workplace protections and ensure that they are treated the same as
other workers at TSA.
The availability and level of training and deployment of technology
is incredibly inconsistent among our nation's airports. Given the
resources necessary to get the job done quickly and effectively, and
with valuable input from the TSOs doing the tough job of keeping the
public safe, TSA can further accomplish its mission.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to take questions
from the Subcommittee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I now recognize Ms. Friend to
summarize her statement for 5 minutes.
We welcome you. We thank you for your service.
And as I do that, let me acknowledge Congresswoman Ginny
Brown-Waite of Florida, who has joined us, and a member of the
committee.
Ms. Friend, thank you.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA A. FRIEND, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,
ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, AFL-CIO
Ms. Friend. And thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee and
members of the committee, for giving me this opportunity to
testify today.
It was our members, flying partners and friends who were
among the first victims to die at the hands of terrorists on
September 11th, all while performing their duties with
professionalism. Today flight attendants remain the only
frontline first responders guaranteed to be in the cabin of
every passenger aircraft.
Considering those facts, you would think that we would have
been among the first to be given the tools and training to
protect ourselves, our passengers and the aircraft.
Unfortunately that is not the case. I hope that my testimony
today will convince all members of this subcommittee that a
glaring loophole in our aviation security remains, and that
more must be done to close that dangerous loophole. While
Congress and the administration have taken many steps to
improve aviation security, flight attendants are still left in
the passenger cabin with no meaningful training or tools.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September
11th, it became clear that the flight attendant antihijacking
and security training was outdated, inadequate and in major
need of revision to reflect the current security threats. The
report from DOT Secretary Mineta's Rapid Response Team called
for a meaningful and comprehensive update for flight attendant
security training, as did the staff report accompanying the 9/
11 Commission report. We have repeatedly asked for the
necessary improvements to our training, including basic self-
defense maneuvers. We are not asking to be certified black belt
martial arts experts, but simply a basic level of meaningful
training to help protect ourselves, our passengers and slow
down the next terrorist attack.
We also desperately need better training on crew
communication and coordination among the three components of
in-flight security: flight attendants, pilots and air marshals.
Today security training provided to flight attendants consists
of the advanced voluntary training program provided by TSA and
a basic mandatory training provided by the airlines.
The TSA-developed advanced voluntary portion of flight
attendant security training is conducted several times a year
over 3 days at various community colleges around the country.
The voluntary nature of the training requires a flight
attendant to find 3 consecutive days off from work and to pay
themselves for the necessary housing during these classes. AFA
firmly believes that many of the provisions of this voluntary
program should be integral parts of a basic mandatory training
program.
Currently the basic mandatory security training for flight
attendants is provided directly by the airlines with little
oversight by the TSA. Reports from our air safety health and
security representatives indicate that security training has
been systematically watered down year after year. A summary of
reports on the status of flight attendant security training at
a number of AFA-represented carriers is attached to my written
testimony. A quick review will demonstrate the weakness of
airline security training programs provided to flight
attendants as first responders.
As well as a lack of the most basic meaningful security
training for flight attendants, equipment for enhancing on-
board aviation security is also lacking. The most basic
necessity on board a passenger aircraft is the ability to
communicate quickly, efficiently and clearly between the cabin
and the flight deck crew. With pilots safely barricaded beyond
their reinforced cockpit doors, and with instructions to limit
exposure, it is crucial that a reliable and clear communication
tool be provided for the aircraft crew to communicate with one
another. Currently the only communication device available for
cabin and flight deck crew is the aircraft interphone. This is
the telephonelike device that I am sure you have all seen the
flight attendants use on board aircraft. This device is
unreliable for a number of reasons, but most critically access
to an interphone may be blocked, or the interphone itself may
be easily and quickly disabled.
The events of September 11th clearly demonstrated that a
more reliable form of communication is needed. AFA, along with
other unions representing flight attendants at major carriers
in this country, have repeatedly called for a wireless
communication device for flight attendants to use on board the
aircraft. Such a device would provide flight attendants with
the ability to notify pilots at the earliest possible moment of
a problem.
Madam Chair and members of this subcommittee, it is
unfortunate that I appear before you today 6 years after
September 11th to tell you that while everything related to the
experience of air transportation has changed, little has
changed for the flight attendants' ability to protect you or
themselves. The 9/11 Commission report highlighted numerous
acts of bravery on that terrible day. It highlighted the heroic
and professional acts performed by the many flight attendants
on those four hijacked flights, even as they watched their
flying partners brutally murdered. The report drew special
attention to how the flight attendants on those flights acted
in the best interest of their passengers and took action
outside the scope of their training to do what they could to
relay information and to protect those passengers and
themselves. I can assure you that the flight attendants I know
and represent would do the same thing again today when
confronted with a similar situation. However, I am once again
pleading with you to help make a repeat of that day a little
less likely by giving us the tools and training that we need.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify on
behalf of the brave women and men who staff the passenger
aircraft of the U.S. aviation system. I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Ms. Friend.
[The statement of Ms. Friend follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patricia A. Friend
November 1, 2007
Thank you Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, and the members of this
Subcommittee, for giving me the opportunity to testify today. My name
is Patricia Friend and I am the International President of the largest
flight attendant union in the world, the Association of Flight
Attendants--CWA (AFA-CWA). AFA-CWA represents flight attendants at 20
airlines with over 55,000 members. Our members work onboard airline
operations from the largest, international flights to small, regional
service in thousands of communities across this country. It was our
members, flying partners and friends that were the first victims to die
horrible, brutal deaths at the hands of terrorists on September 11th
while performing their duties with professionalism. Today, flight
attendants remain as the only front line first responders guaranteed to
be in the cabin of every single passenger aircraft operating in this
county. Considering those two facts, you'd think that we would have
been among the first to be given the tools and training to protect
ourselves, our passengers and the aircraft. Unfortunately, Congress and
the Administration have failed to take the necessary steps to make that
possible.
I hope that my testimony today will help convince all the members
of this Subcommittee that a glaring loophole in our aviation security
remains and that more must be done to close that dangerous loophole.
I'm here to tell you that for the over 100,000 flight attendants in
this country, very little has changed since the attacks of September
11th. While this Congress and the Administration have taken steps for
airline pilots, who are now safely barricaded behind reinforced cockpit
doors and are in some cases armed with guns, and air marshals are on a
higher percentage of flights then before September 11th, flight
attendants are left in the passenger cabin with no meaningful training
or tools. This is an unacceptable situation and one which we, many
aviation security experts and the 9-11 Commission have been urging a
change to for well over six years now.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11th, 2001,
I was appointed by then Secretary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, to
his Rapid Response Team for Aircraft Security, a group of industry
experts assembled to recommend aircraft security improvements. The
members of this team were appointed in order to bring our collective
experience together to attempt to address what we viewed as the glaring
loopholes that were exploited by the 9-11 terrorists. One of those
identified loopholes was the inadequate and outdated training provided
to flight attendants. The report for the Rapid Response Team called for
a meaningful and comprehensive update for flight attendant security
training to reflect the current threat environment, as did the staff
report accompanying the 9-11 Commision.
It was clear that the flight attendant anti-hijacking and security
training provided by the carriers was outdated, inadequate and in major
need of revision to reflect the current security threats posed by
terrorist attacks onboard aircraft. Previous training that called for
flight attendants to be cooperative with terrorists that were hoping to
land a plane somewhere to negotiate for the release of hostages was
clearly no longer the situation flight attendants would face in another
Al-Qaeda attack onboard an aircraft. The threat posed to flight
attendants, passengers and the aircraft changed and our training needed
to reflect the new reality.
What we have repeatedly asked for is to update our training to
include a number of important facets. Among them are basic self defense
maneuvers to allow for us to defend ourselves against a terrorist
attack. We are not asking, as some have tried to portray it, to be
certified black belt martial arts experts. We are simply asking for a
basic level of meaningful training to protect ourselves and slow down
any terrorist attack. Also included would be training on crew
communication and coordination. Currently, there is no comprehensive
training or explanation of what the three components of in-flight
security--flight attendants, pilots and air marshals--are trained to do
in case of an attack. Clearly, these three groups must be trained on
how to work together as a team to be as effective as possible.
Unfortunately, that is not happening.
Ever since 9-11, AFA-CWA has been engaged in aggressive and
repeated legislative efforts to enact legislation to provide the
meaningful training that we need. Unfortunately, our efforts have been
thwarted by airline management--which is more interested in the
financial bottom line rather than meaningful security efforts--as well
as refusal and outright stonewalling by federal agencies.
I have prepared an outline for the Subcommittee on our various
legislative efforts since September 11th, 2001.
Air Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
Our first legislative efforts were undertaken in Congress during
drafting and debate of the Air Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in
the fall of 2001. The final legislation approved by Congress included
provisions that required the FAA to update and improve flight attendant
security training requirements. These provisions called on the FAA to
require that air carrier flight attendant training programs be updated
and changed to reflect the current security and hijacking situations
that flight attendants may face onboard the aircraft. It was AFA-CWA's
intention and belief by ensuring that the FAA approve these updated
programs, all carriers across the industry would implement similar, if
not identical, training programs.
However, in the immediate months after passage of ATSA it became
abundantly clear that the security training programs being implemented
by the carriers and approved by the FAA were not adequate or
consistent. There was a wide variance in the type of training and the
hours spent on the training. Some carriers were showing flight
attendants a twenty minute video, while others were conducting two full
days of mandatory, hands-on training. These discrepancies in the
security training in the aviation system led to many flight attendants
unprepared for any future terrorist attack onboard an aircraft. We have
stated repeatedly that all flight attendants, regardless of the carrier
employing them, must receive the same level of security training.
It was at this time that we began to urge Congress to change the
requirements for flight attendant security training to include a
provision that mandated a set number of hours for the security
training. These mandates would have to be enforced so that all carriers
would be required to provide the same level of adequate security
training for all flight attendants. AFA-CWA still believes that this is
the best requirement for training.
