[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING OUR SCHOOLS: FEDERAL
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2007
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Serial No. 110-37
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 27
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania................................. 28
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 36
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 25
The Honorable David Davis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee............................................. 19
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 30
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 31
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 21
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 35
The Honorable Carolyn McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 37
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From
the District................................................... 34
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 33
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington................................... 23
Witnesses
Panel I
Ms. Holly Kuzmich, Deputy Chief of Staff, Policy and Programs,
Department of Education:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Robert J. Sica, Special Agent in Charge, United States Secret
Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Panel II
Ms. Cornelia M. Ashby, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income
Security, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. David Rainer, Associate Vice Chancellor, Environmental Health
and Public Safety North, Carolina State University:
Oral Statement................................................. 63
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
Dr. James C. Renick, Senior Vice President for Programs and
Research, American Council on Education:
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Prepared Statement............................................. 69
Kenneth S. Trump, M.P.A., President, National School Safety and
Security Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
Appendix
Questions and Responses:
Responses from Ms. Holly Kuzmich............................... 77
PROTECTING OUR SCHOOLS: FEDERAL
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
----------
Thursday, May 17, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Dicks, Norton,
Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Perlmutter,
Reichert, Dent, Bilirakis and Davis of Tennessee.
Also present: Representative McCarthy.
Chairman Thompson. The committee is meeting today to
receive testimony on protecting our schools, to strengthen
efforts of preparedness and response. Our Republican
colleagues, they are in a meeting and will be over very
shortly, but they indicated in the interest of time that we
should begin.
The Chair would like to acknowledge one Member who does not
sit on the full committee, the Congresswoman from New York Mrs.
McCarthy, has asked to participate in today's hearing.
Consistent with the rules and practices of the committee, we
are pleased to honor her request.
I now ask unanimous consent to allow Representative
McCarthy to sit and question the witnesses at today's hearing.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Good morning. I thank all of you for joining us this
morning as we explore the Federal efforts available for our
schools and administrators when developing and implementing
emergency preparedness and response plans. I would like to
especially thank our witnesses for working with my staff as we
periodically change the hearing schedule.
The incident at Virginia Tech was just another reminder of
the tragedies that children and students face in and around our
Nation's school. In March 1999, the tragedy at Columbine left
over a dozen students and teachers dead. In September 2001,
dozens of schools and over 6,000 children were evacuated from
the area surrounding the World Trade Center. In October 2002,
snipers struck fear in the hearts of D.C.-area residents when
they shot a Maryland boy as he stood outside of school. In
September of 2004, 186 children were killed and hundreds more
wounded when terrorists attacked the schools in Beslan, Russia.
Each of these tragedies remind us that our schools remain
vulnerable to direct and indirect attacks.
Today we will discuss the resources that are available to
our schools and look for ways to bridge the communications gap
between local and State school administrators and the Federal
Government.
Existing objective and anecdotal evidence suggests that
most American schools are not adequately prepared to respond to
a serious crisis. I have spent much time on this committee
working on school preparedness issues. Last year I commissioned
a survey as Ranking Member of the House Homeland Security
Committee. I sent this survey to various schools and school
districts within the Second District of Mississippi to
determine the level of preparedness within the schools and to
see how these respondents are relying on Federal agencies like
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Education in making their plans.
Unfortunately, the results of the survey indicate that most
of the schools in Mississippi are doing the bulk of the work
alone. The two major fellow agencies designed to deal with this
issue, DHS and Education, are not even considered resources by
school officials. Many of the respondents commented that they
welcome a more proactive approach from the Department of
Homeland Security in reaching out to schools and school
districts as they develop their emergency plants.
Unfortunately, the Department thus far has failed to take a
leadership role in preparedness.
Our Federal agencies can do better in coordinating school
preparedness materials for our the State and local governments.
I hope that after today's hearing, officials from both
Departments will work to create a comprehensive Web site that
will serve as a one-stop shop for school administrators to use
in planning for and responding to emergencies.
There is an abundance of resources available to State and
local officials. Up until now these resources have been
difficult to find. I think a well-publicized Web site will help
solve some of these problems, but I am also deeply concerned
about the priorities of this administration when it comes to
providing financial resources to help schools confront these
problems.
One must question the administration's priorities in light
of the cuts that have been imposed on school preparedness
funding across the country. For 2 consecutive years, in fiscal
year 2006 and 2007, President Bush has sought to eliminate all
funding for the State grant portion of the Safe and Drug-Free
School program. This program provides grants to State education
agencies which they can distribute to local schools for things
like metal detectors, security cameras, and training for campus
security personnel.
The number of awards under the Emergency Response and
Crisis Management Plan Discretionary Grants program has also
dropped from 134 awards in 2003 down to 100 awards in 2005.
We can't keep doing this to our children. The Federal
Government can't prevent these tragedies from occurring, but we
can help our schools plan better and prepare better. It is the
very least we can do.
Chairman Thompson. In the absence of The Ranking Member, I
will move forward with the introduction of the first witness,
panel of witnesses.
I now welcome our first witness, Ms. Holly Kuzmich, Deputy
Chief of Staff of Policy and Programs, U.S. Department of
Education. Ms. Kuzmich oversees and works with the various
policy officers at the Department on behalf of the Secretary.
Our second witness is Robert J. Sica, Special Agent with
the U.S. Secret Service, having served in various
investigative, protective and staff assignments in New York
City; Wilmington, Delaware; and Washington, D.C. Currently he
is serving as a Special Agent in Charge of the National Threat
Assessment Center.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize their statements for 5
minutes, beginning with Ms. Kuzmich.
STATEMENT OF HOLLY KUZMICH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, POLICY AND
PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Ms. Kuzmich. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and other members
of the committee, for inviting the Department of Education to
come and share what we are doing in the area of emergency
management as it relates to schools.
When parents send their children off to school or college,
they expect them to be safe. Horrible events like the recent
shootings on Virginia Tech's campus give us the opportunity to
review our efforts on school and campus safety and look at ways
that we can improve those efforts.
As part of this effort, in response to these deadly
shootings, President Bush directed Secretary Leavitt, Secretary
Spellings and Attorney General Gonzales to travel to
communities across our Nation, meet with educators, mental
health experts, and State and local officials to discuss issues
raised by this tragedy.
The three Cabinet officials traveled to 12 States across
the country over the past several weeks and held productive
meetings. The President instructed Secretary Leavitt to
summarize the information gathered at the series of meetings
and report back with recommendations about how the Federal
Government can help avoid such tragedies in the future. We
expect to report to the President in the next few weeks, and we
look forward to sharing with you the results of these meetings.
While my written testimony goes into much greater detail, I
would like to provide some information about a few of our
activities from the Department of Education that are most
directly related to emergency management issues.
To help create safe schools, ED's Office of Safe and Drug-
Free Schools carries out a broad range of activities. I am
going to let Mr. Sica describe the joint Secret Service and
Education effort under the Safe School Initiative in more
detail.
Our collective efforts as part of this initiative include
development of a final report on targeted school shootings, a
threat assessment guide in interactive CD-ROM, and threat
assessment training. We believe these activities have proven to
be very valuable to schools around the country.
When school violence or a traumatic crisis occurs, a key
function of the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools is to help
school districts provide education-related services and restore
the learning environment. Project School Emergency Response to
Violence, or Project SERV, is the Department of Education's
primary funding source for this purpose.
Project SERV is designed to ensure a continuum of
postincident services through two different tiers of funding:
immediate services and extended services. Under the first tier,
we provide emergency short-term assistance to affected school
districts. Under the second, we assist school districts in
meeting their longer-term needs in responding to the crisis.
In addition to supporting schools that are recovering from
traumatic events, we support schools as they plan for potential
crises. We administer the Readiness and Emergency Management
for Schools grant program to provide funds to school districts
to improve and strengthen their emergency management plans.
Grant funds enable schools to work closely with local
community partners and first responders as well as to provide
training on emergency procedures, conduct practice drills and
purchase supplies to support their emergency management
efforts.
We also provide additional resources to support school
preparedness efforts. Our Practical Information on Crisis
Planning Guide provides schools and their communities with an
introduction to emergency management as it applies to schools
and basic guidelines for developing school emergency management
plans.
In addition, since 2004, we have supported an Emergency
Response in Crisis Management Technical Assistance Center that
is available to support schools in their development of all-
hazards emergency management plans. The Center supports a Web
site and offers a series of school-based emergency management
publications and training sessions to the public. And in an
effort to provide crisis-planning information to an audience
beyond our grantees, we provide training on emergency
management planning for nongrantees twice a year, and this
training has included attendees from over 40 States.
In addition, in October of 2006, the White House convened a
Conference on School Safety in a response to a series of tragic
shootings that took place in our Nation's schools. The
conference was designed to provide an opportunity for
educators, law enforcement officials, mental health providers,
representatives of community-based organizations, parents and
students to come together to share strategies for preventing
violence and learn from one another.
Additionally, we hosted a special Webcast last November to
review emergency planning and construct strategies to help
schools mitigate, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover
from a crisis. We updated our crisis planning guide and
recently sent it to chief State school officers, key education
associations, Safe School Centers, and school security chiefs
across the country.
The Department of Education also works closely with other
Federal agencies. We have worked with the Department of
Homeland Security on a number of items including the Safe
School Initiative and the protective efforts related to schools
as part of the National Infrastructure of Protection Plan.
In addition to the Department of Homeland Security, we will
continue to work regularly with other Federal agencies, such as
the Department of Health and Human Services, Justice, and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, on a variety of school
safety initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, schools are generally safe, but all of us,
Federal, State, and local government, community-based
organizations, and parents and students share the
responsibility to work to make them safer. I believe that by
working together we can do so.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
committee, and I look forward to answering any questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Kuzmich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Holly Kuzmich
I. Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and all the
members of the Committee for inviting the Department of Education to
come and share with you what we are doing in the area of emergency
management as it relates to schools.
On behalf of Secretary Spellings I compliment you on your focus on
the issues that are the subject of today's hearing, as well as the many
actions you have taken prior to today. Whether we are parents or not,
we are all touched by the lives of children. Childhood is a time of
innocence, learning, and experiencing new things and we are deeply
troubled when that innocence is shattered by senseless tragedy. When
parents send their children off to school or college they expect them
to be safe. And when horrible events like the recent shootings on
Virginia Tech's campus happen, we are shaken to our core and need to
take time, as a nation, to grieve for what we lost that day.
As you know, in response to the shootings at Virginia Tech,
President Bush directed Secretary Spellings, Secretary Leavitt, and
Attorney General Gonzales to travel to communities across our nation,
to meet with educators, mental health experts, and State and local
officials to discuss issues raised by this tragedy. This effort is
under way, and some very productive meetings have been held. The
President instructed Secretary Leavitt to summarize the information
gathered at the series of meetings and report back with recommendations
about how the Federal Government can help States and communities avoid
such tragedies in the future.
But the events like those at Virginia Tech also require that we
redouble our efforts to make schools even safer. As President Bush
said, ``Schools should be places of safety and sanctuary and learning.
When that sanctuary is violated, the impact is felt in every American
classroom and every American community.''
I want to start by mentioning a few key facts and principles about
schools and school safety.
Schools are safe places for students to be. While even one murder
or one assault or robbery is too many, schools generally are much safer
than the communities in which they are located. For many students,
schools remain safe havens, places they can go to get away from
violence.
Schools can't create safe learning environments by themselves. They
need to establish partnerships with a variety of local organizations
and agencies, including law enforcement, health and mental health
organizations, faith-based groups, youth-serving organizations, parent
groups, and student groups.
Issues related to the safety and security of our Nation's schools
are primarily a State and local responsibility. While the Department of
Education and other Federal agencies have an important role to play in
helping make schools safer, that role is a limited one. Our priority is
to have the greatest impact that we can, given the limited nature of
our role.
II. Mission of the Department and of Schools
The mission of the Department of Education is to promote student
achievement by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal
access. We work to supplement and complement the efforts of States,
local school systems, and others to improve the quality of education.
We believe that supporting the efforts of States and localities to
create safe and secure learning environments is a critical part of that
mission. We know that while schools generally are safe and shootings
are rare, we can and must work to make them even safer. When schools
are not safe, when children are compromised because of drugs or
alcohol, or when children are afraid to go to school because of
bullying, the educational experience is diminished and academic
achievement will be limited. Research on academic achievement indicates
that students must first feel safe and secure and be healthy in order
to have the best chance to be successful in school.
While the mission of schools is to teach all students to the
highest possible standards, we know that teachers can't teach and
students can't learn to their fullest extent if they are not safe or if
they don't feel safe. In order to help students maximize their academic
potential, schools need to create a climate which not only promotes
learning but does so in an atmosphere where:
inappropriate behaviors such as bullying are not
tolerated;
students are held responsible for their actions and
are sanctioned consistent with discipline policies;
the illegal possession of alcohol, drugs, and firearms
is strictly prohibited;
threats against schools, faculty, and students are
diligently investigated; and
all students feel connected to their school and know
that they have a place to turn for help and advice.
III. ED Emergency Management Activities
To help create safe schools, ED's Office of Safe and Drug-Free
Schools (OSDFS) carries out a broad range of activities. We provide
support to States, local educational agencies, and community-based
organizations through a formula-grant program, and also administer a
series of competitive grant initiatives. We also carry out a range of
national leadership activities with funds appropriated under the Safe
and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act National Programs authority.
We use these funds to support activities including training, technical
assistance, data collection and dissemination, program development, and
program support.
Many of these activities are developed and implemented in
coordination and collaboration with a variety of other offices within
ED, as well as with other Federal agencies and private organizations
that serve youth. We work regularly with other Federal agencies such as
the Department of Homeland Security, including the United States Secret
Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Homeland Security
Institute, and other offices and councils; the Department of Health and
Human Services, including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; the Department of Justice,
including the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention;
and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. We also work closely
with a variety of private non-profit youth serving organizations, such
as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
Details about some of the activities we carry out that are directly
related to readiness and emergency management for schools follow.
Safe School Initiative:
I am going to let Mr. Sica, the Special Agent in Charge of the
United States Secret Service (USSS), National Threat Assessment Center
describe the joint USSS and ED effort under this initiative in more
detail. Our collective efforts as part of the Safe School Initiative
include development of a Final Report on Targeted School Shootings; a
Threat Assessment Guide; an interactive CD-ROM ``A Safe School and
Threat Assessment Experience: Scenarios Exploring the Findings of the
Safe School Initiative''; a study on students that were aware of
planned school shootings and took no action (in draft); and threat
assessment trainings (339 sessions to over 77,000 persons). We believe
that these activities have proven to be very valuable to schools around
the country.
Project SERV
A key function of the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools is to
help school districts provide education-related services and restore
the learning environment after a violent or traumatic crisis. Project
School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV) is the Department of
Education's primary funding source for this purpose.
Experience has taught us that responding adequately to school-based
traumatic events requires both an immediate and a continuing component.
Project SERV is designed to ensure a continuum of post-incident
services through two different tiers of funding: Immediate Services and
Extended Services. Under the first tier (Immediate Services), we
provide emergency, short-term assistance to affected school districts;
under the second (Extended Services), we assist school districts in
meeting their longer-term needs in responding to the crisis.
Immediate Services grants are intended to provide support very
quickly following an incident. Immediate Services grants under Project
SERV generally are for a maximum amount of $50,000 over a six-month
period. Applications received for Immediate Services grants are given
priority and undergo an expedited review. Extended Services grants are
intended to address the long-term recovery efforts that may be needed
following a significant, traumatic event. They generally provide a
maximum of $250,000 over a period of up to 18 months to help maintain
safety and security in an affected school and to help students,
teachers, school staff, and family members recover from the event.
Since the program's inception in 2001, the Department has awarded
$24.9 million in grants under Project SERV to 34 school districts and
nine States. These grants have included 45 Immediate Services and nine
Extended Services grants. Funds have been awarded to districts in
response to events such as school shootings and student suicides. In
addition, Project SERV funds were awarded in response to large-scale
events such as 9/11, the Washington, D.C., area sniper incidents, and
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Project SERV funds have enabled schools to restore a critical sense
of safety and security after a crisis. Funds have been used for mental
health services, additional security services and temporary security
measures, training for staff, and other services needed to restore the
learning environment.
Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
In addition to supporting schools that are recovering from
traumatic events, we support schools as they plan for potential crises.
We administer the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS)
competitive grant program to provide funds to local educational
agencies to improve and strengthen their emergency management plans.
Since 2003, OSDFS has awarded 413 grants under this program totaling
over $112 million for K-12 school preparedness. Funds are used to
support emergency management plan development incorporating the four
phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery. Grant funds enable schools to work closely with
local community partners and first responders, as well as to provide
training on emergency procedures, conduct practice drills, and purchase
supplies to support their emergency management efforts.
We also provide additional resources to support school preparedness
efforts. Our Practical Information on Crisis Planning Guide provides
schools and their communities with a general introduction to emergency
management as it applies to schools and basic guidelines for developing
school emergency management plans. In addition, since 2004, we have
supported an Emergency Response and Crisis Management Technical
Assistance Center that is available to support schools in their
development of all-hazards emergency management plans. The Center
supports a Web site and offers a series of school-based emergency
management publications and training sessions to the public. Also, in
an effort to provide crisis planning information to an audience beyond
REMS grantees, we provide training on emergency management planning for
non-grantees twice a year. These training activities have included
attendees from more than 40 States. Our most recent session was held in
St. Louis earlier in May.
DHS/NIPP
OSDFS has been working with the Department of Homeland Security on
protective efforts related to schools for several years. In the summer
of 2006, the category of Education Facilities, which includes all
schools and institutions of higher education, became a sub-sector
within the Government Facilities Sector as part of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) effort. As part of this change,
we are responsible for providing information to DHS on school and
university protective efforts. We also coordinate school protective
efforts with a number of other offices within DHS, including the Office
of Infrastructure Protection, which leads the coordinated national
effort to reduce the risk to our critical infrastructures and key
resources posed by acts of terrorism, and the Office of Risk Management
and Analysis, which leads DHS' efforts to establish a common framework
to address the overall management and analysis of homeland security
risk.
We also participate in other homeland security-related activities,
including working groups involved in the interagency review of the
National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System
(NIMS), and provide senior-level representation on the NIPP Federal
Senior Leadership Council and the Homeland Security Council's Domestic
Readiness Group.
White House Conference on School Safety
In October of 2006, the White House convened a Conference on School
Safety in response to a series of tragic shootings that took place in
our Nation's schools. The conference was designed to provide an
opportunity for educators, law enforcement officials, mental health
providers, representatives of community-based organizations, parents,
and students to come together to share strategies for preventing
violence and learn from one another.
Because school violence is a complex problem, requiring a
comprehensive approach, panelists and participants discussed a wide
range of topics, including:
research about the nature and extent of school
violence;
ways in which law enforcement, schools, and others can
work together to establish safe environments and prevent school
shootings;
emergency management planning activities that help
schools prepare to respond to violent acts and other crises;
and
strategies to help school communities heal and recover
if and when a violent incident occurs.
As a follow-up to the Conference, the Department disseminated
materials on emergency management preparedness to all public and
private elementary and secondary schools, including a message from the
Secretary summarizing the conference content and the Practical
Information on Crisis Planning brochure.
We hosted a special web cast on November 15 to review emergency
planning and suggest strategies to help schools mitigate, prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from a crisis. Nearly 3,900 people
successfully participated in the live event in November, and, by the
end of 2006, about 2,600 additional individuals downloaded the archive
Web cast.
In December, the Secret Service and ED released a new interactive
CD-ROM, A Safe School and Threat Assessment Experience: Scenarios
Exploring the Findings of the Safe School Initiative, designed to
complement the existing Threat Assessment Guide. As Mr. Sica mentioned,
this CD-ROM, which included a copy of the Threat Assessment Guide and
final report of the SSI, was distributed to chief state school
officers, key education associations, Safe School Centers, and School
Security Chiefs in January 2007.
We updated our crisis-planning guide and mailed the revised
information to chief state school officers, key education associations,
Safe School Centers, and School Security Chiefs on April 19, 2007.
Chiefs of School Police
ED staff meets regularly with the head safety and security
officials from the Nation's 40 largest school districts. These face-to-
face meetings provide the Department with a better understanding of the
problems confronting the Nation's schools and allow the safety and
security officials to share information about issues facing their
particular school districts. We have also established a list serv for
the group that allows the Department and the security officials to
engage in dialogue on various issues related to school safety and
security, school crime, and emerging concerns.
NOAA Public Alert Radios
Since 2005, the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools has
collaborated with the Departments of Homeland Security and Commerce to
provide NOAA Public Alert Radios to schools. Since 2005, 97,000 radios
have been distributed to public schools in the country.
Information on these initiatives and the various products I've
mentioned is available on the Department's web site www.ed.gov by
clicking on ``school safety''.
IV. Other Related Activities
The Department of Education also implements several other programs
and initiatives that, while not designed to immediately address
readiness and emergency management concerns, do play an important role
in efforts to create safe and supportive school climates. Details about
some of these activities follow.
Safe Schools/Healthy Students
A joint project of the Departments of Education, Health and Human
Services, and Justice, the Safe Schools/Healthy Students initiative
provides grants to local school districts to develop and implement a
comprehensive plan to create safe school environments and support
healthy youth development. Local school districts that receive grants
under the initiative are required to enter into partnerships with
juvenile justice and law enforcement officials, as well as the local
public mental health authority as part of the initiative.
Character Education
The Partnerships in Character Education Program helps create a
school climate that is safe and caring. Since 1995, the goal of this
grant program has been to bring schools, parents, students, and the
community together to implement a community-wide character education
program. To date, we have made 139 partnership grants to State
educational agencies and local school districts totaling more than
$121,500,000. Research studies posted on the U. S. Department of
Education's What Works Clearinghouse Web site show that character
education is linked to improved character development, pro-social
behavior and academic achievement.
School Associated Violent Death Study
Since 1992, the Department of Education has assisted the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention in collecting information about
school-associated violent deaths in order to identify trends that can
help schools develop preventive measures that protect and promote the
health, safety and development of all students. Although school-
associated violent deaths remain rare events, they have occurred often
enough to begin to detect patterns and identify potential risk factors.
The data has provided important information about the characteristics
of homicides, homicide perpetrators and the context of a homicide event
to help inform potential homicide prevention strategies and activities.
Results from the ongoing study are available on the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention website.
Gun-Free Schools Act
The Gun-Free Schools Act (GFSA) requires that each State or
outlying area receiving Federal funds under the ESEA have a law that
requires all local educational agencies to expel from school for at
least one year any student who takes a firearm to school or possesses a
firearm at school. State laws also must authorize the local school
superintendent to modify, in writing, any such expulsion on a case-by-
case basis. In addition, the GFSA states that the law must be construed
so as to be consistent with the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).
