[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FARM TO FORK: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT THE FOOD YOU EAT
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FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-55
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
Jessica Herra-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, Chairman
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York TOM DAVIS, Virginia
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
Officio) Officio)
Jeff Greene, Director & Counsel
Brian Turbyfill, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 1
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 2
WITNESSES
Mr. T. David Filson, Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness and
Response, Partnership Expansion Leader, Penn State Cooperative
Extension:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Dr. Frederic J. Hoerr, Professor, College of Veterinary Medicine,
Auburn University:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Dr. Thomas McGinn, Director, Veterinary and Agriculture Security,
Office of Health Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
FARM TO FORK: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT THE FOOD YOU EAT
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MONDAY, JULY 9, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigation,
and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in
Room 1 of the Wyoming County Courthouse, Tunkhannock,
Pennsylvania, Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the
Subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Carney and Rogers.
Mr. Carney. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
Subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on Farm to
Fork: Partnerships to Protect the Food You Eat. First, I would
like to thank everybody for joining us here today in our neck
of the woods. It is not every day that Tunkhannock, let alone
Northeast Pennsylvania, gets to host a Congressional Hearing.
I would like to recognize a few people in the audience.
Stark Bartron, County Commissioner, Mayor Norm Ball, Tony
Litwin, County Commissioner, friends and neighbors from the
area. I appreciate you showing up today, it is very nice to see
you. Thanks also goes to the Subcommittee's ranking member, Mr.
Mike Rogers, for taking a couple of days out of his busy 4th of
July schedule to travel all the way up here from Alabama.
Hopefully, the weather is very reminiscent of his home back in
Alabama. And finally I would like to thank our friends at
Cargill at Taylor Packing for allowing us to come up this
morning for a visit. We had a very enlightening trip, tour of
the plant.
And we are here today to examine how the Department of
Homeland Security will work with its partners at all levels of
government, as well as with the private sector in the event of
a large-scale food contamination or agro-terror event.
Agriculture is one of Pennsylvania's leading industries.
According to the most recent data complied by the State
Department of Agriculture, 59,000 farm families farm over 7.7
million acres in this state alone. And it is not just farms
that contribute to our agriculture industry, there are over
2,000 food producers, producing businesses, scattered across
the state that create goods for market or prepare food stuffs
for the next steps toward a finished product. And Pennsylvania
is not alone, as we understand. Many states rely upon
agriculture as a major piece of their economy. Most consumers
take for granted what it takes to keep bringing food to their
tables. Aside from just planting, farming and harvesting, the
industry produces, packs and ships to market. Not to mention
safety, which is an integral part of every step of the process.
They do all these things. While domestic sources account for
the vast majority of what appears on our plates at every meal,
America imports roughly 15 percent of what we eat. Food and
agriculture safety are paramount to not only our health but to
our economy as well. We have already seen relatively small
scale food scares be it dirty scallions, tainted spinach or E.
Coli outbreaks, etcetera. But if we are facing a truly wide-
spread event, let alone an international one, this nation would
be crippled.
In Pennsylvania alone, production, agriculture and related
agribusiness contributes over $40 billion to our economy
annually. Putting aside the economic damages, responding to
potential health issues would also be very daunting. In the
event of a large-scale food safety event, we cannot have mass
confusion. Clear leadership is a must. It is up to the
Department of Homeland Security to coordinate any crisis
response should our Nation's agriculture industry come under
attack while respecting the expertise of other federal agencies
and state and local government as well.
As we have seen in other scenarios, some agencies that
should have been listening to DHS, treat it more like the new
kid on the block, which hindered its ability to operate
effectively. DHS has responsibility of coordinating response,
disseminating information and allocating needed resources. It
only makes sense that if there were an agro-terror or food
contamination event, DHS would coordinate, not only with state
and local governments, but with the US Department of
Agriculture, the US Department of Health and Human Services and
the Food and Drug Administration as well for more focused
expertise.
Homeland Security has also established partnerships with
industry as well as we saw with Taylor Packing this morning or
Cargill this morning. The federal government is great at large-
scale planning and response but private industry is much better
suited to police itself for food contamination and from agro-
terror.
Long before DHS stood up today, Taylor Packing, which, of
course, is now Cargill that we toured, established an uphill
standard for excellence in food handling. It is vital that our
farmers and small businesses continue to do everything they can
to ensure the safety and quality of our food. Ensuring that
robust security and food handling procedures are in place and
in practice at every agro-business is essential to preventing
an economically devastating agro event.
The Department of Homeland Security, the state and local
governments have done a good job in preventing a food
catastrophe thus far and I am looking forward to hearing from
Mr. Filson and Dr. Hoerr to hear their thoughts on how we can
better prepare to prevent any agro-terror event.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member from the
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Rogers. I want to thank you, Chairman Carney. It is
good to be here with you in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania and
have a chance to find out how we can better help protect our
food supply. I want to thank the witnesses for being with us
and particularly Dr. Hoerr from Auburn coming up. He is from
the School of Veterinary Medicine at Auburn University and is a
leader, a world leader, in avian flu. I want to thank him.
East Alabama is similar to northern Pennsylvania in its
support for agriculture. Here, dairy farming is prevalent and
in my home area, poultry farming is prevalent. The annual
receipts for farm and poultry products in Alabama are about $5
billion. Of this total, approximately 47 percent is in the
production of broiler chickens, which is Alabama's number one
agricultural commodity. In fact, Alabama rates number three in
the county for poultry production marketing over one billion
chickens annually. An outbreak of highly contagious avian flu
could be devastating to the economy of my home state, as well
as our nation.
And if such an outbreak among poultry and wild birds is not
properly contained and controlled, we could increase the risk
that this disease will find its way into the human population.
An outbreak of this type is one reason why my constituents in
Alabama, like the folks here in northern Pennsylvania, want to
know what is being done in this area.
Today we will hear from the chief veterinarian from the
Department of Homeland Security. Of special interest is how DHS
coordinates with the USDA and state agencies to protect our
food supply. We also look forward to hearing from our witnesses
about what steps are being taken and what additional steps
should be taken to help prevent an act of agro-terrorism and
the spread of foreign animal diseases.
I am sure the information we learn today will be helpful in
our work on the Homeland Security Committee, as well as the
House Agriculture Committee on which I am also a member.
And I want to thank Chairman Carney again for inviting me
up here.
Mr. Carney. I want to thank Mr. Rogers for taking the time.
It really is nice to have a good bipartisan committee. Mr.
Rogers and I were very close together in a number of issues and
this is something we are both very concerned with.
I want to welcome the witnesses today. Our first witness is
Dr. Tom McGinn. Dr. McGinn has had a background in dairy and
beef farming before going to veterinary college, graduating
from North Carolina State University in 1987. As an assistant
state veterinarian to North Carolina, in 1993, he pioneered the
use of geographic information systems for animal and human
health management. He is currently the director of veterinary
and agricultural security for the office of the chief medical
officer of the Department of Homeland Security. Our second
witness is Mr. David Filson. Mr. Filson is the emergency
preparedness and response coordinator for the Penn State
Cooperative Extension and is responsible for ensuring that it
is prepared to play a key role in the event of an agricultural
emergency. He also serves as the partnership leader and is a
liaison to state and federal agencies and other organizations.
In that capacity, he is responsible for building, maintaining
and enhancing professional connections and funding partnerships
with a variety of agencies and organizations. He is a Penn
State alumnus, having received his MS and BS from the College
of Agricultural Sciences. Welcome.
Our final witness is Dr. Frederic Hoerr. Dr. Hoerr is a
professor at Auburn University, College of Veterinary Medicine.
He also serves as director of the Alabama Diagnostic
Laboratories. The TBS State Diagnostic Laboratory is a member
of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network and conducts
surveillance on foreign animal diseases, including avian
influenza and Exotic Newcastle Disease. I am not sure what that
is, please enlighten us. Dr. Hoerr supervises eight
veterinarians who provide diagnostic services for livestock,
poultry, wildlife and companion animals. Dr. Hoerr received his
DVM and his MS and a Ph.D. from Purdue University and has
veterinary specialty certifications from the American College
of Poultry Veterinarians and the American College of Veterinary
Pathologists.
Without objections, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. Also, asking the audience's consent
that we have the report, who is in charge, Dr. Filson, entered
into the record. Without objection, so ordered.
I now ask each witness to summarize their statement for
five or so minutes, whatever it takes, beginning with Dr.
McGinn. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS MCGINN, DIRECTOR, VETERINARY AND
AGRICULTURE SECURITY, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. McGinn. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to
be with you this afternoon and Congressman Rogers as well.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here in Wyoming County.
Wyoming means extensive meadows and Tunkhannock means small
streams, so we must be in the area of great agricultural
capabilities.
You have asked me to report to you today on the progress
being made to prepare for, to prevent and to respond and
recover to acts of bioterrorism, agroterrorism, outbreaks of
contagious diseases and natural disasters that would affect our
food system.
A little bit of my background is 25 years as a dairyman, as
a cattleman and as a veterinarian. I have worked extensively
with contagious infectious diseases and what I found is that
turning to the industries, like you mentioned earlier in Taylor
Packing earlier this morning, gives us the ability to
understand how they actually resolve problems and actually have
the ability to contribute. So this is really a public/private
partnership that we are invested in in terms of being able to
protect the food supply in our country.
I have also been a deputy commander for one of the VMAT
teams, veterinary medical assistance teams, and the founder of
the State Animal Response Teams, SART, in North Carolina and I
will come back to that as it relates to Pennsylvania in just a
moment. And had the opportunity to work in many disasters in
those capacities, as well as you mentioned now with Homeland
Security.
My history with Pennsylvania, I have a great love for
Pennsylvania. I came here about five years ago, was invited by
the state veterinarian to talk about how to prepare for and
respond to disasters in Pennsylvania. And at that point in
time, presented on what North Carolina was doing because I was
there in North Carolina and then also encouraged Pennsylvania
to develop a State Animal Response Team as well.
Part of what I understood when I was in North Carolina was
that emergency management and the capability to respond to an
agricultural disaster begins at the county level and then at
the state level. It begins with the private industry in concert
with the local folks and the state folks having the ability to
respond for two reasons. One, the response could be in multiple
counties and multiple states at the same time particularly if
it is of an agricultural nature of a Homeland Security impact.
And so the ability of counties and states to work with their
industry to respond quickly and effectively is the kind of
needs that we have just out of the gate to be able to respond
to a disaster.
We also have to develop the ability to have seamless
response, seamless diagnostics and seamless recovery
capabilities as it relates to any sort of emergency.
I am proud to be here to renew my commitments to the State
of Pennsylvania from within the Department of Homeland Security
because what we realize is the ability for Pennsylvania to have
secure agricultural capability is the same ability that we have
throughout our entire country.
I am very proud to point to the $40-plus billion that
Pennsylvania contributes to the food and ag vitality of this
state and thereby to that of the nation.
Pennsylvania also has the third largest port in the nation
as it relates to agriculture and the first largest port as it
relates to fruits in the entire nation. So you can see you have
a very important critical component of the infrastructure that
needs to be protected.
You have 58,000 farmers and you contribute $14.5 billion
through your restaurant industries as listed in 2005. You have
an excellent tripartite relationship within the diagnostic
laboratory system between your Department of Agriculture, Penn
State and the University of Pennsylvania.
You have a very successful food program that is emulated
throughout the entire country in the way that you--your
labeling of your food, Manufacturers Registry Programs.
You have 60 of your 67 counties with county animal response
capability. That is a model for the rest of the country. It is
a great testimony and a great example of how other states can
build their capability to be able to respond. Again, we have to
have that response capability for one county to be able to help
another county and for states to be able to help states in
order for our Nation's food to be secure.
You have also been successful in Pennsylvania to obtain the
Homeland Security dollars, a little over a million dollars per
year to be invested into this vital component of your economy.
So being able to demonstrate the value of getting those
Homeland Security dollars to protect your food and agriculture
is a very important process and it is also a great example to
the other states of ways in which they can then emulate what
Pennsylvania is doing as well.
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security, and I
have brought and I will leave these with everyone as well, are
basically five goals within Homeland Security. We are to
protect the nation against dangerous people, against dangerous
goods, protect the critical infrastructure, have a nimble and
effective emergency response system and a culture of
preparedness and strengthen and unify the operations in
management within DHS. And we have discussed how important
management is to this Subcommittee.
The goals within the Office of Health Affairs is to serve
as a principle medical and veterinary authority to the
Department of Homeland Security. We actually run the biodefense
and agrodefense activities within the Department of Homeland
Security. We do the internal and external coordination of the
programs and we also provide the point of contact for state,
federal and local capabilities, as well as the private sector
on veterinary and public health issues.
The first person that the chief medical officer within the
Office of Health Affairs hired was a veterinarian. This is the
emphasis that our office has placed on animal health as a
component of human health and the one medicine approach that we
see as it relates to health that is vital to health of the
communities and of the states. We now hired three veterinarians
into the Office of Health Affairs and so we are very thankful
to be able to start building this capability within animal
health in the Department of Homeland Security.
The goals for this office, the Office of Food, Animal and
Veterinary Medicine, are as follows. To stand up this office,
to build this capability. To build a strategic plan for food,
agriculture and veterinary medicine. We currently have not yet
developed this sort of strategic planning and this is one of
the first goals that I have as the director of this office. We
also need to be able to give the accountability for our
directives within HSPD-9 and to be able to answer the questions
that are related to the GAO and the IG reports and then we got
to be able to work with the different--coordinating with the
different agencies right down to the private sector in our
abilities to execute what is necessary for the protection of
our food supply.
