[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE THREAT:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-48
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
JANE HARMAN, California, Chair
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 4
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 31
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Washington........................................ 26
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Colorado.......................................... 27
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Connecticut.................................. 29
Witnesses
Mr. Salam Al-Marayati, Executive Director, Muslim Public Affairs
Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy
Institute, The George Washington University:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Brian Jenkins, RAND Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE THREAT: DEFINING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN
TERRORISM
----------
Thursday, June 14, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Dicks, Perlmutter,
Reichert, Shays and Dent.
Ms. Harman. The hearing will come to order. Almost 6 years
after 9/11 and after countless Intelligence briefings on the
Hill, I am very unhappy to report that I still don't know what
makes a terrorist. And not just any kind of terrorist, mind
you, but terrorists who are either American citizens or legal
residents who are here actively planning to murder their
neighbors, who could be you or me or our relatives and friends
and, by the way, as many of us as possible.
I ask, why does an American citizen like Russell Defreitas
allegedly conspire with an al-Qa'ida inspired cell of
international terrorists to destroy JFK Airport and kill
thousands of people by blowing up fuel storage tanks and
pipelines? Why would a U.S. citizen and two U.S. residents
conduct reconnaissance of Fort Dix in New Jersey and plot to
kill, quote, as many American soldiers as possible, unquote,
with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and guns all, quote, in
the name of Allah, unquote? And why did Adam Gadahn, a Jewish
kid from southern California, go from being an alienated
American teenager to an al-Qa'ida sympathizer to the mouthpiece
for Osama bin Laden preaching hate and violence across the
airwaves.
I don't have the answers. I don't believe my colleagues
have the answers. And the American people don't either.
What I do know, however, is that I am chilled by what Dame
Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former director of Britain's MI5,
has said about the consequences of failing to get the answers
and failing to act in time based on those answers. Last
November, Dame Eliza revealed that, in the United Kingdom
alone, police and others within our organization, quote, are
working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks totaling
1,600 identified individuals who are actively engaged in
plotting or facilitating terrorist acts here--here means
Britain--and overseas. You heard me right. Some 200 terrorist
plots involving more than 1,600 British citizens planning to
kill other British citizens, or if we had not foiled the liquid
bomb plot last summer, planning to kill up to 4,000, mostly
American, citizens traveling to the U.S. on U.S. planes.
I am worried. We must learn from the UK experience and fix
what needs fixing in this country before we find ourselves
under the same threats as Britain is. An important step toward
doing that, I believe, is to consider establishing a national
commission on the prevention of radicalization and homegrown
terrorism. While we potentially face similar problems as
Britain, I am mindful of the fact that we are not the United
Kingdom. And what we face may be different and less menacing.
That is all the more reason for us to conduct an expedited but
thorough study of what is happening in our country so we can
find an American response to our American indigenous threat.
The commission, we want to discuss with our witnesses
today, could be modeled after the National Commission on
Terrorism, which I served on in the late 1990s, from 1999 to
2000, and which I believe produced a very important report
predicting a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil. One of our
witnesses, Brian Jenkins, was also involved in that effort. And
I should say to our audience and our witnesses that, on 9/10/
2001, the commission's chairman, L. Paul Bremer, Jerry Bremer,
and I had lunch near the Capitol wondering why no one was
paying attention to our recommendations.
A commission focused on radicalization and homegrown
terrorism could get us up to speed quickly on the threat and
help us assess whether a legislative strategy is needed to
address it. The commission could also bring together the best
minds in the Nation from as many diverse backgrounds and
experiences as possible. It could create a common strategy that
not only shapes the action we take here but also carves out a
role for other stakeholders at the Federal, State and local
levels. And I might add, we should probably assess what the
private sector could be doing as well. I am eager to hear from
the witnesses about the value of this approach, what issues it
should address and what recommendations it should make.
And let me commend the ranking member, Mr. Reichert, who we
also call Sheriff Reichert, for being one of the early
advocates for this approach. But let me be absolutely clear,
when we talk about radicalization and homegrown terror, we are
not talking about--I want to underscore this--people from one
particular ethnic, political or religious group. On the
contrary, we are talking about anyone who might be engaged in
ideologically based violence, whether by a U.S. Bronze Star
honoree named Timothy McVeigh; or in Belgium, a female Catholic
convert to Islam who traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or
in the UK, third generation Britons of Pakistani decent who, 2
years ago, killed scores of their fellow citizens on buses and
trains. I am sure everyone on this subcommittee would agree
that while taking on radical extremists who mean us harm, it
would be wrong, it is wrong, to lump an entire community
together for increased scrutiny simply because of their ethnic,
religious or national background. And it would be equally
wrong, let me stress this, to pretend that there is no problem
and hope for the best.
The time for action is now. We will consider marking up
legislation next week. What our witnesses share with us today
will help us finalize our work and help save lives now and in
the future.
Welcome, again, to you all. And I now yield to the ranking
member, Mr. Reichert, for an opening statement.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jane Harman, Chair, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment
Almost six years after 9/11, and after countless
intelligence briefings on the Hill, I am very unhappy to report that I
still don't know ``what makes a terrorist''.
And not just any kind of terrorist, mind you, but
terrorists who are either American citizens or legal residents who are
actively planning to murder their neighbors--who could be you or me or
our relatives and friends.
I ask: why does an American citizen like Russell Defreitas
conspire with an al-Qa'ida-inspired cell of international terrorists to
destroy JFK airport and kill thousands of people by blowing up fuel
storage tanks and pipelines?
Why would a U.S. Citizen and two U.S. residents conduct
reconnaissance of Fort Dix in New Jersey and plot to kill ``as many
American soldiers as possible'' with mortars, rocket-propelled
grenades, and guns--all ``in the name of Allah''?
And why did Adam Gadahn, a Jewish kid from Southern
California, go from being an alienated American teenager, to an al-
Qa'ida sympathizer, to the mouthpiece for Osama bin Laden, preaching
hate and violence across the airwaves?
I don't have the answers, my colleagues don't have the
answers, and the American people don't either.
What I do know, however, is that I am chilled by what Dame
Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Director of MI5, has had to say
about the consequences of failing to get those answers--and failing to
act based on them.
Last November, Dame Eliza revealed that in the United
Kingdom alone, police and others within her organization ``are working
to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600
identified individuals . . .who are actively engaged in plotting, or
facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas.''
You heard me right. Some 200 terrorist plots involving
more than 1600 British citizens planning to kill other British
citizens!
I'm worried that it could happen here, too.
We must learn from the UK experience and fix what needs
fixing in this country before we find ourselves in precisely the same
situation.
An important first step toward doing that, I believe, is
establishing a National Commission on the Prevention of Radicalization
and Homegrown Terrorism.
While we potentially face similar problems, I am mindful
of the fact that we are not the United Kingdom and we may face a
different, less menacing, kind of homegrown threat.
That is all the more reason for us to conduct an expedited
but thorough study of what his happening in our country so we can find
an American response to our indigenous threat.
The Commission we are exploring is modeled after the
National Commission on Terrorism that I served on during the late
nineties.
One of our witnesses, Brian Jenkins, was also involved in
that effort.
A Commission focused on violent radicalization and
homegrown terrorism could get us up to speed quickly on the threat and
help us assess whether a legislative strategy is needed to address it.
The Commission could bring together the best minds in the
nation--from as many diverse backgrounds and experiences as possible.
Such a Commission could create a common strategy that not
only shapes Congressional action but also carves out a role for other
stakeholders at the Federal, State, and local levels.
I am eager to hear from the witnesses about the value of
this National Commission approach, what issues it should address; and
what recommendations it should make.
But let me be absolutely clear: when we talk about
``radicalization'' and ``homegrown'' terrorists, we're not talking
about people from any particular ethnic, political, or religious group.
On the contrary, we're talking about ideologically-based
violence, whether by a white, U.S. Bronze Star honoree named Timothy
McVeigh; or
in Belgium, a female Catholic convert to Islam who
traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or
in the UK, third generation Britons of Pakistani descent
who two years ago killed scores of their fellow citizens on buses and
trains.
I am sure everyone on this Subcommittee would agree that
while taking on radical extremists who mean us harm, it would be wrong
to lump an entire community together for increased scrutiny simply
because of their ethnic, religious or national background.
And it would be equally wrong to pretend the problem does
not exist and hope for the best.
The time for action is now. We will mark up legislation
next week.
What our witnesses share with us today will help us
finalize our work and help save lives now and in the future.
Welcome again to you all.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank
you for holding this hearing and for your leadership on this
issue. And just for the information of the audience and the
panel present today, you have a committee with varying
backgrounds and experience.
And the Chair referred to me as the sheriff. My experience
comes from local law enforcement for the past 33 years. This is
my second term here in Congress. The last 8 years of my tenure
in the sheriff's office in Seattle was as the elected sheriff
there. And the rest of the committee comes, as I say, with a
background in a variety of degrees and a lot experience in
Homeland Security efforts, Intelligence efforts and Department
of Defense. So you have a committee here that is really
interested and willing to work with you to help make this
commission a successful event.
And I want to thank you three for being here this morning,
taking time out of your busy schedule to give us your insights
and to answer some of the questions that we have to pose to you
today. This subcommittee has focused intently on the issue of
radicalization, as you know, and how it affects our security.
Unfortunately, since that time, as we have been moving through
this, we have seen radicalization and individuals involved in
radicalism in plots against us, most recently against the John
F. Kennedy Airport.
JFK plotters aimed to cause greater destruction than in the
September 11th attacks, by destroying the airport, killing
several thousand people and destroying parts of Queens. One of
the United States citizens involved in the plot indicated that
JFK was targeted because it is a symbol that would put the
whole country in mourning saying, it is like you can kill the
man twice. This is what we are dealing with.
And, unfortunately, the scope of the potential problem is
huge. Radicalized cells can form in prisons, get together on
the Internet, meet and follow charismatic leaders or any
combination of the three. They can also decide to become a lone
wolf to avoid detection. This example is especially noteworthy
after the lone wolf shooting at the Jewish Federation in
Seattle last summer.
Radicalization is a complex phenomena. It is essential that
we understand the phenomena, especially on how these cells form
and how they grow. In March of this year, I introduced H.R.
1605, The Prevent Act, which would establish a national
commission on the prevention of radicalization. And unlike most
commissions, like the 9/11 Commission, like the WMD Commission
and the U.S.S. Cole Commission, which were formed after a major
failure occurred, this commission would focus on mitigating
problems leading to radicalization before a major attack
occurs.
I have been involved in all sorts of commissions over my
career and conferences and committees. And most of the time
what happens, we get together, we talk, we write down some
reports, and nothing is ever done. This needs to be a
commission, an effort, some energy put toward where we actually
have some meaningful findings, things that we can do, some
action items that we can apply, so that we can prevent attacks
from occurring within the United States. And, again, I thank
all of you for being here.
I thank you, Madam Chair, again, for your leadership. And
this truly is a committee that has worked in a bipartisan way
to protect our Nation and its people. Thank you very much.
I yield.
Ms. Harman. I thank the ranking member and now welcome our
witnesses. Let me note also that other members of the
subcommittee under subcommittee rules can enter opening
statements in the record if they so choose.
All of the witnesses on this panel are very well known to
me. And I commend them for not only the excellent testimony
they have submitted for today's hearing but for the work they
do in their day jobs on these issues.
Our first witness, Brian Jenkins, is the senior advisor to
the RAND Corporation and is one of the world's leading
authorities on terrorism. He is a repeater. He testified at our
recent Los Angeles hearing on the same subject. And I would
also say, he is the godfather. He founded the RAND
Corporation's terrorism research program in 1972. That is not a
typo, 1972. Has written frequently on terrorism. And has served
as an advisor to the Federal Government and the private sector
on terrorism-related issues. In 1996, he was appointed by
President Clinton to the White House Commission on Aviation,
Safety and Security. He also served as an advisor to the
National Commission on Terrorism, the one on which I served,
and is a member of the U.S. Comptroller General's advisory
board.
Our second witness, Mr. Salam Al-Marayati, is the executive
director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, MPAC, which is
an organization that, among other things, plays a major role
with the FBI regional office in Los Angeles. MPAC is a public
service agency aimed at disseminating accurate information
about Islam to the American public. The MPAC national office in
Washington, D.C., serves as the primary interface between the
Muslim American community and U.S. Government officials. MPAC
has worked with the Departments of State, Treasury and Homeland
Security, and the White House to offer guidance on issues that
affect the United States and the Muslim community.
Our third witness, Mr. Frank Cilluffo, is the associate
vice president for Homeland Security at the George Washington
University Homeland Security Policy Institute. That is a
mouthful. Mr. Cilluffo leads the university's homeland security
efforts on policy, research, education and training. He directs
the multidisciplinary Homeland Security Policy Institute, a
think tank that advances homeland security issues. The
institute's recent policy and research agenda has spanned
domestic terrorism, radicalization, disaster management,
emergency preparedness, pandemic influenza planning,
biodefense, intelligence and information sharing. And if that
is not enough of a nightmare, I am sure we will hear from him
today about how we need to do even more. I would add, about Mr.
Cilluffo, when I became, with the former House Member Saxby
Chambliss, the--I guess we were the co-chairs of--I am not sure
how it was defined, but anyway of our House focus on terrorism
following 9/11. We called a small panel together to advise us
on what we should do, and Mr. Cilluffo was one of the people we
turned to.
Without objection, the witness's full statements will be
inserted in the record. I would now ask each of you to
summarize your statement for 5 minutes. There is a little clock
that will be blinking at you if you violate my edict.
And let us start first with Mr. Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Madam Chair, members of the committee, I want
to thank you for providing me with another opportunity to
address radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the
United States. In my April 5th testimony, I address the ways
terrorists recruit and what we might do to improve it. Today I
would like to focus my remarks on the specific proposal; that
is, the creation of a national commission on the prevention of
violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism.
As a historian and based upon personal experience, I
believe that advisory commissions can be useful instruments for
addressing difficult issues and providing new approaches. In
the past, national commissions have helped the country navigate
crises, define and address problems of domestic violence and
prepare for the growing challenge of terrorism. To go all the
way back to the wave of assassinations and riots in the 1960s,
the Eisenhower Commission on Violence in America, in 1968,
thoughtfully reviewed America's propensity for violence. It
warned of a divided society.
In 1983, the Long Commission convened to review the bombing
of the Marine barracks in Beruit. It went beyond that, and it
alerted the Pentagon and the public that terrorism had become
another form of armed conflict for which our armed forces had
to be prepared.
