[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY:
IMPROVING INFORMATION SHARING WITH
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 25, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
JANE HARMAN, California, Chair
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 1
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 29
Witnesses
Panel I
Chief John R. Batiste, Washington State Patrol:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Chief R. Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Major General Timothy J. Lowenberg, Washington Military
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. John McKay, Former U.S. Attorney:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Panel II
Mr. Richard E. Hovel, Aviation Security Advisor, The Boeing
Company:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
Mr. Matt Morrison, Executive Director, Pacific North West
Economic Region:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Mr. Steve L. Stein, Senior Program Manager, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Mr. Richard H. Stevenson, President and COO Clise Properties,
Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
BUILDING A PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY: IMPROVING INFORMATION SHARING WITH
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
----------
Friday, May 25, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., at
Bellevue City Council Chambers, 450 110th Avenue NE, Bellevue,
Washington, Hon. Jane Harman presiding.
Members present: Representatives Harman, Dicks and
Reichert.
Ms. Harman. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
improving information sharing with state and local--law
enforcement and the private sector, and before we begin I would
like to yield to our ranking member, Dave Reichert, for a
matter of personal business.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want to take a moment. I think we would, all of us
here, as community members, be remiss if we didn't just take a
moment to recognize the passing of our good friend Norm Maleng,
so if we could just--I'm not going to make a long speech. We
all know how much he meant to each and every one of us in this
room, how much he meant to all of us in this community, but if
we could just take a moment, Madam Chair, a moment of silence
in honor of Norm's service and also maybe a personal and
private prayer for their family and for their peace and
strength.
Thank you.
[Moment of silence.]
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Thank you both for inviting me to this beautiful city and
this beautiful location on a sunny day.
I have been to Seattle many times, never in sunshine, so I
think having this hearing is a good omen.
Less than a week ago, 11 time zones away, I was in Baghdad
and Ramadi, Iraq. It's a tough place to visit. I'm sure some of
you have been there.
One thing I came away with is that al-Qa'ida is very real
in Iraq, but I also know from other travels that al-Qa'ida is
real and growing around the world.
This is just one of the major threats that could come our
way.
I also know that about 150 miles from here at the Canadian
border in 2000 a man named Ahmed Rasam was apprehended due to
the good work of a customs agent.
Ahmed Rasam was driving a car with a trunk full of
fertilizer, and the bomb, that he was going to put together,
was intended to blow up at Los Angeles International Airport.
That gets my attention since my congressional district
surrounds Los Angeles International Airport, and LAX is the
airport target in America that has been identified several
times by al-Qa'ida as a place that it would like to hit.
So it brings home to us how real are threats against us.
I'm just talking about terrorism threats. There are also--
obviously most of us who come from California know about the
natural threats.
Some say the four seasons of California are fire, floods,
earthquakes, and riots, but nonetheless, all of us understand
vividly how dangerous our world is.
This hearing explores the failure of the federal government
to share critical terrorism-related information with those who
need it most, and they're sitting right in front of us, our
first responders in state and local law enforcement and their
private sector partners.
Just last fall our staff concluded a random survey of
police and sheriff's officers across the country to find out
what was really going on with information sharing.
One sheriff in North Dakota when asked why we weren't
making faster progress had a stunning answer. ``I hate to say
it,'' he said, ``but 9/11 memories are fading. We simply
haven't bled enough to get where we need to be.''
Well, I think we shouldn't have to wait for more Americans
to be hurt or killed before we get it right.
This subcommittee, on a bipartisan basis, has been focusing
on ways to fix how the federal government shares information
not only horizontally with its federal partners but vertically
with those of you on the front lines.
No one has a monopoly on how to do information sharing, and
Washington DC definitely doesn't have all the answers.
I think the greatest hope and most measurable progress is
to be found at the state and local levels, and that is why, at
the invitation of two capable members sitting to my right and
left, we are here in Washington state.
Slowly but surely cities like Seattle, Bellevue, Los
Angeles, and others are making real progress in standing up
intelligence fusion centers and relaying to the federal
government their information needs.
In the view of this subcommittee, we need to make state,
local, and tribal sector information needs the driver of
federal information sharing efforts not the other way around.
You're the ones who need to identify the information you
need, and then that needs to go up the chain, and the federal
government, your client, needs to respond to you.
That was the message in the Homeland Security Committee's
law enforcement assistance and partnership or LEAP strategy
last fall, which some of you are going to address in your
testimony.
Law enforcement officers know that to prevent and disrupt a
potential attack, they must be full participants in the
intelligence cycle, and as some of you pointed out in your
testimony, that's the goal, preventing and disrupting not
responding.
I am particularly interested in hearing from our witnesses
about two ideas in the LEAP strategy, first the creation of a
national center for intelligence-led policing. In my view
creating such a center makes good sense and will allow locals
to learn about the intelligence process as well as the
protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the
people they serve.
Second, the deployment of state and local law enforcement
officers to the national counterterrorism center, the NCTC, to
work side by side with intelligence analysts.
You may know, and I'm sure the witnesses know, that
Congress has passed, in both Houses, a so-called 9/11 bill to
implement those recommendations of the 9/11 commission that we
have not yet enacted into law.
The Senate and House bills are different, and so a
preconference is going out to try to reach agreement and then
pass a final version of the bill, which would go to the
President.
The 9/11 bill is--at least the House version of it, and
we're being effective in persuading the Senate to agree to
this, would require the NCTC to include state, local, and
tribal law enforcement officers. We've come to that point of
view since it's not happening voluntarily, so we're thinking
we're going to put a requirement in the law if it doesn't
happen before that law is enacted.
The third point I want to make, final point, is that the
private sector owns or controls at least 85 percent of this
country's critical infrastructure.
Our second panel will include private sector witnesses.
The private sector too needs information that will help
inform decisions about how to protect against terrorism.
The newly created national infrastructure advisory council
is a positive step forward in addressing private sector
concerns about securing facilities. However, the council's
recommendations don't appear to be gaining much traction on
Capitol Hill.
Local law enforcement agencies like the Seattle police
department, on the other hand, have begun to share information
with the private sector very successfully, another example of
leadership at the local level.
As I mentioned, I was pleased to be invited, but I'm also
pleased to join my colleagues, Ranking Member Sheriff Dave
Reichert and committee member, Appropriations Committee
cardinal, Norm Dicks.
I'm in between a sheriff and a cardinal. It's quite a
religious experience.
I'm very pleased also to have read about the progress that
Washington state is making.
You may not know that 35 years ago, when we were each 5
years old, Norm and I worked together in the United States
Senate. He worked for Senator Magnuson, and I worked for
California Senator John Tunney.
We worked there together, although we are from the same
political party, at a time when toxic partisanship was not in
Washington. It was a better time, but the good news is that
Dave and I work together very well, and this subcommittee works
on a bipartisan basis.
I haven't--our legislative projects and our hearings have
been totally bipartisan, and as far as I'm concerned, that's
the way you get the job done, so I'm very pleased to be here
with Norm and Dave, the cardinal and the sheriff--maybe a play
could be written--and at this point would like to recognize two
people in our audience and introduce our first panel.
First the mayor of Bellevue--I think he's still here--Grant
Degginger is here, and the Interim Police Chief Linda Pillo is
here.
If you want to get the job done right, put a woman in
charge, right?
So let me tell you that I'm very excited about our
witnesses today, and we'll introduce the first panel, and then
you will each testify or summarize your testimony in five
minutes.
Ms. Harman. Yes, I forgot about Dave Reichert giving his--
thank you. Everyone has been pulling at me, and I couldn't
figure out what I had said wrong about the mayor.
Let me first yield to the ranking member for an opening
statement.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The hesitancy is that she knows once I get the microphone,
I continue to talk and talk and talk.
I've learned that's what you do in DC is that you grab the
microphone and never stop, right, Norm?
Mr. Dicks. Five minute rule in the House.
Mr. Reichert. So for those of you--and they really go by
the five-minute rule.
For those of you who haven't experienced a federal hearing
before--I know that the panel has--it's quite an experience
back in Washington DC, and it's kind of a formal experience,
but usually the members of the committee, we get to pontificate
for a while, and then we get to hear the witnesses and their
testimony, and we get to ask questions.
Part of the reason we do that is we want to learn as much
as we can, and we go back and build good legislation, and, as
Jane said, we really have been a committee that has worked well
together.
We are a committee that is really focused on protecting
this country and protecting our citizens and protecting our
community and doing away with that bipartisanship--or that
partisanship that you see back in Washington DC, so you'll see
this committee really focused on that.
Again, thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to Washington
state, and Norm and I are, of course, good friends, and thanks
for coming up from the south end today, Norm, and welcome to
the 8th District.
I'm just going to read a prepared statement very quickly.
I would like to welcome, again, the Chairwoman here for
this hearing, glad that you were able to make it and thank you
for coming to Seattle.
We are all here because we agree that having information
flow to and from our first responders is paramount in
preventing a future terrorist attack.
However, information sharing is a two-way street. It needs
to happen in a partnership based on trust and mutual
understanding.
That is the purpose of this hearing today, to better
understand how information--information sharing, how those
needs are being met and how these relationships can be
improved.
Unlike many other major cities across the nation, Seattle
is located in close proximity to an international border.
It's home to a number of internationally recognized
businesses and combined with the Port of Tacoma has the third
largest port as well as the largest ferry system in the nation.
Our region is not new to the threat of terrorism.
Ahmed Rasam is a reminder to us of that threat posed by the
border, and the challenges we will face in the upcoming 2010
Vancouver Olympics is real.
Collaboration between federal, state, and local entities is
key.
It is clear that in Seattle information sharing has
improved dramatically since September 11th, and I was fortunate
to be a part of those efforts in the beginning and working with
everyone represented today on this panel as their partner in
law enforcement here.
I know from past experience that increased collaboration
between the federal government and local law enforcement needs
to improve more though. We have a lot more work to do.
The private sector as well should be involved. They should
be helping us to create a better understanding of potential
threats to the Seattle area, and though--and through those
partnerships being developed at the Washington joint analytical
center, the WAJAC, and FBI, information is flowing directly to
those first preventers capable of increasing our level of
protection, but it is also clear there is room for improvement.
One of the issues I hear about time and time again is
ensuring that the federal funding can be used for analysts in
fusion centers, and I know that that's something the chief will
touch on today.
The Department of Homeland Security recently allowed state
and local entities to use grant funding for analysts, but we
are looking to strengthen this law.
While the feds have focused their efforts on improving the
security in the nation's most critical infrastructures, it is
also essential that the federal government focus on forging new
partnerships and improving information sharing, whether these
networks be human or cyber.
It is essential that these partnerships and networks
include the private sector, especially since private sector
owns and operates 85 percent of U.S. critical infrastructure.
Part of the difficulty of the information sharing with the
private sector is that the private sector companies are often
reluctant to share information with the federal government.
They fear exposure to lawsuits and the loss of competitive
advantage.
Given the track record from the Department of Homeland
Security protecting information, they are rightly worried.
That is why as part the Department of Homeland Security
Authorization Act that passed the House earlier this month, I
included a provision to study incentives for the private sector
for information sharing.
If a company takes a risk in sharing sensitive data, it is
essential that potential benefits outweigh possible costs.
Having some sort of incentives in place could help increase
the flow of critical information.
I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being here
today and for participating in these two panels, and with that,
Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, very much Congressman Reichert.
Ms. Harman. Congressman Dicks had the opportunity in his
home state to make an opening comment but has chosen to waive,
and so I know we'll hear from him shortly.
Mr. Dicks. I would like to hear from the witnesses.
Ms. Harman. There you go.
Our first witness, Major General Timothy Lowenberg is the
Adjutant General of Washington state where he guides the
preparation of Washington Army and Air National Guard citizen
soldiers and airmen to respond in times of state and national
emergency.
Major General Lowenberg is responsible for formulating,
developing, and coordinating all policies, plans, and programs
affecting the Army National Guard.
He also serves as chair of the national governors
association, homeland security advisors council, and is
extremely well known nationally, and it is a pleasure to have
you as our witness, sir.
Our second witness, Gil Kerlikowske, is the chief of police
for the City of Seattle, a position he has held since August of
2000.
During his 35 years in law enforcement, the chief has
served in many distinguished capacities, including as the
deputy director of the community-oriented policing services,
COPS, at the Department of Justice, the police commissioner in
Buffalo, New York, and as a patrol officer in St. Petersburg,
Florida, and I do know that you're close friends of the chief
and the sheriff in Los Angeles.
Again, it's a pleasure to see you.
Our third witness, David McKay--
Mr. Dicks. John McKay.
Ms. Harman. John McKay, thank you.
I'm sorry, I had it down wrong in this transcript.
John McKay was, until recently, the U.S. Attorney for
western Washington. He was nominated by President Bush to serve
as U.S. Attorney on September 19, 2001, and the United States
Senate confirmed his nomination several weeks later.
From 1989 to 1990 Mr. McKay served as a White House fellow
where he worked as special assistant to the director of the
federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington.
I know you also, as I recall, were president of the legal
services corporation in Washington in the late 1990s, a very
important assignment, I believe, and you are presently visiting
professor at the Seattle University school of law.
Our fourth witness, John Batiste, is the chief of
Washington state patrol, the largest public safety and law
enforcement agency in the state.
Chief Batiste oversees the day-to-day management of the
agency's six bureaus: Field operations bureau, fire protection
bureau, forensic laboratory services bureau, investigative
services, management services, and technical services.
Without objection, each of your full statements will be
inserted in the record, and I would ask you each to summarize
your statement in five minutes, and I can't see, but is there a
timer--over there, so for those--why don't you focus it toward
the people who are testifying first, and we're starting with
Major General Lowenberg.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, WASHINGTON
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
General Lowenberg. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of
the committee. It's a pleasure to be a member of this
distinguished panel with my friends and colleagues with whom
I've worked so long and so well.
As noted, I am testifying today as a state official but
also as chair of the national governors association of homeland
security advisors council.
In fact, I had a national teleconference at 11:00 local to
review my testimony with my colleagues from all of the states,
and I also appear today as chair of homeland defense and
homeland security for the adjutant generals association of the
United States.
Let me begin by stating an obvious but critical ground
truth acknowledged by the chairwoman, and that is that we are a
nation at war, a nation whose communities for the first time in
our nation's history are part of the global battle space, and
the intent of our adversaries is very clear.
The ``Blind Sheik'' when he was sentenced for a life term
of imprisonment for the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Tower
said, and I quote, ``God will make America disappear from the
surface of the earth as He has made the Soviet Union
disappear.''
With a lot of great leadership and unity of effort, we have
done a number of things to make us safer today than we were
when we were attacked in 2001, but we are far from safe.
The 9/11 commission did a laudable job of addressing the
spectrum of threats related to al-Qa'ida and what they referred
to as ideological movements, but I believe it's also important
that we address the spectrum of home-grown terrorism, to that I
would add specifically the growing phenomenon of prison
radicalization in U.S. prisons, principally in our state prison
systems, and these and other domestic threats can only be dealt
with by leveraging the vastly superior numbers and ``boots on
the ground'' contacts or our local law enforcement and
officials in the private sector as well.
The homeland security advisory council released a report in
December of 2004 that went well beyond the 9/11 commission's
reports in focusing on the criticality of incorporating these
state, tribal, and local intelligence-gathering, intelligence-
fusion, and information sharing capabilities, and focused on
the need for a truly national as opposed to a federal system of
intelligence and information sharing.
The LEAP strategy mentioned by the chairwoman I think goes
a long way, provides an excellent road map for a true
enterprise strategy that would enhance and improve our nation's
domestic security.
I know that Chief Kerlikowske is going to comment on the
national center for intelligence-led policing and some of the
other specification provisions, so I'm not going to spend my
limited time doing that, other than to acknowledge that the
kinds of activities that support or many times presage domestic
terrorist events can best be discerned, interdicted, and
prevented when there is a seamless local, tribal, state, and
federal intelligence network.
The ground truth is that state intelligence centers have
been established almost solely as a result of the initiative
and the perseverance of local jurisdictions and states.
There's been tremendous pushback from the very inception.
We were told initially that it wasn't part of the national
strategy when then Governor Mitt Romney led the Homeland
Security's advisory council's effort on intelligence and
information sharing and released their report.
It took us more than a year to get that report through the
advisory council, simply to acknowledge the efficacy of state
and local intelligence fusion centers.
Once we got that in the fiscal year 2005 grant guidance, we
were told that we could hire up to two contract planners to
assist the state efforts, but we weren't given the guidelines
to enable us to do what we really needed to do, and that was
begin to develop a cadre of analysts.
Beginning in fiscal year 2006 we've been authorized to hire
analysts but only with grant money limited to the two-year
program cycle of the grant, and so as we look at how we fund
these efforts at the state and local level, we are restricted
to part-time contract employees.
It does not allow us to build a cadre of professional
analysts so necessary for national security.
By the way, Madam Chair, you mentioned the NCTC, and we
need state and local representation on the NCTC, the national
counterterrorism center, that goes beyond one or two fellowship
status prisons.
What we really need is a regime in which state and local
analysts rotate through the NCTC and federal analysts rotate
into the field, so that over a period of time we begin to
develop crosspollination personal and professional
relationships where fusion center analysts at the various
echelons truly have a keen appreciation and understanding of
the requirements at the other echelons.
What jeopardizes the operations of state and local
intelligence fusion centers in Washington and every other state
is the lack of predictable and sustainable federal funding.
We believe, and when I say ``we,'' the Homeland Security
advisors for the several states and territories, believes that
a multiyear POM cycle for Homeland Security budgeting, much
like we do for the Department of Defense budgeting, is long
overdue and would help lay the groundwork for strategic and
long-term homeland security planning at all levels of
government.
We also believe fervently that the restrictions of DHS
information bulletin 235, which limit funding support for its
contract intelligence analysts to the two-year performance
period, is really not driven by any Congressional authorization
or appropriation language and is policy that is off the mark.
If it's not revised, it should be revised by Congress.
Finally, a national as opposed to a federal intelligence
center communications architecture needs to be developed and
funded, tying together intelligence centers within the states,
within intrastate and interstate regions and nationally.
Targeted support from Congress that would allow us to
develop this information-operations-sharing database and
information system will go a long way to making our country
more secure.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to appear
before you, and I look forward to your questioning.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, General, and I will just point out
to you that the legislative fix we have in mind in the 9/11
bill for the NCTC is exactly what you described, so hopefully
we will get that very soon.
General Lowenberg. That will be very welcome.
[The statement of General Lowenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General Timothy Lowenberg
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. For the record, I am Major General Tim Lowenberg, Adjutant
General of the State of Washington. I am also Chair of the National
Governors Association (NGA) Homeland Security Advisors Council and
Chair of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security for the Adjutants
General Association of the United States (AGAUS). In addition to my
Army and Air National Guard command responsibilities, state law
designates the Adjutant General as the state's senior emergency
management official and vests in me the responsibility to ``administer
the comprehensive emergency management program of the state of
Washington (RCW 38.52.005).
I wish to emphasize that although I am a federally recognized and
U.S. Senate-confirmed Air Force general officer, I appear before you
today solely in my capacity as a state official.
We are a Nation at War!
We are a nation at war! That is the ``ground truth'' that must
drive all of our data collection, information sharing and intelligence
fusion and risk assessment actions.
We have been under attack since al-Qa'ida operatives prevailed in a
decade-long battle against one of the world's two acknowledged ``Super
Powers'' in Afghanistan. Having watched the Soviet Union implode and
literally cease to exist within two (2) years of the conclusion of that
bloody conflict in 1989, al-Qa'ida began systematically attacking
United States interests at home and abroad. The ongoing conflict has
already lasted longer than America's involvement in World War II--with
no end in sight. More than three thousand U.S. residents perished in
the September 11, 2001 attack. Today, all American communities, large
and small, are part of a new and frighteningly lethal 21st Century
global battle space.
Our adversaries' intentions--and commitment--are manifestly clear.
At his sentencing for masterminding the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Towers, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (the ``Blind Sheik'') declared: ``God
will make America disappear from the surface of the earth, as He has
made the Soviet Union disappear!''
We Are Safer Today--But Not Safe
As the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor and Chair of the NGA
Homeland Security Advisors Council, I am often asked if we are safer
today than we were on September 11, 200l. In other words, are we safer
today than when we were last attacked?