The secretary has also given our office the lead on food,
agriculture and veterinary issues, as well as Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9.
Within Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 there are
19 tasks. Seventeen of these DHS has responsibilities for. Five
of those 17 are in a supportive role, for example, to the
national veterinary stockpile. Five we co-lead and those are
vulnerability assessments, border protection, specialized
training, counter measures developments and secure biolabs. We
also have seven that we are responsible for in a leadership
capacity. They are in the area of intelligence, biothreat
assessment, adequate local response capabilities and adequate
planning, coordinated planning. In the area of information
sharing, particularly with the private sector, and then the
Centers of Excellence, of which there are two. One is centered
around the University of Minnesota and that is in post-harvest
and the other one is centered around the University of Texas, A
& M in pre-harvest. It is these coordinated plans and this
ability to rapidly respond in an inner-agency, integrated
manner is the kind of capability that you are looking for from
the Department of Homeland Security.
We also have over 30 programs with responsibilities in food
and agriculture and veterinary medicine. Thirty programs. These
are divided into basically five directives, science and
technology, FEMA, customs and border, our Office of Health
Affairs and intelligence and analysis. Within science and
technology, let me highlight just a couple of programs which
are important to you. One is in the building of additional
counter-measures, such as the latest vaccines and diagnostic
capabilities. Another in the management of the Plum Island
Diagnostic Facility, which we coordinate with USDA. There are
roughly 500 routine shipments to Plum each year of potential
foreign animal diseases and is important to facilities like the
one we visited this morning, Taylor Packing. Those are
diagnosed in a very rapid and accurate manner to maintain their
ability to provide the food that we all enjoy.
The biothreat assessment capabilities and then we mentioned
the Center of Excellences. They have tremendous relationships,
these Centers of Excellence, with the private sector and they
are vital to our ability to protect the homeland since over 70
percent of the critical infrastructure in food and agriculture
are owned by the private sector. Another area, FEMA's grant
systems. I mentioned that you have been able to in this
facility to--I mean, within Pennsylvania you have been able to
obtain a million dollars in the grant programs into the food
and ag sector. It is a great, great testimony to the work here.
One of the challenges that we have is making sure that we
analyze these grants that are being given to all states, being
able to determine which programs are being effective in putting
resources into the food and ag area and then showing those
effective states to other states so that we can be able to
demonstrate best practices and ways to obtain further grants in
that competitive process within the state, so that then we can
further protect the food and agricultural commodities and
sectors within that state.
I mentioned the intelligence community. DHS has a vital
role in collecting, analyzing, fusing data within our National
Biosurveillance Integration System. It is not just agricultural
data that we are bringing in those programs, we are also
bringing in data from hospitals, from other medical networks
from around the world and from the environmental capabilities.
These sorts of biosurveillance efforts actually result in
the ability of building an effective tool to combat the war on
terrorism in a similar way that sonar and radar have been used
in previous wars.
Customs and borders. This will be my last example. Customs
and borders. We have seen a tremendous working relationship
being established between the USDA and the Department of
Homeland Security in customs and borders. Both secretaries have
recently signed a letter supporting customs and border ag
specialists to remain within the Department of Homeland
Security. They are developing excellent working relationships.
The number of inspectors has increased 30 percent. The number
of dog teams have gone up significantly as well. And there is
these pest risk committees, risk pest committees, at each port.
The Port of Philadelphia has an excellent example of one of
these committees. It has three states, university personnel,
private sector, state governmental folks were working together
with these pest risk committees to be able to make sure that
the ports are secure and the stakeholders' needs are being met.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today and I want to thank you for the leadership of this
committee to actually improve and give guidance to the
protection of our food supply for our children and our
children's children's future. Thank you.
[Statement of Dr. McGinn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Tom McGinn
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the progress we are making at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent, respond to, and
recover from acts of agroterrorism, major disease outbreaks or natural
disasters affecting the Nation's livestock, crops and food supply. I
will also address concerns regarding our national food supply chain and
highlight a specific application to the food and agricultural industry
in Pennsylvania.
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and enacted laws and
appropriations with various agroterrorism-related provisions. The
executive branch has responded by implementing the new laws, and
creating liaison and coordination offices. The Government
Accountability Office has studied several issues related to
agroterrorism and made very useful recommendations. Various Homeland
Security Presidential Directives were issued to direct the development
of national efforts to combat natural and intentional threats against
critical infrastructures, including agriculture.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act was enacted in 2002 to address agroterrorism preparedness
and response vulnerabilities identified following September 1 1,200 1.
Agriculture-specific provisions included expanding the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) authority over food manufacturing and imports,
tightened control of biological agents and toxins under rules by the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), expanded agricultural security activities
and security upgrades at USDA facilities, and increased criminal
penalties for terrorism against animal enterprises and violation of the
select agent rules. Concurrently, DHS became responsible for
coordinating the overall national efforts to enhance the protection of
the critical infrastructure and key resources of the U.S.
Among the Homeland Security Presidential Directives, HSPD-9,
Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, was issued to establish
a national policy to defend the Nation's agriculture and food systems
against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The
directive recognizes role as ``responsible for coordinating the overall
national effort to enhance the protection of the critical
infrastructure and key resources of the United States'' and
acknowledges the DHS Secretary as ``the principal federal official to
lead, integrate and coordinate implementation of efforts'' to protect
critical infrastructure as outlined in HSPD-7. These efforts include
mitigation of vulnerabilities in food, agriculture and water systems,
as well as developing a robust biological threat awareness capacity. Of
the 21 tasks for which DHS is designated as having significant
responsibility, DHS has the lead for 12, in which the Office of Health
Affairs (OHA) is responsible, in either a lead or support role, for
coordination. The 12 activities fall under 5 ``pillars.'' Those pillars
are:
1) Awareness and Warning: under which fall intelligence operations
and analysis of biological threat assessments;
2) Vulnerability Assessments: under which DHS is to assess our
national vulnerability to a broad spectrum of threats;
3) Mitigation Strategies: under which DHS will develop and
implement response strategies, as well as screen our national borders;
4) Response Planning Recovery: includes activities involving local
response capabilities and coordinating them with overall response
planning; and
5) Outreach and Development: which involves information sharing and
analysis mechanisms, specialized training in agriculture and food
protection, continued research and development of countermeasures
against diseases, plans to provide biocontainment labs for research
capabilities and the establishment of university-based Centers of
Excellence.
DHS OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS (OHA)
Secretary created the Office of Health Affairs as part of the
Departmental reorganization on January 18,2007. OHA was created to
protect the health and security of the American people in full
coordination and collaboration with other DHS components, Federal
partners, and the private sector. Responsibilities and activities
within the do not duplicate or supplant activities currently being
provided by other components or programs within DHS or among the
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. The OHA Assistant
Secretary and Chief Medical Officer (CMO) has the specific
responsibility to coordinate Federal activities to protect human
health, livestock, crops, and the food supply. OHA's goals are as
follows:
Serve as Secretary's principal medical and veterinary
authority for DHS;
Coordinate DHS biodefense (including agrodefense)
activities, to include policy, planning, strategy,
requirements, operational programs and metrics;
Ensure coordination of medical and veterinary
preparedness activities;
Serve as primary DHS point of contact for governments
and the private sector on medical and veterinary and public
health issues; and
Discharge DHS responsibilities under Project
The Department serves as the integrator of Federal, state and local
resources that are dedicated to preserving the security of the Nation.
With specific reference to agroterrorism preparedness, in a memo dated
March 28,2007, Secretary designated Assistant Secretary and Chief
Medical Officer as the DHS official accountable for the implementation
of the Department's responsibilities for veterinary, food and
agriculture security. . .[who] will also coordinate the Department's
responsibilities for implementation of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9, Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food.''
Within OHA, I serve as the Director of Food, Agriculture and
Veterinary (FAV) Defense. FAV defense goals are to ensure food and
agriculture are actualized as Critical Infrastructure, understand and
strengthen public confidence in food protection through assessment and
advancement, ensure critical stakeholders are functionally aligned, and
assist all DHS Food, Ag and Veterinary programs in attaining
operational capability. OHA FAV Defense activities are fostering
efficiency and effectiveness across 30 programs within DHS regarding
food and agricultural and veterinary defense.
THE FOOD SECTOR
The post-harvest food industry accounts for 12 percent of the
Nation's economic activity and employs more than 10 percent of the
American workforce. It consists of enormous subsectors, including
business lines addressing processing, storage, transportation, retail,
and food service. Statistics on just two of these subsectors serve to
illustrate the magnitude of the sector. The National Restaurant
Association projects that the industry's 925,000 domestic locations
will reach $51 1 billion in sales for 2006, serving over 70 billion
``meal and snack occasions'' for the year. Meanwhile, the Nation's $460
billion food retail business consists of more than 34,000 supermarkets,
13,000 smaller food markets, 1,000 wholesale club stores, 13,000
convenience stores, and 28,000 gas station food outlets. Like the other
components of the food industry, these subsector business units have a
broad geographic distribution and are present in all regions of the
country.
Private sector entities are the predominant owners and operators of
the food sector. Federal, state, and local governments have noteworthy
food production, distribution, retail, and service operations, but
these are small when compared to private sector operations. Regulation
of the food industry is divided between Federal, state, and local
agencies. State, territorial, and local governments conduct oversight
of food retail and food service establishments within their
jurisdictions. These levels of government oversee restaurants,
institutional food service establishments, and hundreds of thousands of
food retailers.
The food sector experiences several types of significant adverse
events. Among these, intentional food contamination is of great concern
and preventing such events has grown in importance since the attacks of
September 1 1,2001. Food products may be deliberately contaminated with
a wide variety of chemical, biological, or radiological agents. Despite
that range of possible contaminating agents and the open vulnerability
of many links in the food supply chain, there have been few recorded
cases of deliberate food contamination in the United States. However,
we would be grossly remiss if we began to rely upon that historical
safety and assume it will continue into the future.
Food safety practitioners also devote considerable attention and
resources to hazards associated with unintentional food contamination.
In the past, this type of food contamination has led to many major
outbreaks, which have occurred with much more frequency and on a
considerably larger scale than recognized deliberate acts. In 1985, for
example, the unintentional contamination of milk with Salmonella
typhimurium caused illness in 170,000 individuals in the United States.
A decade later, an estimated 224,000 people in 41 states became ill
after consuming ice cream with Salmonella enteriditidis.
The food sector could also suffer adversely from attacks or natural
events affecting other sectors. Because food is often consumed some
distance from its point of production, significant transportation
disruptions have the potential to spawn food shortages. The
availability of food products is also dependent on the continuing
efforts of the food sector workforce. Conditions that undermine the
willingness of food industry workers to go to their worksites or to
otherwise perform their jobs could also contribute to food shortages.
Major U.S. cities typically have access to about one week's supply of
food. Therefore, moderately sustained transportation or labor
disruptions would critically undercut the availability of food. Such a
disruption could occur, for example, during a widespread communicable
disease outbreak that kept food sector workers from their jobs.
Additionally, electricity disruptions seriously reduce the availability
and shelf-life of perishable foodstuffs.
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets,
termed agroterrorism, is increasingly recognized as a national security
threat, especially following the events during and after September 1
1,2001. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as
the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal
of generating fear, causing economic losses, undermining social
stability. The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants.
These are the means to the end of causing economic damage, social
unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at
risk if contaminated food reaches the table or if an animal pathogen is
transmissible to humans.
The agricultural sector has several characteristics that inherently
present unique vulnerabilities. Farms are geographically dispersed in
typically remote environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in
confined locations, and transported or commingled with other herds.
Many agricultural disease agents can be easily obtained, handled, and
distributed as they may be readily found in many areas outside the
United States and do not pose a safety risk to the aspiring
agroterrorist. Because of the relative success of our domestic
agricultural disease prevention activities, our herds are free from
more than 40 internationally significant diseases such as foot and
mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (formerly known as hog
cholera), and African swine fever. This success leads to great
vulnerability, however, as international trade in food products often
is tied to disease-free status, which could be jeopardized by an
attack. Because our herds have been free of these diseases for
generations and vaccines do not yet exist for many of them, our animals
are highly susceptible to natural or intentional introduction.
Moreover, most U.S. veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal
diseases that have been eradicated domestically but remain endemic in
foreign countries. In the past five years, agriculture and food
production have received a certain degree of increased attention from
the counterterrorism community and response capacities have been
significantly upgraded. However, as I stated previously, much work
remains before we can consider ourselves reasonably protected.
Specifically considering FMD, the disease can be spread rapidly by
aerosol and cause symptoms in cattle, swine, sheep, goats, deer, and
other ruminant species. The virus is incredibly transmissible and be
carried long distances by the natural environmental flow of air between
farms. Should this disease become established in susceptible U.S. wild
animal populations, eliminating it would prove problematic.
The risk of an attack on the Nation's livestock is defined by the
likelihood of a terrorist attempting to use a biologic agent to infect
livestock populations, the vulnerability of those livestock populations
to infection with the agent utilized, and the economic or other
consequence the attack. The overall economic impact of a natural or
intentional reintroduction of FMD would include the direct supply
shortages to livestock-dependent industries such as the meat and milk
industries. The feed industry would have an instant overabundance of
feedstuffs previously consumed by production animals that could not be
sold and employees of these industries would be adversely impacted.
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, major trade issues would
result as many other nations would likely ban the import of all U.S.
livestock products such as meat, milk, leather products, and feed.
These direct effects on the National economy and potential impacts from
quarantines and third and fourth order effects will reach into the
transportation, tourism and defense sectors of our economy as has been
seen in recent outbreaks such as occurred in the United Kingdom in
2001.