The GFSA requires States and outlying areas to report information
about the implementation of the GFSA annually to the Secretary of
Education. We summarize reports from the States and produce an annual
report that is released to the public. The reports are not designed to
provide information regarding the rate at which students carry firearms
to school or possess firearms at school. Rather, the data summarized in
the report relate to actions taken with regard to the number of
students found bringing firearms to schools or possessing firearms at
schools.
The most recently released report contains data from the 2002-2003
school year. That report indicates that the States (including the
District of Columbia and the territories) expelled 2,143 students for
bringing a firearm to school or possessing a firearm at school. More
than half of the expulsions (58 percent) were in senior high schools
and 11 percent were for elementary school students. Fifty-five percent
of expulsions were for bringing or possessing a handgun, and 13 percent
were for bringing or possessing a rifle or shotgun. The remaining 32
percent of expulsions were for other firearms or destructive devices
such as bombs or grenades.
Additional details about all of these initiatives are available at
the Department's website, www.ed.gov.
V. Reauthorization
While many local school districts have made strides toward creating
safe and drug-free learning environments, it is clear, based on the
results of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review, as well as
our experience in administering the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act provisions, that we must do better. The 2006 PART for
the Safe and Drug Free Schools State Grant Program found the structure
of this program is still flawed, spreading funding too broadly to
support quality interventions and failing to target those schools and
communities in greatest need of assistance. As part of the
reauthorization of No Child Left Behind, we propose restructuring the
Safe and Drug-Free State Grants program in order to better serve
schools and communities. Specifically, we propose making Safe and Drug-
Free Schools State Grants funds available to States to support
training, technical assistance, and information for schools about the
most effective models and strategies to create safe, healthy, and
secure schools.
A key difference between our proposed approach and the current Safe
and Drug-Free Schools State Grants program is that our reauthorization
proposal would focus on building State capacity to assist schools adopt
and implement effective models that, to the extent possible, reflect
scientifically based research. While States would be authorized to make
subgrants to local school districts, these awards would not be made
based on a statutory formula, but rather in response to demonstrated
need for assistance.
Our reauthorization proposal would complement these changes to the
Safe and Drug-Free Schools State Grants program with revisions to the
SDFS National Programs authority. We propose consolidating SDFS
National Programs into a single and flexible discretionary grant
program that would be focused on four priority areas--emergency
management planning; preventing violence and drug use, including
student drug testing; school culture and climate, including character
education; and other needs related to improving the learning
environment to help students meet high academic standards.
Our proposed approach would replace an array of narrowly conceived,
but sometimes overlapping-authorities with a single program focused on
critical areas of national concern. It would provide the flexibility
that we need to respond to new and emerging needs in school safety and
drug prevention, and provide potential grantees with the opportunity to
develop more comprehensive proposals rather than piecing together
activities from multiple grant streams, requiring multiple application
notices, implementation rules, and reporting and accountability
requirements.
V. Closing
In conclusion, I want to return to where I began. Schools are
generally safe, but all of us--Federal, State and local government
organizations, community-based organizations, and parents and
students--share the responsibility to work to make them safer. I
believe that by working together we can do so. Thank you for this
opportunity and I look forward to working with you on these issues.
Chairman Thompson. We now will hear from Special Agent Sica
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. SICA, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, U.S.
SECRET SERVICE, NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT CENTER, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sica. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Congressman King
and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
Mr. Chairman, if it pleases the committee, I will offer a
few brief remarks and ask that my full statement, in addition
to the guides and CD-ROM before you, be made part of the
record.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
Mr. Sica. On behalf of the men and women of the United
States Secret Service, I would like to convey our condolences
to the families of the Virginia Tech victims and all other
victims of school-targeted school violence.
In 1997, the Secret Service completed the exceptional case
study project, an operational study of the behavior of all
persons who attacked or tried to attack prominent public
officials or public figures in the United States between 1949
through 1995. This study lead the Secret Service to modify and
improve its approach to threat assessment as it relates to the
protection of our national and world leaders.
Also, as a result of this study, the term ``targeted
violence'' was developed. Targeted violence refers to any
incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects
a particular target prior to their violent attack.
In 1998, the Secret Service established the National Threat
Assessment Center, an entity within the Secret Service that is
dedicated to continuing efforts to study and prevent targeted
violence and to share this developing knowledge with other
constituent agencies responsible for public safety and
protection.
After a number of school shootings that occurred in 1998
and 1999, the Secret Service, at the invitation of and in
partnership with the U.S. Department of Education, began a
similar operational study of school shootings: the Safe School
Initiative. The goal of the Safe School Initiative was to
gather and analyze accurate and useful information about the
behavior and thinking of students who commit acts of targeted
violence in our Nation's schools.
The study was comprised of a systematic analysis of
investigative, judicial, educational and other pertinent case
records and included interviews with those involved with school
shootings. As a result of the study, the Secret Service and the
Department of Education published a final report and the threat
assessment guide for schools, copies of which have been
provided to this committee.
The Secret Service and the Department of Education
routinely share results of our study with school and law
enforcement professionals responsible for the prevention of
targeted school violence. We believe that the guide and final
report may aid our Nation's school and law enforcement
communities to work together in a systematic way and prevent
further acts of targeted violence in schools.
These publications are available on our public Web site.
The report contains key study findings, two of which I
would like to highlight: Prior to most incidents, other people
knew about the attackers' idea or plan to attack. The attackers
often communicated their plans to others, friends, schoolmates,
or siblings. This finding, in particular, struck both the
Secret Service and the Department of Education as being of
particular importance to prevention efforts.
We are currently conducting additional research into this
bystander phenomenon to shed more light on more information
that may be conveyed prior to an attack. We hope the knowledge
gained through this study will help improve prevention efforts.
Despite prompt law enforcement response, most incidents
were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by
school administrators, educators and students or by the
attacker stopping on his own.
In light of these findings and others, the use of a threat
assessment approach may be a promising strategy for preventing
a school-based attack.
Threat assessment is a fact-based investigative and
analytical approach that focuses on the identification,
assessment, and management of those who may pose a threat of
targeted violence. Schools and law enforcement may be able to
prevent some incidents of targeted school violence if they know
what information to look for and what to do with such
information when it is found.
Schools should consider establishing multidisciplinary
threat assessment teams to better detect and evaluate
information that might indicate that there is a risk of
targeted school attack and ultimately develop strategies to
prevent potential school attacks from occurring.
As of April 2000, the National Threat Assessment Center has
provided briefing and training on school initiatives in 339
different sessions to over 77,000 people. The attendees have
included educators, school administrators, school resource
officers, other law enforcement and community representatives.
However, to even better assist with the dissemination of this
salient research, the Secret Service and the Department of
Education have recently released an interactive CD-ROM, a copy
of which has been provided to this committee.
Through the use of hypothetical school-based scenarios,
school threat assessment team members may further develop their
skills in conducting a threat assessment inquiry. The unique
interactive format is designed to serve as a tabletop exercise
for team members to gain familiarity with the threat assessment
process as well as the role each team member will play in it.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I
would be happy to answer any questions that you or other
members of the committee may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Sica follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Sica
Good morning, Chairman Thompson. I would like to thank you, as well
as the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. King, and the other members of
the Committee for providing an opportunity to discuss the Safe School
Initiative, a collaboration between the U.S. Secret Service and the
U.S. Department of Education.
As part of our protective responsibilities, the U.S. Secret Service
has long held the view that the best protective strategy is one of
prevention. The goal of Secret Service threat assessment efforts is to
identify, assess, and manage persons who have the interest and ability
to mount attacks against Secret Service protectees.
National Threat Assessment Center
In 1998, the Secret Service created the National Threat Assessment
Center (NTAC). The mission of NTAC is to provide guidance on threat
assessment both within the Secret Service and to the criminal justice
and public safety communities. Through the Presidential Protection Act
of 2000, Congress formally authorized NTAC to provide assistance to
federal, state, and local law enforcement as well as others with
protective responsibilities in the following functional areas:
Conducting research on threat assessment and various
types of targeted violence;
Providing training on threat assessment and targeted
violence to law enforcement officials and others with
protective and public safety responsibilities;
Facilitating information-sharing among agencies with
protective and/or public safety responsibilities;
Provide case consultation on individual threat
assessment investigations and for agencies building threat
assessment units; and,
Developing programs to promote the standardization of
federal, state, and local threat assessment and investigations
involving threats.
As a result of our research in the areas of attacks on public
officials, public figures, and in schools, NTAC has provided relevant
information and advice to law enforcement and other professionals who
are charged with investigating and/or preventing targeted violence.
NTAC has also collaborated with experts in the fields of stalking,
domestic violence, and targeted workplace violence. The Secret Service
provides this information nationwide through NTAC's threat assessment
seminars and formal presentations, as well as several publications. In
addition, NTAC offers assistance to organizations interested in
developing threat assessment programs.
Background
In response to concerns about the safety of America's schools
following several high-profile shootings, in June of 1999, the U.S.
Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education collaborated on the
Safe School Initiative (SSI), an operational analysis of school-based
attacks in the United States. The SSI focused on a rare but significant
component of the problem of school violence--incidents of targeted
violence in schools. The term ``targeted violence'' evolved from the
Secret Service's Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), an operational
analysis of the thinking and behavior of those who have assassinated,
attacked, or tried to attack public officials or public figures in the
United States since 1949. The ECSP defined targeted violence as any
incident of violence where a known (or knowable) attacker selects a
particular target prior to their violent attack. The purpose of the
ECSP was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public
officials which, in turn, would assist the Secret Service with
investigations of threats against the President and other protectees,
and support the development of strategies to prevent harm to these
public officials.
Research and Findings
The SSI, in both focus and design, was modeled after the ECSP.
Targeted school violence was defined as an incident where a current or
recent former student attacked someone at his or her school with lethal
means and purposefully chose the school as the location of the attack.
Through the use of this modified definition, the SSI identified and
studied 37 school shootings, involving 41 attackers that occurred from
1974 through 2000. The emphasis of the SSI, as with the ECSP, was on
obtaining information about the pre-incident thinking and behaviors of
the attackers--students who have planned and carried out instances of
targeted violence in American schools. This information was gathered
through a systematic analysis of investigative, judicial, educational,
and other pertinent case records, and interviews with ten (10) of the
young boys involved in school shootings. Ultimately, this collaboration
was designed to address two central questions concerning school
attacks: ``Could we have known these attacks were planned?'' and,
``What could be done to prevent these attacks from occurring?''
The SSI resulted in the publication of two documents, The Final
Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the
prevention of school attacks in the United States (May 2002), and
Threat Assessment in Schools: A guide to managing threatening
situations and to creating safe school climates (May 2002), copies of
which have been provided to this Committee. The report and guide are
available on the Secret Service web site at: www.secretservice.gov.
The ten key findings of the SSI, as detailed in the Report,
include:
1. Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden,
impulsive acts.
2. Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the
attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
3. Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior
to advancing the attack.
4. There is no accurate or useful profile of students who
engaged in targeted school violence.
5. Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the
incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for
help.
6. Most attackers had difficulties coping with significant
losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or
attempted suicide.
7. Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by
others prior to the attack.
8. Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to
the attack.
9. In many cases, other students were involved in some
capacity.
10. Despite prompt law enforcement response, most incidents
were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by
school administrators, educators, and students or by the
attacker stopping on his own.
While each of these findings is important and may be useful for
improving school safety, one finding in particular struck both the
Secret Service and Department of Education as being of unique
importance to prevention efforts: ``Prior to most incidents, other
people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.'' We are
currently conducting additional research into this `Bystander'
phenomenon to learn more about information that may be conveyed prior
to an attack. Some of the questions we are attempting to address
include: What information is conveyed prior to the attack? To whom? Why
isn't the information brought forward to a responsible adult? How can
we increase the likelihood that information will be shared? The goal of
this effort is to provide information to school administrators and
educators regarding possible barriers that may prevent children who
have information about a potential incident from reporting that
information to a responsible adult.
Threat Assessment Approach
Threat assessment, as developed and utilized by the Secret Service,
is a fact-based investigative and analytical process that focuses on
the identification, assessment, and management of those who may pose a
threat of targeted violence. In light of findings of the SSI, a threat
assessment approach may be a promising strategy for preventing a
school-based attack. The Secret Service believes there are six
fundamental principles to the threat assessment process:
1. Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable,
and often discernable, process of thinking and behavior.
2. Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the
person, the situation, the setting, and the target.
3. An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical
to successful threat assessment.
4. Effective threat assessment is based on facts, rather than
characteristics or traits.
5. An integrated systems approach, which incorporates gathering
and sharing information between entities that had involvement
with the student, such as educational, community, or faith-
based organizations, should guide threat assessment
investigations.
6. The central question of a threat assessment is whether a
student poses a threat, not whether a student made a threat.
As illustrated by these principles, targeted violence is the end
result of a process that can often be detectable by accurately
gathering and assessing the facts of a particular case. Schools and law
enforcement may be able to prevent some incidents of targeted school
violence if they know what information to look for and what to do with
such information when it is found. To best gather and evaluate
information from multiple sources, schools should consider establishing
multidisciplinary threat assessment teams comprised of people from the
school, the community, and law enforcement. By utilizing this multi-
systems approach, these threat assessment teams may be able to detect
and evaluate information that might indicate that there is a risk of a
targeted school attack; and, ultimately develop strategies to prevent
potential school attacks from occurring.
Trainings and Dissemination
The U.S. Secret Service routinely shares the results of the SSI
with school and law enforcement professionals responsible for the
prevention of targeted school violence.
As illustrated in the graph below, through April 2007, NTAC has
provided briefings and training on the SSI at 339 different sessions to
over 77,000 people. The attendees have included educators, school
administrators, school resource officers, other law enforcement, and
community representatives.
These information-sharing seminars have occurred throughout the
United States and internationally as well. The illustration below
depicts the locations of the SSI sessions.
To aid in the dissemination of this salient research, the Secret
Service and Department of Education have released an interactive CD-
ROM, A Safe School and Threat Assessment Experience: Scenarios
Exploring the Findings of the Safe School Initiative, a copy of which
has been provided to this Committee. Following last October's White
House Conference on School Safety, this CD-ROM along with a copy of the
threat assessment guide and final report of the SSI described earlier--
was distributed to school superintendents and others involved in school
safety in January 2007. Through the use of hypothetical school-based
scenarios, school threat assessment team members may further develop
their skills in conducting a threat assessment inquiry. The unique
interactive format is designed to serve as a tabletop exercise for team
members to gain familiarity with the threat assessment process, as well
as the role each team member will play in it.
Conclusion
The research completed by the Secret Service and Department of
Education through the Safe School Initiative has greatly contributed to
our understanding of targeted school violence and helped to identify
steps that may be implemented to prevent future occurrences.
Establishing and maintaining multidisciplinary threat assessment teams
that enlist school and community resources may better equip schools to
handle those who pose a risk of targeted violence through prompt
identification, accurate assessment, and effective management.
Chairman Thompson, thank you again for the opportunity to appear
before this Committee.
Chairman Thompson. I would like to thank you both for your
testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Ms. Kuzmich, first of all, thank you for helping me in the
Greenville, Mississippi, forum. As you saw, there is a good bit
of interest in this whole question, but you could see the range
of participation from small districts to large, and the degree
of sophistication varied based on that.
Can you tell the committee, for the most part, what a
school district is telling you they need from a preparedness
standpoint?
Ms. Kuzmich. I think in terms of what we hear consistently
as we talk to people across the country is wanting model
programs to look at. We especially hear--you know, I think we
see from urban districts across the country and larger school
districts who have more staff and more capacity, they have
obviously looked at these issues more significantly. We do hear
a lot from smaller, rural districts that they need, you know,
best practices and model approaches that they can take and
adopt in their district because it is more of a challenge for
them.
I think the thing that we have worked on significantly,
too, and the thing that we see as something to continue working
on in the future is, you know, there are 15,000 school
districts across the country, and State education agencies
obviously play a large role in education within our States and
is one of our main liaisons at the Department of Education. So
how can we best work not just with all 15,000 school districts,
which is a big challenge for us at the Federal level, but to
work with States so that they can work with their own
districts, provide training, technical assistance to their own
districts on emergency management planning.
Chairman Thompson. Well, is it your testimony before the
committee that you have provided training for all States on
school preparedness at this point?
Ms. Kuzmich. We have about 40 States who have participated
so far.
Chairman Thompson. So it is voluntary.
Ms. Kuzmich. It is.
Chairman Thompson. Can you tell the committee whether or
not the Department plans to do anything else around school
preparedness other than to offer voluntary participation in
training?
Ms. Kuzmich. There is voluntary participation at the State
level. Right now through the Safe and Drug-Free Schools formula
program that we currently have, which is a formula grant to all
50 States, but essentially a formula program to all districts
across the country, as part of that program within No Child
Left Behind, districts have to certify that they have an
emergency response plan within their districts. Now, whether
that plan is updated and robust is another question, and I
think that is certainly something we need to work on.
And the thing that we have proposed, since that program is
authorized through No Child Left Behind, which is up for
reauthorization this year, what we propose to do with the
States grant program, which right now is disbursed very thinly
to districts across the country, half of districts get less
than $10,000, which is not really effective for them to do
alcohol/drug prevention and emergency crisis planning--what we
have proposed to do is to change that plan program into a more
robust State grant program where we give the funding, two
grants at the State level, and allow them to do training and
technical assistance, because disbursing funds to all 15,000
districts we don't think is the most effective way to really
get more bang for our buck.
Chairman Thompson. You do understand this is the same
program that the President has zeroed out in the last two
budgets?
Ms. Kuzmich. We have put money in the budget this year for
that program, and we have redesigned it to focus it at that
State level so that we can --I think we feel like that is a
more effective model to work with State leadership.
Chairman Thompson. How much money?
Ms. Kuzmich. We have $99 million.
Chairman Thompson. Ninety-nine million dollars for 15,000
school districts?
Ms. Kuzmich. For 50 States. We have redesigned how to--how
we send that money out.
Chairman Thompson. Fifty States, 15,000 school districts.
It still has to get to the school districts, right?
Ms. Kuzmich. It does.
Chairman Thompson. So that is about a million and a half
per State?
Ms. Kuzmich. It is about $2 million per State, although
that could change based on the size of the State. And I mean
our real goal, we are always going to have a discussion about
what is the right level of funding for programs like this where
9 percent invest in education. So there needs to be a
significant role for States and locals in funding these
programs, too.
But I think the way we would redesign the program is that
funding would not have to go to all 15,000 districts. Some
districts have already done a very good job of emergency
management planning, so States would have the authority to
target funds within their State to districts to keep funding at
the State level if they would choose.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The last thing is when these districts submit school
preparedness plans, do you approve them or reject them or you
just receive them?
Ms. Kuzmich. We don't actually receive the plan itself. The
current provision in law is that districts have to certify that
they have a plan. They do not have to send the plan in to us at
the U.S. Department of Education.
Chairman Thompson. So, in essence, if they certify they
have it, then we give them the money.
Ms. Kuzmich. That is a piece of their State application,
State and district application.
Chairman Thompson. But we never look at the plan.
Ms. Kuzmich. Correct.
Chairman Thompson. Okay.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Davis.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Kuzmich, thank you for being with us today. I
appreciate your testimony. If you would, could you please
discuss the grants that are available through the Department of
Education for school preparedness?
Ms. Kuzmich. Our most targeted grant program is those--are
the Readiness Emergency Management grants that I talked about
in my testimony that go out to districts to essentially create
very robust emergency response plans within their districts.
That is the most significant piece of that. We have our Project
SERV grants, which I talked about, which are for the aftermath
of an event within a district or a State, whether it be a
natural disaster or school violence. We used them post-9/11.
And then we have our State grant program. So there are the
three main pieces that we have.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Who has the ability to apply for
the grants?
Ms. Kuzmich. Local school districts generally are the
applicants for those grants.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. And do you provide assistance in
actually setting up a plan?
Ms. Kuzmich. We do. We have offered, as I said, to
grantees. Obviously we go out and use model plans that we
funded in the past to talk to districts about what we are
seeing, what the most effective ways to put together a plan
are. We provide training to those who are nongrantees. You
don't have to be a grantee to access the model plans that we
have at the Department.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. How many schools have taken
advantage of these grants? How many school systems?
Ms. Kuzmich. I believe it is over 400, although I will have
to get back to you and double-check that number for you, sir.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. And how much money is typically
given out in a given year, grant money?
Ms. Kuzmich. It ranges between 20--and $30 million that we
have given out over the past several years each year for those
emergency response grants, and then the State grants program,
which is not solely targeted on emergency response; it can be
used by States and districts at their discretion for alcohol/
drug prevention programs and emergency response. We have spent
about a little over $30 million a year.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. How do you go about spreading the
word to local school systems that there is grant money
available?
Ms. Kuzmich. It is a challenge, and it is always something
that we are always continually trying to do. It is where we try
to work with States as much as possible, because while we do--
while we have sent--after the White House conference last fall,
we sent communication in our General Guide on Emergency
Response Planning to all 15,000 districts across the country.
You know, sending it to them doesn't mean that they always use
it and share it within their community.
And so we work with the Safe School Centers, which are in
States across the country, with the chief State school officers
who are in every State and, you know, communicate with their
districts on a regular basis. So these are a variety of means.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. There is only 400 out of 15,000
that have applied for the grants. What can we do as Members of
Congress to help spread the word across our districts?
Ms. Kuzmich. Well, we have--you know, we have a Web site
with all of or resources, with all of our model plans, with the
threat assessment guides on it, all of the grants that they can
apply for. So part of it is publicizing that with your own
district, letting educators know it is there.
A lot of it, too, is getting educators to work within their
local community with law enforcement and the mental health
community. You know, we can't, at the Federal level, force
those discussions, but they are very important as far as
emergency response planning.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. I think I hear you saying that you
feel like emergency preparedness is best done in local
communities with assistance from the Federal Government, not
mandated from the Federal Government; is that correct?
Ms. Kuzmich. And we think that we have a role to play in
providing best practice and model plans, but the real work that
happens to create these plans is at the local level.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you for being here today. And
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina
Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
you and the Ranking Member for calling this hearing.
Just so the witnesses know, I think I am the only former
State chief school officer serving in Congress. This is not a
new issue with me, and I don't think it is a new issue with
members of the committee. So we have been interested in it, and
I expect, as we start this conversation, all others are
interested in improving emergency school planning, emergency
and response.
So let me ask this question this way, and it may not be
what you anticipate to hear from some of the stuff you have
talked about, but let me ask the question for both of you.
