    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

              H.R. 2631, THE NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
                          THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND
                             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 10, 2007

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 110-76

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

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      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                   BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman

    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California,         PETER T. KING, New York
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      LAMAR SMITH, Texas
    NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington          CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
    JANE HARMAN, California              MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             TOM DAVIS, Virginia
    NITA M. LOWEY, New York              DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    Columbia                             BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    Islands                              GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
    BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina        MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                 DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
    CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
    AL GREEN, Texas
    ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado

           Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel

                         Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel

                         Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk

                    Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director

                                     ______

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
                                   TECHNOLOGY

                   JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman

    ZOE LOFGREN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin    DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    Islands                              GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
    BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina        MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    AL GREEN, Texas                      PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
    VACANCY                              Officio)
    BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
    Officio)

                        Jacob Olcott, Director & Counsel

            Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science & Technology

                           Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk

           Dr. Diane Berry, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member

                                      (II)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   STATEMENTS

    The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Rhode Island, Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology:
      Oral Statement.................................................    19
      Prepared Statement.............................................    19
    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology....     2
    The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of North Carolina....................................     1
    The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas.................................................    37

                                   WITNESSES
                                    Panel I

    The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California:
      Oral Statement.................................................    30
      Prepared Statement.............................................    32

                                    Panel II

    Dr. Steven Aoki, Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism,
      National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy:
      Oral Statement.................................................     7
      Prepared Statement.............................................     9
    Dr. Carol Burns, Group Leader, Nuclear and Radiochemistry,
      Chemistry Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory:
      Oral Statement.................................................    22
      Prepared Statement.............................................    24
    Mr. Mike Evenson, Associate Director for Operations, Defense
      Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense:
      Oral Statement.................................................    13
      Prepared Statement.............................................    14
    Mr. Andrew Grant, Acting Director for WMD Terrorism, Bureau of
      International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of
      State:
      Oral Statement.................................................    20
      Prepared Statement.............................................    21
    Dr. Vahid Majidi, Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction
      Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of
      Justice:
      Oral Statement.................................................    16
      Prepared Statement.............................................    17
    Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
      Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     3
      Preapred Statement.............................................     4

              H.R. 2631, THE NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, October 10, 2007

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity,
                                    and Science and Technology,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
    Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. James Langevin
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Langevin, Christensen, Etheridge,
    Green, McCaul, Pascrell, Jr and Broun, Jr.
        Also present: Representative Berman.
        Mr. Etheridge. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
    order.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
    the need to develop and maintain a national nuclear forensic
    capacity. Today, the subcommittee is meeting to discuss and
    subsequently mark up an amendment in the nature of a substitute
    to H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Act.
        I would like to congratulate my colleague, Congressman
    Schiff--he is not here right now, I don't think--for
    introducing this legislation and for working collaboratively
    with the committee to develop the amendment in the nature of a
    substitute that we will consider immediately after today's
    hearing.
        To paraphrase the provisions of H.R. 2631, as I am sure
    will be echoed by witnesses here today, the threat of nuclear
    terrorism attack is the most serious threat to the U.S.
    homeland and to our interests abroad. We must do everything we
    can to prevent such an event. Nuclear forensics and attribution
    is one important tool in this effort. Through nuclear
    forensics, it may be possible to identify the source of nuclear
    or radiological weapons. A robust forensic capacity should also
    have a deterrent effect for those who might use a weapon or
    provide such a weapon or weapons materials to terrorists.
        If the worse should happen and a nuclear attack is carried
    out, attribution is critical. In order to perform such, we must
    have the capacity for rapid sample acquisition, analysis, and
    characterization of the samples, and comparison of those
    samples to other known sample signatures. It is my belief that
    the provisions of this amendment in the nature of a substitute
    will help promote this capacity. I look forward to discussing
    this bill with our witnesses today.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul for an
    opening statement.
        Mr. McCaul?
        Mr. McCaul. I thank the chairman.
        The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban area of this
    country would be catastrophic. Reducing the risk of nuclear or
    radiological terrorism requires a layered system of defenses
    that involves deterring, detecting, disrupting, and recovering
    from terrorist attacks.
        We spend a great deal of time in this Congress discussing
    DNDO's efforts to deploy radiation portal monitors at our
    nation's ports of entry. These monitors, staffed by Customs and
    Border Protection officers are the nation's first line of
    defense against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological
    material.
        I would like to take this opportunity to commend DNDO on
    their achievements in this area. Mr. Oxford, to me, I have been
    very impressed that in only 18 months, your organization has
    deployed radiation monitors which now screen 91 percent of
    cargo coming across the northern border, and 97 percent of
    cargo coming across the southern border.
        In the next several months, Secretary Chertoff is expected
    to make a decision on the certification of the advance
    spectroscopic portal monitors. I hope this technology
    demonstrates a significant improvement over current radiation
    portal monitors, allowing Customs and Border Protection to
    improve accuracy, while maintaining this high percentage of
    cargo screening.
        But even with the best possible detection systems, the
    possibility remains that terrorists could beat the system and
    sneak something past one of our detectors, or through a
    nonofficial port of entry. That is why defense against
    terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, requires this multi-
    layered approach.
        Today, we are here to discuss one of the layers in the
    government's strategy to defend against nuclear terrorism. That
    layer is the Interagency Program of Technical and Nuclear
    Forensics and the role it plays in attribution. While forensics
    is only one component of attribution, it is a key part of
    ensuring the nation has a robust program to accurately and
    rapidly identify perpetrators of nuclear or radiological
    terrorism.
        The forensics program we have today includes programs in
    defense, the intelligence community, law enforcement, homeland
    security, and our national laboratories. I look forward to
    hearing on the progress DHS has made in coordinating this
    interagency program, and I also hope to hear the role each
    department plays in the acquisition, analysis, and
    characterization of radiological and nuclear material that
    would be necessary in the case of a successful nuclear attack.
        The main concern of this committee is the pipeline of
    qualified people into the fields associated with nuclear
    forensics. In recent years, the number of young people entering
    scientific fields has decreased. The nuclear fields in
    particular are suffering, especially in fields relevant to
    nuclear forensics, which may have no commercial counterpart. I
    am very interested to know the panel's thoughts on this issue
    as well, and what is in store for technical programs such as
    this one if this trend continues.
        I thank the panelists for being here. I yield back my time.
        Mr. Etheridge. I thank the gentleman.
        I would like to welcome our panelists here today, our first
    panelists who are witnesses to the hearing. I look forward to
    discussing the topics of nuclear forensics with such a
    collection of dedicated public servants. Welcome and thank you
    for being here.
        Our first witness is no stranger to this committee. Mr.
    Oxford is the director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
    in the Department of Homeland Security. Welcome.
        Next is Dr. Aoki--is that pronounced correctly?
        Mr. Aoki. Aoki.
        Mr. Etheridge. Aoki. Okay, welcome. He is deputy under
    secretary of energy for counterterrorism at the Department of
    Energy. We welcome you.
        We also have--I hope I get this right; let me try--Dr.
    Vahid Majidi.
        Mr. Majidi. Sir, it is Vahid Majidi.
        Mr. Etheridge. Vahid Majidi. Thank you, sir. Welcome. He is
    assistant director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Directorate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
        And next is Dr. Andrew Grant, acting director of the WMD
    Terrorism Bureau of International Security and
    Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.
        And next we have Mr. Michael Evenson, who is the associate
    director for operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
        And finally, we have Dr. Carol Burns, currently serving as
    the Group Leader for the Nuclear and Radiochemistry in the
    Chemistry Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
        Let me welcome each of you. Thank you for being here.
    Without objection, your full statement will be entered into the
    record.
        I would recognize Mr. Oxford first and ask each one of you,
    as soon as the other one has finished, to move along. I won't
    introduce you again. It would take up time. Summarize your
    statement within the 5 minutes if possible.
        I recognize you now, Mr. Oxford, for 5 minutes, for a
    summary. Thank you.

    STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
                OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Oxford. Good afternoon, Chairman Etheridge, Ranking
    Member McCaul and other members of the subcommittee.
        I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
    discuss the U.S. government's nuclear forensics program and the
    role of DNDO in coordinating and advancing the nuclear
    forensics efforts through our National Technical Nuclear
    Forensics Center.
        I would also like to thank my colleagues who are joining me
    today from the Departments of Energy, Defense, State, FBI and
    Los Alamos National Laboratory.
        Technical nuclear forensics is the analysis,
    characterization and interpretation of pre-and post-detonation
    nuclear and radiological samples and devices, as well as the
    output signals from national nuclear detonations. The U.S.
    government's nuclear forensics efforts provide the tools,
    techniques and expertise to potentially determine the nature
    and origin of the materials and devices used in acts of
    terrorism and smuggling.
        In the last year, the U.S. government has made great
    strides in forming an integrated interagency team. Together, we
    are planning, prioritizing, and exercising. Our goal is to
    achieve and maintain a proficient national nuclear forensics
    capability that is credible, reliable, and ready for any
    contingency, from interdiction of nuclear materials or devices
    at the border, to a nuclear detonation in the homeland or
    against U.S. interests abroad.
        Nuclear forensics is now increasingly recognized as having
    the potential to serve as a central pillar of deterrence in the
    21st century. Nuclear forensics underpins the attribution
    process by helping to identify the possible sources of
    materials or devices, the device design, or the pathway taken
    to the actual incident. Attribution will be derived form the
    fusion of technical nuclear forensics analysis, with all-source
    intelligence, and law enforcement information to enable the
    decision-making process.
        DHS established the Forensics Center in DNDO on 1 October
    2006. The center develops and advances capabilities to perform
    nuclear forensics on pre-detonation nuclear and radiological
    materials. In coordination with our partners, it implements
    national-level integration, centralized planning, exercising,
    evaluation and stewardship across the full spectrum of U.S.
    government nuclear forensics capabilities from pre-to post-
    detonation. In essence, the center serves as a system
    integrator for the end-to-end national capabilities.
        The strategic goals for the center include improving our
    nuclear forensics capabilities, developing a national-level
    exercise program, developing strong international nuclear
    forensics cooperation, and developing a strategic
    communications plan.
        Finally, it is important to note that most of the nation's
    scientific nuclear forensics capabilities exist in a relatively
    small cadre of experts at the national laboratories. We are all
    facing the challenges of recruiting and retaining the nuclear
    experts that we rely on so heavily to achieve our mission. We
    are working with our partners to assess the issues, identify
    solutions, and ultimately establish a stable and enduring
    workforce and career pipeline.
        In conclusion, the importance of nuclear forensics cannot
    be understated. It is challenging and it is essential, another
    critical layer in our nation's strategy of layered defense
    against the nuclear threat.
        Chairman Etheridge, Ranking Member McCaul and other members
    of the committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will
    be happy to answer any questions you may have.
        [The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford

    Introduction
        Good morning, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, Director
    of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and I would like to
    thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the U.S.
    Government's (USG) nuclear forensics program and the role of DNDO in
    coordinating nuclear forensics efforts through our National Technical
    Nuclear Forensics Center, (NTNFC) that was established in DNDO last
    October. I would also like to thank my partners who are joining me from
    the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DoD), State (DOS), and
    Justice (DOJ).