Computerized risk assessment scenarios conducted by DHS reveal that
a single point introduction of FMD could spread very rapidly and affect
millions of animals and cause billions of dollars in economic damage.
These risk assessment and impact analysis of an attack with this
biologic agent identify the vulnerability of our livestock populations
and the potentially devastating consequences of only one livestock
disease. DHS brings a great sense of urgency to develop and diagnostics
to combat a wide variety of these livestock bioterrorism threats.
WHAT'S BEING DONE BY DHS
In recent testimony, Secretary pointed out the $1.3 trillion of
this economy that's focused in agriculture. He asked the question, how
do we protect this system without damaging the prosperity and the
techniques that actually make it a vibrant part of the economy? His
answer was that anything DHS does has to be done in partnership with
farmers, producers and cooperatives to analyze and understand the
risks, and then work on a protection plan that ensures commerce is
preserved rather than impeded. On May 21,2007, the sector-specific plan
for agriculture and food was released; giving an overarching planning
framework for a cooperative effort between Federal, state, local and
tribal governments and the private industry to protect agricultural and
food systems. Likely next steps are to understand what reduces those
vulnerabilities and foster those activities in a strategic fashion.
DHS is working with USDA and FDA to conduct comprehensive risk
assessments for agricultural and food commodities, which can then be
used to identify protective measures and research and development gaps.
Additionally, we are working with those agencies and sector partners to
exercise communications, response and recovery efforts. A major threat
in the food and agriculture sectors is a crisis of confidence, where a
poorly prevented or recognized event causes people to question the
safety of food regionally or nationally. Therefore, a swift confidence-
building response is a critical objective of our planning and
exercising efforts. Another critical element is to continue to provide
online training tools for regulators, inspectors, farmers, food
producers and food cooperatives.
DHS is also advancing scientific research and analysis through
several national facilities. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center
(PIADC) is one such facility that provides diagnostic, research, and
teaching services to prevent the introduction and spread of foreign
animal diseases. As PIADC is aging and becoming increasingly costly to
operate, DHS is working with USDA to build the next-generation
laboratory that will allow advanced research to understand and develop
better preventions against the threats to humans, crops, and animals.
DHS sponsors two university Centers of Excellence to study emerging
issues related to food and defense--one at the University of Minnesota,
which conducts research on food defense and actually has a tool that
allows quick analysis and the other is a Center of Excellence at Texas
University that researches potential threats to animal agriculture.
Probably one of the most important activities DHS is undertaking
with regard to protecting the food and agricultural sectors concerns
intelligence collection, analysis, and application. DHS is fusing,
under the leadership of the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and
Chief Medical Officer, not only the typical kinds of information
received through the agricultural network about potential problems with
respect to food or animals, but adding information sources both the
health establishment hospitals and the medical network that CDC relies
upon) and the more traditional intelligence community information. We
need to know, for example, when and where there are highly pathogenic
avian influenza outbreaks so that appropriate import restrictions can
be immediately put in place to mitigate the threat to our domestic
poultry flocks. Once we get a better operating picture, DHS can put
measures in place at the borders to protect domestic animals and crops
from outside pests and microbes.
DHS also wants to integrate the various border defenses and enhance
them with human and technological capabilities to defend this country
against the deliberate or accidental introduction of foreign pathogens
or pests that could affect the viability of our crops and animals. One
key part of our border defense is the agricultural specialists within
DHS' Customs and Border Protection (CBP). These inspectors are
specifically trained and capable of focusing on reducing the risk from
imported foods, plants, or animals. Agricultural inspectors intercept
more than 4,000 prohibited meat, plant, and animal products every day
at US ports of entry. DHS recently formed a task force with the USDA to
address the concerns of agricultural stakeholders and to identify and
close gaps in the inspection process.
In March 2004, USDA, FDA and DHS invited the private sector to join
in the creation of two bodies, one for government officials and one for
private industry, to work together on security initiatives. The
industry sector coordinating council (SCC) is comprised of private
companies and associations representing key components of the food
system. The SCC has seven sub-councils spanning the farm-to-table
continuum--agricultural input, animal producers, plant or cop
producers, food processors, retail operations, warehouses and
establishments. The government coordinating council (GCC) is comprised
of Federal, state, tribal and local governmental agencies responsible
for a variety of activities including agricultural, food, veterinary,
public health, laboratory, and law enforcement programs. In simple
terms, the SCC and GCC are the liaison bodies that will plan,
coordinate, and implement homeland security policies and programs for
the food and agriculture sector.
There must be a continued effort to identify ways to motivate
public and private sectors to harden infrastructures and build a more
resilient U.S. economy through enhanced response capabilities. Such
resilience would facilitate the quicker reopening of a favorite
restaurant following a small scale natural disaster and an economy that
fuels recovery on a larger scale.
PENNSYLVANIA
The safety and security concerns of our food systems are shared by
consumers and government officials alike. Pennsylvania alone has nearly
12.5 million citizens, 58,000 farms, more than 3,200 food processors,
2,000 plus food warehouses, three large ports and a $14.5 billion
restaurant industry. In 2005, Pennsylvania saw agricultural cash
receipts of $4.8 billion and ranked in the top 10 of all states in
production categories. In the same year, Pennsylvania exported $1.1
billion worth of agricultural products to other countries. In terms of
the impact agriculture has on Pennsylvania's economy, the dairy
industry alone represents 1.4 percent of the Commonwealth's gross
domestic product. Agriculture in Pennsylvania must be recognized as an
extremely diverse industry with unique security needs. The day-to-day
production of the food supply is what most of us think of first when we
envision the entire agriculture sector. But agriculture also
contributes significantly to less obvious health and welfare areas such
as the development of vaccines and pharmaceutical research, the
inspection of restaurants and food processors, the prevention and
containment of unintentional outbreaks of food-borne illnesses, and the
monitoring and management of animal and plant diseases and pests.
The various segments of the food and agriculture sectors each have
their own current protocols and management practices to ensure safety
and security. However, it is essential that the Pennsylvania
Departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security work closely to create
a comprehensive, statewide strategy that protects consumers and the
Commonwealth's economic interest throughout all stages of the farm-to-
fork continuum. Agroterrorism, and even unintentional acts that impact
the Commonwealth's food supply and its security, has economic
ramifications, through the loss of products, markets and jobs, as well
as emotional ramifications of diminished consumer confidence in
agricultural products and, perhaps most importantly, a lower quality of
life.
Focusing on the animal agriculture industry, the Pennsylvania
Animal Diagnostic Laboratory System (PADLS) was created in 199 1 and is
a tripartite system joining the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture,
Pennsylvania State University, and the University of Pennsylvania
together for the mission of improving the health, safety and welfare of
families in Pennsylvania. Specifically, PADLS exists for the purpose of
protecting animals and humans from health threats by providing accurate
diagnoses to assist Pennsylvania's agricultural community in
controlling diseases to minimize economic loss. Also associated with
PADLS is a field investigation team of veterinary diagnosticians with
bases of operation at PADLS-Penn State and PADLS-New (University of
Pennsylvania's large animal facility). This team works with veterinary
practitioners who need support on difficult problems in the field and
are activated when there is a suspicion of any outbreak of disease that
may threaten Pennsylvania agriculture. Pennsylvania is also home to a
Biosafety Level 3 laboratory that can some of the most dangerous animal
diseases in the world.
In terms of response and recovery, the Pennsylvania State Animal
Response Team (PA SART) was formed in 2004 as a coordinated effort
between several governmental, corporate, and private entities dedicated
to preparation, planning, response, and recovery operations regarding
animal emergencies in Pennsylvania. The mission of PA SART is to
develop and implement procedures and train participants to facilitate a
safe, environmentally sound and efficient response to animal
emergencies at the local, county, state and Federal levels. Local
teams, called (County Animal Response Teams), have been initiated in 60
of 67 counties as of June, 2007. Funding for the PA SART and local CART
teams is currently. limited to Federal dollars. Progress includes the
following highlights:
Receipt of over $148,000 for purchase of equipment
from State Health Department;
Creation of on-line registration capability for
volunteers;
Establishment of as an IRS approved 501 (c) (3) non-
profit organization;
Receipt of from Office of Defense Preparedness for
calendar year 2006;
Receipt of $380,000 from DHS Office of Grants and
Training for 18 months effective January 1,2007;
Receipt of $50,000 from State Health Department for
training for calendar 2006; and
Sponsorship of a truckload of donated supplies sent to
a Hurricane Katrina ravaged area.
At the farm level, premises identification creates a unique numeric
identifier for livestock operations, which provides traceability back
through the food chain. The USDA also actively participates with the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Commonwealth's Regional
Counter-Terrorism Task Forces, and the Strategic Partnership Program
Agroterrorism Initiative.
The food distribution system would benefit from the expansion of
food safety and security protocols. There is no requirement for
trailers, railcars, or crate sealing for security and traceability as
these transports move through commerce. Ports represent serious
challenges as far as safety and security are concerned. Pennsylvania is
home to three ports, including the Port of Philadelphia, which is the
fourth largest port in the U.S. and the second largest port on the east
coast. The ports in Erie and Pittsburgh must also be addressed, but the
sheer volume of activity done in Philadelphia's port is staggering--
over 3,000 ships enter the port each year.
CONCLUSION
Agrosecurity, food safety and food defense are issues that will
only increase in importance as the food industry and regulatory
agencies continue to move forward in creating policies and procedures
to protect human and economic interests. This is a combined challenge
for all involved, from using similar taxonomy to devising common
reporting and response protocols during emergencies. Going forward,
DHS, FDA and USDA must continue to work together to create and train on
table top exercises, increase the familiarity of key players in the
three agencies, and communicate each agency's standard operating
procedures for different emergencies. Cross-agency efforts and funding
should be used to inform the public and even other governmental
organizations and leaders of the need for a strong relationship between
these agencies to keep the food supply safe, abundant and affordable.
Today, a single hamburger can have more than 80 ingredients, each
of which may originate in a separate country. The coordination of
states and local governments as central partners between the private
sector and the Federal government will create a model vision to be
emulated by other states. Mr. Chairman, the leadership you foster,
within the Federal government and within Pennsylvania, will provide for
that 'farm to fork' safety that Americans have come to expect. Thank
you for the opportunity to speak to the Subcommittee on the state of
food protection and security. This Subcommittee plays an important role
in helping all of us continue to improve upon the methods and
coordination necessary to detect and diminish threats to the Nation's
Agricultural and Food sectors. I look forward to continuing my working
relationship with you and the members of this Subcommittee and am happy
to address any questions you may have.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Dr. McGinn. Before we go to Mr.
Filson, I would like to do something I do not get to do in
Washington chairing the committee. A tan Camry, license plate
number ESH-6926 is blocking the driveway. Anybody who wants
to----
Mr. Filson. Welcome to rural Pennsylvania.
Mr. Carney. I will now recognize Mr. Filson for five
minutes or so.
STATEMENT OF DAVID FILSON, COORDINATOR, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE
Mr. Filson. Welcome to rural Pennsylvania. Chairman Carney,
Congressman Rogers, Congressional support staff and invited
guests, thank you for inviting me to share with you at this
Committee Hearing, Farm to Fork: Partnerships to Protect the
Food You Eat.
I am Dave Filson, an emergency preparedness and emergency
response coordinator for Penn State Extension. I am also the
chair elect for the National Extension Disaster Education
Network or EDEN and I have been with Penn State Extension for
22 years.
In my current role, I have a professional working
perspective and involvement in interagency collaboration or
partnerships at the federal, state and local level between and
among stakeholders across the entire continuum from Farm to
Fork. I have co-authored a series of three OG&T reviewed and
approved courses on agricultural emergencies and disasters and
have collaborated with other universities, APHIS and various
agencies and organizations on training material specific to
emergency management for agricultural disasters and emergency
preparedness.
I will focus my comments around these areas. The importance
of agriculture, the cost of a major agricultural disaster, the
partnerships in the food and agricultural system, documenting
the need and, finally, a few recommendations.
Less than three percent of our population is directly
involved in production agriculture and yet that group of
committed farmers and ranchers generate cash receipts in excess
of $900 billion or about 10 percent of the US Gross Domestic
Product. Include the allied and support industries and we have
about a $50 billion annual contribution to the national trade
balance.
US citizens spend less than 11 percent of their disposable
income to feed their families with the most nutritious, most
diverse and safest food supply in the world. Around the world,
other nations must spend two to three times or up to 30 percent
of their disposable income on food. Food and agriculture is not
only big business, it is vital to our very existence.
The Food and Mouth Disease outbreak in Great Britain
several years ago cost that country $32 billion. If a similar
scale outbreak occurred in the United States, the estimates on
the financial loss to the economy range as high as $140
billion. Additional losses would come from the loss of domestic
and export markets and a loss of confidence in the food system
and the agencies who are charged with protecting our food
system.
No less than five federal agencies have some responsibility
to ensure the safety of our food system. USDA and FDA have the
most visible roles but Homeland Security has overall
responsibility. EPA and Health and Human Services have
responsibilities at certain points. To complicate the issue
further, lead roles in food safety change from agency to agency
depending of whether the role is during prevention and
preparation or during response and recovery. At the state
level, similar diverse and varied responsibilities are held by
state level agencies that sometimes are similar to federal
agency responsibilities.
The State Department of Agriculture is lead partner with
the responsibilities for animals, plants and some food
products. Other state level agencies have various
responsibilities for food and agriculture safety. At the local
level, the diversity of responsibility, and I might add the
diversity of the level of preparedness, is even greater. Many
counties do not have a comprehensive emergency management plan
that addresses food and agriculture issues.