The principal studies and statutory materials I rely upon in
responding to this question include the 9/11 Commission Report; the
Homeland Security Act of 2002; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004; the December 2004 Homeland Security Advisory
Council Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative chaired by
then-Governor Mitt Romney; and the 2006 Law Enforcement Assistance and
Partnership Strategy. The 9/11 Commission Report reminds us that
``Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured
a majority of al-Qa'ida's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave
al-Qa'ida sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the
organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted
attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be? The
problem is that al-Qa'ida represents an ideological movement, not a
finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer
directs. --Because of the offensive actions against al-Qa'ida since 9/
11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we
are safer today. But we are not safe.''
I concur with this analysis. To the obvious threats posed by al-
Qa'ida's ``ideological movement'', I would add the dangers of home-
grown terrorism to include the growing and disturbing phenomenon of
U.S. prison radicalization. These domestic threats can only be dealt
with by leveraging the vastly superior numbers and ``boots on the
ground'' contacts of state and local law enforcement officials.
To improve domestic security, the 9/11 Commission stressed the
importance of unity of effort within the intelligence and information
sharing community and urged, among many recommendations, targeted
intelligence initiatives to create (1) a national counter-terrorism
center to unify strategic intelligence and operational planning; (2) a
national intelligence director to unify the intelligence community; (3)
increased congressional oversight; and (4) establishment of a
specialized and integrated national security unit within the FBI.
Subsequent to the 9/11 Commission report, the Homeland Security
Advisory Council released a report in December 2004 that focused
specifically on the nation's intelligence and information sharing
requirements and went even further in recommending:
Effective prevention efforts must be information-
driven and risk-based.
Federal, state, tribal and local authorities must work
together with the private sector to assess threat,
vulnerability, risk and consequence.
State, tribal, local and private entities are now
``consumers'' of accurate, timely and actionable intelligence.
The federal government needs to develop a reliable and
organized conduit for providing information to state, tribes,
and localities.
The federal government should emphasize providing
current and actionable unclassified information.
The collectors of intelligence; state, tribal and
local entities are now partners with the federal intelligence
community. *
The federal government should take steps to ensure
domestic intelligence/information activities are carried out in
a consistent fashion.
State, tribal and local governments need to collect,
analyze, disseminate and use intelligence and information as
part of their day-to-day operations. *
DHS should gather and share best practices.
Statewide intelligence/information fusion centers
should be an important part of national intelligence/
information sharing efforts. *
Each state should establish an information center that
serves as a 24/7 ``all-source,'' multi-disciplinary,
information fusion center. *
* (emphasis added)
Two years after release of the Homeland Security Advisory Council
report, the House Committee on Homeland Security proffered additional
and more precisely focused recommendations in its Law Enforcement
Assistance and Partnership (LEAP) Strategy. I applaud the House
Committee's analysis and concur with many of the LEAP Strategy
recommendations including establishing a national center for
intelligence-led policing; establishing a law-enforcement presence
overseas; creating intelligence fusion centers at or near our borders;
supporting grant programs to assist local law enforcement education and
teaming; enhancing vertical information sharing between levels of law
enforcement; assuring timely accessible security clearances for law
enforcement; and continual surveying efforts to provide feedback on
intelligence system effectiveness. If authorized and funded, these
initiatives would enhance unity of effort and fundamentally improve our
nation's domestic security.
To date, however, most of the attention and funding for these and
other initiatives have been focused at the federal level. While
continuously improving federal interagency operations, we must also be
mindful that terrorist attacks and criminal activities that support
terrorist activities occur in local communities and local citizens are
the primary victims. Unless and until the federal government also
supports and funds a national strategy of state and local counter-
terrorism capacity building, homeland security will continue to be an
illusive goal.
Federal-Centric First Steps
In 2003 the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was formed
to provide a comprehensive assessment of potential terrorist threats to
U.S. interests. The TTIC included the Department of Homeland Security,
the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, the Central Intelligence Agency's
Counterterrorist Center, the Department of Defense and other U.S.
Government agencies. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 renamed the TTIC the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) and placed it under the control of the United States Director of
National Intelligence (DNI). The NCTC vision statement calls for it to
serve as the nation's center of excellence for counterterrorism and to
eliminate the threat of terrorism through integrated, dedicated and
disciplined strategic operational planning and counterterrorism
intelligence. One of its stated objectives is to operate as a
partnership of organizations including: the Central Intelligence
Agency; the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security; and other
entities that provide unique expertise such as the Departments of
Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human
Services; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the US Capitol Hill
Police.
While this vision, purpose, and strategy are prudent and highly
important, I mention the creation of the TTIC and NCTC as an
illustration of the federal-centric nature of many of our initial
homeland security initiatives. Without diminishing the importance of
these and other federal government actions, they must be part of a
larger enterprise strategy of federal-state-tribal-local capacity
building, especially in the areas of intelligence fusion and
information sharing. As DHS moves forward with efforts to create
uniform information sharing guidelines, it is imperative that they have
a better understanding of state operations and how state, tribal and
local operations can enhance our overall national intelligence system.
State intelligence fusion centers have had to be built almost
exclusively through state and local perseverance, not as a result of
any federal encouragement or federally-supported national strategy.
Even after release of the Homeland Security Advisory Council's
Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative report touting the
national security benefits of state-tribal-local intelligence fusion
centers, financial support from DHS and OMB was not forthcoming. Only
after a substantial number of states established such centers and
others were clearly in the process of doing the same did DHS and OMB
belatedly begin providing limited funding support for these state and
local operations.
With American communities at the heart of the new 21st Century
battle space, we cannot afford to ``manage'' the consequences of future
terrorist attacks. We must be able to detect, deter, intercept and
prevent such attacks from occurring. That can only be done through the
systematic gathering, assessment, distillation and dissemination of
actionable intelligence. The LEAP report accurately notes that
intelligence analysis has heretofore been the near-exclusive domain of
the federal government and that we have been slow to recognize that
local, state, and tribal law enforcement professionals, if properly
resourced, are our nation's true ``eyes and ears'' and can
substantially enhance our nation's security.
When planes were flown into buildings on September 11, 2001 it was
the brave men and women of local police and fire departments who
heroically responded. That same sense of urgency and commitment exists
today in our state, tribal and local intelligence fusion centers.
--Enhancing State and Local Intelligence Fusion Capacity--
Creating a ``National'' Intelligence System that Makes our Nation
Safer!
Capitalizing on an All-Crimes Approach
To develop a broader intelligence sharing system, additional
information, that is to say information other than that which has a
clear nexus to terrorism, must be considered. To that end, the LEAP
report observed:
Everyday, police and sheriffs' officers collect millions of pieces
of information during the course of their work--the kind of information
that, if properly analyzed and integrated, can form the basis of highly
informative law enforcement intelligence reports. That is what
``intelligence-led policing'' or ILP is all about.
Another proponent of ILP, Michael Downing, Commander of the Los
Angeles Police Department's Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence
Bureau, has opined:
The success and understanding of community based policing
philosophies and community based government practice [has] set the
stage for local, state, and federal law enforcement partners to
construct the building blocks for shared and fused intelligence that
will prevent, deter, disrupt, and interdict planned terrorist acts
targeting America. This intelligence model of policing should be robust
enough to incorporate an ``all-crimes, all-hazards'' approach,
resisting terrorism as well as crime and disorder.
The state of Washington has firmly embraced an all-crimes approach
to the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence
information. The State's fusion center, known as the Washington Joint
Analytical Center or WAJAC, regularly dispenses actionable intelligence
and Be-On-the-Look Out (BOLO) information related to terrorism as well
as a variety of topics including missing children, stalking suspects,
counter-drug and narcotics interdiction missions, auto-theft rings, and
organized gangs.
This kind of information can only become fully actionable when
state, tribal and local fusion centers are linked together by
consistent communications architecture within states and throughout the
nation. A national--as opposed to a federal--intelligence center
information operations (IO) strategy would facilitate the horizontal
and vertical sharing of ``real time'' classified and law enforcement
sensitive information.
We should also leverage the skills and capabilities of trained and
experienced analysts and subject matter experts from our state prison
systems and from non-law enforcement disciplines such as the Army and
Air National Guard and Public Health.
The Need for Predictable and Sustainable Federal Funding
Above all else, however, what jeopardizes the operations of state
and local intelligence fusion centers in Washington and all other
states is the lack of predictable and sustainable funding. Current
federal grant guidelines (Information Bulletin--IB235) authorize
funding support for intelligence analysts for only the 2 year
performance period of the fiscal year 2006 UASI and LETPP programs.
Fiscal Year 2006 Grant Guidance (pages 33-34, 83, 89):
``Furthermore, costs associated with hiring new intelligence
analysts are allowable only for the period of performance of the fiscal
year 2006 UASI and LETPP programs. Upon close-out of the fiscal year
2006 grants, States and Urban Areas shall be responsible for supporting
the sustainment costs for those intelligence analysts.''
Fiscal year 2007 HSGP Grant Guidance (pages 26 and B-1):
``Costs associated with hiring new intelligence analysts are
allowable for only two years, after which States and Urban Areas shall
be responsible for supporting the sustainment costs for those
intelligence analysts.''
Although there are no references to intelligence analysts in the
congressional appropriation bills, the Department of Homeland Security,
as a matter of discretion and policy, has issued IB235 which tracks
both grant guidelines and applies the two year limitation to both
years' funding. These limitations, coupled with the overall uncertainty
and unpredictability of federal grant funding, create continuous staff
turnover and prevent state and local fusion centers from developing a
cadre of experienced career analysts. The federal government wouldn't
think of contracting out its Intelligence functions, yet the DHS policy
essentially forces state and territorial governments to rely upon
contract personnel hired for only a 2-year grant performance period.
States are predictably unable to recruit and retain skilled personnel
when federal grant guidelines accommodate only short-term,
``temporary'' contractor assistance.
Synchronizing State and Federal Information Sharing and Intelligence
Analysis
Washington State's proximity to the Canadian land border, coupled
with our proximity to Puget Sound and the Pacific Ocean, provide ample
air, land and maritime routes of illegal entry for those who would do
us harm. These geographic vulnerabilities substantially increase the
risk of a terrorist attack especially when viewed against the backdrop
of the world ``stage'' that will be presented to terrorist cells by
events such as the 2009 World Police and Fire Games and the 2010 Winter
Olympics and Paralympics. Many of these events will be held in and near
Vancouver, British Columbia at venues within 35 miles of Washington
State communities. If domestic or transnational terrorists were to plot
an attack in conjunction with these international events, it is likely
that pre-operation planning and surveillance will be conducted from
within the state of Washington. Given al-Qa'ida's modus operandi, such
planning might even be occurring in our region today.
Developing a closer, more disciplined information sharing
relationship between local, state, and tribal law enforcement and
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and other federal agency colleagues would substantially enhance
our collective situational awareness. In this regard, I concur with the
LEAP report's observation that ``in order to better secure the
homeland, the Department [of Homeland Security] must partner more
effectively with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in
our nation's border communities--the `force multipliers' at our own
frontiers.''
David Carter, Professor and Director of Michigan State University's
School of Criminal Justice, noted in the LEAP report:
The borders of the U.S. are replete with small state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies. Officers in those agencies know the
people in their communities and the character of life on the border and
readily recognize when there are anomalies. Yet, they rarely report
this information and even more rarely are asked. This is valuable data
that may often times help fusion center analysts and the federal
Intelligence Community complete the threat puzzle.
Fortunately, Washington State has benefited from a close
relationship with our federal border partners. Specifically, Thomas
Hardy, Director of Field Operations for the Seattle CBP Field Office,
and his staff have been invaluable collaborators, particularly as we
have worked together on preparing for the 2010 Winter Olympics.
Washington's local police agencies have also benefited from a high
level of collaboration with our federal agency partners. In the LEAP
report, Ferry County (WA) Sheriff Peter Warner emphasized:
We rely on Border Patrol agents in my jurisdiction for
information about what's going on at the border, and I know
them personally. We frankly need more Border Patrol agents--and
more resources to hire additional police and sheriffs'
officers--in order to meet the threat of terrorism at the
border.
I concur with Sheriff Warner and encourage the members of this
Committee and your fellow members of Congress to appropriate funding
for additional human and technological resources at the federal and at
state and local levels--with special and targeted support for state and
local intelligence fusion center operations--to help ensure the air,
land and maritime routes of access to our country are secure.
Conclusion
We are a nation at war. We are confronted by daunting and
unprecedented domestic security risks. Our ability to detect, deter,
dissuade and prevent future terrorist attacks is directly tied to our
ability to analyze all-crimes intelligence in adequately funded and
staffed state and local intelligence fusion centers and in collectively
sharing that information between and among members of the local-tribal-
state-federal intelligence community. A federal-centric intelligence
system will not allow us to meet the threats now confronting our nation
nor will it enable us to effectively respond to or recover from future
terrorist attacks. Our homeland will be secure only when members of
local, tribal, state and federal law enforcement communities and other
emergency responders have the information and resources they need on a
daily basis to make sound decisions about transnational and domestic
terrorist threats.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. Chief Kerlikowske, please summarize your
testimony in five minutes.
STATEMENT OF R. GIL KERLIKOWSKE, CHIEF, SEATTLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Chief Kerlikowske. Thank you, Committee Chair Harman and
Congressman Dicks, Congressman Reichert. Thanks very much for
inviting me to share observations with you on the very
important topic of information sharing between the public and
private sectors as it relates to homeland security.
I'm going to sketch for you the state of intelligence
fusion and homeland security from the vantage point of a local
police chief, and I want to address the following two areas:
The nature of the current obstacles to the creation of an
integrated system of intelligence fusion, including private
sector participation; and some proposed solutions for removing
those impediments and improving the information sharing, in
particular some of the promising initiatives contained in the
LEAP report which myself and my colleagues have been very
impressed with.
The essential concept of intelligence fusion, which is in
several different national guidelines, fusion center
guidelines, et cetera, involves the systematic collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information through an inclusive
process, involving the full engagement of all of the key
stakeholders, and without the participation of the private
sector, which as you mentioned, Madam Chair, holds, manages and
controls over 85 percent of the critical information
infrastructure in the nation, it is hard to contemplate that we
are going to be able to achieve that objective.
Realization of such private/public partnership is
predicated upon though having a system upon which we are going
to all participate, and this is the dilemma that vexes my
colleagues and the major city chiefs, that is the organization
of the 56 largest police and sheriff's departments in the
United States and Canada and where I currently serve as vice
president.
We consider increased engagement of participation by the
private sector in homeland security to be among one of our
highest priorities.
Unfortunately, our individual ability to collect and create
intelligence fusion centers has been limited, at best.
Two of the major impediments: First, we remain tethered to
the federally centered vision of intelligence information based
on the Cold War ``bottom up'' type of system. Security
clearances are difficult and time-consuming procedures for
obtaining access to equipment, are convoluted and unnecessary,
and the sharing of vast categories of information is prohibited
unless it is brokered by DOJ or DHS.
Second, the restrictions on the use of funds to support
homeland security, which the General mentioned and I believe
Chief Batiste will mention also, the potential solutions are
contained in the LEAP report.
One is, of course, what you had mentioned earlier, the
proposal to establish a center for intelligence-led policing.
We are doing this, as the sheriff or Congressman Reichert
knows, across the country and looking at best practices in
collaborating and working together.
Having this federally located system and funded system
would go a long way to that.
The foreign liaison officer against terrorism program--you
have great acronyms, by the way, for this. Very well done.
Ms. Harman. Give our staff the credit.
Chief Kerlikowske. The FLOAT program--what an ability in
this global issue to be able to have local law enforcement
understand and obtain knowledge in foreign countries, something
that we could not, unless you are New York City, afford to do,
the proposal to reform and streamline the process for obtaining
security clearances.
In Seattle we have a convergence of the circumstances that
have created the ideal environment for information sharing, and
that is some of the things that we can accomplish in the city,
and I very much appreciate the support that we've had from our
own local members.
Right after 9/11 we were able to reach out to the Muslim
community and through a joint letter signed by, at that time,
United States Attorney John McKay and myself, we notified every
police agency in the state of Washington how they could be
helpful in reducing fear and increasing cooperation and
communication in those communities.
We participated in TOPOFF, the first federally centered
exercise against terrorism after 9/11.
Under John McKay's leadership, the Puget Sound region was
the first to operationalize Linx, the law enforcement system
for data coordination, and we have been working very hard at a
regional fusion center in conjunction with our state fusion
center, WAJAC.
Our areas of interest converged and create substantial
opportunities for expanded collaboration. No one knows the
strengths and vulnerabilities of these critical facilities
better than the locals do.
What I suggest is that we seek the kind of enduring
dependable relationship we have in Seattle with leaders like Al
Clise and Richard Stevenson of Clise Properties. That is a
foundation of trust and cooperation and relationships that make
sure that we are going to protect the critical infrastructure
in the private sector to the very best of our ability.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Chief.
[The statement of Chief Kerlikowske follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief R. Gil Kerlikowske
Committee Chair Harmon, Congressman Dicks and Congressman Reichert,
thank you for inviting me to share my observations with you on the
important topic of information sharing between the public and private
sectors as it relates to homeland security.
To address the central question of this hearing--How do we build a
partnership between the public and private sectors to share information
relevant to homeland security?--requires an analysis, first, of the
status of homeland security intelligence efforts and systems to date.
This is because we cannot share information and intelligence that we
don't have. Moreover, it would be premature to undertake an expansion
of information sharing if the infrastructure of intelligence fusion is
inadequate or incomplete.
In the brief time I have today, then, I will attempt to sketch for
you the state of intelligence fusion in support of homeland security,
from the vantage point of a local police chief, by addressing the
following:
the nature of current obstacles to the creation of
integrated systems of intelligence fusion, including private
sector participation; and
proposed solutions for removing these impediments and
improving the information sharing environment, in particular,
some of the promising initiatives contained in the ``Law
Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy'', or LEAP
report.
I will conclude my testimony with some observations aimed at
reinforcing the importance of public private partnerships, and why I am
optimistic that we will achieve success to meet that priority.
Obstacles to creating integrated intelligence fusion.
The essential concept of intelligence fusion--as defined by DHS in
both National Criminal Justice Information Sharing Plan (NCISP) and the
NIJ-Global Justice Initiative ``Fusion Center Guidelines'' document
they adopted--involves the systematic collection, analysis and
dissemination of information through an inclusive process, involving
the full engagement of all relevant stakeholders. Without the
participation of the private sector, which holds, manages and controls
over 85% of the critical information infrastructure of the nation, it
is hard to contemplate achievement of this objective.
Realization of such a private/public sector partnership, however,
is predicated upon having a system or process within which to
participate. This is the dilemma which has vexed my colleagues in the
Major City Chiefs organization, which comprises the 56 largest
metropolitan police agencies in the US and Canada, and where I
currently serve as vice-president. We consider the increased engagement
and participation by the private sector in homeland security to be
among our highest priorities. Unfortunately, our individual and
collective progress to create intelligence fusion systems or centers
that have the capacity to integrate private sector participation has
been limited, at best.
Two major impediments have contributed to this reality:
First, we remain tethered to the federally centered vision of
intelligence information management. Developed during the Cold War,
this vision remains stubbornly resistant to change. For all the stated
commitment to derive intelligence requirements and priorities from the
``bottom up''--which I interpret to mean from the front lines of local
law enforcement--many decisions still originate from somewhere inside
the beltway, and specifically within DHS and the FBI. This reality
finds confirmation in many ways. Security clearances are difficult for
many in law enforcement to obtain in a timely fashion.
Procedures for obtaining access, equipment or support
are often convoluted, tortuous and unnecessary.
The sharing of vast categories of information is
prohibited unless brokered by the FBI, in particular as relates
to foreign counter-intelligence. (As a police chief of the 19th
largest city in the nation, and in possession of a top secret
clearance, by law I cannot set foot unescorted in the NCTC, let
alone have direct access to even the most benign information)
And while there are some noteworthy and commendable
fusion centers and systems around the country (I am thinking
here of Los Angeles-Los Angeles County, Arizona and
Massachusetts, to name a few), the vast majority of
intelligence management remains centered in the traditional
JTTF-FIG structure, almost six years after 9/11.
Second, the restrictions on the use of funds to support homeland
security initiatives virtually assure that our progress will be
limited. In particular, the UASI prohibitions concerning the hiring of
sworn law enforcement personnel contradict an order of priority that
every chief of police knows by heart: It is people who solve crimes and
prevent terrorism, not buildings and equipment.
Potential solutions for improving the information-sharing
environment.
