[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE GRADES ARE IN!--IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MEASURING
UP?
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-70
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 28
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 27
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 22
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 30
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 24
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 19
WITNESSES
The Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary, Management,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United
States, Government Accountability Office....................... 6
FOR THE RECORD
Material submitted by Hon. Mike Rogers:
Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS chart................. 5
APPENDIXES
I. Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS..................... 39
II. Additional Questions and Responses:
Responses from Hon. Paul A. Schneider...................... 43
Responses from Hon. David M. Walker........................ 53
THE GRADES ARE IN!--IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MEASURING
UP?
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Tuesday, September 18, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:41 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Harman, Lowey,
Jackson Lee, Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Clarke, Green,
Rogers, and Dent.
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from
Comptroller General David M. Walker of the Government
Accountability Office and Mr. Paul A. Schneider, Undersecretary
for Management at the Department of Homeland Security,
regarding GAO's assessment of the Department of Homeland
Security's efforts over the past 4 years.
I have an opening statement that I would like to read. I
would like to welcome our two witnesses to the panel today. We
look forward to both of your testimonies.
I would like to share with the members of the committee and
the audience that, as you know, on September 6, 2007, a day
after the House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing
examining Secretary Chertoff's record at the Department of
Homeland Security, GAO publicly released its report assessing
the department's progress over the past 4 years.
GAO examined legislation, homeland security presidential
directives and DHS and component agency strategic plans. GAO
assessed the department's performance based on its inspector
general's report, past GAO reports and documents provided by
the department.
All in all, GAO found that the key underlying themes that
have affected the department's implementation efforts are the
lack of strategic planning and management, risk management,
information sharing, agency transformation, partnership
formulation and internal and external coordination.
Simply put, the GAO report confirmed, and I and the
committee have suspected for a while now, that the department
has failed to complete major projects, programs and plans
critical to fulfilling critical homeland security missions.
In addition to incomplete performance in several
operational and programmatic areas, I am also troubled about
the department's ongoing challenges in resolving critical
personnel vacancies that exist in key decision-making
positions.
The GAO report is really pointing to a need for
accountability.
Mr. Schneider, it did not go unnoticed that the department
chose to send you to defend 4 years record and that you have
only been with the department for 9 months. It should be noted
that the committee sought the attendance of Deputy Secretary
Michael Jackson, who has been in the department since its
inception and who serves as the department's chief operating
officer and is responsible for managing the department's day-
to-day operation.
Let me state emphatically that the department must not
evade its responsibility to the American people. The leaders of
the department should be here to account for why they have
decided to swap the national response plan for a national
response framework that state and local participants are still
confused about.
The decision-makers of the department must account for the
300 percent cost increase of the SBInet program the department
said would help to secure the borders against dangerous persons
and cargo. The managers of the department should account for
the delay in the issuance of TWIC, the transportation worker
identification card.
The directors of the department need to account for the
fact that taxpayers' dollars were spent on the homeland
security information network, a program that the department's
inspector general found does not support information sharing
effectively, does not fully meet user needs, and, in many
cases, is not relied upon by state, local and tribal law
enforcement agencies.
Now, I understand that the department questions the
methodology employed by GAO in compiling its assessment of DHS.
Mr. Schneider, I am prepared to hear the department's
concern about the GAO, but I must warn you that the
department's failure to accomplish its responsibilities to the
American people is hardly due to statistical manipulation.
The fact is that at the September 5 hearing, I gave
Secretary Chertoff a list of outstanding projects that he is to
complete before his tenure is over at the department. When all
the items on the list have been accomplished, then the American
people will be able to say that we are safer now than we were
before.
I will close by saying, once again, that we owe the
American people security, we owe them accountability, and, most
importantly, we owe them freedom from fear.
With that, I thank you for being here today and I look
forward to your testimony.
I would also like to now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
from Alabama, who is our ranking member, Mr. Rogers.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
September 18, 2007
On September 6, 2007, a day after the House Committee on Homeland
Security held a hearing examining Secretary Chertoff's record at the
Department of Homeland Security, GAO publicly released its report
assessing the Department's progress over the past four (4) years.
GAO examined legislation, Homeland Security Presidential
Directives, and DHS and component agencies' strategic plans.
GAO assessed the Department's performance based on its Inspector
General's reports, past GAO reports, and documents provided by the
Department.
All in all, GAO found that the key underlying themes that have
affected the Department's implementation efforts are the lack of
strategic planning and management, risk management, information
sharing, agency transformation, partnership formation and internal and
external coordination.
Simply put, the GAO report confirmed what I and this Committee have
suspected for a while now--That is the Department has failed to
complete major projects, programs, and plans critical to fulfilling
critical homeland security missions.
In addition to incomplete performance in several operational and
programmatic areas, I am also troubled about the Department's on-going
challenges in resolving critical personnel vacancies that exist in key
decision-making positions.
The GAO report is really pointing to a need for accountability.]
Mr. Schneider, it did not go unnoticed that the Department chose to
send you to defend the Department's chief operating officer and is
responsible for managing the Department's day-to-day operations.
Let me state emphatically that the Department must not evade its
responsibility to the American people.
The leaders of the Department should be here to account for why
they have decided to swap the National Response Plan for a National
Response Framework that State and local participants are still confused
about.
The decision makers of the Department must account for the 300
percent cost increase of the SBInet--a program the Department said
would help to secure the borders against dangerous persons and cargo.
The managers of the Department should account for the delay in the
issuance of TWIC--the transportation worker identification card.
The directors of the Department need to account for the fact that
taxpayer dollars were spent on the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN)--a program that the Department's Inspector General found
does not support information sharing effectively, does not fully meet
user needs, and in many cases is not relied upon by State, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies.
Now I understand that the Department questions the methodology
employed by GAO in compiling its assessment of DHS.
Mr. Schneider, I am prepared to hear the Department's concerns
about the GAO but I must warn you that Department's failure to
accomplish its responsibilities to the American people is hardly due to
statistical manipulation.
The fact is that at the September 5th hearing, I gave Secretary
Chertoff a list of outstanding projects that he is to complete before
this tenure is over at the Department.
When all of the items on the list have been accomplished then the
American people will be able to say that we are safer now than we were
before.
I will close by saying--once again--that we owe the American people
security. We owe them accountability. And most importantly, we owe them
freedom from fear.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, would like to welcome Mr. Walker and Mr. Schneider
back to the committee.
The GAO report we will discuss today sets forth a
comprehensive review of the progress made at DHS, as well as a
number of challenges still facing the department. Specifically,
the 320-page GAO report points out that, while DHS has made
significant progress in carrying out its missions, more needs
to be done to strengthen the management structure.
Partially, in response, DHS has raised serious concerns
with the methodology and performance measures GAO used to
develop its report, but we will hear from Undersecretary
Schneider about these concerns.
The creation of DHS in March 2003 marked the largest
government reorganization since the creation of the Department
of Defense. While DHS has made great strides in integrating 22
separate agencies, DHS officials acknowledge more work needs to
be done.
GAO acknowledges that successful transformations of large
organizations, even those with less strenuous organizations
than DHS, generally take 5 to 10 years. DHS also has undergone
reorganizations, including the secretary's second stage review
in 2005 and the reorganization of FEMA earlier this year.
While Congress must actively oversee DHS, it should not
mandate more changes that will impede the department's ability
to complete its integration. As you can see from the chart, DHS
also has the challenge of reporting to 86 Congressional
committees and subcommittees because Congress has not yet
implemented the 9/11 commission recommendations to consolidate
jurisdictions.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mike Rogers, A Representative in
Congress from the State of Alabama
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we welcome back to the Committee both Comptroller General
David Walker and Under Secretary Paul Schneider.
The Government Accountability Office report we'll discuss today
sets forth a comprehensive review of the progress made by DHS, as well
as a number of challenges still facing the Department.
Specifically, the 320-page GAO report points out that while DHS had
made significant progress in carrying out its missions, more needs to
be done to strengthen the management structure.
Partially in response, DHS has raised serious concerns with the
methodology and performance measures GAO used to develop its report.
We will hear from Under Secretary Schneider about these concerns.
The creation of DHS in March 2003 marked the largest government
reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense.
While DHS has made great strides in integrating 22 separate
agencies, DHS officials acknowledge more work needs to be done.
GAO acknowledges that successful transformations of large
organizations--even those with less strenuous reorganizations than
DHS--generally take five to seven years to achieve.
DHS also has undergone reorganizations, including the Secretary's
Second Stage Review in 2005, and the reorganization of FEMA earlier
this year.
While Congress must actively oversee DHS, it should not mandate
more changes that will impede the Department's ability to complete its
integration.
DHS also has the challenge of reporting to 86 congress committees
and subcommittees because Congress has not yet implemented the 9/11
Commission recommendation to consolidate jurisdiction.
Mr. Chairman, I ask Unanimous Consent to include in the Record a
chart that shows the committees and subcommittees that currently
oversee DHS.
Consolidated jurisdiction would maintain strong oversight, while
DHS strengthens its organization and carries out its missions.
Again, I thank the witnesses for being here today, and we look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to
include in the record the chart that shows the committees and
subcommittees that currently oversee DHS.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rogers. Consolidated jurisdiction would maintain strong
oversight while DHS strengthens its organization and carries
out its missions.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today
and look forward to their testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Other members of the committee are
reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may
be submitted for the record.
I now welcome our first witness, Mr. David Walker. Mr.
Walker became the seventh comptroller general of the United
States and began his 15-year term when he took his oath of
office on November 9, 1998.
As comptroller general, Mr. Walker is the nation's chief
accountability officer and head of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, a legislative branch founded in 1921.
GAO's mission is to help improve the performance and assure
the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of
the American people. Over the years, GAO has earned a
reputation for professional, objective, fact-based and
nonpartisan review of government issues and operations.
Mr. Walker, I thank you for your service and I appreciate
you agreeing to testify here today.
Our second witness is the honorable Paul Schneider,
Undersecretary for Management at the Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to joining the department earlier this year,
Undersecretary Schneider was a defense and aerospace consultant
for 3.5 years. Before that, he was a civil servant for 38
years, including serving as senior acquisition executive of the
National Security Agency from October 2002 to September 2003,
and more than 4 years as principal deputy assistant secretary
of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.
Thank you, Mr. Schneider, for being here today.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Mr. Walker.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Walker. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, other
members of the Homeland Security Committee, thank you very much
for the opportunity to be with you and to review GAO's findings
with regard to our report that was issued earlier this month on
the implementation, integration and transformation of
Department of Homeland Security.
DHS began operations in March of 2003 with a number of
missions, which included, among other things, preventing
terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States,
reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the
damages from attacks that might occur, and helping the nation
recover from these attacks.
The department has initiated and continued to implement a
variety of policies and programs designed to address these
challenges, as well as its many non-homeland security
functions. I think it is important to note at the outset that
thousands of DHS employees are working very hard on these and
other challenges and we obviously appreciate their efforts.
DHS has also taken a number of actions to integrate its
management functions and to transform its component agencies
into an effective and integrated cabinet department.
However, given the size and significance of this undertaken
and in light of the experience of Department of Defense in
1947, GAO designated the implementation and transformation of
the Department of Homeland Security as a high risk area and it
continues to be high risk today.
In designating this as a high risk area, we noted that
building an effective department would require consistent and
sustained leadership from top management in all key areas. And
we also noted that successful mergers and transformations, even
in the private sector, of large and complex organizations, can
take 5 to 7 years to achieve and be sustained. And, quite
candidly, in government, for a variety of reasons, it takes
longer.
Our report provides our assessment of DHS' progress across
14 mission and management areas. For each area, we identified
performance expectations based upon not our expectations, but
the expectations of the Congress, the president of the United
States and the secretary of homeland security.
We worked with the inspector general of the department of
homeland security and, also, considered our prior work. We also
provided an opportunity for the department to be able to
provide us with additional information, including extensive
information after reviewing a copy of our draft report.
DHS has raised certain concerns about our methodology. We
are comfortable with what we did, how we did it and why we did
it.
At the same point in time, I also want to acknowledge that
in a hearing that we had on the Senate side about 2 weeks ago,
I agreed with the chairman and ranking member of Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that we would work
together with DHS to come up with a modified methodology to
evaluate DHS on a prospective basis and, in my opinion, that
methodology should include both what the status is of these
major efforts, as well as whether or not meaningful progress is
being made with regard to each of these major areas, because
after all, it is going to take years to effectively address
some of these areas no matter what best efforts might be from
the related parties.
They have made varying levels of progress in implementing
their mission and management areas since March of 2001. In
general, DHS has made more progress in its mission areas than
its management areas, for understandable reasons. Mission is
what it is all about and mission is about protecting security
and safety.
I would note that there is a board which is noted on page
four of my testimony, which includes the summary of our
evaluation.
I would also note that there are a variety of factors that
have affected DHS' ability to implement its mission and
management functions. These factors include both domestic and
international events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
major homeland security legislation. And the next board, which
is on page seven of your testimony, summarizes a number of
these major events.
Given the leading role that DHS plays in securing the
homeland, it is critical that the department's missions,
programs and functions operate as efficiently and as
effectively as possible. It has been more than 4 years since
the department was established.
They have made progress. More progress is necessary, but it
is going to take time. I think it is important they be focused
on the right things and that they be held accountable for
making meaningful progress on a recurring basis.
I also would note that in order for us to be able to
effectively discharge our responsibilities to the Congress,
that we need timely access to GAO people, documents and
operational exercises, and, in that regard, I am pleased to
note that just before I came to this hearing, I received a
response to a recent letter that I sent to Secretary Chertoff
in which he pledged to be personally engaged in making sure
that we gain more timely access than we have in the past.
I appreciate his willingness to set the right tone at the
top and that is absolutely necessary in order for us to be able
to effectively discharge our responsibilities for the Congress
and the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:] \1\
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\1\ See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T
(Washington, D.C.): September 18, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now ask Mr. Schneider to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHNEIDER, UNDER SECRETARY MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
Rogers, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to
appear before you today.
Without question, the most significant challenge we face at
DHS is to continue to transform the department into a unified
force that protects our country. Although the department has
faced numerous challenges during the first 4 years of this
critical undertaking, we have made great progress.
GAO largely recognizes this progress across 14 mission and
management areas. In fact, GAO concluded that the department
has generally achieved 78 performance expectations.
This is particularly noteworthy given GAO's recognition
that, in many cases, there was no anticipation that the
department would achieve the performance expectations by the
end of our 4th year.
Also of importance is the GAO recognition that their
assessments of progress do not reflect nor are they intended to
reflect the extent to which DHS' actions have made the nation
more secure in each area.
Although the department takes issue with the methodology
and rating system employed by GAO, there can be no dispute that
GAO's positive assessments of generally achieved reflect the
department's significant progress in the four major mission
areas.
I think it is worth noting that many of the areas where GAO
rightly recognized the department's progress were those
critical areas we chose to focus our resources to secure the
homeland. While we were pleased that GAO recognized our
progress, the department continues to believe that GAO used the
flawed methodology in preparing its report, which resulted in
many of the assessments not fully reflecting the department's
progress.
We are particularly concerned that the report is based on
vague, shifting criteria and standards that result in an ``A or
fail'' grading system does not properly credit DHS for on track
implementation of long term multiyear goals or constantly
evolving programs, that it is subjective and does not normalize
the audit standard amongst analysts to ensure consistent
assessments across the 171 performance expectations, and does
not consistently account for issues outside DHS' control.
In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a revised
statement of facts that the department's progress would now be
rated as generally achieved or generally not achieved rather
than generally addressed or generally not addressed.
Although their reply to our comments suggest that this was
merely a change in language rather than substance, the
practical differences between these standards are significant,
reflecting, at a minimum, a difference in how the performance
expectations would be perceived.
``Addressed'' suggests that a program is on track, whereas
``achieved'' indicates final completion. Our view is that GAO
went from a pass-fail to an A-fail grading system without
explaining why. In our view, this is like moving the goalpost
after the game has started.
Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments
of the department, the 28 performance expectations, to
generally not achieved.
We are also concerned with the binary achieved-not achieved
standard. We believe it is ill equipped to evaluate the
department's progress accurately in a multiyear endeavor.
In closure, my letter to the GAO dated 20 July 2007, which
has been included in the GAO report, and my testimony,
highlights in detail a discussion of some of these problematic
assessments.
Moving forward, we will build upon the department's recent
program developments and successes, while dedicating ourselves
to continuous improvement.
I personally look forward to maintaining the cooperative
approach with the GAO that was followed in preparing this
report and, as the comptroller general indicated, based on our
hearing with Senator Lieberman, we are in the process of
starting to work together to establish criteria for subsequent
evaluation that is mutually agreed to by both parties.
I would also like to thank the Congress and especially this
committee for your leadership and for your continued support of
the Department of Homeland Security.
I am happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary
for Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Representative King and members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today.
I am here today to discuss where the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) stands after its first four years--both its successes
and where more work is needed. In particular, I am here to discuss the
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled
Department of Homeland Security, Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions (GAO Report).
I want to say at the outset that we are very appreciative of the
frank and open communication with GAO that has been established during
recent months, especially during the final stages of GAO's work on this
report. In this regard we are especially appreciative of the efforts of
the Comptroller General, Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland
Security and Justice, and their team for their professionalism,
courtesy and cooperation. We look forward to building on and continuing
this cooperative approach. We also appreciate the opportunity that we
were given to review and provide comments on the earlier draft report
submitted by GAO.
As you know, this report looks at DHS' first four years, although
GAO has observed that ``successful transformations of large
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations
than DHS, can take at least five to seven years to achieve.'' We
appreciate GAO's acknowledgement of the challenges the Department faces
and recognition of the progress we have made in the past four years.
Without question, the most significant challenge we face at DHS is to
continue to transform the Department into a unified force that protects
our country. DHS, whose size is comparable to a Fortune 50 company, has
been an entrepreneurial start-up effort that, at the same time, has
been required to merge 22 agencies with approximately 209,000 employees
into one.
