[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:
ARE WE PREPARED?
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 15, 2007
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Serial No. 110-35
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 16
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 22
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania................................. 23
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 44
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 30
The Honorable David Davis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee............................................. 25
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 33
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 42
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 35
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 26
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From
the District................................................... 20
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 40
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama............................................... 19
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 17
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 31
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida...................................... 28
Witnesses
Panel I
The Honorable R. David Paulison, Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Panel II
Mr. Joe, Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and
Response, American Cross National Headquarters:
Oral Statement................................................. 69
Prepared Statement............................................. 71
Mr. Craig Fugate, Director, Florida Division of Emergency
Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 61
Prepared Statement............................................. 63
Mr. William Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues Division, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Appendixes
Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and
Recovery....................................................... 89
Appendix II: Related GAO Products................................ 97
THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:
ARE WE PREPARED?
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Tuesday, May 15, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:09 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Lowey, Norton,
Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Carney,
Green, Perlmutter, King, Shays, Rogers, Brown-Waite, Bilirakis,
and Davis of Tennessee.
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from
FEMA and other key stakeholders on what has been done to
prepare for the 2007 hurricane season.
Good afternoon. On behalf of the members of the committee,
let me welcome our panel. We are glad that all of you are here
to discuss preparations for this year's hurricane season.
First of all, I am enormously concerned, Mr. Paulison, that
FEMA is still not compliant with the committee's requirement
that testimony be submitted within 48 hours of the hearing. We
have shared this to the secretary. I know you have significant
jurisdictional issues, a lot of committees. We have said we
would work through it. And I understand what other challenges
you have before you, but we have some committee rules that we
have adopted, and, to the extent practicable, we would like to
see them followed.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is
adequately coordinating activities with its partners and the
state and local level as well as key stakeholders in the
private sector.
The 2007 Atlantic hurricane season officially begins on
June 1 and will last until November 30. The fact that FEMA
still not has issued the strategy that establishes practices
and procedures for coordination among federal, state and local
governments is very disturbing.
I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing and
whether all key stakeholders are ready to respond and
coordinate effectively. As a member of the Gulf Coast, I have
particular interest in seeing FEMA apply the lessons learned
from Katrina into practices for the future. In the event that a
hurricane makes landfall and puts our communities at risk, we
need to know that FEMA will respond quickly and administer
assistance in an evenhanded way.
Another key player that has some hard lessons learned from
Katrina was the American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing
how the organization plans to coordinate with FEMA. As we all
know, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal. Last
year, Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation
that we would see some real progress at this beleaguered
agency.
I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for its
agency's failure to produce a national response plan by the
start of hurricane season, and FEMA will have a lot of
explaining to do if it is not all ready when a hurricane makes
landfall this season.
I want to thank the witnesses again for being here and look
forward to their testimony.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
The Purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is
adequately coordinating activities with its partners on the State and
local level as well as key stakeholders in the private sector. The 2007
Atlantic hurricane season officially begins on June 1st and will last
until November 30th.
The fact that FEMA still has not issued the strategy that
establishes practices and procedures for coordination among Federal,
State and local governments is very disturbing.
I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing, and
whether all key stakeholders are ready to respond and coordinate
effectively. As a Member from the Gulf Coast, I have a particular
interest in seeing FEMA apply the ``Lessons Learned'' from Katrina into
practices for the future.
In the event that a hurricane makes landfall and puts our
communities at risk, we need to know that FEMA will respond quickly and
administer assistance in an evenhanded way.
Another key player that has some hard `Lessons Learned' from
Katrina was the American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing how the
organization plans to coordinate with FEMA.
As we all know, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal.
Last year, Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation that
we would see some real progress at this beleaguered agency.
I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for his
agency's failure to produce the National Response Plan within the
required period. Mr. Paulison, explanations don't excuse and excuses
don't explain. And FEMA will have a lot of explaining to do if it is
not ready when a hurricane makes landfall this season.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for
holding this hearing and for the bipartisan effort that we are
making, as far as ensuring that FEMA is given the jurisdiction
and the tools to get the job done.
Last year, our committee, working in a bipartisan way, was
very instrumental in the enactment of the FEMA reform bill,
which kept FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security but
certainly set up a chain of command and gave the director, I
believe, the authority and the power that he needs to get the
job done in times of terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
That legislation clarified the command structure and
required establishment of a surge capacity force. It also
consolidated emergency communications, grant-making, and other
responsibilities.
Let me just say also, speaking as someone from New York, I
want to commend FEMA for the job they did during the heavy
snowstorms this year. They delivered generators less than 24
hours after the snowfall ended, and even though it was not in
my district, in talking to people around the State, they were
very appreciative of the job you did, the professionalism and
the timeliness.
I also, like the chairman, would appreciate testimony being
provided to the committee on time. At the same time, however,
though, I think it is important and upon us in the Congress to
work in a bipartisan way to reduce the number of committees
that Director Paulison, Secretary Chertoff and all the
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries have to report to.
So while I am not excusing the late testimony, I also
realize that it is in everyone's interest, including the
country's, primarily the country's, that we consolidate this so
you are not going from committee to committee and getting
caught up in jurisdictional entanglements.
I look forward to your testimony. I want to commend you for
the job that you have done. You took over under very trying
circumstances. Certainly, from talking to first responders
across the country, particularly those in the fire service,
they speak very highly of the efforts that you are making.
Unfortunately, you are in a job where, I guess, you are judged
by mistakes.
But all I can say is that I certainly want to commend you
for the enthusiasm, the professionalism and the energy that you
bring to the job, and I look forward to your testimony today.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Other members of the committee are reminded that, under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I now welcome our first panel. We are pleased to have the
administrator of FEMA, Mr. David Paulison, here to testify. Mr.
Paulison has an extensive background in the emergency
preparedness arena, having served as the U.S. fire
administrator and as the fire chief of Miami-Dade County in
Florida.
Without objection, the witness's full statement will be
inserted into the record. I now ask Mr. Paulison to summarize
his statement for the committee for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. DAVID PAULISON, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Paulison. Chair Thompson, I appreciate the invitation.
Ranking Member King.
And, just for the record, I take very seriously your issues
with getting our testimony in on time, and we will make a very
honest, concerted effort to make sure we do that.
I also take very seriously your comments about the national
response plan. We are working very diligently to get that out
and operating. I will talk about that a little bit in my
testimony. I am sure it will come up during the questioning.
We have made steady progress to approve our preparedness
posture for the 2007 hurricane season. The new FEMA is leaning
further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance,
not only to individuals but to communities impacted by the
disaster.
You can see our results in our response this year in
Florida, Georgia, the Alabama tornadoes, the nor'easter that
affected the states in the Mid-Atlantic and up in New England
and just last week in Greensburg, Kansas. In each of these
cases, FEMA was engaged as a partner with the state
immediately, we deployed operational and technical experts, we
rolled logistics and communication capabilities even before the
disaster declaration was declared, and we coordinated with the
governor to facilitate a presidential disaster delegation.
It was also FEMA that supported and helped facilitate the
effective unified command among many federal, state and tribal
and local partners involved in these responses. We called this
an engaged partnership. Our response in these diverse and
numerous events across the breadth of this great country are
evidence of the new FEMA's readiness for the 17 currently
predicted storms during the 2007 hurricane season.
With the first named storm of the season, Andrea, already
behind us, let's look at our advanced preparation, our plans
for operations during the storm and our proved ability to help
with the long-term recovery.
Local governments will always, always be the first to
respond, but FEMA has an important role to play. The old
paradigm of waiting for the state and local governments to
become overwhelmed before providing federal assistance simply
does not work in today's environment.
Under our engaged partnership, FEMA has strengthened our
relationship with key state and local partners. A one-size-
fits-all approach to emergency management will not work. FEMA
is helping each state analyze their strengths and weaknesses.
Thus, our planning is more informed, and we can better
anticipate specific needs and quickly move to support each
state.
A visible demonstration of improved federal capabilities is
our playbook of pre-scripted mission assignments. It contains
plans for a range of federal support that may be requested in a
disaster and lays out interagency coordination needed to ensure
that it gets there. The support ranges from heavy helicopters
from the Department of Defense, generators from the Army Corps
of Engineers, to disaster medical assistance teams from HHS and
emergency road-clearing teams from the U.S. Forest Service.
Prior to Katrina, we had just a handful of these pre-
scripted mission assignments. Last year, we had about 40, and
this year, we have over 180 pre-scripted mission assignments
with over 21 federal agencies.
So don't believe the stories that say FEMA and the federal
government is not ready and do not have plans in place. We do
and they are getting better.
With these preparations under way, FEMA will be ready to
act. We have prearranged contracts, an improving logistics
system and other elements that are already in place to expedite
our response. FEMA can surge its own teams and assess them to
an area in anticipation of an approaching storm.
This forward-leaning new FEMA is evident of our response in
the tornado that devastated Greensburg. In the first 72 hours,
FEMA coordinated the efforts of numerous federal agencies,
supplies rolled in before they were requested, mobile support
vehicles moved in early, and when the state asked us to
supplement their urban search and rescue efforts, the FEMA task
force was on the ground within hours.
I also need to point out that the Kansas City National
Guard, led by General Todd Bunting with the local mayor and the
city administrator, simply did an outstanding job of responding
to this disaster, despite the fact that their homes were
destroyed also.
I am proud of the response by our team of federal, state
and local partners in responding to this tragedy.
Now, once a storm has passed, FEMA is also better prepared
to help with the recovery. FEMA's disaster assistance
directorate has expanded its capabilities to provide mass care,
sheltering, debris removal, victim registration, including
enhanced protections against waste, fraud and abuse, and
coordination among government and private-sector entities, all
moving to provide assistance.
I am pleased to report that on May 3, 2007, an offer was
made and accepted for the national disability coordinator. This
individual is in clearance in our security office, and the
official start date has not been declared, but we should have
her on board by the end of this month.
One recent example is FEMA's response to the storms and
flooding that hit the Northeast earlier this spring. FEMA had
staff on the ground before the rain stopped, evaluated damage
and registering victims. Mobile assistance centers were
available in the immediate wake of the storm. The first
individual financial aid was actually delivered less than 24
hours after the president signed the first disaster
declaration. This fast, efficient, multi-state response shows
the type of action you can expect from FEMA during this year's
hurricane season.
In conclusion, we have made real progress at FEMA and are
much better prepared for the 2007 hurricane season. By leaning
further forward to coordinate the federal response, which is
more informed through assessments and communication with our
partners, we can better serve all Americans.
Today, FEMA has created an engaged partnership with state
and local governments, we have facilitated and supported
effective unified command across all levels of government, we
have engaged with hurricane-prone states to gain a better
understanding of the vulnerabilities, and we have improved
logistics and communication capabilities to improve our
response, and we have a much improved disaster assistance
capability for recovery efforts.
Now, we are not done yet. We have a lot of work to do, but
if our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe
we are on the right track for fulfilling our vision of becoming
the nation's preeminent emergency management agency.
I am especially proud of the men and women who work at
FEMA. They really have put their heart and souls into
rebuilding this agency.
So I want to thank this committee and you, Chairman
Thompson, particularly, for your continued support, and I look
forward to the opportunity to discuss with you about the 2007
hurricane season.
[The statement of Mr. Paulison follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. David Paulison
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, and Members of the Committee.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee to
discuss how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is prepared
for the 2007 Hurricane Season.
The guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are leaning
further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance to
individuals and communities impacted by a disaster. We call it
``engaged partnership''. That is the FEMA you saw in the Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama tornadoes--the Nor'easter that affected the New
England States and most recently in Kansas where the community of
Greensburg was devastated by a tornado.
In those disasters you saw a FEMA that became an engaged partner
with the State within minutes of the disaster, immediately deployed
operational and technical experts to the disaster site, started moving
logistics and communications capabilities even before a disaster
declaration and coordinated with the Governor to facilitate a
Presidential disaster declaration. And, FEMA has supported and helped
to facilitate an effective Unified Command with other Federal agencies,
and State and local officials.
All of these actions were taken by a well led, motivated, and
professional FEMA workforce that has embraced and enhanced the vision
and reality of a new FEMA.
Colorado State University has predicted 17 named storms, including
9 hurricanes, of which 5 are expected to be major hurricanes.
Predictions from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) are scheduled to
be released on May 22, 2007, during National Hurricane Preparedness
Week.
FEMA is preparing for an active 2007 hurricane season by taking the
following actions:
1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane preparedness;
2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more thorough and
informed hurricane planning; and
3. Building FEMA's operational capabilities to provide
effective response and recovery.
Establishing a Heightened Posture of Hurricane Preparedness
FEMA is placing primary emphasis on strengthening the Federal-State
partnership to better ensure we are able to achieve shared objectives
for a safe, coordinated and effective response and recovery effort.
First, we are emphasizing the States' primary responsibility to provide
for the safety and security of their citizens. The States must take the
lead to ensure they and their local jurisdictions are prepared for
hurricane season.
The Stafford Act acknowledges the Constitutional authority of a
State to respond to incidents within that State through the State's
Emergency Management Agency or similar agency, which incorporates the
States' mutual aid system and principles of the Incident Command
System, and provides the structure through which State and local
government agencies respond. The State Emergency Management Agency
coordinates the overall management of an emergency to include requests
for support and resources from other State agencies, from other States
under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and for
supplemental assistance from the Federal government. The EMAC process
offers state-to-state assistance during Governor-declared states of
emergency: EMAC offers a responsive and straightforward system for
states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts
in other states. When one State's resources are overwhelmed, other
states can help to fill the shortfalls through EMAC.
The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from
other plans and compacts lies in its governance structure, its
relationship with federal organizations, states, counties, territories,
and regions, and the ability to move just about any resource one state
has to assist another state.
Second, FEMA, by advancing the concept of engaged partnership, then
stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the State--there to support, fill
gaps, and help to achieve a successful response and recovery. In the
past, our system was cued to sequential failure: where the State held
back until the local jurisdiction was overwhelmed, and the Federal
system held back until the State was overwhelmed. This approach,
evident in the response to Katrina, ensured caused delays in delivering
support. Under ``engaged partnership,'' FEMA has strengthened the
relationship between FEMA Regional Administrators and State Emergency
Managers to focus on more deliberate disaster planning. In preparation
for this hurricane season, we have engaged each of the 18 hurricane
impact States (Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories
in a focused effort to identify strengths and weaknesses. We are
engaging now in discussions to fill gaps and develop mitigation
strategies to ensure successful response and recovery. FEMA is prepared
to allocate commodities and enlist the assistance of other departments
and agencies as needed to ensure a strong response to a State's call
for assistance. And, as a result of our joint planning, we can
anticipate a State's needs and be more able to quickly provide support.
Third, FEMA has extended our reach across the span of Federal
agencies to ensure the smooth and responsive coordination of Federal
support when it is needed. The most visible demonstration of that
coordination is the array of Federal capabilities contained in our
``playbook'' of pre-scripted mission assignments. This playbook
represents an examination of the range of Federal support that may be
requested in response to a disaster. It also includes advance inter-
agency coordination to ensure delivery of that capability when it might
be called upon in time of need. At present, we have gained approval for
103 separate forms of assistance and are reviewing 85 potential pre-
scripted mission assignments over a span of 21 Federal agencies. This
support ranges from heavy-lift helicopters from DOD, to generators from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
from HHS and Emergency Road Clearing Teams from the U.S. Forest
Service. These pre-scripted mission assignments will result in more
rapid and responsive delivery of Federal support to States.
Disaster response support is coordinated through one or more of the
National Response Plan's (NRP) 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).
The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism supporting
FEMA in providing State and local disaster assistance in functional
areas such as transportation, communications, public works and
engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public
health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture, and
energy. The signatories to the NRP provide substantial disaster
response assistance in their areas of expertise and provide operational
support for FEMA when assigned missions to support the disaster
response. In addition, FEMA can surge its own teams and assets into an
area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected
to cause a significant impact and result in a declared emergency or
major disaster and can turn to other DHS components such as the U.S.
Coast Guard for assistance. The surge capability allows FEMA to
position assets prior to the event to enable a quick response, but
actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and
the President approves a disaster declaration.
Within the first 72 hours after the tornado devastated Greensburg,
Kansas, FEMA coordinated the efforts of numerous Federal agencies in
their ESF roles under the NRP. For example, the DHS/National
Communication System (ESF 2) worked with the State and local officials
to reestablish communications infrastructure, advising local government
as necessary, and providing needed technical assistance. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (ESF 3) management team for critical facility
restoration planning was on-site providing technical assistance to
state and local government. Additionally, Mobile Emergency Response
Support (MERS) in the form of 13 small Mobile Emergency Operations
Vehicles (MEOVs) and one large MEOV were deployed to Greensburg for
communications and command and control support. The larger MEOV was
provided to serve as the Unified Command Post.
To further strengthen our partnerships, FEMA is actively engaging
with State governments and other Federal partners in joint exercises as
we prepare for the 2007 Hurricane Season. During the first week in May,
FEMA tested the national incident management system and its response
operations during an exercise called Ardent Sentry--Northern Edge,
which depicted a Category 3 hurricane that struck Newport, Rhode
Island.
Engaging with State and Federal Partners in More Thorough and Informed
Preparedness Planning
As we approach the 2007 Hurricane Season, FEMA is a taking a three-
tier approach to planning. First, we are engaging each of the 18
hurricane impact States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
Territories in focused hurricane planning. This includes employing a
Gap Analysis Tool that will inform the planning process. Second, we are
providing specific attention to the Gulf Coast States pursuing for the
first time regional development of a Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan. Third,
we are pursuing specific planning efforts with our partners in the
State of Louisiana, in recognition of their fragile condition following
the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Last, we are also focusing
Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning on Southeast Louisiana and the
State of Florida.
Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool
FEMA is employing a Gap Analysis Tool that is serving as the basis
for better understanding vulnerabilities in a more consistent manner.
The Gap Analysis Tool was developed in coordination with the State of
New York Emergency Management Office/New York City Office of Emergency
Management and has been implemented to provide FEMA and its partners at
both the State and local levels in the hurricane prone regions of the
country with a snapshot of asset gaps at the National, State and local
levels
The initiative is a joint effort between State Emergency Management
representatives and FEMA Regional representatives to conduct a series
of structured discussions with local jurisdictions to better understand
potential disaster response asset gaps in the critical areas of debris
removal, evacuation, sheltering, interim housing, healthcare
facilities, commodity distribution, communications, and fuel. The
discussions are providing an opportunity for local jurisdictions to ask
specific questions of Federal and State officials and identify issues
of critical concern to help long-term preparedness programs. We are
confident that through these structured discussions, we will all be
better prepared.
Specific gaps are determined by identifying a series of
requirements in each critical area within each location and then
subtracting the corresponding capabilities for meeting those
requirements for each location. By June 1, 2007, the data will be
compiled for the jurisdictions within the hurricane prone States,
reviewed, and then incorporated into FEMA's planning efforts. Although
our initial use of this method is being applied for the upcoming
hurricane season, this process is applicable to all hazards and the
goal is to build upon lessons learned and apply the tool to all
locations for all hazards on an ongoing basis.
The new FEMA has made a conscious effort to focus broadly on all 18
hurricane-prone States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
Territories to prepare for the 2007 Hurricane Season. Today, FEMA is
working closely with each of the 18 state emergency management
communities in hurricane prone states using a consistent set of
measures and tools to evaluate strengths and vulnerabilities.
We are actively conducting these analyses with state emergency
managers. So, not only have we improved our ability to respond, we also
will have a better understanding of what type of response and supplies
may be needed for a particular area following a disaster.
Modeling is also an essential element of FEMA's planning efforts
for different circumstances. FEMA is coordinating with the DHS Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate to adapt modeling tools to large
metropolitan areas. For example, many tools utilize a standard figure
for population per square mile, often resulting in skewed data for
areas with high-rise apartment buildings. The work with S&T is focusing
on adapting these modeling tools to urban environments.
As the use of the Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool becomes more mature,
FEMA plans to incorporate additional modeling capabilities to validate
the data received and to forecast needs based on different variables.
FEMA's current hurricane planning efforts rely heavily on existing
modeling tools such as:
HurrEvac (Hurricane Evacuation) to enable tracking
hurricanes and assist in evacuation decision making;
SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes)
to enable estimates of storm surge heights and winds resulting
from historical, hypothetical, or predicted hurricanes by
taking into account pressure, size, forward speed, track, and
winds;
HAZUS (Hazards U.S.) established by FEMA to assess
risk and forecast losses based on population characteristics
and buildings;
The US Army Corps of Engineers modeling tools which
rely on geospatial capabilities to provide estimates of debris
volumes; water, ice, and commodity needs; and the number of
people within the households likely within hurricane force
winds; and
NISAC (National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center) advanced modeling and simulation capabilities to
analyze critical infrastructure interdependencies and
vulnerabilities.
Gulf Coast State Evacuation Plan
FEMA is helping Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama develop a Gulf
Coast Evacuation Plan that extends to adjacent States who may host Gulf
Coast evacuees. The purpose of this effort is to synchronize separate
State evacuation plans to create a more jointly organized effort. Teams
are engaging with each State, identifying requirements and
capabilities, and then will work to develop a plan that integrates
shelter planning with transportation planning. The result will be a
timelier, better organized and coordinated evacuation by those with
their own transportation and those who need assistance to evacuate by
bus or air.
Coordinating with Louisiana
Recognizing Louisiana's continuing fragile situation, we are
collaboratively assessing requirements, State capabilities and the
potential need for Federal assistance. Louisiana is better prepared
than last year--by applying lessons learned and investing some of their
resources, but still needs assistance in finding shelter space in
adjacent States, ensuring sufficient transportation resources to
conduct a timely and effective evacuation, pre-positioning commodities,
and caring for those with critical medical needs.
Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiatives
We are also working with 13 southeastern Louisiana parishes
(including the City of New Orleans), which were selected as the initial
geographic focus area for FEMA's ``Catastrophic Planning'' initiative,
because of their vulnerability to hurricane disasters. Substantial
planning activity continues with the State of Louisiana and its
parishes in planning and preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season.
In addition, FEMA is using scenario-driven workshops to enhance the
State of Florida's capability to respond to a Category 5 Hurricane
making landfall in Southern Florida. This is a two-phased project.
Phase 1 focuses on developing regional response and recovery annexes,
including evacuation planning, for the counties and communities
surrounding Lake Okeechobee (in the event of failure of the Herbert
Hoover Dike) and will be completed by the beginning of the 2007
Hurricane Season. Phase two will address the effects of a Category 5
hurricane striking south Florida. The end product for phase two will be
standardized and comprehensive catastrophic Category 5 hurricane
disaster functional response and recovery plans for the State of
Florida and responding Federal agencies. Phase two will be completed by
September 30, 2008. These plans will be used as planning templates for
other large urban areas also.
Next, it is important to understand what FEMA is doing to build its
operational capabilities to improve its response and recovery
capabilities in support of State and local efforts.
Building FEMA's Operational Capabilities to Provide Effective Response
and Recovery
In addition to the many action items already described to better
prepare for the 2007 Hurricane Season, FEMA's comprehensive strategy
for improving its disaster response efforts includes a 2007 Hurricane
Contingency Plan, a new operational planning unit, an Interagency
Agreement with Defense Logistics Agency, Total Asset Visibility, a new
generation of response assistance teams, principal federal officials
role, and mass evacuation planning.
2007 Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
The 2007 Hurricane CONPLAN provides the operational incident
management framework to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate the effects of hurricanes impacting the United States. The
CONPLAN provides guidance on actions that will be executed by Federal
Departments and Agencies.
This document was developed in collaboration with all of FEMA's
National Response Plan partners for the Emergency Support Functions--or
``ESFs''--and addresses the coordinated national-level Federal
preparedness, response and initial recovery operations that will be
used to support State, local, Territorial and Tribal government
entities impacted by a hurricane or tropical storm.
New Operational Planning Unit Capabilities
FEMA is hiring staff for its new Operational Planning Unit
(Planning Unit). Located in FEMA's Headquarters, the Planning Unit will
provide sophisticated operational analyses. With the new staff, FEMA is
building its core planning competency that will possess greater depth
of experience and more capability to perform critical disaster response
operational analyses, prepare operational plans, and conduct crisis
action planning to ensure that the Agency can lead, coordinate and
support a national all-hazard emergency management response.
Specifically, the Operational Planning Unit--
Provides National and Regional operational planning
guidance and coordination;
Coordinates at the operational level the execution of
all hazard contingency plans;
Provides forecasting and analysis of potential events;
Assists FEMA Regions in operational planning at the
regional level; and
Leads the development of DHS and FEMA hazard-specific
contingency plans.
Eventually, planners will also be hired for the Regions to provide
this capability to those specific areas.
FEMA/DLA Interagency Agreement
FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have entered into a
collaborative partnership, via an Interagency Agreement, to optimize
the planning, ordering, storing and replenishing of certain commodities
such as emergency meals and fuel, and develop a road map for larger
scaled supply chain initiatives.
The FEMA/DLA partnership has improved FEMA's immediate response and
logistics capabilities by reducing the acquisition and distribution
time, as well as the replenishment lead-time. The partnership has also
improved FEMA's day-to-day supply chain operations by creating
repeatable, sustainable processes for planning and execution at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Through this agreement DLA
will procure, maintain, transport, and stage commodities. DLA currently
provides visibility of all commodities shipped to disaster locations,
logistic centers or other locations as directed, from the initial
receipt of the order until ownership passes to FEMA.
TAV Program
FEMA Logistics has identified areas for improving its end-to-end
supply chain to deliver critical supplies at the right time, in the
right quantity and to the right location. FEMA is implementing industry
best practices for supply chain management and an automated system that
is improving information flow by providing real-time visibility into
orders and shipment of critical supplies during emergency response
efforts. The Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Program oversees, directs and
manages the design and implementation of an initial capability pilot
system to monitor and view the orders and movement of select
commodities which was launched during the 2006 hurricane season.
Currently, the TAV Program provides FEMA with the ability to (1)
manage and view orders and inventory of select commodities and (2)
track the location of trailers carrying the commodities distributed
from the FEMA Logistics Centers (LCs) and select vendors to field
sites. The long-term vision for the TAV Program is to engage external
emergency management stakeholders--from state, local and tribal
governments and other federal agencies to non-government agencies and
vendors--in the entire FEMA supply chain. These activities cover
requests for critical supplies to tracking shipments and delivery to
people in need during times of emergency. Stakeholders would have real-
time visibility into the status of requests and locations of shipments
in transit.
