[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
H.R. 2631, THE NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-76
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
AL GREEN, Texas PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
VACANCY Officio)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Jacob Olcott, Director & Counsel
Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science & Technology
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Dr. Diane Berry, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Rhode Island, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology.... 2
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina.................................... 1
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas................................................. 37
WITNESSES
Panel I
The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Panel II
Dr. Steven Aoki, Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism,
National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Dr. Carol Burns, Group Leader, Nuclear and Radiochemistry,
Chemistry Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Mr. Mike Evenson, Associate Director for Operations, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Andrew Grant, Acting Director for WMD Terrorism, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of
State:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Dr. Vahid Majidi, Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Preapred Statement............................................. 4
H.R. 2631, THE NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT
----------
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity,
and Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. James Langevin
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Langevin, Christensen, Etheridge,
Green, McCaul, Pascrell, Jr and Broun, Jr.
Also present: Representative Berman.
Mr. Etheridge. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the need to develop and maintain a national nuclear forensic
capacity. Today, the subcommittee is meeting to discuss and
subsequently mark up an amendment in the nature of a substitute
to H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Act.
I would like to congratulate my colleague, Congressman
Schiff--he is not here right now, I don't think--for
introducing this legislation and for working collaboratively
with the committee to develop the amendment in the nature of a
substitute that we will consider immediately after today's
hearing.
To paraphrase the provisions of H.R. 2631, as I am sure
will be echoed by witnesses here today, the threat of nuclear
terrorism attack is the most serious threat to the U.S.
homeland and to our interests abroad. We must do everything we
can to prevent such an event. Nuclear forensics and attribution
is one important tool in this effort. Through nuclear
forensics, it may be possible to identify the source of nuclear
or radiological weapons. A robust forensic capacity should also
have a deterrent effect for those who might use a weapon or
provide such a weapon or weapons materials to terrorists.
If the worse should happen and a nuclear attack is carried
out, attribution is critical. In order to perform such, we must
have the capacity for rapid sample acquisition, analysis, and
characterization of the samples, and comparison of those
samples to other known sample signatures. It is my belief that
the provisions of this amendment in the nature of a substitute
will help promote this capacity. I look forward to discussing
this bill with our witnesses today.
With that, I recognize the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul for an
opening statement.
Mr. McCaul?
Mr. McCaul. I thank the chairman.
The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban area of this
country would be catastrophic. Reducing the risk of nuclear or
radiological terrorism requires a layered system of defenses
that involves deterring, detecting, disrupting, and recovering
from terrorist attacks.
We spend a great deal of time in this Congress discussing
DNDO's efforts to deploy radiation portal monitors at our
nation's ports of entry. These monitors, staffed by Customs and
Border Protection officers are the nation's first line of
defense against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological
material.
I would like to take this opportunity to commend DNDO on
their achievements in this area. Mr. Oxford, to me, I have been
very impressed that in only 18 months, your organization has
deployed radiation monitors which now screen 91 percent of
cargo coming across the northern border, and 97 percent of
cargo coming across the southern border.
In the next several months, Secretary Chertoff is expected
to make a decision on the certification of the advance
spectroscopic portal monitors. I hope this technology
demonstrates a significant improvement over current radiation
portal monitors, allowing Customs and Border Protection to
improve accuracy, while maintaining this high percentage of
cargo screening.
But even with the best possible detection systems, the
possibility remains that terrorists could beat the system and
sneak something past one of our detectors, or through a
nonofficial port of entry. That is why defense against
terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, requires this multi-
layered approach.
Today, we are here to discuss one of the layers in the
government's strategy to defend against nuclear terrorism. That
layer is the Interagency Program of Technical and Nuclear
Forensics and the role it plays in attribution. While forensics
is only one component of attribution, it is a key part of
ensuring the nation has a robust program to accurately and
rapidly identify perpetrators of nuclear or radiological
terrorism.
The forensics program we have today includes programs in
defense, the intelligence community, law enforcement, homeland
security, and our national laboratories. I look forward to
hearing on the progress DHS has made in coordinating this
interagency program, and I also hope to hear the role each
department plays in the acquisition, analysis, and
characterization of radiological and nuclear material that
would be necessary in the case of a successful nuclear attack.
The main concern of this committee is the pipeline of
qualified people into the fields associated with nuclear
forensics. In recent years, the number of young people entering
scientific fields has decreased. The nuclear fields in
particular are suffering, especially in fields relevant to
nuclear forensics, which may have no commercial counterpart. I
am very interested to know the panel's thoughts on this issue
as well, and what is in store for technical programs such as
this one if this trend continues.
I thank the panelists for being here. I yield back my time.
Mr. Etheridge. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to welcome our panelists here today, our first
panelists who are witnesses to the hearing. I look forward to
discussing the topics of nuclear forensics with such a
collection of dedicated public servants. Welcome and thank you
for being here.
Our first witness is no stranger to this committee. Mr.
Oxford is the director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
in the Department of Homeland Security. Welcome.
Next is Dr. Aoki--is that pronounced correctly?
Mr. Aoki. Aoki.
Mr. Etheridge. Aoki. Okay, welcome. He is deputy under
secretary of energy for counterterrorism at the Department of
Energy. We welcome you.
We also have--I hope I get this right; let me try--Dr.
Vahid Majidi.
Mr. Majidi. Sir, it is Vahid Majidi.
Mr. Etheridge. Vahid Majidi. Thank you, sir. Welcome. He is
assistant director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
And next is Dr. Andrew Grant, acting director of the WMD
Terrorism Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.
And next we have Mr. Michael Evenson, who is the associate
director for operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
And finally, we have Dr. Carol Burns, currently serving as
the Group Leader for the Nuclear and Radiochemistry in the
Chemistry Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Let me welcome each of you. Thank you for being here.
Without objection, your full statement will be entered into the
record.
I would recognize Mr. Oxford first and ask each one of you,
as soon as the other one has finished, to move along. I won't
introduce you again. It would take up time. Summarize your
statement within the 5 minutes if possible.
I recognize you now, Mr. Oxford, for 5 minutes, for a
summary. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Good afternoon, Chairman Etheridge, Ranking
Member McCaul and other members of the subcommittee.
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
discuss the U.S. government's nuclear forensics program and the
role of DNDO in coordinating and advancing the nuclear
forensics efforts through our National Technical Nuclear
Forensics Center.
I would also like to thank my colleagues who are joining me
today from the Departments of Energy, Defense, State, FBI and
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Technical nuclear forensics is the analysis,
characterization and interpretation of pre-and post-detonation
nuclear and radiological samples and devices, as well as the
output signals from national nuclear detonations. The U.S.
government's nuclear forensics efforts provide the tools,
techniques and expertise to potentially determine the nature
and origin of the materials and devices used in acts of
terrorism and smuggling.
In the last year, the U.S. government has made great
strides in forming an integrated interagency team. Together, we
are planning, prioritizing, and exercising. Our goal is to
achieve and maintain a proficient national nuclear forensics
capability that is credible, reliable, and ready for any
contingency, from interdiction of nuclear materials or devices
at the border, to a nuclear detonation in the homeland or
against U.S. interests abroad.
Nuclear forensics is now increasingly recognized as having
the potential to serve as a central pillar of deterrence in the
21st century. Nuclear forensics underpins the attribution
process by helping to identify the possible sources of
materials or devices, the device design, or the pathway taken
to the actual incident. Attribution will be derived form the
fusion of technical nuclear forensics analysis, with all-source
intelligence, and law enforcement information to enable the
decision-making process.
DHS established the Forensics Center in DNDO on 1 October
2006. The center develops and advances capabilities to perform
nuclear forensics on pre-detonation nuclear and radiological
materials. In coordination with our partners, it implements
national-level integration, centralized planning, exercising,
evaluation and stewardship across the full spectrum of U.S.
government nuclear forensics capabilities from pre-to post-
detonation. In essence, the center serves as a system
integrator for the end-to-end national capabilities.
The strategic goals for the center include improving our
nuclear forensics capabilities, developing a national-level
exercise program, developing strong international nuclear
forensics cooperation, and developing a strategic
communications plan.
Finally, it is important to note that most of the nation's
scientific nuclear forensics capabilities exist in a relatively
small cadre of experts at the national laboratories. We are all
facing the challenges of recruiting and retaining the nuclear
experts that we rely on so heavily to achieve our mission. We
are working with our partners to assess the issues, identify
solutions, and ultimately establish a stable and enduring
workforce and career pipeline.
In conclusion, the importance of nuclear forensics cannot
be understated. It is challenging and it is essential, another
critical layer in our nation's strategy of layered defense
against the nuclear threat.
Chairman Etheridge, Ranking Member McCaul and other members
of the committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, Director
of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and I would like to
thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the U.S.
Government's (USG) nuclear forensics program and the role of DNDO in
coordinating nuclear forensics efforts through our National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center, (NTNFC) that was established in DNDO last
October. I would also like to thank my partners who are joining me from
the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DoD), State (DOS), and
Justice (DOJ).
Background
The USG's nuclear forensic efforts provide the tools and the
expertise to potentially determine the nature and origin of the
materials and devices used in acts of terrorism and smuggling. This
information is used in the broader process of attribution, which
couples intelligence and law enforcement information with the results
of forensic analyses to aid in the identification of those who
designed, built, supplied, transported and used an improvised nuclear
device (IND), a stolen or acquired nuclear weapon, a radiological
dispersal device (RDD), or nuclear/radiological material. Technical
Nuclear Forensics, or TNF, refers to the thorough analysis,
characterization, and interpretation of pre-detonation and post-
detonation nuclear/radiological samples and devices, as well as prompt
output signals from a nuclear detonation. TNF is a critical nuclear
deterrence capability to demonstrate we can hold perpetrators
accountable, and also to help find and prevent follow on attacks. The
roots of this program are founded in the techniques that were used for
many years in the U.S. nuclear weapons development and testing
programs, arms control monitoring, and intelligence activities. Today,
with the looming threat of nuclear terrorism, the requirements and
timelines that drive our efforts are new and only began crystallizing
in the last few years.
TNF is necessarily an interagency effort with respective lead and
support roles and responsibilities assigned through a recent
Presidential policy directive. In the last year the USG has made great
strides in aligning itself in accordance with the directive, forming an
integrated interagency team. Together we are planning, prioritizing,
and exercising. DNDO's TNF goal is to achieve and maintain a proficient
national nuclear forensics capability that is credible, robust, rapid,
reliable, and ready for any contingency, from interdiction of nuclear
materials at the border to a nuclear detonation in the homeland, or
against U.S. interests abroad. Nuclear forensics is now increasingly
recognized as having the potential to serve as a central pillar of
deterrence in the 21st century, tied to new concepts of ``nuclear
accountability'' (as Graham Allison calls it) for countries that might
consider the ``witting'' transfer of nuclear materials or weapons to
our adversaries, as well as to encourage improved safeguarding of those
materials and weapons, to deter the ``unwitting'' transfer. We
understand that effective strategic communications is fundamental to
the deterrence equation. If deterrence fails, then nuclear forensics
serves to underpin the attribution process by helping to identify the
possible source of the materials or device, the device design type
(after a detonation), and the pathway taken to the incident scene,
utilizing both nuclear and traditional forensics techniques.
