[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES AND COORDINATION OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE TEAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS,
AND RESPONSE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-33
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
NITA M. LOWEY, New York MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
Columbia DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
Islands Officio)
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Craig Sharman, Director
Nichole Francis, Counsel
Brian Turbyfill, Clerk
Heather Hogg, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response..................... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response........... 2
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress from
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 36
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York.......................................... 38
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress from
the District of Columbia....................................... 34
The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas........................................ 40
Witnesses
Mr. Bill Devir, Commander of Disaster Medical Assistance Team,
Ohio-5, Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Preapred Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Fred Endrikat, Special Operations Chief, Philadelphia Fire
Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Bob Powers, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Disaster
Operations Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA):
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Preapred Statement............................................. 6
Mr. Charles Prather, Chief, Orange County Fire Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES AND
COORDINATION OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
----------
Wednesday, May 9, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cuellar, Lowey, Norton,
Christensen, Etheridge, Rodriguez, and Dent.
Mr. Cuellar. [Presiding.] Good morning. The subcommittee
will come to order.
This subcommittee is meeting today to assess the roles and
responsibilities and coordination of the federal response teams
deployed in the wake of a catastrophic incident.
Good morning. And, first of all, on behalf of the members
of the subcommittee, I would like to welcome our panel.
At the outset, I would like to express concern about the
timeliness of receiving the witnesses' testimony. It is
important that all witnesses before--the committee rules
requires that we receive the testimony 48 hours in advance of
the hearings so members will have ample time to review and
develop follow-up questions. I hope this rule will be honored
in the future.
For my ranking member, Mr. Dent, if it is okay with you, I
would ask the committee's staff to sit down with our FEMA folks
and let's go through the process on how this works, what we can
do to make sure this doesn't happen again, because it is not
the first time. If it would have been the first time, we would
not be doing this.
But I would ask that FEMA, the governmental liaison, sit
down with Graig and the committee staff to go over this
because, again, if it was the first time, Mr. Dent, I would
just make that statement and move on, but it is one of those
bad recurring dreams that keeps coming back and back and back
again.
So I would ask the staff to sit down with FEMA and any
other Homeland Security part that is under our jurisdiction to
make sure that we get these procedural issues out of the way.
On a positive note, we are glad that all of you are here to
discuss the coordination and the capabilities of the federal
response teams that are up in response to this type of
incident, whether they are terrorist attacks or natural
disasters. I look forward to hearing testimony from Mr. Powers
from FEMA, so we can get an overview of how disaster operations
will work in the new FEMA.
I also look forward to an update of how the department's
reforms will impact their ability to quickly deploy assets
before, during and after disasters. Key assets that FEMA can
call on in the wake of a disaster are the urban search and
rescue system and the national disaster medical system. These
programs form the backbone of a coordinated federal response
and we need to make sure that they have the resources and the
management they need.
Specifically, I am interested in looking at how these teams
fit into the overall FEMA command structure, especially the
NDMS, which was transferred from FEMA to the Department of
Health and Human Services at the beginning of the year. The
issues identified in the wake of Katrina highlighted the
discrepancies over who is responsible for bringing response
capabilities to bear in these types of emergencies.
At the same time, there were many success stories that came
out of that disaster. The work of the urban search and rescue
and the disaster medical assistance teams were definitely among
them. Congress must ensure that these teams are fully funded,
adequately trained, and that each team member is given the
equipment necessary to perform and function at the highest
level possible.
It is unsettling that after the devastating Oklahoma City
bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the Hurricane Katrina, that funding
levels to support the urban search and rescue systems have
drastically decreased from $66 million in fiscal year 2003 to
$25 million in fiscal year 2007. We can all agree that we need
to make and take the appropriate steps to provide consistent
funding, as these emergency responders are vital in preserving
and protecting the lives and the property of American citizens.
Finally, it has not gone unnoticed by this committee that
the Department of Homeland Security will likely not meet the
June 1 deadline in producing the final version of the national
response plan, which will reflect lessons learned from Katrina.
Again, I emphasize there have been several deadlines that have
not been met, and this is another one that has not been met by
the agency.
Again, we are interested not in a ``gotcha``-type of
politics, but we are more interested in how we can work
together so we can all do our job together. With the 2007
hurricane season only a few weeks away, we anxiously anticipate
its release.
I want to thank the witnesses again for their testimony.
The chair will now recognize the ranking minority member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent,
for any statement that he might have.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This hearing continues the subcommittee's oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to strengthen the
capabilities of FEMA and implement the post-Katrina emergency
management format of last year.
One of the lessons learned from the response to Hurricane
Katrina was that the federal government lacked a clear incident
command structure, and that information and situational
awareness were insufficient.
The emergency response teams we are going to discuss today
were established to help improve situational awareness and
support state and local response operations. These teams
provide federal assistance to help integrate federal, state,
local, tribal and nongovernmental response efforts in the early
stages of a catastrophic incident. It is my understanding that
some of FEMA's response teams will soon be restructured to meet
the requirements of last year's reform legislation.
I look forward to discussing the steps FEMA has taken in
the interim to improve its responsiveness with Mr. Bob Powers,
FEMA's assistant administrator for disaster operations. I also
look forward to hearing from him on when and how FEMA
anticipates the current emergency response teams will be
transformed into incident management assistance teams, and how
this will affect the roles of other existing federal response
assets.
As the chairman has mentioned today, too, also here with us
will be Mr. Fred Endrikat, the special operations chief of the
Philadelphia Fire Department; Mr. Charles Prather, chief of the
Orange County Fire Authority; and Mr. William Devir, commander
of Ohio's disaster medical assistance team.
So I do look forward to discussing with each of these
gentlemen their perspectives on the coordination of federal
emergency response teams with other response efforts by state
and local governments. I also hope to discuss with them ways in
which Congress can help strengthen this important surge
capacity for disaster response and whether legislation is
necessary to do so.
So I thank the witnesses for taking the time to be here
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Dent.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
I ask at this time for unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Rodriguez, be permitted to join our hearing and
ask the witnesses questions.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
I now welcome the panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Bob Powers, who is the acting
deputy assistant administrator for disaster operations at the
Federal Emergency Management Agency within the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. Prior to his current post, Mr. Powers
served as the operations branch chief, response division for
FEMA, where he was responsible for incident response.
Our second witness is Mr. Fred Endrikat, who is the special
operations chief of the Philadelphia Fire Department. The chief
has been a Philadelphia firefighter for 32 years. He also
serves FEMA's urban search and rescue national response system
in concurrent duty assignments as the national task force
leaders representative, incident support team operations chief,
task force leader for the Pennsylvania Task Force 1.
Our third witness is Mr. Charles Prather, who is the chief
of the Orange County Fire Authority. Chief Prather began
serving in this capacity in 1997, and is responsible for the
daily operations of one of the largest fire operations in the
state of California.
Our fourth witnesses is Mr. William Devir, who is the
commander for the disaster medical assistance team, Ohio 5, for
the national disaster medical system for the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. Commander Devir is the founding
member of the Team Ohio 5 and has served as team commander
since 1991.
We are all pleased to have you present. Again, welcome.
Without objection, the witnesses' full testimony will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize the statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Mr. Powers.
Mr. Powers, if you want to get started?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. POWERS, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, DISASTER OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, FEMA
Mr. Powers. Good morning, Chairman Cuellar, Mr. Dent,
members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today.
I am Robert Powers, the acting deputy assistant administrator
for disaster operations at FEMA. I look forward to working with
you to continue our joint efforts to enhance the capabilities
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the Department of
Homeland Security.
In May 2006, as FEMA was being scrutinized in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, the president nominated and the Senate
confirmed David Paulison as the FEMA director. Mr. Paulison's
vision for a new FEMA is for FEMA to become the nation's
preeminent emergency management and preparedness agency. We are
working hard, very hard, to achieve this vision, especially as
it relates to strengthening the full spectrum of disaster
operational capabilities, including developing more robust
national and regional emergency response teams.
The post-Katrina reviews, including those from the White
House, the Senate, the House, and others, and the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management and Reform Act of 2006 identified a number
of candidate areas to improve our disaster response
capabilities. An overarching theme among the recommendations
was the need to strengthen command, control, coordination and
unity of effort, and to be able to field a new generation of
rapidly deployable federal emergency teams.
Drawing upon our extensive disaster response experience,
lessons learned, and these recommendations, we are taking
definitive steps to improve incident management to ensure
greater operational awareness and to become more proactive in
our approach. FEMA employs a network of operations and
coordination centers to help integrate and manage disaster
response, maintain situational awareness, and develop a common
operating picture.
These centers facilitate information-sharing, oversee
resource allocations, and prepare consolidated, consistent and
accurate reports on the status of incidents, responses or
potential events for use by FEMA and department leadership.
Operationally, FEMA maintains very close connectivity with the
Department of Homeland Security through the national operations
center, as well as with national and regional federal,
military, state, and local operations centers, including our
joint field offices responding to a disaster, state fusion
centers, and joint terrorism task forces.
To manage our situational awareness, coordination and alert
and notification needs, FEMA has a network of centers,
including the national response coordination center located at
FEMA headquarters. It is one of the five component elements of
the DHS national operations center. The NRCC is a multiple
agency coordination center that integrates overall federal
emergency response actions, coordinates FEMA operational
activities, and manages disaster response from the federal
interagency.
Regional response and coordination centers are located in
each of our 10 FEMA regions. The RRCCs are multi-agency centers
that coordinate tactical response actions and support the
regional administrator at joint field offices located within
their region, and the FEMA administrator. The FEMA operations
center located at Mount Weather serves as a critical note in
the nation's warning and communications network.
As part of our mandate to provide critical assistance to
state, local and tribal governments, we can activate and deploy
a number of response teams and assets. They include a national-
level emergency response team called an ERT-N. It is deployed
by FEMA headquarters for incidents of national significance and
major disasters; advanced element emergency response teams,
called ERT-As, are located in each of the 10 FEMA regions. They
can be deployed in the early phases of an incident to work
directly with the state and local officials to assess the
disaster impact, to gain situational awareness, to help
coordinate the federal response, and to respond to specific
state requests for assistance.
The federal incident response support team, or FIRST, can
rapidly deploy to or work with state and local officials to
provide preliminary on-scene situational awareness and provide
initial federal support at the local incident commander level
to ensure integrated and interjurisdictional response. Urban
search and rescue task forces can be deployed to assist in
structural collapse rescue. Mobile emergency response support
systems, also called MERS, can be deployed to provide mobile
telecommunications, logistics and operational capabilities.
As directed by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and adopted as
part of our continual improvement process, we are developing a
next-generation of rapidly deployable interagency national and
regional emergency response teams. Unlike our current emergency
response teams, which are staffed on a collateral duty basis,
these new teams will be staffed with a corps of dedicated,
permanent, full-time employees who when not responding to a
disaster, will regularly train and exercise as a unit to
support state and local emergency response, planning, training,
and exercises.
These teams are designed to provide better management
coordination and integration of the federal disaster response,
and when fully operational will replace the existing emergency
teams at both the national and regional levels. We are taking
FEMA in a new direction, one that reflects a broader mission
challenge, a wider set of partners, and a greater depth of
mission perspective. The new FEMA will require new skill sets,
a greater investment in people, and new tools to help ensure
mission success.
The response team upgrades currently underway will position
FEMA to more effectively carry out our core missions to protect
the American public.
Thank you for your time today. I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Powers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert F. Powers
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Thompson, Subcommittee Chairman Cuellar, and Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.