Several commissions were convened in the 1990s to examine
new dangers offered by terrorism. One after another they issued
sober findings. The Deutch Commission warned of the weapons of
mass destruction. The Bremer Commission warned of a large-scale
terrorist attack in the United States. In many respects, that
commission's report and the problems it identified proved
prophetic. Its concerns were echoed by the Gilmore Commission.
All three commissions agreed that the United States had to
prepare for terrorist catastrophe.
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon in 2001, of course, the 9/11 Commission was able to
build upon this earlier work and the issues that the earlier
commissions had identified to produce a national plan for
improving our capabilities to combat terrorism. The 9/11
attacks were carried out by 19 terrorists who were radicalized
and recruited abroad. But as the threat has evolved since,
today we worry more about individuals in the United States who
may respond to the continuing, and I should say, increasingly
sophisticated incitement to violence emanating from al-Qa'ida
and its allies. And that is the challenge that the proposed
commission would have to consider.
In doing so, it would be required to address a broad range
of questions: What do we know about radicalization and
recruitment to terrorism in the United States? We talk about
self-radicalization, but our actual cases show evidence of
proselytizers, inciters, incubators, people who facilitate
travel abroad for training for terrorism; hardly ``self.'' What
could be done about this infrastructure that supports
radicalization and recruitment? Should we see recruitment as a
societal problem calling for community intervention or a matter
of purely personal choice? And if the former, what is the role
of the communities where recruiting is occurring, and how would
the affected communities frame the problem? What role, if any,
would they propose? What is the role of the Internet? What
lessons might we learn from the efforts of other nations? What
are possible strategies for reducing recruitment to terrorism
in this country? And finally, what is the appropriate role of
Federal and local government?
Tasking an advisory commission with assembling all we know
and developing a framework for understanding radicalization and
homegrown terrorism, therefore, in my view, is a good idea.
Inevitably, it will lead to the identification of some specific
threats and vulnerabilities and possible ways to fix them. Some
of these will address issues of enhancing our local
intelligence capabilities, updating legal mechanisms to deal
with Internet-era technology. Those certainly should be done.
Some will inevitably touch upon more sensitive areas. And here
we do have to be cautious. Proposals that get us into the area
of social engineering have to be very carefully analyzed for
their intended and unintended consequences. Whatever we do to
improve national security must be accomplished without
degrading our enduring values or our inherent national
strengths. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkings \1\
Defining the Role of a national Commission on the Prevention of Violent
Radication and Homegrown Terrorism \2\
Madame Chairperson and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank
you for providing me with another opportunity to address the issue of
radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States. Since
my earlier testimony, authorities have uncovered two more terrorist
conspiracies, and although these plots were nowhere near operational
and probably would not have produced the death and destruction the
conspirators fantasized about, they nevertheless indicate a mindset of
those who seriously wanted to cause devastation. Had they been allowed
to acquire the capability and not been intercepted, they probably would
have used it.
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT285.
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In my April 5 testimony, I addressed the ways terrorists recruit,
what we know about radicalization and recruitment in the United States,
how we might impede it, and guiding principles for any actions we might
consider.\3\
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\3\ Brian Michael Jenkins, ``Building an Army of Believers:
Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment: Testimony Before the Committee
on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing
and Terrorism Risk Assessment, United States House of
Representatives,'' April 5, 2007.
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Today I want to focus my remarks on the specific proposal before
us--the creation of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism.
As a policy analyst, and based upon my own personal experience, I
believe that advisory commissions can be useful instruments for
addressing knotty issues and providing fresh perspectives.\4\
Commissions can bring together individuals inside and outside of
government to combine experience, expertise, and political savvy.
Commissions can conduct impartial inquiries, level hard criticism when
warranted, help government officials and the public understand events,
provide forums for diverse views, and alert the country to new threats.
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\4\ I served as an advisor to the Long Commission in 1983, briefed
the Inman Panel, was a member of the Committee on the Embassy of the
Future, advised the Pan Am 103 Commission, served as a member of the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 1996--97 and as
an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism 1999--2000, was a
technical reviewer for the Gilmore Commission Report, and testified
before and assisted the staff of the 9/11 Commission.
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Commissions are not permanent government bodies. They have no
authority beyond their powers of persuasion, which I think is good.
Required to produce a public report, commissions come to see the
American people as their primary constituency, the national interest as
their sole guide, which enables them to rise above partisan politics
and transcend bureaucratic agendas. Often they can say things that
cannot comfortably be said by officials, including themselves as
individuals in their current or former positions. Even when their
recommendations are ignored by legislators or decisionmakers,
commissions offer a nonpartisan dissenting voice.
Commissions, however, have their limitations:
The oft-heard criticism that creating a commission enables
political leadership to duck hard decisions may be deserved, but clamor
for immediate action can lead to hasty decisions and drive-by
legislation. A conscientious decision to buy time for more thoughtful
recommendations (and a better decisionmaking climate) can be wise
leadership.
Finding the right balance between a roadmap to a perfect world and
pragmatic suggestions that have some chance of implementation is never
easy. Bipartisanship can sometimes lead to milky compromises. Courtesy
among commission members can permit the inclusion of sometimes-
eccentric recommendations.
The presumption that something has gone wrong, a sense of urgency
underscored by a commission's own limited life span, can drive
commissions into making too many recommendations, many of them
exhortations to do better without direction. The first option--not
altering course and therefore not doing more harm--should always be
considered seriously. Often, it is not.
Commission members may choose to be gadflies; frankly, sometimes
they can become cranks. Nevertheless, in the recent past, national
commissions have helped the country navigate crises, define and address
problems of domestic political violence, and prepare for the increasing
challenge of terrorism \5\:
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\5\ Commissions that have addressed domestic political violence and
international terrorism include the following:
1967--National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner
Commission)
1968--National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
(Eisenhower Commission)
1970--President's Commission on Campus Unrest (Scranton Commission)
1983--DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,
October 23, 1983 (Long Commission)
1984--Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (Inman Panel)
1989--President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
(McLaughlin Commission) 1995--Commission on the Roles and Capabilities
of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission)
1996--President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1996--White House Commission on Aviation and Security (Gore
Commission)
1996--Task Force on the Khobar Towers Bombing (Downing Commission)
1998--U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-
Rudman Commission)
1998--U.S. Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Deutch Commission)
1998--Accountability Review Board on the Bombings of the U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7,
1998 (The Crowe Commission)
1999--National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission)
1999--Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission)
2000--DoD USS Cole Commission (Crouch-Gehman Commission)
2002--National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (9/11 Commission)
2004--Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S.
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Robb Commission)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the wake of assassinations and riots, the 1968
Commission on Violence in America thoughtfully reviewed
America's propensity for violent politics and put the
contemporary outburst in historical context but warned of a
divided society.
In 1983, the Long Commission, convened to review the
terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, alerted the
Pentagon and the public that terrorism had become another form
of armed conflict for which our armed forces must be prepared.
Further commissions were convened to review events and distill
lessons learned from the terrorist bombings of Khobar Towers in
1996, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and
the USS Cole in 2000.
At the same time, the Inman Panel, responding to
terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities,
laid out an ambitious program to increase the security of our
diplomatic establishment.
In 1989, the Pan Am 103 Commission devised another
ambitious program to improve U.S. efforts to combat terrorism
and increase security for commercial aviation.
The crash of TWA flight 800, although it turned out
not to have been caused by terrorist sabotage as initially
suspected, provided the basis for the Gore Commission to make
specific recommendations to improve aviation safety and
security.
Several national commissions were convened in the
1990s to examine the new dangers. One after another, they
issued sober findings. In 1999, the Deutch Commission warned of
the diversion of weapons of mass destruction from Russia,
possession of weapons of mass destruction by unfriendly states,
clandestine delivery of a nuclear weapon, and terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction in the United States. The following
year, the Bremer Commission warned of large-scale terrorism in
the United States, including chemical, biological, and
radiological attacks. The Gilmore Panel warned of attacks in
the United States with weapons of mass destruction, terrorist
attacks on U.S. agriculture, and cyberterrorism. All three
commissions agreed that the United States had to prepare for
catastrophe. They also warned that national panic in the face
of such threats could imperil civil liberties. The Hart-Rudman
Commission recommended the creation of a cabinet-level Agency
of Homeland Security.
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the 9/11 Commission identified
failures and built upon earlier work to provide a comprehensive
blueprint for improving national capabilities to prevent the
recurrence of such attacks.
The 9/11 attacks were carried out by 19 terrorists who were
radicalized and recruited abroad to attack the United States. Such
attacks remain a possibility, but the terrorist threat has evolved.
Today we worry more about individuals already in the United States,
legally or illegally, who may respond to the continuing and
increasingly sophisticated incitement to violence emanating from al-
Qa'ida, radicalize themselves, and plot terrorist attacks. In examining
homegrown terrorism, the proposed commission would come closer to the
Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions of the late 1960s than to the later
commissions, which focused on threats from abroad.
Any commission convened to address radicalization and recruitment
in the United States will inevitably touch upon broader sensitive
issues:
Protecting religious freedom while protecting society
against incitement and violence wrapped in asserted religious
imperatives.
The tenets of religious faith versus the
responsibilities of citizenship.
Protecting free speech but not incitement to violence
when it can be expected to result in criminal action.
Whether new communications technologies--e.g., the
Internet--warrant further monitoring and regulation.
Our ability to control our borders, regulate
immigration, and reduce illegal immigration.
Whether the assimilation of immigrants--America's
great strength--is still working.
The role and rules of domestic intelligence
collection.
The still fluid and always difficult determination of
when and how authorities should and may intervene to thwart
terrorist plots.
One of the major challenges will be to correctly frame the issue,
avoiding unsupported assumptions that lead to inappropriate strategies.
Is homegrown terrorism an immigration and assimilation problem? Is this
a problem for the Muslim community? (And what do we mean by ``the
Muslim community''?) Do we need to mobilize the ``moderate Muslims''?
And if so, how do we do that? Or is recruitment to violence a matter of
individual choice and chance encounter?
To conduct a thorough inquiry, the proposed commission would have
to consider a broad range of questions:
What do we currently know about radicalization and
recruitment to terrorism in the United States? What do we need
to know?
How would we assess this threat? Is the danger
exaggerated? Radicalization and recruitment are occurring here,
but there is no evidence of a significant cohort of recruits.
Yet how confident are we that we know what is going on? Is this
a slow building effort by our terrorist foes?
We speak of self-radicalization, but actual cases show
evidence of proselytizers, inciters, incubators, trips abroad
for training, volunteers for violence seeking mission approval
from perceived figures of authority--not entirely ``self.''
What do we know about this infrastructure for radicalization?
Is radicalization here a product of an externally
financed missionary campaign that is pushing an extreme version
of faith, self-isolation, intolerance, and militancy?
Should radicalization and recruitment be framed as an
immigration and assimilation problem? What about extremist
enterprises that recruit native-born Americans to violence?
Does it make sense to lump together the self-radicalization
that led to the Oklahoma City bombing with the self-
radicalization that has produced violent jihadists?
Assimilation of immigrants, accomplished with little
federal intervention, is a historic strength of America. Along
with the ``huddled masses yearning to breathe free,'' we have
in the past occasionally imported their violent quarrels. Is
the problem significantly worse than previously? Have
circumstances changed to deepen the pools of unassimilating,
alienated immigrants or sons of immigrants? Has a violence-
exalting narrative combined with effective exploitation of
modern communications, and perhaps anger at policies that can
easily be portrayed as an assault on faith or community,
interrupted the normal multigeneration integration of immigrant
communities?
Is recruitment to terrorism a societal problem calling
for community intervention or a matter of purely individual
choice? If it is the former, then what is the role of the
communities where recruiting is occurring? And if it is the
latter, do affected communities have no greater role than any
other citizens (and less basis for complaint when authorities
focus on suspected recruiting venues)?
What are the views of affected communities? How would
they frame the problem? What role, if any, would they propose?
Does inevitable and understandable public concern about
terrorism and the resulting heightened scrutiny of certain
communities reinforce community efforts to discourage young men
(and women) from pursuing dangerous and destructive paths or
only provoke suspicion and antagonism? Do affected communities
see a need for assistance, and if so, what kind of assistance?
What role does the Internet play in radicalization and
recruitment to violence, along with practical instruction in
its application? Does this role pose a sufficient threat to
require consideration of some measure of regulation? What are
other nations that face this challenge doing? What might be
learned from their efforts?
What are possible policies and strategies for reducing
recruitment to terrorism, explicitly considering the
possibility that the potential adverse consequences of any
government intervention beyond current local community and
intelligence efforts outweigh likely payoffs?
If useful interventions can be identified, what is the
appropriate role of the federal government versus that of local
government?
You can detect a difference between my view on the creation of a
national commission to examine radicalization and homegrown terrorism
and my cautionary views regarding government intervention to prevent
such threats. Let me make this explicit.
Tasking a national commission with assembling all we know and
developing a framework for understanding radicalization and homegrown
terrorism is a good idea. Inevitably, such an inquiry will lead to the
identification of some specific, perhaps new, threats and
vulnerabilities, and possible ways to fix them. But here I become more
cautious, even skeptical.
Judging by the terrorist conspiracies uncovered since 9/11, violent
radicalization has yielded very few recruits. Indeed, the level of
terrorist activities in the United States was much higher in the 1970s
than it is today. Fashioning national strategies to deal with handfuls
of diverse misfits may be counterproductive. Therefore, as I concluded
my April 5, 2007 testimony with some basic principles, let me conclude
here by underscoring some principles to guide the proposed commission's
work:
Improving national security must be accomplished
without degrading our enduring values.
Updating legal mechanisms to deal with Internet-era
technology should be done, but more ambitious and more
sensitive proposals for social engineering should be
extensively analyzed for their intended and unintended,
positive and negative consequences.
The criterion for any proposed measure should be a
very high level of confidence that it will be effective, that
the risks of adverse consequences will be very small, and that
it will include mechanisms to prevent and remedy the abuse if
things go wrong.
Finally, efforts should be primarily local, albeit with federal
assistance.
SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON A PROPOSED COMMISSION
ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT
RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
Brian Michael Jenkins
June 22, 2007
The proposed commission can build on strength. Although we know
that radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are taking place in
the United States, these efforts thus far do not appear to have
produced a significant cohort of terrorist operatives. Since 9/11, we
have suffered no further terrorist attacks. We may credit good
intelligence, possibly discouragement by the community, and the paucity
of terrorist volunteers. Polling indicates that the vast majority of
our immigrant population rejects violence. All this is good news. But
the bad news is that our terrorist foes remain determined, their
communications are becoming more sophisticated, and a greater number of
young people may endorse terrorist violence. The challenge will be to
reduce the appeal of those foes without eroding our inherent strengths.