GAO itself has referred to this project as an ``enormous management
challenge,'' and in regards to the size, complexity and importance of
our efforts, as ``daunting.''
Although the Department has faced numerous challenges during the
first four years of this daunting--and critical--undertaking, we have
made great progress. The GAO Report largely recognizes this progress
across 14 mission and management areas. In fact, GAO concluded that the
Department has ``Generally Achieved'' 78 performance expectations,
despite GAO's recognition that in many cases it had not expected that
the Department could achieve the performance expectations by the end of
our fourth year. In other areas, GAO also recognizes the Department's
ongoing programs but nevertheless concludes that the progress to date
warrants a different assessment of ``Generally Not Achieved''.
Although the Department takes issue with the methodology and rating
system employed by GAO, there can be no dispute that GAO's positive
assessments in 78 performance expectations reflect the Department's
significant progress in four major mission areas, including: (1)
securing modes of transportation, (2) securing the border and
administering the immigration system, (3) defending against, preparing
for, and responding to threats and disasters, and (4) implementing
management functions.
Securing modes of transportation. The Department has implemented a
strategic approach for aviation security functions. In order to make
air travel more secure, the Department has hired and deployed a federal
screening workforce as well as federal air marshals on high-risk
flights, and developed and implemented procedures for physically
screening passengers and air cargo. The GAO Report also recognizes the
Department's progress in developing and testing checkpoint technologies
and deploying explosive detection systems and explosive trace detection
systems to screen checked baggage. The Department has also established
policies and procedures to ensure that individuals known to pose, or
suspected of posing, a risk or threat to security, are identified and
subjected to an appropriate action.
In the area of maritime security, GAO recognizes the Department's
development of national plans for maritime security, and progress in
developing a vessel-tracking system to improve awareness on vessels in
U.S. waters, ensuring port facilities have completed vulnerability
assessments and developed security plans; and developing a system for
screening and inspecting cargo for illegal contraband.
Securing the border and administering the immigration system. The
Department has implemented a biometric entry system to prevent
unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States through
ports of entry and is developing a program to detect and identify
illegal border crossings between ports of entry. We have also developed
a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and
other items into the United States. In the area of immigration
enforcement, the Department has developed a program to ensure the
timely identification and removal of noncriminal aliens as well as a
comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent the trafficking and
smuggling of aliens into the United States. We have also developed a
prioritized worksite enforcement strategy to ensure that only
authorized workers are employed. In order to provide better immigration
services, the Department has established revised immigration
application fees based on a comprehensive fee study and has created an
office to reduce immigration benefit fraud.
Defending against, preparing for, and responding to threats and
disasters. In order to satisfy our mission of being prepared for and
responding to future threats and disasters, whether they are along the
lines of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, the Department has developed a national incident management
system and a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure
protection. The Department has identified and assessed threats and
vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure and has supported efforts
to reduce those threats and vulnerabilities. The GAO Report also
recognizes the Department's progress in coordinating and sharing
homeland security technologies with federal, state, local, tribal and
private sector entities.
Implementing Management Functions. While I have indicated in my
prior testimony that there remains much work to be done in the area of
improving and integrating management functions, there has nevertheless
been progress in these areas. For example, GAO's assessments reflect
our progress in assessing and organizing acquisition functions to meet
agency needs. We have also designated a Department Chief Financial
Officer, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who is
currently working to prepare corrective action plans to address
internal control weaknesses. In the area of human capital, we have
developed a results-oriented strategic human capital plan, and have
created a comprehensive plan for training and professional development.
We have also organized roles and responsibilities for information
technology under the Chief Information Officer and developed policies
and procedures to ensure the protection of sensitive information. A
Senior Real Property Officer has also been established and an Office of
Management and Budget-approved asset management plan has been
developed.
I think it is worth noting that many of the areas in which GAO
rightly recognizes the Department's progress were those areas where we
have chosen to focus our resources during our first four years based
upon a risk-based approach. For example, the Secretary has focused the
Department's efforts on securing transportation modes given the nature
of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The GAO Report recognizes that the
Department has indeed made great strides in this area, giving the
Department assessments of ``Generally Achieved'' in 37 out of 50
performance expectations in this area. In this regard, it is worth
noting that GAO acknowledges that its ``assessments of progress do no
reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS'
actions have made the nation more secure in each area''.
While we were pleased that GAO recognizes our progress in these and
other areas by indicating that we had ``Generally Achieved'' relevant
performance expectations, the Department continues to believe that the
GAO Report is based upon a flawed methodology. This methodology results
in many assessments that do not fully or accurately reflect the
Department's progress.
We have raised our concerns with the methodology used by GAO on
several occasions, including in our July 20, 2007 comments to the draft
report. GAO's recent reply to our comments notwithstanding, these
methodological issues continue to contribute to the report's systematic
understatement of the Department's progress at the four-year mark.
Therefore, I think they bear repeating here. We are particularly
concerned that the GAO report:
Is based on vague and shifting criteria, standards,
and performance expectations that results in an ``A or Fail''
grading system;
Does not properly credit DHS for the on-track
implementation of long-term, multi-year goals;
Does not account for constantly evolving programs,
especially those where total achievement may never be possible;
Is subjective and does not normalize the audit
standard amongst analysts to ensure consistent assessments
across the 171 performance expectations;
Does not consistently account for issues outside the
control of DHS;
Relies on outdated or inaccurate information; and
Weighs all performance expectations equally.
Many of these concerns were first expressed to GAO in connection
with an initial, draft Statement of Facts provided by GAO to the
Department in February. To evaluate the Department's progress over its
first four years, GAO officials had relied almost exclusively on
outdated reports and data to rate the Department's performance on a
subjective, binary scale of ``Generally Addressed'' or ``Generally Not
Addressed.'' GAO indicated that an assessment of ``Generally
Addressed'' was given where analysts determined that DHS had ``taken
steps to effectively satisfy most of the key elements of the
performance expectation.'' GAO neither defined ``effectively satisfy,''
nor identified the key elements or criteria associated with each
performance expectation. Accordingly, the initial Statement of Facts
and assessments provided us with little insight into how GAO had
evaluated the Department's activities.
After the Secretary personally reviewed the initial Statement of
Facts, he wrote to the Comptroller General on March 7, 2007 expressing
his concerns and offering to work with GAO ``to ensure the final GAO
statement fully reflect[ed] the Department's achievements over the past
four years.'' Shortly thereafter, the Department provided GAO with
thousands of pages of documents explaining how key programs were on
track and a detailed 100-plus-page explanation of the Department's
overall progress. Over many weeks, the Department continued to provide
additional documentation and meet with GAO officials to demonstrate how
DHS was addressing various program areas and performance expectations.
In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a Revised Statement of
Facts which altered the standard for judging the Department's progress
without prior warning or consultation with the Department. The Revised
Statement of Facts indicated for the first time that the Department's
progress would now be rated as ``Generally Achieved'' or ``Generally
Not Achieved,'' rather than as ``Generally Addressed'' or ``Generally
Not Addressed.'' Although GAO's recent reply to our comments suggests
that this was merely a change in language rather than substance, the
practical differences between these standards are significant,
reflecting, at a minimum, a difference in how the performance
expectations would be perceived. ``Addressed'' suggests that a program
is on track, whereas ``achieved'' indicates final completion. The
Department went from being rated on the GAO standard to ``effectively
satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may
not have satisfied all of the elements'' to now completely satisfying
all of the requirements. Our view is that GAO went from a Pass/Fail to
an A/Fail grading system without explaining why. This is like moving
the goal post in the middle of a game. Consequently, DHS spent many
months working to show how the Department had satisfied those now-
abandoned standards.
Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments of the
Department in 28 performance expectations. In 24 such instances, the
Department went from ``No Assessment Made'' to ``Generally Not
Achieved.'' These changes were particularly surprising in light of the
extensive documentation and materials describing the Department's
progress and successes that were provided to GAO. As discussed in the
Department's formal response, which is included in the final GAO
Report, we believe the downgraded assessments are not supported by the
facts.
The binary ``Achieved''/``Not Achieved'' standard ultimately
adopted by GAO mid-audit is particularly ill-equipped to evaluate
accurately the Department's multi-year programs, especially when DHS is
only a few years into the project. GAO acknowledges the applied
standard is ``not perfect'' but supports its decision to maintain the
binary standard as it was unable ``to assess where along a spectrum of
progress DHS stood for individual performance expectations''. We
disagree with the standard used. For example, although GAO officials
have indicated that the Department's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is
``on a trajectory'' towards achievement, the Department received a
score of ``Generally Not Achieved'' in this performance expectation
because it had not yet fully completed the goals of the entire SBI
program. It is important to note that the Department was authorized to
commence SBInet just one year ago. To assess this program within this
report under the assumption that the Department has had four years to
implement it is misleading. GAO's assessments of multi-year programs
are thus at odds with GAO's own disclaimer that its assessments are
``not meant to imply that DHS should have fully achieved the
performance expectation by the end of its fourth year.''
We are also concerned with the apparent shifting of the already
nontransparent criteria used by GAO to assess the Department. We
disagree with GAO's reply that the key elements are somehow
``inherent'' to the performance expectations. While certain elements of
a given performance expectation may in some cases be obvious, the
subjectivity of other key elements and criteria used by GAO is borne
out by our exchanges with GAO over the past months. In many instances,
where the Department provided GAO with supplemental information
directly addressing specific criteria discussed in the initial or
Revised Statement of Facts, GAO acknowledges DHS's new information yet
does not fully consider its significance or include additional criteria
for that performance expectation that was not previously provided to
the Department. In some cases, this new criteria contained in the GAO
Report goes beyond or contradicts the scope of the performance
expectation itself. For instance, GAO's assessment of the Department's
efforts to implement a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows
of cargo, drugs, and other items illustrates this point. The Revised
Statement of Facts indicated that GAO's assessment was based in part on
GAO's belief that the Department had not established or met milestones
for achieving relevant goals. After GAO was provided with information
to the contrary, GAO simply dropped its reference to those criteria and
added language regarding new criteria, including the criticism that the
Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan
(SABPOE) was ``in the early stages of implementation'' where the
performance expectation only asks whether a strategy has been
implemented.
Moreover, there appears to have been no effort to ``normalize'' the
process by which GAO officials made admittedly subjective assessments
across the entire spectrum of 171 performance expectations. As a
result, GAO analysts in various mission and management areas could have
evaluated the Department's performance differently. The vague
descriptions of ``Generally Addressed'' and then ``Generally Achieved''
do not appear to provide detailed guidance to support these
determinations or ensure consistency in application. Therefore it is
difficult to have confidence in the level of consistency applied in
evaluating the performance expectation criteria or the assessments
based upon them. Furthermore, the GAO Report treats all of the
performance expectations as if they were of equal significance. While
all of the 171 performance expectations included in the GAO Report are
important, they are not of the same priority when it comes to securing
the nation's homeland. GAO readily admits that it did not weigh the
relationship between each performance expectation with the Department's
overall priorities and mission. In contrast, the Department uses a
risk-based approach to consider its overall priorities and mission in
choosing where to focus its limited resources. As previously discussed,
the GAO Report indicates that DHS has made the greatest progress in
several areas that it identified as priorities, such as securing
transportation modes.
In addition to these methodological concerns, we believe that many
of GAO's specific assessments do not reflect the significant progress
made by the Department over the past four years. The following are a
few prime examples:
Even after our July 20, 2007 comments GAO continues to
assess the Department's efforts to detect and identify illegal
border crossings as ``Generally Not Achieved.'' This assessment
understates the importance of our successful efforts to deploy
6,000 National Guard agents to the border, to increase Border
Patrol staffing by 30 percent since 2001, and to begin
implementation of the comprehensive SBI Program. For example,
GAO does not take into consideration the Department's efforts
to secure the northern border. It also does not mention that
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (DHS-CBP) Border Patrol
apprehensions for the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 2007
are down 24 percent compared to the previous year along the
southwest border, indicating a significant decline in illegal
cross-border activity between ports of entry. The Yuma,
Arizona, and Del Rio, Texas, sectors experienced the greatest
declines, with decreases of 68 percent and 51 percent,
respectively. The number of other-than-Mexican alien
apprehensions dropped 48 percent along the southern border. The
decrease in other-than-Mexican apprehensions reduces the time
agents spend transporting and processing them, and increases
the time spent patrolling the border.
The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal to establish standards and
procedures for effective airport perimeter security and to
control access to secured areas does not give proper
consideration to the extensive documentation recently provided
to GAO by the Department's Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). The documentation not only demonstrates
substantial progress in establishing standards, but also the
steps the Department is taking in implementing those standards.
For instance, TSA established the Aviation Inspection Plan as
guidance to implement the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA). Based on the Aviation Inspection Plan, TSA is
conducting perimeter and access control pilots with airports,
and has recommended to airport operators commercially available
measures or procedures to prevent unauthorized access to
secured airport areas. The Report continues to downplay the
significance of the detailed action plan addressing all GAO
recommendations from its 2004 audit and many processes already
in place to improve airport perimeter security and access
controls.
The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of leveraging technology,
personnel and information to secure the border is incorrect.
The US-VISIT program incorporates eligibility determinations
made by both DHS and the Department of State into a continuum
of security measures to secure the border. US-VISIT manages
systems that operate at 283 air, sea and land ports and 210
Consular Offices worldwide. These systems collect data and
screen travelers against existing watch lists and databases
containing information about previous DHS encounters with the
traveler, verifying identities and travel documents. The
Department also captures data on individuals attempting illegal
entry between the ports of entry, as well as individuals who
are being investigated or removed from the interior of the
country. This information is then shared with the ports of
entry, Consular Offices, Border Patrol Stations, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (USICE) Field Offices, U.S. Citizenship
Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Coast Guard. GAO's
statement that there is ``more work to be done,'' which will
almost certainly be true should substantiate this subjective
score.
The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of developing new programs
to prevent future immigration benefit application backlogs from
developing is incorrect. In GAO's response to the Department's
July 20, 2007 comments, they acknowledge that the Department
has initiated various programs to help reduce processing time.
Despite this acknowledgement, GAO maintains its subjective
assessment of ``Generally Not Achieved''.
We continue to disagree with GAO's assessment that the
Department has ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of
establishing training programs to reduce fraud in the benefits
process. This assessment provides an example of our concerns
about GAO's shifting and vague criteria, as GAO's focus has
apparently shifted from the ``establishment'' of training
programs to concerns about the specific implementation of those
programs. Not only has the Department established training
programs, it is implementing them and has provided to GAO
statistics on these training classes including number of
attendees and course content. Additionally, this assessment is
based on shifting criteria. The GAO requested we establish
training programs and is assessing the Department on how the
training program has been implemented.
The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of implementing a
prioritized worksite enforcement strategy does not capture the
significant progress that ICE has made since 2004. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's (USICE) efforts have resulted in a
significant increase in the use of the employment verification
system as well as significant increases in investigations and
arrests. The worksite enforcement strategy is a comprehensive
three-pronged approach: (a) criminal investigations of
egregious employer violators; (b) enhanced employer compliance
and outreach to help employers follow the law; and (c) ensuring
that critical infrastructure sites have only authorized
workers.
The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of implementing a
comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent trafficking and
smuggling of aliens into the U.S is not supported by the facts
provided to GAO officials. The Department's implementation
strategy for counteracting the trafficking and smuggling of
aliens is just one part of the larger SBI and SABPOE Strategic
Plan. DHS has made significant progress coordinating with other
departmental components and federal agencies to target cross-
border criminal activity, including human trafficking.
The Department does not agree with the assessment that
the Department's Science and Technology (S&T) directorate has
``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal to create a plan for its
departmental research, development, testing and evaluation
activities. S&T delivered a Strategic Plan to Congress on June
26, 2007 that incorporates a five-year Research and Development
Plan including information on milestones for fiscal years 2007
through 2011. The milestones, deliverables and goals are
included for every project within S&T, especially Test and
Evaluation. It reflects the highest level objectives for
internal departmental activities, and provides overarching
guidance for addressing the science and technology needs within
each homeland security mission area. The Plan also addresses
the importance of developing a strong homeland security science
and technology national workforce by developing professional
S&T employees.
Although GAO changed its assessment of our efforts
towards developing a comprehensive Enterprise Architecture (EA)
that substantially meets each of the Enterprise Architecture
Management Maturity Framework (EAMMF) elements from ``Generally
Achieved'' to ``No Assessment Made,'' we continue to believe
that this expectation has been met.
We also believe that the comprehensive EA has been implemented,
contrary to GAO's assessment of that related expectation. With
significant input from stakeholders, the Department has made
great strides in these areas. In fact, the Office of Management
and Budget has rated the Homeland Security Enterprise
Architecture 2007 as a 4.3 on a 5.0 scale for completeness and
a 4.5 on a 5.0 scale for use, which includes the elements of
governance, change management, deployment, collaboration, and
Capital Planning and Investment Control integration. The August
2006 GAO report found that DHS fully satisfied 24 out of 31
applicable EAMMF elements, and partially satisfied four
additional elements. Since that time, DHS has taken additional
steps to identify and/or address the final three elements.
Products related to the EA are now required to undergo
independent verification and validation (IV&V) which will
ensure interoperability, compatibility, and efficiency within
the larger structure. DHS has also worked to centralize
information technology (IT) processes and avoid unnecessary
duplication, by requiring adherence to the EA for all IT
investments over $2.5 million. In addition, the Office of the
Chief Information Officer is currently aligning all new
investments to the EA. All IT investments in Fiscal Year 2008
have already been aligned with the Department's strategic plans
and will continue in future fiscal years. Also, with respect to
implementing the EA, DHS has created a repeatable methodology
for assessing potential IT investments. The developed
methodology is based upon detailed compliance criteria.