I am Robert F. Powers, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for
the Disaster Operations Directorate at FEMA. I look forward to working
with this Subcommittee and Congress to continue improvements to enhance
the capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Based on our experiences
and lessons learned over the years, we are building a new FEMA to
further improve our Nation's all-hazards preparedness, protection,
response, recovery and mitigation systems and capabilities. We are
taking the first steps in what will be a multi-year effort to
significantly increase FEMA's core operational capabilities and
capacity to better serve and protect our Nation and its citizens.
FEMA learned significant lessons from the 2005 Hurricane Season.
Following Hurricane Katrina, the White House recommended in its report,
``The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,'' that
FEMA strengthen operational disaster response capabilities. Similar
recommendations were made in General Accountability Office, Inspector
General, and the Senate and House of Representatives reviews. More
recently, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
(Post-Katrina Act) articulated new expectations for FEMA, established
new leadership responsibilities, brought an expanded scope of missions,
and called for FEMA to undertake a broad range of activities involving
preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation both
before and after terrorist events, natural and manmade disasters.
Specific responsibilities assigned to FEMA in the Post-Katrina Act are
the need to:
partner with non-Federal entities to build a national
emergency management system;
improve Federal response capabilities; and
establish national and regional emergency response
teams.
Our goal is to build a new FEMA that will be the Nation's
preeminent emergency management and preparedness agency. FEMA is
adopting a more forward leaning and collaborative disaster response
approach and, we are strengthening our capabilities across the full
spectrum of operational and support missions. Central to this effort
will be developing more robust National and Regional disaster response
teams that will provide the critical support needed to help State,
local, and tribal governments respond to disasters. It is my pleasure
to discuss with you today in more detail our current disaster response
teams and assets, and actions we are taking to improve our capabilities
to serve the American people.
BACKGROUND
FEMA's primary mission is to reduce the loss of life and property
and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters,
acts of terrorism and other man made disasters by leading and
supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency
management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation. FEMA has the primary responsibility for leading and
coordinating the Federal government's disaster response efforts.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
provides the legal basis for FEMA to provide disaster response and
recovery assistance. Following a major emergency or disaster
declaration by the President, FEMA is authorized to dispatch its own
disaster response teams and assets to provide support or to issue a
Mission Assignment to the National Response Plan (NRP) signatory
Departments and Agencies for support. In addition, FEMA can surge
assets into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event
that is expected to cause a significant impact and result in a declared
emergency or major disaster. This surge allows FEMA to position for a
quick response, but actual assistance cannot be provided until the
Governor requests and a Presidential declaration is made.
The Mission Assignment is the vehicle used by FEMA in a Stafford
Act major disaster or emergency declaration to order immediate, short-
term disaster response assistance from Departments and Agencies to help
State, local, and tribal governments that are overwhelmed by the event
and unable to perform the necessary work. To streamline and facilitate
rapid disaster response, FEMA has also approved a number of Pre-
Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs). In 2006, FEMA had a total of 44
PSMAs in place for support--16 Department of Defense PSMAs and 28
United States Army Corps of Engineers PSMAs. By June 15, 2007, we
expect to complete an additional 141 PSMAs for a total of 185 to
support our disaster response activities.
Disaster response support is coordinated through one or more of the
NRP's 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as the
primary operational-level mechanism supporting FEMA in providing State
and local disaster assistance in functional areas such as
transportation, communications, public works and engineering,
firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public health and
medical services, search and rescue, agriculture, and energy. The 32
Departments and Agencies signatory to the NRP provide substantial
disaster response assistance in their areas of expertise and in essence
become force multipliers for FEMA when assigned missions to support the
disaster response. In addition, FEMA can surge its own teams and assets
into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is
expected to cause a significant impact and result in a declared
emergency or major disaster and can turn to other DHS components such
as the U.S. Coast Guard for assistance. The surge capability allows
FEMA to pre-position for a quick response, but actual assistance cannot
be provided until the Governor requests and a Presidential declaration
is made.
FEMA DISASTER RESPONSE ASSETS
FEMA has multiple disaster response operations centers and teams
that allow us to provide and coordinate disaster response assistance.
As stated above, our approach is to lean forward aggressively in
pushing resources out and sustaining the flow of these resources to
ensure immediate and continued support to the impacted governments.
OPERATIONS CENTERS
FEMA manages a network of FEMA operations centers to coordinate and
sustain response operations, maintain situational awareness and a
common operating picture for DHS and FEMA leadership, facilitate
information sharing between FEMA and non-FEMA entities, and provide
internal and external stakeholders a consolidated, consistent, and
accurate status of on-going incidents, responses, or potential events.
The key components of this network are the National Response
Coordination Center (NRCC) in FEMA Headquarters; the Regional Response
Coordination Centers (RRCC) located in each of the ten FEMA Regions;
the FEMA Operations Center (FOC) located at the Mt. Weather Emergency
Assistance Center; the five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS)
Operations Centers (MOC) located in the States of Massachusetts,
Georgia, Texas, Colorado, and Washington; and the Logistics Response
Center at Headquarters.
NRCC
The NRCC is a multi-agency center that functions as the operational
component of the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) to provide
overall Federal response coordination for Incidents of National
Significance, disaster response operations, and emergency management
program implementation. The NRCC maintains situational awareness
linkages with the RRCCs, State Emergency Operations Centers (EOC),
selected local EOCs in each of the ten FEMA Regions, Regional DHS
components, Regional ESF EOCs, State Fusion Centers, Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, Regional Department of Defense Operations Centers, and
other key operational nodes. The NRCC routinely supports program
implementation and disaster response and resource planning; coordinates
incident management operations; monitors potential or developing
Incidents of National Significance; supports regional and field
components; and provides overall response and resource coordination for
DHS and FEMA. In addition to maintaining a 24/7 Watch Team, the NRCC is
augmented by the ESFs during disaster operations and is responsible
for:
Drafting and distributing operational warnings and
orders;
Monitoring the preparedness of national-level
emergency response teams and resources;
Initiating MAs to other Federal Departments and
Agencies;
Activating and deploying national-level teams and
entities;
Tracking and managing Federal resource allocations;
Coordinating operational response and resource
allocation planning with other Departments and agencies, the
RRCCs, the Joint Field Office (JFO), including the use of
Federal remote sensing/disaster assessment support; and
Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information
and incident reports on resource status.
The Logistics Response Center is part of the NRCC and manages
logistics activities at the Headquarters level. The Mobile Emergency
Response Support Operations Centers also support the FEMA Regions, DHS
Components, State EOC(s) and other MERS deployed command and control
assets while supporting emergency communications in the field during
Incidents of National Significance.
RRCC
The RRCCs are regionally-based multi-agency coordination centers
that perform a complementary role to the NRCC. Operating in the ten
FEMA Regions, the RRCCs provide situational awareness information,
identify and coordinate response requirements, perform capabilities
analysis, and report on the status of Federal disaster response
operations. FEMA is in the process of hiring two new Watch Analysts in
each Region. The RRCCs deploy liaison officers and the Emergency
Response Team-Advanced (ERT-A) to initiate Federal support, facilitate
initial delivery of goods and services to save lives and property and
stabilize local infrastructures, and facilitate prioritizing ``in
theater'' interagency resource allocation and coordination, and support
multiple concurrent disaster operations within the Region. NRCC and
RRCC activations and operations are scalable and based on the nature,
scope, magnitude, and potential impacts of the potential or actual
incident.
Operational Planners have been hired at FEMA Headquarters and will
be hired for the Regions to augment the ability to conduct more
sophisticated analyses in the NRCC and RRCCs. In addition, ongoing
assessments of capabilities are underway to identify shortfalls and
equipment needs in order to improve coordination and connectivity
between the Regions and Headquarters.
FEMA Operations Center (FOC)
The FOC supports the NRCC with a 24-hour watch. The FOC implements
notifications to the Departments and Agencies that support the NRCC as
well as activating emergency management staff. The FOC receives,
analyzes, and disseminates all-hazards information within FEMA and DHS
and to Departments, Agencies, and disaster response team members. The
FOC, in coordination with the National Operations Center, facilitates
distribution of warnings, alerts, and bulletins to the emergency
management community using a variety of communications systems such the
National Warning System, the Washington Area Warning System and the
National-level Emergency Alert System.
DISASTER RESPONSE TEAMS AND ASSETS
To assist State, local and tribal governments overwhelmed in a
disaster situation, FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate can
immediately deploy multiple disaster response teams. We regularly test
the capability of our teams and systems to execute their mission by
participating in multi-agency and State and local exercises. Several
different types of disaster response teams can be deployed to support
disaster response, as discussed below. In accordance with the Post-
Katrina Act, FEMA is developing a next generation of rapidly deployable
interagency National and Regional emergency response teams, tentatively
identified as Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT). These teams
will eventually replace existing Emergency Response Teams at the
National and Regional level and the Federal Incident Response Support
Teams (FIRST) and be designed to provide a forward Federal presence to
better manage and coordinate the National response for catastrophic
incidents. The new IMAT concept is discussed later.
Emergency Response Teams-National (ERT-N)
FEMA's ERT-Ns are deployed by FEMA Headquarters in response to
Incidents of National Significance and major disasters. Their purpose
is to coordinate disaster response activities, coordinate and deploy
key national response assets and resources, provide situational
awareness, and maintain connectivity with key Department of Homeland
Security operations centers and components. ERT-Ns are made up of
approximately 32 individuals from FEMA Headquarters and Regions who
also have day-to-day responsibilities beyond their team assignments.
ERT-Ns are organized according to National Incident Management System/
Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) standards, which provide a
systematic, proactive, and coordinated approach for governmental and
nongovernmental organizations at all levels to effectively prepare for,
prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of
incidents. ERT-N members typically provide the initial staffing cadre
for a JFO supporting a major disaster/Incident of National
Significance. The JFOs and ERT-Ns are supported by FEMA's MERS
detachments which provide support in operations, communications, and
logistics. FEMA is working toward achieving NIMS compliance for all
teams.
Emergency Response Teams-Advanced (ERT-A)
ERT-As are located in the ten FEMA Regions and can be deployed in
the early phases of an incident to work directly with the States to
assess the disaster impact, gain situational awareness, help coordinate
the disaster response, and respond to specific State requests for
assistance. The ERT-As are made up of approximately 25 individuals from
the FEMA Regions, who also have day-to-day responsibilities beyond
their team assignments, and representatives from the ESF Departments
and agencies. The ERT-A initially establishes its presence in the State
Emergency Operations Center and later staffs the JFO to support the
disaster response. The ERT-As deploy with basic communications
capabilities including cell phones, wireless laptop computers, and a
limited number of satellite cell phones. As needed, they can also be
supported by the MERS detachments and their capabilities. A small
component of an ERT-A, the Rapid Needs Assessment Team, is designed to
collect disaster information in field needed to determine more specific
disaster response requirements.
Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST)
FIRSTs are emergency response teams consisting of approximately
five individuals who can be deployed immediately to an incident or
disaster, particularly an Incident of National Significance. We
currently have two FIRSTs, one located in Region IV in Atlanta,
Georgia, and the other in Region V in Chicago, Illinois. They are
designed to serve as the forward component of the ERT-A and will
provide the core preliminary on-scene Federal management that supports
the local incident commander or area commander to ensure an integrated
inter-jurisdictional response. Current Federal incident response
support provided by these teams includes a command vehicle and
communications capabilities consisting of Trac-star, Global Star,
Iridium, high frequency, very high frequency repeaters, CATV, INMARSAT/
BGAN, internet, computers, mobile radios, and GPS Units. The FIRSTs
will ultimately be consolidated into the next generation of emergency
response teams, tentatively being called IMATs, which are being
developed.
Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT)
The HLT is a small team designed to enhance hurricane disaster
response by facilitating information exchange between the National
Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida, and other National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration components and Federal, State, and local
government officials.
Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces
The National US&R Response System is a framework for structuring
local emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response
task forces. The 28 National US&R Task Forces, complete with the
necessary tools, equipment, skills and techniques, can be deployed by
FEMA to assist State and local governments in rescuing victims of
structural collapse incidents or to assist in other search and rescue
missions.
The 28 Task Forces are located throughout the continental United
States. Any Task Force can be activated and deployed by FEMA to a
disaster area to provide assistance in structural collapse rescue, or
may be pre-positioned when a major disaster threatens a community. Each
Task Force must have all its personnel and equipment at the embarkation
point within six hours of activation. The Task Force can be dispatched
and en route to its destination in a matter of hours. There are three
types of task forces. A Type I task force consists of 70 multi-faceted
cross- trained personnel divided into six major functional elements:
search, rescue, medical, hazmat, logistics, and planning, supported by
canines and capable of conducting physical search and heavy rescue
operations in damaged or collapsed reinforced concrete buildings. Each
Task Force can be divided into two 35-member teams to provide 24-hour
search and rescue operations and are completely self-sufficient for 72-
hours. Task Forces are also equipped with convoy vehicles to support
over the road deployments and can be configured into a Light Task Force
to support weather events such as hurricanes and tornadoes and other
similar type incidents. An intermediate size Task Force is currently
under development.
The US&R Task Forces have the following specific capabilities:
Ability to conduct physical search and rescue
operations in damaged/collapsed structures;
Ability to operate in a known or suspected weapons-of-
mass-destruction environment;
Ability to provide emergency medical care for
entrapped victims, Task Force personnel and search canines;
Ability to provide reconnaissance to assess damage and
needs, and provide feedback to other officials;
Ability to provide assessment/shut-off of utilities to
houses and other buildings;
Ability to provide hazardous materials survey/
evaluations;
Ability to provide structural and hazard evaluations
of buildings; and
Ability to stabilize damaged structures, including
shoring and cribbing;
In preparation for the 2007 Hurricane Season, the US&R Hurricane
Concept of Operations has been updated based on lessons learned. Also,
in coordination with our partner agencies, including the U.S. Coast
Guard, Department of the Interior, and Department of Defense, we have
expanded the NRP ESF-9 Annex and to reflect a broader scope of search
and rescue capabilities including water and wilderness search and
rescue.
Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS)
Another key FEMA disaster response asset is the MERS System. The
primary function of MERS is to provide mobile telecommunications,
logistics, and operational capabilities for the on-site management of
disaster response activities. MERS support falls into three broad
areas:
Operations--Mobile Emergency Operations Centers, quick
reaction support, disaster preparedness (HAZMAT) officers, and
MERS security officers.
Communications--satellite, multiple radio vans, High
Frequency line of sight microwave, land mobile radios, voice,
video, and data capabilities, and wide area interoperability.
Logistics
fuel, water, HVAC, life support, transportation, and
power.
MERS provides support required by Federal, State and local
responders in their efforts to save lives, protect property and
coordinate disaster operations. MERS can provide prompt and rapid
multi-media communications, information processing, logistics,
administrative, and operational support. Staged in six strategic
locations, one with offshore capabilities, the MERS detachments can
concurrently support a large JFO and multiple field operating sites
within a disaster area. The telecommunications function is accomplished
using a variety of communications transmission systems including
satellite, high frequency, and microwave line-of-sight interconnected
by fiber optic cables to voice and data switches, local area networks,
and desktop devices such as personal computers and telephones. MERS
Telecommunications assets can be provided for one or multiple locations
within a disaster area and can be used to establish or reestablish
communications connectivity with the public telecommunications system
or Government telecommunications networks. Facilities within a disaster
region can be interconnected by MERS assets to enhance emergency
communications interoperability and austere facilities can be wired for
computer, telephone, and video networks.
FEMA deploys MERS capabilities to support the JFO and provide for
its continuing operational communications and systems needs. FEMA
focuses on providing seamless emergency communications across the full
spectrum of disaster operations. To meet this objective, FEMA provides
a national, tactical and fixed emergency communications capability for
command and control and situational awareness at all levels of
government during emergencies and incidents. Additionally, FEMA can use
supplemental assets to provide Forward Area Wireless access (satellite,
cellular and land mobile radio) to users across the department. This
deployment strategy improves our support to State, county, and local
first responders. As the Nation's preeminent emergency management
agency, FEMA will extend its sphere of influence and assume a leading
National role in the field of disaster emergency communications,
supported by MERS, and in full coordination with all of the Federal
stakeholders and ESFs partners.
Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT)
The NIRT teams are specialized teams managed day-to-day by the
Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They are
operationally controlled by DHS/FEMA when activated to provide expert
technical advice and support in disaster response operations and other
needs involving:
Nuclear weapons accidents and incidents of national
significance;
Radiological accidents;
Lost or stolen radioactive material incidents; and
Acts of nuclear terrorism.
The NIRT consists of assets from DOE and the EPA and, when
activated, operates as a DHS organizational unit under the operational
control of DHS. The NIRT is configured for rapid response to nuclear
accidents or incidents. The NIRT interagency specialized teams are a
quick deployment advance element with specialized equipment and trained
personnel that assess situations and advise local, State and Federal
officials on the scope and magnitude of response needs. NIRT teams have
the capability to conduct specialized search and detection operations
for nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radiological
dispersal devices in urban or other areas on the ground or by special
air support. They support the full spectrum of all nuclear/radiological
incidents or accidents considered to be Incidents of National
Significance including: terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices
or improvised nuclear devices as well as reactor accidents (commercial
or weapons production facilities). NIRT consists of one or all of the
following DOE/NNSA and EPA response assets:
Aerial Measuring System: airborne radiological sensing
and surveying;
Accident Response Group: scientific technical
expertise and equipment;
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center:
operational and logistic management focused on radiological
consequence management;
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability:
computer modeling of transport, diffusion, and disposition of
radioactive and hazardous materials;
Nuclear Emergency Support Team: umbrella team
encompassing Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team, Joint
Technical Operations Team, and the Search Response Team;
Radiological Assistance Program: regional first
response capability;
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS): cadre of physicians, nurses, and other specialists
who provide advanced health physics and medical assistance and
advice needed to treat victims of acute radiation exposure
accidents.
Radiological Emergency Response Team: provided by the
EPA, works with other Federal agencies, State and local
governments, and international organizations to monitor,
contain, and clean up the release while protecting people and
the environment from harmful exposure to radiation.
NIRT assets deploy at the direction of the Secretary of DHS in
connection with an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major
disaster, or other emergency in the United States. A U.S. Secret
Service liaison is detailed to FEMA Headquarters to coordinate NIRT
activities and is working closely with DOE and DHS to better define the
roles and responsibilities of the multiple agencies involved with the
NIRT.
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
The DEST is another specialized interagency U.S. Government team
designed to expeditiously provide expert advice, guidance and support
to the FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) during a WMD incident or credible
threat. The DEST is comprised of crisis and consequence management
components and augments the FBI's Joint Operations Center with tailored
expertise, assessment and analysis capabilities, providing the FBI OSC
with expert advice and guidance in the following areas:
interagency crisis management assistance;
information management support;
enhanced communications capability;
contingency planning for consequence management
support;
explosive devices and their components;
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons/devices and
their components and radiological dispersion devices; and
technical expertise and equipment to operate in a
contaminated environment to conduct threat sampling, take
measurements, and collect tactical intelligence and evidence.
The U.S. Secret Service liaison detailed to FEMA Headquarters who
is coordinating NIRT activities is also responsible for coordinating
DEST activities. The liaison is working closely with the FBI to better
define the roles and responsibilities of the multiple agencies involved
with the DEST.
Next Generation Emergency Response Teams--Incident Management
Assistance Teams (IMAT)
To further enhance disaster response capabilities and ultimately
provide for the three national-level response teams and regional-level
emergency response ``strike'' teams required in the Post-Katrina Act,
FEMA is developing the next generation of rapidly deployable
interagency emergency response teams, tentatively identified as IMATs,
designed to provide a forward Federal presence to facilitate managing
the national response to catastrophic incidents. The primary mission of
a FEMA IMAT will be to rapidly deploy to an incident or incident-
threatened venue, provide leadership in the identification and
provision of Federal assistance, and coordinate and integrate inter-
jurisdictional response in support of the affected State(s) or US
Territory(s). The IMATs will support efforts to meet the emergent needs
of State and local jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide
initial situational awareness for Federal decision-makers; and support
the initial establishment of a unified command.
IMATs will meet the multi-disciplinary needs of emergency
management and in the future may include members from the inter-agency
community. For events where the Secretary determines, or may determine,
that an Incident of National Significance exists, a national-level team
will lead the response, supported by regional-level teams. The National
teams are envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective
Federal presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the State,
coordinate Federal activities, provide initial situational awareness,
and to be self sufficient for a minimum of 48-hours to augment
potentially scarce local resources.
The new IMATs will eventually subsume the existing mission and
capabilities of the FIRST and ERTs and their mission and capabilities
and will incorporate similar leadership, emergency management doctrine,
and operational communications concepts. The national-level and
regional-level teams will be staffed with a core of permanent full-time
employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral duty
basis; will be fully compliant with NIMS and ICS; and will train and
exercise as a unit.
The National IMATs will consist of approximately 26 staff members
and the Regional IMATs each will consist of approximately 15 staff
members. Both teams can be augmented with additional staff as needed.
The teams will be supported by FEMA's MERS elements as described
earlier. The teams are still being designed and decisions on team
assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not yet been
finalized. When not deployed, the teams will train with Federal
partners and provide a training capability to elevate state and local
emergency management capabilities. The teams will also engage in
consistent and coordinated operational planning and relationship-
building with State, local, tribal, and other stakeholders.
Initially, our goal is to establish interim Regional and National
teams utilizing existing personnel within FEMA. The IMATs will be led
by a credentialed Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). Our short-term
plan is to, at a minimum, stand-up one fully operational interim
National IMAT and one fully operational interim Regional IMAT by June
30, 2007. The interim teams will form the nucleus of FEMA's next
generation of emergency response personnel until we hire and train
personnel to staff permanent teams. Our longer-term plan is to have one
permanent National IMAT and three permanent Regional dedicated IMATs by
September 30, 2007.
CONCLUSION
We are taking FEMA in a new direction, one that reflects a broader
mission challenge, a wider set of partners, and a greater depth of
mission perspective. The new FEMA will require new skill sets, a
greater investment in our people, and new tools to ensure more
effective response, recovery and mitigation. We will be more engaged in
operational planning to improve the capabilities of our disaster
response teams, work proactively and collaboratively with our Federal,
State, local, tribal, and private sector partners, and always maintain
focus on our core mission to protect the American people.
Thank you for your time today and I look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Powers, thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Devir to summarize your statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. DEVIR, COMMANDER, DISASTER MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE TEAM OHIO-5
Mr. Devir. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dent, and members of
the subcommittee, I would like to take this opportunity to
speak to you on behalf of the team commanders and the
approximately 8,000 professionals who comprise the 107 response
teams of the national disaster medical system.