My purpose in making the above observations is not to itemize
grievances, but rather to join with you in finding solutions. Just as
it is fair to say that many of us in the local law enforcement
community have been frustrated by certain unnecessary, and sometimes
mysterious, impediments to our progress relating to homeland security,
it is equally fair to say that we have come a long way since 9/11, and
that the nation is, on balance, safer and more prepared than we have
been in the past. And we are all keenly interested in continuing the
progress that we have jointly achieved. This brings me to comment on
certain of the promising initiatives contained in the LEAP report.
Specifically, I wish to lend my voice in support of the following
initiatives outlined in this laudable, strategic document:
First, the proposal to establish a ``center'' for intelligence-led
policing. This, to me, makes a lot of sense. From my vantage, there
does not appear to be sufficient attention paid to creating a unified
approach to the overall concept of intelligence-driven policing on an
all-crimes basis, nor is there sufficient focus upon the strategic or
civil liberties implications of police deployment based upon actionable
information. The opportunity to evaluate successful models and develop
standards and guidelines on a national level would meet a great need.
This being said, the concept of a national center must be more than
just about building another big box, of course, and must be designed
based upon the concepts I discussed earlier. Fundamentally, the full
participation of local law enforcement is critical to the success of
such an initiative. Perhaps there would be a place in such a center or
system for the private sector, as well.
Second, the ``Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT)
Grant Program'' would go a long way toward expanding both the knowledge
base and the preparedness capacity of local, state and tribal law
enforcement. In a real sense, a program of this kind directly confronts
the preclusion of local law enforcement involvement in the categories
of intelligence that I spoke of earlier. This program would open the
eyes of local law enforcement to understanding this issue and create a
knowledge base around terrorism and international crime that is
presently lacking. Remember that most police agencies have trouble
talking to their next-door neighbors, let alone communicating across
international borders. This is an extremely worthwhile component of
LEAP.
Third, the proposal to establish and fund a ``Vertical Intelligence
Terrorism Analysis Link (VITAL)'' is directly on point to confront the
current restrictions on local law enforcement access to relevant
foreign intelligence data. This proposal strikes an appropriate middle
ground between the integration of local law enforcement in foreign
counterintelligence missions--which, except in extreme cases, I do not
advocate--and allowing appropriate access to information that links to
threats directed at the communities we police. Like the FLOAT program,
this proposal is based upon a mature recognition that for 99% of the
populous, their homeland is not inside the beltway, but is instead the
city, town or unincorporated county where they reside; and their
homeland defenders are the local police officers and sheriff's deputies
who live and work in those same cities and towns.
Fourth, the proposal to reform and streamline the process of
obtaining security clearances will find few--if any--detractors among
law enforcement executives. Both the goal of the initiative and
recognition of the priority of this need are long overdue.
There are many other laudable proposals described in the LEAP
strategy document, including the need to strengthen border intelligence
capacity through the creation of a specific focus on US border
intelligence fusion, and I do not want my failure to mention them to
suggest a lack of support.
In my time remaining, though, I want to return to the issue of
creating greater opportunities for public-private information sharing.
As I stated earlier, the need to understand the challenges that
inhere in our commitment to create systems of intelligence fusion is a
prerequisite to any meaningful discussion of public-private information
sharing. I have spent some time describing both the limitations and
promising alternatives to the current picture of intelligence fusion
confronting local law enforcement, for the reason that meaningful
partnerships are founded upon meaningful systems that provide timely
and relevant information. In other words, we must build a strong house
if we intend to invite our private sector partners to share floor
space. With that, I turn how to the issue of creating greater
opportunities for public-private information sharing.
When I consider the current status of intelligence sharing between
local law enforcement and the private sector, I must first observe that
the quality and frequency of the exchange of information remains more a
matter of personal relationships and individual initiatives than a
well-organized, reliable system of intelligence fusion that includes
private sector representatives as full partners. As happens frequently
in this profession, whom we know and have worked with in the past
defines the boundaries of engagement, particularly as concerns
sensitive or classified information. And while public-private
partnerships remain a priority in the design and implementation of
intelligence fusion, there remain few examples of the kind of fully-
integrated, systematic collaboration with the private sector that state
and local public safety leaders acknowledge as a vital component of
comprehensive intelligence management. The need for this cooperation is
evidenced in the Pulitzer Prize winning book, Looming Tower.
This is not to suggest that the model of personal, relationship-
based engagement and collaboration cannot meet our objectives for
intelligence sharing in the short term. At the local level,
relationships between police and community have been a force
multiplier, and have been shown in many cases to prevent or reduce
crime. In a real sense, it is precisely these relationships which make
a system of public-private collaboration even possible.
In Seattle, for example, we have a convergence of both
circumstances and initiatives that create an ideal environment for
information sharing. Our business, minority and neighborhood
communities have a long and proud tradition of civic participation and
contribution. Almost twenty years ago, the Seattle Police Department
established a structure of precinct level advisory councils, which were
so successful that they were expanded to include specific councils
representing communities of color, sexual minorities, private security
companies and human service providers.
Some examples of how this information environment has been of value
in the context of homeland security are, as follows:
Immediately after 9/11, our outreach to the local
Muslim community addressed practical fears and concerns, and at
the same time showed the world that humanity has many diverse
faces and beliefs.
The City elected to participate in TOPOFF 2, the first
national terrorism exercise after 9/11, which created new
partnerships and brought many diverse people and interests
together in a real time exercise to test our preparedness.
We were able to create a Seattle Police Foundation,
comprised of many of the city's most important and civic-minded
business and community leaders.
Under the leadership and commendable commitment of US
Attorney John McKay, the Puget Sound region was the first to
operationalize the ``LinX'' (Law Enforcement Information
Exchange) data coordination system.
And we are in the process of designing and
implementing a regional fusion center which seeks to integrate,
to the greatest extent possible, private sector participation.
The City of Seattle and the Puget Sound region--like many
communities across the nation--has the capacity to transform our time-
tested, profound personal relationships within the private sector into
a system and structure of regular information sharing. So in thinking
about the potential for public-private intelligence sharing, I believe
it is not so much a matter of will as a matter of structure and design,
and of overcoming impediments that frustrate our shared commitment to
collaborate. The real key to this transformation, however, consists of
law enforcement consciously and purposefully broadening its engagement
with the private sector, much in the same way we have asked DHS to
expand the scope of their engagement and partnership with local law
enforcement.
One area where our interests converge and create substantial
opportunities for expanded collaboration is in the analysis of critical
infrastructure. No one knows the strengths and vulnerabilities of the
critical facilities we seek to protect better than their owners and
staff. Another is in the area of integrated communications, to include
the possibility of interoperability.
What I suggest we seek is the kind of enduring, dependable
relationship we in Seattle have with leaders like Al Clise and Richard
Stevenson of Clise Properties. You will hear testimony today from
Richard about how our longstanding professional friendship has been the
basis for sharing information about critical infrastructure strengths
and vulnerabilities, and has enhanced the capabilities of both the
Seattle Police Department and Clise Properties to prevent, detect and
respond to threats to those private sector holdings. For obvious
reasons, neither Richard nor the Seattle Police Department will
disclose any details about this instance of collaboration. The point is
that these types of candid, inclusive partnerships are eminently
possible. They are founded upon trust, confidence, and mutual respect.
They can, and should be, the rule, rather than the exception.
While much work remains, not the least of which involves further
development of the infrastructure of intelligence fusion at the local,
state and tribal level, it is clear that the potential for public and
private sector collaboration and information sharing is significant.
We've seen it in Seattle. It is possible in every community in this
nation. And it is on this note of optimism that I will close and take
any questions you may have.
Ms. Harman. Mr. McKay.
STATEMENT OF JOHN McKAY, FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY
Mr. McKay. Chair, thank you very much. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here as a former United States attorney and a
lowly law professor at Seattle University Law School. I thank
you very much.
I apologize for being late. I don't know if Madam Chair is
aware that we lost a real leader last night, Norm Maleng, and
Norm was a close friend of mine and I know of many others here,
and we will miss him tremendously, a national leader in
deterrent sentencing and programs constructed toward violence
against women, many other tremendous services over his 30 years
as the elected prosecutor here, and I will miss him terribly.
I wanted to talk for a moment about the role of the federal
government in building regional law enforcement sharing
systems, and I think we need to distinguish for a moment
between fusion centers, which are important because they bring
persons together, and bringing the data together, the records
together that contain information of crimes.
I think that most law enforcement recognize that while
intelligence is incredibly valuable in the war on terror, it
may be more important to know what each other knows about crime
in our region, and amazingly we today, in most places in the
United States, do not routinely share law enforcement records
with each other.
In a world in which we can go online and Google information
from all over the world, law enforcement is not capable today,
in most places, of finding out what federal agencies, state
agencies, and local agencies know about individuals who have
been arrested or convicted of crimes; in particular, relating
to investigative records which contain full text information
about crimes that have occurred and which could be the basis
for criminal conspiracies or even terrorist conspiracies.
Madam Chair, we do not do a good job of creating those
regional systems.
The individuals on this panel are among some of the very
best leaders in law enforcement in the United States, I
believe, in creating the governance behind the first Linx
system which was operational here in the state of Washington
and to include the gentleman to your right, Congressman
Reichert, our sheriff here in King County who along with the
individuals on this panel with me, including General Lowenberg,
have been tremendously helpful in creating the governance
necessary to establish a system in which federal, state, and
local records reside.
It sounds easy. The public thinks we have it. We do not
have this capability, other than a very few places around the
United States.
I've set some of those out in my prepared remarks and won't
repeat them here.
I do believe that the federal government has an incredibly
important role, and it begins with acknowledging what the Chair
has said and what Congressman Reichert has said, and that is
that local knowledge about crime and local data concerning past
crimes and current investigations are in many ways more
important than information that the federal government brings
to the table.
Yet, it is not possible among the more than 200 law
enforcement agencies in the state of Washington, for example,
to ask each of them to create a piece of a system that will
result in that Google capability that we really do seek.
That means the federal government has to assist in funding.
It has to assist in providing the forum for the government
structure that will bring those many different police
organizations together, all with different civilian supervision
at the local, state, and federal level.
That's what the Linx system is, and I'm not here to sell
Linx. Linx is owned by the government. It's owned by the
Department of Defense.
Some have really maliciously said that Linx is somehow a
proprietary system. It isn't.
The key elements of Linx are the ability to search
databases that are under the control and supervised by civilian
authorities over law enforcement, and I'm very proud of what
has been created here.
I'm also terribly disappointed in the Department of Justice
in not pursuing the pilot programs that Linx has so
successfully launched in a number of places around the country,
and I would ask really this subcommittee to consider this
question.
I don't believe that anyone in the federal government is
responsible for building these systems. We propose an
interdepartmental partnership with the United States attorneys
between Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the
Department of Justice.
We believe we had an arrangement to do that. It has not
occurred, and I believe that is why when you peel aside the
rhetoric and all the nice words, very little law enforcement
information sharing is occurring among state, federal, and
local partners.
Partnership is the key. We built trust here. We know it can
be done, and I'm certainly looking forward to taking any
questions that you may have.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. McKay follows:]
Prepared Statement of John McKay
Good afternoon Madam Chair and members of the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment. I am John McKay, the former United States Attorney for the
Western District of Washington. I am currently Visiting Professor of
Law, Seattle University School of Law. I am pleased to appear before
you to present information regarding ``Building a Partnership Strategy:
Improving Information Sharing with Local and State Law Enforcement and
the Private Sector''.
It has been my distinct pleasure to serve the citizens of the State
of Washington and the Department of Justice as the United States
Attorney for the Western District of Washington from 2001 to 2007, when
I resigned along with a number of my colleagues from around the
country. I was honored to serve with professional men and women in the
United States Attorney's Office in Seattle and Tacoma, and with the
many extraordinary professional law enforcement personnel from the
various local, county, state, tribal and federal law enforcement
agencies throughout the State of Washington and around the United
States.
One of my most rewarding experiences while serving as the U.S.
Attorney was to help lead the development of an extremely effective law
enforcement information sharing effort known as the Law Enforcement
Information Exchange (LInX). I first became involved in the development
of a program to enhance information sharing among law enforcement
agencies following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It soon
became apparent after that fateful day that an extraordinary effort
would be required to improve information sharing among law enforcement
agencies at all governmental levels if we were to be successful in
mitigating another devastating terrorist attack on our homeland. As the
U.S. Attorney in Seattle, I sought to facilitate the development of an
effective information sharing strategy among scores of law enforcement
agencies to both mitigate another terrorist attack, and effectively
combat rising organized crime in my district.
In early 2002, I was invited to attend a pilot program sponsored by
the FBI in St. Louis, Missouri. This program, knows as the Gateway
initiative, was an effort by the FBI to demonstrate that local, county,
state and federal law enforcement agencies could effectively break down
the cultural barriers and obstacles to information sharing, and develop
a cost effective technology among their disparate information
management systems. During the demonstration of this program, I met
with Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson of the FBI, Director
David Brant of the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and a
variety of other U.S. Attorneys to discuss a strategy to expand the
Gateway initiative outside of the St. Louis area.
The Puget Sound area of Washington State serves as a vital homeport
to the strategic resources of the United States Navy. We have nuclear
powered aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines and a large
civilian and military workforce which are strategic assets in the
defense of our country in the Pacific, and which have played a vital
role in our military response in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S.
Naval Criminal Investigative Service is responsible to provide felony
criminal investigative, counterintelligence and counterterrorism
support to the Department of the Navy, and to the strategic assets in
the Western District of Washington. Following my positive impression of
the FBI Gateway Program, I approached Director Mueller and Director
Brant to consider a law enforcement information sharing pilot program
in my district to enhance our law enforcement and counterterrorism
strategies.
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) eagerly accepted my
request, and then Director Brant devoted resources to develop what has
come to be known as the LInX program. This is more than a technology
project; it is in fact a law enforcement and counterterrorism
operational capability. The LInX effort in Seattle began with the
effective organization of senior law enforcement executives, to include
Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs and Special Agents-in-Charge from thirteen
critical agencies. NCIS provided the funding to develop the technology
to permit the electronic sharing of law enforcement records, to include
criminal incident data, traffic summons, computer assisted display
(CAD) data, criminal arrest histories and other law enforcement records
that are legally retained and shareable by and among these law
enforcement agencies. NCIS also provided resources to assist me in
formally organizing the leadership of these law enforcement agencies
who actually owned and were responsible for the collection of this
data. We formed a LInX Board of Governance, which was comprised of this
executive level leadership of local, county, state and federal
agencies. My office provided direct legal oversight of this program to
ensure that all federal guidelines, to include the Federal Privacy Act
was complied with in the development of this program.
The NCIS simultaneously initiated LInX Programs in other
geographical areas vitally important to the Department of the Navy, and
sought to enhance their criminal investigative and force protection
support to the Navy through the enhancement of information sharing with
regional law enforcement agencies. NCIS developed LInX projects in the
Hampton Roads area of Virginia, the Gulf Coast of Texas, Hawaii,
Northeast Florida and Southeast Georgia, the National Capital Region of
Washington, DC and in New Mexico. In each of these regions, the local
United States Attorney was personally involved in the oversight and
participation of the LInX project. From 2003-2006 we expanded the
Northwest LInX project to include more than one hundred fifty (150)
agencies throughout the State of Washington, and most recently to
include the Portland, Oregon Police Bureau, which includes seventeen
local and county agencies. I believe in total, the LInX Program, now
deployed to seven regions throughout the United States, has developed
an effective law enforcement information sharing effort with more than
350 agencies.
Throughout my involvement with the LInX Program, I had the
opportunity to meet frequently with leaders in Washington, DC, to
include the Secretary of the Navy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Deputy Attorney General of the United States and the Deputy Secretary
of Homeland Security. In partnership with the Director of NCIS, I
offered that LInX has fostered an extremely harmonious environment
among law enforcement leaders in the Northwest, bringing them together
to plot a strategy for effective information sharing. We successfully
overcame those artificial barriers between agencies, which had become a
part of the law enforcement culture prior to the events of September
11, 2001. More importantly, with the direction of these law enforcement
leaders and their operational personnel, NCIS developed a technical
solution for the sharing of electronic data that directly led to law
enforcement successes in my District. I received reports from virtually
all agencies involved in this effort that their personnel had solved
criminal investigations that previously would not have been solved, or
would have required extensive resources to pursue.
The LInX Program allowed each participating agency's law
enforcement personnel to search and retrieve law enforcement records of
other jurisdictions within the State of Washington. In addition, the
Department of Justice joined the LInX Program in Washington, by
developing a linkage to the DOJ Regional Data Exchange (R-DEX) program,
which is an effort to share information between FBI, DEA, AFT, USMS and
BOP. For the first time in the profession of law enforcement,
detectives from Seattle to Spokane were able to share criminal files
with each other, and they were able to query the DOJ criminal
investigative components, and determine if any of those agencies had a
file of interest to the local agencies.
Unique to the LInX system is the ability to conduct a comprehensive
search of law enforcement records, retrieve both structure data and
full text investigative narratives, to literally connect the dots to a
crime. Most important to me from a strategic standpoint, was the
ability of LInX to offer insight into crime committed at the local
level, which could be a precursor to a future terrorist attack, or a
terrorist support network. These are the dots that could not be
connected prior to 9/11. We have developed a system, and a regional
organizational structure of law enforcement leaders, which, if
implemented on a national scale, could likely prevent the next
terrorist attack on our country. Law enforcement information sharing
should have the following characteristics:
The system should include all the legally shareable
data maintained in the record systems of each participating
agency. Access controls must be included to protect sensitive
information from widespread or premature dissemination.
The system must permit partners full access to the
relevant documents.
The system must provide a technical analytical
capability to ``connect the dots'', by linking all variables
associated with a subject and instantly providing a composite
picture for the investigator.
The system must meet the security standards of the
federal law enforcement agencies.
I am convinced that the elements of the LInX program, and all of
the standards that it embodies should be developed by the federal
government on a national scale, building on the experience here and in
the other NICIS funded pilots.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England proposed to Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty and Deputy Secretary of DHS Michael
Jackson, that we develop an inter-departmental effort between DoD, DOJ
and DHS to implement a LInX effort on a national scale. Secretary
England believed that it was more appropriate for either DOJ or DHS to
lead such an effort, but certainly offered the full support of his
Department, and of his law enforcement component in NCIS. As then
Chairman of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Information
Sharing, I respectfully urged the Deputy Attorney General in a letter,
co-signed by eighteen of my U.S. Attorney colleagues, to further expand
LInX throughout the United States, under the auspices of each of the
U.S. Attorneys who signed this letter. While the DOJ supported the
efforts of the U.S. Attorney led LInX programs, it declined to take a
leadership role in the further development of this vital capability.
Instead the Justice Department has taken three distinct positions
that seriously compromise law enforcement information sharing in the
United States. First, DOJ has retreated from its earlier standard that
all legally sharable data be included in LInX or similar programs, and
has substituted a far lesser standard that gives great discretion to
agencies in what will be shared. Second, DOJ has refused to mandate
technical and security approaches for information sharing--leaving that
to local discretion and thus ensuring that only non-sensitive data will
be shared with local law enforcement. And third, DOJ has chosen not to
assume responsibility for leading, directing, supporting, or funding
any regional information sharing system, preferring to let local
interests and the market place determine the ultimate configuration of
a national system. In a December, 2006 Memorandum by Deputy Attorney
General McNulty, the Department of Justice withdrew from the LInX
pilots and halted meaningful record sharing with state and local law
enforcement. This is a tragic and harmful step backwards in local,
state and federal law enforcement and cooperative counter terrorism
efforts and puts our country at greater risk of terrorism attacks.
In spite of the failure of leadership at the senior level of DOJ,
efforts have been made by DoD and NCIS to transition the LInX Program,
which has been funded by DoD through FY'11, to the Department of
Homeland Security. Former U.S. Attorney Debra Wong Yang of Los Angeles,
working with Chief Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department, Sheriff
Baca, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, and Sheriff Carona, Orange
County Sheriff's Department, is attempting to implement a LInX project
in the Central District of California. USA Yang submitted a formal
proposal for the development of this program to DOJ, and requested DOJ
invest funding, and partner with DoD/NCIS to develop LInX, however, her
request was denied by the DAG. The leadership of the Los Angeles law
enforcement agencies subsequently petitioned DHS for funding.