The Department also takes strong exception to GAO's assessments
within the Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area. In
addition to the five performance expectations that GAO recognizes that
we have Generally Achieved, we also believe that the Department has
Generally Achieved 10 additional performance expectations. The
following are some examples in this mission area that reflect the
progress we have achieved:
GAO maintains that the Department has ``Generally Not
Achieved'' the goal of establishing, coordinating, and
implementing a single, all hazards national response plan. In
fact, the Department issued the National Response Plan in
December of 2004. With regard to implementation, the Department
has actively trained Federal, state and local government and
non-governmental leadership and first responders since the
plan's release through a formal roll-out process, an on-line
training course, workshops, and regular exercises. GAO's
reliance on ongoing efforts to revise and update the NRP as a
basis to downgrade the Department's assessment does not reflect
the reality that the NRP is a living document that will be
regularly reviewed and revised as long as it is in existence.
This assessment is an example of GAO's flawed methodology, as
it does not take into account the nature of the Department's
constantly evolving, yet established programs. Even as the
successor to the NRP, called the National Response Framework,
has been recently published for public comment, the existing
NRP continues to serve as a single, all-hazards national
response plan.
The Department disagrees with the assessment of
``Generally Not Achieved,'' regarding the goal to ensure the
capacity and readiness of disaster response teams. GAO does not
give sufficient consideration to readiness and capacity of
FEMA's disaster response system that is in place and now tried,
tested, and proven to be successful in recent hurricanes,
tornados, floods, and tropical storms. FEMA continues to work
hard to refine doctrine, policies, procedures, guidance, and
metrics, for its disaster response teams and activities. In
fact, the interagency community, especially the Department of
Defense, was very complimentary of the comprehensive
coordination, led by FEMA, in preparing for a response to
Hurricane Dean. The Federal Incident Response Support Teams
(FIRST) from Atlanta and a Mobile Emergency Response Support
(MERS) Component were airlifted to Puerto Rico by Coast Guard
and Department of Defense aircraft and were in position well
before Hurricane Dean's arrival. The FIRST demonstrated for the
first time the capability to provide real time situational
awareness in a live video broadcast from Puerto Rico back to
the FEMA Headquarters and the Regional Response Coordination
Center. In addition, six Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task
Forces and a US&R Incident Support Team were deployed to Fort
Worth, Texas, and the FIRST from Chicago was deployed to
McAllen, Texas, for support. After the storm passed Puerto
Rico, the FIRST was quickly flown back to Atlanta and was
prepared for a second deployment in case of a future hurricane
strike.
DHS also disagrees with GAO's assessment that the
Department has Generally Not Achieved the goal to develop the
capacity to provide needed emergency assistance and services in
a timely manner to individuals and communities in an emergency
event. Critical services, such as improved logistics tracking
and capacity, increased disaster victim registration, and
robust fraud, waste and abuse protections are in place and
fully functional. Recently, FEMA received high marks from the
Mayor of Greensburg, Kansas for its rapid response to the
tornado which destroyed 90% of the town. Mayor Lonnie McCollum
said ``As I broke down my back door to go out, there's a
fireman from Dodge City, Kansas. He meets me as I'm digging out
of the rubble to see if I'm OK. And almost the next person
behind him is somebody from FEMA.'' FEMA is also supporting
major planning efforts in the Gulf Coast states to address
evacuation needs should another major disaster strike that
area. Additionally, the Department has undertaken a number of
initiatives such as the National Shelter System with the Red
Cross to improve shelter management. FEMA has also engaged in
outreach to other Federal agencies to ensure the smooth and
responsive coordination of Federal support and has been working
closely with highest risk hurricane states on a gap analysis
initiative that helps the States identify and address the their
strengths and weaknesses.
DHS disagrees with GAO's assessment that the
Department has Generally Not Achieved the goal to develop a
system for collecting and disseminating lessons learned and
best practices to emergency responders. The Department
developed the Lessons Learned Information Sharing website in
2004 for the first responder community. Based on user feedback
the Department has been making significant system upgrades
resulting in dramatic improvements in the ability of first
responders to access and share valuable information on all
aspects of emergency response and homeland security.
Our response to the GAO dated July 20, 2007, which is included in
the GAO Report contains a more detailed discussion of these and other
particularly problematic assessments contained in the GAO Report.
Conclusion:
The Department has done a great deal to ensure the safety and
security of our country. We are proud of what DHS has been able to
accomplish in a short time, notwithstanding the many challenges faced
by the Department. We are pushing ourselves to strengthen the
Department and are committed to strengthening its management and
operational capabilities.
I want to take this opportunity to publicly thank the Department's
employees for their tireless efforts and those who made the ultimate
sacrifice with their lives to ensure the freedom of our nation. Moving
forward, we will build upon the Department's recent program
developments and successes while dedicating ourselves for continual
improvement.
In pursuing our mission, I look forward to maintaining the
cooperative approach with the GAO that was followed in preparing this
report. This process has provided valuable lessons on a better way
ahead and we look forward to working with GAO to obtain upfront the
necessary clarifications on performance expectations. I also want to
thank the Congress and this Committee for your leadership and your
continued support of the Department of Homeland Security. I am happy to
answer questions that you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I want to thank
both of you for your testimony.
And I would like to remind each member that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question Mr. Walker and Mr. Schneider.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Walker, you have heard the department's disagreement
with your report. Do you stand by your report to this
committee?
Mr. Walker. We do and, frankly, I think it is reasonable to
expect that when you are doing something like that, that there
are going to be some areas of disagreement.
Let me make it very clear. The approach that we took we
laid out. It was transparent. It is true that the department
expressed concerns about the approach, but very late in the
ballgame, after we had done most of the work and, therefore, we
couldn't turn the battleship that late in the ballgame.
The bottom line is this: that while there are differences
of opinion on how we evaluated some of the individual
performance expectations, frankly, even given those differences
of opinion, I doubt there would have been much of a difference
in what our bottom line assessment would have been with regard
to overall progress.
More importantly, we have agreed that we are going to come
up with an alternative methodology for prospective evaluation
of the Department of Homeland Security, which, as I said
before, I believe to consider both status, as well as whether
or not they are making meaningful progress on a prospective
basis.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
One of the questions, Mr. Schneider, is take the SBInet
contract. In that contract, we find some costs associated with
the fence and we can't get the hard figures on the fence.
We have had $1.6 million as a cost, but some say it could
go as high as $4 million per mile.
Do you have any information on that particular issue?
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Chairman, I can get you the information.
I can tell you, having spent some time looking at the secure
border initiative, that different areas of fence actually cost
a little different per mile and that is because of the nature
of the fence in that particular geographic area.
What we do is we look at what type of fence is appropriate,
a fence, vehicle barriers. So the numbers are not going to be
identical as, for example, the----
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me. When you average it out, is
it $1.6 million per mile?
Mr. Schneider. I don't know the average.
Chairman Thompson. Can you get that information for us?
Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir. Yes, I will.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Walker?
Mr. Walker. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that, obviously,
they are in a better position to get the information. The
number you heard about the $4 million, it is my understanding
that the current estimate of the cost per mile for Project 28,
which is a virtual fence and it is seven miles long, is about
$4.5 million a mile.
Now, that is high tech equipment and, obviously, there are
other portions aren't as high tech that would be less cost,
presumably.
Chairman Thompson. Are you aware, Mr. Schneider, of any
performance bonuses associated with this contract?
Mr. Schneider. No, no, I am not.
Chairman Thompson. If there are, will you provide the
committee with that information on the contract?
Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Walker, did you have any difficulty getting any of this
information from the department?
Mr. Walker. We have had difficulties in the past with
regard to timeliness. We haven't been outright denied
information from the department, but sometimes it has taken a
significant amount of time for us to gain access.
That was the purpose of my correspondence with Secretary
Chertoff within the last couple of weeks and, as I said, he
responded right before this hearing, and I was encouraged by
his response.
He is committed that he wants to work with us to give us
timely access, and that he wants to try to work to try to
streamline their practices. It is not their policies as much as
what the historical practices have been. And I take him at his
word.
And so we will keep this committee apprised, as well as the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. But if you had to rank the
department, Mr. Walker, at this juncture, as you compare other
agencies in terms of getting information to you to do your job,
how would you rank it?
Mr. Walker. It ranks below average with regard to the
timeliness of getting information to us, but it is got a
massive undertaking and it has got a lot of people that are
trying to get information from it, too.
It would be below average at this point in time.
Chairman Thompson. So we take Secretary Chertoff's letter
as an effort to get the department above average.
Mr. Walker. I do. In fact, one of the things that I want to
do on a prospective basis is to annually evaluate each
department and agency with regard to how they are doing, along
with records access, responding to our recommendations and a
variety of other factors, in order to highlight those that are
doing well and hopefully encourage those that aren't doing as
well to do better, as well as recognizing progress when
progress is made.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, in looking at your overall assessment, a minute
ago, you used the phrase ``bottom line'' and you framed this
earlier in your statement that this is government and even in
the private sector it would take 5 to 7 years to achieve this
merger and expect the operation to be efficient and effective.
Your bottom line assessment--is the development that you
are seeing by DHS, in your word, meaningful?
Mr. Walker. I think they have made meaningful progress.
They have made more progress on the mission front, which I
would hope and expect, than they have on the mission support
front.
As you can see in our report card, that the area they have
done the best is maritime security, lot of reasons for that,
including the Coast Guard, which is a very well run
organization, in general, but there are other areas where they
have got quite a ways to go.
Mr. Rogers. And I guess that is what I am trying to get at.
As I have talked to people back home about homeland security
and the frustrations that we have experienced post-Katrina and
in other areas, I try to remind folks that while I am very
critical of the department in a lot of ways, it is still in
development.
I reference it as being like a gangly teenager still trying
to get control of itself, and so people need to be patient
about that. And I wanted to hear from you, do you think that
the point of development that they are in now is acceptable
given where they came from in 2003 and where you expect them to
be in that 7 to 8, 9-year----
Mr. Walker. Mr. Rogers, I don't think it would be fair to
the Congress or fair to DHS for me to give it just one bottom
line assessment. I think what we tried to do is to say, ``Look,
there are certain areas where they are doing well and where
they have made considerable progress. There are other areas
where they are not doing as well.''
They have a limited amount of resources, both financial and
human, and they have some restrictions on what they can do, as
well. And so I think I will stick by what I have said on the
overall assessment.
In some areas, they are doing well. In some areas, they
need to do better.
Mr. Rogers. And I agree, but the bottom line is the
American people are going to take an assessment from your
report, either their development is acceptable, at an
acceptable pace, or it is not, and I guess that is what I am
trying to----
Mr. Walker. And it depends on the area. Here is the bottom
line. Are we safer than we were on 9/11/2001? Absolutely. Will
we ever be totally safe? No. And we need to keep in mind that
this is not just about counterterrorism. It is also about
natural disasters.
That is what Katrina and Rita was.
And we also need to keep in mind that before 2003, before
the creation of this department, with 22 different agencies,
most of these agencies' mission was not homeland security.
So we basically have created a huge merger with different
agencies, different cultures, different systems, most of which
weren't even focused on homeland security. And so progress
varies, but I am not surprised at that at this point in time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I will give up on trying to get you
to say whether it is acceptable or not.
I do want to turn to your methodology. I understand that
you acknowledge and Mr. Schneider has acknowledged there has
been a difference as to whether the methodology was acceptable
and that, going forward, prospectively, you intend to use a
modified methodology.
Going forward, are you going to both agree to objective
ways of interpreting progress in the future?
Mr. Walker. What we have committed to do is that we will
work with DHS in order to help develop a revised methodology
that will consider all these performance expectations and that
will also consider the fact that one needs to be concerned not
just whether or not they have been met, but whether or not
meaningful progress is being made towards ultimately meeting
them.
In the final analysis, we want to work together
constructively and cooperative, but in the final analysis, GAO
will have to use its independent professional judgment about
what it thinks is the right answer, because it is our name that
goes on the evaluation.
Mr. Rogers. I guess what I am getting at is I want to take
the subjectivity out of it, though. I would like to make sure
that you know and DHS knows, when you are going to grade them,
what the standards are, what the objectives are that are being
measured, and that DHS has basically a heads-up about what they
are going to be tested on.
Mr. Walker. Well, I think our methodology was transparent.
There is a difference of opinion about whether or not it was
appropriate and whether or not it was the right one.
I mean, I don't think there is any debate about the fact
that our methodology was transparent. What I hear the
undersecretary saying is that he believes that our methodology
didn't give them enough progress in areas where they think they
have made considerable progress and certain other factors.
Well, what I am proposing to do is to consider both whether
or not they have met or not met, but, also, whether or not they
are making meaningful progress. That, in and of itself, I
think, is a good faith attempt to try to bridge the difference.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. My time is up.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
I will now allow 5 minutes of questioning for myself.
Mr. Walker, over the years that I have been sitting up here
and we have been taking a look at DHS, I have to admit that I
was not a vote to form the Department of Homeland Security. The
reason was I used to work for Booz Allen, and I did performance
audits, and I did a lot of M & A work, and I knew what a hell
it is for two companies to come together, let alone 22
different pieces of the government, and I knew this would take
a long, long time.
And under the committee that I chair, the subcommittee that
I chair, which has to do with maritime, border, really the
ingress and egress into the United States, I look at some of
the really major projects.
I mean, we have America really angry about immigrants
coming into this country and I look at SBInet, which is our
first solution to trying to do something with this, and the
dates missed and nobody can tell me when I am going to get it.
I look at US-VISIT, figuring out who is coming in and
whether they are leaving our country when they are supposed to
leave, and I have DHS not having an exit program piece of that,
and that is a major piece of this whole visa overstay and
everything, and it is just not working. They don't have it up.
I look at the TWIC card, ports, maritime. Who is on our
ports? Who is actually there? Who is doing it? And they can't
get the TWIC thing together. They were supposed to do it July
1. Then who knows what the new rollout date is and when the
pieces are going to be put together.
Coast Guard and I look at Deepwater. In the major areas
that, at least under my committee, I look at, I see a lot of
work being done, but everything is missing the mark, and the
reality of why we are doing those programs, we are not meeting
what we need to be doing.
I am going to submit for the record specific questions to
those projects that I hope you or somebody in your department,
when you are looking at the department, can get answers back to
me on that.
But when I step back and I look at it, I guess I have also
heard over these years that management has really lacked, that
the talent--somebody told me, one of your earlier people in a
different hearing said something to the effect of ``There is
vision at the department, but management is really lacking.''
Can you tell me, is that still true? Because we have had so
many people move in and move out of jobs. Is it still really
the management problem that is really hampering us from being
able to ensure we are getting some of this done?
Mr. Walker. Well, in any organization, as you know, and
having been in consulting yourself, I was in the private sector
for 21 years and did a lot of change management consulting
myself, you need to have a plan.
That plan has to recognize what the different goals and
objectives are consistent with the mission. The plan has to
recognize what resources you have. The plan has to be risk-
based and it has to be implemented by capable people who are
going to hopefully be there long enough in order to see through
a number of these initiatives.
More needs to be done with regard to the planning,
especially the risk-based assessment. There are a number of
open positions in the Department of Homeland Security, a number
of critical open positions right now and, candidly, in
government much more than the private sector, you see a lot
more turnover in some of the critical leadership positions than
you and I are accustomed to.
For example, at DHS, we have had two secretaries, three
deputy secretaries, two undersecretaries for management, and
many other players have changed during the period of time.
I think one of the things that we have to recognize, which
I have touched on before, is we need to recognize that with
regard to major management activities, strategic planning,
organizational alignment, financial management, information
technology, human capital strategy, change management,
knowledge management, we need to look at those positions
differently and figure out how we can end up getting people in
those jobs that can stay there longer.
And that also includes the undersecretary for management,
where we have proposed that that be converted into a term
appointment to provide continuity not just with
administrations, but between administrations.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask you one last question before we go
to the next Congressperson.
This issue of resources, because as I recall, when the
legislation was done to create the department, it was supposed
to be neutral with respect to the dollars. In other words, the
pieces of the government that we had before, we were going to
put them in this new department, but they were going to bring
their budgets with them, and it wasn't supposed to necessarily
increase.
I think that is originally how the legislation was looked
at and how it was passed and, I think, implemented. And then
over the years we have increased a little here and a little
there for programs, but overall, not a lot of money--from my
standpoint, and maybe it is because I sit on the defense
committee, also, but when I look at it, I haven't seen a lot of
resources really dedicated to homeland security.
In your opinion, is that right, that it was sort of revenue
neutral, in a sense, when it was created and it has been
augmented?
Mr. Walker. Well, I would have to let Undersecretary
Schneider talk about what their budget has been. I don't have
that off the top of my head.
My understanding is, initially, it was basically neutral,
but over time, they have received additional resources. So the
question is how much do they have and then how much flexibility
do they have with regard to the utilization of those resources.
So it is not just how much money you give them and how many
people you give them, but how much flexibility they have to be
able to allocate that money and allocate those people to add
the most value and mitigate the most risk, and that is
important, as well.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Schneider?
Mr. Schneider. Yes. Congresswoman, my understanding is when
the department was set up, it was basically revenue neutral. We
have, over the past 3 years or so, our budgets have gone up
quite a bit in certain areas, and we can obviously get you the
numbers.
Some of those areas are where it was basically we put in
the budget and it was authorized and appropriated by Congress,
some of the major modernization programs. The Deepwater program
is about $1 billion a year. SBInet or SBI, I should say, is
over $1 billion a year. A lot of the increases in manning in
terms of border patrol agents, ICE agents and the like,
increase of our efforts in the fugitive operations with ICE in
terms of detention and removal capability all has basically
received augmentation of funds.
So our resources have gone up over the years in those
areas, those major mission areas that the comptroller general
talked about, where we have made a fair amount of progress,
more so than, as he indicated, in the management area.
Ms. Sanchez. I am just thinking of some of the frustration,
also, with the department that many of us have, my colleagues,
for example, people waiting to get their green cards or to do
their work visas, 7 or 10 years or what have you on some of
these programs.
It just seems like maybe the Congress didn't put moneys
toward or augmented those programs, but there are a lot of
decent people waiting for this department to get some of this
done, and we just don't see it happening fast enough.