You have asked me to address the role of the disaster
medical system team commanders and also the coordination of
federal response teams with state and local operations. To put
this in a global perspective, I gave you a copy of the
assistant secretary for preparedness' response mission and
vision statements, and also the NDMS statements, so you can see
the role that NDMS plays within ASPR.
A disaster medical assistance team, or DMAT, provides
temporary medical care to the victims of disasters or public
health emergencies. In addition to the standard team, which
deploys as a 35-to 50-member unit, and is depicted in the slide
picture that you have, specialized teams and equipment are also
available to provide surgical capability, burn, pediatric, and
mental health specialties, as well as teams that can operate in
hazardous chem-bio environments.
While DMATs comprise the greatest share of the response
teams, NDMS is significantly broader in its overall
capabilities. The slide with the dog shows a veterinary medical
assistance team, or VMAT. VMAT supports states in the care of
animal victims of disasters, but they are also invaluable
resources to the DMATs because they are specialists in zoonotic
diseases, the same diseases which represent the greatest threat
to humans as potential biological weapons.
Disaster mortuary operational response teams, or DMORTs,
provide disaster portable morgue units, forensic specialists,
and family assistance personnel to assist local medical
examiners in working with the victims of mass fatality
incidents and their families. While the teams came from a
number of origins across the country, NDMS has been able to
mold these teams so that they are uniform in their composition,
equipment, credentialing and resource typing.
Today, team members are appointed as federal intermittent
employees, and these appointments provide the process to
validate and maintain professional credentials, and also give
support for the extensive day-to-day team operations of
training and maintaining the specialized equipment that the
teams deploy with. Another key benefit of this appointment is
that it provides the members with USERRA rights at a time of
deployment.
In response to your specific questions, the role of the
DMAT commander has several key elements. The first is serving
as the manager responsible for these intermittent government
employees and the federal property entrusted to them, but also
in representing NDMS in the local community. Occupying a public
or private professional position in the local community is key
because this local private position that they have is their
primary occupation. Sometimes it can be both complementary and
competitive to their role as a team commander.
If they have a disaster in their community, they are
certainly called on to be a participant in their regular job.
But this is, in fact, the rationale of the NDMS response teams:
the ability to bring in outside resources to a community at a
time when they are under duress because of the stress of having
their own disaster.
When deployed to a disaster, NDMS response teams truly
demonstrate their expertise. In a response team deployment,
they are going to be located near traditional medical care,
self-sufficient for 3 days, and work within the national
incident management system. This is key because when the local
medical infrastructure comes back into operation, the team
leadership then coordinates the demobilization of the teams
with the incident command medical officer, HHS regional
personnel in the area, and then they work in turn with the
local, state and local health care officials to decide when it
is best for the team to withdraw.
Once in an assignment, the team is often positioned in
locations where a hospital either formerly operated or where it
is operating today, but the demands exceed what it can do. The
slide that is provided with the patients on the litters is
actually a shot of the New Orleans Airport during Hurricane
Katrina, and one of the DMAT treatment areas that was set up
inside.
As a federal asset, the role of the NDMS response team, we
have to come in and maintain control as we operate in the
incident, but it is not our role to come in and take control of
the incident. That is kind of an important distinction.
I would like to address how the members of Congress can
support us in our mission. The need for our services and the
time that we put out over the last 5 years has significantly
increased. Unfortunately, I can't say the same for our
resources. In fact, our budget has remained flat for several
years now. Looking forward, the new Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act actually adds additional tasks for us by
calling for us to do specific planning for at-risk individuals,
to include the medical reserve corps in our planning and
exercises, and also to have additional training in NIMS and the
national response plan.
I know the fiscal year 2008 HHS budget calls for a modest
$6 million increase in the NDMS budget. I have to say that in
the shadow of some of the most significant disasters this
country has ever witnessed, I think we are in a unique position
to argue the value of this type of preparedness.
We in the NDMS deal with citizens one at a time, whose
daily lives have been shattered by a disaster, either as
patients, victims or the affected family members. This provides
us with a unique hands-on perspective on disaster medicine, and
it provides the federal government with a very unusual personal
role in their care. Providing the best care possible under
austere conditions is our passion, and it is what drives us to
prepare for the call. We are grateful for this opportunity to
serve.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would like to
thank you and the members of your subcommittee for your
attention. I hope I have been able to provide you with a clear
picture of the role and duties of an NDMS team commander, and I
would be happy to answer any questions you might have later.
Thanks.
[The statement of Mr. Devir follows:]
Prepared Statement of William L. Devir
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dent, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I would like to take this opportunity to speak to you on behalf of
the team commanders and the approximately 8,000 professionals who
comprise the 107 response teams of the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS). I hope to be able to convey to you in this short time the
incredible amount of work and sacrifice these members put forth in
their service to our nation, and specifically, to the citizens and
their families impacted by disasters, both natural and man-made.
You have asked me to address the role of Disaster Medical
Assistance Team (DMAT) commanders and the coordination of the federal
response teams with state and local operations. Much of what I will
relay to you will be from the perspective of my own team's experiences,
or the experiences that I have had working with the Management Support
Team, a part of the NDMS Incident Command infrastructure that supports
the teams when deployed in the field.
Since 1979, I have served in the Fire Service and Emergency Medical
Services. In my role as a Fire Department EMS Captain, I recognize the
need for a disaster medical resource outside the immediate state and
local community at the time of a major disaster. NDMS fills that unique
niche with trained, equipped and uniformed disaster medicine
specialists.
I came to the position of DMAT commander 16 years ago, when the
Office of Medical Readiness at Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB)
in Fairborn, Ohio, came to the members of the Greater Miami Valley
Emergency Medical Services Council with a request for our support in
the formation of a Disaster Medical Assistance Team in the Dayton,
Ohio, area. As a Federal Coordinating Center for NDMS, WPAFB was
completing contingency planning in the face of thousands of potential
military chemical casualties returning from the Desert Storm conflict.
The reception and care of military patients is just one facet of NDMS,
while the more common use of the teams has been in caring for civilian
patients, animals, and the deceased following a major disaster. While
DMATs comprise the greatest share of the response team assets, NDMS is
significantly broader in its overall capabilities.
DMATs provide temporary medical care to the victims of disasters or
public health emergencies. In addition to the standard team, which
deploys as a 35-40 member unit, specialized teams and equipment are
available to provide surgical capability, as well as burn, pediatric,
and mental health specialties, and even teams capable of providing care
in hostile Chemical, Biological or Radiological environments.
Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) support states in the
care of animal victims of disasters. They are also an invaluable
resource to DMATs, due to their expertise in the zoonotic diseases,
which represent the greatest threat to humans as potential biological
weapons.
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) provide
Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMU), forensic specialists, and family
assistance personnel to assist local medical examiners in working with
the victims of mass fatality incidents and their families.
I have told you how DMAT OH-5 started, but if you study the
response teams nationally you find a variety of origins that led to
their development. Teams were started by university medical schools, as
the result of a specific mass casualty incident in the community, or as
part of a state's emergency management planning activity to name a few.
Although teams have evolved from a variety of backgrounds, NDMS has
molded the various teams to be uniform in their composition, equipment,
credentialing and resource-typing.
Under the early System, each individual deployment initiated a
hiring process for team members, who were then terminated upon its
completion. Today, team members are appointed as Federal Intermittent
employees, essentially employees who are on the federal rolls ``on
call,'' who then clock in at the beginning of an assignment and clock
out when they return home. These intermittent appointments provide the
process to validate and maintain professional credentials, but also
allow for the extensive day-to-day team operations of training and
maintaining specialized equipment to be able to deploy a team within
hours of activation.
The experience of my team and its development is unique, but it
parallels that of other teams. Our initial challenge was the
recruitment of medical professionals and support personnel to be able
to field a team capable of providing medical care in an austere
environment. With the support of the Greater Dayton Area Hospital
Association, we were able to staff and train a core group, and most of
them still remain as members of the team today. The Veterans Affairs
Medical Center (VAMC) in Dayton provided guidance on obtaining surplus
medical equipment through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Service, and gave us access to VAMC facilities to both store our
equipment and conduct exercises. When we achieved the requisite
staffing and readiness, we became eligible for a federal cache of
medical and logistical equipment. This brought with it its own
challenges to be able to transport, store and maintain the equipment.
Today, as an Operational DMAT, our team has three box trucks and a
6,000 square foot warehouse where we keep our federal vehicles and
equipment.
The Committee's request for my testimony today asked about the role
of the DMAT Commander, and how our services are coordinated with state
and local operations.
The role of the DMAT Commander has several key elements, including:
Serving as the manager responsible for intermittent
government employees under his/her command and the federal
property assigned to the team.
Representing NDMS in the local community; often
serving in a leadership role in disaster planning for public
health and broader emergency management functions.
Occupying a public or private professional position in
the local community: Emergency Physician, Registered Nurse,
Hospital Administrator or Emergency Services Officer.
This latter local community role is the primary occupation of the
team commander. This is important to keep in mind because the local
position is both complementary and competitive to the role of team
commander. Should a disaster or public health emergency occur locally,
this individual more often that not has associated duties in that local
community. This is in essence the reason for the NDMS Response Teams--
the ability to bring in outside medical resources to a community with
insufficient local resources during a disaster. This is further
complicated because many of the NDMS teams started as a local resource,
and continue to play a role in state or local emergency management
plans. The disaster medical resources of this nation are limited in
nature. Participation of a team member in a local employer's disaster
plan, in a state or local emergency management plan, and in an NDMS
Response Team presents a confusing scenario when determining how many
disaster medical personnel truly exist. An emergency planner must be
careful not to count the same responder more than once.
Because NDMS Response Teams often developed as a local resource,
there is an associated local attitude of ``ownership,'' even though
financial support and equipment is essentially federal. This has caused
some states to turn to creating state disaster medical teams in order
to maintain command and control over a local resource. Some of these
teams then compete for the same medical professionals needed by a DMAT.
Better coordination of the state and federal role of a team could
minimize this duplication.
When deployed to a disaster, NDMS Response Teams truly demonstrate
their expertise. Teams follow an organized rotation schedule, and
several times a year pre-plan a roster of available personnel to
respond as needed to disasters. If a disaster occurs, they ``ramp up''
in anticipation, but wait for deployment orders to activate team
members. Variables like distance, the medical services required, and
whether an on call team is impacted by the incident combine to
determine what teams are sent on a deployment. Some events like a
hurricane provide a pre-planning timetable, with the ability to pre-
position teams in a response location close to the storm's landfall,
but safe from the impact of the storm. In fact, significant NDMS
resources were pre-positioned prior to the landfall of Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, then moved to the impacted areas as needs
were identified and the travel routes cleared.
Once in an assignment, the team is often positioned in a location
where a hospital formerly operated, or where the demand for medical
care exceeds what the local medical facility can provide. In a matter
of hours, the DMAT sets up in a parking lot or standing structure, and
starts to see patients. The team is designed to have sufficient
logistical and medical supplies for up to 3 days. In these early hours
and days, it is easy to define our role in medical care, as we are
often the only option available. However, if and when the local
community sees its infrastructure come back into operation, the team
leadership works under the direction of the Incident Command Medical
Officer and the HHS regional personnel, who in turn work with state and
local officials to reach agreement when the team can withdraw. The team
commander plays a key role in this decision, providing input on the
number and acuity of patients seen, and what local alternative
resources are available to treat patients. Incoming teams are often
viewed as the ``cavalry,'' the federal response coming to the rescue in
a disaster. Teams easily take charge in this environment of chaos
because they bring discipline, training, and experience. The role of
the NDMS Response Team, however, is to maintain control in the incident
without taking control of the incident. The teams are a temporary
supplement to that local community's healthcare system.