Attribution will be derived from the fusing of the technical nuclear
forensics conclusions with all source intelligence and law enforcement
information, which in turn enables the decision-making process for
assessing potential follow-on attacks, response options for the
President, as well as prosecution deliberations.
NTNFC
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) in DNDO on October 1, 2006.
Like the broader DNDO, the Center is staffed with a mix of DHS federal
employees and detailees from our partner agencies. DHS assumed this
mission as a result of the classified Presidential policy directive
that defined two core forensics missions for DNDO. First, the NTNFC is
intended to serve as the national ``capability provider'' to develop
and advance capabilities to perform nuclear forensics on pre-detonation
nuclear and radiological materials. The second mission for the NTNFC is
to implement national-level integration, centralized planning,
exercising, evaluation, and stewardship across the full spectrum of USG
nuclear forensics capabilities, from pre-to post-detonation--in essence
to serve as the ``System Integrator'' for the end-to-end national
capabilities. These missions are specifically directed to be carried
out ``in coordination'' with our partners in the DoD, DOS, DOE, DOJ,
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
Strategic Goals
The strategic goals for the NTNFC include striving to continuously
improve nuclear forensic capabilities through research & development,
interagency program reviews, independent assessments, and exercising.
We are developing a highly matrixed national-level exercise program--we
know that strict protocols and intense timelines will be the rule after
an event, and so we must exercise regularly to optimize our
capabilities and readiness.
We are also working closely with our interagency partners to
develop a strong international pillar of nuclear forensics
cooperation--which means sharing best practices and information on
materials and cases, developing personal relationships with
international forensic scientists and law enforcement, and performing
exercises in cooperation with other nations. The NTNFC provides
considerable technical support to the DOS in order to engage other
nations and develop the absolutely essential international aspects of
our nuclear forensics programs.
The NTNFC will also be developing an in-depth strategic
communications plan. We need to raise the awareness of others in the
government and the public to garner the appropriate kinds of support
and disseminate the right kinds of messages. With effective strategic
communications, our nuclear detection and forensics missions can
succeed in creating a new kind of deterrence for the 21st century.
It is important to note that most of the Nation's scientific
nuclear forensics capabilities rest on the shoulders of a relatively
small cadre of experts at the national labs. We are all facing the
challenges of recruiting and retaining the nuclear experts that we rely
on so heavily to achieve our mission. The NTNFC is working with our
partners to assess the issues, identify solutions, and ultimately
establish a stable and enduring workforce and career pipeline. This is
a major strategic goal of not only DHS, but all of us here at the table
today.
Accomplishments to date
In the short time since the NTNFC was established, we have been
working quickly to create a small staff of in-house experts to
coordinate with our federal and laboratory partners to meet the needs
of our TNF mission. We have developed a baseline Nuclear Forensics
Knowledge Management & Analysis System that underpins our capabilities
to perform nuclear forensics on interdicted materials. This program
entails the development of forensic information analysis tools, for
example, multivariate pattern recognition tools; methods to deduce and
link materials signatures to production processes; and development of
historical nuclear material process and production timelines.
The NTNFC also chairs the Attribution Working Group of the
Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and Development, Committee on
Homeland Defense and National Security, National Science and Technology
Council. The purpose of this Subcommittee is to identify and recommend
a prioritized investment strategy to continually increase the overall
effectiveness and productivity of USG R&D related to developing a
robust nuclear defense capability. Additional Subcommittee working
groups include Nonproliferation, Interdiction, Render Safe, and
Response and Recovery, resulting in effective integration of R&D needs
analysis across the nuclear defense spectrum. With members from DHS,
DoD, DOS, DOE, DOJ, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and Intelligence Community, the Attribution Working Group is
developing six areas of R&D emphasis that define a USG coordinated
forensics and attribution program. The Subcommittee has currently
baselined the capabilities in nuclear defense, developed the vision of
the desired end-state five years out, and prioritized gaps in R&D.
Ultimately, the development and analysis of this roadmap will form the
basis for an interagency coordinated program of prioritized R&D efforts
to effectively address gaps without redundancy. This Roadmap is
scheduled for completion in February 2008, in time for agencies to use
the plan to develop FY 2010 budget requests.
The NTNFC has made significant strides in integrating the day to
day workings of our interagency team. In addition to the joint Exercise
Planning Group, we have established a few essential bodies to plan and
direct nuclear forensics activities--we stood up a Nuclear Forensics
Working Group at the action officer level; a Steering Committee at the
program manager level; and just last month we launched a ``Nuclear
Forensics Executive Council'' with senior executive membership across
each department and the intelligence community. The Council was
established to assure effective implementation and oversight, with
enduring senior level focus and attention to the forensics mission. At
our inaugural meeting last month, we were honored to have Secretary
Chertoff join us and express his strong support for this critical
mission.
Conclusion
The importance of nuclear forensics cannot be overstated. It is a
field that seems to grow in visibility on a weekly basis. It is
challenging, and it is essential--another critical layer in our
Nation's strategy of layered defense against the nuclear threat. Our
mandate requires that we develop, improve and sustain an enduring
capability that is rapid and credible--that will meet the President's
and Congress' expectations during an unprecedented catastrophe--and
effectively support attribution conclusions, and potential responses.
Moreover, nuclear forensics efforts may indeed help to prevent a
follow-on attack--the issue that will be foremost on all of our minds
in the wake of an attack. The nuclear forensics mission is a
crosscutting effort throughout the USG and appropriate coordination
through the DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center will
ensure that effective, integrated, and robust capabilities are
developed and sustained.
The Secretary and I are committed to doing whatever it takes, as
quickly and as prudently as possible, to prevent a nuclear 9-11, or a
dirty bomb attack. Nuclear forensics is central to our efforts. And
there is no doubt that our odds of success are magnified tremendously
when we persevere with our partners across the board, through planning,
exercising, and improving our national capabilities.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir.
STATMENT OF STEVEN AOKI, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Aoki. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the
committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's efforts
in the area of nuclear forensics. Along with our colleagues
from other federal agencies, we are actively involved in
developing and maintaining the technical expertise, scientific
tools, and specialized facilities to help identify those
involved in the theft of nuclear materials or those responsible
for an act of nuclear terrorism.
I submitted a written statement, so I just will focus on a
few key points here.
First, technical nuclear forensics really is only part of a
broader process of attribution. Attribution really aims to
answer the question ``who did it'' by looking at the full range
of intelligence, law enforcement and scientific information
available to the nation. Technical forensics may play a
critical part in reaching that final judgment, but it is only a
part.
Secondly, we must be prepared to provide technical
forensics analysis in several different types of situations
that have different characteristics. We may recover weapons-
grade nuclear materials from a smuggler apprehended at a border
crossing or as a result of a criminal investigation. Forensic
tools can help identify where that material originated and
perhaps tell us something about its history.
Alternatively, we might intercept an actual nuclear device
before it can be detonated. In this case, in addition to the
forensic analysis of the nuclear material, expert analysis of
the design of the device could give us valuable clues about who
built it and in particular whether there was any assistance
from a foreign government. Of course, special procedures and
facilities will be required to perform any operations of a
potentially live nuclear weapon.
Finally, we must also prepare for the grim possibility that
we will be called on to conduct forensic analysis after a
terrorist nuclear device has detonated. In this case, it is
possible to analyze the radioactive debris to determine the
types of nuclear materials involved and perhaps reconstruct the
device design, providing important clues to identify the
responsible party.
In all three of these cases, the availability of a strong
and capable national technical nuclear forensics program
strengthens deterrence against those who might support an act
of nuclear terrorism. We must, however, be realistic about the
length of time required for some of the analytical procedures
involved in nuclear forensics. In some cases, weeks or months
may be required to obtain reliable results. This is clearly an
area where additional research is called for, but there are
some inherent physics limits to what can be done in this field.
The complexity of the possible scenarios means that
technical nuclear forensics is inherently a team effort,
drawing expertise and specialized capabilities from across the
federal government. The Department of Energy contributes
broadly to this effort in line with the roles and
responsibilities established by the president last August.
Among our key contributions, let me mention a few here.
First, DOE's Office of Emergency Operations will take
custody of a terrorist nuclear device after it has been
rendered safe in the field. Once the device has been
transported to a secure location at the Nevada test site, DOE
will oversee the collection of material samples and other
forensic data.
In the event of a nuclear detonation or nuclear material
dispersion event in the United States, DOE on-the-ground teams
will collect samples utilizing equipment and operational
concepts developed by our colleagues at the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. The collection of samples for forensics
purposes will be fully integrated with the other on-site
activities carried out by DOE teams as part of their overall
response to this catastrophic event.
To support these and other forensics responsibilities, DOE
conducts research and development aimed at improving the speed
and accuracy of radiochemical analysis, and at developing
sensors to provide near real-time information about the nature
of a terrorist nuclear device. Drawing on the expertise of its
national laboratories, DOE sponsors analytical studies of
potential nuclear device designs, using advanced modeling and
simulation tools developed for our own nuclear weapons program,
to understand how an improvised nuclear device might be
constructed. These efforts allow the calculation of signatures,
including expected radioactive debris that would be compared
against forensic results.
An essential component of any forensics effort is a library
of information against which to compare an unknown sample. DOE
has been assigned responsibility for managing the Nuclear
Materials Information Program, which is developing a database
of information on nuclear materials worldwide to support
technical nuclear forensics.
Perhaps most importantly, DOE is responsible for sustaining
the national laboratory system that underlies most of the
interagency efforts described at today's hearing. During the
Cold War, we built specialized facilities, developed unique
scientific techniques, and assembled teams of scientists and
engineers to support the design, production and testing of our
own nuclear weapons. I think it is fair to say that all of the
nation's technical nuclear forensics capability ultimately
rests on the underlying science base around the accumulated
knowledge it represents.
As the national laboratory complex evolves to meet a new
national security environment, it will be vitally important to
ensure that maintain and strengthen this fundamental resource
for the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Aoki follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki
Chairman Langevin, Representative McCaul, members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss nuclear terrorism and, in particular, the Department of
Energy's efforts to sustain and improve our nation's capabilities to
attribute threats involving nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
materials introduced covertly into our country. I will begin by briefly
addressing the specifics of the nuclear terrorism threat, the
components of a national strategy to counter that threat, and the
specific role that technical nuclear forensics and attribution can play
in that strategy. I conclude by describing DOE's efforts to work with
its interagency partners to strengthen national nuclear technical
forensics and attribution capabilities.
