[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FIXING THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION
NETWORK: FINDING THE WAY FORWARD FOR BETTER INFORMATION SHARING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 10, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-34
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
JANE HARMAN, California, Chair
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Director and Counsel
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 30
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 26
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 29
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 3
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Donald F. Kennedy, Executive Director, New England State
Police Information Network, Regional Information-Sharing
System:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Wayne Parent, Deputy Director, Office of Operations
Coordination, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Captain William Harris, Delaware State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
Mr. Barry S. Lindquist, Inspector, Office of Statewide
Intelligence, Florida Department of Law Enforcementq:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
First Sergeant Lee Miller, Virginia State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Captain Brian Tomblin, Military Liaison, Office of Homeland
Security, Tennessee Army National Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
FIXING THE HOMELAND SECURITY
INFORMATION NETWORK: FINDING
THE WAY FORWARD FOR BETTER INFORMATION SHARING
----------
Thursday, May 10, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Langevin, Carney,
Perlmutter, and Shays.
Ms. Harman. [Presiding.] The hearing will come to order.
My apologies to my colleague, Mr. Shays, and our witnesses,
but of course the Democratic Caucus was called at precisely the
same time. As yet, I have not mastered the ability to be in two
places at the same time; maybe soon.
The Homeland Security Information Network, or HSIN for
short, was supposed to be the department's main pipeline for
sharing unclassified information with state, local and tribal
partners. More than 3 years later, we are far from the robust
system that was promised. What we have instead is kind of a
mess. What we need is an effective fix. Sadly, I am not very
hopeful.
I have in my hand a one-page memo dated April 17, 2007,
from Admiral Roger Rufe, the director of the department's
Office of Operations Coordination, to the undersecretary of
management, Paul Schneider. I am frankly perplexed by what
Admiral Rufe had to say about the HSIN just several weeks ago.
Although he concedes that the system has ``grown without
sufficient planning and program management'' for years, the
admiral defends it, saying that ``the HSIN, for better or
worse``--sounds like a marriage--``is tied to DHS missions and
operations.''
Is the HSIN-DHS relationship, as I just said, some kind of
bad marriage that we are all just supposed to accept?
Perhaps sensing that the long knives are out, the admiral
goes on to say that he ``fully embraces the concept of making
decisive strategic changes to the program,'' but he urges Mr.
Schneider ``to fully consider the unintended consequences of
programmatic decisions, particularly as they impact DHS
operations and missions.''
I am afraid that the admiral's plea for patience and fear
of unintended consequences could be undermined by the rest of
his comments. He notes that the HSIN working group last fall
found that ``DHS has not clearly defined the purpose and scope
of HSIN nor designated roles and responsibilities for strategy
development and implementation through a formal policy
mechanism.''
The admiral agrees, adding that ``we continue to struggle
with the lack of aligned DHS policy and established business
rules.'' If only it were that simple. From what GAO is telling
us and what the DHS IG told us last year, HSIN's troubles go
far deeper, to day one of the program.
We are joined this morning by a person who saw all this
coming almost 5 years ago--or we will be joined; he is not here
yet--our colleague Congressman Jim Langevin of Rhode Island.
Jim started asking Tom Ridge back in 2002 about why the
department didn't first talk to state and local officials to
find out what information-sharing systems were already working.
Today, we are asking Jim's question again. Why did the
department choose not to partner with those working
information-sharing systems and avoid the mess it finds itself
in now? I have a strong suspicion that turf had something to do
with the department's decision to go its own way, even if it
meant duplicating tried and true information-sharing systems in
the process.
Ignoring the experience, expertise and requirements of
state and locals is unfortunately a common thing these days.
With all due respect to the well-meaning men and women who work
at DHS, many do not know what state and local needs are. We
find time and again everywhere we look that there is an absence
of consultation at the front end, and then we end up with a
mess at the back end. I suppose we shouldn't be surprised,
then, that they didn't talk to the state and locals who were
building an information network that would have worked.
The needs of end-users should have been the starting point,
as they should be the starting point with intelligence products
and a lot of other things that DHS is doing. Because DHS got it
backwards, the HSIN problems were cooked in from the beginning.
What do we have to show for it? A flawed information system
with core problems that have continued to fester. I note that
the HSIN has the dubious distinction of being on both the OMB
watch list for poorly planned IT projects and the OMB high-risk
list for poorly performing IT projects. In fact, the HSIN is
one of 20 out of 900 IT systems across the federal government
that makes both lists. For the mathematicians out there, that
means that HSIN is among the top two percent worst IT systems.
Almost 6 years after the largest terrorist attack in our
country, this is totally unacceptable.
So what do we do? First, we need an information-sharing
system that gets buy-in from state and locals, that includes
accurate, reliable and timely information, and helps them
protect their communities. Second, we need an information-
sharing system that complements existing systems that will work
for decades, in some cases for more than 30 years. Third, we
need an information-sharing system that not only helps
safeguard the American people, but also operates within the
bounds of the U.S. Constitution.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how to get there, what benchmarks we should be establishing so
we can conduct rigorous oversight of the HSIN that is so
plainly needed. Let me just conclude by saying this: It is no
pleasure to sit up here and say these things. It makes me quite
uncomfortable. I don't play ``gotcha'' and I don't want you to
feel that that is what we are trying to do up here.
What we are trying to do up here is get it right. I think
we have wasted a lot of time and resources and human talent in
duplication because we don't effectively coordinate. So this
subcommittee has said for a long time that we are going to
start at the other end. We are going to talk to the users of
information, find out what they need, find out if they have
tools that work, and then on a vertical basis coming back from
the end-point to Washington, we are going to make sure that
Washington is providing those things and adopting processes
that will keep our communities safe.
Only if we have really robust information sharing; only if
we have a full understanding at the local level of what to look
for and what to do, are we going to find the people in Cherry
Hill, New Jersey, or pick a place of interest. I know you all
want to do that, and I know you all want to get it right. So I
am just telling you that is our intention.
The ranking member is not here, so I would like to ask Mr.
Shays if he has some opening remarks.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I first want to
say that this committee is very fortunate to have you chair the
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment, with your background on the Intelligence Committee.
It is just really wonderful to have you chair this committee
and to have this hearing.
I have a statement that I am going to read--it is Mr.
Reichert's--and then I am going to be leaving. I do apologize
for that, because I think this is a very important hearing.
Good morning. We meet today to examine the Homeland
Security Information Network, or HSIN, the DHS information
system network.
By virtually all accounts, HSIN was poorly planned and
implemented by the department. There have been several reports
by the DHS inspector general and the General Accountability
Office to catalogue the failings of the HSIN program. A recent
example includes the June 2006 inspector general report
indicating that HSIN is not effectively supporting state and
local information sharing.
Today, GAO is releasing a report with similar conclusions.
We have also heard, though, that the situation with HSIN is
improving. While this is good news, we must focus intently on
how to move forward more quickly and make the federal
information-sharing environment, including HSIN, a success. The
story of HSIN is a story of the federal government trying to
impose a one-size-fits-all approach on states and locals. It is
no wonder that in many states and localities, it is not
working.
In any homeland security endeavor, but especially in the
realm of information sharing, DHS has need to get state and
local buy-in and cooperation. A federal-first, top-down
approach simply does not work in an environment where state and
local law enforcement are America's first preventers.
It is also important to realize that DHS will never be able
to please every state and locality across America. While there
will never be 100 percent satisfaction, DHS needs to get the
message loud and clear that Congress expects substantial
progress in the relations with states and localities.
On our first panel, we especially want to hear from Mr.
Parent on how DHS can improve its cooperation with state and
local stakeholders. On the second panel, we expect to hear that
in some states, the HSIN system duplicates ongoing efforts. In
other states, it simply gathers dust.
We will also hear that HSIN is being used by some as an
essential tool for information sharing. It is critical that DHS
gets information sharing right and does so in a cooperative
manner. It is a fundamental element of our homeland security
and vital to protecting our nation.
That is the statement of our ranking member. I would also
like to say that evidently he is not feeling very well, so that
is part of the reason why he is not here today. So I thank you
all.
Ms. Harman. I thank you, Mr. Shays. All compliments are
welcome. Please stay here and offer more.
[Laughter.]
And to the ranking member, please send him our best wishes.
I hope he will be feeling better.
I am told that we will be joined by other members.
Unfortunately, this morning was a very hectic one for everyone,
and they are on their way over. I especially hope that Mr.
Langevin will be able to be here soon.
Let me welcome the first panel of witnesses.
A ha, right on time. Here is Mr. Perlmutter.
Let me welcome the first panel of witnesses, just in time
for votes.
Our first witness, David Powner, is the director of
information technology management issues for the GAO. Mr.
Powner is responsible for a large segment of GAO's IT work,
including systems development, IT investment management, health
IT, and cyber-critical infrastructure protection and reviews.
That is a mouthful.
Mr. Powner has led teams reviewing major IT modernization
efforts at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National
Weather Service, the FAA, and the IRS. These reviews covered
many IT areas, including software development and maturity,
information security, and enterprise security.
His team's fine work on the HSIN is one of the reasons we
are holding this hearing today. I would mention that we met
with Mr. Powner just a couple of days ago and reviewed some
aspects of this report. It is a very important report, and we
thank you for it.
Our second witness, Donald Kennedy, is the executive
director of the New England State Police Information Network,
or NESPIN. NESPIN is one of the six regional information-
sharing system risk centers that are funded through DOJ's
Office of Justice programs in the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
Mr. Kennedy is currently the vice chairman of the RISS National
Directors Association.
Prior to being named executive director in 2006--wonderful;
here he is just in time, a hero's welcome--he served as
NESPIN's deputy director of field services. Mr. Kennedy is a
retired captain from the Rhode Island State Police where he
served for 24 years and has served in all bureaus and divisions
within the state police.
We are very pleased you are here.
I want to welcome Mr. Langevin, because he is truly the
godfather of this hearing and the issues that we are raising
today.
Our third witness--and we put you in this order, Mr.
Parent; I just want to explain that--is Wayne Parent, the
deputy director of DHS's Office of Operations Coordination. Mr.
Parent previously served as the director of current operations
for the Border and Transportation Security Directorate within
the department.
On the BTS operations staff, Mr. Parent was responsible for
current operational issues including coordinating the execution
of both interdepartmental and interagency operations plans. He
supervised the BTS Watch Sector in the Homeland Security
Operations Center and managed planning and exercise
participation for BTS. He was also responsible for coordination
of intelligence-sharing between DHS's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the agencies within
the BTS Directorate.
The vote lights seem to have gone off, so I would like
someone to tell me where we are with anticipated votes. If they
are not happening immediately, I would like to go directly into
testimony, and then hopefully we can get through your testimony
and some member questions before we have to adjourn briefly for
votes.
I thank you, and I will recognize our first witness.
STATEMENT OF DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Madam Chair, members of the subcommittee, we
appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Homeland Security
Information Network.
HSIN is a communications application that is to serve as
DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool for
transmitting sensitive, but unclassified, information. HSIN's
problems to date have been well publicized. DHS's IG reported
last year that it does not effectively support state and local
information sharing.
In addition, it is on the Office of Management and Budget's
radar screen, having made both OMB's management watch list and
high-risk list, meaning that according to the administration,
HSIN is a poorly planned and poorly performing project.
This morning, as requested, I will summarize the results of
a report that we recently completed at the request of Chairman
Thompson that identified nearly a dozen homeland security
networks within DHS that now cost over $300 million annually to
develop, operate and maintain.
Specifically, I will address the lack of coordination
between HSIN and the regional information sharing program, a
key nationwide information-sharing initiative operated and
maintained by state and local officials. I will also address
key efforts needed to improve coordination and to avoid this
problem from reoccurring.
First, DHS did not effectively coordinate HSIN and the RISS
program. RISS officials met with DHS in late 2003 and early
2004 to demonstrate that their application could be used by DHS
to share homeland security information. Communications stopped
shortly after these meetings with no explanation. When we
questioned why this communication stopped, we were told that
DHS officials involved in these initial meetings are no longer
with the department.
Instead of leveraging the existing RISS application, DHS
developed its own. The reasons for this lack of coordination
are several, and include DHS rushing into HSIN without
understanding key state and local initiatives. Until DHS
coordinates key information-sharing initiatives better, it
faces the risk of ineffective information sharing associated
with terrorist threats, vulnerabilities and warnings.
In addition, DHS is developing and deploying HSIN
capabilities that duplicate those associated with the RISS
program. Both programs target similar users. For example, both
are used and marketed for use at state fusion centers. In
addition, both offer similar community-based portals such as
those associated with emergency management in our nation's
critical infrastructure sectors.
DHS acknowledges the lack of coordination and several
improvements efforts are under way. These include developing an
integration strategy so that HSIN can work with other
applications and networks; improving the content that HSIN
provides; and forming multiple committees that are to define
operational priorities for DHS users and advise DHS on how HSIN
can better meet user needs.
These are positive steps that should help, but these
efforts have either just begun or are in the early planning
stages. For example, the membership of the committees mentioned
are still being established. Further, implementation milestones
for these improvements efforts have yet to be defined. In
addition to these planned improvements, we recommended that
that the department conduct an inventory of state and local
information-sharing initiatives like RISS and assess
opportunities for the HSIN program to improve information
sharing and avoid duplication.
Addressing the HSIN coordination issues with state and
local initiatives should be the immediate focus, but on a
broader scale, DHS has many networks and associated systems
that need to be coordinated to effectively share critical
information and to avoid duplicative efforts. We made
recommendations to address this larger coordination challenge
and to ensure that these efforts are consistent with the
information-sharing environment called for in the 2004 Intel
Reform Act.
In summary, HSIN has many hurdles to overcome. It has been
poorly managed and poorly coordinated. Although some overlap in
our nation's initiatives is prudent to adequately protect the
homeland, duplication is not and is a waste of taxpayers'
dollars.
Moving forward, it is essential that DHS clearly define
HSIN requirements with input from users; improve its content;
strengthen its program management; and implement an integration
strategy so that it can work with other applications.
Otherwise, it will not be the key information-sharing network
it is intended to be.
Madam Chair, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased
to answer questions.
[The statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss challenges
facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in coordinating
efforts on its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) with state
and local governments and other parties involved in the mission of
keeping our nation secure. As you know, DHS is responsible for
coordinating the federal government's homeland security communications
with all levels of government--including state and local. In support of
this mission, the department developed HSIN as part of its goal to
establish an infrastructure for sharing homeland security
information.\1\ Besides HSIN, an Internet-based application, DHS also
operates at least 11 other networks in support of its homeland security
mission. The department reported that in fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
these investments cost $611.8 million to develop, operate, and
maintain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed DHS to establish
communications to share homeland security information with federal
agencies, state and local governments, and other specified groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As agreed, in my remarks today I will discuss the department's
efforts to coordinate its development and use of HSIN with key state
and local information-sharing initiatives. These remarks are based on
our recent report on homeland security networks and applications.\2\
That report focused on two key initiatives under the Regional
Information Sharing Systems program. This nationwide program, operated
and managed by state and local officials, provides services (including
information sharing) to support law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies. Its information-sharing efforts also include emergency
responders and public safety officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to
Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated wth Key State
and Local Information Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In performing the work for the report, we analyzed descriptive data
(e.g., type of network, estimated costs) on major networks and
Internet-based systems identified by DHS as supporting its homeland
security mission, including information sharing. We also reviewed
documentation on HSIN and state and local initiatives; compared it
against the requirements of the Homeland Security Act, federal
guidance, and related best practices; and interviewed DHS officials and
state and local officials. This work was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
In developing HSIN, DHS did not effectively coordinate with key
state and local initiatives that are part of the Regional Information
Sharing Systems program. Specifically, the department did not fully
develop joint strategies and coordinated policies, procedures, and
other means to operate across agency boundaries and meet mutual needs,
which are key practices for effective coordination and collaboration
and are a means to enhance information sharing and avoid duplication of
effort. For example, DHS did not engage the program in ongoing dialogue
to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs or
work through technical issues and differences in what each organization
considers to be terrorism information.