Most of the committee members are no doubt aware of the shortage of
medical personnel across the country. When the members of our teams
leave for a deployment, hospitals and employers back home double-up
shifts and fill in for those team members who are deployed. Although
NDMS Response Team members enjoy USERRA coverage associated with their
deployment, there can still be negative feelings back home, both with
employers and the co-workers who cover their shifts. Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita were especially challenging in this respect because of the
multiple or extended deployments of team members. Team leadership is
often faced with explaining to local employers why team members are
being utilized, and reassuring those same employers that their
employees' NDMS service is essential to the disaster response.
While team members are deployed, family members go without hearing
from their loved ones, and endure the associated media blitz detailing
all the problems and dangers in the affected areas. This places stress
on the family members, and needs to be addressed by the non-deployed
team members with a family support structure. This was especially
important for families during responses associated with the 9-11
attacks.
I would be remiss in my duty to my fellow team commanders, if I did
not take this opportunity to tell the members of your committee how you
can support us in our mission.
Whether it be the response to the events of 9-11, the multiple
hurricane responses of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, or the
vigilant preparedness of our specialized Weapons of Mass Destruction
response assets, the need for our services and the time and effort
expended to improve our readiness have significantly increased over the
past five years. Unfortunately, we have not seen our resources increase
with these demands. The NDMS program budget specifically has remained
flat since 2003. Looking forward, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) addresses new areas for which teams
must prepare:
Specific planning for the ``at-risk individuals'' in a
disaster response.
Specific planning for inclusion of the Medical Reserve
Corps in coordinated response plans and exercises
Additional training of team members in the National
Response Plan and the National Incident Management System
The recent Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006
will require VMATs to work with state governments and other national
animal service agencies to define how disaster responses will
coordinate veterinary and animal rescue efforts.
I know that the FY 2008 DHHS budget request calls for a modest $6
million increase in the NDMS budget. I can tell you from the
perspective of the team commander that these funds and more are truly
needed, and have the potential for a tremendous payback to the
taxpayer. In the shadow of some of the most significant disasters this
country has ever witnessed, I think we are in a unique position to
argue the value of this type of preparedness.
The additional provisions of the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act are equally important with respect to their emphasis
on local planning and preparedness. NDMS Team Commanders experience
first-hand the ability to integrate operations in an impacted state
where robust Department of Health and Emergency Management Agency
disaster planning exist. Local preparation for known hazards is
especially important for successful outcomes in the real event.
We in NDMS are an unusual entity in the federal government, in that
many of us deal with citizens, one at time, whose daily lives have been
shattered, either as patients, victims, or affected family members.
This provides us with a unique hands-on perspective in disaster
medicine, and provides the federal government with an unusual personal
role in their care. Providing the best care possible in these
conditions is our passion, and it is what drives us to train and
prepare for the call. We are grateful for the opportunity to serve.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of your Subcommittee for
your attention. I hope I have been able to provide you with a clear
picture of the role and duties of an NDMS Team Commander.
This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer your
questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Devir, for your testimony.
Now at this time I recognize Chief Prather to summarize
your statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES ``CHIP'' PRATHER, CHIEF, ORANGE COUNTY
FIRE AUTHORITY
Chief Prather. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent,
members of the committee, I am Chip Prather, the fire chief of
the Orange County Fire Authority. Thank you for this
opportunity to address the committee.
I also want to thank Congresswoman Sanchez for her role in
pushing forward issues having to do with the urban search and
rescue task force, and drafting and preparing a crucial piece
of legislation that should be introduced later.
My remarks this morning are on behalf of the Orange County
Fire Authority, but more importantly, the local agencies that
sponsor the 28 national urban search and rescue task forces
located in 19 states. For several years, the 28 sponsoring
agencies have been advocating for legislation that would
authorize the task forces under FEMA and address an array of
administrative issues. It is our hope that this morning we are
taking a step forward in that goal.
For the last 10 years, I have served as the fire chief of
the OCFA which provides services to a population greater than
that living in 12 states. My department has been a USAR-
sponsoring agency since 1991. Before being approached by FEMA
to consider USAR, we and other major urban areas had begun to
independently prepare for major building collapse and search
and rescue operations.
Because of that ready resource of highly trained
firefighters, I believe most would agree with FEMA wisely
choosing not to have an in-house rescue capability of its own.
Instead, FEMA recognizes the best source of urban search and
rescue knowledge and skill resides at the state and local
level. Back then, not every local agency saw value in
participating in this new federal initiative. Many saw USAR as
a potentially costly burden where local agencies would be stuck
with administering this new program and not receiving a
commensurate value.
On the other hand, 28 of us recognized that we and those
that we serve would be better off with developing the
personnel, training, skills and protocols to work together
during a large-scale incident. In fact, in California we had
just experienced the Loma Prieta earthquake and the collapse of
the San Francisco Bay Bridge, where, by the way, it was my
firefighters who traveled 300 miles to Northern California and
rescued the last survivor from the I-80 collapse 89 hours after
the earthquake.
This ever-present earthquake risk and our intense
preparation is likely part of the reason why FEMA saw fit to
have eight of the 28 national task forces located in
California. As I stated, FEMA appropriately recognized that
local and state agencies have the expertise and knowledge upon
which they could build to develop the premier national response
system.
The purpose of USAR is to have a ready and trained force so
that the 6,000 participants may deploy to incidents across the
nation within the FEMA-mandated 6-hour target. And they must be
fully able to sustain themselves for 72 hours after they have
arrived at the theater of operations.
Again, let me emphasize, the urban search and rescue task
forces act as a ready reserve team immediately available to
respond at the direction of FEMA. Just like we see today in
Kansas, with the deployment of Nebraska Task Force 1, we
provide the first surge of personnel and equipment that comes
in behind the local first responders to help and expand their
capabilities.
The vehicles and equipment caches are stored safely and
secured, ready to respond at a moment's notice when called upon
by FEMA and the federal government. In fact, because of the
operational readiness requirements, we are prohibited by our
agreement with FEMA from using those resources on the local
level. That is not to say that us at the local level don't see
value in being a member of the national response system. In
large measure, our job is to develop the protocols and
guidelines on how to handle various emergency scenarios.
Quite often, we are working in multiple levels of
government and with various agencies. Our participation in the
system provides an opportunity to develop interoperable
strategies and tactical plans with other agencies, resulting in
a coordinated and effective response to those who we are trying
to help. Of course, our firefighters are better trained because
of our participation.
So what are the needs of the urban search and rescue task
forces? Well, I can probably point to our response to the
Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the Gulf Coast and New
Orleans, where, by the way, members of my task force once again
rescued the final survivor there. We are in constant need of
improvements and ongoing support.
Unfortunately, the last few years have seen a decrease in
the levels of federal appropriations. The most recent
appropriation of $25 million provides each task force with
$700,000. According to a report by FEMA, it costs approximately
$1.7 million annually to support a single task force in a full
state of readiness. This leads these task forces with a $1
million deficit, and requires the local agency to decide
whether they are going to subsidize the federal program or fund
their own local important needs.
Therefore, I would respectfully urge Congress to
appropriate the $45 million authorized for 2008 in last year's
appropriations bill.
Finally, the national response system needs to address
certain administrative issues. That is why we are happy that
the legislation that Congresswoman Sanchez is working on will
be introduced, and hopefully if approved, will achieve the
following. It authorizes the national USAR system and the 28
task forces under our program within FEMA. It would allow FEMA
to reimburse local agencies for our costs when there is a
deployment, particularly in the area of workers compensation
when a member is injured on a federal mission.
It provides protection to our civilian members
participating on the task force--our doctors, train operators,
structural engineers, heavy riggers, dog handlers--from losing
their private sector job when they are engaged in a federal
deployment. It also establishes an advisory committee, and
lastly and most importantly, it authorizes $52 million in
funding for the system.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The statement of Chief Prather follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles ``Chip'' Prather
Intro
Thank you Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Charles Dent and members
of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response for this opportunity to discuss the federal government's
capabilities to respond to national emergencies. I would also like to
thank Congresswoman Sanchez for her role in pushing forward the issues
of the USAR task forces and introducing crucial legislation, HR ------
----.
I'm speaking here on behalf of the Orange County Fire Authority and
on behalf of all agencies that sponsor one of the twenty eight National
Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. For several years the 28
sponsoring agencies have been advocating for legislation that will
authorize the Task Forces under FEMA, address administrative issues and
provide stable funding. It is our hope that we are taking a step
forward in realizing these goals today.
I have had the privilege since 1997 of serving as the Fire Chief
for Orange County Fire Authority and overseeing the protection of the
1.3 million residents that live in the 22 cities and unincorporated
portions of Orange County. In addition to providing basic fire and
emergency medical service to our residents and businesses, we also have
within Orange County major tourist attractions such as Disneyland,
Knott's Berry Farm and Angel Stadium along with the Ports of Long Beach
and Los Angeles immediately to our north and the San Onofre Nuclear
Power Plant directly to the south. As with almost all of California we
also face the threat of a major earthquake. Undoubtedly this has
contributed to our belief in maintaining a prepared and well trained
cadre of individuals to be a part of the National Urban Search and
Rescue System.
USAR Background
Orange County Fire Authority has been a USAR sponsoring agency
since 1990. Before being approached by FEMA, we and other major urban
areas had begun to prepare for major building collapses and search and
rescue operations. Local agencies were well suited to provide personnel
with a high level of training that lent itself naturally to the
specialized skills needed to serve as a member of a USAR Task Force. I
believe most would agree with FEMA wisely choosing not to have an in-
house rescue capability of its own to administer and operate on a daily
basis for the sake of responding to the occasional national emergency
incident. Instead, FEMA recognized that the best sources for urban
search and rescue knowledge and skills resided at the State and local
levels.
Back then, local agencies were not sure how to approach this new
effort and not every local agency saw value in participating in this
new federal response capability. Many saw USAR as a potentially costly
burden where local agencies would be stuck with administering this new
program and not receiving commensurate value. Some of us recognized,
though, overall we would be better off with developing the personnel,
training, skills and protocols to work together during a large
emergency incident. In fact, in California we had just experienced the
Loma Prieta earthquake and the collapse of the San Francisco Bay
Bridge. We knew the consequences of not being prepared and trained for
large urban emergencies requiring specialized resources from outside
the immediate capabilities of local agencies.
This is likely part of why FEMA saw fit to have 8 of the 28
National Task Forces located in California. We had been focused on
earthquake preparedness for decades and were well suited to see the
value in having our personnel trained and cooperating with, not just
each other, but with federal resources to develop a sophisticated
response capability.
As a large agency comprised of over 800 safety personnel, we have
the resources and ability to make those personnel available for
extended deployments responding to large scale national incidents.
However, we must still rely on assistance from other agencies such as
the Anaheim Fire Department, Santa Ana Fire Department, Orange Fire
Department, LA County Sheriffs and Montebello Fire to fully staff USAR
Task Force 5. In fact, almost all sponsoring agencies rely upon
assistance from other public agencies or other organizations to staff
the 210 positions of a USAR Task Force.