Any inquiry into measures to combat radicalization and recruitment
to terrorism in the United States inevitably will confront the fact
that the structure and strategy to address these elements as a
component of our global efforts against terrorism are inadequate.
In the first months after 9/11, we understandably focused our
attention on disrupting any further large-scale terrorist attacks in
the pipeline and on degrading the terrorists' operational capabilities.
The United States then invaded Iraq, which has continued to command our
resources and demand our attention. As a result, efforts aimed at
preventing radicalization and recruitment to terrorism were consigned
to the sidelines and remain scattered and uncoordinated. The Pentagon's
Office of Strategic Information was strangled at birth. Military
psychological operations remain tactical--in essence, playing cards
with wanted posters. The State Department, although the lead agency for
public diplomacy, has few resources and little authority over other
parts of government. Nearly six years after 9/11, we have created no
Political Warfare Executive, no new version of the United States
Information Agency, to counter increasingly sophisticated terrorist
propaganda.
How we ultimately approach the issue here will affect perceptions
abroad. Successful ideas developed to address the issue of homegrown
terrorism will also find application elsewhere.
Europe, especially the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and
the Netherlands, has been intensively examining the issue of
radicalization and recruitment. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Malaysia, and
Singapore have launched programs to reduce incitement, inoculate
targeted communities, offer those who have been recruited a way back,
and rehabilitate terrorist prisoners. We can learn from these
experiences.
Radicalization and recruitment to terrorism have also been examined
by analysts in the intelligence community, by local law enforcement
(with some informative research done by the New York Police
Department), and by people in the research community. If the
information was assembled in one place, we would probably find that we
know a great deal about the dynamics of recruitment.
Our encounters are primarily with individuals who have been
arrested or detained. These include a number of hardcore terrorists,
committed to the depths of their souls, who may color our overall view.
Not surprisingly, we hear less from those who have been radicalized and
decide to leave, although these may be the most informative and
credible sources of information. Khaled al-Berry's La Terre est Plus
Belle que le Paradis, Daveed Gortenstein-Ross' My Year Inside Radical
Islam: A Memoir, and Ed Husain's The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical
Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left could help us
identify the decision points and weaknesses in the radicalization
process.
At the same time, these testimonials must be interpreted with care.
While entirely sincere, they may reflect the denunciatory zeal of the
``ex.''
There is also debate within the broader community of faith, where
the terrorists' extreme and exotic interpretations are being
challenged. In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons From the Life of
Muhammad, by Tariq Ramadan, is a recent example. This is not a matter
of mobilizing the so-called moderates against the extremists. Our role
is not to endorse any religious scholars, which would in any case
destroy their credibility, but instead to endorse the kind of debate
that is consistent with individual liberty.
We are looking at intent here. Therefore, I want to repeat a point
made in response to a question. Those arrested on terrorism-related
charges in the United States have manifest intent--they had simply not
yet acquired the capability to carry out any attack.
The Hamburg Cell, whose members ultimately led the 9/11 attacks,
had intent. Until they went to Afghanistan, they had no capability.
That was provided by al-Qa'ida.
The Leeds Cell responsible for the 2005 bombings in London had
intent. They acquired capability, probably when one of their members
traveled to Pakistan.
To move outside of al-Qa'ida's realm, Timothy McVeigh and his co-
conspirators responsible for the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City had
intent. McVeigh, a former soldier, acquired the capability himself.
Intent is the constant. Capability is the variable. A determined
group will continue to seek capability, reaching out for assistance or
until its members are recruited for a specific terrorist operation by
those with capability.
We must, however, move very cautiously in criminalizing intent. As
a country that guarantees individual liberty, we have not developed a
large corpus of law dealing with intent. Free speech is
constitutionally guaranteed, although not unlimited. Radicalization
alone--the acquisition of extreme or outlandish beliefs--is no crime.
It is only when radicalization turns to commitment to carry out acts of
violence or to recruiting, assisting, or inciting others to do so that
we enter the domain of law enforcement. We may never be able to draw a
sharp line defining exactly where that occurs, which is why oversight
is vital. The ultimate auditors, of course, are judge and jury.
A final comment: The proposed commission's work might be divided
into two phases. Phase one would examine radicalization and recruitment
to homegrown terrorism, assess the threat, and identify its
vulnerabilities. Phase two would recommend specific measures,
identifying those requiring federal legislation and describing the
benefits and risks of each.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Mr. Jenkins, for posing
some very provocative questions and for the expertise you
bring. Should we proceed with this idea, you are hereby
enlisted.
Mr. AlMarayati.
STATEMENT OF SALAM AL-MARAYATI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MUSLIM
PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL
Mr. Al-Marayati. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson,
and the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, for inviting the Muslim Public
Affairs Council to provide a voice for the mainstream Muslim
American community on Homeland Security. We believe that the
commission is a very good idea that can address a number of
very important issues, specifically identifying the
relationship between the Muslim American community and the U.S.
Government. We believe that increased engagement with and the
role of the mainstream Muslim American community should be
understood within the broader strategy of protecting our
country. The Muslim American community is an underutilized
asset. We can partner with it and understand legitimate,
authentic and credible leadership as a key to countering
extremism and radicalization.
Preventing alienation of this group is also a key to
effective policy making. Counter-extremism, in many ways, is
tantamount to countering ghettoization, seen right now in
European Muslim communities. And let me just add to this that
the Muslim American story is a story of success. And we are
dealing today with a very serious problem. But we should not
dismiss many of the great contributions of Muslim Americans in
business, academia, science and the arts. We should not dismiss
the Muslim American contributions in our armed forces and in
law enforcement today.
America offers equal opportunity to citizenship, an open
society, an alliance with civil society and a process for
integration into pluralism. No other country today offers those
opportunities for any of its minorities. America needs Muslims,
and Muslims need America.
We have a saying in our organization, home is not where our
grandparents are buried; home is where our grandchildren are
going to be raised. And for an effective counterterrorism
strategy, the community should be involved as it is considering
this a priority in protecting our home from any enemy.
Therefore, community-based policing, similar to neighborhood
watch groups, are effective in increasing crime. The Muslim
Public Affairs Council in 2004 offered the national grassroots
campaign to fight terrorism that is built on three major
components: one, to amplify Islam's message against terrorism,
to fight bad theology with good theology, to counter the
theology of death with the theology of life; number two, to
build partnerships between law enforcement and local Muslim
communities, as Muslim Public Affairs Council has developed an
important dialogue with the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies on this very important issue; and number three, to
offer guidelines to Muslim institutions so that they can
demonstrate their transparency and accountability to the
American public. And we do this not for political reasons but
for Islamic reasons based on the Quranic principle found in
sura 5, verse 32, that basically says the killing of an
innocent human being is equal to the killing of all of
humanity, and the saving of an innocent life is equal to the
saving of all of humanity. We are here to save lives, Christian
life, Jewish life, Muslim life, atheist life. And we counter
the ideology of death with the ideology of life.
But the ideology of life needs to have the platform and the
arena and needs the assistance of government in raising its
profile. Therefore, in doing so, I believe the American public
can at least begin to appreciate that Muslim Americans are part
of the solution, not part of the problem. In the FBI
headquarters down the street, there is a quote that says, the
most effective weapon against crime is cooperation; the efforts
of all law enforcement with the support and understanding of
the American people. The U.S. Government therefore needs to
publicize the partnership it has developed with the Muslim
American community and not just publicize the arrests of fringe
elements that are not necessarily part of the mainstream Muslim
American community. Muslim Americans want to be treated as
partners, not suspects.
Let me just end by touching upon three important elements
that we believe should be addressed by the commission. Number
one is the credibility of leadership. The term moderate has
lost its impact and meaning. It is now interpreted by the
Muslim American community as the one who has left Islam and
condemns the religion wholesale with this following logic, that
the only good Muslim is an ex-Muslim. The commission needs to
include Muslims who are self-critical, but not self-hating. The
term moderate should describe those who believe in the change
of the status quo and perhaps are anti-establishment, but in
advancing towards change renounce violence as an instrument of
change and support civic engagement, human and interfaith
relations and an understanding of Islam that is inclusive, not
exclusive.
Muslim youth need our support. In the several campuses
throughout the United States, there are Hillel and Christian
chaplaincy that support Jewish and Christian students
respectively, but there is no similar support system for Muslim
American students. Universities can also consider establishing
a center for Muslim American studies that looks into the
development and integration of Muslim Americans. And, finally,
on the issue of Muslim youth, we need Federal programs that
train adults, as well as youth, on the difference between free
speech and incitement to violence.
Lastly, Islamophobia is a root cause of radicalization, and
we need more of our government and political leaders to speak
out against anti-Islamic rhetoric, not for the sake of civil
liberties necessarily but for the sake of keeping the Muslim
American community engaged in all important policies. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. Al-Marayati follows:]
Prepared Statement of Salam Al-Marayati
Thank you, Congressman Bennie Thompson, Congresswoman Jane Harman,
and members of the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment for
inviting me to testify on ``Assessing and Addressing the Threat:
Defining the Role of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism.'' On behalf of the Muslim
Public Affairs Council (MPAC), I am honored to offer analysis and
recommendations that we believe can be helpful and constructive in
increasing the understanding and role of the mainstream Muslim American
community within the broader strategy of protecting the country. While
one of the most underutilized assets, understanding and partnering with
the Muslim American community and its legitimate, authentic and
credible leadership is the key to countering extremism and
radicalization.
One major aspect of any effective counterterrorism strategy is
community-based policing, similar to neighborhood watch groups that
have been effective in dealing with various crimes throughout the
United States. To this end, MPAC launched the National Grassroots
Campaign to Fight Terrorism in 2004 (http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/). This
program was based on three critical components: (1) amplifying Islam's
message against terrorism; (2) developing partnerships between law
enforcement and local Muslim communities; and (3) offering guidelines
to Muslim institutions to demonstrate transparency and accountability
in the post 9/11 era. This program is based on the Quranic instruction:
``Whosoever killed a human being--unless it be in punishment for murder
or for spreading corruption on earth--it shall be as if he had killed
all humankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though
he had saved the lives of all humankind.'' [5:32]
Down the street from this House Office Building is the FBI
Headquarters, and in the interior is etched an important quote
underscoring the need for partnership: ``The most effective weapon
against crime is cooperation . . .the efforts of all law enforcement
agencies with the support and understanding of the American people.''
Hence, the role of community-based organizations like MPAC is
critical to bridging the governmental and non-governmental agencies in
any policy initiative. To do so, there must be an environment of mutual
trust and respect. Muslim Americans want to be treated as partners in
making America safe and secure, not suspects. Treating them as suspects
by advocating for policies that single out and hence isolate the entire
community undermines and impedes efforts for homeland security.
Engagement
Direct engagement with the Muslim American community is now a clear
strategy of several federal agencies. It is the time to look more
closely at the human and intellectual resources Muslim Americans can
offer in the various areas of interest. Lately, hearings on
radicalization have focused on campuses, the internet and prisons. For
each of these problem areas, there are solutions found within the
Muslim American community.
Muslim Americans want to be part of the solution and do away with
the stigma of being part of the problem. On the issue of universities,
Muslim organizations and individuals work with students in counseling
and guidance towards problem-solving. On the issue of the internet,
there are several internet sites that provide thoughtful analyses on
current affairs and counter extremist rhetoric. On the issue of
prisons, Muslim chaplains are a critical part of the answer to self-
styled leaders that wear the cloak of Islam. Here I'd like to focus on
Muslim Youth and the key factors in supporting rather than isolating
our youth. In order to scratch beyond the surface to begin
understanding and preventing radicalization from taking root in the
United States amongst our youth, we must identify and explore the
critical issues of identity, the government's responsibility to partner
with credible leadership, the effects of Islamophobia, and the
application of counterproductive language.
Muslim Youth
MPAC recently issued a special report on Muslim youth entitled
``The Impact of 9/11 on Muslim American Young People: Forming National
and Religious Identity in the Age of Terrorism and Islamophobia''
(http://www.mpac.org/article.php?id=512). The recommendations in this
report identify important steps that universities, government, media
professionals and Muslim American institutions can take to begin their
collective contribution to supporting and protecting our youth. In
regards to the government's role, the recommendations include but are
not limited to creating an Inter-Agency Muslim American Youth Advisory
Board of leaders and young professionals, eliminating conflation of
every criminal activity by Muslims as terrorism, more vocally speaking
out against anti-Muslim hate speech, and inviting young Muslim American
professionals and youth to trans-Atlantic dialogues that aim to create
space for Western Muslim Youth to compare their experiences and build
friendships and alliances. Furthermore, our federal law enforcement
agencies should publicize the important and productive relationship
they hold with Muslim American organizations and their leadership in
order to demonstrate to the American public that mainstream Muslims are
working alongside the government to protect their communities and their
country. As we discuss the potential threat of homegrown terrorism and
radicalization, universities also play a critical role in fostering
inclusion.
For this reason, we recommend that universities institutionalize a
Muslim chaplain position for every campus in the United States. While
every campus has a Hillel support system or a Christian chaplaincy,
Muslim students have no comparable support. Hence, MPAC is calling for
a collaborative effort emanating from the leadership of every college
campus to institute a Muslim religious advisor funded, staffed and
certified by the university to ensure the applicability of the
chaplain's contributions are germane to each campus. In tandem,
universities should dedicate resources to the creation of centers for
Muslim American studies that can foster better understanding of the
Muslim landscape, including much needed academic research. This
research, when coupled with direct engagement, should facilitate
further integration of Muslim Americans into American pluralism.
Credibility of Leadership
The word moderate has been politicized in the discourse on counter-
extremism to the extent that it has lost its impact. Moderate has
become associated with the individuals who have left Islam and condemn
the religion wholesale. Government partnering with credibile leadership
within the Muslim American community is a key component in effective
engagement. The Commission needs Muslims who are self-critical without
being self-hating. A major problem in the policy-making circles is the
absence of Muslim Americans who represent the mainstream community with
a track record in enhancing civic engagement, interfaith and human
relations.
Campus life should represent the best of America in offering
opportunities for critical thinking, free speech and civil discourse.
Hence, discussions with federal agencies on the distinctions between
free speech and incitement to violence are crucial to the development
of healthy debate in universities. Federal programs in promoting
dialogue and countering hate speech could be very instructive and
beneficial to Muslim and non-Muslim student groups.
Islamophobia
Those involved in counterterrorism policy-making should understand
that the more negative the image of Islam is in public discourse, the
more fertile the soil will be for radicalization of Muslim youth
throughout America. Young people react to perceived threats upon their
identity by amplifying the most noticeable anti-social elements as
symbols of their independence and chosen identity.