Because I think the other issues that we haven't talked
about, crowding in school facilities, plagues a lot of school
districts across this country, both large and small, despite
local government efforts to put more money in on bond issues,
et cetera. Surveys have found that there are a lot of kids,
millions of students in the country in makeshift classrooms in
trailers, and a host of conditions that we would not want to
run an office in and we wouldn't put up with, and yet we put
our children there, and if this were in prisons, we would have
a lawsuit against us, but yet we put children there. A number
of reports have come out that says they are just not good
places to learn nor good environments.
So here is my question: Does the size composition of our
schools increase the risk or effects of an emergency; and
secondly, how does school overcrowding affect the schools'
emergency management plans; and number three, have you looked
into how much or how vulnerable trailers or portable facilities
are compared to brick-and-mortar school buildings? If not, why
not?
Ms. Kuzmich. Congressman, you know, this isn't--school
facilities is generally a local and State issue. We have done
some work on--
Mr. Etheridge. We used to say that about roads and a host
of other things. I know the--
Ms. Kuzmich. We fund a Center on School Facilities. They
have done some work on this issue, and there are some outside
organizations that have done some work on this, and I do know
that at our White House conference last fall, we had several
participants come and talk about the design of schools, things
that we have learned post-Columbine in terms of how to design
schools to minimize risk at those facilities.
So I would encourage you--we would be happy to share that
information with you.
Mr. Etheridge. The answer is no.
Ms. Kuzmich. The answer is there has been work done on
that. It is not my area of expertise, but I would be happy to
get that information.
Mr. Sica. Congressman, unfortunately our research does not
speak to the overcrowding issue whatsoever, and I wouldn't be
able to comment on that accurately.
Mr. Etheridge. That is a concern to me when we look at
security, because if you do it in any other area, you would
look at those issues, I would think. Seems to me that would be
an issue.
Let me go back to another question, because there is
probably most likely going to be legislation this time at the
Federal level for school construction across the country so the
government can be a partner if we are going to require certain
things get done, and I think we will have an opportunity to
provide that.
You may not be able to ask for it at the Department of
Education, but at some point I am going to get the Secretary
and ask her the question whether or not the Department will
support Federal legislation for school construction on a
partnership, because I think we may be a 7 percent partner, but
having been a State superintendent, I can tell you many times
there are more than 7 percent requirement on the things that we
do. On many issues it is more like 50 or 60 percent requirement
on 7 percent of the money.
Would you want to comment on that?
Ms. Kuzmich. No. But I would be happy to follow up with you
on it.
Mr. Etheridge. If you would, please.
Both the National Threat Assessment Center and U.S.
Department of Education have done a lot of analyses of school
safety and response, and you alluded to that earlier and have
developed an impressive collection of information, planning,
resources in our school preparedness that are useful. However,
my concern is that information doesn't really get in the hands
of school officials, and you alluded to that dealing with
thousands of school districts, many of which, you know, there
is no such thing as school districts, and no one there--it is
just in name only and just in this country.
My question is as you meet with chief State school officers
who do have the responsibility, depending on the State where
you have a school system or system of schools, it seems to me
there is a leverage at that level through the U.S. Department
to implement.
So my question is this: As we deal with school safety. I
think the view as every parent--I agree with you there, the
safest place is where children go everyday, but the issue is
the parents want 100 percent. And we look at urban and rural,
and if you look at where the major incidences have happened in
recent years, they weren't in the large urban areas. They were
in the isolated rural areas, and there is a reason for that.
So my question is what are you doing to ensure that
schools--or what are the resources available through NTAC and
through the Department of Education? And given the variety of
demand of school administrators and teachers, their first job
is to teach, of course, do you think there is enough funding
available to help schools out?
It is one thing to make them available; it is another thing
to make sure they have the resources. And you alluded to that
earlier that when you spread it out, it is so thin, that there
is not enough money. This committee needs to know that.
Ms. Kuzmich. I think--you know, I think the reauthorization
of No Child Left Behind, which we are working on this year,
gives us a good opportunity to look at a lot of these--
Mr. Etheridge. Even that is underfunded by a huge amount of
what the President proposed. So if we underfund that, we still
don't have resources there or here.
Ms. Kuzmich. I think one of the things that we would like
to do from the Department level is really focus our funding in
on the most effective programs, and we are certainly open to
talking with you about how to do that.
We feel like, you know, spreading that money thinly across
all districts is not the most effective way to spend our
Federal dollars. To partner with our States; to do that, and to
also continue to fund these model programs so that we can share
that information. We do have a lot to do to get better
information out, and while in a lot of the recent discussions
we have had where the Secretary has gone out after Virginia
Tech, we have heard a lot of people talk about the threat
assessment guide, some of the model plans out there. We don't
hear as much as we should. And that is--you know, that is a
continuing challenge we face.
We are doing a national conference this summer where all 50
States will be present on Safe and Drug-Free Schools, and
emergency planning will be a significant piece of that. And we
continue to look for new ways to communicate with them and get
them to do this effectively.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
We now recognize the gentleman from Washington Mr.
Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My--I think it is
always important for the people who are testifying to know a
little bit of background of the person that is asking the
questions.
My background was in law enforcement. I was the sheriff in
Seattle up until a couple of years ago, and now I find myself
here. So 33-years in law enforcement, and we watched what
Columbine did to change the way that local law enforcement
responded to a school crisis.
One of the things that we have done in Washington State,
and I think that maybe you will find that is one of the more
progressive states in this arena, is we have a rapid response
plan in place. It is a statewide system. We also have a mapping
system that maps all of the schools in the State. We are moving
on to mapping colleges so that as first responders arrive, they
immediately have a floor plan of the school and immediately can
communicate with the school officials and other first
responders in the area and those coming to help.
But to really get to some of the questions, the threat
assessment guide that was conducted and then provided, I am
really curious about--you know, when I went to school in 1950,
1960s, boy, things have changed a lot. What is happening? I
mean, the bottom line is prevention is really what we are
looking for here.
So in your assessment really, and Mr. Etheridge hit on part
of the problem, but drugs and alcohol and that sort of thing,
how do gangs play into this? What about home-grown terrorism?
What is happening in the homes? Have you looked at those sorts
of things, and do you guys work together? Do you know each
other, and do you----
Mr. Sica. We do now, Congressman.
Ms. Kuzmich. Our staff at the Department works very
significantly with Mr. Sica.
Mr. Reichert. So how deep does the assessment go? I mean, I
think we get caught up in, you know, now we are here, these
things are happening, now what are we going to do? We talk
about prevention, but really what is the underlying cause of
the violence happening in our society today in our schools
today, in gradeschools?
Mr. Sica. Congressman, if I may, I will at least start to
answer that question.
What we found--and this is consistent with the research
that was conducted, and the exceptional case study project that
goes back to 1997 which really transformed the way the Secret
Service conducts its protective intelligence investigations. We
moved away from more of a profile approach to a nonprofile. The
research suggested that there is no profile of an assassin,
that mental illness was a product--or assassination was a
product of mental illness, and that--and direct threats. All of
these myths were debunked by that research.
And one of the things that really changed the course of our
practices was a behavioral-based approach. We looked at the
thinking and behavior of attackers, and, quite frankly, we
applied that approach to the targeted violence and school
issue, and we saw that it really did have application, and that
is truthfully why it is so successful.
The research doesn't really speak to gang violence. And one
of the interesting things that came out of the Safe School
Initiative that supports the nonprofile is that very few
attackers in the--there were 41 attackers that we looked at and
37 incidents, and of those 37 incidents, rarely were attackers
using drugs or alcohol. It just didn't seem to be the factors
that we thought it would be.
One of the notable behaviors, I think, that is worth
mentioning, and I think it is true of the exceptional case
study as well, attackers are looking to solve a problem, and
they resort to violence as the only way that they can solve
that problem. I think that is something that we pay a lot of
attention to.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
So we are talking about $99 million, which is what you are
budgeted for. Just recently within the last week or so, we
passed a bill in the House of Representatives increasing grant
monies for COPS funding by $1-1/2 billion. I know as a sheriff
for 8 years in Seattle, I really accessed and used COPS
funding, and it does marry up with the 99 million for school
resource officers, and I think, wouldn't you both agree, that
that is a program that really is a program that works and is
preventative in nature?
Ms. Kuzmich. Yes. And besides the Department of Education,
the Department of Homeland Security also has their general, you
know, emergency planning monies that can be used for schools.
So ours is just a piece of what is going on.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas Mr.
Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you for hosting this meeting today on
this very important issue.
In 1999, I was part of a task force in Texas because of
what happened in Colorado. We also did the same thing.
Basically what we are doing right now, except at a State level,
we traveled the State of Texas. We got 1,048 school districts
in Texas, and we are facing the same type of situation--we
faced the same type of situations that we are seeing right now
in many ways.
What I gathered, as you see, and I think Bob mentioned
this, you got the large school districts, and I see that you
meet with about 40 of the largest school districts across the
Nation, but we are also looking at the small school districts,
the ones that can't travel, that don't have access to you. And
one of the basic issues that I remember from that 1999 tour
that we did across the State of Texas was what you all
mentioned, and I think we still try to figure out how do we
implement this.
Number one, what they wanted was model plans and the best
practices, but it was not only develop them, but how do you get
it over to them so they can implement those model plans and
best practices? Because you can have the best plans on one of
your shelves and best practices; that doesn't help anybody.
So the question is how do we get to the 15,000 school
districts, which is probably the hardest question is how do we
get to them to establish that, and some of the basic things
that they needed--and I think the former sheriff over here,
because we had a lot of law enforcement--is do the training
with them and make sure that they act in this with the local
law enforcement and all of that.
But even some of the basic things that they needed was
information; for example, can we buy some video cameras for our
schools because I know the big school districts have them, but
if you go to the school districts, and I have got a lot of
small school districts in my area, and I am sure every single
Member has this, some of the basic things like video cameras,
they couldn't even get that.
So what I am asking is a two-part question, is, one, put
yourself in the shoes of a school official that is not part of
this 40 larger school districts that you have, and if you are
in their shoes, they are supposed to take the first step to
address this, what would they do? In other words, can you
provide us a list of all of the different agencies that are
involved in school safety and what each of them does?
So horizontal, vertical; which are the different agencies
and what they provide under that. And the second part to that
is what are the different grants are available, for example,
and your answer to your question, you said you have about $99
million to address about 15,000 schools. If you look at the
Emergency Response Crisis Grant program under the Homeland
Security, we have got about $24 million involved there.
So I need a list of all of the agencies, what they can do,
number one.
Number two, what are the grants that are available, what
they cover in an easy format--not 20 different sources, but an
easy format--if you can compile that, so they can go ahead, and
if somebody who is calling from Atascosa County in Pleasanton,
Texas, they can call up, they can do this without going to 20
different places, pretty much in line with what the Chairman
said.
I think it is a great idea about having a one-stop center
and a very easy way to access this, because otherwise we will
be here another 8 years, like we did this back in 1999, still
trying to address the same thing.
What are the model plans? What are the best practices are
there on somebody's shelves right now and in somebody's, you
know, drawers, and how do we get that to them as soon as
possible? What are the grants available? And then you can put
that--and I would ask you, too, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask
that they submit this to the committee, and I would like to
look at that and have some input, because I think, like all of
the Members, we all have--have our own experiences. I know that
Carolyn has different types of experiences. All of us bring
them in, and I think you ought to allow some of us with some
different type of experiences to help you put this in a format
that large school districts can get it, small school districts
can get it and in an easy format that we can all understand.
Ms. Kuzmich. We would be happy to do that.
Mr. Cuellar. Then I got 20 seconds.
How fast can you all put this together? Because if you all
have been coordinating, you can probably turn this in by this
afternoon.
Ms. Kuzmich. We do have a lot of this on our Web site right
now. We probably don't have it all in one matrix. We can
probably do that fairly quickly.
Mr. Cuellar. Five days, ten days.
Ms. Kuzmich. I will get back to you, but we can do that
probably within the next week or so.
Mr. Cuellar. Will you contact the staff and my office?
Ms. Kuzmich. We will be happy to.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further
questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from Florida Mr. Bilirakis
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like all Americans, I was deeply disturbed when I learned
of the tragedies at Virginia Tech. Our Nation's schools should
be sanctuaries for safety and learning, not front lines for
senseless violence. Unfortunately, when these events happen, we
must reevaluate how we are ensuring our children's security,
and I know that a lot of this takes place with the State and
local government; however, I am interested in learning what
additional roles, if any, the Federal Government should have.
With that I have a couple of questions. And the first one
to Mr. Sica.
After reading the conclusions of the Safe School
Initiative, it seems that it is extremely difficult to profile
someone who intends to commit an act of violence at school.
Would it be correct to believe that this makes it very
difficult to prevent an attack?
Mr. Sica. Our research suggests, Congressman, yes. There is
no profile, and again, that is consistent with the exceptional
case study and validated through the Safe School Initiative
report.
Despite all of our best efforts, we will never prevent
every incident of targeted violence in schools. And I think we
have to accept that.
What we have to embrace is looking at thinking and behavior
and looking at ways to intervene before an attack occurs, and
therein lies the challenge.
Mr. Bilirakis. Could you give me a couple of examples on
how we can do that?
Mr. Sica. I think we are doing it, Congressman.
I am confident that through the collaborative effort that
we have with--efforts that we have with the Department of
Education, the research that we have conducted and provided to
the 77,000 people that we have talked with over the course of
the last 5 years, I know we have prevented acts of targeted
violence in schools. Unfortunately, we don't have raw data, but
we do hear occasionally of schools and law enforcement calling
back to the Threat Assessment Center and thanking us. Quite
often if a threat assessment inquiry is occurring in a school,
we will assist and provide guidance. So I do know that this
works.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Can you discuss the--and pardon me, I had a conflict
earlier, so you may have discussed this earlier. Can you
discuss the bystander phenomena you described? Can you describe
it in more detail? Specifically, do you believe that other
students bringing information to law enforcement is the best
way to prevent school violence?
Mr. Sica. Absolutely. The research suggests that--often
suggests that oftentimes attackers have communicated to others.
In fact, a very sad part of this bystander phenomenon, we know
that some students have actually participated in providing
logistical support to the attack.
The bystander study will be released later in the year. It
is going through some final editorial reviews, and I would be
happy to provide this committee with that report as soon as its
available.
Mr. Bilirakis. So you anticipate it may be later in the
year, maybe in the fall?
Mr. Sica. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
No further questions.
Chairman Thompson. We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
from Pennsylvania Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you for holding this important hearing. I
want to thank the witnesses for coming as well.
I will be very brief.
The $99 million, is that an annual sum?
Ms. Kuzmich. That is.
Mr. Carney. We spend about $12 million in Iraq, so this is
about an 8-hour day's work in Iraq of funding for safe schools.
What is the prospect of getting more money available?
I agree with my colleagues, Mr. Davis. You know, I think
that it is important that States have control as much as
possible. I agree with the philosophy. I am just appalled by
what I consider to be a very paltry amount for this problem.
You know, I am a father of five kids in a public school,
and it concerns me that we are at $99 million for grants for
the entire Nation for 15,000 school districts.
Ms. Kuzmich. That is a piece of our funding. We have got
over $300 million in the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
that we propose at the Department of Education, and that is,
once again, in partnership with other programs that we run with
other agencies or that other agencies run. Homeland Security
provides funding. We partner with the Department of Health and
Human Services on our Safe Schools Healthy Student Program. We
work with the Department of Justice in a lot of their programs,
too.
So that is one piece, and, you know, when we have that
right calibration, we are happy to discuss with you. We do
think it is a priority, though.
Mr. Carney. How close do you work with the States'
departments of education to promulgate the information to the
various school districts and their States?
Ms. Kuzmich. We work closely. We think we could work more
closely in the sense of how our funding goes out, and what I
talked about earlier in terms of how, instead of funding down
to districts across the country, work more significantly with
State departments, many of whom are taking and have taken a
more active role post-Columbine and post-9/11 in the area of
school safety and in emergency planning so that we are not--so
that we are dovetailing on their efforts with them as opposed
to duplicating anything they are doing.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. No further questions.
Chairman Thompson. I will take a little bit of your time.
Can you explain to the committee how do you evaluate the
districts who only check that they have completed their plans
to see whether or not they are complete or anything? In other
words, they check that we have a plan. Who actually goes out to
see whether or not the plans are actually being followed, or
are we just taking them at their word?
Ms. Kuzmich. Mr. Chairman, you are right. They do just have
to certify that they have those plans. I think that is an area
that we would be happy to look at, you know, how we can ensure
that they don't create a plan that doesn't address all of the
four critical pieces of emergency management planning.
I do think it is a capacity issue, and it is why I think we
would like to work with States as the intermediary in some of
this. But we do know that a lot of districts have a plan in
place. They put it on the shelf, and they don't update it and
use it, and that is an important part, and we would be happy to
talk with you further.
Chairman Thompson. I think that is the crux of what I think
the committee is trying to respond to. There is no real
oversight in this whole process.
I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from North
Carolina Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. I would like to offer, as a suggestion,
since you have 50 States and the territories, it would be a lot
simpler to have them to be the ones responsible where they are
funding anywhere, depending on the range, from 40 to 70 percent
of the funding; they ought to be the ones where you have the
repository to check, to reinforce and work with. It would be a
lot simpler and then you don't have to check with--
Ms. Kuzmich. I think we would agree with you on that.
Mr. Etheridge. That seems to me that would be a commonsense
approach.
Ms. Kuzmich. We do have a good opportunity to work on that
in reauthorization of that Safe and Drug-Free School program.
Mr. Etheridge. That seems to be--wouldn't be a
reauthorization issue. It should be an administrative issue
that you should deal with because it is in the law.
Ms. Kuzmich. The law only requires that they certify. So if
we are going to do something above that, we will have to change
the statute on that.
Chairman Thompson. Can you provide the committee--and I
will take back the balance of the time--can you provide the
committee what the Department expects in a plan that you
certify, that you--that a district certifies?
Ms. Kuzmich. I will get back to you on this. I don't have
the application with me.
Chairman Thompson. They certify something.
Ms. Kuzmich. Yes.
Chairman Thompson. And we need to know what it is the
Department expects.
Mr. Dicks. She said something about four elements of a
plan.
Chairman Thompson. Please.
Ms. Kuzmich. The four elements: Prevention, planning,
response, and recovery; those are the four critical areas of a
good plan. Now, that is not required statutorily under the Safe
and Drug-Free Schools program. So I think we would like to look
into how we can strengthen those requirements and make sure
that plans are robust and that States have a real active role
in that.
Chairman Thompson. I think the issue is the general public
would expect us to have some standard of measurement as to
whether or not a district is meeting some expectation, but if
we only require the Department to certify something that we
never look at, then we have really not met the real
expectations.
Mr. Reichert. Will the gentleman yield?
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Reichert. Just through my experience through my
sheriff's office in Seattle, the COPS office is a great
practice in monitoring grants. They have performance measures
set out. They sent out a team of people to the sheriff's
office, to the school district. When you talk about safe
schools and drugs, there are grants available and have been--
and granted, they have been reduced, and now they are going to
be increased. But if you are working in partnership with the
COPS office, that performance measure program is already in
existence and, in my experience, is just outstanding program.
I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Thompson. I think all of us are just trying to
push the envelope to the point where there is some real
oversight and not just a certification taking place in the
process.
Thank you.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. States are permitted--they
are permitted to use funding from the Department of Homeland
Security's Homeland Security Grant Program and UASI program,
the Urban Areas Security Initiative, for school security and
preparedness activities. Does DHS share information with you
regarding how States are using homeland security grant funds to
secure schools?
Ms. Kuzmich. They do generally. I will have to get back to
you with how specifically they do that. I do think that we can
do a better job of making sure that, through DHS grants,
schools are included in that community-wide planning. They are
not always included as a piece of that.
Mr. Dent. Well, it certainly should be better coordinated.
I would like for you to follow up with the committee on that if
you would. Do you believe that DHS should play a greater role
with respect to school security, Ms. Kuzmich?
Ms. Kuzmich. Well, I will have to leave that to my DHS
colleagues. We work with them very well in terms of our joint
activities. We obviously have different constituencies. We
think that partnership is important. We work most significantly
with districts and State education officials. They work more
with, you know, the emergency planning community. So there is a
reason that we have different pieces, but we should also work
jointly together.
Mr. Dent. Yeah, it seems there is a coordination issue here
that has to be addressed. The Department of Education recently
held an emergency management training session for schools in
Philadelphia, and I think another session is planned this month
or later this month. How frequently does the Department of
Education hold this type of sessions?
Ms. Kuzmich. We do these every few months. We also have Web
casts so people who can't come can see it online.
Mr. Dent. Who can participate in these programs?
Ms. Kuzmich. I will get back to you in terms of the actual
sessions on site, but the Web casts anyone can participate in.
Mr. Dent. What do you generally discuss in these sessions?
Does the Department of Education consult with DHS in creating
the curriculum for these programs?
Ms. Kuzmich. We do. We talk about our grant programs and
specifically, you know, how to apply what we have learned from
those, what model plans look like, how to address those four
areas that I talked about before in creating those model plans
across the country.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you. Would you like to add anything?
Mr. Sica. No, Congressman.
Mr. Dent. I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now recognize the
gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The U.S. Secret Service completed a study to which the
term, as you mentioned, Agent Sica, the targeted violence was
developed--which the term targeted violence was developed. Can
you explain what targeted violence is and how it relates to
school preparedness?
Mr. Sica. Yes, Congressman. Targeted violence was developed
through the exceptional case study project, and it refers to
any incident where a known or knowable attacker selects its
particular target prior to their violent attack. In the case of
schools, that target might be a classmate, maybe a teacher or
even the school building itself.
Mr. Dicks. The U.S. Secret Service, in partnership with the
Department of Education, conducted and completed an operational
study of school shootings, the safe school initiative. What was
the primary goal of this safe school initiative?
Mr. Sica. The primary goal of the safe school initiative
was to identify information about the thinking and behavior of
individual students who planned or committed acts of targeted
violence, and what we were looking to do is take that
information and provide it to these schools and law enforcement
which we have in hopes that they would develop preventive
policies and strategies.
Mr. Dicks. Yeah. It seems to me that one of the key facts
here that I have heard is that we--there may not be any
overall, you know, indication of who is going to do this. But
there are people who do hear about it. I mean, it seems to me
that one of the things we have to do is work with the school
districts to talk to the kids and to tell them, if somebody
brings up the idea that they are going to do something, they
are expected to turn, you know, to bring that information to
the authorities. Do they do that? I assume they do that, but is
it happening out there?