    Background
        The USG's nuclear forensic efforts provide the tools and the
    expertise to potentially determine the nature and origin of the
    materials and devices used in acts of terrorism and smuggling. This
    information is used in the broader process of attribution, which
    couples intelligence and law enforcement information with the results
    of forensic analyses to aid in the identification of those who
    designed, built, supplied, transported and used an improvised nuclear
    device (IND), a stolen or acquired nuclear weapon, a radiological
    dispersal device (RDD), or nuclear/radiological material. Technical
    Nuclear Forensics, or TNF, refers to the thorough analysis,
    characterization, and interpretation of pre-detonation and post-
    detonation nuclear/radiological samples and devices, as well as prompt
    output signals from a nuclear detonation. TNF is a critical nuclear
    deterrence capability to demonstrate we can hold perpetrators
    accountable, and also to help find and prevent follow on attacks. The
    roots of this program are founded in the techniques that were used for
    many years in the U.S. nuclear weapons development and testing
    programs, arms control monitoring, and intelligence activities. Today,
    with the looming threat of nuclear terrorism, the requirements and
    timelines that drive our efforts are new and only began crystallizing
    in the last few years.
        TNF is necessarily an interagency effort with respective lead and
    support roles and responsibilities assigned through a recent
    Presidential policy directive. In the last year the USG has made great
    strides in aligning itself in accordance with the directive, forming an
    integrated interagency team. Together we are planning, prioritizing,
    and exercising. DNDO's TNF goal is to achieve and maintain a proficient
    national nuclear forensics capability that is credible, robust, rapid,
    reliable, and ready for any contingency, from interdiction of nuclear
    materials at the border to a nuclear detonation in the homeland, or
    against U.S. interests abroad. Nuclear forensics is now increasingly
    recognized as having the potential to serve as a central pillar of
    deterrence in the 21st century, tied to new concepts of ``nuclear
    accountability'' (as Graham Allison calls it) for countries that might
    consider the ``witting'' transfer of nuclear materials or weapons to
    our adversaries, as well as to encourage improved safeguarding of those
    materials and weapons, to deter the ``unwitting'' transfer. We
    understand that effective strategic communications is fundamental to
    the deterrence equation. If deterrence fails, then nuclear forensics
    serves to underpin the attribution process by helping to identify the
    possible source of the materials or device, the device design type
    (after a detonation), and the pathway taken to the incident scene,
    utilizing both nuclear and traditional forensics techniques.
    Attribution will be derived from the fusing of the technical nuclear
    forensics conclusions with all source intelligence and law enforcement
    information, which in turn enables the decision-making process for
    assessing potential follow-on attacks, response options for the
    President, as well as prosecution deliberations.

    NTNFC
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the National
    Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) in DNDO on October 1, 2006.
    Like the broader DNDO, the Center is staffed with a mix of DHS federal
    employees and detailees from our partner agencies. DHS assumed this
    mission as a result of the classified Presidential policy directive
    that defined two core forensics missions for DNDO. First, the NTNFC is
    intended to serve as the national ``capability provider'' to develop
    and advance capabilities to perform nuclear forensics on pre-detonation
    nuclear and radiological materials. The second mission for the NTNFC is
    to implement national-level integration, centralized planning,
    exercising, evaluation, and stewardship across the full spectrum of USG
    nuclear forensics capabilities, from pre-to post-detonation--in essence
    to serve as the ``System Integrator'' for the end-to-end national
    capabilities. These missions are specifically directed to be carried
    out ``in coordination'' with our partners in the DoD, DOS, DOE, DOJ,
    and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

    Strategic Goals
        The strategic goals for the NTNFC include striving to continuously
    improve nuclear forensic capabilities through research & development,
    interagency program reviews, independent assessments, and exercising.
    We are developing a highly matrixed national-level exercise program--we
    know that strict protocols and intense timelines will be the rule after
    an event, and so we must exercise regularly to optimize our
    capabilities and readiness.
        We are also working closely with our interagency partners to
    develop a strong international pillar of nuclear forensics
    cooperation--which means sharing best practices and information on
    materials and cases, developing personal relationships with
    international forensic scientists and law enforcement, and performing
    exercises in cooperation with other nations. The NTNFC provides
    considerable technical support to the DOS in order to engage other
    nations and develop the absolutely essential international aspects of
    our nuclear forensics programs.
        The NTNFC will also be developing an in-depth strategic
    communications plan. We need to raise the awareness of others in the
    government and the public to garner the appropriate kinds of support
    and disseminate the right kinds of messages. With effective strategic
    communications, our nuclear detection and forensics missions can
    succeed in creating a new kind of deterrence for the 21st century.
        It is important to note that most of the Nation's scientific
    nuclear forensics capabilities rest on the shoulders of a relatively
    small cadre of experts at the national labs. We are all facing the
    challenges of recruiting and retaining the nuclear experts that we rely
    on so heavily to achieve our mission. The NTNFC is working with our
    partners to assess the issues, identify solutions, and ultimately
    establish a stable and enduring workforce and career pipeline. This is
    a major strategic goal of not only DHS, but all of us here at the table
    today.

    Accomplishments to date
        In the short time since the NTNFC was established, we have been
    working quickly to create a small staff of in-house experts to
    coordinate with our federal and laboratory partners to meet the needs
    of our TNF mission. We have developed a baseline Nuclear Forensics
    Knowledge Management & Analysis System that underpins our capabilities
    to perform nuclear forensics on interdicted materials. This program
    entails the development of forensic information analysis tools, for
    example, multivariate pattern recognition tools; methods to deduce and
    link materials signatures to production processes; and development of
    historical nuclear material process and production timelines.
        The NTNFC also chairs the Attribution Working Group of the
    Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense Research and Development, Committee on
    Homeland Defense and National Security, National Science and Technology
    Council. The purpose of this Subcommittee is to identify and recommend
    a prioritized investment strategy to continually increase the overall
    effectiveness and productivity of USG R&D related to developing a
    robust nuclear defense capability. Additional Subcommittee working
    groups include Nonproliferation, Interdiction, Render Safe, and
    Response and Recovery, resulting in effective integration of R&D needs
    analysis across the nuclear defense spectrum. With members from DHS,
    DoD, DOS, DOE, DOJ, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA) and Intelligence Community, the Attribution Working Group is
    developing six areas of R&D emphasis that define a USG coordinated
    forensics and attribution program. The Subcommittee has currently
    baselined the capabilities in nuclear defense, developed the vision of
    the desired end-state five years out, and prioritized gaps in R&D.
    Ultimately, the development and analysis of this roadmap will form the
    basis for an interagency coordinated program of prioritized R&D efforts
    to effectively address gaps without redundancy. This Roadmap is
    scheduled for completion in February 2008, in time for agencies to use
    the plan to develop FY 2010 budget requests.
        The NTNFC has made significant strides in integrating the day to
    day workings of our interagency team. In addition to the joint Exercise
    Planning Group, we have established a few essential bodies to plan and
    direct nuclear forensics activities--we stood up a Nuclear Forensics
    Working Group at the action officer level; a Steering Committee at the
    program manager level; and just last month we launched a ``Nuclear
    Forensics Executive Council'' with senior executive membership across
    each department and the intelligence community. The Council was
    established to assure effective implementation and oversight, with
    enduring senior level focus and attention to the forensics mission. At
    our inaugural meeting last month, we were honored to have Secretary
    Chertoff join us and express his strong support for this critical
    mission.

    Conclusion
        The importance of nuclear forensics cannot be overstated. It is a
    field that seems to grow in visibility on a weekly basis. It is
    challenging, and it is essential--another critical layer in our
    Nation's strategy of layered defense against the nuclear threat. Our
    mandate requires that we develop, improve and sustain an enduring
    capability that is rapid and credible--that will meet the President's
    and Congress' expectations during an unprecedented catastrophe--and
    effectively support attribution conclusions, and potential responses.
    Moreover, nuclear forensics efforts may indeed help to prevent a
    follow-on attack--the issue that will be foremost on all of our minds
    in the wake of an attack. The nuclear forensics mission is a
    crosscutting effort throughout the USG and appropriate coordination
    through the DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center will
    ensure that effective, integrated, and robust capabilities are
    developed and sustained.
        The Secretary and I are committed to doing whatever it takes, as
    quickly and as prudently as possible, to prevent a nuclear 9-11, or a
    dirty bomb attack. Nuclear forensics is central to our efforts. And
    there is no doubt that our odds of success are magnified tremendously
    when we persevere with our partners across the board, through planning,
    exercising, and improving our national capabilities.
        This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
    permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
    Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
    answer any questions that you may have.

        Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir.

          STATMENT OF STEVEN AOKI, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
      COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Aoki. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the
    committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear
    before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's efforts
    in the area of nuclear forensics. Along with our colleagues
    from other federal agencies, we are actively involved in
    developing and maintaining the technical expertise, scientific
    tools, and specialized facilities to help identify those
    involved in the theft of nuclear materials or those responsible
    for an act of nuclear terrorism.
        I submitted a written statement, so I just will focus on a
    few key points here.
        First, technical nuclear forensics really is only part of a
    broader process of attribution. Attribution really aims to
    answer the question ``who did it'' by looking at the full range
    of intelligence, law enforcement and scientific information
    available to the nation. Technical forensics may play a
    critical part in reaching that final judgment, but it is only a
    part.
        Secondly, we must be prepared to provide technical
    forensics analysis in several different types of situations
    that have different characteristics. We may recover weapons-
    grade nuclear materials from a smuggler apprehended at a border
    crossing or as a result of a criminal investigation. Forensic
    tools can help identify where that material originated and
    perhaps tell us something about its history.
        Alternatively, we might intercept an actual nuclear device
    before it can be detonated. In this case, in addition to the
    forensic analysis of the nuclear material, expert analysis of
    the design of the device could give us valuable clues about who
    built it and in particular whether there was any assistance
    from a foreign government. Of course, special procedures and
    facilities will be required to perform any operations of a
    potentially live nuclear weapon.
        Finally, we must also prepare for the grim possibility that
    we will be called on to conduct forensic analysis after a
    terrorist nuclear device has detonated. In this case, it is
    possible to analyze the radioactive debris to determine the
    types of nuclear materials involved and perhaps reconstruct the
    device design, providing important clues to identify the
    responsible party.
        In all three of these cases, the availability of a strong
    and capable national technical nuclear forensics program
    strengthens deterrence against those who might support an act
    of nuclear terrorism. We must, however, be realistic about the
    length of time required for some of the analytical procedures
    involved in nuclear forensics. In some cases, weeks or months
    may be required to obtain reliable results. This is clearly an
    area where additional research is called for, but there are
    some inherent physics limits to what can be done in this field.
        The complexity of the possible scenarios means that
    technical nuclear forensics is inherently a team effort,
    drawing expertise and specialized capabilities from across the
    federal government. The Department of Energy contributes
    broadly to this effort in line with the roles and
    responsibilities established by the president last August.
    Among our key contributions, let me mention a few here.
        First, DOE's Office of Emergency Operations will take
    custody of a terrorist nuclear device after it has been
    rendered safe in the field. Once the device has been
    transported to a secure location at the Nevada test site, DOE
    will oversee the collection of material samples and other
    forensic data.
        In the event of a nuclear detonation or nuclear material
    dispersion event in the United States, DOE on-the-ground teams
    will collect samples utilizing equipment and operational
    concepts developed by our colleagues at the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency. The collection of samples for forensics
    purposes will be fully integrated with the other on-site
    activities carried out by DOE teams as part of their overall
    response to this catastrophic event.
        To support these and other forensics responsibilities, DOE
    conducts research and development aimed at improving the speed
    and accuracy of radiochemical analysis, and at developing
    sensors to provide near real-time information about the nature
    of a terrorist nuclear device. Drawing on the expertise of its
    national laboratories, DOE sponsors analytical studies of
    potential nuclear device designs, using advanced modeling and
    simulation tools developed for our own nuclear weapons program,
    to understand how an improvised nuclear device might be
    constructed. These efforts allow the calculation of signatures,
    including expected radioactive debris that would be compared
    against forensic results.
        An essential component of any forensics effort is a library
    of information against which to compare an unknown sample. DOE
    has been assigned responsibility for managing the Nuclear
    Materials Information Program, which is developing a database
    of information on nuclear materials worldwide to support
    technical nuclear forensics.
        Perhaps most importantly, DOE is responsible for sustaining
    the national laboratory system that underlies most of the
    interagency efforts described at today's hearing. During the
    Cold War, we built specialized facilities, developed unique
    scientific techniques, and assembled teams of scientists and
    engineers to support the design, production and testing of our
    own nuclear weapons. I think it is fair to say that all of the
    nation's technical nuclear forensics capability ultimately
    rests on the underlying science base around the accumulated
    knowledge it represents.
        As the national laboratory complex evolves to meet a new
    national security environment, it will be vitally important to
    ensure that maintain and strengthen this fundamental resource
    for the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
        That concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to your
    questions.
        Thank you.
        [The statement of Mr. Aoki follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Dr. Steven Aoki

        Chairman Langevin, Representative McCaul, members of the
    Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss nuclear terrorism and, in particular, the Department of
    Energy's efforts to sustain and improve our nation's capabilities to
    attribute threats involving nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
    materials introduced covertly into our country. I will begin by briefly
    addressing the specifics of the nuclear terrorism threat, the
    components of a national strategy to counter that threat, and the
    specific role that technical nuclear forensics and attribution can play
    in that strategy. I conclude by describing DOE's efforts to work with
    its interagency partners to strengthen national nuclear technical
    forensics and attribution capabilities.