The system is truly complex. HSPD-9 in part says, ``the
United States agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to
disease, pests or poisonous agents that occur naturally or
unintentionally introduced or are intentionally delivered by
acts of terrorism. America's agriculture and food system is an
extensive open interconnected, diverse and complex structure
providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We should
provide the best protection possible against such successful
attacks on the United States agriculture and food system, which
could have catastrophic health and economic effects.''
One could argue that the system in place to protect our
food and agriculture system, with multiple agencies at federal,
state and local level, is also an extensive, open,
interconnected, diverse and complex structure. Our system of
food and agriculture safety is very complex but it works. Could
it be improved? Yes. Can we ensure zero risk? Absolutely not.
Partnerships exist and they function but sometimes the
effectiveness of the partnership is limited intentionally or
unintentionally by silo or stovepipe philosophy.
Communication up and down within an agency, both at the
federal and state level, occurs freely. That same degree of
collaboration and communication across or between agencies is
not nearly as open and free. The partnership is utilized when
it becomes imperative to bring others into the conversation.
Communication and collaboration issues have been identified
in nearly every exercise and nearly every report on agency
response capabilities. A March 20, 2007 GAO report entitled
``Critical Infrastructure Challenges Remain in Protecting Key
Sectors'', agriculture and food is one of our key
infrastructures and a key sector. The barriers to success as
identified in the report are difficulties in developing
partnerships, concerns about sharing information and lack of
long-standing working relationships.
Significant resources have been channeled from various
sources, Homeland Security, HHS, USDA, FDA and others to build
a better food and agriculture safety system. When we consider
the entire continuum from Farm to Fork, how much have we
invested to ensure food and agriculture safety on the farm?
Agencies are better staffed, better equipped, better trained,
better exercised, more knowledgeable, but what about the
poultry producer on the Eastern Shore, the Northeastern dairy
producers, the Mid-west corn and soybean growers, the Western
cattle feeders, swine producers in North Carolina and
Washington State apple growers? What investments from agencies
have been dedicated to the safety and security of our food and
agriculture system for the producer at the farm or ranch?
A national survey of agriculture producers by the Extension
Disaster Education Network asked producers a series of
questions. When asked, how likely do you think it is that
agroterrorism could happen somewhere in the United States, the
majority or 77 percent indicated that an agroterrorism event
would likely occur. Most thought it would not happen to them
individually but that it would occur. When asked, do you
believe you are properly prepared for agroterrorism or some
other biosecurity threat on your operation, only 14 percent
said yes. This should be a concern to all of us. I am not aware
of any funds from any federal agency allocated to improve our
agricultural producers' level of preparedness for food and
agriculture safety and security issues. No producer continuity
of operations, no agriculture producer contingency plans, no
producer disaster and terrorism plans. We have a $900 billion
industry that could receive some support for disasters
including terrorism. HSPD-9 says we should provide the best
possible protection. Should not that protection also include
the producer?
Numerous GAO reports indicate the critical nature of
surveillance and detection. Where better to enhance
surveillance and detection than at the production level and by
the individuals whose very livelihood depends on the continuous
market of safe and nutritious agricultural commodities. Multi-
agency response and recovery enhancement is important but
resources at the front end, at the producer level, including
surveillance and detection and individual disaster and
terrorist plans for agriculture producers may, in fact will
likely, result in a fewer potential incidents escalating to
disaster status when response and recovery are required.
In that same EDEN survey I mentioned earlier, producers
were asked, if you discovered a crop disease outbreak on your
farm that you didn't recognize, to whom would you turn for
advise? 80 percent of the producers across the nation indicated
that they would turn to Cooperative Extension. Same group,
different question. Who would they turn to if they discovered
an animal disease outbreak? The highest response was their
local veterinarian, which is logical. Following closely was the
Cooperative Extension System and no response to the producers
on whom they would contact did they indicate Homeland Security,
FEMA, APHIS or FDA.
There are a number of recommendations that I could bring to
your attention and they are fully listed in the narrative that
I have shared with you. Let me highlight several. Use real
world incidents such as spinach, peanut butter, wheat gluten,
Foot and Mouth Disease, Anthrax, soy bean rust, Exotic
Newcastle Disease, Plum Pox Virus and other real life food
safety incidents as valuable learning experiences. Find out
what went wrong and then try to fix it and then share reports
and findings across all agencies. Support and enhance existing
resources and networks such as the Cooperative Extension
System, the Extension Disaster Education Network and other
established resources. Re-focus efforts toward food and
agriculture safety and security at the producer level. Ensure
that states and local municipalities have comprehensive
emergency management plans that have resources, tasks and
protocols or standard operating procedures developed to
accurately represent the local food and agriculture community
for all disasters, including food and agriculture issues.
Support educational programs to increase awareness of the
complexity of the agriculture production system to agency staff
and first responders and educational programs to increase the
awareness of food and agriculture safety system, including NIMS
and the national response plan for the agricultural industry.
CSREES and the Cooperative Extension System have established
creditability and science to meet those needs. Evaluate the
work. What has been the effectiveness of resource allocation at
all levels to improve the safety and security of our food and
agriculture system? Is the system any more safe or more
prepared for disaster than before investment and to what degree
and at what levels? Support research and public outreach
programs that address current emerging issues on food and
agriculture safety and security. Again, the Cooperative
Extension System has science-based research in the National
Land-Grant System and reach capability into every county and
parish in the United States to address that need.
As we focus on the partnerships that protect the food you
eat, please consider the importance of the food production
industry. Consider how we collectively, with financial support
and with existing resources and networks, can place more
emphasis on preparedness and preparation, surveillance and
detection, response and recovery with possibly the most
important partner in this partnership, the American farmer and
rancher.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide my professional
perspective on the partnerships in the Farm to Fork Food
System.
[Statement of Mr. Filson follows:]
Prepared Statement of T. David Filson
Chairman Carney, Committee members, congressional support staff,
and invited guests, thank you for inviting me to share with you at this
committee hearing ``Farm to Fork: Partnerships to Protect the Food You
Eat''.
My name is Dave Filson, I am the Emergency Preparedness and
Emergency Response Coordinator, and Partnership Expansion Leader for
Penn State Cooperative Extension. I am also the chair-elect for the
National Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN). I have been with
Penn State Extension for 22 years.
In my current role, I have a professional working perspective and
involvement in interagency collaboration, or partnerships, at the
federal, state, and local level between and among stakeholders across
the entire continuum from ``Farm to Fork''. I have co-authored a series
of three OG&T reviewed and approved courses on Agricultural Emergences
and Disasters, and have collaborated with other universities, APHIS,
and various agencies and organizations on training material specific to
emergency management for agriculture disasters and emergency
preparedness.
I will focus my comments around these areas:
The Importance of Agriculture,
The Cost of a Major Agriculture Disaster,
The Partnerships in the Food and Agriculture System,
Documenting the Need, and finally,
Recommendations.
The Importance of Agriculture
Less than 3 % of our population is directly involved in production
agriculture, and yet that group of committed farmers and ranchers
generate cash receipts in excess of $900 billion dollars or about 10 %
of U.S. Gross Domestic Product. Include the allied and support
industries and we have about 50 billion annually contributing to the
national trade balance. U.S. agricultural exports are more than twice
the exports sold by other U.S. industries. The U.S. food system
employees an additional 15 % of the U.S. workforce across the diverse
network from ``Farm to Fork''. U.S. citizens spend less than 11 % of
their disposable income to feed their families with the most
nutritious, most diverse, and safest food supply in the world. Around
the world, other nations must spend two to three times, or up to 30 %
of their disposable income on food. Food and agriculture is not only
big business, it is vital for our very existence.
The Cost of a Major Agriculture Disaster
The Foot and Mouth outbreak in Great Britain cost that county $32
billion dollars. If a similar scale outbreak occurred in the United
States, the estimates on the financial loss to the economy range as
high as $140 billion dollars. Additional loss would come from loss of
domestic and export markets and a loss of confidence in the food system
and agencies who are charged with protecting our food system.
The Partnerships in the Food and Agriculture System
When we use the term ``partnership'' in the context of protecting
the food we eat, the number of agencies with responsibility in these
partnerships is so diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
describe how we as a nation ensure the safety of our food and
agriculture system. No less than five federal agencies have some
responsibility to ensure the safety of the food system. USDA and FDA
have the most visible roles, but Homeland Security has overall
responsibility. EPA and Health and Human Services have responsibilities
at some point. To complicate the issue further, lead roles in food
safety change from agency to agency depending on whether the role is
during Prevention and Preparation, or during Response and Recovery. At
the state level, similar diverse and varied responsibilities are held
by state level agencies that sometimes are similar to federal agency
responsibilities. The state Department of Agriculture is lead partner
with the responsibilities for animals, plants, and some food products.
Other state level agencies have various responsibilities for food and
agriculture safety. At the local level, the diversity of
responsibility, and I might add level of preparedness, is even more
diverse. Many counties do not have a comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan that addresses Food and Agriculture issues. Some counties have a
plan that was developed from a generic template that was borrowed, and
there are some counties that have a legitimate working document in
which the stakeholders and local agency partners are identified and a
protocol or standard operating procedure is identified for Food and
Agricultural incidents.
The system truly is complex. HSPD 9 in part says: ``The United
States agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or
poisonous agents that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced,
or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. America's
agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected,
diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for
terrorist attacks. We should provide the best protection possible
against a successful attack on the United States agriculture and food
system, which could have catastrophic health and economic effects.'
One could argue that the system in place to protect our food and
agriculture system with multiple agencies at federal, state, and local
level is also. . .an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and
complex structure. A flow chart that tracks a commodity from ``Farm to
Fork'' and identifies the various agencies that may have oversight
responsibility across that continuum is mind boggling!
My comments are not intended to be overly critical. Our system of
food and agriculture safety is very complex, but it works! Could it be
improved? Yes. Can we ensure zero risk? Absolutely not. Partnerships
exist and they function, but sometimes the effectiveness of the
partnership is limited intentionally, or unintentionally, by silo or
stovepipe philosophy.
Within agencies, information and collaboration is more functional.
Communication up and down within an agency, both at the federal and
state level, occurs freely. That same degree of collaboration and
communication across or between agencies is not nearly as open and
free. Sometimes important information on an incident is held within an
agency until a critical point is reached. Then, information may be
shared across agencies. The partnership is utilized when it becomes
imperative to bring others into the conversation. Precious time can be
lost until all agencies are fully functional and engaged in the
incident.
Communication and collaboration issues have been identified in
nearly every exercise, and nearly every report on agency response
capabilities. A March 20, 2007 GAO report, ``Critical Infrastructure
Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors,'' Agriculture and Food is
one of the critical infrastructures and key sectors. The barriers to
success as identified in the report are:
1. Difficulties in developing partnerships with DHS.
2. Concerns about sharing information.
3. Lack of long standing working relationships.
As our society and our culture are changed by the events of the
world, our way of doing business needs to change as well. Change is
difficult for everyone. We are doing business differently, which is
necessary. Some who are directly affected by changes in agency roles
and accountability are challenged to perform in a new work environment.
Time will help, but we must all be accountable for our individual and
collective role and responsibility to ensure a safe and secure food and
agriculture system. You, as House Homeland Security Committee members
are included in that charge.
Documenting the Need
Significant resources have been channeled from various sources--
Homeland Security, HHS, USDA, FDA, and others--to build a better food
and agriculture safety system. That has been a wise investment. But
allow me to ask, when we consider the entire continuum from ``Farm to
Fork'', how much have we invested to ensure food and agriculture safety
on the farm? The very hub of the system has been largely ignored.
Agencies are better staffed, better equipped, better trained, better
exercised, more knowledgeable, but what about the poultry producers on
the Eastern Shore, the Northeastern dairy producers, the Mid-west corn
and soybean growers, the Western cattle feeders, swine producers in
North Carolina, and Washington State apple growers? What Homeland
Security or other agency resources have been dedicated to the safety
and security of our food and agriculture system for the producer at the
farm or ranch?
A national survey of agriculture producers (n,337 from 34 states)
by the Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN), asked producers a
series of questions. When asked, How likely do you think it is that
agroterrorism could happen somewhere in the U.S.?, the majority, 77 %,
indicated that an agroterrorism event was likely to happen. Most
thought it would not happen to them individually, but that it would
occur. When asked, Do you believe you are properly prepared for
agroterrorism or some other biosecurity threat on your operation?, only
14 % said yes. Ladies and Gentlemen this should be a concern to all of
us. What resources have we invested to improve this situation? I'm not
aware of any funds, from any federal funding agency, allocated to
improve our agricultural producers' level of preparedness for food and
agriculture safety and security issues. No producer continuity of
operation plans, no agriculture producer contingency plans, no producer
disaster and terrorism plans. . . . We have a 900 billion dollar
industry that has not received support to prepare for disasters
including terrorism. HSPD 9 says we should provide the best protection
possible. Shouldn't that protection also include the producer?
Numerous GAO reports indicate the critical nature of surveillance
and detection. Where better to enhance surveillance and detection than
at the production level and by the individuals whose livelihood depends
on a continuous market of safe and nutritious agricultural commodities?
Multi-agency response and recovery enhancement is important, but
resources on the front end, at the producer level, including
surveillance and detection, and individual disaster and terrorist plans
for agriculture producers may, in fact, will likely, result in fewer
potential incidents escalating to disaster status when response and
recovery are required.
