[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY BEYOND OUR
BORDERS: EXAMINING THE STATUS OF COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION
OVERSEAS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 4, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-970 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
AL GREEN, Texas PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Alison Rosso, Director
Denise Krepp, Counsel
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Gobal Counterterrorism................... 2
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Rhode Island,................................ 32
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida........................................... 31
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California............................................ 29
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington................................... 35
Witnesses
Mr. Gary L. Cote, Deputy Assistant Director, Immigration and
Customs Enforcementd........................................... 31
Mr. Thomas V. Fuentes, Assistant Director, Office of
International Operations, Legal Attache Program, Federal Bureau
of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Principal Deputy Director, national
Counterterrorism Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Ambassador Marisa R. Lino, Assistant Secretary, International
Affairs, Office of the Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Edgar Moreno, Assistant Director, Domestic Operations, Bureau
of Diplomatic Security, Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
HOMELAND SECURITY BEYOND OUR
BORDERS: EXAMINING THE STATUS OF
COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION OVERSEAS
----------
Thursday, October 4, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and
Global Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Harman, Jackson Lee,
Cellar, Green, Souder, Reichert, McCaul, Bilirakis and
Langevin.
Ms. Sanchez. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of
Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas. I would like to thank
our witnesses for appearing before us today. This hearing was
originally scheduled for the end of July, and I appreciate your
cooperation in rescheduling and getting in front of us.
We are here today to discuss the important topic of
counterterrorism coordination overseas. In this subcommittee's
work on border security, maritime security, we spent a lot of
time discussing the idea of pushing our borders out, and this
concept involves performing critical Homeland Security
functions abroad, like screening travelers and cargo before
they arrive to the United States.
As a result of these efforts, the Department of Homeland
Security has about 1,300 employees from Customs, Border
Protection, Immigration Customs Enforcement and Secret Service
stationed abroad. These DHS employees perform critical work
related to pushing our borders out. They also have the
potential to make significant contributions to counterterrorism
work for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
State and intelligence agencies.
Unfortunately, the potential contribution of Homeland
Security agencies to counterterrorism work abroad does not seem
to be fully realized due to lack of coordination among all the
agencies that I have just mentioned. And I am in particular
concerned that after 6 years from 9/11, we are still struggling
to coordinate our Nation's counterterrorism work.
Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act to try to
address this problem, among many others. It requires that the
National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, to coordinate the
strategic operational planning for all of the government's
counterterrorism efforts. And while I understand that NCTC has
a general plan for this coordination from June of 2006, we have
no information on the development of operational guidance for
implementing that broad plan. And we have heard from agencies
within the Department of Homeland Security that they have not
received clear guidance from the Department or from NCTC on how
to best coordinate counterterrorism work with other agencies.
And quite frankly, that is unacceptable. As the committee who
has oversight on this, we believe that NCTC must do a better
job of coordinating those counterterrorism efforts. If people
are out there, and they haven't received directive, we need to
fix that.
So I look forward to hearing from NCTC about the progress
in developing the National Implementation Plan that would
achieve this coordination. And I am also interested in hearing
from our other witnesses about their agencies' experiences
carrying out their counterterrorism missions. It is very easy
to get caught up in jurisdictional battles. We have that here
in the Congress, and we have seen it quite a bit. But when it
comes to counterterrorism efforts, we really have to rise above
that. We have to figure out what we have out in the field and
how best we can utilize them to do really the number one thing
that Americans expect us to do with respect to Homeland
Security, and that is stop things from ever happening.
So I thank you for being before us, and I will now ask my
Ranking Member if he has an opening statement.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. I do.
The Committee on Homeland Security was specifically formed
after the tragic events on September 11, 2001, in order to
provide oversight and support to the new Homeland Security
Department and to monitor our Nation's counterterrorism
defenses. There is no doubt that Al-Qa'ida and related
terrorist cells want access to America and our allies to carry
out attacks, to raise money and to search for vulnerabilities.
We have held hearings in the previous two Congresses on
strengthening the security of our documents, disrupting
smuggling organizations and establishing layered security to
counter the terrorist threat.
Today's hearing examines another important area: how U.S.
law enforcement agencies work with each other and host nations
overseas to deter and disrupt terrorism. The witnesses here
today represent most of the major players and have between them
over 128 years of government service.
I appreciate your presence here today and your service to
your country, but I would also like to express my appreciation
to GAO for their efforts in the May 2007 report, Combating
Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist
Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt and Prosecute Terrorists,
which examined the issue of counterterrorism coordination. They
have been very helpful to the committee as we prepare for
today's hearing.
I want to hear from the witnesses on the issue of
coordination of efforts and clarity of mission. I want to
understand what additional resources and programs have been
implemented since 9/11, as well as where we hope our overseas
presence and what we hope it looks like in 5 years.
I think the most important thing to examine today is the
role intelligence plays, how it is shared, what impact does it
have on operations and investigations, and where are the areas
for improvement.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding today's hearing. I look
forward to working with you on these issues. And I yield back
the balance of my time.
Ms. Sanchez. And I thank my Ranking Member.
Other members on this subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
Ms. Sanchez. So I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first
witness is Mr. Michael Leiter, Principal Deputy Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center. And prior to joining NCTC,
Mr. Leiter served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, where he assisted in
the establishment of ODNI and coordinated all internal and
external operations for ODNI, including relationships with the
White House; the Departments of Defense, State, Justice,
Homeland Security; the CIA and Congress. And he was also
involved in the development of national intelligence centers,
including NCTC.
Welcome.
And our second witness will be Ambassador Marisa Lino,
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs with the
Department of Homeland Security. And in that capacity, she
plays a central role in developing the Department's
international strategy and in formulating and implementing the
Department's mission overseas. Ambassador Lino has 30 years of
distinguished services in the Foreign Service, where she held
overseas positions in Albania, Italy, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq,
Peru, and she served as the Ambassador to the Republic of
Albania from 1996 to 1999.
Welcome.
Our third witness is Mr. Gary Cote, Deputy Assistant
Director for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of
International Affairs. Mr. Cote has 33 years of law enforcement
experience, serving in numerous capacities with the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service and ICE. Much of his
work has focused on the growing problem of transnational
crimes, with a nexus to the United States including organized
crime, human trafficking and smuggling, as well as visa
security matters.
Welcome.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Edgar Moreno, Assistant Director
for Domestic Operations for the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, and in that capacity he is responsible for
managing and directing Department of State activities within
the United States, including all of the field officers,
criminal investigations, counterintelligence and protection
operations. And before his appointment in June of 2007, Mr.
Moreno served as the Special Agent in Charge of the Miami field
office, where he oversaw criminal investigative programs that
focused on passport and visa fraud, interagency cooperation and
asset forfeiture.
Welcome.
And our fifth and final witness is Thomas Fuentes,
Assistant Director of International Operations at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. In that position he manages more than
75 FBI offices in U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide. Mr.
Fuentes has served in various positions at the FBI since being
appointed a special agent in 1979, including Chief of the
Organized Crime Section at FBI headquarters. He has also
developed and managed several initiatives to combat
international organized crime, and has represented the FBI on
numerous international working groups.
Welcome this morning also, Mr. Fuentes.
So without objection, all of your full statements will be
inserted into the record. And I now ask each witness to
summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes. And we will begin
with Mr. Leiter. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member
Souder, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you very
much for the opportunity to come and speak to the committee
about NCTC's role in coordinating the war on terror.
I would like to briefly try to address what NCTC does with
respect to coordinating operations overseas, and more
specifically our role in coordinating law enforcement
activities. Before I do that, I want to again briefly describe
the roles that NCTC plays consistent with the Intelligence
Reform Act in 2004.
NCTC is, in fact, responsible for planning and integrating
all elements of national power for the U.S. Government in the
war on terror. Our intent is to take the high-level strategic
policy promulgated by the White House and translate that into
coordinated actionable tasks for departments and agencies to
pursue their own mission. The principal overarching result of
this planning is, as the Chairwoman has stated, the National
Implementation Plan, or NIP, which was approved by the
President in June of 2006.
I am going to very briefly describe some of the key
elements of the NIP, but let me first note that there are four
parts to the NIP, and the first element is attacking terrorist
capability overseas. The second is countering violent Islamic
extremism. The third is protecting and defending the homeland.
And the fourth is avoiding terrorist acquisition of WMD.
Supporting all of these is what we call a cross-cutting
enabler, and that is, in fact, promulgating and supporting our
foreign partners in a way our foreign partners can in turn
support our efforts overseas.
Second, each of those four components is supported by very,
very specific tasks, and each of those tasks is given then to a
department or agency that has responsibility for coordinating
the interagency efforts. As we can talk about later, many of
those actions involve overseas work involving law enforcement
agencies, and others are, of course, coordinated by the
Department of State, which plays that role as a matter of
statute.
Third, we not only plan, but we do, in fact, seek to
coordinate and integrate the synchronization of all these joint
departmental activities.
Fourth, the NIP is a planning document that is also used by
the Office of Management and Budget, and OMB, in conjunction
with NCTC, works with the NIP to make sure that department and
agency programs are, in fact, supporting the tasks and
objectives of the NIP.
Finally, I want to stress one thing that the NIP and NCTC
does not do, and this is a matter of statutory direction. We do
not direct operational activity. We are, in fact, responsible
for strategic operational planning, but ultimately we rely on
individual departments and agencies and their statutory
authorities to carry out operations.
With that, I would move briefly to how we specifically
support efforts overseas and law enforcement more specifically.
First, we put the highest priorities, as I have already noted,
on working with our partners overseas. This is clearly the
fight, the war on terror, that cannot be won by the U.S.
Government alone. So much of our effort focuses on both
enabling capability overseas and also doing operations where we
are permitted by our host nation.
Let me give you a quick example of where we do that, and
one is trying to limit terrorist travel within and across
borders. The NIP enables the tracking of potential terrorists
as they move between nations to obtain training, recruit new
terrorists, position themselves operationally or move money and
equipment. And along these lines, the NIP encourages foreign
partners to use all their means, criminal, economic, regulatory
and intelligence, to ensure that we, in fact, get the support
that we need.
Now, within this broader effort again fall the subcategory
of law enforcement activities. And again, law enforcement
activities are a subcategory because in many instances in many
countries it is quite difficult to distinguish between what is
a law enforcement agency, what is an internal security agency
and what is an intelligence operation. So we at NCTC try to
take a broader view and work with all of our components, both
our partners at this table and others. From my perspective,
this partnership between NCTC and the agency sitting at this
table works relatively well. Certainly overseas country teams,
I believe, are quite well coordinated, and here in Washington
we work very closely together.
Now, that being said, I am not at all stating that we don't
have a long way to go. Although we have a cohesive strategic
plan that assigns individual cabinets and agencies
responsibility, we continue to work both in Washington and
overseas to make sure those partnerships are optimized. And we
at NCTC are certainly committed to doing so, and we welcome the
opportunity to come and brief the committee and its staff more
fully on more specific and classified characteristics of the
NIP.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. I think we are going to need that
classified hearing in order for us to do our work. Thank you
for your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Leiter
Chairman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in regards to the status of US
Government counterterrorism (CT) efforts overseas. My testimony
addresses three points: (1) NCTC's overall role in coordinating the US
Government's strategic plan for the War on Terror; (2) NCTC's more
specific role in coordinating counterterrorism efforts overseas; and
(3) how the coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies fits into the U.S.
government's larger, counterterrorism efforts overseas.
To begin I would like to summarize very briefly the role NCTC does-
and does not--play in coordinating the US Government's efforts in the
War on Terror. Doing so is, I believe, especially important given the
very innovative and groundbreaking nature of Strategic Operational
Planning (SOP)--the rubric under which NCTC operates in this realm.
NCTC, as directed by Congress and the President through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is
responsible for strategic operational planning and integrating all
elements of national power, for the US Government's efforts War on
Terror (WOT). Our goal is to translate US counterterrorism policy and
strategy into coordinated, actionable tasks for individual departments
and agencies. The result our planning is a landmark document--the
National Implementation Plan or NIP, which was approved by the
President in June 2006--the first-ever US Government-wide strategic war
plan for countering terrorism.
This war plan does not stand alone. Rather, it complements two
types of planning efforts that have long existed and continue to exist-
high-level national trategies directed by the President and the'
National Security and Homeland Security Councils, and very granular and
tactical department and agency-specific implementation plans. By
filling this void between high level strategies and the efforts of
individual departments and agencies, efforts, and the NIP in
particular, are designed to fill a gap that previously hindered
interagency coordination at a strategic level.
Let me briefly describe five of the most critical characteristics
of the NIP. First, the NIP groups all of the nation's efforts into four
components: protecting and defending the Homeland and US interest
abroad, attacking terrorists and their capacity to operate, countering
violent extremism, and preventing terrorists' acquisition or use of
weapons of mass destruction.
Second, and of significant importance to both providing a
relatively granular ``playbook'' and requiring accountability, each of
these four component capabilities is supported by strategic objectives
and specific tasks. Each of the tasks is assigned to a Cabinet-level
officer for action and other Cabinet officers for support. Each
department or agency is responsible for generating an individual
supporting plan, which is to articulate how that element of the
Government will execute the individual tasks for which it is assigned a
lead role. In the cases where there are lead and supporting agencies,
the lead agency is given the task of deconflicting each agency's plan.
Third, our efforts do not stop at the planning stage. Rather, we
also seek to ensure the coordination, integration, and synchronization
of joint departmental operations, and monitor the combined impact of
multiple agencies engaged in implementing the plans and tasks. As part
of our responsibility, we assess how our plans are impacting the enemy
so we may tailor them accordingly in the future: NCTC oversees a
monitoring process requiring lead and partner departments and agencies
to submit status reports on the execution of tasks, the level of
interagency coordination, the identification of impediments, and
adequacy of resourcing .
Fourth, the NIP helps to guide resource allocation. Specifically,
NCTC and the Office of Management and Budget have provided guidance to
departments and agencies to ensure their budget requests (for FY-09)
align with and will adequately resource priorities identified in the
NIP, including a number related to USG efforts to expand foreign
partnerships and partner capacity in the War on Terror.
Finally, an important part about what the NIP--and the NCTC more
boradly--does not do: Neither directs specific operations. In fact, the
specifically prohibits the Director of NCTC from ``direct[ing] the
execution of counterterrorism operations.'' This final note is of
critical importance, for although NCTC is responsible for strategic
operational planning, we must ultimately rely on individual departments
and agencies--those organizations with explicit statutory authorities
and responsibilities, as well as the greatest expertise and
experience--to execute the tasks and activities necessary to execute
the War on Terror.