FEMA recognizes that certain types of resources may be required
immediately after a disaster by State and local governments in order
for them to adequately respond.
If State or local governments, and State partners, are unable to
supply these resources, then FEMA will coordinate the provision of
Federal commodities to ensure that resources are in place in order to
supplement State and local response efforts during the immediate phase
of response activities. FEMA has initiated the Pre-Positioned Disaster
Supply (PPDS) program to position life-saving and life sustaining
disaster equipment and supplies in modular containers as close to a
potential disaster sites as prudent, in order to substantially reduce
the initial response time to incidents.
Enhanced Response Teams
FEMA is developing the next generation of rapidly deployable
interagency emergency response teams, tentatively identified as
Incident Management Assistance Teams (``IMATs''). These teams will
support the emergent needs of State and local jurisdictions; possess
the capability to provide initial situational awareness for Federal
decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of a unified
command. These teams will ultimately provide the three national-level
response teams and regional-level emergency response ``strike'' teams
required by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
The teams are still being designed and decisions on team assets,
equipment, and expected capabilities have not yet been finalized.
FEMA's goal is to establish interim Regional and National teams using
existing personnel within FEMA. The teams will subsume the existing
mission and capabilities of the Federal Incident Response Support Teams
(or ``FIRSTs'') and Emergency Response Teams (or ``ERTs''). The mission
and capabilities will incorporate similar leadership, emergency
management doctrine, and operational communications concepts. The
national-level and regional-level teams will eventually be staffed with
a core of full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a
collateral duty basis; will be fully compliant with NIMS and ICS; and
will train and exercise as a unit.
Principal Federal Officials
Also, the Secretary of Homeland Security is represented by the
Principal Federal Official (PFO). The PFO ensures that incident
management efforts are well coordinated and effective. The PFO does not
direct or replace the incident command structure, nor does the PFO have
directive authority over other Federal and State officials. For
example, during a terrorist incident, the local FBI Special Agent-in-
Charge coordinates with other members of the law enforcement community
and works in conjunction with the PFO.
The PFO is one member of the JFO Coordination Group. This group
also includes either an FCO, who manages and coordinates Federal
resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and
emergencies, or a Federal Resource Coordinator, who performs similar
functions for incidents that do not involve Stafford Act declarations.
Depending on the incident, other agency officials are added to the
Coordination Group, such as the Senior Federal Law Enforcement
Official.
Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the National Response Plan
As part of incorporating lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, a
Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRP is under development. The
Mass Evacuation Incident Annex will provide an overview of evacuation
functions and agency roles and responsibilities. It also will provide
overall guidelines to enable evacuation of large numbers of people in
incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response through the NRP
ESFs. This annex will describe how Federal support resources are
integrated into State, local, and tribal efforts. Communication linkage
to sheltering facilities, special needs of evacuees, and addressing the
need for evacuation of both companion and service animals are just a
few of the issues reflected in this annex.
Improved Delivery of Disaster Assistance
FEMA is making significant progress in improving its disaster
assistance as well. FEMA's Disaster Assistance Directorate's planning
and capability building initiatives include enhancing mass care
capability by improving the National Shelter System and developing
better tools for coordinating and tracking donations and volunteers;
greatly increasing disaster victim registration capabilities while
enhancing protections against waste, fraud and abuse; developing a
national disaster housing strategy and improving operational planning
for providing temporary housing in a catastrophic disaster;
establishing a case management program; updating ESF 6 Mass Care,
Housing, and Human Services standard operating procedures; developing
debris estimation technology and monitoring methodology and enhancing
state and local debris operations capabilities; and, improving our
capability to conduct operations planning for long term disaster
operations.
Emergency Evacuation, Shelter, and Housing
FEMA's most pressing priority for planning for Recovery from a
catastrophic disaster event has been emergency evacuation, shelter and
housing. In 2004, FEMA completed an initial Catastrophic Disaster
Housing Strategy, which proposed several initiatives to increase FEMA's
capability to provide assistance to individuals and households
following an extraordinary or catastrophic disaster. The strategy
provided the principles and recommended strategies that establish the
framework for the catastrophic disaster housing recovery planning being
done today. Key needs identified at that time included: an expandable
disaster registration intake and applicant assistance process; the
ability to provide immediate benefits payments; a plan for assisting
applicants to temporarily relocate to outside the disaster area; and a
strategy and prepared public messages to provide victims with
information about assistance.
Mass Evacuee Support Planning: The 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes caused several hundred thousand residents to
evacuate to over forty States, many for prolonged time periods.
Cities such as Houston, Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and Baton Rouge
received hundreds of thousands of evacuees requiring immediate
shelter, food, other basic assistance, as well as longer term
services. In June 2006, FEMA published Recovery Strategy RS-
001, Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance. This strategy
addresses many contingencies for providing sheltering and
housing assistance for declared emergencies and major
disasters. In addition, FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass
evacuee support planning. This will assist State and local
governments to plan and prepare for hosting large displaced
populations. The project includes FEMA developing an evacuee
registration and tracking capability, implementation plans for
federal evacuation support to states, emergency sheltering
guidance and providing direct planning assistance to potential
host States and communities.
The National Emergency Family Registry and Locator
System and National Emergency Child Locator Center: As defined
in the Post Katrina Act, these capabilities will address the
reunification of displaced persons and activity to locate
missing children during disasters. For disasters declared by
the President, this tracking capability will assist FEMA,
Department of Justice and the American Red Cross in further
developing and implementing methods for quickly identifying and
reunifying missing and separated children and family members
during a disaster.
Improving Shelter Management and Accountability: FEMA
and the American Red Cross, the nation's largest operator of
major congregate shelters during disasters. The first phase of
the National Shelter System (NSS) was developed through a FEMA/
American Red Cross partnership to provide a web-based data
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities. The system is intended for use by
all agencies that provide shelter services during disasters to
ensure a comprehensive understanding of the shelter populations
and available shelter capacity. In addition, this system will
provide visibility on large shelter populations and position
FEMA to provide targeted registration assistance to disaster
victims. Outreach and training for Federal, State, and local
authorities in use of the system is being conducted.
Housing Options: The FEMA Housing Portal was developed
to consolidate available rental resources for evacuees from
Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals. The
Joint Housing Solutions Group is a dedicated unit to research
and document alternatives to traditional temporary housing.
They are currently conducting initial baseline field tests of a
housing option assessment tool.
Expanding Home Inspections Capacity: FEMA has
increased the daily home inspection capacity of FEMA contracted
firms from 7,000 per day to 40,000 per day through a new
contractual agreement. This added capacity--combined with a
newly established third party evaluation of inspections
performed on victims' damaged homes--will increase the speed
and accuracy of home inspections that determine the FEMA repair
and replacement grants for which a victim may be eligible.
Applicant Registration and Management
In 2006 and 2007 FEMA has focused its Recovery planning and
capability building efforts on improving applicant management systems,
expanding registration intake and processing capacity, increasing fraud
controls, supporting displaced populations, identifying alternative
forms of temporary housing, and debris management planning. FEMA has
made significant progress in increasing its capability to provide
assistance to individuals particularly in the areas of registration,
applicant processing, and providing assistance.
Doubling Registration Capacity to 200,000 Per Day:
During the days and weeks following Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, FEMA surpassed 100,000 registrations a day, shattering
all previous records of intake. While call center capacity was
increased to its highest levels ever, FEMA is pursuing even
more robust contract and contingency surge capabilities that
will quickly allow for rapid expansion to a registration intake
capacity of up to 200,000 per day. FEMA's Internet-based
registration capability has been increased by improving
accessibility, allowing FEMA to handle more registrations than
ever before. This will help reduce registration wait times and
FEMA Helpline information delays following a major disaster.
Deployable Mobile Registration Intake Centers (MRICs)
Pilot: Recognizing many disaster victims may be stranded or in
congregate shelters with no communications, and unable to
register for assistance, FEMA has established a new
registration pilot program that pushes registration
capabilities directly into the field. In the 2007 hurricane
season FEMA will have the ability to deploy Mobile
Registrations Intake Centers immediately to congregate shelters
and provide an on-site capability to quickly register for FEMA
assistance.
Debris Management Planning
Management of contaminated debris is of particular concern for
terrorist events, but is also an issue in most large natural disasters.
An Interagency Work Group to coordinate Federal agency management of
contaminated debris began work in 2005 just prior to Hurricane Katrina.
The Work Group is further developing Federal contaminated debris
operational procedure guidance. This project is analyzing the
implications of a catastrophic incident on contaminated debris
management programs and policies and will assist FEMA, USACE, EPA,
USCG, and other federal stakeholders to better define their operational
role and inter-relationships. FEMA's Public Assistance Program is also
undertaking two catastrophic planning initiatives focusing on
increasing State and local debris management capabilities through
planning and enhancing Federal capabilities to estimate debris volumes
following a disaster to assist in operational planning and cost
estimation.
Increasing Fraud Controls
FEMA has also taken steps to implement new and stronger controls
pertaining to identity and occupancy verification of applicants for
disaster assistance. Examples of controls implemented include:
deployment of a new Internet registration application that disallows
any duplicate registrations; added identity proofing to the call center
registration application so that all Individual and Households Program
(IHP) registrations are subjected to the same stringent criteria,
including verification of social security numbers and occupancy
requirements; data-marking any applications in FEMA's database that
fail identity proofing so they are flagged for manual review and denied
automated payment; real-time interaction between the FEMA Service
Representative and the applicant during registration to ensure the data
entered that resulted in a failed identity check is correct before
accepting the application; working with FEMA's data contractor to flag
any addresses that are not residential addresses in order to prevent
automated payments without an on-site inspection verification of
address and residency; and flagging at-risk social security numbers to
identify potential fraud.
Conclusion
I believe we have made real progress at FEMA and are prepared for
the 2007 Hurricane Season. Our efforts will bear fruit across our
disaster operations and assistance programs. Today, I have focused on
1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane
preparedness;
2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more
thorough and informed hurricane planning; and,
3. Building FEMA's operational capabilities to provide
effective response and recovery.
But, there is a lot more going on inside FEMA that will contribute
to enhanced performance and organizational success. For example, I hope
to announce soon the selection of our Disabilities Coordinator.
Although all disasters are local, FEMA must play a more proactive
role in understanding vulnerabilities so we can assist the localities
in being better prepared to respond. And, as I hope you can see by
today?s testimony--we are. By leaning further forward to coordinate the
federal response, we can better serve all Americans.
Today, FEMA:
Has created engaged partnerships in support of State
and local governments,
Has supported and helped to facilitate an effective
unified command with other Federal agencies, and State and
local officials,
Has engaged with hurricane-prone states to gain a
better understanding of their vulnerabilities,
Has improved logistics and communications capabilities
to improve response, and
Enhanced Disaster Assistance capabilities for recovery
efforts.
Of course, we are not done yet. There is still much work to do.
But if our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe
we are on the right track to fulfilling our vision to become the
nation's preeminent emergency management and preparedness agency.
I am especially proud of the men and women who work at FEMA. They
have put their hearts and souls into rebuilding this agency. The men
and women of FEMA are dedicated to the mission of disaster and victim
recovery, and staunchly committed to improving the speed, efficiency,
and accountability with which we perform that mission. That commitment
is not only to the victims and communities of those disasters that we
expect to face in the future, but to those victims and communities
still struggling with the personal, professional, and social
consequences and challenges of past disasters.
Thank you for your continued support and the opportunity to discuss
how FEMA is preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Paulison. I
thank you for your testimony.
I will remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witness.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Before I do, I would like to make reference that, under the
House rules and this committee, visitors and guests are not
permitted to make undue noise or to applaud or in any way show
their pleasure or displeasure as to the actions of the members
of the House.
Mr. Paulison, as you know, with the hurricane season coming
on June 1, when do you think we will have the plan ready?
Mr. Paulison. Well, the national response plan is actually
in place now, the one we have been using. The concept of how we
are going to operate under that plan is still in place. What we
are doing is trying to rewrite that plan, to build it from the
bottom up, to make it much easier for the local communities to
understand and use and also incorporate some of those things
that came out of the Post-Katrina Reform Act.
We are going to try to get this thing ready before our
first hurricane comes. I will not be ready by June 1, I want to
tell you that right now, but it should be done shortly after
that. I have had my staff working on it with the Department of
Homeland Security and also a lot of our users out there are
involved in rewriting this plan.
So we do have a plan in place. We have a CONOPS for
hurricane season, we are doing right now multi-state evacuation
planning and working with all the states and their planning
efforts to make sure that we can fill those gaps that they
have.
So we have a plan in place. The national response plan you
are speaking of, as far as rewriting it, is not done yet, but
we are working very hard to make sure we get done in a timely
manner.
Chairman Thompson. Can you give us an approximation of when
you think it will be ready?
Mr. Paulison. I would hate to give you that and have
something happen. Invariably, if I give a date on something,
something happens with that. I can tell you that we are working
hard to get it done in the June timeframe and not into July.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I think you do understand the need
to present that document.
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Chairman Thompson. Is your testimony to this committee of
such that even though we don't have the plan before us, that it
does not impede FEMA's ability to respond to any particular
disaster, especially hurricanes?
Mr. Paulison. That is correct, sir. That is my testimony.
We are ready to respond. We are working with the states, making
sure we are doing those gap analyses, particularly with the
hurricane states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and
working with them very closely. And we are ready to respond
should a hurricane come prior to getting that revised national
response plan out; yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Another issue that came before us in
previous testimony is that we authorize FEMA a certain number
of slots from a personnel standpoint. Can you provide the
committee where we are in completing the slots, as authorized
by Congress?
Mr. Paulison. At this point in time, we are just a little
bit over 90 percent of our authorized strength, and I think
that is remarkable. We will be at 95 percent before hurricane
season, that is our goal. And don't forget we only had 1,700
people when I took over FEMA, and we lost 500 after Katrina. So
we made a remarkable recovery of hiring people, getting them
aboard, and we are at 90 percent.
If you are talking about the 254 positions converting to
full-time, we are in the process of doing that. Of course, that
will drop the percentage down once we get those in there, but
we are doing a remarkable job of hiring, being able to cut
through some of the red tape and being able to get people on
board.
Chairman Thompson. Can you provide the committee with what
you identify as some of the red tape that perhaps prevented you
from bringing people on as fast as you would like to have?
Mr. Paulison. I think a lot of it was getting stuck in the
mud, so to speak, with the old way of doing things. I will give
you an example: We have a job fair right there at the Holiday
Inn where FEMA is located, and we had almost 600 people show up
for 42 jobs.
So we are going to be doing more things like that, going
out and looking at hiring veterans that have been disabled from
the war in Iraq, going out to colleges and community colleges.
I spoke at a commencement exercise last week and challenged
people to come to work for FEMA. It is a good place to work.
Targeting minority groups and women groups to get them to apply
to come to work for FEMA.
We are looking outside the box, trying to cut through some
of the red tape. One of the things I learned coming from local
government, the hiring of the federal government is much more
difficult than at the local level.
Chairman Thompson. Well, as you know, one of the workplace
issues for DHS in general is the morale of its employees. Can
you provide us those things that you think that might help
Congress help the department improve morale of its employees?
Mr. Paulison. I will speak to FEMA directly. The morale of
FEMA when I took over was obviously, by anyone's perception,
not good. They had been beat up, they were overworked,
shorthanded, not enough people to do the job. So we are
building the morale by doing a couple of things.
One, the employees see that I am very serious about
rebuilding this organization and they bought into that. Two, we
have been hiring people. Like I said, we are at 90 percent of
our authorized strength now. Three, and maybe as important as
the other two, is bringing people on board who have experience
to do the job, bringing in good leadership. We only had two of
our 10 regional director slots filled. Now, they are all 10
filled, and they are people with 25 and 30 years experience
dealing with emergency management. So the employees see that we
are serious about it.
I think that what I would ask Congress to do is to continue
what you have been doing, Mr. Chair. You have been supporting
me, you have been supporting this agency, and the employees
recognize that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Last question, Mr. Paulison: Are you aware of an issue with
formaldehyde in certain trailers that FEMA bought and placed in
the Gulf Coast region? And if you are, to what extent have you
had it investigated, and what have you come up with your
investigation?
Mr. Paulison. The formaldehyde issue was brought to our
attention, and we actually went out and investigated. We used
EPA and some other agencies to do testing. We have been told
that the formaldehyde does not present a health hazard;
however, we do encourage our occupants of those trailers to air
those out, keep them open as much as possible to let the fumes
die out. And pretty much any mobile home you buy has that same
issue. Actually, a lot of single family homes have that.
But we have been very cognizant and are on top of that and
are making sure that we are not doing anything that is going to
harm those people that are living in those travel trailers and
mobile homes.
Chairman Thompson. So there is not anything out of the
normal?
Mr. Paulison. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
the gentleman from New York, for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Paulison, I understand that probably in the next
several weeks the U.S. International Trade Commission may issue
a decision in a patent dispute case that would prohibit the
importation of broadband-capable cell phones that allow users
to share video and exchange other data via the Internet. I
assume you are aware of it. I know several first responder
groups have come to me, and they are concerned about the impact
that would have.
What impact do you think it would have, and how would FEMA
adapt itself to that decision, if it comes down that way?
Mr. Paulison. We had a discussion with this yesterday, so
your question is timely.
I won't have a major impact on FEMA itself, because we have
the capability of doing those things already. What it does have
an impact on is the first responders. They need that technology
out there to be able to do the video, the data over one
instrument instead of having several.
So without getting into a dispute on who is right, the fact
is that the first responder community can use that technology
and can use it to actually protect themselves and better
protect the American public.
Mr. King. On to another point, and I realize that no two
disasters are alike and no incidents are alike, but based on
the leadership you are bringing to FEMA and based on the
legislation that was passed last year, what would be done
differently if a Katrina-like event occurred this summer? How
do you see FEMA reacting differently than it did 2 years ago?
Mr. Paulison. Well, FEMA itself, the difference is some of
the things we have already talked about, about having a better
communication system, having the right type of leadership on
the ground who know how to handle disasters, know how to manage
these big disasters, but also having visibility of what is
actually happening in real time as opposed to guessing what is
happening and getting it off some of the television stations.
Also, we have been working with each state, looking at
evacuation plans. Are they in place, how are they going to
transport people, where are they going to go, who is going to
staff the shelters? We have been working very closely with the
Red Cross on the shelter issue, putting a shelter registry in
place. We have identified 44,000 shelters across this country
that we didn't know that were there before.
So we are doing a lot of things that you are not going to
see the same type of response. You are going to see a federal
government that is extremely proactive, moving very quickly and
making sure that when the state asks for something it is there
on the ground waiting for them.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield to the gentlelady from California for 5
minutes, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being before us today.
In the next couple of weeks, I am planning to introduce
legislation to authorize the national urban search and rescue
system. And my question for you is, do you think that the
national urban search and rescue system and its task forces are
a successful part in helping FEMA respond to these disasters?
Mr. Paulison. There is no question about it. They are an
outstanding asset for FEMA to use. We have 28 teams out there
right now. In 2007, they received $25 million from FEMA, and
the president's proposed budget for 2008 is another $25
million.
Ms. Sanchez. In particular, the legislation I have drafted
right now would allow the urban search and rescue system and
task forces to activate for pre-staging and training
activities, and do you think that this will improve the
system's preparedness and ability to respond when they are
needed?
Mr. Paulison. Well, without seeing the legislation, I will
just speak generally, that any time that the teams exercise and
deploy in practice, it makes them sharper and more able to
respond in a better manner, if that is answering your question.
And that is why we have increased the amount of money they get
to $25 million and again next year to give them the dollars to
do some of those things.
Ms. Sanchez. In the testimony that we received from the
second panel, Mr. Fugate, the director of the Florida Division
of Emergency Management, urges us to increase the funding for
the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. The
National Emergency Management Association estimates that the
current national need for that funding is at about $487
million, and yet the president only put in $200 million for
this 2008 budget.
Given that this the only grant that we have of federal
funding for the states and locals to use for planning and
preparedness activities for all hazard disasters, do you think
that that is enough money, the fact that the president only put
in $200 million in his budget?
Mr. Paulison. Well, since Mr. Fugate is sitting behind me,
I will be careful how I answer that.
Actually, the president and the administration does feel
that that is sufficient. There is no amount of money that is
ever enough for anybody to operate under. We know that our
state emergency management systems are stretched. Florida has a
very robust one, and Mr. Fugate is one of our better emergency
managers around the country.
But the president is putting into the budget what he thinks
is sufficient to keep those systems going. It is a state
activity, and the federal government is simply assisting in
that area.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you think that the Department of Homeland
Security has a sufficient all-hazards approach to emergency
preparedness and response?
Mr. Paulison. I do. I am a firm believe in all-hazards
response and all-hazards preparedness. Any type of disaster
that we prepare for we have to prepare for all of them. We have
to prepare for natural disasters, manmade disasters, terrorist
disasters, any type of thing. You can see it in your home state
what you have to deal with, from forest fire to floods,
mudslides, earthquakes, all those types of things.
So we have to have a general perspective of this, and I do
feel like that I get a lot of support as the secretary for an
all-hazards approach to how we respond and how we prepare.
Ms. Sanchez. And, lastly, let me ask, my biggest concern
right now, being a Californian and just going out in the
community, is that the first line of response or successfulness
with respect to either a terrorist attack or a hazard situation
is how the people respond. And what I have seen is really a
deterioration in people even being prepared on an individual,
family or unit basis.
What do you think that we can do to increase that knowledge
and really get people to understand that it may be 9 days, like
in Katrina, before the federal government or anybody else gets
to them?
Mr. Paulison. And I have seen the same thing, and I will
talk about my home state of Florida after Hurricane Andrew came
through. We saw several years where people were prepared and
would get ready for every hurricane season. And as we got
further and further away from that hurricane, it got worse and
worse where people simply did not prepare.
With Hurricane Wilma coming through last year, we ended up
working with the state and simply could not keep up with the
amount of supplies we had to deliver to people because they
were not ready. They didn't have their 3 days supply of food
and water and medicine, flashlights and batteries and all those
things that we know you have to have.
This country has to get back to a culture of preparedness.
We can preach it from here, but it takes people like Mr.
Fugate, who will testify in the next committee, and the local
emergency managers and our congressional members and our local
elected officials continuing to preach that we have to be ready
for any type of disaster. Because regardless of what state you
live in, in this free country of ours, there is some type of
natural disaster that can be there. Plus we have the threat of
terrorism.
So I think we are on the same page. We have got to get that
out there and convince our public out there, our residents,
that they have to prepare and take care of themselves and their
families.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I apologize to the
gentlelady. I looked at one red light and it was second.
We now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Those of us who were on this committee last Congress are
all aware of the real difficulty DHS has had in trying to
recruit and retain top management personnel, and we all are
also aware how difficult it was for us when your position came
open to recruit top-flight personnel to be interested in this
job. And as I recall, you were the only top-flight candidate
who didn't run for the hills, and our nation owes you a debt of
gratitude for taking on this job when nobody else wanted it of
your caliber. So I appreciate that.
Also, I appreciate the fact that when we had a tornado in
Alabama earlier, a few months ago, FEMA performed exceptionally
well, which was a stark turnaround from what we saw on the Gulf
Coast after Katrina. So I know that didn't happen by accident
either, so I appreciate your service in Alabama.
There are several things I want to ask about. First is, on
the coast, in the coastal states, we have, and I know in
Mississippi and in Alabama, primarily rural water systems that
provide water to these small towns. It is my understanding that
in Georgia and in Mississippi there are adequate numbers of
mobile generators for pumping the water when the power goes
out, but in Alabama there are a very small number of those
generators.
Is there anything being done by FEMA to address that
inadequacy, at least on the southern part of Alabama, toward
the Gulf Coast, in water generation?
Mr. Paulison. We have quite a few generators that we call
50-pack. We have 50 generators on a tractor trailer that we
move in very quickly after a storm. Greensburg, Kansas, had
their own water system and their own power system owned by the
city, so we moved in very quickly with generators, along with
the National Guard, to help them get those things back up and
running again. And we would do the same thing in Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Can these local rural water systems apply for
grant assistance to get mobile units that they can move among
their own members and their associations?
Mr. Paulison. They can after a storm. If there is a storm
and their infrastructure is damaged--
Mr. Rogers. I am thinking ahead of time, pre-positioning
these things, knowing that on the Gulf Coast we are going to
have seasonal weather problems that will take the water
distribution down. Because Georgia has an adequate number and
because Mississippi, because of Katrina relief, has them, I
want to know if we can do anything in advance of a disaster to
make sure these water systems have these mobile units they can
share among each other?
Mr. Paulison. I am not aware of any off the top of my head,
Congressman, but I will tell you what I will do: I will
research and see if we can find something.
Mr. Rogers. If you would, I would appreciate it, sir.
The next thing you talked about in response to Congressman
King's question about what we would do differently. You talked
about anticipating and working better with local governments.
One of the things that our local officials in south Alabama
talked about after Katrina was the debris removal, and they
would like the latitude to go ahead and negotiate ahead of time
with companies who are not in the immediate coastal area, to
come in after a hurricane or tornado and remove debris, pre-
negotiated prices along pre-negotiated routes so that we don't
get extorted when we have these disasters.
Have you all done anything to allow these local governments
themselves to pre-negotiate these debris removal contracts?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. In fact, we encourage them to do
that. One thing that we have done is there used to be a
disparity between at what percentage rate we reimburse the
Corps, if the Corps did it, or if a local community contracted
themselves, and we have taken that disparity away. That was not
the right thing to do, so we have taken that disparity away.
We encourage local communities and states to have those
debris contracts in place. It makes it much easier. First of
all, it puts the work back at the local community where it
needs to be so you can put local people working. And then,
secondly, it takes the burden off of the Corps also.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. My last question is to follow up on
Congresswoman Sanchez's issue of search and rescue. Do you all
have within your resources canine detection teams for post-
disaster search and rescue?
Mr. Paulison. The 20 urban search and rescue teams, most of
those do have canine dogs to search for live victims and also
body recovery. FEMA itself does not own them, but we pay for
them through the local communities that have urban search and
rescue teams, or the states that have them.
Mr. Rogers. You pay for them?
Mr. Paulison. We support the urban search and rescue teams,
again, $25 million this year, and part of that the teams will
support a dog canine corps at the urban search and rescue
level.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of
Columbia for 5 minutes, Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The gentleman from Alabama has raised an issue of the kind
that about a dozen members came to testify before our
subcommittee last week. And just for the information of
members, we are preparing a package of legislative fixes really
drawn from the Katrina experience. Sometimes they may apply to
states like Alabama, which is also affected, but these would be
one time only fixes, and we had the entire delegation from both
states come. And we would appreciate your continuing input into
that discussion.