    Countering Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Threats to the Homeland
        In this post-Cold War world, nuclear terrorism may be the single
    most catastrophic threat that this nation faces--we must do everything
    we can to ensure against its occurrence. The focus of my testimony
    today involves covert delivery by sub-national terrorist groups, either
    at the bidding of a state sponsor supplying the nuclear warhead or on
    their own via purchasing or stealing a warhead. There are three main
    threat variants identified below in decreasing order of likelihood, but
    increasing order of consequence in terms of deaths, injuries, cleanup
    costs, etc.:
             terrorists could acquire radioactive materials and
            construct devices for dispersal--so
             called radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs) or ``dirty
            bombs'',
             terrorists could acquire special nuclear materials
            (SNM)--plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU)--and build an
            improvised nuclear device (IND),
             terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon from a
            nuclear weapons state.
        The overall strategy to protect the United States from terrorist
    nuclear weapons threats has six components:
             Determine terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and
            plans to develop or acquire nuclear weapons
             Deny terrorists access to the nuclear materials,
            expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop
            a nuclear device
             Deter terrorists from employing nuclear devices
             Detect and disrupt terrorists' attempted movement of
            nuclear-related materials, weapons, and personnel
             Prevent and respond to a nuclear terrorism attack
             Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed
            nuclear device

    Prevention
        Although the focus of today's hearing is nuclear forensics and
    attribution, I must reiterate that our number one priority is to keep
    key fissile materials--plutonium or highly-enriched uranium--out of the
    hands of terrorists. Absent access to sufficient quantities of such
    materials there can be no bomb. We cannot overstate the importance of
    this point. Making a sophisticated nuclear weapon small enough to fit
    on a modern ballistic missile is difficult. Making a crude and
    inefficient one delivered by a rental truck may not be. We cannot be
    certain that we have controlled knowledge; thus we must control
    materials.
        We are working hard to prevent terrorist acquisition of nuclear
    devices and fissile materials by:
             Strengthening physical security of U.S. nuclear
            weapons and weapons usable materials, Providing assistance to
            Russia to strengthen protection, control, and accounting of its
            nuclear weapons and materials,
             Working with friends and allies to secure weapons-
            usable nuclear materials worldwide, and to strengthen security
            at civil nuclear facilities,
             Taking more aggressive steps to interdict illicit
            trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear materials and related
            technologies via strengthened export controls, cooperation with
            other countries through DOE's Second Line of Defense and
            MegaPorts programs, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
        In July 2006, at the G-8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin
    announced that they would create a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
    Terrorism to strengthen cooperation worldwide on nuclear materials
    security and prevention of terrorist acts involving nuclear or
    radioactive substances. Keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of
    terrorists--and where possible, eliminating potentially vulnerable
    weapons-usable materials--is the most effective means of prevention.
    Paired with UNSCR 1540, we now have both the legal mandate and
    practical means necessary for concrete actions to secure nuclear
    material against the procurement efforts of terrorists.
        Barriers to acquisition also provide an important element of
    deterrence. If terrorists believe that it will be extremely risky, or
    impossible, to acquire weapons or materials, they may be deterred from
    seeking them, or perhaps seek other avenues of attack. While we, of
    course, want to prevent all types of terrorism, deterring a devastating
    nuclear detonation has particular urgency.

    Nuclear Forensics and Attribution
        Attribution--a capability to rapidly characterize and identify the
    source of a nuclear warhead or weapons usable nuclear materials either
    before or after an attack--is a key component of an overall strategy to
    deter nuclear terrorism. States will not provide nuclear weapons to
    terrorists if they know that we will find out and, under certain
    conditions (e.g., a witting transfer from a state sponsor to
    terrorists), retaliate. Moreover, post-attack attribution would provide
    critical information to help prevent follow-on attacks.
        Attribution involves the rapid fusion of information obtained via
    three sources: domestic law enforcement investigations of nuclear
    terrorist threats, associated collateral foreign intelligence received
    about those threats, and the technical analysis of the nuclear device
    or materials interdicted prior to detonation, or the debris and signals
    that result from a detonation. This latter source of information is
    called technical nuclear forensics. The elements of a nuclear forensics
    capability involve (1) collection of technical forensics data from the
    device or event, (2) lab analysis and reporting including comparison of
    collected data with a materials data base, and (3) interpretation and
    evaluation coupled with appropriate technical peer review.
        The types of questions that we want to answer in technical nuclear
    forensics and, more broadly via the attribution process include: What
    material is it? Is it U.S. material? If not, where did it come from and
    how did it get here? How, when and where was it produced? For nuclear
    devices: Was it an RDD or a nuclear explosive device? What fissile
    materials were used? What was the yield? What was the design?
        Post-detonation nuclear event forensics can provide key information
    about both the design and sophistication of a warhead, and about the
    origin of its fissile materials. During the period of nuclear testing,
    we gained much experience and critical information evaluating
    radioactive debris from Soviet above-ground nuclear tests, and from our
    own underground tests in Nevada. Covert delivery by terrorists presents
    a different challenge. For this challenge, a comprehensive
    international fissile materials data base would assist nuclear
    forensics efforts to correlate debris data with a particular reactor or
    enrichment facility that produced the material. It should be in every
    nation's interest to contribute to such a data base, both to help deter
    nuclear terrorism worldwide and to build confidence that it is a
    responsible steward of weapons usable fissile materials.
        One point I want to emphasize: during the Cold War, post-detonation
    analysis was carried out over a period of several months--it was
    important but not time-urgent to complete it. We recognize that a
    nuclear detonation in a U.S. city would create enormous pressures to
    get solid information out in the shortest possible timeframe. As a
    result, our efforts to sustain and improve nuclear forensics
    capabilities include substantial efforts to shorten analytical
    timelines.

    DOE contributions to technical nuclear forensics
        The United States recently has made important progress, both in
    policy and technology, towards establishing a national technical
    nuclear forensics capability. As pointed out in Vayl Oxford's
    testimony, roles and responsibilities for various U.S. government
    agencies were established by the President last August and are being
    implemented. DHS is working to coordinate efforts among agencies, and
    identify capability gaps, in national technical nuclear forensics
    capabilities. This includes close coordination with the law enforcement
    and intelligence communities. At the initiative of the DoD, a national
    capability for post-detonation forensics became operational at the end
    of 2005. DHS is working to develop a concept of operations and to
    advance and ensure appropriate capabilities related to forensic
    analysis of interdicted nuclear materials. DOE has responsibility to
    develop a concept of operations and ensure appropriate capabilities to
    assess an interdicted nuclear device.
        DOE has been engaged in a wide range of activities in support of
    this interagency effort. Its role has been key because most, if not
    all, of the capabilities that the nation draws upon for technical
    nuclear forensics reside at DOE's national laboratories. To date,
    forensics capabilities relating to such areas as nuclear weapons device
    modeling, nuclear materials production, radiochemistry and associated
    specialized facilities, advanced computations and simulations, and the
    physics and chemistry of fissile materials have been sustained in large
    part by leveraging off activities carried out in NNSA's nuclear weapons
    program. In the following discussion, we address some of the details of
    DOE's efforts in support of technical nuclear forensics.

                Pre-and Post-Detonation Nuclear Device Missions

        NNSA's Office of Emergency Operations provides operational
    capabilities and support in the following areas in addition to its
    direct support to the Attorney General in the render safe mission for
    interdicted nuclear devices in the United States:
             Develop and sustain pre-detonation nuclear device
            forensics concept of operations and associated capabilities.
             Take custody of the rendered safe nuclear explosive
            devices and support the collection of material samples and
            other forensic data from such devices.
             As part of the DoD-developed concept of operations for
            the post-detonation mission, support ground sample collection
            after a nuclear detonation or dispersion of nuclear material
            within the United States. This includes providing a reliable
            capability to deploy, support domestic ground sample
            collection, and deliver post-detonation nuclear debris samples
            for shipment to designated laboratories.

                Nuclear Forensics R&D--Post-detonation analysis

        NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) organization is
    sponsoring advanced R&D activities at our national laboratories to
    improve techniques for radiochemical analysis of bomb debris and has
    also sponsored ground-breaking work on other diagnostics tools. It is
    developing the next generation of post-nuclear detonation ground based
    forensics capabilities. Emphasis is on reducing timelines for producing
    analytical results. This work includes advanced sampling technology and
    collection tools for rapid, safe, precise post-detonation nuclear
    sample collection and analysis. It also includes nuclear event modeling
    to predict activation and entrainment of contaminants, deposition
    pattern of debris, remote sample collection/recovery concepts and rapid
    in-field analytical capabilities.

         Nuclear Forensics R&D--Prompt output diagnostics measurements

        DNN is also sponsoring work to improve capabilities to determine
    nuclear device information directly through collection and analysis of
    the prompt radiation diagnostics from a detonation. Hi-fidelity, near-
    field, prompt diagnostics capabilities are being developed that will
    provide greater sensitivity and thus greater insight into a terrorist
    nuclear device design than the current suite of satellite and seismic
    sensors used for world-wide nuclear event reporting, attack assessment
    and treaty monitoring.

                    Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support

        NNSA's Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support (NCDS) program is
    focusing the talent, capabilities, and resources of our nuclear weapons
    program on the threat of nuclear terrorism. In place since 2000, the
    NCDS program provides an essential element of technical support to our
    nation's efforts to prevent the detonation of a terrorist nuclear
    device. Under NCDS, weapons designers at our national laboratories
    analyze and model potential IND designs, drawing on computational
    tools, experimental data, and expertise originally developed in the
    nuclear weapons program. The knowledge gained is applied to nuclear
    search and detection, forensic analysis, nuclear device render-safe,
    nuclear facility security, and intelligence assessments.
        NCDS analysis is drawn on extensively by other DOE components as
    well as by other United States government agencies with associated
    responsibilities.

         Nuclear Forensics R&D--Calculation of IND output and rad-chem
                                   signatures

        In addition to its NCDS work, NNSA's Defense Programs organization
    is carrying related work in the following areas:
             Via device modeling studies of INDs, identification
            and characterization of signatures that discriminate various
            IND designs from traditional U.S. and foreign warheads.
             For pre-detonation forensics work, assessment of
            signatures associated with plutonium and HEU samples derived
            from domestic and foreign sources. Work currently includes
            physical and chemical analysis to associate materials
            processing knowledge to product material signatures.
             Support to attribution and forensics communities by
            providing IND experts to participate in exercises, more
            accurately identify the range of threats, and provide education
            on IND design.
        Defense Programs, including through its Science Campaign, is
    seeking to improve capabilities to calculate and assess weapon
    outputs--both prompt (gamma rays, neutrons, x-rays, and debris kinetic
    energy) and long-lived radionuclide debris--released from a nuclear
    detonation. The Advanced Simulation and Computations (ASC) program is
    improving computer simulation capabilities for technical nuclear
    forensics. Improved physics models will enable the ASC codes to be
    applied more reliably to model the breadth of threats, including low-
    technology INDs, and provide predictions regarding the post-explosion
    radionuclide debris isotopes. This work facilitates more timely and
    responsive nuclear forensics capabilities.

