    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

     THE GRADES ARE IN!--IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MEASURING
                                      UP?

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                                  FULL HEARING

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 18, 2007

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 110-70

                                   __________

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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                   BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman

    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California,         PETER T. KING, New York
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      LAMAR SMITH, Texas
    NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington          CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
    JANE HARMAN, California              MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             TOM DAVIS, Virginia
    NITA M. LOWEY, New York              DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    Columbia                             BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
    SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas            MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    Islands                              GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
    BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina        MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                 DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
    CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
    AL GREEN, Texas
    ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
    VACANCY

           Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel

                         Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel

                         Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk

                    Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   STATEMENTS

    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     2
    The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of New York..........................................    28
    The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Texas.................................................    27
    The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of California............................................    22
    The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Rhode Island.................................    30
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas:
      Oral Statement.................................................    34
      Prepared Statement.............................................    35
    The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of New York..........................................    24
    The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Alabama:
      Oral Statement.................................................     3
      Prepared Statement.............................................     4
    The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of California........................................    19

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary, Management,
      Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     8
      Prepared Statement.............................................     9
    The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United
      States, Government Accountability Office.......................     6

                                 FOR THE RECORD

    Material submitted by Hon. Mike Rogers:
      Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS chart.................     5

                                   APPENDIXES

    I.  Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS.....................    39
    II.  Additional Questions and Responses:
          Responses from Hon. Paul A. Schneider......................    43
          Responses from Hon. David M. Walker........................    53

     THE GRADES ARE IN!--IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MEASURING
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                                  ----------

                          Tuesday, September 18, 2007

                         U.S. House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:41 p.m., in Room
    311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
    [chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Harman, Lowey,
    Jackson Lee, Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Clarke, Green,
    Rogers, and Dent.
        Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
    Security will come to order.
        The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from
    Comptroller General David M. Walker of the Government
    Accountability Office and Mr. Paul A. Schneider, Undersecretary
    for Management at the Department of Homeland Security,
    regarding GAO's assessment of the Department of Homeland
    Security's efforts over the past 4 years.
        I have an opening statement that I would like to read. I
    would like to welcome our two witnesses to the panel today. We
    look forward to both of your testimonies.
        I would like to share with the members of the committee and
    the audience that, as you know, on September 6, 2007, a day
    after the House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing
    examining Secretary Chertoff's record at the Department of
    Homeland Security, GAO publicly released its report assessing
    the department's progress over the past 4 years.
        GAO examined legislation, homeland security presidential
    directives and DHS and component agency strategic plans. GAO
    assessed the department's performance based on its inspector
    general's report, past GAO reports and documents provided by
    the department.
        All in all, GAO found that the key underlying themes that
    have affected the department's implementation efforts are the
    lack of strategic planning and management, risk management,
    information sharing, agency transformation, partnership
    formulation and internal and external coordination.
        Simply put, the GAO report confirmed, and I and the
    committee have suspected for a while now, that the department
    has failed to complete major projects, programs and plans
    critical to fulfilling critical homeland security missions.
        In addition to incomplete performance in several
    operational and programmatic areas, I am also troubled about
    the department's ongoing challenges in resolving critical
    personnel vacancies that exist in key decision-making
    positions.
        The GAO report is really pointing to a need for
    accountability.
        Mr. Schneider, it did not go unnoticed that the department
    chose to send you to defend 4 years record and that you have
    only been with the department for 9 months. It should be noted
    that the committee sought the attendance of Deputy Secretary
    Michael Jackson, who has been in the department since its
    inception and who serves as the department's chief operating
    officer and is responsible for managing the department's day-
    to-day operation.
        Let me state emphatically that the department must not
    evade its responsibility to the American people. The leaders of
    the department should be here to account for why they have
    decided to swap the national response plan for a national
    response framework that state and local participants are still
    confused about.
        The decision-makers of the department must account for the
    300 percent cost increase of the SBInet program the department
    said would help to secure the borders against dangerous persons
    and cargo. The managers of the department should account for
    the delay in the issuance of TWIC, the transportation worker
    identification card.
        The directors of the department need to account for the
    fact that taxpayers' dollars were spent on the homeland
    security information network, a program that the department's
    inspector general found does not support information sharing
    effectively, does not fully meet user needs, and, in many
    cases, is not relied upon by state, local and tribal law
    enforcement agencies.
        Now, I understand that the department questions the
    methodology employed by GAO in compiling its assessment of DHS.
        Mr. Schneider, I am prepared to hear the department's
    concern about the GAO, but I must warn you that the
    department's failure to accomplish its responsibilities to the
    American people is hardly due to statistical manipulation.
        The fact is that at the September 5 hearing, I gave
    Secretary Chertoff a list of outstanding projects that he is to
    complete before his tenure is over at the department. When all
    the items on the list have been accomplished, then the American
    people will be able to say that we are safer now than we were
    before.
        I will close by saying, once again, that we owe the
    American people security, we owe them accountability, and, most
    importantly, we owe them freedom from fear.
        With that, I thank you for being here today and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        I would also like to now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
    from Alabama, who is our ranking member, Mr. Rogers.

       Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman,
                         Committee on Homeland Security

                               September 18, 2007

        On September 6, 2007, a day after the House Committee on Homeland
    Security held a hearing examining Secretary Chertoff's record at the
    Department of Homeland Security, GAO publicly released its report
    assessing the Department's progress over the past four (4) years.
        GAO examined legislation, Homeland Security Presidential
    Directives, and DHS and component agencies' strategic plans.
        GAO assessed the Department's performance based on its Inspector
    General's reports, past GAO reports, and documents provided by the
    Department.
        All in all, GAO found that the key underlying themes that have
    affected the Department's implementation efforts are the lack of
    strategic planning and management, risk management, information
    sharing, agency transformation, partnership formation and internal and
    external coordination.
        Simply put, the GAO report confirmed what I and this Committee have
    suspected for a while now--That is the Department has failed to
    complete major projects, programs, and plans critical to fulfilling
    critical homeland security missions.
        In addition to incomplete performance in several operational and
    programmatic areas, I am also troubled about the Department's on-going
    challenges in resolving critical personnel vacancies that exist in key
    decision-making positions.
        The GAO report is really pointing to a need for accountability.]
        Mr. Schneider, it did not go unnoticed that the Department chose to
    send you to defend the Department's chief operating officer and is
    responsible for managing the Department's day-to-day operations.
        Let me state emphatically that the Department must not evade its
    responsibility to the American people.
        The leaders of the Department should be here to account for why
    they have decided to swap the National Response Plan for a National
    Response Framework that State and local participants are still confused
    about.
        The decision makers of the Department must account for the 300
    percent cost increase of the SBInet--a program the Department said
    would help to secure the borders against dangerous persons and cargo.
        The managers of the Department should account for the delay in the
    issuance of TWIC--the transportation worker identification card.
        The directors of the Department need to account for the fact that
    taxpayer dollars were spent on the Homeland Security Information
    Network (HSIN)--a program that the Department's Inspector General found
    does not support information sharing effectively, does not fully meet
    user needs, and in many cases is not relied upon by State, local, and
    tribal law enforcement agencies.
        Now I understand that the Department questions the methodology
    employed by GAO in compiling its assessment of DHS.
        Mr. Schneider, I am prepared to hear the Department's concerns
    about the GAO but I must warn you that Department's failure to
    accomplish its responsibilities to the American people is hardly due to
    statistical manipulation.
        The fact is that at the September 5th hearing, I gave Secretary
    Chertoff a list of outstanding projects that he is to complete before
    this tenure is over at the Department.
        When all of the items on the list have been accomplished then the
    American people will be able to say that we are safer now than we were
    before.
        I will close by saying--once again--that we owe the American people
    security. We owe them accountability. And most importantly, we owe them
    freedom from fear.

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I, too, would like to welcome Mr. Walker and Mr. Schneider
    back to the committee.
        The GAO report we will discuss today sets forth a
    comprehensive review of the progress made at DHS, as well as a
    number of challenges still facing the department. Specifically,
    the 320-page GAO report points out that, while DHS has made
    significant progress in carrying out its missions, more needs
    to be done to strengthen the management structure.
        Partially, in response, DHS has raised serious concerns
    with the methodology and performance measures GAO used to
    develop its report, but we will hear from Undersecretary
    Schneider about these concerns.
        The creation of DHS in March 2003 marked the largest
    government reorganization since the creation of the Department
    of Defense. While DHS has made great strides in integrating 22
    separate agencies, DHS officials acknowledge more work needs to
    be done.
        GAO acknowledges that successful transformations of large
    organizations, even those with less strenuous organizations
    than DHS, generally take 5 to 10 years. DHS also has undergone
    reorganizations, including the secretary's second stage review
    in 2005 and the reorganization of FEMA earlier this year.
        While Congress must actively oversee DHS, it should not
    mandate more changes that will impede the department's ability
    to complete its integration. As you can see from the chart, DHS
    also has the challenge of reporting to 86 Congressional
    committees and subcommittees because Congress has not yet
    implemented the 9/11 commission recommendations to consolidate
    jurisdictions.

     Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mike Rogers, A Representative in
                       Congress from the State of Alabama

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Today, we welcome back to the Committee both Comptroller General
    David Walker and Under Secretary Paul Schneider.
        The Government Accountability Office report we'll discuss today
    sets forth a comprehensive review of the progress made by DHS, as well
    as a number of challenges still facing the Department.
        Specifically, the 320-page GAO report points out that while DHS had
    made significant progress in carrying out its missions, more needs to
    be done to strengthen the management structure.
        Partially in response, DHS has raised serious concerns with the
    methodology and performance measures GAO used to develop its report.
        We will hear from Under Secretary Schneider about these concerns.
        The creation of DHS in March 2003 marked the largest government
    reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense.
        While DHS has made great strides in integrating 22 separate
    agencies, DHS officials acknowledge more work needs to be done.
        GAO acknowledges that successful transformations of large
    organizations--even those with less strenuous reorganizations than
    DHS--generally take five to seven years to achieve.
        DHS also has undergone reorganizations, including the Secretary's
    Second Stage Review in 2005, and the reorganization of FEMA earlier
    this year.
        While Congress must actively oversee DHS, it should not mandate
    more changes that will impede the Department's ability to complete its
    integration.
        DHS also has the challenge of reporting to 86 congress committees
    and subcommittees because Congress has not yet implemented the 9/11
    Commission recommendation to consolidate jurisdiction.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask Unanimous Consent to include in the Record a
    chart that shows the committees and subcommittees that currently
    oversee DHS.
        Consolidated jurisdiction would maintain strong oversight, while
    DHS strengthens its organization and carries out its missions.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for being here today, and we look
    forward to their testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to
    include in the record the chart that shows the committees and
    subcommittees that currently oversee DHS.
        Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rogers. Consolidated jurisdiction would maintain strong
    oversight while DHS strengthens its organization and carries
    out its missions.
        Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today
    and look forward to their testimony.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Thompson. Other members of the committee are
    reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may
    be submitted for the record.
        I now welcome our first witness, Mr. David Walker. Mr.
    Walker became the seventh comptroller general of the United
    States and began his 15-year term when he took his oath of
    office on November 9, 1998.
        As comptroller general, Mr. Walker is the nation's chief
    accountability officer and head of the U.S. Government
    Accountability Office, a legislative branch founded in 1921.
        GAO's mission is to help improve the performance and assure
    the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of
    the American people. Over the years, GAO has earned a
    reputation for professional, objective, fact-based and
    nonpartisan review of government issues and operations.
        Mr. Walker, I thank you for your service and I appreciate
    you agreeing to testify here today.
        Our second witness is the honorable Paul Schneider,
    Undersecretary for Management at the Department of Homeland
    Security. Prior to joining the department earlier this year,
    Undersecretary Schneider was a defense and aerospace consultant
    for 3.5 years. Before that, he was a civil servant for 38
    years, including serving as senior acquisition executive of the
    National Security Agency from October 2002 to September 2003,
    and more than 4 years as principal deputy assistant secretary
    of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.
        Thank you, Mr. Schneider, for being here today.
        Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
    inserted in the record.
        I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
    minutes, beginning with Mr. Walker.

     STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Walker. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, other
    members of the Homeland Security Committee, thank you very much
    for the opportunity to be with you and to review GAO's findings
    with regard to our report that was issued earlier this month on
    the implementation, integration and transformation of
    Department of Homeland Security.
        DHS began operations in March of 2003 with a number of
    missions, which included, among other things, preventing
    terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States,
    reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the
    damages from attacks that might occur, and helping the nation
    recover from these attacks.
        The department has initiated and continued to implement a
    variety of policies and programs designed to address these
    challenges, as well as its many non-homeland security
    functions. I think it is important to note at the outset that
    thousands of DHS employees are working very hard on these and
    other challenges and we obviously appreciate their efforts.
        DHS has also taken a number of actions to integrate its
    management functions and to transform its component agencies
    into an effective and integrated cabinet department.
        However, given the size and significance of this undertaken
    and in light of the experience of Department of Defense in
    1947, GAO designated the implementation and transformation of
    the Department of Homeland Security as a high risk area and it
    continues to be high risk today.
        In designating this as a high risk area, we noted that
    building an effective department would require consistent and
    sustained leadership from top management in all key areas. And
    we also noted that successful mergers and transformations, even
    in the private sector, of large and complex organizations, can
    take 5 to 7 years to achieve and be sustained. And, quite
    candidly, in government, for a variety of reasons, it takes
    longer.
        Our report provides our assessment of DHS' progress across
    14 mission and management areas. For each area, we identified
    performance expectations based upon not our expectations, but
    the expectations of the Congress, the president of the United
    States and the secretary of homeland security.
        We worked with the inspector general of the department of
    homeland security and, also, considered our prior work. We also
    provided an opportunity for the department to be able to
    provide us with additional information, including extensive
    information after reviewing a copy of our draft report.
        DHS has raised certain concerns about our methodology. We
    are comfortable with what we did, how we did it and why we did
    it.
        At the same point in time, I also want to acknowledge that
    in a hearing that we had on the Senate side about 2 weeks ago,
    I agreed with the chairman and ranking member of Senate
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that we would work
    together with DHS to come up with a modified methodology to
    evaluate DHS on a prospective basis and, in my opinion, that
    methodology should include both what the status is of these
    major efforts, as well as whether or not meaningful progress is
    being made with regard to each of these major areas, because
    after all, it is going to take years to effectively address
    some of these areas no matter what best efforts might be from
    the related parties.
        They have made varying levels of progress in implementing
    their mission and management areas since March of 2001. In
    general, DHS has made more progress in its mission areas than
    its management areas, for understandable reasons. Mission is
    what it is all about and mission is about protecting security
    and safety.
        I would note that there is a board which is noted on page
    four of my testimony, which includes the summary of our
    evaluation.
        I would also note that there are a variety of factors that
    have affected DHS' ability to implement its mission and
    management functions. These factors include both domestic and
    international events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
    major homeland security legislation. And the next board, which
    is on page seven of your testimony, summarizes a number of
    these major events.
        Given the leading role that DHS plays in securing the
    homeland, it is critical that the department's missions,
    programs and functions operate as efficiently and as
    effectively as possible. It has been more than 4 years since
    the department was established.
        They have made progress. More progress is necessary, but it
    is going to take time. I think it is important they be focused
    on the right things and that they be held accountable for
    making meaningful progress on a recurring basis.
        I also would note that in order for us to be able to
    effectively discharge our responsibilities to the Congress,
    that we need timely access to GAO people, documents and
    operational exercises, and, in that regard, I am pleased to
    note that just before I came to this hearing, I received a
    response to a recent letter that I sent to Secretary Chertoff
    in which he pledged to be personally engaged in making sure
    that we gain more timely access than we have in the past.
        I appreciate his willingness to set the right tone at the
    top and that is absolutely necessary in order for us to be able
    to effectively discharge our responsibilities for the Congress
    and the American people.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The statement of Mr. Walker follows:] \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
    Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T
    (Washington, D.C.): September 18, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
        We will now ask Mr. Schneider to summarize his statement
    for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHNEIDER, UNDER SECRETARY MANAGEMENT,
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative
    Rogers, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to
    appear before you today.
        Without question, the most significant challenge we face at
    DHS is to continue to transform the department into a unified
    force that protects our country. Although the department has
    faced numerous challenges during the first 4 years of this
    critical undertaking, we have made great progress.
        GAO largely recognizes this progress across 14 mission and
    management areas. In fact, GAO concluded that the department
    has generally achieved 78 performance expectations.
        This is particularly noteworthy given GAO's recognition
    that, in many cases, there was no anticipation that the
    department would achieve the performance expectations by the
    end of our 4th year.
        Also of importance is the GAO recognition that their
    assessments of progress do not reflect nor are they intended to
    reflect the extent to which DHS' actions have made the nation
    more secure in each area.
        Although the department takes issue with the methodology
    and rating system employed by GAO, there can be no dispute that
    GAO's positive assessments of generally achieved reflect the
    department's significant progress in the four major mission
    areas.
        I think it is worth noting that many of the areas where GAO
    rightly recognized the department's progress were those
    critical areas we chose to focus our resources to secure the
    homeland. While we were pleased that GAO recognized our
    progress, the department continues to believe that GAO used the
    flawed methodology in preparing its report, which resulted in
    many of the assessments not fully reflecting the department's
    progress.
        We are particularly concerned that the report is based on
    vague, shifting criteria and standards that result in an ``A or
    fail'' grading system does not properly credit DHS for on track
    implementation of long term multiyear goals or constantly
    evolving programs, that it is subjective and does not normalize
    the audit standard amongst analysts to ensure consistent
    assessments across the 171 performance expectations, and does
    not consistently account for issues outside DHS' control.
        In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a revised
    statement of facts that the department's progress would now be
    rated as generally achieved or generally not achieved rather
    than generally addressed or generally not addressed.
        Although their reply to our comments suggest that this was
    merely a change in language rather than substance, the
    practical differences between these standards are significant,
    reflecting, at a minimum, a difference in how the performance
    expectations would be perceived.
        ``Addressed'' suggests that a program is on track, whereas
    ``achieved'' indicates final completion. Our view is that GAO
    went from a pass-fail to an A-fail grading system without
    explaining why. In our view, this is like moving the goalpost
    after the game has started.
        Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments
    of the department, the 28 performance expectations, to
    generally not achieved.
        We are also concerned with the binary achieved-not achieved
    standard. We believe it is ill equipped to evaluate the
    department's progress accurately in a multiyear endeavor.
        In closure, my letter to the GAO dated 20 July 2007, which
    has been included in the GAO report, and my testimony,
    highlights in detail a discussion of some of these problematic
    assessments.
        Moving forward, we will build upon the department's recent
    program developments and successes, while dedicating ourselves
    to continuous improvement.
        I personally look forward to maintaining the cooperative
    approach with the GAO that was followed in preparing this
    report and, as the comptroller general indicated, based on our
    hearing with Senator Lieberman, we are in the process of
    starting to work together to establish criteria for subsequent
    evaluation that is mutually agreed to by both parties.
        I would also like to thank the Congress and especially this
    committee for your leadership and for your continued support of
    the Department of Homeland Security.
        I am happy to answer any questions that you may have.
        [The statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary
              for Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