In the same EDEN Survey I mentioned earlier, producers were asked,
If you discovered a crop disease outbreak on your farm that you didn't
recognize, to whom would you turn for advice? 80% of the producers
across the nation indicated that they would turn to the Cooperative
Extension Service. The other two groups with highest number of
responses were the State Department of Agriculture, or another farmer
or rancher. Same group different question, Who would they turn to if
they discovered an animal disease outbreak? The highest response was
their local veterinarian, which is logical. Following closely was the
Cooperative Extension System. In no response on whom to contact did
they indicate Homeland Security, FEMA, APHIS, FDA.
Recommendations:
Accept the fact that we will never have zero risk.
Increase and improve communication at all levels with
all agencies and with all partners
Include representation and consider the input of the
working farmer or rancher, and the agriculture industry on
committees at all levels.
Ask agriculture producers what should be done to
improve food and agriculture safety and security.
Use real world incidents such as spinach, peanut
butter, wheat gluten, Foot and Mouth Disease, Anthrax, soybean
rust, Exotic New Castle Disease, Plum Pox Virus, and other
real-life food safety incidents as valuable learning
experiences. Find out what went wrong and then try to fix it.
Share reports and findings across all agencies.
Support and enhance existing resources and networks
such as the Cooperative Extension System, the Extension
Disaster Education Network, and other established resources.
Re-focus efforts towards Food and Agriculture Safety and
Security at the producer level.
Ensure that states and local municipalities have
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans that have resources,
tasks, and protocols or standard operating procedures developed
to accurately represent the local food and agriculture
community for all disasters including food and agriculture
disasters.
Practice / test plans at all levels with all
stakeholders including agriculture producers, who would be
involved in a response effort for a food or agriculture
disaster or terrorism incident.
Support increased emphasis on surveillance and
detection by education of First Detectors, including producers,
adequately trained technicians, and adequately equipped
laboratories for the National Plant Diagnostic Network and the
National Animal Health Laboratory Network.
Support educational programs to increase awareness of
the complexity of the agriculture production system to agency
staff and First Responders, and educational programs to
increase the awareness of the food and agriculture safety
system including NIMS and NRP for the agriculture industry.
CSREES and the Cooperative Extension system have established
credibility and science to meet these needs.
Evaluate the work--What has been the effectiveness of
resource allocation at all levels to improve the safety and
security of our food and agriculture system? Is the system
anymore safe or prepared for disaster than before investments?
To what degree? At what levels?
Provide training in crisis communication for all
agencies who have food and agriculture safety and security
responsibility, and who interact with the public.
Encourage better coordination and collaboration
between federal and state agencies, academia, local responders,
and the private sector, including the agriculture industry.
Support the development of an improved media campaign
to educate the public before, during, and after a disastrous
event including terrorism that will reduce fear and panic.
Support research and public outreach programs that
addresses current emerging issues on food and agriculture
safety and security. Again, the Cooperative Extension system
has science-based research in the national Land-Grant system
and reach capability into every county and parish in the United
States to address that need.
As we focus on the ``the Partnerships that Protect the Food You
Eat'', please consider the importance of the food production industry.
Consider how we, collectively, with financial support, and with
existing resources and networks can place more emphasis on preparedness
and preparation, surveillance and detection, response and recovery with
possibly the most important partner in this partnership, the American
Farmer and Rancher!
Thank you for opportunity to provide my professional perspective on
the partnerships in the ``Farm to Fork'' food system.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Filson. I now recognize Dr.
Hoerr to summarize his testimony for five minutes or so.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERIC J. HOERR, PROFESSOR, COLLEGE OF
VETERINARY MEDICINE, AUBURN UNIVERSITY
Dr. Hoerr. Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers, thank you for the
invitation to present this testimony.
My name is Fred Hoerr. I am a veterinarian who serves as
director of the Alabama State Diagnostic Laboratories. I am
also a professor at the Auburn University College of
Veterinarian Medicine.
Today I am presenting information about Auburn University's
research technologies and programs that respond to food safety
and agroterrorism concerns for the State of Alabama and for the
nation.
Auburn University is a top 50 public university with
notable programs in training of dogs in the detection of
explosives and drugs and in advanced conflict and tactical
simulation software for first responder training.
In many ways, Alabama is a microcosm of other agricultural
states. We are an exporter of chicken and beef but an importer
of dairy products. An agroterrorism event can threaten the
economy of Alabama by directly affecting production, blocking
exports, limiting imports of dairy products and influencing
livestock and poultry markets. For this reason, research at
Auburn University is focused on the detection of agents that
threaten food safety and the public health and well-being.
The Auburn University Detection and Food Safety Center was
developed with faculty from across the university. The goal is
to foster research synergism to develop new technologies that
will detect food-borne pathogens from the farm to the dinner
table and to facilitate the transfer of this technology to
society. The center has made advances in the prevention of BSE
or Mad Cow Disease by developing a new procedure for detecting
ruminant byproduct in animal feeds. Other research focuses on
the detection of agents of agro or bioterrorism such as,
research to understand the cellular basis for the very
sensitive smell possessed by animals, to develop new
technologies to detect pathogens at extremely low levels. Also,
newly developed biosensors for Anthrax and salmonella are more
robust than those currently available. Also involving detection
is our new State Diagnostic Laboratory on the Auburn Campus,
which continues a 60-year partnership with Auburn University
and the Alabama Department of Ag and Industries, the Honorable
Ron Sparks, Commissioner. This biosafety level two and three
laboratory is a member of the National Animal Health Laboratory
Network. It conducts surveillance for foreign animal diseases
and would be the first responder laboratory for an
agroterrorism event in Alabama.
In the area of response, Auburn is the lead site for
development of advanced conflict and tactical simulation. This
is software first developed by the military but undergoing
modification for domestic application. ACATS can model
terrorism or agroterrorism events for almost any variable that
could be encountered. For national implementation of ACATS,
Auburn works with 10 regional collaborators with the goal of
putting this training capability in every state and down to the
county and local city government. Also in the area of response
is a new avian influenza vaccine that enables rapid production
of a vaccine specific to an emerging strain with high-volume
production and mass application to millions of chickens if
necessary.
Auburn faculty are active in agroterrorism awareness and
training at the regional and national levels including Internet
New Digest, with the latest information on agroterrorism
awareness and on avian influenza. As mentioned by Mr. Filson,
the Extension Disaster Awareness Education Network, or EDEN,
Auburn veterinarians work with southern regional states and the
goal of this program is to provide farmers information about
farm security and disaster planning. And our veterinarians at
the College of Veterinarian Medicine have recently published
articles on veterinarian responsibilities in agroterrorism and
natural disasters.
Auburn University veterinarians are instructors in the
Department of Homeland Security, Center for Domestic
Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama. Each year, the Agricultural
Emergency Response Training course--in this course more than
400 first responders from across the nation receive training
specific to agricultural events. It is the only program of this
type with hands-on animal training scenarios which are
conducted at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Auburn
University.
For the future, Auburn University offers accountability in
developing technologies that are applicable to Alabama and to
the nation. We are fostering collaborative research lead by
innovative faculty, while we strive to provide quality research
facilities for those faculty members. Through our new research,
our Auburn Research Park, we will transfer new technology to
the marketplace by building partnerships with business and
industry.
Thank you again for the invitation and this concludes my
formal presentation.
[Statement of Dr. Hoerr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederic J. Hoerr, DVM, PhD
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee. Thank
you for the invitation to present this testimony on the activities of
Auburn University relative to food protection, particularly those
aspects related to agroterrorism. My name is Frederic Hoerr. As a
veterinarian with specialties in pathology and in poultry medicine, I
have worked with the poultry industry in Alabama since 1980. For the
past 20 years, I have served as the director of the state diagnostic
laboratories for Alabama, a program of the Alabama Department of
Agriculture and Industries, The Honorable Ron Sparks, Commissioner. I
hold a joint appointment in the Auburn University College of Veterinary
Medicine at the faculty rank of Professor
Auburn University is a top-50 ranked public university that has
provided instruction, research and outreach to benefit Alabama and the
nation for more than 150 years. Auburn contributes to our nation's
homeland security through a number of innovative programs, including
AU's unique ability in canine explosives and drug detection training
and AU's robust first responder training activities that utilize the
highly flexible Advanced Conflict and Tactical Simulation (ACATS)
exercise software
In many ways, Alabama is a microcosm of the interstate and
international scope of agriculture today. States with intensive
agriculture must rehearse for rapid and effective response to an
agroterrorism event, develop rapid detection capabilities for agents of
agroterrorism, create a awareness of the issues among the agricultural
producers, and train agricultural first responders. Auburn University
is addressing these key components not only for the state of Alabama,
but with technological developments and programs that can benefit the
nation as a whole.
Alabama ranks third nationally in broiler chicken production and
9th in beef cow production. These rankings translate to a substantial
economic presence in the state with nearly 4000 poultry farms producing
20 million chickens each week. The 2002 USDA Agricultural Census maps
show many counties clustered in north and south Alabama having 75% or
more of their total economy based on poultry production. Alabama
chickens are a healthy and wholesome food shipped to consumers
throughout the country and exported throughout the world. Many poultry
farms are also ideally suited for the production of beef cattle,
especially beef cows producing calves that are shipped to feedlots in
western states. The poultry-beef farming connection is exemplified by
Cullman County, which ranks first in the state in poultry and cattle
production, and second in dairy production. Dairy production in Alabama
now occurs on fewer than 90 farms, with much of the state's milk supply
imported from Texas and New Mexico.
From these basic farm facts emerge several agroterrorism concerns.
The density of production farms in poultry-rearing areas creates a
major challenge to prevent the rapid spread of a highly contagious
disease, whether it is introduced naturally or maliciously. Centers of
poultry production in Alabama extend across the state lines into
Georgia, Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee. Ten to 20 percent of
poultry products are exported and therefore vulnerable to rapid closure
of export markets in the event of a disease emergency. Calves produced
in Alabama are shipped out of state to realize their economic potential
and require health certificates to travel interstate. During an animal
disease emergency, farm quarantines for either a poultry or cattle
disease could severely impact all of the poultry, beef, and dairy
production within a quarantine zone involving one or more counties.
This could result in not only the direct loss of animals on the farm,
but also economic losses from an inability to process rapidly growing
poultry at the market weight, the closing of interstate shipments of
cattle and poultry products, and the overnight loss of export markets.
Those who work in diagnostic and regulatory testing of livestock and
poultry are reminded are ever mindful of this potential reality. The
line between an agroterrorism event and a threat to a major segment of
the food supply is only a matter of the severity of given situation,
and the effectiveness of the response to it.
Auburn University's mission is defined by its Land-grant traditions
of service and access. Several significant advances relative to acts of
agroterrorism and safety of the food supply are highlighted in the
following.
Detection. The Auburn University Detection and Food Safety Center
(AUDFS) links and coordinates researchers from five Auburn University
colleges: Agriculture, Engineering, Human Sciences, Sciences and
Mathematics, and Veterinary Medicine. Core faculty work together to
address the need for next-generation sensors and information systems
for the detection of food contamination, and rapid inventory and
traceability of food products. The results of this research will
benefit national and international efforts to detect threats to the
food supply system. AUDFS seeks to combine advances in the
identification of foodborne illnesses and contaminants with the latest
in biosensor technology. The goal is to have a system that monitors
food products from production to consumption, thereby eliminating or
reducing significantly the threat of foodborne bacteria, pathogens and
toxins reaching our dinner tables and restaurants. AUDFS fosters
multidisciplinary programs leading to synergistic collaborations
between university researchers and the detection industry. It
facilitates technology transfer from the university to product
development, and encourages joint industry-university research
collaborations. Potential applications include technology to
instantaneously evaluate food safety at port-of-entry inspection
stations; ascertain the presence of ruminant meat-and-bone-meal (MBM)
in agricultural feed, thereby preventing bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) from infiltrating the food-supply chain; and
identifying, warning and tracing problems in food processing lines.
Two core faculty members of AUDFS, who are located at the College
of Veterinary Medicine, focus on improved detection technologies. Dr.
Vitaly Vodyanoy studies sensory physiology and the biophysics of odor
detection using the canine nose and its highly sensitive sense of smell
(olfactory system). The aims are to determine the initial
chemoreceptive events in the animal olfactory system and to find out
how the odor-related information translates into electrical events in
the cellular level. The potential application of this research is to
produce new or improved artificial systems responsive to very small
concentrations of odorant. The objective is to develop an
electrochemical sensor that shares basic molecular mechanisms
associated with the sense of smell. Dr. Valery Petrenko studies small
viruses (phage) that infect bacteria. He discovered that specific
proteins on the outer surface of the phage can be employed as sensitive
and specific detectors of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores as well
as Salmonella. He is developing additional applications for other
pathogenic viruses, bacteria, and toxins.
The cooperative relationship between Auburn University and the
state diagnostic laboratory now extends to 60 years. The state
laboratory emerged from the post-war veterinary school in 1947,
progressing to the new Thompson Bishop Sparks State Diagnostic
Laboratory, a program of the Alabama Department of Agriculture and
Industries, in 2006. This Biosafety Level 2 and 3 facility is the
central animal disease diagnostic laboratory in a four-laboratory
system. Diagnostic and regulatory testing is provided for livestock,
poultry, wildlife, and companion animals. The Auburn laboratory, a
member of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network, provides full
service diagnostic testing to determine the cause animal mortality, as
well as regulatory testing for interstate and international movement of
animals. The state laboratories will conduct 900,000 diagnostic tests
in 2007, including surveillance for avian influenza in poultry,
waterfowl, and wild birds. The state laboratories are linked to the
National Veterinary Services Laboratory for confirmatory testing for
emerging and foreign animal diseases. This laboratory is the most
likely first-site of laboratory assessment and preliminary
determination of an agroterrorism event involving animal health in
Alabama. Because of the size of poultry production in the southeastern
U.S. and the potentially rapid spread of an infectious disease, this
detection capability has major regional impact.