MPAC offers the Muslim American identity as the model for healthy
integration into American pluralism. We reject the ``clash of
civilizations'' theory as we see no friction between the founding
principles of America and the values of Islam. As we have repeatedly
stated, ``Home is not where our grandparents are buried, but home is
where our grandchildren will be raised.'' Hence, America is home, and
defending it against all who seek to harm her is our priority.
Defending the Muslim American community against those who scapegoat and
stereotype Islam and Muslims is a priority in effective civic
engagement and securing our nation.
Terminology
While radicals use Islam to justify terrorism, we cannot afford to
lend Islamic legitimacy to extremist groups. Hence, using ``Islamic''
before terms like fascism, terrorism, violent radicalism is
counterproductive. MPAC appreciates the initiative of the Committee on
Homeland Security to make distinctions between Islam and its
exploitation by extremists.
In conclusion, to the mainstream Muslim American community, Islam
is the antidote to violent radicalization. The empowerment of the
mainstream Muslim American community is the most effective but
underutilized resource in creating effective counter-terrorism
strategies. MPAC is optimistic and is ready to foster cooperation and
mutual understanding between our government and the Muslim American
community.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
I watched your neighbor to your left, Mr. Cilluffo, nodding
through your testimony, Mr. Al-Marayati, and I bet we are going
to hear some reinforcement right now.
Mr. Cilluffo.
STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.
Mr. Cilluffo. Madam Chair, Congressman Reichert,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. And sitting next to my
friend, Brian, and Mr. Al-Marayati, I do have to say they
covered much of the waterfront. And I applaud the efforts of
both and have worked with Brian for a number of years.
But prevention of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is
one of the most pressing issues of our time. And you should be
commended for your strong leadership in examining and, more
importantly, in acting on these matters. As director of the
Homeland Security Policy Institute at GW, much of my time and
energy over the least 18-months has been directed towards the
study of radicalization. In particular, the processes by which
people become radicalized. In prisons, over the Internet, here
at home and also abroad. Unfortunately, recent events such as
the Fort Dix case, the Toronto 18 and the JFK plot remind us
that there is no basis for complacency. The up side is that the
domestic plots we have seen thus far have demonstrated intent
but not much in terms of capability. We would be foolish
however to ignore the real possibility that both intent and
capability may indeed marry up in the future.
Testifying before the subcommittee last September, I
presented the key findings and recommendations of a report on
prisoner radicalization produced jointly by HSPI and the
University of Virginia's CIAG. Our study recommended that
Congress establish a commission to investigate the issue in
order to better understand the nature of the threat and the
baseline of activity and effectively assess current prevention
and response efforts and recalibrate them accordingly.
Radicalization, wherever it is occurring and through whatever
venues, is only one subset of the battle of ideas. And
effective response strategies and tactics need to extend beyond
our borders. In fact, it is a bit of a misnomer to speak of
homegrown terrorism. We live in a largely borderless world, and
the threats that we face are transnational. Activity in
cyberspace reinforces that point.
In a second joint study, we looked at Internet-facilitated
radicalization and found that Internet chat rooms are now
supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and
coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by
terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida. A copy of our report has
been submitted for the record. By incorporating and
manipulating local, political and economic grievances, some of
which are legitimate, extremists have woven an effective tale
of an imaginary clash of civilizations between the West and
Islam. The extremist's compelling call to action, based partly
on myths and falsehoods, begs for the development of an
effective counternarrative, one that unpacks, forcefully
refutes and powerfully responds to the extremist's own. The
West is not at war with Islam, and terrorism is, in fact, un-
Islamic.
The real challenge for us here is to offer a dream of sorts
and provide real opportunities for a better tomorrow to those
who feel alienated and marginalized and who might otherwise be
seduced by the extremist ideology. The U.S. needs to catch up
in the cyber battle of words and ideas, to deconstruct the al-
Qa'ida brand campaign and turn it into nothing more than a
passing fad. To succeed, of course, this means much more than
slick marketing and framing of the message. Our words must
match our actions.
The bottom line is that radicalization is not a well
understood phenomenon. Greater study of the life cycle of a
terrorist, when one goes from sympathizer to activist to
indiscriminate violence, is needed in part to identify trigger
points and possible points of intervention.
With all this as background, your proposal to establish a
commission is a necessary step to meet and defeat existing and
potential threats to the United States. Your legislation will
go a long way towards pulling together what is known in this
field, identifying gaps and seams in our knowledge and chart a
more clearer course ahead. That foundational research may then
be used to better inform and shape policies. The importance of
tapping knowledge and experience of both the public sector at
all levels of the government and private and nongovernmental
sectors needs to be emphasized. And while there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to the challenge at hand, there still is a
substantial value in looking beyond our borders to the work
done and lessons learned or at least observed by other
countries.
In fact, HSPI has inaugurated an ambassador roundtable to
do just that. And your legislation clearly recognizes all of
this. It is important to note, though, that the role of
government is limited in this context. The solution for this
problem lie primarily at the grassroots level in local
communities where trusted incredible leaders can have real
impact with their fellow citizens. That is not to say that
government at all levels don't have a contribution to make.
Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials
and communities founded on a solid education about Muslim
cultures an Islam is crucial.
Let me emphasize that radicalization is not unique to
Islam, nor is it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist
beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major
religion in the world, and Islam is one of those several. And
they actually do run directly counter to the basic tenets of
Islam, and most polls overseas would demonstrate that.
Let me just get to two quick points. I know I am over the
time. But I do think it is important that we appreciate the
sensitivities and the perceptions of those who feel that they,
their religion and entire community are being targeted as a
result of the extremist action of a fringe element. And I think
you should really run with the protections you have there in
terms of civil liberties and recognize that balance, and I
applaud that. And I also think there are two points in
particular that could be enhanced in the legislation. The first
is, it is not comprehensive of all the disciplines that need to
be addressed. Behavioral science needs to have a front row seat
at the table, as do social networking experts. This is largely
a networking phenomena, so people in the IT sector who can do
that. And I would also suggest that, since terrorists don't
adhere to artificial timelines, and 18 months is an awful long
way to go before you come up with a complete report, that you
should have interim reporting requirements and draft that into
the legislation itself.
In closing, thank you for your leadership. HSPI stands
ready to help however we can, and I thank you for the
opportunity to be here with friends and colleagues.
[The statement of Mr. Cillufo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished
Members of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. The prevention of radicalization and homegrown
terrorism is surely one of the most pressing issues of our time, and
your leadership in examining these matters--and, more importantly, in
acting on them --is to be heartily commended.
As Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at The
George Washington University, much of my time and energy over the last
eighteen months has been directed towards studying the phenomenon of
radicalization in various contexts: in prisons, over the Internet, here
at home in the United States, and also abroad. Sadly, recent events
have only reinforced the importance of this task and driven home the
sense of urgency that should accompany both examination of and action
against radicalization. The Fort Dix case and the JFK airport plot
revealed just days ago, serve as only the latest reminders that there
is no basis for complacency. The threat is real and plainly, our shores
will not act as a failsafe against it. Yet it is something of a
misnomer to speak of ``homegrown terrorism'' for the term is suggestive
of watertight compartments that do not in fact exist. To the contrary,
we live in a borderless world and the threats that we face are
similarly transnational. That said, the United States remains in some
respects reasonably well situated. Other countries are currently
experiencing a more full-blown manifestation of certain dimensions of
the problem such as the United Kingdom. In a sense therefore, we have
an opportunity to get ahead of the curve and deal proactively with
these elements before they have the chance to flourish more vigorously
in this country. Fortunately, the domestic plots that we have seen in
the U.S. to date have evidenced intent but not much in the way of
capability--but we would be foolish to think that the two cannot or
will not come together in future.
Testifying before this Subcommittee in September 2006,\1\ I
presented the key findings and recommendations of a special report
produced jointly by HSPI and the University of Virginia's Critical
Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), and entitled Out of the Shadows:
Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.\2\ That report was informed
by a dedicated volunteer task force of subject matter experts in law
enforcement, intelligence, behavioral science, and religion (including
imams, chaplains, and scholars). The study reached the fundamental
conclusion that Congress should establish a commission to investigate
in depth the matter of prisoner radicalization by conducting an
objective risk assessment in order to better understand the nature of
the threat, and calibrate and formulate our prevention and response
efforts accordingly. We emphasized the complexity of the problem and
the associated need to take a multidisciplinary approach to analysis,
and further urged that the commission seek to balance the practice of
religious freedom while preventing the spread of radical ideology. A
number of the priority issues we recommended be addressed by the
commission were specific and targeted to the prison setting, such as
the need for more data and greater study of prisons outside the
jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Others were more wide-
ranging, including for example the identification of broader areas of
dialogue with the Muslim community to better facilitate cultural
understanding, mutual respect, and trust. Prisoner radicalization is of
course but one subset of the battle of ideas, and the former cannot be
divorced from the larger context in which it is embedded. Effective
response requires strategies and tactics that extend not only beyond
bars but beyond borders. A commission with a broader mandate than that
described above is therefore to be welcomed.
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\1\ Frank J. Cilluffo, ``The Homeland Security Implications of
Radicalization,'' testimony before the Intelligence, Information
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the U.S. House
of Representatives' Committee on Homeland Security, delivered on
September 20, 2006.
\2\ Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, et al., September 19, 2006.
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Like the nation's prison system, cyberspace constitutes another
understudied but fertile ground for radicalization in the United
States. With the twin aims of redressing the dearth of research in this
area and offering powerful prescriptions for action, HSPI and CIAG
jointly undertook a study of Internet-facilitated radicalization titled
NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy, a copy of which is
submitted along with this statement.\3\ That report, supported by a
task force of highly regarded subject matter experts from a range of
disciplines, found that Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and
replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for
recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups like al-Qa'ida. The
real time, two-way dialogue of chat rooms has enabled extremist ideas
to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially. By
incorporating and manipulating local political grievances--some of
which are legitimate--extremists have woven an effective tale of an
imaginary ``clash of civilizations.'' The extremists' compelling ``call
to action'' based partly on myths and falsehoods begs for the
development of an effective counter-narrative that forcefully refutes
and responds to the extremists' own. One wonders how it is that the
nation that gave rise to Silicon Valley and the Internet itself, came
to be outplayed in this realm. In part the answer lies in the fact that
we have not channeled our collective talents and energies into that
end. Irrespective of the reason, it is clear that the U.S. needs to
catch up in this cyber-battle of words and ideas. However, unless
elements of the counter-narrative emanate from within the Muslim
community and are conveyed by voices that are trusted and credible
within those communities, the opportunity to achieve impact will be
limited at best.
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\3\ Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, et al., May 3, 2007. See also
Frank J. Cilluffo, ``The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist
Extremism,'' testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, delivered on May 3, 2007.
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As in the case of prisoner radicalization, the challenge in
cyberspace should be appreciated in larger context. Granted, where
appropriate we should seek to deny or disrupt extremist access to and
extremist efforts through the Internet via legal and technical means
and covert action. At the same time however, it is crucial that we bear
in mind wider and deeper goals and themes such as the need to offer an
alternative to those who feel alienated and marginalized. Another
example is the importance of intelligence work to inform
counterterrorism. These underlying or foundational elements merit
special consideration as they are critical components of our efforts
concerning radicalization writ large. By way of illustration, our
report therefore offers a cluster of recommendations intended to foster
intra--and cross-cultural dialogue and understanding to strengthen the
ties that bind together communities at the local, national and
international levels. Likewise, we emphasize that the need for
additional behavioral science research into the process of
radicalization both online and offline, must be recognized and
addressed.
Radicalization is not a well understood phenomenon, hence greater
study of the life cycle of a terrorist--specifically, the process by
which an individual becomes motivated to listen to radical ideas, read
about them, self-enlist or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, and
ultimately, undertake terrorist activity--is needed in part to identify
trigger points and possible points of intervention. Against this
background, your proposal to establish a National Commission on the
Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism is a
necessary step to meet and defeat existing and potential threats to the
United States. The stated primary purposes of the Commission--(1) to
``[e]xamine and report upon the facts and causes of radicalization and
homegrown terrorism in the United States. . .''; and (2) ``to [b]uild
upon and bring together the work of other entities. . .,'' both
domestic and foreign \4\--are suggestive of both a sorely needed
initiative and a well thought out methodology. Rigorous scrutiny of
radicalization undertaken by academics and practitioners alike, as
mandated by this legislation, should go a long way towards pulling
together what is known in this area, identifying the gaps in our
knowledge, and moving forward. In turn, that foundational research may
then be used to better inform and shape policies, which should prove to
be all the more effective as a result of this evidence-based tailoring.
To date, some work has been done, but not under a broad rubric or with
the active engagement of the federal agencies necessary. To the extent
that solid work on these critical areas has already been done, it
should not be discarded or ignored. Collaborative endeavors undertaken
by HSPI and CIAG, and projects undertaken by other similar entities
such as the Center of Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland,
offer a starting point for more in-depth investigation and analysis by
the Commission and its staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Manager's Amendment to H.R. 1955 Offered by Ms. Harman of
California, Section 899C(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance of drawing upon knowledge and experience that may
reside in both the public sector, at all levels of government, and the
private and nongovernmental sectors must be emphasized--as must the
value of looking beyond our borders to the work done and lessons
learned (or at least observed) by other countries. While there is no
one size fits all approach to the challenges under study, since each
country setting derives its experience and response from a different
set of political, economic, social and cultural circumstances and
history, there remains substantial value in carefully examining whether
certain elements may be relevant to the U.S. context. Put differently,
in a borderless world such as ours, we would be acting at our peril if
we failed to take into account ``foreign government studies of, reviews
of, and experiences with radicalization and homegrown terrorism,'' as
required by the legislation.\5\ This is an area where HSPI has been
particularly active. Our Ambassador Roundtable Series on International
Collaboration to Combat Terrorism and Insurgencies, co-sponsored by the
Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, builds upon and
institutionalizes efforts to engage ambassadors, heads of state and
cabinet level officials in an ongoing dialogue on counterterrorism
efforts of multiple nations. This coming Monday, in fact, HSPI will be
hosting the United Kingdom's Home Secretary, Dr. John Reid, who leads
the UK's effort to protect the public from terrorist attack. His
address will speak to the future of terrorism, the ``battle of ideas,''
international law, and recent developments in the U.K. Secretary Reid
will offer insights on radicalization and potential methods to counter
it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid., sec. 899C(b)(2)(C).
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Yet the role of government whether foreign or domestic is perforce
limited in this context, as the solution sets for the problem under
discussion must emanate principally from the grassroots, from local
communities, their leaders and the citizens that reside there.