A major factor contributing to the limited coordination was that
after September 11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule for
deploying HSIN. In its haste, it did not develop a comprehensive
inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives.
Consequently, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing
is not occurring. It also faces the risk that the HSIN system may be
duplicating state and local capabilities. Specifically, both HSIN and
one of the key initiatives target similar user groups, such as
emergency management agencies, and all have similar features, such as
Web portals,\3\ electronic bulletin boards, ``chat'' tools, and
document libraries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources
or services, such as search engines, news articles, forums, and other
tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The department has efforts planned and under way to improve
coordination and collaboration. For example, it is forming an HSIN
Mission Coordinating Committee and an HSIN Advisory Committee to help
ensure that HSIN meets the information-sharing needs of DHS and other
users. However, these activities have either just begun or are being
planned, with implementation milestones yet to be defined. In addition
to the planned improvements, DHS has agreed to implement our
recommendations to take steps to ensure that HSIN is effectively
coordinated with key state and local government information-sharing
initiatives, which include identifying and inventorying such
initiatives. We also recommended that DHS determine whether there are
coordination and duplication issues with its other homeland security
networks and associated systems and applications. Until DHS completes
these activities, including developing an inventory of key state and
local initiatives, and fully implementing and institutionalizing key
practices and guidance for effective coordination and collaboration, it
will continue to be at risk of not effectively sharing information with
other key state and local information initiatives and duplicating state
and local capabilities.
Background
DHS is the lead department involved in securing our nation's
homeland. Its mission includes, among other things, leading the unified
national effort to secure the United States, preventing and deterring
terrorist attacks, and protecting against and responding to threats and
hazards to the nation. As part of its mission and as required by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002,\4\ the department is also responsible
for coordinating efforts across all levels of government and throughout
the nation, including with federal, state, tribal, local, and private
sector homeland security resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we have previously reported, DHS relies extensively on
information technology (IT), such as networks and associated system
applications, to carry out its mission.\5\ Specifically, in our recent
report, we reported that the department identified 11 major networks it
uses to support its homeland security functions, including sharing
information with state and local governments.\6\ Examples of such DHS
networks include the Homeland Secure Data Network, the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Network, and the Customs and Border Protection
Network. In addition, the department has deployed HSIN, a homeland
security information-sharing application that operates on the public
Internet. As shown in table 1, of the 11 networks, 1 is categorized as
Top Secret, 1 is Secret, 8 are Sensitive but Unclassified, and 1 is
unclassified. HSIN is considered Sensitive but Unclassified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Major Federal
Networks That Support Homeland Security Functions, GAO-04-375
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004) and Information Technology: DHS
Needs to Fully Deine and Implement Polices and Procedures for
Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07-424 (Washington, D.C.: April
27, 2007).
\6\ GAO-07-455.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1: DHS Information-Sharing Networks and HSIN Application
Reported cost per fiscal year
Users outside (dollars in millions)
Name Categories DHS
2005 2006 TotalC Local Area Network Top Secret -- (a) (a) --
(C-LAN)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Secure Data Secret Other federal, $46.2 $32.6 $78.8
Network (HSDN) state, local
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard Data Network Plus Sensitive but Other federal 15.0 15.0 30.0
(CGDN+). Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Infrastructure Warning Sensitive but Other federal, 12.1 12.0 24.1
Information Network (CWIN). Unclassified state
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Sensitive but -- 58.7 63.0 121.7
Network. Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Core Network (DCN) Sensitive but -- 13.4 10.3 23.7
Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security Information Sensitive but Other federal, 11.9 20.5 32.4
Network (HSIN). Unclassified state, local
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Sensitive but Other federal, 14.4 19.2 33.6
Network (ICENet). Unclassified state, local
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONENet Sensitive but -- 34.6 40.0 74.6
Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secret Service Wide Area Network Sensitive but -- 2.8 3.1 5.9
(WAN). Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Security Sensitive but Other federal 70.0 105.0 175.0
Administration Network (TSANet). Unclassified
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Emergency Management Agency Unclassified -- 6.0 6.0 12.0
(FEMA) Switched Network.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totala $285.1 $326.7 $611.8
Source: GAO analysis of
agency data.
a Costs for C-LAN are not included, as the
information is not publicly available.
As the table shows, some of these networks are used solely within
DHS, while others are also used by other federal agencies, as well as
state and local governments. In addition, the total cost to develop,
operate, and maintain these networks and HSIN in fiscal years 2005 and
2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. Of this total, the
networks accounted for the vast majority of the cost: $579.4 million.
DHS Established HSIN to Provide Information-Sharing Capabilities
DHS considers HSIN to be its primary communication application for
transmitting sensitive but unclassified information. According to DHS,
this network is an encrypted, unclassified, Web-based communications
application that serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing
and collaboration tool. It is intended to offer both real-time chat and
instant messaging capability, as well as a document library that
contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local sources.
Available through the application are suspicious incident and pre-
incident information and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and
weapons. The application is managed within DHS's Office of Operations
Coordination.
HSIN includes over 35 communities of interest, such as emergency
management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and
private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages
that are tailored for the community and contain general and community-
specific news articles, links, and contact information. The community
Web pages also provide access to other resources, such as the
following:
Document library. Users can search the entire document
library within the communities they have access to.
Discussion threads. HSIN has a discussion thread (or
bulletin board) feature that allows users to post information
that other users should know about and post requests for
information that other users might have. Community
administrators can also post and track tasks assigned to users
during an incident.
Chat tool. HSIN's chat tool, known as Jabber, is
similar to other instant message and chat tools--with the
addition of security. Users can customize lists of their
coworkers and send messages individually or set up chat rooms
for more users. Other features include chat logs (which allow
users to review conversations), timestamps, and user profiles.
States and Local Governments Have Also Established Similar Initiatives
State and local governments have similar IT initiatives to carry
out their homeland security missions, including sharing information. A
key state and local-based initiative is the Regional Information
Sharing Systems (RISS) program.
The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among
other things, share information in support of their homeland security
missions. This nationwide program, operated and managed by state and
local officials, was established in 1974 to address crime that operates
across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of six regional
information analysis centers that serve as regional hubs across the
country. These centers offer services to RISS members in their regions,
including information sharing and research, analytical products, case
investigation support, funding, equipment loans, and training. Funding
for the RISS program is administered through a grant from the
Department of Justice.
As part of its information-sharing efforts, the RISS program
operates two key initiatives (among others): the RISS Secure Intranet
(RISSNET) and the Automated Trusted Information Exchange \7\ (RISS
ATIX):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Formerly called the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange.
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Created in 1996, RISSNET is intended as a secure
network serving member law enforcement agencies throughout the
United States and other countries. Through this network, RISS
offers services such as secure e-mail, document libraries,
intelligence databases, Web pages, bulletin boards, and a chat
tool.
RISS ATIX offers services similar to those offered by
RISSNET to agencies beyond the law enforcement community,
including executives and officials from governmental and
nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have public
safety responsibilities. RISS ATIX is partitioned into 39
communities of interest, such as critical infrastructure,
emergency management, public health, and government officials.
Members of each community of interest contribute information to
be made available within each community.
According to RISS officials, the RISS ATIX application
was developed in response to the events of September
11, 2001; it was initiated in 2002 as an application to
provide tools for information sharing and collaboration
among public safety stakeholders, such as first
responders and schools. As of July 2006, RISS ATIX
supported 1,922 users beyond the traditional users of
RISSNET.
RISS ATIX uses the technology of RISSNET to offer
services through its Web pages. The pages are tailored
for each community of interest and contain community-
specific news articles, links, and contact information.
The pages also provide access to the following
features:
Document library. Participants can store and search
relevant documents within their community of interest.
Bulletin board. The RISS ATIX bulletin board allows
users to post timely threat information in discussion forums
and to view and respond to posted information. Users can post
documents, images, and information related to terrorism and
homeland security, as well as receive DHS information,
advisories, and warnings. According to RISS officials, the
bulletin boards are monitored by a RISS moderator to relay any
information that might be useful for other communities of
interest.
Chat tool. ATIXLive is an online, real-time,
collaborative communications information-sharing tool for the
exchange of information by community members. Through this
tool, users can post timely threat information and view and
respond to messages posted.
Secure e-mail. RISS ATIX participants have access to
e-mail that can be used to provide alerts and related
information. According to RISS, this is done in a secure
environment.
GAO Has Designated Information Sharing as High Risk
The need to improve information sharing as part of a national
effort to improve homeland security and preparedness has been widely
recognized, not only to improve our ability to anticipate and respond
to threats and emergencies, but to avoid unnecessary expenditure of
scarce resources. In January 2005,\8\ and more recently in January
2007,\9\ we identified establishing appropriate and effective
information-sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as a high-
risk area. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has also issued
guidance that stresses the importance of information sharing and
avoiding duplication of effort.\10\ Nonetheless, although this area has
received increased attention, the federal government faces formidable
challenges in sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate
and timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
\9\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
\10\ For example, Office of Management and Budget, Management of
Federal Information Resources, Circular A-130 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
30, 2000) and Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,
Circular A-11 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we concluded in October 2005, agencies can help address these
challenges by adopting and implementing key practices, related to OMB's
guidance, to improve collaboration, such as establishing joint
strategies and addressing needs by leveraging resources and developing
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across
agency boundaries.\11\ Based on our research and experience, these
practices are also relevant for collaboration between federal agencies
and other levels of government (e.g., state, local). Until these
coordination and collaboration practices are implemented, agencies face
the risk that effective information sharing will not occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, D.C.: October 2005).
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Congress and the Administration have made several efforts to
address the challenges associated with information sharing. In
particular, as we reported in March 2006, the President initiated an
effort to establish an Information Sharing Environment that is to
combine policies, procedures, and networks and other technologies that
link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal,
state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.\12\ In
November 2006, in response to congressional direction, the
Administration issued a plan for implementing this environment and
described actions that the federal government intends--in coordination
with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners--to
carry out over the next 3 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and
Sensitve but Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.:
March 2006).
Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local Information-Sharing
Initiatives Have Been Limited
DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices
in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local
information-sharing initiatives. The department's limited use of these
practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular, after
the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule
to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not develop an
inventory of key state and local information initiatives. Until the
department fully implements key coordination and collaboration
practices and guidance, it faces, among other things, the risk that
effective information sharing is not occurring. DHS has efforts planned
and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including
implementing the recommendations in our recent report.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO-07-455.
Key Practices Were Not Effectively Implemented
In developing HSIN, DHS did not fully adhere to the practices
related to OMB's guidance. First, although DHS officials met with RISS
program officials to discuss exchanging terrorism-related documents,
joint strategies for meeting mutual needs by leveraging resources have
not been fully developed. DHS did not engage the RISS program to
determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs.
According to RISS program officials, they met with DHS twice (on
September 25, 2003, and January 7, 2004) to demonstrate that their RISS
ATIX application could be used by DHS for sharing homeland security
information. However, communication from DHS on this topic stopped
after these meetings, without explanation. According to DHS officials,
they did not remember the meetings, which they attributed to the
departure from DHS of the staff who had attended.
In addition, although DHS initially pursued a limited strategy of
exchanging selected terrorism-related documents with the RISS program,
the strategy was impeded by technical issues and by differences in what
each organization considers to be terrorism information. For example,
the exchange of documents between HSIN and the RISS program stopped on
August 1, 2006, because of technical problems with HSIN's upgrade to a
new infrastructure. As of May 3, 2007, the exchange of terrorism-
related documents had not yet resumed, according to HSIN's program
manager. This official also stated that the program is currently
working to fix the issue with the goal of having it resolved by June
2007.
Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies,
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries with
the RISS program. DHS has not fully developed such means to operate
with the RISS program and leverage its available technological
resources. Although an operating agreement was established to govern
the exchange of terrorism-related documents, according to RISS
officials, it did not cover the full range of information available
through the RISS program.
DHS's Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination,
Increasing the Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication
The extent of DHS's adherence to key practices (and the resulting
limited coordination) is attributable to DHS's expedited schedule to
deploy an information-sharing application that could be used across the
federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in its
haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key state and local
information initiatives. According to DHS officials, they still do not
have a complete inventory of key state and local information-sharing
initiatives. DHS's Office of Inspector General also reported that DHS
developed HSIN in a rapid and ad hoc manner, and among other things,
did not adequately identify existing federal, state, and local
resources, such as RISSNET, that it could have leveraged.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
Office of Information Technology, HSIN Could Support Information
Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, DHS did not fully understand the RISS program.
Specifically, DHS officials did not acknowledge the RISS program as a
state and local based program with which to partner, but instead
considered it to be one of many vendors providing a tool for
information sharing. In addition, DHS officials believed that the RISS
program was solely focused on law enforcement information and did not
capture the broader terrorism-related or other information of interest
to the department.
Because of this limited coordination and collaboration, DHS is at
increased risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. The
department also faces the risk that it is developing and deploying
capabilities on HSIN that duplicate those being established by state
and local agencies. There is evidence that this has occurred with
respect to the RISS program. Specifically:
HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user
groups. DHS and the RISS program are independently striving to
make their applications available to user communities involved
in the prevention of, response to, mitigation of, and recovery
from terrorism and disasters across the country. For example,
HSIN and RISS ATIX are being used and marketed for use at state
fusion centers \15\ and other state organizations, such as
emergency management agencies across the country.
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\15\ A fusion center is defined as a ``collaborative effort of two
or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to
the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect,
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.''
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HSIN and RISS applications have similar approaches for
sharing information with their users. For example, on each
application, users from a particular community--such as
emergency management--have access to a portal or community area
tailored to the user's information needs. The community-based
portals have similar features focused on user communities. Both
applications provide each community with the following
features: \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Beyond the collaboration tools listed, RISSNET also provides
access to other law enforcement resources, such as analytical criminal
data-visualization tools and criminal intelligence databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Web pages. Tailored for communities of interest (e.g.,
law enforcement, emergency management, critical infrastructure
sectors), these pages contain general and community-specific
news articles, links, and contact information.
Bulletin boards. Participants can post and discuss
information.
Chat tool. Each community has its own online, real-
time, interactive collaboration application.
Document library. Participants can store and search
relevant documents.
DHS Has Improvements Planned and Under Way, Including Implementing Our
Recent Recommendations
According to DHS officials, including the HSIN program manager, the
department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination.
For example, the department is in the process of developing an
integration strategy that is to include enhancing HSIN so that other
applications and networks can interact with it. This would promote
integration by allowing other federal agencies and state and local
governments to use their preferred applications and networks--such as
RISSNET and RISS ATIX--while allowing DHS to continue to use HSIN.