I am convinced that the standards of senior executive law
enforcement leadership, a cost efficient technology, and a fervent
commitment to share all legally shareable law enforcement records is
the recipe for successful information sharing among our 18,000 law
enforcement agencies in our country. This is an effort which must be
led from the most senior ranks of government, and one which must meet
the operational needs of our sworn law enforcement officers and
analysts who are on the front line every day attempting to find the
proverbial needle in the haystack that might lead them to a terrorist
support network, or to quickly capture a serial pedophile, random
rapist or violent criminal. Neither crime, criminals nor terrorists
know any borders. In fact, they now know how to exploit our
geographical borders and bureaucratic jurisdictions to their own
advantage. We need a new weapon in our fight to preserve our freedoms,
and I believe we may have found such a weapon in the deployment of the
LInX program.
Thank you for this opportunity to address you and this important
subcommittee. I look forward to answering any questions you may have
for me.
Ms. Harman. Chief Batiste.
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BATISTE, CHIEF, WASHINGTON STATE PATROL
Chief Batiste. Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of
this distinguished committee.
Thank you for allowing me to be here to have this
opportunity to showcase the Washington Joint Analytical Center.
In 2002 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
in Washington joined together to develop a new system of
intelligence sharing.
The key components of this system are the WAJAC, a
centralized fusion center serving as a single point of
intelligence collection, and the regional intelligence groups
located throughout the state providing a link to a line of
level personnel--to line level personnel and homeland security
partners; the goal, of course, investigating crimes and
preventing acts of terrorism.
The true success of the fusion center can be measured by
the long-term partnership developed since the inception of the
statewide integrated intelligence plan.
Situated in the same--on the same floor and in the same
work area as the FBI's intelligence work group, the WAJAC
employees share information real-time without the hindrance of
communications barriers that have existed for decades and have
only recently been breached.
For this, we can thank the tremendous efforts of the
Seattle field office, the FBI, the United States attorney's
office under the leadership of John McKay, and many other
federal and local law enforcement leaders.
Within our fusion center, the King County sheriff's office,
Bellevue police department, and the Washington state patrol
detectives work hand in hand with numerous federal agencies in
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence
information.
A prime example of the trust developed between our agencies
is demonstrated in the authority established within the WAJAC
by the supervision of WSP sergeant--Washington State Patrol
sergeant who has the ability to assign tasks to the field
intelligence personnel owned by the FBI, and the field
intelligence group supervisor having the same authority to task
members of the WAJAC.
In 2006 the WAJAC reviewed and disseminated over 2,000
intelligence information reports, developed 323 leads to
support criminal or terrorist case investigation and provide
assistance to homeland security partners on 500 separate
occasions.
These numbers alone don't tell the story with regards to
the exceptional work being done in this partnership.
Every day investigators and analysts from many different
jurisdictions throughout this state are communicating with each
other at a frequency never realized before and are sharing
critical information by way of the WAJAC.
One of the primary information collection programs that has
substantially served our intelligence--served our information
sharing efforts is the Navy's law enforcement information
exchange or the Linx system.
The WAJAC and the marine analysts use this tool on a
regular basis to assist them in locating persons of interest,
establishing identities, and connecting the dots on criminal
investigation.
This tool has been invaluable throughout the state and has
been an instrumental tool in solving a number of criminal
cases.
It's imperative with regards to information sharing
environment that support for Linx that we hope will continue
well into the future.
Because Linx contains information only on closed criminal
investigation, there still exists a need for a true
intelligence database.
At present, this state does not have the necessary
resources to store and electronically share critical
intelligence with all agencies.
Many agencies continue to rely on e-mails, fax, and
telephone conversations.
The western state information network or WSIN is one of six
federally funded regional information sharing system centers.
WSIN is a force multiplied as it provides the network
intelligence databases and also safety information services
that law enforcement requires.
WSIN serves the five western states, including the state of
Washington. I, in fact, sit on the policy board.
At our state's request, WSIN expanded its mission several
years ago to include gangs and more recently all crimes
including terrorism.
Washington has taken the lead in providing access to major
crime units, such as homicides, burglary, and intelligence
units and police agencies, but more needs to be done.
This is a proven concept and it should be fully funded
rather than using federal dollars to develop additional similar
intelligence systems.
Even though we've had great successes in establishing
partnerships and sharing information, Madam Chair and members
of this committee, we still face significant hurdles.
We need the ability to sustain these valuable programs.
Dedicated and adequate funding for WAJAC, RIGs, and WSIN is
the greatest of concerns to myself and our stakeholders.
The three local law enforcement agencies and the National
Guard who have assigned investigators to the WAJAC have done so
on their own operational--by using their budget resources.
Additionally, all 19 contracted analysts both in the WAJAC
and the RIGs are funded through the law enforcement terrorism
prevention program.
In conclusion, we simply need your help.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief. We are all here to help.
[The statement of Chief Batiste follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief John R. Basiste
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to showcase the
Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) and our state's efforts in
sharing critical criminal intelligence information.
In 2002, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in
Washington joined together to develop a new system of intelligence
sharing. The key components of this system are the WAJAC, a centralized
fusion center serving as a single point of intelligence collection, and
regional intelligence groups located throughout the state providing a
link to line level personnel and homeland security partners. The goal:
investigating crime to prevent acts of terrorism.
The true success of the fusion center can be measured by the long-
term partnerships developed since the inception of the Statewide
Integrated Intelligence Plan. Situated on the same floor and in the
same work area as the FBI's Field Intelligence Group, WAJAC employees
share information real-time without the hindrance of communications
barriers that have existed for decades and have only recently been
breached. For this, we can thank the tremendous efforts of the Seattle
Field Office of the FBI, the United States Attorney's Office and many
other federal and local law enforcement leaders. Within our fusion
center, King County Sheriff, Bellevue Police and WSP detectives work
hand-in-hand with numerous federal agencies in the collection, analysis
and dissemination of intelligence information
A prime example of the trust developed between our agencies is
demonstrated by the authority of the WAJAC supervisor (a WSP Sergeant)
to assign tasks to any of the FIG personnel and the FIG supervisor
having the same tasking authority over WAJAC.
In 2006, WAJAC reviewed and disseminated over 2,000 Intelligence
Information Reports, developed 323 leads to support criminal or
terrorism case investigations and provided assistance to homeland
security partners on 500 separate occasions. These numbers alone don't
tell the story of the exceptional work being done through this
partnership. Every day investigators and analysts from many different
jurisdictions throughout the state are communicating with each other at
a frequency never realized before and are sharing critical intelligence
information with the WAJAC.
One of the primary information collection programs that has
substantially served our intelligence sharing efforts is the Navy's Law
Enforcement Information Exchange or LINX system. WAJAC and RIG analysts
use this tool on a regular basis to assist them in locating persons of
interest, in establishing identities and connecting the dots on
criminal investigations. This tool has been invaluable throughout the
state and has been instrumental in solving a number of criminal cases.
It is imperative to our information sharing environment that support
for LINX continues well into the future.
Because LINX contains information only on closed criminal
investigations, there still exists a need for a true intelligence
database. At present, this state does not have a method to store and
electronically share critical intelligence with multiple agencies. We
continue to relay on e-mails, fax and telephone conversations.
Currently, WAJAC and other stakeholders are evaluating a statewide
intelligence database to supplement our current programs. In the near
future, we will be requesting Department of Homeland Security grant
funding to purchase and maintain a viable database for information
sharing purposes.
Even though we have had great successes in establishing
partnerships and sharing information, we still face a significant
hurdle in our ability to sustain this program. Dedicate funding for
WAJAC and the RIGs is of the greatest concern to all stakeholders. The
three local law enforcement agencies and National Guard who have
assigned investigators to the WAJAC have done so out of their own
operational budgets and have received no monetary compensation to
backfill these talented specialists. Additionally, all nineteen
contracted analysts both in the WAJAC and in the RIGs are funded
through the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program Grant; funding
we expect to diminish over time. Over the last three years, a
significant portion of LETPP money granted to Washington State has been
dedicated to funding the work completed by these contractors.
Successful programs designed to counter criminal activity and
terrorism require a human element. Software programs, databases and
computers alone do not fight terrorism, people do, and without the
talented investigators and analysts of the WAJAC, it would be near
impossible to prevent or disrupt any act of terrorism. We must have an
established funding source to sustain the WAJAC into the future.
Another significant challenge we must overcome is our difficulty in
staffing regional intelligence groups in all nine emergency management
regions of the state. Within the rural areas of Washington, many law
enforcement agencies do not have the resources available to provide
full-time or in many cases even part-time investigative support for the
intelligence process. Even though we have assigned grant-funded
analysts to each region, without investigative support we are only
meeting half of our commitment to this program. The solution to the
problem may not be a simple one and with hope we will be able to
further develop our RIGs to a point where they have the ability to
deliver a viable service their region and the state.
When the WASPC Intelligence Subcommittee began laying the
foundation for WAJAC and the Statewide Integrated Intelligence Plan
they came to the same realization that no one of is as strong as all of
us and no single entity can make this program work alone. We have
combined our limited resources, worked collaboratively and have made a
strong partnership against the terror groups who threaten the citizens
of this state.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. I would just--let me advise our members that
each of you will have five minutes for questions, and I'll
recognize myself first for five minute.
In my five minutes, let me observe that if Charlie Allen,
the head of the intelligence division of the Homeland Security
Department, or Michael Allen the deputy director--or Michael
Chertoff, the director of the Homeland Security Department were
here, I think they would have the same reaction I have, which
is this is exactly how a region, a local--a state and a region
should organize itself.
You have the right ideas for how the work should get done.
The problems you're having are with federal funding and
connection between the federal government and you, and those
are things that we need to fix, and I certainly intend to talk
further to Charlie Allen and to Michael Jackson and to Michael
Chertoff about this.
These are things that must be fixed, and if they won't be
fixed voluntarily, they have to be fixed with legislation, as
in the case of participation in the NCTC.
Let me just ask a few questions, and if you could keep your
answers brief, we can ask more questions.
General Lowenberg, you mentioned the problem with prison
radicalization. That is not the direct subject of this hearing,
but it is directly relevant to terrorist activity.
This committee held a field hearing in Torrance, California
in my district where a prison radicalized cell has been
arrested and is awaiting trial.
What are the problems here and, briefly, what are you doing
to make sure that you are aware of them and can prevent and
disrupt them from becoming life--
General Lowenberg. Madam Chair, I am well aware from having
worked with the intelligence director from the California state
prison system three weeks ago in Monterey, California, that
California probably has the best assessment of the prison
radicalization threat.
We have brought our state Department of Corrections into
the WAJAC. Our secretary of corrections, Harold Clark, is part
of the evidence group that met this last week, and so we're
doing everything we can, quite frankly, to catch up with
California and New York state who are frankly on the leading
edge nationally in dealing with this very disturbing
phenomenon.
Ms. Harman. Of course I don't mind that comment ``catching
up with California.'' That's good.
Chief Kerlikowske, you gave me an insight about the fact
that the federal center system of information--intelligence
sharing is based on a Cold War model.
When we did intelligence reform in 2004, a bill I was very
involved with, that was our rant against the organization of
our intelligence community.
You said it was a 1947 business model and no one can
possibly operate in a 1947 business model, so we changed it.
I am very aware that there are problems with clearances at
the local level and that the FBI and DHS clearances are treated
differently.
Could you just give us a short bit of information on the
record about the problem getting security clearances?
Chief Kerlikowske. I think one of the suggestions that was
made by the major city chief's intelligence subcommittee in
Charlotte was to allow, at one level, some of the background
work that is now either done by federal agents or is, in fact,
contracted out to retired federal agents. Why not go ahead and
let some of these large local agencies do some of the basic
background and preliminary work, which is so labor intensive
and so time consuming?
That actually was not particularly well received by DHS.
We think it makes sense because we're trusted with
protecting our communities, and we hire these officers. Why in
heaven's name shouldn't we be trusted to doing the preliminary
background data and information that could be helpful to
getting--to moving that clearance further and faster?
Ms. Harman. Thank you. I think that's an excellent
suggestion.
Finally for Mr. McKay and Chief Batiste. Mr. McKay, thank
you for your courageous comments about the Linx system and its
reception at DOJ.
Surely you know there's a rumor alive in Washington that
your advocacy for that system may have cost you your job, and I
know how well regarded you are. I would just like to say that
if that is true, that is extremely unfortunate.
This subcommittee has looked at systems like HSNet and LEO
and HSIN. I won't go into what they all are because my time is
running out, but I would just like to know from both of you, do
you think that Linx is a better system?
Obviously it matters--it is of critical importance how we
move data and trying to get to some common system.
Do you think that Linx is the best?
Mr. McKay. Well, I do. I think that the elements which I've
set out in my prepared remarks are important.
What's critical, Madam Chair, I think, is this: The federal
government cannot command the transfer of law enforcement
records to it.
I'm not sure, and I would issue a challenge to members of
Congress, it's like telling a judge they can't do something,
but truly trust and cooperation is required because principals
of federalism would say that those 18,000 law enforcement
agencies around the country cannot be ordered to transfer their
records to the federal government.
What has to happen, I think what we've demonstrated in
Linx, is that where we own it together--federal, state, and
local--and are responsible for its administration and its
security and to make sure that it's not misused and people's
rights are protected, that is a cooperative governance
structure that is not offered in any other system, and if
there's one aspect of a system that is critically important, it
is the full text records being shared, in essence, voluntarily
by each participating agency because they know that if they had
access to each other's data, they could make us safer.
That is the difference.
The structures exist in other places, but you will see upon
analysis that they are not sharing all of their records the way
we are here.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time is expired, but I want to
give Chief Batiste the time to answer that question.
Chief Batiste. Madam Chair, I think I can say with
confidence in support of all my colleagues across the state and
region, we truly support what John is remarking with regards to
the Linx system being a system that serves us well.
It does allow for independence with regards to pushing our
information forward, as an agency, for viewing capabilities,
yet I maintain control of that information.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Chief. Thank you all.
I now recognize our ranking member Sheriff Reichert for
five minutes of questions.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You've all mentioned relationships, and that was key when
we started to talk about Linx, and I remember when John showed
up on the scene and gathered everybody together. I think
everybody in this panel would agree that it was a breath of
fresh air, John was, and his energy behind Linx, and the
sharing of information was welcomed.
I think it brought us all together, so first of all, I
would like to say, ``Thank you'' to John and agree with Madam
Chair's comments on your courage that you show, and I
appreciate all the efforts that each and every one of you put
forth to make this community a safer place.
Sometimes I do miss wearing the uniform. I just thought I
would share that with everybody.
Technology is the other thing that we touched on, and the
Chair asked about the Linx and whether or not it's a great
system.
John and I had many conversations about when the sheriff
officers were going to get involved in this project, and we
didn't jump until second year, and that trust had to be there.
The third thing, money.
So we have relationship, technology, money. All of these
things have to come together to build a program, to build a
community, to build this effort around Linx, and so now we've
had the relationships are built, we've had some technology, the
RAIN system here in Seattle, Linx and other systems that have
come together from some of the other agencies, and granted the
money has been lacking, but hopefully we'll be able to work
together on acquiring more funds for this effort.
What is the status of Linx right now here in our region?
Mr. McKay. Linx in this region continues to operate very
robustly. My understanding is that of the 150 of the something
over 200 police agencies--I believe that's about right--about
200 agencies now have signed the agreements.
I believe that about 70 agencies have data flowing, and
that's simply a function of having the funds to move that
forward.
Of those 70, that consists of the largest agencies,
including King County sheriff's office, Seattle police
department, Washington state patrol, and others, so actually,
in terms of data, huge amounts of data are flowing in the Linx
system today.
Nationally, Linx is, I believe, up and running in five
areas with seven on the boards, up to nine to include the
Washington capital region and Los Angeles, and that is
principally--all of that is principally being funded by the
Naval criminal investigative service who should get, in my
mind, a huge amount of credit here.
The technology is simple. It's not the technology.
The money is important, but it's not the money.
What is important is the agreement by agencies to actually
put their data out there and share it with each other.
Frankly, it's the federal government--it's the law
enforcement agencies and the federal government that need a
good stick taken to them to get that done, not a carrot, a
stick, and they need to put their data in there and share it,
just as the Washington state patrol, the King County sheriff's
office, Seattle police department are sharing all of their
investigative records with the FBI and other federal agencies.
Mr. Reichert. Another question for you, John. In this
reluctance to share information, you say overclassification
plays a part in that.
Is there a role that that plays?
Mr. McKay. I think not so much overclassification. For one
thing, the Linx system is not--it's certified to the secret
level, but classified data does not reside there, and mostly
that would be contributed by the FBI, but, quite understood,
classified data.
I think the question is whether sensitive--what agencies
deem to be sensitive information is being screened out mostly
by federal partners not the state and local agencies.
Chief, among these, being DEA, and, frankly, the security
system that we built into Linx could take care of all of that,
and I think it's a question of individual agencies relying on
old days of silos and turf and saying, ``Our stuff is too
important to share with local police officers.''
That is the wrong--that's the pre-9/11 attitude, and I
can't believe that we allow it to continue to exist, and
unfortunately the deputy attorney general of the United States
issued a memorandum in December of 2006 going right back to
that standard and letting federal agencies screen their data
out of the Linx systems.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
One quick question, Chief Kerlikowske. You mentioned being
focused on the community, private sector.
Have you seen a difficulty reaching out to the private
sector, including them in this--reluctance on their part to
become involved?
Chief Kerlikowske. You know, I haven't seen any reluctance
on their part because I think, as you did in King County, you
have relationships established with the private sector,
particularly those that contain the key infrastructure that we
all know that if something happens, things are not going to
work well, commerce and banking and on and on, and that's based
upon the trust, but we also, of course, follow the Los Angeles
art angel model and the A-cam model of looking at these
infrastructures and working with them, but they have to be
assured that liability, and you had mentioned that earlier, is
not going to attach, and they have to be assured that we are
going to be as protective of that critical information on how
that facility can be better protected to make sure that it is,
in a proprietary way, not released.
Ms. Harman. The Chair now recognizes the cardinal from
Washington, Mr. Dicks, for five minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you Jane for bringing the hearing here.
Our same group went down to Los Angeles and saw a fusion
center down there, so we're trying to get a picture of what's
going on around the country, and I want to commend all of you
in working together as effectively as you do in trying to
overcome some of the impediments from the federal side.
Now, on this question--I think we could change this two-
year limit. I mean, that's a policy matter on these analysts--
funding the analysts.
I mean, if Congress stepped in and legislated and said,
``The funding that we provide is available for analysts for
fusion centers beyond two years,'' I mean, I don't see any
problem doing that, and that's what you would like us to do.
Is that not right?
General Lowenberg. The key, Congressman Dicks, is whether
the grant money can be used to fund a state FTE as opposed to a
contractor.
We recognize that Congress authorizes and appropriates for
grant program cycles for two or three years, with each fiscal
year appropriation cycle, but being told what we can expend the
money for is a limitation.
As we dealt with Secretary Ridge and now Secretary
Chertoff, the mantra has always been, ``We would if we could,
but we can't,'' and our question has been, ``Why can't you,''
and it's always been, ``Because OMB and the White House will
not allow us to expend the money, as a matter of policy, for
anything other than contract analysts or contact planners,''
and so we're left with these temporary hires, and frankly these
information sharing centers and fusion centers then end up
being a training ground, if you will, for analysts who just
leave at the first opportunity to work for a federal agency
where there's some relative job security, sense of stability
and future employment.
Mr. Dicks. John, I want to commend you on this Linx system.
I remember we talked about this when we were having a
little difficulty early on, and I think--how did the Navy wind
up--the Naval criminal investigative--how did they wind up
being kind of the lead on this?
Mr. McKay. That's a good question. It was envisioned by the
FBI, and I was asked by Dale Watson, who then was the executive
assistant director of the FBI, to lead the effort regionally
among Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and then the FBI
disappeared after their project gateway in St. Louis crashed
for different reasons, which we avoided out here in Washington
state.
I went to Dave Brant, who was the NCIS director, and he
agreed to run it as a pilot project in Puget Sound mainly
because of the naval bases in our district, so that's how it
came to be NCIS, but we felt all along that it should move away
from the Department of Defense and be taken over by Homeland
Security and Justice.
Mr. Dicks. I was impressed to see that Gordon England, who
is a very outstanding--and who was the deputy at Homeland
Security was all for this and was urging the Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security to go forward
on this, and yet we've had all this resistance from the
Department of Justice.
I just want to commend you for what you did here, and I'm
glad that Linx is still operational here in the state of
Washington and that you all are working together on this.