Countering Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Threats to the Homeland
In this post-Cold War world, nuclear terrorism may be the single
most catastrophic threat that this nation faces--we must do everything
we can to ensure against its occurrence. The focus of my testimony
today involves covert delivery by sub-national terrorist groups, either
at the bidding of a state sponsor supplying the nuclear warhead or on
their own via purchasing or stealing a warhead. There are three main
threat variants identified below in decreasing order of likelihood, but
increasing order of consequence in terms of deaths, injuries, cleanup
costs, etc.:
terrorists could acquire radioactive materials and
construct devices for dispersal--so
called radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs) or ``dirty
bombs'',
terrorists could acquire special nuclear materials
(SNM)--plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU)--and build an
improvised nuclear device (IND),
terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon from a
nuclear weapons state.
The overall strategy to protect the United States from terrorist
nuclear weapons threats has six components:
Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and
plans to develop or acquire nuclear weapons
Deny terrorists access to the nuclear materials,
expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop
a nuclear device
Deter terrorists from employing nuclear devices
Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of
nuclear-related materials, weapons, and personnel
Prevent and respond to a nuclear terrorism attack
Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed
nuclear device
Prevention
Although the focus of today's hearing is nuclear forensics and
attribution, I must reiterate that our number one priority is to keep
key fissile materials--plutonium or highly-enriched uranium--out of the
hands of terrorists. Absent access to sufficient quantities of such
materials there can be no bomb. We cannot overstate the importance of
this point. Making a sophisticated nuclear weapon small enough to fit
on a modern ballistic missile is difficult. Making a crude and
inefficient one delivered by a rental truck may not be. We cannot be
certain that we have controlled knowledge; thus we must control
materials.
We are working hard to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear
devices and fissile materials by:
Strengthening physical security of U.S. nuclear
weapons and weapons usable materials, Providing assistance to
Russia to strengthen protection, control, and accounting of its
nuclear weapons and materials,
Working with friends and allies to secure weapons-
usable nuclear materials worldwide, and to strengthen security
at civil nuclear facilities,
Taking more aggressive steps to interdict illicit
trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear materials and related
technologies via strengthened export controls, cooperation with
other countries through DOE's Second Line of Defense and
MegaPorts programs, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
In July 2006, at the G-8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin
announced that they would create a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism to strengthen cooperation worldwide on nuclear materials
security and prevention of terrorist acts involving nuclear or
radioactive substances. Keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of
terrorists--and where possible, eliminating potentially vulnerable
weapons-usable materials--is the most effective means of prevention.
Paired with UNSCR 1540, we now have both the legal mandate and
practical means necessary for concrete actions to secure nuclear
material against the procurement efforts of terrorists.
Barriers to acquisition also provide an important element of
deterrence. If terrorists believe that it will be extremely risky, or
impossible, to acquire weapons or materials, they may be deterred from
seeking them, or perhaps seek other avenues of attack. While we, of
course, want to prevent all types of terrorism, deterring a devastating
nuclear detonation has particular urgency.
Nuclear Forensics and Attribution
Attribution--a capability to rapidly characterize and identify the
source of a nuclear warhead or weapons usable nuclear materials either
before or after an attack--is a key component of an overall strategy to
deter nuclear terrorism. States will not provide nuclear weapons to
terrorists if they know that we will find out and, under certain
conditions (e.g., a witting transfer from a state sponsor to
terrorists), retaliate. Moreover, post-attack attribution would provide
critical information to help prevent follow-on attacks.
Attribution involves the rapid fusion of information obtained via
three sources: domestic law enforcement investigations of nuclear
terrorist threats, associated collateral foreign intelligence received
about those threats, and the technical analysis of the nuclear device
or materials interdicted prior to detonation, or the debris and signals
that result from a detonation. This latter source of information is
called technical nuclear forensics. The elements of a nuclear forensics
capability involve (1) collection of technical forensics data from the
device or event, (2) lab analysis and reporting including comparison of
collected data with a materials data base, and (3) interpretation and
evaluation coupled with appropriate technical peer review.
The types of questions that we want to answer in technical nuclear
forensics and, more broadly via the attribution process include: What
material is it? Is it U.S. material? If not, where did it come from and
how did it get here? How, when and where was it produced? For nuclear
devices: Was it an RDD or a nuclear explosive device? What fissile
materials were used? What was the yield? What was the design?
Post-detonation nuclear event forensics can provide key information
about both the design and sophistication of a warhead, and about the
origin of its fissile materials. During the period of nuclear testing,
we gained much experience and critical information evaluating
radioactive debris from Soviet above-ground nuclear tests, and from our
own underground tests in Nevada. Covert delivery by terrorists presents
a different challenge. For this challenge, a comprehensive
international fissile materials data base would assist nuclear
forensics efforts to correlate debris data with a particular reactor or
enrichment facility that produced the material. It should be in every
nation's interest to contribute to such a data base, both to help deter
nuclear terrorism worldwide and to build confidence that it is a
responsible steward of weapons usable fissile materials.
One point I want to emphasize: during the Cold War, post-detonation
analysis was carried out over a period of several months--it was
important but not time-urgent to complete it. We recognize that a
nuclear detonation in a U.S. city would create enormous pressures to
get solid information out in the shortest possible timeframe. As a
result, our efforts to sustain and improve nuclear forensics
capabilities include substantial efforts to shorten analytical
timelines.
DOE contributions to technical nuclear forensics
The United States recently has made important progress, both in
policy and technology, towards establishing a national technical
nuclear forensics capability. As pointed out in Vayl Oxford's
testimony, roles and responsibilities for various U.S. government
agencies were established by the President last August and are being
implemented. DHS is working to coordinate efforts among agencies, and
identify capability gaps, in national technical nuclear forensics
capabilities. This includes close coordination with the law enforcement
and intelligence communities. At the initiative of the DoD, a national
capability for post-detonation forensics became operational at the end
of 2005. DHS is working to develop a concept of operations and to
advance and ensure appropriate capabilities related to forensic
analysis of interdicted nuclear materials. DOE has responsibility to
develop a concept of operations and ensure appropriate capabilities to
assess an interdicted nuclear device.
DOE has been engaged in a wide range of activities in support of
this interagency effort. Its role has been key because most, if not
all, of the capabilities that the nation draws upon for technical
nuclear forensics reside at DOE's national laboratories. To date,
forensics capabilities relating to such areas as nuclear weapons device
modeling, nuclear materials production, radiochemistry and associated
specialized facilities, advanced computations and simulations, and the
physics and chemistry of fissile materials have been sustained in large
part by leveraging off activities carried out in NNSA's nuclear weapons
program. In the following discussion, we address some of the details of
DOE's efforts in support of technical nuclear forensics.
Pre-and Post-Detonation Nuclear Device Missions
NNSA's Office of Emergency Operations provides operational
capabilities and support in the following areas in addition to its
direct support to the Attorney General in the render safe mission for
interdicted nuclear devices in the United States:
Develop and sustain pre-detonation nuclear device
forensics concept of operations and associated capabilities.
Take custody of the rendered safe nuclear explosive
devices and support the collection of material samples and
other forensic data from such devices.
As part of the DoD-developed concept of operations for
the post-detonation mission, support ground sample collection
after a nuclear detonation or dispersion of nuclear material
within the United States. This includes providing a reliable
capability to deploy, support domestic ground sample
collection, and deliver post-detonation nuclear debris samples
for shipment to designated laboratories.
Nuclear Forensics R&D--Post-detonation analysis
NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) organization is
sponsoring advanced R&D activities at our national laboratories to
improve techniques for radiochemical analysis of bomb debris and has
also sponsored ground-breaking work on other diagnostics tools. It is
developing the next generation of post-nuclear detonation ground based
forensics capabilities. Emphasis is on reducing timelines for producing
analytical results. This work includes advanced sampling technology and
collection tools for rapid, safe, precise post-detonation nuclear
sample collection and analysis. It also includes nuclear event modeling
to predict activation and entrainment of contaminants, deposition
pattern of debris, remote sample collection/recovery concepts and rapid
in-field analytical capabilities.
Nuclear Forensics R&D--Prompt output diagnostics measurements
DNN is also sponsoring work to improve capabilities to determine
nuclear device information directly through collection and analysis of
the prompt radiation diagnostics from a detonation. Hi-fidelity, near-
field, prompt diagnostics capabilities are being developed that will
provide greater sensitivity and thus greater insight into a terrorist
nuclear device design than the current suite of satellite and seismic
sensors used for world-wide nuclear event reporting, attack assessment
and treaty monitoring.
Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support
NNSA's Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support (NCDS) program is
focusing the talent, capabilities, and resources of our nuclear weapons
program on the threat of nuclear terrorism. In place since 2000, the
NCDS program provides an essential element of technical support to our
nation's efforts to prevent the detonation of a terrorist nuclear
device. Under NCDS, weapons designers at our national laboratories
analyze and model potential IND designs, drawing on computational
tools, experimental data, and expertise originally developed in the
nuclear weapons program. The knowledge gained is applied to nuclear
search and detection, forensic analysis, nuclear device render-safe,
nuclear facility security, and intelligence assessments.
NCDS analysis is drawn on extensively by other DOE components as
well as by other United States government agencies with associated
responsibilities.
Nuclear Forensics R&D--Calculation of IND output and rad-chem
signatures
In addition to its NCDS work, NNSA's Defense Programs organization
is carrying related work in the following areas:
Via device modeling studies of INDs, identification
and characterization of signatures that discriminate various
IND designs from traditional U.S. and foreign warheads.
For pre-detonation forensics work, assessment of
signatures associated with plutonium and HEU samples derived
from domestic and foreign sources. Work currently includes
physical and chemical analysis to associate materials
processing knowledge to product material signatures.
Support to attribution and forensics communities by
providing IND experts to participate in exercises, more
accurately identify the range of threats, and provide education
on IND design.
Defense Programs, including through its Science Campaign, is
seeking to improve capabilities to calculate and assess weapon
outputs--both prompt (gamma rays, neutrons, x-rays, and debris kinetic
energy) and long-lived radionuclide debris--released from a nuclear
detonation. The Advanced Simulation and Computations (ASC) program is
improving computer simulation capabilities for technical nuclear
forensics. Improved physics models will enable the ASC codes to be
applied more reliably to model the breadth of threats, including low-
technology INDs, and provide predictions regarding the post-explosion
radionuclide debris isotopes. This work facilitates more timely and
responsive nuclear forensics capabilities.
Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP)
Last year, the President established the Nuclear Materials
Information Program (NMIP)--an interagency effort managed by DOE's
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to:
Develop an integrated system of information from all
sources concerning worldwide nuclear material holdings and
their security status;
As part of this effort, collect signatures of nuclear
materials to support forensics and attribution assessments; and
Identify opportunities to work with international
partners directly to share information on nuclear materials
characteristics and security. International Cooperation
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is advancing international nuclear
forensics cooperation in Central Asia, which remains a focus of
engagement due to the region's integral role in the former Soviet
weapons complex and the willingness of the current governments to work
with NNSA and U.S. laboratory personnel. This international
collaboration focuses on joint collection and characterization of
uranium ore, ore concentrate and tailings, which expands the U.S.
knowledge base and contributes to the overall nuclear counterterrorism
effort. To date, work has focused on uranium mining and milling sites
in the Central Asian nations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. NNSA
coordinates its Central Asia work closely with the DHS, which is
conducting similar international outreach activity in Kazakhstan.
Search and Render Safe
Should we detect nuclear materials or a suspected nuclear device,
the DOE--through its national laboratory system--deploys highly-trained
teams of experts to search for clandestine nuclear materials or
warheads and, if necessary, to disarm and dispose of a terrorist
nuclear device. These teams work in close partnership with the DoD, DHS
and the FBI in managing our national response to nuclear terrorism. The
DOE has a robust research program to support its nuclear search and
render-safe mission and a complementary technology integration program
that develops tools for use by its emergency response teams in the
field.
Sustaining Key Capabilities
A key challenge is to ensure that we sustain and strengthen nuclear
forensics capabilities in support of nuclear counterterrorism in an era
when our nuclear weapons program is undergoing substantial change. This
includes sustaining the people at our national laboratories involved in
these efforts and the specialized laboratory facilities and
experimental and analytical tools that they employ to carry out their
job. Along these lines, in coordination with DHS and DOD, the DOE has
initiated a study to be conducted by the National Academy of Science to
examine the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities and provide
findings and recommendations to sustain and improve them including
technical, infrastructure, and human resource elements, and
international collaboration, cooperation and information sharing.
Finally, while we have made great progress over the past several
years, more remains to be done in fleshing out the technical and policy
dimensions of nuclear forensics and attribution.
Thank you for your attention; I would be happy to take questions.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir.
Let me just say to the other panelists, it looks like we
are going to have a vote call somewhere between 2:30 p.m. and
2:45 p.m., so we are going to try to get through this part with
your help before they call the vote. We will stay around and
try to finish the testimony and do the questions after the
vote, because it could take up to 45 minutes to 1 hour with the
vote.
STATEMENT OF MIKE EVENSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Evenson. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the
Department of Defense's role, responsibility and capabilities
in support of the National Technical Nuclear Forensics program.
I have already submitted my written statement and will
summarize my remarks.
First, I believe that international cooperation is critical
to the success of any attribution effort. However, to date
there has been limited international collaboration.
International cooperation can help improve certainty of
attribution by expanding the information and data available to
investigators, and help increase public confidence in an
attribution conclusion. This would serve to deter and dissuade
potential enemies by reinforcing this strategic message. U.S.
government policy needs to be developed for the sharing of
forensically valuable nuclear data without compromising U.S.
government nuclear secrets.
Second, in order to meet the very severe timelines required
of the technical forensics, we must move past the traditional
radiochemistry technology we use today. While DTRA and its
partners represented at this table have made huge improvements
in our timelines--approximately a 93 percent improvement--we
are still judged as too slow. Thus, we must find new
technologies that allow much more rapid and certain technical
conclusions.
Third, despite my belief that technical and nuclear
forensics will provide major, perhaps critical, information, we
all need to recognize that the classical forensics work that
the FBI has always done and is renowned for is mostly like to
yield the definitive answer of who did it. We must not lose
sight of that as we collect radioactive debris. We must be
guided by the on-scene FBI lab personnel and make sure that we
collect the other debris that may yield fingerprints, trucks
axles, or other definitive evidence.
My last point concerns strategic communications. During a
recent National Defense University-sponsored workshop on
nuclear attribution, attendees, including congressional staff,
stressed the incredible pressure the president and his advisors
would be under to make a rapid attribution determination, both
for response purposes and to prevent a potential follow-on
attack. Policy advisors acknowledged the need to develop
further the nation's strategic communication of attribution
capabilities for deterrence, dissuasion and assurance purposes.
Our NTNF capability must be able to respond and deliver the
initial and final technical conclusions necessary to protect
the nation and make well-informed decisions. We have made
noteworthy progress, but still have a long way to go in
refining the U.S. government technical nuclear forensics
capabilities, such as more robust collection capabilities and
improved rapid analysis and data evaluation capabilities, to
meet the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.
No single-agency effort can ensure success. Meeting this
threat requires the focused integration and coordination of our
full NTNF capabilities, as well as international capabilities
and expertise.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Evenson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael K. Evenson
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor to be here today to address the Department of Defense's ( DoD)
support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensic (NTNF) program. I am
the Associate Director for Operations within the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), the primary organization within the Department
of Defense (DoD) charged solely and full-time with reducing the threat
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Countering chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons is the reason for the agency's
existence. We perform research and development and provide operational
support to enhance DoD nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
consequence management capabilities. Our primary customers are the
Combatant Commanders. Our mission is guided by the National Strategy to
Combat WMD, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and
direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DTRA works closely with partners across DoD, the United States
Government (USG), academia, and the private sector, as well as with our
allies and friends in the performance of our mission. Our efforts in
support of the national nuclear forensics capability are conducted in
close collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Laboratories, Department of
State, Department of Justice, and the office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Policy advisors have underscored the importance of international
cooperation both to attribution and prevention; however, to date there
has been limited international collaboration. International cooperation
can make attribution more certain by expanding the information and data
available to investigators, and increase confidence in an attribution
decision. This would serve to deter and dissuade by reinforcing the
strategic message. However, we must balance the need for the sharing of
forensically valuable nuclear data without compromising US nuclear
secrets.
Background
The Defense Department's interest in nuclear forensics and
attribution rests on more than the need to provide information that
would guide the appropriate national response to a nuclear event. We
believe that highly capable forensics and attribution would enable this
nation to stop follow-on attacks, and serve to deter states that may
assist nuclear terrorists, thereby making nuclear use more difficult
for terrorists. As noted in the 2000 Defense Science Board report on
Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, one of the strongest elements
of protection is deterrence through the threat of reprisal. The goal of
stopping subsequent attacks serves to define the timelines for
accomplishment of attribution and substantially increases the need for
a rapid and authoritative attribution system which, in turn, requires
exquisite nuclear forensics capabilities.
Nuclear forensics is not a new mission for DoD. The department's
existing nuclear forensics capability is the result of programs that
span six decades and includes activities to assess foreign nuclear
weapons testing activities, monitor and verify nuclear arms control
treaties, and to support intelligence and law enforcement activities.
During the Cold War, attribution was a simpler matter as we knew who
would be the likely aggressor, and had the means for detecting attacks
and confirming the origin of attack. However, nuclear proliferation and
the global threat of terrorism mean that we are more likely to face
covert rather than readily observable means of nuclear attack. In
today's security environment, post-detonation forensics to support
attribution requires much faster answers to different questions under
the pressure of an extreme crisis without prior notice.
In 2000, DTRA initiated the Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution
(DNEA) program to improve USG post-detonation nuclear forensics
capabilities and develop a focused system for rapid and accurate
attribution of a domestic nuclear or radiological event. DNEA was
created as a joint effort of military, intelligence, technical and law
enforcement communities. In 2005, DTRA conducted a successful concept
demonstration of DNEA capabilities, and continues its efforts to
operationalize a process and capabilities for producing technical
nuclear forensics information to fulfill DoD's global responsibilities
under the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program. This
effort to ``operationalize'' post-event nuclear forensics is focusing
on collection of samples, scientific analysis of the samples, and
subsequent reporting of findings that meet legal and scientific
requirements.
The DoD Role
The recent signing of the NTNF policy by the President specifically
assigns DoD the responsibility to ensure a worldwide post-detonation
NTNF capability, including ground and air sample collection, analysis
of post-detonation debris, developing and sustaining a concept of
operations, and supporting enhancements to post-detonation scientific
and technical capabilities. DoD support to NTNF is being led by the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs. DTRA and other DoD elements, such as the
Air Force Technical Applications Center, provide specific, supporting
operational capabilities.
DTRA maintains the capabilities developed under the DNEA program,
including a ground sample collection capability, a forensics laboratory
process, and an exercise program to sustain post-detonation NTNF
capabilities. DTRA will partner with DOE to provide support in domestic
incidents with DTRA developed capabilities including= a ground sample
collection capability, a forensics laboratory process, and as mentioned
earlier, an exercise program to sustain post-detonation NTNF
capabilities. We also maintain a special cadre of select personnel and
equipment to respond globally to any nuclear or radiological incident.
The DTRA Nuclear Forensics R&D Program is an integral component of
a coordinated interagency effort, rather than different potential paths
to meet similar requirements. Our investment areas include: Prompt
Nuclear Effects Data Collection and Analysis, which is key to the
precise measurement of nuclear yield; Debris Sample Collection and
Field Measurements to develop more robust ground robotic, unmanned
aerial vehicle and manual collection capabilities; Debris Analysis to
develop novel approaches and new technologies to achieve rapid and
precise isotopic measurements; Data Evaluation and Knowledge Management
to improve the application and management of signatures, databases,
models, calculations and expertise to produce consensus results;
Integration to bring efficient, full national post-detonation NTNF
capabilities to bear across the interagency in a crisis environment
providing accurate and rapid initial and final results; and other DoD
nuclear forensics missions, which may be non-NTNF, but support
development of foundational capabilities to provide technical
conclusions.
Additionally, DTRA manages and sponsors DoD NTNF exercise and
evaluations, is working to fully integrate DoD's exercise and
evaluation program into the DHS NTNF exercise program, and has begun
crafting DoD's integrated NTNF concept of operations. DTRA supports the
DHS and the FBI with hardware, systems, training, exercises and
evaluations, and planning for a response to a nuclear incident.
I would like to note that NTNF capabilities rely on the aging
physical infrastructure and human expertise that support the USG
nuclear weapon programs. While the interagency effort described here
today makes a small investment in revitalizing aspects of this national
treasure, further erosion in the nuclear weapons program will severely
impact our nuclear forensic analysis and evaluation capabilities. A
deliberate and concerted effort is needed to ensure these critical
capabilities will be available when the nation needs them most.
In addition, I would like to emphasize that neither DTRA nor DoD
performs the forensics mission in a vacuum. Many components in the USG,
including the DNDO, DOE, FBI, and the Intelligence Community all play a
vital role in that effort.
Conclusion
During a recent National Defense University sponsored workshop on
nuclear attribution, attendees, including Congressional staff, stressed
the incredible pressure that the President and his advisors would be
under to make a rapid attribution determination, both for response
purposes and to prevent a potential follow-on attack. Policy advisors
acknowledged the need to develop further the nation's strategic
communication of attribution capabilities for deterrence, dissuasion,
and assurance purposes. Our NTNF capability must be able to respond and
deliver the initial and final technical conclusions necessary to
protect the nation and make well informed decisions.