I am going to limit my question to a single one,
particularly since my subcommittee is having a hearing that
comes close to this one. It is going to be called, ``Assuring
the National Guard is as Ready at Home as Abroad,'' and I
appreciate that you are appearing at both of these hearings.
Although I am going to suggest to both chairmen, full
chairmen, that we perhaps have some joint hearings so as to
keep FEMA from running between two committees, which very
honestly do have overlapping jurisdictions. And so we have just
got to figure that out, and the committees are trying very
hard. They each have a deep interest in your work.
My question really goes to preparing for the coming season
and avoiding what I will call, for lack of a better word, false
positives. We may have scared FEMA into overpreparedness. You
will remember, Mr. Paulison, our hearing on the millions of
dollars above what was needed for food, and I know you are
fixing that now, but several million dollars was wasted, some
was given away.
We also have asked for an audit of your new management
employees. I think much of that came out of both committees.
Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in our committee on the
Federal Management Service we discussed, as we had in the other
committee, how the person who became head of this federal
police service that covers the entire federal work force,
almost 2 million people, had never run a police department. I
understand some of these people come out of the military, but
that raises that some questions that I think only an audit will
tell us about.
But you have now new people predicting hurricanes, and
there was an internal debate in FEMA last year about this 7-day
directive, that there will be 7 days advance warning and so
forth, and a lot of that comes out of the science, but the
debate had to do with keeping mobilizations and deployments
from occurring that may not be necessary. And it appears that a
fair number of deployments were made that were not necessary
based on this 7-day warning when in fact most of those
hurricanes peter out and go out to sea, thank heavens.
I want to know if you feel that you are more actively able
to discern which hurricanes are likely to hit land, and you
know that in about 3 days out. In that case, wouldn't that be
enough, given advance orders for food and so forth, if needed,
to do the necessary deployments without trying to figure out 7
days out and then deploying people around the country, spending
taxpayers' money where it may not be necessary?
Mr. Paulison. That is a very difficult issue and a very
intriguing question you are asking.
We work very closely with the National Hurricane Center. In
fact, I have a FEMA employee that is stationed down there. We
have a hurricane liaison team actually based in the National
Hurricane Center down in Miami. And we know they are working
very hard to give us better predictions. Three-day predictions
are pretty accurate, the 5-day predictions are not quite as
accurate, and if you get out any further than that, it makes it
much harder.
We want to be proactive. The states have to move quickly.
If we look at an area like Louisiana or anywhere in the Gulf
Coast where a significant number of people are going to have to
be evacuated and going to have to be evacuated by buses, if we
wait too long before we start moving people, then they will be
in harm's way. Now, 7 days is too early to move people,
obviously, but, still, 72 hours out takes almost that long
sometimes to move people.
I know Craig Fugate is here, and he has a lot of experience
with that. I am sure you can ask that same question from a
state perspective just to tell you what they think.
We don't want to move assets needlessly, we don't want to
waste taxpayers' dollars, but at the same time, the downside
would not to be there if they needed us.
So it is a tough call. We are trying to make the best
judgment we can. I am on the phone constantly. I was with Max
Mayfield and the new Hurricane Director Proenza. We are
developing a good relationship, and I am on the phone with him
constantly, ``Tell me what you really think. Where do you think
it is going to go?'' We are just making the best call we can at
the time.
Ms. Norton. Yes. It would be too bad if an audit then is
done on FEMA going more places than was necessary. There ought
to be someway to somehow do this scientifically. I do
understand what you are up against.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I would like to remind the audience that cell phones should
be in the ``off'' or ``vibrate'' mode during hearings. We
continue to hear phones going off while questions and witnesses
are responding.
I now recognize the gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes,
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I am sure you are aware, Director, many experts have
predicted that this hurricane season will be a very active one.
Obviously, those of us who represent coastal states are very
concerned about the potential of these dangerous forecasts.
I believe it is incumbent upon our states and local
governments to best prepare for major disasters. So with that,
I will ask my questions.
What are the most important steps that states, localities
and even individuals can take to ensure that they are best
prepared for the upcoming hurricane season?
Mr. Paulison. That is a pretty broad question.
I am from south Florida also. My family is still down
there. Individually, I can tell you what we do. We make sure
that our home is prepared, make sure we have hurricane
shutters. Every beginning of hurricane season we go out and
purchase food and water, make sure we have batteries for our
flashlights. I happen to have a portable generator. I make sure
I have fuel for that and we are ready to go.
At the local level, the local community definitely has to
be prepared, because that is where the response is going to
come from. They have to make sure they have plans in place,
they exercise those plans, make sure they know what their
shelters are going to be, how they are going to evacuate
people, when they are going to call it, how are they going to
get there.
And at the state level, the same type of thing. The state
needs to make sure that they are following up on each of those
counties and each of those communities, that they are
evaluating those plans to make sure those are in place and make
sure the state is ready to respond with the assets it has.
It is a team effort. It takes the federal government, the
state, the local community and the individuals all to take it
very seriously to prepare themselves for these types of storms,
particularly in the coastal areas.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. I have a question. I introduced a
piece of legislation which was to provide tax incentives for
Americans in their property to better withstand hurricane and
tornado-free winds.
Do you believe that the administration would be interested
in working with me on this proposal to help continue our
country's commitment to disaster preparedness?
Because I think mitigation is where it is at.
Mr. Paulison. I can speak for FEMA, particularly. We would
be glad to work with you on any type of legislation that would
help people better prepare themselves and to sit down and talk
with you and talk about what our issues are and how we think we
can get this country all prepared for any type of disaster,
quite frankly.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Can you specifically discuss again--I
know it was touched upon--the adjustments that your agency made
post-Katrina?
Mr. Paulison. I will, and I will cover them quickly,
because I know you have another panel behind me. We took very
seriously those things that came out of committees like this,
came out of the White House, came out of the IG report, the GAO
reports, and they boiled down to just a few things that were
overall themes.
One, the biggest failure was communications, no
communication between the local community and the state,
between the state and the federal government and inside the
federal government itself. That is why we put this unified
command system in place. It has a better visibility of what is
happening on the ground real time. We have put systems in place
to be able to get live videos back where we can actually see
that and have satellite communications.
Having a better logistics system, better handle on how much
stuff do we need on the ground, how do we move it, how do we
track it, and how do we get it to the people. Having better
leadership on the ground, people who know what they are doing--
we learned that very clearly--and then also being able to take
better care of our victims, the people who have had to
evacuate. Have a better registration system in place, being
able to track people, making sure they get what they need but
yet at the same time putting waste, abuse and fraud systems in
place so we don't waste money like we did during Katrina.
And that is a very quick, short answer, but I would be glad
to sit down with your office and go over it in detail if you
would like.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Director.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Carney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Paulison, once again, I want to commend you for your
efforts in jumping on. It is not easy, and I realize the task
you have at hand.
On February 15 of 2006, February 15, 2006, Secretary
Chertoff testified, and I want to quote this so I get it right,
that, ``It seems to me the minimum of what we need to do by
June 1 is require that you put on the trucks the kind of
communications that allow you to track where a truck is at any
particular point in time.''
Now, the secretary is talking about June 1, 2006. Does
FEMA, in fact, have this capability in place by January 1,
2006?
Mr. Paulison. We do. We do for the Gulf Coast, and up the
Atlantic Coast, anything that flows out of our office in
Denton, Texas, or our offices out of Atlanta, which is our
biggest supply depots. We purchased 20,000 GPS units and we can
track our trucks real time, but it is a bigger system than
that.
So nationwide what we can do is our ordering system, where
does the order come from, when is it filled, where is it going,
and when does it get on the road. We have put a system in place
like that.
Mr. Carney. And that is nationwide?
Mr. Paulison. The tracking of the individual trucks is not
nationwide. The tracking of the individual trucks is anything
that comes out of Texas or anything that comes out of Atlanta.
But we are looking now at going to more of what we call a
3PL, third-party logistics where leveraging the private sector
out there, like the UPSs and the FedExes and tying into their
system instead of spending the millions and millions of dollars
to purchase our own. So that is going to be the next phase of
this.
Mr. Carney. In case of a true catastrophe, are you going to
then be pulling resources from all over the country; is that
what you are telling us?
Mr. Paulison. Well, the bulk of our supplies are in Texas
and Alabama, although we do have them scattered around the
country. But what we are really doing is develop a partnership
with the Defense Logistics Agency where they will be our main
supplier and a backup supplier. So we will be able to rotate
stocks, so we don't have the wasted supplies like we had
before, but at the same time being able to track those through
that system also. We really are developing partnerships.
We have learned a lot of lessons over the last 3 years on
how the logistics systems should work and also to the point of
hiring one of the top officials. I had a DLA to come work for
us and run our logistics, so we are excited about that.
Mr. Carney. Thanks. In your prepared testimony, you said
that the guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are
leaning further forward to deliver more effective disaster
assistance to individuals and communities impacted by a
disaster, and you called it, ``engaged partnership.'' I really
commend that approach. I am very happy to hear that.
Yet last week, when White House Spokesman Tony Snow was
asked about Kansas Governor Sebelius concern over response
efforts, he said, ``If you don't request it, you are not going
to get it.''
Is this statement consistent with FEMA's principles, or do
you have some education to do at the White House?
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me a minute. We will save your
time, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Paulison. What was the question again? Sorry?
Mr. Carney. Your leaning forward approach, you have engaged
partnership I think is great, but Tony Snow said, ``If you
don't request it, you are not going to get it.''
Mr. Paulison. I think that was in context to some of the
Guard issues, I am not sure. But I can tell you that the
philosophy of this agency is we are going to try to anticipate
what the needs are. We see thousands of disasters all the time,
so we kind of know what is going to be needed. So we are going
to be moving supplies, communications but not without talking
to the state and telling them what we are doing. We are not
going to come in and take over. This is a local response and it
is a state response.
But what we did in Greensburg, Kansas, just seeing the
magnitude of the disaster of that, we knew that they were going
to have a difficult time asking for things, so we started
moving the stuff that we thought they would need right away,
and it worked extremely well.
Mr. Carney. Is Mr. Snow aware of this?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, he is. He was with us when we went down
there and saw what we were doing. I think that may have been
taken--again, I don't know what the context of what that
statement was said, but I know he was very supportive of what
we were doing.
Mr. Carney. Good. All right. That is good to hear.
Thank you very much. No further questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize Mr. Davis of Tennessee for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Paulison, for being here. I
appreciate your testimony today.
It is my understanding that FEMA and the national response
plan make it quite clear that FEMA's role is to coordinate
federal resources and to assist in disasters and not actually
take over for local and state governments. Do you agree with
that?
Mr. Paulison. Absolutely. All response is local; that is,
we are not going to take over. We want to be there as a partner
from day one, not wait for people to become overwhelmed before
we step in.
But I was a local first responder also. I ran the Miami-
Dade Fire Department, and I would not want somebody to come in
and take over my disaster, but I would want somebody by my
side, and that is the tact we are going to take. We are not
going to take over, that disaster belongs to that state,
belongs to that local community. We just want to make sure they
have the tools and the supplies to do the job.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. You used the word, ``overwhelmed,''
and it appears to me that we are really in a partnership, the
federal government and state and local governments, coming
together, working alongside, closer to the people. Local
government, state government really take the lead and then FEMA
comes in and follows up.
With that in mind, though, there are people around the
country that watch national TV and they just feel like the
federal government should take control and be there quicker. I
am not sure that I agree with that, but what would you say to
the people around the country that have that sense that we
should react quicker at a federal level?
Mr. Paulison. I think we should act quicker than we have in
the past but not to take over. If the state or local community
does need something, like communications equipment, food,
water, blue tarps, all those types of things that FEMA
supplies, they should be there when they need them, not have to
wait 3 or 4 days for us to ship them across the country.
So we are going to move faster with things that we think
they do need, but we are not going to step on their toes, we
are not going to take over these disaster scenes.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. I know that I have been a state
legislator myself, and I understand that at the local level we
are closer to the people, typically, than we are in the
Washington level. Do you believe you even have the
constitutional authority to take control or do you still
believe that is down there at the local and state level?
Mr. Paulison. In a catastrophic event, the president would
have legal authority to take over, invoking Insurrection Act or
something like that. However, in a normal disaster, we are not
going to do that. That is not what we have the authority to do.
That is the local response or a state's rights out there.
Again, we want to be a partner. This is not an adversarial
at all. We want to be there with them as soon as we can,
standing by their side, ``What do you need, how can we help,
what can we give you,'' and that is the way we want to operate.
That is the philosophy this organization is going to operate
under as long as I am in charge.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you for your partnership, and
I can tell you, being from the mountains of east Tennessee,
there are times that we have floods coming out of the mountains
with rivers and streams and FEMA has always been very
responsive. This is my first term but I hear very good things
that you have been able to do in the past, and thank you for
working with us on the local and state level.
And with that, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey,
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Lowey. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and what a
delight it is for me to welcome Administrator Paulison.
I must tell you that we had a severe nor'easter and the
subsequent flooding devastated many communities, particularly
in Westchester County, which is my community, and Administrator
Paulison joined Senator Clinton and me on a tour of the flooded
areas and FEMA quickly had preliminary damage assessment teams
on the ground, which led to the president issuing a disaster
declaration in a timely manner. I cannot be more effusive. You
were extraordinary, you responded immediately, and I visited
every disaster preparedness center, recovery center, I guess we
call it now in the district, and the response has really been
fantastic.
You set up seven disaster recovery centers, nearly 6,000
households and businesses have registered for assistance, $7.25
million in housing assistance grants have been approved for
over 3,000 households. The Small Business Administration has
approved 41 loans for a total of $2.24 million, and the
majority of those I have spoken with have really been pleased.
So congratulations, and we thank you for your very
efficient, effective and compassionate response.
On another issue, I wanted to ask you about the Stafford
Act, which limits grants for housing repair to primary
residences, and I certainly understand the intent to not
provide assistance for an individual to repair a second home or
vacation house.
This limitation, we have found, can have a negative impact
on landlords who are trying to make repairs so their renters
can return home, and affordable housing is very scarce in my
district, and after the recent flooding you and I saw many
cases in which landlords are denied assistance to repair their
rental units, because these are not the owners' primary
residences.
The landlords must secure a Small Business Administration
or private loan in order to repair their property, and in some
cases, landlords have simply said that it isn't financially
viable to take a loan to fix property that is rented by low or
moderate income individuals.
So this exacerbates the affordable housing problems and
really has had a major effect on renters who must find a new
place to live.
So in order to solve this problem, which also remains in
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, I am working on
legislation to allow FEMA to provide direct assistance to
landlords of low to moderate income housing. It would also give
FEMA the flexibility to set appropriate conditions to ensure
that funding is directed to areas where it will be most
beneficial.
I would appreciate it if you could share with me your
thoughts and whether you could support a change to the Stafford
Act to assist landlords who rent to low or moderate income
tenants.
Mr. Paulison. The issue that you saw is why we really
encourage people to have flood insurance and insurance on their
dwellings, because no matter where you are the potential for
flood is always there across this country.
We would sit down and work with you on the issues.
Obviously, I can't commit the administration position on the
legislation, but I would like to look at it and have an
opportunity to comment on it.
Mrs. Lowey. I thank you very much.
And it is also my understanding that when seeking federal
assistance for personal property losses, an applicant must
first file for a Small Business Association loan and if denied,
FEMA may offer the applicant a grant.
Why does an individual--oh, I see my red light, I will talk
quickly--why must an individual first apply to the SBA for a
loan when attempting to secure a FEMA grant for personal
property damage?
Mr. Paulison. I am not sure that is totally accurate. When
they apply for individual assistance, if they get turned down
by FEMA, then they can apply for SBA loan, but I think it is
the other way around. Let me have my staff sit down with you
and go over that individual--that is one of the things we are
actually going to look at this next year.
Okay. There is one called, ``other needs assistance,'' and
that part is correct, but we are going to look very carefully
at the individual assistance piece this next year, because it
doesn't move as quickly as want it to, it doesn't move as
smoothly as we want it to, and see how we can streamline that
and make it much more user friendly. And then next year we will
do public assistance.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
And thank you for indulging.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-
Waite, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to also thank Mr. Shays for relinquishing his
time to me, because I have to be in the Veterans' Affairs
Committee.
I just wanted to thank you, Mr. Paulison, for proving that
you are taking emergency management seriously. When we had the
tornadoes touch down in central Florida, we got absolute great
response from FEMA. We were able to have your people and SBA on
the ground helping people, and that is what I think that they
expect from government. So let me just commend you very much
for rapid response.
Probably coming from Florida, you have just had a lot of
experience in the Miami-Dade area, and, certainly, in Florida,
we have a great state system that I am proud to say I helped
put together after Hurricane Andrew. When I was got elected it
was right after Hurricane Andrew, and we knew that we needed
some changes in Florida and made those necessary changes.
One thing that has concerned local elected officials in my
area is that FEMA will not reimburse in a gated community for--
they will not reimburse the locality for out front of the house
pickup of debris, and why some may think that gated community
are just for the wealthy, I can assure you that I have low and
moderate income mobile home gate communities also.
I would like to ask you if the agency is considering any
changes in that prohibition?
Mr. Paulison. I need to check with my staff, but I think we
have corrected that where we do do some of those things and the
reimburse the communities for that type of pickup. I live in a
gated community too, but let me follow up and make sure. I
think we have put stuff in place to deal with some of these
issues. But let me find out for sure. I don't want to give you
a bad answer here.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I do believe that what you do is, they
have to haul it out to the front of the gated community, and it
will be taken away from there. But for many elderly homeowners,
that is a problem. And if people are in a gated community, I
just don't see why we should be discriminating against them,
either because they are at the wealthy end of the spectrum,
living in a gated community, or at the very poor end of the
spectrum, living in a secure senior mobile home park. And I
would just ask you to take a look at that policy.
Mr. Paulison. I know we dealt with this during Katrina in
New Orleans and some other areas, and we worked around it by
getting a right of entry to do some of those things. But let me
give you the right answer, and I will get back with your staff
and brief them on what those issues are. And if it is still not
where you need it to be, we will work on it some more.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I appreciate that.
Certainly, at a time of an emergency, such as we regularly
have in Florida and other coastal states, tell me how you
coordinate with the National Guard. I know that the issue of
the National Guard has been brought up recently. I wrote to the
state National Guard general asking where Florida is, because
that is of course my concern and Mr. Bilirakis's concern.
Tell me how you coordinate with the National Guard.
[Audience interruption.]
Ms. Brown-Waite. Excuse me, ma'am, I didn't ask you. I
asked Mr. Paulison.
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me. According to our House rules,
you are out of order, and you are not allowed to speak. I have
admonished the audience a couple of times about that. And we
are trying to be tolerant, but understand we do have rules of
the committee, and unless you follow those rules, we will have
you removed.
Continue, Ms. Brown-Waite.
Mr. Paulison. The National Guards are a state asset, and we
work very closely with them when we get on the scene. In
Greensburg, the adjunct general of the National Guard was the
incident commander and we immediately made contact with him to
make sure that we were coordinating the response.
I know the issue is, as we heard just behind me, about the
National Guard's asset being overseas, but we do have a system
in this country called, EMAC, the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact, where we move assets from one state to
another to assist a particular state that is going through a
disaster, and we do that with the National Guard asset also.
But we work very closely with the Guard. They are a key
player in our response system, and we have a very good
partnership with them.
Ms. Brown-Waite. One other question: When localities
contract with various clean-up companies, they very often will
contract with two or three in case one is not available, which
I think is a very wise thing to do. But during the tornado that
struck down, it really was a feeding frenzy of, ``Well, I have
got the contract, no I have got the contract,'' and I am not
certain I want the federal government to enter in there but
perhaps to advise the localities of one has to be the primary,
one has to be the secondary. Because in this instance, both of
these companies thought that they were the primary. And I am
sure you have found this in other locations.
After you respond to that, I will yield back the balance of
my time, but please do respond.
Mr. Paulison. Yes, I actually have seen that on occasion
when there are several contractors, but that really is a local
issue, and I think you are right, you don't want the federal
government stepping into that. We do encourage the communities
to have those debris contracts in place. We have the Army Corps
of Engineers that can sometimes come in and referee those types
of things, but that is up to the local community to say,
``Okay, you are the prime, you are the backup.'' We can advise
them to do that, but it is really their contract, not ours.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands for
5 minutes, Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Paulison, thank you for your testimony. I am
encouraged by the progress you are reporting.
I have a question about mass care, because, as I understand
it, the ESF-6, the housing, feeding and providing first aid now
comes under FEMA, but I would like you to explain to me what
the role of the Red Cross is then in mass care and how that is
being coordinated.
Mr. Paulison. The Red Cross is one of our major players in
that ESF-6 system. We ended up taking it over, because they
don't have the authority to mission assign other federal
governments and we do. But they are partners in that, along
with several other groups, like HHS and others, that fit into
that ESF-6 position of mass care. And we take the lead in it,
but they are right there with us as partners.
And, by the way, I just met with your adjunct general and
your state emergency manager recently, a few days ago, exactly
and talked about some of these same issues. And they are doing
a great job for you down there; they really are.
Mrs. Christensen. Yes, they are. We are very proud of them
and looking forward to have the change of command very soon.
I am also concerned about mitigation, because in my
experience with FEMA, mitigation played a big role for us in
the Virgin Islands in being able to prevent the damage with
recurrent hurricanes. And if I remember correctly, we could
request about 20 percent additional funding for mitigation. And
I am hearing that that is no longer the case.
Could you tell me if there is still a provision for
mitigation as you repair and recover or is that done?
Mr. Paulison. No. If a disaster is declared, there is a
certain portion of the disaster dollars that can be used by the
state or the local community for mitigation efforts. There is
also Hazard Mitigation Grant Program out there that can be used
for public assistance, and I think it is 15 percent of whatever
the disaster cost is. And that can be used to raise homes or do
other things to mitigate future damage. But the money is still
there. It is 15 percent.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay. I still have a little more time.
The PFO and FCOs--
Mr. Paulison. Yes?
Mrs. Christensen. --do they both report to the secretary?
Mr. Paulison. No. The FCO reports to me. That is our
employee. What we are doing with the PFO, the PFO is the
secretary's representative out there to do the high-level
coordination with federal agencies. The FCO is the primary
federal person to manage disasters.
Mrs. Christensen. But the FCO is the person that I, as the
health person in the Virgin Islands, would go to to ask for
whatever assets I needed from the federal government.
Mr. Paulison. That is correct. You should.
Mrs. Christensen. I am surprised the question didn't come
up before, but it just seems to me that we have too many there,
and when that happens, things fall between the cracks. Has that
been exercised to see how it works and whether we really need
those two officials?
Mr. Paulison. It has. We just had a major exercise just
this last week, actually, 2 weeks ago, not only to a hurricane
but tied into a terrorist event where the PFO and the FCO
worked together. The FCO, which you normally deal with, is the
person that handles anything to do with the Stafford Act in
that disaster. That will continue on.
The PFO is the secretary's representative out there.
Doesn't have operational control; the FCO has that. The PFO is
going to help mitigate issues between different federal
agencies, may feed the information back to the secretary.
Again, it is his eyes and ears out there on the ground.
But the FCO is going to be the primary person managing the
federal assets on the ground, not running the disaster. That is
either, in your case, the territorial or a state responsibility
to manage that disaster.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut,
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being here. I think
you have got a very difficult job, and I know you are working
very hard at it.
I don't have the same reaction Ms. Lowey has about the
gratitude from FEMA. You left Connecticut out of the businesses
and personal assistance, and we could give you literally
hundreds of examples of damage, 2,400 residential units and so
on.
What I am puzzled by is, wouldn't you group the area
together and--I mean, what does it matter if Greenwich in New
York are divided if it is the same storm in the region? Isn't
the whole point of natural disaster to look at the impact on
the region? Why would you do it next door to the same storm and
not Connecticut?
Mr. Paulison. I have my staff looking at Connecticut right
now, actually. The president did sign off on two counties for
public assistance. I have not turned down individual assistance
yet. I have asked the state for more information about
individual damage.
We are bringing on a small state and rural advocate into
FEMA to report directly to me also. The public assistance and
individual assistance piece for some of the smaller states like
yours, it doesn't work as smoothly as I want it to. I am just
trying to be very candid here. Fifty homes in Connecticut is
much different than 100 or 200 homes in New York or Texas or
California. And what it does is, the whole idea of the Stafford
Act is to cover when the state is overwhelmed and can't deal
with a disaster.
So it has been very difficult with Connecticut. Your county
system is not like the other states.
Mr. Shays. No, we don't have a county system.
Mr. Paulison. And you don't have a county system.
Mr. Shays. We have counties only in name, and that is the
only thing that they represent.
Mr. Paulison. That is what is making it difficult for us,
so I sat my staff down just before I came to this area,
actually not even knowing you would be here, but I want them to
look at this very carefully as we look at the individual
assistance piece and the amount of damage. We have an area in
there that was very low income that has--
Mr. Shays. Right. I was going to read you some of the
folks, renters, who didn't have flood insurance--these were
rivers that hadn't flooded as long as anyone can remember.
But the same storm that impacted Ms. Lowey's district
impacted ours, and there is this artificial boundary in New
York and Connecticut. I would think we would look at the region
and treat the region, and if that is not possible, and it seems
to me it is a defect in the law, we should look at us as a
region. And I appreciate you checking that out, and I look
forward to having more dialogue with you about that.
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I know you received correspondence
from all five congressmen, two senators and the governor as
well.
I would like to ask, in regards to Katrina, we all weep for
different reasons. Everything about it, it was a huge storm, 10
miles inland, 20 feet of water, and Mississippi. It was a
biblical storm.
But there were things that were very troubling to me. One--
I want no comment about this, I will just say it--that the head
of Homeland Security chose to only go there by Wednesday with
the president. I would have thought he would have been there
Monday, Tuesday, whatever. I think his reasoning was he wanted
to let FEMA be FEMA and stay out of the way.
But when I helped write the Department of Homeland Security
legislation with others, we wanted the Department of Homeland
Security to be added value to FEMA, not to just like say,
``Here you go, you are the experts, do it.'' We wanted
everything to be added value.
Can you tell me what added value you have by having the
Department of Homeland Security and how the department may
respond more effectively than it did, not FEMA, per se?
Mr. Paulison. There is a significant amount of added value
by us being inside Homeland Security, from my perspective. I
have assets at my fingertips that we would not have had before.
I meet every week with the seven operational components of
Homeland Security, from the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol,
ICE, all of those, TSA. And those are people that can give me
assistance when we have a disaster or even in the meantime.