Arming Pilots Legislation
During the spring of 2002, as legislation began moving in the House
and Senate that would allow pilots to carry fire arms, AFA-CWA asked
that Congress mandate 28 hours of detailed flight attendant security
training at all carriers, with the training requirements and guidelines
to be developed by the Transportation Security Agency (TSA). In the
House, AFA-CWA worked closely with Representative Steve Horn (R-CA) to
introduce an amendment in the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee to the Arming Pilots Legislation that would mandate 28 hours
of detailed flight attendant security training. At the last minute,
Representative Horn did not offer the amendment after discussions with
the Chair and Ranking Member in the hope that language would be
included in the final bill before reaching the House floor. Eventually,
a provision was included in the final version that passed that House
requiring TSA to develop detailed flight attendant security training
requirements that must be followed by all carriers, but not mandating
28 hours specifically.
In the Senate, Senators Bob Smith (R-NH) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
included AFA-CWA's ideal provisions mandating 28 hours of detailed
flight attendant security training in their Arming Pilots Legislation.
As the Senate debated amendments to the Homeland Security Act on
September 5th of 2002, we were successful in convincing a majority of
Senators to support the amendment and succeeded in including the
provisions in the Homeland Security Act.
Homeland Security Act
The House version of Homeland Security did not include provisions
on arming pilots or flight attendant security training. While the bill
was being finalized in the Homeland Security Act Conference Committee,
AFA-CWA urged the Committee to support the Senate version of the
language, but we were ultimately unsuccessful in having the mandated 28
hours of training included. The final legislation did include language
that would require TSA to issue a rule mandating a set number of hours
for extensively detailed flight attendant security training that must
be implemented by all carriers and mandatory for all flight attendants.
While not completely satisfied with the final language, we began to
work closely with TSA and those developing the training curriculum and
guidelines in order to guarantee that the training requirements and the
final rule issued by the TSA would be as strong and comprehensive as
possible.
Airline Management Efforts to Kill Flight Attendant Security Training
Airline management has been strongly opposed to any efforts that
would require them to abide by any industry wide training standards or
a firm requirement on the number of hours required for training. To
them, it has not been an issue of security, but an issue of bottom line
profit. They have fought AFA-CWA every step of the way and have even
attempted a number of back door efforts to completely gut requirements
for flight attendant security training.
In the spring of 2003, they attempted to insert a provision into
the Omnibus Appropriations Act that would make any flight attendant
security training required by TSA voluntary. They had also worked
consistently to legislate that any flight attendant security training
be made voluntary, make the flight attendants pay for the training
themselves and prevent industry wide standards for the security
training or eliminate it completely.
Vision 100_FAA Reauthorization
In 2003, as the House worked on its version of the Vision--100 FAA
Reauthorization, the carriers continued in their efforts to gut flight
attendant security training. Early in the process, AFA-CWA was
approached by certain carriers about possibly reaching a compromise on
the issue that could be acceptable to all. It was abundantly clear to
flight attendant labor unions that we could either negotiate with the
committee on language that we could live with or take our chances with
airline management forcing through their preferred language. Regardless
of our support for the current law, it was clear that the Congressional
leadership of the majority were intending to enact changes to flight
attendant security training, at the request of airline management.
In the end, the final language included in the House FAA
Reauthorization created a two tier approach to training. It created an
advanced, voluntary training program and a basic, mandatory level of
security training with the requirement that TSA must develop firm and
specific guidelines for that training. It was our understanding that
this compromise was a settled issue. Unfortunately, at the last minute,
Continental Airlines went to Republican House Leader Tom DeLay and had
him change one word in the security training provisions. He had the
provision that said ``TSA shall issue guidelines'' changed to ``TSA may
issue guidelines''. By changing this one word, he took away the ability
to force TSA to issue these guidelines. TSA, which has proven to be
under the pressure of the carriers, would now not be required or
mandated to issue meaningful guidelines for crucial, mandatory flight
attendant security training.
Since enactment of that legislation, AFA-CWA has pursued various
efforts to improve upon our security training. Unfortunately, we have
been unsuccessful.
Current Status of Flight Attendant Security Training Programs
Today, training provided to flight attendants remains
unsatisfactory. It consists of the advanced, voluntary training program
provided by TSA and basic mandatory training provided by the airlines
themselves.
Advanced, voluntary training
Currently, the TSA has developed the advanced, voluntary portion of
flight attendant security training. The training is conducted several
times a year over three days at various community colleges around the
country and focus on self defense training. At times, TSA has been slow
in providing information on class locations and dates, depressing
turnout. It has also become increasingly difficult for our members to
attend the training as it has become harder for them to find three
consecutive days to take off from work. Also, with the recent rounds of
bankruptcies in the airline industry and the resulting dramatic pay
cuts, our members have found it difficult to pay for the necessary
housing during these classes. Questions remain about the effectiveness
of this training when it does not include a yearly recurrent training.
This is a one time training that does not require a yearly
``refresher'' course. Further, AFA-CWA firmly believes that many of the
provisions of this voluntary program should be integral parts of a
basic, mandatory training program.
Basic, mandatory training
At this time, the basic mandatory security training for flight
attendants is provided directly by the airlines themselves, with little
oversight by the TSA. While Congress established the TSA to develop and
oversee transportation security programs, according to the September
2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress on
flight attendant security training, TSA believes it is the individual
air carriers themselves who are responsible for establishing
performance goals for these training programs. Unfortunately, TSA's
inability to carry out its most basic oversight capabilities has
resulted in a further watering down of flight attendant security
training programs over the past several years.
In fact, reports from our Air Safety, Health and Security
representatives at AFA-CWA represented carriers of all sizes indicate
that security training has continually been watered down year after
year. In fact, one of our members recently reported that instead of
spending time on required security training, the airline instructor
released the students in order to ``take an early lunch'', neglecting
to cover the required program. I have attached a summary of reports
from our representatives on a number of AFA-CWA represented carriers,
you can see how the training is again as varied and random as that
which existed prior to September 11th.
The 2005 GAO report goes on to state that TSA has failed in its
basic requirement to provide overall strategic goals for the carriers
or to develop a framework from which to establish goals for the
training. While TSA told the GAO that they planed on completing work on
detailed guidance for airlines two years ago, to our knowledge, they
have continued to fail in this most basic requirement.
Furthermore, TSA has been given the ability to periodically review
and audit airline training programs. It is unclear how frequently TSA
is actually undertaking this requirement. In fact, as the September
2005 GAO report stated, ``although TSA officials stated that TSA
inspectors reviewed all 84 air carriers' revised security training
curriculums in response to January 2002 guidance and the corresponding
standards, TSA was only able to provide us documentation related to 11
reviews.''
Also, the Vision 100 FAA Reauthorization included a provision that
required the TSA to consider complaints from flight attendants when
determining when to conduct a review and audit of a carrier's security
training program. TSA representatives told the GAO that they ``were not
aware of any instances in which crew members had complained to TSA''
about the training programs. I can attest to the fact that this is not
accurate. AFA-CWA members have written TSA to complain about the
watering down and inadequacies of their training programs. Either TSA
officials do not read their mail, or they were not truthful with GAO
investigators.
The September 2005 GAO report is full of promises from the TSA to
develop reporting guidelines, databases for the tracking of carrier
training programs, a handbook to document procedures for TSA inspectors
and reorganizing inspection staff into a newly created Office of
Compliance. I urge this Committee to conduct the proper oversight to
see if TSA has truly and completely followed through with their
promises to the GAO over two years ago. While taking these steps still
leaves the current security training woefully inadequate, it could help
provide a level of consistency that is currently lacking in the
industry.
I regret to inform the members of this Subcommittee that due to TSA
inaction and lack of oversight, airline managements' desire to
streamline and cut training programs and lack of--to date--
Congressional oversight, flight attendant security training programs
are no more effective today as they were prior to September 11th.
Lack of Equipment to Enhance Aviation Security in the Aircraft Cabin
As well as a lack of the most basic, meaningful security training
for flight attendants, equipment for enhancing onboard aviation
security is currently lacking. The most basic necessity onboard a
passenger aircraft is the ability to communicate quickly, efficiently
and clearly between the cabin and flight deck crew. With pilots safely
barricaded behind their reinforced cockpit doors, and with instructions
to limit exposure, it is crucial that a reliable and clear
communication tool be provided for the aircraft crew to communicate
with one another in an emergency situation.
Currently, the only communication device available for cabin and
flight deck crew is the aircraft interphone. This is the telephone
device that I'm sure you've all seen the flight attendants onboard the
aircraft use to make announcements and to communicate with the cockpit.
This device is inconvenient for a number of reasons. First, an
inoperable interphone is not a reason to prevent an aircraft from
departing for a scheduled flight. Second, the interphone is located in
the galleys of the aircraft--all the way in the aft or in the front--
making it very difficult to run to in an emergency situation if flight
attendants are located throughout the cabin of the aircraft.
It should also be noted that when various federal agencies
conducted a mock terrorist attack onboard an aircraft in June of 2005,
referred to as ``Operation Atlas'', one of the first things that the
mock terrorists did was to cut the phone cord on the aft interphone,
thereby restricting communication between the cabin and cockpit. Many
crucial minutes passed before the cockpit crewmembers were even aware
that anything had happened, giving the terrorists plenty of time to
kill and injure various crewmembers and passengers. While this was a
mere ``mock'' hijacking, such a possibility exists today.
AFA-CWA, along with other unions representing flight attendants at
major carriers in this country have repeatedly called for a cost
effective, wireless communication device for flight attendants to use
onboard the aircraft. Such a device would provide flight attendants
with the ability to notify pilots at the earliest possible moment of a
problem. The technology is available today and has even being factored
into the designs on the newer aircraft coming off the assembly lines at
Boeing and Airbus. There are several different vendors in this country
that have prepared just such a cost effective and functional device
that could easily be integrated into the aircraft operating systems and
could be installed on all U.S. commercial aircraft in a relatively
short period of time. AFA-CWA believes that it is well past time that
hands-free, discreet, wireless devices should be made mandatory for all
flight attendants.
The need for such a device is not a new one that has only emerged
post 9-11. In fact, in 1999, the White House directed the FAA to
establish the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) to investigate
numerous turbulence injuries that were occurring onboard aircraft. That
year, the CAST Committee began working on a bi-directional wireless
communications system for pilots and flight attendants. The system was
needed because at times of spur-of-the-moment turbulence, the pilots
could not ensure that flight attendants would hear a public address
warning over the cabin intercom. In addition, numerous cases of flight
attendant and passenger injuries due to turbulence could not be
communicated to the pilots because the flight attendants were
unconscious on the floor with no means of communicating. Studies
reviewed by CAST showed that wireless notification would result in huge
savings for air carriers with fewer flight attendant on-duty injuries.