With that background, I would like to move to how NCTC participates
in the coordination of overseas counterterrorism efforts in general and
how we view Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) coordination more
specifically.
As the lead agency for coordination, integration, and
synchronization of all US Counterterrorism (CT) efforts, NCTC puts the
highest priority on the strategic coordination of overseas
counterterrorism efforts in order to combat terrorism worldwide and,
more specifically, to protect American lives. Although we and our
allies have had tremendous successes in the War on Terror, we face a
determined enemy. Protecting the homeland from another catastrophic
attack requires more then simply a hardening of our borders; rather, we
must work closely and tirelessly with foreign law enforcement,
security, and intelligence agencies to identify, deter, detain, and
prosecute terrorists operating within their domain.
Last year's foiled United Kingdom aviation plot showed how vital
the role of foreign partners are in preventing terrorist attacks on
Americans. In that case, it was only with our foreign law enforcement
and intelligence partners that we were able to monitor and track
effectively terror plotters developing plans against the United States
overseas. In the process, our foreign partners must perform a very
difficult, but essential, balancing act: providing us with key
intelligence on the advancement of plots while allowing for eventual
detainment and successful prosecution of the plotters, all while
providing the appropriate protection for civil liberties.
The NIP directs both lead and partner departments and agencies to
work together in a coordinated, integrated, and synchronized manner in
order to cooperate with, and assist foreign partners in, a multitude of
diverse ways. Expanding foreign capacity furthers each of the four NIP
components. In simpler terms, expanding foreign capacity is a baseline
capability that permits each of the four component strategic objectives
to be achieved.
Although I cannot go into extensive detail in open session as to
the types of tasks that comprise this area within the NIP, I would like
to offer several examples where developing foreign capacity is
particularly important.
As this Committee is well aware, countering the violent extremist
message is of utmost importance to winning the War on Terror. In this
regard, the NIP includes several tasks that relate to the need for US
departments and agencies to work with foreign partners--LEAS and
beyond--to combat extremist messaging and counter radicalization.
The NIP also directs departments and agencies to help foreign
partners build their capacity to limit terrorist travel, including
crossing international borders. In addition, it seeks to ensure that
these capabilities, as they are developed, link appropriately to US
capabilities.
Finally, I would note that the NIP highlights the importance of
strengthening not only our foreign partners' capabilities, but also the
willingness of those foreign governments to use all means at their
disposal, to include economic, regulatory, and criminal sanctions. This
point may seem obvious, but developing a capability serves little
purpose if there is not an accompanying will to use that capability.
Within the broader category of expanding foreign capacity falls a
subcategory of activity--coordinating the overseas efforts of LEA's. As
is the case with most of the NIP tasks that require overseas activity,
the State Department is as a general matter charged with directing,
managing, and coordinating all US Government efforts to develop and
provide counterterrorism capacity within each host nation. The State
Department--partnering with the law enforcement elements of the USGO--
is the best positioned department to lead our overseas coordination
efforts.
Every country has a unique intelligence and law enforcement
structure. Domestic police and intelligence functions may be shared by
a single entity or separated in a variety of organizational constructs.
Moreover, the different foreign partners and their components have
varied preferences as to how they desire to partner with the United
States and its law enforcement and intelligence elements. The decision
on how to cooperate must literally be made on a country by country
basis. State serving as the lead for these tasks ensures that Chiefs of
Mission around the world can fully and appropriately guide all US
activities within the host nations.
Within the broader mission of working with overseas partners in the
War on Terror, the NIP recognizes the importance of US LEAs. Again, the
NIP-in many of its specific tasks--gives lead authority to the State
Department to coordinate the efforts of organizations like the FBI,
DEA, ICE, CBP, and Secret Service to achieve the NIP's strategic goals.
For example, the NIP focuses on building partner nation capacity to
deny terrorists access to resources that facilitate travel. Thus,
several agencies are tasked to work with foreign partners to identify
and close down alien smuggling networks and document forgery cells. In
this instance, as in most tasks associated with foreign partners, the
State Department has the lead, but is partnered with the law
enforcement agencies that bring the expertise and resources to carry
out the NIP task.
For greater specificity on how various coordinate their efforts--
both overseas and in Washington--I defer to my colleagues here today.
Their Departments work together in a variety of contexts on a day-to-
day basis, conducting operations and developing foreign partner
capacity critical to combating terrorism.
None of what I have said here should be understood to mean that we
no longer face real and significant challenges. We recognize the need
to continuously monitor our progress, objectively evaluate our success,
openly acknowledge our failures, and do all that we must to improve and
mature our strategies, plans, and procedures in order to support an
enduring counterterrorism capability. This is true for the broad
mission of working with foreign partners, as well as the narrower
mission of coordinating LEA activity.
In closing, I would reiterate we have come a long way in the last
two years. For the first time, we have a cohesive strategic plan that
assigns individual cabinet departments action on an enormous array of
tasks, many of which focus on working outside of the US with our
foreign partners. In doing so, we aim to have a system wherein US LEAs
can, where permitted, pursue operational activity with their foreign
partners, as well as help those same foreign partners develop their own
capabilities. And as core elements of government power, we at NCTC are
committed to ensuring that LEAS--acting under the guidance of Chiefs of
Mission all over the world--take coordinated action to protect the US,
US interests, and our allies.
Ms. Sanchez. And I now recognize the Ambassador. Welcome.
Please, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARISA R. LINO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Ms. Lino. Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder,
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
testify before you today. I was going to start by briefly
introducing myself because I am new, but for the most part you
have done that, Madam Chairwoman.
I would simply add that after I retired from the State
Department, I also spent 3 years in the academic world. I began
at DHS in March of this year as an advisor to the Secretary on
international affairs, and he named me in July as Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs. My office is tasked with
coordinating DHS's international activities and with providing
policy guidance for international engagement.
Obviously I believe it vitally important to develop close
partnerships with our overseas counterparts and cooperative
activities with our close allies in order to protect the
homeland effectively. Terrorists look to exploit our
vulnerabilities, so we must fashion an international response
that goes beyond traditional cooperation for law enforcement.
At the same time, it is vitally important to our economy to
permit legitimate travel and commerce to proceed smoothly and
with a minimum of obstacles.
Capacity building as a means of addressing security
vulnerabilities is one of the most cost-effective and lasting
force multipliers for our efforts overseas. One way that DHS
adds value is by providing a significant amount of
international training and technical assistance to foreign law
enforcement agencies in areas such as maritime security, border
management, fraudulent document detection and so on. Virtually
all of our training and technical assistance is work
collaboratively with the State Department and other agencies in
using State and DOD funding and subject to State and DOD
priorities.
DHS participates in a host of interagency committees and
working groups with these same agencies. We work closely with
State, DOD, Justice and others, both in the United States and
overseas, in support of various overseas programs.
As you have mentioned, we have significant numbers of
personnel based overseas, but these are primarily in
operational functions. They work collaboratively with other
agencies in achieving their objectives. Since most are
operational, they work in airports, at seaports, at border
crossing points, working side by side with host government
officials in programs such as the Container Security
Initiative, the Immigration Advisory Program, the Port Security
Program, the Visa Security Program and others.
Our people are involved in a wide range of activities
overseas from investigations of human smuggling and trafficking
to financial crimes, to immigration fraud and human rights
violations. Some of our people do work in embassies, where they
are fully-fledged members of the Ambassador's country team.
In my written testimony I have provided over a dozen
examples of the types of activities which DHS personnel are
engaged in overseas, some of which, as I mentioned, are work
collaboratively with some of the other agencies at this table.
In closing, I would add that in my few short months at DHS,
I have been privileged to work with a group of incredibly
dedicated and driven individuals, totally devoted to this
country's safety and security. I was attracted to my position
at DHS because the security of the homeland depends a great
deal on our success in building international cooperation and
partnerships. Throughout my professional career, I have worked
on building bridges internationally, and it is an area in which
I believe I have something to contribute. I am very proud that
my office consists of an outstanding group of people who have
already accomplished a great deal and are eager to do more,
much more. I feel the same way about my interagency colleagues
working on the same issues. The challenges we face together are
great, but the consequences of not achieving our goals are even
greater.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify before you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. And I thank you
for your testimony.
[The statement of Ms. Lino follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marisa R. Lino
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you today on the subject
of ``Homeland Security Beyond our Borders: Examining the Status of
Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas.''
As this is my first time appearing before the Subcommittee, I would
like to introduce myself. I joined the Department as an advisor on
international affairs March 5, 2007 and was appointed Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security by Secretary Michael Chertoff on July 23, 2007. The Office of
International Affairs (OIA) is part of the Policy Office at DHS and has
primary responsibility for international affairs at the Department. As
such, OIA is charged with managing international activities and
providing policy guidance on the direction of DHS international
engagement to ensure that our overseas activities support fully the
Department's goals and mission.
In my statement I intend to touch on three themes: the security of
the homeland depends on international cooperation and partnerships; we
can build capacity in our partners by continuing to provide training
and technical assistance; and we work cooperatively and coordinate
effectively within the U.S. Government interagency.
Let me begin by giving you a sense of the magnitude of the
Department of Homeland Security's activities overseas. We have over
1700 personnel assigned outside of the United States in approximately
70 different countries. That may seem to be an extraordinarily high
number for an agency devoted to securing the homeland from terrorist
attacks and natural disasters, as well as responding to these attacks.
However, I believe it fairly self-evident that to engage effectively in
global counterterrorism we must work closely with our international
partners.
Much of what we do to protect the United States begins overseas and
requires us to develop close partnerships with our counterparts and to
establish cooperative activities with our allies. DHS international
engagement is an extension of domestic policies and programs into the
international arena. Of course, cooperation and coordination begin at
home, within the U.S. Government, but I will comment further on that in
a moment.
Promoting international consensus and enhancing regional efforts to
combat terrorism remain key priorities of this government. We view
terrorism as a common threat that exploits shared vulnerabilities,
requiring a concerted international effort across international borders
and critical infrastructure. By partnering with our international
friends and allies, we strengthen our nation's security, by reducing
risk and building resiliency. At the same time, we are very cognizant
of the need for such areas as travel and trade to prosper and therefore
attempt to implement security efforts without undermining the ability
of these systems to function.
Our ``ounce of prevention'' does not begin at the U.S. coastline or
border. It begins before a person sets foot on an airplane bound for
the U.S. or before a container is loaded onto a ship bound for a U.S.
port. Terrorism today is a globalized and networked phenomenon. Because
we live in a globally interdependent society, the threat of terrorists
continually trying to utilize the same assets, systems, and networks
that we have deemed ``critical'' to our nation does not stop at our
borders. Experience shows that terrorists do not respect international
boundaries; do not feel restricted by them, and will attempt to exploit
them in any way possible. So we are constantly engaged in the sharing
of lessons learned and best practices for risk reduction; of creating
better mechanisms for the sharing of threat information and
intelligence; promoting joint law enforcement efforts; and working with
our allies to develop international standards in areas such as aviation
and maritime security.
One way DHS adds value to the U.S. Government's overseas programs
is by making available training and technical assistance to foreign law
enforcement agencies based on the expertise developed through domestic
operations. The recognized subject matter expert in the areas of
maritime security, border management and fraudulent document detection,
DHS currently provides a significant amount of training and technical
assistance (T/TA) to foreign partners. In doing so, DHS relies on the
priorities and parameters set by the funding agencies in delivering
technical assistance to foreign governments and law enforcement
organizations. The funding agencies ultimately determine the countries
to receive assistance, the scope of work performed, and the
programs'duration. Capacity building as a means to address security
vulnerabilities before they threaten our shores is the most cost
effective and lasting force multiplier to U.S efforts in combating
terrorism.
Interagency coordination and cooperation are key to achieving DHS'
goals and objectives. As you well know, the lessons of 9/11 drove the
creation of the Department I represent. It is precisely because we
needed to coordinate our efforts and share information that personnel
from 22 different agencies were merged into one DHS, in the largest
U.S. Government reorganization since the 1947 National Security Act.
The Department's mandate to protect the homeland against man-made and
natural disasters was the vision driving that massive reorganization.
The expansion of DHS's Office of International Affairs now provides the
Department with the depth of staffing necessary to work with the
interagency as an equal partner and contributor to the larger USG
efforts abroad. My staff collaborates regularly with the Departments of
State, Defense, Justice, Commerce and others in support of programs
such as Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS),
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Overseas
Prosecutorial Development Assistance (OPDAT).
Since the Department's founding in 2003, we have made enormous
progress, which continues, in both internal and interagency
coordination and cooperation. Today, you will find DHS representatives
on a wide range of interagency working groups focused on countering
terrorism. Examples include the Terrorist Financing Working Group, the
Maritime Security Working Group, the Biometrics Coordination Group, and
the National Implementation Plan Strategic Coordination Working Groups.
We are equally determined to expand our overseas activities in areas
where our contributions can have the greatest impact. For example,
during the June 5--6 Counterterrorism Trilateral (United States, Japan,
and Australia) Meeting, in which DHS participated in an interagency
delegation led by the State Department, senior officials from DHS
engaged in a series of discussions on collaborative capacity building.
The group reached consensus on a number of capacity building work
streams to enable countries in Southeast Asia to better respond to the
threat of terrorism. Discussions consistently underscored the need for
greater DHS investment and engagement in the region in capacity
building where DHS has unique skill sets.
Our overseas personnel aim at preventing acts of terrorism by
interdicting the people, money and materials that support terrorist and
criminal activities. They are engaged in activities from border and
transportation security to customs investigations and refugee
processing. Our programs include such major and important efforts such
as the Container Security Initiative, the Immigration Advisory Program,
the Port Security Program, the Visa Security Program and the Pre
Clearance Program.
Virtually all our overseas personnel are operational, not
representative, and they engage directly in programs run by one of DHS'
components. Among DHS components, the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (DHS-ICE), the Customs and Border Protection (DHSCBP), the
U.S. Coast Guard (DHS-USCG) and the U. S. Secret Service (DHS-USSS)
have the most substantial international programs and presence overseas,
although the Transportation Security Administration (DHS-TSA), the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (DHSUSCIS) and the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) have
international activities and personnel overseas as well.