Mr. Schneider. If I may, the areas where we are trying to
build, if you will, are some of our major transformation
efforts, and it is not just hiring more agents.
We know, for example, Customs and Immigration Services, we
have antiquated capabilities. When I first met with the
director, he told me, ``Picture the 'Indiana Jones' first
movie, where, at the end of the movie, the Ark is put in this
big underground cave with miles and miles of files that are
paper files.''
He said, ``Paul, picture that.'' He said, ``That is the
situation we have in terms of modernization.'' So we embarked
on trying to modernize CIS using different business models,
information technology and the like.
So we have a long way to go, as the comptroller general
indicates, in these areas and that is where we are starting to
increase our focus. That is where we are properly evaluated
fairly low, quite frankly, and that is where we know we have a
substantial amount of work to do.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Seeing no other Republican on your side, I will go to Ms.
Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. For 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Welcome to our witnesses.
This morning, the director of national intelligence, Mike
McConnell, testified before the House Judiciary Committee on
FISA, an issue that I, for one member of Congress, hope we deal
with seriously and modify.
But at any rate, in the course of his testimony, he was
outlining the threat to the homeland and, in part, he said,
``Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist
threat to the homeland. Al-Qa'ida will continue to enhance its
capabilities. Al-Qa'ida's homeland planning is likely to
continue to focus on prominent political, economic and
infrastructure targets, with the goal of producing mass
casualties. Al-Qa'ida will continue to try to acquire and
employ chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material
in its attacks,'' and then he talks about how Lebanese
Hezbollah also may consider homeland attacks.
I mention this because the threat, in my view and his view
and the view of many others, is real and it is right now, which
is why this hearing has urgency.
I am wondering, if I were a hardworking employee of the
Department of Homeland Security, listening to this hearing, how
I would feel right now. I think most of the people who work at
DHS in the various departments think they are a real threat to
the homeland.
I think certainly most of them try very hard to get their
jobs right. But if I were tuning in from DHS, I might throw my
hands up and say, ``Oh, my god, this is impossible. This is
never going to get right, and I am working this hard, and I
won't be able to succeed.''
I mention that not because I think we shouldn't ask the
tough questions, but I think we have got to work harder
together to provide a path forward.
I had this conversation with David Walker when we came in
to the hearing and he agrees, and I know you agree, Mr.
Schneider. We have to work harder together to find a way
forward immediately, to share information adequately, to do all
the maritime security fixes that the chairman was just talking
about, and to fix bigger problem areas.
And so I think it would be productive if each of you
addressed that. It is a message to the employees of DHS. How
are we going to find a path forward together to fix the urgent
problems?
And let me just add a p.s. before you answer that. I don't
want to go over my time, out of respect for other members.
My p.s. is I think we were over ambitious in what we did
setting up the department. I voted for it. I was part of a
hardy little bipartisan band that wanted us to create a
homeland function.
None of us was as ambitious as this department is. The
concept for this department was designed in the Bush White
House by then Chief of Staff Andy Card, who presented it to
Congress, and, basically, we knew that that was the train
leaving the station. So if we wanted reform, we would have to
take this.
I think it is over ambitious. Nevertheless, it is what it
is, as they say.
So please address my one question, which is how do we send
a message to homeland department employees that we will find a
path forward together to fix these urgent problems before we
have another serious catastrophic attack on the homeland,
hopefully?
Mr. Schneider. I will start. First, that is a question that
most of us in leadership think about, I would say, every day. I
mean, 9/11 was an awesome impact.
I worked in the Pentagon at that time. I know where the
plane hit, wiped out the Navy communications center. I was the
principal deputy assistant secretary of the Navy. I know people
who died, and I know people whose lives were changed forever.
At that point in time, I came to the conclusion, having
grown up in the Cold War and doing this duck-and-cover drills
in school, I recognized that our lives would never be the same.
And so what we do is, and all the leadership does this, is
we continuously talk to our people. We say we are in this for
the long haul. We tell them, ``Don't expect giant increases in
progress.'' The fact of the matter is we are in this for the
long haul, and so what we try and do, quite frankly, and we do
it by publishing information, passing words with Web sites,
information with Web sites, we celebrate incremental progress.
Ms. Harman. I do think it is very important, too, that we
push harder together to achieve, to fill some of these obvious
demonstrated gaps.
Mr. Walker?
Mr. Walker. First, homeland security has a critically
important mission for the United States. It is part of our
basic security and self-preservation needs. It doesn't get much
more fundamental than that.
It is clearly something that is envisioned that the federal
government would have an important role in under the
Constitution.
We have got tens of thousands of hardworking people doing
their best day in and day out. They need to continue to do
their best. That is all we can expect them to do.
They need to understand that it is going to take time in
order to achieve this major merger, integration and
transformation effort. They need to keep their chin up, and we
need to try to make sure that we recognize their progress, and
that it is going to take time to achieve everything that is
necessary.
Ms. Harman. Well, my time has expired.
I agree, in part, but I disagree with respect to the
message just that it is going to take time.
I think the other message has to be we will help focus this
so that, in real time, immediately, you can achieve more
progress in certain key vulnerable areas in America.
Thank you.
Mr. Walker. Can I come back real quick, Ms. Harman?
I think it is really important that we pick our priorities
well. You have got to target based upon value and risk. You
have to allocate financial, human and other resources to make
progress there, and you need to be able to demonstrate that
that progress is being made, and that is how people can feel
that they are making a difference, and they are making a
difference.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from California.
And I yield 5 minutes to Ms. Lowey of New York.
Mrs. Lowey. I thank our chair.
Mr. Walker, Mr. Schneider, I appreciate your testimony. I
am sorry that Deputy Secretary Jackson put you in this position
after just 9 months.
And it seems to me that, once again, the department is just
passing the buck and instead of admitting that its goals have
not been met and creating a plan to make our country more
secure, what we are hearing from DHS is excuses and you are
saying, ``Yes, we try harder,'' and then they are claiming that
the methodology GAO used is faulty.
Everyone knows on this committee, we all know it and we all
want to work together and, as a New Yorker, I want to tell you,
I am impatient, because I know there are possible threats out
here. And I don't want to see ``I will give you an 'I' for
improvement.''
I have to tell you something. When my kids were in
elementary school, they knew that if we saw ``I-needs
improvement,'' it doesn't mean an ``A'' or an ``A+'' or a
``B.''
So we need to see real improvement here and we all know, as
I said, that the job of this department is difficult, whether
we voted for it or we didn't vote for it.
However, I would have more confidence in this
administration's ability to make us more secure if the problems
were recognized and you were working to fix them. Instead, we
get from the department finger-pointing.
And as I read Undersecretary Schneider's testimony, the
aspect, frankly, that stood out the most is that it is little
more than an excuse. There is no plan for how the problems will
be addressed.
So I just want to make it very clear, before I get to a
specific question, that if September 11 taught us anything, it
should be that our enemies are well funded, they are well
financed, and they are very patient.
This is a painful pill to swallow, especially for me as a
New Yorker, who has been to more funerals and wakes than you
can ever have imagined. But we must recognize that it is not
good enough to secure a few sectors, but leave gaping security
gaps in others.
And what you are telling me about the files, that we are
living in the stone age, why hasn't someone gotten it done?
There are technology companies. If Microsoft said, ``Well, I am
so sorry, I can't fix this. All the files are in a cave
someplace,'' they would be out of business.
So I am very troubled specifically by the fact that the
area in which the department performed the worst was in
emergency preparedness and response. The underlying reason,
frankly, Mr. Schneider or Mr. Walker, probably Mr. Schneider,
because Mr. Jackson isn't here, the underlying reason for the
formation of the department was a terrorist attack.
And out of 24 performance expectations, the department has
only achieved five. Yet, Undersecretary Schneider's testimony
highlights the critical role of defending against, and I am
quoting, ``preparing for and responding to threats and
disasters.''
There seems to be a major disconnect between the two,
particularly when you consider the indisputable fact that the
department failed in its response to the first major test,
Hurricane Katrina, and that just last week, it released a
national response framework, many months after its own self-
imposed deadline, that was widely criticized by state and local
emergency managers.
I am not even sure where to begin with questions, because
we can go on and on, and my time is running out.
But, Undersecretary Schneider, can you elaborate how
defending against, preparing for and responding to threats and
disasters is a success, when GAO gave the department such poor
marks on emergency management?
Mr. Schneider. Yes, Congresswoman. First, for point of
info, I was born and bred in Brooklyn, okay?
Mrs. Lowey. I was born and bred in the Bronx, and in the
Bronx, we need instantaneous success. How about Brooklyn?
Seriously, seriously, I know you----
Mr. Schneider. I want to be----
Mrs. Lowey. Let me just say this. I have heard Mr. Walker
testify and he is being very kind, and I know there are
thousands of good people at the Department of Homeland Security
and we salute them.
I also serve on the Appropriations Committee, and I know
that the department has gotten more money than has been
requested by the administration.
So rather than excuses, maybe you can come back next time
or submit in writing to us what you are doing to correct this,
not saying that ``We didn't agree on the plan or the
criteria.'' It doesn't make any sense.
Mr. Schneider. Could I just have a minute, please?
Mrs. Lowey. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. And I will come back to you in writing. But
what I would like to say is this. I think the words, and this
is where I think we basically agree, I think the words in the
GAO assessments, the actual detailed words that describe what
they think our progress has been is fairly accurate.
What happens and our issue is not with so much their
description of our progress to date, but how it is labeled. So
one of the challenges I have, and when people in the department
ask me about ``What do you do about these poor grades,'' I say,
``Read the detailed words of the progress.''
The national response plan is a classic example, okay? We
flat out disagree with the two ratings. And the reason we
disagree is when you read the GAO's own words about what we
have done with the national response plan, the fact of the
matter is, I submit, most people would read those words and
say, ``They have made progress in a very critical area.''
I couldn't agree with you more that that mission area,
emergency preparedness and response, is one of the most
critical areas. And I think the comptroller said it, I couldn't
say it better than him, one of the reasons why we are going to
mutually work on seeing if we can come up with a different set
of criteria is, as he says, to come up with a better way to
accurately describe the progress that is been made to date.
That is why I say don't look at the grade, look at the
words.
Mr. Walker. Can I?
Mrs. Lowey. I am out of time and it is up to the chair if
she wants Mr. Walker to answer.
Mr. Walker. Madam Chair, can I quickly? It won't take more
than 30 seconds, I promise.
Ms. Sanchez. Thirty seconds, Mr. Walker, just because you
are such a nice guy.
Mr. Walker. Thirty seconds. First, one of the reasons that
we have not been able to get more comfortable with emergency
preparedness and response is we haven't been able to observe
the exercises.
The exercises are being done to help demonstrate to us
directly what they have done. Hopefully, we now have a
breakthrough with the letter from Secretary Chertoff that I
received this morning.
Secondly, interoperable communications continues to be a
major challenge and that is one of the areas that we really
want to take a look at as part of this observation.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
Mrs. Lowey. Let me just thank you, and I am sorry that I am
impatient, but, frankly, we know that we have to get this right
and, as my colleague said, we have to work together. And I
don't think we can afford to get ``I's'' on most of the various
areas that you have been reviewing. We need to get ``E'' and
know that our people are safe in the Bronx and Brooklyn and
Westchester and throughout the country.
And I thank you. Thank you for your indulgence.
Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome.
Mr. Green of Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the ranking
member, as well.
And thank you, men, for appearing today. You each have very
difficult jobs.
Mr. Walker, your job is exceedingly difficult because you
have to evaluate and your evaluation has to have meaning. So I
appreciate where you are.
Mr. Schneider, 9 months on the job and here you are. God
bless you. You have a difficult job, too. Apparently, someone
thought that baptism by fire was a great way to get you
inculcated into the proper mindset. So thank you for coming
today.
Mr. Walker, you indicated that DHS is a high risk area. Is
this true?
Mr. Walker. That the implementation and transformation of
the new Department of Homeland Security is a high risk
endeavor. It is on GAO's high risk list.
Mr. Green. Would you just define that for me, please? What
does that mean, high risk?
Mr. Walker. High risk means higher risk of fraud, waste,
abuse or mismanagement, higher risk of not being able to
effectively achieve its mission, higher risk of not being able
to do it in an economical, efficient and effective manner.
And, in fact, one of the real concerns I have about DHS is
that they don't end up being where DOD is today. DOD is very
effective on mission, but they waste billions of dollars every
year.
Mr. Green. And Mr. Schneider indicated that your
methodology, your system has gone from a pass-fail to an A-
fail.
Is that what you said, Mr. Schneider?
Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Mr. Walker, my assumption is that you don't
entirely agree with that. So would you give us an explanation
for why you contend--maybe we will start with Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider, starting with you, give us an explanation
for why you contend that it has gone from a pass-fail to an A-
fail, and then I would like to hear your response, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Schneider. Sure. I will give you one example. Any
multiyear program, and many of our programs are multiyear
programs, especially in the mission areas, it is going to take
many years to achieve the results.
And even actually in some of the administrative areas, like
internal controls for financial management, it will probably
take us out through fiscal year 2010.
So the fact is before we have actually completed the total
effort, it is going to take several years. The words in the
report, in many cases or in most cases, do a pretty good job of
actually describing they have done this, they have started
this, but it is going to take a lot of years to go through
this, so it is generally not achieved.
Whereas our belief is if you use the term ``generally
addressed,'' that term in itself implies some degree of
progress, and that is the issue that the comptroller general
and I are going to work on for the future.
So if you have an SBInet program, for example, which is
absolutely key, a multibillion dollar program for securing our
borders, the fact of the matter is that in 10 months, we have
Project 28 up and running. We know what the technical issues
are with the system. We know what we have to do to fix it.
I happen to think, from a technology, development and
fielding standpoint, that is not all bad. In fact, one could
look at it as good. But the fact of the matter is, because it
is a multiyear program, the fact is it is generally not
addressed.
So that is kind of like ``A'' or fail, as opposed to
generally achieved or generally not achieved, as opposed to
generally addressed. And you can go into some of these other
criteria.
Mr. Green. I am going to have to give Mr. Walker some time
to respond.
Mr. Walker. Let me try to be brief, and let me come back to
something that every member of this committee should be
familiar with.
The Congress asked GAO to evaluate the status of progress
on the 18 benchmarks in Iraq and when the Congress asked us to
do that, which I testified on on numerous occasions 2 weeks
ago, they said they wanted us to tell them whether or not they
were met or not met.
We basically used that type of approach in coming up with
this evaluation for the Department of Homeland Security. We
also used descriptive language to try to provide some context
and contextual sophistication, where even if we showed that
there was not significant progress, to help describe what had
been done.
In my view, what is important is not what we have done in
the past, although we stand by what we have done, it is to
recognize that, going forward, we have agreed that we are going
to come up with an approach that will recognize two things,
which Ms. Lowey talked about, as well.
One, where do you stand on result, have you achieved it or
not, and, secondly, whether or not you are making meaningful
progress, which would allow us to be able to consider
complexity, whether or not it is likely to be a multiyear
effort, more than we were able to under this methodology.
Mr. Green. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Madam
Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. Next, we will hear from Ms. Clarke of New York
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I would like to just state for the record that I would like
to associate my comments with those of Congresswoman Lowey.
I am a new member, and I am here about the same amount of
time you have, Mr. Schneider, and I have to tell you I haven't
sat here very comforted by knowing that this agency has moved
in a direction that I think the people of the United States
would like to see it go, given the fact that the agency was
stood up in March of 2003.
In March of 2008, which is just around the corner, it will
have been 5 years and based on what Mr. Walker has said about
new agencies and coming together in culture, we are talking
about typically 7 years.
Now, this is a mega agency, and I think everyone recognizes
that, but when you look at the assessment, progress of mission
and management areas, they don't indicate that we are anywhere
near where we should be given the fact that typically you could
say, by the 7th year, okay, we are on firm ground.
I would like to just really reiterate the concern that we
have, particularly in the area of emergency preparedness. I
looked at, also, the area of science and technology, which are
critical areas, human capital management.
I mean, to have constant turnover in DHS doesn't help
anyone, because how do you get institutional memory? How do you
retain institutional memory? How do you keep the wherewithal,
the intellect and the talent in place that then builds upon the
culture that you are trying to create?
These are critical areas that I don't think we can waste
any time at really addressing and trying to solidify. And I
have been here the same amount of time as you have. There have
been reports that have been requested by this committee that
have yet to be completed.
There just seems to be some sort of malaise within the
agency that I think is really critical that we get past.
Having said that, I know that you have an awesome task
ahead of you and an awesome mission and I certainly don't want
to be one to discourage. I want to be one to encourage.
So I want to encourage you to go back, speak to your
colleagues and let them know that there are a lot of people
pulling for them out here. This is a critical area for us to
emerge from as experts.
The American people deserve it, they require it, and I
don't think they will stand for anything less than that.
One of the areas that has concerned me is the area of
border protection, because I have been here and I have listened
to a lot of the concerns, particularly with respect to the
southern border.
I wanted to know whether we have invested--and I will ask
Comptroller Walker, perhaps in some of your review, you can
give us a sense of this, about how we are doing with our border
with Canada and what many would term as the third border in the
Caribbean.
It appears as though, oftentimes, we focus primarily on the
Mexican border and when you look at the performance of DHS and
border security, it appears that DHS met expectations equally
at each of these borders or does it appear that the
expectations have been better met at the southern border, while
the other borders have received less attention?
Mr. Walker. Thank you very much for that question. There is
no question that there has been significantly more time and
effort, financial resources and human resources focused on the
southern border, because we are not only concerned with regard
to homeland security, we are also concerned with illegal
immigration.
That is also a major policy issue for the Congress, as
well.
Whereas with regard to the northern border, the primary
concern, for a variety of reasons, is security. And the
Caribbean, we have done a little bit of work there, not much.
We have done more work with regard to the Canadian border and,
clearly, as we have reported, most of the time and effort and
energy has been focused on the southern border. And we can't
forget about our other borders as it relates to security
considerations.