I don't have to do a mission assignment. All I have to do
is pick up the phone and call all these people that I know on a
first name basis and say, ``I need some help or I need this or
I need that.'' Tremendous assistance.
Secretary Chertoff has been personally, I mean personally
involved in helping me rebuild this organization. Tremendous
amount of support, making sure that I get the assets that I
need, making sure that I get the support that I need from all
the other agencies inside the organization. So I feel like that
there is a significant amount of value added.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Do I have time to make a unanimous consent request now, or
do you want me to do that later?
Chairman Thompson. We will take it right now.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would ask unanimous consent to
include, ``The Mega-Catastrophe: A Call to Action,'' in the
record. And this is a report produced by the financial services
roundtable and provides 25 recommendations to the public and
private sectors for reducing the economic and human impact, as
well as reducing the cost of rebuilding after mega-catastrophes
of not only hurricanes, the subject of today's hearings, but
the earthquakes, floods, pandemics and terrorist attacks. And I
could do that--*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* See The Financial Services Roundtable, Blue Ribbon commission on
Mega-Catastophes: A Call to Action, Edward B. Rust, Jr. and Kerry
Killenger in the Committee's file.
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Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
And thank you very much, Mr. Paulison.
Chairman Thompson. We now recognize the gentleman from
North Carolina for 5 minutes, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator, thank you for being here today, and I
appreciate your comments thus far.
Let me go back to a situation, you know, hurricane season
is almost on us, and North Carolina pays a lot of attention to
hurricanes, as you know. Florida does as well.
You partially answered this when you spoke to Ms. Lowey
earlier. We are going to see some major changes to the national
response plan, as you well know, but as you also know, the NPR
is meant to provide standardization for incident managers so
that the federal, state and locals can work effectively
together. And, certainly, we know that in response to Katrina
that did not happen. And even though this plan is not ready, it
also impacts NGOs as well, because when you have a major
catastrophe, that is an important part of this whole process.
My question to you, you partially answered but would you go
into a little bit more detail, in the absence of that being
completed, number one, when will it be completed, but, number
two, in the absence of that, do you feel comfortable that we
are going to be ready, having these pieces in this hurricane
season, be it natural or manmade?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. I am comfortable that we have a
good plan in place. In fact, we are doing gap analysis now in
North Carolina and other states up and down the Atlantic Coast
to find out what those issues are that we have to help the
states fill. And they can recognize themselves sometimes that
there is a gap that they can fill themselves.
We have good solid disaster plans in place. The national
response plan is still there. The new that we are revising is
not out yet, and I want to get that out in June. But before we
really get deep into hurricane season?of course, we have had a
storm already this year, so they are unpredictable when they
are going to come usually--but I am comfortable that we are
ready to respond. We are working with the NGOs, the Red Cross
is going to testify at the next panel, and I am sure they will
tell you some of the significant things that--
Mr. Etheridge. Do you think we will have it by June of this
year?
Mr. Paulison. It won't be by June 1. I want it out before
July 1, though, and we are going to work very hard on that. We
have a good draft outline now, and we are populating that to
get it filled in. I at least have that base plan done; yes,
sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Let me ask one question on the National Guard, because we
heard from the Guard in the last meeting this committee held,
and, as you well know, when Floyd struck North Carolina in
1999, it was a massive storm. They classified it as a 500-year
flood plain. I don't know how you do that when no one was here
to measure it, but be that as it may, we used 6,500 guardsmen
with equipment, Fort Bragg, Lejeune, our active military were
there with helicopters and others. We lost a lot of lives, but
we saved a lot.
Just recently, our governor, Mike Easley said that we only
have enough equipment now to handle a category three. You
alluded to this earlier. Our Guard only has 55 percent of the
dual use.
In addition to drawing from other states, here is my
question, because I think that is critical: How much does FEMA
have the ability to reach out and get equipment if you really
need it when it becomes catastrophic like the one we had? And,
secondly, given the state of the equipment, can you pull that
resource in in advance and have it ready and staged to work?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. We do have the ability to pull
equipment in, not only from other states, but private
contractors and also the Corps of Engineers who has a
tremendous amount of equipment.
Mr. Etheridge. Have you pre-entered into those contracts?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. We have a lot of contracts in
place, hundreds of contracts in place and literally hundreds of
pre-scripted mission assignments with different agencies around
the country. And we can move some of those things quickly.
Also, if there is a major storm coming in, and there are
certain guidelines to follow, but we can do a pre-landfall
declaration, the president can do that--
Mr. Etheridge. And get it ready.
Mr. Paulison. --that would allow us to move. So if we had a
category four or five storm coming into North Carolina and we
knew it was going to hit and you had to do evacuations, we can
help you with all of that, with those dollars, asking the
president to do a pre-landfall declaration.
Mr. Etheridge. Good.
Mr. Paulison. Yes.
Mr. Etheridge. Good. Thank you, sir.
In the time I have left--this may be above your pay grade.
If it is, let me know. I am sure it happened prior to your
arrival. And if not, I would like to have it in writing.
I have it from pretty good sources that within the last
several--well, in the last bit, previously, when hurricanes hit
Florida, we had to contract out for pre-setting, when people
were injured, were moved, put in mobile homes, to do the pads
of water, electrical at a certain price. That was rewritten so
that less than a handful of contractors in America were
eligible to bid, which meant that the cost of those pads more
than doubled.
If that was not written by FEMA--I want to know if it was
written by Homeland Security. I would like to have that in
writing when that was rewritten, who wrote it, and I would like
to see the documentation on that, if I may. And if that is not
in your jurisdiction, just let me know where it is and I will
keep moving up the chain.
Mr. Paulison. That does belong in FEMA, and the fact is we
rebid all of those contracts. I don't know about the early
ones, but a lot of those contracts were done in the aftermath
of Katrina, and the contracts were not what we wanted them to
be. We have rebid all of those contracts, and we have a lot
more contractors because they have to use local contractors to
do a lot of the work.
But I will tell you what, I will break that whole thing
down.
Mr. Etheridge. Please do.
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Because my understanding was it was
rewritten to the point where you had to have so many engineers
on staff, which meant that you only had one or two big
contractors take it, then they sub'ed it out to everyone else,
which drove the cost through the roof for the taxpayers of this
country.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Following along that, can you provide the committee with
whether or not any no-bid contracts have been awarded for this
hurricane season in anticipation or have all of them gone
through the procurement procedure?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. I will research and give you a
definitive answer, but I can tell you that there were no no-bid
contracts that I am aware of. There may be an occasion to do
those in the middle of a disaster if there is something you
hadn't thought of, but what we don't want to do is we don't
want to do no-bid contracts and we don't want to do contracts
after a disaster happens.
That is why we are putting these contracts now. In fact, we
already have them on the shelf. You negotiate much better when
you have the upper hand as opposed to after a disaster strikes.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island,
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director, welcome. Thank you for your testimony today.
I appreciated having the opportunity to meet with you
personally a few months back, and I appreciate what you have
had to say today.
Let me just turn to my attention to a couple of issues.
Last year, Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Reform Act,
which I believe, as do others, will enhance FEMA's ability to
effectively respond to disasters in a timely manner.
Now, as part of this comprehensive legislation, I fought to
create a new and, I believe, much needed position at FEMA,
which is a disability coordinator. We all know that people with
disabilities face unique challenges in their everyday lives,
and they range from ability impairment to communications
barriers, and they can certainly become substantial obstacles
in an emergency. We saw this as a result of the attacks on 9-
11, we saw that in Katrina.
And so I believe it is, therefore, critical that the
national disability coordinator position be filled immediately,
and I am extremely concerned that our 2007 hurricane season
starts less than a month from now from today, and yet this
crucial position remains vacant still.
So my question is here: How close are you to filling this
position? Will the job be filled by June 1? And, finally, how
will this individual be able to effectively implement a
national plan for persons with disabilities when the position
has remained vacant for so long?
My next question is, earlier this month, FEMA's region one
held a mock hurricane preparedness exercise in my home state in
Rhode Island--this may be the one that you were just referring
to in a previous question and answer with other members. But in
carrying out this event, FEMA effectively partnered with other
federal, state and local entities, such as around emergency
management agency and first responders to test preparedness and
response to our hurricane.
The event was highly successful from everything that I
could see, and I think it is critical that each state, city or
town have a pre-approved plan that has been thoroughly examined
before a catastrophic event occurs. Each plan, obviously, has
to take into account a region's unique assets and
vulnerabilities and must be properly tested to give the
government, first responders and citizens an idea of existing
weaknesses.
So my question in this area are: Are other FEMA regions
embarking on similar tests, do you believe these simulations
should become annual preparedness exercises, and, finally, what
other initiatives are you undertaking to test preparedness and
response for the upcoming hurricane season in regions
throughout the country?
You can start with the issue of the disability coordinator
first. Thank you.
Mr. Paulison. We have interviewed for the disability
coordinator. I have made a selection. She is ready to come on
board. She is going through background checks. I suspect that
we will have her on board within a couple of weeks. And I think
we made an excellent, excellent selection. She will report
directly to me, so she will have access to my office to make
sure that we can get things get done. Actually, we are excited
about having her on board.
We learned a lot of lessons during Katrina of things that
we didn't do right that we should have done with some of our
people who had had difficulty with access, and she will be a
tremendous asset to us to help us do a better job.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I look forward to that announcement and
hopefully a meeting with this individual.
Mr. Paulison. As soon as she gets through the process of
the background checks, we should have her on board. She is
ready to come, and we are ready to bring her here. We
interviewed a lot of people and picked out who we think is an
excellent person.
The second piece, yes, it was an excellent exercise, and,
yes, we are doing them with all of our regions, and, yes, I do
think it should be an annual type of thing to do those
exercises, test our system and to find out where our gaps are,
because they are going to be different every year. I am very
supportive of those types, of having plans in place and
exercising them.
Mr. Langevin. What other initiatives do you have coming up?
Mr. Paulison. We are doing catastrophic planning also. We
are picking four areas right now. One is the southeast
Louisiana for catastrophic planning, two in Florida, one around
Lake Okeechobee, the Herbert Hoover Dike, working with the
state to do evacuation planning around there, south Florida,
category five coming into there. And then the new Madrid fault,
doing catastrophic planning for that and then also for
California. We are picking those because they represent pretty
much everything we are going to have to deal with in putting
our catastrophic plans in place.
Mr. Langevin. Well, thank you, Director. I appreciate your
answers to that and look forward to continuing to work
together. Thank you for the job you do.
Mr. Paulison. And I appreciate your support too, by the
way. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairman and the ranking
member.
Mr. Paulison, thank you for your presence here today.
I think we can look back over the last couple of years, I
think we can say a couple of years, and applaud the fact that a
first responder, firsthand, is in the position that you happen
to be in, which is the director of FEMA. It makes a difference.
It is an important first step, I believe, as we have tried to
rebuild the building blocks.
And as we have hindsight, we understand that the whole
challenge of FEMA was vertical. It was a combination of many
issues, and it really didn't fall to personalities as much as
it fell a lot to process, particularly, obviously, the angst
with the secretary of the Homeland Security Department, who
recognized the enormous frustration but really loss of life.
And I think that is something that should always be in
front of us, the fact that the debacle of Katrina really
focused around the enormity of the loss of life and how we
could have been better custodians, if you will, better
protectors of the American people. We must always be protectors
of the American people.
My questions will focus in that direction.
I know you were not here for 9/11, but I simply want, to
your recollection, a yes or no answer. Your recollection is
that after 9/11 was FEMA on the ground in New York?
Prpeared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this extremely important
hearing. As we near the two year anniversary of one of the most
devastating hurricanes in our nation's history, I think it is a very
appropriate time to examine how we have (or have not) adequately
prepared for further disasters. I would also like to thank the
committee's Ranking Member, and to welcome our witnesses, the Honorable
R. David Paulison, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency; William Jenkins, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice
Issues Division of the U.S. Government Accountability Office; Craig
Fugate, Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management; and
Joe Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness and Response, from
the American Red Cross.
Hurricane Katrina was among the worst storms in American history.
Its magnitude was rivaled only by the catastrophic failure of the
federal government to adequately respond to the resulting suffering in
a manner befitting our great nation. This year's hurricane season
officially begins on June 1st, and scientific predictions do not bode
well. Forecasters anticipate a ``very active'' year for storms along
the Atlantic coastline, with researchers at Colorado State University
anticipating 17 named storms, including 9 hurricanes. According to
these predictions, there is a 74% chance that at least one major
hurricane will strike the U.S. coastline. Similarly, Accuweather
forecasts 13--17 total storms in the Atlantic Basin. Of those, 3--5 are
likely to be major hurricanes of Category 3 of Category 3 or greater.
Mr. Chairman, this time we have fair warning. We know how
devastating a hurricane can be, and we know we are likely to see
another storm of this magnitude. We know that our disaster prevention,
preparedness, and relief mechanisms and agencies are woefully
inadequate. Problems involved lack of staff, the inability to track
assets en route to destinations, lack of sufficient supplies,
inefficient delivery processes, processes, poor communication amongst
agencies, ineffective computer systems for processing requests, lack of
credentialing and more.
We can no longer use ignorance as an excuse, and we cannot allow
ourselves to be caught unprepared once again.
Hurricane Katrina struck some of America's most vulnerable and
disadvantaged communities, communities which are just now beginning to
find their feet again after those two devastating storms. Here in
Congress, we must candidly admit that as a nation, we were derelict in
our duty to deliver the lifesaving and life-altering assistance to many
of the Hurricane Katrina victims who literally begged for us to throw
them a lifeline. We have a responsibility to work to ensure that they
are not, once again, left to face nature's wrath alone.
Hurricane Katrina was responsible for $81.2 billion in damage, as
well as for the deaths of 1,836 people. Criticism of the federal,
state, and local governments' reaction to the storm was widespread and
resulted in an investigation by the United States Congress and the
resignation of FEMA Director Michael Brown. We now have an opportunity
to do our utmost to ensure that when this year's hurricane season
arrives, and when the next big storm lands on America's coastline, we
have done our utmost to ensure adequate protection and response.
Last month, FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security informed
us that they required additional time to revise the National Response
Plan, which is designed to integrate federal domestic prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery plans. Due to the complexity of
the issues involved, they will not meet the June 1st deadline, and the
plan will not be available for the start of hurricane season. We in
Congress have not yet seen a revised timetable for when this plan will
be ready, and I am concerned about FEMA's ability to respond to any
disasters that may occur in the meantime.
Mr. Chairman, the Federal Government's response to Hurricane
Katrina was a disaster. This absolutely must not be allowed to happen
again. FEMA's logistical systems, charged with providing food, water,
and other absolutely crucial supplies, were completely overwhelmed.
Long term rebuilding efforts have been plagued with additional
weaknesses, with residents still, nearly two years later, facing an
acute shortage of affordable housing. FEMA has decided to implement a
policy that transfers its housing program to the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). I look forward to learning more about this
new program in this hearing.
Disaster response preparedness also means ensuring that the
citizens of this country can rely on the emergency assistance of the
National Guard. As we saw just recently in the aftermath of the Kansas
tornado, the citizens of this country were deprived of much needed
emergency assistance because much of the Guard's pertinent personnel
and emergency equipment was not readily available, but was in Iraq and
Afghanistan. According to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have left state
governors with roughly half of the equipment needed to respond to
disasters within the United States.
Mr. Chairman, as Members of Congress we have an obligation to
inquire how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may impact the nation's
ability to respond to a major hurricane or terrorist attack. That is
why I have proposed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that
requires the Secretary of Defense to study and report back to Congress
the impact that the deployment of more than 40% of a state's National
Guard personnel for overseas duties has on that state's readiness and
responsiveness to a natural disaster, or civil disturbance.
We also have an obligation to provide the American people with a
disaster response system that works. I have been a strong advocate of
creating a contracting system that awards contracts to local companies
when possible and always to those who can get the job done. By
involving members of the community in the rebuilding process, we would
substantially increase the prospects for long-term sustainability of
any reconstruction effort.
Mr. Chairman, now is the time that we must act. With the onset of
hurricane season only a few short weeks away, we must ensure that,
should another storm of Katrina's magnitude make landfall on America's
coastline, we will not have to witness the atrocious suffering that we
saw in the summer of 2005. I look forward to hearing the insights
offered by today's panel of witnesses, and to engaging in constructive
debate with my colleagues about how best we can secure our nation
against the 2007 hurricane season.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Paulison. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And the reason why I wanted that as a
backdrop is because it is important to note that FEMA is an
agency that deals with natural disasters and, tragically,
manmade disasters. You have to be holistically prepared.
And so I really want you to--Major General Blum mentioned
the lack of equipment in states, and you had this line of
questions. And we are looking at this threshold of 40 percent
of the National Guard not being available or not being in-
state.
Would that not have an impact--if 40 percent or more of the
National Guard were away, would that not have an impact on
response coordination with FEMA?
Mr. Paulison. I don't think it would have an impact on the
coordination with FEMA. I guess, depending on the size of the
disaster, it may or may not have an impact on the response.
In Greensburg, Kansas, the lack of resources they said they
had did not have an impact on that particular response. What
the adjunct general said, if they had another disaster of that
same size, they would have trouble responding. And what I
committed to him was that if they did have another one, that I
would make sure that we have resources from other states, bring
the Corps of Engineers in with equipment they needed and also
access our contracts out there to bring equipment in.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think your answer is very accommodating.
I am not suggesting that you are being forthright, but,
frankly, I think that we would have problems. And one of the
issues that I think is important is coordinating with FEMA and
other emergency entities pre-deployment of National Guard out
of different states. I don't know if we thought about that.
So that means that, one, you have an inventory of who has
gone and what states are gone, because I think my colleagues
have asked the question, how quickly can you get them there. So
if the next-door neighbor state or the next-door neighbor to
the right or the left are down to zero, you have a similar
problem.
Let me move forward and comment. I think you made the point
about lack of equipment and a lot of states have a lack of
equipment. That has an impact, does it not, yes or no?
Mr. Paulison. Again, I think that would depend on the size
of the disaster. Something as catastrophic as Katrina I think
you have to say it would have an impact if they are not at the
full speed. We are at war, there is no question about it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Clearly, but it has a negative impact if
you don't have equipment to meet that disaster.
Let me move on to the question, a particular question that
you always hear about Houston, Texas. One, this is a solution,
I guess, that they attempted, but I do want to put on the
record, out of the $400 million that came through CDBG monies,
Houston got $60 million in Houston and Harris County. And I
want to put on the record that obviously that is an outrage.
I want to move to interoperability. There is $1 billion. We
understand that this money is going through the states on the
interoperability.
My question to you is, how in the world can the average
cities, major urban cities at risk--and I know this is a
process--function with dollars going through the states,
percentages taken off and the question as to whether or not
cities who need this interoperability, the top 50 cities, can
get the appropriate amount of dollars through this process?
Have you all consulted about using a different formula for
getting dollars to the at-risk cities, like directly to the
cities?
Mr. Paulison. I am sorry, I didn't understand the question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There is $1 billion in interoperability
money, which falls under different aspects of the homeland
security but, clearly, it responds to FEMA's needs. You need
cities to be able to speak to each other or speak inside the
city when there is a disaster.
The formula that is being used is a formula that sends the
monies to the states. Is it better to send the money directly
to the at-risk cities? And this is from your professional
opinion, not from the idea of jurisdiction inside the
department. Cities are crying out for the at-risk cities to get
the monies directly.
Mr. Paulison. And my staff is telling me that by law the
funding has to go through the states. We want that money to
flow down where it needs to go, but most of our
interoperability issues in this country are not equipment per
se, it is a governance issue of how you act interoperably with
other units. It can be as simple as exchanging hand-held radios
with another city alongside of you. We have equipment that we
can bring in to help with interoperability.
But the money going through the states, the states
understand the entirety of the whole state to help with the
interoperable issue, and we feel that is the right way to go
right now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, I just want
to finish this sentence.
Director Paulison, the question was really from your
professional perspective. I do know that the utilization of
this equipment is how you use it within an area, but the point
is if a state has the money and it doesn't get directly, fully
to the impacted area, I can assure you that your job as a first
responder is going to be that much tougher, and so the local
jurisdiction should be the first in line. And I do know it is
law. I am just trying to get your professional position on the
record.
I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Mr. Perlmutter from Arizona--Colorado, I am sorry,
Colorado, from the great West.
Mr. Perlmutter. Director, and I appreciate your answers, do
you know how many states deployed National Guard units to the
Gulf Coast during Katrina?
Mr. Paulison. No, sir, I do not. We could probably track
that down, but I don't have any off the top of my head how many
actually responded.
Mr. Perlmutter. I was just looking at reports that was
issued today, and there are a couple of things that concern me.
Looking at page four, it says, ``For us, it is difficult to
assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving
response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a
category four or five hurricane.''
And it goes on and says, ``The National Guard has
traditionally been an important component of response to major
disasters. States and governors rely on their National Guard
personnel and equipment for disaster response. However, as we
reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment
the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and
states agencies that would have roles in responding to such
events have not completed and integrated their plans.''
So along with what Representative Jackson Lee was saying
and the woman who stood up in the audience and from comments
that various adjutant generals have made, I mean, has your
office, your division looked at the fact that we have a number
of our National Guards deployed in Iraq and what effect it has
on being able to respond to a category four or five hurricane
in the Gulf Coast?
Mr. Paulison. I don't know that we have looked at that
particular issue. I would like to find out what report that is
to know who it came from. But we depend heavily, the states
depend heavily on our EMAC system, Emergency Management
Assistance Compact.
No, I believe you, I just didn't know what the name of the
report was. I wasn't questioning your word at all, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. It is a GAO report.
Mr. Paulison. Okay. Because I wanted to get it and read it
myself too.
But we depend heavily on the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact between states to share equipment back and
forth. We have done that for years. The system has worked well.
It is more robust now than it ever has been. And that is how we
would respond to these disasters. And we know there is a lot of
equipment gone, there is no question about it, nobody can argue
that, but there are still resources in this country to deal
with disasters.
Mr. Perlmutter. And I appreciate that. And, clearly, a
national disaster is going to require a national response. And
I appreciate the effort that all of you have gone to so that we
respond to something like Katrina in a much more thoughtful,
methodical manner, but there is only so many people and
contractors and national guardsmen and women to go around.
And this is a debate for probably with the president and
not you, but if in fact we have something like we had with
Katrina or Rita or the one that Mr. Etheridge was talking about
that hit North Carolina, I mean, the bottom line is you don't
know what the real impact of our deploying National Guard
troops and the numbers we have to Iraq will be on responding to
a Katrina.
Yes or no, or answer it however you like.
Mr. Paulison. Well, first of all, I am going to work with
General Blum on the issue and talk about some of those issues
you just raised and raised in this committee and raised behind
me.
But to say what kind of impact any particular thing is
going to have on a disaster, that would be impossible to
answer. I can tell you that we do have the ability to move
equipment around, we do have the ability to move National Guard
around, and we are going to prepare for whatever storm comes
our way or whatever it is with what we have, and we are going
to make the best we can with it.
Mr. Perlmutter. I guess, a couple just factual questions. I
would like to know how many National Guard units from across
the country were deployed to the Gulf Coast for Katrina and how
long they stayed. And if in fact, as you are doing this process
and you are preparing for a mega-storm or a mega-emergency,
what kind of National Guard effort you see as part of your
plan. Those would be my questions, and if you could help me
with those later on, I would appreciate it.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Mr. Paulison. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Perlmutter. I return the balance of my time.
Ms. Sanchez. Submit that for the record. That would be
great.
We have some votes on the floor, so what I would like to do
is to try to get Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke in for their
questions, and then we could dismiss the director. And then we
will come back from votes and have the second panel.
So with your concurrence, Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke, instead
of giving each of you 4 minutes, try to keep it closer to maybe
3.5, because by the time we finish we still need to get running
across to take the vote.
So the next one in line would be Mr. Green of Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Director, for appearing today.
The title of this hearing is ``2007 Hurricane Season: Are
We Prepared?'' So why don't we visit for just a moment with
reference to this topic, are we prepared.
With reference to the ability to determine who is in
charge, are we prepared, and I ask this given the circumstance
that developed with Katrina and some consternation as to
whether the federal government was to make the first move or
whether the state government was to. Are we prepared to deal
with that?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir. We have a very clear system in
place. The response is local. The local community and the state
are in charge. We are not in charge of a natural disaster. Our
role is to come into a system as best we can to give them the
tools and supplies they need to do their job.
We are going to move early, I made that very clear. We may
move even before the state asks for assistance, but I move with
what I think they are going to use--
Mr. Green. Permit me to intercede quickly. Are we
indicating that the same system that we utilized previously is
the one that we would have in place now for making this
determination as to which entity is going to make the call?
Mr. Paulison. As far as what?
Mr. Green. The debate last time was whether the governor of
Louisiana or the president of the United States should have
done something immediately, if not sooner. Is that same system
still in place?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Okay. If that same system is still in place, how
will we avoid seeing what we saw on television, persons begging
for help and nobody showing up? No disrespect to you but that
is what the country saw, in fact that is what the world saw.
How do we avoid that is the same system is in place?
Mr. Paulison. And I meant by the same system is the fact
that the state is in charge, the local government is in charge
to respond to disasters. The federal government there is to
assist them, and that is what we are going to do.
However, there are several things that we can do that we
have in place now that we did not have before. One, we can do a
pre-landfall declaration if there is a major storm coming into
a vulnerable community where we move assets in before the storm
comes in. And we are going to do that anyway.
Mr. Green. Is it your belief that we will not see what we
saw previously?
Mr. Paulison. There is no question in my mind whatsoever
that you are not going to see another Katrina in this country.
Mr. Green. Next question, quickly, please, if I may. With
reference to pre-hurricane or pre-disaster relief, do we have
the vehicles, do we have the gas stations, can we move scores
of thousands of people along the highways and byways, out of
harm's way immediately?
Mr. Paulison. That is why we are working with the states to
make sure that there are good solid evacuation plans--
Mr. Green. Can I assume that your answer is, yes? Because
the reason I say this, sir, is because sometimes when people
finish I don't know whether they said yes or no. So I have to
ask.
Mr. Paulison. Well, I didn't want to say yes or no, because
I wanted to tell you what we are doing.
Mr. Green. Well, unfortunately, I have to deal in a world
of yes or noes right now. Will we move scores of thousands of
people over the highways and byways to get them out of harm's
way?
Mr. Paulison. Yes.