        Thank you Mr. Chairman, Representative King and members of the
    Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today.
        I am here today to discuss where the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) stands after its first four years--both its successes
    and where more work is needed. In particular, I am here to discuss the
    recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled
    Department of Homeland Security, Progress Report on Implementation of
    Mission and Management Functions (GAO Report).
        I want to say at the outset that we are very appreciative of the
    frank and open communication with GAO that has been established during
    recent months, especially during the final stages of GAO's work on this
    report. In this regard we are especially appreciative of the efforts of
    the Comptroller General, Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland
    Security and Justice, and their team for their professionalism,
    courtesy and cooperation. We look forward to building on and continuing
    this cooperative approach. We also appreciate the opportunity that we
    were given to review and provide comments on the earlier draft report
    submitted by GAO.
        As you know, this report looks at DHS' first four years, although
    GAO has observed that ``successful transformations of large
    organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations
    than DHS, can take at least five to seven years to achieve.'' We
    appreciate GAO's acknowledgement of the challenges the Department faces
    and recognition of the progress we have made in the past four years.
    Without question, the most significant challenge we face at DHS is to
    continue to transform the Department into a unified force that protects
    our country. DHS, whose size is comparable to a Fortune 50 company, has
    been an entrepreneurial start-up effort that, at the same time, has
    been required to merge 22 agencies with approximately 209,000 employees
    into one.
        GAO itself has referred to this project as an ``enormous management
    challenge,'' and in regards to the size, complexity and importance of
    our efforts, as ``daunting.''
        Although the Department has faced numerous challenges during the
    first four years of this daunting--and critical--undertaking, we have
    made great progress. The GAO Report largely recognizes this progress
    across 14 mission and management areas. In fact, GAO concluded that the
    Department has ``Generally Achieved'' 78 performance expectations,
    despite GAO's recognition that in many cases it had not expected that
    the Department could achieve the performance expectations by the end of
    our fourth year. In other areas, GAO also recognizes the Department's
    ongoing programs but nevertheless concludes that the progress to date
    warrants a different assessment of ``Generally Not Achieved''.
        Although the Department takes issue with the methodology and rating
    system employed by GAO, there can be no dispute that GAO's positive
    assessments in 78 performance expectations reflect the Department's
    significant progress in four major mission areas, including: (1)
    securing modes of transportation, (2) securing the border and
    administering the immigration system, (3) defending against, preparing
    for, and responding to threats and disasters, and (4) implementing
    management functions.
        Securing modes of transportation. The Department has implemented a
    strategic approach for aviation security functions. In order to make
    air travel more secure, the Department has hired and deployed a federal
    screening workforce as well as federal air marshals on high-risk
    flights, and developed and implemented procedures for physically
    screening passengers and air cargo. The GAO Report also recognizes the
    Department's progress in developing and testing checkpoint technologies
    and deploying explosive detection systems and explosive trace detection
    systems to screen checked baggage. The Department has also established
    policies and procedures to ensure that individuals known to pose, or
    suspected of posing, a risk or threat to security, are identified and
    subjected to an appropriate action.
        In the area of maritime security, GAO recognizes the Department's
    development of national plans for maritime security, and progress in
    developing a vessel-tracking system to improve awareness on vessels in
    U.S. waters, ensuring port facilities have completed vulnerability
    assessments and developed security plans; and developing a system for
    screening and inspecting cargo for illegal contraband.
        Securing the border and administering the immigration system. The
    Department has implemented a biometric entry system to prevent
    unauthorized border crossers from entering the United States through
    ports of entry and is developing a program to detect and identify
    illegal border crossings between ports of entry. We have also developed
    a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows of cargo, drugs, and
    other items into the United States. In the area of immigration
    enforcement, the Department has developed a program to ensure the
    timely identification and removal of noncriminal aliens as well as a
    comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent the trafficking and
    smuggling of aliens into the United States. We have also developed a
    prioritized worksite enforcement strategy to ensure that only
    authorized workers are employed. In order to provide better immigration
    services, the Department has established revised immigration
    application fees based on a comprehensive fee study and has created an
    office to reduce immigration benefit fraud.
        Defending against, preparing for, and responding to threats and
    disasters. In order to satisfy our mission of being prepared for and
    responding to future threats and disasters, whether they are along the
    lines of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or Hurricanes Katrina
    and Rita, the Department has developed a national incident management
    system and a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure
    protection. The Department has identified and assessed threats and
    vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure and has supported efforts
    to reduce those threats and vulnerabilities. The GAO Report also
    recognizes the Department's progress in coordinating and sharing
    homeland security technologies with federal, state, local, tribal and
    private sector entities.
        Implementing Management Functions. While I have indicated in my
    prior testimony that there remains much work to be done in the area of
    improving and integrating management functions, there has nevertheless
    been progress in these areas. For example, GAO's assessments reflect
    our progress in assessing and organizing acquisition functions to meet
    agency needs. We have also designated a Department Chief Financial
    Officer, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who is
    currently working to prepare corrective action plans to address
    internal control weaknesses. In the area of human capital, we have
    developed a results-oriented strategic human capital plan, and have
    created a comprehensive plan for training and professional development.
    We have also organized roles and responsibilities for information
    technology under the Chief Information Officer and developed policies
    and procedures to ensure the protection of sensitive information. A
    Senior Real Property Officer has also been established and an Office of
    Management and Budget-approved asset management plan has been
    developed.
        I think it is worth noting that many of the areas in which GAO
    rightly recognizes the Department's progress were those areas where we
    have chosen to focus our resources during our first four years based
    upon a risk-based approach. For example, the Secretary has focused the
    Department's efforts on securing transportation modes given the nature
    of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The GAO Report recognizes that the
    Department has indeed made great strides in this area, giving the
    Department assessments of ``Generally Achieved'' in 37 out of 50
    performance expectations in this area. In this regard, it is worth
    noting that GAO acknowledges that its ``assessments of progress do no
    reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS'
    actions have made the nation more secure in each area''.
        While we were pleased that GAO recognizes our progress in these and
    other areas by indicating that we had ``Generally Achieved'' relevant
    performance expectations, the Department continues to believe that the
    GAO Report is based upon a flawed methodology. This methodology results
    in many assessments that do not fully or accurately reflect the
    Department's progress.
        We have raised our concerns with the methodology used by GAO on
    several occasions, including in our July 20, 2007 comments to the draft
    report. GAO's recent reply to our comments notwithstanding, these
    methodological issues continue to contribute to the report's systematic
    understatement of the Department's progress at the four-year mark.
    Therefore, I think they bear repeating here. We are particularly
    concerned that the GAO report:
             Is based on vague and shifting criteria, standards,
            and performance expectations that results in an ``A or Fail''
            grading system;
             Does not properly credit DHS for the on-track
            implementation of long-term, multi-year goals;
             Does not account for constantly evolving programs,
            especially those where total achievement may never be possible;
             Is subjective and does not normalize the audit
            standard amongst analysts to ensure consistent assessments
            across the 171 performance expectations;
             Does not consistently account for issues outside the
            control of DHS;
             Relies on outdated or inaccurate information; and
             Weighs all performance expectations equally.
        Many of these concerns were first expressed to GAO in connection
    with an initial, draft Statement of Facts provided by GAO to the
    Department in February. To evaluate the Department's progress over its
    first four years, GAO officials had relied almost exclusively on
    outdated reports and data to rate the Department's performance on a
    subjective, binary scale of ``Generally Addressed'' or ``Generally Not
    Addressed.'' GAO indicated that an assessment of ``Generally
    Addressed'' was given where analysts determined that DHS had ``taken
    steps to effectively satisfy most of the key elements of the
    performance expectation.'' GAO neither defined ``effectively satisfy,''
    nor identified the key elements or criteria associated with each
    performance expectation. Accordingly, the initial Statement of Facts
    and assessments provided us with little insight into how GAO had
    evaluated the Department's activities.
        After the Secretary personally reviewed the initial Statement of
    Facts, he wrote to the Comptroller General on March 7, 2007 expressing
    his concerns and offering to work with GAO ``to ensure the final GAO
    statement fully reflect[ed] the Department's achievements over the past
    four years.'' Shortly thereafter, the Department provided GAO with
    thousands of pages of documents explaining how key programs were on
    track and a detailed 100-plus-page explanation of the Department's
    overall progress. Over many weeks, the Department continued to provide
    additional documentation and meet with GAO officials to demonstrate how
    DHS was addressing various program areas and performance expectations.
        In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a Revised Statement of
    Facts which altered the standard for judging the Department's progress
    without prior warning or consultation with the Department. The Revised
    Statement of Facts indicated for the first time that the Department's
    progress would now be rated as ``Generally Achieved'' or ``Generally
    Not Achieved,'' rather than as ``Generally Addressed'' or ``Generally
    Not Addressed.'' Although GAO's recent reply to our comments suggests
    that this was merely a change in language rather than substance, the
    practical differences between these standards are significant,
    reflecting, at a minimum, a difference in how the performance
    expectations would be perceived. ``Addressed'' suggests that a program
    is on track, whereas ``achieved'' indicates final completion. The
    Department went from being rated on the GAO standard to ``effectively
    satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may
    not have satisfied all of the elements'' to now completely satisfying
    all of the requirements. Our view is that GAO went from a Pass/Fail to
    an A/Fail grading system without explaining why. This is like moving
    the goal post in the middle of a game. Consequently, DHS spent many
    months working to show how the Department had satisfied those now-
    abandoned standards.
        Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments of the
    Department in 28 performance expectations. In 24 such instances, the
    Department went from ``No Assessment Made'' to ``Generally Not
    Achieved.'' These changes were particularly surprising in light of the
    extensive documentation and materials describing the Department's
    progress and successes that were provided to GAO. As discussed in the
    Department's formal response, which is included in the final GAO
    Report, we believe the downgraded assessments are not supported by the
    facts.
        The binary ``Achieved''/``Not Achieved'' standard ultimately
    adopted by GAO mid-audit is particularly ill-equipped to evaluate
    accurately the Department's multi-year programs, especially when DHS is
    only a few years into the project. GAO acknowledges the applied
    standard is ``not perfect'' but supports its decision to maintain the
    binary standard as it was unable ``to assess where along a spectrum of
    progress DHS stood for individual performance expectations''. We
    disagree with the standard used. For example, although GAO officials
    have indicated that the Department's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is
    ``on a trajectory'' towards achievement, the Department received a
    score of ``Generally Not Achieved'' in this performance expectation
    because it had not yet fully completed the goals of the entire SBI
    program. It is important to note that the Department was authorized to
    commence SBInet just one year ago. To assess this program within this
    report under the assumption that the Department has had four years to
    implement it is misleading. GAO's assessments of multi-year programs
    are thus at odds with GAO's own disclaimer that its assessments are
    ``not meant to imply that DHS should have fully achieved the
    performance expectation by the end of its fourth year.''
        We are also concerned with the apparent shifting of the already
    nontransparent criteria used by GAO to assess the Department. We
    disagree with GAO's reply that the key elements are somehow
    ``inherent'' to the performance expectations. While certain elements of
    a given performance expectation may in some cases be obvious, the
    subjectivity of other key elements and criteria used by GAO is borne
    out by our exchanges with GAO over the past months. In many instances,
    where the Department provided GAO with supplemental information
    directly addressing specific criteria discussed in the initial or
    Revised Statement of Facts, GAO acknowledges DHS's new information yet
    does not fully consider its significance or include additional criteria
    for that performance expectation that was not previously provided to
    the Department. In some cases, this new criteria contained in the GAO
    Report goes beyond or contradicts the scope of the performance
    expectation itself. For instance, GAO's assessment of the Department's
    efforts to implement a strategy to detect and interdict illegal flows
    of cargo, drugs, and other items illustrates this point. The Revised
    Statement of Facts indicated that GAO's assessment was based in part on
    GAO's belief that the Department had not established or met milestones
    for achieving relevant goals. After GAO was provided with information
    to the contrary, GAO simply dropped its reference to those criteria and
    added language regarding new criteria, including the criticism that the
    Securing America's Borders at the Ports of Entry Strategic Plan
    (SABPOE) was ``in the early stages of implementation'' where the
    performance expectation only asks whether a strategy has been
    implemented.
        Moreover, there appears to have been no effort to ``normalize'' the
    process by which GAO officials made admittedly subjective assessments
    across the entire spectrum of 171 performance expectations. As a
    result, GAO analysts in various mission and management areas could have
    evaluated the Department's performance differently. The vague
    descriptions of ``Generally Addressed'' and then ``Generally Achieved''
    do not appear to provide detailed guidance to support these
    determinations or ensure consistency in application. Therefore it is
    difficult to have confidence in the level of consistency applied in
    evaluating the performance expectation criteria or the assessments
    based upon them. Furthermore, the GAO Report treats all of the
    performance expectations as if they were of equal significance. While
    all of the 171 performance expectations included in the GAO Report are
    important, they are not of the same priority when it comes to securing
    the nation's homeland. GAO readily admits that it did not weigh the
    relationship between each performance expectation with the Department's
    overall priorities and mission. In contrast, the Department uses a
    risk-based approach to consider its overall priorities and mission in
    choosing where to focus its limited resources. As previously discussed,
    the GAO Report indicates that DHS has made the greatest progress in
    several areas that it identified as priorities, such as securing
    transportation modes.
        In addition to these methodological concerns, we believe that many
    of GAO's specific assessments do not reflect the significant progress
    made by the Department over the past four years. The following are a
    few prime examples:
             Even after our July 20, 2007 comments GAO continues to
            assess the Department's efforts to detect and identify illegal
            border crossings as ``Generally Not Achieved.'' This assessment
            understates the importance of our successful efforts to deploy
            6,000 National Guard agents to the border, to increase Border
            Patrol staffing by 30 percent since 2001, and to begin
            implementation of the comprehensive SBI Program. For example,
            GAO does not take into consideration the Department's efforts
            to secure the northern border. It also does not mention that
            U.S. Customs and Border Protection (DHS-CBP) Border Patrol
            apprehensions for the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 2007
            are down 24 percent compared to the previous year along the
            southwest border, indicating a significant decline in illegal
            cross-border activity between ports of entry. The Yuma,
            Arizona, and Del Rio, Texas, sectors experienced the greatest
            declines, with decreases of 68 percent and 51 percent,
            respectively. The number of other-than-Mexican alien
            apprehensions dropped 48 percent along the southern border. The
            decrease in other-than-Mexican apprehensions reduces the time
            agents spend transporting and processing them, and increases
            the time spent patrolling the border.
             The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal to establish standards and
            procedures for effective airport perimeter security and to
            control access to secured areas does not give proper
            consideration to the extensive documentation recently provided
            to GAO by the Department's Transportation Security
            Administration (TSA). The documentation not only demonstrates
            substantial progress in establishing standards, but also the
            steps the Department is taking in implementing those standards.
            For instance, TSA established the Aviation Inspection Plan as
            guidance to implement the Aviation and Transportation Security
            Act (ATSA). Based on the Aviation Inspection Plan, TSA is
            conducting perimeter and access control pilots with airports,
            and has recommended to airport operators commercially available
            measures or procedures to prevent unauthorized access to
            secured airport areas. The Report continues to downplay the
            significance of the detailed action plan addressing all GAO
            recommendations from its 2004 audit and many processes already
            in place to improve airport perimeter security and access
            controls.
             The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of leveraging technology,
            personnel and information to secure the border is incorrect.
            The US-VISIT program incorporates eligibility determinations
            made by both DHS and the Department of State into a continuum
            of security measures to secure the border. US-VISIT manages
            systems that operate at 283 air, sea and land ports and 210
            Consular Offices worldwide. These systems collect data and
            screen travelers against existing watch lists and databases
            containing information about previous DHS encounters with the
            traveler, verifying identities and travel documents. The
            Department also captures data on individuals attempting illegal
            entry between the ports of entry, as well as individuals who
            are being investigated or removed from the interior of the
            country. This information is then shared with the ports of
            entry, Consular Offices, Border Patrol Stations, Immigration
            and Customs Enforcement (USICE) Field Offices, U.S. Citizenship
            Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Coast Guard. GAO's
            statement that there is ``more work to be done,'' which will
            almost certainly be true should substantiate this subjective
            score.
             The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of developing new programs
            to prevent future immigration benefit application backlogs from
            developing is incorrect. In GAO's response to the Department's
            July 20, 2007 comments, they acknowledge that the Department
            has initiated various programs to help reduce processing time.
            Despite this acknowledgement, GAO maintains its subjective
            assessment of ``Generally Not Achieved''.
             We continue to disagree with GAO's assessment that the
            Department has ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of
            establishing training programs to reduce fraud in the benefits
            process. This assessment provides an example of our concerns
            about GAO's shifting and vague criteria, as GAO's focus has
            apparently shifted from the ``establishment'' of training
            programs to concerns about the specific implementation of those
            programs. Not only has the Department established training
            programs, it is implementing them and has provided to GAO
            statistics on these training classes including number of
            attendees and course content. Additionally, this assessment is
            based on shifting criteria. The GAO requested we establish
            training programs and is assessing the Department on how the
            training program has been implemented.
             The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of implementing a
            prioritized worksite enforcement strategy does not capture the
            significant progress that ICE has made since 2004. Immigration
            and Customs Enforcement's (USICE) efforts have resulted in a
            significant increase in the use of the employment verification
            system as well as significant increases in investigations and
            arrests. The worksite enforcement strategy is a comprehensive
            three-pronged approach: (a) criminal investigations of
            egregious employer violators; (b) enhanced employer compliance
            and outreach to help employers follow the law; and (c) ensuring
            that critical infrastructure sites have only authorized
            workers.
             The GAO Report's assessment that the Department has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal of implementing a
            comprehensive strategy to interdict and prevent trafficking and
            smuggling of aliens into the U.S is not supported by the facts
            provided to GAO officials. The Department's implementation
            strategy for counteracting the trafficking and smuggling of
            aliens is just one part of the larger SBI and SABPOE Strategic
            Plan. DHS has made significant progress coordinating with other
            departmental components and federal agencies to target cross-
            border criminal activity, including human trafficking.
             The Department does not agree with the assessment that
            the Department's Science and Technology (S&T) directorate has
            ``Generally Not Achieved'' the goal to create a plan for its
            departmental research, development, testing and evaluation
            activities. S&T delivered a Strategic Plan to Congress on June
            26, 2007 that incorporates a five-year Research and Development
            Plan including information on milestones for fiscal years 2007
            through 2011. The milestones, deliverables and goals are
            included for every project within S&T, especially Test and
            Evaluation. It reflects the highest level objectives for
            internal departmental activities, and provides overarching
            guidance for addressing the science and technology needs within
            each homeland security mission area. The Plan also addresses
            the importance of developing a strong homeland security science
            and technology national workforce by developing professional
            S&T employees.
             Although GAO changed its assessment of our efforts
            towards developing a comprehensive Enterprise Architecture (EA)
            that substantially meets each of the Enterprise Architecture
            Management Maturity Framework (EAMMF) elements from ``Generally
            Achieved'' to ``No Assessment Made,'' we continue to believe
            that this expectation has been met.
            We also believe that the comprehensive EA has been implemented,
            contrary to GAO's assessment of that related expectation. With
            significant input from stakeholders, the Department has made
            great strides in these areas. In fact, the Office of Management
            and Budget has rated the Homeland Security Enterprise
            Architecture 2007 as a 4.3 on a 5.0 scale for completeness and
            a 4.5 on a 5.0 scale for use, which includes the elements of
            governance, change management, deployment, collaboration, and
            Capital Planning and Investment Control integration. The August
            2006 GAO report found that DHS fully satisfied 24 out of 31
            applicable EAMMF elements, and partially satisfied four
            additional elements. Since that time, DHS has taken additional
            steps to identify and/or address the final three elements.
            Products related to the EA are now required to undergo
            independent verification and validation (IV&V) which will
            ensure interoperability, compatibility, and efficiency within
            the larger structure. DHS has also worked to centralize
            information technology (IT) processes and avoid unnecessary
            duplication, by requiring adherence to the EA for all IT
            investments over $2.5 million. In addition, the Office of the
            Chief Information Officer is currently aligning all new
            investments to the EA. All IT investments in Fiscal Year 2008
            have already been aligned with the Department's strategic plans
            and will continue in future fiscal years. Also, with respect to
            implementing the EA, DHS has created a repeatable methodology
            for assessing potential IT investments. The developed
            methodology is based upon detailed compliance criteria.
        The Department also takes strong exception to GAO's assessments
    within the Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area. In
    addition to the five performance expectations that GAO recognizes that
    we have Generally Achieved, we also believe that the Department has
    Generally Achieved 10 additional performance expectations. The
    following are some examples in this mission area that reflect the
    progress we have achieved:
             GAO maintains that the Department has ``Generally Not
            Achieved'' the goal of establishing, coordinating, and
            implementing a single, all hazards national response plan. In
            fact, the Department issued the National Response Plan in
            December of 2004. With regard to implementation, the Department
            has actively trained Federal, state and local government and
            non-governmental leadership and first responders since the
            plan's release through a formal roll-out process, an on-line
            training course, workshops, and regular exercises. GAO's
            reliance on ongoing efforts to revise and update the NRP as a
            basis to downgrade the Department's assessment does not reflect
            the reality that the NRP is a living document that will be
            regularly reviewed and revised as long as it is in existence.
            This assessment is an example of GAO's flawed methodology, as
            it does not take into account the nature of the Department's
            constantly evolving, yet established programs. Even as the
            successor to the NRP, called the National Response Framework,
            has been recently published for public comment, the existing
            NRP continues to serve as a single, all-hazards national
            response plan.
             The Department disagrees with the assessment of
            ``Generally Not Achieved,'' regarding the goal to ensure the
            capacity and readiness of disaster response teams. GAO does not
            give sufficient consideration to readiness and capacity of
            FEMA's disaster response system that is in place and now tried,
            tested, and proven to be successful in recent hurricanes,
            tornados, floods, and tropical storms. FEMA continues to work
            hard to refine doctrine, policies, procedures, guidance, and
            metrics, for its disaster response teams and activities. In
            fact, the interagency community, especially the Department of
            Defense, was very complimentary of the comprehensive
            coordination, led by FEMA, in preparing for a response to
            Hurricane Dean. The Federal Incident Response Support Teams
            (FIRST) from Atlanta and a Mobile Emergency Response Support
            (MERS) Component were airlifted to Puerto Rico by Coast Guard
            and Department of Defense aircraft and were in position well
            before Hurricane Dean's arrival. The FIRST demonstrated for the
            first time the capability to provide real time situational
            awareness in a live video broadcast from Puerto Rico back to
            the FEMA Headquarters and the Regional Response Coordination
            Center. In addition, six Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task
            Forces and a US&R Incident Support Team were deployed to Fort
            Worth, Texas, and the FIRST from Chicago was deployed to
            McAllen, Texas, for support. After the storm passed Puerto
            Rico, the FIRST was quickly flown back to Atlanta and was
            prepared for a second deployment in case of a future hurricane
            strike.
             DHS also disagrees with GAO's assessment that the
            Department has Generally Not Achieved the goal to develop the
            capacity to provide needed emergency assistance and services in
            a timely manner to individuals and communities in an emergency
            event. Critical services, such as improved logistics tracking
            and capacity, increased disaster victim registration, and
            robust fraud, waste and abuse protections are in place and
            fully functional. Recently, FEMA received high marks from the
            Mayor of Greensburg, Kansas for its rapid response to the
            tornado which destroyed 90% of the town. Mayor Lonnie McCollum
            said ``As I broke down my back door to go out, there's a
            fireman from Dodge City, Kansas. He meets me as I'm digging out
            of the rubble to see if I'm OK. And almost the next person
            behind him is somebody from FEMA.'' FEMA is also supporting
            major planning efforts in the Gulf Coast states to address
            evacuation needs should another major disaster strike that
            area. Additionally, the Department has undertaken a number of
            initiatives such as the National Shelter System with the Red
            Cross to improve shelter management. FEMA has also engaged in
            outreach to other Federal agencies to ensure the smooth and
            responsive coordination of Federal support and has been working
            closely with highest risk hurricane states on a gap analysis
            initiative that helps the States identify and address the their
            strengths and weaknesses.
             DHS disagrees with GAO's assessment that the
            Department has Generally Not Achieved the goal to develop a
            system for collecting and disseminating lessons learned and
            best practices to emergency responders. The Department
            developed the Lessons Learned Information Sharing website in
            2004 for the first responder community. Based on user feedback
            the Department has been making significant system upgrades
            resulting in dramatic improvements in the ability of first
            responders to access and share valuable information on all
            aspects of emergency response and homeland security.
        Our response to the GAO dated July 20, 2007, which is included in
    the GAO Report contains a more detailed discussion of these and other
    particularly problematic assessments contained in the GAO Report.