Ms. Kuzmich. It could be happening a lot more. And they do
that. That is a part of a lot of guidance we give.
Mr. Dicks. Is it on your Web site?
Ms. Kuzmich. It is. When we held our conference last fall,
one of the things we heard about was the importance about
talking to kids and teachers about reporting things that they
hear. That can really only happen, you know, within a school at
a very personal level, this whole issue of connectedness and
not fearing disclosing information to a teacher.
Mr. Dicks. In an ideal situation, what is the relationship
between the law enforcement community and the school district
or the school itself? I mean, what should they be doing? What
are the key things in terms of their cooperation? My colleague
from Washington mentioned, in Washington State, we have this
prepared response program where they have maps of the schools
that are available to law enforcement. So if something happens,
they are able then to go into the school and have a real
understanding of how the whole situation is laid out, which I
think is--you know, I think all of our schools out there have
this. I think it is a very valuable way for law enforcement to
have a better understanding of how to proceed into the school
and deal with the shooter.
Ms. Kuzmich. Congressman, when we give out our emergency
response grants, one of the things we require that we know is
effective is that you have to have the school, the school
district. We require the school and school district to work
with law enforcement and mental health. They have to all be
partners in this, because those are essential elements of
creating a good emergency plan and having that link between the
two and open dialogue and discussion within a community.
Mr. Dicks. You know, it does bother me that--which one of
the programs, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned this--was not funded
in 2006 and 2007, not requested in the President's Budget?
Ms. Kuzmich. He was referring to our State grants program.
Mr. Dicks. Is that the $100 million?
Ms. Kuzmich. That is the one we proposed $100 million for.
Mr. Dicks. In 2008?
Ms. Kuzmich. Correct.
Mr. Dicks. But, in 2006 and 2007, it was not in the
President's Budget?
Ms. Kuzmich. Correct.
Mr. Dicks. How do you explain that?
Ms. Kuzmich. The evaluations of the program and the way
that the funding flows has been very ineffective in the past,
and several studies have demonstrated that, that the amount of
funding that gets out to districts is an amount that is, you
know, useful to them. So we have proposed a redesign of the
program, and we have put that money back in our budget to focus
it more on the State level.
Mr. Dicks. I would yield to my colleague from North
Carolina who I think has a comment.
Mr. Etheridge. Who did the evaluation? Did GAO do it?
Ms. Kuzmich. OMB.
Mr. Etheridge. OMB, not GAO?
Ms. Kuzmich. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And did Congress restore the money both in 2006
and 2007?
Ms. Kuzmich. Yep.
Mr. Dicks. Heaven forbid, earmarks, that the Congress steps
in and puts the money back in. I just hope we think about that
as we give away the power of the purse here to the--you know,
this is why we have a Congress, to have oversight, and when
there is a mistake made, to put the money back in. I don't
think we should give away that authority. And I yield--I have
no further--I have no further time.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, on this very
issue, this money is--I am reminded by my friend from
Washington was talking about--which is so well coordinated with
our law enforcement folks and the school folks at the local
level that he just talked about. You know, it baffles me that
OMB would say it was so ineffective unless they were the ones
who said they didn't want it to start with because it was a
congressional program. I can tell you, in North Carolina, it
works. I can't speak for other States. It works; it saved
lives. It makes a difference in safety at schools for children.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We now yield to the
gentleman from Colorado Mr. Perlmutter for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perlmutter. I think that Mr. Dicks, Mr. Etheridge and
Reichert are right on the numbers here. It is law enforcement.
It is mental health, and it is schools. And I want to come at
this a little bit differently because I have had the
unfortunate circumstance of having Columbine two miles, three
miles from my house and another school, Platt Valley. So a
suburban school and then a rural school where we have had
attacks. And I think the thing that I would just suggest to the
Department of Education is to keep an eye. You know, we have
got to prevent the attacks, but there is a mental health aspect
to the kids after all this happens. And between 9/11 and these
various Columbine and now Virginia Tech and then all of the
copycat stuff that goes on, I have seen, as my kids have gone
through school and particularly with one of my children, you
know, boy, if anything like this happens, it brings up kind of
a post-traumatic stress for them. And I don't know what is in
the safe schools and drugs act or anything else we have for the
mental health to kind of keep an eye on our kids. Is there
anything in there about that?
Ms. Kuzmich. There is. There is. Two pieces that I will
highlight most significantly: First of all, in places where
there is an incident, those project moneys that we have at the
Department are used most directly for mental health services
for students in those schools impacted by violence.
We also fund the Safe Schools, Healthy Students Program in
partnership with HHS and the Department of Justice. And that is
very significantly--a piece of that is mental health and mental
health services in schools and creating a healthy school
environment for students.
Mr. Perlmutter. Is anybody looking at the fact now that, I
mean, at Virginia Tech, you know, it was a copycat--I mean,
they refer to Klebold and Harris out of Columbine--picked that
same week, you know, that we had Waco, now Columbine, Virginia
Tech. I mean, we ought to take a look at that week--and I would
turn this to the Homeland Security Department as being a week
that is going to be one where we are going to have threats and
violence. And I don't know what to do about it. You know, you
can't take the week out of the calendar, but maybe have
vacations there then. I don't know if anybody has thought about
that. That is another kind of off-the-radar-screen kind of
question, but the fact that I have had to deal with this stuff
personally has caused a lot of thought about this. So, I mean,
what do the schools do when we come up to that week of April
15?
Ms. Kuzmich. You know, that wasn't something--the
secretaries have been out obviously post-Virginia Tech talking
about the issues of campus safety. And we didn't really hear
too much about that, but that is something we will take under
advisement as we move forward. But we didn't hear specifically
about timing issues, but we did hear about copycat issues and
how to prevent that in the future. And a lot of that is the
threat assessment piece, looking for warning signs and having a
culture where people feel free to share information which we
often don't find on college campuses these days.
Mr. Perlmutter. And I would just suggest, in Colorado, we
have seen you know the Platt Valley was at a whole different
time. But what we have seen is kind of a spike in threats, and
most of them are, you know, you leave something in the library,
and it says x, y and z are going to be killed, you know, on the
anniversary of Columbine. It never materializes, but we have
seen those kinds of things. And we definitely saw them in a big
way after Virginia Tech, which was the Monday of that week. And
then the rest of the week we had schools being shut down on a
pretty regular basis, which you know they were taking these
things seriously, and I applaud them for that. I would just
suggest to all of you that you take a good look at that week if
there is some way to kind of--I don't know that there is much
that can be done. But you certainly should look at that as a
period of time when there is more energy, negative energy,
whatever you want to call it in kids and others, you know,
towards violence. And then I guess the last thing, and it is
more of a statement, and if I didn't do this, one of my former
campaign managers would be terribly upset. But at Virginia
Tech--and I am curious how we are dealing with college
campuses--she would say, you know, that kid, the mental health
problem that he had coupled with guns that he had, you know,
led to a lot of deaths. And one or the other of those, we
wouldn't have had that kind of problem with that particular
student. And so that is just more of a statement than an
answer.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We will try to get
through and complete the panel. But if we could ask the
indulgence of the rest of the committee to try to shorten it to
less than 5 minutes for your questions so we can get through.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
will do that so that everyone has a chance here. We have seen
the violence in schools only escalate. It is as if there was no
Federal response. And by the way, when you said the 50 States
we are dealing--I take it you mean 50 States and the District
of Columbia.
Ms. Kuzmich. Correct.
Ms. Norton. We have passed the gun culture down to kids
clearly. It used to be that somebody who was half off, a little
mentally deranged--and we know about those people in the 1970s
and 1980s and 1990s, and now most of the people look like they
are kids. Actually, my good friend's daughter questioned--that
was indeed going to be my question, that is given
particularly--or even before Virginia Tech, are colleges and
universities required to have any plans? We were shocked to
know that they didn't--you know, some of them didn't know
whether you could contact people by text messaging, whether you
do it by loud speaker. They seemed to have no plan whatsoever
and no guidance from the Federal Government or anyone else. And
finally, I just wanted to know about an administration report
that I think I read about that talked about trying to do
something about the effect of gun violence in the media on
violence in children. I guess that would be Ms. Kuzmich.
Ms. Kuzmich. On your first issue, especially on college
campuses and whether they have plans, most college campuses do
have plans. Now whether they are robust--
Ms. Norton. I am just asking, just like you are requiring
something of the schools, are you requiring anything of
colleges and universities?
Ms. Kuzmich. Colleges, I believe currently there are no
statutory requirements for college campuses.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a hole, and
Virginia Tech shows them. You need statutory guidance, and I
think we ought to give it to you. What about the--I believe
there was a report from the administration on gun violence and
its effects on children, gun violence in the media and its
effects on children. Are you aware of that?
Ms. Kuzmich. Not specifically, but I would be happy to
follow up if we can get more details on where that came from.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Gentleman from Rhode Island Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for their statements here today and questions they
have answered. I know we talked a bit about coordination. I
want to focus in on that specifically.
Mr. Sica, I have worked closely with Chairman Thompson to
conduct assessments of emergency preparedness and response in
schools located in my district about a year and a half ago. The
results of that study were astonishing. I have to tell you that
neither the Department of Homeland Security nor the Department
of Education had been effective resources for Rhode Island
schools in developing their emergency plans. In fact, none of
the respondents in my district indicated that DHS assisted in
developing their emergency plans, and only one responded it had
relied on the Department of Education. Now in answering a
question regarding the role that DHS should take in providing
or funding emergency response plans, some of the respondents
stated that they did not even know that DHS was a resource. And
I fear that many of the results yielded by that survey still
hold true today.
So my question for you, Mr. Sica, is, what is DHS doing to
change this perception? And what methods do you have reaching
out to schools and universities? And please also describe how
the Department partners with the Department of Education to
effectively alert State and local officials of Federal
resources in emergency planning for schools. And my last
question, I know Mr. Reichert had touched on the issue of
mapping. This is for the panel. I think it would be useful for
emergency responders to readily have access to school floor
plans and building maps in an emergency situation. We can all
understand how that would be of great value. A part of the
problem we saw at both Virginia Tech and Columbine shootings,
law enforcement officials lacked key logistics needed to
effectively quarantine the shooters. So I understand that the
technology actually exists to compile information about floor
plans and other relevant information and to do a consolidated
database and make it easily accessible for first responders.
Some cities and towns have actually moved to catalog plans of
their schools, government buildings and their critical
infrastructure to give first responders greater situational
awareness. Many cases, these floor plans and maps already
exist. They just haven't been compiled into a combined database
that can be accessed onsite. So my question is, are you aware
of these efforts? And do you think that this concept is
something that either the Department of Homeland Security or
the Department of Education would be interested in supporting
on a larger scale? Perhaps providing assistance for State and
local governments to develop these preparedness databases?
Mr. Sica. Congressman, I cannot speak for the Department.
That would be the type of question you would pose to my
colleagues at the Department directly. I think it is very, very
important that we clarify the Secret Service's role in this in
that the Secret Service doesn't have statutory authority here.
And our contribution to this has been on the prevention side,
quite frankly, and we have tried to stay in that lane because
we don't have any statutory authority. We recommend--we
typically don't tell the States or the school districts or even
law enforcement what to do. We just strongly recommend, based
on our expertise in prevention, in threat assessment, but that
type of a question would probably be better answered by a
member of the Department directly.
Ms. Kuzmich. I have talked a little bit about some of our
information-sharing efforts. You know, we work with our
colleagues at DHS. We have a variety of methods for
communicating with districts across the country. It is clear
that we can do a better job and our efforts after Virginia Tech
are going to lead us to make some recommendations about how we
can do that even more and provide better guidance for districts
and States across the country. So we will continue to do that.
Mr. Langevin. I think that would be important to have a
better outreach and coordination with the schools. It would be
nice for them to say, yes, we were contacted and assistance was
offered, and this is what we did as a result.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentlelady from
New York, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In New York
City, the threats of terrorists attacks and natural disasters
are very real to the community. Because of the enormity of the
event, the terrorist event known as 9/11, many people were
unaware that just minutes away from that event were a community
college, a high school, an elementary school. These issues are
compounded when we see news stories about schools taken hostage
in Russia and elsewhere and when we hear about schools
destroyed by hurricanes and tornadoes across America, when we
find out that somewhere a deeply disturbed student or adult has
run through a school building and shot at students and
teachers. While we can never completely prevent tragedy from
occurring, it is vital that the Federal Government work with
local governments and individual schools to ensure that
catastrophes are very rare and that they are able to respond
appropriately when these acts do happen. In my constituency, in
Brooklyn, this concern is extended to religious based
educational institutions such as the Yeshivas that are embedded
in densely populated urban environments. To Special Agent Sica,
I would like to ask, in your testimony, you noted that the
National Threat Assessment Center often disseminates
information about safe school initiatives to over 77,000 people
representing schools, law enforcement and others. Can you tell
me what percentage of that number are school officials? And do
these seminars work? Are they just briefings, or do you
actually go to individual schools and work with people onsite?
Mr. Sica. Congresswoman, it is an excellent question. It is
something that we are working toward, better instructing
audiences in a fiscally responsible way. I think it is
wonderful that we have been able to reach the 77,000 people and
the fact that we have conducted over 340 or 350 presentations.
What I am more interested in is ensuring that we are
instructing audiences that touch the right people, people that
can actually implement different preventative strategies to
include policymakers. Last week I was up in the State of
Connecticut at the request of the Governor, and I addressed a
group of representatives from colleges and universities
throughout the State of Connecticut and the State police as
well, law enforcement. And it was very apparent to me that this
was something that we needed to continue to do. We need to
ensure that we are touching the right people. I think there
isn't a person that hasn't heard our presentation.
Chairman Thompson. I might have to cut it off. I apologize
for that. But I am trying to get to the gentlelady from New
York, who has been so patient for the last round of questions.
And for the second panel, we have 70 minutes of votes to take.
So I would beg your indulgence for that period and would
suggest that we reconvene about 1:00. So you can get lunch or
something like that, because we have 70 minutes of votes.
Mrs. McCarthy.
Mrs. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly
enjoyed sitting here listening to this on the Homeland Security
Committee. I wish we had done a joint hearing with the
Education Committee because everything fits in. I sit on the
Education Committee. Let me just give you a little background.
I have introduced a bill, H.R. 354, Safe Act, which would
require the use of law enforcement data to identify the safety
climate in k-through-12 schools because, in my view, we do not
have an accurate picture of what is happening in our schools.
We are missing a piece of the puzzle, namely timely and uniform
data which we could use to identify school violence and crimes.
Under the Cleary Act, colleges are required to use law
enforcement data in reporting to parents and the Department.
But there is not a crime-tracking system in place for K-
through-12.
With that being said, to make it go a little bit faster,
you had mentioned the Associated Violent Death Survey Act which
the CDC emphasized the word study. This is certainly something
that is more interviews than anything else from 1994 to 1999
with data for further studies being primary. We are in the year
2007. But I can go to the Web site of one of the witnesses that
we will be talking to later on the next panel, Mr. Trump, who
will get violent death numbers as current as last week. I guess
my question is, if we don't have the correct data up to date,
we don't know what schools are actually violent. And if we
don't know what schools are actually violent, then how are we
supposed to send our very sources there to help those
particular schools? So I am hoping that you really can look
that this because it is something both of you said, prevention.
And that is how we can do that by going to the lowest grades
and more, is about talking to the children and young people. I
can go into any school, and everybody will say it is a safe
school. And if you talk to those students, they are not going
to feel that way. Whether it is bullying or other issues that
they are being faced or even to the point, especially among
young women that were saying they were being sexually assaulted
and some verbally which makes them feel unsafe. So there is a
lot more we could go do.
We will be reauthorizing Leave No Child Behind. I know a
lot of people are probably going to be disappointed that I am
not talking about guns at this particular hearing. But I do
believe what we can do in schools today to make them safer is
reach out to our young people to prevent gun violence in the
future.
Ms. Kuzmich. I would just agree with you, we can do a
better job of collecting data on our k-through-12 schools on
issues of safety and violence. It is something we have learned
over the years. We have put money out for States to develop
better systems, but we are still behind. That is something we
need to work on.
Mrs. McCarthy. We did a lot of research on this. That is
why we need to do it on the Federal level.
Mr. Sica. Congresswoman, community outreach for the Secret
Service is certainly a core value of our agency. And I am very,
very proud of that. When I ran the office up in Delaware, I was
very--I had a very ambitious outreach with the Boys and Girls
Club community, and that is a national effort that all of the
field offices throughout the country are encouraged to support.
And that is such a wonderful opportunity for us to touch the
children that you are speaking to because I absolutely agree
with you.
Mrs. McCarthy. And one of the other things that was
mentioned here a couple times on the COPS program, our school
safety officers that go in, that is probably one of the best
programs I have seen in my underserved schools. Relationships
are made. The kids feel safer with them around, and we need to
do a better job on that, too.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, and I thank the panel of
witnesses. We will recess until 1:00 p.m.[Recess 11:33 a.m.]
Chairman Thompson. We would like to reconvene the recessed
meeting. I apologize to our second panel. We were obviously in
the midst of votes, and that is one of the unfortunate
situations we have to contend with because as chairpersons,
when we set committee hearings, we have no idea when votes will
be called.
I appreciate your patience.
I now welcome our second panel of witnesses. First witness,
Ms. Cornelia Ashby, Director of Education, Workforce, and
Income Security, Government Accountability Office.
You have been there since 19----
Ms. Ashby. 1973.
Chairman Thompson. 1973. Congratulations.
And in 2002 you moved to your current position as Director,
and we appreciate your hard work in that respect.
Second witness is Mr. Kenneth Trump, who is President of
National School Safety and Security Services, a Cleveland,
Ohio-based national firm specializing in K-through-12 school
security and emergency preparedness training and consulting.
Glad to have you.
Our third witness is Dr. James Renick--pleasure--Senior
Vice President for Programs and Research, American Council on
Education, and former Chancellor of North Carolina A&T State
University.
Welcome.
And our last witness is Dr. David Rainer, Associate Vice
Chancellor, Environmental Health and Public Safety, North
Carolina State University.
Looks like Congressman Etheridge has significant influence
on this committee.
Chairman Thompson. Welcome, panel. Mr. Etheridge and others
are on their way back. We do have some conflict in committee
hearings going on.
Ms. Ashby, if you will begin summarizing your statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CORNELIA M. ASHBY, DIRECTOR, EDUCATION, WORKFORCE,
AND INCOME SECURITY, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Ashby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss
emergency management in public school districts. My testimony
this afternoon will focus on what school districts have done to
plan and prepare for emergencies and the challenges they have
experienced.
The Federal Government supports emergency management in
school districts by providing districts funding, guidance,
training and equipment. However, with respect to funding
school--I am sorry--with respect to funding, program guidance
for three DHS grants does not clearly specify that school
districts are among the entities to which State and local
government grant recipients can disburse funds. As a result,
not all States receiving DHS funding are aware that such
funding could be disbursed to school districts, and therefore,
some school districts may not have the opportunity to benefit
from this funding.
Almost all school districts have taken steps to prepare for
emergencies. Based on our survey of school districts, we
estimate that 95 percent of all school districts have written
emergency management plans that address multiple hazards, and
over half of the districts with the plans update them at least
once a year.
We also estimate that 93 percent of all school districts
conduct inspections of their school buildings and grounds to
identify possible vulnerabilities. Of those school districts 87
percent made security enhancements to their school facilities
and grounds as a result of these inspections.
Some school districts took responsibility for a number of
activities to prepare for emergencies at the district level,
such as negotiating the use of school buildings as community
shelters and identifying security needs in schools. However,
school districts' emergency management plans and preparation
activities are not always consistent with federally recommended
practices.
For example, while most school districts have written roles
and responsibilities for school staff, only 43 percent use the
incident command system to establish the roles and
responsibilities of school district officials, local first
responders and community partners during an emergency. In
addition, about three-fourths of all school districts have not
included written procedures in their plans for communicating
with limited-English-proficient parents and students, and 28
percent of school districts with emergency management plans do
not have specific provisions for students with special needs in
their plans.
While over half of all school districts with written
emergency plans include procedures to assist with recovery
after an incident, few school districts' emergency plans
contain procedures for continuing student education in the
event of an extended school closure.
Further, less than half of the school districts with plans
involve community partners in the development and updating of
the plan; 27 percent have never trained with any first
responders and only 29 percent have trained with community
partners.
In planning for emergencies, many school districts face
challenges. For example, 70 percent of all school districts
face challenges resulting from competing priorities and 62
percent cited a lack of equipment and expertise as impediments
to emergency planning.
School district officials we interviewed reported
challenges in incorporating special needs students in emergency
management planning, with the challenge sometimes resulting
from the lack of equipment or expertise to evaluate--I am
sorry--to evacuate the special needs students. Also, 39 percent
of districts with emergency plans experience challenges in
communicating and coordinating with local first responders,
sometimes because of limited time or funding to collaborate
with first responders or a lack of interoperability between the
equipment used by the school district and equipment used by
first responders.
Further, while all of the 27 school districts we
interviewed have ways of communicating emergency procedures to
parents, 16 of these districts experience difficulties in
implementing the recommended practice that school districts
communicate clear, consistent and appropriate information to
parents regarding an emergency.
In conclusion, the Federal Government plays a critical role
in assisting school districts to prepare for emergencies. The
school districts have taken a number of important steps to plan
for a range of emergencies; however, in many school districts
these emergency management plans or their implementation do not
fully align with federally recommended practices.
Given the challenges many school districts face due to a
lack of necessary equipment and expertise, they do not have the
tools to support their plans and they are left with gaps in
their ability to fully prepare for emergencies.
Additional clarity regarding access to Federal resources
and improved guidance in areas such as incorporating special
needs students in emergency management planning and continuing
student education in the event of an extended school closure
may enhance the ability of school districts to plan and prepare
for emergencies. We are currently considering recommendations
to address these issues.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would
be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Ashby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cornelia M. Ashby
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss emergency management in
public school districts. The nation's more than 17,000 school districts
are responsible for maintaining the safety and security of
approximately 49 million public school students. Events such as the
recent shootings by armed intruders in schools across the nation,
natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and potential pandemics have
heightened awareness of the need for school districts to be prepared to
address a range of emergencies within and outside of school buildings.
My testimony today is drawn from ongoing work we have conducted for
this Committee and other congressional requesters on emergency
management in school districts. We anticipate completing the report in
June 2007. ``Emergency management'' refers to the range of efforts
involved in building the capacity to prevent, protect against, respond
to, and recover from an incident. Planning for such incidents varies by
the type and scale of the incident. The federal government's role in
emergency management is principally to support state and local
activities and develop the federal capabilities to respond effectively
when state and local governments require federal assistance. Some
federal support comes in the form of guidance and recommendations.