Some of our overseas personnel are assigned to embassies; the rest
work in locations related directly to their programs: airports, sea
ports, border crossing stations, and so on. Our law enforcement
personnel overseas, including DHS-ICE, DHS-CBP and DHS-USSS, are
involved in a wide range of activities, including: investigations of
human smuggling and trafficking; narcotics, weapons and all other
contraband smuggling; export enforcement, such as investigating illegal
arms exports and exports of dual-use equipment that may threaten
national security; financial crimes, such as money laundering,
commercial fraud, intellectual property rights (including commercial
counterfeiting) violations; cyber crime; immigration fraud; and human
rights violations.
DHS personnel provide the critical link for the U.S. Government in
cooperative efforts with partner nations as we build networks to
disrupt terrorist goals and activities. Our own goals and objectives
are simple and straightforward. We aim to continue to protect our
nation from dangerous people and dangerous goods; we seek to continue
to protect the critical infrastructure of our nation; we work to build
a culture of preparedness; and we strive to strengthen and unify DHS
operations.
As I have said, some of our overseas personnel work in embassies;
approximately 150 senior DHS representatives are the DHS lead for
interagency coordination and cooperation. They are fully-fledged
members of the Embassy Country Team, and as such, respond to the
Ambassador's overall direction as well as to their respective DHS home
offices in the U.S.
Coordination and cooperation overseas is a two-pronged effort.
Clearly, the Ambassador, as the President's personal representative,
provides guidance on how the Country Team will operate and how best to
approach a host government on counterterrorism efforts. That leadership
is the key to ensuring that disparate agencies in the mission
collaborate effectively. In Washington, the agencies of the U.S.
Government involved in counterterrorism activities strive through the
interagency process to provide our people in the field guidance on best
approaches. Is either part of this two-pronged effort perfect? Of
course, the answer is no. However, I can tell you that in the few short
months I have been at DHS, I have seen no sign of complacency. On the
contrary, I feel honored to work with a group of incredibly dedicated
and driven individuals, totally devoted to this country's safety and
security. I feel the same way about my interagency colleagues working
on the same issues, be they from any agency of the U.S. Government. The
challenge we face together is great, but the consequences of not
achieving our goals are even greater.
A few simple numbers tell the story very clearly of what we are
facing. I may be repeating some facts and figures you have heard
before, but I believe describing the magnitude of the problems we are
dealing with provides important context for the issue we are discussing
today: every year, more than 500 million people, 130 million motor
vehicles, 2 1/2 million railcars, and more than 11 million containers
are processed at our land borders, airports and 317 sea ports. These
staggering numbers demonstrate better than any selected examples might
do that the United States forms part of a critical global economic
network, requiring an international dimension to all of DHS' efforts to
secure the homeland. Security does not start at our land, air, sea
border.
In the spirit of better describing for you what our overseas
personnel are doing, I would like to cite a few examples of their
excellent work and activities:
This fiscal year alone, the DHS-ICE Forensic Document
Laboratory (FDL) has trained more than 1,900 individuals in
locations all over the world, including the United States,
South Africa, El Salvador, Botswana, Jordan, Trinidad & Tobago,
Kenya, Turkey, and Yemen. The FDL is the premier forensic
document laboratory in the world and is a forensic crime
laboratory dedicated to fraudulent document detection and
deterrence. Providing a wide variety of forensic and support
services to all DHS components, the FDL also supports other
federal, state, and local agencies, as well as foreign
government law enforcement and border control entities. The FDL
is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to disrupting
terrorist travel and works both domestically and
internationally to strengthen international travel documents.
Real-time support is provided 24 hours a day, 365 days a year
to assist all federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers with questioned documents.
The Customs--Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Program (C-TPAT) is an element of a continuum of supply chain
security through which DHS-CBP and members of the international
trade community have been working together successfully to
implement measures to secure the global supply chain. Further,
DHS-CBP is working with foreign governments to establish and
mutually recognize similar programs around the world. Mutual
recognition pilot projects currently include New Zealand,
Jordan, and members of the European Union.
DHS-TSA has initiated a Cross Border Pipeline
Assessment Program that requires the United States and Canada
to conduct visits to critical cross-border pipeline
infrastructure, identify security gaps, and recommend
protective measures to mitigate those gaps. In addition, TSA
has partnered with Natural Resources Canada to assess four
pipeline systems to date. As of June 2007, approximately 85
percent of the country's natural gas pipeline systems have been
evaluated.
DHS/Office of Infrastructure Protection conducted
several joint risk assessments with their Canadian and Mexican
counterparts on cross-border critical infrastructure. They
responded to the recent events in London by immediately
deploying a team of experts from their Office of Bombing
prevention to add their expertise. Additionally they have been
able to bring international attention to the importance of
critical infrastructure protection is such multi-lateral forums
as the G8, OAS, and the EU.
The Coast Guard manages the International Port Security
(IPS) Program which seeks to promote improved foreign port
security by engaging in bilateral and multilateral discussions
with trading nations in order to share and align maritime
security practices. The program assesses the anti-terrorism
measures in place in foreign ports through IPS Program visits
to see how these ports meet the internationally accepted
standard (the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code). Employing a team of uniquely trained port facility
security specialists, the Coast Guard IPS Program has visited
100 countries since 2004. These 100 countries are responsible
for over 80% of the vessel arrivals to the United States. The
remaining 45 country visits will be completed by early CY 2008.
The implementation of DHS-CBP's Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP), which provides for the deployment of DHS-CBP
officers to some of the largest, busiest airports around the
world, to work with foreign immigration authorities and air
carriers, to target and identify airline passengers who may
pose a terrorist threat or are otherwise inadmissible before
they can enter the United States. DHS-CBP currently has IAP
representatives stationed in London, Tokyo, Warsaw, and
Amsterdam and is working with other governments to expand our
IAP representation to other critical airports.
DHS-ICE's Visa Security Program (VSP), a
counterterrorism program in 9 posts in 8 countries, performs
proactive law enforcement vetting and investigation of visa
applicants and works to uncover threats to homeland security.
The goal is to identify not-yet-known terrorist or criminal
suspects and stop them before they get to the United States. In
one recent case, following interviews and vetting activities,
VSP identified a relationship between a visa applicant and 30
individuals, 24 of them not-yet-known to the USG, who were
closely tied with known terrorist associates and subjects of
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) investigations. As an
outcome, Department of State and VSP created multiple new
terrorist watchlist records. To further its mission, VSP has
developed a five-year expansion plan that will cover 75% of the
highest-risk visa activity globally and increase the VSP
footprint to more than 140 resources in over 40.
DHS-CBP has been working through the World Customs
Organization to draft, adopt and implement the Framework for
Security and Facility in the Global Environment (SAFE Framework
of Standards). This Framework of Standards is being used by 144
nations to leverage customs authorities and resources to secure
and facilitate international trade--and protect global supply
lines from being used by terrorists to transport weapons. The
Framework calls for a common approach to risk management, the
use of advance data and non-intrusive inspection technology and
partnerships between customs authorities and with members of
the international trade community to secure the global supply
chain.
DHS-ICE and DHS-USSS worked with the Mexican
authorities on a major case in Mexico City following the
seizure of almost $5 million in laundered monies, which was
believed to be counterfeit and later deemed to be legitimate.
The money, hidden in air conditioning equipment, was seized by
Mexican Customs, working with DHS-ICE.
DHS-ICE has achieved significant progress in working
with other countries to implement speedy processing of the
repatriation of illegal aliens. In Fiscal Year 2006, DHS-ICE
removed 192,171 illegal aliens, including 88,217 criminals, a
13 percent increase in total removals and a four-percent
increase in criminal removals over the prior Fiscal Year. DHS-
ICE officials have encouraged non-cooperating countries to
issue travel documents. The DHS-ICE Electronic Travel Document
Program has shortened the processing and detention times for
removal of aliens.
For over nine years, DHS-USSS has investigated the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency and other U.S. payment and
identity documents manufactured in Bulgaria. In December 2001,
the USSS began a new chapter in its Bulgarian counterfeit
investigations when the Bulgarian National Bank notified them
of the deposit of very high quality counterfeit U.S. Federal
Reserve Notes. Thorough forensic analysis of these counterfeit
notes revealed they were allied to a similar family of
counterfeit notes, which the U.S. media had previously dubbed
as the ``Supernote.'' The ``Supernote'' investigation is one of
the Service's most important international cases.
DHS-ICE, DHS-CBP and DHS-USCG participate in Integrated
Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) with their Canadian
counterparts, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and
Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA) along the U.S.-Canadian
border. IBETs aim to enhance shared border integrity and
security between ports of entry by identifying, investigating
and interdicting persons, organizations and goods that threaten
the national security of one or both countries, or that are
involved in organized criminal activity.
Each year, the Coast Guard deploys approximately 100
Mobile Training Team (MTT) missions to an estimated 50
countries, hosts an average of 300 international resident
students in Coast Guard schoolhouses located in the U.S., and
responds to more than 400 requests for technical assistance in
the form of subject matter experts. These international
training efforts created force multipliers for U. S. strategic
goals by developing proficient officer and enlisted corps among
partner nations and by inculcating in foreign partners the need
for an interagency response to crisis management scenarios.
DHS-Policy and US-VISIT are working with international
partners Australia, Canada, and the U.K. (Four Country
Conference) to improve transnational immigration and border
security methods and processes. Efforts to this end include
analysis of data sharing arrangements; study of the business,
policy, legal, process and technical aspects of biometric data
sharing; discussion of identity management processes; analysis
of risk assessment capabilities and best practices; and
improved communication of watchlists. This multinational
coordination and cooperation effort improves and strengthens
our ability to identify individuals who are threats to the
homeland.
In support of DHS components' and other Federal
agencies' law enforcement and counterterrorism missions, DHS'
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provides
international training and technical assistance to foreign
police and criminal justice officers and officials. FLETC
presents advanced and basic law enforcement programs overseas,
administers an International Visitors Program that hosts
foreign delegations visiting our training sites, and processes
individual foreign student requests to participate in law
enforcement training offered by FLETC. FLETC has management
oversight for the International Law Enforcement Academies in
Botswana and El Salvador, and provides support to the ILEAs in
Hungary and Thailand.
I would like to wrap up my three themes by giving you
my very personal perspective on these issues. You all know very
well the Department was established just over four years ago.
It is a work in progress and there is still much to do, but not
for lack of effort on the part of many good people who care
deeply about the safety and security of our nation. I was
attracted to my position at DHS because the security of the
homeland depends a great deal on our success in building
international cooperation and partnerships. Throughout my
professional career I have worked on building bridges
internationally and it is an area where I believe I have
something to contribute. I am also fortunate that my office
consists of an outstanding group of people who already have
accomplished a great deal and are eager to do more. With
respect to our overseas presence, we still have work to do in
building a unified DHS. I have met with the DHS teams in Tokyo
and Beijing and I have been impressed by the team spirit and
approach. But more needs to be done. Our international presence
and our international activities are the frontline of our
security. Last, but not least, interagency cooperation is
critical to success in our efforts overseas and I believe all
of us at DHS work hard to make this happen.
In closing, I would remind all that terrorism is not a threat we
face alone. As we have seen around the world--in London, in Bali,
Madrid, Riyadh and Islamabad--terrorism is a threat faced by all
countries. In the same way, we cannot win this war alone; we need our
friends and allies to cooperate with us to win. They fight the same
threat, face the same risks and oppose the same enemy.
Ms. Sanchez. I now recognize Mr. Cote to summarize your
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY L. COTE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Cote. Madam Chairwoman, my comments are included with
Ambassador Lino's as part of the DHS.
Ms. Sanchez. That is brief.
And I now recognize Mr. Moreno to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDGAR MORENO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
OPERATIONS, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Moreno. Good morning, Chairwoman Sanchez and members of
the committee. I am honored here to appear before you today
with my distinguished colleagues.
Counterterrorism coordination, security overseas and the
task of limiting terrorists from accomplishing goals is of
paramount concern to Diplomatic Security. With a regional
security office representing at 285 posts worldwide and 25
domestic offices, Diplomatic Security is uniquely represented
in the most represented U.S. law enforcement organization in
the world.
Our law enforcement network includes 1,500 special agents
who are assigned both overseas and domestically. And overseas,
our agents serve as the primary law enforcement contact to
foreign government and law enforcement authorities.
Providing security for our diplomatic interests requires a
multiagency and coordinated approach. Ambassadors can use two
options, an Emergency Action Committee and Law Enforcement
Working Groups, in an overseas post to coordinate activities of
all law enforcement agencies. First, the Emergency Action
Committee is a group of senior-level officers representing all
U.S. Government agencies at posts that provides the Ambassador
guides in preparing for and responding to threats and other
crises at post or against U.S. interests abroad. Diplomatic
Security and the other Federal law enforcement agencies also
can participate in Law Enforcement Working Groups at U.S.
missions abroad, and these groups work with the goal of
improving information sharing, coordination among various law
enforcement components.
One of the most critical national security challenges our
country faces is the desire for terrorists to inflict
catastrophic harm to the United States and our citizens. Access
into the U.S. requires the acquisition of travel documents,
including visas and passports, to allow terrorists to enter and
move freely within our borders.
As the law enforcement arm of the Department of State,
Diplomatic Security is responsible for upholding the integrity
of the U.S. visa and passport documents. Our partnership with
the Bureau of Consular Affairs and worldwide presence makes us
the go-to agency for the investigation of U.S. passport and
visa fraud.
Last year Diplomatic Security crafted the Visa and Passport
Security Strategic Plan that leverages our international
expertise and worldwide presence. Our approach incorporates the
principles of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel
and addresses the objectives for Intelligence Reform and
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.
In addition, Diplomatic Security incorporates four other
programs for a multiple-directional approach designed to combat
terrorist activities. First, Diplomatic Security's Awards for
Justice Program. Rewards for Justice is currently offering up
to $25 million for the capture of or information leading to
Osama bin Laden and other key Al-Qa'ida leaders. Through these
efforts, the Awards for Justice Program, international
terrorists and other most wanted persons have already been
brought to justice, including Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the
World Trade Center in 1993; and Mir Aimal Kansi, who killed two
CIA employees and injured three others in 1993; and Uday and
Qusay Hussein, Saddam Hussein's sons, killed in July 2003.
Second, through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program,
Diplomatic Security is building a global network of host
government experts dedicated to assisting us combat terrorism
and safeguard the conduct of U.S.--the diplomacy, diplomatic
personnel facilities and information around the world. At the
present time, the ATA, or Antiterrorism Assistance Program, has
trained over 55,000 foreign counterparts from over 80
countries.