Although one has to also consider how easy it is to get
into those countries, too. It is easier to get into Mexico than
it is to get into Canada if you do it legally.
Mr. Schneider. We have implemented, through the Customs and
Border Protection organization of the department, border
security evaluation teams in all eight northern border sectors
in order to provide some security in those areas where they
were previously too remote to have been monitored.
We are also partnering with the Canadian government in
several endeavors, what we call the integrated border
enforcement team, basically interdicting certain persons and
organizations that might pose a threat to national security or
be involved in criminal activity.
Ms. Clarke. My time has expired. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome, Ms. Clarke.
Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, for your
testimony.
Mr. Schneider, I would like to start with you, if I could.
As you know, I am very concerned about the ASP program within
DNDO.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, it is my job to oversee
the DNDO, and I am anxious to see that we get the next
generation of radiation portal monitors deployed as quickly as
possible.
At the same, of course, we have to make sure that we are
being good stewards of taxpayer dollars and we are getting what
we pay for and that these ASP detectors are markedly better
than the first generation detectors that have already been
deployed.
This program, obviously, is far too important to fail and
we, therefore, have to ensure that the review process that is
ongoing right now is conducted with the highest levels of
security and scrutiny and due diligence.
I know that you and Mr. Oxford were at a hearing this
morning to discuss this topic before the Energy and Commerce,
one of the subcommittees there. I have a few questions that I
would like to ask you about this critical program.
First, could you please explain the certification process
required by the secretary? I wanted to delve into that a bit.
And, also, can you give us an update on the independent
review team that you commissioned? I understand that Pete Nanos
of DTRA was initially asked to head that effort, but then you
requested John Higby from the Defense Acquisition University
lead the charge.
I understand that Mr. Higby is no longer taking the lead.
So my question is who has been named to head the review team
now and why were the first two people replaced?
In addition, are the rest of the team members the same? And
when will the review team be done with their review?
Mr. Schneider. Okay, let's start with your first question
about the certification.
Mr. Langevin. Yes, the certification process.
Mr. Schneider. The certification is required by some
legislation, I forget whether it is the Appropriations Act or
not, but it basically requires the secretary, Chertoff, to
certify that the performance of the advanced spectroscopic
portal, ASP, that its performance is significantly--I think the
correct words in the legislation are either significantly or
substantially better than the existing radiation portal
monitors, which is the polyvinyl toluene sensors.
So he is required by law to make a certification. The
process that we have in place is, as you are very much
familiar, Congressman, is a whole series of testing that
started with contractor tests, specifically, Northwest tests,
various types of level one and level two, I guess level three
testing, all the way up to now what we have, these ASP monitors
at several CBP ports for field evaluation.
So the idea is that when the Customs and Border Protection,
who is the user, the customer, of the ASP is satisfied that
they have acquired enough data to make a recommendation to the
secretary, at that point in time, our plan is to go forth with
a recommendation--that recommendation could be positive or
negative, depending upon what the consolidated test data lays
out--for the secretary to make a certification.
That is a separate and distinct act from a decision on the
part of the department to go into full scale production and
deployment. So that is the sequence and that is required by
law.
For the timing, let me just--it is convenient here.
Originally, there was a rough estimate that the results of the
testing would be made available to the secretary, I think,
sometime around September 21. Based on a meeting that I had
with the head of DNDO and the deputy commissioner from border
protection, the conclusion at that point in time, based on a
recommendation from the deputy commissioner, was that he wanted
an additional 2 months of testing, roughly starting around the
first week or so of September, after an updated software load
was made to the system.
Mr. Langevin. The secretary of the director of DNDO?
Mr. Schneider. The deputy commissioner for CBP.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Mr. Schneider. Again, as I said, he is the customer or the
operational user.
Mr. Langevin. I understand.
Mr. Schneider. He specifically requested an additional 2
months of field validation testing once this updated software
load was made. The estimate, and I forget the exact date of
that conversation, but the updated software was supposed to
delivered I think roughly around the first or so of September.
So if you go forward roughly 2 months, he wanted at least
through the end of October, early November to get additional
field validation testing. And so, obviously, any schedules that
might have been predicated on the third week in September
secretarial decision have been pushed to the right.
We are right now in the process of trying to figure out
what our schedules will be, either for the completion of the
field validation testing going forth to the secretary for
secretarial certification, and then what would be our action
regarding convening what we call an investment review board,
which is the board the department uses for making major
investment decisions, to consider whether or not the department
is willing to spend the bucks to actually go into full
production on these systems.
So that is the sequence on that.
With regard to the independent review, frankly, I am
absolutely amazed about all of the external scrutiny that I
have been given about the external review. It originated with
me. It was my idea. It was based on my review of the ASP
program in late July, my review of the GAO documentation.
I immediately realized there was a difference of views, if
you will, regarding testing, the amount of testing that has
been accomplished, the amount of testing that will be
accomplished, the issue about sources used, sources not used.
And I come from a world in the Department of Defense where
it is not an uncommon process when you have to make a major
decision like that to go out and get some independent sets of
eyes. So that is what I did.
I went to see the secretary. I said, ``We need to get an
independent group of people,'' independent in terms of
independent from DNDO, and that is what I did.
Do you want me to finish up?
Dr. Nanos, nuclear physicist, Ph.D., and I asked him to
assemble a team. This was not directed to be a DTRA study.
Rather, he, as an individual, associate director, put together
a team of experts and go do this study.
As it turned out, subsequently, he had to withdraw. It was
based on him and his management. I just accepted it at face
value. I was, frankly, in a schedule press, given the fact that
I was working to what was then a September 21 deadline.
We have a cooperate arrangement with Defense Acquisition
University. We work very closely with them. They do this type
of work. I asked Mr. Higby do this. He agreed and we started to
spin up.
It was shortly, around last Wednesday, when it became
evident to me that he was a possible contender for a job in
DHS, that I decided to remove him.
I might point out that there was no conflict of interest.
He had no financial interest. He had no technology interest. In
fact, after the hearing this morning, the staff of E&C told me
they really liked the fact that he was the guy.
I was gun shy, quite frankly, of all the external scrutiny
I have been given and, in some cases, you can say the
micromanagement of this effort, and I elected to not take a
chance and removed him.
I subsequently, on Friday morning, decided to take the
number two individual at the Homeland Security Institute. The
Homeland Security Institute is the department's federally-
funded research and development center.
This is the kind of work that FFRDCs do. They do it for the
Army, they do it for the Navy, they do it for the Air Force,
they do it for the FAA. So that is how I settled on Mr.
Thompson and he is up and running.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Rogers has a quick question for you all.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. I want to revisit this
consolidation of oversight issue.
As you all know, the 9/11 commission recommended that we
develop a single point of principal oversight in each chamber
for the department.
There have been several references made today that Mr.
Schneider is in his 9th month in his current job, 34-35 weeks
you have been with us, and I think this is the third time you
have testified before the committee when I have been in here.
How many times since you have been in your position have
you testified before Congress?
Mr. Schneider. I have to check, but I think it is about 11.
I think this is the 11th hearing. I am really not sure.
Mr. Rogers. So more than once a month since you have been
here.
Mr. Schneider. Yes. And today I was basically grilled for 3
hours this morning.
Mr. Rogers. How much time do you put into preparing for
this testimony each time?
Mr. Schneider. It depends, Congressman. If it is testimony
that is directly relevant to my main line of business, not a
lot. I had to spend a tremendous amount of time for the hearing
this morning, and the main reason is I found out on I think it
was either Wednesday night or Thursday morning, I had to get my
testimony written by Friday.
I wrote my testimony for that hearing. I had to go read a
tremendous amount of information over the weekend so I could
get prepared.
So some of them require more than others. I had to testify
twice in front of the Small Business Committee, frankly, once
down in New Orleans at a field hearing, once up here. And while
we respectfully tried to get out of that hearing, and the
reason was they were really more interested--I mean, the
subject of the hearing was, operationally, what happened with
contracting on the ground in New Orleans.
Well, I am not directly responsible for that. And we
offered several other people who were much closer to that, and
it was denied on every attempt and, quite frankly, there was
pretty much of an inference that if I didn't testify, that I
would be subpoenaed.
For hearings like that, where I am not a small business
expert, by law, the small business director works directly for
the secretary, I spent an inordinate amount of time getting
ready for those two particular hearings.
So it varies.
Mr. Rogers. I note in the chart that we submitted for the
committee there are 86 full committees and subcommittees that
have some oversight jurisdiction.
Mr. Walker, in your testimony or in answer to one of your
questions, you made reference to the fact that there are a lot
of people trying to get information from DHS simultaneously,
and I think you made that statement in reference to the fact
that they have been a little slow getting responses to you, but
you acknowledge that is the reason why.
Tell me how much, in your opinion, based on your analysis,
your recent analysis of the department, they would be able to
better deal with their tasks if they didn't have 86 committees
and subcommittees of Congress asking them for information.
Mr. Walker. First, I would say, Congressman Rogers, as you
know, we work for the institution of the Congress. So the
extent they cooperate with us, our information is made
available to everybody in the Congress. So there is a benefit
to cooperate with us.
Secondly, there is absolutely no question that they could
achieve a lot more focus on mission and improve responsiveness,
should they so desire, if they didn't have as many players they
had to deal with.
Now, as you know, I work for the Congress, and the
Congress, frankly, is not a model of efficiency. The Congress
is a lag indicator on efficiency, and I think that there is a
need for the Congress to look at its alignment and see whether
or not it is properly aligned to best discharge its
constitutional responsibilities for the 21st century, and this
is clearly one area that deserves additional consideration.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I agree and that is the reason I bring
the issue up. I know the chairman of this committee and the
ranking member of this full committee have both agreed that we
have got to follow through on the 9/11 commission's
recommendation that we consolidate oversight.
Obviously, this is the committee that should have primary
jurisdiction on the authorizing side in this chamber and then
similarly in the Senate. But it has taken far too much time, in
my opinion, from the department's management to deal with all
the various committees that have jurisdiction over them and it
takes time away from their ability to do their job.
But with that, I will be quiet and thank the chairlady for
the time.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
And now I will recognize Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. And let me thank
Secretary Schneider and certainly our busy head of the GAO. I
think we have seen each other a number of times. So I think you
have equal opportunity to be in front of members of Congress.
Why don't I follow up on the line of questioning, Mr.
Walker, that my good friend from Alabama has just begun with
and indicate that I believe this committee sent a letter asking
for an assessment by the GAO of how we could be more efficient
or the negative impact of the extensive jurisdictional maze
that this particular department is subjected to.
So let me try to stand in the place of that letter and have
you expand just a little bit more.
I do understand that you are not only working for Congress,
but you are a creature of Congress, to a certain extent. But
you have been in front of committees when we have applauded
you, because, rightly so, a parent created a child, but in many
instances, it may be important for either one to chastise the
other one based upon their knowledge.
I, frankly, believe that it is not a question of
sensitivity. It is a question, if you will, of undermining the
security of this nation.
This is, in essence, an abomination. The idea of the
Homeland Security Department, of which I was a member of the
select committee, was to provide synergism or consensus or
energy around a certain point.
So I would ask you not maybe the direct question of my
colleague, but I want to know the negative impact on security
you can predict just by looking at this maze.
You have indicated what that might suggest. But what brings
about a better ordering of the department, the ability to have
limited entities of which it is subjected to oversight, because
I don't want to abdicate and give up any oversight
responsibilities.
I certainly applaud this committee and all of the other
committees as we have changed leadership in this House that
have engaged in its oversight responsibilities. But tell me the
negative impact on, if you will, security with this kind of
structure in place.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
``We Must Keep DHS Accountable For Potential Security Gaps in Order to
Fully Protect Our Nation''
``Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, The Department of
Homeland Security and its Secretary are responsible for preventing and
deterring terrorist attacks and responding to threats and hazards to
the nation,'' stated Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. ``In examining
the performance of the department, several pressing and critical issues
have surfaced.''
In addition to the high vacancy rate in the upper management
position, an issue of particular concern continues to be the number of
important programs that have not met their deadlines,'' added
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. ``The recent government
Accountability Office findings concluded that the Department met less
than 25%, or only five of the twenty-four emergency preparedness and
response performance expectations. We must make sure that the
department in working at the highest level of efficiency to protect
this nation.''
As Chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, I will be
working to help make sure that the Department of Homeland Security
continues to operate at the highest level of proficiency and efficiency
to protect the citizens of the United States of America.
Mr. Walker. Well, first, this schematic is probably speaks
loudly. The only schematic that I have seen that is more
troubling is the financial management systems at the Department
of Defense, which are also a mess.
I think the bottom line is the Congress needs to
consolidate and integrate its responsibilities with regard to
the Department of Homeland Security, not abdicate. And if you
have fewer----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent.
Mr. Walker. --if you have fewer that are focused, I think
that, A, you will be able to discharge your constitutional
responsibilities more efficiently and effectively and,
secondly, it would allow more time for the department to be
able to accomplish its mission.
But it would be impossible for me to tell you with any
degree of reliability, consistent with GAO standards, as to
exactly how much more secure that would make the country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have already said it is a mess
and, certainly, messes cannot ensure security for any nation.
And so I think we do have a challenge here.
But what you did say is that Congress needs to focus and
that it does impede and can possibly impede the security of
this nation only because of the maze which we are seeing here.
Oversight is our responsibility.
Let me, Mr. Schneider, go to you and recognize that you
have been here 9 months, but also recognize that one of the
elements of criticism of the GAO was the fact that we have not
completely hired all of those that we need to hire.
Let me quickly ask you these questions.
We have heard, for a very long period of time, we have
gotten $250 million committed to the US-VISIT program since
2003. We have asked for a functioning biometric exit system.
In June, the GAO testified before the committee that the
prospects were, I am paraphrasing, ``strange, at best, unclear,
absent.''
Can you tell me what is happening with that exit program,
the biometric exit program? And let me give you this other,
quickly. You indicated you just got here in January. We asked
you about the TWIC card just last week, on one of your many
visits to Congress, and you basically said, ``I don't know.''
That is frightening. At least we have captured this from
your testimony. You have a chance to clear up the record.
How much money has the department spent to date on the TWIC
initiative? You have got employees across America frightened
and waiting for some kind of answer. And how much money will
you need to spend to complete its rollout?
Mr. Schneider. First off, on the TWIC, at the hearing in
front of the Senate, very specifically, Senator Collins asked
me a series of questions on TWIC. I gave her what I thought was
a pretty comprehensive status of the TWIC program in terms of
where we are, in terms of the notice of the proposed rule.
I explained in a fair amount of detail the technical
problems that we were having with the card. I explained the
fact that I chair a biweekly meeting that goes into
excruciating detail on the progress of TWIC, that I thought we
were just at the point of having all the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. When do you project the rollout?
Mr. Schneider. My next meeting is Friday and our plan is,
shortly, on the assumption that we complete successfully the
N10 system test this week or next week, it will be shortly
after the first part of October in the Port of Wilmington.
That is predicated on----
Ms. Jackson Lee. The first of October?
Mr. Schneider. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a big announcement.
Mr. Schneider. Well, I told her that I would come back and
see her with the details. One of the things that we do, quite
frankly, is sometimes we announce these dates way in advance of
when we probably should to have confidence in hand.
We have deliberately not published any dates, because
publishing a date and then going through an end-to-end
verification test and then finding out you have problems you
have to fix.
During the hearing, I explained some of the problems we
were having with getting the software to make the printers
work. We had problems with 1-D barcodes. We had all kinds of
problems and the fact of the matter is we believe we have most
of those technical problems in hand.
So we were reluctant to publish a date, raise the level of
expectations and then find out we are off by a week or so.
So that is why we had deliberately not done that. I
committed to the Senator and I will commit to you that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider. ----after my next meeting, I will come and
go through the details, explain to you where we are and the
detailed schedules.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, can he answer the biometric
question he did not answer?
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Schneider. Yes. I know we have a substantial amount of
activity. I cannot provide you right here and now the details
of how we are handling exit.
I realize it is an issue. I know we have been asked lots of
questions. I am not aware of the details.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You can come back to this committee or
provide that information back.
Mr. Schneider. Yes. I will gladly provide that information
to you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentlewoman from Texas.
I thank Comptroller General Walker and Undersecretary
Schneider for their valuable testimony and the members for
their questions.
And as usual, the members of the committee may have
additional questions for you and we will ask that you respond
quickly to them in writing.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I: Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS
----------
Part I. In the 110th Congress, the following Congressional committees
and subcommittees asserted DHS jurisdiction by holding hearings or
otherwise exercising formal oversight activity. Accurate as of August
2007.