The business case based on this is available.
The events of 9-11 clearly demonstrated that a more reliable form
of communication, other than cabin interphones, is needed. Other
methods of determining the cabin status such as video cameras have been
tested but are laced with problems and concerns about their usage. A
wireless system allows for integration of the air marshals and provides
a compromise to the countries that do not want lethal weapons or air
marshals onboard the aircraft.
In fact, Congress itself has recognized the possibility that this
technology presents. The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
directed the FAA to ``revise procedures'' for communicating between the
cockpit and aircraft cabin. Then in March 2002, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), recommended that all international
carriers provide flight attendants with a discreet, wireless
communication device. In December 2002, the Homeland Security Act gave
the TSA the ability to require discreet, wireless communication devices
for flight attendants. And the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 included the requirement that the TSA conduct a
study on the technology and ability to install such a wireless
communication system.
Unfortunately, as with our training, neither TSA, nor the FAA have
taken any actions to try and provide such a communications system, even
after repeated requests from Congress that something be done. In fact,
the FAA has taken the position that there is no need for additional
technology or communication devices onboard the aircraft. They believe
that teaching flight attendants and pilots a secret knock, followed by
a code word is sufficient enough method to communicate that an attack
of some sort is taking place. I am not joking, even though I sincerely
wish I was.
Madame Chair and members of this Subcommittee, it is unfortunate
that I appear before you today, six years after September 11th, 2001--
six years after our colleagues were among the very first victims on
that day--to tell you that little has changed since that day. I wish I
could tell you differently, but I can't. We have tried repeatedly to
get Congress, the TSA and our employers to take the action necessary.
Those efforts have been repeatedly thwarted. While air marshals are on
more flights and pilots are barricaded behind reinforced doors and
provided with lethal weapons to protect themselves those most at risk,
and those most able to act in the aircraft cabin to defend their
passengers and the aircraft, have been provided little tools. I want to
ask Congress--even if a cockpit is protected and the pilots land the
aircraft successfully, while everyone in the passenger cabin is dead,
have the terrorists still not achieved their goal to wreak havoc and
bring terror back into our lives?
The 9-11 Commission report highlighted numerous acts of bravery on
that terrible day. It highlighted the heroic and professional acts
performed by the many flight attendants on those four hijacked flights
even in the light of seeing their devoted flying partners brutally
murdered. It drew special attention to how the flight attendants on
those flights acted in the best interests of their passengers and
``took action outside the scope of their training'' to do what they
could to relay information and to protect those passengers and
themselves. I can assure you that the flight attendants I know and
represent would do the same thing again today when confronted with such
a situation. However, I beg you to please help make a similar repeat of
that day a little less likely, by giving us the tools and training we
need.
Thank you for having the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to answering any questions that you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And if I might, as I introduce, thank you
for your important testimony, just to indicate that anyone who
focused on 9/11, as we all have done, and certainly we respect
all of the law enforcement and frontliners in transportation
security, allow me to acknowledge in particular the flight
attendants for the role that will maybe go untold on 9/11 as
they continue to put passengers first. And we thank them very
much for all that they have done.
I would like to now yield to and recognize Captain
Hesselbein to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, and we
thank him very much.
Welcome, Captain Hesselbein.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT HESSELBEIN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Hesselbein. Thank you. And good afternoon, Madam
Chairwoman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. On
behalf of the 60,000 ALPA members who fly for 42 airlines in
the United States and Canada, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to provide a frontline perspective on aviation
security training and equipment needs.
For such a broad topic, I have decided to narrow my remarks
to just two of the association's security priorities. I would
like to address the training and support gaps in the Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program, and also the need for secondary
barriers and procedures to protect our flight decks.
Let us start with the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program,
or as we call it the FFDO Program. The first class of 44 FFDOs
graduated from training in April 2003. Since then many, many
thousands of airline pilots have been trained, deputized and
now serve as Federal flight deck officers. But there are
several things that are hampering the recruitment and retention
of FFDOs. They must often risk discipline by their employers to
attend training. They must pay all out-of-pocket expenses to
attend training as well. And to practice and requalify, they
have to spend their own money, and then they must perform their
duties with no postgraduate mentoring and no minimal
supervision. They are expected to accomplish their duties and
succeed in their assigned missions, but they do it with a
fraction of the support structure enjoyed by other Federal law
enforcement officers.
Many employers will not permit pilots to take unpaid leave
to attend FFDO training. Unlike military leave, there are no
legal devices that require employers to allow their pilots to
leave for required training. In fact, some airlines create
obstacles for pilots to attend this valuable training.
After graduating from basic training for which they
personally pay up to $500 in housing, meals and transportation
expenses to attend, an FFDO is deployed on mission status
without the guidance of a field training officer or frontline
supervisor. All that the FFDO has for support is a TSA phone
number to call if any issues arise, access to a protected Web
site for routine scheduling, and they also can access a Web
site for administrative information.
Furthermore, there is no partner system in place to mentor
incoming FFDOs, and no routine supervised training beyond a 6-
month proficiency demonstration until their third year of
mission status. At that point they are provided with 2 days of
recurrent training.
Speaking of which, the Federal Air Marshals Service
announced that as of April 25, 2007, all FFDOs must attend a 2-
day recurrent training event in Atlantic City, New Jersey, at a
certain interval within their FFDO career. Because of the very
limited training dates and locations, pilots must often travel
hundreds, if not thousands, of miles to attend, again at their
own expense. This function may cost pilots upwards of $800.
In a time of significantly reduced pilot salaries and
terminated pension plans, we are concerned that the FFDO
Program's attrition rate will grow, and fewer pilots will make
the personal sacrifices needed to keep the program alive. One
solution is to add more training locations and use current
Federal air marshal facilities for their training.
We believe Congress can take a few simple steps to ensure
that FFDOs remain an effective force in protecting our skies.
First of all, enact legislation that gives FFDO trainees the
same leave rights as those citizens performing military
service. Second, we must ensure that pilots who enter the
system have ongoing and frequent access to standardized
training that includes protocols, procedures and training
scenarios that coordinate with our Federal air marshal
counterparts and, especially, reimburse the FFDOs for their
reasonable out-of-pocket training and travel costs.
Speaking of cost-effective measures, ALPA believes that the
flight deck's secondary barrier and associated procedures will
provide the biggest bang for the taxpayer bucks in terms of
aviation security on the flight deck. To that end ALPA has
worked closely with Congressman Steve Israel on the development
of a bill, H.R. 3925, that would mandate the installation of
secondary barriers in all Part 121 aircraft.
While the reinforced door is a vital element in flight deck
protection, it is not fully sufficient to protect the flight
deck from a well-coordinated, efficient assault executed when
the door is open. An inexpensive secondary barrier, along with
access procedures, will ensure that door transitions are made
safely, securely and in minimal time. Importantly, two U.S.
major airlines have already developed and installed these
secondary barriers on their airplanes, and others seek agreed-
upon design standards for their manufacturing installation as
well.
The industry seeks standardized procedures to complement
these use of secondary barriers to complement the wall
fortifications. The few seconds that a secondary barrier will
buy during a hijacking event are worth their weight in gold if
they prevent hijackings. The barriers are especially needed on
all cargo aircraft as well, which do not even have a flight
deck door between the cargo and the crew.
In summary, all FFDOs must be effectively trained and
supported to remain a successful part of the security process.
Inexpensive secondary barriers that have a high benefit for a
very low cost should be considered and installed. We urge
Congress to support both of these initiatives.
Thank you very much, and I would be happy to answer any of
your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hesselbein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Capt. Robert Hesselbein
November 1, 2007
Good afternoon. I am Bob Hesselbein, Chairman of the National
Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association, International
(ALPA). ALPA is the world's largest pilot union, representing more than
60,000 pilots who fly for 41 airlines in the U.S. and Canada. ALPA was
founded in 1931 and our motto since its beginning is ``Schedule with
Safety.'' We are pleased to have been asked to testify today on the
important subject of human resources and equipment as used to enhance
aviation security.
There are obviously a great many subjects that could be addressed
within this general topic, but today I would like to focus on just two:
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) training and support needs, and
secondary barriers on flight decks.
Federal Flight Deck Officer Program
ALPA was the first organization to call for the creation of the
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program, which became a reality when
the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (APATA) was enacted as part of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The first class of 44 Federal Flight Deck Officers graduated from
training in April 2003. Since then, thousands more have joined their
ranks and are recognized as key components in the U.S. government's
layered approach to protecting the aviation domain. Because the
majority of these federal law enforcement officers are ALPA members,
the Association has a vested interest in the integrity and viability of
the program and remains engaged in a close working relationship with
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Air
Marshal Service (FAMS) to ensure the program's continued success.
The FFDO program is unique in that it capitalizes on the
willingness of volunteer candidates to protect a critical component of
the nation's infrastructure. In order to become an FFDO, a pilot must
successfully pass background, psychological and physical requirement
vetting, and then complete a rigorous initial training curriculum at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Artesia, NM.
Upon so doing, the pilot is deputized as a federal law enforcement
officer and, under color of federal law, is empowered to use lethal
force to protect the flight decks of passenger and all-cargo transport
category aircraft. No other such program exists within the federal law
enforcement domain.
From the outset of our support for the FFDO program, we have
emphasized that the initiative must select, train and deputize
qualified candidates who are chosen from the airline pilot population.
We applaud TSA's significant efforts to develop and deploy the FFDO
program, and the FAMS' contributions in maintaining and managing it.
These successes notwithstanding however, it must be noted that FFDOs
are not provided with post-basic training opportunities beyond the need
to demonstrate semi-annual weapons proficiency and a brief two-day
refresher course after three years of duty.
ALPA has brought this inadequacy to the attention of the TSA/FAMS
upon numerous occasions. Although armed pilots have shown tremendous
professionalism in the performance of their duties and provide the most
wide-spread armed federal security coverage in United States airspace,
we remain concerned that their training and mentoring falls short of
what other federal officers receive to accomplish their respective
missions. It is clear that no other federal law enforcement officers
are expected to succeed in their assigned missions without a support
structure which includes post-basic-training mentoring and ongoing
training.