We have made noteworthy progress, but still have a long way to go
in developing and fielding capabilities, such as more robust collection
capabilities and improved rapid analysis and data evaluation
capabilities, to meet the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. No single
Agency or effort can ensure success. Meeting this threat requires the
focused integration and coordination of full NTNF capabilities, as well
as international capabilities and expertise.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to
respond to your questions.
Mr. Langevin. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF VAHID MAJIDI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Majidi. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
Member McCaul and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to
be here today to demonstrate the commitment of the FBI to
strengthening our nation's ability to conduct effective
technical nuclear forensics.
Our number one priority is to protect the nation from
terrorist attack. Within that priority, the weapons of mass
destruction threat is our most pressing concern. The FBI
established a WMD Directorate in 2006 to develop a
comprehensive approach for combating WMD proliferation.
We began by consolidating the units within the FBI that
were addressing the response, investigation, intelligence,
analysis, dissemination and countermeasures program into one
unified structure. Paramount to our prevention effort is a
strong forensic program that includes all aspects of WMD and
traditional forensic expertise.
We also recognize that it is through an effective
interagency cooperation that the WMD threat is best addressed.
The FBI Laboratory Division is central to our support to the
interagency effort in nuclear forensics. The laboratory
provides the personnel, equipment and know-how to effect the
safe and secure collection of radiological and nuclear
materials. Furthermore, the laboratory provides training on WMD
crime scene awareness so that our personnel can properly enter,
exit and work within any scene where biological, chemical,
radiological or nuclear materials might be present.
Beginning this fall, we are pleased to be offering WMD
crime scene awareness training to selected personnel from the
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and
Department of Energy to strengthen our interagency
collaboration.
No agency has the necessary resources and capabilities to
independently perform technical WMD forensics. The FBI
laboratory leverages the capability of the interagency
community to conduct and direct the forensic examination of the
evidence that is contaminated or contains hazardous material.
To that end, the FBI has formalized partnerships with a variety
of government, academic and private labs to carry out specific
examination of our evidence.
For example, we have formal agreements in place with
Savannah River National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center
for forensic analysis of recovered radiological material,
special nuclear materials, recovered improvised nuclear
devices, and debris resulting from a detonated device.
The laboratory support for technical nuclear forensics is
culminated through our ability to conduct traditional forensics
on radiological and nuclear materials--in other words, to
perform the very forensic examination for which the FBI
laboratory is world renowned. The FBI laboratory has taken the
lead by developing and implementing the hazardous evidence
analysis team, or HEAT program.
Normally, we transport evidence from the crime scene to the
FBI laboratory. For WMD crimes, however, we have made the
conscious decision to refrain from transporting any such
evidence to our laboratory until we demonstrate that no
residual WMD contamination exists. Nonetheless, the
investigation process requires prompt traditional forensic
signatures such as latent prints, human DNA analysis, and trace
evidence.
To ensure timely traditional forensic examination of
evidence, we transport the examiners to the evidence at one of
the partner laboratories. The HEAT program provides additional
training for qualified forensic examiners and technicians,
which allows them to operate in a WMD laboratory environment
such as a hot cell for nuclear materials at biosafety level
three or four suite for pathogens or a chemical surety facility
for toxic chemicals.
In short, the FBI is proud to be a member of the dedicated
interagency community focused on WMD forensic issues to protect
our nation.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Majidi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vahid Majidi, Ph.D.
Good morning, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and members
of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to demonstrate the
commitment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
strengthening our nation's ability to conduct effective technical
nuclear forensics.
The number one priority of the FBI is to protect the nation from
terrorist attacks. Within that priority, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) terrorist threat is clearly our most pressing
concern. The FBI established the WMD Directorate in 2006 to bring
together the units within the FBI that were addressing the response,
investigation, intelligence dissemination and analysis and
countermeasures programs into one unified structure. This unity of
leadership has strengthened the FBI's ability to prevent a WMD
terrorist attack significantly. Key to our prevention efforts is a
strong forensic program that includes all aspects of WMD and
traditional forensic expertise. Additionally, we at the FBI recognize
that it is through interagency cooperation that the WMD terrorist
threat is best addressed.
The FBI Laboratory Division is central to our support to
Interagency efforts of the DOJ, DHS, DOE, DOD and members of the
Intelligence Community (Interagency) in nuclear forensics. We view our
Laboratory as the world's premiere forensics laboratory and are proud
of the role it fulfills in preventing WMD terrorism and in responding
to crimes when they occur. The Laboratory's Hazardous Materials
Response Unit (HMRU) provides the personnel, equipment, and know-how to
effect the safe and secure collection and transport of radiological and
nuclear materials and debris to an appropriate facility for analysis
and characterization These capabilities include the people who work at
HMRU in Quantico, Virginia, and their gear, as well as those of 27
Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRTs) that are trained, equipped
and certified by HMRU. These teams are located throughout the United
States (US) with various FBI Field Divisions and provide over 400
personnel to augment our operational response capabilities.
HMRU also provides training on WMD Crime Scene Awareness so that
our personnel will know how to properly enter, exit and work within any
scene where biological pathogens, toxic chemicals and radiological or
nuclear materials might be present. This training, which historically
has been directed toward our own personnel, has recently been adapted
to provide WMD crime scene awareness training for personnel from the
Interagency. We are pleased to be offering the training beginning this
fall to selected personnel from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Energy (DOE). In
keeping with the importance we attach to nuclear forensics, we have
targeted those DHS, DOD, and DOE elements most directly involved in
nuclear activities as the first priority to receive this training from
the FBI.
No one agency has the necessary resources, experience and
capabilities to solely perform technical WMD forensics. The Laboratory
leverages the capabilities of the Interagency through the efforts of
its Chemical Biological Science Unit (CBSU), an all-discipline WMD
analysis unit. CBSU develops and maintains the Laboratory's ability to
conduct and/or direct the forensic examination of evidence that either
contains or is contaminated with hazardous chemical, biological or
radiological material. To that end, CBSU has formalized partnerships
with a variety of government, academic and private labs to carry out
specific examinations of FBI evidence.
We have formal agreements in place with Savannah River National
Laboratory (SRNL), Aiken, South Carolina for recovered radiological
materials and detonated radiological dispersal devices (RDDs); with
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, California,
for recovered Special Nuclear Materials as well as intact improvised
nuclear devices (INDs); and with the US Air Force Technical
Applications Center (AFTAC) for debris resulting from the detonation of
an IND.
In November 2006, we began operations at SRNL of the Radiological
Evidence Analysis Laboratory Suite (REALS), which was stood up with our
funds plus funding from DHS. REALS provides dedicated space at SRNL for
our forensic examiners and technicians to perform selected activities,
including the storage of evidence. The joint DHS/FBI funds also enabled
us to begin planning and designing a unique set of fully functional
forensic laboratory spaces that we refer to as the Radiological
Evidence Examination Facility (REEF). Thanks to specifically-targeted
Congressional funding received this past Fiscal Year (FY), we began
renovations of existing space at SRNL to create REEF. It is projected
to become fully functional in FY 2009, thereby allowing our Laboratory
examiners and technicians to conduct a full range of traditional
forensic examinations on evidence that is contaminated with nuclear
materials.
The final pillar to our Laboratory's support for technical nuclear
forensics speaks to our ability to conduct traditional forensics on
radiological and nuclear materials--in other words, to perform the very
forensic examinations for which the FBI Laboratory is so well-known. In
this case, CBSU has also taken the lead, both domestically and
internationally, by developing and implementing the Hazardous Evidence
Analysis Team or HEAT program. That program responds to the altered
operational dynamic that prevails when we investigate a crime or
suspicious event involving WMD. Normally, we transport evidence from a
crime scene to the FBI Laboratory. For WMD crimes, though, we have made
the conscious decision to refrain from transporting any such evidence
to our Laboratory in Quantico until we can demonstrate that no residual
WMD contamination exists.
But the needs of the investigation to process the evidence for
traditional signatures of interest--such as latent fingerprints, human
DNA analysis, and trace evidence--are immediate. To ensure we begin
such traditional examinations promptly, we have flipped the dynamic,
and we transport the examiners to the evidence at one of partner
laboratories. The HEAT program takes our trained and qualified forensic
examiners and technicians from across the Laboratory and provides
additional training which allows them to operate in a WMD laboratory,
such as in a hot cell for nuclear materials, a Biosafety Level 3 or 4
Suite for biological pathogens or a Chemical Surety Materiel laboratory
for toxic chemicals. We certify our personnel through the HEAT program
as qualified examiners and technicians in their discipline. We believe
HEAT has been a success, with more than 60 examiners and technicians
trained and certified, representing the various forensic disciplines in
our Laboratory. Our examiners and technicians profit, gaining the
confidence and skills needed to conduct their demanding tasks in an
altered environment. The investigation is supported by ensuring we have
a cadre of such trained and certified personnel who are ready to deploy
immediately when the need arises. Through this training and
certification process, we are learning what modifications, if any, are
needed to conduct traditional forensic techniques when the work must be
performed in a radiological or nuclear laboratory or, in the more
general case, in any WMD laboratory, such as those of our partners with
DHS at NBACC and with DOD at the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.
Again, as with our novel nuclear forensic examiner program, we are
unaware of any program similar to HEAT with any of our international
partners, but we are certainly anxious to share our experiences with
them.
Thank you for time, I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Majidi.
Before we go to the next witness, you heard the buzzers
going off. That means that there is a vote on right now. My
plan is to finish the testimony of the last two witnesses. We
will recess and then return for questions, and then go to the
second panel.
Before I do that, I want to thank Mr. Etheridge for
stepping in and chairing and opening the hearing for me. I was
in a markup in the House Intelligence Committee, and obviously
couldn't be here. So I want to thank the witnesses for being
here today.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable James R. Langevin,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science
and Technology
The subcommittee will now move on to the markup of an amendment in
the nature of a substitute to HR 3621. The Nuclear Forensics and
Attribution Act. I would like to again congratulate my colleague
Congressman Schiff for introducing this legislation and for working
collaboratively with me to develop the amendment in the nature of a
substitute we will consider today.
The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act expresses the sense of
Congress that the President should:
purse bilateral and multilateral agreement to
establish an international framework for determining the source
of any confiscated nuclear material or weapon, as well as the
source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear material used in
such a weapon;
develop protocols for the dissemination of sensitive
information relating to nuclear materials to the extent
required by such agreements; and
develop expedited protocols for the dissemination of
sensitive information needed to publicly identify the source of
a nuclear detonation.
It also amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to task the
Secretary with the development of methods to attribute nuclear or
radiological material--both within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office and in partnership with other Federal agencies--to its source
when such material is intercepted by the United States, foreign
governments, or international bodies or dispersed in the course of a
nuclear terrorist attack or other nuclear or radiological explosion.