Mr. Green. Next question: Housing post-disaster, can we
house scores of thousands of people such that we will not find
ourselves with people in the streets of life after the
hurricane has hit? Can we do this?
Mr. Paulison. Do you mean will there be homeless, will they
not have a place to stay?
Mr. Green. Will we have the same circumstances we had in
Houston, Texas where we had people who were brought in and we
had to have NGOs trying to find places for people to stay.
People were sheltered in various and sundry places, but we
didn't seem to have a plan to accommodate people, and thank God
Houston was accommodating to the extent that it was. So will we
avoid that circumstance?
Mr. Paulison. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. And final question is this--this goes beyond
probably your pay grade, but it does say, are we ready, and I
consider myself a part of the ``we``--how are we going to?and
this is rhetorical--going to deal with displaced voters?
We still have a political question that has not been
resolved with reference to people who were forced away from
their homes who could not vote and participate in the political
process.
Thank you, Madam Chair. You were gracious with the time.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Clarke?
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And good afternoon to you, Director Paulison. You know me
from Brooklyn, New York. I just wanted to ask three questions
very quickly.
In 2005, some of the greatest in FEMA involved reaching the
many individuals who lived in the inner city, in particular in
the poorer areas. How will your national response plan address
this issue, one?
And, two, were a catastrophic disaster to occur in New
York, it could easily displace many hundreds of thousands, even
millions, of people, potentially far more than New Orleans.
Do you feel FEMA is prepared to successfully reach everyone
necessary in such a larger, more densely populated city? And I
am not thinking just FEMA unto itself but, of course, an
incident command structure and everything else that may have
been put in place.
And then, finally, among my concerns is the ability of FEMA
to effectively communicate with victims of a disaster. Not only
do you need to urgently explain to them what they need to do
during an emergency, but afterward FEMA must register everyone
and ensure that they understand where to go and what to do in
order to navigate a sometimes complicated bureaucracy and
receive assistance. Nowhere else in the world are there more
languages spoken than in New York City and in Brooklyn, and
many residents are not highly proficient in English.
Have you done anything to ensure that FEMA officials would
be able to communicate with people from such a broad range of
dialects, particularly during an emergency when family and
friends may be separated?
Mr. Paulison. Okay. If I remember, the first question was
about being able to reach some of the inner city with
directions and how. We have contracted with some of the
predominant black colleges to come up with how do we
effectively communicate with lower income, sometimes minority
populations better about personal preparedness, what to do when
things happen.
So we are working on that issue, to how do we do that and
how do we better reach people, how do we get to them and tell
them what they are supposed to do, where they are supposed to
go and those types of things.
Ms. Clarke. Excuse me, Mr. Director. Is that part of your
national response plan? Like in New York City, there isn't a
historically black college.
Mr. Paulison. But the philosophy is going to be the same
regardless of who does it. I think Texas A&M is one of the
colleges that is working on some of those issues to come up
with--and we had a grant actually from Congress to do that.
The second was that you talked about what happens if we are
going to have a catastrophic event in New York. Joe Bruno, the
state emergency manager for New York, has just probably one of
the most comprehensive disaster plans that I have ever seen. It
is about 300-and-some-odd pages. In fact, we are using that,
and he is working with us, to use that for other states around,
but right now we are doing the hurricane coast.
They have a great plan in place on how to deal with a
disaster, and they have looked at a category four or five
hurricane coming right into Brooklyn. So I am very comfortable
with what they are going to do and how they are going to move
people and how they are going to house them. It is, again, very
comprehensive.
And the last piece is the communication really has to come
through the state and local government on where people are
supposed to go and what they are supposed to do. That should
come before a disaster happens and also during a disaster. The
people need to listen very carefully to what their local
emergency manager is saying. If they are asked to evacuate,
they should do so quickly. And the individual should have a
personal plan in place too. If I am in an evacuation air zone,
where am I going to go if I am told to evacuate, and how am I
going to get there and where am I going to go.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the director.
I thank you, Ms. Clarke. Your time is expired.
And if there are any other questions from the members for
you, we will get it to you in writing. We hope you get us back
an answer fairly quickly.
And we stand in recess with votes on the floor to come back
after votes for the second panel.
Mr. Paulison. Thank you, Madam Chair.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] If we could, we would like
to get our panel of witnesses before us. My colleagues will be
coming there shortly. I appreciate your indulgence for allowing
us to interrupt so we could take those five votes.
We would like to reconvene the recessed panel. On our
second panel, we have three witnesses.
First witness is Mr. William Jenkins, who is director
within GAO's Security and Justice Issues Division. And Mr.
Jenkins has served as a director for 4 years, and has worked on
a wide variety of issues in his 28 years at GAO.
Second witness is Mr. Craig Fugate, who is director of the
Florida Division of Emergency Management. Mr. Fugate has been
serving as the director for 7 years.
Our third panelist is Mr. Joe Becker. Mr. Becker is here to
represent the American Red Cross, and serves as the senior vice
president of the Preparedness and Response Division.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JENKINS, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES DIVISION, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Thompson and members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to
discuss the important topic of our nation's emergency
preparedness and response system as we approach the 2007
hurricane season.
Well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective disaster
preparation and response can save lives and mitigate damage
while helping set the stage for recovery. Preparing for and
responding effectively to a major disaster, and particularly a
catastrophic disaster, is a difficult task.
There is no magic bullet or easy solution for success. It
takes hard work, attention to details, and effective pre-and
post-disaster cooperation and coordinated actions among all
levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the
private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through knowing
evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a disaster preparedness plan and supplies.
FEMA provides assistance in major disasters principally by
coordinating and deploying a range of resources from a variety
of government and nongovernmental sources. This requires it to
develop effective partnerships with a wide range of
organizations.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions designed to
strengthen FEMA's organizational capacity to coordinate the
preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic
disasters, regardless of cause. Effectively implementing the
Act's provisions should address many of the recommendations and
concerns we have had as a result of our work on Katrina.
Although FEMA has formally completed its reorganization
under the Act, it enters the 2007 hurricane season as an
organization in transition, one that is working simultaneously
to implement the Reform Act's provisions while addressing
immediate preparedness needs and capabilities.
FEMA faces a formidable challenge as it works to implement
the Reform Act's provisions, change its culture from one of
mostly reactive to more proactive, and quickly build its
capacity to effectively respond to a major disaster that could
occur at any time.
It is important that FEMA's approach, preparedness, and
response for major disasters is a national system with linked
capabilities and responsibilities among all levels of
government and nongovernmental organizations.
Developing these capabilities must be a cooperative effort
that integrates and defines for all major participants what
needs to be done, how it should be done, and how well it should
be done.
On the basis of our post-Katrina work, we identified three
basic areas of focus. One, having clear and clearly understood
roles and responsibilities. Two, identifying, developing, and
maintaining needed capabilites. And three, balancing the need
for quick, flexible action with accountability for the use of
resources.
We noted that improvements were particularly needed in the
areas of situational awareness, emergency communications,
evacuation, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and
shelter. In each of these areas, the lack of clear and clearly
understood roles and responsibilities contributed to the
problems that were experienced in the Katrina response.
FEMA has initiated reviews and actions in these and other
areas, but their effectiveness has not yet been tested in a
major disaster. Some targeted improvements, such as a
completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts.
Others, such as building mobile communications and registration
assistance vehicles, have been used already in recent tornado
and flood events.
As the principal federal agency now responsible for
preparedness and response, FEMA has a unique opportunity to
evaluate how it can most effectively target the grants it will
now administer to enhance the nation's disaster preparedness
and response system. This can best be done by viewing the
grants collectively rather than individually.
As FEMA and the nation move forward, there are several
areas that we believe deserve congressional oversight. Each of
these areas is part of a considerable ongoing effort and
resource investment by both federal and nonfederal agencies.
These areas include: One, the development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for all types of major disasters, natural or man-
made. Two, needed state and local capabilities and the use of
federal grants in building and sustaining those capabilities.
Three, regional and multistate planning and preparation.
Four, the role of preparedness exercises in building and
maintaining preparedness and response capabilities. And five,
the transparency of DHS policies and the basis for those
policies.
It is important that those affected by DHS and FEMA
policies have sufficient information to enable them to
understand the basis for those policies, and for Congress to
assess how well DHS and FEMA are using the billions of dollars
of resources that have been entrusted to it.
We look forward to working constructively with this
committee, the Congress, FEMA, and DHS in the weeks and months
to come as efforts continue to build the National Emergency
Preparedness System that we all want and our nation deserves.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of William O. Jenkins
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to address the
shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and
enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including
hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins in just a few weeks.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements
of preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to
state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond
to disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-
coordinated, and effective actions that minimize the loss of
life and property and set the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters
in particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS's
high-risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and response,
DHS must overcome continuing challenges, including those related to
clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting
against waste, fraud, and abuse.\1\ These issues are enormously complex
and challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view
preparedness for and response to major disasters as a national system
with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is because
effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the
coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first
responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well
as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put aside and
cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event. The
experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to
tackle these difficult issues.
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\1\ GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
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My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership,
response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made
by DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act
\2\ and other recommendations made in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster management issues for
continued congressional attention. My comments today are based on our
body of work on disaster and emergency management including more than
30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent
emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and
statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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\2\ The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394
(2006).
Summary
Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood
leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary
disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively
balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue
that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and
responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the
authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response
and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was
to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
DHS has designated a FCO for each region that includes states at risks
of hurricanes and a supporting FCO for each of these states. It has
also designated a PFO for each of three regions--the Gulf Coast, the
Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Region--plus a separate PFO for
the state of Florida and Texas.
It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and
responsibilities of these designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly
understood by all. There is still some question among state and local
first responders about the need for both positions and how they will
work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the
FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet and
discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, local, and
nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, possibly setting
the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual
disaster.
As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters
requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to
integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles
and responsibilities); how it should be done; and how well it should be
done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the
National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the
NPG are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and
local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and
private sector officials. This effort is intended to assess the
effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these documents, identify
modifications and improvements, and reissue the documents. The results
of the review for the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for
release in June 2007. However, in April 2007 DHS officials notified
stakeholders that some important issues were more complex and require
national-level policy decisions, and stated that additional time than
was expected was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted
that the underlying operational principles of the NRP remain intact and
that the current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA
officials have told us that the final version of the NPG and its
corresponding documents are currently receiving final reviews by the
White House and will be due out shortly. We are concerned, however,
that if the revisions are not completed prior to the beginning of the
2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the changes resulting from
these revisions could be effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane
season.
In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation's experience
with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the
adequacy of the nation's disaster response capabilities in the context
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that
needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and
coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which the
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and
local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, in congressional
testimonies, and in some documents FEMA has described a number of
initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas
and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However, a
number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate
their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to
have been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions
and demand they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster.
Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of these
initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster,
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane.\3\ Additional information on
FEMA's efforts can be found in Appendix I.
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\3\ Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines
``catastrophic incident'' as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or
other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of
casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population
(including mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy,
national morale, or government functions in an area.
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The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of
response to major disasters. States and governors rely on their
National Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and
National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas,
including those outside their home states. However, as we reported in
January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National Guard
needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully
identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would
have roles in responding to such events have not completed and
integrated their plans.
With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability,
FEMA has stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for
individual assistance while including safeguards for preventing
fraudulent and duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and
efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major
problem following Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in
improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its debris
removal and contracting policies and to increase the use of advanced
contracting for goods and services. Again, we have no basis to
determine the effectiveness of these systems as they have yet to be
tested on a large scale basis.
As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in
transition that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by
the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to
implement a comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management
system as required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller
General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that one area
needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding
to, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that
Congress might consider for oversight are:
the development and implementation of the National
Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural
disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic;
the assessment of state and local capabilities and the
use of federal grants in building and sustaining those
capabilities;
regional and multistate planning and preparedness;
the status and use of preparedness exercises; and
DHS policies that affect the transparency of its
efforts to improve the nation's preparedness for and response
to major and catastrophic disasters.
Background
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford
Act) \4\ primarily establishes the programs and processes for the
federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance
to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and qualified
private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility
for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.
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\4\ The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5121
et seq.
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Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources,
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.\5\ We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness
could be enhanced and expect to report by this summer.
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\5\ California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state's
legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired.
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As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations
have been made to improve the nation's ability to effectively prepare
for and respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina,\6\ the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee,\7\ the White House Homeland Security
Council,\8\ the DHS Inspector General,\9\ and DHS and FEMA \10\ all
identified a variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations
for, response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In
addition to these reviews, a report from the American National
Standards Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP)
contains recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness,
response, and recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A
key resource identified in the document is the American National
Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set of
criteria for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management,
and business continuity programs.
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\6\ House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
\7\ U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington,
D.C.: May 2006).
\8\ White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
\9\ Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General.
A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in
Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2006).
\10\ Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).
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Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the
federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic
elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any
catastrophic disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more
effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately
overwhelmed.\11\ Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined
and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3)
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the
nation's most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we recommended that
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
We also recommended that DHS
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\11\ GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
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1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent
clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes
needed to remedy identified coordination problems;
2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting
Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and
detailed operational implementation plans;
3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities
fully support preparedness, response, and recovery
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis;
4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to
prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the
interim National Preparedness Goal; and
5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how
to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a
catastrophic disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the
act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA
is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports
directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within
DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of
FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent
legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS's
Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute
establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The
statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other
areas, such as evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs
of individuals with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several
provisions to strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's
workforce. For example, the statute called for a strategic human
capital plan to shape and improve FEMA's workforce, authorized
recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity
Force. Most of the organizational changes became effective as of March
31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy for
FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became
effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4,
2006.
FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements
Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities
were over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within
DHS as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform
Act, whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely
tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS,
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal
structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and
integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities
within FEMA.
As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation
of recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities should
address many of our emergency management observations and
recommendations. In addition, we previously reported that DHS needs to
more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the
response capabilities of state and local governments are almost
immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly
defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3)
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from
Catastrophic Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any
catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government
must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood
to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina
showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to
better respond to a catastrophic disaster. As we have previously
reported, developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters
requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to
integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles
and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be
done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP,
NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by
federal, state, and local government officials, tribal authorities,
non-governmental and private sector officials.\12\ For example, the
review of the NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the NRP,
identify modifications and improvements and reissue the document. This
review includes all major components of the NRP including the base
plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the
Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the
PFO, FCO, and the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current
NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of
Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human
Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support
function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the
responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007
letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP
review process is complete and all changes are approved.
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\12\ On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including
catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to
the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on
implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, dated August 2006.
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The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in
June 2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders
that some important issues were more complex and require national-level
policy decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a
comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational
principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as
revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that
the final version of the National Preparedness Goal and its
corresponding documents like the Target Capabilities List, are
currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are expected
to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be
a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO,
who has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies
for response and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose
role was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to
address this issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may
not have fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of
the PFO and the FCO. While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid
conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both positions
in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary of
Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so.
Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents,
and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this
limitation.
FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf
Coast and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes
FCOs and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,\13\ Northeast Region,\14\ and
the Mid-Atlantic Region,\15\ and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states
of Florida and Texas. It is critically important that the authorities,
roles, and responsibilities of these pre-designated FCOs and PFOs be
clear and clearly understood by all. There is still some question among
state and local first responders about the need for both positions and
how they will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit
of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity
meet and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state,
local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster,
possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and
communication in an actual disaster.
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\13\ Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
\14\ Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands.
\15\ Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia,
District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond
to Major Disasters
Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the
White House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources
and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number
of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the
ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and
catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort
that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and
where, how it should be done, and how well it should be done?that is,
according to what standards. As previously discussed, the principal
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of
people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed
capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination
in conjunction with training and exercises in which the capabilities
are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently
addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local
stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day
operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its
transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's management
of existing resources compounded these problems.\16\ FEMA lacks some of
the basic management tools that help an agency respond to changing
circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found that FEMA
lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies--
such as succession planning or a coordinated training effort. Such
tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to
define staffing levels, identify the critical skills needed to achieve
its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and future
skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are beginning to
address these and other basic organizational management issues. To this
end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and
recommendations are due later this spring.\17\
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\16\ GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and
Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-
07-139 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
\17\ The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4)
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6)
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15)
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget
process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
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An important element of effective emergency response is the ability
to identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a
variety of sources--federal, state, local or tribal governments;
military assets of the National Guard or active military;
nongovernmental entities; and the private sector. One key method of
tapping resources in areas not affected by the disaster is the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Through EMAC about
46,000 National Guard and 19,000 civilian responders were deployed to
areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We have
ongoing work examining how EMAC has been used in disasters and how its
effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report by this summer.
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard.
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are
frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states.
However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of
equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state
agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not
completed and integrated their plans.\18\ As a liaison between the
Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is well
positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces.
However, until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation
are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for
multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and the
National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and
efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the
level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic
emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil
support missions or report this information to Congress. Thus, although
the deployment of National Guard units overseas has decreased the
supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in
the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the
impact on the Guard's ability to perform its domestic missions.
Although DOD has begun to collect data on units' preparedness, these
efforts are not yet fully mature.
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\18\ GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
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The nation's experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces
some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the
context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1)
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3)
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care
and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies
in each of these areas. Examples include designating national and
regional situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile
satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for
receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies
on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to
clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human
services. However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too
early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these
initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably
simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a major
or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or
catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section
below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements
in each of these areas. Additional details can be found in appendix I.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called
National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal
presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing
the national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will
support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers
and support the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies' communications systems during a
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication
requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have
identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to
improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken
action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,
interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which
we discuss further in appendix I.
Logistics. FEMA's inability to effectively manage and track
requests for and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other
supplies came under harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military
to take over much of the logistics mission.\19\ In the Post-Katrina
Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more
flexible and responsive. FEMA's ongoing improvements to its logistics
strategy and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide
immediate support to a disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods
and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the
private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and
recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we
recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach,
identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system,
which are discussed in appendix I. In short, FEMA is taking action to
transition its logistics program to be more proactive, flexible, and
responsive. While these and other initiatives hold promise for
improving FEMA's logistics capabilities, it will be several years
before they are fully implemented and operational.
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\19\ GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to
Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-
06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
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Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO's work examining the nation's ability
to evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA
needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the
federal government and outside the federal government. In an April
testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations said that
emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most pressing
priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He
said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support
planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing
methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family
members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that
resources are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic
disaster, decision makers struggle with the tension between
implementing controls and accountability mechanisms and the demand for
rapid response and recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered
many examples where quick action could not occur due to procedures that
required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of
vital supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600
million to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments
to applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended
outcomes.\20\
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\20\ GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention
Is the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts.
GAO-07-418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.
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Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different
magnitude of capabilities and resources for effective response, they
may also require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making
should quickly replace ``business as usual'' and unquestioned adherence
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time,
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes
intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to
provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in
all cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance
procurement practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal
agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal
agencies could then better manage disaster-related procurement and
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the
maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of
emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that
provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its
disaster-related procurements. These practices include developing
knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing
vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable
operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response
with the need.\21\
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\21\ GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
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In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes
have established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For
example, The Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations
designed to limit the excessive use of subcontractors and
subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is also required to
promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive contracts to
150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight funding is
specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one percent of funding for agency
mission assignments as oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must
develop and maintain internal management controls of FEMA disaster
assistance programs and develop and implement a training program to
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to or
recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to
identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued
Congressional Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the
congressional leadership suggesting areas for congressional
oversight.\22\ He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform
and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and
rebuilding after catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane
Katrina and the threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the
importance of ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to
catastrophic disaster management. Disaster preparation and response
that is well planned and coordinated can save lives and mitigate
damage, and an effectively functioning insurance market can
substantially reduce the government's exposure to post-catastrophe
payouts.
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\22\ GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress.
GAO-07-235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
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Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an
opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the
effects of potential catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS
provided Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform
Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes
made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes,
according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated
in our March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-
Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes and related roles and
responsibilities--in addition to those changes already undertaken by
DHS--should address many of our emergency management observations and
recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that
Congress could also consider how the federal government can work with
other nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private
sector organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to
help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given
the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to,
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters,
congressional oversight is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-
term efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific
areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.
DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of
implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization
requirements and additional organizational changes made under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS,
were to become effective on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the
department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal structure
to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate
systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities within
FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
United States Fire Administration,
Office of Grants and Training,
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Division,
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
Office of National Capital Region
Coordination, and,
Office of State and Local Government
Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several
organizational elements, such as a logistics management division, a
disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In
addition, FEMA expanded its regional office structure with each region
in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one
Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the director for
region III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in recent
memory there will be no acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA
regional offices will be headed by experienced professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It
also will include the National Integration Center that will maintain
the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities
reflect these documents.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns
As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the
effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities--in
addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS--should address
many of our emergency management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood
leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the
necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to
strengthen leadership roles and responsibilities. For example, the
statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act as the
principal emergency management adviser to the President, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide
recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of
DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National
Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that
the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and coordinate
the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or
other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that
appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a
demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and
homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management
experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response.
For example, the statute requires the President to establish a national
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities,
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities,
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program
to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and
strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in
order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state
annexes must be developed in consultation with local officials,
including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to
foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA
must enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal
entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment
capabilities, including credentialing of personnel and typing of
resources. In addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities,
such as (1) developing a logistics system providing real-time
visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics system, (2)
establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing
emergency support and response teams.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster
Capabilities
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating
the construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System,
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal ``to establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from
them.'' The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards
for preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing
the nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness
Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist
related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major
earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to
illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic
emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form
the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide
range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios focused on the
consequences that first responders would have to address. Some state
and local officials and experts have questioned whether the scenarios
were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in
terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and
local emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over
1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS
then identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal,
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005.
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for
these capabilities and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the
Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined
in the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the NPG, target capabilities and
preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems--should
be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established
seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness,
including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening
capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two
overarching priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant
dollars on risk-based investment. In addition, the department has
prioritized regional coordination and investment strategies that
institutionalize regional security strategy integration. In addition to
the two overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several
others. These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2)
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3)
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key
resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence
fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6)
strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities,
and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan
review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP
applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that
provides background information, strategic objectives and priorities
addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management;
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the
effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes,
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation.
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of
detection and response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers.
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and
response for such a disaster will require particularly close
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector,
individuals within the United States, as well as international
cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services? National
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late
summer 2007.
Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve
Their Capabilities Is Limited
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus
on state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying
risk management principles to guide federal investments, over the past
4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to
states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants.
Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to
define and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions
about emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is,
what are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given
finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed.
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes.
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people
across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that
eligible recipients must provide an ?investment justification? with
their grant application. States were to use this justification to
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding.
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to
evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk
and effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions,
although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process
more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said
that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from
grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because
they do not yet have the metrics to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and
multistate planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have
largely been focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately
adjacent neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the
abilities of first responders from multiple jurisdictions to
communicate at the site of an incident and the potential for large-
scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the
extent to which first responders should be focusing their planning and
preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the
National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to
building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of
government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination
and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent
regional and multistate planning has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in
planning. Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital
Region Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of
expenditures.\23\ One of these challenges included a coordinated
regionwide plan for establishing first responder performance goals,
needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of expenditures in
enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work on National
Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that needed
strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically improving the
substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers.\24\ For
example, additional information could have been provided regarding the
type, nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and
initiatives; performance expectations and measures; designation of
priority initiatives to meet regional risk and needed capabilities;
lead organizations for initiative implementation; resources and
investments; and operational commitment.
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\23\ GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants
in the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated
Planning and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28,
2004); Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to
Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region,
GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security:
Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness,
GAO-04-1009 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security:
Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in
the National Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2005); and Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the
National Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).
\24\ GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital
Region Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons
Learned
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For
first responders, exercises-especially of the type or magnitude of
events for which there is little actual experience?are essential for
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective
response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and
areas needing attention, it is important that they be realistic,
designed to test and stress the system, involve all key persons who
would be involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by
honest and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational
Decisions
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's
policies regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has
testified that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to
strengthen its management areas and mission functions. While much of
its sensitive work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS
has not been receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress
and us with access to various documents and officials have impeded our
work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress
that DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken
other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified.
However, DHS has not made its management or operational decisions
transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively,
efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding
it receives annually, and is providing the levels of security called
for in numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives.
Concluding Observations
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded
billions of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local
governments to assist in strengthening emergency management
capabilities. DHS has developed several key national policy documents,
including the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG to guide federal, state, and local
efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a
reassessment of the federal role in preparing for and responding to
catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past year--by
Congress, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS
and FEMA, GAO, and others--have provided a number of insights into the
strengths and limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to
catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for
strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports
paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal,
state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the
private sector; and individual citizens--faces in preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-
Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy
changes to respond to these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no ``silver
bullet,'' no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything
we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to
any questions you and subcommittee members may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize Mr. Fugate to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG FUGATE, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Fugate. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, ranking members,
and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity
to testify.
My name is Craig Fugate, and I serve Governor Crist as his
director of emergency management, a position I have served for
two governors, Governor Bush and Governor Crist.
My experiences go back 25 years, and I have been involved
in numerous disasters, both as a first responder, as a
paramedic and firefighter, later as an emergency manager for
Alachua County, which is home to the University of Florida in
Gainesville, as well as serving the state as state coordinating
officer and the governor's authorized representative for the
2004 hurricane season, 2005, and currently serving Governor
Crist as the state coordinating officer during the wildfire
emergency that is occurring in Florida.
There are several key areas that we would like to present
for consideration as we talk about getting ready for the 2007
hurricane season. And the first one is all-hazard. When we talk
about hurricanes, or we talk about specific disasters, many
people, in trying to describe all-hazards, look for the common
elements within the disaster itself.
I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing in common
with a hurricane and the wildfires. They are entirely different
creatures. What is all-hazards is the fact that the governor of
the state of Florida will be the governor in all of those
disasters.
It is the team that you build to deal with a variety of
threats to community space, those known and both unknown, that
is truly all-hazard. And when you try to define all-hazard by
talking about disasters, you miss the point. So while we are
oftentimes concerned about hurricane season, understand what we
do in Florida isn't just about hurricanes.
As we are talking about right now, we still have major
fires going in Florida. We have over five fire management
grants issued by FEMA. We have emergency management assistance
compact from other states, from Georgia and South Carolina.