Governments at the federal, state, local and tribal levels certainly
have a contribution to make however, and there is also a measure of
interplay between the public and private sectors that is and will
continue to be crucial to combating radicalization at home and
elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement at the local level should
develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim
communities as local figures are best placed to identify radicalization
at its earliest stages. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding
between officials and communities, founded on a solid education about
Muslim cultures and Islam, is critical. Notably, in the Fort Dix case,
the mosque attended by three of the plotters quickly called an
``emergency town hall meeting'' to invite law enforcement, other
officials, and members of the public ``to ask anything they want about
the mosque or about Islam, and to publicize a ringing denunciation of
terrorism and violence of any sort. . .''.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Chris Newmarker, ``Mosque where Fort Dix suspects struggles
with suspicion in wake of plot,'' International Herald Tribune, May 15,
2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/15/america/NA-GEN-US-Fort-
Dix-Plot-Mosque.php.
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Let me emphasize that radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is
it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist beliefs have been used to
subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world and Islam is
only one of several that terrorists may invoke to justify acts of
violence (though such acts run counter to the very tenets of Islam). In
cyberspace, extremist organizations of all stripes, adhering to any
number of radical belief systems, are present and have used the
Internet to radicalize and recruit others. Likewise, in addition to
radical Muslim influence, U.S. prisons have borne the imprint of right-
wing extremist groups and cults known to participate in criminal
activity. Unfortunately, there exists a certain symbiosis between the
two and some radical right-wing groups have found common ideological
cause with extremists identifying themselves as Muslim. Moving forward,
it is imperative that due care be accorded to the sensitivities and
perceptions of those who may feel that they, their religion and entire
community are being targeted as a result of the egregious and extremist
action of but a few. Section 899F of the legislation, which speaks to
the protection of civil rights and liberties while preventing
ideologically-based violence and homegrown terrorism, recognizes the
delicate balance that is required here.
Turning to the more specific aspects of your proposal, in
particular the nature of the composition of the Commission and the
proposed qualifications of its members, it is suggested that two
members each shall be appointed by various officers of government and
that in these instances those two members ``shall not be members of the
same political party.''\7\ Without wading too far into comment on this
particular clause, it bears reiterating that homeland security is a
national endeavor that should be pursued collectively and
collaboratively with vigor and determination, drawing on the tremendous
reservoir of talent, imagination and energy that exists in this
country. If ever there was an issue or challenge that should be
considered and acted upon in nonpartisan fashion, this is it. The
stakes are simply too high for any other approach. Section 899C(e) is
also reflective of this understanding as the section calls for
Commission members to be ``selected solely on the basis of their
professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise,
and relevant experience in the areas of sociology, terrorism, religion,
counterterrorism, cultural anthropology, sociology, juvenile justice,
education, and corrections.'' At the risk of offering an overly
``micro-level'' comment, I would suggest adding to the foregoing
passage the phrase ``including but not limited to,'' so that the clause
would read in relevant part as follows: ``. . .in the areas including
but not limited to sociology,'' et cetera. This is more than mere word-
smithing as there may be other disciplines that could provide trenchant
insights into the matters at hand and yet those disciplines may not be
referenced in the list cited above. The behavioral sciences constitute
one such example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Manager's Amendment, supra note 4 at sec. 899C(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continuing on at the structural level of analysis, the Amendment
requires the Commission to issue within 18 months of its first meeting
``a report of its findings and conclusions, and any recommendations for
immediate and long-term countermeasures to homegrown terrorism and
ideologically based violence and measures that can be taken to prevent
violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism from developing and
spreading within the United States.'' \8\ However, terrorists do not
adhere to artificial timelines. Given the seriousness of the
Commission's endeavors and the potential consequences that could result
should an incident materialize in the U.S., it may in fact be desirable
to embed a greater sense of urgency by imposing one or more interim
reporting requirements that would set in motion the sharing of key
ideas with relevant partners at an earlier stage of the process. Those
parties should be in a position to feed the Commission's preliminary
thoughts into key channels that could have real impact--as they
identify areas of missing information/data and matters of concern--and
potentially change outcomes. Even if this concept is not accepted, the
requirement to issue recommendations should be firm and broad, and
should be highlighted more so than is the case at present, as the
ultimate objective of the legislation is to solve a remarkably complex
problem and the way to achieve that end is through action. Further
study, reflection and planning are all crucial tasks, but it must be
remembered that they are in essence merely precursors to our
fundamental aim, which is to act effectively so as to defeat the
challenge posed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid., sec. 899C(r)(1).
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Although I have focused my remarks on the Commission itself, H.R.
1955 also establishes a grant program to prevent radicalization and
homegrown terrorism in the United States.\9\ The text accords
eligibility to any State to apply, and funds granted may be awarded by
States to ``agencies and organizations, including but not limited to,
social services agencies, community-based groups, educational
institutions and non-governmental organizations. . .'' .\10\
Conceptually, this passage cuts two ways. On the one hand, it reflects
an appreciation of the fact that an array of entities and actors must
be involved in prevention efforts. On the other hand, the possibility
of taint or ``blowback'' (in the lay sense of the term) inheres in this
grant proposal as the credibility of the programs and messages being
delivered by private and non-governmental entities may be impugned or
challenged simply due to the fact they are funded by the government. By
noting this conundrum, it is not to suggest that the grant program
should be abandoned altogether. To the contrary, it could enable a
range of productive initiatives that could yield real impact and that
might otherwise never get off the ground for lack of funding. That
said, our expectations of what may be achieved through this particular
mechanism should be realistic and should discount from the get-go the
fact that government is but one player of many in this area and it is
neither the most crucial nor without drawbacks even in terms of limited
involvement. Further and more importantly however, there is an issue of
sequencing: it may in fact be best for the Commission to complete its
work first so as to better inform the proposed grant program.
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\9\ Section 899C(a).
\10\ Section 899C(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the most recent developments with the Fort Dix and JFK
airport plots, it is my sincere hope that quick action is taken to
establish this Commission, so that this critical work can get underway.
Thank you again for according me the privilege of testifying before you
on this issue of fundamental national importance. The work of the
Subcommittee and its staff in driving this matter forward is a genuine
public service. Should it be possible to assist your efforts in any way
in days ahead, HSPI stands ready to do so. I would now be pleased to
try to answer any questions that you may have.
Ms. Harman. I thank all of the witnesses. Each of you has
just made an additional contribution to this focus that we have
had ongoing for some time. I am hopeful that all of your
testimony will be carefully digested by us and by staff and
that the legislation we look at next week will include many
good new suggestions that you have just made.
Each member will now have 5 minutes to question the panel.
And I will first recognize myself for questions. My first
question is about language, names. And let me say why I raise
this. If we launch a commission and its name is something that
offends many of the people we are trying to reach for, that
would be a mistake. On the other hand, if we try to come up
with some warm and fuzzy name that is not clear about what we
are studying, I think that could be a disservice. So let me ask
all three of you--obviously, I recognize that Mr. Al-Marayati
has a lot to contribute to the answer, but all three of you
do--about three terms: radicalization, each of you used it;
homegrown terrorism; and ideologically based violence. What
about these names? And I am not sure in what order, but does
any of these names give you heartburn in terms of a description
of what we are trying to look at with this new commission? I
would appreciate an answer from all of you, starting with Mr.
Al-Marayati.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Thank you very much. I think that is a
very important question, Congressperson Harman. And I don't
have a problem; I don't think we have a problem with any of
these terms. These are real issues that no one should be in
denial of their manifestations. I think we have two problems in
general in terms of terminology. The first is a selective
application of terminology. And I think you covered that very
well in your introductory remarks, that we are not talking
about one particular religion. And indeed homegrown terrorism
did not begin just a few years ago, but with Timothy McVeigh,
with Puerto Rican terrorists, with so many other examples of
terrorism in the past.
The other issue is affording religious legitimacy to
extremists by using terms like Islamic fascism, Islamic
radicalism, Islamic terrorism. Number one, that is an
inaccurate description; as I believe we agree, the essence of
Islam is against terrorism. There is no room for terrorism in
the front. Number two, when we give in to extremists and let
them use jihad or jihadi to describe themselves, we are giving
them religious legitimacy and taking it away from the Muslim
mainstream.
Ms. Harman. You'll note, I did not use that term.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Exactly. I just wanted to underscore and
emphasize that point.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentlelady yield for just one minute?
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. What terms would you use?
Mr. Al-Marayati. The terms that were used without religious
labels; radicalization, terrorism, extremism, ideologically
based violence. And I believe that that is a constructive way
of establishing the dialogue with the Muslim American community
on this issue. And you will find more constructive discussions
on the issue.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you for yielding.
Ms. Harman. You are welcome.
Reclaiming my time, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Cilluffo would you
comment on terminology please.
Mr. Jenkins. Just two quick comments. I do think the term
radicalization needs the adjective violent in front of it,
because that will keep us out of some trouble in terms of
conveying a wrong message that we are in any way attacking
people's ideas here. Homegrown is a perfectly good term,
however in the actual conduct of the commission's work, I think
they would have to realize that, in today's world, we do live
in a global society. And so many of the issues that come into
play here, when we look at what we call homegrown
radicalization, it involves Internet, which in fact is a global
network. It may involve recruiters from abroad. It may involve
going abroad for training.
Ms. Harman. Let me just interrupt you there. I take that
point. And Mr. Cilluffo made it in his testimony. But a premise
would be that there is something unique about the American
experience. And we better understand that because there are
many more Americans here who could be radicalized than there
are, let's just start with Americans. Americans abroad, is that
correct?
Mr. Jenkins. Absolutely. That is why I would leave
homegrown in the title of the commission. But as I said, the
commission ranges more broadly in terms of how that feeds into
homegrown terrorism.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate that much.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Madam Chair, I do think words really do
matter. And how we use those words are critical in determining
our success, and this is not an academic exercise. I have no
qualms with any of the terms you have identified. I would note,
however, that, and this is not a political statement, but I
don't use the term GWOT, for example, when looking at these
issues overseas.
Ms. Harman. GWOT is Global War on Terrorism?
Mr. Cilluffo. Global War on Terrorism. To some extent, that
empowers the adversaries we are looking at. I do use, I call
it, and this is quite the bumper sticker made for TV, but it is
a transnational insurgency underpinned by a global jihadi
salafist movement. Now I do use the term jihadi, but in each
case, I will identify that it is being misconstrued by a small
set of individuals. And if you couple salafist with the jihad,
that is in large part what we are seeing, so I am not taking
that in isolation. But I very much agree with my colleague's
points. Let's not make them any more religiously codified than
they should be. They are not warriors.
Ms. Harman. I thank you for your answer. My time has
expired.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your
question. I think, in my past line of work, again, I'll
mention, the use of words really does affect people. It touches
their heart in so many different ways. As a homicide detective
for 13 years, in the beginning of my early career investigating
murder cases, the term closure was used for families who had
lost a loved one who was murdered. And we learned very quickly
as we moved through some very important cases that there is
never any closure, and it was deeply offensive to the families.
They got answers to questions about their loved one's death,
but they never got closure.
So I appreciate the question from The Chair and your
answers from the panel. It is also that important that people
who are members and active participants of this commission, and
certainly there are recommendations made in the legislation, do
any of the three of you have any other thoughts besides, I know
the behavioral science person recommended, any other thoughts
on who should be participating in this commission?
Mr. Jenkins. I think that the commission would be well
served to have, in addition to behavioral scientists, to have
either as members or certainly as advisors or witnesses that
would assist its work those involved in intelligence issues,
particularly at the local police level, because those are the
people who directly interface with the various communities
involved. I would, at some peril, suggest the inclusion of a
lawyer, a constitutional lawyer. We are going to be touching
upon, any commission, any commission that addresses this is
going to touch upon extremely sensitive issues, issues
involving free speech, religion, immigration and, therefore,
would do well to have the kind of guidance that could be
provided by a Federal judge or someone who is well versed in
these matters.
I would agree with Frank Cilluffo that our behavioral
scientists should definitely include someone in the area of
both individual motivations as well as social networks. So we
have legal. We have behavioral. We have intelligence. Those, I
think, would be essential components.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Mr. Al-Marayati.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Yes, in addition to what my colleagues
have stated, I think what we need are experts for the community
in terms of community-based policing to understand how to
detect and how to intervene in cases, such as Mr. Gadahn, that
Congresswoman Harman stated. In that particular situation,
could there have been intervention in the mosque with that
individual? Because here is the dilemma, I can just be very
frank with you, about how Muslim Americans are feeling about
the situation. If they intervene, they are afraid that law
enforcement and those in the media are going to exploit the
situation and say that they are associating themselves with
terrorists, not just in mosques but also on the Internet.
People are afraid to go into these extremist Web sites because
they don't want a law enforcement agent knocking on their door
the next day asking them questions and misconstruing it as
association with terrorists. So experts that can help in
determining how to intervene in these situations would be very
helpful.
Number two, experts on Islamic ideologies of human rights
and human decency I think are important to make these important
distinctions and to explain it to the American public in a way
that satisfies our first amendment, the establishment clause,
and separation of church and state so that the American public,
as was stated earlier, gets a greater level of confidence that
we are providing some answers, not just talking about the
problems.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo. I would just add, Congressman Reichert, that
I agree very much that community policing is at the heart of
this matter. It is not going to be decided here inside the
Beltway. And it can't only be in a counterterrorism
environment, because that creates a defensive posture to begin
with. It has got to be part of a larger community police
effort. I also agree very much with Brian, the Intelligence
Community, not only intelligence-led policing but people who
have had experience in understanding the opportunities and the
limitations of intelligence from a national security
standpoint.
I also think those with experience in organized crime. To
some extent, we have been uniting our adversaries when we need
to start disaggregating. And I think that the role that we
played in Cosa Nostra, it was in large part because they
started losing confidence in one another. And trust is the key
to everything. Trust is the key to the good guys. Trust is the
key to the bad guys. You start eroding some of their trust;
maybe it starts falling apart. So I would highlight those.
The other area I would highlight and accentuate is the
international component. We have a lot to learn. And hopefully,
we don't learn it and have the same scar tissue that some of
our friends overseas have. And I would like to see that somehow
find its way into its findings.
And then, finally, of course, to have resonance, we need
Islamic scholars. The solution sets in part are going to come
from within, within the Muslim community. And to have
resonance, that is who we need to look toward.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you for your answers.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dicks from Washington for 5
minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. I want to give each of you a chance
to talk about this subject. And first of all, I appreciate your
testimony here today. And I want to compliment the chairman and
the ranking member. We have gone around the country and looked
at a few different situations. How big an issue is this?