As an example of this shortcoming, the FFDO's duty to protect the
flight deck clearly supports the mission of the Federal Air Marshal
Service. However, armed pilots are not trained to work in coordination
with FAMs and are generally unprepared to deal with an onboard security
event requiring FAM intervention. Determining how to handle an
attempted hijacking should not happen at the moment it occurs, but
rather during training events on the ground. Response protocols,
procedures, and training scenarios should be coordinated between FFDOs
and FAMs in advance--the middle of a crisis is not the time to make
introductions and determine each other's unique roles. The federal
government conducts interagency crisis management exercises on a
regular basis. It is only reasonable, therefore, that armed FFDOs
should know what to expect from FAMS in the event of an attempted
assault on the cockpit, and what the FAMS will expect of them.
FFDOs, by the very nature of their work, operate individually and
with little direct supervision. Nearly all communication between them
and FAMS program managers is accomplished by secure e-mails which
generally incorporate basic advisories or scheduling details. Clearly,
this missed opportunity for distance learning, information sharing and
mentoring is a program shortcoming. FFDOs should be provided mission-
related educational materials using secured-access libraries. In
addition, training opportunities should be provided at local FAMS field
offices.
Another significant issue which serves as a deterrent to pilot
participation in the program relates to the need to compensate
volunteer FFDOs for out-of-pocket expenses that they incur during
initial, re-qualification and recurrent training events. These costs
include hotel, meal, travel, ammunition and incidentals, which can add
up to hundreds of dollars for an individual pilot. ALPA believes the
government should assist the FFDOs by reimbursing them for such
expenses for the following reasons:
The program is a key component of our nation's layered
aviation security system. Its value has been attested to by
multiple components of the federal government, to include the
Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security
Administration and the Federal Air Marshal Service. Because
global intelligence efforts continue to indicate that aviation
remains a key target for terrorism, this reality must not be
underestimated. The program was overwhelmingly approved by
Congress because of its demonstrated need and because of the
responsible vision that was articulated for developing and
deploying it.
The presence of FFDOs on commercial flights is a component of
the system utilized to schedule Federal Air Marshal flight
coverage and by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)
in the decision-making matrix related to handling security
events involving transport category aircraft. FFDOs are tracked
by the government not only when they are piloting aircraft, but
also when they are in transit, while deadheading, or commuting
in the aviation domain in order to utilize all resources to
best advantage.
Initial training and re-qualification costs deter FFDO
program applications. FFDOs frequently incur significant out-
of-pocket expenses to attend basic and re-qualification
training. Average travel, food and lodging costs incurred for
basic training vary from $300 to $500. Additionally, mandatory
twice-yearly firearms re-qualification costs an average of $75
per event for most FFDOs. However, because of a lack of re-
qualification sites in Alaska and Hawaii, FFDOs domiciled in
those states must travel to the continental U.S. twice yearly
to fulfill training requirements, which may require the pilot
to use several days of personal time. As a result, these FFDOs
incur lodging and food expenses averaging $150 per re-
qualification event. Because FFDOs are not reimbursed for such
costs, application rates are negatively impacted. Re-
qualification sites are needed in the states of Hawaii and
Alaska.
Recurrent training requirements have increased FFDOs'
costs. After three years of service, FFDOs must attend a two-
day recurrent training event in Atlantic City, NJ. For most
FFDOs, attendance at two full days of training requires a
commitment of four days of their time, plus associated travel,
hotel and meal costs estimated at $800. The FFDO program will
likely lose some current participants and potential candidates
as a direct result of the fact that only one training site will
be used for this purpose. In times of significantly reduced
pilot salaries, terminated pensions, and difficulty in
obtaining leave for training, the impact on FFDOs is
significant. To alleviate this problem, additional,
strategically located recurrent training sites are needed. The
FAMS has indicated its awareness of this problem, and should be
provided with sufficient resources to address it.
The FFDO program is efficient and cost-effective. It
supplements the FAMS and provides a high degree of deterrence
at a small cost to the US government and taxpayers. The
government should recognize the value that is derived from the
program and do all within its power to support and grow it,
rather than letting it languish and diminish.
FFDOs have no external means for raising funds. Unlike
other individuals who volunteer to assist a government entity
by performing a dangerous duty (e.g., volunteer firefighters),
FFDOs have no external means of raising funds to cover their
personal expenses. They are not allowed to hold fundraisers,
solicit funds, or even identify themselves to the public.
Financial demands are causing FFDOs to reconsider
their participation in the program. FFDOs are volunteers who
provide a reliable level of security for the domestic aviation
industry at no cost to air carriers and at minimal cost to the
government. By their own choice, they subject themselves to
significant government regulation, supervision, personal
expense, liability and risk. The more demands for personal
sacrifice they are subjected to, the greater the risk that
their willingness to participate will diminish or evaporate.
This fact is now being demonstrated as FFDOs learn that they
must pay significantly in terms of dollars and personal time to
attend recurrent training. Even before the announcement was
made about the new recurrent training requirement, some FFDOs
had reached a point of departure from the program because the
personal cost in time and money had become too great.
Clearly, Congress did not intend for the FFDO program to mature in
a fashion that would cause current FFDOs to decline further
participation, or to discourage prospective candidates from applying.
However, the program has reached this stage because some pilots are
simply unwilling to fund this layer of national security from their own
pockets any longer.
FFDOs provide a direct service to the nation and the aviation
industry. The government should recognize the special nature of this
program and ensure its ongoing viability by funding personal costs
incurred by FFDOs related to training.
The Association has worked continuously to suggest areas of
additional ``fine tuning'' to the FFDO program since its inception,
initially with TSA and more recently with the Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) since it assimilated the program two years ago. We have
outlined in a white paper on the FFDO program 12 specific areas in
which the program may be enhanced. We recommend that Congress legislate
these improvements.
Secondary Barriers
Airplane cockpits are vulnerable to breach and seizure during
fortified cockpit door opening and crewmember transitions during
flight. Flight and cabin crewmembers are not rigorously trained,
however, to prepare and protect the integrity of the flight deck during
the door opening and closing process, and what training is provided is
not standardized between airlines. To remedy this shortcoming, ALPA is
actively promoting the installation of flight deck secondary barriers
to protect against an attack. These barriers, which have already been
installed on some aircraft by two major airlines, are lightweight
devices mounted on the passenger cabin side of the flight deck door and
serve to deter individuals from congregating near the door, attempting
to open the door, and help to identify those who may intend harm to the
flight. The barrier is not intended to prevent access to the flight
deck door, but it does provide a delay which helps give the flight and
cabin crew invaluable seconds to react to a threat. The barrier is used
in conjunction with the proper training of crewmembers and a
standardization of procedures and protocols to ensure full security.
Reinforced, or fortified, cockpit doors have added a valuable level
of protection to airliner flight decks never before provided. A
secondary barrier, accompanied by standardized procedures and protocols
for protecting the cockpit door during those times it must be opened in
flight, would significantly augment the fortified door and add an
important layer of security to prevent hostile takeover of the cockpit.
ALPA has expressed and coordinated its support of a secondary
barrier with ALPA member airlines, other associations and non-member
airlines, and with TSA and the FAA. We have found there to be a
consensus among all those contacted that the secondary barrier is a
valid proposal and that such a security enhancement would bring added
value to aviation security at a reasonable cost.
ALPA has worked closely with Congressman Steve Israel (D-NY) on the
development of a bill, HR 3925, that would mandate the installation of
secondary barriers on all Part 121 aircraft. ALPA fully supports this
bill and calls on Congress to enact it promptly.
In July of this year, ALPA published a white paper titled Secondary
Flight Barriers and Flight Deck Access Procedures, A Call for Action
which provides further details about this important equipment. That
paper urges Congress, FAA, TSA, and industry to support secondary
flight deck barriers and provide accompanying flight deck access
procedures on all airliners by January 1, 2010. These barriers should
be built to a standard that will delay an attack on the cockpit by at
least five (5) seconds, thereby enabling crewmembers to close and
secure the reinforced cockpit door.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today and would be
pleased to address any questions.
[For additional see Appendix.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you and all the witnesses for
their testimony.
At this time I remind each Member that he or she will have
5 minutes to question panel one. I now recognize-- which is the
panel for today. I now recognize myself for questions.
Let me just have this question for each of you. You have
made and provided this committee with a litany of concerns,
which is why we are having this particular hearing and why I
noted the absence of the air traffic controllers, who I believe
are very much a part of helping to secure America. But the
question that I want to ask each of you is that the various
need for improvement, the various issues that you have raised
that suggest a need for improvement, in your answers tell me
whether or not you feel that this impacts on the security of
America? And that is why we are here.
And so, Mr. Gage, you mentioned the lack of relevant
training, the low-grade nature of the training, and the fact
that technology is not used at the level that it should. And I
think a point that is very stark, the 19 percent attrition
rate. So let me ask the question on how all of that, from your
perspective, impacts on the security of the aviation traveling
public.
Mr. Gage. I think it impacts on it very negatively, and I
think these are all choices that TSA has made. When training is
old, it doesn't keep up with really the issues at the
workplace, that training is useless; when training is
inconsistently applied, when there is not enough staff. There
was one of our screeners who asked why he hadn't been trained
in a month, his training he is supposed to receive every week,
and the supervisor basically just laughed. And it shows that
the pressures that the TSA puts the workers as well as the
supervisors under, it just does not take into account the
risks. And I think it is a choice that TSA made. Even in
technology, I don't believe they have stepped out on technology
that could be most effective.
So I think all these things add up to a workplace where
instead of having good, solid workers who really see what their
job is about and how important it is to the country, we have a
revolving door. And I think that is probably the result of many
of these choices that TSA has made.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
You are remembering in your testimony, as you mentioned,
the leak results of the covert testing on simulated bombs and
bomb parts. Would you just quickly tell me what you think TSA
could have done better to prepare the TSOs for future tasks?
And with that I am going to submit into the record a statement
by the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association that
recounts a number of incidents regarding the lack of detecting
bomb material coming through the checkpoint.
Mr. Gage. I think clearly that is a matter of technology.
In my statement it said you can't hold a screener responsible
for what he can't see with the current technology that is
employed. And as I said, too, that even when our screeners
became innovative and were placing components of an explosive
device, very, very difficult to pick up and align at a
checkpoint or even in the baggage area. So I think on that,
technology clearly has to be purchased, has to be employed and
has to meet the threat.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Friend, your membership are clearly on the frontline as
well. And you indicated meaningful tools and the idea of
training. For example, are you concerned that defense courses
for flight attendants will place a burden on them to engage
physically? Also, the pure communication tool, and I agree with
you, it is clear that that one communication system is very
vulnerable. Does the plight of your flight attendants today
impact on security, and what is the most crucial need that you
have today for flight attendants?