Blackhawks are flying in support of our Division of Forestry
and our National Guard fighting these fires.
And this is not a hurricane, but this is how we do business
in Florida. It is the all-hazard approach. And that is why we
have been so insistent that it needs to be the basis as we look
at the variety of disasters we face in the nation.
The second one, which is really a concern for my peers in
other states and local government, is the Emergency Management
Performance Grant. This is a 50-50 funding program that has
been authorized by Congress for numerous years, starting back
with the era of civil defense, that builds capability and
capacity in our communities to share resources, respond
effectively, and manage many of those local disasters without
state or federal assistance, or, in many disasters, only
require federal reimbursement assistance, because we built
capacity.
Again, to look at that is a wise investment for our
country, to continue building that capacity. Because when you
look around the nation, I don't know how many fire trucks the
federal government has, but I can tell you the state of Florida
doesn't have that many.
They are at local government. And if we don't build the
capability to share the unimpacted resources of the nation, we
leave too many resources off the table when the victims are in
their time of need, and we need to support that capability-
building.
But you also have to be able to move those resources from
state to state, and that brings us to the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact. It was something the late Governor Chiles
realized after Hurricane Andrew, that we needed to have a
better way of bringing assistance from other states, and
through the Southern governors, developed the Southern
Governors' Compact.
Congress thought that was a great idea, endorsed it, issued
a public law to allow states to enter into that compact, and
moved it beyond just the Southern states. And now we have the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which all 50 states
are a member of, as well as several of our territories and
commonwealths.
This allowed us in the state of Florida to send over 7,000
responders to Mississippi in their time of need during
Hurricane Katrina. Not only was it sending resources or sending
people, we were actually sending resources--food, water, and
ice--that we did through our own contracts. As we were prepared
to serve our citizens in their time of need, we were able to
provide that assistance to our neighbors in their time of need.
And finally, the last one I want to get to is one that
hasn't been discussed very much, and that is the Temporary
Disaster Housing Program.
Mr. Chairman, you know as well as I do that housing is an
issue before a disaster strikes, and oftentimes it exasperates
the program. The Stafford Act was never designed to heal the
ills a community has in housing needs before a disaster, and
yet we try to make that disaster program fit the needs.
There has been a lot of talk about moving the Temporary
Housing Program to HUD. I would suggest it again. We need swift
and effective means to house people in the immediate aftermath
of a disaster, or we are going to depopulate regions of this
country, as we saw in Katrina.
But I think we need to have a better understanding that
FEMA's role is the emergency, and many of these issues are
longer-term, far beyond ever anticipated under the Stafford
Act. There should be a better system that we can use the FEMA
program to do the immediate housing needs, then realize many of
these folks will have long-term housing issues.
And perhaps the more appropriate will be a hybrid between
FEMA and HUD, where at the end of the emergency, many of these
people that still have long-term housing issues are then
transitioned into HUD programs, versus creating a new program
from scratch in the midst of another hurricane season.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Fugate follows:]
Prepared Statement of William ``Craig'' Fugate
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity testify before
you on preparedness efforts for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I am Craig
Fugate, the Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. I
have over 25 years of experience in state and local emergency
management, serving in various positions including ten years as the
Emergency Management Director for Alachua County, Florida, Chief of the
Bureau of Preparedness for the State of Florida, and the appointment to
my current position in 2001. I continue to serve and have been
reappointed to my position by Governor Charlie Crist. In my time with
the State of Florida, I have served as the Governor's authorized
representative for major disasters such as the 2004 Hurricane season
including Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne and coordinated
the State Emergency Response Team (SERT)'s response for all Florida
disasters and for state-to-state mutual aid for Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Emergency management is built upon three very basic concepts: 1)
All-hazards preparedness is the foundation in which readiness is built
for all disasters regardless of the cause or size; 2) The emergency
management cycle includes preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation; and 3) All disasters are local. There are several key areas
that I wish to discuss with you today that need to be addressed in
order to secure our preparedness for all disasters:
1. We must maintain an all-hazards approach to emergency
management;
2. Funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant
(EMPG) program should be increased, at least restored to FY
2005 levels;
3. We need federal support of the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
4. The FEMA Temporary Disaster Housing Program can be more
effective with a transition plan that includes HUD resources.
MAINTAINING THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
All-hazards emergency preparedness is the key building block and
foundation for emergency management. Natural hazards continue to be the
pervasive disaster that occurs regularly. In the past several years,
major disaster declarations were for events including severe storms and
tornadoes, typhoons, tropical storms, multiple hurricanes, flooding,
ice storms, snowstorms, and wildfires. Natural disaster preparedness
must not suffer as a result of homeland security efforts, but rather
should be viewed as the most frequent opportunity to validate domestic
preparedness efforts and to also build best practices. We need to start
looking at the system in terms of hazards preparedness. Furthermore,
our emergency response system must be built for all-hazards and
terrorism should be a component of the system. We cannot afford to
build duplicate systems by hazard or to eliminate programs to support
the homeland security effort. An all-hazards approach should be viewed
as building a single team to deal with a large variety of hazards.
Since I have been with the State of Florida, we have had had 22
major disaster declarations, five emergency declarations, and 45 fire
management assistance declarations. While hurricanes are the most
urgent and prevailing threat we have faced, we do not prepare for
hurricanes alone. Florida was the first state with anthrax cases in
2001, the terrorists for 9/11 trained in Florida, we have three
commercial nuclear power plant sites, host major sporting events
including Superbowls, and boast three national championships in the
past two years in college football (2006) and basketball (2006 and
2007). We have extensive threats for tornadoes, flooding, fires, and
severe freezing. You will recall the February 2, 2007 tornado that left
21 people dead and destroyed hundreds of homes with more than $17
million in federal assistance for victims. Additionally, we have done
significant influenza pandemic planning for our large special needs
populations and planning for mass migration incidents from the
Caribbean.
While every state may not experience a disaster every single year,
preparedness is essential. Florida took the lead in ensuring that
localities were prepared for any disaster when our state legislature
made changes after Hurricane Andrew that a surcharge is set aside for
emergency preparedness from every insurance policy written in the
state. This fund called the Emergency Management Preparedness and
Assistance Trust Fund, which exists only in Florida, helps us to ensure
that localities have the necessary means to prepare for disasters and
citizens do their part too. In addition, we utilize the only all-
hazards funding source, the Emergency Management Performance Grants to
supplement these funds to build our key preparedness programs.
Hazards need to be explored in the context of disasters too. A
disaster is really caused by humans as a result of getting in Mother
Nature's way. Humans build in harms way, we traditionally build at the
cheapest costs, and we build power grids that are subject to wind
damage. When we prepare for terrorism, we harden critical
infrastructure and look for ways to prevent events. We develop strong
public health systems and plans to address pandemics. However,
addressing hazards before a natural disaster means stronger building
codes, enforcing those codes, heeding warnings ahead of disasters and
having business and family plans in place when disaster does occur. We
have to begin looking at the complexities and scale of the consequences
of hazards.
The federal government must continue its commitment to ensuring
national security through all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of state and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for
adequate emergency management systems from the ground up. Instead of
making unbalanced investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must
maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our
response system for all disasters regardless of cause.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every state
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
state and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness
activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our
country is continuing long term recovery efforts from one of the
largest natural disasters in history and making strides to improve the
nation's emergency preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have
this vital program be just maintained. EMPG is the backbone of the
nation's all-hazards emergency management system and the only source of
direct federal funding to state and local governments for emergency
management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning,
training, and exercises at both the state and local levels. EMPG is
primarily used to support state and local emergency management
personnel who are responsible for writing plans; conducting training,
exercises and corrective action; educating the public on disaster
readiness; and maintaining the nation's emergency response system. EMPG
is being used to help states create and update plans for receiving and
distribution plans for emergency supplies such as water, ice, and food
after a disaster; debris removal plans; and plans for receiving or
evacuating people--all of these critical issues identified in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the following investigations and
reports.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the state and
local level. The match is evidence of the commitment by state and local
governments to address the urgent need for all-hazards emergency
planning to include terrorism. EMPG requires a match of 50 percent from
state or local governments. According to the National Emergency
Management Association's (NEMA) 2006 Biennial Report, states were
continuing to over match the federal government's commitment to
national security protection through EMPG by $96 million in FY05, which
is an 80 percent state and 20 percent federal contribution. To bring
all state and local jurisdictions up to the fifty percent level, $135
million is needed. This would allow as many as 3,030 additional local
jurisdictions to become part of the program. To bring non-participating
jurisdictions into the program at the 50 percent level requires an
additional $152 million.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
During the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the interdependencies
of the nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one
of the success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC). EMAC enabled 48 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin
Islands, and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than
2,100 missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
impacted states. The estimated costs of these missions will exceed $829
million. Of the personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,503
were National Guard personnel and 19,426 were civilians. Many of the
civilians sent to provide assistance are supported by the EMPG program
in their state. The nature of the nation's mutual aid system vividly
shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities to
respond to disasters of all types and sizes. In Florida we used EMPG to
build self-sustained response teams that are able to respond to
disasters in our state and in neighboring states when called upon to
provide assistance. The increased reliance on mutual aid for
catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed to
continue to build and enhance the nation's mutual aid system through
EMAC.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after ten
years of straight-lined funding, the program needs to be adequately
resourced based on building capacity. The increased flexibility of EMPG
is offset by funding shortfalls estimated in the NEMA Biennial Report
in 2006 to be over $287 million for all 50 states. The current total
need is $487 million. The Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act authorized EMPG
at $375 million for FY 2008.
Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with
these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006
Quick Response Survey found that if states were to each receive an
additional $1 million in EMPG funding for FY 2007, states would use the
following percentages for each of the following activities: 88 percent
of states responding would use the funding to support the update plans
including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic
disasters and others; 83 percent would provide more training
opportunities for state and local emergency preparedness and response;
88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local
jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more state and local exercises;
and 61 percent would use funding for state and local NIMS compliance.
(States were able to respond to multiple activities, as each state has
multiple emergency preparedness priorities.)
Last year's Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report completed by the
Department of Homeland Security found that current catastrophic
planning is unsystematic and not linked within a national planning
system. The report cites that, ``This is incompatible with 21st century
homeland security challenges, and reflects a systematic problem:
outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary
contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of
the Review support the need for a fundamental modernization of our
Nation's planning process. The report goes on to explain that all
states do not adequately address special needs populations, continuity
of operations, continuity of government, evacuation plans, and resource
management. EMPG is the ONLY source of funding that can address these
significant and immediate needs. The current EMPG shortfall does not
take into account these findings.
BUILDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the nation's history through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned
previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines
from all member states to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas. The process enabled National Guard, search and
rescue teams, incident management teams, emergency operations center
support, building inspectors, law enforcement personnel, and other
disciplines to immediately assist the requesting states in need of
support. The National Guard even chose to continue under EMAC when
deployed under Title 32 because of the organization, liability
protections, accountability, and tracking abilities EMAC provides.
EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the member states of
the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable
mutual aid among member states in emergency situations. The Southern
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by
participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs
nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and
FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (P.L. 104-321). Currently all 50
states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia are members of EMAC. EMAC requires member states to have an
implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC
Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement,
liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
The following is a synopsis of the historical support that the
state of Florida provided to Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the largest support mission in the history of EMAC. The State
of Florida, acting under provisions of the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact and a direct request from the Governor of
Mississippi, deployed a self-contained response team on the day of
landfall to the impacted coastal area of Mississippi (3 coastal
counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson; 3 contiguous inland
counties to the north consisting of Pearl River, Stone, and George). By
the evening of landfall on August 29, 2005 assets of law enforcement,
firefighting, search and rescue, medical, Incident Management Teams,
and others were in the area of operations in coastal Mississippi
performing lifesaving, safety, and security missions. Major logistical
assets were sent to the area, as well, to include ice, water, food,
fuel, and other commodities to support initial response operations. Due
to the dire situation caused by Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi
coast, the mission of the Florida Task Force grew significantly and
commodities and personnel continued to flow from the State of Florida
continuously until the end of October 2005 (note: some smaller level
missions continued with Florida support up until November 2006). The
Florida Task Force set-up a major command and logistical staging area
at Stennis Space Base which became the hub of the operation. This
command communicated with and supported Incident Management Teams from
Florida which were located in the 6 assigned counties to support the
local Mississippi Emergency Management Directors. In relation to this
effort, it must be noted that the State of Florida had itself been
impacted by Hurricane Katrina (a weaker storm at that time) prior to
its passage into the Gulf of Mexico. It is a tribute to the entire
Florida State Emergency Response Team (state and local government,
private entities, faith based organizations, etc. . .) that they were
able to effectively rise to the challenge of responding to the South
Florida impact of Hurricane Katrina while providing significant and
necessary assistance to our neighbors on the Gulf Coast.
Overview of EMAC Support to the State of Mississippi
COMMODITIES: (Purchased and provided by the State of Florida)
Water--768 truckloads--3,648,000 gals.
Ice--457 truckloads--19,194,000 lbs.
Juice--16 trucks--16,000 cases
Shelf Stable Meals--138,000 meals
USDA commodities--6,000 cases
Baby food, formula, etc.--20,892 cases
Baby supplies (nipples, diapers, wipes)--4,962 cases
Adult diapers, wipes--376 cases
Children Liquid Supplement--10,200 cases
Adult Liquid Supplement--5,100 cases
1,304 State Trucks of Commodities
2,057 Trucks Total of Commodities
PERSONNEL and TEAMS:
6,404 Personnel Total
Three Area Command Teams with 115 personnel to manage
entire area of responsibility of six counties
Six Incident Management Teams sent to County Emergency
Operation Center's
Three Logistics Management Teams
Urban Search and Rescue Teams
Three Type I Teams
Four Type II Teams
Two Water Rescue Teams
One Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordination Team
767 Law Enforcement Personnel with vehicles and
equipment
207 Fire Fighting Personnel
70 ALS Ambulances and EMS personnel
710 Medical Personnel in various disciplines
30 Elder Care Specialists
1 School Recovery Team
1 FDOT Advance Recon Team (10 personnel)
1 FDOT Bridge Recovery Team (7 personnel)
14 Public Information Officers
497 National Guard Personnel (also sent aircraft and
equipment)
3 zodiac boats w/trailers
3 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWV's)
2 GSA vans
2 UH-60 ``Black Hawk'' helicopters
1CH-47 ``Chinook''
4 Hazmat Teams (8 personnel)
14 Volunteer, Donations and Reception Center Personnel
13 Animal Control Teams (60 personnel)
1 State Animal Response Team (5 personnel)
16 Water/Wastewater Facility Teams (101 personnel)
4 Communications Personnel
38 Recovery Personnel
Continued support of EMAC will allow Florida to focus on the
implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
such as training and education for all mutual aid stakeholders,
resource typing and credentialing, and information and resource
management.
ADDRESSING TEMPORARY DISASTER HOUSING PROGRAM CHALLENGES
Housing is often seriously impacted following natural disasters,
leaving many families in the impacted areas with no place to call home.
Disaster housing consists of three phases:
1. The initial phase focuses on retaining citizens in the
affected area and providing interim housing solutions for them.
2. The next phase focuses on rebuilding local housing
resources.
3. The final phase deals directly with developing long-term
redevelopment strategies.
Providing housing assistance following a disaster can not just be
based on expiration dates and eviction dates; the focus must be on long
term housing solutions for the affected area. Disaster case management
of survivors that deals with the entire scope of housing and human
needs is necessary throughout all the phase to transition those
affected from interim situations into longer term solutions. Typically
in a community where the ability to transition disaster survivors into
permanent housing is problematic, there is usually an existing housing
problem before the disaster struck the community.
A disaster housing partnership between the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would
provide a disaster housing solution that is more responsive, flexible
and would provide a more cost effective long term disaster housing
solutions. Bringing HUD's financial resources and their subject matter
expertise regarding building loans, subsidies and land management into
the fold early on in the disaster housing process, would greatly
improve an impacted community's ability to recover and develop long-
term housing solutions and strategies. Additionally, HUD is capable of
providing case management experience for permanent solutions for
affected citizens that will provide permanent solutions to local
situations. Case management will result in accountability on all levels
of disaster housing.
CONCLUSION
The first goal the State of Florida looks at when preparing for any
sort of disaster is how we can best serve our citizens. This goes back
to my previous statement regarding the fact that all disasters are
local and that all groups involved in responding to disasters must use
a team approach, regardless of the type of disaster, to prepare for and
respond to these events. This team approach is imperative when
addressing the federal role in responding to disasters, it is important
that the response from the federal level is one of a supporting role
for state and local emergency management, it cannot supplant these
efforts.
Florida is successful and is looked to as a leader due to the fact
that our leadership has invested in emergency management through the
creation of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Emergency
Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund. Additionally, the
state has worked to develop strong partnerships that will ultimately
insure the state's success in affecting positive outcomes for those
impacted when a disaster occurs in our state. This type of investment
was on display recently when the Florida Legislature, based on Governor
Crist's budget recommendations, approved an appropriation of $895,000
in the state's FY 07-08 budget to upgrade Florida's State Warning
Point. The Florida State Warning Point is a function of the Division of
Emergency Management and is housed in the Emergency Operations Center.
The Florida State Warning Point is responsible, through Florida
Statutes and federal regulations, to be the central clearing house for
all emergencies occurring in the State that require response by or
resources from multi-county incidents, multi-State agency incidents or
any incident requiring County/State/Federal communications and/or
coordination.
With the passage of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act, Congress has
affirmed their support for ensuring preparedness for our nation's
continuous vulnerability against all-hazards. We must continue to build
national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. We
appreciate Congress' increased attention and focus on disaster
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. We ask that
Congress look at ways to immediately influx the system with resources,
encourage and reward innovation in order to face the challenges of the
day. We cannot afford to continue to repeat history as we did with
Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina. We must, once and for all,
learn the lessons of the past and resolve ourselves to ensure that
Federal, State and local governments have adequate funding for baseline
emergency preparedness so exercises and training can ensure that plans
and systems are effective before a disaster.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your
committee today and want to affirm Governor Crist's dedication to
continually working with our federal partners to improve the nation's
capabilities to respond to all types of hazards that our communities
may face on a daily basis.William ``Craig'' Fugate, Director, Florida
Division of Emergency Management
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now will recognize Mr. Becker to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOE BECKER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PREPAREDNESS
AND RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Mr. Becker. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. My name is Joe Becker, and I lead the American Red
Cross's national disaster relief efforts. Thank you for your
invitation to speak today.
I was asked to cover three topics: to review what the Red
Cross does for victims of disasters and what we don't do, to
share the steps that we have taken since Katrina, and to
discuss our changed role in the National Response Plan.
What we do in times of disaster for people? We shelter, we
feed, we distribute items that people need, the supplies that
they would need to get through the immediate next few days. We
have learned over the years that there are some supplies where
it is difficult to give the actual item?gas for a car or shoes
where sizes matter--and we give some financial assistance so
people can obtain those when their economy recovers.
We provide mental-health counseling. We provide health
services with our nurses and shelters. We provide information
to connect families with lost loved ones, and we work in the
longer-term recovery to help families plan and find resources--
our resources and others--on their longer-term recovery.
What we don't do: We don't evacuate cities. That is a state
and local, particularly local, operation. We don't rescue
people. That belongs in the first-response community.
We don't give everybody money who had a loss. We are not a
bank. We are not an insurance company. And we don't build
houses. There are others that do that very well.
You hear of the Red Cross charter to provide a national
system of disaster relief. That means we don't pick and choose
which disasters we respond to. We don't think about if it is a
big enough one, that we will come, or if our people are
available, or if we have money in the bank. We respond
regardless, to about 200 events a day, around the country.
If the event is larger than the very small event, such as a
multifamily fire, we will be joined by our usual key partners,
mainly faith-based groups. The Southern Baptists will be there
to help feed, Catholic Charities will often serve, Salvation
Army would be there to help feed.
If an event is much larger, or if there is an event that is
very visible in the news, we will be joined by many from the
community, and others who arrive to do good work, mostly faith-
based groups, some businesses and civic groups.
The challenge is for the local quarterback, the local
emergency manager, and whatever structure the community has, to
incorporate their good works into a coordinated response. And
how that is done varies community by community.
What did the Red Cross learn from Katrina? I will give you
a list of key learnings. Briefly, we learned instead of moving
our supplies in ahead of a storm, it is better for us to expand
our stockpile and permanently keep them in risk areas. We
learned where our systems need to be bigger, especially our
systems to use untrained spontaneous volunteers, and to move
large numbers of people around the country to help.
A key learning, we learned where our relationships with
community groups, particularly faith-based groups, were not as
strong as needed. These are nondisaster organizations who step
forward in a very large disaster and don't know how to plug
into the system and help. We learned which of these community
groups, such as churches, would step forward and didn't know
how to get support, and we learned how we can do that better.
We learned that we needed year-round staff to work with
state government in risk areas, and where we needed a larger
team to work with our federal partners. We learned where our
infrastructure, particularly our IT infrastructure, was
completely overwhelmed and had to be rebuilt post-Katrina. We
learned where our satellite communications system wasn't big
enough, and where we needed more redundancy.
In short, we learned about our capacity, and we learned
about our relationships, and we learned that we needed to grow
both. We had a large number of projects post-Katrina that just
had to be done by last hurricane season last year.
We gave ourselves 4 months to acquire 1.5 million square
feet of warehouse space, to put in those warehouses additional
supplies to shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time,
buying a half million cots, a half million blankets, and those
related supplies. We now have 6 million prepackaged meals ready
to go.
We now have 21 cities in risk areas with permanent triple-
redundant communications equipment along the coast, and we are
adding more cities. We have hired full-time staff for 14 state
emergency management offices, such as Mr. Fugate's, and staff
to work with partner groups to help national partners, national
organizations, become part of the disaster response. We redid
our IT systems, and we did a lot of work on our supply chain.
Locally, our chapters have created new partnerships,
especially with faith-based groups, to enable the work, and we
even worked with about 100 national partners. A good example
would be the NAACP, where we trained over 1,000 of their
members, and they helped respond to the tornadoes in Florida
and to Alabama and Georgia.
You might also remember that our role in the National
Response Plan has changed recently. We have a separate team
that supports the federal structure in disaster. They help
receive requests from states for support items for mass care,
and help the federal agencies fill those requests.
This team is very different from our operating team. It
does not direct our operating team. It takes information from
the operating team, and gives it to federal partners.
In the new construct, in the new National Response Plan, in
a key learning from Katrina, if you are going to be a primary
agency in the National Response Plan, you need to be able to
help make quick and decisive commitments of federal assets.
It is clear that the Red Cross can't commit federal
resources. I can't sign a contract on behalf of government for
water or fuel to appear. And now that ESF6 is growing to
include evacuation planning and pet planning, it is appropriate
that a federal agency take that role, and FEMA has agreed to do
so.
The key point here is that there will be no change in our
service delivery on the ground. This is a separate team from
the people who feed and shelter and do those seven things that
I described.
Are we ready? We are never ready enough. We have made big
strides with our people, in our supplies, in our plans, in our
systems, but we work every day and we see the problems at
county level, we see the problems at state level, we see the
problems in our federal family. And we know there is much more
to be done.
The Red Cross has learned a lot. We have done a lot, but we
have a lot more to do. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Becker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph C. Becker
Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee
on Homeland Security, thank you for providing me the opportunity to
testify before you today on this important topic: Hurricane Season
2007. I am pleased to inform the Committee that we have made
substantial improvements in our capacity to respond to the challenges
that may come our way.
I would like to start by recognizing the selection of Mark W.
Everson as the next president and chief executive officer of the
American Red Cross. Many of you know Mr. Everson, who has led the
Internal Revenue Service for the past four years. We at the American
Red Cross are excited and encouraged about his selection and look
forward to him officially joining the organization on May 29.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank each of you for your
support of H.R. 1681, the American National Red Cross Governance
Modernization Act of 2007, which was signed into law by President Bush
on May 11. This legislation modernizes the governance structure of the
American Red Cross and enhances the Red Cross Board of Governors'
ability to support the critical mission of the Red Cross in the 21st
century.
In today's testimony, I will focus on the significant improvements
made by the American Red Cross since Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma
devastated the Gulf Coast during the 2005 hurricane season. I will also
address recent changes to the National Response Plan (NRP), in which
the American Red Cross plays a significant role.
About the American Red Cross
For more than 125 years, the American Red Cross has been our
nation's partner in preventing, preparing for, and responding to
disasters. Our past and present Congressional Charter mandates that the
Red Cross ``maintain a domestic and international system of disaster
relief.'' In fact, the Red Cross responds to more than 70,000 disasters
each year, ranging from single family home fires to large scale
hurricanes and tornadoes. In addition to family home fires and small
scale events, today the Red Cross has 39 large scale disaster
operations in 26 states and the Northern Mariana Islands, including the
tornado that struck Kansas earlier this month and our continuing work
to support the tragedy at Virginia Tech.
The Red Cross must function at many levels and across multiple
jurisdictions. It is simultaneously a local responder, a state partner
and a national organization. At the local level, we provide immediate
services: food, shelter, immediate and longer-term assistance, for
people in all disasters ranging from home fires to large scale
disasters.
While the American Red Cross is the nation's largest mass care
provider, we are not the only mass care provider. As an independent,
nonprofit organization, we rely on the generosity of the American
people to provide services to victims of disasters. We also rely on our
partners, such as the Southern Baptists, the Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities, and the United Way, to provide their services in larger
events. Since Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross has reached out to
hundreds of organizations across the nation to ensure our partnerships
are solid, to find mutual ways of providing services during times of
disasters, and to ensure that the gaps that existed in our response to
Katrina are filled.
Hurricane Katrina
In August 2005, our nation awoke to the inconceivable wrath that
was Hurricane Katrina. Millions of people were immediately displaced.
The sheer magnitude of Katrina's impact was unprecedented, and the
American Red Cross, along with all other response and human services
organizations, was not prepared for the magnitude of the response
required by such a disaster. In our planning, we failed to ``think
big'' enough.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest domestic events the Red
Cross ever responded to were the 2004 hurricanes--Charley, Frances,
Ivan, and Jeanne--which crisscrossed their way across the southeast.
Our response to these storms easily surpassed anything done in prior
disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992. After those storms, we
made significant strides to increase our feeding, sheltering, and
emergency assistance capacity.