Other examples of improvements either begun or planned include the
following:
The formation of an HSIN Mission Coordinating
Committee, whose roles and responsibilities are to be defined
in a management directive. It is expected to ensure that all
HSIN users are coordinated in information-sharing relationships
of mutual value.
The recent development of engagement, communications,
and feedback strategies for better coordination and
communication with HSIN, including, for example, enhancing user
awareness of applicable HSIN contact points and changes to the
system.
The reorganization of the HSIN program management
office to help the department better meet user needs. According
to the program manager, this reorganization has included the
use of integrated process teams to better support DHS's
operational mission priorities as well as the establishment of
a strategic framework and implementation plan for meeting the
office's key activities and vision.
The establishment of a HSIN Advisory Committee to
advise the department on how the HSIN program can better meet
user needs, examine DHS's processes for deploying HSIN to the
states, assess state resources, and determine how HSIN can
coordinate with these resources. In addition to these planned
improvements, DHS has agreed to implement the recommendations
in our recent report. Specifically, we recommended that the
department ensure that HSIN is effectively coordinated with key
state and local government information-sharing initiatives. We
also recommended that this include (1) identifying and
inventorying such initiatives to determine whether there are
opportunities to improve information sharing and avoid
duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices
related to OMB's guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency
coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the
department's coordination efforts are consistent with the
Administration's recently issued Information Sharing
Environment plan.\17\ In response to these recommendations, DHS
described actions it was taking to implement them. (The full
recommendations and DHS's written response to them are in
report.)
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\17\ As mentioned earlier, this plan is aimed at establishing, in 3
years, the networks and other technologies that link people, systems,
and information among all appropriate federal state, local, and tribal
entities and the private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary
information-sharing system with two key state and local initiatives.
Largely because of the department's hasty approach to delivering needed
information-sharing capabilities, it did not follow key coordination
and collaboration practices and guidance or invest the time to
inventory and fully understand how it could leverage state and local
approaches. Consequently, the department faces the risk that effective
information sharing is not occurring and that its HSIN application may
be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. This also raises
the issue of whether similar coordination and duplication issues exist
with the other federal homeland security networks and associated
systems and applications under the department's purview.
DHS recognizes these risks and has improvements planned and under
way to address them, including stated plans to implement our
recommendations. These are positive steps and should help address
shortfalls in the department's coordination practices on HSIN. However,
these actions have either just begun or are planned, with milestones
for implementation yet to be defined. Until all the key coordination
and collaboration practices are fully implemented and
institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk that the
effectiveness of its information sharing is not where it needs to be to
adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are unnecessarily
duplicating state and local initiatives.
Madame Chair, this concludes my testimony today. I would be happy
to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may
have.
Ms. Harman. I thank you, Mr. Powner, for powerful testimony
delivered in precisely 5 minutes.
Mr. Kennedy, no pressure.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF DONALD KENNEDY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW ENGLAND
STATE POLICE INFORMATION NETWORK, (RISS)
Mr. Kennedy. Good morning. Chairman Harman and members of
the subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss efforts in the exchange of
homeland security information and initiatives currently under
way to leverage existing systems available to criminal justice
agencies throughout our country.
As stated by the chairman, I am currently the executive
director of the New England State Police Information Network,
one of the six regional information-sharing system centers in
the United States, otherwise known as RISS.
Having been a part of law enforcement for the past 33
years, first serving 24 years as a member of the Rhode Island
State Police and now serving as a member of the RISS program
for the last 9 years, I have come to understand first-hand the
importance of information sharing across all levels of
government.
Decades before terrorism moved into the forefront, RISS was
established to combat crime and enhance public safety. The RISS
program is a congressionally funded nationwide program
supporting state, local, federal and tribal law enforcement,
and prosecution efforts, with membership in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and
England.
The RISS program operates on a national basis, but provides
support regionally through its six intelligence centers, which
support and serve the unique needs of their individual regions.
One of RISS's strengths is that each RISS center is governed by
a policy board consisting of executives representing state,
local and tribal law enforcement.
RISS currently provides services to 75,000 access offices
representing hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers
from all government levels. Some of those services that RISS
provides includes analysis, training, confidential funds,
equipment loans, and a telecommunications systems we call
RISSNET.
RISSNET was developed in 1997 and is a national system that
was designed by and for state and local law enforcement.
RISSNET provides its users with a variety of online resources,
which include websites, bulleting boards, and intelligence
databases that are managed and populated by the law enforcement
community we serve.
At RISS, we have always be cognizant of the need for
communication interoperability between existing law enforcement
systems, so much so that in the pat 10 years, RISS has
partnered and linked our system to numerous other state, local
and federal databases, as well as recently providing node
connectivity to state fusion centers and intelligence centers
throughout the U.S. so that data can be shared securely, using
the RISS backbone, fusion center to fusion center.
RISS has worked closely with DEA to develop the national
virtual pointer system, which is a national database for
narcotics traffickers, along with the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms to share their GangNet database; and the U.S. Secret
Service, who share their dignitary protection database with our
users, using our node connection to RISSNET.
Continuing with this effort, soon after 9/11, RISS
partnered with the FBI's law enforcement online system in an
attempt to share data between the two systems. This partnership
was referenced in the global national criminal intelligence
sharing plan as systems that law enforcement should utilize in
their information intelligence sharing using the Internet.
After 9/11, RISS also approached the Department of Homeland
Security to partner with their then-JRIES--Joint Regional
Intelligence Exchange System. Several meetings were held, and
several presentations were provided in the hopes that DHS would
adopt the RISSNET system, or at least utilize some of the law
enforcement or first responder resources we provide. For
whatever reason, that did not come to fruition, and soon after
JRIES became the Homeland Security Information Network.
Recently, RISS again approached DHS and HSIN in an effort
to better share law enforcement first responder documents. This
dialogue ahs been quite successful as of late, and thanks to
the hard work of folks like Theresa Phillips of Homeland
Security in the HSIN program, we believe that we are closer to
completing that particular RSS feed from Homeland's information
network to the RISS environment.
But we need to do more. We need to continue the dialogue
between systems like RISS, LEO, HSIN and other systems that
have a public safety mission or nexus. We need to discuss not
only the sharing of documents, but the need for bidirectional
communication and the interoperability of these systems so that
we can technically accomplish what I call a single log-on
capability where if I, as a HSIN user, would like to get to a
RISS or a LEO resource, that I can do that without having to
log-off from that system and log-on to one of those other two
systems.
The time is right for this technical solution to occur.
RISS has been working very hard and has developed a way in
which this will work and work successfully. RISS stands ready
to meet and discuss and work with the policymakers and
technical staffs of both DHS and DOJ to make this goal a
reality. But first we need buy-in by the senior leadership of
both DOJ and DHS.
Madam Chairman, I thank you and your colleagues for giving
me this opportunity to speak with you today. I hope that my
comments have been of use to you.
[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald F. Kennedy
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Chairwoman Harman, and
Members of the Subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss efforts in the exchange of homeland
security information and initiatives currently under way to leverage
existing systems available to criminal justice agencies in our country.
I currently serve as the Executive Director of the New England
State Police Information Network (NESPIN), one of the six Regional
Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers. Prior to being named
Executive Director, I served as NESPIN's Deputy Director of Field
Services after retiring as a captain from the Rhode Island State
Police, having served in all bureaus and divisions within the state
police for 24 years. In my career, I have been afforded the opportunity
to actively participate in many aspects of law enforcement, from patrol
to policymaker. In those roles, I have come to understand firsthand the
importance of information sharing across all levels of government.
Decades before terrorism moved to the forefront, RISS was
established to combat crime and enhance public safety. The RISS Program
is a congressionally funded, nationwide program supporting local,
state, federal, and tribal law enforcement and prosecution efforts,
with membership in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, U.S.
territories, Australia, Canada, and England. The RISS Program operates
on a national basis but provides support regionally through its six
regional intelligence centers, which support and serve the unique needs
of their individual regions. The six RISS centers and the areas which
they serve are:
Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law
Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN): Delaware, District of
Columbia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, as well as Australia, Canada, and
England.
Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC):
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, as well as Canada.
New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN):
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Vermont, as well as Canada.
Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC):
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well as
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN): Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming, as well as Canada.
Western States Information Network (WSIN): Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Canada
and Guam.
Each RISS center is governed by a policy board or executive
committee, composed of representatives from member agencies in the
center's multistate region. The RISS National Policy Group is composed
of the six Directors of the RISS centers and the chair of each center's
policy board. The RISS National Policy Group is responsible for
strategic planning, resolution of operational issues, advancement of
information sharing, and decision making affecting the six RISS
centers, the national organization, service delivery, member agencies,
and related partner organizations.
The RISS Program strives to enhance the ability of criminal justice
agencies to identify, target, and remove criminal conspiracies and
activities spanning multijurisdictional, multistate and, sometimes,
international boundaries. RISS facilitates rapid exchange and sharing
of information among the agencies pertaining to known suspected
criminals or criminal activity and enhances coordination and
communication among agencies that are in pursuit of criminal
conspiracies determined to be interjurisdictional in nature.
RISS is a force multiplier in fighting increased violent criminal
activity by terrorists, drug traffickers, sophisticated cybercriminals,
gangs, and emerging criminal groups that require a cooperative effort
by local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement. There is an
increasing communications sophistication by the criminal networks,
including terrorists, and a rising presence of organized and mobile
narcotics crime. Interagency cooperation in sharing information has
proven to be the best method to combat this increasing criminal
activity. The RISS centers are filling law enforcement's need for
rapid, but controlled, sharing of information and intelligence
pertaining to known or suspected terrorists and other criminals.
Congress funded the RISS Program to address this need, as evidenced by
its authorization in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
Part M.
RISS provides diverse and valuable services and tools directly to
detectives and investigative units within local, state, regional,
federal, and tribal criminal justice entities, making RISS a
comprehensive and universal program. These services and tools include
investigative and intelligence analysis, secure national information
sharing and communications capabilities, specialized investigative
equipment, investigative funds support, criminal activity bulletins and
publications, training, and other investigative support and technical
services (Attachment A).
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administers the RISS Program
and has established guidelines for provision of services to member
agencies. The RISS centers are subject to oversight, monitoring, and
auditing by the U.S. Congress; the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, a federally funded program evaluation office; the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), BJA; and local and state governmental
units. BJA also monitors the RISS centers for 28 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 23 compliance. The 28 CFR Part 23 regulation
emphasizes adherence to individual constitutional and privacy rights
and places stricter controls on the RISS intelligence sharing function
than those placed on most local, state, or federal agencies. RISS
supports and has fully operated in compliance with 28 CFR Part 23 since
its inception. RISS firmly recognizes the need to ensure that
individuals' constitutional rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and
privacy interests are protected throughout the intelligence process. In
this regard, RISS officials adopted a RISS Privacy Policy to further
strengthen their commitment and support of 28 CFR Part 23 and
protection of individual privacy rights.
RISS has served as a pioneer, forging the way for today's
information sharing age. In 1997, through funding from Congress, RISS
implemented and continues to operate the secure Web-based nationwide
law enforcement network known as RISSNET. RISSNET offers state-of-the-
art technology to address and support law enforcement demands for rapid
communication and sharing of information. RISSNET provides the
communications backbone and infrastructure for sharing investigative
and intelligence information, offers secure sensitive but unclassified
electronic communications, and provides controlled access to a variety
of sensitive information resources.
Currently, RISS serves over 7,700 law enforcement and criminal
justice agencies from all levels of government. Over 75,000 access
officers, representing hundreds of thousands of law enforcement
officers from all government levels, are able to access the databases
of six regional RISS centers and other intelligence systems from a
single query--member agencies have bidirectional access to a number of
state, regional, federal, and specialized criminal intelligence systems
electronically connected to RISSNET. Examples of agencies connected to
RISSNET include the Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System at the El
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC); the National Drug Pointer Index
(NDPIX); the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) Database; the
National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C); Nlets--The International
Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network; the California
Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Database;
the Criminal Information Sharing Alliance network (CISAnet); the Oregon
State Intelligence Network; the Utah Law Enforcement Information
Network; the Wyoming Criminal Justice Information Network; and the
Colorado Law Enforcement Intelligence Network. The Executive Office for
United States Attorneys has also connected staff to RISSNET, as well as
all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys' Offices Anti-Terrorism Task Forces
throughout the United States. In addition, staff at DOJ, Criminal
Division, have connected to RISSNET.
In this world of rapidly changing technology and with the increased
need to provide timely, accurate, and complete information to law
enforcement and public safety professionals, the ability to connect
critical systems and streamline the ability to house, share, inquire,
and disseminate information and intelligence is paramount. Through
RISS's trusted system, the ability for law enforcement to target,
investigate, and prosecute crime continuously improves. RISS also
provides valuable collaboration with others who have experienced
similar crime problems or who are investigating the same or similar
crime.
RISS has also entered into a partnership with the High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to electronically connect all of the
HIDTAs to RISSNET for communications and information sharing.
Currently, 18 HIDTAs are electronically connected as nodes to RISSNET.
RISS is working to complete the connection of the remaining HIDTAs.
RISS has partnered with the HIDTAs and Nlets to create the National
Virtual Pointer System (NVPS). The NVPS, which became operational in
June 2004, is an automated system that connects existing deconfliction
pointer databases into one virtual pointer system. RISS has also
developed an officer safety deconfliction system, RISSafe, to be
accessible by member agencies for the purpose of identifying potential
conflict in operational cases.
RISS has emerged as one of the nation's most important law
enforcement intelligence sharing networks and continues to support
efforts to expand and improve information sharing. The partnerships
RISS has formed with fellow criminal justice and public safety agencies
has allowed for this unprecedented level of information and
intelligence to be exchanged through RISSNET. As a result, it is
critical to ensure that the information is secure and available only to
those with authorized access. RISSNET protects information through use
of encryption, smart cards, Internet protocol security standards, and
firewalls to prevent unauthorized access. The criminal intelligence
information accessed through RISSNET is controlled by its local, state,
federal, and tribal law enforcement member agency owners. The technical
architecture adopted by RISS requires proper authorization to access
information but also provides flexibility in the levels of electronic
access assigned to individual users based on security and need-to-know
issues. RISSNET supports secure e-mail and is easily accessible using
the Internet. This type system and architecture is referenced and
recommended in the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) and is
endorsed by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP).
The NCISP represents law enforcement's commitment to ensure that
the ``dots are connected,'' be it in crime or terrorism. The Plan
supports collaboration and fosters an environment in which all levels
of law enforcement can work together to improve the safety of the
nation. The Plan is the outcome of an unprecedented effort by local,
state, federal, and tribal law enforcement officials at all levels,
with the strong support of DOJ, to strengthen the nation's security
through better intelligence analysis and sharing.
The NCISP provides in Recommendation 21 that RISS and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Online (LEO) systems,
which interconnected September 1, 2002, as a virtual single system,
shall provide the initial sensitive but unclassified secure
communications backbone for implementation of a nationwide criminal
intelligence sharing capability. In addition to providing secure
communications, the RISS Program has embraced and integrated many of
the recommendations contained in the NCISP. For example, RISS is
developing a security architecture solution to allow users with various
types of security credentials to connect and traverse RISSNET to share
information and access resources without being required to use the RISS
specific security credentials. This project, known as the Trusted
Credential Project, will promote interoperable connectivity among
information sharing systems, allow bidirectional sharing, and enhance
critical information exchange.