Third, the Overseas Security Advisory Council, or OSAC,
also established in 1985, provides an ever-evolving mechanism
for the sharing of security expertise and information between
the Department and the private sector. OSAC services over 4,500
private-sector organizations composed of U.S. businesses, NGOs,
faith-based organizations, academic institutions that, in
conjunction with the Department of--the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security create an information-sharing platform for security
issues of concern to the U.S. private sector.
Lastly, our Major Events Coordination Unit helps address
future worldwide security needs surrounding major events that
has U.S. representation overseas. Diplomatic Security recently
provided security resources to the Pan Am Games in Rio de
Janeiro, the G-8 meeting in Japan, and we are currently
preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.
In summary, cultivating and developing partnerships with
other U.S. Government law enforcement agencies, the
Intelligence Community and in particular host government law
enforcement elements are critical to defending our homeland.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security leverages all available
resources in contributing to the coordination of overseas
counterterrorism efforts. With our combined efforts and your
assistance, I am confident that we can succeed and will
succeed.
Chairwoman Sanchez, I thank you and the other members of
the committee for being given the opportunity to appear this
morning. I have submitted a written formal statement with
additional information that can be used as a reference. I would
now be happy to answer any of your questions and appreciate
your time. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Moreno.
[The statement of Mr. Moreno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edgar Moreno
Good Morning Chairwoman Sanchez and members of the Committee.
It is my honor to appear before you today with my distinguished
colleagues. I would like to thank you and the Committee members for
your continued support and interest in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security's (DS) protective and investigative programs. Through
Congressional support, DS safeguards American diplomats, facilities,
and information around the world. Counterterrorism coordination,
security overseas, and the task of limiting terrorists from
accomplishing their goals is of paramount concern to DS and requires a
multi-agency effort for success.
As the most widely represented law enforcement organization in the
world, DS is the primary U.S. law enforcement contact for foreign
government and law enforcement authorities at 285 State Department
posts worldwide. Our presence includes nearly 1,450 Special Agents
dispersed among 25 field and resident offices domestically, with
representation on 26 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and assignments to
U.S. embassies and consulates in 159 countries. DS Agents serving
around the world in embassy and consulate Regional Security Offices
manage the security programs that ensure the safety and security of
U.S. Government personnel, facilities, and classified information.
DS's efforts can manifest themselves at any time or any place
around the globe. In May and June 2006, when a rupture between the
national Government and security services of East Timor resulted in
heavy fighting, DS agents at the U.S. Embassy in Dili assisted with
emergency preparedness and response, including the evacuation of U.S.
citizens to Australia. Later in the summer, DS agents on the ground in
Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Nicosia, along with other
Department of State employees, were critical elements in the safe
evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during the
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
It is important to note that providing security for our diplomatic
interests from all possible threats overseas requires a multi-agency,
coordinated approach. To ensure effective utilization of the law
enforcement and intelligence tools at their disposal, Ambassadors
utilize Emergency Action Committees (EACs) and Law Enforcement Working
Groups (LEWGs) at overseas posts to coordinate the activities of all
participating agencies.
The EAC is a group of senior-level officers representing all U.S.
Government agencies at post. The EAC provides the Ambassador or
principal officer with guidance in preparing for and responding to
threats, emergencies, and other crises at post or against U.S.
interests elsewhere. Each post is responsible for preparation of the
Emergency Action Plan, which is designed to provide procedures and
protocols for just about any type of unforeseen event. It identifies
actions the post, Department, and other Federal agencies might take to
mitigate and manage an emergency or threat to U.S. interests.
Additionally, to better coordinate U.S. law enforcement efforts
overseas, DS and other Federal law enforcement agencies participate in
LEWGs at U.S. missions abroad. These working groups will fulfill a role
similar to their domestic Joint Terrorism Task Force counterparts, with
the goal of improving information sharing and coordination among
various law enforcement components.
One of the most critical national security challenges our country
will face for the foreseeable future is the desire of terrorists to
inflict catastrophic harm to the United States and our citizens. A key
element in all terrorist operational planning is access to their
target. Such access necessitates the acquisition of travel documents
(including visas and passports) that allow terrorists to enter and move
freely within our borders.
As the law enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of State, DS is
responsible for upholding the integrity of U.S. visa and passport
documents. Our partnership with the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) and
worldwide presence make DS uniquely positioned to meet the serious
national security challenge of travel-document fraud and to be the
premier agency for the investigation of U.S. passport-and-visa fraud.
Terrorists attempt to discover, manipulate, and exploit
vulnerabilities within our travel document system. To successfully
counter this threat, DS, last year, crafted the Visa and Passport
Security Strategic Plan that leverages our international expertise and
worldwide presence. The Plan provides the framework for the worldwide
Visa and Passport Security Program that will significantly augment the
Department's ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist travel. Our approach
incorporates the principles of the National Strategy to Combat
Terrorist Travel and addresses the objectives of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
The Plan is built upon a cornerstone of three strategic goals:
To defend the homeland and our foreign partners from
terrorist attack through aggressive and coordinated
international law enforcement action;
To detect terrorist activity, methods, and trends that
exploit international travel vulnerabilities; and
To disrupt terrorist efforts to use fraudulent travel
documents through strengthening the capacities of foreign
partners.
This three-tiered approach has resulted in the deployment of
additional DS Special Agents overseas. They are responsible for
conducting passport-and-visa-fraud investigations in-country, working
with host government law enforcement authorities to identify potential
terrorist travel, and to disrupt existing in-country criminal networks.
Through our close working relationships with host government law
enforcement authorities, DS was able to strengthen host country
resources through Department of State-sponsored antiterrorism training.
Currently, DS has 33 Special Agents assigned to key posts whose
sole duty is to investigate travel-document fraud and to ensure the
integrity of the consular process. By the end of 2008, DS will have 50
agents in 48 overseas posts to serve in such a capacity. DS
investigations with our foreign law enforcement colleagues and fraud
prevention training of more than 7,800 foreign law enforcement and
security personnel has yielded great success. Since 2004, these efforts
have resulted in nearly 1,285 arrests for document fraud and related
offenses, almost 4,200 visa refusals and revocations, and over 450
refusals of U.S. passports and consular record-of-birth-abroad
applications.
The following are just a few specific examples of the Visa and
Passport Security Program's success:
Operation Triple X--DS Special Agents in Surabaya, Indonesia,
partnered with the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs and
the Indonesian National Police on Operation Triple X, an investigation
that shut down 12 major criminal syndicates that produced and sold
counterfeit U.S. visas and other fraudulent documents for illegal entry
into the United States. The investigation, which resulted in 84
arrests, including that of an Indonesian immigration official, revealed
that more than 2,000 individuals had used the services of these
criminal syndicates, which had ties to terrorist extremists. All 84
individuals arrested were charged and convicted under Indonesian fraud
statutes.
Human Smuggling Rings--As a result of a 17-month investigation that
was initiated by a facial recognition hit in the consular section at
the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, the Colombian Administrative
Department of Security (DAS), in conjunction with the DS and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaches Office, conducted a
coordinated takedown of a human smuggling ring in Cali, Colombia. At
the conclusion of the takedown, a total of 19 arrests were made. These
arrests included five active members of the human smuggling ring, two
false applicants, and 12 medical doctors who had conspired with the
organization.
Document Fraud U.S. Entry Requirements Training--DS Agents and CA's
Fraud Prevention Unit in Caracas conducted a Document Fraud and U.S.
Entry Requirements training course for over 250 airline employees. The
training session, conducted with the assistance of the Customs and
Border Protection Carrier Liaison Program, focused on U.S. travel
documents, entry requirements, document fraud, and fraud indicators.
Fraud Training--DS Agents in Tel Aviv developed a working agreement
with the Israeli Ministry of Interior and the Israel National Police to
provide anti-fraud training to new police recruits at various locations
throughout Israel and at Ben-Gurion International Airport.
Strengthening Visa Security--DS Agents, in coordination with other
Embassy officials, have been working with Guatemalan Government
officials to strengthen the security of their visas and visa-issuance
processes. This process will not only minimize host country
vulnerability to document fraud, but also strengthen the U.S. consular
process against those same vulnerabilities.
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Training--DS Agents
traveled to the ILEA in Budapest, Hungary, in February of 2007 to teach
a course on Diplomatic Security and document fraud. Present at the
course were 48 police officers from the Ukraine, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan.
In addition to DS's Visa and Passport Security Program, DS
incorporates a variety of other programs in a multi-directional
approach designed to combat terrorist activities. These include:
The Rewards for Justice Program;
The Antiterrorism Assistance Program;
The Overseas Security Advisory Council; and
Major Events Coordination Unit.
Rewards for Justice
DS is the operational component for the Rewards for Justice (RFJ)
Program, which was established by the 1984 Act to Combat International
Terrorism. RFJ continues to be one of the most valuable U.S. Government
assets in the fight against international terrorism. RFJ is currently
offering rewards of up to $25 million dollars for the capture of, or
information on, Usama bin Ladin and other key al-Qa'ida leaders.
Through the efforts of RFJ, international terrorists and other most
wanted persons have been brought to justice, including Ramzi Yousef,
the bomber of the World Trade Center in 1993; Mir Aimal Kansi who
killed two CIA employees and injured three others in 1993; and Uday and
Qusay Hussein, Saddam Hussein's sons, killed July 22, 2003.
The goal of RFJ is to find creative ways to educate the public
regarding wanted terrorists--in essence putting their names and faces
before the public eye--and encourage potential sources to provide
information that might help bring these terrorists to justice or
resolve prior acts of terrorism against U.S. persons or property. Such
methods may include television, radio, newspaper, or other media
advertisements. Other advertising concepts used by RFJ include the use
of banner ads on websites and distributing posters and matchbooks in
areas where featured terrorists are believed to be hiding. RFJ's
website (www.rewardsforjustice.net), a key component in RFJ's outreach,
was recently expanded from four to 25 languages, with plans to add more
languages in the coming year. The entire website was redesigned and
launched on July 17, 2007.
DS's RFJ Program continually works with the CIA, DoD, FBI, and U.S.
embassies around the world, adding new terrorists who pose a threat to
U.S. persons and/or property to the RFJ Most Wanted List. RFJ
coordinates with its interagency partners to ensure that the identities
of sources are kept strictly confidential and to arrange the actual
reward payment. RFJ currently has active public campaigns in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Comoros Islands/Madagascar, Greece, Iraq, and
the Philippines. At this time, RFJ is actively working to expand its
operations into the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, and other countries in
Southeast Asia. These efforts are closely coordinated with DoD's
regional commands and Special Operations Command, whose Military
Information Support Teams support RFJ's advertising efforts in key
frontline nations. To date, RFJ has paid over $72 million to more than
50 people who provided actionable information that helped bring
terrorists to justice or prevented acts of international terrorism.
Antiterrorism Assistance:
The events of September 11 demonstrated the need to maximize
training opportunities, particularly for those designated as frontline
countries in the War on Terror. It has resulted in Congressional
approval of a significant expansion of the Antiterrorism Assistance
(ATA) Program, both in terms of course offerings and numbers of
participants.
Through the ATA Program, DS is building a global network of experts
dedicated to combating terrorism and safeguarding the conduct of U.S.
diplomacy, diplomatic personnel, facilities, and information around the
world.
Through training programs for foreign law enforcement and security
professionals, DS builds alliances with security services worldwide and
bolsters the counterterrorism capabilities of our foreign partners.
Many of these efforts achieved synergy through a coalition of willing
and able governmental and nongovernmental partners in the international
law enforcement community.
Bomb technicians trained by DS helped the Indonesian Special
Detachment Task Force 88 Unit in an operation in which two terror
suspects were killed, one was wounded, and a fourth was taken into
custody. The operation uncovered explosive backpacks, suicide vests,
and other explosive devices and components. The explosives were
rendered safe by DS-trained explosives experts.
Training and assistance from DS helped Pakistan's Special
Investigative Group (SIG) develop into an elite counterterrorism force.
In 2006, the SIG arrested a Belgian citizen in Lahore who was plotting
a suicide attack against the President of the United States. In
Peshawar, the SIG investigated and raided a terrorist financing office,
uncovering evidence that can be used in the prosecution of suspected
terrorists. Because of the training and assistance from DS, the SIG
helped the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigate the suicide
bombing which resulted in the death of a Foreign Service officer at the
U.S. Consulate in Karachi.
Because of its DS training, the Special Operations Unit of the
Albanian State Police played a key role in a joint investigation with
the Albanian Organized Crime Directorate directed against weapons
trafficking. The operation resulted in the detention of five
individuals, including three police officers, and subsequent searches
of nine residences for illegal weapons.
In January 2006, DS began providing personal protection for the
first democratically elected president of an African state, Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf, President of Liberia. Remaining in Monrovia until June
2006, DS agents also trained 325 Liberian personnel for that country's
presidential protective service.
Overseas Security Advisory Council
The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), which was
established in 1985, provides an ever-evolving mechanism for the
sharing of security expertise and information between the Department
and the private sector.
While the United States has bolstered security at our political,
diplomatic, and military facilities overseas, terrorists increasingly
are striking at targets that have symbolic value, including American
businesses, schools, and cultural institutions and other
nongovernmental facilities. Attacks on such facilities can generate
many fatalities, intimidate civilian populations, and even influence
politics. The shift from targeting military, diplomatic, and
governmental personnel and facilities to private citizens and
organizations presents DS, and the U.S. Government as a whole, with
very complex challenges. OSAC was established to address such
challenges and to promote security cooperation and information sharing
among private-sector organizations and the U.S. Department of State.
The Council is made up of 30 private-sector and four public-sector
representatives who advise the Department and DS about security issues
of concern to the U.S. private sector overseas.
OSAC provides an information lifeline to Americans during crises
overseas. In July and August 2006, OSAC played an important role in
helping Americans and American organizations during the conflict
between Israel and Hezbollah. In addition to responding to more than
600 requests from constituent members for information and assistance,
OSAC funneled information to the State Department's Bureau of Consular
Affairs and to DS's Regional Security Office in Beirut. In many cases,
such information concerned special needs of Americans affected by the
crisis, including serious medical and family circumstances that needed
to be taken into account as part of the evacuation operation from
Lebanon.
Through OSAC country councils active in some 100 nations worldwide,
more than 4,500 American businesses, schools, museums, churches, and
other organizations exchange timely information about the overseas
security environment. The information the country councils provide is
used to plan and implement security programs that protect American
organizations and their personnel worldwide and to assist Americans and
American organizations in crisis situations. In 2006, OSAC launched an
initiative to work in partnership with other information-sharing
organizations in the public sector. Through this initiative,
organizations such as the New York City Police Department's Shield
Unit, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, and the United
Nations Department of Safety and Security began to exchange security
information.