The diagnostic laboratory is both a consumer and developer of new
detection procedures and technologies. As the point of first detection
of emerging diseases in Alabama, numerous research projects at Auburn
University have been initiated through the years by diagnostic
laboratory findings of infectious diseases of poultry and livestock.
Response. Auburn University is the pilot site for deployment and
training of a conflict response modeling program, Advanced Conflict and
Tactical Simulation (ACATS). This U.S. military-developed program is
being refined and tested as an emergency response and homeland security
preparedness trainer for local, state and regional public service
agencies. ACATS provides realistic and real-time computer simulation to
improve domestic response preparedness rehearsal activities. The
computer simulation program integrates terrain and structures, vehicles
and equipment, line of site responder views, sensor data, weather,
casualty modeling, human fatigue factors, and chemical dispersion
models for real-time modeling. ACATS has potential application to agro/
food supply terrorism with appropriate refinements, especially large
venue events, which could rapidly occur in the poultry or cattle
producing regions of Alabama and throughout the nation. ACATS testing
is in the early stages with lead agencies in eight national regions,
and will eventually link deployment sites in every state across the
nation.
The first egg-injected vaccine to protect chickens against avian
influenza (AI), a virus threatening human health and global poultry
populations, has been developed by Dr. Haroldo Toro, at the College of
Veterinary Medicine in collaboration with researchers at Vaxin Inc. of
Birmingham, AL. This vaccine has the potential to diminish the spread
of highly pathogenic avian influenza in large commercial poultry
production facilities located throughout the world.
The vaccine can provide a high degree of protection once an
outbreak's strain is determined. The researchers inserted a gene from a
low pathogenic avian flu virus strain (H5N9) into a non-replicating
human virus (a Vaxin proprietary technology), which was then injected
into developing chicken embryos still in the egg. In trials with the
vaccine against two highly pathogenic avian flu viruses, a Vietnam H5N1
strain and a Mexican H5N2 strain, the results showed acceptable to
excellent protection. Current AI vaccines have inherent constraints
against large volume production and must be administered to individual
birds by hand application. This vaccine can be produced in high volume
and robotically administered into the incubating egg several days
before the chick hatches, both major advantages.
U.S. poultry producers, with a few specific exceptions, do not
vaccinate for AI and their flocks have no protection to the disease
should exposure occur, such as during a bioterrorism event. Dr. Toro's
work is a significant advancement because of the millions of chickens
that may need to be rapidly vaccinated in the face of an outbreak. This
vaccine technology provides for rapid production of a strain-specific
vaccine that can be applied to large populations of chickens,
protecting the viability of the poultry industry, as well as the
poultry meat protein in the food supply. It could also significantly
reduce the public health threat that could develop with certain AI
strains amplifying in commercial poultry flocks.
Awareness. Dr. Robert Norton, of the College of Agriculture,
publishes a daily news digest of agroterrorism-related news as well as
a similar list devoted to avian influenza, with linkages to the
unclassified avian influenza mapping system (AIMS) (nortora@ag-
security.com). The subscribers to this list number in the thousands,
representing most states and several countries. Faculty members in the
College of Agriculture consult with Federal agencies about protecting
agriculture and food production. The close working relationship between
Auburn faculty and poultry and livestock producers in Alabama enhances
the value of this information transfer.
Extension specialists in the Alabama Cooperative Extension System
are working with specialists from the southeastern U.S. to develop the
Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN), which includes
agroterrorism awareness information. EDEN is a working partnership of
extension specialists, livestock and poultry producers, and emergency
responders to help protect the food supply system.
Agricultural and veterinary faculty members participate in the
Annual Agroterrorism Conference sponsored by the South Central Center
for Public Health Preparedness at University of Alabama at Birmingham,
and the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries. Two recent
publications by Auburn veterinarians in the Journal of American
Veterinary Medical Association delineate role of veterinarians,
including small animal veterinarians, in biological and agricultural
terrorism (JAVMA (2007) 230:494-500; 1476-80).
Training. Auburn University has significant collaboration with the
Department of Homeland Security at the Center for Domestic Preparedness
in Anniston, Alabama. Four faculty members from the College of
Veterinary Medicine provide instruction in the Agricultural Emergency
Response Training program (AgERT). Thirteen training sessions with 32
students each are held annually, training a total 416 first responders
from across the nation each year. The trainees include fire fighters,
HAZMAT specialists, veterinarians and veterinary technicians, and
agricultural first responders. The Auburn instructors present
instruction on epidemiology, foreign animal disease recognition, animal
restraint and euthanasia, and methods of mass carcass disposal. This
course is the only training of this type that includes hands-on
experience with post mortem examination of animals under adverse field
conditions, presented as a scenario at the College of Veterinary
Medicine.
The future. Auburn University is a prime force that supports the
state of Alabama's efforts to move to a knowledge-based economy, taking
its place as one of the nation's preeminent comprehensive land-grant
universities in the 21st century. In this spirit, Auburn continues to
focus strategically its agriculture and food safety programs; yielding
results that are broadly benefit the national effort to protect the
food supply. The AU Detection and Food Safety Center is yielding
technologies available for transfer to the market place and
implementation. The development of the avian influenza vaccine reflects
the partnership of the private and public university research sectors.
This synergism should expand with the Auburn Research Park,
scheduled to open in 2008. The research park will help create new
academic, research, and entrepreneurial opportunities for Auburn
faculty and students, and help build stronger partnerships with
business and industry. Agriculture and food safety can become chief
beneficiaries of this effort. The ACATS program is a technological
development that can bring Auburn University into partnership with
small municipalities and county governments state-of-the-art modeling
and rehearsal scenarios. The state diagnostic laboratory, with linkages
to Auburn University, the Alabama Department of Public Health, the
USDA, as the Alabama Department of Agriculture, and the NAHLN is
positioned for modeling exercises. With five veterinarians trained in
Foreign Animal Disease diagnosis at the Plum Island, the laboratory is
developing closer relationships to hands-on training of veterinary
students from Auburn University and nearby Tuskegee University in
pathology skills needed recognized and respond to an agroterrorism
event.
The future success of Auburn University requires that it be
accountable to the citizens of Alabama and the nation. This is
essential to maintaining a strong innovative faculty and the facilities
to support expanding research programs of an increasingly complex
nature.
Mr. Carney. I would like to thank all the witnesses for
their testimony. Mr. Rogers and I will now ask the panel some
questions. It will go about five minutes each. We will probably
have two or three rounds anyway. I will recognize myself for
the first five minutes. This is to all the witnesses, starting
with Dr. McGinn.
Under the national response plan, DHS is to be a
coordinated agency during a terrorist act, a major disaster or
other emergency involving the Nation's agricultural or food
systems. Could you please give us some detail how you have seen
the department fulfilling its role?
Dr. McGinn. In an agroterror event? Obviously, if it is
agroterror, then what is probably going to happen to begin with
is it is going to show up as a large-scale event, multiple
states probably. At the same time, we will start diagnosing and
will very quickly recognize a trigger that says we are no
longer dealing with a small-scale incident, we are dealing with
a massive intentional, sort of event. In that situation, DHS is
in a position where quite a number of federal agencies will be
involved in that kind of response. Lots of states will be
asking the President to declare an incident of national
significance and so we would be in a coordinating role. And
that coordinating role, to bring together all the assets at the
federal level but also at the state level and down to the local
one and private sector level as well. We would not be doing
that in a way that takes away any of the other agencies' legal
responsibilities. They would actually be in--USDA, for
instance, would be working with the state level to be able to
manage the agricultural and animal concerns within such an
incident. It is that coordination that is actually what gives
you the ability to get ahead of a biological event, which is
quickly spreading of an intentional nature.
Mr. Carney. Let me ask you this. Has DHS reached out to
state and local governments across the country beforehand? We
do not want to see a kind of a Katrina thing happen where we
respond after the fact. Has this outreach been done? Are you in
the process of doing it? Where are we there?
Dr. McGinn. At this point in time I am an office of one and
we are in the process of expanding that office to six FDs, bio,
eight. One of my first responsibilities is to work on this
national planning-type of responsibility that DHS does have. A
national plan has to have all the different seams between the
state and the local work in such a way that they work together.
We have had several incidences and as Mr. Filson was saying,
use the incidences that have occurred in the past to help you
see the kinds of things you need to do. We have had incidences
recently that demonstrate the need for us to work in a much
more coordinated interagency sort of way than we have been able
to accomplish yet and we are trying to learn from those
instances to actually build that capability.
One of the key ways that we have done what you are asking
about is providing training resources into the states to be
able to do training and exercises. Planning, equipping,
training and exercising are the key ways that when we build
this capability at the state and local level that we need to be
able to have within DHS to be able to respond to a disaster.
Some $160 million--a portion of $160 million of the dollars
that go to the states have been used--DHS dollars that go to
states have been used in the whole area of building plans and
building exercises. We got a ways to go in being able to
respond to an intentional outbreak as effectively as we want to
but we have made significant advancements through those
resources being put into the states.
One of my challenges is to increase that capability so that
we got a much more coordinator approach. Thanks.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Filson?
Mr. Filson. Dr. McGinn I think made some very valid points
and I think if we assume that there has already been some sort
of an incident, then we are already fast-forwarding to a
response and recovery mode and we are not talking about
planning, preparation or mitigation. So with that assumption,
Homeland Security's role would be one of fostering resources, I
think at all levels. Not just at the federal level but helping
to foster resources at the state level and fostering the
communication collaboration of those agencies who have direct
responsibility for this kind of an incident. I think the over-
arching objective would be to make sure that everybody who has
responsibility, and that might include CDC, could include FDA,
USDA, EPA, FEMA, FBI depending on who all may be involved and
what kind of food product it would be, would be to make sure--
Homeland Security's job--make sure that all those agencies
understand what their role is in that particular incident and
coordinate resources. That may mean moving resources from one
area of the country or one agency to help stop, gap and provide
the required kind of support that may be necessary depending on
the particular incident. They are the go-to people when there
is a problem in making sure that a particular agency that needs
resources gets their resources.
I do not look to Homeland Security as those that have the
answers. We have a number of federal and state agencies who
their role is to answer the questions and respond down from the
state to the local level. I look at Homeland Security as the
agency that fosters the collaboration between those agencies at
all levels.
Mr. Carney. Have you had a relationship with Homeland
Security before now? Can you describe the nature of that
relationship?
Dr. McGinn. Nature of the relationship would be
conversations in developing exercises, being part of exercises
at the state level, to identify areas in food and agricultural
disasters where there may be some room for improvement. It
would be at the state level working with Pennsylvania Office of
Homeland Security and FEMA to identify vulnerability issues and
the Pennsylvania's Food System, likewise, developing exercises
to test the agencies at the state level. No interaction with
Homeland Security at the local level.
Mr. Carney. My time is up in this round. I now recognize
Mr. Rogers for five minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on
that. My impression from the Chairman's initial question to Dr.
McGinn was, in the event of what we suspect is an agro-terror
attack, who is in charge? I am open to an answer. Is it going
to be DHS? Is it going to be your state agency? Who is going to
be in charge in the event that it becomes obvious we have had
an agro-terror attack?
Dr. McGinn. Homeland Security will be in that position of
being in charge. We will be building those relationships,
fostering that the resource that he is referring to both now in
the planning side and also in the response side.
Mr. Rogers. Do you have the authority to direct actions by
anybody outside your agency?
Dr. McGinn. In an incident of national significance, which
I think you are describing would occur, then we are in the
position where we actually do that coordination, yes.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I want to ask, last month GAO issued a
report on the USDA. I am talking about an Avian Flu Pandemic.
And the GAO found that USDA's plan would actually bypass DHS in
the event of an outbreak, and we believe DHS would be charged
with the lead. Because DHS and USDA coordination is absent from
USDA planning, how do you think that is going to work itself
out? If USDA is saying they do not have to listen to you, not
even plan to interact with you in the event of an outbreak, how
do you resolve that failure in planning?
Dr. McGinn. It was my understanding, because I worked
through that report, my understanding was that USDA put
together a plan for what they considered to be high path AI
type scenarios that they would be facing. And they put together
one that looked at markets, commercial birds and wildlife, for
example. What did not occur in that planning process was one
that would be an incident that actually expanded to an incident
of national significance or at least an incident where the
number of sick people would be involved, an exotic disease for
example. In situations where there would be, for instance, H5N1
that we currently have with the potential for a number of human
illnesses, you have a zoonotic component there that gets human
health involved, as well and this whole interagency
coordination becomes even more essential. So what my
understanding was in the GAO report was is they wanted to see
where scenarios where DHS was needed to assume this role of
interagency coordination. Particularly if an incident of
national significance was to occur, they want to be able to see
that we put together the kinds of planning that would
accomplish that. GAO directed us to develop con-ops with USDA
and we are very glad to be able to work on that and issue.
Mr. Rogers. Well, that is what I--as you know, I am a
member of the House Agriculture Committee as well and I want to
make sure that we, on the policy side, have put in place the
appropriate authorization to make sure that there is some
sequence of organization in the decision-making process in the
event of an attack. And I am concerned, we are talking about
this coordination, we are talking about voluntary coordination
and when it comes down to an emergency, nobody is going to be
in charge. Mr. Filson, let me ask you. Do you agree with Dr.