                  Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP)

        Last year, the President established the Nuclear Materials
    Information Program (NMIP)--an interagency effort managed by DOE's
    Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to:
             Develop an integrated system of information from all
            sources concerning worldwide nuclear material holdings and
            their security status;
             As part of this effort, collect signatures of nuclear
            materials to support forensics and attribution assessments; and
             Identify opportunities to work with international
            partners directly to share information on nuclear materials
            characteristics and security. International Cooperation

      Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is advancing international nuclear
        forensics cooperation in Central Asia, which remains a focus of
       engagement due to the region's integral role in the former Soviet
    weapons complex and the willingness of the current governments to work
          with NNSA and U.S. laboratory personnel. This international
       collaboration focuses on joint collection and characterization of
       uranium ore, ore concentrate and tailings, which expands the U.S.
    knowledge base and contributes to the overall nuclear counterterrorism
     effort. To date, work has focused on uranium mining and milling sites
        in the Central Asian nations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. NNSA
       coordinates its Central Asia work closely with the DHS, which is
       conducting similar international outreach activity in Kazakhstan.

                             Search and Render Safe

        Should we detect nuclear materials or a suspected nuclear device,
    the DOE--through its national laboratory system--deploys highly-trained
    teams of experts to search for clandestine nuclear materials or
    warheads and, if necessary, to disarm and dispose of a terrorist
    nuclear device. These teams work in close partnership with the DoD, DHS
    and the FBI in managing our national response to nuclear terrorism. The
    DOE has a robust research program to support its nuclear search and
    render-safe mission and a complementary technology integration program
    that develops tools for use by its emergency response teams in the
    field.

                          Sustaining Key Capabilities

        A key challenge is to ensure that we sustain and strengthen nuclear
    forensics capabilities in support of nuclear counterterrorism in an era
    when our nuclear weapons program is undergoing substantial change. This
    includes sustaining the people at our national laboratories involved in
    these efforts and the specialized laboratory facilities and
    experimental and analytical tools that they employ to carry out their
    job. Along these lines, in coordination with DHS and DOD, the DOE has
    initiated a study to be conducted by the National Academy of Science to
    examine the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities and provide
    findings and recommendations to sustain and improve them including
    technical, infrastructure, and human resource elements, and
    international collaboration, cooperation and information sharing.
        Finally, while we have made great progress over the past several
    years, more remains to be done in fleshing out the technical and policy
    dimensions of nuclear forensics and attribution.
        Thank you for your attention; I would be happy to take questions.

        Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir.
        Let me just say to the other panelists, it looks like we
    are going to have a vote call somewhere between 2:30 p.m. and
    2:45 p.m., so we are going to try to get through this part with
    your help before they call the vote. We will stay around and
    try to finish the testimony and do the questions after the
    vote, because it could take up to 45 minutes to 1 hour with the
    vote.

     STATEMENT OF MIKE EVENSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS,
         DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Evenson. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the
    Department of Defense's role, responsibility and capabilities
    in support of the National Technical Nuclear Forensics program.
    I have already submitted my written statement and will
    summarize my remarks.
        First, I believe that international cooperation is critical
    to the success of any attribution effort. However, to date
    there has been limited international collaboration.
    International cooperation can help improve certainty of
    attribution by expanding the information and data available to
    investigators, and help increase public confidence in an
    attribution conclusion. This would serve to deter and dissuade
    potential enemies by reinforcing this strategic message. U.S.
    government policy needs to be developed for the sharing of
    forensically valuable nuclear data without compromising U.S.
    government nuclear secrets.
        Second, in order to meet the very severe timelines required
    of the technical forensics, we must move past the traditional
    radiochemistry technology we use today. While DTRA and its
    partners represented at this table have made huge improvements
    in our timelines--approximately a 93 percent improvement--we
    are still judged as too slow. Thus, we must find new
    technologies that allow much more rapid and certain technical
    conclusions.
        Third, despite my belief that technical and nuclear
    forensics will provide major, perhaps critical, information, we
    all need to recognize that the classical forensics work that
    the FBI has always done and is renowned for is mostly like to
    yield the definitive answer of who did it. We must not lose
    sight of that as we collect radioactive debris. We must be
    guided by the on-scene FBI lab personnel and make sure that we
    collect the other debris that may yield fingerprints, trucks
    axles, or other definitive evidence.
        My last point concerns strategic communications. During a
    recent National Defense University-sponsored workshop on
    nuclear attribution, attendees, including congressional staff,
    stressed the incredible pressure the president and his advisors
    would be under to make a rapid attribution determination, both
    for response purposes and to prevent a potential follow-on
    attack. Policy advisors acknowledged the need to develop
    further the nation's strategic communication of attribution
    capabilities for deterrence, dissuasion and assurance purposes.
        Our NTNF capability must be able to respond and deliver the
    initial and final technical conclusions necessary to protect
    the nation and make well-informed decisions. We have made
    noteworthy progress, but still have a long way to go in
    refining the U.S. government technical nuclear forensics
    capabilities, such as more robust collection capabilities and
    improved rapid analysis and data evaluation capabilities, to
    meet the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.
        No single-agency effort can ensure success. Meeting this
    threat requires the focused integration and coordination of our
    full NTNF capabilities, as well as international capabilities
    and expertise.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Evenson follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Michael K. Evenson

        Introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
    an honor to be here today to address the Department of Defense's ( DoD)
    support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensic (NTNF) program. I am
    the Associate Director for Operations within the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency (DTRA), the primary organization within the Department
    of Defense (DoD) charged solely and full-time with reducing the threat
    of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Countering chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear weapons is the reason for the agency's
    existence. We perform research and development and provide operational
    support to enhance DoD nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
    consequence management capabilities. Our primary customers are the
    Combatant Commanders. Our mission is guided by the National Strategy to
    Combat WMD, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and
    direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        DTRA works closely with partners across DoD, the United States
    Government (USG), academia, and the private sector, as well as with our
    allies and friends in the performance of our mission. Our efforts in
    support of the national nuclear forensics capability are conducted in
    close collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
    Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Laboratories, Department of
    State, Department of Justice, and the office of the Director of
    National Intelligence.
        Policy advisors have underscored the importance of international
    cooperation both to attribution and prevention; however, to date there
    has been limited international collaboration. International cooperation
    can make attribution more certain by expanding the information and data
    available to investigators, and increase confidence in an attribution
    decision. This would serve to deter and dissuade by reinforcing the
    strategic message. However, we must balance the need for the sharing of
    forensically valuable nuclear data without compromising US nuclear
    secrets.

        Background
        The Defense Department's interest in nuclear forensics and
    attribution rests on more than the need to provide information that
    would guide the appropriate national response to a nuclear event. We
    believe that highly capable forensics and attribution would enable this
    nation to stop follow-on attacks, and serve to deter states that may
    assist nuclear terrorists, thereby making nuclear use more difficult
    for terrorists. As noted in the 2000 Defense Science Board report on
    Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, one of the strongest elements
    of protection is deterrence through the threat of reprisal. The goal of
    stopping subsequent attacks serves to define the timelines for
    accomplishment of attribution and substantially increases the need for
    a rapid and authoritative attribution system which, in turn, requires
    exquisite nuclear forensics capabilities.
        Nuclear forensics is not a new mission for DoD. The department's
    existing nuclear forensics capability is the result of programs that
    span six decades and includes activities to assess foreign nuclear
    weapons testing activities, monitor and verify nuclear arms control
    treaties, and to support intelligence and law enforcement activities.
    During the Cold War, attribution was a simpler matter as we knew who
    would be the likely aggressor, and had the means for detecting attacks
    and confirming the origin of attack. However, nuclear proliferation and
    the global threat of terrorism mean that we are more likely to face
    covert rather than readily observable means of nuclear attack. In
    today's security environment, post-detonation forensics to support
    attribution requires much faster answers to different questions under
    the pressure of an extreme crisis without prior notice.
        In 2000, DTRA initiated the Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution
    (DNEA) program to improve USG post-detonation nuclear forensics
    capabilities and develop a focused system for rapid and accurate
    attribution of a domestic nuclear or radiological event. DNEA was
    created as a joint effort of military, intelligence, technical and law
    enforcement communities. In 2005, DTRA conducted a successful concept
    demonstration of DNEA capabilities, and continues its efforts to
    operationalize a process and capabilities for producing technical
    nuclear forensics information to fulfill DoD's global responsibilities
    under the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program. This
    effort to ``operationalize'' post-event nuclear forensics is focusing
    on collection of samples, scientific analysis of the samples, and
    subsequent reporting of findings that meet legal and scientific
    requirements.

    The DoD Role
        The recent signing of the NTNF policy by the President specifically
    assigns DoD the responsibility to ensure a worldwide post-detonation
    NTNF capability, including ground and air sample collection, analysis
    of post-detonation debris, developing and sustaining a concept of
    operations, and supporting enhancements to post-detonation scientific
    and technical capabilities. DoD support to NTNF is being led by the
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs. DTRA and other DoD elements, such as the
    Air Force Technical Applications Center, provide specific, supporting
    operational capabilities.
        DTRA maintains the capabilities developed under the DNEA program,
    including a ground sample collection capability, a forensics laboratory
    process, and an exercise program to sustain post-detonation NTNF
    capabilities. DTRA will partner with DOE to provide support in domestic
    incidents with DTRA developed capabilities including= a ground sample
    collection capability, a forensics laboratory process, and as mentioned
    earlier, an exercise program to sustain post-detonation NTNF
    capabilities. We also maintain a special cadre of select personnel and
    equipment to respond globally to any nuclear or radiological incident.
        The DTRA Nuclear Forensics R&D Program is an integral component of
    a coordinated interagency effort, rather than different potential paths
    to meet similar requirements. Our investment areas include: Prompt
    Nuclear Effects Data Collection and Analysis, which is key to the
    precise measurement of nuclear yield; Debris Sample Collection and
    Field Measurements to develop more robust ground robotic, unmanned
    aerial vehicle and manual collection capabilities; Debris Analysis to
    develop novel approaches and new technologies to achieve rapid and
    precise isotopic measurements; Data Evaluation and Knowledge Management
    to improve the application and management of signatures, databases,
    models, calculations and expertise to produce consensus results;
    Integration to bring efficient, full national post-detonation NTNF
    capabilities to bear across the interagency in a crisis environment
    providing accurate and rapid initial and final results; and other DoD
    nuclear forensics missions, which may be non-NTNF, but support
    development of foundational capabilities to provide technical
    conclusions.
        Additionally, DTRA manages and sponsors DoD NTNF exercise and
    evaluations, is working to fully integrate DoD's exercise and
    evaluation program into the DHS NTNF exercise program, and has begun
    crafting DoD's integrated NTNF concept of operations. DTRA supports the
    DHS and the FBI with hardware, systems, training, exercises and
    evaluations, and planning for a response to a nuclear incident.
        I would like to note that NTNF capabilities rely on the aging
    physical infrastructure and human expertise that support the USG
    nuclear weapon programs. While the interagency effort described here
    today makes a small investment in revitalizing aspects of this national
    treasure, further erosion in the nuclear weapons program will severely
    impact our nuclear forensic analysis and evaluation capabilities. A
    deliberate and concerted effort is needed to ensure these critical
    capabilities will be available when the nation needs them most.
        In addition, I would like to emphasize that neither DTRA nor DoD
    performs the forensics mission in a vacuum. Many components in the USG,
    including the DNDO, DOE, FBI, and the Intelligence Community all play a
    vital role in that effort.