Before Katrina made landfall, we enhanced local Red Cross chapter
capacity with supplies, emergency response vehicles (ERVs), kitchens,
communications equipment, and a first wave of almost two thousand
additional volunteers--a force that would ultimately grow to 240,000
workers. But, for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, this was not
enough. The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were 20 times larger than our
previous largest disaster.
To say that the organization was stretched beyond capacity is an
understatement. Some shelters became exceptionally crowded, we were
slow to reach some rural areas, and when we gave emergency financial
assistance our systems became overwhelmed. We responded by creating new
systems utilizing our relationships with some of the best and brightest
in corporate America to give aid to people in need. We also ramped up
our workforce and trained tens of thousands of spontaneous volunteers
who stepped up to help their neighbors.
It was not perfect--it was far from perfect--but we were
successful, with the help of our partners, in getting the critical
emergency aid to those who had nothing else on a scale that was
unprecedented.
Hurricane Katrina exposed systemic vulnerabilities for the Red
Cross and governmental agencies that respond to disasters. Yet, by
bringing them to light, we were given the opportunity to identify them,
fix them, and ensure that we are prepared for future disasters that may
lie ahead.
Lessons Learned and Improvements, 2005-2007
Mr. Chairman, I shared lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for the 2006 hurricane season with this Committee last
June. While we were fortunate as a nation to have a relatively quiet
hurricane season last year, that did not give the Red Cross reason to
delay our progress, it simply gave us time to do more--time to ensure
that we rebuilt our systems right, and to create the necessary
capacity.
Today, I welcome the opportunity to address two specific issues
that might have characterized the Red Cross in years past. The first is
a cultural issue, the second is capacity.
First our culture. The Red Cross had a history of acting as an
insular organization too many times and in too many places. As the
nation's largest mass care provider, we have been successful in
responding to disasters for more than a century. On larger relief
efforts, we have worked with key partners over the years, typically
faith based groups like the Southern Baptists and the Salvation Army.
In very large events, like Katrina, many new groups step forward,
especially the faith community. Our ability to work with these non-
traditional disaster response organizations was limited. While
overwhelmed providing service, we had difficulty helping them become
part of the community response. This was a hard, but valuable lesson
for the Red Cross to learn. In very, very large events, non disaster
groups and new partners come forward to serve--and the Red Cross can
take a lead role in helping them become part of the response.
Katrina also was a wake up call for the Red Cross that partnering
in fact is important in all disasters--small and medium ones, not just
the catastrophes. Since Katrina, the Red Cross at the national level
and our more than 700 chapters nationwide have worked diligently to
create and foster strong partnerships with many new organizations that
would typically not be in the disaster response business. From faith
groups and businesses to local civic organizations, our chapters have
been working with local community organizations to ensure that
partnerships are in place so that organizations--that selflessly step
up to help their neighbors--know in advance how to access supplies,
resources, and expertise. Through partnerships, Red Cross chapters are
providing training and supplies to community-based organizations to
strengthen response efforts across the nation. If and when a disaster
strikes, these community-based organizations will be better prepared to
assist in their response efforts, and the Red Cross will be better
prepared to identify and reach out to people are that may need
assistance. We have seen the benefit of working with these new partners
in many significant responses over the last year. The Red Cross does
not think or act alone. . .our commitment to partnerships is here to
stay.
The second area is capacity. The Red Cross has significantly
increased the investment in our capacity to respond. Today, we have six
million pre-packaged meals are at the ready, and sheltering supplies,
like blankets, cots, toiletry kits, and clean up kits for up to a half
million people are stored in warehouses spread along the coasts and in
other high risk areas.
For many years we had mobile communications vehicles, complete with
interoperable satellite and redundant communications that we would roll
in ahead of a storm. Today we have 21 cities stocked with permanent
satellite equipment along the Gulf Coast, and are working to add more.
We have worked even more effectively with the state and federal
governments as well, hiring full-time Red Cross employees for 14 state
emergency management offices, and for each of the FEMA regions. This is
in addition to the employees we have added to work with NGO partner
groups to help coordinate relief efforts. We have trained more than 165
government relations volunteers and have worked hard to strengthen our
relationship with FEMA, clarifying and redefining roles and
responsibilities. We have increased our efforts to work with and
accommodate people with disabilities and continue to seek appropriate
community partnerships to help us serve other vulnerable communities.
We have changed our information sharing policies to allow transparency
with other organizations and local law enforcement while respecting
client confidentially.
We also have added the following capacity:
A web-based shelter management application developed
in conjunction with FEMA and the Department of Homeland
Security. This system has the ability to track shelter
inventory, facility survey data, and population counts of the
shelter population nationwide. Data on our 44,000 shelters is
entered in the system.
Improvements to the Disaster Services Human Resources
(DSHR) system to track in real-time staff assigned to relief
operations and strengthen the process used for registering
spontaneous volunteers. The DSHR system software has also been
modified to accommodate DSHR ID Smart Card technology. These
improvements provide better information about our volunteers,
their skills and availability.
Addition of six on-staff disaster relief operation
directors to provide leadership to major relief operations as
well as mentor and coach chapter and multi-chapter relief
operation directors. This will improve the skill sets of
administrators and managers in the DSHR system.
Development of national partnerships that chapters can
utilize at the local level to engage underserved groups in
their communities.
A ``Disaster Welfare Information'' system for chapters
to provide ``safe and well'' status information to the families
and loved ones of disaster victims.
Response Center Network expansion for a group of
chapters that staff the 1-866-GET-INFO line. We have 250
simultaneous workers in chapters nationwide supporting the
information center's work.
An enhanced Volunteer Match Portal to help manage
expectations of large numbers of spontaneous volunteers and
provide updated guidance.
All of this was completed by the beginning of the 2006 hurricane
season. Since last fall, we have worked to sharpen our planning,
starting with the six of the highest disaster-risk regions of the
country. Working with partner organizations, state and local
governments, and our federal partners, we have tried to quantify the
worst case catastrophic scenarios: (1) a hurricane hitting New York
City; (2) a terrorist incident in Washington, D.C.; (3) a hurricane on
the Carolina coast; (4) multiple hurricane strikes in the Gulf Coast;
(5) an earthquake in southern California; and (6) an earthquake in
northern California. Taking these scenarios, we are asking real-world
questions. How many would need shelter and are we prepared to shelter
this many people? How many would need to be fed? How many would need to
be cared for? These numbers are daunting, Mr. Chairman, and the Red
Cross--and the country--have many challenges to be prepared to respond.
Changes to the National Response Plan
As you know, the American Red Cross role in the National Response
Plan (NRP) is evolving. This is the result of an expansion of
responsibilities in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 6 (ESF6) and a
change in the expectations of the role of the Primary Agency.
Historically, the Red Cross role in the National Response Plan (and
its predecessor, the Federal Response Plan) has been the primary agency
for mass care, and as a support agency for six other functions. In the
primary role, the Red Cross has:
Received, evaluated and forwarded State requests for
mass care related support to FEMA for approval and fulfillment
by the federal government in time of disaster;
Assisted in federal planning efforts;
Participated in federal level planning for mass care;
and
Provided liaisons to FEMA locations in support of ESF6
Mass Care activities.
Three years ago when the NRP was created, the American Red Cross
assumed the role of the only nongovernmental organization named as a
``primary agency'' in an Emergency Support Function. We were very proud
of this important role and approached it with the care and
consideration necessary to serve in this function. Nevertheless, over
the years, one of the lessons we learned is that this ``primary
agency'' role was never fully understood, and for good reason. The
American Red Cross is not a government agency, and we do not have, nor
have we ever requested, the federal authority or ability to assign
federal assets during times of disaster.
Additionally, our operation as a mass care sheltering service
provider is separate and distinct from our role in the NRP. We have a
separate Red Cross NRP team that supports the federal structure in
disaster. This team receives requests from states for mass care
(feeding and sheltering) and helps the federal agencies determine how
to best fill the requests. This team is very different from our service
provider team operating on the ground running Red Cross shelters and
feeding clients--the Red Cross NRP team does not direct sheltering or
other mass care services.
In the new NRP, currently being rewritten, the confusion regarding
the Red Cross roles as a federal surrogate and a NGO mass care services
provider is eliminated. It is imperative that the primary agency in the
ESF needs to the authority to make quick and decisive commitments of
federal assets. As I stated above, the Red Cross is not a federal
agency, and does not have the authority to require or commit the
federal resources of several cabinet agencies. The Red Cross is very
pleased with the redesign of the NRP and its designation as a support
agency.
For these reasons, and because of the expanded ESF6 role in the
post-Katrina reforms implemented in the fiscal year 2007 DHS
Appropriations bill, the American Red Cross and FEMA have concurred
that it is imperative that it is much more appropriate for FEMA to
perform the federal role of ``primary agency.'' The Red Cross will
become a ``support agency'' under ESF6, and our support role for the
other six emergency support functions will continue unchanged. We
participated significantly in rewriting the NRP along with FEMA and
other federal agencies. In the end, we believe it is in the best
interest of the American people for FEMA to perform the federal
government's role as the Primary Agency for all areas of ESF6. It has
the needed federal statutory authority to commit federal resources of
other federal agencies and to ensure a unified command structure during
operational response.
While our ``NRP status'' has changed, our operations--as a service
provider--have not. The American Red Cross and our partners, regardless
of our role in the NRP, will continue to provide shelter, feeding, bulk
distribution, welfare inquiry, recovery planning, emergency assistance,
heath and mental health assistance, and long term recovery.
Hurricane Season 2007
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I have outlined the steps
the Red Cross has taken to prepare for Hurricane Season 2007. We have
made immense strides in our supplies, plans, systems, and culture. We
have learned that what was ``unimaginable'' can, in fact, become
reality.
While we have made significant improvements, the fact is that we--
and federal government agencies--can never be ready enough.
There are significant national issues that still exist. The NRP is
not complete. While we applaud the work that FEMA, DHS and all the
contributors have done on the NRP, we need to have an operational plan
complete.
We also need to see significant improvement in the areas of
community and personal preparedness. The greatest defense to surviving
a disaster is being prepared. The American Red Cross works with
individuals, communities, states and the federal government to help our
nation and our citizens become prepared for any disaster that comes
their way. Red Cross programs are configured to disaster risk, that is,
we design programs for individuals and families to prepare for natural
disasters that are conducive to their geographic areas. As we rely on
the neighbor helping neighbor philosophy, we encourage local
communities to become more aware of potential hazards that could
adversely impact their regions and prepare accordingly.
The Red Cross firmly believes in the importance of preparedness and
has developed numerous tools and resources offered in a number of
different languages to help families prepare for any unexpected
disasters, from a house fire to a hurricane.
Over the past several years, organizations that help to prepare
communities, as well as local, state and federal governments, have made
efforts to streamline our messages on preparedness. We know that a
single national message helps individuals better understand what they
need to do to protect themselves and their loved ones during times of
disaster. It is important that all levels of government and the Red
Cross convey a unified message to the public on preparedness.
We encourage families and individuals across this country to ``Be
Red Cross Ready.'' Our campaign, which parallels the Department of
Homeland Security's Ready Campaign, provides tools for individual
households to take three important steps: (1) Get a Kit; (2) Make a
Plan; and (3) Be Informed.
Get a Kit--Every household should have prepared and ready to go a
disaster kit that includes enough food and supplies to last each family
member for three days. This could be an old knapsack or backpack with
water, basic first aid supplies, any critical documents (such as
photocopies of driver's licenses), necessary medicines, a change of
clothes, and a small amount of cash. This kit should be replenished as
necessary to ensure that food, water, and medicines are fresh. This
should be the one thing that anyone needing to leave in a hurry can
grab to take with them. In addition, families should consider any
special needs, including those of loved ones as well as their family
pets.
Make a Plan--This plan should incorporate such things as where an
individual and their loved ones would go in the event of a disaster,
how they would communicate with a friend or loved one to let someone
know where they are and that they are safe, particularly when critical
infrastructure like phone lines are down. A good family plan also
considers the care of pets.
Be Informed--Get information from either your local Red Cross
chapter or another organization that offers critical trainings on
making a disaster plan, a communications plan, and first aid/CPR.
Knowing what to do during a time of disaster is critical to ensuring
one's safety and the safety of their loved ones.
Despite our collective efforts, there has not been a significant
improvement in preparedness by individual households. We believe that
Members of Congress could have an impact on this by addressing their
constituents on preparedness issues, and partnering with organizations
that promote disaster preparedness.
While we speak today of the upcoming hurricane season, other
threats loom. One threat that continues to merit careful planning and
attention is the potential pandemic influenza. In this regard, I come
today with a specific request. While the Red Cross will be sharing
vital family care information, providing a safe and adequate blood
supply, and helping to meet the needs of isolated or quarantined
people, we all know that our medical facilities will be overwhelmed.
The medical community will turn to the Red Cross and other
organizations for volunteers to help in overflow facilities. There is
great risk in asking for volunteers to serve in support roles for those
providing medical care, particularly in temporary facilities full of
contagious people.
Our efforts on behalf of the Red Cross and other volunteers
throughout the United States, their families and organizations to
extend federal protections to them have been met with no success to
date. We need strong health care protections for our volunteers, either
through appropriate amendments to the Federal Volunteer Protection Act
or new legislation that affords liability and benefits protections to
volunteers who are placed in harms way. We ask your help here. America
will need volunteers to help in medical situations. I encourage this
Congress to act while we still have time.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee, thank
you again for the opportunity to provide testimony on Red Cross
improvements leading up to the 2007 hurricane season. We want to assure
you, and the American people, that you can rely on the American Red
Cross to be there whenever, wherever disaster strikes.
I am happy to address any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
What I would like to do to start the questioning, Mr.
Jenkins, in your analysis of FEMA, can you capsule what you
think, post-Katrina, what you have seen FEMA do that is their
politics, and what items if any that cause you pause with
respect to FEMA not being up to what you would consider an
acceptable standard?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, as Mr. Paulison pointed out in his
testimony earlier, there is a number of things that FEMA has
done in each of the areas that I mentioned in terms of
situational awareness, where they now have teams that go out,
they have automated trucks with capacity to do that.
There is the same thing with regard to assistance. They
have got now a greater capacity to do that, and a capacity to
be able to do that in a way that also tries to identify
duplicates and fraudulent applications. So in each of those
areas that I mentioned, they have taken positive steps.
I think with regard to logistics, they have a long way to
go. They can now, as you point out, track trucks that leave
from two of their principal warehouses, but they still have
quite a bit to go in terms of how they are going to refine what
their requirements are and work with the private sector in that
area.
They recognize that it is a multiyear effort, that they are
not going to have that implemented for this hurricane season.
They really just need to revamp that system from A to Z, and
they are working on that.
The thing that I think I am a little bit concerned about
is, I think it is important that if in this hurricane season,
the new NRP comes in places he suggested in late June, it is
whether or not you really want to try to implement that plan,
that new plan, in the midst of the hurricane season?
Or do you want to go with what you have got, where that is
what you have trained on, that is what people understand their
roles and responsibilities are. They are not trained in the new
system, whatever it might be? And so, I think that is one
question as to whether or not you want to do that.
I think it is also important that there be a clear
understanding of the roles of the FCO and PFO, and that is not
always clear. Under the existing NRP, the secretary of homeland
security can appoint a single individual to serve as PFO and FO
except in the case of terrorist events, and the reason for that
exception is not clear in the NRP.
But it is, in our view, probably better that that
particular person, one person, serve both roles, as opposed to
having it in two roles. It definitely provides clearer lines of
communication and authority.
There is, at least, by having them predesignated, however,
that these positions--now being predesignated for three regions
and two states--there is an opportunity for both the FCO and
the PFO to meet with state and local counterparts so that there
can be a better discussion of what their roles would be, how
they would interact with the states, what their individual
roles would be in terms of the federal response. But that is an
area of concern for us.
I think the other thing is that FEMA has put a lot of
things into place that potentially are certainly much better
than Katrina was. I think the real issue that we have is the
extent to which these initiatives can actually be successfully
deployed and implemented on a very large-scale basis, like a
hurricane IV or V strength.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I am glad you mentioned that. Mr.
Paulison talked about a hurricane V scenario for Florida, Mr.
Fugate. And part of that, phase one, focused on developing a
regional response and recovery in the counties around Lake
Okeechobee. Are you familiar with that scenario?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It was at my request.
Last year, the Army Corps of Engineers responded to
Governor Bush, who had asked for a review of the dike, came
back with the water management district with concerns that the
dike may have a higher percentage chance of failure in certain
scenarios. That was not something we had previously planned
for.
So we approached Director Paulison. We knew they were
looking to do catastrophic planning in South Florida, and said,
as a part of that, can we first look at Lake Okeechobee, and
what would happen if we had a dike failure there, all along
those very small rural communities, and lack of resources.
So we began there. We are going to shift that focus, as we
have completed that planning, into South Florida. And much of
what we are looking at is building upon the system that is
already in place in Florida, with the state and locals.
Again, our critical issue is not what many people are
talking about. Quite honestly, sir, the National Response Plan
doesn't respond. People do.
Here is the challenge I want to talk about: We look at a
Category V hurricane hitting South Florida, similar to the
Great Miami Hurricane that actually hit in 1926. Based upon
today's population, that would result in losing over 300,000
housing units in less than 24 hours in a band that will stretch
from the Miami-Dade-Broward County line all the way through
Tampa.
I have yet to hear anything in the National Response Plan,
or anything that is being proposed in the Katrina after-action
reports, that tells me how we are going to house 300,000
families--close to 1,000,000 people--without having to disperse
them all over this country.
Those are the kind of challenges, when we talk about
catastrophic planning, we are trying to get down to, not who is
on first base or who is in charge. We knew that in Florida the
day our constitution got written. It is the governor of the
state of Florida and the local official declares the emergency.
Chairman Thompson. And I appreciate this line of
discussion. Have you shared any of your concerns with anyone at
FEMA, or anything of this nature?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir, and that is part of why we were very
fortunate to receive that catastrophic planning. Our primary
emphasis, as we move into the South Florida areas, will be,
again, looking at our existing plans for evacuation response,
but really starting to challenge some of these things that we
don't have answers for.
In Florida, we have moved millions of people in hurricanes.
We have responded after disasters, but there are some
challenges that we have yet to see the impacts of what people
term catastrophic.
I tend to still term that a major disaster, but what
happens when you have the challenges of housing loss of that
nature, based upon not theoretical, but actual hurricanes that
have hit and applied to today's population.
Chairman Thompson. And I think part of what we saw with
Katrina--even though we had a scenario run before Katrina--it
was whether or not we knew what the outcome would be.
But we did not prepare for the impact on the population, so
we saw that dispersal of people, and to some degree, the
abandonment of quite a few. But we knew the physical damage,
but it was the human aspect of it that was not included.
And we will probably come back to another round. I see my
time has expired.
I yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. And I want to thank you for calling us back. This is
really important, and I am glad you extended the time. I
appreciate it very much.
And thank you for your patience, panel.
And I love these recesses, because my seniority increases
every time we come back--climb the ladder of seniority.
Director Fugate, I would like to thank you for testifying,
of course, before this committee. The state of Florida has been
the national leader in disaster prevention and response.
I know I am a little biased, but I think it is true.
Mississippi doesn't do bad either. I want to thank you for your
years of service in making our state a national standard, and
under, as you said, Governor Chiles first, Governor Bush, and
now Governor Crist.
Maybe you can elaborate on this, but what do you attribute
Florida's success to? I know you touched upon it, but if you
can elaborate, we would appreciate it.
Mr. Fugate. I appreciate the question. And again, I think
it is the leadership that our governors have given us. But more
importantly, it is the fact we learned we had to be a team.
Mr. Chairman, I am looking around me, and you have got two
government officials and the Red Cross. That is not the team.
We don't have the private sector here. For a long time, when we
talked about volunteers, we only talked about the Red Cross. We
left the faith-based off the table.
When we talk about disasters and building a team, it has to
be all levels of government as partners. And partners mean you
bring something to the table. You just don't hand your hand out
and say, ``Give me something.''
It means that we have to have our volunteers, and all of
our volunteers, both those that deal with disasters as a
primary, to those that step forward with resources that may be
emergent during an emergency. You can't say no when you need
the help.
But following the other leg of that stool is the private
sector. We oftentimes find ourselves competing and duplicating
with our private sector when what we really should be doing in
many disasters is not ordering up more ice and water, but
spending more time thinking about how we get those local
retailers back on line, so FEMA's disaster assistance can go to
people and they can go out and take care of themselves.
And again, when you talk about building a team, it has to
be something that is not seen as a local issue, a state issue,
or a federal issue. It cannot be seen as government solution or
volunteer solutions. You have to look at what works in a
community on a day-to-day basis, and look at those elements.
And from that, that is how you build a team. And the focus
is always going to be on our citizens we serve. But without the
private sector, without the volunteers, government is one leg
of a broken stool. That was the lesson of Hurricane Andrew.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, appreciate that. Again, Director
Fugate, would you also address the National Guard issue, if you
would like, with regard to readiness to respond to a natural
disaster?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Again, Mr. Chairman, in the state of Florida, we currently
have more National Guardsmen back in Florida with more
equipment than we had in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons.
Throughout all of the response to the world terrorism and to
the deployments, we had more National Guardsmen available for
deployment than we had deployed at any time during Hurricane
Andrew.
I think there is a clear distinction between the
warfighting mission and the long-term impacts on the Guard to
carry out that federal mission at the expense of training and
equipment. But in the short term, the disaster response in
Florida has not been compromised.
We use our Emergency Management Assistance Compact very
effectively. I currently have authorized, and we have EMAC
missions from the state of Georgia and South Carolina
supporting us with firefighting helicopters fighting fires.
Those are the types of things we do every day to get ready for
disasters, and I think it is the way to multiply and maximize
our forces.
But I do think long term, the nation needs to look at the
role of the National Guard in the federal mission, and how do
you keep them equipped and trained for the long term. But I am
not concerned about the ability of the Florida National Guard
to support Governor Crist and the team this hurricane season.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Unfortunately, we have been
seeing numerous disasters have plagued our country. Tornadoes,
floods, and recently, wildfires have caused millions of dollars
in damage and tragically, have taken lives. Do you believe that
the standards outlined in EMAC need to be revised to ensure the
states are best prepared for these disasters?
Mr. Fugate. Well, I think in our process that we are using,
the thing that we lose sight of when we talk about disasters
are local is, we always look at the community's impact. And we
forget about the communities nearby that weren't impacted, and
the states that weren't impacted.
Our ability to leverage our responders in those communities
is our biggest force multiplier. They will bring more to the
table faster than any federal program or any state program. And
so, as we continue to enhance and develop our Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, we have asked for is the
National Emergency Management Association funding to support
that.
Again, our goal is, don't leave the resources of this
nation off the table just because they are not part of the
federal or state response. And to do that effectively, we have
to have a system across state lines, get into the areas and
serve citizens without the paperwork becoming so burdensome
that it stops a response.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you. I know I have got 10 more
seconds.
Quickly, any additional suggestions you may have, how the
federal government can help out the states?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. We have got to stop responding to
disasters as our only course of saving the taxpayers' dollars
and saving lives, and start mitigating them before they happen.
Most of these disasters are well known. The hazards are well
known.
And we have a backwards system of dealing with disasters.
We spend billions of dollars after a disaster fixing what would
have cost hundreds of millions to fix beforehand, at the loss
of life and misery that is unimaginable.
I think again, because of our priorities, we need to go
back and look at how do we get citizens to take greater
ownership of mitigating their homes, protecting their families,
so they are not a burden to you and me when disaster strikes,
but we have given them the tools to make their homes safer and
protect their family.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. I have a couple of suggestions.
Thank you very much, appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We have been joined by the gentleman from Colorado for 5
minutes. Mr. Perlmutter?
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And Mr. Fugate, I think the comments you made right at the
end is just so on the mark. We can always find--whether it is
in business or something else--you can always find time when
the car breaks down to take it to the shop and get it fixed,
most of the time you can.
And it takes much more time and it takes a lot more in
dollars if you just spend a few bucks early on to prevent it,
you have saved yourself the time and the money. And we always
kind of forget that. And the same thing applies on a much
grander scale when it comes to disasters.
But I want to go back to the National Guard piece, because
you heard my questions earlier, I assume, of Mr. Paulison. So,
I am looking at your testimony, and I apologize, I didn't hear
all of you testimony. But it says that you deployed 497
National Guard personnel to Mississippi during Katrina?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. Did you deploy any to Louisiana?
Mr. Fugate. No, sir we did not deploy battalion strength.
We provided technical advisor and aircraft to the request we
got from Louisiana.
Mr. Perlmutter. Did you retain National Guardsmen and women
in Florida at the same time you deployed to Mississippi?
Mr. Fugate. Oh, yes, sir. We probably had about 8,000
Guardsmen available. In fact, we were faced with a couple of
tropical storms and hurricanes during that deployment. It did
not result in us having to back off our support to the states
when we were facing other threats, not as severe, of course.
And then we were able to respond full speed to Hurricane Wilma
with many of the folks that had rotated back out of Mississippi
when they had been released.
Mr. Perlmutter. So you maintained some in Florida, just in
case something bad happened in Florida, but you were able to
send some to Mississippi to assist them?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. And also, understand that over 7,000
responders went from Florida to the National Guard. In many
cases, the majority of the resources that came from other
states under EMAC were National Guard.
In the state of Florida, that was actually local
governments. Over half those responders came from local
governments through mutual aid and EMAC. So again, we were able
to reach out to all our resources, including the National
Guard, and still be ready in Florida for other disasters.
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you know how many in total, in terms of
the National Guard, were deployed to either Mississippi or
Louisiana during Katrina?
Mr. Fugate. No, sir. I believe you can get that information
from General Blum, commander of the National Guard Bureau. It
was in the tens of thousands. I want to say in testimony--I
don't want to guess--but it was in the tens of thousands. He
can give you the best number. And they were coordinated under
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you know whether--and again, this may be
outside of your purview, but how many--you said in Florida
today, you have more Guardsmen available than you did in 2004-
2005?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you know how many in Florida have been
deployed today to Iraq?
Mr. Fugate. Actually, sir, the Florida National Guard, in
the war on terror, had been deployed. We had one full brigade.
The 53rd Infantry Brigade was deployed to Afghanistan. We have
units that have been deployed to Iraq as well as to Africa, and
also Bosnia.
So our Florida National Guard has pretty much been
everywhere in this world that our Department of Defense has
called upon them. I can ask General Burnett to provide that
information. But the Florida National Guard has been in a lot
of countries and a lot of wars since the September 11 attack.
Mr. Perlmutter. But today, do you know how many, actually
from Florida, are deployed outside of Florida to another
country? I assume that you don't have anybody deployed to any
other state today?