    Conclusion:
        The Department has done a great deal to ensure the safety and
    security of our country. We are proud of what DHS has been able to
    accomplish in a short time, notwithstanding the many challenges faced
    by the Department. We are pushing ourselves to strengthen the
    Department and are committed to strengthening its management and
    operational capabilities.
        I want to take this opportunity to publicly thank the Department's
    employees for their tireless efforts and those who made the ultimate
    sacrifice with their lives to ensure the freedom of our nation. Moving
    forward, we will build upon the Department's recent program
    developments and successes while dedicating ourselves for continual
    improvement.
        In pursuing our mission, I look forward to maintaining the
    cooperative approach with the GAO that was followed in preparing this
    report. This process has provided valuable lessons on a better way
    ahead and we look forward to working with GAO to obtain upfront the
    necessary clarifications on performance expectations. I also want to
    thank the Congress and this Committee for your leadership and your
    continued support of the Department of Homeland Security. I am happy to
    answer questions that you may have.

        Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I want to thank
    both of you for your testimony.
        And I would like to remind each member that he or she will
    have 5 minutes to question Mr. Walker and Mr. Schneider.
        I now recognize myself for questions.
        Mr. Walker, you have heard the department's disagreement
    with your report. Do you stand by your report to this
    committee?
        Mr. Walker. We do and, frankly, I think it is reasonable to
    expect that when you are doing something like that, that there
    are going to be some areas of disagreement.
        Let me make it very clear. The approach that we took we
    laid out. It was transparent. It is true that the department
    expressed concerns about the approach, but very late in the
    ballgame, after we had done most of the work and, therefore, we
    couldn't turn the battleship that late in the ballgame.
        The bottom line is this: that while there are differences
    of opinion on how we evaluated some of the individual
    performance expectations, frankly, even given those differences
    of opinion, I doubt there would have been much of a difference
    in what our bottom line assessment would have been with regard
    to overall progress.
        More importantly, we have agreed that we are going to come
    up with an alternative methodology for prospective evaluation
    of the Department of Homeland Security, which, as I said
    before, I believe to consider both status, as well as whether
    or not they are making meaningful progress on a prospective
    basis.
        Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
        One of the questions, Mr. Schneider, is take the SBInet
    contract. In that contract, we find some costs associated with
    the fence and we can't get the hard figures on the fence.
        We have had $1.6 million as a cost, but some say it could
    go as high as $4 million per mile.
        Do you have any information on that particular issue?
        Mr. Schneider. Mr. Chairman, I can get you the information.
    I can tell you, having spent some time looking at the secure
    border initiative, that different areas of fence actually cost
    a little different per mile and that is because of the nature
    of the fence in that particular geographic area.
        What we do is we look at what type of fence is appropriate,
    a fence, vehicle barriers. So the numbers are not going to be
    identical as, for example, the----
        Chairman Thompson. Excuse me. When you average it out, is
    it $1.6 million per mile?
        Mr. Schneider. I don't know the average.
        Chairman Thompson. Can you get that information for us?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Thompson. Mr. Walker?
        Mr. Walker. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that, obviously,
    they are in a better position to get the information. The
    number you heard about the $4 million, it is my understanding
    that the current estimate of the cost per mile for Project 28,
    which is a virtual fence and it is seven miles long, is about
    $4.5 million a mile.
        Now, that is high tech equipment and, obviously, there are
    other portions aren't as high tech that would be less cost,
    presumably.
        Chairman Thompson. Are you aware, Mr. Schneider, of any
    performance bonuses associated with this contract?
        Mr. Schneider. No, no, I am not.
        Chairman Thompson. If there are, will you provide the
    committee with that information on the contract?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir, I will.
        Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
        Mr. Walker, did you have any difficulty getting any of this
    information from the department?
        Mr. Walker. We have had difficulties in the past with
    regard to timeliness. We haven't been outright denied
    information from the department, but sometimes it has taken a
    significant amount of time for us to gain access.
        That was the purpose of my correspondence with Secretary
    Chertoff within the last couple of weeks and, as I said, he
    responded right before this hearing, and I was encouraged by
    his response.
        He is committed that he wants to work with us to give us
    timely access, and that he wants to try to work to try to
    streamline their practices. It is not their policies as much as
    what the historical practices have been. And I take him at his
    word.
        And so we will keep this committee apprised, as well as the
    Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
        Chairman Thompson. Thank you. But if you had to rank the
    department, Mr. Walker, at this juncture, as you compare other
    agencies in terms of getting information to you to do your job,
    how would you rank it?
        Mr. Walker. It ranks below average with regard to the
    timeliness of getting information to us, but it is got a
    massive undertaking and it has got a lot of people that are
    trying to get information from it, too.
        It would be below average at this point in time.
        Chairman Thompson. So we take Secretary Chertoff's letter
    as an effort to get the department above average.
        Mr. Walker. I do. In fact, one of the things that I want to
    do on a prospective basis is to annually evaluate each
    department and agency with regard to how they are doing, along
    with records access, responding to our recommendations and a
    variety of other factors, in order to highlight those that are
    doing well and hopefully encourage those that aren't doing as
    well to do better, as well as recognizing progress when
    progress is made.
        Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
        I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Walker, in looking at your overall assessment, a minute
    ago, you used the phrase ``bottom line'' and you framed this
    earlier in your statement that this is government and even in
    the private sector it would take 5 to 7 years to achieve this
    merger and expect the operation to be efficient and effective.
        Your bottom line assessment--is the development that you
    are seeing by DHS, in your word, meaningful?
        Mr. Walker. I think they have made meaningful progress.
    They have made more progress on the mission front, which I
    would hope and expect, than they have on the mission support
    front.
        As you can see in our report card, that the area they have
    done the best is maritime security, lot of reasons for that,
    including the Coast Guard, which is a very well run
    organization, in general, but there are other areas where they
    have got quite a ways to go.
        Mr. Rogers. And I guess that is what I am trying to get at.
    As I have talked to people back home about homeland security
    and the frustrations that we have experienced post-Katrina and
    in other areas, I try to remind folks that while I am very
    critical of the department in a lot of ways, it is still in
    development.
        I reference it as being like a gangly teenager still trying
    to get control of itself, and so people need to be patient
    about that. And I wanted to hear from you, do you think that
    the point of development that they are in now is acceptable
    given where they came from in 2003 and where you expect them to
    be in that 7 to 8, 9-year----
        Mr. Walker. Mr. Rogers, I don't think it would be fair to
    the Congress or fair to DHS for me to give it just one bottom
    line assessment. I think what we tried to do is to say, ``Look,
    there are certain areas where they are doing well and where
    they have made considerable progress. There are other areas
    where they are not doing as well.''
        They have a limited amount of resources, both financial and
    human, and they have some restrictions on what they can do, as
    well. And so I think I will stick by what I have said on the
    overall assessment.
        In some areas, they are doing well. In some areas, they
    need to do better.
        Mr. Rogers. And I agree, but the bottom line is the
    American people are going to take an assessment from your
    report, either their development is acceptable, at an
    acceptable pace, or it is not, and I guess that is what I am
    trying to----
        Mr. Walker. And it depends on the area. Here is the bottom
    line. Are we safer than we were on 9/11/2001? Absolutely. Will
    we ever be totally safe? No. And we need to keep in mind that
    this is not just about counterterrorism. It is also about
    natural disasters.
        That is what Katrina and Rita was.
        And we also need to keep in mind that before 2003, before
    the creation of this department, with 22 different agencies,
    most of these agencies' mission was not homeland security.
        So we basically have created a huge merger with different
    agencies, different cultures, different systems, most of which
    weren't even focused on homeland security. And so progress
    varies, but I am not surprised at that at this point in time.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I will give up on trying to get you
    to say whether it is acceptable or not.
        I do want to turn to your methodology. I understand that
    you acknowledge and Mr. Schneider has acknowledged there has
    been a difference as to whether the methodology was acceptable
    and that, going forward, prospectively, you intend to use a
    modified methodology.
        Going forward, are you going to both agree to objective
    ways of interpreting progress in the future?
        Mr. Walker. What we have committed to do is that we will
    work with DHS in order to help develop a revised methodology
    that will consider all these performance expectations and that
    will also consider the fact that one needs to be concerned not
    just whether or not they have been met, but whether or not
    meaningful progress is being made towards ultimately meeting
    them.
        In the final analysis, we want to work together
    constructively and cooperative, but in the final analysis, GAO
    will have to use its independent professional judgment about
    what it thinks is the right answer, because it is our name that
    goes on the evaluation.
        Mr. Rogers. I guess what I am getting at is I want to take
    the subjectivity out of it, though. I would like to make sure
    that you know and DHS knows, when you are going to grade them,
    what the standards are, what the objectives are that are being
    measured, and that DHS has basically a heads-up about what they
    are going to be tested on.
        Mr. Walker. Well, I think our methodology was transparent.
    There is a difference of opinion about whether or not it was
    appropriate and whether or not it was the right one.
        I mean, I don't think there is any debate about the fact
    that our methodology was transparent. What I hear the
    undersecretary saying is that he believes that our methodology
    didn't give them enough progress in areas where they think they
    have made considerable progress and certain other factors.
        Well, what I am proposing to do is to consider both whether
    or not they have met or not met, but, also, whether or not they
    are making meaningful progress. That, in and of itself, I
    think, is a good faith attempt to try to bridge the difference.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. My time is up.
        Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
        I will now allow 5 minutes of questioning for myself.
        Mr. Walker, over the years that I have been sitting up here
    and we have been taking a look at DHS, I have to admit that I
    was not a vote to form the Department of Homeland Security. The
    reason was I used to work for Booz Allen, and I did performance
    audits, and I did a lot of M & A work, and I knew what a hell
    it is for two companies to come together, let alone 22
    different pieces of the government, and I knew this would take
    a long, long time.
        And under the committee that I chair, the subcommittee that
    I chair, which has to do with maritime, border, really the
    ingress and egress into the United States, I look at some of
    the really major projects.
        I mean, we have America really angry about immigrants
    coming into this country and I look at SBInet, which is our
    first solution to trying to do something with this, and the
    dates missed and nobody can tell me when I am going to get it.
        I look at US-VISIT, figuring out who is coming in and
    whether they are leaving our country when they are supposed to
    leave, and I have DHS not having an exit program piece of that,
    and that is a major piece of this whole visa overstay and
    everything, and it is just not working. They don't have it up.
        I look at the TWIC card, ports, maritime. Who is on our
    ports? Who is actually there? Who is doing it? And they can't
    get the TWIC thing together. They were supposed to do it July
    1. Then who knows what the new rollout date is and when the
    pieces are going to be put together.
        Coast Guard and I look at Deepwater. In the major areas
    that, at least under my committee, I look at, I see a lot of
    work being done, but everything is missing the mark, and the
    reality of why we are doing those programs, we are not meeting
    what we need to be doing.
        I am going to submit for the record specific questions to
    those projects that I hope you or somebody in your department,
    when you are looking at the department, can get answers back to
    me on that.
        But when I step back and I look at it, I guess I have also
    heard over these years that management has really lacked, that
    the talent--somebody told me, one of your earlier people in a
    different hearing said something to the effect of ``There is
    vision at the department, but management is really lacking.''
        Can you tell me, is that still true? Because we have had so
    many people move in and move out of jobs. Is it still really
    the management problem that is really hampering us from being
    able to ensure we are getting some of this done?
        Mr. Walker. Well, in any organization, as you know, and
    having been in consulting yourself, I was in the private sector
    for 21 years and did a lot of change management consulting
    myself, you need to have a plan.
        That plan has to recognize what the different goals and
    objectives are consistent with the mission. The plan has to
    recognize what resources you have. The plan has to be risk-
    based and it has to be implemented by capable people who are
    going to hopefully be there long enough in order to see through
    a number of these initiatives.
        More needs to be done with regard to the planning,
    especially the risk-based assessment. There are a number of
    open positions in the Department of Homeland Security, a number
    of critical open positions right now and, candidly, in
    government much more than the private sector, you see a lot
    more turnover in some of the critical leadership positions than
    you and I are accustomed to.
        For example, at DHS, we have had two secretaries, three
    deputy secretaries, two undersecretaries for management, and
    many other players have changed during the period of time.
        I think one of the things that we have to recognize, which
    I have touched on before, is we need to recognize that with
    regard to major management activities, strategic planning,
    organizational alignment, financial management, information
    technology, human capital strategy, change management,
    knowledge management, we need to look at those positions
    differently and figure out how we can end up getting people in
    those jobs that can stay there longer.
        And that also includes the undersecretary for management,
    where we have proposed that that be converted into a term
    appointment to provide continuity not just with
    administrations, but between administrations.
        Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask you one last question before we go
    to the next Congressperson.
        This issue of resources, because as I recall, when the
    legislation was done to create the department, it was supposed
    to be neutral with respect to the dollars. In other words, the
    pieces of the government that we had before, we were going to
    put them in this new department, but they were going to bring
    their budgets with them, and it wasn't supposed to necessarily
    increase.
        I think that is originally how the legislation was looked
    at and how it was passed and, I think, implemented. And then
    over the years we have increased a little here and a little
    there for programs, but overall, not a lot of money--from my
    standpoint, and maybe it is because I sit on the defense
    committee, also, but when I look at it, I haven't seen a lot of
    resources really dedicated to homeland security.
        In your opinion, is that right, that it was sort of revenue
    neutral, in a sense, when it was created and it has been
    augmented?
        Mr. Walker. Well, I would have to let Undersecretary
    Schneider talk about what their budget has been. I don't have
    that off the top of my head.
        My understanding is, initially, it was basically neutral,
    but over time, they have received additional resources. So the
    question is how much do they have and then how much flexibility
    do they have with regard to the utilization of those resources.
        So it is not just how much money you give them and how many
    people you give them, but how much flexibility they have to be
    able to allocate that money and allocate those people to add
    the most value and mitigate the most risk, and that is
    important, as well.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Schneider?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes. Congresswoman, my understanding is when
    the department was set up, it was basically revenue neutral. We
    have, over the past 3 years or so, our budgets have gone up
    quite a bit in certain areas, and we can obviously get you the
    numbers.
        Some of those areas are where it was basically we put in
    the budget and it was authorized and appropriated by Congress,
    some of the major modernization programs. The Deepwater program
    is about $1 billion a year. SBInet or SBI, I should say, is
    over $1 billion a year. A lot of the increases in manning in
    terms of border patrol agents, ICE agents and the like,
    increase of our efforts in the fugitive operations with ICE in
    terms of detention and removal capability all has basically
    received augmentation of funds.
        So our resources have gone up over the years in those
    areas, those major mission areas that the comptroller general
    talked about, where we have made a fair amount of progress,
    more so than, as he indicated, in the management area.
        Ms. Sanchez. I am just thinking of some of the frustration,
    also, with the department that many of us have, my colleagues,
    for example, people waiting to get their green cards or to do
    their work visas, 7 or 10 years or what have you on some of
    these programs.
        It just seems like maybe the Congress didn't put moneys
    toward or augmented those programs, but there are a lot of
    decent people waiting for this department to get some of this
    done, and we just don't see it happening fast enough.
        Mr. Schneider. If I may, the areas where we are trying to
    build, if you will, are some of our major transformation
    efforts, and it is not just hiring more agents.
        We know, for example, Customs and Immigration Services, we
    have antiquated capabilities. When I first met with the
    director, he told me, ``Picture the 'Indiana Jones' first
    movie, where, at the end of the movie, the Ark is put in this
    big underground cave with miles and miles of files that are
    paper files.''
        He said, ``Paul, picture that.'' He said, ``That is the
    situation we have in terms of modernization.'' So we embarked
    on trying to modernize CIS using different business models,
    information technology and the like.
        So we have a long way to go, as the comptroller general
    indicates, in these areas and that is where we are starting to
    increase our focus. That is where we are properly evaluated
    fairly low, quite frankly, and that is where we know we have a
    substantial amount of work to do.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
        Seeing no other Republican on your side, I will go to Ms.
    Harman.
        Ms. Harman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Sanchez. For 5 minutes.
        Ms. Harman. Welcome to our witnesses.
        This morning, the director of national intelligence, Mike
    McConnell, testified before the House Judiciary Committee on
    FISA, an issue that I, for one member of Congress, hope we deal
    with seriously and modify.
        But at any rate, in the course of his testimony, he was
    outlining the threat to the homeland and, in part, he said,
    ``Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist
    threat to the homeland. Al-Qa'ida will continue to enhance its
    capabilities. Al-Qa'ida's homeland planning is likely to
    continue to focus on prominent political, economic and
    infrastructure targets, with the goal of producing mass
    casualties. Al-Qa'ida will continue to try to acquire and
    employ chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material
    in its attacks,'' and then he talks about how Lebanese
    Hezbollah also may consider homeland attacks.
        I mention this because the threat, in my view and his view
    and the view of many others, is real and it is right now, which
    is why this hearing has urgency.
        I am wondering, if I were a hardworking employee of the
    Department of Homeland Security, listening to this hearing, how
    I would feel right now. I think most of the people who work at
    DHS in the various departments think they are a real threat to
    the homeland.
        I think certainly most of them try very hard to get their
    jobs right. But if I were tuning in from DHS, I might throw my
    hands up and say, ``Oh, my god, this is impossible. This is
    never going to get right, and I am working this hard, and I
    won't be able to succeed.''
        I mention that not because I think we shouldn't ask the
    tough questions, but I think we have got to work harder
    together to provide a path forward.
        I had this conversation with David Walker when we came in
    to the hearing and he agrees, and I know you agree, Mr.
    Schneider. We have to work harder together to find a way
    forward immediately, to share information adequately, to do all
    the maritime security fixes that the chairman was just talking
    about, and to fix bigger problem areas.
        And so I think it would be productive if each of you
    addressed that. It is a message to the employees of DHS. How
    are we going to find a path forward together to fix the urgent
    problems?
        And let me just add a p.s. before you answer that. I don't
    want to go over my time, out of respect for other members.
        My p.s. is I think we were over ambitious in what we did
    setting up the department. I voted for it. I was part of a
    hardy little bipartisan band that wanted us to create a
    homeland function.
        None of us was as ambitious as this department is. The
    concept for this department was designed in the Bush White
    House by then Chief of Staff Andy Card, who presented it to
    Congress, and, basically, we knew that that was the train
    leaving the station. So if we wanted reform, we would have to
    take this.
        I think it is over ambitious. Nevertheless, it is what it
    is, as they say.
        So please address my one question, which is how do we send
    a message to homeland department employees that we will find a
    path forward together to fix these urgent problems before we
    have another serious catastrophic attack on the homeland,
    hopefully?
        Mr. Schneider. I will start. First, that is a question that
    most of us in leadership think about, I would say, every day. I
    mean, 9/11 was an awesome impact.
        I worked in the Pentagon at that time. I know where the
    plane hit, wiped out the Navy communications center. I was the
    principal deputy assistant secretary of the Navy. I know people
    who died, and I know people whose lives were changed forever.
        At that point in time, I came to the conclusion, having
    grown up in the Cold War and doing this duck-and-cover drills
    in school, I recognized that our lives would never be the same.
        And so what we do is, and all the leadership does this, is
    we continuously talk to our people. We say we are in this for
    the long haul. We tell them, ``Don't expect giant increases in
    progress.'' The fact of the matter is we are in this for the
    long haul, and so what we try and do, quite frankly, and we do
    it by publishing information, passing words with Web sites,
    information with Web sites, we celebrate incremental progress.
        Ms. Harman. I do think it is very important, too, that we
    push harder together to achieve, to fill some of these obvious
    demonstrated gaps.
        Mr. Walker?
        Mr. Walker. First, homeland security has a critically
    important mission for the United States. It is part of our
    basic security and self-preservation needs. It doesn't get much
    more fundamental than that.
        It is clearly something that is envisioned that the federal
    government would have an important role in under the
    Constitution.
        We have got tens of thousands of hardworking people doing
    their best day in and day out. They need to continue to do
    their best. That is all we can expect them to do.
        They need to understand that it is going to take time in
    order to achieve this major merger, integration and
    transformation effort. They need to keep their chin up, and we
    need to try to make sure that we recognize their progress, and
    that it is going to take time to achieve everything that is
    necessary.
        Ms. Harman. Well, my time has expired.
        I agree, in part, but I disagree with respect to the
    message just that it is going to take time.
        I think the other message has to be we will help focus this
    so that, in real time, immediately, you can achieve more
    progress in certain key vulnerable areas in America.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Walker. Can I come back real quick, Ms. Harman?
        I think it is really important that we pick our priorities
    well. You have got to target based upon value and risk. You
    have to allocate financial, human and other resources to make
    progress there, and you need to be able to demonstrate that
    that progress is being made, and that is how people can feel
    that they are making a difference, and they are making a
    difference.
        Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from California.
        And I yield 5 minutes to Ms. Lowey of New York.
        Mrs. Lowey. I thank our chair.
        Mr. Walker, Mr. Schneider, I appreciate your testimony. I
    am sorry that Deputy Secretary Jackson put you in this position
    after just 9 months.
        And it seems to me that, once again, the department is just
    passing the buck and instead of admitting that its goals have
    not been met and creating a plan to make our country more
    secure, what we are hearing from DHS is excuses and you are
    saying, ``Yes, we try harder,'' and then they are claiming that
    the methodology GAO used is faulty.
        Everyone knows on this committee, we all know it and we all
    want to work together and, as a New Yorker, I want to tell you,
    I am impatient, because I know there are possible threats out
    here. And I don't want to see ``I will give you an 'I' for
    improvement.''
        I have to tell you something. When my kids were in
    elementary school, they knew that if we saw ``I-needs
    improvement,'' it doesn't mean an ``A'' or an ``A+'' or a
    ``B.''
        So we need to see real improvement here and we all know, as
    I said, that the job of this department is difficult, whether
    we voted for it or we didn't vote for it.
        However, I would have more confidence in this
    administration's ability to make us more secure if the problems
    were recognized and you were working to fix them. Instead, we
    get from the department finger-pointing.
        And as I read Undersecretary Schneider's testimony, the
    aspect, frankly, that stood out the most is that it is little
    more than an excuse. There is no plan for how the problems will
    be addressed.
        So I just want to make it very clear, before I get to a
    specific question, that if September 11 taught us anything, it
    should be that our enemies are well funded, they are well
    financed, and they are very patient.
        This is a painful pill to swallow, especially for me as a
    New Yorker, who has been to more funerals and wakes than you
    can ever have imagined. But we must recognize that it is not
    good enough to secure a few sectors, but leave gaping security
    gaps in others.
        And what you are telling me about the files, that we are
    living in the stone age, why hasn't someone gotten it done?
    There are technology companies. If Microsoft said, ``Well, I am
    so sorry, I can't fix this. All the files are in a cave
    someplace,'' they would be out of business.
        So I am very troubled specifically by the fact that the
    area in which the department performed the worst was in
    emergency preparedness and response. The underlying reason,
    frankly, Mr. Schneider or Mr. Walker, probably Mr. Schneider,
    because Mr. Jackson isn't here, the underlying reason for the
    formation of the department was a terrorist attack.
        And out of 24 performance expectations, the department has