Stepping back from a commission, the big commissions authorized
by Congress before, if the administration doesn't want to
cooperate, that can be a problem. So I hope we can get
cooperation. But how big a problem is this? We know we have got
a terrible problem internationally. There is no question about
that. And we know we have these specific examples. But just
from your experience, the American people want to know how
major a concern is this?
Mr. Jenkins. Let me start with that. And at the risk of
sounding Rumsfeldian, you don't know what you don't know. Where
we have looked at this issue, where local law enforcement and
Federal authorities have examined it, we have in almost every
case have been surprised to find out that there was more going
on than we previously had imagined. The concerns, for example,
about recruiting in prisons, these were not discovered until we
actually began to look at the issue. And once we looked at the
issue, we discovered there were things going on here. When
there were increased intelligence activities as a consequence
of 9/11, we discovered that in fact there was more activity
going on than we previously had imagined. I don't want to
exaggerate this. The country was not filled with sleeper cells,
but certainly there was ample evidence of active radicalization
and recruiting going on in the country.
Now, thus far, based upon the conspiracy and clusters that
we have uncovered since 9/11, there does not seem to be a
significant cohort of terrorist operatives in the country. But
there is active recruiting, and there is the development of
intent. And I want to make a point here about intent. The
Hamburg cell had intent but no capabilities until they showed
up in Afghanistan. The Leeds cell that carried out the bombings
in London had no capability. They may have acquired some in a
training camp somewhere. To move out of that realm of terrorism
and to go back to Timothy McVeigh, Timothy McVeigh had intent
and developed his own capability. Intent is the constant here.
Capability is the variable. So when we look at these various
conspiracies, the only difference between a handful of hotheads
fantasizing about violence and somebody actually doing
something that is going to result in dreadful carnage is the
acquisition of this capability. There are lots of bunches of
guys around the country that are fantasizing about violence. It
only needs one of them, one individual in one of those clusters
to have some capability, and we could confront what some of our
allies have confronted on their soil.
Mr. Dicks. Would the other members want to comment on this?
Mr. Al-Marayati. Yeah. From the community standpoint, we
don't see a movement for radicalization. We don't see similar
expressions of extremism like we have seen in Europe. And
probably the reasons that we discussed earlier, in terms of the
level of integration here in America, American Muslims tend to
be higher in terms of education than the average, higher in
terms of income than the average and definitely much better
than those in Europe. If there are cells at this time, and if
there is just one cell or one individual, that is one too much.
So we are not looking at it in terms of whether there is a
widespread movement for radicalization or not.
However, we can identify the problem. And if we identify
the problem in an effective, precise way, then that will help
us towards a solution. If we identify the problem in a
simplistic way, in a sweeping way, we believe that will
exacerbate the situation. And the further you push young
Muslims especially to the margins of society, then the more
likelihood that they could be recruited by these extremist
recruiters. So we should not even allow that situation to
happen, and therefore, the prevention of those social ailments
in our society should be of utmost concern; therefore we should
not impose the cloud of suspicion on young Muslim Americans
today.
Mr. Dicks. Can we finish this?
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo. I appreciate the question, and it is very
difficult. I often say, since the end of the Cold War,
forecasting has made astrology look respectable, and I don't
have a crystal ball. We simply don't know. But the question we
do have to ask is, how much is too much? And I would agree with
my colleague that one is too much. And the last thing we want
is to have hearings where us or anyone else are before you all
after an incident occurs, and there is going to be the knee-
jerk attempt to take much more Draconian measures, which are
going to further push the issue to making it a bigger set of
challenges.
I might note, though, that the UK asked those same
questions prior 7/7. And for anyone who is interested, I am
hosting Home Secretary John Reid on Monday for a speech and
other things, but if you are interested. What they noticed in
the 7/7 activities, which was quite alarming, is the speed and
the pace of radicalization. We are talking months. We are not
talking years. We are not talking many months. It was very
rapid. So I think that we don't want the cures to be worse than
the disease. We want to get out in front of this issue. And I
can't quantify or qualitatively give you a concrete answer. But
as Brian said, in all of our reports, the more we uncovered,
the more we found. And clearly, the messages are being targeted
at a Western demographic and a young demographic.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time has expired. Before
yielding to Mr. Perlmutter, I just note that the British
experience is somewhat different. There is a huge British
Pakistani population that travels home for a month a year for
family reunification purposes. Tens of thousands of people go
to Pakistan each year. So there is an opportunity there for bad
things to happen that I don't see a parallel for in America,
which is another reason to study radicalization from the
American perspective.
The Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Perlmutter of
Colorado.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Madam Chair.
And thank you for bringing your bill forward and convening
this panel. We met in Torrance, what, 2 months ago, 3 months
ago, and I was hoping that the prison experience and Mr. Gadahn
were aberrations. And since then, we have had the pizza-Fort
Dix experience; we have had Toronto; and just recently, JFK.
And so it is becoming more prevalent and, quite frankly, a
little more frightening. But, Mr. Cilluffo, you asked or you
used a couple words that sort of resonated with me. You said
these guys are not warriors; they are a bunch of thugs, I think
you said.
Mr. Cilluffo. It is New York speak.
Mr. Perlmutter. No, I appreciate that. You also talked
about the Cosa Nostra, the gangster kind of element to this.
Gangsters may be more focused on economic, making money and
that kind of power. This is more ideologically driven. But
between that comment and Mr. Jenkins' comment about intent is
the constant and capability is the variable; if you were both
commission members, what would you be focusing on based on your
use of Cosa Nostra and thugs, but also taking into account his
statement about intent, constant, capability as a variable, if
you please?
Mr. Cilluffo. That is a complex question. And I am not sure
I have a quick answer for that. But clearly it is the
convergence of bad guys and good stuff, and the good stuff
being technology, capability, training, execution. And that
training can occur anywhere. So what I meant by Cosa Nostra is
also that terrorism is a team sport. We haven't found a single
profile. In fact, quite the contrary. The one thing we do know
is that social bonds matter. And it is often friends, family.
And those are very difficult to use conventional instruments to
be able to respond to. But what I do think, in terms of
organized crime, this is where we have worked on some of the
Federal, State, local interactivities, and I firmly believe
that this isn't going to come from the beltway. It is not going
to come from overseas intelligence. This is largely going to
have to come from communities that are going to see when
something is awry. So I do think we have got to focus on
intent. But I also think that there is a lot of intent. The
question is, when do the two marry up with capability. And
there we have got a problem.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Jenkins, if my complex question made
any sense to you?
Mr. Jenkins. It is a complex question. I am not quite sure
I have got it framed right. Let me just put up here a note
agreeing with the other witnesses. In looking at this, I would
say, let's begin with the fact that, right now, we have a
success story. We have a success story in terms of our ability
as a Nation to assimilate immigrants, to provide them with
futures in this country. And therefore, we do not confront the
same problems that many of our European allies do. Second, we
have a success story thus far in being able to identify and
uncover some of these conspiracies that we have discovered. Not
all of them have turned out to be significant in terms of
capability. But as I said, certainly intent was there.
So one of the things I would be focusing on or advise the
commission, rather, to focus on, is, how can we enhance that
success? How can we improve our local intelligence
capabilities? How can we improve the relationships between
police activities at the local level? I emphasize at the local
level, and the various communities and avoid doing things that
are going to have counterproductive effects, and that is by
isolating, alienating, stigmatizing and angering that same
potential reservoir of recruits that the terrorist ideology is
going after. So how can we take advantage of our inherent
strengths in this country, add some capability and ensure that
we are not going to spoil that? That is especially important,
by the way, if, heaven forbid, an incident should occur. Having
good intelligence and knowing what is going on and having good
relations is going to prevent the country from propelling
itself into a series of measures that in fact will imperil all
of our civil liberties.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Could I just add?
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Mr. Al-Marayati. We mentioned intent and capability. Also,
I think the overriding factor is our capability to intervene,
as my colleague has stated. And if we look at the model that
was stated before, it simplifies its activists to violent
radicalization. The intervention point is in the early stages
when there are sympathizers. The mechanism for intervening is
ideological intervention. And just to share with you internally
what is happening in the Muslim American community, there is a
training of religious leaders to intervene in a healthy,
constructive way to make sure that sympathy is addressed within
the Islamic context, that you cannot sympathize with murder,
you cannot sympathize with wholesale violence; and number two,
that these individuals who are being trained need to be
empowered and need to be given the resources to make sure that
we prevent the further stages of radicalization.
Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would just like the record to be clear that we are
talking about sympathy with violent action, not sympathy with
any particular religion or religious tenets.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Exactly. Exactly.
Ms. Harman. The Chair now yields 5 minutes of questions to
Mr. Shays of Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I think there are two inconvenient
truths in the world--the one that Al Gore talks about and the
other that the 9/11 Commission talks about. I think it is an
incredible statement and shows, as the Commission says, we are
not confronting terrorism as if it is some ethereal being; we
are confronting radical Islamist terrorists.
One, I want to know if you agree with that, each of you.
Secondly, I want you to tell me what you think our country's
strategy is to deal with this threat, if you think it exists.
The Cold War threat was contain, react and mutually assure
destruction. So I would like you to tell me, one, if you agree
with what the 9/11 Commission said and; secondly, what you
think our strategy is to deal with that threat.
Mr. Jenkins. First of all, I think the threat is real.
There is no question about it. Second, in terms of the
radicalization--
Mr. Shays. ``The threat is real'' is not what I asked.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Do you agree that we are confronting as a--there
are a lot of real threats. They highlight this as a major
concern of the United States.
Mr. Jenkins. It is the principal threat that we face in
this country right now--
Mr. Shays. Okay.
Mr. Jenkins. --and I suspect that we will face for decades.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. We are talking about a phenomenon that cannot
be dealt with by driving tanks across the desert and reaching
Baghdad.
Mr. Shays. So what is our strategy to deal with that?
Mr. Jenkins. I am critical of us here. I think that we,
understandably, right after 9/11 focused our efforts on the
degrading the operational capabilities of our terrorist folks.
We had to do that because we did not know if another 9/11 was
in the pipeline at that moment, but what we have not done and
what is far behind is our understanding of and our strategy for
dealing with the frontal end of it.
Mr. Shays. So what is the strategy?
Mr. Jenkins. We do not have a strategy.
Mr. Shays. What should the strategy be?
Mr. Jenkins. The strategy should be intervening in the
radicalization and recruitment process before they reach the
stage of terrorist operatives. At that point, unless we can
interrupt that radicalization and recruiting process, we are
condemned to a strategy of stepping on cockroaches one at time.
We are going to be doing it forever.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Can I take a--
Mr. Shays. All three of you, sure.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Ambassador Edward Jarugian, in the late
1980s or early 1990s, said we need to have a dual track
approach. Now, the one is to bring culprits to justice. So
intelligence, incarceration, prosecution, conviction of
criminals is one important track, and then the second track is
to deal with the root causes and the social factors that lead
to what Mr. Jenkins has aptly identified as the radicalization
process.
So our strategies should be a dual-track approach. I agree
with the 9/11 Commission that it is a Muslim task, and if it is
a Muslim task, then there are internal issues within the Muslim
community, and there are national and international issues that
deal with relations between these Muslim communities and their
governments and their law enforcement, and we can get into more
specifics later. I just disagree with the nomenclature and the
terminology because we do not want to give more religious
legitimacy to the terrorists than they are already trying to
obtain.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Shays, I would actually agree with both
of my colleagues here, but let me put it a little differently.
Clearly, it is the greatest threat facing the United States
today, and others can exploit asymmetric means as well to take
the United States on, which they cannot do tank for tank/plane
for plane in the traditional war on a conventional battlefield.
Let me say that I think the time has come to recognize we
have got to stop only attacking the structure and start
attacking their strategy. This is a battle of ideas. There is
only one side on the battlefield right now, and it is not us,
and our diplomacy efforts should not be about projecting
American values; it should be about debunking and unpacking
their narrative to demonstrably show how it is misusing and
distorting a religion.
I would also add that, when looking at our overseas
function, my simple philosophy in 2 seconds--because I know my
time is going to get cut off--but we have got to isolate the
military and operational planners from the organization,
organizations from one another, that from a movement and that
from society at large. Every step of the way, there are
different instruments of state craft that have to be brought to
bear. Heretofore, the emphasis has been on the kill and
capture, and that is where Congress is spending the money as
well.
So I think we need to look to how we can marshal other
instruments of state craft. I am not suggesting that the
military component is not important; it is part of it, but we
need to get other instruments to the fore.
Ms. Harman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair.
On the issue that you were just talking about of
radicalization and religious arguments, how would you recommend
that we deal with these religious arguments? I guess, you know,
maybe these Islamic extremists have been motivated by religious
arguments.
Is it incumbent upon moderate Islamic clerics to help
deradicalize? How do you think the Commission should address
that specific question? I thought maybe either one of the two
of you.
Mr. Cilluffo. I do think we need to--when I give public
speeches on these sorts of issues, I always ask the audience,
who is often an informed one--and I am not going to ask for an
answer here because I know I am in the seat of taking
questions--but how many people actually can tell me how many
statements Osama bin Ladin has made? How many people have
actually read them? You would be surprised at how few hands I
will ever see raised.
Before we can come up with a counternarrative, we have to
understand what the narrative is. Why is it having resonance?
Why is it sticking? That is where, I think--stage one, let us
understand--forget the bad pun--what makes them tick. Then we
have got to identify what a compelling counternarrative is, and
that is going to have to, to a large extent, be driven, or be
at least communicated from within the Muslim community. The
Koran is arguably the most important instrument we have to show
how it is being distorted by others--Islamic scholars, cultural
experts--and we need to provide an opportunity for others to
have a better tomorrow. That is all part of it. I do not think
we have done that, and in fact--
Mr. Dent. So, with this type of commission, you think it
would be wise to engage the modern Islamic community to help
debunk these--
Mr. Cilluffo. Unequivocally.
Mr. Dent. Whatever term. Understood.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Yes. I think we should empower Muslim
religious authorities who are speaking about the ideology of
Islam that looks at Jews and Christians as people of the book,
not as infidels, but looks to human beings, other human
beings--as the Koran stated, ``We have created you with human
dignity. The children of Adam are created and bestowed with
human dignity.'' It talks about the role of Muslims and Islam
within the modern era, not as something that we have to
replicate from the 15th century or from the 10th century or
from before then but looking at modern issues of human rights,
of democracy, of co-existence, of something that is very
different from when Islamic civilization was at the top. In
other words, we live as Muslim minorities here, and the Muslim
world is a very different Muslim world than it was 1,000 years
ago.