RISS is also embarking on an initiative to streamline the process
for RISS users to access RISSNET resources. Known as the RISSNET
Portal, it will provide users with one entry point for RISSNET,
allowing them to instantly view and access all RISSNET resources from
one location. In addition, RISS is moving to an industry standards-
based SSL authentication technology. SSL technology is a mature
technology for the transmission of encrypted information and is
supported by all major Internet browsers. These three initiatives--the
Trusted Credential Project, RISSNET Portal, and SSL--will work in
unison and represent the natural next steps for enhancing RISS
technology and service to its members.
In the aftermath of 9/11, RISS recognized the critical need for
timely exchange of national security and terrorist threat information,
not only among law enforcement officials but to all first responders
and officials involved in homeland security. As a result, RISS created
the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX). ATIX is a
communication system that allows first responders, critical
infrastructure personnel, and other public safety personnel--including
firefighters and public utility and school personnel and local, state,
and federal law enforcement--to share terrorism and homeland security
information in a secure, real-time environment. Through ATIX, users
access the RISS ATIX Web pages and library, the ATIX bulletin board,
ATIXLive, and secure e-mail.
In its first year of connectivity, ATIX was selected as the
official system for secure communication and information sharing for
the G8 Summit in 2004 by the team in charge of security and
communications, which included the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the
Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Office of Homeland
Security, and the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Group. In
2005, the ability for ATIX to be successfully utilized in the aftermath
of a disaster was demonstrated when it served as a communication tool
following Hurricane Katrina. RISS provided logistical support to law
enforcement in the damaged areas to receive water, clothing, food,
medical supplies, information, and equipment. In addition, RISS
prepared intelligence assessments on gang and criminal activity, which
aided law enforcement response following the hurricane. In 2006, ATIX
demonstrated its communications power during a plane crash incident in
Delaware, when a C-5 cargo plane, laden with supplies for U.S. troops
in Iraq, crashed after takeoff from Dover Air Force Base. The Delaware
Information Analysis Center (DIAC), through its use of ATIX,
communicated the incident to appropriate officials and personnel ten
minutes prior to media reports of the incident. This allowed law
enforcement and first responders to coordinate efforts, assess the
situation, and secure the scene. And today, some state homeland
security offices, such as DIAC, use ATIX to communicate critical
information on a daily basis. In Delaware, more than 100 users across
21 discipline communities involved in their multijurisdictional,
multiagency response to all crimes and all hazards utilize ATIX as a
primary tool to communicate on a daily basis.
In the months following the creation and deployment of ATIX, RISS
reached out to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other
federal agencies to offer the infrastructure support and services
available through RISSNET. It was also during this time that DHS was
transitioning from the Joint Regional Information Exchange System
(JRIES) to the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) as a means
of expanding to include more communities. In July 2005, at the
culmination of numerous briefings and meetings, an executive meeting
was held to discuss interoperability and interconnection of the JRIES/
HSIN, RISS, and LEO. At that time, a joint decision was made by
policymakers from RISS, DOJ, DHS, and FBI to demonstrate
interoperability of the systems within a short time frame of 60 days.
The parties collaborated to produce a technical white paper describing
the information sharing project and a memorandum of understanding. The
ultimate goal of this project was to quickly demonstrate the capability
to create a seamless connection between systems, permitting users of
the individual systems to access unique tools, resources, and
capabilities of all the systems through the current access method.
Although not all the aspects of this initiative came to fruition,
RISS and DHS still created an information sharing partnership. During
the past two years, RISS has continued to work with DOJ and DHS on what
has evolved into the Counterterrorism Collaboration Interoperability
Project (CCIP). CCIP is a partnership among RISS, HSIN, LEO, and
CISAnet that allows the participating partner systems to publish
documents for access by authorized users of the other participating
partners? systems via the use of Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds.
This project has been recognized as a model for all agencies that will
share information, as required by Presidential Executive Order 13388,
Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect
Americans.
While significant strides have been made in the implementation of
the CCIP, much work still remains. For example, a disruption in the RSS
feeds from HSIN to RISSNET has resulted in a daily search effort by
RISS technical staff to access documents posted on the HSIN Law
Enforcement and HSIN Emergency Management sites. Through the limited
access that RISS has been granted to HSIN, a concerted effort is made
to identify and retrieve information available on HSIN, which could be
provided automatically through RSS feeds, and post this information on
ATIX for access by thousands of users.
In addition to the CCIP, RISS is also involved in other critical
initiatives with federal agencies to assist in their efforts to
facilitate the exchange of criminal intelligence with local and state
law enforcement. As the only nonfederal agency or organization involved
in the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Program (LEISP), RISS has
the unique opportunity to participate in the this critical initiative
with DHS and DOJ to demonstrate applicability of federated identity
management as a tool to enhance information sharing. In addition, RISS
has been invited to participate in a Secure But Unclassified (SBU)
Networks/Systems Collaboration Effort initiative from the Information
Sharing Council, tasked to the Program Manager--Information Sharing
Environment. This effort is focused on sharing SBU terrorism
information and identifying capabilities necessary for a SBU Network/
System to be included in the Information Sharing Environment. RISS is
pleased to receive these invitations, have the opportunity to assist in
the development of national strategies for information sharing, and be
recognized for its significant role in advocating for local and state
agencies who depend on RISSNET as a system of systems for information
sharing.
Local and state law enforcement, which depend on the RISS centers,
must be leveraged and included in an information sharing plan. The more
than 800,000 law enforcement officers and over 19,000 police agencies
in this country are part of the frontline defense in domestic security.
Important intelligence/information that may forewarn of a future attack
is collected by local and state government personnel through their
routine activities. The critical importance of intelligence for
frontline police officers cannot be overstated. And without the benefit
of intelligence, local and state law enforcement cannot be expected to
be active partners in protecting our communities from terrorism. The
RISS Program aims to represent these frontline officers in the quest
for increased terrorism information sharing in our nation and strives
to provide a platform for all areas of homeland security to work
together to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist activities and to
improve the safety of our nation. As demand from citizens continues to
increase for the country to be ready and prepared and funds continue to
tighten, it will be critical to leverage available resources and
expertise.
The ultimate goal of RISS is to develop and enhance bidirectional
systems access and provide secure real-time information, enabling all
participants to share information to enhance the investigative process,
in furtherance of recommendations in the National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan. Having a trusted sharing environment for communicating
information and intelligence is a priority issue. There are a number of
national systems and networks that local, state, and tribal law
enforcement agencies utilize for information sharing efforts, including
RISS, LEO, and HSIN. Each of these systems offers unique resources and
provides essential information to its primary users. However, the power
of these systems linked is exemplary of the whole being greater than
the sum of its parts. A true success would be the creation of a
``system of systems'' that is accessible by hundreds of thousands of
criminal justice and homeland security officials, as well as first
responders and private sector partners who aid our country in the
battle against terrorism.
Currently, users must sign on to multiple systems in order to
access information. Rather than develop new systems, it is recommended
that the existing networks and systems be modified and augmented based
on continuing information needs. The federal government should provide
the funding needed to leverage existing information sharing systems and
expand intelligence sharing by executing interoperability between
operating systems at the local, state, regional, federal, and tribal
levels using a federated identification methodology. Local, state, and
tribal users should be able to access all pertinent information from
disparate systems with a single sign-on, based on the user's
classification level and need to know.
In order to succeed, we must bridge the remaining gaps between
local, state, and federal intelligence agencies and homeland security
information consumers. If we are to continue to successfully deter and
prevent attacks, we must work as one united force to combat all crimes.
Over the last few years, RISS has seen increased interest by
individuals, agencies, and organizations to use RISSNET as their
primary communications system and to partner with RISS on a variety of
critical projects and initiatives. RISS is eager to meet this demand
and continually partners with law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies to fully develop an efficient and effective information
sharing environment. However, this demand is draining RISS's resources,
and additional funds are needed to ensure that law enforcement and the
criminal justice community continue to improve both their information
sharing and investigative capabilities in order to most effectively
protect public safety.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, RISS was appropriated $39.719 million,
the same level appropriated in fiscal year 2006. For fiscal year 2008,
the President's Budget includes $38.5 million, $1.219 million less than
the fiscal year 2007 appropriation. Based on the needs of local and
state law enforcement throughout the country, as well as the demand for
increased safeguarding against terrorism, gangs, violent crimes, and
other critical crime problems, RISS has requested $53.7 million.
To combat crime, there must be continued funding support to
programs like RISS, which have demonstrated decades of success in
fighting crime, advancing technology, and enhancing officer safety.
Through this strategy, we can maximize available funding, eliminate
duplication, and accomplish more with less.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and your colleagues for giving me the
opportunity to speak to you today, and I hope my comments have been of
some use to you in your deliberations.
ATTACHMENT A: The Regional Information Sharing Systems
Each RISS center offers basic services to member agencies.
Traditional services include information sharing, analysis,
telecommunications, equipment loans, confidential funds, training, and
technical assistance.
Information Sharing--The operation of RISSNET and its
various applications enhances information sharing and
communications among RISS members by providing various secure
databases and investigative tools. Each RISS center develops
and provides access to specialized information sharing systems
for use by its member agencies.
Analysis--RISS center personnel create analytical
products for investigative and prosecutorial use. RISS develops
flowcharts, link-analysis charts, crime scene diagrams,
telephone toll analysis reports, and financial analysis reports
and provides computer forensics analysis. Staff also provide
video and audio enhancement services.
Investigative Support--Each center maintains a staff
of intelligence technicians that support member agencies with a
variety of investigative assistance. Staff conduct database
searches, utilize all RISS applications, and process batch
uploads. Intelligence technicians respond to thousands of
requests and questions.
Field Operations--Centers maintain field service
coordinators who dedicate their time visiting and liaising with
RISS member agencies to coordinate delivery of RISS services.
This personal interaction with member agencies significantly
improves information sharing and ensures that member agencies
are provided quality and timely service.
Telecommunications--RISSNET is the communications
backbone that supports electronic access and exchange of
information by RISS users. The network provides a secure
platform for communications, as well as access to various state
and federal intelligence systems across the country. RISSNET
provides member agencies with a secure, rapid means to access
RISS resources. In addition to RISSNET, several RISS centers
operate long-distance telecommunications, or WATS services, to
facilitate toll-free contact between RISS member agencies
working jointly on investigations.
Equipment Loans--Pools of specialized and surveillance
equipment are available for loan to member agencies for use in
support of multijurisdictional investigations.
Confidential Funds--Member agencies can use funds to
purchase information, contraband, stolen property, and other
items of an evidentiary nature or to provide for other
investigative expenses related to multijurisdictional
investigations. The availability and use of confidential funds
are strictly controlled by federal guidelines, and internal
policies and procedures are developed by each center.
Training and Publications--RISS centers sponsor or
cosponsor meetings and conferences that build investigative
expertise for member agency personnel. Subject areas include
anti-terrorism, crime-specific investigative and surveillance
techniques, specialized equipment, officer safety, and
analytical techniques. In addition, each center researches,
develops, and distributes numerous publications, such as
bulletins, flyers, and criminal intelligence publications.
Centers also offer additional services based on regional and member
agency needs.
Ms. Harman. I thank the witness.
We will now hear from our final witness, Mr. Parent.
Let me say that votes are expected soon. Hopefully, we will
get through all the testimony. If there is more time before the
votes are called, it is my intention--and I hope all the
members will agree with this--to ask the godfather of this
hearing, Mr. Langevin, to ask the first questions.
Mr. Parent, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WAYNE PARENT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Parent. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I am Wayne Parent, the deputy director of the
Office of Operations Coordination at the Department of Homeland
Security. I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Homeland Security
Information Network and to provide an update on the
department's continuing efforts to improve information sharing
with HSIN.
Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank
Congresswoman Harman for all of her efforts on information
sharing. I know that you have been active in this arena for
years, working to ensure efficient and timely vertical and
horizontal information sharing. I look forward to working with
you and the members of the subcommittee on a path forward for
HSIN.
The DHS mission requires a robust information-sharing
environment. Assorted efforts have been under way to connect
the department with our stakeholders, the state, local, and
tribal entities, the private sector and other federal partners.
One of the most important tools DHS has to facilitate
information sharing in the sensitive-but-unclassified
environment is HSIN.
Although various issues have at times hampered the
effectiveness and the use of HSIN, it remains an important tool
in the fulfillment of the department's mission. Previously
released GAO and DHS inspector general reports have called
attention to many shortcomings, and action has been taken by
the Office of Operations Coordination to address many of these
recommendations. I have included specifics on those actions in
my written testimony, but I would like to address just a few of
the improvements that have been made to HSIN over the past
year.
In response to concerns expressed by the DHS IG, the GAO
and this subcommittee, we have instituted a strategy for the
management of HSIN, as well as a requirements evaluation
process. These are key elements of any program, but previously
missing in HSIN.
Many of the previous criticisms of HSIN have centered on
poor communication with stakeholders. We have established the
HSIN Mission Coordination Council, or HMCC, to work HSIN issues
within DHS. For stakeholders outside of DHS, just this week we
released a solicitation for members to the HSIN Advisory
Council, which will be a key body for collecting state, local
and private-sector issues and recommendations. The first
meeting of the HSIN Advisory Council will be held in August of
this year.
Within the last month, we have hired a person to engage
full-time on issues pertaining to the information-sharing
environment. This will ensure that HSIN stays aligned with the
efforts and recommendations of the ISE. In addition, this
person will spearhead an effort to measure content quality
within the key communities of HSIN.
The National Operations Center carries the DHS common
operating picture on HSIN. This common operating picture, or
COP, which was fielded last year in response to Hurricane
Katrina lessons learned, is a key element of national incident
management and provides critical situational awareness for
stakeholders and DHS leadership during an incident. It includes
pre-incident, obviously.
The COP has recently been upgraded to include the
integrated common analytic viewer, or iCAV, a state-of-the-art
GIS mapping package that has been strongly desired by our
stakeholders going back several years in the state, local and
private sectors. It is a good system. Within incident
management, HSIN is the information-sharing tool that brings
all of the DHS components and external partners together to
maximize situational awareness and support decisionmaking.
Finally, we know that a system must be user-friendly, and
HSIN has not enjoyed that evaluation. We have worked to improve
customer service by establishing a single sign-on mechanism
within HSIN, and also increasing the loading capability to
prevent slow-downs on system time, and in also developing a
more focused stakeholder outreach program.
This program also includes the addition of an automated
feedback process, or feedback button, on the user portals which
never existed previously. This system will be operational in
August 2007.
I think it is important for me to state that DHS is
committed to integrating HSIN with other interagency
information-sharing systems. Our intent is for HSIN to leverage
existing platforms designed to share information in order to
increase information-sharing efficiency among our partner
organizations and their existing systems. Our HSIN strategy is
not to duplicate capability that already exists, but to
leverage existing capability.