Because the federal government serves as a partner to all states, it is
uniquely positioned to observe and evaluate the range of emergency
management activities across states and local governments, including
school districts, and disseminate information on recommended practices
and successful strategies.
My testimony today will focus on (1) the role of the federal and
state governments in establishing requirements and providing resources
to school districts for emergency management planning, (2) what school
districts have done to plan and prepare for emergencies, and, briefly,
(3) the challenges school districts have experienced in planning for
emergencies and communicating and coordinating with first responders,
parents, and students. When discussing the federal government, I am
primarily referring to the three agencies included in our report--the
Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Education (Education), and
Health and Human Services (HHS).
To determine the role of the federal and state governments,
planning requirements for school districts and schools, and the types
of resources provided to districts, we conducted interviews with
officials representing DHS, Education, and HHS and reviewed relevant
federal laws. We also administered two surveys, one to state education
agencies and one to state administering agencies (the state agencies to
which DHS disburses emergency management funding) in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia. To better understand how school districts
plan and prepare for emergencies, we administered a mail survey to a
stratified random sample of school districts in the 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Using a 95 percent confidence interval, all
percentage estimates included in this statement have a margin of error
of plus or minus 10 percent or less, unless otherwise noted. To further
understand the experiences districts have had in planning for
emergencies and communicating and coordinating with first
responders,\1\ parents, and students, we visited selected districts in
the states of Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Washington. In total, we conducted semi-structured interviews, either
in person or by telephone, with officials in 27 school districts. We
are conducting the review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
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\1\ In both our site visits and our survey of school districts, we
focused on the traditional definition of first responders--law
enforcement, fire, and EMS. However, the Homeland Security Act as
amended includes a broader definition of emergency response providers,
including ``Federal, State, and local governmental and nongovernmental
emergency public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response,
emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and
related personnel, agencies, and authorities.'' Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 2,(codified at 6 U.S.C.
Sec. 101(6)). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 defined the
term ``first responder'' as ``individuals who in the early stages of an
incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life,
property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response
providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health,
clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such
as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during
prevention, response, and recovery operations.''
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In summary, federal and state governments support emergency
management in school districts with a range of resources and most
school districts have developed emergency management plans despite
facing challenges; however not all of these plans incorporate
recommended practices. Federal and state governments provide funding,
guidance, training, and equipment; and many states require school
districts to develop emergency management plans or engage in other
planning activities. However, funding guidance for some federal grant
programs does not clearly identify school districts as entities to
which state and local governments may disburse these grant funds.
Therefore, some states receiving this funding may be uncertain as to
whether such funding can be allocated to school districts or schools;
and as a result, school districts may not have the opportunity to
benefit from this funding. At the local level, school districts have
taken a number of important steps to plan for a range of emergencies,
most notably developing emergency management plans; however, in many
districts these plans, or their implementation, do not align with
federally recommended practices. For example, many school districts do
not include procedures for special needs students in their plans and
many districts have not employed any procedures in their plans for
continuing student education in the event of an extended school
closure, such as might occur during a pandemic. Additionally, school
districts are generally not training with their first responders (i.e.,
law enforcement, fire, and Emergency Medical Services [EMS]) and
community partners (such as the local head of government and local
public health agency), which are both federally recommended practices.
Finally, many school district officials said that they experience
challenges in planning for emergencies due to a lack of equipment,
training for staff, and expertise and some school districts face
difficulties in communicating and coordinating with first responders
and parents, but most said that they do not experience challenges in
communicating emergency procedures to students. We are currently
considering recommendations that federal agencies clarify and improve
guidance to states and school districts to better enable school
districts to incorporate recommended practices for emergency
management.
Background
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and consolidated most
of the federal programs and agencies with responsibilities for
emergency management into that agency.\2\ DHS serves as a federal
partner to state and local governments in emergency management.\3\ DHS
provides technical assistance and homeland security grant funding to
states and local governments to enhance their emergency management
efforts. States and local governments have the responsibility for
spending DHS grant funds in accordance with DHS guidelines to meet
local emergency management needs. In fiscal year 2006, DHS awarded $1.7
billion to states, urban areas, and territories to prepare for and
respond to terrorist attacks and other disasters. States and local
governments may then provide a portion of this funding to a range of
entities, as specified in DHS's program guidance.
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\2\ Pub. L. No. 107-296.
\3\ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, provides the legal framework for this
partnership. The Stafford Act is the principal federal statute
governing federal disaster assistance and relief and primarily
establishes the programs for and processes by which the federal
government may provide major disaster and emergency assistance to
states and local governments. The Stafford Act also provides emergency
assistance to tribal nations, individuals and qualified private non-
profit organizations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
the principal federal agency responsible for implementing the Stafford
Act.
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As we have noted in prior reports, emergency management requires
coordinated planning and implementation by a variety of participants.
Effective emergency management requires identifying the hazards for
which it is necessary to be prepared (risk assessments); establishing
clear roles and responsibilities that are effectively communicated and
well understood; and developing, maintaining, and mobilizing needed
capabilities, such as people, skills, and equipment.\4\ The plans and
capabilities should be tested and assessed through realistic exercises
that identify strengths and areas that need improvement, with any
needed changes made to both plans and capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to
Disasters, GAO-07-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007); and
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
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The hazards that school districts may face will vary across the
country depending upon the natural hazards to which their particular
areas are prone and an assessment of other risks for which they need to
be prepared, such as pandemic influenza or the discharge of hazardous
substances from nearby chemical or nuclear plants. Similarly, who
should be involved in emergency planning and response for schools, and
the roles of the various participants will vary by type and size of the
emergency incident. For large-scale emergencies, effective response is
likely to involve all levels of government--federal, state, and local--
nongovernment entities, such as the Red Cross, and the private sector.
Federal and State Governments Provide Resources to School Districts for
Emergency Management Planning, While Only States Have Laws that Require
School Emergency Management Planning
Although no federal laws exist requiring school districts to have
emergency management plans, most states reported having requirements
for school emergency management planning; however, the federal
government, along with states, provides financial and other resources
for such planning. Education, DHS, and state governments provide
funding for emergency management planning in schools. However, DHS
program guidance does not clearly identify school districts as entities
to which states and local governments may disburse grant funds. Not all
states receiving DHS funding are aware that such funding could be
disbursed to school districts. In addition to providing funding, the
federal government assists school districts and schools in emergency
management planning by providing other resources such as guidance,
training, and equipment.
Although No Federal Laws Exist Requiring School District Emergency
Management Planning, the Majority of States Have Requirements
Although there are no federal laws requiring school districts to
have emergency management plans, many states reported having laws or
other policies that do so. Congress has not enacted any broadly
applicable laws requiring all school districts to have emergency
management plans. While the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 provides
that local education agencies (LEAs or school districts) applying for
subgrants under the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Program
include in their grant applications an assurance that either they or
their schools have ``a plan for keeping schools safe and drug-free that
includes. . .a crisis management plan for responding to violent or
traumatic incidents on school grounds'', Education has not issued any
regulations imposing such a requirement on all school districts.\5\
However, 32 of the states responding to our survey of state
administering agencies and state education agencies reported having
laws or other policies requiring school districts or schools to have a
written emergency management plan (see fig. 1). Several state laws
identify a broad range of specific emergencies that schools or
districts are required to address in their plans, while many other
states do not identify particular kinds of crises or use more general
language to refer to the kinds of emergencies that plans must
incorporate.
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\5\ 20 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(d)(7)(D). However, these plans are not
required to address multiple hazards; therefore, for purposes of this
report, we do not consider this to be a requirement for an emergency
management plan.
Federal Agencies and States Provide Funding for School Districts'
Emergency Management Planning
Education and DHS provided some funding to school districts for
emergency management. Education provides funding to some school
districts specifically for emergency management planning through its
Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ERCM) Grant Program.\6\ Since
fiscal year 2003, Education dispersed $130 million in such grants to
over 400 of the over 17,000 \7\ school districts in the United States.
These grant awards ranged from $68,875 to $1,365,087.
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\6\ The purpose of the ERCM grant program is to provide funds for
local education agencies to improve and strengthen their emergency
response plans. School districts receiving grant funds under this
program may use them to develop improved plans that address all four
phases of crisis response: prevention/mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery. In April 2007, Education announced that it was
renaming the ERCM grant as the Readiness and Emergency Management for
Schools grant program (REMS) to reflect terminology used in the
emergency management field. 72 Fed. Reg. 17,139 (April 6, 2007)
\7\ As reported by the states to the Department of Education and
contained in the Common Core Data (CCD), there were over 17,000 school
districts in the United States in school year 2003-04. This number
includes school districts in Puerto Rico; four outlying areas (American
Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); the
Bureau of Indian Affairs; and the Department of Defense, which were
eligible for funds but we excluded from the sample for our survey of
school districts. Department of Defense schools are included in the CCD
count of school districts, but according to Education officials, such
schools are not eligible to receive funding under the ERCM/REMS grant
program.
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DHS provides funding to states and local jurisdictions for
emergency management planning, some of which can be provided to school
districts or schools for emergency management planning. DHS officials
told us that such funds are available through the State Homeland
Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, and Citizen Corps
grants.\8\ Five states--Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi, and
Wyoming--reported that they provided approximately $14 million in DHS
funding directly to school districts in these states during fiscal
years 2003-2006. In addition, eight states and the District of Columbia
reported that they provided DHS funding to local jurisdictions that
then provided a portion of these funds to school districts or schools
for emergency management planning.\9\
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\8\ The State Homeland Security Program provides funds to enhance
the emergency preparedness of state and local governments. The Urban
Areas Security Initiative grant is awarded to some states with high
threat and high density urban areas that need planning, exercises,
equipment, and training to respond to acts of terrorism. Citizen Corps
funds are provided to states to promote volunteer efforts.
\9\ A ninth state distributed DHS funding to its state education
agency, which then provided the funding to public schools in its state.
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Although DHS officials told us that these three grant programs
allow for the use of funds at the district or school level, the
department's program guidance does not clearly specify that school
districts are among the entities to which state and local governments
may disburse funds.\10\ As a result, some states may not be aware of
their availability.
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\10\ DHS guidance for these grant programs provides that state
administering agencies are the only agencies eligible to apply for
funding and that they are responsible for disbursing grant funds to
local units of government and other designated recipients. The guidance
identifies a definition of ``local unit of government'' that was used
in the Conference Report accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act of
2006, and which includes ``any county, city, village, town, district,
borough, parish, port authority, transit authority, intercity rail
provider, commuter rail system, freight rail provider, water district,
regional planning commission, council of government, Indian tribe with
jurisdiction over Indian country, authorized Tribal organization,
Alaska Native village, independent authority, special district, or
other political subdivision of any State.''
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State governments also provide state funds to school districts.
Eleven of the 49 states \11\ responding to surveys we sent to state
education and state administering agencies reported providing state
funding to school districts for emergency management planning.
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\11\ We included the District of Columbia in our state education
and state administering agency surveys.
Federal Agencies and States Provide Guidance, Training, and Equipment
for Emergency Management in School Districts
The federal government also provides guidance, training, and
equipment to school districts to assist in emergency management
planning (see table 1).
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1: Examples of Guidance, Training, and Equipment the Federal
Government Provides to School Districts
Examples of guidance
Education publishes a guide for schools and
communities titled Practical Information on Crisis Planning,
which explains, among other things, how schools can prepare for
an emergency.
DHS created a Web site, How Schools Can Become More
Disaster Resistant, that provides guidance for teachers and
parents regarding how to prepare emergency management plans.
The site also discusses identifying and mitigating hazards,
developing response and coping plans, and implementing safety
drills.
Examples of training
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within
DHS, offers on-line courses including one on emergency
management planning for schools.
Education offers two 1-1/2; day Emergency Management
for Schools training sessions that provide school personnel
with critical training on emergency management issues,
resources, and practices. Emphasis for these trainings is
placed on emergency management plan development and enhancement
within the framework of four phases of emergency management:
prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery.
Examples of equipment
With funding from DHS and support from Education, the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) distributed 96,000 NOAA radios to almost
all public schools in the United States in 2005 and 2006. These
radios are intended to notify school officials of hazards in
their area 24 hours a day/7 days a week, even when other means
of communication are disabled.a
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Education, DHS, and HHS.
a Schools receiving NOAA radios included those in six states
that, according to DHS, mandate that public schools have radios. These
states are Washington, Tennessee, North Carolina, Maryland, Florida,
and Mississippi. DHS told us that they have procedures in place to
allow a school to request a radio if it did not receive one. DHS
officials also told us that they plan to distribute NOAA radios to non-
public schools (private, independent, and parochial and other faith-
based institutions), postsecondary education facilities, and district
offices in 2007.
Education, DHS, and HHS have collaborated and developed recommended
practices to assist in preparing for emergencies that can be applied to
school districts.\12\ Some of these practices are shown in table 2.
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\12\ Education, for example, also obtained input from state and
local school and emergency management officials and associations in
developing these recommended practices.
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2: Selected Practices that Education, DHS, and HHS Recommend
School Districts Take to Prepare for Emergencies
------------------------------------------------------------
Recommended practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Allocate time to emergency management planning.
Conduct an assessment of vulnerabilities.
Conduct regular drills.
Identify and acquire equipment to mitigate and respond
to emergencies.
Identify a storage location and replenish emergency
supplies on a regular basis.
Develop an emergency management plan and update the
plan on a regular basis. In developing and updating this plan,
school districts should:
Identify and address a range of events and
hazards specific to the district or schools.
Develop roles and responsibilities and
procedures for school community members.
Develop roles and responsibilities for first
responders and community partners.
Develop procedures for communicating with key
stakeholders such as parents and students, including
those who are limited-English proficient.
Develop procedures for special needs students.
Develop procedures in the plan for recovering
from an incident, including continuing student
education during an extended school closure.
Determine lessons learned after an incident or
training.
Develop multi-purpose manuals, with emergency
management information, that can be tailored to meet
individual school needs.
Include community partners such as local government
and public health agencies in planning.
Coordinate the school district's emergency procedures
with state and local governments.
Practice the emergency management plan with first
responders and community partners on a regular basis.
--------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Education,
DHS, and HHS guidance and training
documents.
The type of guidance available from the federal government on
topics related to these recommended practices varies significantly; in
some instances, federal agencies provide detailed instructions on how
to implement recommended practices while, in other instances, guidance
is less detailed.
We have also recognized the importance of certain of these
practices in our prior reports on emergency management.\13\ We have
noted the importance of realistic training exercises followed by a
careful assessment of those exercises. Those with whom the school
districts should coordinate and train will vary by the type and size of
the emergency. For example, for a potential pandemic flu or other major
infectious outbreak, planning and working with local health authorities
is critical.
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\13\ See GAO-07-395T and GAO-06-618.
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In addition to the federal government, states provide guidance and
training to school districts. Based on our survey of state
administrative agencies and state education agencies, 47 states
reported providing guidance and 37 states reported providing training.
Some states also reported providing online resources that include
guidance and training.
Most Districts Have Taken Steps to Prepare for Emergencies, but Some
Plans and Activities Do Not Address Recommended Practices
Almost all school districts have taken steps to prepare for
emergencies, including developing written plans, but some plans do not
address federally recommended practices such as establishing procedures
for special needs students and procedures for continued student
education in the event of an extended closure. Additionally, many
school districts do not have procedures for training regularly with
first responders and community partners.
Most School Districts Have Undertaken Some Emergency Management
Activities
Many school districts, those with and without emergency management
plans, have undertaken activities to prepare for emergencies. Based on
our survey of school districts, we estimate that 93 percent of all
school districts conduct inspections of their school buildings and
grounds to identify possible vulnerabilities in accordance with
recommended practices. Of those school districts, 87 percent made
security enhancements to their school facilities and grounds as a
result of these inspections. Security enhancements included adding or
enhancing equipment to communicate with school employees, strengthening
the perimeter security of the school, and enhancing access controls.
In addition to conducting vulnerability assessments, many school
districts carry out a number of other activities to prepare for
emergencies such as conducting some type of school drill or exercise
and maintaining a storage location for and replenishing emergency
supplies such as food, water, and first-aid supplies, as recommended.
Additionally, school districts took responsibility for a number of
activities to prepare for emergencies at the district level such as
negotiating the use of school buildings as community shelters and
identifying security needs in schools. These activities can vary by
locality depending on community needs and include oversight,
coordination with other entities, and training.
Most Districts Have Emergency Management Plans That Address Multiple
Hazards, but the Content of Plans Varies Significantly
Most school districts have developed written emergency management
plans that address multiple hazards. Based on our survey of school
districts, we estimate that 95 percent of all school districts have
written emergency management plans with no statistical difference
between urban and rural districts.\14\ Of those school districts that
have written emergency plans, nearly all (99.6 percent) address
multiple hazards in accordance with recommended practices to prepare
for emergencies. However, the specific hazards addressed by plans vary.
(See fig. 2.) In some instances, the hazards included in emergency
plans are specific to local conditions, which is to be expected.
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\14\ Those school districts that did not have a written emergency
management plan cited several reasons for the lack of such plans that
included (1) no requirement to have a written plan, (2) inadequate
resources for experienced personnel to develop emergency plans, and (3)
schools, not the district, have individual plans.
The extent to which school districtS' emergency management plans
and planning activities are consistent with other recommended practices
varies:
Develop Roles and Responsibilities for School Community Members.
Based on our survey of school districts, most districts have written
roles and responsibilities in their plans for staff such as
superintendents, building engineers or custodians, principals,
teachers, and nurses.
Develop Roles and Responsibilities for First Responders and
Community Partners. Based on our survey, we estimate that 43 percent of
school districts use the Incident Command System (ICS)--established by
DHS as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) \15\--to
establish the roles and responsibilities of school district officials,
local first responders, and community partners during an emergency, in
accordance with recommended practices.
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\15\ The Incident Command System is a standard incident management
system to assist in managing all major incidents. The Incident Command
System also prescribes interoperable communications systems and
preparedness before an incident happens, including planning, training,
and exercises. The Incident Command System was developed in the 1970s
following a series of catastrophic fires. Specifically, researchers
determined that response problems were more likely to result from
inadequate management rather than from any other reason. The Incident
Command System was designed so that responders from different
jurisdictions and disciplines could work together better to respond to
natural disasters and emergencies, including acts of terrorism. NIMS
includes a unified approach to incident management: standard command
and management structures, and emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid,
and resource management. Develop Procedures for the Continuation of
Student Education. Few school districts' emergency plans contain
procedures for continuing student education in the event of an extended
school closure, such as a pandemic outbreak, although it is a federally
recommended practice. Based on our survey, we estimate that 56 percent
of school districts do not include any of the following procedures (see
table 3) in their plans for the continuation of student education
during an extended school closure. Without such procedures school
districts may not be able to educate students during a school closure
that could last from several days to a year or longer.
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Develop Procedures for Communicating with Key Stakeholders. Central
to district emergency plans is the inclusion of procedures for
communicating with key stakeholders such as staff, parents, and
students, including those who are Limited-English Proficient. Our
survey finds that roughly three-quarters of all school districts have
not included written procedures in their plans for communicating with
Limited-English Proficient parents and students, in accordance with
federally recommended practices.
Develop Procedures for Special Needs Students. Although the number
of special needs students in the schools is growing, our survey finds
that an estimated 28 percent of school districts with emergency
management plans do not have specific provisions for them in their
emergency management plans. Education officials told us that because
there is no agreement among disability groups on what the best
practices are for special needs students in an emergency, districts
usually devise their own procedures. According to these officials, some
of these procedures such as keeping special needs students in their
classrooms during some emergencies may not ensure the students' safety
in an emergency.
Develop Procedures for Recovering from an Incident. Over half of
all school districts with written emergency plans include procedures in
their plans to assist with recovering from an incident, in accordance
with recommended practices. School districts' plans include such
procedures as providing on-site trauma teams, restoring district
administrative functions, and conducting assessments of damage to
school buildings and grounds.
Develop Procedures for the Continuation of student Education. Few
school districts' emergency plans contain procedures for continuing
student education in the event of an extended school closure, such as a
pandemic outbreak, although it is a federally recommended practice.
Based on our survey, we estimate that 56 percent of school districts do
not include any of the following procedures (see table 3) in their
plans for the continuation of student education during an extended
school closure. Without such procedures school districts may not be
able to educate students during a school closure that could last from
several days to a year or longer.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3: Percentages of School Districts with Written Plans that
Include Certain Types of Procedures to Continue Student Educational
Instruction in the Event of an Extended School Closure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated percentage of
school districts with
Types of procedure to continue student written plans that
educational instruction include procedure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic or human telephone trees to 30
communicate academic information to students
------------------------------------------------------------------------
based distance instruction 12
Mailed lessons and assignments 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Academic instruction via local radio or 7
television stations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of survey data.
Note: Responses are not mutually
exclusive.
Determine Lessons Learned. Based on our survey of school
districts, we estimate that 38 percent of districts have emergency
management plans that contain procedures for reviewing lessons learned
to analyze how well the plans worked in responding to a drill or
emergency. Of the remaining school districts, 53 percent indicated they
have procedures but those procedures are not included in their plans
and 7 percent have no such procedures.
Develop Multi-Purpose Manuals. Some school districts have multi-
purpose manuals that contain various types of information such as roles
and responsibilities for staff, descriptions of how to respond to
different types of emergencies, as well as site specific information
for individual schools to complete in order to tailor their plan. In
contrast, other districts provide less information. For example, one
district's plan consisted of a flipchart with contact information on
whom to call during an emergency.
Involve Local Government and Public Heath Agencies in Developing
and Updating Plans. School districts differed in the extent to which
they involve community partners in the development and updating of
their plans.\16\ Fewer than half of school districts with emergency
management plans involve community partners such as the local head of
government (43 percent) or the local public health agency (42 percent)
when developing and updating their emergency management plans, as
recommended by HHS.\17\ According to written guidance provided by
Education, those school districts that do not include community
partners in the development and updating of their plans may limit their
opportunity to exchange information with local officials, take
advantage of local resources, and identify gaps in their plan. More
than half (52 percent) of all school districts with emergency
management plans report regularly (i.e., at least once a year) updating
their emergency management plans in accordance with recommended
practices. However, 10 percent of all school districts had never
updated their plans.
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\16\ In our survey, community partners included representatives
from public health, mental health, local head of government,
transportation, hospitals, Red Cross, faith-based community, and the
business community.
\17\ Twelve percent of school districts do not know whether public
health agencies were included in the development and update of plans.
Thirteen percent of districts do not know whether the local head of
government was included in the development and update of plans.