Let me just add to that, and I think my colleague was
alluding to this, that there have been polls done of Muslim
mainstream communities about violence. Those who supported
violence use political arguments. Those who oppose violence use
religious arguments, and so we have to be aware of that
narrative in order for the counternarrative to be effective.
Mr. Dent. That is well said.
My next question is to you. Is it Mr. Cilluffo?
Mr. Cilluffo. Correct.
Mr. Dent. You have, I think, been quite a bit involved with
prison radicalization. What do you think the Commission should
do with respect to our penal system and to the radical Islamic
movement that is currently going on in many prisons?
Mr. Cilluffo. You know, that is a long answer, but let me
suggest that part of the solution, there again, is getting
Muslim chaplains who can actually use the faith that prisoners,
themselves, have been distorting, and prisons have always been
incubators for radical ideas, I mean whether you are looking at
Adolf Hitler, writing Mein Kampf, whether you are looking at
Joseph Stalin, filling the ranks of the Bolshevik Revolution,
and I can give many other examples. It has always been an
incubator for radical ideas. You have got a captive and a
captured audience with a lot of time on their hands, but I
think a lot of the emphasis heretofore has been on the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. That is a very small percentage of our
prison population.
Mr. Dent. I agree.
Mr. Cilluffo. 82 percent State and county prisons and
jails.
California, Madam Chair, has done a phenomenal job. We used
them as a case study. L.A. County and LAPD, those are the
models we should be looking at, and I can go ad nauseam.
Mr. Dent. My time is about up, but for maybe a later round
of questioning here, when should we intervene with this
radicalization process? How should we go about that?
My time is up. I do not know if you want to take that into
the next round.
Ms. Harman. If I might point out to Mr. Dent, that question
was asked in a slightly different form a little bit earlier, so
we are going to go to one more question each. That seems, to
me, to be about the right period of time, and if you would like
to ask that question at that point, you should feel free to,
but we do have a fairly full record.
I will just point out to Mr. Cilluffo that the cell that
was arrested in Torrance, the site of our prior hearing where
Mr. Jenkins testified, was radicalized in Folsom State Prison.
So, while I would like to give California a lot of credit,
there is still a lot of work to do.
We will go to a partial second round now and ask those
members who wish to to ask one additional question starting
with Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will make mine
quick.
We talked about keeping it simple, and we have had a lot of
discussion about community, working together, education,
community-oriented policing. I just wanted to ask the panel if
any one of you are aware of a program called Cops and Culture.
The National Crime Prevention Council of the King County
Sheriff's Office, when I was the sheriff, implemented that
program in King County along with the Seattle Police
Department, and I think it might be a tool that could be used
in this effort.
Go ahead.
Mr. Jenkins. Absolutely. There are three ways local police
are going to be able to address this.
One is through routine criminal investigations that then
take other directions. That was the case in Torrance. The
second is through community policing, the relationships with
the community so that communities are comfortable in a
relationship with the police and provide information, and the
third is through dedicated intelligence efforts, that is, a
portion of police resources with Federal assistance,
specifically focusing on areas of concern.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Another point to underscore to reinforce
your theory, Congressman Reichert, is where we have seen plots
occur in terms of violence against the United States in the
name of Islam, we have also seen the that there are Muslims who
are key in unfoiling those plots, and the U.K. terror plot
would not have been stopped had it not been for a responsible
Muslim British citizen's stepping forward to the authorities
and letting them know about this plot. So the key in community
policing is the partnership and the cooperation and the comfort
level with the community so that they can share information
with our law enforcement without the fear of reprisal, without
the fear of stigmatization.
Mr. Reichert. Specific to this program, it really gets into
educating the local law enforcement agencies about the cultures
and about the ethnic groups that they are serving.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Exactly.
Mr. Cilluffo. Congressman Reichert, I think that is an
excellent program, and there are others that we need to be
building upon because it all comes down to trust. It is all
trust--
Mr. Reichert. Yes.
Mr. Cilluffo. --and it is individuals. These are human
beings, and you need people who can feel comfortable talking to
another individual, and that is all based and contingent upon
trust, and it is going to have to come from the bottom up. My
Latin teacher, if he is still around on this earth, in the 4th
grade would probably kill me because I will butcher the words,
but there is a term, ``Audiator et altera pars,'' which
basically means ``let the other side be heard,'' and I think we
need to be listening, not only doing, but I would also add that
law enforcement at the local level, I do not think, has the
analytical capacity right now or the breadth or the depth, and
there is still this belief that Washington is going to come
down with that silver bullet when and where something will
occur.
You know what? We have never done indication or warning
intelligence well, but I think we have got to get down to brass
tacks, requirement setting. What do I need? What do I have? How
can I provide that information and ask the questions from both
the Federal and the State and local? But community policing is
even more important in that equation.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. I thank the gentleman.
I might suggest that that Latin proverb apply to Congress.
The Chair now yields to Mr. Dicks for one additional
question.
Mr. Dicks. You know, you mentioned Mein Kampf and Stalin.
There is a history in the United States of radicalization. This
is not the first episode of this. I mean--so I think we need to
take that into account as we look at this. This is very
important phenomena, and I guess the prison issue--Mr.
Cilluffo, if you would like to go on a little bit further about
this prison aspect of this--what is good, what is bad. I mean,
you know, one thing about a commission is that it kind of
forestalls doing things. My view is, you know, I do not want to
wait for a commission. I mean, we ought to have a commission--I
would support that--but I think there are things we can be
doing now, especially on this prison issue, where we can make
some progress forward.
So, would you like to comment on that?
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Congressman Dicks.
We did look at white supremacy. We did look at other gang
activity of every stripe and ilk, and we came to conclude that
the activity is the activity. The modus operandi is the modus
operandi. Some were converting to Islam--which conversion is,
arguably, a very good thing. The problem is you have got those
who can manipulate that, and they have little to no knowledge
coming in about the faith so they can easily be co-opted by a
charismatic leader, which was the case in California. When I
was talking about the best practices in California, I was
actually talking post new Folsom because then they actually
started providing the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, JRIC.
It was part of that intelligence stream. The Bureau of Prisons
was being looped into the whole process. Until then, they were
treated, to a large extent, in isolation. So we have got a lot
to do in terms of the prison systems, and a lot of that is
information, but first and foremost, it is a priority setting
issue.
If you are in charge of a prison and you are worried about
gang activity and getting stabbed on a daily basis, it is very
difficult--and we are already overcrowded and overpopulated,
and they have got more than their handful of challenges. To
throw yet another set of issues onto an already full list is
difficult, so part of that is raising awareness, and what I
would like to see is a confederation of not only the FBOP, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, but I would like to see that much
better looped into the State prisons and county jails where
much of the activity is occurring.
Mr. Al-Marayati. I think one of the issues in terms of
Muslim chaplains is looking at the rate of bringing Muslim
chaplains into the prison system. To my understanding, it has
been frozen. There have been no additional Muslim chaplains
added since the case of Captain James Yee in Guantanamo, number
1.
Number 2, we have seen in various studies that religion,
whether it is Judaism, Christianity or Islam, in the prison
system is a positive force for prisoners so that they do not
return to crime after they leave the prison system. So, just in
general, I think we need to look at how religion plays a
constructive role in the prison system.
Mr. Cilluffo. Could I build on that, Madam Chair, just for
one second? Because it is the integration into society where
you have those points where we were talking about intervention.
That is absolutely critical. Many convert for protection. We
called it priz-lam. We had a couple of imams who referred to it
as ``jailhouse Islam,'' and they get better food. So part of it
is really going to be at that exit, at that facilitation. That
is where we have to actually spend more resources in general in
the prison system, and I would note that most major prisons are
not in urban areas. So, in many cases, you are not going to
have a very large Muslim community to begin with, so it is hard
to get to the prisons.
Mr. Jenkins. Can I make one comment here quickly?
Stepping out of the issue of prisons specifically, we have
had examples in our history of domestic radicalization to
violence and to terrorist activity in this country. The
difference now, however, since previously, say, in the 1960s or
in the 1970s, is that the means of communication have
developed, and we are now facing a foe that has been very
sophisticated in using the most modern means of communications
to convey a message to create a community, a sense of belonging
to something. We have to deal with that threat, but other
radical groups will learn from the use of these techniques and
will adopt them to their own means, so we are dealing with
something--we dealt with this historically, but we are dealing
with something new today.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Perlmutter for one question.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Madam Chair. You said that in such
a way that maybe--can I put like four questions into one
question like I did the last time?
Ms. Harman. [Shakes head.]
Mr. Perlmutter. The question I have--and Mr. Jenkins, you
were sort of hitting on it--is there is a different way to
communicate that is much broader and that may be more potent.
Is there an age group that is particularly susceptible to this?
Mr. Jenkins. It is the same age group--yes, there is, and
it is the same age group that is susceptible to being recruited
into gangs. It is the same age group that is susceptible to
being recruited into a lot of things. We are talking about
primarily young men in their teens on up into their early 20's.
These are young men who are going through, in many cases, just
because of the age, identity crises, looking to define
themselves. Because of their age, again, they have lots of
energy, lots of hormones. That is the age bracket that commits
crime in this country. That is the age bracket that goes into
gangs. It is what young men do, and unfortunately, if you have
a narrative, a narrative that exalts violence, that attempts to
project that violence as a personal obligation, that justifies
it, that offers the tantalizing prospect of clandestinity,
identity, all of those are very appealing to that specific age
group.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you.
Mr. Al-Marayati. If I could just pick up on the issue of
identity then--and this connects with Mr. Dent's question--in
terms of intervention, this is where we are intervening now,
and we need to be more proactive and provide more resources in
developing a healthy Muslim-American identity that America is
home, that we counter gutterization within the Muslim-American
community whether it is psychological gutterization or any
other form of gutterization. In doing so, we will prevent this
form of antisocial behavior of this group, and antisocial
behavior could be manifested in drugs, in promiscuous sex or in
joining groups with violent ideologies. So the root cause here
is an identity crisis that we have to address.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Shays, one question.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
First off, this is an excellent panel. I really wish we
were going to spend more time because there is more that we
could learn.
I think it is instructive that none of us really could
state what our strategy is. Yet, we could state what the Cold
War strategy is. That, to me, is--what we need first is a huge
national dialogue about what we are confronting. In the short
run, it has got to be protect, prevent, preempt, and sometimes
act unilaterally, and you may call that getting the
cockroaches, but it has got to be that, and then we fill it in
with other things that we did during the Cold War with Sputnik,
education and so on to compete economically with Russia.
What I just want to say--and I want your reaction--is I
find it repugnant, having just finished reading. Elie Wiesel's
``The Night'' last night, that I would have to speak to or deal
with people who are so sick that they would literally wrap
themselves in a weapon and blow up themselves in front of
children, and somehow dealing with that is striking me as
incomprehensible, and it may be a disconnect that we have, but
it is somehow like we have to kind of negotiate and deal with--
I just react to it.
Mr. Al-Marayati. I agree, Mr. Shays. This is a sickness. It
is a psychosis. It is something that the average human being,
the normal human being, can not comprehend, and we have to
address it objectively and effectively. There is an ideology of
suicide culture that is taking on a cloak of religion, and I
think what we are all seeing here is that we have to understand
the development, the metamorphosis of this suicide culture. We
really have not invested enough in the ideological battle
against this suicide culture.
So we should do that, and also, we have to listen to the
mainstream. We are not listening enough to the mainstream
Muslim communities. Our policies have isolated the mainstream
Muslim-American communities who, like you and I, cannot explain
why there is a suicide culture in the name of their religion
right now, and we should also speak out more against
Islamaphobes like Pat Robertson, who said yesterday that Islam
is not a religion but a move for worldwide domination. When
they hear that message from a religious leader, they view that
as a message that is closely associated with the U.S.
Government, as a friend of the U.S. Government. So we need to
also address how to deal with our own extremists here in
America who are fermenting anti-Islamic rhetoric and how they
exacerbate the situation.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Shays, could I just add to that?
I certainly would hope no one at this table would suggest
negotiating with people who would actually take those steps.
That is very different--again, getting back to my isolate,
military and operations plans, organizations, it is that second
ripple effect that I am most concerned about. Those who are
potentially teetering on the edge who can go one way or the
other. In dealing with the military and operational planners,
we are going to have to use the heavy instruments of
government--covert action, law enforcement, military, string
them up, string them along. I do not know.
It is a case--by--case basis, but it is that next tier of
folks that is the group we are potentially losing, and we wrote
a major report on the narrative and counternarrative, so
obviously, I agree with everyone here, but it is also worth
noting that it is not what you say; it is what people hear, and
we have to understand what they are hearing.
Mr. Jenkins. I want to underscore that.
Once they strap on a bomb and become a weapon, that is,
obviously, not the point for having discussions about identity
and radicalization. They are a weapon and must be dealt with as
such.
The point of intervention is to try to do things that are
going to reduce the reservoir of those who will be caught up in
this narrative, which is essentially an ideology of death. This
is an ideology that exalts death. It connects the individual
with some glorious utopian pass which may or may not have
existed and promises them earthly pleasures in some future
life, leaving the now which is nothing and, therefore, enables
an individual to simply turn himself into a weapon, and he
thinks of himself as nothing more than a weapon. We have to be
able to intervene to ensure that there is not going to be a
large reservoir of those who can be recruited to that.
Mr. Cilluffo. Could I just add one point?
Because it is that reaffirmation, that moral equivalency
that people then will be emboldened to actually act. That is
that reservoir we have to keep flipped on the other side.
Mr. Al-Marayati. And also there is the terrorist, and there
are audiences, and terrorists try to influence audiences, and
we should embrace and engage the audiences. The terrorist is
not somebody we need to--you are right. We are not here to
understand or to develop an agreement with a terrorist. They
should be handled swiftly and with justice.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. The good news is that I need to
leave now, but Mr. Dicks will take over the chair, and if our
members have additional questions, we can go until noon,
assuming the witnesses can stay.
I just want to observe that this is one of the best panels
we have ever had and that what you have just said will directly
influence a legislative proposal, which we are working on now,
to set up a national commission but, not only that, perhaps
some other legislative initiatives which I believe this
committee on a unanimous basis--that will be a miracle in this
Congress--but on a unanimous basis will embrace, and for once,
you know, Congress is accused of more heat than light. We might
actually shed some light on a very serious set of problems.
So I just, personally, want to thank our witnesses and our
members for an enormously productive hour and a half.
Mr. Dicks. [Presiding.] Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair. I concur with your
remarks. I am sorry I did not get here for the beginning of it.
The media, the Internet and religion, I think we can all
agree, play a role in radicalization and, hopefully, a role in
the prevention of the mitigation of radicalization.