With the HSIN Joint Program Management Office and our new
program manager, we are pushing ahead to ensure the ability and
capability of HSIN to get relevant information to and from our
stakeholders in a more increasing manner. As we look to the
future, we will continue the pattern of recent program
enhancements and outreach efforts. We recognize that work must
continue to ensure increasing connectivity and interoperability
with all of our DHS partners. We are committed.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Parent follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wayne Parent
Good morning, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am Wayne Parent, Deputy Director of the Office
of Operations Coordination at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). I am pleased to appear today before this Subcommittee. Thank you
for inviting me today to discuss the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN) and to provide an update on the Department's continuing
efforts to improve information sharing and HSIN.
The DHS mission demands a robust information sharing environment.
Key to addressing information sharing requirements is the ability to
share information both vertically and horizontally. Assorted efforts
are underway to connect the Department with our stakeholders: state,
local, and tribal entities, the private sector and other federal
partners. One of the most important tools DHS has to maximize
information sharing in the sensitive but unclassified environment is
HSIN.
Background
As you are aware, HSIN is a set of commercially secure web-based
portals through which DHS provides real-time operation information and
decision support, shares documents, supplies situational awareness and
collaboration opportunities, and provides alerts, warnings and
notifications. HSIN operates at the Sensitive-But-Unclassified (SBU)
level from which threat and incident management information is
collected and shared between all levels of government.
Although complex issues have, at times, hampered the effectiveness
and use of HSIN, it remains an important tool in the fulfillment of the
Department's mission. Previously released GAO and DHS Inspector General
Reports have called attention to certain shortcomings, and action has
been taken by the Office of Operations Coordination to address their
various recommendations. Specifically, in response to these
shortcomings, Operations has, among other efforts:
Improved Management
In November 2006, our office hired the first Program Manager
(PM) for HSIN and stood up a Joint Program Management Office
(JPMO). Since starting, the PM has created integrated project
teams to establish programmatic discipline and to
systematically address the network's development and use. The
PM has initiated formal assessments of the system's
vulnerabilities, redundancy, survivability and training.
Additionally, the PM has identified key performance measures to
gain a better understanding of the network's operation and use
and guide future improvements. Of note, the PM initiated and
completed an extensive review of HSIN, which I will discuss in
more detail today. The review resulted in the creation of a
HSIN Strategic Framework Implementation Plan.
Assessed the Policy and Strategy Framework for HSIN
In October of 2006, the Office of Operations Coordination stood
up the HSIN Working Group which conducted an internal review of
HSIN and issued a final report that provided recommendations to
DHS leadership on the required actions or decisions to make
HSIN a more effective and efficient program. The working group
was comprised of representatives from various DHS components.
Key recommendations were:
(1) Establish clearly defined requirements processes;
(2) Develop HSIN into a capable information sharing,
communication, and collaboration solution;
(3) Identify the user and technical requirements of HSIN; and
(4) Develop metrics to periodically assess the program
These recommendations formed the basis of the HSIN Strategic
Framework Implementation Plan that was finalized in December
2006.
Created the framework for the HSIN Mission
Coordinating Committee (HMCC)
The HMCC consists of DHS mission component representatives who
plan to or are currently utilizing HSIN to support their
operation mission requirements. The goal of the HMCC is to
identify and validate operational enhancements to HSIN that are
critical to the successful accomplishment of the mission of DHS
components and the external partners they represent. Through
these efforts, we can plan for a prioritized delivery of
solutions that meet mission-operational needs.
Create the HSIN Advisory Committee (HSINAC)
A Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) compliant advisory
committee is being formed to provide independent advice and
recommendations to DHS leadership, particularly the Office of
Operations Coordination Director, on HSIN requirements of end
users within State, Local, Federal and Tribal governments and
the Private Sector.
The advisory committee efforts will initially focus on:
operational requirements necessary for effective information
sharing and incident management; compatibility and
interoperability between HSIN and other relevant information
networks, databases, and resources of State, Local, Federal,
Tribal, and Private Sector entities; and the security,
integrity, and safety of HSIN resources and contents.
The Federal Register notice announcing the formation of the
HSINAC was posted on October 20, 2006. The Federal Register
notice soliciting members for the committee was published
earlier this week. Our goal is to have our first meeting of the
advisory committee this summer.
Interagency Integration
The Office of Operations Coordination is committed to
integrating HSIN with other interagency information sharing
systems. The intent is for HSIN to leverage existing platforms
designed to share information so as to increase information
sharing efficiency among partnership organizations and their
existing systems. As such, we are working to establish a
technical means to seamlessly utilize information resident on
other platforms. This enables HSIN to both serve the internal
needs of DHS missions, while also addressing the convergence of
DHS missions with those of other agencies.
Some of our current initiatives focused on interagency integration
include:
Reestablish Connection between HSIN and RISS
The initiative to reconnect the technological bridge between
the HSIN and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) is
nearing completion. In June 2006, when HSIN completed a
technology refresher that moved HSIN from the old JRIES
technology platform to its current platform, the bridge was
inadvertently severed and not reconnected. Reconnecting this
bridge will allow pre-defined information to automatically flow
back and forth between the two systems.
Additionally, the original agreement between HSIN and RISS only
allowed for very narrowly defined information to be passed
between the systems. This definition mandated that the content
be specifically identified as terrorism information. We are
working to incorporate a more liberal, flexible definition such
as suspicious activity that may later be deemed terrorist
related. The expansion of content will enhance information
delivery over a single platform; maximizing the usefulness of
both systems.
Intelink-U
HSIN will provide a link to Intelink-Unclassified, affording access
to the content and contacts available on this online compendium of
resources. Intelink-U is well-used content repository. This enhancement
will provide a broad range of relevant information to HSIN users who
may not have another way to access this valuable resource.
Federated Identity Management
The JPMO is actively involved in an Office of the Program
Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)-sponsored,
Department of Justice-led pilot project for Federated Identity
Management. Federated identity management is a systematic
effort to create a single sign-on for multiple secure websites.
Our office understands the long-term possibilities and benefits
of this pilot and is committed to the effort.
Federated identity management will allow authorized HSIN users
to seamlessly traverse other participating programs' systems,
gaining access to content and tools that are not available on
HSIN. It will also permit other authorized system members to
gain access to the tools and content on HSIN. This is a
significant step in the direction of eliminating duplication
and maximizing existing systems across the entire landscape of
the ISE. HSIN, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and RISS are all
participants in this groundbreaking pilot. Once identity
management has been federated--including federation to the
state fusion centers and critical infrastructure Sector
Coordinating Councils--it will provide a basis for such
advanced capabilities as fine-grained dissemination control
based on the recipient's identity, role, and organizations/
communities to which the recipient belongs.
Data Exchange Hub
The Office of Operations Coordination is working towards an
initial operating capability between HSIN and a Data Exchange
Hub (DEH) that connects the National Capital Region's emergency
management systems. The DEH will enable a two-way transfer of
information between multiple reporting systems within the NCR
(to include WebEOC) with HSIN. The success of this initiative
is expected to result in a repeatable process that can be used
throughout the nation to connect HSIN to emergency operation
centers that use different communication platforms.
HSIN Utilization
Over the past nine months, numerous improvements and enhancements
to HSIN have been made and I believe it has the potential become the
information sharing and situational awareness tool it was envisioned to
be. For instance, DHS National Operations Center (NOC) notifications,
which alert leadership and key stakeholders when incidents occur, are
posted on HSIN through the COP. Additionally, HSIN supports the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) by becoming the primary
national hub for communications and information during major domestic
incidents.
An increased number of DHS components are now using HSIN
extensively in the execution of their mission. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has integrated the tool in all emergency
management coordination and has conducted extensive training across the
nation. The United States Coast Guard has begun to use the tool as its
primary coordination tool for exercises and missions that require
large-scale, real-time collaboration. In addition, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) has constructed collaboration space for each of its 27
border patrol sectors to enhance seamless information flow and
situational awareness. Data currently shows that CBP is making daily
use of this tool.
HSIN is also an important tool for information sharing between
state, local, tribal, and private sector communities. The network is
also actively embraced by state and local fusion centers across the
country, many of which have created their own customized portals. For
example, in the State of Tennessee, the Director of the Office of
Homeland Security has cited HSIN as the backbone of its new state
fusion center and recommended that all states adopt the network for
information sharing and situational awareness. As I believe you will
hear from additional testimony today, The State of Florida is also an
active user of the system.
One of the most valuable tools on HSIN is the Common Operating
Picture. HSIN and COP will be increasingly relied upon as the
Department continues with a number of important initiatives, in
particular, interagency planning and exercises. The COP is a real-time,
web-based situational awareness tool that ties together key homeland
security partners primarily at the federal, state, and Joint Federal
Official (JFO) levels. It is designed to:
Provide a common view of critical information during a
crisis in order to enhance situational awareness;
Support sound, timely, risk mitigated and informed
decision making by providing a shared understanding of the
situation;
Provide the inter-agency with the capability to share
critical information;
Provide information integrity for reporting
requirements; and
Support a geospatial mapping feature known as iCAV--
the infrastructure critical asset viewer--that can overlay
events such as hurricanes onto critical infrastructure assets.
The COP was initially deployed during Hurricane Season 2006. As
such, the focus of the early iterations of the COP was on natural
disaster information. Currently, as part of our incremental approach,
we are advancing the COP capabilities from natural disasters to all
hazards and all threats. These steps will advance the COP capabilities
from unclassified, hurricanes/natural disasters to classified,
terrorist threats and incidents. The current focus is to develop a COP
template for the ``worse case'' scenario for nuclear/radiological
incidents and will use national exercises such as Ardent Sentry and
real world events to validate and continue this development.
While initially focused on integrating natural disaster
information, DHS activated the COP for several non-natural disaster
incidents, including the liquid explosive airline plot in the UK and
the private airplane crash in New York City.
Additionally, the National Infrastructure Coordination Center
(NICC) utilizes the HSIN-Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) portal to share
information about the nation's infrastructure with private sector
stakeholders. DHS has designated HSIN-CS to be its primary information-
sharing platform between the Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource
sectors. HSIN-CS enables DHS and the critical sector stakeholders to
communicate, coordinate, and share information. Through HSIN-CS, users
are able to:
Receive, submit, and discuss timely, actionable, and
accurate information;
Communicate information pertaining to threats,
vulnerabilities, security, response and recovery activities
affecting sector and cross sector operations; and
Maintain a direct, trusted channel with DHS and other
vetted sector stakeholders
The primary objectives of HSIN-CS are to generate effective risk
management decisions, and to encourage collaboration and coordination
on plans, strategies, protective measures, and response/recovery
efforts between government, operators, and owners.
HSIN's Way Ahead
Building on HSIN successes, lessons learned, and various
recommendations from outside review, the Joint Program Management
Office is pushing ahead to ensure that we get relevant information to
more of our stakeholders more of the time. As we look to the future, we
will continue the recent program enhancements and outreach efforts.
Additionally, system enhancement will continue by examining and taking
action on additional measures. The JPMO will:
Assess, and act upon, results from metrics designed to
measure a number of aspects of the overall program regarding
the effectiveness of information sharing across HSIN. Some
areas to be assessed include: the number of users, timeliness
of information posted, response times for requests for
information, numbers of outstanding and closed action items,
and comments posted through the system feedback mechanism.
Ensure DHS components become more involved in the
development of HSIN capabilities, articulate their mission
needs as well as the needs of the external partners they
sponsor, create a governance structure within their mission
areas with regard to HSIN use, and become active participants
in shaping the future of the program;
Evaluate advanced information technologies for
incorporation into HSIN such as tools for multi-party real-time
collaboration/co-authoring and fine-grained dissemination and
user access control to sensitive information products.
Work with the PM-ISE and the Information Sharing
Council to improve business processes and contribute to an
Information Sharing Environment that eliminates current
``stove-pipes'' between programs;
T3Conclusion
HSIN plays an important role in the information sharing mission of DHS.
Additionally, it is critical that all agencies and components are able
to monitor HSIN/COP for up-to-date event/threat information when
notified via NOC Notification.
HSIN is the information sharing tool that brings together all DHS
components and external partners to maximize situational awareness.
Without HSIN, the ability of the Department to share information would
be degraded.
Work needs to continue to ensure there is robust connectivity and
interoperability with all DHS partners. This is an obtainable goal that
will be achieved through methodical, thoughtful collaboration and
planning.
HSIN, in conjunction with the COP, is becoming the Department's
solution to address the ever-growing need to gather, assess, and share
information critical to the Department's overall mission.
Finally, as we improve the HSIN technology and core functionality, we
will focus on customer involvement and user satisfaction. Our goal is
to improve overall collaboration and situational awareness among
Federal, State, Local, and private industry partners.
HSIN is playing a critical role in the Ardent Sentry and Pinnacle
exercises that are currently underway. In these instances, HSIN and the
COP are being utilized for situational awareness and information
sharing.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify today and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Ms. Harman. I thank the witness. He is in a tough position
on this panel. I do appreciate the fact that you see this as a
collaboration. We do want to be your partners in fixing the
problem. That is our goal.
I now recognize our colleague, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes
of questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank the panel for being here.
Before I begin with my questions, I just want to thank you,
Madam Chair, for holding this hearing and for focusing on this
issue, which is of great importance.
It is worth noting that the chair until just recently
served for a number of years on the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and served for most of that time as
ranking member of the Intelligence Committee. There is not a
person in the Congress who understands the importance of good
intelligence more than Congresswoman Harman.
On that, you and I are in lock-step. Again, I thank you. It
is no surprise that you would be holding this hearing so early
as chair of this subcommittee. It is a great service to the
country, and I appreciate it.
I also, again, want to thank the panel.
Ms. Harman. We won't take that out of your time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
[Laughter.]
I want to thank the panel for being here.
Mr. Powner, thank you for issuing and conducting this very
important report. GAO is to be commended. You are focusing on
issues that I have tried to raise now for a number of years. In
particular, Don Kennedy and I have had the opportunity to speak
on several occasions, going back over a number of years.
Again, I thank you all for being here.
I know that the focus of the hearing is moving past the
missteps, but I think a certain amount of history is necessary
here for context. In March of 2002, when I was first briefed by
Mr. Kennedy and his team, about the RISS program, and actually
went to RISS in Massachusetts and saw it first-hand for myself.
I was certainly impressed with its information-sharing
capabilities. I thought it could be the backbone for a national
information-sharing network for the homeland security of the
nation.
In September of that year, I met with Tom Ridge, then
secretary, or actually director of homeland security--later to
be secretary--to recommend that RISS be used as a tool for the
federal government to disseminate information for first
responders and law enforcement. He seemed receptive and said he
would look into it.
Later in July of 2003 at a Homeland Security Intelligence
Subcommittee hearing, I informed Bill Parrish, DHS's acting
assistant secretary for information analysis, about my meeting
with Secretary Ridge, and asked for an update of how DHS was
working with RISS. In the 4 years since then, I have discussed
RISS numerous times with DHS officials, so its existence and
capabilities should not be a surprise at all to DHS.
Given that history, I was extremely frustrated to read Mr.
Powner's report, and learn not only that HSIN and RISSNET are
not fully interoperable, but also that they are in many cases
duplicative. It is certainly not a surprise to me. We have
spent tens of millions of taxpayer dollars to create HSIN, yet
it falls far short of what it should accomplish.
Now, I know that Mr. Parent cannot speak to some of the
mistakes that were made before his tenure, but I have to ask
why DHS did not make it a priority from day one to ensure that
HSIN would be fully compatible with RISSNET and other
information sharing networks.