Ms. Friend. Thank you.
The aviation security system that we have developed over
the past 6 years is a layered approach starting from the no-fly
list to the security checkpoint to the reinforced cockpit
doors, the FFDO Program. But the reality is when those layers
fail, there is no one in the cabin of that aircraft except for
the flight attendant, and as it should be.
I don't mean to be critical in this response, but the
pilots, armed or not, are not coming out of that cockpit to
help, and they shouldn't, because it is critical that we
protect the cockpit. But those of us who have become the last
line of defense, the human shield, if you will, against the
invasion of the cockpit, have no training on how we can best
protect ourselves in a situation like that. We have--we are
missing the most basic of tools to let the cockpit know that
there is a serious security breach in the cabin of the
aircraft. The only hope for any of us in that aircraft is to
get that airplane safely on the ground. The sooner the flight
deck crew knows that there has been a breach and that they must
get the aircraft on the ground, the sooner that we can all be
rescued. In the meantime, we are at the mercy of the
individuals who have managed to breach this layer of security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You think the state of affairs impacts on
the security of the passengers?
Ms. Friend. Absolutely, absolutely. Without being overly
dramatic, we may, in fact, with a barricaded cockpit door get
that aircraft on the ground. The question is how many
fatalities will exist in the back of the aircraft by that time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say that we are writing
legislation, this committee is, in addressing that question.
Let me thank you for your testimony.
And it is my pleasure now to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from California Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, and I thank the three
witnesses for appearing before us and their very interesting
testimony.
Let me ask you this. We have problems. We are not perfect.
We need to do more. But I would just ask the three of you, we
have not had another instance since 9/11 in which someone has
captured an aircraft and done what the terrorists did. Is that,
in your judgment, pure happenstance, or are some of the things
that we have done since then, have they been effective; and if
they have been effective, which things that we have done with
respect to your employees do you think have been effective?
Mr. Gage.
Mr. Gage. No, I don't think it is happenstance. I think
that they are doing a very good job. I think everybody takes
their job seriously. But at the same time, Congressman, I think
that it could be more coordinated. I think that the training
can be more consistently applied. I think that you shouldn't
short-cut training, especially--for instance, a new standard
operating procedure may come out, and the employee has no time
to review it, has no time to see it, yet he is tested on it.
And it just seems that--I think the training aspect, and to
make this a more professional workforce, would go a long way to
reducing the turnover, which something has to be done about the
turnover and the way these people are treated on the job
without any voice at work and with a performance system that
just doesn't encourage creativity or innovation or even--or
reward, I think, good solid work.
Mr. Lungren. And a system of feedback in which the ideas of
the frontline people is actually taken into serious
consideration.
Mr. Gage. That is true.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask you this. In terms of training, if
you do testing properly, if you use testing as a training tool,
that can be very effective. That is, if you have continual
training in which you find where there are some holes, and then
you use that to point out to your employees where, in fact, the
shortcomings were, and use that to reenforce the training
either that they have or new training that they are then
receiving, it actually is part of the training as opposed to
just a gotcha program?
Mr. Gage. I don't disagree with that at all. But, for
instance, our screeners are subjected to--one part of their
certification is a contractor, a Lockheed--Martin. I don't know
what they are doing there. But they come in, and our people are
supposed to pat them down, and if they touch too softly, or if
they touch too hard, something goes to their supervisor which
affects their evaluations, affects their certification. They
have no say in it. They don't even know what this person is
looking for. But it is a negative. It is not really training
there. It is totally gotcha.
Mr. Lungren. I understand what you are saying.
Ms. Friend, the question about what has been effective, if
anything has been effective, from your standpoint and the
standpoint of the people you represent.
Ms. Friend. Clearly, as I said, we have set up this
aviation security that is layered, and so far it is working.
But we do know that those who would recreate an event as
spectacular as that of September 11 are constantly probing the
system. So the fact that they haven't yet found a weakness that
they can exploit on a particular day doesn't mean that they are
going to stop trying.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask something on that, and that is that
we know that the American people today would react differently
than they would have before 9/11, because beforehand we were
told, sit in your seats, don't do anything, you will be in for
a long ride, but eventually they just want to go somewhere. Now
we know they want to use the aircraft as an instrument of
destruction. So you have your passengers who are going to react
differently and aid attendants if they need it. Is that taken
into account in terms of the training?
Ms. Friend. No, it is not. And I say that simply because we
have not seen incorporated into our training a module or a
portion on how do you manage that reaction. I mean, it is a
question, I suppose, of crowd control. I mean, you don't want
an out-of-ontrol mob. And you will have some passengers on
board who will want to help, so help me understand how best to
use that willingness to help, and don't expect me to just stand
back and let the mob take over.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Hesselbein, in terms of the pilots who are
the flight deck officers that we have in the program now, do
they receive training about how they exit the cockpit, when
they exit the cockpit, what they look for, how they use--where
they place their weapon during that period of time, all those
sorts of things? Is it that detailed such that they feel
confident when they are taking their breaks and where they
place the weapon and when they are supposed to use it and all
that sort of stuff?
Mr. Hesselbein. Congressman, without getting into the----
Mr. Lungren. I don't want you to get into the absolute
details. I am asking you is it that comprehensive so that we
would have some confidence in these officers?
Mr. Hesselbein. We have great confidence in the training
the officers get in the understanding that their jurisdiction
is a small flight deck area, and they are trained to protect
that area and that space alone, and they are very well trained.
I would like to address just a couple other comments that
were thrown out as well from other members of the board, and I
would like to reinforce that. First of all, there have been
almost 60 hijackings since 9/11 across the world, so hijackings
will continue. And the success of 19 individuals in 1 morning
is certainly a motivator for those who choose to do great
damage to attempt to do it again despite our effort.
In regards to passenger responses of Flight 93, we cannot
presume that all passengers will have the time or opportunity
to do what the people on United 93 did. They had the
opportunity to gather their wits about them, communicate over
the telephone, find out what was happening that day. Then and
only then they organized in the back of the plane to do the
honorable and brave effort that they made in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.
I would like to point out that the fortified flight deck
door provides hijackers with a benefit that the people on
United 93 didn't have. The hijackers inside a fortified flight
deck would be protected from those who attempt to overrun the
airplane. So we still have the same challenges we faced on 9/
11; however, at all levels our security has greatly improved
from what we had that morning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
I am trying to acknowledge or will acknowledge
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, a member of the committee.
And we will yield now 5 minutes to Congresswoman Clarke of
Brooklyn, New York.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member Lungren.
Madam Chair, I would like to receive unanimous consent to
receive the statement of Marcus W. Flagg, president of the
Passenger Cargo Security Group and the Federal Flight Deck
Officers Association, who unfortunately was unable to be here
to testify today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of Marcus W. Flagg, President of Passenger-Cargo
Security Group, and The Federal Flight Deck Officers Association
Chairwomen Jackson-Lee, Congressman Lungren, Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to provide testimony before you this afternoon on the
Government Accounting Office report, discussing Federal Coordination
for responding to In-flight Security Threats. I am a United States
Naval Academy graduate, a former Navy fighter pilot and a graduate of
the Naval Post-Graduate School on Aviation Safety. I am also currently
an airline pilot with UPS Airlines. On September 11, 2001, my father
RADM Bud Flagg USNR and my mother Dee Flagg died aboard American
Airlines flight #77, when it was commandeered by terrorists and crashed
into the Pentagon.
Since 2001, I have been proactive in improving aviation security to
help protect our country against terrorism. I currently serve as
president for two aviation security organizations. In 2005, I co-
founded the Passenger-Cargo Security Group (PCSG), which is a non-
compensated, not-for-profit trade association formed by commercial
pilots from passenger and all-cargo airlines. These pilots fly for
several different airlines, and are considered experts in aviation
security from their work together on various airline security projects.
PCSG continues to work with regulators, and members of Congress, and
has provided testimony in the past for both the Senate and House.
I also serve the not-for-profit and non-compensated Federal Flight
Deck Officers Association (FFDOA) as its president. FFDOA represents
Federal Flight Deck Officers (armed pilots), which now represent the
third largest Federal Law Enforcement organization in the United
States. The FFDO program is an extremely viable, cost effective, and
successful element of our national aviation security effort today.
Security Philosophy
PCSG believes in integrated security solutions that work together
as a ``system of systems'' providing the maximum deterrent against
terrorist attacks at the lowest possible expense. Flight crews are a
key element in an integrated security system and are an asset that has
yet to be fully exploited. Aircraft on the ground should be protected
with security measures that begin in the cockpit and radiate outward to
the airport parking lot and beyond. This clearly requires the
cooperation of several different entities. Once a flight is airborne,
only on-board assets can affect the positive outcome of a security
breach. Therefore, it is crucial that flight crews have the training
and information necessary to influence a safe outcome. The lives of
hundreds of innocent Americans on-board the aircraft and thousands on
the ground hang in the balance. Nothing can be made terrorist-proof,
but intelligent and coordinated programs can provide a powerful
deterrent to those who might attack the aviation interests of our
country.
Cockpit Defense
Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) are the first line of
deterrence and the last line of defense. This is the most cost
effective security measure we have to date. FFDOs are trained to stop a
threat using the full spectrum of the force continuum. While the
training is consistently reported as excellent, serious questions
remain about the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
administration of the program. Including the complete omission of the
FFDO program in Secretary Hawley's most recent testimony dated October
16, 2007. The FFDO program is a growing federal officer corps, but many
more pilots are needed. Those volunteers will not be forthcoming unless
fundamental changes in carriage, liability, time for training without
airline obstruction, and international coverage are made to the
program.
Officer safety should be ``number one'' without question, as well
as the safety of passengers. No one in law enforcement handles a
firearm as many times a day as an operating FFDO per the TSA Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP). This is a formula for an accidental
discharge. The transporting protocol will lead to the loss of firearm
retention, directly contradicting sound law enforcement practices, and
the participating FFDOs should be commended for superior performance
against a poorly constructed SOP. The politicizing of procedures and
defiance of law enforcement lessons-learned places FFDOs and others in
the airline environment at risk, as well as poses a liability on many
fronts. The FFDOs should use transporting a locked firearm as an
option, but otherwise carry their firearm on their person. The
September 2001, FBI Cockpit Protection Plan provides a 6-day course to
arm 60,000 pilots in two years using full time carry protocol.