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Train with First Responders. Based on our survey, we estimate that
27 percent of all school districts with emergency management plans have
never trained with any first responders on how to implement the plans,
in accordance with federally recommended practices. The reasons why
school districts are not training with first responders are not readily
apparent. As we have previously reported, involving first responder
groups in training and exercise programs can better familiarize first
responders with and prepare first responders for their roles in an
emergency as well as assess the effectiveness of a school or district
emergency plan.\18\
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\18\ See GAO-06-618.
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Train with Community Partners. School districts report training
with community partners--such as local government and local public
health entities--on activities to prepare for an emergency with similar
frequency. Specifically, we estimate that 29 percent of all school
districts train with community partners. As with first responders, the
reasons for the lack of training with community partners are not
readily apparent. In our work on Hurricane Katrina, we reported that
involving local community partners in exercise programs and training
could help prepare community partners and enhance their understanding
of their roles in an emergency as well as help assess the effectiveness
of a school district's emergency plan.\19\ Without such training,
school districts and their community partners may not fully understand
their roles and responsibilities and could be at risk of not responding
effectively during a school emergency.
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\19\ See GAO-06-618.
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School Districts Report Challenges in Planning for Emergencies and
Difficulties in Communicating with First Responders and Parents
In planning for emergencies, many school districts face challenges
resulting from competing priorities, a lack of equipment, and limited
expertise; some school districts experience difficulties in
communicating and coordinating with first responders and parents, but
most do not have such challenges with students.
Competing Priorities, Lack of Equipment, and Limited Expertise Are
Obstacles to Incorporating Recommended Practices in Emergency
Management Planning
School district officials who responded to our survey reported
difficulty in following the recommended practice of allocating time to
emergency management planning, given the higher priority and competing
demand on their time for educating students and carrying out other
administrative responsibilities. Based on our survey of school
districts, we estimate that in 70 percent of all districts, officials
consider competing priorities to be a challenge to planning for
emergencies.
In an estimated 62 percent of districts, officials cited a lack of
equipment and expertise as impediments to emergency planning. For
example, officials in one Massachusetts school district we visited
reported that they do not have adequate locks on some of the doors to
school buildings to implement a lockdown procedure. In a North Carolina
district we visited, officials said a lack of two-way radios for staff
in the elementary schools hinders their ability to communicate with one
another and with first responders during an emergency.\20\ As
demonstrated in these school districts, the lack of equipment would
prevent districts from implementing the procedures in their plans and
hinder communication among district staff and with first responders
during emergencies. In addition to not having sufficient equipment,
school district officials we spoke with described a shortage of
expertise in both planning for and managing emergencies. These
officials said their districts lacked specialized personnel and
training with which to develop needed expertise. For example, district
officials in 5 of the 27 districts we interviewed noted that they do
not have sufficient funding to hire full-time emergency management
staff to provide such training or take responsibility for updating
their district plans. These officials noted that the lack of expertise
makes it difficult to adequately plan for responding to emergencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Two-way radios, commonly known as walkie-talkies, are radios
that can alternate between receiving and transmitting messages.
Cellular telephones and satellite telephones are also two-way radios
but, unlike walkie-talkies, simultaneously receive and transmit
messages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
School districts we interviewed also reported challenges in
incorporating special needs students in emergency management planning.
According to officials in about half (13 of 27) of the districts in
which we conducted interviews, a lack of equipment or expertise poses
challenges for districts--particularly in the area of evacuating
special needs students. For example, an official in one school
district, said that the district tracks the location of special needs
students, but many of the district's schools do not have evacuation
equipment (e.g., evacuation chairs used to transport disabled persons
down a flight of stairs) to remove students from buildings and staff
need more training on how to operate the existing equipment.
Some School Districts Reported Difficulty in Communicating and
Coordinating with First Responders
Based on our survey of school districts, an estimated 39 percent of
districts with emergency plans experience challenges in communicating
and coordinating with local first responders.\21\ Specifically, these
school districts experience a lack of partnerships with all or specific
first responders, limited time or funding to collaborate with first
responders on plans for emergencies, or a lack of interoperability
between the equipment used by the school district and equipment used by
first responders. For example, the superintendent of a Washington
school district we visited said that law enforcement has not been
responsive to the district's requests to participate in emergency
drills, and, in addition to never having had a districtwide drill with
first responders, competition among city, county, and private first
responders has made it difficult for the school district to know with
which first responder entity it should coordinate. According to
guidance provided by Education, the lack of partnerships, as
demonstrated in these school districts, can lead to an absence of
training that prevents schools and first responders from understanding
their roles and responsibilities during emergencies. Additionally, in 8
of the 27 districts we interviewed, officials said that the two-way
radios or other equipment used in their school districts lacked
interoperability with the radios used by first responders.\22\
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\21\ Thirteen percent of school districts reported not knowing
whether the district has challenges related to first responders.
\22\ GAO has reported on the range of issues associated with the
lack of interoperability among first responders and the implications of
these issues for emergency management. For a fuller discussion of these
issues see the following GAO reports: First Responders: Much Work
Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability, GAO-07-301
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007); Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced
Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Homeland
Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation Required
to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications. GAO-04-740
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
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School Districts Have Methods to Communicate With Parents, but Face
Challenges in Ensuring Parents Receive Consistent Information during
Incidents
In keeping with recommended practices that call for school
districts to have a way to contact parents of students enrolled in the
district, all of the 27 school districts we interviewed had ways of
communicating emergency procedures to parents prior to (e.g.,
newsletters), during (e.g., media, telephone), and after an incident
(e.g., letters). Eleven of these districts have a system that can send
instant electronic and telephone messages to parents of students in the
district. Despite having these methods, 16 of the 27 districts we
interviewed experience difficulties in implementing the recommended
practice that school districts communicate clear, consistent, and
appropriate information to parents regarding an emergency. For example,
officials in a Florida school district said that with students'
increased access to cellular telephones, parents often arrive on school
grounds during an incident to pick up their children before the
district has an opportunity to provide parents with information. Thus,
according to these officials, the district experiences challenges in
simultaneously maintaining control of both the emergency situation and
access to school grounds by parents and others. Representatives of
three education associations \23\ also noted that school districts have
much to do to ensure that their emergency management efforts diffuse
confusion during emergencies and provide parents with consistent
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ National Education Association, American Association of School
Administrators, and National Association of Secondary School
Principals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on our survey of school districts, an estimated 39 percent of
all school districts provide translators to communicate with Limited-
English Proficient parents during emergencies, but fewer--an estimated
23 percent of all districts--provide translations of emergency
management materials. Officials in eight of the 27 districts we
interviewed discussed challenges in retaining bilingual staff to
conduct translations of the districts' messages or in reaching parents
who do not speak the languages or dialects the district translates. Our
findings, are consistent with the observations of some national
education groups that have indicated that districts, in part due to
limited funding, struggle to effectively communicate emergency-related
information to this population of parents.
Officials in all but one of the districts in which we conducted
interviews said that the district did not have problems communicating
emergency procedures to students. While some of these officials did not
provide reasons; as we previously discussed, most districts regularly
practice their emergency management plans with their students and
staff.
Concluding Observations
The federal government plays a critical role in assisting school
districts to prepare for emergencies by providing funding, giving
states flexibility to target federal funding for emergency management
to areas of greatest need, disseminating information on best practices
and other guidance, and providing training and equipment. School
districts have taken a number of important steps to plan for a range of
emergencies, most notably developing emergency management plans;
however, in many districts these plans or their implementation do not
align with federally recommended practices. Given the challenges many
school districts face due to a lack of necessary equipment and
expertise, they do not have the tools to support the plans they have in
place and, therefore, school districts are left with gaps in their
ability to fully prepare for emergencies. Additional clarity regarding
access to federal resources and improved guidance may enhance the
ability of school districts to plan and prepare for emergencies. We are
currently considering recommendations to address these issues.
Chairman Thompson. We will now move to Mr. Trump for his
comments.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH S. TRUMP, M.P.A., PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY SERVICES
Mr. Trump. Chairman Thompson and distinguished committee
members, thank you for the invitation to speak here today; and
also thank you for your recognition that protecting our
Nation's schools is not simply primarily a State and local
issue but one requiring proactive, coordinated and meaningful
Federal leadership.
I would also like to recognize Congressman Etheridge for
his efforts on keeping K-through-12 schools in the homeland
security planning. I know you have been vigilant, and we thank
you, sir. Police, fire, emergency medical services are our
first responders, but schoolteachers, principals, secretaries,
custodians, bus drivers, security staff and school police
officers are our very first responders.
Unfortunately, parents do not know what they do not know
and schools are much less prepared than parents, many parents,
believe them to be.
Our work in evaluating emergency plans for K-through-12
schools in 45 States over 25 years has shown that most schools
have emergency plans, but the contents of the plans are often
questionable, not consistent with best practices put together
with little or no input of public safety and emergency
partners. Staff and students are often not trained on these
plans, and the plans are not tested or exercised by tabletop
exercises or other activities in cooperation with public safety
and community partners.
The threats to school safety range from weather and natural
disasters and Hazmat spills to school shootings, acts of
violence and potential targets of terrorism. What is the extent
of school violence? Nobody honestly knows.
One of the dirty little secrets in the K-through-12
education community today is that there is no comprehensive
Federal school crime reporting and tracking for K-through-12
schools, as Congresswoman McCarthy noted earlier. And the
Education Department's school crime data is actually based on a
very limited, hodgepodge collection of a half dozen or so
academic surveys, not actual incident-based data.
So we have no actual numbers on the offenses in schools,
and this leaves Congress to make best-guesstimate-approach
decisions for policy and funding and creates some gaps that
need to be improved.
We also are challenged by a historical culture in the
education and political communities of ``downplay, deny, defect
and defend'' in acknowledging the extent of school crime and
violence, which has segued over to our discussions of schools
and school buses as potential targets of terror, because many
people are afraid of alarming parents; and therefore, these
discussions have been placed on the back burner.
Schools fit the definition of ``soft targets.'' We saw most
recently the March 16 FBI and Homeland Security bulletin about
foreign nationals with terrorist associations getting licenses
to drive school buses, buying buses and some having interests
in explosives. The Beslan, Russia, incident in 2004, the
history of schools or school buses in the Middle East and other
incidents outlined in my written testimony certainly would lead
us to be very concerned and we need to have more discussions on
this.
What is not needed? Educators and public safety officials
on the front line do not need extensive research studies,
traveling hearings, paralysis-by-analysis conference
symposiums, gathering manuals, guides, templates and
regurgitation of best practices. We don't need earmarked
technical assistance centers and institutes.
And as you all stated earlier, Mr. Chairman, the Web site,
we need to go beyond that as well.
How can Congress help? Congress can help in six meaningful
ways:
Number one, help acknowledge the full range of threats,
including the terror threat to schools, in a balanced, rational
way and correct the limitations of the current school violence
data upon which policy and funding decisions are made.
Number two, restore cut funding for school emergency
preparedness planning and expand future funding. One thing that
did not come up in this morning's first panel was that the
Education Department's emergency response and crisis management
program, now known as the REMS program, Readiness and Emergency
Management for Schools has actually been cut 40 percent since
2003.
Exhibit 3 to my testimony is the chart from an Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Education from Safe and Drug-Free
Schools showing that $39 million in fiscal year 2003 that
served 134 school sites has been cut down to $24 million last
year, almost a 40 percent cut. Over 550 applications for that
program existed in fiscal year 2003 and, subsequently, would
have been greater had the Education Department not put out the
RFP for these proposals in May and June when the schools are
actually involved in end-of-year graduations and other
activities and don't have time to apply.
Cutting almost 40 percent in school emergency planning
funding at a time when our Nation's homeland security model has
appropriately been focused on beefing up security and
preparedness for airports, monuments and the very hallways of
the buildings in which we sit today is counterintuitive
counterproductive and counter to the best interest of
protecting children and teachers.
Number three, open up Homeland Security Department grants
for K-through-12 schools as primary applicants. I would
recommend working through the education associations, the
school board, superintendents, principals, organizations to
make sure they know of their availability and to allow those to
focus on training tabletop exercises, school bus security and
limited equipment needs.
Number four, require local police and emergency management
agencies receiving Homeland Security grant funding to include
K-through-12 public and private schools in their planning.
Number four, require States receiving Homeland Security
Department funding to include State education departments and
school safety experts in their planning.
And finally, number five, taking a look at the current
Federal structure for oversight of school safety and readiness.
The Education Department has long been in the lead for
prevention--violence prevention intervention programs, bullying
and suicide; and many believe the expertise rests there. But
our challenge and knowledge base of safety and emergency
preparedness has changed in a post-Columbine and a post-9/11
world.
The Department of Homeland Security and Justice have richer
experience that should be brought in in the short term with a
recommended permanent interagency working group of those three
agencies; and perhaps in the long term even looking at Homeland
Security and Justice as having a broader role in leading those
efforts in cooperation with, but not led by Education.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Trump follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth S. Trump
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Committee
members, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
provide testimony on strengthening the preparedness and response
readiness of our nation's K-12 schools. Our educators and school safety
professionals across the nation appreciate your recognition of the
importance of including our K-12 schools in the federal government's
plans for protecting our nation's critical infrastructure.
I would like to also specifically recognize and thank Congressman
Bob Etheridge of North Carolina for his leadership and persistence in
advocating for the inclusion of K-12 schools in Homeland Security
policies and programs, protection of schools and school buses from
terrorism, and funding of K-12 school preparedness from the Department
of Homeland Security.
My name is Kenneth Trump and I am the President and CEO of National
School Safety and Security Services, Incorporated, a Cleveland (Ohio)-
based national consulting firm specializing in school security and
school emergency preparedness consulting and training. I have worked
with K-12 school officials and their public safety partners in urban,
suburban, and rural communities in 45 states during my career of over
20 years in the school safety profession.
In addition to working with educators and public safety officials
nationwide, my background includes having served over seven years with
the Cleveland City School District's Safety and Security Division as a
high school and junior high school safety officer, a district-wide
field investigator, and as founding supervisor of its nationally-
recognized Youth Gang Unit that contributed to a 39% reduction in
school gang crimes and violence. I later served three years as director
of security for the ninth-largest Ohio school district with 13,000
students, where I also served as assistant director of a federal-funded
model anti-gang project for three southwest Cleveland suburbs.
I have authored two books and over 45 articles on school security
and emergency preparedness issues. My education background includes
having earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Social Services (Criminal
Justice concentration) and a Master of Public Administration degree
from Cleveland State University; special certification for completing
the Advanced Physical Security Training Program at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center; and extensive specialized training on
school safety and emergency planning, terrorism and homeland security,
gang prevention and intervention, and related youth safety topics.
Presently I volunteer as Chair of the Prevention Committee and
Executive Committee member for Cleveland's Comprehensive Anti-Gang
Initiative, one of six Department of Justice-funded federal and local
collaborative model projects to address gangs through enforcement,
prevention, and reentry strategies. I was an invited attendee at the
White House Conference on School Safety in October of 2006. In 1999, I
testified to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP)
Committee as a school safety and crisis expert, and on April 23, 2007,
I testified to the House Education and Labor Committee on school safety
and emergency preparedness issues, needs, and actions Congress can take
to make our schools safer (see testimony at http://edlabor.house.gov/
testimony/042307KennethTrumptestimony.pdf or http://
www.schoolsecurity.org/news/House_Education07.html ). School districts
and other organizations engage our services to evaluate school
emergency preparedness plans, provide training on proactive school
security strategies, develop and facilitate school tabletop exercises,
conduct school security assessment evaluations, and consult with school
administrators and board members on management plans for improving
school safety. We have increasingly found ourselves also called to
assist educators and their school communities with security and
preparedness issues following high-profile incidents of school
violence. In the past several years alone, we have worked in a school
district where a student brought an AK-47 to school, fired shots in the
halls, and then committed suicide; in a private school where death
threats raised student and parental anxiety; and in a school district
where a student brought a tree saw and machete to school, attacked
students in his first period class, and sent multiple children to the
hospital with serious injuries.
My perspective on school safety is vastly different from the many
other types of other witnesses you may have heard from in the past, or
will hear from in the future. I am not an academician, researcher,
psychologist, social worker, law enforcement official, non-profit
agency head, or government agency representative. Instead, I bring to a
perspective of front-line experience in working with public and private
school staff, their public safety and community partners, and parents
of our nation's children on school violence prevention, security risk
reduction strategies, and emergency preparedness measures.
SCHOOL READINESS: PARENT EXPECTATIONS, THREATS, AND GAPS
Parents will forgive educators, legislators, and others they have
entrusted their children's educational direction to if their children's
test scores go down for a year. They are much less forgiving if
something happens to their children that could have been prevented or
better managed when it could not be avoided. Children cannot learn and
teachers cannot teach to their maximum capability if they are worried
about their personal safety. Education will cease as school-communities
struggle to manage and recover from a critical incident, and the impact
can be both severe and long-term.
Police, fire, emergency medical services, and other public safety
officials are the first responders to critical incidents at schools.
However, teachers, principals, custodians, secretaries, school resource
officers (police officers assigned to schools), school security
personnel, and other school officials are our VERY FIRST RESPONDERS
when an incident of crime, violence, mass casualty, or natural disaster
strike at their schools.
Preparing our public safety officials for emergencies without also
adequately preparing our school officials is a serious mistake.
Incidents of crime and violence occur very quickly, oftentimes with
only minutes passing from beginning to end, and even the quickest
response by public safety officials may place them on-scene after the
incident itself is over. The actions taken by school officials as the
incident unfolds, and in the first half hour or so immediately
thereafter, can determine the severity of the impact on the lives of
children and teachers for months and years to come. And once public
safety officials complete their heroic jobs and leave the school
emergency site, it will be the school officials who will carry the bulk
of the responsibility for the short and long-term recovery of their
schools.
When parents drop off their children at school each day, they have
an inherent and typically unspoken expectation that school, public
safety, and elected officials have taken every possible step to place
every measure of prevention and preparedness in place to protect their
children. The harsh reality is that while there have been many
improvements in school security and school emergency preparedness
following the 1999 Columbine High School tragedy, that progress has
stopped and has actually slipped backwards since recent years due in
many cases to cuts in school safety and emergency preparedness funding
for K-12 schools. Sadly, most parents do not know what they do not
know, i.e., that their schools are much less prepared than parents
believe them to be.
We must do a better job at preparing our school officials to
prevent and manage threats. The threats include weather and natural
disasters, such as we saw with Hurricane Katrina or the destruction of
a school in Enterprise, Alabama. They include hazardous materials
spills that may occur on roadways or railroad tracks adjacent to
schools. They include school shooting rampages. And they also include
the potential for schools and school buses to be targets of terrorism.
What is the extent of the threat? In terms of school violence, no
one honestly knows in real numbers. One of the ``dirty little secrets''
in our nation's education community is that there is no comprehensive,
mandatory federal school crime reporting and tracking of actual school
crime incidents for K-12 schools. While Congress enacted the Cleary Act
in 1990 to improve crime reporting and collecting on college campuses,
K-12 schools have no such requirements or incident-driven data in
place. Federal school crime and violence data by-and-large consists of
a hodgepodge collection of just over a half-dozen academic surveys and
research studies. See Exhibit 1 for these limited survey sources and
Exhibit 2 for my tally of school-associated violent deaths since 1999.
Unfortunately, this means that Congress is forced to make school
safety policy and funding decisions based on a ``best-guestimate''
approach, and the American public is being inadvertently mislead when
these surveys are being used to claim that school violence in America
is actually decreasing over the past decade. It also means claims by
the Department of Education and others that understate the threat of
school crime and violence can lead to the underestimation of policy and
resources for prevention and preparedness. See my aforementioned
testimony to the House Education and Labor Committee on April 23, 2007,
for a lengthy discussion of these issues.
There has been a historical culture in the education community of
``downplay, deny, deflect, and defend'' in acknowledging the extent of
school crime and violence. This mindset and practice has extended to
the discussion, or better stated ``lack of discussion,'' of the issue
of schools and school buses as potential targets for terrorism. Elected
and administrative officials do not want to openly address this issue
with the American public out of fear of creating panic among parents.
Schools clearly fit the definition of a ``soft target'' and an
attack upon our schools would have not only a devastating impact on
Americans emotionally, but a severe impact on the American economy if
the ``business'' of education shut downs and/or is disrupted due to a
catastrophic terror attack upon our educational infrastructure.
We need only look at the following quote from the National
Commission on Children and Terrorism's report of June 12, 2003: ``Every
day 53 million young people attend more than 119,000 public and private
schools where 6 million adults work as teachers or staff. Counting
students and staff, on any given weekday more than one-fifth of the
U.S. population can be found in schools.'' Schools and school buses
have basically the same number of children at the same locations every
day of the week in facilities and buses that are unquestionably soft
targets.
There are a number of ``red flags'' that appear to be going
unnoticed in recent years. News reports in June of 2004 indicating a
suspected sleeper-cell member of al-Qaeda who obtained a license to
drive a school bus and haul hazardous materials; the reported
(appropriate) reclassification of schools to a higher risk category in
its national risk assessment program by the Department of Homeland
Security in 2006; March of 2007 alert by the FBI and Homeland Security
Departments about foreign national with extremist ties obtaining
licenses to drive school buses and buying school buses; and even a top
school administrators employed in the Detroit and DC schools who was
federally charged in 2005 with a conspiracy with terrorists according
to news reports. Add to that a number of other suspicious activities
around schools across the country, the Beslan, Russia, school hostage
siege and murders in 2004, and the history of schools and school buses
being terror targets in the Middle East. While I have no firsthand
knowledge, I strongly suspect our federal intelligence, justice, and
homeland security agencies have even more information on the potential
terror threat to schools that American parents and local safety
officials may never know.
In short, the tactics have been used elsewhere in the Middle East
and in Beslan, Russia. An attack our educational system would have a
devastating emotional and economic on America. And it is not
unforeseeable except to those who do not wish to acknowledge and deal
with it for political and image reasons. Congress must sure that K-12
schools are an integral part of our nation's homeland security
preparedness policy and funding.
Yet to date, from inside the Beltway to our local communities,
public officials have largely been afraid of talking about, and acting
proactively upon, the idea of schools as potential terror targets out
of fear of alarming parents. I pray we do not face the day where we
have a ``911 Commission'' type hearing asking how a terrorist attack
that occurred upon a school in the United States could have been
avoided. We know that denial, downplay, and ``Ostrich Syndrome'' make
us more vulnerable. We cannot continue the current course of ignoring
the threat of terrorism to our nation's K-12 schools.