My second question for Mr. Kennedy, RISS has been in
existence since 1974, and reaches more than 7,500 law
enforcement and criminal justice agencies. I would like to just
have you take a few minutes to describe how and why RISS has
been such a success.
So with that, Mr. Parent?
Mr. Parent. Yes, sir. What I can give you is the history of
the relationship between RISS and HSIN, as I know it, and I am
very certain it is correct. There was a relationship that
resulted in a technological connection between RISS and HSIN
that occurred sometime within the dates that you talked about
and last June 2006. Last June 2006, which is about the time
that my involvement with RISS and HSIN, and my involvement with
HSIN goes back a little bit further, that connection was
severed when HSIN went through an upgrade process in 2006. So
that is the first point that the present group of people had to
look at that issue.
We are now re-fixing that technological connection between
RISS and HSIN that Mr. Kennedy talked about, but I would also
like to emphasize what he said which is that is only the first
step. That is, in essence, a gateway that will allow documents
to flow back and forth between the two systems. But I think we
both have a bigger expectation of what this is going to go than
just documents going back and forth.
We have identified that the previous technological
connection was very restrictive in terms of what documents went
back and forth between the two systems. Our goal at this time
is to open that conduit up substantially. But I think this is
the beginning of a new relationship, or certainly a much better
relationship. That is what I know about the history.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Congressman Langevin.
To answer your question, I believe that the success of RISS
lies in the fact that we are run by state and local and tribal
law enforcement. We are funded through the federal government,
but our executive policy boards are the colonels and the chiefs
of police that we serve throughout the United States.
I also believe that it is that regionality that we have,
that actually we work with our users and we are user-driven. So
if we have a system, we don't just give them a system; we sit
our members down in a group and ask them for their input as to
what they would like in a system, and then that is how we
developed RISSNET.
Whatever program that we do or whatever service we provide,
whether it be camera equipment or to develop a database for
them, it is for the users, and they are the ones that usually
come to us, and we try to provide them with that service.
But I think the most important thing is that we are not in
competition with any agency, whether it be state, local or
federal. I am sorry. We are not in competition with any agency
or system. We are like Switzerland. We want to get along with
everyone. We believe that if our members have a need for
information, wherever it resides, that we at RISS have to find
a way through interoperability with systems like HSIN and LEO
to get that information to our members, because it is bi-
directional.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. My time has expired.
I thank the chair for her indulgence, and thank you for
your testimony.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
We will now move to Mr. Perlmutter. We are sort of
recognizing people in the order of arrival, and then Mr.
Carney.
There will be a long recess for about six votes or so. It
is coming up shortly. Hopefully, all three of you can ask your
questions before we do that recess. And then what I think I
might do, if it works out that way, is forego my own questions.
I think you have all heard from me. And we will move to our
next panel after the recess.
Mr. Perlmutter, 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Just thinking about this over the last few days, there are
different kinds of approaches here, if I understand it
correctly. The HSIN system is a centralized system where there
is somebody at the top. The RISS system is a decentralized
system where you have a board of law enforcement for a
particular region--the Rocky Mountain West or the Northeast.
And so, to you, Mr. Kennedy, and to you, Mr. Parent, and
then Mr. Powner if you want to jump in, how do we best get
information? We talked about it. The ultimate goal here is the
safety and security of the citizens of the United States of
America within the bounds of the Constitution. The next level
up is law enforcement. How do we best provide them information
that makes me and my neighbors secure in Golden, Colorado?
Mr. Parent? Am I wrong in describing one as a centralized
kind of system and the other as a decentralized system?
Mr. Parent. It is very hard to put HSIN into any normal
category like that. What you said is correct, sir. It is
central in that DHS is at the center of it, but HSIN is
basically a series of communities. The communities include some
law enforcement members, but they also include a large
contingent of emergency management people, an international
community, the private-sector people in the critical sector
connections, and a few others that kind of represent this
family.
I agree with your goal completely, and I think all of us
recognize the fact that we inherited or we have a series of
what we can call ``communities,'' but they are enclaves out
there, and the enclaves all need to be connected. They need to
be connected in any way of communication that is presently
being utilized to share information, whether that is chat,
email, whether that is documents going back and forth.
And that is our goal right now, is to, one, acknowledge
that we at least have the communities. We have the people who
have stepped up to the plate to participate in this grand
information-sharing endeavor. It is our job to connect all of
them.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Kennedy?
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you.
I wouldn't say that RISS is decentralized. We work
individually in the regions with our network, but it is a
national network. We have one IT. We call it the Office of
Internet Technology that oversees all of the RISS programs as
it relates to RISSNET. We also have all, like I said, state,
local, federal and tribal systems that are online with us. We
interconnect with many of the systems that I have actually
briefed in my nine-page brief that is before you.
But to answer your question, I think that what we need to
do to continue this dialogue is we need to probably set up some
type of an executive steering committee made up of the
policymakers and the leadership of Homeland, DOJ, and RISS and
others, and then maybe have someone that is the chairman of
that particular steering committee--maybe the program manager
from ISE or someone from Global--so that we can ensure that
these meetings will continue so that the information that law
enforcement and first responders need, you know, that comes
from these systems that work independently of one another, can
work together to try and make sure that that information
doesn't slip through those cracks, and then incidents like that
that happened in New Jersey don't fall by the wayside.
Mr. Perlmutter. And I guess I can see some instances where
we have to take information from the top and push it down, and
then others where there is information from the bottom and push
it up to the top--to do it as quickly as possible to minimize
whatever the damage might be on some kind of bad guy out there
who wants to do harm to Golden, Colorado.
So for $300 million per year, what is it that I am actually
getting out of HSIN?
Mr. Parent. HSIN is not a $300-million-a-year program. In
the entire life of HIS, we have spent $71 million, sir, and
right now it is budgeted at about $20 million or $21 million
per year. The $300 million is a number that I think includes a
number of other DHS systems that are not part of HSIN or
connected with this directly.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
We will now hear from Mr. Carney for 5 minutes for
questions. Following that, this panel will be adjourned. I am
intending to come back during votes, during the motion to
recommit, to convene the second panel. Unfortunately, this is a
crazy day, so that we can get their testimony on the record.
If some of you can come back, that will be great.
Mr. Carney?
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Once again, thank
you for your leadership.
And my good colleague, Mr. Langevin, thank you so much. It
is absolutely critical to get through this and get this fixed.
Mr. Parent, DHS had an opportunity to comment on the GAO's
report. The GAO obviously said that there is a lot of
duplication going on. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Parent. I agree with it, and Mr. Powner and I have
talked, as well as our staffs have worked on this report
together from the time the first draft came out in January.
There is some truth in there. There are some functions that
take place within the HSIN system that are very, very similar,
dealing with the same kind of people and the same kind of
information.
But it is not and either/or-type situation. If you today
said, ``Stop HSIN; pull the plug; save the $20 million;
everybody use RISS,'' that couldn't work. RISS does not have a
common operating picture. It doesn't have the information flow
templates and process that we put into place for incident
management. It also doesn't have all the same people. So there
is a little bit of apples and oranges there, but it is true to
say that at some point there are groups of the same type of
people getting onto two different systems that are doing
similar things.
Mr. Carney. What percentage of HSIN do you think is unique,
compared to what else is out there? Compared to RISS or LEO?
Mr. Parent. I think the incident management piece is
completely unique. I think the private-sector piece is
completely unique. The law enforcement piece is the one where
there are obviously other systems that are frequently compared
as the GAO did, RISS and LEO being the two biggest systems. But
some of the states have systems that they have put together
that are obviously just state-centric that are also very
similar.
Mr. Carney. But on a percentage basis, could you give me a
rough estimate?
Mr. Parent. I think the law enforcement piece on HSIN, and
let me use the number of authorized users. We have about 17,500
authorized active users today on HSIN. About 4,000 are law
enforcement members of HSIN-LE.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Nothing further. We should go vote.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Carney.
That was the 10-minute bell, so I do think we need to move.
I would just say to Mr. Powner--in fact, I will stay around
for another minute or so, and I haven't asked questions--I
would like to ask you to comment on the answers to prior
questions, including the answer to the budget question.
How much money, in GAO's opinion, has been spent on these
different systems? And going forward, if we were able to
rationalize this more efficiently, how much money would it cost
and how much money would we save?
Mr. Powner. Collectively, when you look at roughly 10
homeland security information networks and applications at DHS,
the annual amount spent is around $300 million. If you look at
HSIN in particular, between 2004 and 2007, we have spent about
$75 million.
Now, in terms of going forward--and we had this discussion
about in terms of what is duplicative and what is not
duplicative--I wouldn't use the word that it is completely
unique, because I think even in some of those areas that Mr.
Parent referred to, there still is some duplication that occurs
in some of those areas.
The important thing moving forward is because we have some
users now tied to HSIN--they like HSIN better than RISS, and
some folks like RISS better than HSIN--the important thing
moving forward is how do we integrate these applications and
leverage them. But a couple of things to reinforce: One, we
need to start with requirements. What are the users' needs?
There are committees set up. It is very important that
these committees actually identify the key users. No matter
what the community is we are focused on, we need to make sure
we get the right user needs and we proceed forward with that.
We need to built out the content so that users are more
inclined to use this. The key is linking these applications and
perhaps others so that we leverage and we don't duplicate going
forward.
The program management of HSIN clearly needs improvement,
according to OMB. I think Mr. Parent and I have discussed that.
There are many efforts to do that. And then we talked a lot
about the technical integration that needs to occur. Coupled
with the technical integration, you probably want policies and
strategies, because I think what you heard here is executive
governance that would help, where we actually have some
policies in place so that we know what the ground rules and
game plans are. That can be done through MOAs and MOUs and
those types of things.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Powner. I think you have the
last word.
This panel is dismissed. I should say for the record that
your testimony will be included in the record in full. Without
objection, so ordered.
I would like to thank our colleagues and again commend Mr.
Langevin--he wasn't here when I said this--for asking a
question in 2002 that we are finally getting the answers to in
2007. It took a while. I thank you for your patience.
And I say to our panelists, we have a lot of work to do
together. In real-time, we could be attacked at any moment. It
is absolutely critical that information be shared efficiently,
and that those who are protecting our hometowns get what they
need and can communicate what they need, so that we can
prevent, hopefully, or disrupt the plans of those who would
harm us.
I will be back shortly during this series of votes to
convene the second panel. Hopefully, other members can return
as well.
Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Ms. Harman. Hello, everybody. I would like to call up our
second panel of witnesses. Thank you.
Welcome to all of you, and apologies for this crazy
schedule, but that is what we have today.
I did talk to the ranking member, Mr. Reichert, and he will
try to make it briefly. We are in between votes, which I think
you all understand, so the goal here will be to convene this
panel, to get your testimony in the most abbreviated form, to
see whether we can proceed with questions. If that is possible,
we will do it, but we are all trying to do all the things that
are required this morning.
So I welcome the second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Captain William Harris, a 26-year
veteran of the Delaware State Police. Captain Harris presently
serves as the officer in charge of his agency's criminal
intelligence section. His command includes the Delaware State
Police electronics surveillance unit, the high-tech crime unit,
intelligence investigations, and the Delaware Information and
Analysis Center, the DIAC, the Delaware Fusion Center that has
been operational since December of 2005.
I am going to skip over some other aspects of your bio to
get us going.
Our second witness is First Sergeant Lee Miller, a 13-year
veteran of the Virginia State Police, who manages the day-to-
day operations of the Virginia Fusion Center. First Sergeant
Miller is intimately familiar with that center, having been
involved in the working group that led to its creation and the
policies and procedures that govern it.
I want to thank you, sir, for the work that you did during
the horrible massacre at Virginia Tech. We have heard from
others that that work was widely shared and was very critical
in giving needed information to other fusion centers around the
country.
The third witness is Inspector Barry Lindquist. Inspector
Lindquist has a law enforcement career that exceeds 37 years.
This career includes 28 years with the Pompano Beach Police
Department, with 22 years as a supervisor, including 12 years
as a command-level officer. Inspector Lindquist has worked with
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement since his retirement
from Pompano Beach in 1998 as a police captain.
Our fourth witness is Major Brian K. Tomblin. Major
Tomblin, Tennessee Army National Guard, is the military liaison
to the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security. Major Tomblin
coordinates military resources and response for the Tennessee
National Guard in support of the Tennessee Office of Homeland
Security and local authorities. As the program manager for
HSIN-Tennessee, Major Tomblin manages the portals and
coordinates training of Tennessee users.
I think we will start our testimony right now with Captain
Harris. If you can summarize in less than 5 minutes, your
nation would be grateful.
Let me just add that, in all cases, your written testimony
will be included in the record in full.
STATEMENT OF CAPT WILLIAM HARRIS, DELAWARE STATE POLICE
Captain Harris. Okay. Good morning. First of all, thank you
for having me. I am very humbled that you would ask us as a
group, and particularly me, for our opinion on such important
matters.
My name is Captain Bill Harris. I am with the Delaware
State Police. I am in charge of the criminal intelligence
section and the Delaware Information Analysis Center,
Delaware's state fusion center. I have been asked to give you
state law enforcement's perspective on the information sharing
culture as it pertains to our counterterrorism efforts.
I will specifically speak about the duplication of efforts
in federal agencies that not only hamper our efforts at
effective information sharing, but also hamper our efforts to
secure our state and our nation from future terrorist activity
and attack.
I would first like to preface my comments that I have had
positive experience with professionals from both the Department
of Homeland Security and many with the Department of Justice,
particularly with the Bureau of Justice Assistance. As the
commander of our state's fusion center, I am thoroughly
familiar with the Department of Justice, the Department of
Homeland Security's unclassified-but-sensitive information
sharing systems.
I would particularly like to speak about the duplication of
efforts between the Homeland Security Information Network,
RISS, the regional information-sharing system, and LEO, to
include INFRAGARD.
The RISS network was established in 1974 and has been a
staple of federal, state and local law enforcement information
sharing for over 30 years. In 2002, RISS launched new assets
with the Automated Trusted Information Exchange. This new asset
was to enhance the information-sharing environment with those
non-law enforcement, homeland security stakeholders, within
their own discipline, cross discipline, and their local, state
and federal law enforcement partners.
Each of the previously mentioned systems offer similar
capabilities, such as an electronic bulletin board, document
library, a chat tool, and encrypted email. As a law enforcement
agency participating in the information-sharing environment, we
are forced to choose between information-sharing systems with
separate logons and passwords, and the monitoring of those
systems. Because of this bureaucracy of multiple systems, our
personnel have had to monitor all of these systems at once in
an attempt to stay current on the sharing of counterterrorism
information and homeland security information.
This has also forced law enforcement agencies such as mine
to look at the bes6t information-sharing resources available.
This has been by far the regional information sharing system,
or RISS. This system is both robust, user-friendly, contains
more relevant, reliable and timely law enforcement and homeland
security information that is actionable for the line-level law
enforcement personnel, that will most likely identify the link
to disrupting pre-operational planning of a domestic or
international terrorist.
Ms. Harman. Captain Harris, I hate to interrupt you. It has
been 3 minutes, and it is not that we didn't tell you 5
minutes, but I want to give everyone a chance. You have a made
a point that I think is enormously important for our record.