U.S House of Representatives
1. House Agriculture Committee
2. House Armed Services Committee
3. House Appropriations Committee
4. Homeland Security Subcommittee
5. Select Intelligence Oversight Panel Subcommittee
6. House Budget Committee
7. House Energy and Commerce Committee
8. Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection
Subcommittee
9. Environment and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee
10. Health Subcommittee
11. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
12. Telecommunications and the Internet
13. House Financial Services Committee
14. Oversight and Investigations
15. Housing and Community
16. House Foreign Affairs Committee
17. Europe
18. Africa and Global Health
19. House Homeland Security Committee
20. Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism
Subcommittee
21. Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response
Subcommittee
22. Emerging Threats, Cyber security, and Science and
Technology
Subcommittee
23. Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism
Risk Assessment
Subcommittee
24. Management, Investigations, and Oversight
Subcommittee
25. Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection Subcommittee
26. House Judiciary Committee
27. Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security
28. Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International
Law
29. Commercial and Administrative Law
30. House Natural Resources Committee
31. Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans Subcommittee
32. National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands
Subcommittee
33. Water and Power Subcommittee
34. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
35. Government Management, Organization and Procurement
36. Domestic Policy
37. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
38. Intelligence Community Management
39. Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis, and
Counterintelligence
40. House Science and Technology Committee
41. Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee
42. Technology and Innovation Subcommittee
43. House Small Business Committee
44. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
45. Aviation Subcommittee
46. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
47. Economic Development, Public Buildings and
Emergency Management
Subcommittee
48. House Ways and Means
49. Trade Subcommittee
U.S. SENATE
50. Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
51. Senate Appropriations Committee
52. Homeland Security Subcommittee
53. Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies
Subcommittee
54. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Subcommittee
55. Senate Armed Services Committee
56. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee
57. Senate Budget Committee
58. Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee
59. Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism
60. Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard
Subcommittee
61. Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and
Security
62. Science, Technology and Innovation
63. Senate Energy and Nature Resources Committee
64. Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee
65. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
66. Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and
Water Quality
Subcommittee
67. Senate Finance Committee
68. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
69. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee
70. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
71. Disaster Recovery Subcommittee
72. Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, Federal
Services, and International Security Subcommittee
73. Oversight and Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee
74. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
75. State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration
Subcommittee
76. Senate Judiciary Committee
77. Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship
Subcommittee
78. Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
Subcommittee
79. Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee
80. Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Committee
81. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
82. Senate Small Business Committee
83. Senate Special Committee on Aging
Part II. In the 109th Congress, the following Congressional committees
and subcommittees asserted DHS jurisdiction by holding hearings or
otherwise exercising formal oversight activity.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1. House Armed Services Committee
2. Terrorism, Unconventional Threats & Capabilities
Subcommittee
3. House Appropriations Committee
4. House Homeland Security Subcommittee
5. House Education & the Workforce Committee
6. 21st Century Competitiveness Subcommittee
7. Select Education Subcommittee
8. House Energy & Commerce Committee
9. Telecommunications and the Internet Subcommittee
10. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
11. House Financial Services Committee
12. Domestic & International Monetary Policy, Trade &
Technology Subcommittee
13. Housing & Community Opportunity Subcommittee
14. Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
Subcommittee
15. House Government Reform Committee
16. Federal Workforce & Agency Organization
Subcommittee
17. National Security, Emerging Threats & Intl
Relations Subcommittee
18. Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Resources
Subcommittee
19. Government Management, Finance & Accountability
Subcommittee
20. Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee
21. House Homeland Security Committee
22. Emergency Preparedness, Science & Technology
Subcommittee
23. Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism
Risk Assessment Subcommittee
24. Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, &
Cyber security Subcommittee
25. Management, Integration & Oversight Subcommittee
26. Prevention of Nuclear & Biological Attack
Subcommittee
27. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
28. House International Relations Committee
29. Africa, Global Human Rights, & International
Operations Subcommittee
30. International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
Subcommittee
31. Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
32. House Judiciary Committee
33. Commercial & Administrative Law Subcommittee
34. Constitution Subcommittee
35. Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security Subcommittee
36. Immigration, Border Security & Claims Subcommittee
37. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
38. Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis &
Counterterrorism Subcommittee
39. House Resources Committee
40. Fisheries & Oceans Subcommittee
41. National Parks Subcommittee
42. Water & Power Subcommittee
43. House Science Committee
44. House Small Business Committee
45. Regulatory Reform & Oversight Subcommittee
46. Workforce, Empowerment, & Government Programs
Subcommittee
47. House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
48. Aviation Subcommittee
49. Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Subcommittee
50. Economic Development, Public Buildings & Emergency
Management Subcommittee
51. Highways, Transit & Pipelines Subcommittee
52. House Veterans' Affairs Committee
53. House Ways & Means Committee
54. Oversight Subcommittee
55. Social Security Subcommittee
56. Trade Subcommittee
U.S. SENATE
57. Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee
58. Senate Appropriations Committee
59. Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee
60. Senate Armed Services Committee
61. Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee
62. Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee
63. Fisheries & the Coast Guard Subcommittee
64. National Ocean Policy Study Subcommittee
65. Disaster Prevention & Prediction Subcommittee
66. Trade, Tourism, & Economic Development Subcommittee
67. Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee
68. Energy Subcommittee
69. Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee
70. Transportation & Infrastructure Subcommittee
71. Senate Finance Committee
72. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
73. East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee
74. International Operations & Terrorism Subcommittee
75. Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps & Narcotics Affairs
Subcommittee
76. Senate Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions (HELP)
Committee
77. Bioterrorism Preparedness & Public Health
Preparedness Subcommittee
78. Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee
79. Federal Financial Management, Government
Information & International Security Subcommittee
80. Oversight of Government Management, Federal
Workforce & DC Subcommittee
81. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
82. Senate Judiciary
83. Immigration, Border Security & Citizenship
Subcommittee
84. Terrorism, Technology & Homeland Security
Subcommittee
85. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
86. Senate Special Committee on Aging
Appendix II: Additional Questions and Responses
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Bennie G. Thompson,
chairman, Committee on Homeland Security
Responses from the Honorable Paul A. Schneider
Question 1.: What new measures are being taken by the Department to
ensure that Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs) have the resources they
need to increase the number of on-site inspections and ensure more
visual documentation?
Is the Department considering amending the Annual Aviation Plan in
order to allow more on-site inspections of air carriers?
Response: In fiscal (FY) 2007, the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) air cargo program deployed over 100 additional
vehicles at 51 airports to support the 300 Transportation Security
Inspectors-Cargo (TSI-Cs). Additionally, TSA has initiated the hiring
of 150 cargo inspectors who are to be deployed by July 2008. Vacancy
announcements for 75 of the new positions have already closed and the
selection process has begun. These additional resources will be
deployed to high-volume airports and to those airports where cargo
operations pose a higher degree of risk. Supplemental funds received in
fiscal year 2007 will support the addition of 85 TSA proprietary canine
teams. The teams will be led by a TSI-C Canine Handler and will
concentrate their efforts on screening air cargo to be transported on
passenger aircraft. As outlined in the fiscal year 2008 Regulatory
Activities Plan, inspectors have been directed to increase inspection
activity through observation techniques and interviewing, as opposed to
document review.
Question 2.: Is the Department revisiting TSA's regulations and
guidelines within their security programs and making the necessary
changes in language in order to do away with their misinterpretation?
If so, what process is being implemented in the rewriting of these
guidelines and regulations?
Is there an advisory group in place that can provide theoretical
and practical experience when rewriting these guidelines?
Once these changes are made, what are the Department's plans to
ensure proper training is implemented and enhance communication
channels between ASIs and TSA?
Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
making revisions to current regulations in order to: (1) make
substantive changes to the current regulations to enhance security
requirements, and (2) clarify other parts of the regulations based on
industry feedback to enable regulated parties to more easily understand
and adhere to TSA security requirements. TSA utilizes the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Air Cargo Working Group, which
represents the regulated parties, to discuss areas of the regulations
that might be unclear or might cause significant operational impacts.
Additionally, TSA has established a Compliance Advisory Group comprised
of senior, experienced Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) who
meet quarterly to receive and offer recommendations on procedural
items. TSA recognizes the importance of implementing a security regime
that provides for the highest security standards without adversely
impacting the flow of commerce, and TSA continues to partner with
industry to make sure regulations and guidelines issued meet these twin
goals. Drafted changes to the security programs are due for industry
comment.
As security program changes are made, TSA will ensure TSIs are
knowledgeable on the updated procedures through training. TSA will
continue to provide guidance to the TSIs through training modules and
bi-weekly conference calls. TSA is committed to compiling questions and
answers from the field and posting them to the employee web board in an
effort to maintain consistency in the application of security
procedures.
Question 3.: What is the Department doing to address the concerns
raised by TSA's PARIS Advisory Group in 2006? Please provide a progress
report timeline describing any steps taken to address the weaknesses in
PARIS as a monitoring and reporting tool.
Response: Several steps have already been taken to implement
recommendations directed at improving the effectiveness and
functionality of the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS)
program. First, resources were identified in fiscal year (FY) 2007 to
transition the information technology away from a highly customized
application to one that is capable of accommodating commercial off-the-
shelf components. In the latter part of the fiscal year, an information
technology proposal was presented to the Agency's Office of Chief
Information Officer to enable the program administrators to
dramatically change and improve the direction of the current
application. That proposal will be submitted through the department's
approved information technology acquisition process in fiscal year
2008.
Next, the Office of Security Operations, Compliance Division, has
committed to assign two additional full-time personnel in fiscal year
2008 to augment the headquarters-based PARIS staff. This much needed
support will increase the administrative oversight and staff support
required to supervise and manage this application serving approximately
more than 3,000 end users within the Agency.
Finally, in fiscal year 2008, additional quality assurance
procedures will be implemented to support managers and supervisors who
review and approve PARIS records, and new program guidance and
additional technical training will be made available to PARIS users.
This guidance will inform end users of the steps required to accurately
enter and retrieve data from the application, over and above the
current support that is now available. To improve program
communications, periodic technical presentations via telephone and
online conferencing will be conducted with the field work force to
encourage information sharing, collaboration, and assist in identifying
program and process improvements.
Question 4.: In an effort to secure our nation's borders, we must
know who enters and exits this country, and, slowly, we are
implementing systems to accomplish this goal. Nonetheless, I am deeply
troubled by occurrences of special interest aliens attempting to enter
our country with little follow up investigative activities being
conducted. More specifically, I suggest that a thorough investigation
should be conducted to determine if these individuals are part of a
larger criminal or smuggling organization and most importantly, are
they associated with any terrorist organization. Furthermore, the
individuals should be run through all law enforcement databases to
determine if they are subjects/targets of other investigations. A new
report last week indicated a considerable number of special interest
aliens have illegally crossed the border in the last year.
Having said that, can you explain to us the steps that would be
taken should a CBP Officer or Border Patrol agent encounter a special
interest alien, for example, from Syria or Pakistan?
Who conducts the investigation?
Who insures that the information is vetted through other federal
law enforcement agencies?
Do CBP Officers and Border Patrol agents have a security clearance
and statutory authority that will allow them to investigate these
activities?
Please describe any policies and /or procedures as they relate to
the interdiction and handling of special interest aliens.
Response: This response is for Official Use Only and Law
Enforcement Sensitive.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs a layered, risk-based
approach to our security and facilitation efforts at our Nation's
borders.
CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents are keenly aware and kept
informed of continuing and emerging threats posed along our Nation's
borders.
CBP has implemented policies to specifically address encounters
with individuals posing possible threats of terrorism. Policy requires
Officers and Agents to immediately notify the CBP National Targeting
Center--Passenger (NTC-P), the centralized coordination point for all
of CBP's anti-terrorism efforts. The NTC-P conducts a full vetting to
include notification to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, who have a
full time Liaison Section assigned to the NTC-P which provides 24 hour
notification to ICE JTTF in the field and immediate coordination on all
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) encounters. Other
agencies are also notified including the FBI Terrorist Screening
Operations Unit (TSOU) who provides case agent instructions back to the
NTC to further identify any possible threat or connection to terrorism.
The local CBP Officer or Border Patrol Agent designated as a Counter-
Terrorism Response (CTR) Officer is responsible for coordinating with
NTC and other law enforcement agencies, and for ensuring that a full
inspection, document review and questioning of suspect persons takes
place.
CBP's NTC-P has several programs whose focus is to identify
potential threats to national security prior to the individual arriving
in the United States. In some instances, NTC-P has coordinated with
foreign governments to deny boarding to the passenger thereby extending
our borders. Some of these programs include:
--Immigration Advisory Program (IAP). The IAP review team at
the NTC-P has the responsibility of utilizing airline
reservation systems for passengers scheduled to depart aboard
flights destined to the United States from the overseas IAP
locations prior to boarding. Targeting efforts continue to
focus on those passengers who have the highest probability of
matching TIDE, TSA No-Fly, Visa Revocation, and Non-U.S. Lost/
Stolen Passport records.
--As a result of the Transportation and Security Agency (TSA)
Aviation Security Directive Number: SD 1544-06-03C, CBP-NTC-P
initiated Operation Mirage II in response to the arrests of
terrorist suspects in the UK who allegedly planned to carry-out
suicide bombings on US-bound commercial aircraft. This on-going
operation requires air carriers to provide CBP-NTC-P with
complete passenger manifests before the flight departs from the
UK. The air carriers are notified if any passenger off-loads
are required before the flight is given permission to depart.
--CBP initiated Intelligence Driven Special Operations (IDSO)
in response to specific ``threat streams'' identified during
intelligence analysis or Special Interest Aliens. Each IDSO
identifies specific criteria as applied to a ``threat stream''.
CBP field offices are required to contact NTC-P when travelers
matching IDSO criteria are encountered. NTC-P conducts research
on each traveler in both classified and unclassified systems to
determine if the subject posed a threat to national security.
All CTR Officers undergo initial and recurring special training
related to their specific duties. This training includes the ability to
determine if an individual may pose a possible risk for terrorism,
based on: suspicious travel to special interest countries; questionable
identities and/or travel documents; suspicious documents, brochures or
other written materials; suspicious itineraries or travel routes; and/
or unusual items contained in the individual's baggage or vehicle. This
is particularly important when aliens from special interest countries
falsely claim to be Mexican (or from another non-special interest
country).
Some traits or indicators that may indicate a basis to question an
alien's claim of citizenship from a non-special interest country are
explained below.
Observation regarding the style and type of clothing,
mannerisms and speech patterns and including physical features.
Search of the subject's person and belongings for any
type of identity and/or travel documents to corroborate a story
or identify potential risk.
Physical evidence on subject's person or in subject's
belongings that list phone numbers and addresses, foreign or
domestic, that would lead and Officer or an Agent to believe
that the alien is from a special interest country.
Responses to certain questions (for example, regarding
certain facts about Mexico) that are unlikely to be answered
correctly by an alien from a special interest country.
Biometric information, such as fingerprints and
digital photographs that are checked and enrolled through the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) and
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) as well as
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System
(IAFIS) where alien's fingerprints are additionally
checked to detect any previous criminal history or outstanding
warrants.
The CTR Officer should use questioning techniques and observational
behavioral analysis. At a minimum, the CTR interview is required to
establish and properly record the following: purpose and intent of
travel; length of visit; persons visited or to be visited; places
visited abroad, or to be visited in the United States; sponsoring
organization for the trip, or means used to pay for the trip;
affiliations with educational or professional institutions; value of
cash and other monetary instruments in the traveler's possession; and
the traveler's next destination.
With respect to security clearances, a select group of CBP Officers
and managers assigned to counterterrorism duties and trained for those
specific responsibilities have been vetted for Secret or higher
clearances as appropriate. And although many Border Patrol Agents have
security clearances of varying levels up to Top Secret, most agents
have a standard Background Investigation (BI) which entitles them to
view and handle Law Enforcement Sensitive or For Official Use
Information Only material.
Most CBP Officers do not have investigative responsibilities.
Instead, their singular focus is on the inspection of individuals
arriving at the ports of entry and detection of risks to national
security or violations of Federal laws administered by CBP. When a
person designated as a Special Interest Alien (SIA) presents himself
for admission at a US port of entry, he will be referred to secondary
inspection for additional examination and interview. Specifically,
SIA's are processed in the National Security Entry Exit Registration
System (NSEERS), which includes document verification and an interview
regarding purpose of travel, destination, and other pertinent facts.
SIA's are also fingerprinted, registered in, and queried against our
system of law enforcement biometric databases (including ENFORCE/IDENT
and IAFIS) and any documents or possessions of interest are examined
and, where appropriate, copied for follow-up by investigative entities.
Appropriate notifications are also made when an SIA, or other
individual whom CBP Officers determine may pose a risk to national
security, are encountered. Such notifications may be to Special Agents
with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF), the National Targeting Center (NTC), and other
Federal, State, or local authorities with a vested or possible interest
in the alien.
The FBI's TSOU and CBP's NTC-P will run the biographical
information through a multitude of databases and watch lists to
determine whether the alien has any nexus to terrorism or is of any
investigative interest to other agencies. If a subject is determined to
be a positive match to the terrorist watch list or is of significant
interest, NTC immediately notifies ICE NTC who provides direct
notification to ICE JTTF in the field for response and appropriate
coordination with CBP and other agencies as appropriate. These
notifications are made on a 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week basis. If the
JTTF determines that the alien is of investigative interest, the alien
may be subjected to further investigation by the FBI or Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Office of Investigations pending further
investigation.
Section 287 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, Title 8, 18,
19 and 21 all give fairly broad statutory authority for Border Patrol
Agents to arrest, detain and investigate illegal activity. For example,
all Border Patrol Agents are specifically authorized to conduct
investigative stops, either from roving patrol or pedestrian
interviews, and must diligently pursue lawful ``investigative
activities'' likely to promptly resolve questions as to immigration
status or ``criminal activity''. These authorities are explained and
delineated in the Border Patrol Handbook and other sources. Again,
Policy requires Officers and Agents to immediately notify the CBP
National Targeting Center (NTC), the centralized coordination point for
all of CBP's anti-terrorism efforts, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The NTC
conducts a full vetting to include notification to other agencies, as
required, to further identify any possible threat or connection to
terrorism.
Question 5.: The GAO report says that the Department has
``generally not achieved'' the improvement and enhancement of public/
private information sharing involving attacks, threats, and
vulnerabilities.
Please list how many private sector entities are linked to HSIN (or
its related systems), whether this linkage has been done through the
Sector Partnership Framework, and how many members of State and local
governments have access.
Please describe your successes and difficulties in these areas.
Response:
HSIN-CS User Numbers (approximate count)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Private 648 organizations (1,278 individuals)
Sector
Organization
s
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Educational 16 institutions (19 individuals)
Institutions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State/Local/ 117 entities (186 individuals)
Tribal
Members
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal 90 entities (299 individuals)
Partners
(non-DHS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Employees 200--250 individuals (NOTE: This is a very rough
estimate. It includes 180 on the National Infrastructure
Coordinating Center Tactical Portal, plus an estimated
50+ from the Transportation Security Administration, US
Coast Guard, etc.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Sector Partnership Framework provides the governance and
coordination for the Homeland Security Information Network Critical
Sector (HSIN-CS). Many of the sectors, through their Sector
Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils
(GCCs), have working groups that develop functional requirements for
HSIN-CS and determine content, portal appearance, and governance for
their participation in HSIN-CS. This approach ensures that HSIN-CS is
an efficient and effective tool that fits into each sector's business
processes, culture, and policy framework.