The Amendment in the nature of a substitute builds on and strengthens
these ideas by:
Emphazing that the development of a robust nuclear
forensics capability will depend chiefly on an expertly trained
workforce in this area, and the recognition that our workforce
in this area is currently waning and that we must turn this
trend around.
It also tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security to
act as the integrator and steward of our national nuclear
forensics capabilities. While it is a certainty that the
cooperation of all the agencies represented here is needed for
success in this mission, clearly specifying this duty for the
Secretary should provide the needed leadership for success.
The amendment further requires the Secretary to report
annually to Congress on the activities of the interagency group
as well as the development and maintenance of the needed expert
workforce;
And finally, it authorizes $20 million per year for
the next three fiscal years for this effort.
I would also like to thank Ranking Member McCaul for his
contributions on many of the topics just mentioned to strengthen the
underlying bill. I appreciate his efforts and am pleased that this
subcommittee continues to be a model of bipartisanship.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Grant, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW GRANT, ACTING DIRECTOR FOR WMD TERRORISM,
BUREAUS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Grant. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
Member McCaul and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide remarks on the State
Department's role in supporting the U.S. government's nuclear
forensics program.
As others have stated already, the U.S. government is
working to develop the appropriate cooperation with its
international partners so that each day we are improving our
ability to conduct effective nuclear forensics when and where
it is needed. The Department of State supports this in a
variety of ways. The Department of State has always contributed
to the policy and program development of the U.S. nuclear
forensics effort and State Department personnel today work at
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and assist in operations
at the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center in the
Department of Homeland Security.
Also, the Department of State interacts regularly with the
IAEA through participation in the Illicit Trafficking Database
program. Finally, the Department of State builds international
support to improve nuclear forensics, and where necessary
coordinates deployment of U.S. technical or investigative teams
for forensics.
The president has made clear his view on the importance of
building international partnerships to carry out nuclear
forensics, with specific commitments in the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Bratislava initiative.
These initiatives highlight the need to improve capabilities
for response, mitigation and investigation, including
development of technical means to identify nuclear material or
other radioactive materials in substances that are or may be
involved in a nuclear incident. Through the Global Initiative,
over 60 partner nations have committed to this objective as a
key element of global capacities to combat nuclear terrorism.
Supporting our political commitment to strengthen nuclear
forensics, the Department of State also chairs the Interagency
Nuclear Trafficking Response Group, or NTRG. The NTRG
coordinates the U.S. government's response to international
forensics and radioactive material trafficking incidents. If
deemed necessary, the Department of State also leads
coordination for the Foreign Emergency Support Team, or FEST,
an interagency team that can quickly deploy anywhere in the
world to assist U.S. embassies in our responses to acts of
terrorism, including incidents involving nuclear or
radiological material.
Although nuclear forensics is often associated with
activities conducted in post-detonation environments, nuclear
forensics is also extremely important to combat nuclear
smuggling. As part of a shared commitment with our
international partners to improve control of nuclear materials,
shut down trafficking networks and routes, and prosecute
nuclear smugglers, we are assisting other government to
strengthen their own nuclear forensics capacity, and thus
strengthen our collective nuclear forensics effort.
Our work with the Georgians in a successful prosecution of
a 2006 case involving highly enriched uranium, or HEU, is a
noteworthy example. This month, a U.S. team went to Georgia to
help the Georgian government align its nuclear forensics
procedures with recent IAEA guidance on nuclear forensics which
we helped create.
The U.S. government also coordinates with the international
community on technical nuclear forensics activities through the
International Technical Working Group, or ITWG. The ITWG also
works closely with the IAEA to provide member countries with
support for forensics analysis. Priorities include the
development of common protocols for the collection of evidence
and laboratory investigations, organization of forensics
exercises, and technical assistance to requesting nations.
Through the ITWG, the U.S. can provide technical assistance on
nuclear forensics to countries in response to specific
requests.
The Department of State will continue to support and lead
in many areas to further develop our own nuclear forensics
capacity. We will also continue to identify and maximize
opportunities where our partners can assist us in our efforts
to strengthen our nuclear forensics capacity. In doing so, we
save lives and strengthen our chances to identify threats.
This concludes my summary. I have also submitted a formal
statement. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank
you and I am happy to answer any of your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Grant follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew F. Grant
Introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide remarks on the Department of State's role in
supporting the U.S. government's nuclear forensics program. As others
have noted, the U.S. government is working to develop the appropriate
cooperation with international partners so that each day we are
improving our ability to conduct effective nuclear forensics when and
where it is needed.
Roles and Responsibilities
The U.S. government aims to establish global capacity to conduct
pre-detonation and post detonation nuclear forensics anywhere necessary
to support U.S. interests. The Department of State supports this in a
variety of ways. The Department of State has always contributed to the
policy and program development of the U.S. nuclear forensics effort and
State Department personnel also work at the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office and assist in operations at the National Technical Nuclear
Forensics Center. The Department of State supports the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to integrate and coordinate the full
spectrum of U.S. nuclear forensic activities, as well as efforts to
develop and advance nuclear forensic capabilities for pre-detonation
nuclear materials. Also, the Department of State interacts regularly
with the IAEA through participation in the Illicit Trafficking Database
Program. Finally, the Department of State leads many U.S. government
efforts overseas for nuclear forensics, which include building
international support to improve nuclear forensics and, where
necessary, coordinating for deployment of U.S. technical or
investigative teams for nuclear forensics.
The President has made clear his view of the importance of building
international partnerships to carry out nuclear forensics with specific
commitments in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and
the Bratislava Initiative. These initiatives highlight the need to
improve capabilities for response, mitigation, and investigation,
including the development of technical means to identify nuclear
material or other radioactive materials and substances that are, or may
be, involved in a nuclear incident. Through the Global Initiative, over
sixty partner nations have committed to this objective as a key element
of global capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism.
Supporting our political commitment to strengthen nuclear
forensics, the Department of State chairs the interagency Nuclear
Trafficking Response Group, or (NTRG). The NTRG coordinates the U.S.
government's response to international nuclear and radioactive material
trafficking incidents. If deemed necessary, the Department of State
also leads coordination for the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST),
an interagency team that can quickly deploy anywhere in the world to
assist U.S. embassies in our responses to acts of terrorism, including
incidents involving nuclear or radiological material.
International Coordination to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Although nuclear forensics is often associated with activities
conducted in post-detonation environments, nuclear forensics is
extremely important to combat nuclear smuggling. As part of a shared
commitment with our international partners to improve control of
nuclear materials, shut down trafficking networks and routes, and
prosecute nuclear smugglers, we are assisting other governments to
strengthen their own nuclear forensics capacity and thus, strengthen
our collective nuclear forensics effort. Our work with the Georgians in
the successful prosecution of the 2006 case involving highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) is a noteworthy example. This month a U.S. team went to
Georgia to help the Georgian government align its nuclear forensics
procedures with recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
guidance on Nuclear Forensics, which we helped create. The U.S.
government also coordinates with the international community on
technical nuclear forensics activities through the International
Technical Working Group, or ITWG. The ITWG also works closely with the
IAEA to provide member countries with support for forensic analyses.
Priorities include the development of common protocols for the
collection of evidence and laboratory investigations, organization of
forensic exercises, and technical assistance to requesting nations.
Through the International Technical Working Group, the U.S. can provide
technical assistance on nuclear forensics to countries in response to
specific requests.
Conclusion
The Department of State will continue to support and lead in many
areas to further develop our nuclear forensics capacity. We will also
continue to identify and maximize opportunities where our partners can
assist us in our efforts to strengthen our nuclear forensics capacity.
In doing so, we save lives and strengthen our chances to identify
threats.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
permission, I request that my formal statement be submitted for the
record. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and the other
distinguished members of this Subcommittee, I thank you and I am happy
to answer any of your questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Grant.
The chair now recognizes Dr. Burns for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CAROL BURNS, GROUP LEADER, NUCLEAR AND
RADIOCHEMISTRY, CHEMISTRY DIVISION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
LABORATORY
Ms. Burns. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
Member McCaul and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
is an honor to appear before you today to discuss this
important legislation. In particular, I have been asked to
focus my remarks on the workforce needs required to meet the
challenges of technical nuclear forensics.
My name is Carol Burns. I am the group leader for the
Nuclear and Radiochemistry Group at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. I have more than 20 years of experience
investigating the chemistry of radioactive elements. I also
served on detail to the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, working on issues associated with nuclear threats.
There are three main points I would like to convey to you
this afternoon. First, the national laboratories underpin the
nation's nuclear forensics capability. Second, we face a
challenge in sustaining our workforce. And finally, I would
like to offer some ideas on how we can go about bringing in the
next generation of forensic experts.
My first point is that Los Alamos and the other DOE
national laboratories are major contributors to our nation's
capability for nuclear and radiological forensics funded by the
agencies represented here today. The laboratories offer unique
expertise and special facilities for handling radiological and
nuclear materials. I staff and maintain our radioanalytical
group capability, and as such am a consumer of the product of
our educational pipeline.
Many disciplines are involved in the different facets of
technical nuclear forensics. Chemists and material scientists
evaluate signatures to distinguish the origin of interdicted
materials. Nuclear physicists and engineers develop tools to
rapidly characterize the threat presented by a suspect device.
Radiochemists separate and characterize the composition of
complex mixtures of isotopes in debris in the wake of a nuclear
or radiological explosion.
To speak to my second point, the laboratories face
challenges in recruiting and retaining a qualified workforce to
carry out elements of this important work. Statistics from DNDO
indicate that most employees who work solely on nuclear
forensics at the laboratories are more than 50 years old. Some
requisite knowledge cannot be acquired through formal
education, but must be learned first-hand or taught by
experienced workers.
For instance, few radiochemists remain who have analyzed
the debris from a nuclear explosion. It takes years working
with senior staff and retirees to build this competence in a
new worker even if he or she starts with a sound knowledge of
radiochemistry.
Another concern is the depth of our capability. At our
current staffing levels, we will tax the capacity of the system
with the surge of samples that might be expected after a major
event, such as the detonation of a nuclear device.
It has been well documented that some of our traditional
feeder disciplines are on the decline. As highlighted in a 2004
report from the Department of Energy and the National Science
Foundation, the number of Ph.D.s granted in nuclear science
disciplines has declined by 20 percent since the mid-1990s and
by 50 percent since the mid-1970s. The number of radiochemistry
and nuclear chemistry Ph.D.s awarded by U.S. universities has
declined by more than a factor of five since 1970, as has the
number of chemistry departments offering even one course in
these disciplines.