A FFDO as a flying pilot would defend the aircraft from the cockpit
only, and not exit the cockpit door. If one or more FFDOs are riding as
passengers in the back of that same aircraft, they may be the only law
enforcement on board (including cockpit crew). They should not be
restrained by the government from defending the cockpit in the event of
a terrorist attack regardless of the side of the cockpit door they are
seated. The absence of this element of the program is very damaging on
more than one front. On September 11th, a Federal Officer was on board
United Airlines flight # 93. Unfortunately, due to the FAA and his
agency policy, his weapon was located in the belly of that aircraft.
Threat assessment aside, the inability to operate internationally
translates into many FFDOs who may not operate domestically, since they
fly mixed schedules. This specifically takes trained FFDOs out of the
system. Currently, FFDOs operate four times the coverage of the Federal
Air Marshal Service at 1/25th the cost.
Cabin crewmembers should also be trained in defensive tactics (DT).
Airline managements have resisted this valuable training and prefer to
view cabin crews as mere food servers.
Proper employment of defensive tactics could provide cockpit crews
with critical time to prepare a cockpit defense plan and land the
aircraft. Currently, the TSA has developed an outstanding Crew Member
Self Defense Training (CMSDT) program that all crewmembers may take as
often as they like. TSA should mandate the airlines to provide CMSDT to
crewmembers, and enable each airline to teach this course at their crew
domiciles. As a volunteer program that requires crewmembers to pay for
their own travel and hotel expenses on their own time, mitigates the
value of this excellent course.
The cabin crew should also have a remote means of communicating
with the cockpit crew in the event of a security breach, in addition to
their present antiquated primary and secondary communication methods.
The Airline Transportation Association (ATA) lobbying efforts defeated
legislation mandating such a system. The ATA also lobbied against
cameras in the cabin of passenger airliners, a method to help provide
the cockpit crew with vital information. These systems cost less than
the entertainment systems that many airlines have installed.
The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program, although another excellent
layer of security, has serious shortcomings, not the least of which is
an agency of insufficient size. The Federal Air Marshal Service also
manages the current FFDO program. An improvement to this viable program
would be more involvement and cooperation in training with FAMS and
FFDOs. This would require additional funding to support and train the
FAMS/FFDO team concept. Presently, FAM Field Offices cannot accommodate
FFDOs who wish to use the FAM facilities to improve their skills and
teamwork.
Of all the proposed aviation security enhancements available today,
``flight deck secondary barriers'' represent the single most effective
additional layer to protect the flight deck from another potential
hijacking. Congress mandated the installation of flight deck hardened
doors in 2001, but at the time didn't anticipate the need for a
secondary barrier. PCSG and almost every other industry group have
since come to the conclusion that a hardened door alone does not
provide a predictably reliable barrier to an attack. In order to
effectively protect the flight deck during times that the door is
opened in flight, the crew needs a protected space behind the flight
deck door, and a few seconds to respond to an attempted breech.
Secondary Barriers, such as those currently installed on some of
United Airlines airplanes, provides crews the essential space and time
to accomplish a door transition. Secondary barriers are extremely
inexpensive when compared to other security systems, can easily be
installed, and can be easily incorporated into current flight deck
access procedures as currently modeled by United Airlines and other
carriers. Most importantly, like the mandated hardened flight deck
doors, a Congressional mandate of secondary barriers would result in a
significant layer of aircraft security in minimal time. In order to
expedite this security enhancement Congress should fund the cost of
installing secondary barriers, including reimbursement of carriers who
are already beginning to install this much needed aviation security
enhancement.
A major problem for all three layers of security is that there is
no integration of training, or at the least, a clear understanding
among each group on how to work together. These three systems have been
``stove piped.'' In addition, the TSA does not require crewmembers to
receive operational Security Directives or Information Circulars. The
TSA provides this information to airline corporations and lets them
decide who the ``need to know'' employees are. Very few airlines have
chosen to share this vital information with cockpit and/or cabin crews.
A notable example of the failure to disseminate information to airline
crews was the Richard Reid ``shoe bomber'' incident. Previously,
crewmembers were not told of an existing threat to passengers involving
explosives in shoes. It was not until after this event that American
Airlines elected to change their policy. Other airlines provide only a
minimal and cryptically scrubbed version, usually in an untimely
manner. It is unconscionable that the TSA leaves this crucial
information to individual airline policy or negotiations, and does not
require delivery of the operational information to pilots and cabin
crews.
Cargo Security
Dramatic growth and maturity for the all-cargo airline has occurred
over the past 30 years. In their earlier days these airlines were not
very big, and operated at night beyond the view and consciousness of
the general public. Today, they are large global airlines that operate
around the clock, flying the same aircraft in the same flight
environment as the passenger carriers do.
For years all-cargo airlines were exempt from many of the
government safety and security regulations required of passenger
carriers. One such example involves a critical airborne Traffic
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) that was required of passenger
aircraft, but not mandated on cargo aircraft until 13 years later. This
lack of uniform safety standards continues today as illustrated by
their being no requirement for airport Aircraft Rescue and Fire
Fighting (ARFF) to be provided for the all-cargo aircraft, nor for the
first responders to conduct any training on all-cargo aircraft.
Hardened cockpit doors are non-existent on cargo aircraft, although
mandatory on passenger aircraft. The TSA has stated that all-cargo
aircraft have the highest risk for hostile takeover. Hardened cockpit
doors should be mandatory on all current and future all-cargo aircraft.
All-Cargo carriers routinely receive exemptions from government
regulations imposed on passenger carriers. Unfortunately, this same
double standard is placing all Americans at risk.
A new Full All-Cargo Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program
(FACAOSSP) does mandate security training to crewmembers of all-cargo
airlines. However, the original requirement was reduced at behest of
the Cargo Airline Association (CAA) and ATA by fifty percent and is
clearly insufficient in regards to training initial crewmembers. Many
all-cargo airline corporations have fought against the training for
their pilots claiming the cost is too great. When pilots have
petitioned their companies to work with them to develop programs,
airline managers have told them they would refuse to incorporate such
training unless it is regulated by the government. It would seem
obvious that an all-cargo B-767 can cause just as much damage as a
passenger B-767, whether hijacked or detonated over a populated area.
This is a fact that has been lost on airline managements with an
economic bias, keeping them rooted in the old ways of doing business,
hoping nothing will happen again, and believing they are not
responsible for security.
There has been no positive response as to when the All-Cargo Common
Strategy will be accessible to the crewmembers. This working group
ended almost two years ago.
Government regulation and planned programs fall short of what is
required to shore up this weakness in our aviation security.
Unfortunately, our government and airline managers are ignoring the
fact that China and two major European cities have been using
electronic inspection equipment successfully for the last five years.
These foreign airports have demonstrated dramatic statistics of reduced
contraband, smuggling, and terrorist related shipments. These tools
would enable the United States to be proactive, versus doing little to
nothing, and are not cost prohibitive either in acquisition or in
throughput.
Airport security standards have seen minimal enhancement for the
all-cargo operation. While minor improvements are underway for larger
airports, many smaller airports are not required to have an airport
security program, and are still not required to make any changes even
though they host large jets and are located near major populated areas.
Once again the excuse given is the fear of ``financially
overburdening'' the all-cargo airlines. Additionally, the TSA does not
want to establish new rules that may be difficult to understand by
people that never had to follow them at unregulated airports.
PCSG believes in ``one level'' of security for cargo on passenger
and all-cargo aircraft.
Crew Screening
Physical screening of crewmembers prior to flight is conducted as
part of the TSA program for providing airport and flight security.
Designed to prevent another 9/11-type attack, this method of screening
crewmembers can never prevent such a disaster. Legitimate crewmembers
must obviously have access to aircraft in order to fly them, and
therefore do not require a screening routine designed to stop potential
terrorists at the passenger screening portal. Therefore, for crewmember
screening to be meaningful, the process must be able to confirm or deny
the identity of an individual as a crewmember so as to prevent
unauthorized access.
PCSG calls on the TSA to conduct this security function in a manner
that will truly protect the civilian population. Crewmembers are the
most vetted employees in the civil aviation system with countless
checks on their abilities and backgrounds. Pilots have their hands on
the controls of what is now considered a potential weapon of mass
destruction, so in effect, physical screening is meaningless.
Crewmember screening must simply address the issue of confirming access
authority. There are several off-the-shelf systems available that are
capable of such a task, including biometric solutions and database
solutions already approved by the TSA and FAA. In addition to Cockpit
Access Security System and Department of Justice INS FASTPASS,
countless other crewmember screening systems have been proposed to the
TSA. Current practices which screen crewmembers in the same manner as
passengers waste valuable resources that could be put to better use
elsewhere. The TSA currently screens more than 2,000,000 pilots
monthly.
Two years ago, on May 13, 2005, I provided testimony to this
committee on Aircrew Screening. The TSA once again promised the
Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) would be the solution
to all credentialing. This program has had marginal success and is
proof positive, that one size does not fit all, especially when it
comes to aviation. Canada has implemented a workable biometric ID
program. Even Walt Disney World has biometrics for its season pass
holders. If the Mouse can do biometrics, surely the Government can
also.
A National Law Enforcement Biometric Identification Credential was
produced to confirm positive LEO status anywhere in the country. This
program could be piggy-backed for airline pilots instead of waiting on
the TWIC program.
Passenger Screening
PCSG recognizes the nature of a changing threat, and the necessity
for a proactive approach to mitigate that threat. There are solutions
for passenger screening that rely on physical security, technology, and
the human element. PCSG believes that the TSA has made large
investments in time and money building a system that looks for
dangerous ``things'' instead of dangerous people. We are convinced that
this approach is fundamentally flawed.
The current state of passenger screening in the United States has
made some limited improvements over the screening methods from pre-9/
11. More ``process'' has been added in an effort to create a serious,
but not necessarily more meaningful, screening environment. The
selectee process is significantly flawed and the secondary screening
provides little if any advantage over the initial primary screening.