Such an approach is intended to ensure coordination and
communication in an all-hazards environment; it also affords
sustainable information exchange within the sector and across sectors
for the long term. The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI-
KR) sector partnership provides the nexus for private-sector
participation on HSIN-CS.
We have had a number of successes in our outreach efforts to the
private-sector owners/operators for HSIN-CS. Each sector now has a
portal in pilot status on HSIN-CS. We are working with the sectors to
create a business case that provides the owners/operators (the Nuclear,
Oil & Natural Gas and Chemical sectors, for example) with a compelling
reason to share information. Also, the sectors, led by the SCC/GCC, are
developing their own governance and membership criteria for HSIN-CS; in
this way, the sectors have a vested interest in building a trusted
environment and fostering its successful execution. Finally, we have
established HSIN-CS as a key distribution medium for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to share reports, threats, and analysis with
the private-sector owners/operators. For two years, for example, DHS
has made regionally based hurricane impact models available on the
HSIN-CS portals for use by the sectors in preparing for the hurricane
season. Nine sectors have signed Memorandums of Understanding with DHS
to move out of the pilot stage and expand the use of their portals to
the entire sector.
We are in the process of acquiring a new technical platform that
will overcome the limitations of the current HSIN in supporting sector
annual reports, broadcast alerts, key functionalities, and various
private-sector core requirements. Several sectors are limiting their
participation pending the move to a new platform, once identified. The
GAO report did note, however, that progress had been made on the
information-sharing front overall for the CI-KR sectors.
Question 6.: During the intelligence subcommittee's May 2007
hearing on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Mr. Wayne
Parent said that the Department would be taking steps to ensure that
the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is staying aligned
with the efforts and recommendations of the Program Manager of the
Information Sharing Environment.
What steps has the Department taken, and what specific
recommendations has the Program Manager made to the Department in that
regard?
How are you implementing any such recommendations by the Program
Manager?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps
to ensure that HSIN is aligned with the efforts and recommendations of
the Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). DHS
established an Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC) which is
comprised of representatives from across the DHS components and chaired
by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis's Information Sharing and
Collaboration Office. The DHS/ISCC is chartered to review and
coordinate recommendations from the PM-ISE. The Office of Operations
Coordination has a representative on this council and coordinates
applicable efforts and recommendations with the HSIN Joint Program
Office.
The PM-ISE has drafted an Enterprise Architecture Framework (EAF)
that will enable the sharing and searching of terrorism information
across jurisdictional boundaries. The ISE EAF includes the concept of
an ISE Shared Space. The Shared Space is an area to be used by
participating agencies to place shareable services and data in a manner
that is readily accessible and ensures appropriate security. At a
concept level, this definition gives DHS the opportunity to further
articulate the mechanics of its own Shared Space. DHS has begun the
process of defining how it will implement the concept of the Shared
Space in anticipation of a final recommendation from the PM-ISE. HSIN
is an integral part of enabling the ISE Shared Space concept.
Question 7.: GAO concluded that DHS has generally not achieved
performance expectation number 16: Develop a long range vessel-tracking
system to improve maritime domain awareness. GAO bases its conclusion
on that fact that after Congress first gave the US Coast Guard the
authority to develop long range vessel tracking capabilities over four
years ago in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 [MTSA]
(Public Law 107-295), DHS does not have a long range vessel tracking
system that can provide coverage up to nautical 2,000 miles from the US
coast.
I understand that the maritime industry, specifically the Maritime
Information Service of North America (MISNA), which is a non-profit US
maritime organization, has developed a long range vessel tracking
system that can not only provide coverage up to nautical 2,000 miles
from the US coast, but around the world. Are you aware of this system?
I understand that MISNA believes it would compliment the system being
developed by the IMO, and would provide more benefits to the U.S. than
the IMO system will.
Response: Yes, the Coast Guard is aware of the Maritime Information
Service of North America (MISNA) system. MISNA, like other commercially
available systems, provides global tracking of vessels as a corporate
service. Unlike the compulsory International Maritime Organization
(IMO) Long Range Information Tracking (LRIT) system which will track
all Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) vessels, the long range MISNA system
is voluntary and is limited to tracking only MISNA subscribers.
Question 8: The Coast Guard's lack of progress on developing long
range vessel tracking capabilities is especially troubling given that
the SAFE Port Act mandated that DHS would have a long range vessel
tracking system by April 1 of this year. When the Coast Guard was asked
about this, their response was that they have access to sufficient data
right now, but that the problem is that once the data has been
gathered, they do not know how to display it and share it with those
who need it. It seems that GAO came to the same conclusion.
Specifically, GAO notes that while DHS has reported that the Coast
Guard has vessel-tracking capabilities, but noted that work is needed
in the processing, display, and training in the use of this
information.
If DHS is not able to process or display the information it has,
nor does it have the capability to train anyone in the use of this
information, what good does it do to have the information in the first
place? All the information in the world will not stop a terrorist
attack if that information is not actionable. And it certainly will not
help DHS to manage risk in the maritime environment.
Response: The Coast Guard met the April 1, 2007, tracking
requirement of the SAFE Port Act using a full range of classified and
unclassified means. This multi-faceted range of vessel tracking sources
provides both complementary and confirmatory information used to
improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is achieved through a
combination of established training programs, data fusion & analysis
tools, Department of Defense-compliant display systems including Coast
Guard-wide distributed classified and unclassified Common Operational
Pictures, and sharing of vessel tracking information with Customs and
Border Protection and other port partners. Ongoing efforts continue to
improve the efficiency and performance of these existing Coast Guard
capabilities and information systems.
Question 9.: Sec. 404 of the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-241) authorized DHS to
conduct a pilot program for long-range tracking of up to 2,000 vessels
using satellite systems with a nonprofit maritime organization that has
a demonstrated capability of operating a variety of satellite
communications systems providing data to vessel tracking software and
hardware that provides long-range vessel information to the Coast Guard
to aid maritime security and response to maritime emergencies.
Given DHS's lack of progress on developing long range vessel
tracking capabilities over the past four years, combined with the fact
that MISNA has had these capabilities for that entire time, and keeping
in mind that MISNA's system will provide some capabilities that IMO's
system will not and that IMO's system will not be fully functional for
some time, do you think it would be prudent for Congress to appropriate
funds to get this pilot project up and running, and for the Coast Guard
to work with the maritime industry to achieve long range vessel
tracking capabilities?
Response: The Maritime Information Service of North America
(MISNA), like other commercially available systems, provides global
tracking of vessels as a corporate service. Unlike the compulsory
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Long Range Information
Tracking (LRIT) system which will track all Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) vessels, the long range MISNA system is voluntary and is
limited to tracking only MISNA subscribers. We do not seek funding for
a pilot project for MISNA.
The United States Government has led the effort for the past four
years to implement LRIT as an international standard system. Progress
toward implementing a compulsory, international long range tracking
system through the IMO depends upon international participation and
cooperation. The Coast Guard will be working with the maritime
industry, our international partners and commercially available systems
to receive long range tracking information when LRIT is deployed as
planned in 2008. An NPRM on LRIT was published by the Coast Guard in
October 2007 and a U.S. National Data Center for LRIT is planned to be
in operation by the summer of 2008.
Question 10.: According to the GAO's report, overall progress on
Border Security was Modest, Immigration enforcement was Moderate, and
Immigration services was Modest. Can you elaborate on why these figures
appear so low and what DHS is currently doing to improve them?
Response: As discussed in the Department's response to the GAO
report, we disagree with the methodology used by GAO to score the
Department. We also disagree with GAO's overall scores in the specific
areas of Border Security, Immigration Enforcement, and Immigration
Services.
The Department has, over the past four years, implemented several
initiatives and strategies with the overall goal of gaining effective
control of our Nation's borders. More importantly, our results
demonstrate a success that is clearly higher than ``Modest''.
The Department has developed a comprehensive National Strategy to
gain and maintain operational control of our borders, between the ports
of entry, with the appropriate mixture of staffing, technology and
tactical infrastructure. This strategy was implemented in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2005 and complements the strategy for securing our Nation's
borders at the ports of entry as well as the DHS' Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). SBI is a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure
America's borders and reduce illegal migration by gaining effective
control of the borders and strengthening interior enforcement and
compliance. The goals are interdependent and must be addressed
simultaneously and collectively in order to achieve significant gains
in border security. This is partially achieved by increasing the rate
of interception and removal, therefore increasing the rate of
deterrence.
While GAO did not assess deterrence as a performance measure, the
Department believes it is a vital part of the National Strategy and
implemented several initiatives aimed at deterrence. For example, DHS
expanded the use of Expedited Removal to Border Patrol apprehensions
between the ports of entry, and has since ended the practice of catch
and release. Combined with targeted enforcement efforts such as
Operation Streamline in the Del Rio Sector, the addition of more Border
Patrol Agents, tactical infrastructure and technology such as ground
based radar in other sectors, additional deterrence to illegal cross
border activity was achieved.
The significant gains made in border miles under effective control
are mostly attributable to the significant numbers of new Border Patrol
Agents hired and deployed to the southwest border during fiscal year
2006 and fiscal year 2007 and Operation Jump Start (OJS). The new
Border Patrol Agents added will become more effective in the
performance of their duties as they continue to develop their law
enforcement skills through post academy and on the job training. The
number of support personnel hired was also increased commensurate with
the hiring of additional Border Patrol Agents which has sent ``badges
back to the border'' and increased our presence and ability to deter
and apprehend border incursions.
Along with the permanent personnel enhancements, increased targeted
enforcement operations and implementation of long term initiatives, the
Border Patrol's southwest border sectors also received augmentation by
National Guard troops participating in OJS. The most noteworthy support
provided by OJS National Guard troops was through the deployment of
Entry Identification Teams (EITs). These EITs provided additional
detection capability and deterrence in areas with limited monitoring
capabilities. This brought additional miles of the border under
surveillance and allowed the Border Patrol Agents to more effectively
respond to illegal entries. Additionally, the National Guard supported
the Border Patrol mission in several other ways, by repairing patrol
roads, providing fleet maintenance support, operating radios and
cameras and performing other non-law enforcement activities. This
allowed hundreds of Border Patrol Agents, performing non-law
enforcement missions, to return to their law enforcement duties and
place them back on the border.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2007, over 600,000 hours for CBP
Officers and Border Patrol Agents were freed up through the use of a
``guard and transportation'' services contract that will continue in
fiscal year 2008. This contract allows CBP Officers and Border Patrol
Agents to focus on their primary law enforcement duties instead of
spending time transporting and guarding apprehended aliens.
The results were and continue to be decreased apprehensions and
increased amounts marijuana and cocaine seized between the ports of
entry by Border Patrol Agents. At the end of fiscal year 2006, border
security efforts resulted in an eight percent decrease in overall
apprehensions and a 13 percent increase in the amount of marijuana
seized and an eight percent increase in the amount of cocaine seized
compared to fiscal year 2005 figures. Efforts in fiscal year 2007
resulted in a 20 percent decrease in overall apprehensions and a 36
percent increase in the amount of marijuana seized and an 11 percent
increase in the amount of cocaine seized compared to fiscal year 2006
figures.
Achievement at the border is the result of the continued
application of the Border Patrol's multi-year strategy to deploy the
right mix of highly trained and well-equipped personnel, strategically
placed tactical infrastructure and integrated technology to secure our
borders. The goal of this strategy is to ensure that the Border Patrol
can consistently detect, identify and classify, respond to and resolve
all illegal entries between the ports of entry while maintaining
mobility for rapid deployment to counter shifts in illegal cross border
activity.
In regards to Immigration Enforcement, it is apparent that the GAO
failed to adequately assess several of the ICE programs that touched
upon the performance expectations highlighted in the report.
For example, in an effort to ensure timely identification and
removal of aliens subject to removal from the U.S., ICE has acquired
additional aircraft, increased the use of the Electronic Travel
Document system that meaningfully shortens processing and detention
times, and increased the use of Video Teleconferencing for consular
interviews, thereby reducing interview scheduling and travel delays.
It is also important to note that decisions by foreign countries to
refuse or delay in the issuance of travel documents are not within
ICE's control. In many instances, there is little incentive for some
countries to repatriate their citizens, nearly all of whom contested
removal to their nation and some of whom are criminals. Many countries
extensively delay or outright refuse the issuance of travel documents
for the return of their nationals, even when presented with conclusive
identity information and passports. However, ICE continues to encourage
non-cooperating countries to issue travel documents. Some efforts
include, stationing a full-time ICE Liaison Officer at the Department
of State to foster better foreign relations, expanding e-Ticketing to
those countries who receive the highest number of repatriated aliens,
and facilitating consular interviews.
Furthermore, the length of removal proceedings conducted by
agencies within the Department of Justice or the federal courts is
outside of ICE control. Aliens are entitled to present their cases to
an immigration judge, appeal, and seek further review in the federal
courts. In some jurisdictions, the removal of aliens is judicially
stayed--or enjoined--by federal court order upon the alien's request.
The GAO did not take into consideration the number of aliens in ICE
detention whose detention is prolonged by their litigation choices and
rulings by courts.
ICE has also made extensive progress in ensuring the removal of
criminal aliens and absconders through its Criminal Alien Program
(CAP). ICE would like to note that the CAP maintains a presence in
approximately 2000 federal, state, and local correctional institutions
and jails, including 114 Bureau of Prisons federal detention
facilities. Furthermore, ICE continues to train and hire nearly 200
additional staff to support CAP, is expanding video-teleconferencing
technology to field offices, and continues to expand coverage to state
and local jails and prisons. Additionally, CAP is on course to double
the number of aliens placed in removal proceedings by issuance of
charging documents in 2007.
In addition to the CAP program, ICE has also successfully developed
and implemented a robust worksite enforcement program which actively
targets employers who hire unauthorized workers. ICE uses a two-fold
system that entails a comprehensive risk assessment of its mission-
critical areas, as well as the use of standard law enforcement
statistics to measure the overall effectiveness of its investigations.
The worksite enforcement program continues to mature and will be
developed into an outcome based system.
Lastly, ICE has also made great strides to interdict and prevent
trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the U.S. ICE utilizes Border
Enforcement Task Forces (BEST), which were created to combat border
crime and violence, and also maintains an active and aggressive
domestic and overseas human trafficking program--ICETIPS--to target
criminal organizations and individuals engaged in human trafficking
worldwide.
Question 11.: Responsibility for securing the maritime
transportation system falls to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation
Security Administration, other Federal, State, and local agencies,
foreign partners, and the private sector. The scope is enormous and
includes 300 plus domestic seaports, 12 million maritime containers,
and hundreds of vessels. With all of these stakeholders and missions,
it seems that this category would see the least amount of progress but
the opposite is true.
What makes maritime security different?
Is it a priority for the Department and therefore more resources
and attention were given to this area than Immigration enforcement?
Response: Ensuring the security of the maritime transportation
system continues to be a priority for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). An efficient maritime transportation system is vital to
the global economy, but it can also be used to move dangerous cargo or
people to our ports and cities. Almost 32,000 seagoing containers
arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports each day. In fiscal
year 2006, that equated to 11.6 million cargo containers annually.
Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.
DHS is proud of the strides made over the last several years to
strengthen the security of the maritime transportation system while
facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. As you observed,
the scope of this mission is enormous and responsibilities are shared
between a variety of both federal and private stakeholders. Our
progress in the maritime realm has been aided by a number of unique and
important factors.
The maritime domain has a tradition of partnerships between
stakeholders, especially between the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), maritime industry partners and
others in the private sector. These established relationships enabled
the Department to rapidly identify security gaps and solutions and then
work aggressively to implement realistic mitigation programs and
strategies. As an example, the implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 included the establishment of Area
Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) and development of Area Maritime
Security Plans. Both programs were implemented under tight deadlines
driven by the date the International Maritime Organizations
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) entered
into force. The existing partnerships between Federal, State, and local
agencies and the maritime/port industries, such as the Harbor Safety
Committees, ensured that the stakeholders had pre-existing partnerships
and were rapidly able to transition into AMSCs. Other supply chain
security programs whose success is predicated on strong international
and industry partnerships include the Secure Freight Initiative (a
joint program between DHS and the Department of Energy) the Container
Security Initiative, and the USCGs inspection teams.
Another significant factor contributing to the progress in the
maritime domain is that the federal government has traditionally
maintained primary oversight authority in the maritime realm. Navigable
waterways and port areas fall clearly within the purview of specific
federal agencies, such as the USCG, which has direct jurisdiction over
all U.S. navigable waterways, or CBP which has jurisdiction over cargo
crossing a border. The clarity and centrality of this federal authority
has significantly expedited development of security regimes and
domains. While the partnerships noted above have been crucial, the
centrality of jurisdiction has also helped ensure that rapid progress
was possible.
Question 12.: Although Congress passed a bill to implement
remaining recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the bill failed to
implement the recommendation for Congress to reorganize itself to
consolidate its jurisdiction over DHS. In an op-ed in the Washington
Post on September 9th, the 9/11 Commission's former chairman, Thomas H.
Kean, and former vice chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, noted that this is one
of the--quote--``main items on our list of concerns.''
What recommendations do you have to streamline this process?
a. Could you please provide some examples of how the lack of
consolidated congressional oversight impacts DHS?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently
subject to oversight by at least 86 Congressional committees and
subcommittees. This level of Congressional attention creates a uniquely
difficult and unnecessary burden for DHS and it negatively impacts the
Department's ability to fulfill its mission. Literally thousands of
Congressional requests--from many different committees and
subcommittees, for hearings, briefings, reports, and other
information--consume a significant amount of DHS senior leadership
time, which must be balanced with meeting operational mission demands.