    only achieved five. Yet, Undersecretary Schneider's testimony
    highlights the critical role of defending against, and I am
    quoting, ``preparing for and responding to threats and
    disasters.''
        There seems to be a major disconnect between the two,
    particularly when you consider the indisputable fact that the
    department failed in its response to the first major test,
    Hurricane Katrina, and that just last week, it released a
    national response framework, many months after its own self-
    imposed deadline, that was widely criticized by state and local
    emergency managers.
        I am not even sure where to begin with questions, because
    we can go on and on, and my time is running out.
        But, Undersecretary Schneider, can you elaborate how
    defending against, preparing for and responding to threats and
    disasters is a success, when GAO gave the department such poor
    marks on emergency management?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes, Congresswoman. First, for point of
    info, I was born and bred in Brooklyn, okay?
        Mrs. Lowey. I was born and bred in the Bronx, and in the
    Bronx, we need instantaneous success. How about Brooklyn?
    Seriously, seriously, I know you----
        Mr. Schneider. I want to be----
        Mrs. Lowey. Let me just say this. I have heard Mr. Walker
    testify and he is being very kind, and I know there are
    thousands of good people at the Department of Homeland Security
    and we salute them.
        I also serve on the Appropriations Committee, and I know
    that the department has gotten more money than has been
    requested by the administration.
        So rather than excuses, maybe you can come back next time
    or submit in writing to us what you are doing to correct this,
    not saying that ``We didn't agree on the plan or the
    criteria.'' It doesn't make any sense.
        Mr. Schneider. Could I just have a minute, please?
        Mrs. Lowey. Yes.
        Mr. Schneider. And I will come back to you in writing. But
    what I would like to say is this. I think the words, and this
    is where I think we basically agree, I think the words in the
    GAO assessments, the actual detailed words that describe what
    they think our progress has been is fairly accurate.
        What happens and our issue is not with so much their
    description of our progress to date, but how it is labeled. So
    one of the challenges I have, and when people in the department
    ask me about ``What do you do about these poor grades,'' I say,
    ``Read the detailed words of the progress.''
        The national response plan is a classic example, okay? We
    flat out disagree with the two ratings. And the reason we
    disagree is when you read the GAO's own words about what we
    have done with the national response plan, the fact of the
    matter is, I submit, most people would read those words and
    say, ``They have made progress in a very critical area.''
        I couldn't agree with you more that that mission area,
    emergency preparedness and response, is one of the most
    critical areas. And I think the comptroller said it, I couldn't
    say it better than him, one of the reasons why we are going to
    mutually work on seeing if we can come up with a different set
    of criteria is, as he says, to come up with a better way to
    accurately describe the progress that is been made to date.
        That is why I say don't look at the grade, look at the
    words.
        Mr. Walker. Can I?
        Mrs. Lowey. I am out of time and it is up to the chair if
    she wants Mr. Walker to answer.
        Mr. Walker. Madam Chair, can I quickly? It won't take more
    than 30 seconds, I promise.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thirty seconds, Mr. Walker, just because you
    are such a nice guy.
        Mr. Walker. Thirty seconds. First, one of the reasons that
    we have not been able to get more comfortable with emergency
    preparedness and response is we haven't been able to observe
    the exercises.
        The exercises are being done to help demonstrate to us
    directly what they have done. Hopefully, we now have a
    breakthrough with the letter from Secretary Chertoff that I
    received this morning.
        Secondly, interoperable communications continues to be a
    major challenge and that is one of the areas that we really
    want to take a look at as part of this observation.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
        Mrs. Lowey. Let me just thank you, and I am sorry that I am
    impatient, but, frankly, we know that we have to get this right
    and, as my colleague said, we have to work together. And I
    don't think we can afford to get ``I's'' on most of the various
    areas that you have been reviewing. We need to get ``E'' and
    know that our people are safe in the Bronx and Brooklyn and
    Westchester and throughout the country.
        And I thank you. Thank you for your indulgence.
        Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome.
        Mr. Green of Texas for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the ranking
    member, as well.
        And thank you, men, for appearing today. You each have very
    difficult jobs.
        Mr. Walker, your job is exceedingly difficult because you
    have to evaluate and your evaluation has to have meaning. So I
    appreciate where you are.
        Mr. Schneider, 9 months on the job and here you are. God
    bless you. You have a difficult job, too. Apparently, someone
    thought that baptism by fire was a great way to get you
    inculcated into the proper mindset. So thank you for coming
    today.
        Mr. Walker, you indicated that DHS is a high risk area. Is
    this true?
        Mr. Walker. That the implementation and transformation of
    the new Department of Homeland Security is a high risk
    endeavor. It is on GAO's high risk list.
        Mr. Green. Would you just define that for me, please? What
    does that mean, high risk?
        Mr. Walker. High risk means higher risk of fraud, waste,
    abuse or mismanagement, higher risk of not being able to
    effectively achieve its mission, higher risk of not being able
    to do it in an economical, efficient and effective manner.
        And, in fact, one of the real concerns I have about DHS is
    that they don't end up being where DOD is today. DOD is very
    effective on mission, but they waste billions of dollars every
    year.
        Mr. Green. And Mr. Schneider indicated that your
    methodology, your system has gone from a pass-fail to an A-
    fail.
        Is that what you said, Mr. Schneider?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Green. Mr. Walker, my assumption is that you don't
    entirely agree with that. So would you give us an explanation
    for why you contend--maybe we will start with Mr. Schneider.
        Mr. Schneider, starting with you, give us an explanation
    for why you contend that it has gone from a pass-fail to an A-
    fail, and then I would like to hear your response, Mr. Walker.
        Mr. Schneider. Sure. I will give you one example. Any
    multiyear program, and many of our programs are multiyear
    programs, especially in the mission areas, it is going to take
    many years to achieve the results.
        And even actually in some of the administrative areas, like
    internal controls for financial management, it will probably
    take us out through fiscal year 2010.
        So the fact is before we have actually completed the total
    effort, it is going to take several years. The words in the
    report, in many cases or in most cases, do a pretty good job of
    actually describing they have done this, they have started
    this, but it is going to take a lot of years to go through
    this, so it is generally not achieved.
        Whereas our belief is if you use the term ``generally
    addressed,'' that term in itself implies some degree of
    progress, and that is the issue that the comptroller general
    and I are going to work on for the future.
        So if you have an SBInet program, for example, which is
    absolutely key, a multibillion dollar program for securing our
    borders, the fact of the matter is that in 10 months, we have
    Project 28 up and running. We know what the technical issues
    are with the system. We know what we have to do to fix it.
        I happen to think, from a technology, development and
    fielding standpoint, that is not all bad. In fact, one could
    look at it as good. But the fact of the matter is, because it
    is a multiyear program, the fact is it is generally not
    addressed.
        So that is kind of like ``A'' or fail, as opposed to
    generally achieved or generally not achieved, as opposed to
    generally addressed. And you can go into some of these other
    criteria.
        Mr. Green. I am going to have to give Mr. Walker some time
    to respond.
        Mr. Walker. Let me try to be brief, and let me come back to
    something that every member of this committee should be
    familiar with.
        The Congress asked GAO to evaluate the status of progress
    on the 18 benchmarks in Iraq and when the Congress asked us to
    do that, which I testified on on numerous occasions 2 weeks
    ago, they said they wanted us to tell them whether or not they
    were met or not met.
        We basically used that type of approach in coming up with
    this evaluation for the Department of Homeland Security. We
    also used descriptive language to try to provide some context
    and contextual sophistication, where even if we showed that
    there was not significant progress, to help describe what had
    been done.
        In my view, what is important is not what we have done in
    the past, although we stand by what we have done, it is to
    recognize that, going forward, we have agreed that we are going
    to come up with an approach that will recognize two things,
    which Ms. Lowey talked about, as well.
        One, where do you stand on result, have you achieved it or
    not, and, secondly, whether or not you are making meaningful
    progress, which would allow us to be able to consider
    complexity, whether or not it is likely to be a multiyear
    effort, more than we were able to under this methodology.
        Mr. Green. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Madam
    Chair. I yield back.
        Ms. Sanchez. Next, we will hear from Ms. Clarke of New York
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        I would like to just state for the record that I would like
    to associate my comments with those of Congresswoman Lowey.
        I am a new member, and I am here about the same amount of
    time you have, Mr. Schneider, and I have to tell you I haven't
    sat here very comforted by knowing that this agency has moved
    in a direction that I think the people of the United States
    would like to see it go, given the fact that the agency was
    stood up in March of 2003.
        In March of 2008, which is just around the corner, it will
    have been 5 years and based on what Mr. Walker has said about
    new agencies and coming together in culture, we are talking
    about typically 7 years.
        Now, this is a mega agency, and I think everyone recognizes
    that, but when you look at the assessment, progress of mission
    and management areas, they don't indicate that we are anywhere
    near where we should be given the fact that typically you could
    say, by the 7th year, okay, we are on firm ground.
        I would like to just really reiterate the concern that we
    have, particularly in the area of emergency preparedness. I
    looked at, also, the area of science and technology, which are
    critical areas, human capital management.
        I mean, to have constant turnover in DHS doesn't help
    anyone, because how do you get institutional memory? How do you
    retain institutional memory? How do you keep the wherewithal,
    the intellect and the talent in place that then builds upon the
    culture that you are trying to create?
        These are critical areas that I don't think we can waste
    any time at really addressing and trying to solidify. And I
    have been here the same amount of time as you have. There have
    been reports that have been requested by this committee that
    have yet to be completed.
        There just seems to be some sort of malaise within the
    agency that I think is really critical that we get past.
        Having said that, I know that you have an awesome task
    ahead of you and an awesome mission and I certainly don't want
    to be one to discourage. I want to be one to encourage.
        So I want to encourage you to go back, speak to your
    colleagues and let them know that there are a lot of people
    pulling for them out here. This is a critical area for us to
    emerge from as experts.
        The American people deserve it, they require it, and I
    don't think they will stand for anything less than that.
        One of the areas that has concerned me is the area of
    border protection, because I have been here and I have listened
    to a lot of the concerns, particularly with respect to the
    southern border.
        I wanted to know whether we have invested--and I will ask
    Comptroller Walker, perhaps in some of your review, you can
    give us a sense of this, about how we are doing with our border
    with Canada and what many would term as the third border in the
    Caribbean.
        It appears as though, oftentimes, we focus primarily on the
    Mexican border and when you look at the performance of DHS and
    border security, it appears that DHS met expectations equally
    at each of these borders or does it appear that the
    expectations have been better met at the southern border, while
    the other borders have received less attention?
        Mr. Walker. Thank you very much for that question. There is
    no question that there has been significantly more time and
    effort, financial resources and human resources focused on the
    southern border, because we are not only concerned with regard
    to homeland security, we are also concerned with illegal
    immigration.
        That is also a major policy issue for the Congress, as
    well.
        Whereas with regard to the northern border, the primary
    concern, for a variety of reasons, is security. And the
    Caribbean, we have done a little bit of work there, not much.
    We have done more work with regard to the Canadian border and,
    clearly, as we have reported, most of the time and effort and
    energy has been focused on the southern border. And we can't
    forget about our other borders as it relates to security
    considerations.
        Although one has to also consider how easy it is to get
    into those countries, too. It is easier to get into Mexico than
    it is to get into Canada if you do it legally.
        Mr. Schneider. We have implemented, through the Customs and
    Border Protection organization of the department, border
    security evaluation teams in all eight northern border sectors
    in order to provide some security in those areas where they
    were previously too remote to have been monitored.
        We are also partnering with the Canadian government in
    several endeavors, what we call the integrated border
    enforcement team, basically interdicting certain persons and
    organizations that might pose a threat to national security or
    be involved in criminal activity.
        Ms. Clarke. My time has expired. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome, Ms. Clarke.
        Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, for your
    testimony.
        Mr. Schneider, I would like to start with you, if I could.
    As you know, I am very concerned about the ASP program within
    DNDO.
        As chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
    Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, it is my job to oversee
    the DNDO, and I am anxious to see that we get the next
    generation of radiation portal monitors deployed as quickly as
    possible.
        At the same, of course, we have to make sure that we are
    being good stewards of taxpayer dollars and we are getting what
    we pay for and that these ASP detectors are markedly better
    than the first generation detectors that have already been
    deployed.
        This program, obviously, is far too important to fail and
    we, therefore, have to ensure that the review process that is
    ongoing right now is conducted with the highest levels of
    security and scrutiny and due diligence.
        I know that you and Mr. Oxford were at a hearing this
    morning to discuss this topic before the Energy and Commerce,
    one of the subcommittees there. I have a few questions that I
    would like to ask you about this critical program.
        First, could you please explain the certification process
    required by the secretary? I wanted to delve into that a bit.
        And, also, can you give us an update on the independent
    review team that you commissioned? I understand that Pete Nanos
    of DTRA was initially asked to head that effort, but then you
    requested John Higby from the Defense Acquisition University
    lead the charge.
        I understand that Mr. Higby is no longer taking the lead.
    So my question is who has been named to head the review team
    now and why were the first two people replaced?
        In addition, are the rest of the team members the same? And
    when will the review team be done with their review?
        Mr. Schneider. Okay, let's start with your first question
    about the certification.
        Mr. Langevin. Yes, the certification process.
        Mr. Schneider. The certification is required by some
    legislation, I forget whether it is the Appropriations Act or
    not, but it basically requires the secretary, Chertoff, to
    certify that the performance of the advanced spectroscopic
    portal, ASP, that its performance is significantly--I think the
    correct words in the legislation are either significantly or
    substantially better than the existing radiation portal
    monitors, which is the polyvinyl toluene sensors.
        So he is required by law to make a certification. The
    process that we have in place is, as you are very much
    familiar, Congressman, is a whole series of testing that
    started with contractor tests, specifically, Northwest tests,
    various types of level one and level two, I guess level three
    testing, all the way up to now what we have, these ASP monitors
    at several CBP ports for field evaluation.
        So the idea is that when the Customs and Border Protection,
    who is the user, the customer, of the ASP is satisfied that
    they have acquired enough data to make a recommendation to the
    secretary, at that point in time, our plan is to go forth with
    a recommendation--that recommendation could be positive or
    negative, depending upon what the consolidated test data lays
    out--for the secretary to make a certification.
        That is a separate and distinct act from a decision on the
    part of the department to go into full scale production and
    deployment. So that is the sequence and that is required by
    law.
        For the timing, let me just--it is convenient here.
    Originally, there was a rough estimate that the results of the
    testing would be made available to the secretary, I think,
    sometime around September 21. Based on a meeting that I had
    with the head of DNDO and the deputy commissioner from border
    protection, the conclusion at that point in time, based on a
    recommendation from the deputy commissioner, was that he wanted
    an additional 2 months of testing, roughly starting around the
    first week or so of September, after an updated software load
    was made to the system.
        Mr. Langevin. The secretary of the director of DNDO?
        Mr. Schneider. The deputy commissioner for CBP.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay.
        Mr. Schneider. Again, as I said, he is the customer or the
    operational user.
        Mr. Langevin. I understand.
        Mr. Schneider. He specifically requested an additional 2
    months of field validation testing once this updated software
    load was made. The estimate, and I forget the exact date of
    that conversation, but the updated software was supposed to
    delivered I think roughly around the first or so of September.
        So if you go forward roughly 2 months, he wanted at least
    through the end of October, early November to get additional
    field validation testing. And so, obviously, any schedules that
    might have been predicated on the third week in September
    secretarial decision have been pushed to the right.
        We are right now in the process of trying to figure out
    what our schedules will be, either for the completion of the
    field validation testing going forth to the secretary for
    secretarial certification, and then what would be our action
    regarding convening what we call an investment review board,
    which is the board the department uses for making major
    investment decisions, to consider whether or not the department
    is willing to spend the bucks to actually go into full
    production on these systems.
        So that is the sequence on that.
        With regard to the independent review, frankly, I am
    absolutely amazed about all of the external scrutiny that I
    have been given about the external review. It originated with
    me. It was my idea. It was based on my review of the ASP
    program in late July, my review of the GAO documentation.
        I immediately realized there was a difference of views, if
    you will, regarding testing, the amount of testing that has
    been accomplished, the amount of testing that will be
    accomplished, the issue about sources used, sources not used.
        And I come from a world in the Department of Defense where
    it is not an uncommon process when you have to make a major
    decision like that to go out and get some independent sets of
    eyes. So that is what I did.
        I went to see the secretary. I said, ``We need to get an
    independent group of people,'' independent in terms of
    independent from DNDO, and that is what I did.
        Do you want me to finish up?
        Dr. Nanos, nuclear physicist, Ph.D., and I asked him to
    assemble a team. This was not directed to be a DTRA study.
    Rather, he, as an individual, associate director, put together
    a team of experts and go do this study.
        As it turned out, subsequently, he had to withdraw. It was
    based on him and his management. I just accepted it at face
    value. I was, frankly, in a schedule press, given the fact that
    I was working to what was then a September 21 deadline.
        We have a cooperate arrangement with Defense Acquisition
    University. We work very closely with them. They do this type
    of work. I asked Mr. Higby do this. He agreed and we started to
    spin up.
        It was shortly, around last Wednesday, when it became
    evident to me that he was a possible contender for a job in
    DHS, that I decided to remove him.
        I might point out that there was no conflict of interest.
    He had no financial interest. He had no technology interest. In
    fact, after the hearing this morning, the staff of E&C told me
    they really liked the fact that he was the guy.
        I was gun shy, quite frankly, of all the external scrutiny
    I have been given and, in some cases, you can say the
    micromanagement of this effort, and I elected to not take a
    chance and removed him.
        I subsequently, on Friday morning, decided to take the
    number two individual at the Homeland Security Institute. The
    Homeland Security Institute is the department's federally-
    funded research and development center.
        This is the kind of work that FFRDCs do. They do it for the
    Army, they do it for the Navy, they do it for the Air Force,
    they do it for the FAA. So that is how I settled on Mr.
    Thompson and he is up and running.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
        Mr. Rogers has a quick question for you all.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. I want to revisit this
    consolidation of oversight issue.
        As you all know, the 9/11 commission recommended that we
    develop a single point of principal oversight in each chamber
    for the department.
        There have been several references made today that Mr.
    Schneider is in his 9th month in his current job, 34-35 weeks
    you have been with us, and I think this is the third time you
    have testified before the committee when I have been in here.
        How many times since you have been in your position have
    you testified before Congress?
        Mr. Schneider. I have to check, but I think it is about 11.
    I think this is the 11th hearing. I am really not sure.
        Mr. Rogers. So more than once a month since you have been
    here.
        Mr. Schneider. Yes. And today I was basically grilled for 3
    hours this morning.
        Mr. Rogers. How much time do you put into preparing for
    this testimony each time?
        Mr. Schneider. It depends, Congressman. If it is testimony
    that is directly relevant to my main line of business, not a
    lot. I had to spend a tremendous amount of time for the hearing
    this morning, and the main reason is I found out on I think it
    was either Wednesday night or Thursday morning, I had to get my
    testimony written by Friday.
        I wrote my testimony for that hearing. I had to go read a
    tremendous amount of information over the weekend so I could
    get prepared.
        So some of them require more than others. I had to testify
    twice in front of the Small Business Committee, frankly, once
    down in New Orleans at a field hearing, once up here. And while
    we respectfully tried to get out of that hearing, and the
    reason was they were really more interested--I mean, the
    subject of the hearing was, operationally, what happened with
    contracting on the ground in New Orleans.
        Well, I am not directly responsible for that. And we
    offered several other people who were much closer to that, and
    it was denied on every attempt and, quite frankly, there was
    pretty much of an inference that if I didn't testify, that I
    would be subpoenaed.
        For hearings like that, where I am not a small business
    expert, by law, the small business director works directly for
    the secretary, I spent an inordinate amount of time getting
    ready for those two particular hearings.
        So it varies.
        Mr. Rogers. I note in the chart that we submitted for the
    committee there are 86 full committees and subcommittees that
    have some oversight jurisdiction.
        Mr. Walker, in your testimony or in answer to one of your
    questions, you made reference to the fact that there are a lot
    of people trying to get information from DHS simultaneously,
    and I think you made that statement in reference to the fact
    that they have been a little slow getting responses to you, but
    you acknowledge that is the reason why.
        Tell me how much, in your opinion, based on your analysis,
    your recent analysis of the department, they would be able to
    better deal with their tasks if they didn't have 86 committees
    and subcommittees of Congress asking them for information.
        Mr. Walker. First, I would say, Congressman Rogers, as you
    know, we work for the institution of the Congress. So the
    extent they cooperate with us, our information is made
    available to everybody in the Congress. So there is a benefit
    to cooperate with us.
        Secondly, there is absolutely no question that they could
    achieve a lot more focus on mission and improve responsiveness,
    should they so desire, if they didn't have as many players they
    had to deal with.
        Now, as you know, I work for the Congress, and the
    Congress, frankly, is not a model of efficiency. The Congress
    is a lag indicator on efficiency, and I think that there is a
    need for the Congress to look at its alignment and see whether
    or not it is properly aligned to best discharge its
    constitutional responsibilities for the 21st century, and this
    is clearly one area that deserves additional consideration.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I agree and that is the reason I bring
    the issue up. I know the chairman of this committee and the
    ranking member of this full committee have both agreed that we
    have got to follow through on the 9/11 commission's
    recommendation that we consolidate oversight.
        Obviously, this is the committee that should have primary
    jurisdiction on the authorizing side in this chamber and then
    similarly in the Senate. But it has taken far too much time, in
    my opinion, from the department's management to deal with all
    the various committees that have jurisdiction over them and it
    takes time away from their ability to do their job.
        But with that, I will be quiet and thank the chairlady for
    the time.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
        And now I will recognize Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. And let me thank
    Secretary Schneider and certainly our busy head of the GAO. I
    think we have seen each other a number of times. So I think you
    have equal opportunity to be in front of members of Congress.
        Why don't I follow up on the line of questioning, Mr.
    Walker, that my good friend from Alabama has just begun with
    and indicate that I believe this committee sent a letter asking
    for an assessment by the GAO of how we could be more efficient
    or the negative impact of the extensive jurisdictional maze
    that this particular department is subjected to.
        So let me try to stand in the place of that letter and have
    you expand just a little bit more.
        I do understand that you are not only working for Congress,
    but you are a creature of Congress, to a certain extent. But
    you have been in front of committees when we have applauded
    you, because, rightly so, a parent created a child, but in many
    instances, it may be important for either one to chastise the
    other one based upon their knowledge.
        I, frankly, believe that it is not a question of
    sensitivity. It is a question, if you will, of undermining the
    security of this nation.
        This is, in essence, an abomination. The idea of the
    Homeland Security Department, of which I was a member of the
    select committee, was to provide synergism or consensus or
    energy around a certain point.
        So I would ask you not maybe the direct question of my
    colleague, but I want to know the negative impact on security
    you can predict just by looking at this maze.
        You have indicated what that might suggest. But what brings
    about a better ordering of the department, the ability to have
    limited entities of which it is subjected to oversight, because
    I don't want to abdicate and give up any oversight
    responsibilities.
        I certainly applaud this committee and all of the other
    committees as we have changed leadership in this House that
    have engaged in its oversight responsibilities. But tell me the
    negative impact on, if you will, security with this kind of
    structure in place.

           Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
               Representative in Congress from the State of Texas

    ``We Must Keep DHS Accountable For Potential Security Gaps in Order to
                           Fully Protect Our Nation''

        ``Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, The Department of
    Homeland Security and its Secretary are responsible for preventing and
    deterring terrorist attacks and responding to threats and hazards to
    the nation,'' stated Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. ``In examining
    the performance of the department, several pressing and critical issues
    have surfaced.''
        In addition to the high vacancy rate in the upper management
    position, an issue of particular concern continues to be the number of
    important programs that have not met their deadlines,'' added
    Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. ``The recent government
    Accountability Office findings concluded that the Department met less
    than 25%, or only five of the twenty-four emergency preparedness and
    response performance expectations. We must make sure that the
    department in working at the highest level of efficiency to protect
    this nation.''
        As Chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
    Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, I will be
    working to help make sure that the Department of Homeland Security
    continues to operate at the highest level of proficiency and efficiency
    to protect the citizens of the United States of America.

        Mr. Walker. Well, first, this schematic is probably speaks
    loudly. The only schematic that I have seen that is more
    troubling is the financial management systems at the Department
    of Defense, which are also a mess.
        I think the bottom line is the Congress needs to
    consolidate and integrate its responsibilities with regard to
    the Department of Homeland Security, not abdicate. And if you
    have fewer----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent.
        Mr. Walker. --if you have fewer that are focused, I think
    that, A, you will be able to discharge your constitutional
    responsibilities more efficiently and effectively and,
    secondly, it would allow more time for the department to be
    able to accomplish its mission.
        But it would be impossible for me to tell you with any
    degree of reliability, consistent with GAO standards, as to
    exactly how much more secure that would make the country.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have already said it is a mess
    and, certainly, messes cannot ensure security for any nation.
    And so I think we do have a challenge here.
        But what you did say is that Congress needs to focus and
    that it does impede and can possibly impede the security of
    this nation only because of the maze which we are seeing here.
    Oversight is our responsibility.
        Let me, Mr. Schneider, go to you and recognize that you
    have been here 9 months, but also recognize that one of the
    elements of criticism of the GAO was the fact that we have not
    completely hired all of those that we need to hire.
        Let me quickly ask you these questions.
        We have heard, for a very long period of time, we have
    gotten $250 million committed to the US-VISIT program since
    2003. We have asked for a functioning biometric exit system.
        In June, the GAO testified before the committee that the
    prospects were, I am paraphrasing, ``strange, at best, unclear,
    absent.''
        Can you tell me what is happening with that exit program,
    the biometric exit program? And let me give you this other,
    quickly. You indicated you just got here in January. We asked
    you about the TWIC card just last week, on one of your many
    visits to Congress, and you basically said, ``I don't know.''
        That is frightening. At least we have captured this from
    your testimony. You have a chance to clear up the record.
        How much money has the department spent to date on the TWIC
    initiative? You have got employees across America frightened
    and waiting for some kind of answer. And how much money will
    you need to spend to complete its rollout?
        Mr. Schneider. First off, on the TWIC, at the hearing in
    front of the Senate, very specifically, Senator Collins asked
    me a series of questions on TWIC. I gave her what I thought was
    a pretty comprehensive status of the TWIC program in terms of
    where we are, in terms of the notice of the proposed rule.
        I explained in a fair amount of detail the technical
    problems that we were having with the card. I explained the
    fact that I chair a biweekly meeting that goes into
    excruciating detail on the progress of TWIC, that I thought we
    were just at the point of having all the----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. When do you project the rollout?
        Mr. Schneider. My next meeting is Friday and our plan is,
    shortly, on the assumption that we complete successfully the
    N10 system test this week or next week, it will be shortly
    after the first part of October in the Port of Wilmington.
        That is predicated on----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. The first of October?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a big announcement.
        Mr. Schneider. Well, I told her that I would come back and
    see her with the details. One of the things that we do, quite
    frankly, is sometimes we announce these dates way in advance of
    when we probably should to have confidence in hand.
        We have deliberately not published any dates, because
    publishing a date and then going through an end-to-end
    verification test and then finding out you have problems you
    have to fix.
        During the hearing, I explained some of the problems we
    were having with getting the software to make the printers
    work. We had problems with 1-D barcodes. We had all kinds of
    problems and the fact of the matter is we believe we have most
    of those technical problems in hand.
        So we were reluctant to publish a date, raise the level of
    expectations and then find out we are off by a week or so.
        So that is why we had deliberately not done that. I
    committed to the Senator and I will commit to you that----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
        Mr. Schneider. ----after my next meeting, I will come and
    go through the details, explain to you where we are and the
    detailed schedules.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, can he answer the biometric
    question he did not answer?
        Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Schneider. Yes. I know we have a substantial amount of
    activity. I cannot provide you right here and now the details
    of how we are handling exit.
        I realize it is an issue. I know we have been asked lots of
    questions. I am not aware of the details.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. You can come back to this committee or
    provide that information back.
        Mr. Schneider. Yes. I will gladly provide that information
    to you.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. Thank you.
        Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentlewoman from Texas.
        I thank Comptroller General Walker and Undersecretary
    Schneider for their valuable testimony and the members for
    their questions.
        And as usual, the members of the committee may have
    additional questions for you and we will ask that you respond
    quickly to them in writing.
        Hearing no further business, the committee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

             Appendix I:  Congressional Committee Oversight of DHS

                                  ----------

    Part I. In the 110th Congress, the following Congressional committees
    and subcommittees asserted DHS jurisdiction by holding hearings or
    otherwise exercising formal oversight activity. Accurate as of August
    2007.