One of the most serious drawbacks to the present system is that the
TSA has been pushed and pulled in different directions by many
competing interests. The airlines continue to use (and have sole
authority over) the subjective CAPPS I (Computer Assisted Passenger
Pre-screening) system for ``profiling.'' Unfortunately, the airlines
scrubbed everything useful from the original CAPPS I program out of
fear of discrimination law suits. In an effort to make it without bias,
they have made it ineffective. The criterion to become a selectee has
little bearing on potential terrorist activity, and with a significant
percentage of passengers selected it has more of a harassment effect
than to serve as a true security feature.
The TSA has attempted to take control of the CAPPS program with a
second-generation format. This program was hailed as having the ability
to fix many of the problems that presently exist and to be operated by
the government, instead of each individual airline. At present CAPPS II
is mired down with serious problems and the TSA has no solution in
sight.
There is a system that exists that would provide a dramatic
improvement in anti-terrorism mitigation, and provide an additional
bonus of customer satisfaction. It is known as Behavior Pattern
Recognition (BPR). The TSA currently uses a trimmed-down version of BPR
called Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT). The SPOT
program only teaches TSA Security Officers how to detect one of three
main elements that make BPR work. The other two elements are delegated
to the airport law enforcement officers, who clearly are the backbone
of airport security. As trained law enforcement officers, they have the
bearing, temperament, and most importantly, the authority of law to
conduct this important security feature, although they are not
presently required to receive BPR training. If the full BPR were to be
used by TSA Security Officers as a major screening method, experts
report that selectee counts would be reduced from the current high
numbers, down to a very low percentage. Additionally, that
significantly smaller number would receive a more thorough and
meaningful secondary screening than presently exists. This serious,
behavior-focused program is specifically designed to look for traits
exhibited by those with threatening intent.
Pilots, flight attendants, and certain airline employees are
excellent candidates to receive training in the SPOT or BPR program
since the majority of their time is spent throughout the airport
environment. Once again, this is an untapped potential that TSA will
not address.
At the passenger screening portals, the ability to keep threatening
intentions and material, such as explosives, off the aircraft cannot
depend on the current x-ray machines and TSA screeners alone. Chasing
every tool a terrorist may use is sadly ineffective.
As we look at technology, we recognize it has a necessary and
evolving role in the passenger screening effort. A properly-run BPR
program in combination with K-9's, or their technological equivalent
(such as fluorescent polymer), can be very effective at mitigating many
types of ``carry on explosives'' and other threat behavior; ``looking
for bombers, not for bombs''. Magnetometers, or metal detectors, have
been staples of passenger screening for decades. Both walk-through
portals and hand wands continue to be useful tools, but portals are
becoming enhanced to be trace explosive detectors also. Some airports
are installing such devices, commonly called "puffers", since they
blast a puff of air as a passenger passes through in order to collect
and test for explosive elements. The use of x-ray technology can be
added to these portals, but many passengers have privacy concerns over
the display of their body images. These images can be "cartooned" so
actual body types are not displayed.
Screening devices for carry-on bags have enhanced features (that
have been in place for many years), but the government is preparing to
further enhance these units with existing bomb detection technology.
Detectors are in development for liquid explosives, but they are
presently too slow and lack sufficient accuracy. Bomb sniffing dogs (K-
9s) have their limitations, but are very accurate, and also serve as an
outstanding interim fix while we wait for future technologies currently
in development. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a good tool for
tracking and documenting activity in the entire airport environment,
from the parking lot to the airplane.
Physical security is being adjusted at many airports. This will be
an essential design feature for future airport projects. Parking lot
locations, terminal stand-off features and materials, as well as
electronic ``one way'' gates to help prevent portal breaches, will be
among the approaches to this important element affecting passenger
screening.
MANPADS
Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), otherwise known as
shoulder-fired missiles, pose a clear threat to commercial aviation.
Over the past twenty years, numerous aircraft have been fired upon by
MANPADS in countries outside the U.S. The proliferation of MANPADS has
escalated to the point that there is now serious concern of an attack
in the United States.
Economic realities may prevent retrofitting the entire U.S. airline
fleet with the most expensive MANPAD countermeasures. Of primary
concern is the Civil Reserve Airline Fleet (CRAF). These large jets are
U.S. registered airliners (both passenger airlines and all-cargo
airlines) that fly in support of our U.S. troops abroad. At present
they are the most vulnerable, and should be outfitted first. Also,
different manufacturers provide different successful solutions. MANPADS
is not an airport perimeter issue. The operating envelope of this
weapon system could enable an attacker to be ``away'' from the airport
environment.
TSA
It has been over six years since September 11th. The TSA was formed
to standardize aviation security. This is not the case. Each airport is
its' own domain, isolated in its' exclusive security plan. Consistency
throughout the system is non-existent. Every year, the TSA testifies
about airport access and employee problems, but does little to address
this serious problem. Past TSA congressional testimony always claim
credit for working towards solutions, but is shallow on achievement.
Why? Because the TSA has ceded its' authority to allow the airport
security directors to run the show. Additionally, the TSA has become an
inflexible bureaucracy, resistant to new ideas from stakeholders.
Meetings and working groups are used to reinforce their existing
policies and to placate the GAO reports. TSA is a reactive regulatory
agency unwilling to provide proactive changes. TSA officials, for the
most part, do not have an aviation background nor do they understand
the industry they are attempting to protect.
Summary
Aviation continues to be the favorite target of terrorists. This
threat is real and evolving therefore we must stay one step ahead of
the terrorists. Any attack on aviation would ground the nation's
airline fleets with a resulting economic impact estimated by the
Department of Transportation to be $10 billion U.S. dollars per week.
This figure, of course, does not account for the potential tragic loss
of human life in the air and on the ground.
Pilots and cabin crews are active participants in aviation security
and will live and die by TSA decisions and policies. Every day, pilots
and cabin crews operate in an environment with no margin for error.
Since man began flying, aviation has been inherently dangerous, and
today's airline pilots know that the FAA rules and regulations are all
written in blood.
Many resources from various elements of security must work together
to best mitigate a terrorist threat. In the event of terrorist action,
once airborne, the only viable resources are on the aircraft.
Madam Chairwoman, and members of the Subcommittee, I thank you
again for the opportunity to provide testimony today. I am happy to
respond to any questions which the subcommittee may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to direct my first question to Mr.Gage. From
your testimony it appears that the transportation security
officers have many issues with regard to how they have been
treated by TSA. Generally speaking, what impact do you believe
this has had on morale, and has this treatment led to a high
level of turnover in the ranks?
Mr. Gage. I have to believe it does. Of all the government,
Homeland Security has the worst rating for morale in the
government. And in Homeland Security the TSOs have the worst
morale. So this is the worst of the worst that we are talking
about. And clearly, as I said, it is a choice TSA management
makes. They don't have to deal with folks like this. They don't
need this repressive system. They don't need almost a
militaristic type of view for simple sicknesses or child care
leave or those type things that I think build a professional
workforce and one that has good morale. And I think good morale
is crucial in this job. I think teamwork and morale is
absolutely crucial.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Gage.
Ms. Friend, in your testimony you discuss the need for
coordination between flight attendants, pilots and air
marshals. What type of coordination do you envision and do you
believe is the responsibility of the airlines and the DHS to
facilitate this?
Ms. Friend. Each of us has training, and we know what our
reaction would be to any emergency situation, but we don't
train together, so we are not always assured of knowing what
the other group--how they are going to react, and that is a
situation that can have really disastrous results.
If I may, I will just give you one brief example of it that
happened fairly recently on a flight. The aircraft, as they
were taxiing out, one of the flight attendants identified an
object that had all of the components or appeared to have all
the components of a bomb. The flight attendant reacted
appropriately. There was a Federal air marshal on the flight;
notified the cockpit, notified the Federal air marshal. The
flight deck pulled the aircraft off to the side, made an
announcement to the passengers without unduly alarming them
that there was a situation they needed to check into, and then
announced that while we were waiting here, it would be okay to
use your cell phone.
The Federal air marshal reacted immediately, jumping to his
feet, pulling his weapon, saying no one can use your cell
phone, because the Federal air marshal was fearful that someone
would use a cell phone to detonate this device.
It is a situation that could have been prevented with
better communication and better training for the groups
together.
Ms. Clarke. And then my follow-up to that is do you believe
that it is the responsibility of the airlines and DHS to
facilitate this? Who would you see as the entity that would
ensure that this happens? Because clearly what you have
described is something that anyone would envision if such
integral partners are being trained in isolation of each other.
Ms. Friend. Well, it would require the cooperation of DHS
and/or the TSA, because the Federal air marshals are not under
the direct supervision of the airlines. So it would require a
coordinated effort.
It would also require an economic investment, which has
been the problem, is that there is a reluctance to make that
economic investment in better and more comprehensive training,
at least for the work group that I represent.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask also, would there be any benefit in
further coordinating with the TSOs since all of you share the
same goal of protecting the public as they travel through the
skies? Have you given any thought to that, Ms. Friend?
Ms. Friend. I'm sorry, would you ask me that again?
Ms. Clarke. There is one group that we all acknowledge is
part of the continuum of safety in our airports, and that is
the transportation security officers who oftentimes are near
the frontline, right?
Ms. Friend. Right.
Ms. Clarke. Would you see any benefit to them also
coordinating with the others in terms of protecting passengers
and crews and all of that?
Ms. Friend. Well, it is always helpful for every layer of
the security system to understand what the role is of the other
layer. But we do not have--I mean, the direct contact we have
with the TSOs is during our process through the security
checkpoint during which we are really not much different from
the average passenger clearing security. And I am not aware
that we really have any significant issues with the TSOs. I
think we have a very amicable relationship, as far as I know.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady.
Now it is my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms.
Eleanor Holmes Norton.
Ms. Norton. I want to thank the Chair. And I particularly
thank you for this hearing. I am on the Aviation Subcommittee,
and I find this hearing of value.
Some of the issues recur. Let me ask Mr. Gage in particular
about a statement that appears on page 3 of his testimony about
the TSOs' high attrition rate. You describe it as incredibly
high. I think that is not an overstatement; in the first 8
months of 2007, an attrition rate of 19.6 percent, much higher
than the current 2.2 percent attrition rate of the Federal
workforce. This kind of instability is associated with low-
level jobs, not security jobs. And I would be interested in why
you think there is this incredibly high turnover rate, which I
take it is people leaving or resigning.
Mr. Gage. Voluntary as well as involuntary. I mean, there
are quite a few people that get fired there, too.
Ms. Norton. Why do they get fired?
Mr. Gage. What?
Ms. Norton. Fired for a cause?