A list of the committees and subcommittees who have asserted
jurisdiction over some aspect of DHS operations during the 110th and
109th Congresses is attached.
In 2006 alone, DHS testified at more than 200 Congressional
hearings, responded to more than 3,700 follow-up questions for the
record, provided approximately 2,200 briefings for members and their
staffs, and prepared more than 370 authorization and appropriation
reports for Congress. These figures reflect more than a 25-percent
increase in the number of hearings and briefings required of DHS
between 2004 and 2006.
Unfortunately, the problem appears to be getting worse rather than
better, and the burden is becoming increasingly onerous. So far in
2007, the Department is on pace to exceed the 2006 figures. Already, in
the 110th Congress (as of September 14, 2007), DHS witnesses testified
at over 166 hearings with 228 witnesses, responded to more than 2,600
follow-up questions for the record, provided approximately 1,949
briefings for members and staff, and prepared more than 460 reports for
Congress. In August 2007 alone, two requests from one committee in the
House (other than the Committee on Homeland Security) have consumed
many hundreds of staff hours, and boxes of documentation have been
demanded and supplied.
In addition to the sheer burden associated with responding to the
thousands of oversight requests directed at the Department, the large
number of committees and subcommittees claiming jurisdiction frequently
results in duplicative requests to the Department. We often find
ourselves providing briefings or testimony to multiple committees on a
range of identical or closely related matters. For example, DHS
witnesses have testified, to date, at least five times on the issue of
post-Hurricane Katrina housing in the 110th Congress. Further, DHS
witnesses have testified before five different committees and
subcommittees on worksite enforcement, and seven different times on the
issue of border security.
We understand that there is a high level of interest in many of our
programs and operations and recognize Congress' important oversight
role; however, the time and effort involved in responding to the vast--
and sometimes duplicative--requests has had a significant impact on the
ability of the Department to perform our mission.
b. What recommendations do you have to streamline this process?
Response: One of the most important steps Congress can undertake to
improve operational effectiveness at DHS is to streamline Congressional
oversight over our Department. This action would allow DHS to focus our
time and resources much more effectively on our critical missions,
while preserving appropriate levels of Congressional oversight. [See
Appendix I.]
This view is in line with a key recommendation of the 9/11
Commission which was to create a single, principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security. The Commission stated that:
Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over
this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress
does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in
the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent
standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.
The Department of Homeland Security strongly supports this
recommendation and the Administration has repeatedly expressed its
strong conviction that Congress should adopt this recommendation. As
discussed in the previous answer, the lack of a single, principal point
of oversight and review has led to a number of committees exercising
oversight, requesting information, and holding hearings. The Department
welcomes oversight and is more than willing to engage with members of
Congress on important homeland security issues. However, this must be
done in an organized a way that avoids redundant requests and oversight
efforts, and allows Departmental leaders to engage in full and
efficient dialogue with members of Congress.
We urge Congress to implement this vital reform.
Questions From the Committee on Homeland Security
Responses From the Honorable David M. Walker
Question 1.: Since 2003, the Department has committed roughly $250
million to develop an exit capability for US-VISIT, yet we still do not
have a functioning biometric exit system. In June, GAO testified before
the Committee that the prospects for having operational exit
capabilities continued to be unclear because of the absence of any
detailed plans.
a. Can you speak about the US-VISIT exit plans GAO has reviewed, or
lack thereof, and why you believe the Department's newly launched
efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution will not produce
results different from its past efforts?
Response: DHS has issued a high-level schedule for an exit
capability at air ports of entry, but information supporting that
schedule was not available as of June 2007. In addition, there are no
other exit program plans available that define what will be done, by
what entities, and at what cost in order to define, acquire, deliver,
deploy, and operate this capability. The fiscal year 2007 US-VISIT
expenditure plan did not include a complete schedule for biometric exit
implementation, and the US-VISIT program office has yet to develop a
business case for implementing a planned project for biometric exit
capability at air ports of entry. Further, DHS has not performed an
analysis comparing the life cycle costs of the air exit solution to its
expected benefits and risks.
The US-VISIT program first committed to full deployment of a
biometric exit capability in 2003, and it has continued to make similar
deployment commitments in subsequent years. At the same time, we have
chronicled a pattern of inadequate analysis surrounding the expected
costs, benefits, and risks of these exit efforts since 2004, and thus
an absence of reliable information upon which to view their expected
value and base informed exit-related investment decisions. US-VISIT has
allocated about $250 million in funding to exit pilot programs. At no
time, however, was any analysis produced to justify such a sizeable
investment. While we recognize the value and role of demonstration and
pilot efforts as a means for learning and informing future development
efforts, we believe that exit-related efforts have been inadequately
defined and justified over the last 4 years, and it is unclear whether
DHS's new efforts will produce different results from past efforts.
Questions 2.: Throughout your review, how was the NIPP evaluated?
a. Were you considering coordinated objectives that should have
been accomplished by the NIPP in coordination with Sector and
Government Coordinating Councils?
b. If so, then please list concrete examples that contributed
to your overall analysis.
Response: We based our review of the NIPP on prior GAO work. We
previously reported that the NIPP is a base plan that is to serve as a
road map for how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk
management principles to prioritize protection activities within and
across sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. HSPD-7 required
DHS to develop a comprehensive and integrated plan by December 2004
that outlines national protection goals, objectives, milestones, and
key initiatives necessary to fulfilling these responsibilities. DHS
issued the NIPP in June 2006.
To better coordinate infrastructure protection efforts as called
for in the NIPP, all 17 critical infrastructure sectors have
established their respective government councils, and nearly all
sectors have initiated their voluntary private sector councils. But
council progress has varied due to their characteristics and level of
maturity. Further, the NIPP required the individual sector-specific
agencies, working with relevant government and private sector
representatives, to submit plans to DHS that would establish the means
by which the sectors will identify their critical assets, assess risks
of terrorist attacks or other hazards on them, assess and prioritize
those which have national significance, and develop protective measures
for the sector. DHS is to use these individual plans to evaluate
whether any gaps exist in the protection of critical infrastructures on
a national level and, if so, to work with the sectors to address the
gaps. We reported that all the sectors met the December 2006 deadline
to submit their sector-specific plans to DHS, although the level of
collaboration between the sector and government councils on the plans
varied by sector. In May 2007, DHS announced the completion of the 17
sector-specific plans. However, issuing the NIPP and completing sector
plans are only first steps to ensure critical infrastructure protection
investments and activities are prioritized based on risk management
principles.
We recently reported that the extent to which the sectors addressed
aspects of cyber security in their sector-specific plans varied. None
of the plans fully addressed all 30 cyber security-related criteria.
Several sector plans--including the information technology and
telecommunications sectors--fully addressed many of the criteria, while
others--such as agriculture and food and commercial facilities--were
less comprehensive. In addition to the variations in the extent to
which the plans covered aspects of cyber security, there was also
variance among the plans in the extent to which certain criteria were
addressed. DHS acknowledges the shortcomings in the plans. DHS
officials stated that the sector-specific plans represent only the
early efforts by the sectors to develop their respective plans.
Nevertheless, until the plans fully address key cyber elements, certain
sectors may not be prepared to respond to a cyber attack against our
nation's critical infrastructure.
3. In your report, you give the Department a ``generally achieved''
status for developing partnerships and coordinating with other federal
agencies, state and local governments and the private sector. Please
describe in detail a partnership and coordination effort that was
``generally achieved'' by the Department?
Response: DHS has taken steps to develop partnerships and
coordinate with other federal agencies, state and local governments,
and the private sector. For example, DHS is responsible for the
formation of government and private sector councils to, among other
things, identify their most critical assets and identify protective
measures in sector-specific plans. In October 2006 we reported that all
17 critical infrastructure sectors established their respective
government councils, and nearly all sectors initiated their voluntary
private sector councils in response to the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan.
In addition, DHS has undertaken numerous initiatives to foster
partnerships with other federal agencies, state and local governments,
and the private sector about cyber attacks, threats, and
vulnerabilities. For example, the National Cyber Response and
Coordination Group facilitates coordination of intragovernmental and
public/private preparedness and operations in order to respond to and
recover from incidents that have significant cyber consequences and
also brings together officials from national security, law enforcement,
defense, intelligence, and other government agencies that maintain
significant cybersecurity responsibilities and capabilities. Further,
sectors stated that the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory
Council will give them an effective way to share information about and
coordinate their protection efforts since the council proceedings are
not subject to public disclosure, thus protecting sensitive business
information from competitors.
4. Mr. Walker, you identified numerous problems with the
Department's recruitment, retention, and management of its personnel.
Can you tell us what you think are the top three problems, and what you
think are the short and long term solutions to address them?
Response: Some of the most pressing human capital challenges at DHS
include successfully completing its ongoing transformation; forging a
unified results-oriented culture across the department; linking daily
operations to strategic outcomes; rewarding individuals based on
individual, team, unit, and organizational results; and obtaining,
developing, providing incentives to, and retaining needed talent.
Moreover, employee satisfaction with their involvement in
decisionmaking and feelings of empowerment are low, as measured by
results in the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey.
Given the strategic importance of human capital management to the
success of DHS, finding cost-effective, feasible long-term solutions is
the most appropriate management approach. DHS needs to continue its
efforts to
link organizational goals to individual performance
use competencies to provide a fuller assessment of
performance
make meaningful distinctions in employee performance
continue to incorporate adequate safeguards to ensure
fairness and guard against abuses
involve employees in important decisions such as how
they are deployed and how work is assigned
We have also made recommendations to specific program offices and
organizational entities to help ensure that human capital resources are
provided to improve the effectiveness of management capabilities and
that human capital plans are developed that clearly describe how these
components will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing
demands as they expand and implement new program elements.
Question 5.: Mr. Walker, in the report you cite that DHS reported
to you as of March 2007 that it was scanning 91 percent of
containerized cargo entering the United States by land or sea ports of
entry. This Committee has also been provided with similar, although
more detailed information about scanning cargo for radiation. For that
performance expectation, which was number 4: ``Coordinate deployment of
nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities
and other countermeasures'' under the Science and Technology section,
the GAO Assessment was ``Generally not achieved.''
a. Do you believe the Department is in fact scanning less than
91 percent of containerized cargo entering the U.S.? If so,
what is your basis for that assessment?
Response: DHS has made progress in deploying radiation detection
equipment at US sea ports. We do not disagree with the Department's
statement that it is screening 91 percent of containerized cargo
entering the country, but that screening is only to detect nuclear and
radiological materials. We concluded that DHS has generally not
achieved the performance expectation to ``Coordinate deployment of
nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities
and other countermeasures'' because there is no comparable activity for
biological and chemical detection. DHS did not provide us with
documentation on its effort to coordinate the deployment of
countermeasures beyond radiation detection capabilities at ports of
entry and monitoring of aerosol-based attacks. In addition, until DHS
more completes its threat assessments across all sectors, DHS may not
fully now what technologies or countermeasures are needed to address
identified threats and vulnerabilities.
Question 6.: Mr. Walker, in the S&T section of the report, nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical detection are all somewhat
grouped together.
a. Can you compare among them for us, and tell us your opinion
of the maturity of the rad/nuke, biological and chemical
detection technologies respectively?
b. Because rad/nuke detection has moved out of the S&T
directorate and is now within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, can you compare and contrast the process and efficacy
for threat assessment, RDT&E, and where applicable, technology
deployment between S&T and DNDO?
c. Are the two directorates cooperating or coordinating?
Response: DHS has developed and deployed equipment at ports of
entry for detection of radiological and nuclear materials entering the
United States. The department has also developed and deployed
technologies to detect possible biological and chemical agents in the
air. However, we have not evaluated or compared the maturity of these
detection capabilities. Moreover, we have not compared and contrasted
the assessment and deployment processes used by the Science and
Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. We
also have not reviewed the extent to which the Science and Technology
Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office coordinate their
efforts.
Question 7.: Mr. Walker, in the first performance expectation for
the S&T directorate: ``Develop a plan for departmental research,
development, testing and evaluation activities,'' you note several
reports put out by the Department and that each report seems to do well
in some area and fails in others. For example, the report states that
``The Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan and associated
Five-Year Research [and] Development Plan provide information on
deliverables and milestones for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
However, these plans do not include goals and measures for the
department's science and technology activities. In addition, according
to the department, these plans do not address the requirement in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the department to develop a national
policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives
and policies for, and coordinating the federal government's civilian
efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
biological, and other emerging terrorist threats, upon which the
performance expectation is, in part, based.''
a. Can you differentiate between goals, milestones, measures,
and deliverables and explain why each need to be included and
why the Department included deliverables and milestones but not
goals and measures?
Response: Effective strategic plans contain strategic or long-term
goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives,
for the major functions and operations of the agency. The strategic
goals constitute a specific set of policy, programmatic, and management
objectives for the programs and operations covered in the strategic
plan, and serve as a framework from which the annual performance goals
are derived. Strategic goals explain what results are expected from the
agency's major functions and when to expect those results. Such goals
are an outgrowth of the mission and are very often results-oriented.
Strategic plans should indicate how progress toward achieving strategic
goals will be measured. Effective strategic plans should also show an
obvious link between strategic goals and the specific actions or
deliverables that will be needed to meet those goals. These actions or
deliverables, in turn, should be clearly linked to milestones
describing when such actions will take place. We provide an explanation
of each term below:
Strategic Goal: A statement of aim or purpose that
defines how an agency will carry out a major segment of its
mission over a period of time. Most strategic goals will be
outcomes, and are long-term in nature. The strategic goal is
expressed in a manner which allows a future assessment to be
made of whether the goal was or is being achieved.
Performance Goal: Sets a target level of performance
over time expressed as a tangible, measurable objective,
against which actual achievement can be compared, including a
goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value or rate. A
performance goal is comprised of a performance measure with
targets and timeframes.
Performance Measure: An indicator, statistic or metric
used to gauge program performance against goals.
Milestones: A schedule of significant actions that
need to take place to achieve the goals in a strategic plan.
Deliverables: Products or services to be provided as
specified in a contract or plan.
Questions 8.: Mr. Walker, you considered the assessment of emerging
CBRN threats to generally not achieved. Last year, as you note in your
report, DHS S&T completed a risk assessment of 28 biological agents and
then went on to conduct 14 Material Threat Determinations (MTD)
required under project BioShield.
a. Do you consider the risk assessment of the 28 biological
agents or the MTDs to be inadequate or sub-par?
b. What about similar risk assessments for rad/nuke and
chemical agents?
Response: We did not evaluate the quality of risk assessments and
Material Threat Determinations that have been conducted by DHS. We
based our assessment of generally not achieved primarily on the fact
that DHS was in the process of completing assessments in some sectors.
Our analysis showed that DHS has completed some assessments on
biological and chemical threats and vulnerabilities. However, at the
time of our report DHS was still in the process of completing
assessments in the chemical sector as well as its Integrated Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Assessment. Based on our
analysis, we concluded that DHS's assessments overall appeared to be in
the early stages.
Question 9.: Responsibility for securing the maritime
transportation system falls to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation
Security Administration, other Federal, State, and local agencies,
foreign partners, and the private sector. The scope is enormous and
includes 300 plus domestic seaports, 12 million maritime containers,
and hundreds of vessels. With all of these stakeholders and missions,
it seems that this category would see the least amount of progress but
the opposite is true.
a. What makes maritime security different?
b. Is it a priority for the Department and therefore more
resources and attention were given to this area than
immigration enforcement?
Response: While our work was not designed to explain why DHS has
made varying levels of progress in implementing its mission and
management areas or how the department prioritized among those areas,
we can provide a few observations on maritime security. The two key
agencies responsible for the maritime security mission--the Coast Guard
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection--already had authorities to
conduct security-related activities. These two agencies had the
infrastructure in place--such as trained staff, assets like ships and
aircraft, and a field structure at the ports. These agencies also had
leadership that moved ahead with various security initiatives, such as
the Coast Guard creating Area Maritime Security Committees to
coordinate activities and share information and CBP creating
partnerships with other countries (through the Container Security
Initiative) and the private sector (through the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism).
Question 10.: Would you agree with DHS that the GAO's methodology
led to ``an inaccurate representation of the Department's progress?''
a. What do you consider that most significant limitations of
the review and your resulting report?
b. To what extent do you agree or disagree that these
limitations impaired the results of you analysis?
c. Can you briefly respond to the methodological ``flaws''
cited DHS, and does the Department have valid concerns?
Response: As we acknowledge in our report and testimony, our
methodology has several limitations. For example, we have completed
varying degrees of work for each mission and management area, and DHS's
components and offices provided us with different amounts and types of
information. As a result, our assessments of DHS's progress in each
mission and management area reflected the information available for our
review and analysis and are not equally comprehensive across all 14
mission and management areas. Further, while there are qualitative
differences between the performance expectations, we did not weigh some
more heavily than others in our overall assessments of mission and
management areas.
In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS took issues with
several different aspects of our methodology. For example, DHS believed
that we altered the criteria we used to judge the department's
progress. We did not change our criteria; rather we made a change in
terminology to better convey the intent behind the performance
expectations that DHS achieve them instead of merely taking actions
that apply or relate to them. DHS was also concerned about an apparent
shift in criteria we applied after the department provided us
additional information and documents. What DHS perceived as a change in
criteria for certain performance expectations was really the process by
which we disclosed our preliminary assessment; analyzed additional
documents and information from DHS; and updated and, in many cases
revised, our assessments based on the additional inputs. Further, DHS
raised concerns with consistency in our application of the methodology.
Our core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all inputs from GAO
staff to ensure consistent application of our methodology, criteria,
and analytical process, and our quality control process included
detailed reviews of the report's facts as well as assurances that we
followed generally accepted government auditing standards. Overall,
while we appreciate DHS's concerns about our methodology, we recognize
that in such a broad-based endeavor, some level of disagreement is
inevitable. We have been as transparent as possible regarding our
purpose, methodology, and professional judgments and believe that our
methodology provides a sound basis for assessing DHS's progress.