Is there one more sentence you would like to tell us?
Captain Harris. Yes. The difference in the systems, ma'am,
particularly with the private sector and other stakeholders.
RISS or ATIX has no portals. They share cross-sector
information across discipline information. Where HSIN, separate
from the law enforcement side, has different portals. It
doesn't allow for that information sharing that might be
important to public health, and may also be important to
agriculture.
[The statement of Captain Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Capt William Harris
I am commander of the Delaware State Police's, Criminal
Intelligence Section and the Delaware Information and Analysis Center
(DIAC), Delawares state fusion center. I have been asked to give you
state law enforcement's perspective on the information sharing culture,
as it pertains to our counter-terrorism efforts.
I will specifically speak about the duplication of efforts by
federal agencies that not only hamper our efforts to effective
information sharing, but also hamper our efforts to secure our state
and nation from future terrorist activity and attack.
I would like to preface my comments that I have had positive
experiences with professionals from both the Department of Homeland
Security, and many with the Department of Justice, particularly the
Bureau of Justice Assistance.
As the commander of our state's fusion center, I am thoroughly
familiar with the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland
Security's unclassified, but sensitive information sharing systems. I
would particularly like to speak about the duplication of efforts
between the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the Regional
Information Sharing System (RISS), and Law Enforcement on Line (LEO),
to include INFRAGARD.
The RISS network was established in 1974 and has been a staple of
federal, state, and local law enforcement information sharing for over
30 years. In 2002, RISS launched new assets with the Automated Trusted
Information Exchange. This new asset was to enhance the information
sharing environment with those non-law enforcement, homeland security
stakeholders, within their own discipline, cross discipline, and their
local, state, and federal law enforcement partners.
Each of the previously mentioned systems offer similar capabilities
such as an electronic bulletin board, document library, a chat tool,
and encrypted Email. As a law enforcement agency participating in the
information sharing environment, we forced to choose between
information sharing systems with separate logons and passwords, and the
monitoring of those systems. Because of this bureaucracy of multiple
systems, our personnel have had to monitor all of these systems in an
attempt to stay current on the sharing of counter-terrorism and
homeland security information.
This has also forced law enforcement agencies, such as mine to look
at the best information sharing resource available. This has been by
far the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). This system is both
robust, user friendly, and contains more relevant, reliable, and timely
law enforcement and homeland security information that is actionable
for the line level law enforcement personnel, that will most likely be
the identified link to disrupting pre-operational planning of a
domestic or international terrorist.
The RISS network gives access to an electronic bulletin board (RISS
Leads) used by multiple law enforcement agencies, to include a national
criminal intelligence database (RISS Intel) to include gangs (RISS
Gang). In addition to this RISS has connectivity to assets such as the
High Intensity Drug Trafficking (HIDA) Centers (19 databases), the
National White Collar Crime Center, the U.S. Secret Service's Targeted
Violence Information Sharing System (TAVIS database), the Law
Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU database), the El Passo
Intelligence Center, (EPIC database), the National Drug Pointer Index
(NDPIX database), to name just a few. These features are the force
multiplier that law enforcement agencies and fusion centers are
searching for to assist in identifying anomalies and those common
crimes and networks that are part of pre-operational planning by both
domestic and international terrorist.
Duplication of systems within the information sharing environment
with the public and private sectors are just as confusing and
bureaucratic. HSIN has several portals for this purpose, the FBI is
promoting INFRAGARD as a communication tool, and RISS has the Automated
Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX). The concept of including the
public and private sector are part of the Information Sharing
Environment Implementation Plan, and makes good business sense to
include these disciplines. However, when working with our critical
infrastructure stakeholders in the private sector, they are presented
with three systems that are supposed to accomplish the same goal.
Once again, state and local law enforcement, which have
responsibility for protecting our critical infrastructure, are forced
to choose the best information sharing resource available. This has
been by far the RISS ATIX system, for many of the same reasons law
enforcement likes the features of the RISS law enforcement network. The
information, contacts, and features available on the ATIX system make
it more robust and user friendly. Additionally, like HSIN, users have
the ability to go into their identified ``communities'' or disciplines,
however unlike HSIN and INFRAGARD; users have the ability to gather
information and contacts from users outside of their discipline, giving
them relevant, reliable, and timely information sharing relationships
of mutual value. This was most evident recently in February 2006, when
DHS released the ``lessons learned'' from ``Cyber Storm,'' a cyber
security preparedness exercise. One of the key lessons learned, was to
no one's surprise, that interagency coordination and cross-sector
information sharing enhanced overall coordination, communication, and
response.
RISS ATIX gives our law enforcement personnel and key stakeholders
within our state and region this type of effective information sharing
capability that no other system does.
Ms. Harman. Let me thank you for that.
We are moving right now to Sergeant Miller.
We are going to continue to call on all of you, because we
want this whole reform effort to start with you, not end with
you. You should have been incorporated in the first place. If
the RISSNET turns out to be much more user-friendly and
helpful, I don't want to imagine what our final conclusion will
be, but you should bet on the fact that we want to be useful
and helpful to you.
Sergeant Miller?
STATEMENT OF 1stSgt LEE MILLER, VIRGINIA STATE POLICE
Sergeant Miller. Good morning, Madam Chairman.
The primary mission of the Virginia Fusion Center is to
fuse together key resources from local, state and federal
agencies, as well as private industry, to facilitate
information collection, analysis and sharing in order to
prevent and deter a terrorist attack and all other forms of
criminal activity.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, law
enforcement agencies were forced to meet the information
demands created by the increased focus on terrorism. As a
result, the resources needed to provide proactive intelligence
operations have increased exponentially, thus compelling law
enforcement agencies to consider the concept of a fusion
center.
In order to meet our mission, the Virginia Fusion Center
utilizes a vast array of networks and databases to assist in
the fusion process. These separate systems provide information
and intelligence relevant to situational awareness, as well as
providing the ability to identify trends, patterns, and targets
that enhances the ability of law enforcement to be proactive
instead of reactive.
Some of the networks that the Virginia Fusion Center
monitors during our day-to-day operations are HSIN, of course,
LEO, FPS Portal, HSDN, RISSNET, JRIES, and systems developed by
the Commonwealth of Virginia. As stated in previous reports,
the number of systems that are available causes duplication and
does not promote an effective business process.
These systems also provide the Virginia Fusion Center an
avenue for disseminating information and intelligence to our
different partners. In order to reach all of our partners, our
information must be submitted to multiple networks and systems,
thus creating another area of duplication and operational
ineffectiveness.
On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis initiated the homeland
security information network, HSIN-Intel. This was a 3-month
pilot effort of multi-directional sharing assessments between
state and local intelligence professionals and the Department
of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, of
timely, accurate, actionable information at the unclassified,
for-official-use-only level.
This pilot gave local and state officials the opportunity
to provide input into the business process, as well as the
functionality of the system, and a steering group comprised of
local and state officials wrote and approved the charter. This
pilot was extended for a second 3 months, and then the steering
group recommended turning this into an operational community of
interest.
This collaborative effort between state and local created a
true community of interest that encompassed a usable network of
intelligence professionals, analyst-to-analyst collaboration,
and a continuing partnership between local, state and federal
intelligence communities. This community has created trust
relationships that ultimately is a more powerful tool than any
network or portal, and these relationships will remove the
resistance to sharing information that has plagued government
response in the past, thereby pooling together information form
all pertinent intelligence sources to effect a decisive
response.
This community of interest now has 14 member states, and it
is expected to double by the end of this fiscal year, and is a
perfect example of local, state and federal agencies working
together in an effort to meet the needs of all those involved.
Recommendations. In order to be a true intelligence-led
policing model, local, state and federal analysts must be able
to see all information and intelligence. If analysts are
provided only a couple of pieces of the puzzle, we will never
be able to see the overall picture. Local, state, tribal and
federal agencies, as well as private industry, have individual
pieces, and we must have an IT mechanism, as well as trusted
relationships, to put these pieces together.
Currently, state and local analysts are provided access to
a wide range of unclassified systems, to include some of the
ones that I spoke of before, but we have limited access to
classified systems such as the homeland secure data network.
Local, state and federal unclassified initiatives must be
incorporated to meet the needs of everyone involved in homeland
security and to improve operational effectiveness. Local and
state intelligence professionals must also be given the same
opportunity as their federal counterparts regarding the access
to classified systems.
[The statement of Sergeant Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of 1stSgt Lee Miller
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee.
My name is Lee Miller and I am a 15-year member of the Virginia
State Police. I currently coordinate the day-to-day operations of the
Virginia Fusion Center. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today
regarding the Homeland Security Information Network. There have been
several reports written regarding the numerous federal networks that
are available to promote information sharing among local, state, and
federal agencies and private industry. These reports discussed
practices that were not utilized in the implementation of the Homeland
Security Information Network and recommendations to improve
coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and local and
state initiatives. In my testimony, I will discuss some of these
issues, but I will concentrate on collaborative efforts that will
enhance information sharing as well as Department of Homeland Security
initiatives that have produced positive results in order to move
towards a better information sharing platform.
The Primary Mission of the Virginia Fusion Center is to fuse
together key resources from local, state, and federal agencies and
private industries to facilitate information collection, analysis, and
sharing in order to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and all other
forms of criminal activity. The secondary mission of the Virginia
Fusion Center is to support the Virginia Emergency Operations Center by
centralizing information and resources to provide a coordinated and
effective response in the event of an attack or natural disaster. After
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies were
forced to meet the informational demands created by the increased focus
on terrorism. As a result, the resources needed to provide proactive
intelligence operations have increased exponentially, thus compelling
law enforcement agencies to consider the concept of a Fusion Center.
In order to meet our mission, the Virginia Fusion Center utilizes a
vast array of networks and databases to assist in the fusion process.
These separate systems provide information and intelligence relevant to
situational awareness as well as providing the ability to identify
trends, patterns and targets that enhances the ability of law
enforcement to be pro-active instead of re-active. Some of the networks
that the Virginia Fusion Center monitors during our day-to-day
operations are the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),
Department of Justice's Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Federal
Protective Services Law Enforcement portal, Homeland Secure Data
Network (HSDN), Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET),
Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) as well as systems
developed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. As stated in previous
reports, the number of systems that are available causes duplication
and does not promote an effective business process. These systems also
provide the Virginia Fusion Center an avenue for disseminating
information and intelligence to our different partners. In order to
reach all of our partners, our information must be submitted to
multiple networks and systems thus creating another area of duplication
and operational ineffectiveness.
Moving Forward
On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) initiated the Homeland Security
Information Network State and Local Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) Community
of Interest (COI). This was a three month pilot effort for the multi-
directional sharing assessments between state and local intelligence
professionals and Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A) of timely, accurate, actionable
information at the unclassified, For Official Use Only level. This
pilot gave local and state officials the opportunity to provide input
into the business process and functionality of the system, and a
Steering Group comprised of local and state officials wrote and
approved the charter. This pilot was extended for a second three
months, and then the Steering Group recommended turning this into an
operational Community of Interest. This collaborative effort created a
true Community of Interest that encompassed a useable network of
intelligence professionals, analyst to analyst collaboration and a
continuing partnership between local, state and federal intelligence
communities. This community has created trusted relationships that
ultimately is a more powerful tool than any network or portal and these
relationships will remove the resistance to sharing information that
has plagued government response in the past, thereby pooling together
information from all pertinent intelligence sources to effect a
decisive response. This Community of Interest now has fourteen member
states, and it is expected to double by the end of this fiscal year,
and is a perfect example of local, state and federal agencies working
together in an effort to meet the needs of all those involved.
Recommendations
In order to be a true Intelligence led policing model, local, state
and federal analysts must be able to see all information and
intelligence. If analysts are provided only a couple pieces of the
puzzle, we will never be able to see the overall picture. Local, state,
tribal and federal agencies as well as private industry have individual
pieces, and we must have an IT mechanism as well as trusted
relationships to put these pieces together. Currently, state and local
analysts are provided access to a wide range of unclassified systems,
to include the Homeland Security Information Network, but have limited
access to classified systems such as the Homeland Secure Data Network
(HSDN). Local, state and federal unclassified initiatives must be
incorporated to meet the needs of everyone involved in homeland
security and to improve operational effectiveness. Local and state
intelligence professionals must also be given the same opportunity as
their federal counterparts regarding the access to classified systems.
In the past, analysts from the federal intelligence community primarily
focused on information contained in classified systems, while local and
state analysts focused on information contained in unclassified
systems. Using this system, how will we ever be able to see the overall
picture?
Conclusion
Virginia and other state and local agencies understand the
importance of protecting classified information to include sources and
methods that are contained in these reports. The problem that still
exists is the over classification of information and intelligence and
the lack of tear lines that could be provided to local and state law
enforcement in addition to other agencies and private Industry with a
homeland security role. These tear lines could provide valuable
tactical and strategic information that could assist in the overall
mission of these entities. The ability of local and state law
enforcement agencies to mitigate potential threats in their communities
is hampered because of the lack of actionable information and
intelligence. In all likelihood, a police officer in one of our
communities will encounter a potential terrorist during their normal
tour of duty, and without the information needed to perform their
duties; they will not be able to identify the possible threat. The
Federal Intelligence community needs to understand the importance of
either providing local and state law enforcement agencies with a valid
``right and need'' access to some of these networks or the ability to
provide tear lines through a standard business process and network. The
Homeland Security Information Network would be a perfect network to
disseminate these tear lines in ``real time'' so that local and state
law enforcement agencies could have the ability to receive tactical and
strategic information and intelligence to assist them in their homeland
security role.
Ms. Harman. Sergeant, I am going to cut you off there.
Point well-taken, and you should know that this subcommittee is
working on both reforming our classification and our pseudo-
classification systems, and making certain that you get the
information you need.
I just want to get through this testimony, and we will see
where we are with votes, and give you more time.
Inspector Lindquist?
STATEMENT OF BARRY S. LINDQUIST, INSPECTOR, OFFICE OF STATEWIDE
INTELLIGENCE, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Lindquist. Good morning, and thank you for the
opportunity to speak.
One poster doesn't fit all.
I am departing--for the sake of brevity.
Florida has been deeply committed to HSIN as HSIN-Florida.
We have developed with the cooperation and support of DHS. Yes,
there has been a bumpy road, but we have a mechanism of sharing
for multiple disciplines from our domestic security task force.
It includes law enforcement and critical infrastructure, fire,
public information and health.
Recently, our state Department of Health has made a
decision to vacate a site that they had been using to share
response plans for health, and put it on HSIN-Florida. A HSIN-
Florida is working. It would be very detrimental for us for any
reduction in services or change in the program. If we all the
help desk, the help desk is there.
We have asked for improvements. We have received those. The
common operating picture, that has been great. I want to mirror
what Lee has said about intelligence and analysis, and HSIN-
Intel. It has started. It is a collaboration, and it is working
extremely well. I think it is the direction that the committee
like to see.
We have been guarding that deployment to those intelligence
professionals around the state that are important.
[The statement of Mr. Lindquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barry S. Lindquest
Good morning Madam Chair and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee.
My name is Barry Lindquist and I am a member of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). I am an Inspector assigned to
Domestic Security matters in the FDLE Office of Statewide Intelligence
and the Florida Fusion Center. In this position, I have been the
primary point of contact for the Department of Homeland Security for
matters relating to HSIN.