    Conclusion
        During a recent National Defense University sponsored workshop on
    nuclear attribution, attendees, including Congressional staff, stressed
    the incredible pressure that the President and his advisors would be
    under to make a rapid attribution determination, both for response
    purposes and to prevent a potential follow-on attack. Policy advisors
    acknowledged the need to develop further the nation's strategic
    communication of attribution capabilities for deterrence, dissuasion,
    and assurance purposes. Our NTNF capability must be able to respond and
    deliver the initial and final technical conclusions necessary to
    protect the nation and make well informed decisions.
        We have made noteworthy progress, but still have a long way to go
    in developing and fielding capabilities, such as more robust collection
    capabilities and improved rapid analysis and data evaluation
    capabilities, to meet the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. No single
    Agency or effort can ensure success. Meeting this threat requires the
    focused integration and coordination of full NTNF capabilities, as well
    as international capabilities and expertise.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to
    respond to your questions.

        Mr. Langevin. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.

    STATEMENT OF VAHID MAJIDI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WEAPONS OF MASS
       DESTRUCTION DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
                         DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Majidi. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
    Member McCaul and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to
    be here today to demonstrate the commitment of the FBI to
    strengthening our nation's ability to conduct effective
    technical nuclear forensics.
        Our number one priority is to protect the nation from
    terrorist attack. Within that priority, the weapons of mass
    destruction threat is our most pressing concern. The FBI
    established a WMD Directorate in 2006 to develop a
    comprehensive approach for combating WMD proliferation.
        We began by consolidating the units within the FBI that
    were addressing the response, investigation, intelligence,
    analysis, dissemination and countermeasures program into one
    unified structure. Paramount to our prevention effort is a
    strong forensic program that includes all aspects of WMD and
    traditional forensic expertise.
        We also recognize that it is through an effective
    interagency cooperation that the WMD threat is best addressed.
    The FBI Laboratory Division is central to our support to the
    interagency effort in nuclear forensics. The laboratory
    provides the personnel, equipment and know-how to effect the
    safe and secure collection of radiological and nuclear
    materials. Furthermore, the laboratory provides training on WMD
    crime scene awareness so that our personnel can properly enter,
    exit and work within any scene where biological, chemical,
    radiological or nuclear materials might be present.
        Beginning this fall, we are pleased to be offering WMD
    crime scene awareness training to selected personnel from the
    Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and
    Department of Energy to strengthen our interagency
    collaboration.
        No agency has the necessary resources and capabilities to
    independently perform technical WMD forensics. The FBI
    laboratory leverages the capability of the interagency
    community to conduct and direct the forensic examination of the
    evidence that is contaminated or contains hazardous material.
    To that end, the FBI has formalized partnerships with a variety
    of government, academic and private labs to carry out specific
    examination of our evidence.
        For example, we have formal agreements in place with
    Savannah River National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory, the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center
    for forensic analysis of recovered radiological material,
    special nuclear materials, recovered improvised nuclear
    devices, and debris resulting from a detonated device.
        The laboratory support for technical nuclear forensics is
    culminated through our ability to conduct traditional forensics
    on radiological and nuclear materials--in other words, to
    perform the very forensic examination for which the FBI
    laboratory is world renowned. The FBI laboratory has taken the
    lead by developing and implementing the hazardous evidence
    analysis team, or HEAT program.
        Normally, we transport evidence from the crime scene to the
    FBI laboratory. For WMD crimes, however, we have made the
    conscious decision to refrain from transporting any such
    evidence to our laboratory until we demonstrate that no
    residual WMD contamination exists. Nonetheless, the
    investigation process requires prompt traditional forensic
    signatures such as latent prints, human DNA analysis, and trace
    evidence.
        To ensure timely traditional forensic examination of
    evidence, we transport the examiners to the evidence at one of
    the partner laboratories. The HEAT program provides additional
    training for qualified forensic examiners and technicians,
    which allows them to operate in a WMD laboratory environment
    such as a hot cell for nuclear materials at biosafety level
    three or four suite for pathogens or a chemical surety facility
    for toxic chemicals.
        In short, the FBI is proud to be a member of the dedicated
    interagency community focused on WMD forensic issues to protect
    our nation.
        Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Majidi follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Vahid Majidi, Ph.D.

        Good morning, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and members
    of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to demonstrate the
    commitment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
    strengthening our nation's ability to conduct effective technical
    nuclear forensics.
        The number one priority of the FBI is to protect the nation from
    terrorist attacks. Within that priority, the Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (WMD) terrorist threat is clearly our most pressing
    concern. The FBI established the WMD Directorate in 2006 to bring
    together the units within the FBI that were addressing the response,
    investigation, intelligence dissemination and analysis and
    countermeasures programs into one unified structure. This unity of
    leadership has strengthened the FBI's ability to prevent a WMD
    terrorist attack significantly. Key to our prevention efforts is a
    strong forensic program that includes all aspects of WMD and
    traditional forensic expertise. Additionally, we at the FBI recognize
    that it is through interagency cooperation that the WMD terrorist
    threat is best addressed.
        The FBI Laboratory Division is central to our support to
    Interagency efforts of the DOJ, DHS, DOE, DOD and members of the
    Intelligence Community (Interagency) in nuclear forensics. We view our
    Laboratory as the world's premiere forensics laboratory and are proud
    of the role it fulfills in preventing WMD terrorism and in responding
    to crimes when they occur. The Laboratory's Hazardous Materials
    Response Unit (HMRU) provides the personnel, equipment, and know-how to
    effect the safe and secure collection and transport of radiological and
    nuclear materials and debris to an appropriate facility for analysis
    and characterization These capabilities include the people who work at
    HMRU in Quantico, Virginia, and their gear, as well as those of 27
    Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HMRTs) that are trained, equipped
    and certified by HMRU. These teams are located throughout the United
    States (US) with various FBI Field Divisions and provide over 400
    personnel to augment our operational response capabilities.
        HMRU also provides training on WMD Crime Scene Awareness so that
    our personnel will know how to properly enter, exit and work within any
    scene where biological pathogens, toxic chemicals and radiological or
    nuclear materials might be present. This training, which historically
    has been directed toward our own personnel, has recently been adapted
    to provide WMD crime scene awareness training for personnel from the
    Interagency. We are pleased to be offering the training beginning this
    fall to selected personnel from the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Energy (DOE). In
    keeping with the importance we attach to nuclear forensics, we have
    targeted those DHS, DOD, and DOE elements most directly involved in
    nuclear activities as the first priority to receive this training from
    the FBI.
        No one agency has the necessary resources, experience and
    capabilities to solely perform technical WMD forensics. The Laboratory
    leverages the capabilities of the Interagency through the efforts of
    its Chemical Biological Science Unit (CBSU), an all-discipline WMD
    analysis unit. CBSU develops and maintains the Laboratory's ability to
    conduct and/or direct the forensic examination of evidence that either
    contains or is contaminated with hazardous chemical, biological or
    radiological material. To that end, CBSU has formalized partnerships
    with a variety of government, academic and private labs to carry out
    specific examinations of FBI evidence.
        We have formal agreements in place with Savannah River National
    Laboratory (SRNL), Aiken, South Carolina for recovered radiological
    materials and detonated radiological dispersal devices (RDDs); with
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, California,
    for recovered Special Nuclear Materials as well as intact improvised
    nuclear devices (INDs); and with the US Air Force Technical
    Applications Center (AFTAC) for debris resulting from the detonation of
    an IND.
        In November 2006, we began operations at SRNL of the Radiological
    Evidence Analysis Laboratory Suite (REALS), which was stood up with our
    funds plus funding from DHS. REALS provides dedicated space at SRNL for
    our forensic examiners and technicians to perform selected activities,
    including the storage of evidence. The joint DHS/FBI funds also enabled
    us to begin planning and designing a unique set of fully functional
    forensic laboratory spaces that we refer to as the Radiological
    Evidence Examination Facility (REEF). Thanks to specifically-targeted
    Congressional funding received this past Fiscal Year (FY), we began
    renovations of existing space at SRNL to create REEF. It is projected
    to become fully functional in FY 2009, thereby allowing our Laboratory
    examiners and technicians to conduct a full range of traditional
    forensic examinations on evidence that is contaminated with nuclear
    materials.
        The final pillar to our Laboratory's support for technical nuclear
    forensics speaks to our ability to conduct traditional forensics on
    radiological and nuclear materials--in other words, to perform the very
    forensic examinations for which the FBI Laboratory is so well-known. In
    this case, CBSU has also taken the lead, both domestically and
    internationally, by developing and implementing the Hazardous Evidence
    Analysis Team or HEAT program. That program responds to the altered
    operational dynamic that prevails when we investigate a crime or
    suspicious event involving WMD. Normally, we transport evidence from a
    crime scene to the FBI Laboratory. For WMD crimes, though, we have made
    the conscious decision to refrain from transporting any such evidence
    to our Laboratory in Quantico until we can demonstrate that no residual
    WMD contamination exists.
        But the needs of the investigation to process the evidence for
    traditional signatures of interest--such as latent fingerprints, human
    DNA analysis, and trace evidence--are immediate. To ensure we begin
    such traditional examinations promptly, we have flipped the dynamic,
    and we transport the examiners to the evidence at one of partner
    laboratories. The HEAT program takes our trained and qualified forensic
    examiners and technicians from across the Laboratory and provides
    additional training which allows them to operate in a WMD laboratory,
    such as in a hot cell for nuclear materials, a Biosafety Level 3 or 4
    Suite for biological pathogens or a Chemical Surety Materiel laboratory
    for toxic chemicals. We certify our personnel through the HEAT program
    as qualified examiners and technicians in their discipline. We believe
    HEAT has been a success, with more than 60 examiners and technicians
    trained and certified, representing the various forensic disciplines in
    our Laboratory. Our examiners and technicians profit, gaining the
    confidence and skills needed to conduct their demanding tasks in an
    altered environment. The investigation is supported by ensuring we have
    a cadre of such trained and certified personnel who are ready to deploy
    immediately when the need arises. Through this training and
    certification process, we are learning what modifications, if any, are
    needed to conduct traditional forensic techniques when the work must be
    performed in a radiological or nuclear laboratory or, in the more
    general case, in any WMD laboratory, such as those of our partners with
    DHS at NBACC and with DOD at the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.
    Again, as with our novel nuclear forensic examiner program, we are
    unaware of any program similar to HEAT with any of our international
    partners, but we are certainly anxious to share our experiences with
    them.
        Thank you for time, I look forward to answering your questions.

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Majidi.
        Before we go to the next witness, you heard the buzzers
    going off. That means that there is a vote on right now. My
    plan is to finish the testimony of the last two witnesses. We
    will recess and then return for questions, and then go to the
    second panel.
        Before I do that, I want to thank Mr. Etheridge for
    stepping in and chairing and opening the hearing for me. I was
    in a markup in the House Intelligence Committee, and obviously
    couldn't be here. So I want to thank the witnesses for being
    here today.

        Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable James R. Langevin,
    Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science
                                 and Technology

        The subcommittee will now move on to the markup of an amendment in
    the nature of a substitute to HR 3621. The Nuclear Forensics and
    Attribution Act. I would like to again congratulate my colleague
    Congressman Schiff for introducing this legislation and for working
    collaboratively with me to develop the amendment in the nature of a
    substitute we will consider today.
        The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act expresses the sense of
    Congress that the President should:
             purse bilateral and multilateral agreement to
            establish an international framework for determining the source
            of any confiscated nuclear material or weapon, as well as the
            source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear material used in
            such a weapon;
             develop protocols for the dissemination of sensitive
            information relating to nuclear materials to the extent
            required by such agreements; and
             develop expedited protocols for the dissemination of
            sensitive information needed to publicly identify the source of
            a nuclear detonation.
        It also amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to task the
    Secretary with the development of methods to attribute nuclear or
    radiological material--both within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
    Office and in partnership with other Federal agencies--to its source
    when such material is intercepted by the United States, foreign
    governments, or international bodies or dispersed in the course of a
    nuclear terrorist attack or other nuclear or radiological explosion.
    The Amendment in the nature of a substitute builds on and strengthens
    these ideas by:
             Emphazing that the development of a robust nuclear
            forensics capability will depend chiefly on an expertly trained
            workforce in this area, and the recognition that our workforce
            in this area is currently waning and that we must turn this
            trend around.
             It also tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security to
            act as the integrator and steward of our national nuclear
            forensics capabilities. While it is a certainty that the
            cooperation of all the agencies represented here is needed for
            success in this mission, clearly specifying this duty for the
            Secretary should provide the needed leadership for success.
             The amendment further requires the Secretary to report
            annually to Congress on the activities of the interagency group
            as well as the development and maintenance of the needed expert
            workforce;
             And finally, it authorizes $20 million per year for
            the next three fiscal years for this effort.
        I would also like to thank Ranking Member McCaul for his
    contributions on many of the topics just mentioned to strengthen the
    underlying bill. I appreciate his efforts and am pleased that this
    subcommittee continues to be a model of bipartisanship.

        Mr. Langevin. Mr. Grant, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.

     STATEMENT OF ANDREW GRANT, ACTING DIRECTOR FOR WMD TERRORISM,
        BUREAUS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Grant. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
    Member McCaul and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide remarks on the State
    Department's role in supporting the U.S. government's nuclear
    forensics program.
        As others have stated already, the U.S. government is
    working to develop the appropriate cooperation with its
    international partners so that each day we are improving our
    ability to conduct effective nuclear forensics when and where
    it is needed. The Department of State supports this in a
    variety of ways. The Department of State has always contributed
    to the policy and program development of the U.S. nuclear
    forensics effort and State Department personnel today work at
    the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and assist in operations
    at the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center in the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        Also, the Department of State interacts regularly with the
    IAEA through participation in the Illicit Trafficking Database
    program. Finally, the Department of State builds international
    support to improve nuclear forensics, and where necessary
    coordinates deployment of U.S. technical or investigative teams
    for forensics.
        The president has made clear his view on the importance of
    building international partnerships to carry out nuclear
    forensics, with specific commitments in the Global Initiative
    to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Bratislava initiative.
    These initiatives highlight the need to improve capabilities
    for response, mitigation and investigation, including
    development of technical means to identify nuclear material or
    other radioactive materials in substances that are or may be
    involved in a nuclear incident. Through the Global Initiative,
    over 60 partner nations have committed to this objective as a
    key element of global capacities to combat nuclear terrorism.
        Supporting our political commitment to strengthen nuclear
    forensics, the Department of State also chairs the Interagency
    Nuclear Trafficking Response Group, or NTRG. The NTRG
    coordinates the U.S. government's response to international
    forensics and radioactive material trafficking incidents. If
    deemed necessary, the Department of State also leads
    coordination for the Foreign Emergency Support Team, or FEST,
    an interagency team that can quickly deploy anywhere in the
    world to assist U.S. embassies in our responses to acts of
    terrorism, including incidents involving nuclear or
    radiological material.
        Although nuclear forensics is often associated with
    activities conducted in post-detonation environments, nuclear
    forensics is also extremely important to combat nuclear
    smuggling. As part of a shared commitment with our
    international partners to improve control of nuclear materials,
    shut down trafficking networks and routes, and prosecute
    nuclear smugglers, we are assisting other government to
    strengthen their own nuclear forensics capacity, and thus
    strengthen our collective nuclear forensics effort.
        Our work with the Georgians in a successful prosecution of
    a 2006 case involving highly enriched uranium, or HEU, is a
    noteworthy example. This month, a U.S. team went to Georgia to
    help the Georgian government align its nuclear forensics
    procedures with recent IAEA guidance on nuclear forensics which
    we helped create.
        The U.S. government also coordinates with the international
    community on technical nuclear forensics activities through the
    International Technical Working Group, or ITWG. The ITWG also
    works closely with the IAEA to provide member countries with
    support for forensics analysis. Priorities include the
    development of common protocols for the collection of evidence
    and laboratory investigations, organization of forensics
    exercises, and technical assistance to requesting nations.
    Through the ITWG, the U.S. can provide technical assistance on
    nuclear forensics to countries in response to specific
    requests.
        The Department of State will continue to support and lead
    in many areas to further develop our own nuclear forensics
    capacity. We will also continue to identify and maximize
    opportunities where our partners can assist us in our efforts
    to strengthen our nuclear forensics capacity. In doing so, we
    save lives and strengthen our chances to identify threats.
        This concludes my summary. I have also submitted a formal
    statement. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank
    you and I am happy to answer any of your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Grant follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Andrew F. Grant

    Introduction
        Good afternoon Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to provide remarks on the Department of State's role in
    supporting the U.S. government's nuclear forensics program. As others
    have noted, the U.S. government is working to develop the appropriate
    cooperation with international partners so that each day we are
    improving our ability to conduct effective nuclear forensics when and
    where it is needed.

    Roles and Responsibilities
        The U.S. government aims to establish global capacity to conduct
    pre-detonation and post detonation nuclear forensics anywhere necessary
    to support U.S. interests. The Department of State supports this in a
    variety of ways. The Department of State has always contributed to the
    policy and program development of the U.S. nuclear forensics effort and
    State Department personnel also work at the Domestic Nuclear Detection
    Office and assist in operations at the National Technical Nuclear
    Forensics Center. The Department of State supports the Department of
    Homeland Security's efforts to integrate and coordinate the full
    spectrum of U.S. nuclear forensic activities, as well as efforts to
    develop and advance nuclear forensic capabilities for pre-detonation
    nuclear materials. Also, the Department of State interacts regularly
    with the IAEA through participation in the Illicit Trafficking Database
    Program. Finally, the Department of State leads many U.S. government
    efforts overseas for nuclear forensics, which include building
    international support to improve nuclear forensics and, where
    necessary, coordinating for deployment of U.S. technical or
    investigative teams for nuclear forensics.
        The President has made clear his view of the importance of building
    international partnerships to carry out nuclear forensics with specific
    commitments in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and
    the Bratislava Initiative. These initiatives highlight the need to
    improve capabilities for response, mitigation, and investigation,
    including the development of technical means to identify nuclear
    material or other radioactive materials and substances that are, or may
    be, involved in a nuclear incident. Through the Global Initiative, over
    sixty partner nations have committed to this objective as a key element
    of global capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism.
        Supporting our political commitment to strengthen nuclear
    forensics, the Department of State chairs the interagency Nuclear
    Trafficking Response Group, or (NTRG). The NTRG coordinates the U.S.
    government's response to international nuclear and radioactive material
    trafficking incidents. If deemed necessary, the Department of State
    also leads coordination for the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST),
    an interagency team that can quickly deploy anywhere in the world to
    assist U.S. embassies in our responses to acts of terrorism, including
    incidents involving nuclear or radiological material.

    International Coordination to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
        Although nuclear forensics is often associated with activities
    conducted in post-detonation environments, nuclear forensics is
    extremely important to combat nuclear smuggling. As part of a shared
    commitment with our international partners to improve control of
    nuclear materials, shut down trafficking networks and routes, and
    prosecute nuclear smugglers, we are assisting other governments to
    strengthen their own nuclear forensics capacity and thus, strengthen
    our collective nuclear forensics effort. Our work with the Georgians in
    the successful prosecution of the 2006 case involving highly-enriched
    uranium (HEU) is a noteworthy example. This month a U.S. team went to
    Georgia to help the Georgian government align its nuclear forensics
    procedures with recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
    guidance on Nuclear Forensics, which we helped create. The U.S.
    government also coordinates with the international community on
    technical nuclear forensics activities through the International
    Technical Working Group, or ITWG. The ITWG also works closely with the
    IAEA to provide member countries with support for forensic analyses.
    Priorities include the development of common protocols for the
    collection of evidence and laboratory investigations, organization of
    forensic exercises, and technical assistance to requesting nations.
    Through the International Technical Working Group, the U.S. can provide
    technical assistance on nuclear forensics to countries in response to
    specific requests.

    Conclusion
        The Department of State will continue to support and lead in many
    areas to further develop our nuclear forensics capacity. We will also
    continue to identify and maximize opportunities where our partners can
    assist us in our efforts to strengthen our nuclear forensics capacity.
    In doing so, we save lives and strengthen our chances to identify
    threats.
        This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
    permission, I request that my formal statement be submitted for the
    record. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and the other
    distinguished members of this Subcommittee, I thank you and I am happy
    to answer any of your questions.

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Grant.
        The chair now recognizes Dr. Burns for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF CAROL BURNS, GROUP LEADER, NUCLEAR AND
        RADIOCHEMISTRY, CHEMISTRY DIVISION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
                               LABORATORY

        Ms. Burns. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking
    Member McCaul and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
    is an honor to appear before you today to discuss this
    important legislation. In particular, I have been asked to
    focus my remarks on the workforce needs required to meet the
    challenges of technical nuclear forensics.
        My name is Carol Burns. I am the group leader for the
    Nuclear and Radiochemistry Group at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory. I have more than 20 years of experience
    investigating the chemistry of radioactive elements. I also
    served on detail to the Office of Science and Technology
    Policy, working on issues associated with nuclear threats.
        There are three main points I would like to convey to you
    this afternoon. First, the national laboratories underpin the
    nation's nuclear forensics capability. Second, we face a
    challenge in sustaining our workforce. And finally, I would
    like to offer some ideas on how we can go about bringing in the
    next generation of forensic experts.
        My first point is that Los Alamos and the other DOE
    national laboratories are major contributors to our nation's
    capability for nuclear and radiological forensics funded by the
    agencies represented here today. The laboratories offer unique
    expertise and special facilities for handling radiological and
    nuclear materials. I staff and maintain our radioanalytical
    group capability, and as such am a consumer of the product of
    our educational pipeline.
        Many disciplines are involved in the different facets of
    technical nuclear forensics. Chemists and material scientists
    evaluate signatures to distinguish the origin of interdicted
    materials. Nuclear physicists and engineers develop tools to
    rapidly characterize the threat presented by a suspect device.
    Radiochemists separate and characterize the composition of
    complex mixtures of isotopes in debris in the wake of a nuclear
    or radiological explosion.
        To speak to my second point, the laboratories face
    challenges in recruiting and retaining a qualified workforce to
    carry out elements of this important work. Statistics from DNDO
    indicate that most employees who work solely on nuclear
    forensics at the laboratories are more than 50 years old. Some
    requisite knowledge cannot be acquired through formal
    education, but must be learned first-hand or taught by
    experienced workers.
        For instance, few radiochemists remain who have analyzed
    the debris from a nuclear explosion. It takes years working
    with senior staff and retirees to build this competence in a
    new worker even if he or she starts with a sound knowledge of
    radiochemistry.
        Another concern is the depth of our capability. At our
    current staffing levels, we will tax the capacity of the system
    with the surge of samples that might be expected after a major
    event, such as the detonation of a nuclear device.
        It has been well documented that some of our traditional
    feeder disciplines are on the decline. As highlighted in a 2004
    report from the Department of Energy and the National Science
    Foundation, the number of Ph.D.s granted in nuclear science
    disciplines has declined by 20 percent since the mid-1990s and
    by 50 percent since the mid-1970s. The number of radiochemistry
    and nuclear chemistry Ph.D.s awarded by U.S. universities has
    declined by more than a factor of five since 1970, as has the
    number of chemistry departments offering even one course in
    these disciplines.
        My third and final point is that there are many things that
    can and are being done to improve this situation. Many studies
    offer ideas for drawing students to the field, including
    training centers, faculty fellowships, summer undergraduate
    programs, and post-doctoral programs. We see progress, for
    example, in the establishment of the new DNDO-NSF Academic
    Research Initiative. We need sustained funding for research in
    a broad range of nuclear-related fields to encourage the
    commitment of faculty to the area.
        The laboratories are also responding. Los Alamos is
    initiating efforts to build relationships with partner
    universities to develop and recruit this next workforce through
    our National Security Education Center. In the end, drawing
    from traditional disciplines will not be enough. We need to
    enlist scientists from other fields and provide them with the
    means to conduct work on radioactive materials not easily
    handled in most university environments. This could occur
    through cooperative programs at the national laboratories.
        In conclusion, if the nation succeeds in developing this
    workforce, the benefits will extend beyond nuclear forensics. A
    stronger educational pipeline in nuclear disciplines will help
    the nation meet the challenges of nonproliferation, nuclear
    energy, and nuclear medicine.
        I thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer
    any questions.
        [The statement of Ms. Burns follows:]