I think that's outstanding.
I think our committee ought to try to work on this to try
to convince--at least maybe we can go through Homeland
Security, that this ought to be a national model, which it was
on the road to being until McNolty (phonetic) said, ``We can't
go any further'' in December; is that right?
Mr. McKay. That's correct, and there was an important
meeting between Michael Jackson, Gordon England, and Paul
McNolty in which the outlines of an interdepartmental
partnership, which is, I think, how this should be run, and
again, as I said in my opening remarks here, you cannot find
any organization in the government responsible for building the
trust systems that we have here, and so if I'm sitting in your
chair, I'm thinking, ``Well, how is it done?''
I don't think it can be assigned alone to Homeland Security
because the justice agencies have most of the federal law
enforcement data through the FBI and its five agencies.
I don't think the Department of Defense should own this
system for reasons that deal with civil liberties and the trust
of the American people, not that we don't trust DOD, it's just
that the data there is being kept on American citizens and
should be overseen by civilians in the course, and I think all
of us understood that when we built the system here, so the
pathway to an interdepartmental partnership was there. It has
not gone forward, and that's above my pay grade as to why
that's happened.
Mr. Dicks. Now, I want to make sure I understand this.
Are we getting the information on people who have been
convicted of federal crimes in our area?
Mr. McKay. Some.
Mr. Dicks. In this system.
Mr. McKay. Some but not all.
Mr. Dicks. They screen out some of these--you have all the
local records, right.
Mr. McKay. You bet, Congressman Dicks.
What's happened is the local agencies are contributing all
of their data into Linx essentially, not internal matters but--
administrative matters, but they're investigative records, and
the partnership deal that the federal government offered, and I
know because I was offering it, was, and we will give you the
FBI's 302s, investigative records, the DEA 6s and the federal
records, which will help you solve crime in your regions and
all of us to attack potential terrorism, and that promise has
now been stopped by the federal government, and it is
unfathomable to me why that has occurred, other than that no
one is in charge.
Mr. Dicks. All right. Well, we'll go to work on it. Thank
you very much. I appreciate all of your testimony.
Mr. Reichert. Chair, allow me just one comment.
I just wanted to note that last Congress we presented a
bill that--the language allowed for the full payment of
analysts, and that bill is still in the hopper, so it's not a
new problem, but we've also--I want to acknowledge your
observation that as we've talked with members of Homeland
Security and the secretary himself, there's been a huge
reluctance, as you all know, in financing local FTEs.
I think that's solely being overcome. There's a lot of work
yet to do on that, and I think if we can go to rule change--
some sort of a policy change route, as the General has
suggested, and Norm, that would be the route to go, but we
still have legislation out there too that would push--
General Lowenberg. Congressman Reichert, if I could just
respond, we very much appreciate the leadership shown in the
109th Congress, but the state's homeland security advisor has
presented this issue and others to Secretary Chertoff,
Secretary Jackson, and we have talked to Charlie Allen. All of
that took place on April 17th in Washington DC. We still have
not seen any policy shift from the agency.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. This was an excellent panel, and
this subcommittee will follow up. These are live issues.
They are very troubling.
Our perspective, as I said in my opening remarks, is to
start at the local level, find out what you need and what
participation would be useful, and then view the federal
government as your customer, not the other way around.
Future terrorist acts in America will, to some extent
anyway, happen in our neighborhoods, and you're the folks who
understand those neighborhoods, so I want to thank you for four
pieces of excellent testimony.
This was a superb panel. We all learned a lot. You're
excused.
Ms. Harman. Welcome to all of you. I will introduce you all
at once, and we will start our testimony, our five-minute
summaries, with Mr. Hovel, and all of you will turn the little
clock around so that everybody observes the time limits.
Our first witness, Richard Hovel, is the senior aviation
and homeland security advisor to the Boeing Company, a small
concern that I'm also very familiar with. You have large
facilities in my district in Los Angeles. Thank you for what
you do.
Prior to his tenure with Boeing, Mr. Hovel served as the
federal security manager for the FAA, aviation security
operations division at Seatac.
Mr. Hovel began his law enforcement career with the
Albuquerque police department, after which he worked for the
Idaho state police as a state trooper and supervisor and
criminal investigator.
Our second witness, Matt Morrison, is the executive
director of the Pacific northwest economic region, PNWER, a
public private partnership established in 1991 by statute in
the states of Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon,
and the western Canadian provinces of British Columbia,
Alberta, and the Yukon territory.
For those who don't live here, this is an extremely
impressive idea.
As the director of PNWER, he communicates with the state
and provincial legislatures and coordinates with the working
groups of PNWER in the area of homeland security.
Our third witness, Steve Stein is the northwest regional
coordinator for the homeland security market sector for the
Pacific Northwest national laboratory.
Mr. Stein recently completed a large project supporting the
Department of Homeland Security that was focused on the
assessment of the Seattle urban area's preparedness to prevent
and respond to major disasters and the insertion of new
technologies that would improve the region's level of
preparedness.
Finally, our fourth witness, Richard Stevenson, is the
president and chief operating officer for Clise Properties.
Your firm was mentioned in earlier testimony, as you know.
Mr. Stevenson has worked in the real estate and property
management field for 20 years. He currently serves on the board
of directors for the downtown emergency services center and the
Seattle association.
Without objection, your full statements will be inserted in
the record.
I now ask each of you, starting with Mr. Hovel, to
summarize for five minutes, and the timer will be turned on,
and it it's right next to Mr. Stein.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. HOVEL, AVIATION SECURITY ADVISOR, THE
BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Hovel. Madam Chair, honorable members of Congress, it's
very much appreciated allowing this opportunity to talk with
you about this vital matter.
Since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, and
consistent with HSPD 5, the national response plan, the
national infrastructure and protection plan, and the national
intelligence strategy, there have been increasing strides made
to integrate the private sector within the public sector
information sharing framework throughout all levels of
government.
As has been mentioned, in excess of 85 percent of this
nation's critical infrastructure residing within the private
sector, one can hardly expect the public sector law enforcement
and intelligence entities to sufficiently insulate industry
from risks associated with what once was primarily a criminal
enterprise.
Understanding and responding to the many interdependencies
between the various elements of the critical infrastructure may
be more appropriately and effectively addressed by private
sector ownership but with support from public sector agencies.
This is based upon a sound proactive understanding of the
far reaching damage that a successful attack on critical
infrastructure could have, and is somewhat contrary to the
largely reactive nature of traditional law enforcement.
Because of this, information that has developed regionally
may have significant impact nationally.
This was evidenced very recently by the thwarted terror
plot at Fort Dix New Jersey.
To be effective in this arena, industry must have real-time
access to information through fusion center capabilities in
order to analyze that which may have a local or broader impact.
Conversely, federal, state, local law enforcement and
intelligence entities must have access to very mature
intelligence capabilities in the private sector.
The private sector has the ability to effectively acquire,
interpret, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information
which may originate from private sector sources.
Indeed, many companies are authorized to receive, store,
and communicate classified information by employees already
holding clearances.
Public/private sharing of intelligence information, as
we've all said, is a function of trust, and as we well know,
all trust is local, which provides the very foundation of the
fusion center concept.
Capitalizing on the already significant relationships that
exist between the public and private sectors here in the
northwest and to mitigate the ever-changing risk, Boeing is in
the process of assigning an analyst to the Seattle FBI fusion
center.
Fortunately the government has put in place a mechanism
which enables private industry to enter into such
collaboration, namely the Federal Safety Act.
Boeing is currently working with the Department of Homeland
Security in an effort to submit an application for protection
under that act.
Hopefully this will be the first of many, many similar
efforts across the nation that will establish a collaborative
partnership between public sector and industry and protect our
critical infrastructure more effectively and expeditiously.
A communication hub, around which the fusion concept could
be built would use the collaborative efforts of both the
private and public sectors, working in conjunction with the
Pacific Northwest economic region center for regional disaster
resilience have formed the community-focused northwest warning
and response network, otherwise known as NWWARN.
While the genesis of this was based upon the emergency
response network model implemented in the southwest, NWWARN is
a much more robust, all hazards, all threats communication
tool.
This network provides multidirectional communications
between the FBI and both public and private interests across
the five northwestern-most states of Alaska, Montana, Idaho,
Washington, and Oregon.
Additionally, we are in formative stages of establishing a
virtual regional information fusion center pilot project.
It would provide two-way information sharing on a
multilayered, secure, and very resilient system with analysis
produced by a team of core resident, local, and state experts
with virtual analysts from different sectors and disciplines.
It would be using a largely virtual database to enable
integration, assessment, and secure tailored dissemination of
information provided to key stakeholders.
The analysis would be used for organizational and
collective decision making in crafting public information.
The virtual capability will interconnect state, local,
private sector, now defense, and other stakeholder capabilities
while avoiding duplication of effort, proliferation of
analytical products, and competition for hard-to-find
analytical staff resources.
It will be--it will enable federal authorities to have a
single focal point to efficiently and securely provide
intelligence and other sensitive information to a wide range of
customers.
This pilot would provide a model which could be customized
by states and localities across the nation.
The overarching purpose of these collective efforts is to
better identify infrastructure interdependencies and
preparedness gaps.
They focus emphasis on identifying asset criticality,
managing disasters, and furthering the trust factor between key
stakeholders while moving law enforcement and intelligence
communities beyond the ``need to share'' philosophy toward a
``responsibility to provide'' model.
I thank you very much for the opportunity again, for the
time and effort and the support you all are providing in this
hearing.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Hovel.
[The statement of Mr. Hovel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard E. Hovel
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and consistent with
HSPD-5, the National Response Plan, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan and the National Intelligence Strategy, there have been increasing
strides made to integrate the private sector within the public sector
information sharing framework throughout all levels of government.
With approximately 87 percent of this nation's critical
infrastructure residing within the private sector, one can hardly
expect public sector law enforcement and intelligence entities to
sufficiently insulate industry from risk associated with what was once
[primarily] ``criminal enterprise''. Understanding and responding to
the many inter-dependencies between the various elements of the
critical infrastructure may be more appropriately and effectively
addressed by private sector ownership, with support from public sector
agencies. This is based upon a sound pro-active understanding of the
far-reaching damage that a successful attack on critical infrastructure
could have--and is somewhat contrary to the largely reactive nature of
traditional law enforcement.
Because of this, information that is developed regionally may have
significant impact nationally. This was evidenced by the recently
thwarted terror plot at Fort Dix. To be effective in this arena,
industry must have real-time access to information through Fusion
Center capabilities, in order to analyze that which may have a local or
broader impact. Conversely, federal, state and local government, law
enforcement and intelligence entities must have access to mature
intelligence capabilities in the private sector.
The private sector has the ability to effectively acquire,
interpret, analyze and disseminate intelligence information--which may
originate from private sector sources. In deed, many companies are
authorized to receive, store and communicate classified information by
employees already holding clearances. Public/private sharing of
intelligence information is a function of ``trust'' and as we well
know, ``all trust is local'' which provides the very foundation for the
Fusion Center concept.
Capitalizing on the already significant relationships that exist
between the public and private sectors in the Northwest and to mitigate
ever-changing risk, Boeing is in the process of assigning an analyst to
the Seattle FBI Fusion Center. Fortunately, the federal government has
put in place a mechanism which enables private industry to enter into
such collaboration, namely, the federal SAFETY Act (``Support Anti-
terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.'') Boeing is
currently working with the Department of Homeland Security in an effort
to submit an application for protection under the SAFETY Act.
Hopefully, this will be the first of many similar efforts across the
nation that will establish a collaborative partnership between the
public sector and industry, and protect our critical infrastructure
more effectively and expeditiously.
A communication hub, around which the fusion concept could be built
would use the collaborative efforts of both the private and public
sectors, working in conjunction with the Pacific NW Economic Region
(PNWER) Center for Regional Disaster Resilience have formed the
community-focused Northwest Warning and Response Network (NW WARN).
While the genesis of this was based upon the Emergency Response Network
(ERN) model implemented in the Southwest, NW WARN is a much more robust
``all hazards--all threats'' communication tool. This network provides
multi-directional communications between the FBI and both public and
private interests across the five Northwestern-most States of Alaska,
Montana, Idaho, Washington and Oregon.
Additionally, we are in the formative stages of establishing a
virtual Regional Information Fusion Center Pilot Project (RIFCPP) that
would provide two-way information sharing based on a multi-layered
secure and resilient system with analysis produced by a team of core
resident local and state experts with virtual analysts from different
sectors and disciplines. They would be using a largely virtual database
to enable integration, assessment, and secure, tailored dissemination
of information provided to key stakeholders.
This analysis would be used for organizational and collective
decision-making and crafting public information. This virtual
capability will interconnect state, local, private sector, defense and
other stakeholder capabilities while avoiding duplication of effort,
proliferation of analytical products, and competition for hard-to-find
analytical staff resources. It will also enable federal authorities to
have a single focal point to efficiently and securely provide
intelligence and other sensitive information to a wide range of
customers. This pilot would provide a model which could be customized
by states and localities across the nation.
The overarching purpose of these collective efforts is to better
identify infrastructure interdependencies and preparedness gaps. They
focus emphasis on identifying asset criticality, managing disasters and
furthering the ``trust-factor'' between key stakeholders while moving
the law enforcement and intelligence communities beyond the ``need to
share'' philosophy toward a ``responsibility to provide'' model.
Thank you for your time and support in finding solutions to take
advantage of both public and private sector capabilities.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Morrison.
STATEMENT OF MATT MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PACIFIC
NORTHWEST ECONOMIC REGION
Mr. Morrison. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm very happy to be here.
I think the title of this hearing is--exactly cuts to the
centerpiece of what we need in this country in order to be
better prepared for both manmade and natural hazards.
I would say that our work has been largely with the
critical infrastructures and trying to understand regional
disaster resilience, and the information sharing piece is a
vital cornerstone of regional resilience.
As yet, my experience at DHS has not focused in any
meaningful way on cross sector challenges to the all-important
task of building regional resilience.
We have sector stove-pipes in all of our information
sharing.
What I call the resilience tautology is: Resilient assets
and infrastructures require resilient regions; resiliency
requires understanding which assets are critical in any
specific scenario; understanding criticality depends upon
understanding the interdependencies between and among our
critical infrastructures; interdependencies remain undiscovered
in stove-piped sector specific planning; and understanding
interdependencies require cross sector information sharing; and
cross sector and public/private information sharing requires
creation of an environment of trust where stakeholders feel
safe to share their vulnerabilities with each and other and
with first responders and government.
Comprehensive planning for resiliency cannot be done
without having all the key stakeholders together sharing in a
trusted environment.
That's what we're missing.
This process cannot be done by government or the private
sector alone but only in a trusted partnership.
So our work--I mean, it's been amazing.
The HSIN you mentioned. You know, we--before there was a
Homeland Security Department we met with the office--the White
House Office of Homeland Security.
They came out and endorsed that we could be a pilot at HSIN
CI, it was called.
We built 200 vetted professionals throughout the private
sector, throughout the region. They promised us many times that
Canada could be a part of it, but that never happened, but last
month they just wrote a letter to everyone and said, ``Sorry.
We're closing it down.''
This was shocking to me.
I mean, when really it's--the real asset here is trust, and
you build that with stakeholders, key stakeholders, so it's
been an unbelievable experience in trying to just develop an
opportunity for us to share critical information between the
silos, and here we have a real great test bed.
I mean, the--we get it out here. We've really done the
work. We've had all these exercises. We've looked at
earthquakes to cyber terrorism to pandemic flu and had all 17
infrastructure sectors from the whole region working together.
It's wonderful, and what we lack is this--there's such a
control--DHS just wants to control everything, and they
wouldn't let us share with each other, which is really the
ultimate goal of having resilience, and it's not a technology
issue.
I think it was mentioned very nicely on the first panel
that we can do this if we'll just be allowed to do it, and so
of course since they shut down what we were working on with
NWWARN, we still have the board and all the people, and we're
building a local model, but it would behoove the government to
be listening to the traffic between the utilities and the water
systems and law enforcement because we all need to know this
information, so we set up a thing with gatekeepers and--you
know, we've worked out the requirements for the last four
years.
I guess I want to say that I do think it is the
responsibility of the federal government to find a way to
incentivise and fund and to--the startup and technical support
to develop regional public/private partnerships in communities
and states addressing regional resiliency, public/private
information sharing, and critical infrastructure security.
I think this could be done by a competitive programming
providing even as little as $250,000 seed money for interested
states and regions to develop something like what we've done
here, which is so doable.
I would like to suggest that you use this region as a test
bed to work with regional stakeholders to develop solutions for
critical challenges that we all face.
I'm happy to say that with the support of the committee,
there has been support from the department of the Navy, from
DTRA, the defense threat reduction agency--is working on a
project here because of the stakeholder collaboration, and I
think that there's great opportunities.
I would say that federal support for technical assistance
and encouragement is essential to spearhead, develop, and
initially sustain cross sector collaboration to identify needs
and cost effective solutions, activities and pilot projects to
meet homeland security and disaster resilience challenge.
The area of information sharing is absolutely vital to move
forward with the support for developing a regional information
fusion center that incorporates these critical infrastructure
private sector opportunities, both analytical capabilities,
that we see it as a virtual center that would allow this kind
of communication.
In my formal remarks there is a more detailed explanation
of a pilot that we feel could be a great model for the nation.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Mr. Morrison.
[The statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matt Morrison
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
I commend you for the title of today's Seattle Field Hearing:
``Building a Partnership Strategy: Improving Information Sharing with
State & Local Law Enforcement and the Private Sector''.
This is exactly the right topic to be addressing as it cuts to the
centerpiece of how this nation needs to be and can be better prepared
to face the wide range of natural and man-made hazards with a
comprehensive system of systems approach to preparedness and the
mitigation of vulnerabilities in our communities.
Since 9-11 there has been a great deal of focus on physical
protection, and infrastructure sector specific plans. As we all saw
this week, Secretary Chertoff announced the Sector Reports under the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan have finally been released.
While it has been a positive step to increase the security of our
infrastructures to terrorist attacks, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina,
there is a pressing need to focus on cross-sector cooperation,
coordination and information sharing to achieve regional disaster
resilience. As yet, DHS has not focused in any meaningful way on cross-
sector challenges to the all- important task of building regional
resilience. Infrastructures and essential service providers in a region
are tightly interdependent and subject to cascading failures that can
incapacitate entire communities. What this means is that a utility or
other service provider may have the best security possible and still
have its operations or business practices damaged or disrupted.
Resilient regions are able to bounce back from any kind of disaster
with limited impacts on public health and safety, the economy, and
national security. If we want to have `Resilience' from either a
natural hazards or a terrorist attack we must be able to understand the
vulnerabilities caused by regional interdependencies, what assets and
facilities are truly critical, and determine cost-effective ways based
on risk to prevent or mitigate these vulnerabilities. The only way to
gain this understanding is through cross-sector partnerships that
foster local trust among all the key stakeholders that have roles or
vested interests in providing critical products and services or which
have emergency preparedness and management responsibilities. This is a
large number of organizations--all levels of government, private
sector, non-profits, academic and research organizations and community
institutions.
What I have just described is what we call the `Resilience
Tautology'. To state it simply,
Resilient assets and infrastructures require resilient
regions
Resiliency requires understanding which assets are
critical in any specific scenario
Understanding criticality depends upon understanding
the interdependencies between and among critical
infrastructures (85% of which are privately owned). Criticality
is dynamic and changes during an incident, often in
unanticipated ways
Interdependencies remain undiscovered in stove-piped
sector specific planning
Understanding interdependencies require cross sector
information sharing
Cross sector and public/private information sharing
requires the creation of an environment of trust where
stakeholders feel `safe' to share their vulnerabilities with
each other and with first responders and government
To emphasize, comprehensive planning for resiliency cannot be done
without having all the key stakeholders together--sharing in a trusted
environment--which provides a value added resource to each and all of
them. Regional Resilience requires that procedures and protocols for
information sharing be worked out in advance of any incident, and that
stakeholders work together to mitigate vulnerabilities and address
shortfalls in a consistent framework within a public private
partnership. This process cannot be done by the government or the
private sector alone, but only in a trusted partnership with all key
stakeholders in a community.
PNWER's Long Role in Fostering Regional Infrastructure Security and
Disaster Resilience
PNWER has been working since the September 1, 2001 attacks to
develop ways and avenues for information sharing among the public and
private sectors and other stakeholders through outreach, developing and
conducting workshops, exercises, interdependency forums, pilot projects
and leading/facilitating Partnership activities, including regular
meetings.