McGinn's assessment that in the event of what appears to be an
agroterrorism attack, and to make it clear, that it is just not
appearing, that the President comes out an acknowledges that we
have been attacked by whatever group, that there is some al-
Qa'ida or some other group goes up on the web and acknowledges
that they are responsible for whatever outbreak, do you agree
with Dr. McGinn that DHS would be in charge of directing
actions at the state and local level as well?
Mr. Filson. On an overall level, I agree with Dr. McGinn
that Homeland Security would be in charge. I think the
variances that within that responsibility, specific agencies
may have lead agency roles over which Homeland Security would
oversee their activities.
Mr. Rogers. But do you believe that they would voluntarily
subordinate their activities to DHS in that event?
Mr. Filson. I think that remains to be seen. One of the GAO
reports indicated that this new arrangement for levels of
responsibility and reporting was an area that created some
challenges and will have to be tested.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that Congress needs to put in
place some legislation that would mandate what that structure
should be?
Mr. Filson. For all of our sakes, I would hope that
personalities would not get in the way and we could do this
voluntarily for the good of all of us so it would not have to
be legislated by law. One of the recommendations that I made in
an AAAS-sponsored briefing to Congress a week or so ago,
identified the need to talk about building a matrix. That when
an incident occurred, there would be an automatic level. When
it reaches a certain level, all the agencies would become
involved and be aware of it so that it did not wait until some
person within an agency decided by human decision, it is time
to share information across agency lines.
Mr. Rogers. I just want you to understand. By nature and
philosophy, I am a small government kind of guy. I think the
federal government should not be involved in anything it does
not have to be involved in. But Katrina taught us a real lesson
in preparedness and I am hopeful that we do not drop the ball
as far as Congress is concerned in making sure that we are
comfortable, that we are going to have cooperation, if not
voluntary then otherwise. But my time is up. I will get you in
the next round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Let us just kind of
continue down this path a bit. Do you think the government has
defined clearly enough the roles of the governmental agencies
to handle these things, potential terrorist attacks?
Mr. Filson. I believe on paper it is very well-defined. I
think in practice it may yet to be decided how that may play
out.
Mr. Carney. Has this been exercised yet?
Mr. Filson. May I respond?
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Mr. Filson. I think the exercises have been played out,
testing particularly agency response plans. I think the
shortcoming in most exercises is that they are limited to
within agencies or within several agencies and then have not
brought all the stakeholders together who would be affected in
the event of a disaster. So if you would test any particular
agency for their response plan or their role in an agricultural
disaster, they have a response plan and they have exercised it
within their agency. My concern is that in a real incident, it
is not going to be just one agency. It is going to be multiple
agencies working at the same time, some simultaneous, in the
same geography, on the same incident. Those kinds of exercises
I am not sure have been fully practiced as they should.
Mr. Carney. Do you know, Dr. McGinn, have they been?
Dr. McGinn. There has been quite a lot of exercises being
done and they are continuing to be done like, for instance, on
pandemic flu types of exercises. One of the things that I have
followed on would say this whole aspect of a con-ops that the
GAO asked for then instructs you on a day-by-day basis what
sorts of critical things have to be done and what agency is
going to do them. That is when you are really getting down to
the place where you are actually scoping out what the
responsibilities are and who is going to get them done, day
one, day two, day three.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Following on that train of thought, who
has responsibility, who is going to fulfill them? Do you
believe your department, your area, needs additional authority
to fulfill its responsibility?
Dr. McGinn. Well, we have the responsibility in task number
15 within HSPD-9 to actually do this coordinated planning. We
also had the responsibility to----
Mr. Carney. But that is not what I asked. That is not what
I asked. Do you think you need additional? Do you have what you
need as far as authority goes?
Dr. McGinn. Additional authority, we currently do not have
the resources to actually do the planning that is necessary.
That is part of why this Office of Health Affairs is being
developed, to actually do this sort of planning capability.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Dr. McGinn. Clarifying of roles. I think, part of the best
way to clarify roles is to define what are the actual tasks
that need to be done on a daily basis and who is going to do
those tasks. Is it going to be the industry, is it going to be
the state or is it going to be a federal agency?
Mr. Carney. Under your--do you have enough staff? What
other resources do you need? Do you need more staff? Is your
staff at the right levels now? What do you think?
Dr. McGinn. Well, our office was stood up January 18, 2007,
by Secretary Chertoff. Our plans are to have six persons
working in this area by the end of 2008 with the possibility of
additional five detailees. The kind of work that you are
describing to coordinate these different components, programs
within DHS, is a large task and we are going to take it a day
at a time as we can get the job done.
Mr. Carney. Well, certainly Secretary Chertoff has put a
great deal of responsibility on your shoulders. I guess I am
not saying yeah, we have enough resources to do the job. You
have not said that yet.
Dr. McGinn. We have begun the process. We are identifying
these sorts of gaps. National planning, building capability
down to the local level are some challenges we yet have in
front of us and having the staff to do that is part of what we
are building to in 2008 and 2009 and going forward.
Mr. Carney. Dr. Hoerr, do you care to comment on this
conversation?
Dr. Hoerr. The original question had to do with what was
the process. The process from my end of the business in a State
Diagnostic Laboratory director is that the initial detection
most likely is going to be made out of a State Diagnostic
Laboratory. Exactly when the USDA comes into a state is really
a decision of the state agricultural commissioner or the state
veterinarian would issue an invitation or a call for help from
the USDA. That said, my colleagues in the USDA, who we work
very closely with in partnership, I think have a really
commendable record on disease control. The H5N1 influenza
scenario though is something that I do not think we have dealt
with. We have dealt with highly pathogenic avian influenza but
not one that offers a threat to the public health. And so I am
concerned that should that become a major outbreak, that there
would be a vast marshalling of courses needed across the
country and exactly who does that now is above my pay rate,
sir. But I think there is a need for somebody to take the big
coordinating role, Department of Justice, Transportation,
bringing in national guards. I mean, it could be big.
Mr. Carney. Dr. McGinn?
Dr. McGinn. To add to this and answer your question, do we
have enough resources? One of the challenges that we see is
that the resources that are necessary at the local and state
level need to be plussed up. My challenge within Homeland
Security is to identify how to get that job done so that those
who are going to be responding very quickly to a biological or
chemical event can move at the state and local level with
efficiency to maintain our confidence in our food supply. So
resources definitely are needed at lots of levels and
particularly at the local and state level to build both
preparedness capability and response capability. We got to
build a resilient system. If we are attacked, if we are
insulted, intentionally or accidentally, our ability to get
back to normalcy is a challenge.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. My time is up in this round. Mr.
Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will remind you,
the primary purpose for us having this hearing is to draw on
your expertise as to what we do and do not need with the
Congressional record. And I want to pick back up where I left
off a little while ago on who is in charge. When you talked
about the need for these exercises, it opened the door for
something I was going to talk about anyway which is ACATS. Dr.
Hoerr mentioned it a little while ago. It is Advanced Contact
and Tactical Simulation Programming. It is a software program.
And I would ask Dr. Hoerr, could you tell us a little bit more
about how this would be used in an agroterrorism event?
Dr. Hoerr. Right. At this time, ACATS is a potential for
agroterrorism. But ACATS is a program that can take into
account a large number of variables. Terrain vehicles, hospital
beds, just almost any of these commonly-encountered roadblocks
to success in a disaster type situation and can put together a
challenging modeling simulation program for people to rehearse
to check out their systems.
Mr. Rogers. And my understanding--I am sorry to interrupt
you but I want to make sure that the record understands and the
people in the audience do that the people who would be involved
in making decisions and responding in a terrorist attack, in
this case agroterrorism attack, would be brought together with
this computer simulation and they would have real-time
incidents they have to react to and it would give them a chance
to exercise who makes what decisions and how they make it and
go back afterwards and see how they did. Is that pretty much
it?
Dr. Hoerr. That is exactly correct. It allows the people on
the very front line to practice their decision-making activity
and then to sit back and evaluate those decisions and see if
they were the best decisions under the circumstances.
Mr. Rogers. Um-hum. Now, I have seen this program modeled
for other folks of terrorist attacks. I have not seen it for
agro. Have you seen any of these programs prepared already or
is this----
Dr. Hoerr. I have not seen it prepared for agroterrorism.
My contacts at the university assure me that it could be
modified for agroterrorism.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I want to go back to what I was talking
about a few minutes ago with who is in charge. You made
reference to the fact that you thought USDA would be very
responsive in the event the commissioner of agriculture or your
office called on them. Do you believe that the commissioner of
agriculture in Alabama or your office at the diagnostic lab
would subordinate their responsibilities to DHS in the event of
a terrorist attack, when it comes to directing actions?
Dr. Hoerr. I don't think subordinating to DHS would be an
issue if that was the federal plan.
Mr. Rogers. But somebody is going to have to direct
actions. Who is going to do what? And I am still trying to get
in mind's eye clear whether it is going to be USDA, DHS or who,
FDA?
Dr. Hoerr. Yes, sir. My understanding of how that process
would work is if we had an incident in our state, our state
people would be the first responders, the USDA would be called
in for containment of that agricultural event and after that,
certainly the commissioner of agriculture could call who he
thought was appropriate for assistance. And we also, of course,
have a large task force within the state. It has been working
with the group out of UAB to plan for such events. I am sure
they spill over into the public health area and beyond.
Mr. Rogers. I do want to talk with you in our next series
of questions about Avian Flu but I want to stay on this for
just a few minutes, this organizational stuff. Dr. McGinn, you
mentioned that you currently were an office of one but I
thought you said earlier in your prepared statement that you
had three veterinarians hired since you came on board.
Dr. McGinn. Three veterinarians within the Office of Health
Affairs. We have one veterinarian within the National
Biosurveillance Integration System and then about a month ago,
we hired another veterinarian to run our Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Biodefense area. But within the area of
veterinary and agriculture security, I am an office of one.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Describe this organizational structure.
Dr. McGinn. Gladly. Within the Office of Health Affairs, we
have an acting assistant secretary who directly reports up to
the secretary. That is Dr. Jeff Rundy, who is also our chief
medical officer. We have three sections. The section that deals
with Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense, of which I am
in that office is where the director of veterinarian and
security. We also have a medical readiness section, which does
the planning and the preparedness work and then we have what we
call a section for component services. And that is a section
that takes care of the health care needs of the Department of
Homeland Security employees.
Mr. Rogers. In looking at this Subcommittee, given our role
in supervising management and oversight in particular, what
would you recommend that we focus our energy on when it comes
to drafting legislation, going forward, that would help you in
the subject matter we are talking about here today? What is the
one thing that you would ask us to focus our energies on and
our attention?
Dr. McGinn. Well, the secretary's goal, the last goal, was
strengthening and unifying DHS' operations and management. That
is one of the five----
Mr. Rogers. How can we strengthen it? That is what I am
asking.
Dr. McGinn. Our office is about coordinating the 30
different programs in the veterinary, food and agriculture
areas. So what we are doing is managing to a better economy of
resources within DHS. There are a small amount of resources
devoted to veterinary, food and agriculture and we got to
actually have the ability to manage those resources in a way
that we get the best synergy and we get the best coordination
from the different components within DHS. And in a like
fashion, to work with the states and the other federal agencies
and the private sector to do the same. So it is a management
issue but it is also a motivational issue.
Mr. Rogers. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Dr. Hoerr, in your
testimony, you describe how the density of farms and the
interstate transport of livestock creates major challenges
preventing the rapid spread of highly contagious disease. Could
you elaborate on this please?
Dr. Hoerr. Yes, sir. For example, in the State of Alabama,
we have very nearly 4,000 poultry farms which would have
anywhere from 30,000 to a quarter million birds per farm. Those
poultry farms actually extend to our state borders and
intermingle to some extent with poultry farms in Georgia,
Tennessee, Mississippi and the Florida panhandle. So just the
farm to farm contact can spill outside of the state. The
density of those farms is also very high. When you get into
Coleman County, Alabama, as our leading poultry state, it is a
very high density of farms. Just practically every rural
household has a couple of broiler houses. Significantly,
Coleman County is also the state's highest cattle producing
state. So cattle production and poultry production coexist very
well together in Alabama. Which brings about another issue
which is, what is a problem for the poultry industry also
becomes a problem for the cattle industry. And so you can very
quickly see that agriculture can be all in this together. It is
not just a cattle problem, it is not just a poultry problem.
Dairies, you can add that in also.
Mr. Carney. How long would it take for a disease to spread
from coast to coast do you think?
Dr. Hoerr. I think the best example that would have is West
Nile Virus. It started out on the East coast and I think within
three years, three, four years maximum, it reached the West
coast and there were cases that actually leap-frogged over the
mountains because they rode there in a vehicle.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Filson?
Mr. Filson. I am privy to a study that was done here in
Pennsylvania that looked at the Lancaster Livestock Market as a
hub for introduction of a contagious disease. And if that were
the case, if a disease were introduced at that center, the
potential exists that there would be 17 states exposed in the
first day and the entire nation within five days.
Mr. Carney. Entire nation in five days?
Mr. Filson. Yes, sir. Continental United States.
Mr. Rogers. That would be what kind of contamination, I am
sorry?
Mr. Filson. An animal disease, a highly contagious animal
disease using the Lancaster area as the hub for distribution.
It is a significant market exchange.
Mr. Carney. What were the factors involved in that spread?
Mr. Filson. A significant number of interstate transport
both bringing in and receiving and taking back. So we have
animals coming in and going back. It is not a terminal market.
Animals are exchanged and that creates a very high risk.
Mr. Carney. Mr. McGinn? Dr. McGinn, you have your work cut
out for you it sounds like. Would you be able to respond in
five days?