As I state above, FEMA wisely recognized that local and state
agencies had the expertise and knowledge upon which they could build to
develop a national response system. Until this time, the federal
government had limited response capabilities. The national guard was
available to provide manpower and security during and after incidents
but was not trained or equipped to conduct search and rescue in
specialized settings, such as a building collapse or massive WMD
exposure.
Local and state agencies, however, had experience dealing with
hazardous material exposures, earthquake and hurricane related building
collapses and mass casualty incidents that require planning and
logistics training. To some degree, whether a building collapses due to
natural causes or by acts of terrorism, the response is the same. One
obvious modification would be the additional use of WMDs in a building
collapses but, again, our training for hazardous material spills
provides some background in the specialized training needed for those
potential incidents.
Locally, the value of the USAR Task Forces isn't that we are given
equipment and resources that can be used to supplement local resources.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I cannot stress this point
enough as it seems to be a recurring misconception by many who have
written reports that the task forces and their equipment supplement
local response capabilities.
The purpose of the USAR Task Forces is to be ready and trained so
that they may deploy to incidents across the country within the FEMA
mandated six hours after activation. They must be able to sustain
themselves for the first 72 hours of operation. None of this would be
possible if the sponsoring agencies were using the equipment and
materials on a daily basis for their local responses.
Let me speak to the specific arrangement of OCFA's USAR Task Force-
5. In our possession are the following pieces of apparatus:
Two tractors & 53 foot trailers
2 Box Trucks
Suburban and pick-up trucks
Forklifts
2 utility vehicles
1 flatbed trailer
These vehicles are packed and ready with specialized equipment
purchased with FEMA grant funds or provided directly by FEMA. In Orange
County, these assets are stored throughout 5 fire stations, where we
oversee the logistics and maintenance of the equipment so that it is
ready to deploy at a moment's notice. Again, let me emphasize that the
USAR Task Forces act as a ``ready reserve'' team available immediately
to respond at the direction of FEMA. We provide the first surge of
personnel and equipment that comes in behind the local first responders
to help and expand their capabilities. The vehicles and equipment are
not being used by local agencies to respond to local EMS calls, fires
or other day to day emergency incidents. The vehicles and equipment
caches are being stored safely and securely ready to respond on behalf
of FEMA and the federal government.
In fact, we are prohibited by our agreements with FEMA from using
the cache equipment unless sanctioned by FEMA such as in a training
exercise. Moreover, when some suggest that the Task Forces are
supplementing local responsibilities, it is important to remember that
a Task Force would not respond to a national emergency in their own
backyard. The Task Forces are comprised of first responders from local
agencies and those persons would be otherwise occupied and committed to
the incident. For example, during the attacks on the World Trade
Center, some of the firefighters that comprised NY Task Force-1 were
those individuals that were running into the towers during their
collapse. Those individuals were engaged in the immediate response and
it is the other task forces from throughout the country that were
looked on to come in and provide support. Consequently, in case of a
large earthquake or other disaster in Southern California, we would
rely upon the Northern California Task Forces and other out of state
Task Forces to respond and assist us.
This is not to say that local agencies see little value from the
resources provided via our participation in the National USAR System. A
large part of our job is developing protocols and guidelines for how to
handle various emergency scenarios. Quite often, we are working across
multiple jurisdictions and with various agencies. Our participation in
the National USAR System provides an opportunity to develop a
fellowship and cooperative understanding with other agencies. The
benefits of this relationship extend to FEMA and other federal
agencies. Local agencies feel a greater level of comfort and trust when
they realize that they are receiving assistance from fellow local first
responders.
Lastly, local agencies receive immense value in providing higher
levels of training to their personnel. This training is brought back to
the local level and spreads to other local and regional agencies. In
fact, there are a number of regional and state teams across the country
that have organized themselves and modeled their training and protocols
on what FEMA and the 28 Task Forces have adopted.
USAR System Needs
While I can proudly point to our response to the Northridge
Earthquake, Atlanta Olympic Games, Oklahoma Bombing, Shuttle Columbia,
the attacks of 9/11, and 21 hurricanes including Hurricane Katrina, we
are in need of continued and ongoing improvement.
Unfortunately, the last few years we have seen decreasing levels of
federal appropriations. The most recent appropriation of $25 million
provided each task force with about $700,000. According to FEMA, it
costs approximately $1.7 million annually to maintain a Task Force.
That amount does not take into account responding to incidents, which
are funded separately, only the cost or training and maintaining
equipment.
This leaves each task force with a $1 million deficit. As I stated
previously, these resources and equipment are not used for local
emergency responses. This means a local agency must choose to subsidize
a program that ostensibly provides the federal government with a
response capability or to fund other local needs such as training,
equipment, vehicles or facilities that can be used for local day to day
emergency responses.
Therefore, I respectfully urge Congress to appropriate the $45
million authorized for 2008 in last year's appropriations bill.
Finally, the National USAR System needs to address various
administrative and program issues. That is why I am excited about the
legislation that Congresswoman Sanchez has introduced which will
achieve the following:
1. Authorize the National USAR System and 28 Task Forces as a
program under FEMA and allows activation for pre-staging and
training activities. Currently, the Task Forces may only be
activated during a Presidential declared emergency.
2. Protect task force members and sponsoring agencies by
allowing FEMA to reimburse for costs associated with
deployment. Specifically, members and sponsors need to be fully
reimbursed for costs associated with workers compensation and
health claims arising from a member's injury on a federal
mission.
3. Protects civilian members of the US&R System (non-uniformed
personnel such as physicians, structural engineers, and canine
handlers) from employment discrimination and retaliation for
engaging in federal US&R activities. For example, we faced this
situation when one of our heavy riggers, Don Childress, faced
termination from his civilian employer if he chose to respond
with us to New Orleans. Fortunately for us, Don came but he did
lose his job.
4. Establish a standing advisory committee comprised of
sponsoring agency representatives, technical experts and
emergency response professionals to advise FEMA and DHS
regarding matters affecting the National USAR System.
5. Lastly, yet most importantly authorize $52 million in
appropriations to fully fund the system.
Again, I can not stress how important it is to provide stable
funding so that the Task Forces are secure in knowing that they can
expend current year funds without the risk of acquiring equipment or
hiring personnel that will not be funded in following years.
I hope my testimony and information provided will assist the
committee in moving forward our legislation and also in your broader
deliberations regarding national response capabilities. Thank you again
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Charles Dent and members of the
committee for your time.
[Attachment follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you for your testimony, Chief.
At this time, I will recognize Chief Endrikat to summarize
your testimony for 5 minutes.
Your fellow chief just took 1 minute of your time. No, I am
just kidding.
[Laughter.]
Chief Endrikat. He is higher ranking than I am.
Mr. Cuellar. If he is higher ranking, he can have that
extra minute.
STATEMENT OF FRED ENDRIKAT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHIEF,
PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT
Chief Endrikat. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member
Dent, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for this
opportunity to discuss the capabilities of federal emergency
response teams.
I am speaking today as a first responder, but I also have
the responsibility and privilege to speak on behalf of the
nearly 6,000 members of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's urban search and rescue national response system.
In 1990, following the federal government's responses to
the disasters of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake,
Congress tasked FEMA to develop a national civilian urban
search and rescue capability. The primary purpose of this
system is to provide a nationwide network of heavy search and
rescue teams that can be rapidly deployed to disaster
incidents.
The individual teams are established at the local
jurisdiction level and can be federalized and deployed by FEMA
as needed for nationwide response in order to augment state and
local resources in disaster situations. The 28 USAR task forces
are the fundamental units of FEMA's national response system
and they are strategically located throughout the country.
The FEMA response system also provides an overhead
management capability for field operations known as the
incident support team. This team provides federal, state and
local officials with technical assistance in the acquisition
and utilization of federal USAR resources through advice,
incident command assistance, management, and coordination of
the USAR task forces.
The system has played an essential role in the federal
response to terrorist attacks. Eleven task forces and one
management team took part in the federal response to the
bombing of the Alfred R. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and
25 task forces and two of the standing management teams took
part in the response to the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11.
During the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, all 28 of
the task forces were activated, with 10 being activated a
second time for the extended operations encountered. These USAR
task forces were credited with the search of thousands of homes
and buildings, and the rescue of 6,587 victims. As Chief
Prather mentioned, as we speak today, Nebraska Task Force 1 and
the FEMA USAR incident support team are operating in support of
state and local responders at the site of the devastating
tornado that struck Greensburg, Kansas over the weekend.
Regardless of the triggering mechanism that causes a
disaster, the FEMA USAR system has been built with a foundation
on the concept of all-hazard response and preparedness. This
program has also been at the forefront of the implementation
and field use of incident command structures at incidents of
national significance, which was referenced in last year's FEMA
post-Katrina reform legislation.
One of the demonstrated strengths of the national USAR
system has been the ability to coordinate state and local USAR
assets and quickly fold them into field operations at disaster
sites at the request of the local authorities having
jurisdiction. New Jersey Task Force 1 and Puerto Rico Task
Force 1 were deployed to the World Trade Center collapse on
September 11. Both of those task forces stayed alongside FEMA
task forces at the base of operations located at the Javits
Convention Center.
Neither team was or is a part of the FEMA USAR system. They
technically did not come under the command and control of the
FEMA USAR incident support team, but at the request of the Fire
Department of New York, the IST effectively coordinated their
operations.
State and local rescue teams have realized that FEMA has
developed the best practices model and that model has willingly
been shared as far as policies, procedures, training curricula,
and technical expertise in an outreach effort by FEMA USAR to
first-, second-and third-tier emergency management response
elements.
There are a number of challenges currently before our
system. The system currently operates under authority drawn
from different sections of the Stafford Act, and the system
response elements can only be activated during a presidential
emergency declaration. As the chief mentioned, annual funding
amounts to build and sustain the program have varied widely
since the program's inception. Currently right now, each task
force is faced with an approximate $1 million deficit, and a
lot of that is made up by corresponding soft cost contributions
from sponsoring and participating agencies.
The system has been functioning without an advisory
committee, and the rechartering, re-seating and active
participation of the advisory committee is extremely important
for the continued development of the system. Our ability to
utilize real-time satellite imagery and sophisticated mapping
technology provided by the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency in the field in the response to Hurricane Katrina in
Mississippi made a significant difference in our search for
buried victims.
Time and funding must be dedicated to continue initiatives
like this, as we significantly attempt to advance our
operational capabilities with the introduction of new
technology. The maintenance and new technology upgrades of our
original WMD equipment cache that was issued to each task force
after the September 11 attacks requires significant and stable
funding that is currently not identified.
Each federal task force consistently undergoes several
methods of evaluation, readiness and each task force must
submit a self-evaluation and undergo operational readiness
evaluations periodically. We also undergo audits by the Office
of Inspector General.
They have also illustrated the fact that in these different
evaluations that it is impossible for task forces to attain the
highest levels the program requires without proper program
office staffing, adequate sustained funding, and an increased
focused emphasis on training initiatives.
The FEMA USAR system has not reached its full potential.
Specific legislative authorization and sustained adequate and
recurring funding for the FEMA USAR system remains one of the
larger missing pieces of the puzzle of homeland security. In
effect, the nation has a proven ready reserve force of nearly
6,000 highly trained specialists capable of immediate response
to any type of incident, with an annual current cost to the
federal government of approximately only $4,000 per member.
This program is a proven outstanding example of cost-effective
cooperation between all levels of government.
I would like to thank committee Chair Cuellar, Ranking
Member Dent, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee
for the privilege of appearing before you today.