Our work with K-12 school officials in 45 states over close to 25
years has found that most schools now have crisis/emergency plans. Many
of those were created after the 1999 Columbine tragedy. Expert
evaluations of those plans have found that the plans have frequently
been put together by school officials with limited to no input from
their public safety and emergency management partners; contents of the
plans are often very questionable in terms of best and appropriate
practices; school teachers and staff have not been trained on the
plans; and the plans have not been tested or exercised by tabletop or
other exercises with their public safety partners. It has been widely
acknowledged, even in the U.S. Department of Education's programs, that
many plans are sitting up on shelves in school offices collecting dust.
WHAT IS NOT NEEDED
There are many things Congress can do to help improve K-12 school
emergency prevention and preparedness. But first, there are clearly
some things that our educators and public safety officials on the
front-lines do NOT need.
School and public safety officials do NOT need more federal
research, studies, and paralysis-by-analysis reports. They do NOT need
more conferences, symposiums, and gatherings. They do NOT need more
advisory groups, panels, commissions, and hearings. They do NOT need
more manuals, guides, templates, and regurgitation of best practices.
They definitely do NOT need more earmarked ``technical assistance''
centers, institutes, or Beltway contracted technical assistance
providers. And they certainly do NOT simply need more federal web
sites.
HOW CONGRESS CAN PROVIDE MEANINGFUL HELP TO SCHOOLS
Congress and the federal administrative agencies can take action to
have a meaningful impact on K-12 school readiness and preparedness by:
1. Acknowledging the full range of threats to schools and the
limitations of current data on school violence. In particular,
be forthcoming with the American public and education and
safety officials charged with protecting our children about the
potential threat of terrorism to our nation's schools and
school buses.
2. Restore cut funding for school emergency preparedness
planning and expand funding over time to reflect our nation's
commitment to school preparedness in the way we are beefing up
protection for other national critical infrastructures.
3. Require Department of Homeland Security grants and other
funding to local law enforcement, emergency management
agencies, and other public safety officials to include
mandatory requirements that these public safety officials
actively engage K-12 public and private schools in local
emergency planning.
4. Open select Department of Homeland Security grants
specifically for K-12 schools for emergency preparedness
training, tabletop exercises, school bus security, limited
equipment (especially communications equipment), and related
needs.
5. Require states with Department of Homeland Security funding
to include their state education departments on statewide
homeland security committee policy and funding decision bodies,
and actively include K-12 school safety experts in their
advisory activities.
6. Examine and modify the current federal organization and
structure for the oversight and management of federal school
safety, readiness, and preparedness policy, programming, and
funding to allow the expertise of the Department of Homeland
Security and Department of Justice to have broader input and
leadership, rather than the Department of Education having
primary responsibility for these initiatives.
Acknowledging the Threat
As noted above and in my April 23, 2007, testimony to the House
Education and Labor Committee, there are serious flaws and gaps in
federal Department of Education data on school violence. H.R. 354, The
SAVE Act by Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy, addresses a number of these
issues. Congress should recognize and acknowledge the flaws in school
violence and crime data, and work to improve the data, if it truly
wishes to more accurately identify the potential threat to schools.
We must also acknowledge the terrorism threat to schools and school
buses. It does not have to be done in an alarmist manner, nor should it
be done that way. But fear is best managed by education, communication,
and preparation, not ``Ostrich Syndrome,'' denial, or downplay.
American parents, educators, and the public in general, deserve a more
candid recognition of this threat so we can move to better
preparedness.
Restore School Emergency Preparedness Funding Cuts and Expand Future
Funding
Federal funding for the Education Department's Emergency Response
and Crisis Management (ERCM) program, now known as the Readiness and
Emergency Management (REM) for Schools program, has been cut almost 40%
since 2003. According to PowerPoint slide data from a presentation by a
Department of Education official, the program has been cut from over
$39 million awarded to 134 school sites in FY 03, to only $24 million
awarded to 77 sites in FY06. See Exhibit 3 for this document detailing
these facts.
The numbers of applications for this ERCM/REMS grant program have
ranged from over 550 in its first year of FY03 to 301, 406, and 379 the
following years. Given the Department of Education has issued the RFP
for this grant toward the end of each school year (April-May) and
required submissions around May-June, it is logical to believe there
would be greater interest and more applications had the Department not
chosen to put out calls for proposals at the end of the school year
when educators are focused on testing, graduations, and school-year
closure and therefore have more difficulty in putting together complex
grant applications with multi-agency partners from their communities.
Many of us in the school safety field believe the number of
applications would be even greater if the call for proposals was put
out earlier in the school year and not when school administrators are
so overwhelmed with year-end school matters.
At a time when Congress is funding more resources to protect our
national infrastructure such as airports, monuments, and the hallways
of our government offices themselves, how can we justify cutting almost
40% from an already pithy amount of funding for helping to protect the
children and teachers in the hallways of our nation's schools?
Following my testimony to the House Education and Labor Committee
hearing on April 23, 2007, as I walked back to my Capitol Hill hotel I
counted eight, yes eight (8), Capitol Hill police officers at ONE
street intersection, several with high-power weaponry. Capitol Hill
Police cars seemed to be on every roadway, one after another.
Barricades and bollards surround the Capitol and its Congressional
office buildings and other facilities. Officers, metal detectors and x-
ray machines are at federal building doors.
It dawned upon me what a mixed message it sends to our American
children, their parents, and their educators that while security and
emergency preparedness have been understandably well-funded and beefed
up to protect those of us here in these Capitol Hill offices today,
funding for protecting and preparedness for children and educators in
the hallways of their schools has actually been cut nearly 40% since
2003, along with cuts to the federal Safe and Drug Free Schools and
COPS in Schools program, in a post-9/11 world. It not only sends a
mixed message, but a wrong message and is a wrong action.
Unlike many other narrowly focused federal grant programs, the ERCM
(now REMS) grant provides for a comprehensive and balanced program
consisting of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response
components in order to be successfully funded. This means that school
programs can be designed as they should, not skewed towards prevention
programming-only or security/policing/emergency response-only, but
designed instead with a balanced and comprehensive approach of
prevention, preparedness, and response. The threats facing our schools
today require nothing less.
While the authority for this particular program rests with the
House Education and Labor Committee, the Committee on Homeland Security
and Congress overall should work together in a bipartisan manner to
immediately restore funding cut for the ERCM (now REMS) program and
significantly increase future funding multiple times the original
already-under-funded $39 million funding allocation for this program.
The need is significant. Reducing school emergency prevention and
preparedness funding in a post-911 and post-Columbine world is
illogical, counterintuitive, counterproductive, and inconsistent with
our national homeland security philosophy of preparedness.
Require Homeland Security Grant Recipients to Engage K-12 Schools in
Planning
Local police, emergency management agencies, and other funding
recipients of Department of Homeland Security grant funding should be
required to include K-12 public and private schools in local emergency
planning. This means more than simply inviting schools to sit at a
table in a countywide tabletop exercise. Schools should be integral
parts of local emergency planning and public safety grant recipients
should be required to establish relationships, memoranda of
understanding documents, cross-training, school-specific exercises, and
other joint planning.
Open Select Homeland Security Grants to K-12 Schools
Schools should be made eligible as primary applicants to seek
funding for emergency preparedness for teachers, administrators, and
school support staff such as bus drivers, secretaries, custodians, and
others on the front lines protecting kids. Funds should designated for
training of these school officials; tabletop exercises with public
safety and community partners to get school emergency plans off the
shelves and people talking to see if they would work in a real
emergency; to improve school bus security and emergency preparedness;
for limited equipment needs, particularly to improve communications
capabilities (mass parent notifications capabilities, interoperability
with public safety officials, two-way radio and other communications on
campuses; etc.); and other related preparedness activities.
Require States to Include Education and School Safety Experts in State
Planning
Congress should require states receiving federal Homeland Security
dollars to include state department of education and K-12 school safety
experts in their statewide homeland security policy and funding
governing bodies. Schools and school safety experts are still too often
absent from state homeland security planning.
Modify the Current Federal Structure for Overseeing School Safety and
Readiness
Congress needs to look at how federal school safety and policy is
managed in the federal government administrative structure. The
Department of Education has long been the lead source for violence
prevention curriculum, intervention programming, and dealing with
strategies school as bullying prevention, youth suicide, and related
prevention policy and funding, and many believe they the expertise for
addressing these issues is best housed in the Education Department. It
is worth noting that the Department of Education's current Office of
Safe and Drug Free Schools actually originated as the drug-free schools
program, with safety being added as an after-thought as incidents of
violence in our schools increased over time. In fact, it was not until
a couple years ago that this ``program'' was reshaped under an
``office'' of safe and drug free schools.
Yet the challenges, knowledge-base, and expertise of public safety
and emergency preparedness have expanded greatly in the past decade
and, in particular, in our post-Columbine and post-9/11 world. Congress
should explore whether the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice's richer history, experience, knowledge, and
expertise with security, policing, and emergency preparedness
programming would provide a more focused leadership on managing K-12
school security, policing, and emergency preparedness components of our
nation's school safety policy and funding. While these two departments
do work, and should continue to work, with the Department of Education,
the emphasis of responsibility for specific programmatic areas of
public safety and security, and emergency preparedness, would be worthy
of restructuring and/or realigning.
In the short term, Congress should establish a permanent
interagency working group of the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of Education to create a
formal structure for communication, planning, policy and funding
decisions combining their respective expertise areas and disciplines. A
periodic conversation or meeting, or a joint manual publication,
between the Department of Education and the Department of Homeland
Security is simply not enough. An interagency working group, supported
by state, local, and front-line experts in K-12 school safety and
security, would help build more meaningful and expert-designed federal
policy and funding decisions on K-12 school safety, security, and
emergency preparedness.
In the long term, the leadership for school security and emergency
preparedness should be positioned outside the Department of Education
in Homeland Security and Justice Departments working with, but not led
by, the Department of Education
CONCLUSION
Chairman Thompson and distinguished Committee members, thank you
again for your leadership in protecting me, my family, and our nation.
I appreciate the opportunity to have testified before you today and
look forward to answering any of your questions.
Chairman Thompson. We now will hear opening statements from
Mr. Rainer for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID RAINER, ASSOCIATE VICE CHANCELLOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND PUBLIC SAFETY, NORTH CAROLINA STATE
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Rainer. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Mr. Etheridge. My
name is David Rainer. I bring greetings from our Chancellor
James Oblinger and thank you for inviting me today to testify
in front of the House Homeland Security Committee.
I serve as the Associate Vice Chancellor for Environmental
Health and Public Safety at North Carolina State University in
Raleigh, North Carolina. While my written testimony is more
detailed, I want to focus on several key components that may
help frame the issue around university disaster preparedness
and response and how the Federal Government might assist us
further.
North Carolina State University takes a proactive approach
to disaster preparedness and response. We have a fully
accredited police force with 55 sworn officers, an integrated
fire, public safety and environmental health and safety office
and disaster response plans for a variety of emergency
situations. We regularly test those plans with drills and
scenarios to evaluate our planning and training.
We believe that as a large institution we must be proactive
in our disaster planning and response efforts, and we regularly
review and update our disaster planning processes and our
protocols.
We also believe that we must integrate ourselves within the
larger city and county disaster planning and response efforts,
and so we have mutual aid agreements and hold joint planning
and disaster response drills with the city, county and State
response agencies.
North Carolina State University is a large institution,
similar in size, function and population to a medium North
Carolina city. The university has more than 30,000 students--
8,000 students are residents--7,000 employees and 2,100 acres
on three separate campuses about 3 miles from the State capital
of North Carolina.
In addition to our population, our facilities and our very
active campus, we have about $150 million in Federal
investments on campus.
In my role as Associate Vice Chancellor, I am responsible
for coordinating campus preparedness and response efforts for
disasters and emergencies and coordinating our campus efforts
with those of the larger community.
Now, our accredited police force reports to me, as well as
fire safety and environmental health and safety, and my
division coordinates our disaster and emergency response
planning and regularly conducts all types of emergency drills.
We have conducted a variety of drills and scenarios to
understand what we should expect and how we would respond in an
emergency. In general, what we have learned is that regular
mass communication systems are fragile in a major crisis and
emergency; and depending on the situation, they can easily
become inoperative or overwhelmed. We cannot rely solely on
cell phones, the Internet, radio or TV to communicate to our
campus community in a crisis.
We have also learned that large universities, such as NC
State, must be prepared to be self-sufficient for a time after
a large regional or statewide disaster. We are ever conscious
of the fact that because of our size and the disaster response
capacity, we might not receive outside help for at least 48
hours or more after a large disaster, and we may be a triage or
shelter facility for the greater community.
We have learned that if we have a campus-based chemical
emergency, outside first responders might not have the
detection and protective equipment they need to safely assess
the situation and respond. We must assist them with our own
capabilities.
We have learned that preplanning is critical in many ways,
and we have learned that no amount of planning will make any
campus immune to a disaster.
Finally, let me touch on what I hope the committee and the
Department of Homeland Security might be able to do for us in
the future to assist us:
Help coordinate and develop standardized campus security
and hardening protocols. Current requirements specified by
Select Agent rules, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, DHS's
Interim Final Rule: Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards
need to be coordinated so that universities implement
standardized hardening and security protocols that support the
requirements of a multitude of regulations.
Establish one or more National Resource Centers that
support the provision of emergency planning and campus security
information to universities and ensure that universities are
aware and familiar with available resources.
DHS could host a national ``best practice'' symposium on
regional--or regional symposiums on university campus safety
and security.
Programs such as ``Ready Kids.'' Materials for children
could be modified and targeted to college students and campuses
could be used to communicate more information to families about
personal emergency planning.
Help establish well-formulated and standardized threat
assessment protocols for university campuses modeled after
guidelines of the Safe School Initiative that was discussed
this morning.
DHS could convene a group of disaster preparedness and
university experts to help evaluate how constraints regarding
sharing of information, mandated by FERPA and HIPAA, impact the
university's ability to share and receive information that may
be relevant to identifying threatening individuals.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. Let me
assure you that North Carolina State University is prepared to
do its part to assist the national effort on campus safety and
disaster preparedness.
I am happy to answer any questions that you may have. Thank
you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Rainer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Rainer
Introduction
On behalf of North Carolina State University and Chancellor James
Oblinger, I thank you for inviting me to testify about how to
strengthen federal efforts to enhance community preparedness and
response as it relates to schools, and in particular, to universities.
I hope our experiences at NC State can help to shed light on what is at
risk, what we do to prepare for a disaster and how we respond to a
crisis that affects our campus and our community.
As associate vice chancellor for Environmental Health and Public
Safety at North Carolina State University, I am responsible for
coordinating the campus preparedness and response efforts for disasters
and emergencies within our campus and coordinating with emergency
response agencies throughout the wider community in which we live and
work. I also work with other units on our campus to develop crisis
response and communications plans as well as plan and carry out
simulations of possible disaster scenarios that could occur on our
campus and in our community.
We are fortunate that our university is one of the few that has
under one division the Campus Police, Environmental Health and Fire
Safety. This enhances our ability to train as one team, develop
efficient emergency response protocols, develop a trust and
understanding of how each discipline responds and assure that all
response protocols recognize and support each of our primary campus
emergency response groups.
Our Campus and Community
NC State is a large campus, with more than 30,000 students and
about 7,000 employees, including approximately 1,800 full and part-time
faculty and extension field faculty. Including visitors, there could be
40,000 people or more on campus at any given time. Not only do we have
large numbers of people on campus, but our campus population is spread
over 2,110 acres on three separate tracts of land that make up the main
campus in Raleigh. In addition, we have more than 101,000 acres in
research and extension farms, forests and facilities throughout the
state. As a land-grant university, we have staff and facilities or
field offices in all 100 counties in the state of North Carolina and
the Cherokee Reservation. NC State was awarded more than $146 million
in federally funded research and $207 million in total research awards
in Fiscal Year 2006.
More than 8,000 students live on campus; our approximately 16
million square footage of building space includes student residence
halls, research labs, classrooms, private company and government
administrative offices, dining halls, recreation commons, athletic
facilities, steam and cooling water generation facilities and pilot-
scale manufacturing facilities. We operate our own Wolfline bus system
and transport over 13,000 passengers a day.
NC State's Raleigh campus is located within the city of Raleigh,
the capital of North Carolina. Raleigh is a vibrant and growing city
with more than 350,000 residents. NC State University's campus is less
than 3 miles from downtown Raleigh and the population density on campus
is far higher than the city in general.
NC State Response to Emergency Preparedness
We take our job of protecting campus people and assets very
seriously. We believe the State of North Carolina and the Federal
Government have placed a certain trust in us as a flagship public
university as well as investing significant tax dollars in our campus.
We are good stewards of both.
NC State takes several approaches to campus safety and emergency
preparedness, starting with a well-trained police department, one of
the few accredited university police departments in the country.
Accreditation means our police have met or exceeded nationally
recognized standards for law enforcement agencies. The university's
police department--which includes 55 sworn law enforcement officers--
provides a full range of services, including 24-hour patrol (by
vehicle, on bikes, on foot and on horseback), investigations, a 911
center and a crime prevention unit. The department offers a wide range
of educational services.
We have written mutual aid agreements with other police agencies
including the City of Raleigh and Wake County Sheriff Department. We
have mutual aid agreements with other governmental agencies to use
campus facilities as shelters or mass medical surge facilities in case
of weather or other declared emergencies.
We have university-wide crisis response and communication plans on
which departmental plans are based. By creating a plan before a crisis
erupts, we believe we have accelerated our decision-making process, an
important advantage in an emergency.
The Environmental Health and Public Safety division,
as part of our ongoing commitment to emergency preparedness,
regularly conducts all types of emergency drills. These drills
keep our emergency responders ready for different situations
and help us evaluate our ability to handle problems beyond the
scope of daily happenings in our university community.
By simulating a crisis and engaging the leadership in
a decision-making discussion, we improve our ability to respond
to a real emergency. To make drills realistic, senior
leadership participate. Participation prepares them to take a
leadership role in an actual emergency and furthers their
understanding of how assets are deployed and an incident
command system works.
We understand that because of the size of our campus,
we may not expect to see community resources in case of natural
disaster until up to 48 hours or longer after a major
emergency. Campus drills allow us to test our ability to
support the 8,000-plus students who reside on campus and who
would remain our responsibility in a major event if students
could not travel home.
Campus Police are the first responders to any campus
police emergency and we test their preparedness to all types of
police emergencies.
Environmental Health staff are first responders to
campus radiation safety and chemical emergencies. They serve as
technical specialists should regional HAZMAT teams respond to
campus. We test our technical ability to respond as well as
ability to advise and communicate with outside partners and
regulatory agencies.
Campus Fire Protection staff are all Emergency Medical
Technician certified and are first to respond to emergency
medical events. We have tested our ability to respond to unique
campus medical emergencies that may involve radioactive
material and chemical agents.
Our drills often include municipal response groups. We are proud of
our working relationship with Raleigh Fire, Hazmat, EMS and Police; and
Wake County Emergency and the State Office of Emergency Management. In
turn, community emergency drills often include NC State responders and
sometimes use NC State facilities (football stadium, high-rise
residence halls, underground utility tunnels) to realistically test the
ability to respond to complicated emergency situations.
Over the past four years, we conducted or participated in the
following drills:
Infectious disease outbreak (smallpox, pandemic flu
with the Wake County Health Department)
Radioactive material release (``dirty bomb'') with
Raleigh Hazmat, Raleigh Police Bomb Squad
Terrorist chemical attack with Raleigh Hazmat, Wake
and State Emergency Management, federal agencies, police
agencies
Terrorist attack with hostages at an athletics
facility with local, state and federal police agencies
Active shooter on campus with multiple police agencies
Urban search and rescue, with Raleigh Hazmat and Fire
Department
Train derailment with state, local and federal
agencies
What We Have Learned
All drills are designed to test our ability to respond promptly to
a crisis, communicate effectively with drill participants and our
community at large, and to take appropriate action to stabilize,
mitigate and resolve the problem. Each type of drill presents different
and unique challenges that require temporary work-around actions and
implementation of corrective action plans during and after the drill.
Among other things, we have learned that:
Universities must prepare for catastrophe through
planning and funding. Universities that are self sufficient,
provide support to the larger community in a disaster through
personnel, expertise and shelter. Of course, universities not
prepared become another entity of potentially thousands of
people in need of rescue.
Pre-planning is critical. Universities must clarify in
advance with surrounding city and county agencies their
expectations of use of university facilities for shelter, such
as coliseums and convention facilities. These expectations may
conflict with university plans or require extensive university
support.
Universities must work in partnership with local and
state agencies and must consider entering into its own
contracts and agreements with vendors for continuity and
support.
We must continue revision and improvement of existing
plans in accordance with changes in internal capabilities and
roles and responsibilities. We must also account for changes in
capabilities of supporting groups and agencies.
Departments require cross training in functional roles
and need to understand the capabilities and limits of
responding groups.
Internal and external communication protocols and
capabilities must be tested and retested. Emergency mass
communication is a challenge and communication systems fail
when stressed (cell phones, web servers, text message systems).
When our communication systems have failed we have had to
improvise.
During our radiological drills, we have learned that
emergency responders need better personal monitoring equipment
and training and need to understand some of the technical
aspects of our radiological license.
During chemical emergency response, the university has
had to provide specific monitoring instrumentation to outside
responders.
Recovery and reconstitution plans must be in place,
continuously updated and tested.
Understanding the limits of our ability to respond to
various scenarios and the shortcomings of key systems such as
communication pathways is critical. By practicing various
emergency scenarios, we begin to gain an understanding of the
way the campus population may respond to instructions and what
systems may fail.
We have developed mechanisms to regularly share
equipment and information with outside responders, recognizing
that a university campus response is often not the same as a
general community emergency response because of the density of
the population and sometimes-unique hazards.
We have learned that no crisis proceeds according to
plan.
What More Can the Department Homeland Security (DHS) Do to Help Improve
Campus Safety
I am aware that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
reached out to support state and local governments and universities
through various initiatives, including the Disaster Resistant
Universities Initiative. In our own experiences--and in our
conversations with our colleagues from around the country--we believe
that university campuses are so large, complex and unique that special
support is required.
My recommendations include:
Establish one National Resource Center that supports
the provision of emergency planning and campus security
information to universities and ensures that universities are
aware and familiar with available resources. This Center could
help introduce a greater focus on the unique security needs of
college campuses.
DHS could create a ``best practice'' symposium on
campus safety and security. The last national symposium was
called by Oak Ridge Associated Universities in 2003.
Universities are struggling to identify ``best practices'' for
a wide range of security and communications issues.
Pulling the first two points together, the Center
could research, develop and train best practices in
interdisciplinary and all hazard disasters and guide
universities in implementing effective programs.