PNWER is unique in that it has a statutory mandate from five
states: Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana, as well as the
western Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and the Yukon.
PNWER's board is made up of elected state and provincial legislators,
the Governors and Premiers of all jurisdictions, and Industry leaders
in the major industries in the bi-national region. Our focus is the
economy of the region, and the safety and quality of life for all
citizens. After September 11, our governing board was very concerned
about the safety of our communities, as well as safeguarding against
the potential threats to our economy. In consultation with all
Governors and Premiers, it was agreed that the one area that was not
being fully addressed was the interface between private infrastructures
and government. It was this gap that PNWER's Center for Disaster
Resilience was launched to address.
Throughout the winter of 2002, the Pacific Northwest Partnership
for Regional Infrastructure Security created by PNWER began preparation
for the first multi-sector, multi-jurisdiction, cross border exercise
focused on critical infrastructure interdependencies called Blue
Cascades. This unprecedented exercise was the first in a series and was
held outside of Portland, OR in June 2002 and was attended by more than
200 representatives from all eight jurisdictions in the PNWER region.
The exercise was based on a terrorist attack on some of the Bonneville
Power Administration's important assets, bringing down much of the
northwest power grid for weeks to months. The exercise focused on
cascading impacts involving all critical infrastructure sectors, as
well as law enforcement. It was eye-opening to all participants
After Blue Cascades I, We continued to have quarterly meetings of
the Partnership, and held an Action Planning meeting to address
shortfalls identified in the exercise. This process led to a regional
Action Plan comprised of a number of recommended initiatives, some of
which have been accomplished and some which are ongoing. The most
notable finding from the exercise was the high priority all
stakeholders placed on the need for a regional information sharing
mechanism for all key stakeholders. We took this identified need to the
then Whitehouse Office of Homeland Security--CIO Steve Cooper, and Col.
Bob Stephan. In the spring of 2003 we hosted a meeting with the Seattle
FBI to establish a pilot for the northwest which became the NorthWest
Warning, Alert, and Response Network (NW WARN.GOV).
NW WARN developed a public--private board of key stakeholders, and
a gatekeeper community of over 100 key leaders in all 17
infrastructures. We petitioned to become a pilot project in a new
program DHS was launching based on the Dallas, TX Emergency Response
Network (ERN), which was a largely law enforcement-focused model out of
the Dallas FBI. After much delay, DHS agreed to let us be part of the
new pilot, which became known as HSIN-Critical Infrastructure or HSIN-
CI.
Over the past four years, we have worked to build the membership of
this information sharing system to over 2,000 vetted key stakeholders
in our region. We developed a handbook, detailed requirements for
information sharing among sectors, but never received the support we
needed from DHS for implementation. Instead, Last month, DHS
discontinued the program and sent a letter to all 2000 professionals to
announce the cancellation. Our NW WARN Board nonetheless has continued
to meet, and we are determined to build the functionality into the
system that we have always wanted to be able to share critical
information among sectors and with law enforcement and emergency
management.
Blue Cascades II_focus on Cyber Systems
Key stakeholders elected to develop a second regional
interdependencies exercise with PNWER's help the following year. Blue
Cascades II was again a grassroots effort to address an issue that the
first exercise had left out--cyber vulnerabilities and the gap between
physical and cyber preparedness. A Scenario Design Team, made up of
over 30 organizations, labored over six months developing the scenario,
which brought out the importance of cyber systems and information
security.
The process of bringing private sector key individuals, who live
and breathe the vulnerabilities of their systems, together with law
enforcement and emergency management was incredible. ,e had every
participant sign a non-disclosure agreement to participate in the
exercise. For many first responders, it was the first time they
realized just how the communications systems they relied upon could be
compromised by a cyber attack that could leave them essentially `in the
dark' and unable to communicate.
The exercise led our state Homeland Security Director to state that
were it not for the exercise, he would not have known about what he
considered one of the top five vulnerabilities in the state--pointing
out that both DOD and DHS had missed listing this particular issue on
their state-wide assessment, but was brought out by the process of
stakeholder information sharing during the exercise.
Blue Cascades III_focus on Earthquake Preparedness
Following Katrina, stakeholders met to discuss what was the
Northwest's `Katrina'. All agreed that it was the 9 point subduction
zone earthquake that is anticipated to hit off the coast from British
Columbia to California sometime in the next 50 years or so. (The last
one was on Jan. 26, 1700, and records show that it has happened on
average every 300 years). This exercise was led again by PNWER with
critical infrastructure stakeholders who wanted to address the long
term recovery and reconstitution issues after an extreme disaster. It
was a two day exercise involving over 350 participants.
Lessons Learned for Information Sharing. While previous Blue
Cascades exercises demonstrated the need for interoperable
communications, in BLUE CASCADES III at issue was the impact of the
loss of telecommunications and critical IT systems and how these
systems and particular emergency communications could be made more
resilient (able to withstand a subduction zone quake and expeditiously
recover with minimal damage). Some participants pointed to mitigation
measures, including building more systems redundancy and developing
alternative, mobile, and easily deployable wireless-based
communications. There was need for ``situational awareness''--knowledge
of what was happening throughout the region--as the disaster unfolded,
to enable optimal decision-making on response (e.g., dispatching
personnel and other resources where needed, prioritizing service
restoration, determining evacuations routes and sheltering locations,
etc.). Private sector and other non-government organizations emphasized
the need for their inclusion in regional preparedness planning, not
just with the state or provinces, but with municipalities. One water
systems representative stated that he would like to hear from
government less of ``I got you covered--don't worry'' and have more
cooperation. An energy official noted that ``cooperation is a two-way
street and public and private sector representatives must be willing to
meet and participate in the many infrastructure and planning
initiatives currently underway, and not just at the exercises that come
along every now and again.'' A telecommunications representative
reflected sentiments of other participants that companies are reluctant
to share information directly with government. Through participating in
``lots of exercises'', however, they can determine what information
they need and what needs to be shared. As one participant put it,
``Trust relationships are paramount in creating an environment where it
is felt that information can be shared safely, and in confidence.'' A
power company official cited the need to know what the critical loads
are for the other sectors and that without this knowledge it would be
difficult to establish restoration priorities. Non-electric sectors
wanted to learn more about how power is capable of being restored and
work with utilities to make modifications to their systems so
restoration of power to critical infrastructure can be accomplished
quicker.
The Blue Cascades III scenario of an earthquake--an unexpected act
of nature--precluded the need for participants to address alert and
warning in the Puget Sound Region through NWWARN. A major issue,
however, was the tsunami warning system. Participants questioned
whether the many thousands of individuals along the coast from British
Columbia to San Francisco would have ample warning time to reach higher
ground, or even receive a warning given the widespread regional power
outage and telecommunications failures generated by the earthquake. On
response or recovery/restoration issues, it was unclear in the exercise
how decisions would be made on trade-offs that needed to be made within
a short time frame. An example was the issue of whether to use scarce
water for putting out the fires from gas leaks and pipe ruptures or to
save it for human consumption. Moreover, organizations had no way to
gain information on what resources were available. For example,
Cingular noted that it has ``loaner'' cell phones, portable cell phone
sites, and cellular phones that plug into laptop computers to create
internet connectivity. The federal government was said to be working on
a process to channel private sector assistance to government
authorities in a crisis.
There was much discussion in Blue Cascades III on priorities
regarding service restoration in an environment when there would be
great demand and competition for being towards the top of the
prioritization list. Some participants pointed out that states,
localities, and utilities had already established priority lists, and
these should be followed. Other participants, such as the Postal
Service, expressed concern that they were far down on the list and
would not gain services for ``some period of time''. Still others noted
that priority restoration should be flexible depending on need. At the
same time, most participants appeared to understand that in a major
disaster priority lists would likely ``go out the window'', and that
infrastructure interdependencies should play a role in which services
were restored and in what sequence. As one participant put it,
``priorities are different depending upon where you sit.'' In addition,
there was also some discussion related to what is most critical.
Participants questioned whether is it the water supply system,
hospital, transportation, food and agriculture operation, or life
safety such as emergency services. As an electric power representative
observed, ``understanding what ``critical load'' is will help establish
restoration priorities.''
Blue Cascades IV--Pandemic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructures
Blue Cascade IV held in January of this year focused on impacts on
critical infrastructures and essential service providers from a
Pandemic Influenza attack. We included the excellent experience of the
Ontario Emergency Management director who had handled the SARS epidemic
in Canada, and looked again at the interdependencies of our critical
infrastructures and how there might be cascading impacts due to
workforce shortages. It was evident that more needs to be communicated
to private sector critical infrastructures, and that HHS and DHS need
to be better coordinated for incident management in a Pandemic.
We were fortunate to have the HHS Director of Critical
Infrastructure Protection, Dr. Tom Sizemore for a planning session for
the exercise and have the Regional Director for HHS participate in the
event..
Again, it was clear that information sharing among critical
infrastructures, government, and public health agencies was absolutely
vital, and not being well addressed. Our region has some of the leading
private sector businesses who have done landmark work in Pandemic
preparedness and were willing to share their efforts with their peers.
Boeing, Microsoft, Washington Mutual, Puget Sound Energy, Starbucks,
Bonneville Power Administration are some of the leading companies in
this area in the world. We are in the process of developing an Action
Plan based on the lessons learned from the most recent exercises that
can become part of a regional pandemic preparedness strategy.
Recommendations:
The following are based on PNWER's long experience of working with
stakeholders to develop and implement regional disaster preparedness
initiatives.
The Federal Government should fund the start up and provide
technical support to develop regional public/private partnerships in
communities and states addressing regional resiliency, public/private
information sharing, and critical infrastructure security. This could
be done by a competitive program providing up to $250K to allow seed
money for interested states and regions to move forward and develop an
ongoing process to build trust and develop awareness among key
stakeholders of public and private infrastructures on vulnerabilities
and mitigation measures associated with regional interdependencies.
The eight jurisdiction PNWER region is demonstrably ahead of the
nation in building cross-sector trust among regional stakeholders to
foster disaster resilience. DHS, the Department of Defense, and other
federal agencies can use the PNWER region as a test-bed to work with
regional stakeholders to develop solutions for the critical challenges
that face the nation today--including developing a model regional
public/private sector, all-hazards information fusion center and the
protocols and procedures to allow virtual information sharing among all
critical infrastructures, law enforcement, emergency management, and
other key stakeholders. PNWER commends certain federal agencies, DHS/
Science and Technology Directorate, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, and the U.S. Department of Energy for willingness to provide
modest support for a few significant projects focusing on
interdependencies challenges. Much more of this type of support needs
to be provided to undertake many of the recommended solutions to
preparedness shortfalls identified in the respective Blue Cascades
exercises that are enumerated into the Blue Cascades Integrated Action
Plan.
Summary
To summarize, in addressing disaster resilience, our focus must be
not just inside organizations or on sectors but outside the fence,
cross-sector, grass roots to national level, focus on all threats
(including aging and deteriorating infrastructures), and all-hazards
and regional in scope. We must reminder always that all disasters are
local and that all trust is local.
We have to also keep in mind the ``Resilience Tautology''--that
resilient assets and infrastructures require resilient regions;
regional resilience requires an understanding of infrastructure
interdependencies and associated vulnerabilities, consequences of
disruptions under specific scenarios, and risk-based mitigation; and
that regional risk assessment and management requires collaboration and
information-sharing among key stakeholders, which includes regional DOD
assets.
Lastly, federal support--funds and technical assistance and
encouragement--is essential to spearhead, develop, and initially
sustain cross-sector collaboration to identify needs and cost-effective
solutions--activities and pilot projects--to meet homeland security and
disaster resilience challenges. In the area of information sharing, it
is important to move forward with support for developing a regional
information fusion center that incorporates the private sector that can
be a model for the nation. Following is a description of this essential
pilot project for which PNWER has been tasked to set up and facilitate
a Task Force to develop.
----------
Attachment 1
Northwest Warning, Alert and Response Network
2007
NWWARN Regional
Governnance Board*
Gennie Thomspon
NWARN President
Brandon Hardenbrook
Pacific Northwest Economic
Region; NWWARN Vice
President
Hal Cchlomann
Washington Association of
Sewer and Water Districts;
NWWARN Secretary
Marty Prewett
FBI, Seattle
NWWARN Regional Manager
Joe Huden
City of Everett
Mary Robinson,
Puget Sound Energy
Director
King County OEM
Bryant Harrison
FEMA Region X
Dick Hoval
Boeing
Bill Cooper
Microsoft
Scott Heinz
WA Military Department
Kevin Zeller
WA State Patrol
Rod Hilden
Port of Seattle
Paul Schieck
Seattle Mariners
Paul McIntyre
Alerwood Sewer & Water
* Partial List
----------------
TO: MAJOR GENERAL LOWENBERG, WA ADJUTANT GENERAL
FROM: NWWARN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE BOARD
1SUBJECT: NORTHWEST WARNING, ALERT AND RESPONSE NETWORK
DATE: MAY 15, 2007
Dear General Lowenberg,
Our officers wanted to update you on all the changes occurring with
NWWARN and appreciate the continued interest and support of you and
your staff. These changes have been very challenging and will
ultimately all be very beneficial.
NWWARN was designed and developed locally about five years ago with
the assistance of the FBI, Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER),
and regional private/public critical infrastructure leaders. Along with
similar information sharing networks in other geographic regions, we
all became the pilot for DHS' goal of creating a national private/
public information sharing network. We were collectively known as the
Homeland Security Information Network--Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-
CI).
This DHS goal was met in 2006 and a GAO analysis of all the DHS
HSIN programs stated that HSIN-CI was the only successful program due
in large part to its extensive membership of local decision makers
across all private and public critical infrastructures. However, DHS
then switched to a new technology source that could not support the
system. This resulted in the loss of our national and regional
websites.
We understand the need to be regionally owned, controlled and
managed to ensure our continued existence and to better address our
region's issues and needs, such as the 2010 Olympics security, PNWER
and the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement (PNEMA). We
will be independent but continue our close relationships with L/S/F
government agencies, jurisdictions, and all private and public
infrastructures.
Our challenge has been to select a new technology vendor to rebuild
our system/network, and to obtain initial and ongoing funding. This is
underway and we expect to have our website restored within 90 days,
followed by acceptance of new members and full restoration of our
services.
The benefits to all of us will be our incorporating new features
and functions, and expanding our membership to include all of our
interdependent NW states and provinces. These will be Alaska, Idaho,
Oregon, Montana, and Washington, plus Alberta, British Columbia and the
Yukon.
In closing General, we again want to thank you for your support,
the support of your staff, and the support of the Washington State
Military Department and Emergency Management Division. We have worked
closely with the Washington State Committee on Homeland Security's
Critical Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee and recognize that
NWWARN is important to the success of protecting our state's critical
infrastructure. We have proven our worth to the state and region, and
once we have our funding issues settled, we will be able to solidify
our standing and expand.
Respectfully,
Gennie Thompson,
NWWARN President
----------
Attachment 2
Pacific NorthWest
Economic Region
Pacific Northwest Center for Regional Disaster Resilience
The Pacific Northwest Center for Regional Disaster Resilience (RDR
Center) serves public and private sector organizations and other key
stakeholders to identify preparedness gaps and implement cost-effective
prevention and mitigation measures to address them. The RDR Center is
an integral element of the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER), a
statutory, public/private partnership chartered in 1991 by the
Northwest states of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington and
the Western Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and the
Yukon Territory. As the implementation manager of PNWER's Homeland
Security Program, the RDR Center's mission is to improve the ability of
the Pacific Northwest to protect its critical infrastructures and to
withstand and recover from all-hazards disasters. The RDR Center does
this through raising awareness of infrastructure interdependencies,
providing training and education, and developing tools, technologies,
and approaches that build on existing capabilities and can be utilized
across the United States, Canada, and the international community.
Building on Five years of Progress
The RDR Center's mission is continuing and building upon a long
legacy of PNWER's work with states, municipalities, and other regions
to secure interdependent infrastructures and develop disaster
resilience. The first initiative to address regional infrastructure
security issues was the creation of The Partnership for Regional
Infrastructure Security in November, 2001. The Partnership brought key
private stakeholders representing the critical infrastructures in the
eight-jurisdiction PNWER region together with the federal, state and
provincial officials responsible for emergency management and public
safety. These stakeholders, along with elected officials from each
state and province, identified opportunities for acting proactively to
strengthen their infrastructures.
Since then PNWER has organized with the regional stakeholders three
critical infrastructure interdependencies exercises over the past four
years and is now developing a fourth (the Blue Cascades Series). Each
exercise has been designed by the stakeholders, reflected regional
concerns, and produced an Action Plan of projects and activities to
address lessons learned. Blue Cascades I, held in Portland, Oregon in
June 2002, was conducted under the auspices of the newly created
Pacific Northwest Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security and
sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Navy's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Office, FEMA Region 10, and the Canadian federal government.
The exercise centered on raising awareness of interconnections among
the region's critical infrastructures and resulting vulnerabilities
associated with largely physical attacks and disruptions. Blue Cascades
II, held in Seattle in September 2004, was sponsored by King County,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's National Cyber Security
Division, Puget Sound Energy, Microsoft, and TransCanada. Blue Cascades
II centered on cyber events to meet stakeholder needs to learn more
about cyber threats, disruptions, and impacts. Blue Cascades III, held
in Bellevue in March 2006, was supported by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Navy Region NW, King County, Microsoft, CH\2\M HILL,
Cingular Wireless, Puget Sound Energy, BPA and CTC. Blue Cascades III
focused on the response, recovery and restoration after a M9 subduction
zone earthquake. Blue Cascades IV, which focuses on the impact of
infrastructure interdependencies on pandemic preparedness, is now under
development and scheduled in January, 2007.
As a result of these regional initiatives, PNWER has undertaken
pilot projects with DHS, the Department of Energy and other federal
entities, including development of a regional alert and warning system
(NW WARN), a regional energy vulnerability assessment, and an
interdependencies identification tool for stakeholder use.
RDR Center Today
The RDR Center is building on this extensive foundation of activities
through:
Creating and fostering cross-sector partnerships
focused on infrastructure security and disaster resilience;
Developing and conducting regional infrastructure
interdependencies initiatives focused on various threat
scenarios that include regional cross-sector/cross discipline
workshops and exercises to better understand threats,
vulnerabilities, and develop strategies for action to address
them;
Developing requirements for stakeholder-validated
projects and activities to address readiness gaps and improve
regional resilience;
Seeking funding and other resources to support
regional pilot projects and other activities and to enable
state and local agencies to address regional preparedness
needs;
Overseeing the implementation of priority projects and
activities in a cost-effective, timely and ethical manner;
Conducting outreach and develop and facilitate
seminars, workshops, and targeted exercises to raise awareness
and test the level of preparedness.
Communicating stakeholder validated regional disaster
resilience recommendations to state and provincial governments
and policymakers
Providing information through a dedicated web portal
www.pnwer.org/portal/ and other mechanisms about resources on
CIP and regional disaster resilience issues, lessons learned,
best practices; and on upcoming homeland security, emergency
preparedness, and related events. Tools include:
A Document Library that can be searched by
infrastructure sector, hazard, threat, and
jurisdiction;
An Events Calendar with dates and information
on conferences, exercises, and other events concerning
disaster resilience and critical infrastructure
protection;
A Stakeholders Forum which allows registered
users to interact with each other and with a panel of
knowledgeable stakeholder representatives.
Lastly, through its Consortium of multi-disciplinary experts from
recognized research institutions and technical assistance providers,
the RDR Center provides a Center of Excellence with access to
expertise, best practices, and lessons learned from CIP and
preparedness conferences, workshops, exercises, in addition to other
useful resources.
RDR Center Structure
As the program implementation focal point for homeland security and
disaster resilience for the multi-jurisdiction Pacific NorthWest
Economic Region, the RDR Center is a non-profit, public-private
collaborative organization.
Board of Directors. The RDR Center Board of Directors, comprised of
state and provincial legislators and distinguished independent experts,
provides strategic direction and general oversight the Center's
activities.
RDR Center Director and Administrative Staff. The Director handles
operational activities of the Center and ensures effective program
execution and quality control. The Director determines with PNWER staff
budgetary /resource requirements and seeks means to fulfill these
requirements.