[The statement of Chief Endrikat follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred Endrikat
Thank you Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness,
and Response for this opportunity to discuss the capabilities of
Federal Emergency Response Teams.
By way of introduction, I am Fred Endrikat; I have been a
Philadelphia firefighter for 32 years, and I am currently assigned as
the Special Operations Chief for the Philadelphia Fire Department's
Special Operations Command. I also serve the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) National Response
System in concurrent duty assignments as the National Task Force
Leader's Representative, Incident Support Team Operations Chief, and
Task Force Leader for Pennsylvania Task Force 1.
I have served in various capacities at the local, state, and
federal levels in disaster response operations, including a 40-day
field assignment as the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team Operations
Chief at the September 11th attack and collapse of the World Trade
Center in New York City and a 30-day field assignment as the FEMA US&R
Incident Support Team Operations Chief for Hurricane Katrina
(Mississippi theater of operations) and Hurricane Rita.
I am speaking today as a first responder, but I also have the
responsibility and privilege to speak on behalf of the nearly 6,000
members of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Urban Search &
Rescue National Response System.
Background
Similar to the rapid advances and extensive development of
emergency medical services and hazardous materials response
capabilities during the 1970's and 1980's, the field of technical
rescue has seen significant improvement in terms of organization and
training during the 1990's through today. New performance standards and
accompanying training and legislative initiatives for technical rescue
operations have recently been developed and teams have been assembled
with all of the capabilities that are needed for the most complex and
challenging incidents. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Urban
Search & Rescue National Response System is the product of these
efforts.
In 1990, following the Federal Government's responses to the
disasters of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, Congress
tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a
national civilian urban search & rescue capability. Several advanced
Urban Search & Rescue teams had already been developed by individual
fire departments and within regions where special risks had been
recognized, such as California with its well-known earthquake
potential. FEMA, with support from federal, state, and local
authorities, fire departments, the nation's top technical rescue
specialists, and other interested groups, developed the Urban Search &
Rescue (US&R) National Response System.
As you are aware, during a disaster, the Federal Government
implements the National Response Plan to provide state and local
government with technical expertise, equipment, and other resources.
These resources are provided by one or more federal agencies. The
primary agency responsible for Urban Search & Rescue is FEMA, under
Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF 9) of the National Response Plan.
The primary purpose of this system is to provide a nationwide
network of heavy search and rescue teams that can be rapidly deployed
to disaster incidents. The individual teams are established at the
local-jurisdiction level and can be federalized and deployed by FEMA as
needed for nationwide response. The US&R teams provide an organized
system of resources to locate, extricate, and provide immediate medical
treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures and to conduct
other life-saving operations. The US&R National Response System is
responsible for the coordination, development, and maintenance of the
Federal effort in providing these resources to augment state and local
resources in disaster situations.
The twenty-eight Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Task Forces are the
fundamental units of FEMA's national response system, and are
strategically located throughout the country. Each Task Force is
sponsored by a State or local government jurisdiction and deploys with
technical specialists who are divided into management and operational
elements. FEMA has the ability to deploy the Task Forces in one of two
operational configurations: as a Type I Task Force with 70 personnel
(with a full equipment cache that includes specialized Weapons of Mass
Destruction capabilities), or as a Type III Task Force with 28
personnel (with a modified smaller equipment cache) that is primarily
designed to operate in weather-driven disasters such as hurricanes.
To ensure the ability to deploy at any time with the required
number of personnel, teams are staffed in all positions ``three-deep',
and carry a total rostered personnel complement of two hundred and ten
members. A significant number of the sponsoring agencies are municipal
fire departments, and firefighters comprise the largest percentage of
the rostered members within the system.
The FEMA US&R National Response System also provides an overhead
management capability for field operations known as the Incident
Support Team (IST). The IST provides Federal, state, and local
officials with technical assistance in the acquisition and utilization
of Federal US&R resources through advice, incident command assistance,
management, and coordination of US&R Task Forces, and obtaining
logistical support. The FEMA US&R Program rosters three 21-member
Incident Support Teams (the Red, White, and Blue teams). Each IST is on
call one out of every three months, and members must be able to deploy
within two hours of receiving their activation orders.
Each Task Force maintains extensive capabilities within seven major
functional elements.
Search Specialists utilize canines and technical
electronic search equipment to locate trapped victims.
Rescue Specialists are skilled in shoring operations,
lifting, and cutting and breaching all types of building
materials including structural steel and reinforced concrete to
extricate trapped victims.
Physicians and Medical Specialists (at the paramedic
or equivalent level) provide advanced life support capability
and pre-hospital and emergency care for Task Force members and
crush syndrome medicine and confined space medicine for rescued
victims. Cross-trained personnel
Rigging Specialists work in conjunction with heavy
equipment, such as large hydraulic cranes, to remove heavy
debris and expose collapse voids where victims are buried.
Structural Engineers (some of them firefighters also
licensed as professional engineers) perform structural
integrity assessments of structures in rescue operations.
Hazardous Materials Specialists and Technical
Information Specialists provide support to the overall search
and rescue mission including planning, hazards evaluation,
hazardous materials assessments in rescue operations, and
technical documentation.
Logistics Specialists support the overall search and
rescue mission by providing supplies, equipment,
communications, and transportation for the Task Force and
managing the mobilization and demobilization processes.
In addition to having the above listed capabilities, Task Forces
are structured to be able to operate under the following guidelines:
24-hour around-the clock operations
Self-sufficiency for 72 hours
Report to the Point Of Departure within 4-6 hours of
activation, and to be able to deploy all personnel and the
entire equipment cache by ground or air (as required)
Cross-trained personnel
Standardized equipment and training
Standardized operating procedures
Operate under the Incident Command System (ICS)
Current Overview
The US&R System has played an essential role in the federal
response to terrorist attacks. Eleven of the then 25 Task Forces and
one management team took part in the federal response to the bombing of
the Alfred R. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19,
1995, and 25 of the current 28 Task Forces and two of the current three
standing management teams took part in the response to the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
During the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, all 28 of the
Task Forces were activated, with ten being activated a second time for
the extended operations encountered. These US&R Task Forces were
credited with the search of thousands of homes and buildings and the
rescue of 6,587 victims. As evidenced by the FEMA US&R Program's
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and as highlighted by Secretary
Chertoff in his Report to Congress last year, the FEMA US&R Program was
one of the federal response entities, along with the United States
Coast Guard, that was acknowledged for successful response operations.
Regardless of the triggering mechanism that causes a disaster, the
FEMA US&R System has been built with a foundation in the concept of
``All-Hazard'' preparedness. This program has also been at the
forefront of the implementation and field-use of Incident Command
structures at incidents of national significance (which was referenced
in last year's FEMA Post-Katrina reform legislation).
One of the demonstrated strengths of the National US&R System has
been the ability to coordinate state and local US&R assets and quickly
fold them into field operations at disaster sites (at the request of
the local Authorities Having Jurisdiction). New Jersey TF1 deployed to
New York City to the attack and collapse of the World Trade Center on
September 11, and Puerto Rico TF-1 deployed on September 13. Both Task
Forces staged alongside FEMA Task Forces at the Javits Center Base of
Operations. Neither team was, or is, part of the FEMA US&R National
Response System, but both are modeled in a similar fashion to Federal
Task Forces in the areas of personnel rostering and equipment, and
training. They technically did not come under the command and control
of the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team, but at the request of the Fire
Department of New York, the IST effectively coordinated their
operations.
This positive interaction between the FEMA US&R Program and various
levels of government is demonstrated not only during disaster
operations, but also in the preparedness phase of emergency management.
The benefit of the FEMA National US&R System to the first responder can
be demonstrated by the fact that state, regional, and local first
responders utilize the FEMA US&R National Response System's training
curriculum, equipment standards, and policies as benchmarks in
preparation for response to local emergencies. These rescue teams have
realized that FEMA has developed a best-practices model that they have
incorporated into their training and operations, and the National
Program has willingly shared policies, procedures, training curricula
and technical expertise in an outreach effort to first, second, and
third tier emergency management response elements.
The FEMA US&R National Response System is a proven response entity
of the Federal government, and is available to provide immediate
response to a terrorist attack or natural disasters. Since 1991, this
system has responded to 28 major disasters, and has also been deployed
to support 12 National Security Special events (to include Presidential
Nominating Conventions, the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, the
G-8 Summit, etc.).
Challenges
FEMA currently operates the US&R System under authority drawn from
different sections of the Stafford Act, and System response elements
(Task Forces and Incident Support Teams) can only be activated during a
Presidential emergency declaration.
Annual funding amounts to build and sustain the program have varied
widely since the program's inception. The current annual cost to
maintain a Task Force in a state of readiness has been estimated by
FEMA to be approximately $1.7.million. At the current level of funding,
each Task Force is faced with an approximate $1 million deficit. A
significant portion of this deficit is usually made up by Sponsoring
Agencies and Participating Agencies who absorb both ``hard'' costs
(such as the payment of vehicle insurance, maintenance, and operating
costs), and ``soft'' costs (such as the payment of salaries for members
to maintain specialized rescue skills during training exercises)
related to Task Force expenses.
The System has been functioning for many years without an Advisory
Committee (historically comprised of members representing FEMA,
Sponsoring Agency Chiefs, technical experts, labor officials, and
emergency response professionals). In the past, the Advisory Committee
has brought the diverse views of all stakeholders together and provided
important guidance and a balanced viewpoint to FEMA with regard to the
operation and administration of the US&R National Response System. The
rechartering / reseating and active participation of the Advisory
Committee is extremely important to the Sponsoring Agency Chiefs and
US&R System participants.
Time and funding must be dedicated to continue the development of
working relationships with other agencies (such as the National Geo-
Spatial Intelligence Agency) and private partners in the science and
technology research fields that will significantly advance our
operational capabilities with the introduction of new technology.
The maintenance and new technology upgrades of the original Weapons
of Mass Destruction equipment cache that was issued to each Task Force
after the September 11th, 2001 attacks requires significant and stable
funding that is currently not identified.
National US&R Task Forces are evaluated by several methods in
relation to operational readiness parameters. Annually, each Task Force
must submit a Self-Evaluation to the Program Office. Selected Task
Forces are then identified for a Phase II Evaluation. These Operational
Readiness Evaluations (where an Evaluation Team of Program Office staff
and Peer Evaluators conduct a comprehensive on-site inspection and
review of administrative policies, procedures and documentation,
logistical readiness, training programs, financial record-keeping, and
personnel files) are currently being conducted for six Task Forces each
year. The System also undergoes periodic extensive audits by the Office
of Inspector General. These various evaluation mechanisms have raised
the bar of preparedness and readiness to the highest levels, but have
also illustrated the fact that it is impossible for Task Forces to
attain the highest levels this program requires without proper Program
Office staffing, adequate sustained funding, and an increased focused
emphasis on training initiatives.
Summary
Despite the lessons we have learned from our nation's response to
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and despite our
lessons learned from responses to events similar to the devastating
hurricane season of 2004 and the response in 2005 to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, the Federal Urban Search & Rescue System has not reached it's
full potential.
These responses have increased the urgency for us to continue to
improve our skills and develop new technologies to mitigate complicated
large-scale technical rescue / collapse situations. Specific
legislative authorization and sustained adequate and recurring funding
for the Federal Urban Search and Rescue System remains one of the
larger missing pieces of the puzzle of homeland security.