Mr. Fugate. No, sir. We actually have other states deployed
to us fighting fires today. One of our main?
Mr. Perlmutter. Why?
Mr. Fugate. The helicopters that fly the firefighting
mission, the Florida National Guard does not have--as organic
to their mission--sufficient platforms. So it is not an issue
of the war on terror or any other war. It is actually that we
don't have that many Blackhawks, so when we are fighting
wildfires, we routinely--and this is well before September 11--
reach out to our neighboring states for more rotary wing.
We had more air defense units, most of our infantry-type
units. We did not have a lot of aviation assets. So, we used
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which we have been
using since I have been in the division back in 1997, to access
those National Guards that have particular units that we did
not have. And that gives us the ability to reach out.
Mr. Perlmutter. All right, because I just want to
understand the system. So the system, what you have in place,
basically it is a national system?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. If you don't have the Blackhawks, they come
in from New York City, or someplace like that, who might have
them. Some National Guard will be deployed to Florida when
called upon, or from Colorado or wherever?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. Let me go back to my other question. My
other question was, from Florida today, how many units, if you
know, have been deployed outside of the United States?
Mr. Fugate. I would have to defer to General Burnett. I
know we just got back one of our combat engineering units--the
Red Horse came back. I think that our Special Forces just came
back. And so, the last count I got, was we actually had our
highest number of troops back since we actually engaged in the
airport security missions right after September 11.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. I do have one more question, if
I could, Mr. Chairman. When they return, are they bringing
their equipment, or are they leaving some or all of it in Iraq,
or wherever it was they were deployed outside the country?
Mr. Fugate. By and large, when they deploy their equipment,
they don't come back with their equipment. But we have been
successful in getting equipment moved back into Florida, and
releveling those units.
I think our primary concern isn't being able to respond to
disasters in Florida. I think it is the longer-term issue of
the federal mission, of the equipment and training that will be
a deficit for the National Guard, but from what we see in
Florida, is not an immediate threat to our ability to respond
to disasters, particularly this hurricane season.
But I think it is nationally a long-term concern that we
don't equip the National Guard for their federal mission,
particularly in the training, as we go in the out years without
this equipment.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
And I think we will do another round, since we only have
these members present.
Mr. Becker, you referenced some operating agreements that
you have in place, you said Catholic Charities, Southern
Baptist Convention, and Salvation Army. Now, those are three
agreements you have?
Mr. Becker. On a national level, we have about 130
agreements with national partners. Those are the partners that
we know are going to respond on a larger-scale disaster. A lot
of our other partnerships are with the types of partners that
Mr. Fugate was referring to. They are not necessarily disaster
organizations, but they have great resources that the country
needs in time of disaster.
Chairman Thompson. What I am trying to get at is, are you
talking about Tier 1 operating agreements with those three
organizations that I talked about? Are all operating agreements
the same?
Mr. Becker. We specify what each party can expect of the
other, and what we think they will bring in a disaster, and
what they can expect from us in terms of support. But I think
what is important here is, when it is a very small disaster,
when there is going to be six houses burnt tonight in the
Capital area, the Red Cross will be there at 2 in the morning
with our volunteers.
If the disaster is a little bit bigger than that, a small
flood or a tornado, the Salvation Army will most likely be
there, Southern Baptists would most likely be there. And we
work nationally and locally with them. It is a well-oiled
machine.
That part worked during Katrina. What didn't work during
Katrina was the local faith-based groups in particular, who
stepped forward and said, ``I have got a kitchen,'' or ``I will
be a shelter,'' and it was a pastor and a key and an empty
building.
And after 2 or 3 days, they fatigued. They didn't know
where to get supplies, they didn't know where to get help. And
the local emergency management didn't know they were there,
didn't know they needed law enforcement, didn't know they
needed infrastructure.
What we have done in our local chapters is ask the
community, in a common structure, to say who will be willing to
step forward. And we have sought out partners, partners in
hard-to-serve locations, maybe very rural areas, that speak
specific languages that we don't have a competence in. So those
are local partnerships--
Chairman Thompson. Not to cut you off, but let me tell you
personal experience, what happened to me. A number of those
individuals came to offer help, and was rejected, turned away.
They said that you were not qualified to serve as a volunteer
in time
Many of them were people in the faith community. And I am
of the opinion that that is not the time to turn help away.
Now, I am glad to hear that you indicate that that is not the
case any more. But you have not changed the national operating
agreement.
One other issue is that in many instances, like in New
Orleans and areas where there is a high percentage of minority
populations, you don't have an operating agreement that
provides reimbursement for expenditures, to my knowledge. Now,
I stand corrected. But you called three organizations.
One of the problems associated with Katrina is, you could
not get individuals to go into the impacted areas for quite
some time, fear of harm or what have you. So a number of people
suffered because of that.
Now, other than the three groups I identified based on your
testimony, you talked about NAACP and some other groups. But
that is down the line. Southern Baptist Convention, wonderful
group, but they are not the only religion in America. Catholic
Charities is another, but there are a number of other faith
groups that ought to have a similar operating agreement with
the Red Cross. Now, are you saying that they do have one?
Mr. Becker. Yes sir, Mr. Chairman. We have operating
agreements, particularly with churches, where we will train
them ahead of time, we will give them access to our supplies,
our cots and our blankets, and we will pay their expenses if
they are feeding or if they are sheltering or doing our core
work. That is new since Katrina.
Chairman Thompson. What I would like for you to do for the
committee, and I appreciate you, because that was one of the
difficulties--a number of churches offered shelter. They were
told, ``You are not a qualified shelter.''
I had an armory in my district that offered shelter. They
were told, ``You are not a qualified shelter,'' even though
they housed men and women who served us every day. So I would
hope that we have bridged the Red Cross bureaucracy, and moved
it into the service bureaucracy for the community, because that
was one of the major criticisms we heard all along. But I would
like for you to get me the new list of people you have
operating agreements with.
Mr. Becker. Mr. Chairman, just to address the one issue you
raised, we need to be clear about who designates a shelter, who
declares a building to be a shelter. The local emergency
manager would declare a public building to be a shelter.
The Red Cross just can't show up and take over a school and
say, ``We are here and we are going to run a shelter.'' We have
about 40,000 shelters in our Red Cross system. We don't own
those buildings.
Those are typically high school gyms, and the ones that are
churches now would be typically outside the emergency
management system. And that is where we can reimburse, that is
where we can enter into those types of agreements.
Chairman Thompson. Well, what I am of the opinion is that
my experience with the Red Cross and the state of Mississippi
in trying to get an armory that had a full kitchen, full
bathrooms, showers, cots, mattresses, air conditioning,
everything you would need, the Red Cross personnel said, ``This
is not an approved shelter for us.'' Do you understand?
Mr. Becker. Thank you. I would like to look into that, if I
can.
Chairman Thompson. Greenwood, Mississippi.
I yield to Ranking Member.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. And thanks for bringing that up, too, on the
shelters.
Mr. Fugate, following up on your comments regarding the
private sector as an equal partner in disaster preparedness and
response, will you please discuss how Florida encourages the
private sector to participate before, during, and after a
disaster?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. After the Hurricane Wilma response,
we realized that in many cases, we were handing out food,
water, and ice in front of an open store, oftentimes within
hours to a day after the storm had hit. Didn't make sense to
us, didn't make sense to them why we were competing.
So we had individual meetings with all of our major
retailers in the grocery and in the hardware chains, and sat
down. And the first question we began asking was, how they
could do more of our job?
We realized very quickly we asked the wrong question. The
question should have been, what can we do to get them open?
Because when you can get the private sector back open in a
disaster area, you put people back to work, you jump-start the
economy, and they are much more effective with their already
existing logistical chains to meet demand.
We then can focus on our more vulnerable citizens in those
areas the retailers don't serve, which if we go back to
Hurricane Wilma, we should not have been setting up in front of
an open grocery store. We should have been in Belle Glade and
Pahokee, where there were no stores, and where our most
vulnerable citizens were at.
Because quite honestly, the other thing we never talk about
in disasters is, who is the most vulnerable in this nation? And
it is generally the poor. Poverty is the most underestimated
impact in trying to deal with disasters, because without
resources ahead of time, they are not prepared.
They end up in these programs the most vulnerable. The
programs were never designed to fit them. And they are the ones
that much later, we find, that are still in need, and there are
still challenges.
So we said we should be focusing on those folks, our most
vulnerable citizens, and support, and asked a question of how
do we get our retailers back up faster, so they can serve the
rest of us?those of us that can afford to go get our food,
water, and ice after a disaster?so that government and
volunteer agencies can focus on our most vulnerable citizens.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Mr. Green. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
Mr. Perlmutter is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And Mr. Jenkins, I would like to ask you a couple questions
about the quotation that I read to Mr. Paulison, where it says:
``Thus it is difficult to assess the probable results of these
initiatives in improving response to major catastrophic
disasters, such as a category IV or V hurricane.''
Can you explain what you meant by that sentence, and how
you came to that conclusion that you are concerned there is not
a good plan in place, or I don't know what it is you are
saying. Let me just ask you what you meant by that sentence.
Mr. Jenkins. Well, it is not so much that there is not a
good plan in place. FEMA has taken certain actions. Let me just
give you an example.
They had a major problem in Hurricane Katrina registering
people for individual assistance. If you registered by
Internet, they could then check for duplicates and check your
address, and so forth. If you registered by telephone, they
couldn't, and a lot of people that registered by telephone who
were not eligible or made multiple applications.
They now say that they can register up to 200,000 people a
day with their system, and that they have the ability to check
addresses and make sure that those addresses are correct. And
the question that we have is it has never been tested for
200,000 people a day.
In other words, it has never been stressed to that point,
and it is not clear what would happen, and what kind of
contingency plan they have if that system goes down, for being
able to register people.
There is another issue, is a particular file they are using
to check addresses is a file that very often election officials
use, and it has one particular flaw. And that is that it tries
to identify residential addresses, but in that particular file,
if you live above your business, the address may be shown to be
a business address, not a residential address.
And therefore, you might not be able to register, because
it doesn't show that this was a residential address. So it is
those kind of issues that we are concerned about.
Mr. Perlmutter. In the next paragraph, you talk about the
National Guard, and you say, ``The National Guard needs to
respond to large-scale disasters that have not been fully
identified because the multiple federal and state agencies--
such events have not completed and integrated their plans.''
I mean, when you put together your report, what kind of
research did you do into the National Guard's part of any
disaster response?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, this particular paragraph is actually a
very high-level summary of a much more detailed report that we
issued on the National Guard and domestic preparedness in
January.
And that did look at the equipment that the Guard had, how
they were determining what equipment was needed for their
domestic missions, what kind of equipment they had, how DOD was
assessing their role in domestic missions.
As we point out in that report that DOD doesn't routinely
measure the readiness of the Guard for domestic missions. So
this is a high summary of a much more detailed report which I
can send you that was issued in January of this year.
Mr. Perlmutter. Yes, I would appreciate it if you would
send me a copy of that, please.
No further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I am the
acting chair, as you can see.
And Chairman Thompson made a salient point that I would
like to revisit just for a moment, if I may. He talked to you
about the relationship between the Red Cross and what I would
call other NGOs.
And I assure you, I was not in his district, so I have no
idea as to what was said, other than what I heard him say. But
I heard similar comments in my district, and I want to help
improve the image that has been somewhat tarnished because of
what happened in the aftermath of Katrina.
So my first question to you is this: What is the most
important thing that you have done since Katrina to help you
become proactive as opposed to reactive with reference to your
emergency response?
Mr. Becker. You are referring to the partnerships or to our
capacity to respond in general?
Mr. Green. Capacity to respond as well as partnerships.
Mr. Becker. I would say one of the most significant things
we have done is, rather than roll resources to a hurricane area
ahead of the storm--which we have done in the past, and
prepositioned items as the storm is coming.
We now have every state, from here to Texas along the
coast, with at least one prepositioned warehouse with what it
takes to shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time. To
have the supplies already in the affected area helps us,
because we had problems moving items into the affected areas
and through the affected areas post-Katrina.
I would say of all the action we took, and there were 40-
something projects that we undertook before last hurricane
season, that was probably the most significant, to have our
capacity there before the storm, to have it there year-round.
Mr. Green. And with reference to the NGOs other than
yourself, your entity?
Mr. Becker. I would say the most powerful thing that we
have done is to enable each of our chapters to work within
their communities on those right relationships, and give them
ability to bring resources and money to the table, to the
conversation.
When we go to a church and say ``Would you like to help
this community in time of disaster?'', the answer is typically,
``Well, call us when the big one hits and we will come if we
can.'' And we need to do better than that.
And what we are trying to do is to work with the faith
community in particular and say, ``Would you help the Red
Cross, would you be part of this community's disaster response?
And if you will, we will give you the training you need so that
you can run the Church X shelter when they have the shelter
manager and the shelter workers and your supplies.
``We will train you, we will give access to our supplies.
We will give you our cots.'' And then more importantly, what
they really wanted to know is, ``Will you pay my bills at the
end of all of this?''
Mr. Green. How is this message being conveyed to the
masses?
Mr. Becker. I am sorry?
Mr. Green. The masses. How is this message penetrating to
the entities that you desire to impact?
Mr. Becker. What we ask our chapters to do is to look
strategically at the community and see who the right partners
would be. Some of it is about geography. Where are we slower to
get to because it is very rural, or very far away from where
our volunteers are?
Some of it is demographic. It is language, it is parts of
town that were slower to respond to, or where do we not look
like the people we are saving. So it is asking our chapters to
reach out and form those right partnerships now and ahead of
time, as we have done on the national level.
And then I mentioned before, we have about 130 national
partnerships, and some of these are with organizations that
aren't disaster responders. We trained 1,000 members of the
NAACP, and resourced them. They responded in the Daytona area
to tornadoes. They responded to Alabama with us. They responded
to Georgia with us. They were doing mass care work, but they
were representing the NAACP, not the American Red Cross. We all
think that was a significant improvement.
Mr. Green. Thank you. Permit me to ask Mr. Jenkins a
question if I may, sir. Mr. Jenkins, sir, with reference to the
National Guard and your survey, do you have a comparison
between when we were at our peak of readiness at home, as
opposed to where we are now?
Mr. Jenkins. The survey that we did really wasn't designed
to do that. What we did is, we asked the various National Guard
bureaus what kind of equipment they had, and what they thought
their inventory was compared to what they needed, in other
words, if you have 40 percent, 50 percent, or whatever.
But the survey wasn't really framed in terms of peak
readiness versus current readiness. It was like, what equipment
do you have and what kind of shortages do you have?
Mr. Green. Thank you. My time has expired.
Does Mr. Perlmutter have any additional questions?
Mr. Perlmutter. No, sir.
Mr. Green. All right. Well, we would like to thank all of
the witnesses for your valuable testimony today, and the
members for their questions.
The members of the committee may have additional questions
for you, and we will ask that you respond expeditiously to
their questions in writing, of course.
And the hearing is going to be adjourned, given that there
is no further business. And I am instructed to strike the
gavel.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and
Recovery
----------
Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial
resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal
governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet
the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage
and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be
part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to
integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well
it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The principal
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPGs. The nation's experience with Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the
adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster--
particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness,
(2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue,
(5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering.
FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each
of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional
situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite
communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving
and tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies;
acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route
to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify
roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services.
This appendix provides additional details of FEMA's actions in each of
these areas.
FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities
One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is
their situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a
concept for rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams,
at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a
forward federal presence to facilitate managing the national response
for catastrophic incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three
national-level teams and ten regional-level teams, one in each of the
ten FEMA regions. These teams will support efforts to meet the emergent
needs during disasters such as the capability to provide initial
situational awareness for decision-makers and support the initial
establishment of a unified command. According to FEMA's plans, these
teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure that the multi-
disciplinary requirements of emergency management are met. The teams
are envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective federal
presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the state, to
coordinate federal activities, and to be self sufficient for a minimum
of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially scarce local
resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with
permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a
collateral duty basis. Team composition will include representatives
from other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners.
When not deployed, the teams will team-train with federal partners and
provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency
management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and
coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with state,
local, tribal, and other stakeholders.
According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed
and decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have
not yet been finalized. The new teams are envisioned to eventually
subsume the existing FIRST (Federal Incident Response Teams) and ERTs
(FEMA's Emergency Response Teams), and their mission and capabilities
will incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, emergency
management doctrine, and operational competence in communications. FEMA
plans to implement one National Incident Management Team and one
Regional Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007.
Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications
As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical
capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies?
communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be
operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and
emergency communication requirements. Once operable, they then should
have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies
(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service
agencies (e.g., public works, transportation, and hospitals) can
communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions in real time
as needed.
DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities
they have implemented to improve interoperable communications
nationally. DHS's Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC)
was established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and
compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and federal
emergency preparedness and response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which is
transitioning to the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)--in
response to the Post-Katrina Reform Act--is developing tools,
templates, and guidance documents, including field tested statewide
planning methodologies, online collaboration tools, coordinated grant
guidance, communications requirements, and a comprehensive online
library of lessons learned and best practices to improve
interoperability and compatibility across the nation. DHS officials
cited the development of the following examples in their efforts to
improve interoperable communications:
Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational
and functional requirements for emergency response
communications.
Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help
emergency response agencies map interoperable communications
system requirements and identify system gaps.
Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance
Assessment Program. This project is in conjunction with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to
support the efforts of the emergency response community and
industry;
Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning
Methodology to offer states a tangible approach as they
initiate statewide interoperability planning efforts. SAFECOM
also collaborated in DHS grant guidance to help states develop
statewide interoperability plans by the end of 2007.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to
design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive,
interoperable, and highly reliable emergency communications capability
using the latest commercial off-the-shelf voice, video, and data
technology. FEMA's Response Division is the designated lead for
tactical communications, along with situational awareness information
technology enablers that are provided by FEMA's Chief Information
Officer. Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments provide
robust, deployable, command, control, and incident communications
capabilities to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic Incidents of
National Significance. The MERS mission supports Emergency Support
Function partners at the federal, state, and local levels of
government. The plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and
leverage commercial technology to provide real-time connectivity
between communications platforms in a manner consistent with emergency
communication deployment doctrine being developed by DHS and FEMA.
According to FEMA officials, emergency managers at the federal, state,
and local levels of government will benefit from an integrated
interoperable emergency communications architecture that includes the
Department of Defense, United States Northern Command and the National
Guard Bureau.
Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been
awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to
make improvements on a variety of interoperability projects.\1\ However
this work noted that the SAFECOM program has made limited progress in
improving communications interoperability at all levels of government.
For example, the program has not addressed interoperability with
federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable communications
required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.\2\ The SAFECOM program has focused on helping states and
localities improve interoperable communications by developing tools and
guidance for their use. However, based on our review of four states and
selected localities, SAFECOM's progress in achieving its goals of
helping these states and localities improve interoperable
communications has been limited. Officials from the states and
localities we reviewed often found that the tools and planning
assistance provided by the program were not helpful, or they were
unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The program's
limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program management
practices, including the lack of a plan for improving interoperability
across all levels of government and inadequate performance measures
that would provide feedback to better attune tools and assistance with
public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key management
practices, its progress is likely to remain limited.
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\1\ GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve
Communications Interoperability. GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2,
2007).
\2\ See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 194(a).
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Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25
standards--a suite of national standards that are intended to enable
interoperability among the communications products of different
vendors. For example, although one of the eight major subsets of
standards was defined in the project's first 4 years (from 1989 to
1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed
that could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25
system. The private-sector coordinating body responsible for Project 25
has defined specifications for three additional subsets of standards.
However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to
incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no
compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors' products are
interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and
local agencies to use grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios,
which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios. As a
result, states and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive
radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may provide them
with minimal additional benefits. Thus, until DHS takes a more
strategic approach here, progress by states and localities in improving
interoperability is likely to be impeded.
FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the
logistics area came under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became
overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much of the
logistics mission.\3\ In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required
FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. FEMA's
improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to
initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site
mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish
sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are
needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA
officials.
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\3\ GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to
Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-
06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
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According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning
capabilities that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to
support a variety of communications requirements--satellite, land
mobile radio, computer and telephone systems?with the ability to
operate from one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the
response area of operations. FEMA has also developed a Pre-Positioned
Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving
and life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a
potential disaster site as possible, in order to substantially reduce
the initial response time to incidents.\4\ Further, FEMA is developing
a Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP) that also consists of
standardized containers of equipment to provide state and local
governments responding to a range of major disasters such equipment as
personal protective supplies, decontamination, detection, technical
search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable
communications and other emergency response equipment. According to
FEMA officials, currently FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP
locations, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is
currently conducting an analysis to determine where the additional PEP
sites should be located. FEMA has also stated that it has enhanced its
relationships with the public sector with its disaster logistics
partners and has worked to utilize the public sector's expertise
through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, the
Department of Transportation and Marine Corps Systems Command.
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\4\ States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of
Agreement with FEMA for the use of the containers.
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According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating
an effective logistics system is based upon FEMA's ability to work
collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and
private partners. FEMA's logistics efforts have identified private
sector expertise to improve and develop software systems to increase
logistics program efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the
Logistics Information Management System (LIMS) is FEMA's formal
accountability database system for all property managed within FEMA
nation-wide or at disaster field locations. At the same time, FEMA is
also developing a multi-phased Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program
with the assistance of the private sector to leverage the collective
resources of the private and public sector to improve emergency
response logistics in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and
distribution. The current phase of the program, which is operational at
two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas),
encompasses two software management packages designed to provide FEMA
the ability to inventory disaster response commodities upon arrival at
a warehouse, place the commodities in storage, and track the
commodities while stored in the warehouse. FEMA plans to expand the
capabilities of this first phase of the system to all FEMA Regions
during 2007. This will provide FEMA with sufficient logistics
management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase two can be
implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently conducting market
research to solicit input from the private sector and other sources to
facilitate final design of the program's second phase. According to
FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase are
scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and fully-operational in June
2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more
comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and
incorporate FEMA's financial resource tracking requirements. It will
also be able to support other federal departments and agencies, non-
government organizations, and state, local and tribal organizations
under the guidelines of the NRP.
While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities,
it is too early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA
logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas
necessary for an effective logistics system. Below, we describe these
five areas along with FEMA's ongoing actions to address each.
Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place
to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed
information on states? capabilities and resources. As a result,
FEMA does not have information from these sources to define
what and how much it needs to stock. However, FEMA is
developing a concept of operations to underpin its logistics
program and told us that it is working to develop detailed
plans and the associated stockage requirements. However, until
FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency
will be unable to assess its true preparedness.
Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location,
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track
supplies in-transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under
way to improve transportation and tracking of supplies and
equipment, such as expanding its new system for in-transit
visibility from the two test regions to all FEMA
regions.Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and
dozens of smaller storage facilities across the country.
However, it has little assurance that these are the right
number of facilities located in the right places. FEMA
officials told us they are in the process of determining the
number of storage facilities it needs and where they should be
located.
Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system,
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors,
and lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described
initiatives under way that should mitigate some of the problems
with contractors, and has been working with Department of
Defense and Department of Transportation to improve the access
to transportation when needed.
People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including
the logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent
staff, supplemented with contract and temporary disaster
assistance staff. However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses
of staff, and its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and
contractors, have created staffing shortfalls and a lack of
capability. According to a January 2007 study commissioned by
FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in staffing and skill
sets of full-time employees, particularly in the planning,
advanced contracting, and relationship management skills needed
to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort
to hire qualified staff for the entire agency, including
logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics
program to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and
other initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics
capabilities, it will be years before they are fully implemented and
operational.
Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human
Services
In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for
Operations said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is
FEMA's most pressing priority for planning for recovery from a
catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed
mass evacuee support planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross
are developing methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing
family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based
data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to
clarify the responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations,
especially for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found
that state and local governments are generally not well prepared to
evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations (i.e. planning,
training, and conducting exercises), but some states and localities
have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, in June
2006, DHS reported that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12
percent of the urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately
addressed evacuating these populations. Steps being taken by some such
governments include collaboration with social service and
transportation providers and transportation planning organizations--
some of which are Department of Transportation (DOT) grantees and
stakeholders--to determine transportation needs and develop agreements
for emergency use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government
provides evacuation assistance to state and local governments, but gaps
in this assistance have hindered many of these governments' ability to
sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any
specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the
evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps
in the usefulness of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should
clarify federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing
evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed.
DHS should require state and local evacuation preparedness for
transportation-disadvantaged populations and improve information to
assist these governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to
share information to assist in evacuation preparedness for these
populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our recommendations, and
DHS stated it has partly implemented some of them.
In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, FEMA's Deputy
Administrator stated that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass
evacuation support planning to help State and local government plan and
prepare for hosting large displaced populations. The project is to
include the development of an evacuee registration and tracking
capability and implementation plans for federal evacuation support to
states.
Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA
has revised the organizational structure of ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing,
and Human Services, and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible
for this emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a
supporting agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. FEMA
continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red
Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities for mass care.
The MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December
2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other
support agencies to revise ESF-6 standard operating procedures.
According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will
not take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes
are approved. According to FEMA's Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the
Red Cross have developed the first phase of a web-based data system to
support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification
activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide
shelter service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive
understanding of the shelter populations and available shelter
capacity.
Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to
identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal
government and outside the federal government, including temporary
housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the
National Response Plan's annex covering temporary shelter and housing
in ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two
primary responsible agencies--FEMA and the Red Cross.\5\ However, the
responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans
Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities.
Further, these support agencies had not, at the time of our work,
developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities,
notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific
authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. Our February
2007 report recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to
the NRP that fully reflect each respective support agency's
capabilities for providing temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the
needed fact sheets, and develop operational plans that provide details
on how their respective agencies will meet their temporary housing
responsibilities. The Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the
Veterans Administration, and Agriculture, concurred with our
recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment on our report or
recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is currently
exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by private
sector organizations. FEMA says it has also developed a housing portal
to consolidate available rental resources for evacuees from Federal
agencies, private organizations, and individuals.
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\5\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2007).
Appendix II: Related GAO Products
----------
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations,
and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO-07-
411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007
Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to
Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution
of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO-07-485R.
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has
Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO-07-
356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO-07-
205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and
Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007
Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal
Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.:
February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, D.C.:
February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T.
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness
of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO-07-219.
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February
7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007
GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2007
Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R.
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance
Education's Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and
Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.:
September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712.
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2005.
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05-
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.