Major Events Coordination Unit
Our Major Events Coordination Unit (MECU) helps address future
worldwide security needs surrounding major events with official U.S.
representation overseas. DS recently provided significant security
resources to the Pan American Games in Rio de Janiero, Brazil, and the
G8 meeting in Japan.
MECU and the DS agents are the U.S. Government's primary security
coordination point for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. In addition,
DS has already begun planning and coordination support of the 2010
Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, Canada.
As these major athletic events provide terrorists with multiple
targets, we must continue to offer our security coordination and
expertise to foreign governments hosting these events. Having served as
the U.S. Olympic coordinator to the Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, I
know first-hand of the law-enforcement and counterterrorism initiatives
required to keep athletic venues and our personnel protected from
potential threats.
MECU also supports the Foreign Diplomatic Corps' attendance at the
Democratic and Republican national conventions. DS has 15 major events-
related security courses designed to improve the security posture of
our partner nations as they interact with other nations. The Diplomatic
Security Training Center has provided courses for the Olympics, World
Soccer Cup, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Cricket World Cup,
as well as for international venues in Greece, Pakistan, Yemen, and 20
other countries. In 2007, ATA completed presentations in Peru and
India, with more courses scheduled for South Africa and Senegal.
As I conclude, cultivating and developing partnerships with other
U.S. Government law enforcement agencies, the Intelligence Community,
and in particular, host-government law-enforcement elements, are
critical in the defense of our homeland. Using vehicles such as EACs
and LEWGs and key programs such as RFJ, OSAC, ATA, and Visa and
Passport Security, DS leverages all available resources in contributing
to the coordination of overseas counterterrorism efforts. With our
combined effort and your assistance, I am confident that we will
succeed.
Chairwoman Sanchez, I thank you and the other members of the
Committee for being given the opportunity to appear here. I would now
be happy to answer any questions you or the other members may have.
Ms. Sanchez. And now we will recognize Mr. Fuentes to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS V. FUENTES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, LEGAL ATTACHE PROGRAM, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Fuentes. Good morning, Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking
Member Souder and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to talk about the
FBI's international operations.
I oversee the 75 offices that we have around the world.
Next week it will be 76 when we open an office in Algiers,
Algeria. These offices are staffed by nearly 270 permanent FBI
staffing of agents and specialized support personnel. I also
oversee the over 100 persons that work for my staff here in
Washington, and in addition to the administrative, logistical
and operational support of our legal attaches, as well as
coordination with FBI and other law enforcement partners as
well as the Intelligence Community partners, we also are
responsible for the FBI's protocol, visitors, passport, visa
and other programs related to international operations.
The primary mission of our legal attaches overseas is to
establish a close partnership, enhance the relationship,
develop relationships with the appropriate services in each
country that will match up with our mission, with the
requirements that we have to gain assistance in terrorism
investigations or cybercrime or other criminal programs, and as
well as coordinate requests for training.
In addition to that liaison and investigative effort, we
are extensively involved in efforts to provide training in
those countries, and we work very closely with our partners who
provide the oversight and the funding from the Office of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program at the Department of State, as
well as other Federal criminal agencies and the Department of
Defense.
In addition, we coordinate the appropriate instructors and
staffing for the International Law Enforcement Academies.
Again, this is under the oversight of the Department of State
and includes the academies, now the one that is more than 10
years old in Budapest, Hungary, as well as the academies in
Bangkok, Thailand; Gaborone, Botswana; and the newest one in El
Salvador.
In addition, it wasn't mentioned that I am also a member of
the Executive Committee of Interpol, and we work very closely
with the 186 member nations in Interpol. Here in the Washington
National Central Bureau office, which is comprised of 22
Federal, State and local agencies, I have a staffing of four
agents and support employees here in Washington, as well as a
senior staff member in Lyon, France, at their headquarters, and
the newest office of Interpol where we are working with the
National Security Council of the United Nations in their newest
office in New York. And I have a full-time member in that
office coordinating future international law enforcement
deployments. Also I have an agent assigned at Europol in The
Hague, Netherlands, and we work with any number of other
international, multinational law enforcement groups. That
includes the G-8. I was a member for 5 years of Law Enforcement
Projects Group with the G-8 and many others, Asiapol and many
other regional groupings of law enforcement agencies. We
participate in all of those as well.
We also provide assistance and support to the Department of
Justice's program, the Office of Prosecutorial Development
Assistance and Training, OPDAT, which trains prosecutors and
members of the criminal justice system in developing countries;
the Office of ICITAP at DOJ, which is the International
Criminal Investigative Training Program--Assistance Program. So
we have provided agents, as well as logistical and operational
support for those efforts to train and develop local law
enforcement agencies.
In addition, we--through advanced training programs such as
our FBI National Academy Program at our academy in Quantico,
our National Executive Institute Program, our Law Enforcement
Executive Development Program, we train at a variety of levels
senior law enforcement officials not only from the United
States, but from throughout the world. The National Academy
Program, begun in 1935, was extended by order of President
Kennedy in 1962 to include international partners, and now each
of the four sessions of the National Academy each year is
comprised of 10 percent of the students from international law
enforcement agencies. And I oversee the selection of those
individuals from throughout the world to attend that.
We have expanded greatly in the last couple of years to
address the new issues, the counterterrorism efforts around the
world. And I will be glad to talk specifically about any of the
staffing issues or liaison and information-sharing issues that
we have in working together with our partners, both U.S. and
international. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you so much, Mr. Fuentes.
[The statement of Mr. Fuentes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas V. Fuentes
Good morning Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and members
of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to
discuss the FBI's Legal Attache program, its success, and coordination
with our international partners and other Federal, State and Local
government agencies of the United States.
The Legal Attache Program
The foundation of the FBI's international program is the Office of
International Operations and the Legal Attache, or ``Legat,'' each of
whom is FBI Director Robert Mueller's personal representative in the
foreign country in which he/she resides or for which he/she has
regional responsibilities. FBI personnel abroad serve under the
authority of the Department of State, Chief of Mission at United States
Embassies around the world, at the pleasure of Ambassadors and host
country governments. Their core mission is to establish and maintain
liaison with principal law enforcement and security services in
designated foreign countries. This liaison enables the FBI to
effectively and expeditiously conduct its responsibilities in combating
international terrorism, organized crime, cyber crime, and general
criminal matters. In particular, Legat liaison activities are essential
to the successful fulfillment overseas of the FBI's lead Federal law
enforcement mission to prevent terrorist attacks against citizens and
interests of the United States. Liaison is carried out in accordance
with Executive Orders, statutes, treaties, Attorney General Guidelines,
FBI policies, and interagency agreements. The Legal Attache program
provides for a prompt and continuous exchange of information with
foreign law enforcement and security agencies and coordination with
U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction over the
matters under investigation. Our foreign-based personnel also assist
foreign agencies with requests for investigative assistance in the
United States to encourage reciprocal assistance in counterterrorism,
criminal, and other investigative matters.
In addition to the Legat program, the FBI's international law
enforcement activities focus on one other key element, international
training. Through international training, the FBI provides foreign law
enforcement officers with skills in both basic and advanced
investigative techniques and principles which promote cooperation and
aid in the collection of evidence. Training allows the FBI to
demonstrate major crime scene, counterterrorism, and other
investigative techniques, while establishing better working
relationships, thus strengthening cooperation among law enforcement
personnel worldwide. Funded by the Department of State or Department of
Defense, significant training programs include the International Law
Enforcement Academies in Budapest, Hungary, Bangkok, Thailand, and
Gaborone, Botswana, as well as bilateral training programs targeting
Anti-terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorist Financing.
The FBI also participates in Bilateral Working Groups and several
additional counterterrorism training programs in the Middle East.
The FBI's Legal Attache Program was developed to pursue
international aspects of the FBI's investigative mandates through
established liaison with principal law enforcement and security
services in foreign countries, and to provide a prompt and continuous
exchange of information with these partners. The FBI currently has 60
fully operational Legat offices and 15 sub-offices, with 165 agents and
103 support personnel assigned for a total of 268 employees stationed
around the world. The growth of transnational crime caused by the
explosion in computer and telecommunications technology, the
liberalization of immigration policies, and the increased ease of
international travel has made it necessary for the United States to
cooperate with countries around the world concerning security issues.
The FBI's role in international investigations has expanded due to the
authority granted by the Congressional application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
As the FBI's domestic investigative responsibilities become
increasingly intertwined with international criminal and terrorist
elements in other countries, the FBI must continually enhance its
ability to conduct complex investigations and acquire evidence from
abroad for criminal prosecutions in the United States. To do so
requires close coordination with international partners and security
services. Some of the FBI's most important and visible investigations
are multi-national in scope, placing greater demands on the FBI,
especially in the field, as more case agents are faced with challenges
in obtaining admissible evidence for domestic prosecutions.
The Role of the Legal Attache
The FBI Legal Attache works with the law enforcement and security
agencies in their host country to coordinate investigations of interest
to both countries. The role of Legal Attaches is primarily one of
coordination, as they do not conduct foreign intelligence gathering or
counterintelligence investigations. The rules for joint activities and
information sharing are generally spelled out in formal agreements
between the United States and the host nation.
Typical duties of a Legal Attache include coordinating requests for
FBI or host country assistance overseas; conducting investigations in
coordination with the host government; sharing investigative leads and
information; briefing Embassy counterparts from other agencies,
including law enforcement agencies, as appropriate, and Ambassadors;
managing country clearances; providing situation reports concerning
cultural protocol; assessing political and security climates; and
coordinating victim and humanitarian assistance.
Legal Attache Coordination
The Legal Attache offices provide critical and timely support in
the defense of our homeland through direct coordination with the
Department of Justice, Department of State, Interpol, and other law
enforcement and security entities. For example, the FBI has full-time
detailees to the Interpol offices in Lyon, France, the United Nations,
and the Washington, D.C., based National Central Bureau. Together with
the Department of State, the Office of International Affairs of the
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, is responsible for the
negotiations of bilateral and multilateral law enforcement treaties
needed to effect the extraditions of fugitives and to facilitate
collection of evidence from foreign countries. In addition to the
Office of International Affairs, the FBI also supports the ongoing
efforts of the Department of Justice to provide long-term justice
sector assistance to prosecution and police services in numerous
foreign countries. This long-term assistance, which is provided through
the Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training (OPDAT), and the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), helps to ensure
that our foreign partners not only follow the most modern law
enforcement techniques, but also respect the rule of law. As a result,
the Legal Attache offices benefit from their coordination, training,
and mutual support. The Legal Attache offices directly coordinate with
United States Embassy representatives by personally representing the
FBI as a country team member, and serving as the lead Federal law
enforcement agent for all crimes for which it exercises lead
investigative jurisdiction. That includes both counterterrorism and
terrorism finance investigations.
In virtually all major FBI investigations, a significant
international nexus develops. To balance the FBI's interest in
addressing the international aspects of its investigations with the
requirement to respect the host country's national sovereignty, the FBI
must rely on the capability of the host country's law enforcement
community. This is accomplished through the liaison partnerships
developed by the Legal Attache and reinforced through elements of the
international law enforcement community such as Interpol, the FBI's
National Academy and numerous working groups, task forces, and training
initiatives. These efforts foster interagency cooperation and are
extremely productive in the pursuit of traditional criminal law
enforcement matters, and even more so as we seek to identify, disrupt,
and prosecute terrorists.
Legal Attache Success
The Legal Attache offices have had numerous accomplishments over
the years. As many of these items are sensitive, ongoing investigative
matters, I offer merely a few efforts with which members of the
committee may already be familiar:
Since the September 11th attacks on the United States,
the FBI's Office of International Operations has increased its
personnel by 60%. This expansion has occurred domestically
through operational support units at FBI Headquarters, as well
as through an increase in 54% of overseas Legat office
locations. On September 11th, the FBI's Office of International
Operations and Legats facilitated the rapid deployment of over
700 FBI personnel to countries in Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East.
The FBI coordinated and provided assistance to our
Indonesian counterparts through Legal Attaches following the
October 12, 2002, bombing in a Bali, Indonesia tourist
district, which resulted in more than 200 deaths, including
seven citizens of the United States. FBI personnel were on
scene and offered forensic capabilities to the Indonesian
National Police through the Legal Attache office.
As many of you recall, a large earthquake in the
Indian Ocean occurred on December 26, 2004, triggering a series
of lethal tsunami waves killing an estimated 230,000 people
(including 168,000 in Indonesia alone.) The FBI, Legal Attache,
and Interpol personnel were involved in helping to successfully
identify over 8,000 victims through fingerprint analysis.
On May 10, 2005, the newly established Legal Attache
in Tbilisi, Georgia was assisting the United States Secret
Service Presidential Protective Detail when an individual
tossed an Armenian hand grenade wrapped in a red handkerchief
near the President's stage. Georgian officials worked directly
with Legat Tbilisi and submitted the red handkerchief and other
evidentiary items to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia
for DNA analysis. Following a joint investigative effort
between the Georgians and the FBI, the suspect was captured two
months later in July 2005, and subsequently convicted, based in
part, on the DNA evidence gathered from the handkerchief.
On July 7, 2005, three suicide bombers exploded
Improvised Explosive Devices contained in backpacks within
fifty seconds of each other on three London Underground
commuter trains. A fourth bomb exploded on a bus nearly an hour
later. The attacks killed 56 people, including the four suicide
bombers, and injured 700. Legat London was integral in
facilitating FBI assistance to New Scotland Yard.
In 2006, Israel began a lengthy bombing and ground
campaign against Hizballah elements in Beirut, Lebanon. The
bombing led to a mass evacuation of Americans from Beirut to
Cyprus via the United States military. Legat Athens played a
critical role during the evacuation. Working with other United
States Embassy personnel from the Departments of State and
Justice, Legat Athens acquired copies of all United States
passenger manifests to ensure terrorist elements did not enter
Cyprus and attempt to enter the United States during the mass
evacuation. Legat Athens then supplied manifests to the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters for review
against databases. In addition, while working with the
Department of Defense, Legat Athens assisted our Beirut sub-
office in the expeditious return of 12 high-ranking Lebanese
law enforcement officials who had been in Washington, D.C., for
FBI-sponsored training.
In August 2007, the Department of Justice announced
two plea agreements and record-setting $600 million fines in
association with a multi-national criminal conspiracy on the
part of international airline corporations to fix prices on
passenger and cargo flights worldwide. Several Legat offices
were involved and continue to support this ongoing criminal
investigation.