Given our first amendment, how do we, as a government and
as a society, effectively combat all of these radicalizing
forces that you gentlemen have so eloquently discussed here
today?
Mr. Jenkins. Two things with regard to that.
First of all, combating what is taking place on the
Internet or in other communications media does not necessarily
mean controlling or restricting. It means that is simply the
new terrain of battle. That is where we are going to fight. It
means having counternarratives. It means taking advantage of
those same communications channels. Indeed, the irony of this
is that this Nation, which invented the Internet, which is so
creative in exploiting communications for commercial and
political purposes, has been so flatfooted in engaging those
same means of communications to deal with this problem. So we
can engage it without necessarily impinging upon the first
amendment. In some areas, however, I think that we do look at
appropriate controls.
For example, I mean it is interesting that they are now
talking about putting controls on the Internet to reduce fraud
on sales through eBay. We control the Internet to deal with
issues of child pornography and other things. So the fact that
it is simply this thing called the ``Internet'' does not mean
that we cannot appropriately update our laws and concerns to
deal with specific problems.
Mr. Dent. As you answer these questions, could you also
just address, you know, the role of the government in terms of
on the Internet, and who is going to put up these religious
arguments? Is that the government's role? Whose role is that?
Mr. Al-Marayati. It is the Muslim-American community's role
to put up these arguments, and I think what we need to discuss
in terms of cooperation between these communities and the
government is where the community does not feel stigmatized,
but they enter extremist Internet chat zones to argue against
extremism or to intervene with a potential radical or
sympathizer of radical ideology in the community or in the
mosque so we do not shut these individuals from our communities
and then they become ripe for the pickings of extremist
recruiters.
So I do not see a problem in the first amendment here. If
the government were promoting Islam in any way, that is the
problem, and that is not what we seek. I think what we are
talking about is understanding the Muslim world and the Muslim
western communities in a more nuanced way with a little bit
more precision, more accuracy so that that will help us
sociopolitically and empower us in the tools against extremism.
Mr. Cilluffo. Let me pick up on a couple of those points,
and this is something we have written a lot on, so I will try
to be brief, not my strong suit again.
When we are looking at who the solution sets are, we cannot
look at this, Mr. Shays, I think, as a grand strategy. We
actually have to look at it from a decentralized perspective,
which is very difficult for government to do, and government
only has a small role in this overly complex set of issues.
Shutting Web sites down, it is like Whackamo. Hit it here. It
is just going to pop up somewhere else. Quite honestly, the Web
sites are not even the issue. We need to get into the chat
rooms. It is the chat rooms that are replacing the smoke-filled
bars of the LaCarre novels where espionage used to occur. That
is where people--that is where it goes from the cyberworld to
the physical world. That is where they actually start
connecting. We have got to be in there in a hand-to-hand kind
of way, demonstrably showing how people are misusing the
Internet.
The other thing is that I agree with Brian. Greater
transparency is also the solution here. We have got the ideas
on our side. Let us use them and make sure we are doing that
directly, and there is a program--and I am not suggesting that
all of their programs are very good--but the Saudis have a
program called the ``Tranquility Program'' where they are
actually going into the Internet chat rooms, and they are
bringing in Islamic scholars to refute how they are being
misused. We have got to start thinking about that.
Then on the counternarrative, we all hear about terrorists
and their martyrs. Well, it is about time that some of our
martyrs be remembered, and we have got to remind the
terrorists--and they are trying to create this clash of
civilizations of the West versus Islam--who is being killed by
terrorist bombs, largely Muslims. So how can they, in their own
defense, make these sorts of cases? We have got to remind
people of that. In Beslan, there are hundreds of kids being
killed. I could not think of a more powerful, motivating attack
to abhor terrorism. We need to start reminding people and
showing the graphic visuals.
As to the bombing in Jordan, at the wedding, which actually
was al-Zarqawi's is undoing, I think, in the long run, that had
negative consequences. Obviously, it was a horrendous attack,
but we have got to start packaging that. Casa Blanca. I could
go on and on and on and on. They are packaging it very
effectively. We have not, and I think that is part of this
counternarrative.
Mr. Dicks. Just following up on that, does the government
play a role in this? I mean is this the State Department? Are
they supposed to be involved in this ideological struggle on
the Internet or in the chat rooms? I mean, is that the way to
do it or does it have to be dealt with all outside of
government?
Mr. Jenkins. No, it does not.
You know, during the Cold War, we had something called the
``United States Information Agency.'' It was an institution
that was set up to basically conduct the war of ideas with our
adversaries in the Soviet Union. That does not mean that the
government, itself--that some government official was the
author of every message, but it was a way of facilitating
messages to get to audiences. The government has been involved
in the sponsorship of things like radio for Europe and other
communications mechanisms.
The problem we have now is that we do not have in this
country any institution which brings together these various
components of what we are trying to do in the State Department,
the Defense Department and elsewhere in terms of
communications. We do not have a single point to focus our
efforts; we do not have a strategy, and therefore, we are still
grappling with this particular issue, but we have done this
during World War II. We have done this during the Cold War. It
is a matter of learning some new lessons and, perhaps,
remembering some old ones and creating mechanisms that can
facilitate this ideological combat.
Mr. Al-Marayati. And I do not know of a single instance
where there has been a meeting of all of these components, in a
single setting, to develop a strategy. So I think the
government can help in at least hosting these discussions that
are needed with all of these components now looked upon in a
central manner.
Number 2, I think the government needs to start
publicizing. As Mr. Cilluffo said, we need to look at the
heroes on our side--on America's side-- and those people who
have been on the front lines, battling this extremist ideology,
they need to be empowered, and therefore, publicizing the
relationship between, for example, the Justice Department or
the State Department with these Muslim-American individuals and
Muslim-American institutions is critical.
Lastly, there are exercises of government that have impeded
the progress of the ideological battle, and we need to look
more closely at that.
Mr. Dicks. Well, not to be partisan here, but Abu Ghraib is
an example, I would think, that hurt America's reputation and
image in the world, and it helps the other side, you know, from
my perspective.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Exactly.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, it is not to suggest that
government has a role. I do not necessarily agree that it is
the same role with our counter concealment deception programs
and ideological programs vis-a-vis the Soviet Union just
because I think we have got so many other actors in the
nonstate/onstate kind of environment that it is different, but
what we really do need to be doing is enabling and empowering
and packaging--how many people in this room can tell me that
they know that a number of Muslim associations in the United
States issued statements denouncing terrorism shortly after 9/
11? Very few people.
Well, there have been thousands of such groups, but no one
hears them, so we need to make sure that someone is packaging
that, not just in the United States but overseas as well, and I
would say--there was a 60 Minutes episode not too long ago that
I thought was very powerful. Hassam Batu is one of the primary
al-Qa'ida recruiters for the 7/7 bombers, termed, but he came
out denouncing terrorism, saying he got duped by al-Qa'ida.
That individual is going to have a much greater impact and
resonance on a potential recruit than I would or anyone else
would. I just look at my own children when I try to explain
things. If I use the Disney Channel, they get it and PBS, but
the point being--
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo. --we need people who have credibility with
the constituencies we are trying to work with, and the
government has a role. We have a covert action role we have to
play in the shadows. I am not sure we are doing that very
effectively, and we also have a role in empowering others, but
that is not going to be the solution.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Abu Ghraib was talked about in this country for
months and months and months and months. It was an outrage, and
we should have made it clear it was an outrage. It was talked
on Al Jazeera for months and months and months and years. Yet,
when there were 50 people found in a torture chamber outside of
Baghdad with, you know, drill holes, tortured for months, it
was not even a front page story in this country, and it
certainly was not covered overseas, and when I read Al Jazeera
in English and see it covered there, it is an outrage,
describing what American soldiers do, and I know for a fact
they were giving candy to kids being lured out, and then they
are getting blown up. It is an outrage how Al Jazeera covers
what we are doing there. I will just make another comment and
your comment to that.
I am not impressed with most of the denunciations by the
Muslim community against terrorism, because they always have a
``but,'' and the ``but'' is ``but, you know, we have problems
in Israel with Palestinians,'' ``but we have this but the
western world needs to do this.'' There is no ``but'' to
terrorism, and I would like to see some of these denunciations
without the word ``but'' and then an explanation.
Mr. Al-Marayati. I do not think there was a ``but'' in the
reference to Mr. Cilluffo's--
Mr. Shays. That is, you know, the extreme example.
Mr. Al-Marayati. I think that is actually the rule, Mr.
Shays, not the exception.
Mr. Shays. Well, you know what? Then I would like that
documented to me.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Sure, we can provide you with all of the
documentation.
Mr. Shays. Not a paragraph that follows if there is not a
``but'' but a paragraph that says, ``but the western world
needs to get with it.''
Mr. Al-Marayati. I do not think anybody is adding the
``but.'' I think, maybe, you or your staff needs to look more
closely not to add the ``but.''
Mr. Shays. You know what? I did look closely because I
followed it, and it was my committee that followed it after
September 11th, and we heard a few, but there were more
``buts'' than there were not, and I stand on that.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Let us look at that together, and we will
clarify that for you in terms of the important denunciations of
terrorism as just an absolute, number 1.
Number 2, in terms of media, I agree with you
wholeheartedly. I think there should be a panel in terms of how
the media--the international media and the domestic media
here--plays a role in exacerbating tensions between the United
States and the Muslim world, and we can have a whole panel on
that discussion as well.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Dent, are you all done? Okay.
Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Just a comment. I assume we are winding
this down--
Mr. Dicks. Yes, we are.
Mr. Perlmutter. --but I would hope that each and every one
of you, if you were asked, would be a commission member or
advise this commission that we are putting together because it
is important. Things seem to be speeding up here. You know, it
is a very, you know, vulnerable or open age, that group, and
that group moves fast. I have three in that age category, and
they are reading everything, watching everything, and they move
quickly, and so I just thank you all for your time and for your
expertise.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Chairman, I just want to follow up with what
Mr. Perlmutter just said.
As this Commission moves forward, I hope these three
gentlemen have some role in it. This has been an enormously
helpful hearing for me.
I yield back.
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you just one final question.
On the question of the Internet, you suggested that
Congress is looking at various restrictions. I mean, are you
suggesting, you know, a restriction on violent context when you
take radicalization to violence, that that would be limited?
Mr. Jenkins. You know, that has to be defined, and I think
that is something we want to look at very carefully, so I do
not want to jump ahead to the conclusion before we look at what
are the reasonable possibilities, but to provide, for example,
direct instruction, not only incitement, but specific
instruction of ``this is how you make bombs, and this is how
you should place the bomb``--even in any other media,
incitement is not protected by free speech when there is an
anticipation that it is going to lead to criminal action. So to
provide incitement and instruction with a reasonable
expectation that somebody is going to use it, yes, we do have
to look at that. How we can address that, I am not sure. That
would be a hell of a challenge for the Commission, but
certainly, it is not off the table.
Mr. Dicks. Any other comments on that?
Go ahead.
Mr. Cilluffo. I would very much agree with Brian. Sure, we
also need, for intelligence exploitation, to do it anyway. It
is the chat rooms, though, where there is the interactivity,
the real-time, two-way communication between individuals and
the reaffirmation of Abern attitudes, and to some extent, we
are even seeing the perceived creation of a virtual umah where
they do not have anyone who is denouncing some of what they are
doing, so they actually start reaffirming one another, and
there is something--we talked about child predators. On the Net
in particular, there could be six people, but they start
emboldening one another because they start believing that what
they actually do is acceptable. It is not it. It is really not.
One of the things we looked at, which we could not come to any
conclusion on in our report, is whether or not the media has a
role to play here in terms of exposing like ABC or NBC--I
forget which one it is--in exposing child predators, but that
would be crossing the line, Brian just said, between incitement
activity where that may be against the law to do that, but I am
not suggesting we do not shut them down. If we can, of course,
we do. Realistically speaking, we are not going to get to
everything.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Al-Marayati.
Mr. Al-Marayati. Yes. Let me just segue then to the larger
question of the government's role of how it can help.
Number 1, I agree that there needs to be ideological
independence of these indigenous Muslim-American groups that
are fighting the extremist ideology, and to associate
government with that would tarnish their credibility in the
community, so I agree with that.
Where cooperation comes in then is, for example, the
Federal funding of programs that teach young students--all
students--on our campuses the difference between incitement to
violence and free speech. It can come also in the financing of
programs for partnership between law enforcement and local
communities. It can also come in the form of ad council
advertisements, talking about how to detect criminal activity/
terrorism and what to do or it can also be a positive ad
council advertisement talking about the process of pluralism--I
mean, the greatness of pluralism and the process of
integration, especially that of young Muslim-Americans into our
great society. So these are some of the recommendations that we
have in our Muslim-American youth report that we hope you can
take a look at.
Mr. Jenkins. Can I just make one final point?
Mr. Dicks. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Jenkins. We have probably paid more attention and spent
more money--I am not saying it is not a noble cause--in a
government-sponsored effort to reduce smoking, to reduce drunk
driving, problems to be sure, problems that kill Americans
every day, but we have made it a national effort with
government sponsorship to go after those issues, and we have
done so without violating the Constitution. We certainly can do
that much here.
Mr. Dicks. I think this has been an outstanding hearing,
and the committee will stand adjourned.
We, again, thank the witnesses for a good job done.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
Than you, Madame Chair, for turning our attention today to
the issues of radicalization and homegrown terrorism, and how a
national commission addressing them could make this nation safer.
As the London train bombings in 2005 and the terror
arrests of 12 Canadians in Toronto last summer made clear, the threat
of homegrown terrorism is real.
Indeed, the recent arrests of U.S. citizens who were
plotting attacks against the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey and
JFK airport in New York remind us that the threat in this country is
equally great.
Alsmot six years after 9/11, it is high time that we start
to understand how radicalization can lead to terrorism and what we
should do about it.
I commend Ms. Harman for her efforts in sponsoring the
Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, and I believe that the
creation of a national commission to study this problem and to
recommend a legislative plan of action is the right step.
Such Commissions have had a major impact before.
The Gilmore Commission, for example, made 164
recommendations regarding responses to terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction.
All of those 164 recommendations have been adopted--in
whole or in part--by the Federal Government.
Moreover, the National Commission on Terrorism, on which
Chairwoman Harman served in the late nineties, was a valuable resource
for American counter-terrorism efforts both before and after the 911
attacks.
And the work of the 9/11 Commission itself set in motion
the creation of this Committee and the daily work we do to help secure
the homeland.
I believe that the creation of a national commission on
radicalization and homegrown terrorism will continue this tradition and
help define our approach to these pressing problems.
Welcome again to you all. I look forward to your
testimony.