                          U.S House of Representatives

            1.  House Agriculture Committee

            2.  House Armed Services Committee

            3.  House Appropriations Committee
                    4.  Homeland Security Subcommittee

                    5.  Select Intelligence Oversight Panel Subcommittee

            6.  House Budget Committee

            7.  House Energy and Commerce Committee
                    8.  Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection
                    Subcommittee
                    9.  Environment and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee
                    10. Health Subcommittee
                    11. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
                    12. Telecommunications and the Internet

            13. House Financial Services Committee
                    14. Oversight and Investigations
                    15. Housing and Community
            16. House Foreign Affairs Committee
                    17. Europe
                    18. Africa and Global Health

            19. House Homeland Security Committee
                    20. Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism
                    Subcommittee
                    21. Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
                    Response
            Subcommittee
                    22. Emerging Threats, Cyber security, and Science and
                    Technology
            Subcommittee
                    23. Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism
                    Risk Assessment
            Subcommittee
                    24. Management, Investigations, and Oversight
                    Subcommittee
                    25. Transportation Security and Infrastructure
                    Protection Subcommittee

            26. House Judiciary Committee
                    27. Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security
                    28. Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
                    Security, and International
            Law
                    29. Commercial and Administrative Law

            30. House Natural Resources Committee
                    31. Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans Subcommittee
                    32. National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands
                    Subcommittee
                    33. Water and Power Subcommittee

            34. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
                    35. Government Management, Organization and Procurement
                    36. Domestic Policy

            37. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
                    38. Intelligence Community Management
                    39. Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis, and
                    Counterintelligence

            40. House Science and Technology Committee
                    41. Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee
                    42. Technology and Innovation Subcommittee

            43. House Small Business Committee

            44. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
                    45. Aviation Subcommittee
                    46. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
                    47. Economic Development, Public Buildings and
                    Emergency Management
            Subcommittee
            48. House Ways and Means
                    49. Trade Subcommittee

                                  U.S. SENATE

            50. Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry

            51. Senate Appropriations Committee
                    52. Homeland Security Subcommittee
                    53. Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
                    Related Agencies
            Subcommittee
                    54. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
                    Subcommittee

            55. Senate Armed Services Committee

            56. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee

            57. Senate Budget Committee

            58. Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee
                    59. Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism
                    60. Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard
                    Subcommittee
                    61. Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
                    Infrastructure, Safety, and
            Security
                    62. Science, Technology and Innovation

            63. Senate Energy and Nature Resources Committee
                    64. Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee

            65. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
                    66. Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and
                    Water Quality
            Subcommittee

            67. Senate Finance Committee

            68. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

            69. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee

            70. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
                    71. Disaster Recovery Subcommittee
                    72. Federal Financial Management, Government
                    Information, Federal
            Services, and International Security Subcommittee
                    73. Oversight and Government Management, the Federal
                    Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee
                    74. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
                    75. State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and
                    Integration
            Subcommittee

            76. Senate Judiciary Committee
                    77. Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship
                    Subcommittee
                    78. Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
                    Subcommittee
                    79. Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee
                    80. Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship
                    Committee

            81. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

            82. Senate Small Business Committee

            83. Senate Special Committee on Aging

    Part II. In the 109th Congress, the following Congressional committees
    and subcommittees asserted DHS jurisdiction by holding hearings or
    otherwise exercising formal oversight activity.

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

            1.  House Armed Services Committee
                    2.  Terrorism, Unconventional Threats & Capabilities
                    Subcommittee

            3.  House Appropriations Committee
                    4. House Homeland Security Subcommittee

            5.  House Education & the Workforce Committee
                    6.  21st Century Competitiveness Subcommittee
                    7.  Select Education Subcommittee

            8.  House Energy & Commerce Committee
                    9.  Telecommunications and the Internet Subcommittee
                    10. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee

            11. House Financial Services Committee
                    12. Domestic & International Monetary Policy, Trade &
                    Technology Subcommittee
                    13. Housing & Community Opportunity Subcommittee
                    14. Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
                    Subcommittee

            15. House Government Reform Committee
                    16. Federal Workforce & Agency Organization
                    Subcommittee
                    17. National Security, Emerging Threats & Intl
                    Relations Subcommittee
                    18. Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Resources
                    Subcommittee
                    19. Government Management, Finance & Accountability
                    Subcommittee
                    20. Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee

            21. House Homeland Security Committee
                    22. Emergency Preparedness, Science & Technology
                    Subcommittee
                    23. Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism
                    Risk Assessment Subcommittee
                    24. Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, &
                    Cyber security Subcommittee
                    25. Management, Integration & Oversight Subcommittee
                    26. Prevention of Nuclear & Biological Attack
                    Subcommittee
                    27. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

            28. House International Relations Committee
                    29. Africa, Global Human Rights, & International
                    Operations Subcommittee
                    30. International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
                    Subcommittee
                    31. Western Hemisphere Subcommittee

            32. House Judiciary Committee
                    33. Commercial & Administrative Law Subcommittee
                    34. Constitution Subcommittee
                    35. Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security Subcommittee
                    36. Immigration, Border Security & Claims Subcommittee

            37. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
                    38. Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis &
                    Counterterrorism Subcommittee
            39. House Resources Committee
                    40. Fisheries & Oceans Subcommittee
                    41. National Parks Subcommittee
                    42. Water & Power Subcommittee

            43. House Science Committee

            44. House Small Business Committee
                    45. Regulatory Reform & Oversight Subcommittee
                    46. Workforce, Empowerment, & Government Programs
                    Subcommittee

            47. House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
                    48. Aviation Subcommittee
                    49. Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Subcommittee
                    50. Economic Development, Public Buildings & Emergency
                    Management Subcommittee
                    51. Highways, Transit & Pipelines Subcommittee

            52. House Veterans' Affairs Committee

            53. House Ways & Means Committee
                    54. Oversight Subcommittee
                    55. Social Security Subcommittee
                    56. Trade Subcommittee

                                  U.S. SENATE

            57. Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee

            58. Senate Appropriations Committee
                    59. Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee

            60. Senate Armed Services Committee

            61. Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee

            62. Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee

                    63. Fisheries & the Coast Guard Subcommittee
                    64. National Ocean Policy Study Subcommittee
                    65. Disaster Prevention & Prediction Subcommittee
                    66. Trade, Tourism, & Economic Development Subcommittee

            67. Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee
                    68. Energy Subcommittee

            69. Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee
                    70. Transportation & Infrastructure Subcommittee

            71. Senate Finance Committee

            72. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
                    73. East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee
                    74. International Operations & Terrorism Subcommittee
                    75. Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps & Narcotics Affairs
                    Subcommittee

            76. Senate Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions (HELP)
            Committee
                    77. Bioterrorism Preparedness & Public Health
                    Preparedness Subcommittee

            78. Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee
                    79. Federal Financial Management, Government
                    Information & International Security Subcommittee
                    80. Oversight of Government Management, Federal
                    Workforce & DC Subcommittee
                    81. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

            82. Senate Judiciary
                    83. Immigration, Border Security & Citizenship
                    Subcommittee
                    84. Terrorism, Technology & Homeland Security
                    Subcommittee

            85. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

            86. Senate Special Committee on Aging

                Appendix II:  Additional Questions and Responses

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Bennie G. Thompson,
                    chairman, Committee on Homeland Security

                 Responses from the Honorable Paul A. Schneider

        Question 1.: What new measures are being taken by the Department to
    ensure that Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs) have the resources they
    need to increase the number of on-site inspections and ensure more
    visual documentation?
        Is the Department considering amending the Annual Aviation Plan in
    order to allow more on-site inspections of air carriers?
        Response: In fiscal (FY) 2007, the Transportation Security
    Administration's (TSA) air cargo program deployed over 100 additional
    vehicles at 51 airports to support the 300 Transportation Security
    Inspectors-Cargo (TSI-Cs). Additionally, TSA has initiated the hiring
    of 150 cargo inspectors who are to be deployed by July 2008. Vacancy
    announcements for 75 of the new positions have already closed and the
    selection process has begun. These additional resources will be
    deployed to high-volume airports and to those airports where cargo
    operations pose a higher degree of risk. Supplemental funds received in
    fiscal year 2007 will support the addition of 85 TSA proprietary canine
    teams. The teams will be led by a TSI-C Canine Handler and will
    concentrate their efforts on screening air cargo to be transported on
    passenger aircraft. As outlined in the fiscal year 2008 Regulatory
    Activities Plan, inspectors have been directed to increase inspection
    activity through observation techniques and interviewing, as opposed to
    document review.

        Question 2.: Is the Department revisiting TSA's regulations and
    guidelines within their security programs and making the necessary
    changes in language in order to do away with their misinterpretation?
        If so, what process is being implemented in the rewriting of these
    guidelines and regulations?
        Is there an advisory group in place that can provide theoretical
    and practical experience when rewriting these guidelines?
        Once these changes are made, what are the Department's plans to
    ensure proper training is implemented and enhance communication
    channels between ASIs and TSA?
        Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    making revisions to current regulations in order to: (1) make
    substantive changes to the current regulations to enhance security
    requirements, and (2) clarify other parts of the regulations based on
    industry feedback to enable regulated parties to more easily understand
    and adhere to TSA security requirements. TSA utilizes the Aviation
    Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Air Cargo Working Group, which
    represents the regulated parties, to discuss areas of the regulations
    that might be unclear or might cause significant operational impacts.
    Additionally, TSA has established a Compliance Advisory Group comprised
    of senior, experienced Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) who
    meet quarterly to receive and offer recommendations on procedural
    items. TSA recognizes the importance of implementing a security regime
    that provides for the highest security standards without adversely
    impacting the flow of commerce, and TSA continues to partner with
    industry to make sure regulations and guidelines issued meet these twin
    goals. Drafted changes to the security programs are due for industry
    comment.
        As security program changes are made, TSA will ensure TSIs are
    knowledgeable on the updated procedures through training. TSA will
    continue to provide guidance to the TSIs through training modules and
    bi-weekly conference calls. TSA is committed to compiling questions and
    answers from the field and posting them to the employee web board in an
    effort to maintain consistency in the application of security
    procedures.

        Question 3.: What is the Department doing to address the concerns
    raised by TSA's PARIS Advisory Group in 2006? Please provide a progress
    report timeline describing any steps taken to address the weaknesses in
    PARIS as a monitoring and reporting tool.
        Response: Several steps have already been taken to implement
    recommendations directed at improving the effectiveness and
    functionality of the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS)
    program. First, resources were identified in fiscal year (FY) 2007 to
    transition the information technology away from a highly customized
    application to one that is capable of accommodating commercial off-the-
    shelf components. In the latter part of the fiscal year, an information
    technology proposal was presented to the Agency's Office of Chief
    Information Officer to enable the program administrators to
    dramatically change and improve the direction of the current
    application. That proposal will be submitted through the department's
    approved information technology acquisition process in fiscal year
    2008.
        Next, the Office of Security Operations, Compliance Division, has
    committed to assign two additional full-time personnel in fiscal year
    2008 to augment the headquarters-based PARIS staff. This much needed
    support will increase the administrative oversight and staff support
    required to supervise and manage this application serving approximately
    more than 3,000 end users within the Agency.
        Finally, in fiscal year 2008, additional quality assurance
    procedures will be implemented to support managers and supervisors who
    review and approve PARIS records, and new program guidance and
    additional technical training will be made available to PARIS users.
    This guidance will inform end users of the steps required to accurately
    enter and retrieve data from the application, over and above the
    current support that is now available. To improve program
    communications, periodic technical presentations via telephone and
    online conferencing will be conducted with the field work force to
    encourage information sharing, collaboration, and assist in identifying
    program and process improvements.

        Question 4.: In an effort to secure our nation's borders, we must
    know who enters and exits this country, and, slowly, we are
    implementing systems to accomplish this goal. Nonetheless, I am deeply
    troubled by occurrences of special interest aliens attempting to enter
    our country with little follow up investigative activities being
    conducted. More specifically, I suggest that a thorough investigation
    should be conducted to determine if these individuals are part of a
    larger criminal or smuggling organization and most importantly, are
    they associated with any terrorist organization. Furthermore, the
    individuals should be run through all law enforcement databases to
    determine if they are subjects/targets of other investigations. A new
    report last week indicated a considerable number of special interest
    aliens have illegally crossed the border in the last year.
        Having said that, can you explain to us the steps that would be
    taken should a CBP Officer or Border Patrol agent encounter a special
    interest alien, for example, from Syria or Pakistan?
        Who conducts the investigation?
        Who insures that the information is vetted through other federal
    law enforcement agencies?
        Do CBP Officers and Border Patrol agents have a security clearance
    and statutory authority that will allow them to investigate these
    activities?
        Please describe any policies and /or procedures as they relate to
    the interdiction and handling of special interest aliens.
        Response: This response is for Official Use Only and Law
    Enforcement Sensitive.
        Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs a layered, risk-based
    approach to our security and facilitation efforts at our Nation's
    borders.
        CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents are keenly aware and kept
    informed of continuing and emerging threats posed along our Nation's
    borders.
        CBP has implemented policies to specifically address encounters
    with individuals posing possible threats of terrorism. Policy requires
    Officers and Agents to immediately notify the CBP National Targeting
    Center--Passenger (NTC-P), the centralized coordination point for all
    of CBP's anti-terrorism efforts. The NTC-P conducts a full vetting to
    include notification to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, who have a
    full time Liaison Section assigned to the NTC-P which provides 24 hour
    notification to ICE JTTF in the field and immediate coordination on all
    Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) encounters. Other
    agencies are also notified including the FBI Terrorist Screening
    Operations Unit (TSOU) who provides case agent instructions back to the
    NTC to further identify any possible threat or connection to terrorism.
    The local CBP Officer or Border Patrol Agent designated as a Counter-
    Terrorism Response (CTR) Officer is responsible for coordinating with
    NTC and other law enforcement agencies, and for ensuring that a full
    inspection, document review and questioning of suspect persons takes
    place.
        CBP's NTC-P has several programs whose focus is to identify
    potential threats to national security prior to the individual arriving
    in the United States. In some instances, NTC-P has coordinated with
    foreign governments to deny boarding to the passenger thereby extending
    our borders. Some of these programs include:
            --Immigration Advisory Program (IAP). The IAP review team at
            the NTC-P has the responsibility of utilizing airline
            reservation systems for passengers scheduled to depart aboard
            flights destined to the United States from the overseas IAP
            locations prior to boarding. Targeting efforts continue to
            focus on those passengers who have the highest probability of
            matching TIDE, TSA No-Fly, Visa Revocation, and Non-U.S. Lost/
            Stolen Passport records.
            --As a result of the Transportation and Security Agency (TSA)
            Aviation Security Directive Number: SD 1544-06-03C, CBP-NTC-P
            initiated Operation Mirage II in response to the arrests of
            terrorist suspects in the UK who allegedly planned to carry-out
            suicide bombings on US-bound commercial aircraft. This on-going
            operation requires air carriers to provide CBP-NTC-P with
            complete passenger manifests before the flight departs from the
            UK. The air carriers are notified if any passenger off-loads
            are required before the flight is given permission to depart.
            --CBP initiated Intelligence Driven Special Operations (IDSO)
            in response to specific ``threat streams'' identified during
            intelligence analysis or Special Interest Aliens. Each IDSO
            identifies specific criteria as applied to a ``threat stream''.
            CBP field offices are required to contact NTC-P when travelers
            matching IDSO criteria are encountered. NTC-P conducts research
            on each traveler in both classified and unclassified systems to
            determine if the subject posed a threat to national security.
        All CTR Officers undergo initial and recurring special training
    related to their specific duties. This training includes the ability to
    determine if an individual may pose a possible risk for terrorism,
    based on: suspicious travel to special interest countries; questionable
    identities and/or travel documents; suspicious documents, brochures or
    other written materials; suspicious itineraries or travel routes; and/
    or unusual items contained in the individual's baggage or vehicle. This
    is particularly important when aliens from special interest countries
    falsely claim to be Mexican (or from another non-special interest
    country).
        Some traits or indicators that may indicate a basis to question an
    alien's claim of citizenship from a non-special interest country are
    explained below.
             Observation regarding the style and type of clothing,
            mannerisms and speech patterns and including physical features.
             Search of the subject's person and belongings for any
            type of identity and/or travel documents to corroborate a story
            or identify potential risk.
             Physical evidence on subject's person or in subject's
            belongings that list phone numbers and addresses, foreign or
            domestic, that would lead and Officer or an Agent to believe
            that the alien is from a special interest country.
             Responses to certain questions (for example, regarding
            certain facts about Mexico) that are unlikely to be answered
            correctly by an alien from a special interest country.
             Biometric information, such as fingerprints and
            digital photographs that are checked and enrolled through the
            Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor
            and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) and
            Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) as well as
            the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
            System
         (IAFIS) where alien's fingerprints are additionally
    checked to detect any previous criminal history or outstanding
    warrants.
        The CTR Officer should use questioning techniques and observational
    behavioral analysis. At a minimum, the CTR interview is required to
    establish and properly record the following: purpose and intent of
    travel; length of visit; persons visited or to be visited; places
    visited abroad, or to be visited in the United States; sponsoring
    organization for the trip, or means used to pay for the trip;
    affiliations with educational or professional institutions; value of
    cash and other monetary instruments in the traveler's possession; and
    the traveler's next destination.
        With respect to security clearances, a select group of CBP Officers
    and managers assigned to counterterrorism duties and trained for those
    specific responsibilities have been vetted for Secret or higher
    clearances as appropriate. And although many Border Patrol Agents have
    security clearances of varying levels up to Top Secret, most agents
    have a standard Background Investigation (BI) which entitles them to
    view and handle Law Enforcement Sensitive or For Official Use
    Information Only material.
        Most CBP Officers do not have investigative responsibilities.
    Instead, their singular focus is on the inspection of individuals
    arriving at the ports of entry and detection of risks to national
    security or violations of Federal laws administered by CBP. When a
    person designated as a Special Interest Alien (SIA) presents himself
    for admission at a US port of entry, he will be referred to secondary
    inspection for additional examination and interview. Specifically,
    SIA's are processed in the National Security Entry Exit Registration
    System (NSEERS), which includes document verification and an interview
    regarding purpose of travel, destination, and other pertinent facts.
    SIA's are also fingerprinted, registered in, and queried against our
    system of law enforcement biometric databases (including ENFORCE/IDENT
    and IAFIS) and any documents or possessions of interest are examined
    and, where appropriate, copied for follow-up by investigative entities.
    Appropriate notifications are also made when an SIA, or other
    individual whom CBP Officers determine may pose a risk to national
    security, are encountered. Such notifications may be to Special Agents
    with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Joint Terrorism
    Task Force (JTTF), the National Targeting Center (NTC), and other
    Federal, State, or local authorities with a vested or possible interest
    in the alien.
        The FBI's TSOU and CBP's NTC-P will run the biographical
    information through a multitude of databases and watch lists to
    determine whether the alien has any nexus to terrorism or is of any
    investigative interest to other agencies. If a subject is determined to
    be a positive match to the terrorist watch list or is of significant
    interest, NTC immediately notifies ICE NTC who provides direct
    notification to ICE JTTF in the field for response and appropriate
    coordination with CBP and other agencies as appropriate. These
    notifications are made on a 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week basis. If the
    JTTF determines that the alien is of investigative interest, the alien
    may be subjected to further investigation by the FBI or Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Office of Investigations pending further
    investigation.
        Section 287 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, Title 8, 18,
    19 and 21 all give fairly broad statutory authority for Border Patrol
    Agents to arrest, detain and investigate illegal activity. For example,
    all Border Patrol Agents are specifically authorized to conduct
    investigative stops, either from roving patrol or pedestrian
    interviews, and must diligently pursue lawful ``investigative
    activities'' likely to promptly resolve questions as to immigration
    status or ``criminal activity''. These authorities are explained and
    delineated in the Border Patrol Handbook and other sources. Again,
    Policy requires Officers and Agents to immediately notify the CBP
    National Targeting Center (NTC), the centralized coordination point for
    all of CBP's anti-terrorism efforts, and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The NTC
    conducts a full vetting to include notification to other agencies, as
    required, to further identify any possible threat or connection to
    terrorism.