This past month, Director Mueller met with European
partners and stressed the importance of transatlantic
cooperation and intelligence sharing, provided that national
judicial traditions and laws are respected. Director Mueller
also met with newly appointed members of French President
Nicolas Sarkozy's cabinet to discuss ways to strengthen
aggressive cooperative efforts on counterterrorism, cyber crime
and transnational organized crime matters.
A Fort Worth, Texas retiree was recently released from
captivity, after being kidnapped in the Dominican Republic for
a $1 million ransom. After being dragged through the jungle,
bound, gagged, blindfolded, and dumped in a cave for three
days, the victim was rescued due to relationships established
with the host nation's police and army forces. The FBI's Miami
and Dallas Divisions, Legat, United States Embassy personnel,
and FBI crisis negotiators assisted in this recovery.
Just two weeks ago, the Department of Justice
announced that Oussama Abdullah Kassir, an accused terrorist,
was extradited from the Czech Republic to face charges in the
Southern District of New York. Kassir was taken into FBI
custody in Prague on September 25, 2007. Kassir was arrested in
Prague on December 11, 2005, by Czech authorities, based on a
criminal complaint filed in the Southern District of New York
and a corresponding arrest warrant on file with Interpol. Legat
Prague and several other FBI personnel were instrumental in
this effort.
These are just a few achievements Legal Attaches have attained in
order to protect our nation, its citizens and interests abroad through
coordination with foreign law enforcement in the continuous fight
against terrorism and international crime, in furtherance of our goal
of interagency cooperation.
In closing, the FBI Legal Attaches are committed to continuing
collaborative work abroad, supporting domestic FBI investigative
matters, and coordinating with foreign, Federal, State and Local law
enforcement agencies in the fight against terrorism. The FBI must rely
on the capabilities of the host country's law enforcement community. In
order to ensure that such investigations are brought to successful
conclusions, the establishment and maintenance of effective liaison
through training and other initiatives must be developed and
maintained. The Legats must have direct connectivity between the
Federal agents and foreign law enforcement officials abroad in order to
be successful. At an alarmingly frequent rate, more and more crimes are
being committed across international borders. Technology,
communication, and transportation have done more to blur international
borders in recent years than ever before. Combating transnational crime
and terrorism, therefore, requires cooperation by law enforcement
agencies on a global scale. The focus of the Office of International
Operations is to advance the domestic and international mission of the
FBI, to promote relations with both foreign and domestic law
enforcement and security services operating in the international arena,
and to facilitate investigative activities where permissible.
The FBI, the Office of International Operations and its collective
Legal Attache office personnel look forward to future cooperation with
all partners, domestic and foreign, to protect the citizens and
interests of the United States.
Thank you Chairwoman Sanchez and members of the Subcommittee for
the opportunity to testify before you today. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Ms. Sanchez. And thank you all for your testimony. I will
remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel, and now I will recognize myself for some
questions.
Mr. Leiter, I think that everybody on this committee is
aware of the broad plan for coordinating the counterterrorism
efforts, the one that the President signed off on in June of
2006. I would like to know, what is the status of NCTC's
development of the implementation guidance for that plan?
Mr. Leiter. Madam Chairwoman, after the plan was approved
by the President, each department and agency was required to
write a supporting plan for each one of the tasks they were
assigned. The Department and agencies have done so, and the
NCTC has set up a system of monitoring of the implementation of
those plans. So the departments and agencies are required and
have over the past 6-plus months provided data on where they
have or have not made progress in implementing their supporting
plans to the larger National Implementation Plan.
Ms. Sanchez. So you are saying after you all put together
this broad NIP, you sat down with the different departments
that would be involved with that, and you asked them to write
down--to make a plan of how to implement that down their ranks?
Mr. Leiter. That is exactly right.
Ms. Sanchez. And you also have a monitoring system?
Mr. Leiter. That is correct.
Ms. Sanchez. What type of measurements? How do you know?
What is the array of measurements that you are looking at, if
you can tell us without being in the classified area, so that
we have some idea of how you are monitoring that?
Mr. Leiter. Right. It really does depend from task to task.
But we require submission of information down to a very
granular level. Some of these, in terms of building partnership
capacity, would look at how many countries are you working
with, are you working with the countries that we believe are
most critical to fighting the war on terror, do you have
personnel in those countries, are your--as I also noted with
OMB, are your programs aligned in a way that again they are
attacking parts of the war on terror that the National Security
Council and NCTC have determined are the prime candidates?
And I would note, as Mr. Fuentes noted, the placement of an
FBI Legat in Algeria would be considered a tangible
illustration of FBI focusing its resources on an area where we
think there is an increased terrorist threat, North Africa.
Ms. Sanchez. Let us talk about resource decisions. Will
they be tied to these goals and objectives? Who will take the
lead role in requesting these resources, either from the
administration or from the Congress? Will you overall take a
look and say these departments don't have enough, and sort of
push that way, or would each of the departments have to say,
well, this is a part of our supplement to the NIP? Who is
taking the lead on it? Because, quite frankly, we haven't heard
much on this front.
Mr. Leiter. I understand, Madam Chairwoman. And part of the
reason you have not is because the plan was approved by the
President in June of 2006. So the first very tangible sign you
will see of OMB using the NIP will be in the 2009 budget
submissions. And what NCTC has done is sat down with OMB, and
we have prioritized among the many strategic objectives and
tasks within the NIP and said this is what departments and
agencies should be focusing their resources on.
Ms. Sanchez. So would the President's proposal for the 2008
year, the current one that we are in, would that reflect you
sitting down with OMB for the NIP?
Mr. Leiter. The 2008 was briefly influenced, but because of
the timing of the production of the department and agency
budgets, not completely. The first complete reflection of NIP
priorities and departmental budgets will appear in fiscal year
2009. Again, that is where NCTC and OMB work together to make
sure that the departments and agencies, in fact, prioritize
consistent with their responsibilities within the NIP.
Ms. Sanchez. What has NCTC done to come back to Congress,
to the committees of jurisdiction, to let them know where you
are, what types of resources you are going to need, et cetera,
in order to get the NIP in? How are you talking to us?
Mr. Leiter. Madam Chairwoman, we had provided the NIP to
some Members. I also understand that we have offered to many
committees, including your own, briefings on the NIP. As I
noted in my oral testimony in my opening statement, we are more
than happy and, in fact, would welcome the opportunity to come
speak to Members and staff about how the NIP is set up, more
specifics in a classified setting which are specific to law
enforcement agencies, and then talk about how those are or are
not prioritized within the 2009 budget submission.
Ms. Sanchez. My last question for you, not me, but Mr.
Shays in a prior Congress had asked GAO to take a look at this
issue of Homeland Security Department's array with respect to
international counterterrorism. And one of the things they did
was to go and ask of you and your staff information, the types
of questions I am asking right now: Is it done, how are you
getting it through? And you all decided you didn't want to talk
to them. Why? I mean, this is an open hearing right here, and
you are telling me these things. They have classified
clearances. What was the problem there?
Mr. Leiter. I guess I would--Madam Chairwoman, I would take
a bit of issue with the characterization just because although
we did not go into extensive detail about some parts of the
NIP, we did not refuse to talk to the GAO. I think at the time
that the GAO discussed this with us, part of the discussions in
their work, which frankly has been quite useful to us in
understanding what Congress does know and does not know and how
we have to work better with agencies. So in that sense it has
been a very useful tool for us. But part of it was actually the
GAO discussions started before the NIP was even approved by the
President. The report was ultimately signed and approved after
the NIP was approved. But even since then there has been an
extensive amount of work ongoing in terms of setting up a
monitoring tool with departments and agencies, working with
OMB.
So some of the facts simply didn't exist when GAO did this
report, and to the extent that we couldn't communicate them
then to GAO, again, we would be very happy to sit with yourself
and other Members to go into as much depth as we can.
Ms. Sanchez. So if I sent in my GAO analyst to ask you the
questions that I might have, the probing questions about how to
set up a matrix, whether you have done it correctly or et
cetera--I mean, I was a performance auditor before, so I
understand the types of questions. I don't have the time to sit
down and go through the list, but they might if I ask them to
do that. Would that be available at this point now that you
have an--an NIP, that you have supplemental concurrence from
the different departments about how it is supposed to be, that
you say you have a measuring system; would they be able to take
a look at that?
Mr. Leiter. We would certainly work with you. We are happy
to work with your staff extensively to do that. And to the
extent we can, we will work with GAO to provide them with
additional information.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Leiter.
I will now ask my Ranking Member Mr. Souder for his 5
minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
I know we have been making progress, but I sure hope that
the terrorists will cooperate and wait until fiscal 2009. I
mean, partly we don't sense urgency sometimes, and that becomes
frustrating. And we continue to remain concerned about turf. It
is not only true in the agencies, but in Congress. The thing is
that Congress will always be somewhat disorganized. We hope law
enforcement is organized, because if you miss the terrorists,
we die. We can hold all kinds of hearings, but ultimately you
are the executive branch to try to do that, and you have to be
more organized than we are, and we need to make progress as
well.
Here is part of the challenge. In the National
Counterterrorism Center, the limitation of the statute says you
may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations.
Yet at the same time you are supposed to direct and develop a
strategy for these efforts; that what I heard you say in your
testimony was is that you try to figure out who is doing what
and then give them assignments for how to do this.
Now, let me give a simple example. A simple example would
be a person on our terrorist watch list is going back and
forth, say, between Montreal and Germany and London. We catch
him, let us say, at Buffalo. Now, he starts to talk and
unravels a network that is developing a nuclear bomb or
something to get into the U.S. that goes over Yemen and to
Saudi Arabia, and that leads us into Pakistan and North Korea.
Now, the challenge here is who is in charge, and saying, oh,
well, the FBI has got this part, they have got this part, you
can't get one ambassador in an area. Who would be in charge?
That is a simple case.
I would be curious how you see this, if, after we get
attacked, are we going to have a thing where everybody points
to the other person and says, That wasn't my lane?
Mr. Leiter. Ranking Member Souder, let me begin by telling
you that when I start my day every day at 6:45 going through
intelligence from the United States and virtually every country
in the world every day, and then when I sit down with the
interagencies, 17 different agencies, DHS, TSA, FBI, Terrorist
Screening Center, Department of Justice, Department of State,
Diplomatic Security, CIA, DOD--I can go through the list of 17.
When I do that every single day at 8:00 in the morning, that is
exactly what we talk about. That is exactly what we do. We look
for all of those connections. And accepting the point that I
wish the budget process worked more smoothly and we could align
budgets perfectly before 2009--and I will also note that the
NIP did, in fact, influence 2008 budgets. Frankly, sir, I think
it is a different question about who is in charge of that
operation, because I can tell you again when I start my day
every morning, when that NCTC chairs a video teleconference
three times a day, every day of the year, exactly what you look
for is what you are talking about, and we draw those
connections. And we work with every chief of mission, chief of
station, Legat. It matters not. That information is exchanged
on a daily basis, and I am on the phone daily with FBI and DHS
and CIA counterparts. And there is not an issue there, sir.
Mr. Souder. So you are saying if such a bomb got into the
United States, you are the person who would be responsible?
Mr. Leiter. You can call me up here, and you can yell at
me, sir, because I take it as my solemn oath to protect and
defend this Nation and stop that bomb from coming in. That is
why I get up in the morning and leave my son and go to work.
Mr. Souder. And you believe that even though you may not
direct the execution, do you think it is a disconnect that you
are in charge of putting all that together, making assignments,
but you don't have any authority over the execution? How do we
get in that situation?
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Souder, that is an absolutely fair point.
That does not make it easier. On the other hand, I think
coordination today in terms of--this word is overused in
Washington, but there is a level of collegiality between myself
and my other key counterparts who run operations in each of
these components, so that although I can't say, FBI, go break
down this door; CIA, go do this, there is a level of
cooperation which I think allows that.
Now, as you are aware, you were on the Hill, sir, the
discussions about whether or not NCTC would actually run
operations, interfere with very significant chains of command
and long-lasting statutory responsibilities was a very
difficult discussion.
Mr. Souder. And complicated here by turf as well, to say
the least.
Mr. Fuentes, how many places are you in the physical
collocation with the station chief? And if you can't say that
officially, one of the things I have a concern about is some
embassies do this well, some embassies don't do it well at all
in spite of all the talk we hear.
Mr. Fuentes. Sir, I am unable to specifically answer those
locations, but our national security branch in coordination and
under the direction of NCTC determines where it would be better
served to have an FBI agent or analyst from our
counterterrorism program embedded in a station. And that is as
far as I can say in this format.
I should add that our Legal Attaches' efforts overseas are
in the criminal arena only. We do not conduct
counterintelligence investigations on the ground in foreign
countries. When we were started in 1940 by President Roosevelt,
the FBI was the first civilian counterespionage agency with
international responsibilities outside of the U.S., but that
changed with the National Security Act of 1947. At that time,
the CIA took the lead on that, and the FBI kept the name Legal
Attache, which was somewhat of a covert term, but at that time
began all operations in host countries as completely
transparent, working with the host law enforcement in that
country under the assistance from that host country.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Harman, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And welcome to our witnesses, especially a big welcome to
Mr. Leiter, with whom I have worked closely over recent months.
I thank you for your visit to Los Angeles where we looked at
the Homeland Security Department Fusion Center and some of the
other activities, and for your prompt response to many of my
questions about the need for additional information sharing and
cooperation with State, local and tribal officials.
I want to say that I am pleased that we have finally signed
a memorandum of agreement, and that, as far as I know, at the
earliest possible date we are going to have at least five State
and local officials sitting in chairs at the NCTC or at the
ITAG, another acronym, but physically collocated at the NCTC;
is that correct?
Mr. Leiter. That is correct, Congresswoman. I would thank
you for your commitment to helping us find the State and local
people who can come and help advise the Federal Government on
how we can better serve those constituencies.
Ms. Harman. Well, there are a lot of very capable State and
local people, as you know. They have been witnesses at our
hearings. You have seen them in the field. And it is extremely
important--and I know you agree with me--to share information
vertically, not just horizontally; otherwise, how can our
neighborhoods and communities know in real time about threats
against them?
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I certainly agree. And last week
I spent an entire day--an event which was cohosted by the
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and the National
Counterterrorism Center with representatives from about 70
State and local governments from throughout the country talking
about both the particular threat that we perceive and also ways
in which we can improve our cooperation with them I think was
quite successful.