Regional Steering Group. The Steering Group is comprised of the
chairs of regional and state partnerships/collaborative mechanisms
within the PNWER eight member jurisdictions. The Steering Group
prioritizes and determines what activities will be included in the RDR
Center's programmatic activities, reviews progress on projects, and
provides recommendations.
Project Requirements and Oversight Work Groups. Cross-sector,
multi-disciplinary Work Groups of stakeholder organizations
representing interested regions are responsible for developing
requirements for individual projects and monitoring project
implementation.
State/Provincial Council. A Council of state and provincial senior
officials charged with homeland security and disaster resilience
provides guidance to the Steering Group and the RDR Center Director on
the types of projects that should be undertaken to build upon and
improve existing capabilities.
Federal Advisory Group. Comprised of U.S. and Canadian federal
agencies with homeland security, public safety and emergency management
responsibilities, the Advisory Group provides advice and as
appropriate, technical and policy assistance on program implementation
challenges that have national implications.
RDR Center Technical Assistance Consortium. The Consortium is
comprised of research and technical service provider organizations that
have expertise in the broad range of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and disaster resilience needs (national laboratories, academic research
institutions, contractors/consulting firms). Members of the Consortium,
based on their capabilities, team to assist state and local
stakeholders to develop requirements for specific projects and
activities and provide the technical expertise necessary for program
implementation.
RDR Center Sources of Support
Overall support for the RDR Center comes from PNWER member State
and Provincial dues (which are set by statute), private sector
partnership members, as well as government programmatic funds and
grants; foundations, and other contributions.
----------
Attachment 3
REGIONAL INFORMATION FUSION CENTER
PILOT PROJECT
Purpose
The following paper outlines what is required to build on existing
capabilities for cross-jurisdiction/public-private collaboration and
information-sharing to develop a state-wide, holistic regional
information sharing and analysis capability to meet the following broad
security and disaster resilience needs:
1. Collection, integration, analysis, and dissemination of all-
source threat-related information for law enforcement and
infrastructure protection;
2. Understanding regional interdependencies and determining
critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) vulnerabilities
and risk;
3. Disaster/incident preparedness and management.
The pilot project would encompass and leverage various activities
supported by components of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
that currently are underway to improve regional information sharing and
analysis capabilities, including the Washington Joint Analytic Center
(WAJAC)) and the developing Seattle/King County fusion center; NWWARN,
and the Puget Sound Partnership Interdependencies template project. The
pilot project would also leverage systems and procedures for
information sharing already developed by DHS, DOD and other entities.
The end-result would be a state-wide ``virtual'' Regional
Information Fusion Center (information sharing and analysis capability)
with protocols/procedures that can cost-effectively provide public,
private and other key stakeholders with appropriate, secure, resilient,
two-way interaction at the local, state, and federal (civilian and
defense) level. This capability would connect and enhance but not
replace mission-specific state and local emergency management, law
enforcement, defense, and other systems and mechanisms, including EOCs,
Special Operations Centers, Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations,
Dispatch Centers, etc.
This pilot project would provide a model which could be customized
by states and localities across the nation.
Background
Since the September 11 attacks more than five years ago, acquiring
information on threats to infrastructures, vulnerabilities, and impacts
has been a top priority and essential for determining CI/KR criticality
and risk. At the national level, sector-focused Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers (ISACs) were established. As understanding grew of
infrastructure interdependencies and the need for identifying asset
criticality and managing disasters, regional public-private
partnerships emerged in some parts of the country. A major objective of
these partnerships was to facilitate regional information sharing by
building trust among key stakeholders and cooperatively identifying
security and preparedness gaps.???
At the same time, in states and municipalities nationwide, law
enforcement authorities created information and intelligence sharing
and analysis mechanisms to focus on threats and crimes. Today there are
more than three dozen of these information fusion centers in various
stages of development and reflecting the cultural and jurisdictional
interests of the areas they serve. Their goal is to develop the
technologies, procedures, analytic staff and capabilities to integrate
and assess relevant law enforcement and intelligence information,
coordinate security measures, and facilitate two-way flow of timely,
accurate, actionable information on all types of hazards. The focus,
scope, functions, participation, and organizational structure of these
centers are evolving as understanding of the requirements increases. A
series last year of four Information Fusion Center Regional Conferences
sponsored by Department of Justice with the U.S. DHS for managers of
state and local Centers identified many issues that remain to be
resolved. Some of the more important of these issues are:
Expanding the focus of the Centers to cover all
threats, all crimes, and all hazards;
Inclusion of critical infrastructures and essential
service providers and other key stakeholders with focus on two-
way information-sharing;
Creating and maintaining regional situational
awareness pre and post incident; and
Outreach to communities, including associations
serving ethnic and special needs groups.
A priority issue is developing a virtual capability (i.e.,
procedures, technologies, organizational structure, and supporting
concept-of-operations) to link information fusion centers and other
collaborative mechanisms and key stakeholder organizations in a state-
wide or broader regional interoperable network to accommodate diverse
multi-jurisdiction needs, geographic realities and cultural and
infrastructure sector interests. This virtual Regional Information
Fusion Center would have two-way information sharing based on a multi-
layered secure and resilient system with analysis produced by a team of
core resident local and state experts and virtual analysts from
different sectors and disciplines using a largely virtual database to
enable integration, assessment, and secure, tailored dissemination of
information provided to key stakeholders. This analysis would be used
for organizational and collective decision-making and crafting public
information.
This virtual capability will interconnect state, local, private
sector and other stakeholder capabilities while avoiding of duplication
of effort, proliferation of analytical products, and competition for
scarce analytical staff resources. It will also enable federal
authorities to have a single focal point for effectively and securely
providing intelligence and other sensitive information to a wide range
of ``customers''.
Activities within Washington State that Can Be Leveraged
Washington State is well ahead of many other regions in the nation
with an established information fusion center operated by the State
Patrol and situated in the FBI Building in Seattle. The WAJAC is in the
beginning stages of bringing in private sector analysts. At the local
level, King County with surrounding counties have been developing
regional preparedness plans and working with key stakeholders to
address vulnerabilities and impacts associated with infrastructure
interdependencies.
A public-private Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security
has been in existence since 2002. There have been four regional
interdependencies exercises developed and conducted by the Partnership
thus far, each focusing on a different type of threat scenario--
physical and cyber attacks/disruptions, natural disasters (subduction
zone earthquake) and an influenza pandemic. These exercises have
resulted in recommendations for creation of a Regional Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (regional ISAC) to enable key stakeholders
to prepare for and manage disasters from terrorist attacks, natural
disasters or other causes. In addition, Partnership members are
currently testing an automated interdependency template developed for
them by DHS/S&T/CIP and have created an Information Sharing Working
Group to develop secure information sharing procedures for private
sector organizations to exchange agreed interdependencies data
collected internally with the template.
There is a community-focused alert and warning system, NWWARN, and
the City of Seattle and King County are looking towards developing an
information fusion capability to serve local law enforcement needs that
would include critical infrastructures and essential service providers.
Various proposals and some work are underway on enhancing these
existing capabilities. The City of Seattle Police Department and the
Pacific Northwest Laboratory have been collaborating on technology and
procedural requirements for a Seattle/King County regional fusion
center. ESRI is developing a virtual analysis system for use by fusion
centers. There are plans to enhance WAJAC's collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information and intelligence to law enforcement and
non-law enforcement agencies through developing effective Regional
Intelligence Groups (RIGS) and creating a Threat Early Warning Group
(TEW) system.
Pilot Project Overall Goal
The goal of the proposed pilot project is to develop a statewide
virtual regional cross-sector, cross-jurisdiction, secure, and
resilient two-way information sharing capability that:
Protects proprietary data;
Utilizes existing procedures and mechanisms;
Focuses on all threats, all crimes, and all-hazards;
Identifies vulnerabilities, security and preparedness
gaps, and assesses risk;
Meets local law enforcement needs;
Has a state-wide scope and reaches outside state
boundaries and cross-border to address regional
interdependencies;
Supports the alert and warning function of NWWARN and
incorporates member organizations as appropriate;
Supports Emergency Operations Center Disaster
Management Activities;
Undertakes outreach and educates community groups;
Fosters interoperability and standardization;
Provides federal agencies through a single focal point
access to state, local, and regional key stakeholders.
Tasks
The following tasks and subtasks need to be accomplished for a
Regional Information Fusion Center Pilot Project. Some are already
underway. Most can be addressed simultaneously Specifics on how to
accomplish these tasks and subtasks, including a schedule and
milestones, will be developed by a Regional Information Fusion
Requirements Task Force comprised of representatives of organizations
involved in the current information sharing and analysis activities
noted in the Background Section of this paper and others as
appropriate. (Duration of project activities is dependent on technical
expertise/funding available.)
Task 1: Requirements Definition (Six-months duration)
1.1 Identify local, state, and federal jurisdictional issues
and needs and what memorandums of understanding and other
agreements are required;
1.2 Develop framework for a mechanism to integrate funding
streams for Fusion Center sustainability;
1.3 Identify roles and responsibilities and develop decision-
making process;
1.4 Determine membership criteria--what critical
infrastructures and essential service providers to include and
how to develop sector and organizational collaboration
arrangements to enable collective information sharing;
1.5 Identify security and proprietary data protection and
control needs and develop/leverage appropriate procedures and
systems, e.g., PCII;
1.6 Develop requirements for creating (or leverage an existing)
virtual information sharing system with access based on
multiple levels of security that enables stakeholders to
provide and receive data virtually (i.e., virtual database,
analysis and dissemination);
1.7 Identify what data (information and intelligence) should be
collected, which organizations will provide it and how;
1.8 Determine the security levels for data required and what
security safeguards are required;
1.9 Ascertain data storage needs--what types of data can be
stored, and how and where stored;
1.10 Determine information assessment needs--customer base,
types of analysis required meeting customer requirements, and
data and analytic resources necessary;
1.11 Determine communications and IT security requirements
1.12 Determine communications and IT resilience needs
1.13 Determine what analytic tools are needed to identify and
assess regional interdependencies and disruption impacts; also
for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection and impacts
analysis, including users of these tools;
1.14 Develop requirements for a virtual analytic capability
(determine qualifications of experts, security requirements,
process, and procedures);
1.15 Determine Pilot Project oversight process and program
management;
1.16 Identify potential sources of funding and how to acquire
necessary support.
Task 2. Implementation (multi-year scope--phases and timeframe TBD)
2.1 Develop a Concept of Operations for the Regional Fusion
Center that includes decision making and information sharing
protocols and secure dissemination procedures;
2.2 Develop procedures for providing security clearances to
Center staff and key stakeholder personnel as appropriate;
2.3 Develop training for Fusion Center personnel and analysts
(working with DHS/IA);
2.4 Develop procedures and provide staff training for Community
Outreach;
2.5 Develop Regional Information Fusion Center systems and
tools;
2.5.1 Data collection system;
2.5.2 Data storage and virtual data system;
2.5.3 Assessment ``toolset'';
Task 3. Issues Investigation, Test, Evaluation and Validation
(timeframe TBD)
3.1 Hold targeted workshops and exercises to further
investigate and refine implementation issues and priorities;
3.2 Test and evaluate the Regional Information Fusion Center
through two to three Blue Cascades regional infrastructure
interdependencies exercises that have terrorism and regional
disaster scenarios.
3.3 Develop and conduct additional targeted workshops and
exercises to evaluate specific Regional Fusion Center
capabilities.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Stein.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. STEIN, SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER, PACIFIC
NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Stein. Thank you Madam Chair, Congressman Reichert,
Congressman Dicks.
It is a pleasure to be here representing the Pacific
Northwest international laboratory.
I actually find myself probably in the perfect chair
because I'm in vital agreement with the prior two witnesses.
The beauty of the position I'm in is that I'm kind of being
an observer. I'm not really government. I'm not really private
sector.
My exposure to this issue has been through the regional
technology abrasion initiative which is supported by the
Department of Homeland Security, science and technology side.
The beauty of that program, in my opinion, is that, as you
stated earlier, it starts from the ground up.
The purpose was to meet with the people who live with the
problems and talk about the challenges before them, and based
on their expertise and their wisdom, identify the challenges to
them.
That's the position I've been in for the last four years in
this region, and it has truly been an honor and a blessing, and
I've learned a lot in the process.
One of the things that was keyed up in that process was
that prevention and preparedness was a key element in this
region.
A lot of money was being put into emergency response, but
prevention was one of the pieces that wasn't as keenly
reenforced.
The law enforcement in the region stepped up and said, ``We
need to doing something about that,'' and regionally they
decided to go ahead and move forward with the regional
community intel center.
I've had the opportunity to continue to participate in
that.
One of the challenges with a regional intel fusion center
or a fusion center at a state level is that partnership between
law enforcement, and we've all talked about trust, but also
that relationship with industry.
The partnership with industry--I really don't need to talk
much about that. It's clearly beneficial. It's clearly
important. The challenge though is who do you bring into the
room, what's that company that you bring into the room, and
then what's their obligation and liability.
What appeared to me through this process is that NWWARN
actually is a phenomenal vehicle, wasn't created for this
reason, but it provides, as Matt indicated, that trust in
network, the vetted partnerships, the vetted participation, a
secure portal, all of which allow connectivity within the
infrastructure and between them and law enforcement, if this is
connected to a fusion center.
The beauty is that industry doesn't have to sit inside the
fusion center.
All of the things that they would through NWWARN that they
can do, and that information that can be piped into the fusion
center, and literally run the background--you can run
information systems over the top of that, you can identify
commonalities, you can identify correlation, and as you find
those needles in the haystack, you can then investigate those
and, as appropriate, feed back through the same channel
information that's relevant to industry or that sector so that
they can take the necessary action to both be prepared and
prevent issues in their infrastructure, so everybody is tuned
in, everybody's advised, everybody is aware, without having to
deal with the political issues, and without struggling with the
timely issues.
The intelligence is great if it's timely. It doesn't do
anybody any good if it's not.
This process allows that all to occur in real-time. It
provides a two-way flowing of information. It doesn't create
problems with security. It doesn't disappear and everybody is
vetted in the system. The trust is there.
One of the other things that's really, really powerful
about this, in my opinion, is that it is absolutely scale. You
can do it in a small jurisdiction. You can use the same
mechanisms that you would in a very large jurisdiction.
It provides the opportunity for you then to connect fusion
centers to fusion centers and create a network across the
country that is truly robust.
With that, I would like to thank you and would be delighted
to answer any questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Stein.
[The statement of Mr. Stein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven L. Stein
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to share some of my views on information sharing between
state and local law enforcement and the private sector.
Introduction
In 2004 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was asked by the
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology to lead the
Regional Technology Integration Initiative (RTII) for the Seattle Urban
Area. In leading this effort I have had the pleasure and honor of
working with hundreds of professionals in the public and private
sectors who are committed to public safety and the protection of their
communities. The first phase of this program was to work with the
public safety sector and private sector to identify the major
technology gaps that if met, would significantly improve regional
preparedness for major disasters whether natural or human induced. One
of the key findings of this program was that the Seattle Urban Area
Emergency Management Planners should direct more resources into
prevention. Regional law enforcement used this platform to pursue the
development of a Regional Fusion Intelligence Center that would focus
on intelligence lead, community policing. This effort is being
coordinated with the state intelligence fusion center.
Regional Intelligence Fusion Center
At its origin the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center was conceived
as a partnership. Regional law enforcement recognized that their focus
on jurisdictional priorities and boundaries was self limiting. They
also recognized that resource limitations resulted in suboptimal
intelligence capability. The fundamental question then was how do you
improve your operations and get the desired results without a
significant and sustained increase in resources? The answer is to
partner.
The vision for this partnership is that it will be a multi-
jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary organization with representatives
from state, local, federal and tribal partners, all working toward
common objectives. At a minimum, it will include the regional
intelligence groups in Pierce, Kitsap, King, and Snohomish Counties,
the intelligence operation in the Seattle Police Department, and local
industry. Federal law enforcement agencies and the Washington State
Fusion Intelligence Center are also envisioned as partners as is the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Public Health, Fire, Utilities,
and the private sector.
Without leadership, an articulation of the challenges that need to
be overcome, and a critical mass of supporters to articulate and
improve the concept, this partnership would never have moved forward.
Although there are, and will continue to be numerous challenges I would
like to focus my remarks on information sharing with the public/private
sector.
The Northwest Warning, Alert & Response Network (NWWARN)
The benefits of information sharing between the public and private
sector are well recognized. The challenge for any Regional Intelligence
Fusion Center is not how to build the partnership with the private
sector but rather, who should that partnership be with and what kind of
information should be shared? The attributes of an ideal solution
include:
Trusted network of public/private sector
representatives by infrastructure element
Vetting of participating members so only qualifying
individuals are allowed to participate
Defined roles and responsibilities for private sector
members
Secure communication portal for information sharing
The Northwest Warning, Alert & Response Network (NWWARN) has all
these attributes making it a very attractive solution to the challenge
of information sharing between the public/private sector and law
enforcement. The NWWARN was established as a pilot project of the
Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Information
Network--Critical Infrastructure. NWWARN, a collaborative effort
between government and private sector partners within Washington State,
has as its goal, to maximize real-time sharing of situational
information and provide immediate distribution of intelligence to those
in the field who need to act upon it. Information sharing occurs
through a secure web portal and within each infrastructure element.
Members are vetted by knowledgeable individuals within each
infrastructure element, ensuring the formation of trusted network.
Although initially established to allow infrastructure elements to
communicate with one another in an emergency, NWWARN became an
effective information sharing vehicle for a range of issues.
Establishing an information sharing partnership between NWWARN and the
Regional Fusion Intelligence Center would not change the purpose or
operation of NWWARN. Rather, it enables regional law enforcement to
collect and analyze the information NWWARN members provide to each
other on a daily basis. If law enforcement analysis reveals patterns or
suggests heightened awareness, law enforcement can use the NWWARN
network and secure portal to immediately share appropriate information
with the potentially affected infrastructure elements.
Conclusion
As I mentioned at the beginning, it is a pleasure and an honor to
be able to work with the law enforcement organizations in the region.
The vision for a Regional Intelligence Fusion Center in the Seattle
Urban Area is moving toward reality. The existence of the NWWARN offers
an ideal conduit to enable information sharing between the public/
private partners and regional law enforcement.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Stevenson.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. STEVENSON, PRESIDENT AND COO, CLISE
PROPERTIES, INC.
Mr. Stevenson. Thank you, Madam Chair and committee
members.
Good afternoon. I'll be brief. It's Friday afternoon.
My name is Richard Stevenson. I'm president and chief
operating officer of Clise Properties, Inc., a 120-year old
commercial real estate company with approximately 3 million
square feet of commercial space, mostly located in the downtown
core of Seattle.
I'm also a past chair of BOMA, building owners and managers
association of Seattle and King County, current board member of
the downtown Seattle association, board member of the housing
resources group and also the downtown emergency services
center.
I've managed commercial property and commercial real estate
companies in the Seattle area for approximately 27 years.
Generally speaking, during that time I believe that those
of us in the industry have formed a very strong relationship
with local law enforcement and specifically with that of the
Seattle police department.
My first real professional interaction with SPD was in or
around 1991 when businesses located on 1st Avenue near the Pike
Place Market formed a business improvement area for the
purposes of managing street issues: Cleaning, pan handling, et
cetera.
The then west precinct commander, Captain Clark Kimerer,
agreed to a formal interaction between our security patrols and
the west precinct for the purposes of communicating issues
common to the business improvement area's goals and that of
Seattle's downtown west precinct.
This, at the time, was very bold and innovative thinking.
Since that time we've had a close working relationship with
the police department as it relates to emergency response,
sharing of information, and oftentimes on a street level having
individual officers have access to the buildings for purposes
of surveillance, occasional access to restrooms for bicycle
police, and other operational issues.
I'm here today in front of you because it's my feeling that
with regard to homeland security, we would prefer to see their
efforts and resources used to bolster local law enforcement on
our behalf as opposed to standing alone in potentially
duplicate service.
We would hope that in local law enforcement and homeland
security there would be a type of communication between
entities needed to provide us with intelligence, financial
resources, manpower, and technology to provide safety for our
downtown commercial office buildings and the vitally of the
urban core as a whole.
What I mean by this is that I believe the local law
enforcement, including our relationships with ATF, FBI, and
others, have provided us a strong and reliable core, and then I
think their efforts should be furthered buttressed by a federal
homeland security funding for vital infrastructure improvements
that are mutually agreed upon by the various parties.