My third and final point is that there are many things that
can and are being done to improve this situation. Many studies
offer ideas for drawing students to the field, including
training centers, faculty fellowships, summer undergraduate
programs, and post-doctoral programs. We see progress, for
example, in the establishment of the new DNDO-NSF Academic
Research Initiative. We need sustained funding for research in
a broad range of nuclear-related fields to encourage the
commitment of faculty to the area.
The laboratories are also responding. Los Alamos is
initiating efforts to build relationships with partner
universities to develop and recruit this next workforce through
our National Security Education Center. In the end, drawing
from traditional disciplines will not be enough. We need to
enlist scientists from other fields and provide them with the
means to conduct work on radioactive materials not easily
handled in most university environments. This could occur
through cooperative programs at the national laboratories.
In conclusion, if the nation succeeds in developing this
workforce, the benefits will extend beyond nuclear forensics. A
stronger educational pipeline in nuclear disciplines will help
the nation meet the challenges of nonproliferation, nuclear
energy, and nuclear medicine.
I thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer
any questions.
[The statement of Ms. Burns follows:]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Burns.
As I said, there is a vote on right now. There are four
votes. That should take us at least 1/2 hour, so we will stand
in recess until approximately 3:15 p.m.
[Recess.]
Mr. Langevin. The subcommittee will come to order. In the
interests of time, and I know my colleague from California, Mr.
Schiff, is in the middle of a markup in another committee. We
are going to go to the second panel, and Congressman Schiff
will testify. Once that testimony is concluded, we will go back
to the first panel for questions, and then proceed from there
with the markup after that.
So again, in the interest of time, I am going to forego an
opening statement for the second panel. I want to commend my
colleague from California for his hard work and his thought and
insight into working on this nuclear forensics issue. I think
it is obviously important to the country, and I am proud to be
a cosponsor in support of this effort.
With that, I will yield to the ranking member for any
comments, and then go to the witness.
Mr. McCaul. I echo the chairman's comments. I want to thank
you for being here, and thank you for introducing this
important piece of legislation. I, too, am proud to be a
cosponsor.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the ranking member.
With that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Congressman Adam Schiff.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
McCaul. I greatly appreciate your support for this legislation.
I also appreciate your consideration in taking me out of order.
My apologies to your first panel, and I thank them for their
indulgence as well.
Today, I would like to speak with you very briefly about
the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act. We all recognize
nuclear terrorism as a threat so serious in its consequences,
but we often shrink from contemplating it. A medium-size weapon
detonated in downtown Manhattan would destroy every building
across the width of the island and destroy homes as far away as
Brooklyn and Hoboken. Hundreds of thousands of lives would be
lost. The area would be uninhabitable for decades.
But ignoring the problem won't make it go away. In fact,
ignoring the possibility of terrorists getting a hold of a
nuclear device makes that awful prospect more likely to happen.
Illicit nuclear material has been intercepted in transit many
times since the end of the Cold War, and the material we catch
may be a small fraction of the total that is trafficked.
President Bush has declared nuclear terrorism the number
one national security threat facing the country, and this
Congress and this subcommittee have made it more difficult to
smuggle a weapon into the United States in an ongoing effort to
strengthen the border. However, given the difficulties of
securing our extensive border, we must take a layered approach
to the problem.
During the Cold War, we deterred the Soviet Union with the
threat of overwhelming nuclear attack. Unfortunately, the
decentralized flexible terror networks that we face today are
not as easily deterred. There is little doubt that if al-Qa'ida
acquired a nuclear weapon, they would attempt to use it against
us. Osama bin Laden has termed the acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction a ``religious duty,'' and there is no question
that using such a weapon against America is consistent with the
group's contempt for human life.
Although al-Qa'ida may not be deterred, there are other
groups and nations that can be dissuaded from helping them, but
only if their participation can be traced back to them. This
bill is designed to help shut down the international trade in
nuclear material by deterring those parts of the trafficking
network that can be deterred. Nuclear attribution would allow
us to identify the provenance of nuclear material intercepted
in transit or, God forbid, in the aftermath of a detonation.
That knowledge would help us decide how to respond.
It would also provide a deterrent. If nations around the
world knew that they could be identified as the source of
material used in a nuclear attack, even irresponsible nations
would be disinclined to proliferate. For the more responsible
nations, it would be a strong incentive to improve their
security. Individuals would know that they could be found and
prosecuted if they tried to help terrorist acquire nuclear
materials. By developing a robust attribution capability, we
can usher in an era where proliferation is not just
discouraged, but deterred, because those responsible would be
found and punished.
The bill you are considering today supports our nuclear
attribution capability by strengthening our nuclear forensics
ability. Nuclear forensics involves studying the mix of
isotopes and other features of nuclear material that give it a
particular signature. There can also be information in the
packaging and accompanying materials that could allow an expert
to pinpoint the source.
Nuclear forensics activities have historically taken place
in a variety of government agencies, but primarily in the
Departments of Defense and Energy. The new National Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center in the Department of Homeland Security
will support and coordinate these efforts. Experts in this
office will consider how to develop a database of information
on nuclear material that can assist in tracing traffic,
technology or materials, organize the forensic response to
nuclear detonation, ensure that the right research is being
done to counter threats to our security at home, and make
certain that enough scientists and engineers are entering
fields like radiochemistry which are the key to our forensic
capability.
When a detective finds fingerprints, they must be matched
against the database to identify possible culprits. Nuclear
attribution works similarly, but there is no database of
nuclear fingerprints. It can be difficult to obtain the needed
information because it is considered sensitive in many
countries, including our own. However, little of this
information is of direct use to our adversaries, and in many
cases the risk of not sharing the data is much greater than the
risk of sharing it. Certainly, in the wake of a nuclear
terrorist attack, no one will be reassured to hear that we
couldn't shut down the smuggling networks because we didn't
trust our allies.
In addition, new and innovative approaches may allow
countries to confidently match samples without having direct
access to sensitive information. This bill asks the president
to negotiate agreements with other nations to share information
on the makeup of their nuclear materials. These could be
bilateral agreements with our allies, or multilateral treaties
with the IAEA. We could even begin the database with just
civilian reactor materials where security is less of an issue.
The important thing is to get started now. The National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Center should play a key role in
negotiations, since in the end the data we obtain must be the
data the experts need. Nuclear terrorism is a threat of
paramount danger and uncertain probability. It is not a threat
we can measure in brigades, ships or warheads, but it is no
less pressing for that. I believe this bill is a modest, but
effective effort to reduce the risk of attack at the root of
the problem. I am confident, after hearing from the experts,
you will agree.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I want to thank you again.
[The statement of Mr. Schiff follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for having me
here today to speak about the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act.
Nuclear terrorism is a threat so serious in its consequences that
we often shrink from contemplating it. A medium-sized weapon detonated
in downtown Manhattan would destroy every building across the width of
the island and destroy houses as far away as Brooklyn and Hoboken.
Hundreds of thousands of lives would be lost, and the area would be
uninhabitable for decades. But ignoring the problem will not make it go
away--in fact, ignoring the possibility of terrorists getting hold of a
nuclear device makes that awful prospect more likely to happen. Illicit
nuclear material has been intercepted in transit many times since the
end of the Cold War, and the material we catch is probably a small
fraction of the total trafficked.
President Bush has declared a nuclear terrorist attack on the
United States the number one national security threat facing the
country. This Congress and this Subcommittee have made it more
difficult to smuggle a weapon into the United States in the ongoing
effort to strengthen our border. However, given the difficulties of
securing our extensive border, we must take a layered approach to the
problem.
During the Cold War, we deterred the Soviet Union with the threat
of overwhelming nuclear attack. Unfortunately, the decentralized,
flexible terror networks that we face today are not as easily deterred.
There is little doubt that if Al-Qa'ida acquired a nuclear weapon, they
would attempt to use it against us. Osama bin Laden has termed the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction ``a religious duty'' and
there is no question that using such a weapon against America is
consistent with the group's contempt for human life.
Although Al-Qa'ida may not be deterred, there are other groups and
nations that can be dissuaded from helping them, but only if their
participation can be traced back to them. This bill is designed to help
shut down the international trade in nuclear material by deterring
those parts of the trafficking network that can be deterred.
Nuclear attribution would allow us to identify the provenance of
nuclear material intercepted in transit, or, God forbid, in the
aftermath of a detonation. That knowledge would help us decide how to
respond and it would also provide a deterrent. If nations around the
world knew that they could be identified as the source of material used
in a nuclear attack, even irresponsible nations would be disinclined to
proliferate. For the more responsible nations, it would be a strong
incentive to improve their security. Individuals would know that they
could be found and prosecuted if they tried to help terrorists acquire
nuclear materials. By developing a robust attribution capability, we
can usher in an era where proliferation is not just discouraged, but
deterred, because those responsible would be found and punished.
The bill you are considering today supports our nuclear attribution
capability by strengthening our nuclear forensics ability. Nuclear
forensics involves studying the mix of isotopes and other features of
nuclear material that give it a particular ``signature.'' There can
also be information in the packaging and accompanying materials that
could allow an expert to pinpoint a source.
Nuclear forensics activities have historically taken place at a
variety of government agencies, but primarily in the Departments of
Defense and Energy. The new National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
in the Department of Homeland Security will support and coordinate
these efforts. Experts in this office will consider how to develop a
database of information on nuclear material that can assist in tracing
trafficked technology or material, organize the forensic response to a
nuclear detonation, ensure that the right research is being done to
counter threats to our security at home, and make certain that enough
scientists and engineers are entering fields like radiochemistry which
are the key to our forensic capability.
When a detective finds fingerprints, they must be matched against a
database to identify possible culprits--nuclear attribution works
similarly, but there is no database of nuclear fingerprints. It can be
difficult to obtain the needed information because it is considered
sensitive in many countries, including ours. However, little of this
information is of direct use to adversaries, and in many cases the risk
of not sharing the data is much greater than risk of sharing it.
Certainly, in the wake of a nuclear terrorist attack, no one will be
reassured to hear that we couldn't shut down the smuggling networks
because we didn't trust our allies. In addition, new and innovative
approaches may allow countries to confidently match samples without
having direct access to sensitive information.
This bill asks the President to negotiate agreements with other
nations to share information on the makeup of their nuclear materials.
These could be bilateral agreements with our allies or multilateral
treaties through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We
could even begin the database with just civilian reactor materials,
where security is less of an issue. The important thing is to get
started now. The National Technical Nuclear Forensic Center should play
a key role in the negotiations, since in the end, the data we obtain
must be the data that the experts need.
Nuclear terrorism is a threat of paramount danger and uncertain
probability. It is not a threat we can measure in brigades, ships or
warheads, but it is no less pressing for that. I believe that this bill
is a modest but effective effort to reduce the risk of attack at the
root of the problem, and I am confident that after hearing from the
experts, you will agree.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman from California for his
testimony, and look forward to continuing to work with you on
this important issue. I know you have a markup and we will
forego questions at this time.