Ms. Harman. That is impressive. Michael Jackson, the
outgoing Deputy Secretary at the Homeland Security Department,
has told me that he would come with me and Mr. Reichert, who is
the Ranking Member on our Subcommittee on Intelligence, to the
NCTC, which he has never visited, to see the State and local
people in place. So I am tasking you to let us know day one
that they are there. Do you know what day that is?
Mr. Leiter. I do not, but I will find out and will get back
to you. And I will just note that one of my saddest days in
government in the past several years was hearing that Secretary
Jackson had resigned. It will be a real loss.
Ms. Harman. Well, he, too, has been very cooperative in
terms of trying to move this ball forward, and I salute him for
that.
I have a question for you and for Mr. Fuentes, and I have 2
minutes. So in your case, I want to stress that I don't think
anyone here is looking for fancy booklets, big work charts, all
kinds of lists. What we are looking for is a strategy. I
thought that Mr. Souder's questions were right on point. We are
looking for strategically how do you leverage what you have,
find out what is going on in foreign locations, and then move
that information into the NCTC so that in real time you tell
others who need to have it so they can act on it, hopefully to
prevent and disrupt threats? Our goal is not to respond, but
our goal is to prevent and disrupt. Do you think you have an
adequate strategy in place?
Mr. Leiter. I think we have an adequate high-level
strategy, and I think that on a daily basis the information is
flowing. I didn't ring off that list of acronyms of agencies to
try to impress. It is to show that on a daily basis the
communication occurs.
I think what we continue to be challenged with is to making
sure that departments and agencies are, in fact, aligning their
strategic plans with the larger U.S. Government plan.
Ms. Harman. Well, as one of the godmothers of the
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the goal was not to reorganize
boxes. The goal was to create a joint command across our
Intelligence Community to be sure that we can connect the dots
in real time, and that the information we have is accurate and
actionable. I assume you are a cheerleader for that goal. I
just want to be sure that you personally in your important
position feel that you are creating that joint command and
doing your best when you leave your son early in the morning to
make certain that on an operational level you can do what is
needed.
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely. It is the same reason that
Ambassador Lino and I last week traveled to Copenhagen and
Madrid to sit down with DHS, NCTC and many other agencies side
by side with the entire country team, not just the Intelligence
Community team, but the entire country team, to make sure that
they were working together and that they were working with the
foreign partners.
Ms. Harman. Well, I think we need that classified briefing
so that we can review how some of this works. But it is
absolutely critical that it work, and I am pleased by your
answers.
Mr. Fuentes, I have about 5 seconds. The FBI has just
recently announced a reorganization with a bigger focus on
intelligence. And I am interested to know how you are
implementing that goal abroad.
And, Madam Chair, if he could just answer my question. I
have completed my questions.
Mr. Fuentes. The overseas intelligence gathering is covered
by the Intelligence Community. We are not specifically involved
in that. This is by our agreement with the host countries that
we are there for law enforcement purposes, law enforcement
assistance and training. So we are not directly involved in
that.
We talked earlier about the embedding with some of those
other agencies and the cross share, both overseas and here, and
that is occurring. Beyond that it would be a classified
discussion. But our effort overseas in our agreements with our
host country is to be completely open, transparent, and provide
as great of experience and assistance to them that we can in
order to have that relationship.
And just to give you an example, 4 years ago, Northwest
Africa was covered by our Legal Attache Office in Paris. So we
had covered France and 14 West African, Northwest African
countries. We now have offices in Rabat, Dakar, Freetown,
opening Algiers next week, as I mentioned. We already had Cairo
and Lagos in West Africa. And our philosophy with that is that
you cannot establish partnerships in relationship, whether it
is with our other counterparts in the U.S. or overseas, by
phone, fax, e-mail, other discussions, high-level meetings;
that it takes a direct, face-to-face working partnership every
day. And I refer to it with regard to not just the FBI and the
efforts of all of our law enforcement and State Department
partners, as in some places you need boots on the ground, but
in the rest of the world we need wingtips on the ground. We
need to have a direct partnership. And those law enforcement
agencies provide the assistance that help us.
We have the recent case in Germany working with our
colleagues of the Bundeskriminalamt, BKA. You saw the plot.
That was a direct plot against U.S. military forces on the
ground in Germany. That was worked at a law enforcement level
through our partnerships in cooperation. And I can go on and
on. The London subway attacks, the airplane attacks.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. I would just amend that to say we
also need high heels on the ground.
Mr. Fuentes. I have actually seen a wing-tipped woman's
shoe. I meant that for both.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Ms. Harman.
I would now recognize Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate
it.
I am especially interested in the Visa Security Program,
which performs proactive law enforcement vetting and
investigation of visa applications overseas. My first question
is for Ambassador Lino and Mr. Cote. Would you please update us
on the status of visa security programming and share with us
types of activities that DHS officers overseas engage in to
enhance the visa process as a law enforcement and
counterterrorism tool?
Ms. Lino. Thank you, Congressman.
Okay. It is precisely for this reason that Mr. Cote is here
to talk about the specifics of programs that ICE carries
overseas, so I would ask him to respond to your question.
Mr. Cote. Thank you. Thank you for the question.
Since the inception of the Visa Security Program under the
Homeland Security Act of 2003, we have put together a program
in an overseas realm that encompasses nine offices now with a
program to expand to 32 offices within the next 5 years; that
under the--in working with our partners here at the table, and
especially the Consular Affairs Office at the State Department,
we feel that we can proceed and cover 75 percent of the most
high-threat visa-issuing posts by this expansion plan.
In addition to that, we are working with our Law
Enforcement Working Groups and our law enforcement working
partners at the country team level to facilitate any of the
information we get within DHS to add to the more secure process
of the visa issuance.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do the officers actually go out into the
field to investigate applicants, or are they primarily
searching databases for information that might be a cause for
concern? And also, which countries are--you mentioned nine
posts, and I believe there are eight countries. Can you name
those countries?
Mr. Cote. Because of security concerns and the
confidentiality, I would love to give you that information in a
closed session. But in an open forum, I think there could be
some security issues there, but we would certainly provide that
information to you.
Mr. Bilirakis. We welcome that. Thank you.
Mr. Cote. And as far as working--primarily the visa
security officers work within the consul sections to provide
that immigration law enforcement background to the visa
process. We do work with the host government agencies and
specifically the RSOI program and the RSOs at post to
facilitate any of the information that is needed for background
on any of the investigations that are done locally.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Next question. What happens when an
officer discovers something they believe should make an
applicant inadmissible? Do they actually recommend to the
consulate officials denial of applications? What happens if the
consulate officials disagree with this? And what do visa
service officers look for that would raise a red flag?
Mr. Cote. Part of the job of the visa security officers is
to work with the Law Enforcement Working Group to identify any
threat or information there at post. They bring that law
enforcement information to the visa process, and the consular
officers are the people mandated and have the authority to
issue visas. We bring that information to the consular
officers, and we work collaboratively with them to get all of
the information to them to make an informed decision. And if we
recommend denials to the consular officers, those are
transmitted in a way that is under a specific set of
immigration laws for justification for that. And there is a
process at the departmental level where if there is a conflict,
it can be resolved that level.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Last question, Madam Chair.
Do these officials look for anti-American statements by
visa applicants or connections with other individuals or groups
that espouse anti-American rhetoric or promote violence?
Mr. Cote. We look at any potential threat to the United
States that we get from our law enforcement partners and from
our host country associates that we work with. We would
evaluate the information, and as part of the normal visa
process, we would collaborate with the State Department in
order to make those decisions. But ultimately we would want to
work with the State Department in order for that decision to be
made by them.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you. I look forward to working
with you on this issue.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
And now we will listen to the gentleman from Texas--oh, Mr.
Cuellar is not in. Okay. How about Mr. Langevin from Rhode
Island?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony today. I
was obviously serving here when we created the NCTC. I had the
opportunity to go NCTC and see the work that is being done out
there for myself. I just think that that interagency
intelligence-sharing coordination that is going on, at least in
theory what is supposed to go on, is absolutely essential as we
go forward, making sure that all of our intelligence agencies,
as well as those on the front lines, have the actionable
intelligence that they need to do their job and do it well.
So with respect to interagency coordination, it is
obviously a necessary step in combating terrorism both at home
and abroad. However, we also need one entity that is ultimately
responsible for creating the national strategic vision, setting
benchmarks of achievements, and assessing whether progress has
been made. The National Security Council established the
overarching vision for our counterterrorism efforts in the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the most recent
version of which was released last September.
So my question is, Mr. Leiter, does that national strategy
document remain the strategic vision for NCTC, or are you
following guidance from other sources? And what is the
relationship between NCTC and the National Security Council,
especially with regard to selecting priorities, allocating
resources, and assessing progress?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, the first one is easy. Our
strategy is premised on the most recent White House-driven
strategy, both classified and unclassified. So the National
Implementation Plan is, in fact, consistent with the most
current White House strategy.
On the second point, as you know, Congressman, in our
strategic operational planning role, we do not actually report
to the Director of National Intelligence, we report directly to
the White House. And in practice that is through the National
and Homeland Security Councils. They ultimately--those
policymakers ultimately determine, through the normal
interagency process, what the priorities should be, working
hand in hand with NCTC.
So it is, frankly, a little bit difficult for me to say
exactly who establishes the priority. The NCTC expertise, the
NCTC intelligence feeds the policy community's judgments about
where the priorities should be, and then we work extremely
closely again with the NSC and HSC to try to align agencies'
and departments' programs, budgets, and plans consistent with
those priorities.
Mr. Langevin. But can you elaborate more specifically on
your interaction with the National Security Council and how
they are informing you of where they want to task you, and then
the information that you are providing to the Council?
Mr. Leiter. Our interaction with the NSC and HSC is both on
a very, very tactical and granular level on a daily, if not
hourly, basis often. And then on a broader--on strategic
issues, in terms of the NIP and priorities and changes to the
NIP and assessing the effectiveness of the NIP, again, we
routinely discuss these issues with seniors within the NSC and
HSC.
Mr. Langevin. Let me also turn, I know some of this may
have been touched on, but, you know, I am deeply concerned
about the tendency of agencies with national and homeland
security responsibilities to focus exclusively on strengthening
their own programs and initiatives, while losing sight of the
larger strategic goals on which their programs are
contributing. And I believe we must--it is absolutely essential
that we have a defined framework for interagency cooperation to
achieve the critical goal of combating terrorism both at home
and abroad. Now, this framework obviously has to include
coordination between members of law enforcement, military,
diplomatic, financial communities, but more importantly, there
needs to be a single overarching strategy to guide these
efforts.
The NCTC, as I mentioned and we know, was created 3 years
ago and was the agency tasked with developing a comprehensive
strategy for combating terrorism abroad, but it is troubling
that we still seem to lack this vital strategy. So, Mr. Leiter,
would you please explain the NCTC's role in establishing the
framework for interagency coordination, and please describe
specific steps your agency has taken to increase interagency
coordination? And I understand that many of these details may
be classified, but can you at least walk us through some of the
major unclassified initiatives?
And then I would also like the other witnesses to comment
on this as well. Do you think there is currently sufficient
interagency coordination, and in what ways can it be improved
upon?
Mr. Leiter. I will do the best I can in this setting,
Congressman.
Again, the NIP is the overarching strategic guidance. And I
don't--although it is broad, I don't want to leave the
impression that the NIP does not include significant detail.
The NIP includes hundreds of specific tasks, going down to a
very granular level. So this is not simply a document with sort
of flowery language, this has very specific tasks. It was
designed off GAO processes for requiring department and agency
responsiveness.
I also don't want to leave the impression it is just the
NIP that the NCTC uses as a management tool. We also have what
we call coordination, integration, and synchronization areas,
and, put very simply, those are areas where a lot of people in
the U.S. Government are involved, a lot of department and
agency responsibilities, and no, quote/unquote, big dog to run
the show.
One of those that I think I can speak to in an unclassified
setting is biometrics. Lots and lots of agencies use
biometrics, Department of Defense, Homeland Security, law
enforcement, intelligence. The NCTC has over the past year-plus
worked very intensively with all of the departments and
agencies, OMB, National Security and Homeland Security Councils
to come up with standards and a game plan for looking out 3 to
5 years to make sure that agencies are putting in place
biometric programs that actually allow them to talk to each
other in the future.
So that is just one example in an unclassified setting,
Congressman.
Mr. Langevin. If the Chair would--could the panel comment
on the rest of that as well? Do you think there is currently
sufficient interagency coordination, and what steps could we
take to improve upon that?
Ms. Sanchez. I don't think they want to comment on that.
Anybody else? Okay.
Mr. Moreno. I will just comment briefly. In my 21 years
with the U.S. Department of State, and working overseas, and
the focus being on overseas and interagency cooperation, and
the vast majority serving at posts in different areas around
the world, that it really is dependent on the chief of mission
to set the standard, or the Ambassador, and have the deputy RSO
work with the FBI and chief of station and others to enhance
that interagency cooperation.
So I have seen great examples of it. I think interagency
cooperation can always be better and enhanced and improved;
however, I do think on a daily basis, at least what I have been
exposed to, it has always been very positive in working
together, but obviously there is always room for increasing
that type of cooperation.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. And I thank the gentleman from
Rhode Island.
Mr. Reichert from Seattle for 5 minutes.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I am happy that you are all here, and thank you for taking
time out of your busy schedule to be here.
And it was a pleasure yesterday, Ambassador, to have an
opportunity to sit and visit with you, and congratulations on
your new job, I think.
Ms. Lino. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. I want to touch on this cooperation issue and
who is in charge just a little bit, too. I think it is kind of
a theme that is developing here. It is one that is of great
concern. But I also want to point out just the other day,
Monday, I was asked to manage a bill on the floor, and just to
give you an example of how it is not all bad news about how our
forces here in the United States and across the world come
together to protect this Nation. And I just want to share this
quick real, real positive story.
There was a soldier who was wounded, severe head injury, in
Iraq not too long ago. He was served by the 32nd Med Group in
Iraq. He was immediately moved by a C-17 that was an airplane
out of McChord. The crew was from Charleston. The doctor was a
reservist from, I believe, Langley. The Air National Guard was
a part of the crew. And the entire mission was managed from
Scott Air Force Base. And the list goes on of the people
involved in attending to the needs of one soldier wounded in
Iraq, where all of these agencies, all of these military
resources came together to get the job done. And I see your job
in much the same way.
But the question is who is in charge of counterterrorism
activity overseas? Who really is the person who--agency who is
in charge of that? We know you are all coming together and you
are doing great things, but it does give us some comfort to
know who is running the show.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 was pretty clear on one thing, and that was existing
department and agency authorities, responsibilities, and chains
of command were not going to be changed. So ultimately, as Mr.