It would seem to be a mistake for Homeland Security or any
other governmental agency to go it alone in Seattle when it
could act as a valuable supporting team member for an existing
and functional local private relationship.
The excellent relationship between the downtown business
community and the Seattle police department has been the result
of years of collaboration on the real world challenges.
We worked together for many years at ground level. Our
relationships have been tested and retested over time.
The key to our success has been a thorough understanding of
our respective roles and responsibilities.
The private sector does not want to take on the role of law
enforcement. We want to be informed, consulted, and provided
timely warnings. In return we will lend our support and
assistance to law enforcement as they perform their duties.
We have valuable information and insights into the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the buildings we own and
manage, and are at the table when public safety and homeland
security priorities are debated by our elected officials.
I have every confidence that Chief Kerlikowske and Deputy
Chief Kimerer will give me the information we need if threats
are identified, and I believe that they are confident that
Clise Properties and our colleagues in the downtown business
community will do everything that is in their power to assist
the police department.
This has been a model relationship, and it is only possible
at the local level because of our frequent and ongoing
interaction in the course of our daily business.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Stevenson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Stevenson
Good afternoon. My name is Richard Stevenson. I am president and
chief operating officer of Clise Properties, Inc., a 120 year old
commercial real estate company, with approximately 3 million square
feet of commercial space, mostly located in the downtown core in
Seattle.
I am also a past chair of the Building Owners and Managers
Association of Seattle and King County and a current Board member of
the Downtown Seattle Association, Housing Resources Group, and the
Downtown Emergency Services Center.
I have managed commercial property and commercial real estate
companies in the Seattle area for approximately 27 years. Generally
speaking, during that time, I believe that those of us in the industry
have formed a very strong relationship with local law enforcement and
specifically with those of the Seattle Police Department.
My first real professional interaction with SPD was in or around
1991 when businesses located on First Avenue, near Pike Place Market,
formed a Business Improvement Area for the purposes of managing street
issues, including cleaning, panhandling. The then West Precinct
Commander, Capt. Clark Kimerer, agreed to a formal interaction between
rented security patrols and the West Precinct for the purposes of
communicating issues common to the business improvement area's goals
and that of the Seattle's downtown West Precinct. This, at the time,
was very bold and innovative thinking. Since that time, we have had a
close working relationship with the Police Department as it relates to
emergency response, sharing of information, and often times on a street
level, having individual officers having access to buildings for the
purposes of surveillance, occasionally access to restrooms to bicycle
police, and other operational issues.
I am here today in front of you because it is my feeling that with
regard to Homeland Security, we would prefer to see their efforts and
resources used to bolster local law enforcement on our behalf as
opposed to stand alone and potentially duplicate services. We would
hope that between local law enforcement and Homeland Security there
would be the type of communication between entities needed to provide
us with intelligence, financial resources, manpower, and technology to
provide safety for our downtown commercial office buildings and the
vitality of the urban core as a whole.
What I mean by this is that I believe local law enforcement
including their relationships with ATF, FBI and others have provided us
a strong and reliable core and I think their efforts should be further
buttressed by a federal homeland security funding for vital
infrastructure improvements that are mutually agreed upon by the
various parties. It would seem to me a mistake for Homeland Security,
or any other governmental agency to go it alone in Seattle when it
could act as valuable support and a team member for an existing and
functional local public private relationship.
The excellent relationship between the downtown business community
and the Seattle Police Department has been the result of years of
collaboration on real world challenges. We worked together for many
years at ground level, and our relationships have been tested and
retested over time. The key to our success has been a thorough
understanding of our respective roles and responsibilities. The private
sector does not want to take on the role of law enforcement. We want to
be informed, consulted and provided timely warnings. In return, we lend
our support and assistance to law enforcement as they perform their
duties. We have valuable information and insights into the strengths
and vulnerabilities of the buildings we own and manage, and are at the
table when public safety and homeland security priorities are debated
by our elected officials. I have every confidence that Chief
Kerlikowske and Deputy Chief Kimerer will give me the information we
need if threats are identified, and I believe they are confident that
Clise Properties and our colleagues in the downtown business community
will do everything within their power to cooperate and assist the
police department This has been a model relationship, and is only
possible at the local level because of our frequent and ongoing
interaction in the course of our daily business.
Ms. Harman. The last two of you finished in less than two
minutes. I commend you. You get the gold star.
As I mentioned, your testimony will be inserted in the
record in full, and each of us will now ask you five minutes
worth of questions.
I'll recognize myself first.
Mr. Hovel, you mentioned the Fort Dix issue when, I think,
it was six would-be terrorists were apprehended recently in New
Jersey and charged with plans for a major attack on Fort Dix.
As I recall, the first notice to law enforcement came from
a--I think it was a video store fellow who--or a camera store
fellow who was asked to do something with a video that these
fellows had prepared, and that video obviously contained
material that was very alarming.
This obviously illustrates a point you've all made, which
is that the private sector has a lot to contribute here, not
just to keeping its own facilities safe if it gets the right
information but keeping the rest of us safe.
Had that plot not been foiled, obviously there possibly
could have been a major attack on a U.S. military base.
I just observe that.
If you have anything to say about that, please do, but I
really want to ask a different question.
Mr. Morrison, your testimony was extremely depressing.
I have said for years that the dirtiest four-letter word in
government is spelled T-U-R-F, turf, and I think that for some
reason, maybe it's the water we drink, people instinctively
protect power and draw perimeters around themselves--it sounds
like instinctive animal behavior--and block out others.
What are the best ways to overcome turf instincts?
Do we have to legislate and force people to be different?
Is there some management technique? Do we need different
people?
What is it going to take to overcome turf?
Mr. Morrison. Madam Chair, that's a pretty tough question.
I think that certainly if--in the local and regional sense
it's quite possible to do.
In terms of the dysfunctionality of DHS, I don't know.
I mean, I just--anyway, it's amazing to me.
In our pandemic, we're trying to do a comprehensive
regional pandemic plan and HHS has theirs and DHS has theirs,
and there's--I mean, it's amazing.
Ms. Harman. Is it easier at a local and regional level
because people know each other, live closer to each other.
Mr. Morrison. Definitely.
Ms. Harman. There's common geography? What are the clues.
I'm sure there are some people here, of course nobody in
this room, who are pretty protective of their own power
structure and block out others, right?
Mr. Morrison. Right.
Ms. Harman. No one in this room, certainly not my
colleagues.
It escapes me. I am very frustrated.
I have been personally involved in the legislation to
create the Department of Homeland Security, which I agree has
enormous organizational issues, and to reform our intelligence
community, which is still a work in progress, and the instinct
is to build bureaucracies and enact procedures that aren't--
that keep data in one place and systems that are duplicative
and all the things you've all been testifying to and our first
panel has too, but I think we need a better approach.
Legislation by itself doesn't work. Good people try very
hard, and that doesn't work. The problems are identified over
and over, and that doesn't work.
Does anyone else have some ideas?
Mr. Stein?
Mr. Stein. I don't want to get myself in trouble.
It's leadership.
I mean, there's lots of things obviously, but my
observation in this community is the reason it works is because
of the leadership.
The people that were here before at the earlier panel,
those gentlemen tell the people that they're working with what
their objectives are, what their goals are, and they walk their
talk.
They re-enforce those behaviors with their peers and with
their subordinates.
That leadership translates down.
Now, at the lower levels, it's far from perfect, but the
message is loud and clear, and as a result you get a lot more
cooperation and collaboration, and I am in that kind of unique
position of not being in any of the camps, so I kind of see it
in a different way.
This is where I'll get myself in trouble. In DHS, the
question I would ask is: Do you have the right leadership in
the context of people who see that bigger issue, that bigger
objective, and are really willing to walk the talk to achieve
those goals?
I can't answer it, but the observations are what you can
make.
Ms. Harman. My time has just expired.
Does anyone else have a comment?
Okay. Well, I would just agree with you that any of these
laws and any of these departments, whatever their legal basis
is, are in my view about 50 percent structure and 50 percent
leadership, and I do think leadership is critical.
It was an ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao Tzu, who said
the more power you give away, the more power you have, and it
seems to me certainly the people in Washington have never heard
of Lao Tzu.
Let me now yield to five minutes for questions to the
ranking member, Sheriff Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Well, turf wars--I've started in the sheriff's office in
1972, and there have been turf battles since 1972 and still
today.
It's the human nature, I guess, that we live with, but it
does take leadership.
We had a team of leaders sitting before of us earlier and
we have a team of leaders sitting before us right now, so we
know in this community we have the makings of great programs,
of great systems because we have people here who are interested
and who are willing to work together.
So my first question goes to Mr. Hovel and Mr. Stevenson.
Your two companies, is it unique to your companies, the
connection and the involvement and the interaction that you
have with your local police departments and this
interconnection with not just addressing local crime but the
whole concept of homeland security or are you reaching out too
to other companies and building that platform to make it even
stronger?
Mr. Hovel. Mr. Congressman, we have done all of those
things and in the process of reaching out to many other
companies.
Obviously not all of them have the luxury of being able to
participate at the level and in the manner that we are, but
that being said, because we have that capability, we are not
going to let the opportunity pass either, but there are many
ways, as I mentioned one of in my prepared remarks, concerning
the virtual network, that will go a long way to allowing those
who really have an interest in participating but otherwise
don't have the means or the logistics to do so to become an
integral partner in this entire effort.
Mr. Stevenson. You know, it was mentioned earlier--in fact,
Chief Kerlikowske mentioned that one of the outcomes was the
police association, and I think that that is a perfect example
of one of the things we've been able to do locally is have
business leaders, downtown Seattle association, other groups,
get together, work for the police foundation, raise money.
We saw a real need.
I mean, bicycle policemen in Seattle didn't have
BlackBerrys, and so they would stop somebody on the street and
couldn't really figure out what to do with them, other than
call a squad car and I guess run them downtown, and we got
together the money, we got the BlackBerrys.
We had this very close working relationship because it's
very mutually beneficial to us and it's the right thing to do,
and I think we do it because we're stakeholders and we've got
skin in the game, and I think they do it because they're great
people and it's their job and their career and they're
excellent at it, and it seems to me that the previous question
that Chairwoman Harmon had was ``Why doesn't it work,'' and I
would suggest that maybe not everybody has enough skin in the
game.
Mr. Reichert. Well, I would think too that not only do you
attract other businesses but you are also, in assisting the
police department, the sheriff's office, and other police
departments, that you have the ability then to reach out to the
various diverse communities that exist around your businesses
and the employees that you have within the businesses and get
them involved, and it really goes back to, and the chief well
knows this concept, of community policing.
It really has had to step up to the next level to have an
impact on, again, that overarching concept of homeland
security.
Are either of you--I should have ask the chief this. I'm
sure he is. Is anyone in this panel aware of the Muslim public
affairs council?
So we're involved in that effort in bringing that community
together and reaching out and further educating our community?
Good, good. I am glad to hear that. I wasn't quite sure.
To get back to Matt, it's good to see you. You too, Steve.
On the issue of the HSIN critical infrastructure, you
testified it's closed down, and by who?
Mr. Morrison. By the department.
They transformed it to--
Mr. Reichert. By Homeland Security.
Mr. Morrison. HSIN CS, which is critical sectors, which is
a stove-piped, one direction only communications system, and it
doesn't work for what we have in mind.
Mr. Reichert. I have no further questions.
I yield.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks is now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Let's stay on that subject again.
Now, P-N-W-E-R, PNWER, is your big organization,
multistate, and you're the leader of that operation, right?
Mr. Morrison. I'm just the executive director. The
governors--
Mr. Dicks. Who created NWWARN?
Mr. Morrison. That was a joint effort between the Seattle
FBI, PNWER, and our stakeholder group.
Mr. Dicks. So it's separate from your organization--
Mr. Morrison. DHS, FBI, and we petitioned to DHS at the
time to be a--
Mr. Dicks. And at first they brought you into the fold,
right.
Mr. Morrison. That's right. This was 2000--
Mr. Dicks. And this was based on the Dallas, TX emergency
response network, ERN, which was largely a law enforcement
focused model out of the Dallas FBI.
Mr. Morrison. Right.
Mr. Dicks. And it was after much delay, isn't that correct,
that DHS agreed to let you be part of the new model, which
became known as HSIN critical infrastructure or HISN CI.
Did this letter that went out to the 2,000 people that were
involved in this operation, did you know they were going to go
out or did they just all of a sudden everybody gets this letter
saying this is being disbanded?
Mr. Morrison. That's right.
Mr. Dicks. Is that how it worked.
Mr. Morrison. That's how it worked.
Mr. Dicks. Why did they do it?
Mr. Morrison. I have no idea.
Mr. Dicks. Have you talked to any of them.
Mr. Morrison. Yeah, I mean, we have.
It was a turf battle going on between FBI and DHS, even
though they're both DHS, but it--
Mr. Dicks. You know what I would have done? I would have
called my congressman or your senator or somebody and asked for
some help.
Could you do that? Have you asked anybody to help you?
Mr. Morrison. Oh, yeah.
I mean, we have, but maybe not as effectively as we could
have.
Mr. Dicks. I think these--like your Blue Cascade things, I
think those--I think we should be holding you up as the model
for what a regional entity ought to be doing.
I mean, cyber systems, earthquake preparedness, pandemics,
these are the kinds of things we need to be doing, a possible
attack on BPA assets--those are the four, aren't they?
Mr. Morrison. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. I mean, I would think that the federal
government would think this is what a regional group should be
doing.
I am really taken aback by this, that this--when did this
happen?
When did these 2,000 letters go out?
Mr. McKay. It was March 21.
Mr. Dicks. I am certainly, as a member of this committee,
I'm going to bring up the DHS people and get an explanation for
this, and any information you can give me about the whole
thing, I would appreciate it because I don't think this is
right, and I certainly want to find out why they did this.
I think--I think you're right, the sector idea, the
chemical industry, all of these various industry groups, and
they're supposed to come up with industry recommendations.
That's been going very tediously as well, by the way. That
hasn't been an example of moving out and getting something
done, is it?
I mean, have you--
Mr. Morrison. The secretary announced this week that the
sector specific plans are now released, six months late, but
they are out this week.
Mr. Dicks. Has anybody had a chance to look at them? Are
they any good.
Mr. Morrison. Well--
Mr. Dicks. See I like--sector specific, I like the idea of
a regional approach because that way you know--you've got all
the various institutions in that region that are effected, and
I would love to have some of the information on your Blue
Cascade, these four exercises that you did, because I think
those are where you really learn where the vulnerabilities are
and what the problems are, and if you could get that to us, I
would definitely--I'm sure our committee would like to have
that to take a look at.
Mr. Morrison. We would love to testify in Washington about
them, but I think for me it was with General Lowenberg one time
who said, ``DOD told me all the vulnerabilities in Washington
state. DHS told--you know, in five days, but something is in
the top five was on neither list, and I wouldn't know about it
if I wasn't at the blue Cascades exercise.''
Mr. Dicks. Yeah. One of the things that he found out about
the cyber security issue, right, wasn't that it.
Mr. Morrison. I'm not going to say anything--
Mr. Dicks. That was the one, I believe.
You know, when they first came out, when Homeland Security
first came out with their critical infrastructure in the state
of Washington, do you know what two businesses were not on the
list? Boeing and Microsoft.
I mean, can you imagine having a list--I took one look at
this list, and I just said, ``I mean, this cannot be true,''
and it was true.
I don't know. They had a number of recreational places and
things like that, but they didn't have Boeing and Microsoft on
the list of critical infrastructure in the state of Washington,
and we got that straightened out, and--I just--we've got to do
better, and I appreciate all your testimony today and the work
that you're all doing, and we'll--all of us here on a
bipartisan basis, we all work together. This is about finding
some answers.
We're going to help you try to find some answers on these
issues.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony.
The lively discussion obviously keys off of what you had to
tell us. Some of it was very depressing. Some of it is
inspiring us to action.
You have in these two members people who want to fix these
problems and are obviously very proud of their home state, as
they should be.
I would just mention to Mr. Dicks, and I think he knows
this, that a lot of the information about critical
infrastructure is classified, and there's a place where I
actually think it ought to be classified.
We don't need to be telling the bad guys what our major
vulnerabilities are, but we surely do need to get proper lists
that reflect the activities of states.
There was a very foolish list for a long time that had golf
courses--not that golf courses aren't important, but I don't
think even golfers would claim--well, my husband would claim
that they're critical infrastructure, but seriously, I think
those lists do need to be kept classified, but I think your
point is very well taken that we have to integrate the list.
We can't have more stove-pipes--again, that seems to be our
tendency to have all these separated reports.
If I were Michael Chertoff, I would perhaps be inspired,
after hearing this information, to try to infuse his department
with more coordination and more of a shared mission than it
has.
Mr. Dicks. Madam Chairman, they're not helping us very
much.
Ms. Harman. And something that we have just decided to do
is sit down privately with him and go over our top ten list--
some of those top ten have just come out of this hearing--of
things that we think he needs to work on, and rather than
making it confrontational, we'll just have it be a
conversation, and maybe that is a key to getting some of this
fixed.
Surely he doesn't bring all of this turf consciousness to
his job. It's in the woodwork and it was in the woodwork of the
22 different agencies we thought--we in Congress decided we
could put into one organization on a quick basis, so that is a
problem.
Mr. Reichert has asked me to thank the mayor of the City of
Bellevue.
I think I recognized him at the beginning of the hearing,
but I would like to thank him again for making this facility
available, and just say to all of you that you are a model, and
Mr. Dicks is right that we need to bottle you in some fashion
and make sure that the good work you've done here is encouraged
and nurtured and spread around the country.
It does occur to me that places that are well organized,
like Washington state and the Los Angeles county area, have a
lot to teach the rest of the country.
We're not exactly the same as other parts of the country,
but in terms of coordination in difficult circumstances, we are
a very good model, and best practices matter.
We're spending a lot of money on this. I'm sure we could
spend more, but we need to spend it wiser than we do.
Let me just finally say that something else that was not
mentioned today that is critically important to fix is
interoperable communications, and I worry a lot that should we
have another major terrorist incident, and I believe we could
have one at any time, we might have the same meltdown that we
had in New York and Washington again in some community or some
set of communities around the country, so there's a lot of work
to do.
All three of us care a lot about this, and I would like to
ask both members if they have any concluding remarks, starting
with Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want to end on a real positive note in honor of our
dear friend Norm.
We have talked a lot about turf wars. Norm recognized
those. He and I talked a lot about those as well as most of you
in this room had the opportunity to work with Norm, but he had
two favorite things that he would always share with people, and
maybe some of you in this room even heard him say these words
to you.
One was if he would come to you and ask you how you were
doing, and you said, ``You know, I'm doing okay, Norm,'' he
would say, ``You know what, we need to move ahead today with a
smile on our face and an optimistic spirit,'' so we can do that
when it comes to these problems.
The second thing, Norm would come to me and now and then we
would visit and talk, and I remember one day a really
challenging issue in the sheriff's office, and I told him I had
this challenge ahead of me, and he said, ``You know, Dave,
there's no such thing as a challenge, only opportunities,'' so
today we have opportunities, and we've got a great team.
We really have some great opportunities to do some great
things and be true leaders here in our region, so I thank all
of you for all the hard work that you do to keep our community
safe.
I thank the chairwoman for holding this hearing in our
district, and I again thank Norm for all of his hard work on
behalf of our country and our community.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Norm.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you Jane for coming up and being here
today with us, and Congressman Reichert and I have been working
on this.
Last Congress, the Congressman was chairman, and I told him
that he got to be chairman in his first term and it only took
me 16 to become chairman, so--
Ms. Harman. Some people are slower than others.
Mr. Dicks. It took me a long time, but we're there, but
again I want to thank all of you and especially General
Lowenberg who has been right there at the start of this whole
thing, and we want to try to help you find some solutions to
these opportunities, as Congressman Reichert said, and I would
just say also that Norm Maleng was a friend of mine as well,
and we were in law school about the same time, and he also
worked for Senator Magnuson.
That may not be well remembered, but he was on the staff of
the Senate commerce committee.
The senator picked probably one of the outstanding students
each year--actually it was the faculty that picked--to send
back for this one-year opportunity to work on the Commerce
committee, and Norm Maleng was one of those that was selected,
and we all admired his career and as the prosecuting attorney
in King County for so many years, and so many important things
that he accomplished, and we're going to miss him, so thank
you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, and finally let me thank the
bipartisan staff of the Homeland Security Committee.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]