Mr. Gage. Well, some of the reasons are pretty weak, and
there have been quite a few cases that are being turned over.
But I think the whole--the pressure of the job, the structure
of the job itself, which has been flexible, the fact that the
staffing levels are so low, which really puts additional
pressures on the workers in regards to taking leave, with
regards to getting their training, just the general pressure,
the overall pressure of the job. This staffing problem is going
to have to be addressed, because it causes an additional
staffing problem with people& additional people leaving.
So fully staffing the TSOs I think would go a long way and,
also, I think just treating people more professionally would go
a long way to--most of these people have had other careers,
professional careers. Some are teachers, and they are just not
used to being treated in the way that they are without having
any say, afraid to make any type of suggestion or comment for
fear of reprisal.
So I think there is a whole general attitude there that
needs to be cleaned out, and some of the choices that TSA has
made on how to run this important piece of business just has to
be re-evaluated and modernized.
Ms. Norton. Well, you indicated somewhere in this
testimony, as I recall it, that when a TSA employee reports an
issue, a security issue, that--oh, here it is. It is on page 6.
Much of your testimony, it is just inconsistent with what
we have to demand as that of security. The high turnover,
something has got to be done about that. That is why so much
training, as you report in your testimony, has to go with new
people, just to keep the new people going so you can't train
the people who are already there. That is not what we expected
when this was transferred to the Federal Government. It has
been inconsistent with the way in which other Federal employees
respond and are treated.
You say, though--and this really caught my eye--TSA refuses
to be bound by the Office of Special Counsel recommendations
when TSOs are retaliated against for blowing the whistle on
security breaches. I need to know more about that because,
obviously, that could conceivably concern security.
Mr. Gage. TSA is not bound by virtually any of the
safeguard-type of provisions.
Ms. Norton. Having whistleblower protection?
Mr. Gage. That is right.
Ms. Norton. There is no whistleblower protection?
Mr. Gage. There isn't.
Ms. Norton. Madam Chair, there are two points right there.
One, turnover, as long as you have got something, these people
going in and out, I don't know how we can consider that this is
a workforce for security. And if you cannot blow the whistle
when you see something--of course, they don't have any union in
the first place--without fear of losing your job, I guess the
best thing to do is just let it go by. Very disturbing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are not ending your time. I am dismayed
to indicate that we need to clear the room. There is a package
unidentified, unless someone in this room can identify it. So
we have to clear the room, suspend the hearing for just a
moment and ask all individuals, as I have been instructed by
the Clerk, to clear the room just for a moment.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask for a zero on the clock. Thank
you.
To the witnesses, if there is ever anything that you get
here in Washington, in a complete opposite of what people
perceive as real-life experience, and so you are in the
Homeland Security Committee, and you just had real-life
experience. We are glad, however, that it resulted in a false
status. So thank you very much.
I am going to proceed with my line of questioning, and I
will yield myself 5 minutes as we conclude this hearing.
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton was really tracking a
line of questions, Mr. Gage, that I think are enormously
crucial. And before I do that, let me ask unanimous consent to
submit into the record the Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association, and I can do this because a quorum has been
established. Hearing no objection, it has been submitted into
the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This recounts for us one sentence: ``A
recent news report showed that 75 percent of fake bombs or bomb
parts got past TSA screeners at Los Angeles International
Airport and 60 percent got past TSA screeners in Chicago
O'Hare.''
Even though this data may have been in place for a period
of time, I think it speaks to Mr. Gage in terms of his points
regarding training and also technology.
So I want to go to Mr. Gage again to ask, what are the
issues--as I survey our TSA screeners, one, I want to thank
them for their service for fear of them thinking that that is
not our intent here today. But I do notice or do get an
opportunity to hear of long hours, of painful working
conditions, some airports don't have rest areas, and those are
basics, but they all contribute to the way one does one's job.
But the other question, Mr. Gage, is professional
development. The ability--I asked the question of TSA itself.
What is a route--what is the professional route for a TSA
screener? That always gives one the ability to stick in there.
I cite the huge hours, though a different circumstance, of
interns--of medical interns, residents who work unbelievable
hours, hours not seen in any other professional capacity. But,
in any event, they stay the course because they are going to be
a doctor. So that seems to be a concern. Will you share with me
your thoughts about that?
Mr. Gage. Yeah. I think the avenues of promotion are very
limited. I guess you could possibly become a trainer or a
supervisor, and I think that is about it, which is--and for the
vast majority of the workforce, there simply isn't any
profession promotional potential, and I think that is going to
really force this into an almost part-time workforce, which I
think would be a disaster.
Right now, there is 20 percent or so that are part time.
And as full--time people or people looking for a career,
certainly the money is not there and the promotional
opportunity is not there, and I think that is just going to
require or force airports to be hiring part-time people, and I
think that just exacerbates the whole problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me see if I can explore this question that I had for
Ms. Friend. Tell us again--I think it is really crucial, and we
expect to have the air marshals before this committee and air
traffic control. That is different. But I think it is important
not to highlight some unfortunate circumstance, but
coordination is key. And an airplane is like a closet. There is
nowhere to go. And maybe even worse because, obviously, a
closet might have a door. But say a locked closet. There is
nowhere to go.
And the answer that you presented was stark, which is a
flight attendant giving basic instructions from his or her
experience and a law enforcement contravening it but then
creating what I think might be a scene of tension or confusion
for the passenger.
Speak to this coordination question again, particularly
flight attendants who really are the people movers. They are
moving about. They are also looking at behavior of passengers.
Speak about coordination and the importance of training flight
attends.
Ms. Friend. Well, I mean it is critical that each of us who
play a role in onboard aviation security have a complete and
thorough understanding and expectation of what the other two
parties' role is. I mean, I think that is just plain common
sense that I know what the Federal air marshals' expectations
are, what their instructions are in certain circumstances and
that the air marshals know what mine are and that the flight
crew know what to expect from each of the other two pieces in
the cabin. Otherwise, we end up getting in each other's way and
not accomplishing anything, I mean, and not accomplishing our
goal, which is to protect the travelling public.
If I have to stop or if the air marshal has to stop or if
the captain of the aircraft has to stop and say, okay, what are
you going to do now, then we lose valuable time. We need to
each understand what each other's role is and get out of each
other's way, to be frank with you, and let each of us do our
job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Wireless communication, a lot of people
would raise the question. Of course, they would raise the
question, what would be the revenue source for that as we look
at the legislation, write the legislation? We know we will
craft a revenue stream, and we would hope for the cooperation
of the airlines, since we----
I remember very distinctly cooperating after that tragic 9/
11 event, recognizing the financial hit they had taken. This
Congress rose, if you will, to answer the call. And wireless
communication, to me, eliminates the sitting duck status of a
flight attendant using this heavy equipment at the front and
maybe at the back while everyone is watching and certainly
those who would be interested in doing harm. Why don't you
share how you see the wireless being helpful?
Ms. Friend. Right. I mean, I can give you an example of
that. In a simulated terrorist attack, the first thing that
those individuals acting as the terrorists did was cut the wire
on the interphone so that the flight attendants could not
communicate with the cockpit. That is just logical. But as far
as the venue stream or funding mechanism, I really believe that
the airlines themselves should be responsible for providing
that as a piece of safety and security equipment onboard the
aircraft, just as they are required to provide fire
extinguishers and first aid kits and external defibrillators.
I think the problem here is that the airlines themselves,
the people who manage or mismanage this industry, do not--they
look at security concerns as sort of extraneous to the service
that they provide. When, in fact, ensuring that the people that
they are selling tickets to and promising to transport safely,
that is a part of the service that they have contracted to
provide to the travelling public. And so I think that they
should be fully responsible for that piece of safety equipment,
just as they are other pieces of safety equipment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very instructive. Let me finish.
Captain Hesselbein, one of the things that struck me was
the leave time to, in fact, comply with requirements for your
pilots to comply with a law that was passed by this Congress.
What has been the problem with just doing this through
personnel, through a personnel structure that if you have a
specific training that could be used for your job that you have
that time to be trained or to be retrained? What is the problem
that you are finding?
Mr. Hesselbein. The problem is that many employers find
their pilots resource is scarce at the present time. There are
also those who do not believe that there is a role for an armed
pilot in the flight deck. Those two, combined with the fact
that there is no law in place that allows them to take leave,
causes the problem.
I spent many, many years in the Air National Guard; and
during my time there before I retired, it was a very good thing
to be able to walk in to my employer with a set of orders
saying, I have to leave my place of employment for 60 days to
deploy to one place or another, and the employer had to permit
me to leave my employment to serve my country and then return
to my job.
FFDOs are serving their country when they go to train to
protect their flight decks. They should have that same right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think this has been enormously
instructive; and let me just add, in conclusion, just to recite
from a letter that I offered into the record from Mr. Chris
Paris, again, focussing on air traffic control. And it really
adds to the testimony that has been given here today. It really
speaks to missing elements that each of your constituents have
that keeps them from performing at an excellent rate their jobs
and that impacts on American security.
It relates to this story coming from Houston. There is a
bar by the FAA from having utilization of defibrillators in the
air traffic control unit. Now I would not suggest that everyone
is under tension, enormous tension. But I imagine that there
would be a few air traffic controllers who do their job very
well but would tell you that it is very seriously, a very
serious, if you will, tension-filled responsibility. I think
when I visited with some of them, they indicated they are to be
on a certain number of hours and off just because of that. So
the FAA bars defibrillators from being in the center.
And, unfortunately and tragically, a tribute to this
gentleman whose name has been printed here, John Sanfelippo had
a heart attack as an air traffic controller, no defibrillator,
and tragically 14 minutes before attention could come to him.
And, of course, tragically he lost his life. I put his name
into the record simply because it has been given to me.
But this hearing was to find out what you needed and how
this committee could respond to your needs. It is also to thank
you on behalf of our ranking member and the members of our
committee and just to indicate that a number of members had
overlapping responsibilities, and I thank the members for their
presence here today. So my gratitude for the witnesses for
their valuable testimony and the members for their questions.
The members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions as they are
submitted.
And I would, again, emphasize that the partnership of
security in America has to be with people and tools, people and
travel modes, people and equipment; and your presence here
today reinforces that.
I thank you for your testimony. We look forward to working
with you and curing some of these problems.
With that, hearing no further business, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix: Attachments
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Attachment A
Attachment B