Souder pointed out earlier, there is--I can't tell you that
there is one person in charge of an operation overseas. When it
involves many agencies, there are lots of agencies involved.
Now, within a country you obviously have the chief of mission,
and it is pretty clear. When you start crossing boundaries, you
are in the world of cajoling and cooperating.
Mr. Reichert. Yeah. Anybody else want to address?
Ms. Lino. I would only echo, Congressman, what my colleague
has said. And it was indeed a pleasure to meet you and some of
your colleagues yesterday.
I would echo that because it is very clear overseas who is
in charge. I personally had that experience, and had it in an
instance when there was a specific terrorist threat against my
embassy, and everyone pulled together to work to deal with that
specific threat. I can't go into a lot of details, although
some of it was in the press at the time with respect to a
threat against our embassy in Tirana.
But crossing borders, or the kind of scenario that
Congressman Souder outlined, is more complex, and it is not
that--in the realm of overseas cooperation, it is not that
counterterrorism is not number one on everyone's mind. It is.
Mr. Reichert. Yes. No, I recognize that, and I also want to
just keep this on a positive note from my perspective and my
questioning. If you could just share with us what areas in
counterterrorism do you think the Department of Homeland
Security has made the most progress in coordinating with NCTC?
Ms. Lino. Certainly. I think--well----
Mr. Reichert. I want to hear some good news.
Ms. Lino. Okay. I think that we work exceedingly hard in
two areas--not to say that the other areas we don't also work
exceedingly hard--but I would say that the focus has been to
protect our country against dangerous people and dangerous
goods. These are two of the fundamental things that we work on,
and we can't work on it alone. We obviously work on it through
the auspices of the NCTC and together with our other
colleagues. And I think we have made significant progress in
protecting our Nation against dangerous people and dangerous
goods. And I could go into a lot more detail, but I think those
are two areas where we have had great success.
Mr. Reichert. I yield. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Sanchez. We have votes on the floor, so I think we are
going to bring this to a close. But I do have something that is
gnawing at me, because we did have this report done by the GAO.
And this is in particular to Ambassador--is it Lino or Lino?
Ms. Lino. Lino.
Ms. Sanchez. It is Lino. They had it marked phonetically
Lino, I am so sorry for that.
Okay. So here is the problem. The report says that not only
could we not get--well, we couldn't get information out of Mr.
Leiter's organization for this report. Now, we are going to try
to do that so we can figure out what is going on. Mr. Souder
clearly defined that one plans, and you all implement. So this
GAO report also says when it went out into the field and it
talked to the implementers, or people on the front line doing
this work, that they had no clue what they were supposed to do
aside from things they had already been doing or aside from
actual programs like Container Security Initiative. In other
words, where the overall mission statements for many of the
Department of Homeland Security pieces say things like
preventing--overall mission, preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade. That is for CBP, for example. So
they have this overall mission of stopping terrorists and
terrorism, working with the host countries to do this, and yet
when they were asked by GAO, How are you doing that, what is
that about, how do you it, they said, We are not, basically. We
are not. We don't have time for that, we don't have resources
for that. Worse, we don't have a directive from our Department
about how to do that.
So now Mr. Leiter has said we have got that, and you have
written a plan, or someone in DHS has written a plan to bring
it all the way through. And yet at least at that time when they
were asked, none of that was really going on. Can you talk to
why not, is it, what has changed? And I think that will be the
last question of the day. Ambassador.
Ms. Lino. I am happy to answer your question, because I
think to some extent it is a question of perceptions. If you
say, for example, that a component of DHS is working on bulk
cash smuggling, the individuals on the ground overseas may be
focused on bulk cash smuggling, and not view it necessarily as
antiterrorist, or trafficking in humans may not be viewed by
the person on the ground as counterterrorism. But all of these
things are part and parcel of what we do.
An illegal alien smuggler may be used, either consciously
or not, to smuggle in people who would want to do us harm. Bulk
cash smuggling or narcotics trafficking, et cetera, may be used
by terrorists to fund their work. Perhaps we do not do as good
a job as we should in giving some of our people overseas the
bigger picture into which they fit. Certainly at Homeland
Security, in the Office of Strategic Plans, there is the folks
who are the direct counterparts who work with the NCTC on
counterterrorism plans. But the plan exists. The specific items
which might--Mr. Leiter said are part of the plan, many of
those things our people overseas are carrying out on a daily
basis.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, we will take a look at that now that we
have an opportunity, and he says that he has them.
Here is my big problem with what you have just said. The
GAO also, in taking a look at the Department and giving its
analysis of it, has said that management basically is terrible
in Department of Homeland Security. Then when we look at the
morale, at the surveys of all Federal employees, and we look at
the DHS employees, the morale is the lowest. So clearly what we
are trying to get at is how do we get--how do we do good
management? Because the GAO has said over and over management
is terrible. I mean, that is their biggest complaint,
management is terrible.
So you are sitting there telling me, Oh, this exists, and
we are strategic, and, you know, these little people down here,
they just don't get that it is strategic and everything.
There needs to be better communication to these people so
that they feel they are really doing what they read they are
supposed to be doing, and so that their morale in a sense goes
up because they are more connected. And this is a reflection,
another example of a reflection on what is going on with
management.
So I will just--I don't need an answer to that. And I
just--I mean, this is a message back. This has been identified
over and over in all different areas of the Department as a
problem. And when we see these types of things happening, it
reflects it again.
Ms. Lino. May I comment?
Ms. Sanchez. Certainly, for about 2 seconds, because I have
my counterpart here who needs to ask one more clarifying
question.
Ms. Lino. I would say two things very quickly. My personal
experience with the people I work with directly, the posts I
visited overseas, morale is excellent, and people are working
together and are motivated. That is what my personal experience
is.
I was at the State Department when USIA was brought into
the State Department and consolidated. It took time for
consolidation to happen. Obviously, I don't need to tell you 22
different entities being brought together----
Ms. Sanchez. Absolutely.
Ms. Lino. It took time to make----
Ms. Sanchez. Absolutely, but it has been over 4 years. If
it is still as bad as it is, we have got some management
problems.
Mr. Souder?
Mr. Souder. Chairwoman Sanchez focused on the big question.
That is the big question. Mr. Cote, you made a comment that I
found disturbing. It is a little part of it, but it could be a
morale question. In response to Mr. Bilirakis, when he asked
you about whether statements were calculated in and whether
somebody was going to get cleared, you stated that you would
provide that to the State Department for them to make the
decision. But my understanding of the statute is we
particularly put you there, and you have a veto, and you each
have a vote. Why wouldn't you have vetoed that? Why would it be
a State Department decision?
Mr. Cote. Well, I may have misspoke, sir, but we do this as
a collaborative process and bring all the information we can to
come to a decision. And in the end, if we cannot agree----
Mr. Souder. By the way, that was not the way the law was
written. It is that it nets collaborative----
Mr. Cote. Right.
Mr. Souder. --but each side has a veto. It is not to work
between you to come to a compromise. You are there for national
security reasons, and if you have any objection, it is your
obligation to exercise a veto, because we debated about whether
to give it entirely to the Department of Homeland Security, and
we decided it was good to have impact back. But if you have a
veto power--and that is one of the clarity things that need to
come through the system that can undermine morale and other
types of things.
Now, I understand if you felt strongly, you would exercise
that, and to some degree it is collaborative. But I want to
make sure that the tilt here--because you will be held
accountable for that, not the State Department, because you
were put there specifically for a different risk variable. And
I know we have got a vote on, and I didn't--but I wanted to
make sure there was an understanding.
Mr. Cote. Absolutely, sir. As a matter of fact, under
section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary has
that authority, and we have a process by which we can invoke
that, especially in those cases where we believe strongly. And
part of our duty is to invoke that procedure if that process
ever comes before us.
Mr. Souder. Have you invoked it on a regular basis?
Mr. Cote. We have only invoked it on a handful of cases in
the last----
Mr. Souder. I am sorry, this is ridiculous. Part of the
reason--I was on the Government Reform Committee that put this
in and worked with Ben Gilman. And part of the whole point of
this is that the State Department needed this as an entry-level
position. And I agreed to back off, as did a few others, in
putting this solely in the Department of Homeland Security,
because it is an important part of the State Department. But
you should be the dominant in any kind of security thing. This
isn't a matter of you have to persuade, and you only do it
occasionally. You are the dominant clearance place. And this is
the ultimate breakdown, because if we don't control that desk,
we can't control who is in here.
Mr. Cote. Sir, you are absolutely correct, and I agree with
you. And when I say we work as a collaborative partner with the
agencies that are there, the decisions are made in a
collaborative format; but when there is a national security
interest, there is a violation of law, any type of issue that
we get pushback from any member of the collaborative process,
we do invoke that. We have not had to invoke that, to clarify
it, because the process works well.
Mr. Souder. Presumably the State Department agrees they
don't want a terrorist in.
Mr. Cote. That is correct.
Mr. Souder. It is the marginal, though, we are worried
about.
Mr. Cote. Absolutely.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. And the members
of the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentlelady yield for a moment?
May I just put a question on the record, and I would be happy
to let them answer in writing.
Ms. Sanchez. Put it on the record. We have a vote on the
floor, and we have less than 5 minutes to go.
Ms. Jackson Lee. May I just say one point that I would like
to make? And I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I was
detained in another committee.
I would just simply like to have the Ambassador, Principal
Deputy Director just respond to this, as would I like to have
all of you respond. The idea that this entity was put
together--was to be the first line of defense, intelligence
coordination. And my concern is that we are here in 2007, and
we have no block, no firewall, because we have such fractures
in the connectedness or the coordination of security and
intelligence, meaning the coordination of security agencies.
Please give me a road map--I know there have been many
questions--on how you plan to improve the lack of coordination
that has been proven and has been documented.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in congress from the State of Texas
I thank you Chairwoman Sanchez for convening this important hearing
to examine the status of counterterrorism overseas. I welcome Mr.
Michael E. Leiter, Prinicpal Deputy Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, Ambassador Marisa R. Lino, Assistant Secretary
of International Affairs in the Office of the Secretariat in the
Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Gary L. Cote, Deputy Assistant
Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Edgar Moreno,
Assistant Director of Domestic Operations in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security in the Department of State, and Mr. Thomas V. Fuentes,
Assistant Director of the Office of International Operations Legal
Attache Program in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I look forward
to your testimony.
In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
Department of Homeland Security was created with the mission of
preventing future terrorist attacks, within our nation and abroad, and
reducing the United States' vulnerability to future terrorist attacks,
the success of which cannot easily be quantified. Be that as it may, we
are here today to examine issues surrounding U.S. Law Enforcement
Agencies' (LEAs) counterterrorism oversees, a necessary self-reflection
that is integral to our national security. Since the September 11th
attacks, the Bush administration has issued three primary security
strategies: the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, the National Security Strategy for Homeland Security, and the
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. All of these strategies have at
their epicenter the recognition of combating terrorism as the nation's
top security goal.
Never an isolationist, the United States has long kept close
political and security ties with the other nations of the international
community. However, in the wake of September 11th, there was a distinct
shift with American LEAs abroad, now working to help foreign nations
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists within their countries'.
LEAs from the Department of State, Justice and Homeland Security
operate in U.S. embassies oversees to not only assist the foreign
governments with their local law enforcement issues, but also in
seeking and engaging vigilant allies in the prevention of further
terrorist attacks. Agencies operating under the State, Justice, and
Homeland Security Department overseas include: the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and
Custom's Enforcement (ICE), and the State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS).
Each agency and department has a specific role to play oversees to
combat terrorism. To name a few, CBP's mission is to pre-clear U.S.
bound passengers, work at foreign ports in search of WMDs, work at
embassies on CBP activities in country; whereas ICE investigates
threats to the U.S. to help reduce the potential threat of terrorist
attacks against the U.S. While most overseas posts have multiple U.S.
LEAs present in order to fulfill our modern security needs, American
embassies often continue to operate within their pre-9/11 framework,
unable to accommodate or facilitate information sharing between the
myriad of agencies working within their compound. The GAO Report
revealed, ``these groups did not function in an integrated manner, were
not focused on joint investigations and operations, and did not harness
the combined capabilities of all LEAs to prevent terrorist attacks.''
The GAO Report is inundated with statements by overseas officials
candidly stating they ``had received little-to-no guidance from the
NSC, NCTC, or State, Justice, and DHS on how to implement the directive
to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute
terrorists.''
With such a multitude of departments and agencies operating
overseas, and with the same primary goal, accurate communication,
cooperation, and coordination are absolutely imperative. I have long
recognized this, and in 2004, my fellow members in Congress voted with
me to pass the ``Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004'' establishing the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The
NCTC was charged with ``conducting strategic operational planning for
the U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts,'' with emphasis placed
on integrating all levels of national power, including law enforcement,
homeland security, military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial,
into a coordinated effort to combat terrorism.
While the formation of the NCTC was a step in the right direction,
many problems still remain. For one, on matters of strategic
operational planning, the Director of the NCTC reports directly to the
President, via the NSC, excluding any accountability to the Congress.
In addition, when the GAO attempted to fulfill its role by inquiring
into the operation and ``general plan'' of the NCTC, the GAO was told
only that a ``general plan'' was in development and that it has been
approved by the President in June 2006.
This is unacceptable. The NCTC was created 3 years ago in order to
enhance and coordinate our counterterrorism efforts abroad, however, as
clearly evidenced by the GAO Report, progress has yet to be seen and
there have been problems and jurisdictional issues that could be easily
resolved if the NCTC performed its prescribed functions.
As such the GAO has offered a number of recommendations to address
the current issues. It has prescribed steps to be taken and positions
to be created within the NCTC, NSC, US Attorney General, and the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State. As a senior Member of the
Homeland Security Committee, and Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, I understand
that combating terrorism has become our nation's top national security
goal, and I am resolved to see progress in global war on terror. As
such, we must listen with open hearts and minds to the information we
receive today and diligently work to ensure that it is integrated and
implemented within our current system.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished panel,
and I am hopeful that we will be able to resolve the current lack of
overseas counterterrorism coordination. Thank you Madam Chairwoman, and
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Ms. Sanchez. And if you will do that in writing, we would
appreciate it.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions. And the members of the
subcommittee who will have additional questions for you, we
would ask that you respond quickly to them in writing.
Ms. Sanchez. Hearing no further business, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]