        Question 5.: The GAO report says that the Department has
    ``generally not achieved'' the improvement and enhancement of public/
    private information sharing involving attacks, threats, and
    vulnerabilities.
        Please list how many private sector entities are linked to HSIN (or
    its related systems), whether this linkage has been done through the
    Sector Partnership Framework, and how many members of State and local
    governments have access.
        Please describe your successes and difficulties in these areas.
        Response:
    HSIN-CS User Numbers (approximate count)

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Private                           648 organizations (1,278 individuals)
     Sector
     Organization
     s
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Educational                            16 institutions (19 individuals)
     Institutions
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    State/Local/                             117 entities (186 individuals)
     Tribal
     Members
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Federal                                   90 entities (299 individuals)
     Partners
     (non-DHS)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DHS Employees          200--250 individuals (NOTE: This is a very rough
                   estimate. It includes 180 on the National Infrastructure
                     Coordinating Center Tactical Portal, plus an estimated
                    50+ from the Transportation Security Administration, US
                                                         Coast Guard, etc.)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Sector Partnership Framework provides the governance and
    coordination for the Homeland Security Information Network Critical
    Sector (HSIN-CS). Many of the sectors, through their Sector
    Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils
    (GCCs), have working groups that develop functional requirements for
    HSIN-CS and determine content, portal appearance, and governance for
    their participation in HSIN-CS. This approach ensures that HSIN-CS is
    an efficient and effective tool that fits into each sector's business
    processes, culture, and policy framework.
        Such an approach is intended to ensure coordination and
    communication in an all-hazards environment; it also affords
    sustainable information exchange within the sector and across sectors
    for the long term. The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI-
    KR) sector partnership provides the nexus for private-sector
    participation on HSIN-CS.
        We have had a number of successes in our outreach efforts to the
    private-sector owners/operators for HSIN-CS. Each sector now has a
    portal in pilot status on HSIN-CS. We are working with the sectors to
    create a business case that provides the owners/operators (the Nuclear,
    Oil & Natural Gas and Chemical sectors, for example) with a compelling
    reason to share information. Also, the sectors, led by the SCC/GCC, are
    developing their own governance and membership criteria for HSIN-CS; in
    this way, the sectors have a vested interest in building a trusted
    environment and fostering its successful execution. Finally, we have
    established HSIN-CS as a key distribution medium for the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) to share reports, threats, and analysis with
    the private-sector owners/operators. For two years, for example, DHS
    has made regionally based hurricane impact models available on the
    HSIN-CS portals for use by the sectors in preparing for the hurricane
    season. Nine sectors have signed Memorandums of Understanding with DHS
    to move out of the pilot stage and expand the use of their portals to
    the entire sector.
        We are in the process of acquiring a new technical platform that
    will overcome the limitations of the current HSIN in supporting sector
    annual reports, broadcast alerts, key functionalities, and various
    private-sector core requirements. Several sectors are limiting their
    participation pending the move to a new platform, once identified. The
    GAO report did note, however, that progress had been made on the
    information-sharing front overall for the CI-KR sectors.

        Question 6.: During the intelligence subcommittee's May 2007
    hearing on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Mr. Wayne
    Parent said that the Department would be taking steps to ensure that
    the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is staying aligned
    with the efforts and recommendations of the Program Manager of the
    Information Sharing Environment.
        What steps has the Department taken, and what specific
    recommendations has the Program Manager made to the Department in that
    regard?
        How are you implementing any such recommendations by the Program
    Manager?
        Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps
    to ensure that HSIN is aligned with the efforts and recommendations of
    the Program Manager for Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). DHS
    established an Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC) which is
    comprised of representatives from across the DHS components and chaired
    by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis's Information Sharing and
    Collaboration Office. The DHS/ISCC is chartered to review and
    coordinate recommendations from the PM-ISE. The Office of Operations
    Coordination has a representative on this council and coordinates
    applicable efforts and recommendations with the HSIN Joint Program
    Office.
        The PM-ISE has drafted an Enterprise Architecture Framework (EAF)
    that will enable the sharing and searching of terrorism information
    across jurisdictional boundaries. The ISE EAF includes the concept of
    an ISE Shared Space. The Shared Space is an area to be used by
    participating agencies to place shareable services and data in a manner
    that is readily accessible and ensures appropriate security. At a
    concept level, this definition gives DHS the opportunity to further
    articulate the mechanics of its own Shared Space. DHS has begun the
    process of defining how it will implement the concept of the Shared
    Space in anticipation of a final recommendation from the PM-ISE. HSIN
    is an integral part of enabling the ISE Shared Space concept.

        Question 7.: GAO concluded that DHS has generally not achieved
    performance expectation number 16: Develop a long range vessel-tracking
    system to improve maritime domain awareness. GAO bases its conclusion
    on that fact that after Congress first gave the US Coast Guard the
    authority to develop long range vessel tracking capabilities over four
    years ago in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 [MTSA]
    (Public Law 107-295), DHS does not have a long range vessel tracking
    system that can provide coverage up to nautical 2,000 miles from the US
    coast.
        I understand that the maritime industry, specifically the Maritime
    Information Service of North America (MISNA), which is a non-profit US
    maritime organization, has developed a long range vessel tracking
    system that can not only provide coverage up to nautical 2,000 miles
    from the US coast, but around the world. Are you aware of this system?
    I understand that MISNA believes it would compliment the system being
    developed by the IMO, and would provide more benefits to the U.S. than
    the IMO system will.
        Response: Yes, the Coast Guard is aware of the Maritime Information
    Service of North America (MISNA) system. MISNA, like other commercially
    available systems, provides global tracking of vessels as a corporate
    service. Unlike the compulsory International Maritime Organization
    (IMO) Long Range Information Tracking (LRIT) system which will track
    all Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) vessels, the long range MISNA system
    is voluntary and is limited to tracking only MISNA subscribers.

        Question 8: The Coast Guard's lack of progress on developing long
    range vessel tracking capabilities is especially troubling given that
    the SAFE Port Act mandated that DHS would have a long range vessel
    tracking system by April 1 of this year. When the Coast Guard was asked
    about this, their response was that they have access to sufficient data
    right now, but that the problem is that once the data has been
    gathered, they do not know how to display it and share it with those
    who need it. It seems that GAO came to the same conclusion.
    Specifically, GAO notes that while DHS has reported that the Coast
    Guard has vessel-tracking capabilities, but noted that work is needed
    in the processing, display, and training in the use of this
    information.
        If DHS is not able to process or display the information it has,
    nor does it have the capability to train anyone in the use of this
    information, what good does it do to have the information in the first
    place? All the information in the world will not stop a terrorist
    attack if that information is not actionable. And it certainly will not
    help DHS to manage risk in the maritime environment.
        Response: The Coast Guard met the April 1, 2007, tracking
    requirement of the SAFE Port Act using a full range of classified and
    unclassified means. This multi-faceted range of vessel tracking sources
    provides both complementary and confirmatory information used to
    improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is achieved through a
    combination of established training programs, data fusion & analysis
    tools, Department of Defense-compliant display systems including Coast
    Guard-wide distributed classified and unclassified Common Operational
    Pictures, and sharing of vessel tracking information with Customs and
    Border Protection and other port partners. Ongoing efforts continue to
    improve the efficiency and performance of these existing Coast Guard
    capabilities and information systems.

        Question 9.: Sec. 404 of the Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-241) authorized DHS to
    conduct a pilot program for long-range tracking of up to 2,000 vessels
    using satellite systems with a nonprofit maritime organization that has
    a demonstrated capability of operating a variety of satellite
    communications systems providing data to vessel tracking software and
    hardware that provides long-range vessel information to the Coast Guard
    to aid maritime security and response to maritime emergencies.
        Given DHS's lack of progress on developing long range vessel
    tracking capabilities over the past four years, combined with the fact
    that MISNA has had these capabilities for that entire time, and keeping
    in mind that MISNA's system will provide some capabilities that IMO's
    system will not and that IMO's system will not be fully functional for
    some time, do you think it would be prudent for Congress to appropriate
    funds to get this pilot project up and running, and for the Coast Guard
    to work with the maritime industry to achieve long range vessel
    tracking capabilities?
        Response: The Maritime Information Service of North America
    (MISNA), like other commercially available systems, provides global
    tracking of vessels as a corporate service. Unlike the compulsory
    International Maritime Organization (IMO) Long Range Information
    Tracking (LRIT) system which will track all Safety of Life at Sea
    (SOLAS) vessels, the long range MISNA system is voluntary and is
    limited to tracking only MISNA subscribers. We do not seek funding for
    a pilot project for MISNA.
        The United States Government has led the effort for the past four
    years to implement LRIT as an international standard system. Progress
    toward implementing a compulsory, international long range tracking
    system through the IMO depends upon international participation and
    cooperation. The Coast Guard will be working with the maritime
    industry, our international partners and commercially available systems
    to receive long range tracking information when LRIT is deployed as
    planned in 2008. An NPRM on LRIT was published by the Coast Guard in
    October 2007 and a U.S. National Data Center for LRIT is planned to be
    in operation by the summer of 2008.

        Question 10.: According to the GAO's report, overall progress on
    Border Security was Modest, Immigration enforcement was Moderate, and
    Immigration services was Modest. Can you elaborate on why these figures
    appear so low and what DHS is currently doing to improve them?
        Response: As discussed in the Department's response to the GAO
    report, we disagree with the methodology used by GAO to score the
    Department. We also disagree with GAO's overall scores in the specific
    areas of Border Security, Immigration Enforcement, and Immigration
    Services.
        The Department has, over the past four years, implemented several
    initiatives and strategies with the overall goal of gaining effective
    control of our Nation's borders. More importantly, our results
    demonstrate a success that is clearly higher than ``Modest''.
        The Department has developed a comprehensive National Strategy to
    gain and maintain operational control of our borders, between the ports
    of entry, with the appropriate mixture of staffing, technology and
    tactical infrastructure. This strategy was implemented in Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2005 and complements the strategy for securing our Nation's
    borders at the ports of entry as well as the DHS' Secure Border
    Initiative (SBI). SBI is a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure
    America's borders and reduce illegal migration by gaining effective
    control of the borders and strengthening interior enforcement and
    compliance. The goals are interdependent and must be addressed
    simultaneously and collectively in order to achieve significant gains
    in border security. This is partially achieved by increasing the rate
    of interception and removal, therefore increasing the rate of
    deterrence.
        While GAO did not assess deterrence as a performance measure, the
    Department believes it is a vital part of the National Strategy and
    implemented several initiatives aimed at deterrence. For example, DHS
    expanded the use of Expedited Removal to Border Patrol apprehensions
    between the ports of entry, and has since ended the practice of catch
    and release. Combined with targeted enforcement efforts such as
    Operation Streamline in the Del Rio Sector, the addition of more Border
    Patrol Agents, tactical infrastructure and technology such as ground
    based radar in other sectors, additional deterrence to illegal cross
    border activity was achieved.
        The significant gains made in border miles under effective control
    are mostly attributable to the significant numbers of new Border Patrol
    Agents hired and deployed to the southwest border during fiscal year
    2006 and fiscal year 2007 and Operation Jump Start (OJS). The new
    Border Patrol Agents added will become more effective in the
    performance of their duties as they continue to develop their law
    enforcement skills through post academy and on the job training. The
    number of support personnel hired was also increased commensurate with
    the hiring of additional Border Patrol Agents which has sent ``badges
    back to the border'' and increased our presence and ability to deter
    and apprehend border incursions.
        Along with the permanent personnel enhancements, increased targeted
    enforcement operations and implementation of long term initiatives, the
    Border Patrol's southwest border sectors also received augmentation by
    National Guard troops participating in OJS. The most noteworthy support
    provided by OJS National Guard troops was through the deployment of
    Entry Identification Teams (EITs). These EITs provided additional
    detection capability and deterrence in areas with limited monitoring
    capabilities. This brought additional miles of the border under
    surveillance and allowed the Border Patrol Agents to more effectively
    respond to illegal entries. Additionally, the National Guard supported
    the Border Patrol mission in several other ways, by repairing patrol
    roads, providing fleet maintenance support, operating radios and
    cameras and performing other non-law enforcement activities. This
    allowed hundreds of Border Patrol Agents, performing non-law
    enforcement missions, to return to their law enforcement duties and
    place them back on the border.
        Additionally, in fiscal year 2007, over 600,000 hours for CBP
    Officers and Border Patrol Agents were freed up through the use of a
    ``guard and transportation'' services contract that will continue in
    fiscal year 2008. This contract allows CBP Officers and Border Patrol
    Agents to focus on their primary law enforcement duties instead of
    spending time transporting and guarding apprehended aliens.
        The results were and continue to be decreased apprehensions and
    increased amounts marijuana and cocaine seized between the ports of
    entry by Border Patrol Agents. At the end of fiscal year 2006, border
    security efforts resulted in an eight percent decrease in overall
    apprehensions and a 13 percent increase in the amount of marijuana
    seized and an eight percent increase in the amount of cocaine seized
    compared to fiscal year 2005 figures. Efforts in fiscal year 2007
    resulted in a 20 percent decrease in overall apprehensions and a 36
    percent increase in the amount of marijuana seized and an 11 percent
    increase in the amount of cocaine seized compared to fiscal year 2006
    figures.
        Achievement at the border is the result of the continued
    application of the Border Patrol's multi-year strategy to deploy the
    right mix of highly trained and well-equipped personnel, strategically
    placed tactical infrastructure and integrated technology to secure our
    borders. The goal of this strategy is to ensure that the Border Patrol
    can consistently detect, identify and classify, respond to and resolve
    all illegal entries between the ports of entry while maintaining
    mobility for rapid deployment to counter shifts in illegal cross border
    activity.
        In regards to Immigration Enforcement, it is apparent that the GAO
    failed to adequately assess several of the ICE programs that touched
    upon the performance expectations highlighted in the report.
        For example, in an effort to ensure timely identification and
    removal of aliens subject to removal from the U.S., ICE has acquired
    additional aircraft, increased the use of the Electronic Travel
    Document system that meaningfully shortens processing and detention
    times, and increased the use of Video Teleconferencing for consular
    interviews, thereby reducing interview scheduling and travel delays.
        It is also important to note that decisions by foreign countries to
    refuse or delay in the issuance of travel documents are not within
    ICE's control. In many instances, there is little incentive for some
    countries to repatriate their citizens, nearly all of whom contested
    removal to their nation and some of whom are criminals. Many countries
    extensively delay or outright refuse the issuance of travel documents
    for the return of their nationals, even when presented with conclusive
    identity information and passports. However, ICE continues to encourage
    non-cooperating countries to issue travel documents. Some efforts
    include, stationing a full-time ICE Liaison Officer at the Department
    of State to foster better foreign relations, expanding e-Ticketing to
    those countries who receive the highest number of repatriated aliens,
    and facilitating consular interviews.
        Furthermore, the length of removal proceedings conducted by
    agencies within the Department of Justice or the federal courts is
    outside of ICE control. Aliens are entitled to present their cases to
    an immigration judge, appeal, and seek further review in the federal
    courts. In some jurisdictions, the removal of aliens is judicially
    stayed--or enjoined--by federal court order upon the alien's request.
    The GAO did not take into consideration the number of aliens in ICE
    detention whose detention is prolonged by their litigation choices and
    rulings by courts.
        ICE has also made extensive progress in ensuring the removal of
    criminal aliens and absconders through its Criminal Alien Program
    (CAP). ICE would like to note that the CAP maintains a presence in
    approximately 2000 federal, state, and local correctional institutions
    and jails, including 114 Bureau of Prisons federal detention
    facilities. Furthermore, ICE continues to train and hire nearly 200
    additional staff to support CAP, is expanding video-teleconferencing
    technology to field offices, and continues to expand coverage to state
    and local jails and prisons. Additionally, CAP is on course to double
    the number of aliens placed in removal proceedings by issuance of
    charging documents in 2007.
        In addition to the CAP program, ICE has also successfully developed
    and implemented a robust worksite enforcement program which actively
    targets employers who hire unauthorized workers. ICE uses a two-fold
    system that entails a comprehensive risk assessment of its mission-
    critical areas, as well as the use of standard law enforcement
    statistics to measure the overall effectiveness of its investigations.
    The worksite enforcement program continues to mature and will be
    developed into an outcome based system.
        Lastly, ICE has also made great strides to interdict and prevent
    trafficking and smuggling of aliens into the U.S. ICE utilizes Border
    Enforcement Task Forces (BEST), which were created to combat border
    crime and violence, and also maintains an active and aggressive
    domestic and overseas human trafficking program--ICETIPS--to target
    criminal organizations and individuals engaged in human trafficking
    worldwide.

        Question 11.: Responsibility for securing the maritime
    transportation system falls to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
    Protection, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation
    Security Administration, other Federal, State, and local agencies,
    foreign partners, and the private sector. The scope is enormous and
    includes 300 plus domestic seaports, 12 million maritime containers,
    and hundreds of vessels. With all of these stakeholders and missions,
    it seems that this category would see the least amount of progress but
    the opposite is true.
        What makes maritime security different?
        Is it a priority for the Department and therefore more resources
    and attention were given to this area than Immigration enforcement?
        Response: Ensuring the security of the maritime transportation
    system continues to be a priority for the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). An efficient maritime transportation system is vital to
    the global economy, but it can also be used to move dangerous cargo or
    people to our ports and cities. Almost 32,000 seagoing containers
    arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports each day. In fiscal
    year 2006, that equated to 11.6 million cargo containers annually.
    Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
    opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
    uniquely vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.
        DHS is proud of the strides made over the last several years to
    strengthen the security of the maritime transportation system while
    facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. As you observed,
    the scope of this mission is enormous and responsibilities are shared
    between a variety of both federal and private stakeholders. Our
    progress in the maritime realm has been aided by a number of unique and
    important factors.
        The maritime domain has a tradition of partnerships between
    stakeholders, especially between the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), maritime industry partners and
    others in the private sector. These established relationships enabled
    the Department to rapidly identify security gaps and solutions and then
    work aggressively to implement realistic mitigation programs and
    strategies. As an example, the implementation of the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act of 2002 included the establishment of Area
    Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) and development of Area Maritime
    Security Plans. Both programs were implemented under tight deadlines
    driven by the date the International Maritime Organizations
    International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) entered
    into force. The existing partnerships between Federal, State, and local
    agencies and the maritime/port industries, such as the Harbor Safety
    Committees, ensured that the stakeholders had pre-existing partnerships
    and were rapidly able to transition into AMSCs. Other supply chain
    security programs whose success is predicated on strong international
    and industry partnerships include the Secure Freight Initiative (a
    joint program between DHS and the Department of Energy) the Container
    Security Initiative, and the USCGs inspection teams.
        Another significant factor contributing to the progress in the
    maritime domain is that the federal government has traditionally
    maintained primary oversight authority in the maritime realm. Navigable
    waterways and port areas fall clearly within the purview of specific
    federal agencies, such as the USCG, which has direct jurisdiction over
    all U.S. navigable waterways, or CBP which has jurisdiction over cargo
    crossing a border. The clarity and centrality of this federal authority
    has significantly expedited development of security regimes and
    domains. While the partnerships noted above have been crucial, the
    centrality of jurisdiction has also helped ensure that rapid progress
    was possible.