Unless there is any further business, this panel is
concluded. Thank you very much.
The chair now calls up the first panel so that we can
reconvene.
Okay, the committee will come to order. Since the panel has
given their statements, it is my intention now to go into
questions. Let me begin, if I could, with Director Oxford, and
then let other members of the panel add on to his answer.
Director Oxford, could you please explain the organization
mission and the role of each agency represented here in the
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the Technical
Nuclear Forensics Center resides inside my office. It was
established as a central integrator for U.S. government efforts
in forensics. It was predicated on the same model that DNDO was
established initially to serve, which was a centralized
planning function with decentralized execution in the other
departments.
So besides being the central integrator, we serve a role as
also being responsible for the pre-detonation material and
device characterization, with other responsibilities then
flowing to the other departments as part of their
implementation responsibilities.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Anyone else care to comment?
One of the key assets for nuclear forensics obviously would
be a secure, yet accessible, database containing signatures and
other information about domestic and international samples,
again starting with you, Director Oxford--and I would welcome
comments, of course, from anyone else as well--what is the
current state of our domestic database or databases for
chemical isotopic or radiological signatures for these
materials? What about international databases? Do we have
access to international databases? Do other countries or
international agencies have access to any of our databases?
Mr. Oxford. Let me start by saying a lot of that
information needs to be discussed in a closed setting where we
can talk about classified information and the actual status and
health of both the domestic material database, as well as the
international database.
The agreement within the interagency is that database will
reside within the Department of Energy in what we call the
Nuclear Material Information Program that Dr. Aoki can
reference. Within DNDO and the Forensic Center, we are
responsible for creating some of the knowledge management and
data mining tools that would allow us to quickly make access of
that data in the actual event. I would let Dr. Aoki talk about
the actual, what we call the NMIP.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Before we do that, do you get the sense
from our international partners that they are as interested in
creating this type of a database as we are? Without getting
into classified information, is there a sense or demonstrated
measures that have been taken to ensure that we have this
cooperation?
Mr. Oxford. There are signs of progress since the
interagency has come together here, to start working on the
international aspects. Again, Andrew Grant can probably address
that more adeptly from the State Department. But we have
started some work with the Russians, for example, and some
database structure that will allow us to share, as Mr. Schiff
was saying, at least starting with some of the reactor
material, the non-military kind of isotopes that would allow us
to share that kind of information in a pre-event environment. I
think the problem will be in an immediate post-event, if we are
talking about nuclear weapons material, that is going to take a
little bit longer to actually get those agreements in place.
Mr. Langevin. Good point. Thank you.
Dr. Aoki, did you want to comment?
Mr. Aoki. Yes. Let me just say a few words about the
Nuclear Materials Information Program, or NMIP. As originally
conceptualized, the first problem was that we had was to
identify where nuclear materials are located, even before you
get to the question of actually having samples or detailed
physical information. So the first job NMIP has taken on is
identifying what the holdings of other countries are. This is
actually a somewhat dynamic process since materials are
generated and separated on a daily basis. So simply keeping
track of where the stuff is is actually the first job.
The way in which NMIP has approached the task has really
been to create what is in effect a database of databases. That
is, there is a lot of information and Mr. Oxford referred to
some of this as being classified information. There is a lot of
information that is potentially available to the U.S.
government through various agencies.
So one thing that NMIP is trying to do is just establish
itself as an entry point that allows questions to be routed to
the places where the information is located, and the data fed
back in a proper form. Again, there is quite a bit of
historical record, much of it created for purposes other than
nuclear forensics. So simply getting a handle on that has been
the first task that we have been involved in.
Mr. Langevin. Good. Thank you.
Do other witnesses care to comment?
Mr. Grant. Just two quick comments from the Department of
State's perspective. Number one, we do see a lot of support for
the ITB, the illicit trafficking database that the IAEA
manages. In fact, we do have also awareness of the database and
we use it where we can. It is limited in scope, and it is a
completely voluntary effort. It does not include all members of
the IAEA to submit material to that database, but it is a
start.
Secondly, through the Global Initiative, there is interest,
and in fact there will likely be activity on databasing of
radiological sources and other material. These are all starts,
but these are importantly led by other countries who are
sharing this interest with us.
Mr. Langevin. Right. Thank you.
My time has expired. I will now yield to the ranking member
for question for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This raises a lot of serious issues. This committee is
always involved with very serious issues, but when you look at
the world today, when you look at Pakistan, the A. Q. Khan
network, that Pakistan has the capability. We have Musharraf in
power, but there are a lot of hostile forces to him. The
thought of that capability being turned over to more extreme
forces gives me great pause.
You have Iran on the quest for nuclear weapons, and North
Korea. You have the former Soviet Union, and I am not quite
sure to this day if we have a handle or accountability of the
nuclear weapons that they had. So proliferation is a huge
issue. And so detecting and deterring is very, very important.
I think the focus of this hearing I guess with forensics is
more after it is apprehended, or God forbid, after it has been
detonated, where does it come from?
And so, getting back to the database, because I share the
chairman's concern about, and I understand some of this could
be in a different setting, but the level of cooperation with
many of these suspect countries I assume is very limited, if
zero. So it raises the issue of the effectiveness of us, the
United States, the administration, and the IAEA to effectively
put some teeth into developing a database, so that we can truly
trace back where this comes from if, God forbid, it happens.
If this has already been answered, I apologize, but it is a
question that I think is worth asking again in terms of any
pressure that can be put on the IAEA or the United Nations to
expand the database and have more cooperation throughout the
world. That is for anybody on the panel.
Mr. Grant. I will just answer one element of that that I
think will provide you a little insight. Recently, in fact,
Pakistan has decided to volunteer database material to the
illicit trafficking database. Now, that is one of the only and
few, really, standing databases where they can, if you will,
demonstrate their cooperation for this issue. Also, just in the
last couple of months, Pakistan has also become a Global
Initiative partner. We expect them to participate in our Global
Initiative activities on this particular issue.
Again, these are very modest beginnings, but I think in
that particular space recognizing the concerns for that
country, along with the others who also participate, that is
showing important steps forward for sharing our support and
interest in this area.
Mr. McCaul. Is there anything we in the Congress can be
doing? Mr. Oxford, would you answer that? In addition to that
question, is there anything we in the Congress can be doing to
apply leverage?
Mr. Oxford. First of all, to get to your latter question, I
think just having this hearing and raising this subject is an
important step. The interagency has been working hard the last
year to identify what the gaps in capabilities are that we need
to proceed with.
Getting back to what Mr. Grant was saying, when the
announcement of the Global Initiative first took place, there
was a modest number of countries. I think there were about 13
that first subscribed to that initiative. The number of
countries now subscribing to the Global Initiative is 55. So we
are seeing a willingness to at least start the dialogue. As Mr.
Grant says, there is a lot of work yet to be done, but
forensics is part of the work package that is being brought
into the Global Initiative, and we think that is encouraging.
Mr. McCaul. It certainly is.
Dr. Burns, a specific question for you, the training of
talent and expertise on this area of expertise is very
challenging. Can you speak to the level of the workforce in
this area, and also to retirements? I think most people that
have had a lot of experience in nuclear forensics, we don't
have that young talent that I think we need to have in this
country.
Ms. Burns. There has been some information that was self-
professed by the laboratory, so this is self-reporting data
now, that indicates if you try and identify the number of
people who spend most of their time working on technical
forensics problems, it is probably on the order of 20 to 30, a
small number. Then if you look at the broader community within
the laboratories that are spending a portion of their time
working on technical forensics, it reaches to about 200.
Now, if you look at the demographics associated with that,
we find that in fact there is a challenge in that of the people
who are spending full-time on the effort, those tend to be
predominantly over 50, and in fact in some cases we have
retirees staffing significant roles. So I think that proves
that over the next 10 years, we will have a concern.
Mr. McCaul. Any solution to that?
Ms. Burns. Well, part of the solution is to identify
additional people we can bring in and perhaps some of the
education will go on through our educational system. But
something else perhaps we can in fact do is make sure that our
senior staff are provided with some time working on the
programs specifically to mentor younger staff. That is very
challenging financially for programs to support people who are
largely serving in that sort of training function, but that
knowledge transfer I think is going to be critical in the short
term.
Mr. McCaul. I agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the ranking member as well. I thought that the
ranking member acquitted himself well this morning. I caught
your performance.
[Laughter.]
Friends, it would seem to me that it is in the best
interests of the communities of the world, meaning the nation-
states, to work together on this type of endeavor. Can someone
give me an indication as to how much cooperation we are
receiving from the nation-states? And more specifically, which
seem to find it an issue that they don't want to work
cooperatively on or with us on?
Mr. Grant. Just in review of the illicit trafficking
database and the ITWG, the standing Technical Working Group
that focuses on this issue, there are 28 countries that are
participating in the ITWG right now. Now, the ITWG is
establishing practices in these countries--and again, it is on
a voluntary basis--to work with us and others who have perhaps
a more robust capacity.
In terms of pointing to challenging areas, I think many of
us are aware of where those spaces might be. The Black Sea
region we are most interested in. We are certainly interested
in the Middle East as well. Some of those countries have been
less supportive to be involved in technical nuclear forensics,
but it is a list that includes members from all continents.
Additionally, I think there is strong acceptance to recognizing
the need to provide more detailed technical support or
practices, if you will, procedurally to assist countries to
develop their technical nuclear forensics capability.
So these two forms--the ITV, the illicit trafficking
database as it grows, based on the voluntary nature of the
database, and then the ITWG, are good forums to be strengthened
and for participation from global partners.
Mr. Green. This may be beyond the scope of what you are
here for, but it would help me if you can answer the question.
It would seem to me that the detonation of a device of the
magnitude that we are talking about would be harmful to the
planet Earth as opposed to someplace on the planet Earth. Is
there some truth to what I have said?
Mr. Aoki. Certainly. Leaving aside the political impact,
which would be devastating, and the local impact which would be
devastating, there would also be measurable effects that could
be detected around the world. Again, we have some history of
nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We know that even at
locations that were many hundreds of miles away from the test
site, it was possible to identify radiation. So in that sense,
certainly it will be true that there would be effects that
would be observable and measurable a long distance away. Once
one gets beyond a certain radius from the site of the event,
those are not catastrophic effects, but they are something that
people would be aware of and would have real effects on human
health.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
I am told that other members are returning and we may have
enough for the markup. So with that, I am going to go to a
second round.
Well, with that, I am told we are going to as soon as we
conclude at this point and then move to the markup, we will
have enough time to conclude our business for the day.
So with that, I want to thank the panel for their testimony
here today. I will remind the panel that the panel may have
additional questions. I would ask that the witnesses respond as
expeditiously as possible to those questions in writing.
At this time, the first panel of witnesses is dismissed.
Again, I thank you for your time, your effort, and your service
to the country. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]