Dr. McGinn. For this type of scenario and other scenarios
that we have worked on and discussed earlier, rapidly expanding
into lots of states in a very short period in time. We are
talking about having software that teaches people how to make
decisions quicker. We don't have to have people that can make
decisions quicker in one of these rapidly expanding biological
or chemical incidences but we have also got to have policies
that allow those decisions to be made. Whether we are talking
about a surge in the ability to do diagnostics at different
levels throughout the country, the ability to use vaccination,
the ability to do tracing of infected animals or contaminated
animals or infected product and contaminated product. All these
sorts of policy issues and decisions have to be addressed
before we get in an incident like this, it moves in just a few
days to a few weeks across the country.
Mr. Carney. No, I agree but we do not get to pick where
those incidents occur.
Dr. McGinn. Right.
Mr. Carney. Doctor, yet, I hate to pick on you but you have
some interesting answers here. What does HSPD-9 mean to the
state and local governments?
Dr. McGinn. It is a number of the different--there is about
18 or 19 tasks, depending on how you count them, with an HSPD-
9. If you go through that and you can see there is certain ones
that are very important directly to the states and local
governments and others that are important indirectly. Two of
them that really--or several of them that really just jump out
at me that are very important to the state. One is this whole
thing about coordinated planning. That is task number 15. Very
important to actually have the kind of coordinated planning
that you are referring to that we actually can move through one
of these events very quickly. Number two.
Mr. Carney. Why is that not task number one?
Dr. McGinn. It is just the way it is written. In the
document, it is not 15 in terms of priority. It is just in the
way the tasks----
Mr. Carney. 15 things to do?
Dr. McGinn. Yeah. They are just listed through and they are
arranged in five different pillars so it is not meant in a
priority. It is just the line within the document that has that
particular task.
Mr. Carney. I think I would kind of put it as a priority
myself.
Dr. McGinn. Right. They all are of equal high priority. It
is just task number 15 within the list.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Dr. McGinn. And then the line above there--maybe if I use
the word line--line 14, which is above it talks about having
response capability down to the local level to be able to
respond to acts of terrorism and naturally-occurring disasters
as well, such as floods. These are the kinds of things that
from a state and local perspective would be very important. I
will give you two more. One is vulnerability assessments. Being
able to do these assessments down at the state and local level
within the production units and the processing units. That is
one of the key things that they say within HSPD-9, do
vulnerability assessments. Come up with mitigating strategies
is another one that is very important, to be actually able to
mitigate a situation. Another one is information sharing with
the private sector. The private sector wants to know, not only
who is in charge but who to contact. That is part of why I put
together this contact sheet of who in the Department of
Homeland Security is actually there to contact. One of the
chief complaints or challenges I have is people say, we do not
know what DHS does, we do not know who to contact. And so,
obviously, one of my first challenges has been to put together
what we do and then actually to put together who to contact. So
those are maybe about four or five good examples of priorities
that the state and local would be looking to within Homeland
Security.
Others that are somewhat related is research, education. We
have heard a lot about the value of the Extension Service and
the education university system within the educational systems
and developing the kinds of training courses as we go forward.
We got to have coordinated curriculums within Homeland
Security-type training courses, whether we are talking food or
animal and that is a challenge as we proliferate all these
different training capabilities and we have a proliferation of
research being able to get that in a much more coordinated
managed fashion as we go forward.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Filson, do you care to comment?
Mr. Filson. I agree. I think the focus needs to be across
agencies rather than within agencies. I think the effort
Homeland Security is doing is significant, however there is
still certain challenges that need to be addressed.
Communication, the sharing of vital information and maybe even
some information that may not be considered vital to keep all
the players informed equally as they possibly prepare to
respond. I think the effort, to drive it more local, either at
the state or at the county or at the industry or at the
producer level, is admirable and very much one of the needed
area that needs to focus. I think there is some possibilities
that Homeland Security could look at existing networks and
existing resources and encourage or support what already exists
to extend some of the responsibilities of Homeland Security or
delegate that to other agencies. As long as the work gets done,
does it really matter who takes credit that it is done. So
rather than recreate new ways of doing something that is
already being done, let us look at the resources that may
already be present and possibly add additional support there.
Mr. Carney. At the risk of being naive here, is that being
done?
Mr. Filson. I think to a certain degree it is but I think
it could be enhanced.
Mr. Carney. Good. My time is up. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Filson, in your view, how capable are local
health systems in Pennsylvania, including emergency rooms,
clinics and medical professionals of responding to a pandemic
outbreak of Avian Flu?
Mr. Filson. By pandemic I am assuming that you are talking
that Avian Flu would be a human disease?
Mr. Rogers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Filson. I think almost all the healthcare agencies are
at almost their full capacity and a pandemic would very rapidly
call them beyond their capability of responding. There are
mutual aide agreements within the healthcare industry but if
you look at the capability of each individual healthcare
facility, when we talk about the potential for a pandemic, they
all very rapidly would exceed their capability of being able to
respond at the current facility. Many of those healthcare
facilities are looking at alternative sites for care, tertiary
care kinds of capability off site from the facility or
delegating a particular wing of the unit for a particular kind
of treatment. Those kinds of decisions, I think, are in line
with making sure that they can respond as well as they can. I
think all are very much in agreement that if a pandemic would
strike, their capability would soon be surpassed.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Hoerr, you are recognized as one of the
world's leading experts on this. What do you think about the
vulnerability of our nation on this subject, again please?
Dr. Hoerr. Well, I think that we have made giant progress
in our detection and surveillance capability. The National
Animal Health Laboratory Network has been a good program. Our
laboratory is active in that. We are testing water foul,
commercial poultry. We are testing backyard poultry and the net
is cast wide and this includes active surveillance, going out
to places where backyard poultry are on the weekends and swap
meets and so forth. I think the Public Health Group is very
much aware of this concern and has done some good exercising in
this regard. My concern, and this comes up in the GAO report
that has been referenced several times today, is are we going
to have adequate protection for the agricultural first
responders who are going to have to be the people that deal
with an AI outbreak within hours, minutes preferably. This
includes people in diagnostic labs, people that need to be onto
the farms to do the sampling.
Mr. Rogers. What is the answer to that question?
Dr. Hoerr. The answer is when we try to resolve this in
Alabama and try and find out where is the antiviral medication
and how quickly could we have it, the answer was very slow in
coming. We didn't have the answer to that and we tried to work
with our public health people and you quickly get mired down in
pharmacy regulations and types of things like that. But that
has to be worked out and ready to go in an instant. Should be--
--
Mr. Rogers. And how would you recommend that we do that?
Dr. Hoerr. I think we need centers of these drugs available
in every state that has significant poultry, that there be
people authorized to dispense these compounds to first
responders when they go on the farm and that cannot wait. That
has to be already out there ahead of time. And there seems to
be a question about who can authorize that and how much can
they get to the situation in a hurry. Because it is not just an
agricultural event. It is a public health event and it can
begin with the first responders.
Mr. Rogers. My recollection is that a couple of years ago
the President put a large sum of money aside for the vaccines
to be distributed. To your knowledge, that has not happened? I
know a lot of that money was utilized for Katrina and for the
war. But has there been any stockpiling of this vaccine that
you are aware of?
Dr. Hoerr. I cannot comment on stockpiling of vaccines. My
concern is about antiviral drugs, medications that would
protect a person getting exposed to the virus in a chicken
house.
Mr. Rogers. I see. Tell me, I read in your prepared
testimony--I know you just summarized it but you talked about
the capability of us treating eggs before the poultry is
hatched----
Dr. Hoerr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. --and doing that mechanically. Could you tell
us what that is, what kind of vaccine?
Dr. Hoerr. The current Avian Influenza vaccines are what is
called an inactivated product. It is a virus grown in actually
an embryonated chicken egg and then the virus is inactivated
and it has to be injected by hand into each chicken egg. In
Alabama, we produce 20 million chickens a week. Next door in
Georgia, 25 million a week. You cannot inject that many
chickens by hand and protect an industry. A new vaccine has
been developed by Dr. Torro [phonetic] at Auburn University in
collaboration with the USDA scientists that allows us to
tailor-make a vaccine very quickly by taking a gene from an
emerging influenza virus, splicing it into a virus that has no
effect on the chickens and no effect on humans, so the
influenza virus is not multiplying but it vaccinates or
immunizing the chickens to influenza. This can be applied
robotically to the chicken eggs at 18 days of incubation and
then the baby chick hatches at 21 days of incubation and it is
has already started its immunity response to influenza. It is a
significant breakthrough.
Mr. Rogers. Okay, thank you. I see my time is up.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Dr. Hoerr, I kind of
want to go back to the other sobering comment that Mr. Filson
made. How long would it take to stop, to contain an outbreak,
of something to the nature that Mr. Filson described? Do you
have an idea on that?
Dr. Hoerr. Of a single point introduction?
Mr. Carney. Yeah.
Dr. Hoerr. What was the scenario?
Mr. Filson. Foot and Mouth Disease.
Dr. Hoerr. Foot and mouth disease? Foot and Mouth Disease
is a special concern. For example, all of the calves that are
produced in Alabama, virtually all of these are trucked to feed
lots in the western states. So they all leave on a truck and
some of them come back into Alabama on a truck. So overnight,
those diseases of cattle can go half way across the country in
an 18-wheeler and I think that is the concern. Cattle that are
congregated at auctions, are incubating a disease and it get
expressed somewhere else and they contaminated the interstate
highway system all along the way. So the response is going to
have to be very quick and very focused and the traceability of
those cattle is going to be key.
Mr. Carney. Dr. McGinn, is there a plan with the Department
of Transportation to track such things?
Dr. McGinn. The issue that you are bringing up about
transportation is very important because so far in this hearing
today we have talked about the effects on agriculture. But the
interdependency of the 14 different critical infrastructures is
critical to be able to describe what is going to happen to
transportation and describe what is going to happen to tourism,
to health and on down the road in terms of critical
infrastructure, the banking for instance. And the issue with
transportation is one of the things that needs to be addressed
in terms of a national plan. Currently USDA has a plan for
which they would respond to animal disease such as described
within this country, Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak. But a
national plan that actually puts together all the different
agencies in a coordinated fashion is one of the things that yet
needs to be worked on.
Mr. Carney. I have no further questions. Mr. Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. This would be it for me. I just want to come
back around on what we talked about earlier. Dr. Hoerr's
reference to the ACATS program in his written testimony and
what it could do. Listening to Mr. Filson talk about the need
for us to push down into the local and state level this
coordination activity, I would like to ask you Dr. McGinn, do
you believe that a software program like ACATS, some version of
it, would be something that you would like to see as a part of
your planning, which I understand is the primary role that you
have right now, planning and preparation, to better coordinate
between the state and local and federal agencies and practice
this decision-making? You talked about the vulnerability
assessments, mitigating strategy and information sharing. It
seems to me the only way you are ever going to get those
objectives is to go through some sort of simulation.
Dr. McGinn. Right.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that is worth pursuing as far as
policy?
Dr. McGinn. We have just recently, in May of this year,
released our National Infrastructure Protection Plan. That plan
is actually a way which the industries, the governments, get
together in a method to protect this critical infrastructure.
We have a GCC, Government Coordinating Council, and a Sector
Coordinating Council. In this way the governments are supposed
to be able to--the Government Coordinating Council work
together, as well as the different aspects of the sectors
including transportation would work together.
Mr. Rogers. Do you all have exercises that you go through
with people to----
Dr. McGinn. Well, we do. We are exercising that sort of
arrangement every year and then that information is
disseminated throughout the states. This issue that he raised
about being able to make decisions quick, in a more timely
manner and in a more accurate manner, is a critical component
of a biological incident, particularly of highly contagious
diseases we are describing. So the ability to make those sorts
of decisions rapidly and accurately will be very helpful in the
process of getting us better prepared. And again, it comes back
to this whole issue of being able to mitigate a response. You
asked how long it takes. The number of scenarios that we dealt
with showed these sorts of intentional introductions could last
180 days, 300 days and even long. So the challenge you have by
utilizing this sort of attack technologies is how to make
decisions sooner and reduce the length of the incident and also
the pain and suffering, loss of confidence in the government
and things like that occur as an incident continues on.
Mr. Rogers. Well, this technology is available and it is
very sophisticated. You can take a town like this and literally
see it on the computer, drive down the streets and see the
exact buildings that you would see if you drove down those
streets. I would like to see your office try to take it and
apply it to agroterrorism-type circumstance and see us--try to
integrate these local officials with the state and federal
folks so that we can do the vulnerability assessments that we
need and be able to talk intelligently about it. So I hope that
will be one of the goals that you will pursue. And that is all
the questions I got. Thank you all for your testimony.
Dr. McGinn. We have a responsibility to actually do a Foot
and Mouth exercising capability within our Office of Health
Affairs. So this would be an excellent tool for us to look at
as well.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, great.
Mr. Carney. Well, Dr. McGinn, a couple of requests. One, if
you could please provide an org chart of your particular
agency, your particular organization, and who is in the
particular slots and those that are unfilled, you know, just
say unfilled.
Dr. McGinn. Gladly and I will get that to you today.
Mr. Carney. All right. That would be great. I appreciate
that. And I wanted to thank you all for coming over today,
coming to Tunkhannock in Northeast Pennsylvania to see a
beautiful part of the country certainly. I want to thank the
audience for showing up and listening to this. I think that we
have all seen that we are kind of in a place now where we are
still--we will be in a reactive mode in case a bioterror or
agroterror event occurs. It is my job, it is Mr. Rogers' job
and our Committee's job, the Subcommittee's job, to make sure
that we get to a place where we are proactive and not reactive
to such things. So that is my charge to all of you and hearing
no further business, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]