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Dr. Burns.
        As I said, there is a vote on right now. There are four
    votes. That should take us at least 1/2 hour, so we will stand
    in recess until approximately 3:15 p.m.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Langevin. The subcommittee will come to order. In the
    interests of time, and I know my colleague from California, Mr.
    Schiff, is in the middle of a markup in another committee. We
    are going to go to the second panel, and Congressman Schiff
    will testify. Once that testimony is concluded, we will go back
    to the first panel for questions, and then proceed from there
    with the markup after that.
        So again, in the interest of time, I am going to forego an
    opening statement for the second panel. I want to commend my
    colleague from California for his hard work and his thought and
    insight into working on this nuclear forensics issue. I think
    it is obviously important to the country, and I am proud to be
    a cosponsor in support of this effort.
        With that, I will yield to the ranking member for any
    comments, and then go to the witness.
        Mr. McCaul. I echo the chairman's comments. I want to thank
    you for being here, and thank you for introducing this
    important piece of legislation. I, too, am proud to be a
    cosponsor.
        Mr. Langevin. I thank the ranking member.
        With that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Congressman Adam Schiff.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
                      FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    McCaul. I greatly appreciate your support for this legislation.
    I also appreciate your consideration in taking me out of order.
    My apologies to your first panel, and I thank them for their
    indulgence as well.
        Today, I would like to speak with you very briefly about
    the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act. We all recognize
    nuclear terrorism as a threat so serious in its consequences,
    but we often shrink from contemplating it. A medium-size weapon
    detonated in downtown Manhattan would destroy every building
    across the width of the island and destroy homes as far away as
    Brooklyn and Hoboken. Hundreds of thousands of lives would be
    lost. The area would be uninhabitable for decades.
        But ignoring the problem won't make it go away. In fact,
    ignoring the possibility of terrorists getting a hold of a
    nuclear device makes that awful prospect more likely to happen.
    Illicit nuclear material has been intercepted in transit many
    times since the end of the Cold War, and the material we catch
    may be a small fraction of the total that is trafficked.
        President Bush has declared nuclear terrorism the number
    one national security threat facing the country, and this
    Congress and this subcommittee have made it more difficult to
    smuggle a weapon into the United States in an ongoing effort to
    strengthen the border. However, given the difficulties of
    securing our extensive border, we must take a layered approach
    to the problem.
        During the Cold War, we deterred the Soviet Union with the
    threat of overwhelming nuclear attack. Unfortunately, the
    decentralized flexible terror networks that we face today are
    not as easily deterred. There is little doubt that if al-Qa'ida
    acquired a nuclear weapon, they would attempt to use it against
    us. Osama bin Laden has termed the acquisition of weapons of
    mass destruction a ``religious duty,'' and there is no question
    that using such a weapon against America is consistent with the
    group's contempt for human life.
        Although al-Qa'ida may not be deterred, there are other
    groups and nations that can be dissuaded from helping them, but
    only if their participation can be traced back to them. This
    bill is designed to help shut down the international trade in
    nuclear material by deterring those parts of the trafficking
    network that can be deterred. Nuclear attribution would allow
    us to identify the provenance of nuclear material intercepted
    in transit or, God forbid, in the aftermath of a detonation.
    That knowledge would help us decide how to respond.
        It would also provide a deterrent. If nations around the
    world knew that they could be identified as the source of
    material used in a nuclear attack, even irresponsible nations
    would be disinclined to proliferate. For the more responsible
    nations, it would be a strong incentive to improve their
    security. Individuals would know that they could be found and
    prosecuted if they tried to help terrorist acquire nuclear
    materials. By developing a robust attribution capability, we
    can usher in an era where proliferation is not just
    discouraged, but deterred, because those responsible would be
    found and punished.
        The bill you are considering today supports our nuclear
    attribution capability by strengthening our nuclear forensics
    ability. Nuclear forensics involves studying the mix of
    isotopes and other features of nuclear material that give it a
    particular signature. There can also be information in the
    packaging and accompanying materials that could allow an expert
    to pinpoint the source.
        Nuclear forensics activities have historically taken place
    in a variety of government agencies, but primarily in the
    Departments of Defense and Energy. The new National Technical
    Nuclear Forensics Center in the Department of Homeland Security
    will support and coordinate these efforts. Experts in this
    office will consider how to develop a database of information
    on nuclear material that can assist in tracing traffic,
    technology or materials, organize the forensic response to
    nuclear detonation, ensure that the right research is being
    done to counter threats to our security at home, and make
    certain that enough scientists and engineers are entering
    fields like radiochemistry which are the key to our forensic
    capability.
        When a detective finds fingerprints, they must be matched
    against the database to identify possible culprits. Nuclear
    attribution works similarly, but there is no database of
    nuclear fingerprints. It can be difficult to obtain the needed
    information because it is considered sensitive in many
    countries, including our own. However, little of this
    information is of direct use to our adversaries, and in many
    cases the risk of not sharing the data is much greater than the
    risk of sharing it. Certainly, in the wake of a nuclear
    terrorist attack, no one will be reassured to hear that we
    couldn't shut down the smuggling networks because we didn't
    trust our allies.
        In addition, new and innovative approaches may allow
    countries to confidently match samples without having direct
    access to sensitive information. This bill asks the president
    to negotiate agreements with other nations to share information
    on the makeup of their nuclear materials. These could be
    bilateral agreements with our allies, or multilateral treaties
    with the IAEA. We could even begin the database with just
    civilian reactor materials where security is less of an issue.
        The important thing is to get started now. The National
    Technical Nuclear Forensics Center should play a key role in
    negotiations, since in the end the data we obtain must be the
    data the experts need. Nuclear terrorism is a threat of
    paramount danger and uncertain probability. It is not a threat
    we can measure in brigades, ships or warheads, but it is no
    less pressing for that. I believe this bill is a modest, but
    effective effort to reduce the risk of attack at the root of
    the problem. I am confident, after hearing from the experts,
    you will agree.
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I want to thank you again.
        [The statement of Mr. Schiff follows:]

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in
                     Congress from the State of California

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for having me
    here today to speak about the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act.
        Nuclear terrorism is a threat so serious in its consequences that
    we often shrink from contemplating it. A medium-sized weapon detonated
    in downtown Manhattan would destroy every building across the width of
    the island and destroy houses as far away as Brooklyn and Hoboken.
    Hundreds of thousands of lives would be lost, and the area would be
    uninhabitable for decades. But ignoring the problem will not make it go
    away--in fact, ignoring the possibility of terrorists getting hold of a
    nuclear device makes that awful prospect more likely to happen. Illicit
    nuclear material has been intercepted in transit many times since the
    end of the Cold War, and the material we catch is probably a small
    fraction of the total trafficked.
        President Bush has declared a nuclear terrorist attack on the
    United States the number one national security threat facing the
    country. This Congress and this Subcommittee have made it more
    difficult to smuggle a weapon into the United States in the ongoing
    effort to strengthen our border. However, given the difficulties of
    securing our extensive border, we must take a layered approach to the
    problem.
        During the Cold War, we deterred the Soviet Union with the threat
    of overwhelming nuclear attack. Unfortunately, the decentralized,
    flexible terror networks that we face today are not as easily deterred.
    There is little doubt that if Al-Qa'ida acquired a nuclear weapon, they
    would attempt to use it against us. Osama bin Laden has termed the
    acquisition of weapons of mass destruction ``a religious duty'' and
    there is no question that using such a weapon against America is
    consistent with the group's contempt for human life.
        Although Al-Qa'ida may not be deterred, there are other groups and
    nations that can be dissuaded from helping them, but only if their
    participation can be traced back to them. This bill is designed to help
    shut down the international trade in nuclear material by deterring
    those parts of the trafficking network that can be deterred.
        Nuclear attribution would allow us to identify the provenance of
    nuclear material intercepted in transit, or, God forbid, in the
    aftermath of a detonation. That knowledge would help us decide how to
    respond and it would also provide a deterrent. If nations around the
    world knew that they could be identified as the source of material used
    in a nuclear attack, even irresponsible nations would be disinclined to
    proliferate. For the more responsible nations, it would be a strong
    incentive to improve their security. Individuals would know that they
    could be found and prosecuted if they tried to help terrorists acquire
    nuclear materials. By developing a robust attribution capability, we
    can usher in an era where proliferation is not just discouraged, but
    deterred, because those responsible would be found and punished.
        The bill you are considering today supports our nuclear attribution
    capability by strengthening our nuclear forensics ability. Nuclear
    forensics involves studying the mix of isotopes and other features of
    nuclear material that give it a particular ``signature.'' There can
    also be information in the packaging and accompanying materials that
    could allow an expert to pinpoint a source.
        Nuclear forensics activities have historically taken place at a
    variety of government agencies, but primarily in the Departments of
    Defense and Energy. The new National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
    in the Department of Homeland Security will support and coordinate
    these efforts. Experts in this office will consider how to develop a
    database of information on nuclear material that can assist in tracing
    trafficked technology or material, organize the forensic response to a
    nuclear detonation, ensure that the right research is being done to
    counter threats to our security at home, and make certain that enough
    scientists and engineers are entering fields like radiochemistry which
    are the key to our forensic capability.
        When a detective finds fingerprints, they must be matched against a
    database to identify possible culprits--nuclear attribution works
    similarly, but there is no database of nuclear fingerprints. It can be
    difficult to obtain the needed information because it is considered
    sensitive in many countries, including ours. However, little of this
    information is of direct use to adversaries, and in many cases the risk
    of not sharing the data is much greater than risk of sharing it.
    Certainly, in the wake of a nuclear terrorist attack, no one will be
    reassured to hear that we couldn't shut down the smuggling networks
    because we didn't trust our allies. In addition, new and innovative
    approaches may allow countries to confidently match samples without
    having direct access to sensitive information.
        This bill asks the President to negotiate agreements with other
    nations to share information on the makeup of their nuclear materials.
    These could be bilateral agreements with our allies or multilateral
    treaties through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We
    could even begin the database with just civilian reactor materials,
    where security is less of an issue. The important thing is to get
    started now. The National Technical Nuclear Forensic Center should play
    a key role in the negotiations, since in the end, the data we obtain
    must be the data that the experts need.
        Nuclear terrorism is a threat of paramount danger and uncertain
    probability. It is not a threat we can measure in brigades, ships or
    warheads, but it is no less pressing for that. I believe that this bill
    is a modest but effective effort to reduce the risk of attack at the
    root of the problem, and I am confident that after hearing from the
    experts, you will agree.

        Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman from California for his
    testimony, and look forward to continuing to work with you on
    this important issue. I know you have a markup and we will
    forego questions at this time.
        Unless there is any further business, this panel is
    concluded. Thank you very much.
        The chair now calls up the first panel so that we can
    reconvene.
        Okay, the committee will come to order. Since the panel has
    given their statements, it is my intention now to go into
    questions. Let me begin, if I could, with Director Oxford, and
    then let other members of the panel add on to his answer.
        Director Oxford, could you please explain the organization
    mission and the role of each agency represented here in the
    National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center?
        Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the Technical
    Nuclear Forensics Center resides inside my office. It was
    established as a central integrator for U.S. government efforts
    in forensics. It was predicated on the same model that DNDO was
    established initially to serve, which was a centralized
    planning function with decentralized execution in the other
    departments.
        So besides being the central integrator, we serve a role as
    also being responsible for the pre-detonation material and
    device characterization, with other responsibilities then
    flowing to the other departments as part of their
    implementation responsibilities.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good.
        Anyone else care to comment?
        One of the key assets for nuclear forensics obviously would
    be a secure, yet accessible, database containing signatures and
    other information about domestic and international samples,
    again starting with you, Director Oxford--and I would welcome
    comments, of course, from anyone else as well--what is the
    current state of our domestic database or databases for
    chemical isotopic or radiological signatures for these
    materials? What about international databases? Do we have
    access to international databases? Do other countries or
    international agencies have access to any of our databases?
        Mr. Oxford. Let me start by saying a lot of that
    information needs to be discussed in a closed setting where we
    can talk about classified information and the actual status and
    health of both the domestic material database, as well as the
    international database.
        The agreement within the interagency is that database will
    reside within the Department of Energy in what we call the
    Nuclear Material Information Program that Dr. Aoki can
    reference. Within DNDO and the Forensic Center, we are
    responsible for creating some of the knowledge management and
    data mining tools that would allow us to quickly make access of
    that data in the actual event. I would let Dr. Aoki talk about
    the actual, what we call the NMIP.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Before we do that, do you get the sense
    from our international partners that they are as interested in
    creating this type of a database as we are? Without getting
    into classified information, is there a sense or demonstrated
    measures that have been taken to ensure that we have this
    cooperation?
        Mr. Oxford. There are signs of progress since the
    interagency has come together here, to start working on the
    international aspects. Again, Andrew Grant can probably address
    that more adeptly from the State Department. But we have
    started some work with the Russians, for example, and some
    database structure that will allow us to share, as Mr. Schiff
    was saying, at least starting with some of the reactor
    material, the non-military kind of isotopes that would allow us
    to share that kind of information in a pre-event environment. I
    think the problem will be in an immediate post-event, if we are
    talking about nuclear weapons material, that is going to take a
    little bit longer to actually get those agreements in place.
        Mr. Langevin. Good point. Thank you.
        Dr. Aoki, did you want to comment?
        Mr. Aoki. Yes. Let me just say a few words about the
    Nuclear Materials Information Program, or NMIP. As originally
    conceptualized, the first problem was that we had was to
    identify where nuclear materials are located, even before you
    get to the question of actually having samples or detailed
    physical information. So the first job NMIP has taken on is
    identifying what the holdings of other countries are. This is
    actually a somewhat dynamic process since materials are
    generated and separated on a daily basis. So simply keeping
    track of where the stuff is is actually the first job.
        The way in which NMIP has approached the task has really
    been to create what is in effect a database of databases. That
    is, there is a lot of information and Mr. Oxford referred to
    some of this as being classified information. There is a lot of
    information that is potentially available to the U.S.
    government through various agencies.
        So one thing that NMIP is trying to do is just establish
    itself as an entry point that allows questions to be routed to
    the places where the information is located, and the data fed
    back in a proper form. Again, there is quite a bit of
    historical record, much of it created for purposes other than
    nuclear forensics. So simply getting a handle on that has been
    the first task that we have been involved in.
        Mr. Langevin. Good. Thank you.
        Do other witnesses care to comment?
        Mr. Grant. Just two quick comments from the Department of
    State's perspective. Number one, we do see a lot of support for
    the ITB, the illicit trafficking database that the IAEA
    manages. In fact, we do have also awareness of the database and
    we use it where we can. It is limited in scope, and it is a
    completely voluntary effort. It does not include all members of
    the IAEA to submit material to that database, but it is a
    start.
        Secondly, through the Global Initiative, there is interest,
    and in fact there will likely be activity on databasing of
    radiological sources and other material. These are all starts,
    but these are importantly led by other countries who are
    sharing this interest with us.
        Mr. Langevin. Right. Thank you.
        My time has expired. I will now yield to the ranking member
    for question for 5 minutes.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This raises a lot of serious issues. This committee is
    always involved with very serious issues, but when you look at
    the world today, when you look at Pakistan, the A. Q. Khan
    network, that Pakistan has the capability. We have Musharraf in
    power, but there are a lot of hostile forces to him. The
    thought of that capability being turned over to more extreme
    forces gives me great pause.
        You have Iran on the quest for nuclear weapons, and North
    Korea. You have the former Soviet Union, and I am not quite
    sure to this day if we have a handle or accountability of the
    nuclear weapons that they had. So proliferation is a huge
    issue. And so detecting and deterring is very, very important.
    I think the focus of this hearing I guess with forensics is
    more after it is apprehended, or God forbid, after it has been
    detonated, where does it come from?
        And so, getting back to the database, because I share the
    chairman's concern about, and I understand some of this could
    be in a different setting, but the level of cooperation with
    many of these suspect countries I assume is very limited, if
    zero. So it raises the issue of the effectiveness of us, the
    United States, the administration, and the IAEA to effectively
    put some teeth into developing a database, so that we can truly
    trace back where this comes from if, God forbid, it happens.
        If this has already been answered, I apologize, but it is a
    question that I think is worth asking again in terms of any
    pressure that can be put on the IAEA or the United Nations to
    expand the database and have more cooperation throughout the
    world. That is for anybody on the panel.
        Mr. Grant. I will just answer one element of that that I
    think will provide you a little insight. Recently, in fact,
    Pakistan has decided to volunteer database material to the
    illicit trafficking database. Now, that is one of the only and
    few, really, standing databases where they can, if you will,
    demonstrate their cooperation for this issue. Also, just in the
    last couple of months, Pakistan has also become a Global
    Initiative partner. We expect them to participate in our Global
    Initiative activities on this particular issue.
        Again, these are very modest beginnings, but I think in
    that particular space recognizing the concerns for that
    country, along with the others who also participate, that is
    showing important steps forward for sharing our support and
    interest in this area.
        Mr. McCaul. Is there anything we in the Congress can be
    doing? Mr. Oxford, would you answer that? In addition to that
    question, is there anything we in the Congress can be doing to
    apply leverage?
        Mr. Oxford. First of all, to get to your latter question, I
    think just having this hearing and raising this subject is an
    important step. The interagency has been working hard the last
    year to identify what the gaps in capabilities are that we need
    to proceed with.
        Getting back to what Mr. Grant was saying, when the
    announcement of the Global Initiative first took place, there
    was a modest number of countries. I think there were about 13
    that first subscribed to that initiative. The number of
    countries now subscribing to the Global Initiative is 55. So we
    are seeing a willingness to at least start the dialogue. As Mr.
    Grant says, there is a lot of work yet to be done, but
    forensics is part of the work package that is being brought
    into the Global Initiative, and we think that is encouraging.
        Mr. McCaul. It certainly is.
        Dr. Burns, a specific question for you, the training of
    talent and expertise on this area of expertise is very
    challenging. Can you speak to the level of the workforce in
    this area, and also to retirements? I think most people that
    have had a lot of experience in nuclear forensics, we don't
    have that young talent that I think we need to have in this
    country.
        Ms. Burns. There has been some information that was self-
    professed by the laboratory, so this is self-reporting data
    now, that indicates if you try and identify the number of
    people who spend most of their time working on technical
    forensics problems, it is probably on the order of 20 to 30, a
    small number. Then if you look at the broader community within
    the laboratories that are spending a portion of their time
    working on technical forensics, it reaches to about 200.
        Now, if you look at the demographics associated with that,
    we find that in fact there is a challenge in that of the people
    who are spending full-time on the effort, those tend to be
    predominantly over 50, and in fact in some cases we have
    retirees staffing significant roles. So I think that proves
    that over the next 10 years, we will have a concern.
        Mr. McCaul. Any solution to that?
        Ms. Burns. Well, part of the solution is to identify
    additional people we can bring in and perhaps some of the
    education will go on through our educational system. But
    something else perhaps we can in fact do is make sure that our
    senior staff are provided with some time working on the
    programs specifically to mentor younger staff. That is very
    challenging financially for programs to support people who are
    largely serving in that sort of training function, but that
    knowledge transfer I think is going to be critical in the short
    term.
        Mr. McCaul. I agree.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the ranking member as well. I thought that the
    ranking member acquitted himself well this morning. I caught
    your performance.
        [Laughter.]
        Friends, it would seem to me that it is in the best
    interests of the communities of the world, meaning the nation-
    states, to work together on this type of endeavor. Can someone
    give me an indication as to how much cooperation we are
    receiving from the nation-states? And more specifically, which
    seem to find it an issue that they don't want to work
    cooperatively on or with us on?
        Mr. Grant. Just in review of the illicit trafficking
    database and the ITWG, the standing Technical Working Group
    that focuses on this issue, there are 28 countries that are
    participating in the ITWG right now. Now, the ITWG is
    establishing practices in these countries--and again, it is on
    a voluntary basis--to work with us and others who have perhaps
    a more robust capacity.
        In terms of pointing to challenging areas, I think many of
    us are aware of where those spaces might be. The Black Sea
    region we are most interested in. We are certainly interested
    in the Middle East as well. Some of those countries have been
    less supportive to be involved in technical nuclear forensics,
    but it is a list that includes members from all continents.
    Additionally, I think there is strong acceptance to recognizing
    the need to provide more detailed technical support or
    practices, if you will, procedurally to assist countries to
    develop their technical nuclear forensics capability.
        So these two forms--the ITV, the illicit trafficking
    database as it grows, based on the voluntary nature of the
    database, and then the ITWG, are good forums to be strengthened
    and for participation from global partners.
        Mr. Green. This may be beyond the scope of what you are
    here for, but it would help me if you can answer the question.
    It would seem to me that the detonation of a device of the
    magnitude that we are talking about would be harmful to the
    planet Earth as opposed to someplace on the planet Earth. Is
    there some truth to what I have said?
        Mr. Aoki. Certainly. Leaving aside the political impact,
    which would be devastating, and the local impact which would be
    devastating, there would also be measurable effects that could
    be detected around the world. Again, we have some history of
    nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We know that even at
    locations that were many hundreds of miles away from the test
    site, it was possible to identify radiation. So in that sense,
    certainly it will be true that there would be effects that
    would be observable and measurable a long distance away. Once
    one gets beyond a certain radius from the site of the event,
    those are not catastrophic effects, but they are something that
    people would be aware of and would have real effects on human
    health.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
        I am told that other members are returning and we may have
    enough for the markup. So with that, I am going to go to a
    second round.
        Well, with that, I am told we are going to as soon as we
    conclude at this point and then move to the markup, we will
    have enough time to conclude our business for the day.
        So with that, I want to thank the panel for their testimony
    here today. I will remind the panel that the panel may have
    additional questions. I would ask that the witnesses respond as
    expeditiously as possible to those questions in writing.
        At this time, the first panel of witnesses is dismissed.
    Again, I thank you for your time, your effort, and your service
    to the country. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]