        Question 12.: Although Congress passed a bill to implement
    remaining recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the bill failed to
    implement the recommendation for Congress to reorganize itself to
    consolidate its jurisdiction over DHS. In an op-ed in the Washington
    Post on September 9th, the 9/11 Commission's former chairman, Thomas H.
    Kean, and former vice chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, noted that this is one
    of the--quote--``main items on our list of concerns.''
        What recommendations do you have to streamline this process?

            a. Could you please provide some examples of how the lack of
            consolidated congressional oversight impacts DHS?
        Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently
    subject to oversight by at least 86 Congressional committees and
    subcommittees. This level of Congressional attention creates a uniquely
    difficult and unnecessary burden for DHS and it negatively impacts the
    Department's ability to fulfill its mission. Literally thousands of
    Congressional requests--from many different committees and
    subcommittees, for hearings, briefings, reports, and other
    information--consume a significant amount of DHS senior leadership
    time, which must be balanced with meeting operational mission demands.
    A list of the committees and subcommittees who have asserted
    jurisdiction over some aspect of DHS operations during the 110th and
    109th Congresses is attached.
        In 2006 alone, DHS testified at more than 200 Congressional
    hearings, responded to more than 3,700 follow-up questions for the
    record, provided approximately 2,200 briefings for members and their
    staffs, and prepared more than 370 authorization and appropriation
    reports for Congress. These figures reflect more than a 25-percent
    increase in the number of hearings and briefings required of DHS
    between 2004 and 2006.
        Unfortunately, the problem appears to be getting worse rather than
    better, and the burden is becoming increasingly onerous. So far in
    2007, the Department is on pace to exceed the 2006 figures. Already, in
    the 110th Congress (as of September 14, 2007), DHS witnesses testified
    at over 166 hearings with 228 witnesses, responded to more than 2,600
    follow-up questions for the record, provided approximately 1,949
    briefings for members and staff, and prepared more than 460 reports for
    Congress. In August 2007 alone, two requests from one committee in the
    House (other than the Committee on Homeland Security) have consumed
    many hundreds of staff hours, and boxes of documentation have been
    demanded and supplied.
        In addition to the sheer burden associated with responding to the
    thousands of oversight requests directed at the Department, the large
    number of committees and subcommittees claiming jurisdiction frequently
    results in duplicative requests to the Department. We often find
    ourselves providing briefings or testimony to multiple committees on a
    range of identical or closely related matters. For example, DHS
    witnesses have testified, to date, at least five times on the issue of
    post-Hurricane Katrina housing in the 110th Congress. Further, DHS
    witnesses have testified before five different committees and
    subcommittees on worksite enforcement, and seven different times on the
    issue of border security.
        We understand that there is a high level of interest in many of our
    programs and operations and recognize Congress' important oversight
    role; however, the time and effort involved in responding to the vast--
    and sometimes duplicative--requests has had a significant impact on the
    ability of the Department to perform our mission.

            b. What recommendations do you have to streamline this process?
        Response: One of the most important steps Congress can undertake to
    improve operational effectiveness at DHS is to streamline Congressional
    oversight over our Department. This action would allow DHS to focus our
    time and resources much more effectively on our critical missions,
    while preserving appropriate levels of Congressional oversight. [See
    Appendix I.]
        This view is in line with a key recommendation of the 9/11
    Commission which was to create a single, principal point of oversight
    and review for homeland security. The Commission stated that:
            Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight
            and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are
            best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over
            this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress
            does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in
            the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent
            standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.
        The Department of Homeland Security strongly supports this
    recommendation and the Administration has repeatedly expressed its
    strong conviction that Congress should adopt this recommendation. As
    discussed in the previous answer, the lack of a single, principal point
    of oversight and review has led to a number of committees exercising
    oversight, requesting information, and holding hearings. The Department
    welcomes oversight and is more than willing to engage with members of
    Congress on important homeland security issues. However, this must be
    done in an organized a way that avoids redundant requests and oversight
    efforts, and allows Departmental leaders to engage in full and
    efficient dialogue with members of Congress.
        We urge Congress to implement this vital reform.

               Questions From the Committee on Homeland Security

                  Responses From the Honorable David M. Walker

        Question 1.: Since 2003, the Department has committed roughly $250
    million to develop an exit capability for US-VISIT, yet we still do not
    have a functioning biometric exit system. In June, GAO testified before
    the Committee that the prospects for having operational exit
    capabilities continued to be unclear because of the absence of any
    detailed plans.
        a. Can you speak about the US-VISIT exit plans GAO has reviewed, or
    lack thereof, and why you believe the Department's newly launched
    efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution will not produce
    results different from its past efforts?
        Response: DHS has issued a high-level schedule for an exit
    capability at air ports of entry, but information supporting that
    schedule was not available as of June 2007. In addition, there are no
    other exit program plans available that define what will be done, by
    what entities, and at what cost in order to define, acquire, deliver,
    deploy, and operate this capability. The fiscal year 2007 US-VISIT
    expenditure plan did not include a complete schedule for biometric exit
    implementation, and the US-VISIT program office has yet to develop a
    business case for implementing a planned project for biometric exit
    capability at air ports of entry. Further, DHS has not performed an
    analysis comparing the life cycle costs of the air exit solution to its
    expected benefits and risks.
        The US-VISIT program first committed to full deployment of a
    biometric exit capability in 2003, and it has continued to make similar
    deployment commitments in subsequent years. At the same time, we have
    chronicled a pattern of inadequate analysis surrounding the expected
    costs, benefits, and risks of these exit efforts since 2004, and thus
    an absence of reliable information upon which to view their expected
    value and base informed exit-related investment decisions. US-VISIT has
    allocated about $250 million in funding to exit pilot programs. At no
    time, however, was any analysis produced to justify such a sizeable
    investment. While we recognize the value and role of demonstration and
    pilot efforts as a means for learning and informing future development
    efforts, we believe that exit-related efforts have been inadequately
    defined and justified over the last 4 years, and it is unclear whether
    DHS's new efforts will produce different results from past efforts.

        Questions 2.: Throughout your review, how was the NIPP evaluated?
            a. Were you considering coordinated objectives that should have
            been accomplished by the NIPP in coordination with Sector and
            Government Coordinating Councils?
            b. If so, then please list concrete examples that contributed
            to your overall analysis.
        Response: We based our review of the NIPP on prior GAO work. We
    previously reported that the NIPP is a base plan that is to serve as a
    road map for how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk
    management principles to prioritize protection activities within and
    across sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. HSPD-7 required
    DHS to develop a comprehensive and integrated plan by December 2004
    that outlines national protection goals, objectives, milestones, and
    key initiatives necessary to fulfilling these responsibilities. DHS
    issued the NIPP in June 2006.
        To better coordinate infrastructure protection efforts as called
    for in the NIPP, all 17 critical infrastructure sectors have
    established their respective government councils, and nearly all
    sectors have initiated their voluntary private sector councils. But
    council progress has varied due to their characteristics and level of
    maturity. Further, the NIPP required the individual sector-specific
    agencies, working with relevant government and private sector
    representatives, to submit plans to DHS that would establish the means
    by which the sectors will identify their critical assets, assess risks
    of terrorist attacks or other hazards on them, assess and prioritize
    those which have national significance, and develop protective measures
    for the sector. DHS is to use these individual plans to evaluate
    whether any gaps exist in the protection of critical infrastructures on
    a national level and, if so, to work with the sectors to address the
    gaps. We reported that all the sectors met the December 2006 deadline
    to submit their sector-specific plans to DHS, although the level of
    collaboration between the sector and government councils on the plans
    varied by sector. In May 2007, DHS announced the completion of the 17
    sector-specific plans. However, issuing the NIPP and completing sector
    plans are only first steps to ensure critical infrastructure protection
    investments and activities are prioritized based on risk management
    principles.
        We recently reported that the extent to which the sectors addressed
    aspects of cyber security in their sector-specific plans varied. None
    of the plans fully addressed all 30 cyber security-related criteria.
    Several sector plans--including the information technology and
    telecommunications sectors--fully addressed many of the criteria, while
    others--such as agriculture and food and commercial facilities--were
    less comprehensive. In addition to the variations in the extent to
    which the plans covered aspects of cyber security, there was also
    variance among the plans in the extent to which certain criteria were
    addressed. DHS acknowledges the shortcomings in the plans. DHS
    officials stated that the sector-specific plans represent only the
    early efforts by the sectors to develop their respective plans.
    Nevertheless, until the plans fully address key cyber elements, certain
    sectors may not be prepared to respond to a cyber attack against our
    nation's critical infrastructure.

        3. In your report, you give the Department a ``generally achieved''
    status for developing partnerships and coordinating with other federal
    agencies, state and local governments and the private sector. Please
    describe in detail a partnership and coordination effort that was
    ``generally achieved'' by the Department?
        Response: DHS has taken steps to develop partnerships and
    coordinate with other federal agencies, state and local governments,
    and the private sector. For example, DHS is responsible for the
    formation of government and private sector councils to, among other
    things, identify their most critical assets and identify protective
    measures in sector-specific plans. In October 2006 we reported that all
    17 critical infrastructure sectors established their respective
    government councils, and nearly all sectors initiated their voluntary
    private sector councils in response to the National Infrastructure
    Protection Plan.
        In addition, DHS has undertaken numerous initiatives to foster
    partnerships with other federal agencies, state and local governments,
    and the private sector about cyber attacks, threats, and
    vulnerabilities. For example, the National Cyber Response and
    Coordination Group facilitates coordination of intragovernmental and
    public/private preparedness and operations in order to respond to and
    recover from incidents that have significant cyber consequences and
    also brings together officials from national security, law enforcement,
    defense, intelligence, and other government agencies that maintain
    significant cybersecurity responsibilities and capabilities. Further,
    sectors stated that the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory
    Council will give them an effective way to share information about and
    coordinate their protection efforts since the council proceedings are
    not subject to public disclosure, thus protecting sensitive business
    information from competitors.

        4. Mr. Walker, you identified numerous problems with the
    Department's recruitment, retention, and management of its personnel.
    Can you tell us what you think are the top three problems, and what you
    think are the short and long term solutions to address them?
        Response: Some of the most pressing human capital challenges at DHS
    include successfully completing its ongoing transformation; forging a
    unified results-oriented culture across the department; linking daily
    operations to strategic outcomes; rewarding individuals based on
    individual, team, unit, and organizational results; and obtaining,
    developing, providing incentives to, and retaining needed talent.
    Moreover, employee satisfaction with their involvement in
    decisionmaking and feelings of empowerment are low, as measured by
    results in the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey.
        Given the strategic importance of human capital management to the
    success of DHS, finding cost-effective, feasible long-term solutions is
    the most appropriate management approach. DHS needs to continue its
    efforts to
             link organizational goals to individual performance
             use competencies to provide a fuller assessment of
            performance
             make meaningful distinctions in employee performance
             continue to incorporate adequate safeguards to ensure
            fairness and guard against abuses
             involve employees in important decisions such as how
            they are deployed and how work is assigned
        We have also made recommendations to specific program offices and
    organizational entities to help ensure that human capital resources are
    provided to improve the effectiveness of management capabilities and
    that human capital plans are developed that clearly describe how these
    components will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing
    demands as they expand and implement new program elements.

        Question 5.: Mr. Walker, in the report you cite that DHS reported
    to you as of March 2007 that it was scanning 91 percent of
    containerized cargo entering the United States by land or sea ports of
    entry. This Committee has also been provided with similar, although
    more detailed information about scanning cargo for radiation. For that
    performance expectation, which was number 4: ``Coordinate deployment of
    nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities
    and other countermeasures'' under the Science and Technology section,
    the GAO Assessment was ``Generally not achieved.''
            a. Do you believe the Department is in fact scanning less than
            91 percent of containerized cargo entering the U.S.? If so,
            what is your basis for that assessment?
        Response: DHS has made progress in deploying radiation detection
    equipment at US sea ports. We do not disagree with the Department's
    statement that it is screening 91 percent of containerized cargo
    entering the country, but that screening is only to detect nuclear and
    radiological materials. We concluded that DHS has generally not
    achieved the performance expectation to ``Coordinate deployment of
    nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological detection capabilities
    and other countermeasures'' because there is no comparable activity for
    biological and chemical detection. DHS did not provide us with
    documentation on its effort to coordinate the deployment of
    countermeasures beyond radiation detection capabilities at ports of
    entry and monitoring of aerosol-based attacks. In addition, until DHS
    more completes its threat assessments across all sectors, DHS may not
    fully now what technologies or countermeasures are needed to address
    identified threats and vulnerabilities.

        Question 6.: Mr. Walker, in the S&T section of the report, nuclear,
    radiological, biological, and chemical detection are all somewhat
    grouped together.
            a. Can you compare among them for us, and tell us your opinion
            of the maturity of the rad/nuke, biological and chemical
            detection technologies respectively?
            b. Because rad/nuke detection has moved out of the S&T
            directorate and is now within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
            Office, can you compare and contrast the process and efficacy
            for threat assessment, RDT&E, and where applicable, technology
            deployment between S&T and DNDO?
            c. Are the two directorates cooperating or coordinating?
        Response: DHS has developed and deployed equipment at ports of
    entry for detection of radiological and nuclear materials entering the
    United States. The department has also developed and deployed
    technologies to detect possible biological and chemical agents in the
    air. However, we have not evaluated or compared the maturity of these
    detection capabilities. Moreover, we have not compared and contrasted
    the assessment and deployment processes used by the Science and
    Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. We
    also have not reviewed the extent to which the Science and Technology
    Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office coordinate their
    efforts.

        Question 7.: Mr. Walker, in the first performance expectation for
    the S&T directorate: ``Develop a plan for departmental research,
    development, testing and evaluation activities,'' you note several
    reports put out by the Department and that each report seems to do well
    in some area and fails in others. For example, the report states that
    ``The Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan and associated
    Five-Year Research [and] Development Plan provide information on
    deliverables and milestones for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.
    However, these plans do not include goals and measures for the
    department's science and technology activities. In addition, according
    to the department, these plans do not address the requirement in the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the department to develop a national
    policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives
    and policies for, and coordinating the federal government's civilian
    efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
    biological, and other emerging terrorist threats, upon which the
    performance expectation is, in part, based.''
            a. Can you differentiate between goals, milestones, measures,
            and deliverables and explain why each need to be included and
            why the Department included deliverables and milestones but not
            goals and measures?
        Response: Effective strategic plans contain strategic or long-term
    goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives,
    for the major functions and operations of the agency. The strategic
    goals constitute a specific set of policy, programmatic, and management
    objectives for the programs and operations covered in the strategic
    plan, and serve as a framework from which the annual performance goals
    are derived. Strategic goals explain what results are expected from the
    agency's major functions and when to expect those results. Such goals
    are an outgrowth of the mission and are very often results-oriented.
    Strategic plans should indicate how progress toward achieving strategic
    goals will be measured. Effective strategic plans should also show an
    obvious link between strategic goals and the specific actions or
    deliverables that will be needed to meet those goals. These actions or
    deliverables, in turn, should be clearly linked to milestones
    describing when such actions will take place. We provide an explanation
    of each term below:
             Strategic Goal: A statement of aim or purpose that
            defines how an agency will carry out a major segment of its
            mission over a period of time. Most strategic goals will be
            outcomes, and are long-term in nature. The strategic goal is
            expressed in a manner which allows a future assessment to be
            made of whether the goal was or is being achieved.
             Performance Goal: Sets a target level of performance
            over time expressed as a tangible, measurable objective,
            against which actual achievement can be compared, including a
            goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value or rate. A
            performance goal is comprised of a performance measure with
            targets and timeframes.
             Performance Measure: An indicator, statistic or metric
            used to gauge program performance against goals.
             Milestones: A schedule of significant actions that
            need to take place to achieve the goals in a strategic plan.
             Deliverables: Products or services to be provided as
            specified in a contract or plan.

        Questions 8.: Mr. Walker, you considered the assessment of emerging
    CBRN threats to generally not achieved. Last year, as you note in your
    report, DHS S&T completed a risk assessment of 28 biological agents and
    then went on to conduct 14 Material Threat Determinations (MTD)
    required under project BioShield.
            a. Do you consider the risk assessment of the 28 biological
            agents or the MTDs to be inadequate or sub-par?
            b. What about similar risk assessments for rad/nuke and
            chemical agents?
        Response: We did not evaluate the quality of risk assessments and
    Material Threat Determinations that have been conducted by DHS. We
    based our assessment of generally not achieved primarily on the fact
    that DHS was in the process of completing assessments in some sectors.
    Our analysis showed that DHS has completed some assessments on
    biological and chemical threats and vulnerabilities. However, at the
    time of our report DHS was still in the process of completing
    assessments in the chemical sector as well as its Integrated Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Assessment. Based on our
    analysis, we concluded that DHS's assessments overall appeared to be in
    the early stages.

        Question 9.: Responsibility for securing the maritime
    transportation system falls to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
    Protection, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation
    Security Administration, other Federal, State, and local agencies,
    foreign partners, and the private sector. The scope is enormous and
    includes 300 plus domestic seaports, 12 million maritime containers,
    and hundreds of vessels. With all of these stakeholders and missions,
    it seems that this category would see the least amount of progress but
    the opposite is true.
            a. What makes maritime security different?
            b. Is it a priority for the Department and therefore more
            resources and attention were given to this area than
            immigration enforcement?
        Response: While our work was not designed to explain why DHS has
    made varying levels of progress in implementing its mission and
    management areas or how the department prioritized among those areas,
    we can provide a few observations on maritime security. The two key
    agencies responsible for the maritime security mission--the Coast Guard
    and U.S. Customs and Border Protection--already had authorities to
    conduct security-related activities. These two agencies had the
    infrastructure in place--such as trained staff, assets like ships and
    aircraft, and a field structure at the ports. These agencies also had
    leadership that moved ahead with various security initiatives, such as
    the Coast Guard creating Area Maritime Security Committees to
    coordinate activities and share information and CBP creating
    partnerships with other countries (through the Container Security
    Initiative) and the private sector (through the Customs-Trade
    Partnership Against Terrorism).

        Question 10.: Would you agree with DHS that the GAO's methodology
    led to ``an inaccurate representation of the Department's progress?''
            a. What do you consider that most significant limitations of
            the review and your resulting report?
            b. To what extent do you agree or disagree that these
            limitations impaired the results of you analysis?
            c. Can you briefly respond to the methodological ``flaws''
            cited DHS, and does the Department have valid concerns?
        Response: As we acknowledge in our report and testimony, our
    methodology has several limitations. For example, we have completed
    varying degrees of work for each mission and management area, and DHS's
    components and offices provided us with different amounts and types of
    information. As a result, our assessments of DHS's progress in each
    mission and management area reflected the information available for our
    review and analysis and are not equally comprehensive across all 14
    mission and management areas. Further, while there are qualitative
    differences between the performance expectations, we did not weigh some
    more heavily than others in our overall assessments of mission and
    management areas.
        In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS took issues with
    several different aspects of our methodology. For example, DHS believed
    that we altered the criteria we used to judge the department's
    progress. We did not change our criteria; rather we made a change in
    terminology to better convey the intent behind the performance
    expectations that DHS achieve them instead of merely taking actions
    that apply or relate to them. DHS was also concerned about an apparent
    shift in criteria we applied after the department provided us
    additional information and documents. What DHS perceived as a change in
    criteria for certain performance expectations was really the process by
    which we disclosed our preliminary assessment; analyzed additional
    documents and information from DHS; and updated and, in many cases
    revised, our assessments based on the additional inputs. Further, DHS
    raised concerns with consistency in our application of the methodology.
    Our core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all inputs from GAO
    staff to ensure consistent application of our methodology, criteria,
    and analytical process, and our quality control process included
    detailed reviews of the report's facts as well as assurances that we
    followed generally accepted government auditing standards. Overall,
    while we appreciate DHS's concerns about our methodology, we recognize
    that in such a broad-based endeavor, some level of disagreement is
    inevitable. We have been as transparent as possible regarding our
    purpose, methodology, and professional judgments and believe that our
    methodology provides a sound basis for assessing DHS's progress.