Introduction
Florida was one of the first states to pilot the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) and since implementation in early 2005,
HSIN-Florida has become a cornerstone in our information sharing
strategy. Additionally, the HSIN State and Local Intelligence Community
of Interest (HSIN-Intel COI) is currently becoming our primary method
of sharing information with the Department of Homeland Security, office
of Intelligence and Analysis.
Homeland Security in Florida is called Domestic Security and is
structured around our multi-disciplinary Domestic Security Task Force
(DSTF). The DSTF structure is further subdivided into seven Regional
DSTF components (RDSTF) with an FDLE Special Agent in Charge and a
regional Sheriff or Police Chief as Co-Chairs of their RDSTF.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Florida RDSTF Regions
Each RDSTF had components that include the following workgroups;
Law Enforcement,
Fire,
Emergency Management,
Health and Medical,
Schools and Education,
Communications Critical Infrastructure, and
Public Information.
HSIN-Florida
When the Department of Homeland Security first approached Florida
in early 2005 with the opportunity to pilot HSIN, we already had a
statewide anti-terrorism intelligence database named InSite and an
Internet website named ThreatCom that was used to share information and
alert our task force members about events and potential threats. Both
of these systems were created in 2002 and were well integrated into our
Domestic Security information sharing strategy. The challenge that HSIN
presented was determining how it could be effectively integrated with
our existing systems without confusing our partners.
Florida worked with the Department of Homeland Security to simplify
and tailor the system to meet our needs, HSIN-Florida has four main
components;
Home Page
Announcements
Recently uploaded products
Calendar
Situational Awareness--a discussion thread
DHS Documents--Recently uploaded documents contained
in the government.hsin.gov site
Document Library--that has a statewide document
library and libraries for each of our seven regions.
Using this basic structure, HSIN-Florida allows every user to view
and upload the documents. Every user has the ability to decide what
they believe is important and share their information with other users.
In support of our RDSTF structure, Regional HSIN-Florida Administrators
have the ability to edit and delete content, and also nominate and
validate new users into the system.
Every HSIN-Florida user is asked to complete an application for
access to the system. Our Regional Administrators ensure a background
is conducted before user access is granted. The Regional Administrators
are also responsible for ensuring that users are removed from the
system when their position changes and no longer justifies access.
Since HSIN-Florida was deployed, significant enhancements have been
made in the Common Operating Picture (COP) that is deployed in many of
the national HSIN sites. Florida did not include COP in HSIN-Florida
because of our strong partnership with the Department of Emergency
Management which has its own system for managing events in Florida. In
its new and improved form, Florida has a pending request to include COP
in HSIN-Florida to better inform our task force members about national
incidents managed by DHS.
HSIN_State and Local Intelligence
Florida also participated in the HSIN-State and Local Intelligence
(HSIN-Intel) pilot initiated by the DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A). Our goal in this pilot was to establish a known and
trusted community of intelligence professionals that could collaborate
together and work with I&A on common Homeland Security matters.
The goal of HSIN-Intel is to provide DHS and selected State and
local participants with a trusted and centralized information sharing
mechanism for the exchange of controlled, unclassified intelligence and
threat related information. In Florida, HSIN-Intel is being deployed in
the Florida Fusion Center and with our other fusion centers around the
state.
Other HSIN National Communities of Interest
Florida has not widely deployed other HSIN national communities of
interest. The Florida information sharing strategy focuses on
collecting and analyzing information received from our DSTF regions and
ensuring the accuracy and validity of this information as it flows from
Florida to our national partners.
National communities of interest such as Emergency Management have
been deployed to the Florida Department of Emergency Management. The
Law Enforcement community of interest has been made available to some
of our state and local Fusion centers and Intelligence partners.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for that testimony.
Captain Tomblin?
STATEMENT OF CAPT BRIAN TOMBLIN, MILITARY LIAISON, OFFICE OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, TENNESSEE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Captain Tomblin. Thank you, ma'am.
I am going to follow along with Barry and depart from
written comments, and just state that, like Florida, Tennessee
has adopted HSIN, and has followed the DHS lead and invested
its information sharing solely on HSIN.
The HSIN-Tennessee system is very robust. We have five
separate portals, an emergency management portal, a critical
infrastructure portal, and then the law enforcement portal.
There is a portal for training exercises and for running
operations that you all want out there on the live portal.
So what I would say to you is that HSIN-Tennessee is a
stand-alone system that works for us. It is an information-
sharing tool. We took it from DHS as they presented it. We
modified it to meet our needs. I am confident in the current
leadership, especially Theresa Phillips. She is very
aggressive, very open. We have looked to her to reestablish the
state working groups, and that is one of the big
recommendations.
Everything that we have issue-wise revolves around
communications. Reestablishing those state working groups,
listening to the states and what their needs are, will just
further this system. We are very happy with it at the state
level. My commissioner has only one fear, and that fear is that
it would go away, and he has invested everything in it.
So I would leave you with that, and I thank you for this
opportunity.
[The statement of Captain Tomblin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Maj Brian K. Tomblin
I. Introduction
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and discuss the performance of the Homeland Security Information
Network in the state of Tennessee.
The State's ability to share information quickly and accurately
over a secure network, among various communities of interests, is
crucial in order to prevent, protect, deter and respond to potential
criminal and terrorist acts. The state of Tennessee has followed the
Department of Homeland Security's lead and invested its information
sharing holdings and strategies on the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN) platform. The Homeland Security Information Network--
Tennessee (HSIN-TN) provides connectivity for public service
disciplines to receive and share information throughout Tennessee.
Through a successful partnership with the Department of Homeland
Security, HSIN--TN is the secure information sharing network for the
state and provides users the ability to interface with the state all
crimes intelligence and information fusion center.
II. HSIN--TN Portal Development
In February 2005, TN was selected to participate in the pilot phase
of HSIN development at the state level. Recognizing the state did not
have the ability to gather, review and disseminate information via a
common system, the TN Office of Homeland Security (OHS) developed
information sharing goals for the state and an aggressive timeline for
the deployment of the HSIN--TN across Tennessee. Working directly with
the IT contractor, Mantech-IST, the initial TN portals where developed.
A HSIN-TN pre-pilot was conducted in August 2005 and a pilot phase was
conducted in September to allow TN OHS users to become familiar with
the system. Consequently, HSIN became a viable tool for communication
with Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina. Communicating via the HSIN
portals, Tennessee was able to provide the Louisiana State Police with
logistical support and the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security was
able to route an assistance call received from a relative in Knoxville
to the Louisiana State Police which resulted in the successful rescue
of a family trapped in a flooded attic.
The initial HSIN--TN training of law enforcement occurred in
November, 2005. A fusion center initiative conference was held in
December 2005. During this conference, HSIN--TN was briefed to the
state and local law enforcement leadership as the information sharing
platform for the TN fusion center.
III. HSIN--TN Training
In January 2006, I was named the HSIN-TN program manager and tasked
with developing a HSIN training program for the state. Based on
Tennessee geography and the established 11 TN Homeland Security
Districts; a regional, east to west fielding plan was derived. Training
requirements were submitted to the primary HSIN training contractor,
MTCI, and training began in east TN at Johnson City in March 2006 and
concluded in Memphis in August 2006. This initial fielding plan
resulted in the training of over 783 individual users, representing
over 330 agencies.
The initial training strategy was to train local, state and federal
law enforcement officers in order to develop a user base that would
share critical information with each other and provide the fusion
center with all source criminal data. While reviewing the initial east
TN training, a training gap was identified. We determined the state was
missing an opportunity to get various public service disciplines
together for training which would further promote interaction and
information sharing between law enforcement and non-law enforcement
partners. Training throughout the remaining homeland security districts
was then offered to additional communities of interest (COI) such as
emergency management, fire and rescue and selected critical
infrastructure partners.
IV. HSIN--TN Portals
In June 2006, DHS recognized the HSIN--TN portals as operational
and the portals where considered live and no longer a training
environment. TN currently manages five HSIN state portals; Home, Law
Enforcement, Critical Infrastructure, Training and OHS. All portals are
now monitored by the TN Fusion Center, a joint partnership between the
TN OHS and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations (TBI). The portals
allow all communities of interest users to share information at the
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) level based on their occupational
discipline and provides secure instant messaging via the JABBER
collaboration tool. HSIN--TN users can contribute products to the
appropriate portal, request information or operational support from the
fusion center, research or contribute to the document library and
access additional DHS portals via hotlinks. Since becoming operational,
we have increased our user base to more than 1000 trained users
representing over 500 agencies. HSIN training continues on a weekly
basis as the state strives to make HSIN ? TN the focal point for
information sharing in Tennessee.
V. Current Challenges
While HSIN--TN provides the state with an excellent ability and
resource, frustration is still experienced on managing and maintaining
the system at the state level. As the HSIN--TN program manager, I have
administration and community of interests rights but these are limited
to only the ability to nominate and validate new users and to remove
information from the portals. I cannot effectively manage the user data
base. There is no capability to monitor use of the portal, review the
user data base or to delete users when they no longer require access to
the portals. Once the user is validated into the system, I loose the
ability monitor and maintain the state user accounts. However, I have
been briefed that a new account management tool is reportedly near
fielding.
The line of communication between the state and a viable DHS HSIN
representative is convoluted. Tennessee has a Stakeholder Relationship
Manager assigned through Sim-G Technologies but when request for
support or changes to the portals are requested they often go
unresolved or unanswered. When HSIN was first deployed at the State
level it included a GIS mapping product. Shortly after our state
portals where considered functional and after a third of the state had
been trained, a decision was made to upgrade the HSIN system. The
concept was to standardized portal configuration in order to facilitate
faster deployment to new state partners. While this was understandable,
the changes to the portal where made without input from the pilot
states and included changes that were not discussed with the pilot
states. One of those critical changes was the decision to drop the GIS
mapping product. A reliable mapping tool is crucial to the success of
the portal and provides the smaller departments and agencies a
capability they normally could not afford. I have been briefed that a
replacement mapping tool will be available on the state portals in the
future.
When the pilot states were identified, an HSIN state working group
was developed to allow pilot states to meet together quarterly and
discuss operational and technical issues with each other and the DHS
HSIN staff and contract support. These meetings were very beneficial
and allowed the states to adopt best practices and identify common
issues and problems with the system. After only two meetings, the
working group was dissolved without explanation and changes to the
portals where implemented without input from the states. Information
technology (IT) support is now handled through the Change Request
Registration and Tracking System (CHaRTS). This automated system for
requesting changes to the portals works but it is hard to explain
complex technical issues through written communication. As the portals
are operational, the State cannot afford to submit changes through and
automated system, problems need to be rapidly worked in real time. In
the past, by talking directly to the IT contract support, simple
changes could be made over the phone and reviewed by the state in a
matter of minutes, not days or weeks.
VI. Recommendations
The problems and frustrations currently experienced with HSIN are
all directly related to a lack of communication and clear guidance
between DHS and state partners. Re-establishing the state and local
working groups will greatly enhance the states ability to communicate
common issues and develop working solutions for implementation. Working
together as a team to develop policy and procedures, lessons learned
and best practices, and to review, test and implement new technical
advances and solutions is critical to the continued success between DHS
and its state partners.
VII. Conclusion
The Homeland Security Information Network is a critical component
of the information sharing system of Tennessee. Tennessee has taken
this information sharing tool and forged it into the secure information
sharing network for the state. Continued cooperation and interaction
between DHS and its state partners are crucial to the continued success
of this system. Re-establishing the state working groups, implementing
account management tools and streamlining the IT support will help to
ensure the stability and viability of HSIN for years to come.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Captain. I appreciate your
testimony.
You can see the votes have been called again, but I am try
to get in a couple of questions.
Obviously, two of you think this is more suitable for your
needs, and two of you think that you have been able to use the
HSIN network, at least in your states, in a way that is
satisfactory. I am not sitting up here to referee this. Let me
ask a question and just if any of you disagrees with this
statement, please say so.
Do you all agree that your needs are what these systems
need to satisfy? Yes or no? That the set of criteria that need
to be met have to originate from you, because you are the folks
who have to take the information and make it operational in
your areas. Do you agree with that?
Okay. I think it was Inspector Lindquist who said one size
does not fit all. Does everyone agree with that proposition? Or
do you think one size should fit all?
Nobody disagrees with that?
Everyone was here when the GAO issued its report in our
prior panel. Does anyone want to comment in a sentence on the
findings of the GAO report, which was fairly harsh, at least in
terms of duplication? Does anyone disagree with the thrust of
those findings?
Nobody disagrees? Mr. Lindquist?
Mr. Lindquist. No, I don't.
Ms. Harman. No. Okay. So the goal here, I hope, is to start
at your end, figure out if there is commonality of need, and I
don't mean one size fits all, but how best to figure this out.
And then try to move forward, eliminating duplication, waste,
inefficiencies, with products that suit your needs.
Does anyone disagree with that? No.
We had conversation in the last panel about mechanisms to
do that. You all heard those conversations. Does anyone have a
specific suggestion about how the consultation should work?
Captain Harris. Madam Chairman, I have just a suggestion on
that, not how the mechanism should work, but it is very
important to have a single sign-on for those systems because
those systems are all important, but a single sign-on feature
is very relevant.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Does anyone disagree with that? No.
Okay, the technologically challenged--that would be me--I
would say ``hurray,'' because obviously the goal is to get
everything you need quickly. Correct? And make sure that you
are not missing anything. Right?
Sergeant Miller. A perfect world for us is a one-stop-one-
shop place.
Ms. Harman. Right. That would meet your problem, would it
not, Inspector Lindquist, because if you could log-on through
the system you are comfortable with and get the rest of the
information, you would be happy about that. Right?
Mr. Lindquist. I think a single log-on is a good idea, but
it is not the only solution. I think part of what we need to do
is define how the information is going to flow within a state,
because the states want to be able to vet and verify the
information as it flows from the state to the national
community, and to its partners, so that we don't end up
erroneously tracing down old information that occurred last
week.
Ms. Harman. Hear, hear. I agree with that as well. Nobody
disagrees with that, right? But accurate, actionable and timely
information is what you need. Everyone agrees, and everyone
agrees we have some work to do to get that for all
jurisdictions in a form that is useful. Correct?
All right. I am going to leave this panel there. I am very
sorry about this, but you can hear all the bells and whistles.
Unfortunately, other members could not get back, but if you
can stay for a few more minutes, staff is here and if there are
additional questions we have, they will be asked informally,
because we don't have a mechanism in this committee to do staff
questioning of witnesses. I would hope that could occur.
You are all enlisted in this war against those who would
harm us in America. Let me just add this one sentence. I have
been saying for some time, and it was before the most recent
Fort Dix issue, that they are here. There are people in our
country who are trained, somewhat loosely coordinated, and
intending to attack us. We need our best people on the case. In
most cases, they are you, and the people who work with you.
These attacks could occur anywhere at any time, and if you
don't have the training and information you need to know what
to look for and what to do, we will not prevent and disrupt
them. So our goal on this subcommittee is to get you that
training and information ASAP.
Obviously, we need you as part of the group that fixes
systems that are not working properly, because these products
have to suit your needs. That is the absolute priority, and I
give you my promise that on a bipartisan basis here, everyone
is intent on getting this right, and with your help, we will.
Thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]