DHS has made great strides in encouraging the public
to develop family and personal emergency plans. We believe
university campuses also have an obligation to support
emergency plan development. DHS could create materials targeted
to college students such as ``Ready Kids'' for children and
utilize campuses to communicate more information to families
about personal emergency planning.
Help establish well-formulated and tested standardized
threat assessment protocols for university campuses modeled
after guidelines of the Safe School Initiative for public
schools developed by the U.S. Department of Education and U.S.
Secret Service.
In support of the above point, evaluate how
constraints regarding sharing of information mandated by the
Federal Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and
Health Insurance Probability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)
impact on a university's ability to share and receive
information that may be relevant to identifying threatening
individuals.
Help coordinate and develop standardized campus
security and hardening protocols. Current requirements
specified by Select Agent rules, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, DHS's Interim Final Rule: Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards need to be coordinated so universities
implement standardized hardening and security protocols that
support the requirements of a multitude of regulations.
Thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss
this important issue of campus safety. Your willingness to engage in an
open dialogue and seek input from colleges and universities will help
and continue to improve our ability to respond to campus emergencies.
It is also hoped that this hearing and future initiatives will better
prepare our campuses to prevent future tragedies.
Chairman Thompson. We will now hear from Mr. Renick.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES C. RENICK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
PROGRAMS AND RESEARCH, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION
Mr. Renick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee. And thank you for your
invitation to be here before you this afternoon. In the
interest of time, my oral presentation will highlight key
points in my written testimony submitted for the record.
Let me start by saying, college campus presidents and
chancellors take emergency preparedness very seriously. Without
security our institutions' educational missions cannot
flourish. Campus leadership must develop and continue
continually update emergency preparedness plans that will be
effective against a range of potential hazards, including
terrorism like 9/11, natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina,
possible public health emergencies like avian flu, and gun
violence like the recent tragedy at Virginia Tech. Much as we
might plan and wish the truth is that our campuses are very
much a part of the communities they inhabit and so will never
be totally isolated from the perils of the outside world.
Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests campuses are
among the safest places for young people in America to be. All
of the planning college presidents and chancellors do is
necessary, but it is not easy. Many colleges and universities
are large, diverse and complex places that are open by design.
For example, North Carolina A&T enrolls 11,000 students. It
employs over 1,700 faculty and staff across a sprawling 800-
acre campus, located in downtown Greensboro, whose physical
plant includes over 80 buildings, including dormitories,
classrooms, research labs, cafeterias, libraries, electrical
towers, hazardous waste storage facilities.
On any given day, many hundreds of additional visitors make
their way across A&T's largely urban campus via multiple entry
points to attend meetings and other events. This type of free-
flowing mobility occurs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, all year
round, involving a population of predominantly young adults
whose habits, behaviors and attitudes often differ
significantly from both elementary and secondary school
students and workplace employees.
In short, college campuses can be thought of and accurately
compared to small--to medium-sized cities with all the
activities, vibrancies and, sadly, the vulnerabilities that
entails.
With respect to recommendations that the committee might
consider in this area, let me offer the following:
First, the fact that this hearing is occurs appropriately
underscores the importance of this topic and its worthiness for
increased Federal investments, particularly in the rapidly
developing area of technology with all of its promise and cost.
Second, we believe that the Federal Government should
recognize the unique and vital role that campus security
personnel must play in any comprehensive homeland security
plan, and amend current law to allow campus police to receive
DHS or DOJ funds directly.
Third, we support the creation of a National Center for
Campus Public Safety as recommended, by the 2004 Department of
Justice Summit. And finally, AC encourages the committee to
carefully reexamine the way in which higher education is
currently being integrated into both the national
infrastructure protection plan as well as the Department of
Homeland Security's recently announced interim rule on chemical
facilities, antiterrorism standards. In both cases we are
concerned that a lack of meaningful input and substantive
consultation with the higher education community is producing
policy goals that, though well intended, are going to face
significant real-world implementation problems on campuses
across the country.
Again, thank you for your invitation to be here with you
this afternoon.
[The statement of Mr. Renick follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. Renick
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the
Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the timely and critical
matter of how best to protect our schools in this post-9/11 world. My
name is Dr. James C. Renick. I am the Senior Vice President for
Programs and Research at the American Council on Education (ACE), which
represents more than 1,800 two- and four-year, public and private
institutions of higher education throughout the United States.
Formerly, I served as Chancellor at both North Carolina Agricultural
and Technical State University and the University of Michigan-Dearborn.
As a former chancellor who has spent the bulk of his professional
career in campus administration and teaching, I can tell you that the
safety of students, faculty and staff is a fundamental, ongoing concern
of every college and university president. Without security, our
institutions? educational missions cannot flourish. For that reason,
whether the risk emanates from an act of terrorism like 9/11, a natural
disaster like Hurricane Katrina, a potential public health emergency
like avian flu, or gun violence like the recent tragedy at Virginia
Tech, campus presidents go to great lengths to develop, maintain and
continuously assess emergency preparedness plans that will be effective
at both preventing and responding to an exceptionally wide range of
potential hazards.
This planning is necessary, but it is not easy. Colleges and
universities are large, diverse and complex places that are open by
design. To take an example I am intimately familiar with, North
Carolina A&T enrolls over 11,000 students and employs over 1,700
faculty and staff across a sprawling 800 acre campus located in
downtown Greensboro, N.C. whose physical plant encompasses over 80
buildings--including dormitories, classrooms, laboratories, cafeterias,
libraries, gymnasiums, parking decks, electrical towers, hazardous
waste storage facilities and livestock barns. On any given day, many
hundreds of additional visitors make their way across A&T's largely
urban campus via multiple points of entry to attend meetings, events or
other functions. This kind of free-flowing mobility occurs at every
hour of the day and night, all week long, throughout the entire year.
Moreover, it involves a population of predominantly young adults whose
habits, attitudes and behaviors differ significantly from both
elementary and secondary students and workplace employees.
In short, many college campuses can be thought of--and accurately
compared to--self-contained, small--to medium-sized cities--with all
the activity, vibrancy and, sadly, vulnerability associated with
cities. Unfortunately, inasmuch as campuses are very much a part of the
communities they inhabit, they can never be totally insulated from the
full panoply of risks found in society as a whole. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that colleges and universities are among the safest places
to be for young adults in America.
In its most recent 2001 Report to Congress, ``The Incidence of
Crime on the Campuses of U.S. Postsecondary Education Institutions,''
the Department of Education found that the overall rate of criminal
homicide at postsecondary institutions was .07 per 100,000 students
enrolled, compared to a criminal homicide rate of 14.1 per 100,000 17-
29 year olds in society at large--making college students 200 times
safer than their off-campus peers with respect to this kind of
violence. Based on these findings, the Department of Education
concluded that ``students on the campuses of postsecondary institutions
[are] significantly safer than the nation as a whole.''
Since this is the House Committee on Homeland Security, I have been
asked to reflect on how well the Department of Homeland Security
specifically--as well as the federal government generally--has been
addressing emergency preparedness on college campuses.
In response, I would tell you that, without question, all
stakeholders involved in these efforts--including our campuses, state
and local authorities, as well as the federal government--have been
noticeably more focused regarding matters of emergency preparedness
since the events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina. To offer
one of many possible examples, the University of Florida drew on its
own experience--as well as the experience of other institutions--to
develop hurricane evacuation models that have become widely adopted by
institutions along the Gulf plain. In one of the largely unheralded
success stories of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, our 30 New Orleans
and Gulf Coast institutions were subsequently able to use those models
to evacuate more than 100,000 students and staff during Hurricane
Katrina without a single loss of life.
At the federal level, I would commend the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) for its recent partnership with the International
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA). Through
a grant from DHS, IACLEA has been able to develop a state of the art
suite of emergency preparedness tools designed to help campus
administrators evaluate threats on their campuses and implement best
practices to address them. Shortly after the tragedy at Virginia Tech,
the American Council on Education (ACE) worked with IACLEA to broadly
disseminate these DHS-funded planning and training materials to our
presidents and chancellors, along with a list of jointly developed
security and emergency preparedness questions all campus leaders should
ask (see attachment).
Of course, more can and should be done.
First, the value, and corresponding cost, of deploying ever more
sophisticated technology to effectively deter and mitigate the full
range of threats facing college campuses today clearly makes this an
area worthy of increased federal investment.
Second, it is worth noting that, unlike other specialized security
professionals like transit or tribal security, campus security
personnel are currently not eligible to receive grant funds directly
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Department of
Justice (DoJ). Instead, campus officials must rely on state or local
law enforcement to include campus security departments in their own
emergency planning, which in many cases does not happen. While the
American Council on Education (ACE) honors the efforts of law
enforcement and first responders at all levels of government, we
believe the federal government should recognize the unique and vital
role that campus security must play in any comprehensive homeland
security plan by enabling campus police to receive emergency
preparedness funds directly from DHS and DoJ.
Third, ACE fully supports the creation of a National Center for
Campus Public Safety, as recommended by the 2004 Department of Justice
Summit. We believe such a center would promote needed collaboration
between national and local law enforcement while strengthening the
administrative and operational components of campus security systems
across the country.
Fourth, and finally, we respectfully request that the committee re-
examine the way in which higher education is currently being
incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security's National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Specifically, we are concerned
that the NIPP's Educational Facilities Sub-Sector Plan shoehorns
institutions of higher education alongside elementary and secondary
schools under the Department of Education-s Office of Safe and Drug
Free Schools without regard to the vast differences between these
entities with respect to funding, governance, size and physical
infrastructure. Additionally, the Educational Facilities Sub-Sector
Plan to which our institutions have been assigned falls under the
broader Government Facilities sector, despite the fact that a majority
of American colleges and universities are private institutions and that
our public institutions historically have closer ties to state and
local governments. Perhaps most troubling, the current NIPP subdivides
many elements of our campuses between multiple sectors (e.g. stadiums
and arenas, transportation, chemicals, cybersecurity, public safety,
educational facilities, etc.), thereby complicating emergency
preparedness and response considerably by requiring an institution
governed by a single president or chancellor to interface with multiple
departments of government both during the emergency planning process
and in the event of an emergency.
Although higher education is listed as a ``security partner'' with
respect to the NIPP, key higher education associations have to date not
been meaningfully consulted regarding the NIPP's development, resulting
in the wide-ranging deficiencies described above. At the end of the
day, I am afraid that any security plan for higher education developed
without the substantive input and expertise of higher education itself
will not optimally secure the human, physical and cyber assets we are
all committed to protecting.
Thank you for your consideration of these views. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
ATTACHMENT:
David Ward and the
American Council on Education's
President to President
Vol. 8, No. 20
May 2, 2007
SPECIAL EDITION
Questions Campus Leaders Should Ask About Security and
Emergency Preparedness
Recent events have focused significant attention on the need to
plan for campus emergencies. While incidents of violence on campus
remain isolated, recent events have shown that institutions are often
subject to profound natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes,
flood; attacks on technology systems; releases of biological and
chemical agents; and even terrorism. Because of this, campus leaders
throughout the country are addressing preparedness for crisis with
renewed urgency.
Although no single template will adequately meet the emergency
planning needs of all institutions, among the key questions presidents
should consider are these:
Has our institution conducted a comprehensive
assessment of the potentially catastrophic risks it faces? Has
our institution made plans that address those risks?
Does our institution have an appropriate emergency
team in place? Is the team headed by a senior administrator? Do
key team members regularly participate in emergency
preparedness exercises?
Does our institution have a plan for continuous
operation in the event of an emergency (i.e., continuity plan)?
Is that plan applicable to all types of emergencies?
Does our institution have multiple means to
communicate with students, faculty, staff and visitors in the
event of an immediate, ongoing emergency situation?
What role does our campus information technology
leadership play in our emergency planning? How are technology
experts brought into the day-to-day planning process for campus
communications, emergency response, and the ability to maintain
campus services during a short- or long-term disruption?
What communication and coordination networks exist
among our campus security leadership, local law enforcement,
political officials, first responders and health officials,
both on an ongoing basis and in case of emergency? For example,
does our institution's campus safety department have mutual aid
agreements or memoranda of understanding with local emergency
response agencies?
What kinds of processes or programs does our
institution utilize to inventory campus security resources,
including the ability to retain experienced, trained staff?
Is the training of campus security personnel
appropriately responsive to catastrophic risks?
Are the policies and procedures used at our
institution appropriate with respect to persons who are
believed to pose significant danger to themselves or others?
Even the best-managed institutions cannot completely eliminate the
risk of catastrophe. But by addressing such risks thoughtfully,
institutions can increase their preparedness. Resources are available
to assist in this work. For example, the International Association of
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) has developed what it
believes to be best practices, as well as all-hazards campus
preparedness planning and training materials and guidance that your
institution may find useful. The IACLEA Campus Preparedness Resource
Center, developed with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, is accessible at http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/WMDCPT/cprc/
login.cfm. The login is XXXXX and the password is XXXXX.
In the world in which we live, emergency planning has taken on
heightened priority. Questions and resources such as those identified
above can be valuable in this effort.
David Ward,
President of ACE
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses, and I
will start with my questions.
Ms. Ashby, I heard in your testimony a story that I can
pretty much identify with. I have some 50-odd school districts
in my congressional district. And to be honest with you, I
would probably have 50 different plans, 50 levels of whether or
not they have been implemented.
Can you just tell me, based on your study, did you find
much participation by districts in school preparedness? Or is
this just one of many things that they would do in the normal
course of a school year? And I guess what I am saying is, did
you see any real emphasis on preparedness or was this one of
400 other things they did in the running of a year?
Ms. Ashby. It varies. In terms of looking at the plans
themselves, the emergency management plans, some were very
elaborate in terms of spelling out roles for the district
officials and for school officials, and even in some cases,
what the teacher should do in a classroom in an emergency
setting.
Others were much simpler with just a basic outline of
things to consider, that sort of thing.
Some school districts actually provide money to schools in
their districts to help them with their emergency management
planning. It really varies.
We didn't visit districts in your State, so I can't talk
about that.
Chairman Thompson. Yeah. Well, thank you. You probably
would have found the same thing.
Mr. Trump, in your testimony you kind of gave a broader
brush to this issue of preparedness. What has your experience
taught you in terms of the district level participation in
this?
Mr. Trump. Mr. Chairman, it is very consistent with Ms.
Ashby's findings. One of the unintended consequences of No
Child Left Behind in the focus on academics today has actually
pushed school safety and emergency planning to the back burner
in many school districts. It is not the fact they don't care.
It is not the fact educators aren't concerned. It has just been
an issue, as you well stated, that it is one of the 400 things
to do.
With the pressure of school leaders today to get their test
scores up because many of their jobs, quite frankly, are on the
line to do so, school safety and emergency planning has not
been as high of a priority that many wish that it should be.
One of the side benefits of some of the funding, the
Emergency Response and Crisis Management Grants, the REMS
grants, the midlevel managers have been trying to push it onto
the front burners of the boards; and their superintendents have
actually said that the presence of those grants has forced them
to do things and get it back upon the radar screens at a time
when it otherwise might still be simmering on the back burner.
The interest varies not only district to district, but
principal to principal. We stress that it is a leadership
issue, but all in all we found that the progress that was made
after Columbine in 1999 has actually stalled and slipped
backwards in the recent years, along with the funding that goes
with it.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I think the funding has been
documented. One thing that concerned me--you heard the
testimony of the other panel--is that while we require a school
preparedness plan, nobody checks it for completeness or
anything. And, in fact, Mr. Etheridge and I talked to the
chairman of the Education Committee between votes, and I assure
you that we will tighten that part of the requirement up so
that there is some review of whatever is submitted.
Mr. Trump. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just say that you are
absolutely right. And what I will say is that in the 32 States
that were mentioned as having requirements, we found exactly
what you are saying in one State that requires the
superintendent to sign off each year and certify to the State
superintendent that plans have been reviewed annually.
We reviewed four or five in the year 2006 that were still
dated 1999. There are few carrots for actually following
through, and there are absolutely no sticks, no auditing, no
consequences that go with it for those who don't.
Chairman Thompson. And that is K-through-12.
At the college level, one of the concerns is, we don't have
a Federal oversight entity, to my knowledge, that has any real
focus on colleges and universities.
Would you care to address how you would see that coming to
play in Federal responsibility, Mr. Rainer?
Mr. Rainer. I think you are correct. I think there is no
Federal oversight. Because we are so big and we have such an
important place in the city of Raleigh, we have taken it upon
ourselves to work through the city the county and the State.
So I can only tell you that we recognize that since there
is no oversight authority, we work with our--and partner with
other State agencies and local agencies to make sure that we
can do the right thing. And if we didn't partner with them, I
can honestly say that we would not have effective plans and we
would not be able to implement them.
Mr. Renick. I would agree totally.
I would only add, one size in higher education won't fit
all because of the range and diversity of type. I think Federal
incentives to support certain behaviors would be useful but I
would just add that there is an incredible array of diversity
in American higher education. And so federalizing that, you
know, would have to be a variable included in an approach of
that magnitude.
Chairman Thompson. Yeah. I will yield my time to the
gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again let me thank
you for this hearing, and let me thank and welcome my
colleagues from North Carolina.
Mr. Rainer and Dr. Renick, thank you for being here.
And I acknowledge, there is a huge difference at the
university level, as there is at the public school level; they
are totally different, as you can appreciate, and yet, at the
same time, there are a lot of similarities.
Let me--Ms. Ashby--excuse me. Ms. Ashby, let me get a
question to you. Let me thank you for the work you and your
colleagues are doing with the GAO survey; I look forward to
getting it when you are finished. We had asked earlier to get
that done, and I appreciate the work that you have done.
The reason--and the chairman knows this. The reason we have
asked for that is because I have always believed that schools
are soft targets. They are just out there, and I was concerned
even when I was a State superintendent, and North Carolina took
the lead in the country putting school resource officers in,
even before we did it at the Federal level.
Yet when things get stable, we tend to relax. And when you
relax, that is a dangerous time because that is when you get in
trouble. So my question to you is, as you look across this,
have you gotten far enough along in the report to indicate,
number one, what the funding level is, what kind of funding
level we need?
Obviously, everyone would say we need more money. But the
point is, if we do it, it seems to me it has to be at a
sustained level, so you cannot only get a plan, but a plan has
to be executed and worked, similar to what you do with fire
drills and tornado drills, because here we would be even more
sophisticated.
And the second part of it is, in your survey, what is the
most pressing need for funding? And if there is one, what kind
of funding are we talking about, talking about direct; or are
they talking about grants, are they talking about the
Department of Education? Are they talking about Homeland
Security or what kind of combination? Or does it matter?
Ms. Ashby. Okay. In terms of the total amount of funding
needed, that is not a question I can answer beyond what we did
in our survey. But in the terms of the most pressing needs--and
we refer to those as challenges in our report and in our
testimony statement--States told us that what they need is
expertise. And along with that training, but beyond training
their current personnel, they need, in some cases, individuals
that have expertise in emergency planning.
Mr. Etheridge. Would that mean coordination between--within
the local communities as well?
Ms. Ashby. It is certainly reasonable if they could get it
through that, yes. But as I said in my brief opening statement
and in the fuller testimony statement, there isn't a whole lot
of that going on.
School districts or school also need equipment. In one
case, for example, something as simple as they didn't have
locks for all of their doors, so they couldn't do a lockdown if
they needed to. From there to more elaborate needs.
But all of it does translate into money, and in terms of
exactly how much, I don't know. Certainly, in terms of how it
should be funded, I don't think it matters whether it is from
the Department of Education or DHS or, you know, from them
through the States. But certainly grants would seem to be their
reasonable mechanism.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me interrupt, if I may, at this point,
because it seems to me that what you have just suggested is
something that may be workable.
Number one--more importantly, coordinate with the State and
the local level with a mechanism so that--some of these things
are very similar to be done and could be done very recently if
we had a plan. You have to find out what the problem is first,
before you decide what kind of resources you are going to need.
Once you do that survey, then it needs to be jointly done so we
get it done.
I think Mr. Trump touched on that earlier. Those are the
kinds of things, if you don't know what you don't know, it is
kind of hard to fix what you don't know needs to be fixed. And
it seems to me it varies in size from A to B to C to D, and
calling attention to it first is what we are trying to do; and
number two, devising the plan to fix it, and number three, fix
it, and number four, have a plan that fixes it so it doesn't
happen again.
Ms. Ashby. Correct. That makes absolute sense. One of the
things we did find out in our survey is that most of the
schools, school districts, are assessing their own
vulnerabilities and reacting to the extent they can to those
vulnerabilities. But therein lie the needs.
In some cases, they can't control their perimeter, for
example, so they would need fencing. They might need security
cameras; they might need some type of alarm system. But--most
seem to know, based on their planning, what was needed, but
they didn't always have the means to get it.
Chairman Thompson. If I might cut in, one of the things
that we have seen is not enough of the stakeholders are
involved in that process--you know, the fire department, law
enforcement, emergency management. We found very few instances
of all the stakeholders being involved in putting together a
school preparedness plan.
The example, on most campuses, people did not know how to
get on that in the most efficient manner. They would just go to
the school and they could not identify buildings or anything
like that because there is no lettering on a lot of buildings.
Now--just some basic things that could go toward improving
response time, the knowledge of who is there.
Law enforcement could not talk to the school system on a
radio system; they are on two different frequencies. Parents
could not be notified of what was going on in an incident
because they did not have a system to notify parents.
So there were a lot of things lacking, and especially--in
both situations. You know, we are the custodians of the
children. And to some degree, parents or guardians ask the
school districts or the colleges and universities, take care of
my children while you have them. And we should do the best job
possible.
And I think our emphasis with this hearing is to work with
the various committees of jurisdiction on identifying through
hearings what the problems are, but also coming up with some
resources. We recognize the shortages, but we need, to some
degree, standardized preparedness.
As to say, a basic school preparedness plan should have
one, two, three, four. So while there is no cookie-cutter
approach to it, it has to include certain things. And I think
that is where we are headed, respecting size and all of that.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, I know we have a vote pending.
But the final point I want to make is that some have done it.
North Carolina has done it, working with the attorney general's
office, working with the local superintendents and local
schools.
As you have indicated, it is a coordinated effort. We can't
put all this load on the backs of teachers and principals and
custodians and people in the schools. It really is a community
effort, and we will try to do our part to make it happen.
I want to thank the chairman for taking the time to pull
this together because this is the way we will draw attention to
it; and we will work to make it happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely.
And let me thank the witnesses for being so patient. I know
all of us are very busy, and I again thank you for your input.
We might have some more questions that we will submit to
you in writing, based on what we have heard today, and we will
allow ample time for a response.
Again, thank you very much. Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Appendix: Questions and Responses
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