In effect, the nation has a proven ``ready reserve'' force of
nearly 6,000 highly-trained specialists capable of immediate response
to any type of incident, with an annual current cost to the federal
government of approximately $4,000 per member. This program is an
outstanding example of cost-effective cooperation between all levels of
government. Legislation that is currently being introduced by
Congresswoman Sanchez would consolidate the statutory authority for the
System under the Stafford Act and would, among other things, for the
first time, explicitly authorize the US&R System and address the
funding uncertainties that this program faces every Fiscal Year. This
legislation will ensure a strong federal Urban Search & Rescue response
capability, with measurable benefits through all tiers of emergency
response.
Again I would like to thank Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent,
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee for the privilege of
appearing before you today.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Chief.
I want to thank all of you all, members of the panel, for
being here with us.
At this point, members will now have an opportunity to ask
our witnesses questions. I remind each member that he or she
will have 5 minutes for the set of questions that he or she
might have.
I will now recognize myself for my set of questions.
This question goes to both Chief Endrikat and Chief
Prather. After the September 11, 2001 incident, Congress
provided substantial increases to the urban search and rescue
funding. Federal preparedness funding for the USAR reached a
high of $65 million in fiscal year 2004, but fell to $30
million in fiscal year 2005, and the amount later decreased to
$20 million in fiscal year 2006.
How has this decrease in funding impacted the efficiency of
the deployed teams and the staffing levels of the work that you
all have been doing?
Chief Prather, I think you have the highest rank. Is that
correct?
Chief Prather. It is basically what I said in my remarks,
sir. We need to choose whether we are going to fund our local
needs or support this task force. We have chosen to try and
balance that. There are a number of examples that we make do
with what we have. An example is our task force is spread
around in six different fire stations, as opposed to being in a
single secure facility from which we can efficiently deploy.
Many of the task forces are lacking in some of the
administrative support to take care of the grant funds.
Probably the biggest shortfall that we see is the ability to
complete the required training and to acquire the adequate
depth in our resources so that we can deploy and sustain that
deployment.
I think the strength of the system, in spite of the cyclic
nature of the funding, is, as Chief Endrikat pointed out, you
saw that all task forces, irrespective of the amount of funding
that was available, were able to respond to the Gulf Coast and
New Orleans. So the system works, but we are making it work.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Chief?
Chief Endrikat. Mr. Chairman, maybe a word of background on
the funding. The $60 million that was appropriated after the
September 11 attacks, a good portion of that was earmarked
toward building our capability and giving each task force the
potential to be able to deploy two complete elements, so two
task forces. And a lot of the funding was geared toward
procuring a second equipment cache for the task forces.
We are still in the process of that. That still requires
some funding that possibly has not yet been identified. But the
goal was to give us more depth at the federal level to be able
to respond and support state and local authorities.
As I mentioned, I think one of the benefits of this program
is the level of cooperation between all levels of government.
Based on what Chief Prather mentioned, we balance or we attempt
to balance our local needs with being able to support the
federal requirements and the federal mission. Our sponsoring
organizations and our participating agencies end up absorbing a
lot of this soft cost.
For example, in Pennsylvania, we absorb the soft costs for
our vehicle insurance, for our vehicle maintenance, for costs
along those lines, simply because there is not enough budget
money annually to go around and to fully keep the task force
ready and prepared to respond for a federal mission.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you.
A question to Dr. Devir. According to the 2005 House
Government Reform report on NDMS, after-action reports
following the 2004 hurricane season documented serious
breakdowns in planning, supply management, communications, and
leadership. Some problems included deployment of teams with
inadequate supplies, lacking essential drugs and equipment.
Do you feel these types of issues have been resolved,
number one? And number two, does simply moving NDMS from FEMA
back to the HHS solve all of the NDMS problems?
Mr. Devir. I would like to thank you for my promotion to
``doctor,'' but unfortunately I am just a ``mister.''
Mr. Cuellar. Well, then we will call you ``honorable.''
Mr. Devir. There you go. I like that. That is nice.
[Laughter.]
As far as the issues related to our response, you sort of
have to separate the individual response from the nature of
after-actions. I could probably bring out 10 after-action
reports from different incidents, and I could blindfold you and
read them to you, and you wouldn't know which was which,
because typically the same issues come up--command and control
issues, resupply, et cetera.
In terms of have we made improvements, I think we certainly
have. I know that while we were still positioned within FEMA,
significant changes and improvements were made in the way
logistical resupply was organized. Specifically, some of our
folks on working groups that were actually in the field sat
down and came up with plans that there would be automated
resupply, instead of waiting for somebody to put through the
purchase order and ask for additional supplies.
We knew that if we were seeing a certain level acuity of
patients in certain volumes that we would run out of certain
medical supplies. So there was a system put in place that on
the second day you would start shipping those supplies in, and
on the third day you would start shipping additional supplies
in. So that was a significant improvement.
I know there was also some work to supply us with some
additional communications equipment. I think we still need to
do some work in that area, but the ability to add some
satellite communications and infrastructure that was outside
what you depend on locally that is typically going to be
destroyed, certainly helped our response capability.
As far as moving over to HHS, don't take this as a
criticism of our cousins over in FEMA, but it is difficult to
do some of the medical things when you are not in the medical
community. Anybody that has gone to the doctor, you talk to
your doctor about what is going on, and pretty soon in some
sophisticated language, he has sort of left you in the dust
unless he is an especially good communicator.
We found that in resupply issues that a lot of times the
folks that were sincerely trying to do a good job, they just
didn't know the medical equipment or some of the medical
supplies to be able to provide to us what it was we needed. So
I think moving over to HHS, where we have specialized medical
logistics, is certainly going to help us in that area.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Thank you.
I have a question for Mr. Powers, but since my time is
over, I will go ahead at this time and recognize the ranking
member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent, for any questions. I will come back in the second
round and ask Mr. Powers some questions.
Mr. Dent?
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony.
Mr. Powers, it is my understanding that the national
operations center has the capability to deploy disaster
situational awareness teams. There are also emergency response
teams that are managed or controlled by other federal agencies
such as domestic emergency support teams and nuclear incident
response teams.
How many types of emergency response teams does FEMA have?
And how do they relate to one another is really the big
question?
Mr. Powers. Let me begin from the very beginning of your
questions, the DSAT team that the department has. The reason I
am not answering your question directly is because we have a
number of teams that I did not mention in my testimony as part
of our recovery. There are a number of other things that we
deploy. It is not just initial response. There are a good
number of those.
The DSAT team is a team that the secretary created after
Katrina to provide better situational awareness for the
department. Their purpose was to go on-scene and provide video
and audio links of what was actually happening back to the
Department of Homeland Security so that they did not have to
rely on commercial media as their only news source of
information.
One of the things that we are intending to do with our
incident management assist teams, the new teams that were
created, is to provide them a situational awareness capability
where they will be able to work with the state and local
officials on-scene and provide situational awareness not just
back to DHS, but also back to the local incident command and
the state EOC and the regional FEMA offices, so that everyone
will have the same information at the same time, so that we
have a good understanding of what the situation is on-scene so
we can apply the right resources to whatever the incident
happens to be.
Does that answer your question?
Mr. Dent. Yes. I would like to further elaborate, though.
Can you explain how it is not duplicative to have both FEMA and
the national operations center deploy emergency response teams
and domestic emergency response teams, respectively, at the
same time? Why is that not duplicative, essentially?
Mr. Powers. We are attempting to work together. We respect
the wishes of the secretary to deploy situational awareness
teams that he needs for his information. We are changing the
way we do business, so we are in a position to provide that
information directly to him if he needs it. If that meets his
requirements, then I would expect that his teams will no longer
be required.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Questions to Mr. Endrikat and Mr. Prather. Last year, DHS's
Office of Inspector General issued an audit of the national
urban search and rescue response system, USAR. This audit found
that the USAR task forces were falling short of achieving the
system's set objectives and that there were operational,
logistical and management deficiencies. The audit also
criticized FEMA for funding and staffing shortages that
prevented proper monitoring and oversight of task forces.
From your perspective, has FEMA taken steps to address
these deficiencies? And how does FEMA strengthen its oversight
and involvement with these task forces?
Chief Endrikat. Congressman Dent, recently the FEMA program
office in the area of program staffing was just authorized
basically a doubling of staff. That is something that the
sponsoring agency chiefs and the task forces have been
supporting for years. So the national program office at FEMA
headquarters, with this increase in staffing, should be able to
give greater oversight and greater coordination and guidance to
the 28 task forces in the field.
The inspector general audits exposed a number of weaknesses
in our system. I think a lot of those weaknesses are based on
the high bar and the high standard that has been set. As I
mentioned, we have self-evaluations. We have operational
readiness evaluations.
But I think the core issue here is that without adequate
sustained recurring funding and guessing each year on how we
are going to maintain programs and training programs and
logistical requirements, it is really pretty much a guess each
year what we are going to able to do in order to maintain that
high level of readiness.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I see my time is up.
Mr. Cuellar. No, go ahead.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Prather, do you want to just quickly answer?
Chief Prather. I would just echo what Chief Endrikat said.
I think the increased staffing for FEMA and the use of our
program will be of great help and enable us to roll this
forward. They have had eight people in there--that is half of
what I send to a single structure fire--responsible for
managing the 6,000 people, not only on the administrative side,
but also during the support. So we are very happy with that.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Thank you, Mr. Dent.
The chair would now recognize other members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practices, I will recognize members who
were present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on
the subcommittee, alternating between the majority and
minority. Those members coming in later will be recognized in
the order of their arrival.
Also, for the members who came in a little bit afterwards,
we did grant Mr. Rodriguez, who is also part of the
subcommittee on appropriations for the Department of Homeland
Security. He also had a disaster in Eagle Pass in his district.
So at this time, just so everybody knows the order we will
be following, I will lean over to this side. Ms. Norton will go
first. I will recognize her in a second. Ms. Christensen will
go second. Mr. Etheridge, if he comes back, will go third. Ms.
Lowey will go next, and then Mr. Rodriguez will go after that.
If any other members come in, we will go ahead and put them in.
So at this time, just so everybody knows the order that we
are going, the chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman
from D.C., Ms. Norton, for her 5 minutes of questioning. Ms.
Norton?
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Powers, one of the most serious issues in the catalog
of problems from DHS following Katrina was the confusion and
overlap between FEMA officials and DHS officials. Mr. Dent has
alluded to some continuing overlap in his questions. One thing
Katrina taught us was that essentially we were not prepared to
respond to a WMD attack, because there should be no difference.
The only difference is you don't get a weather forecast ahead
of time telling you that an attack is coming, as we did with
the hurricane.
As I understand it, you worked as something called the
``principal federal official'' during Hurricane Katrina. Is
that not true?
Mr. Powers. That is not true. I worked as the operational--
Ms. Norton. You worked for the principal?
Mr. Powers. I worked for the principal federal official
during Hurricane Rita.
Ms. Norton. Not during Hurricane Katrina?
Mr. Powers. I did not work in Hurricane Katrina.
Ms. Norton. Were you the so-called ``senior DHS official''
in Hurricane Wilma?
Mr. Powers. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. The principal federal official is, as I
understand it, a Department of Homeland Security position. Is
that the case?
Mr. Powers. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. The senior Department of Homeland Security
official in Hurricane Wilma was also a DHS official. Is that
right?
Mr. Powers. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. I would like to know what operational role
these officials have--the principal federal officer, the senior
DHS official--what operational role do these officials have
that is not or could not be played by the federal coordinating
official who is the lead official under the Stafford Act?
Mr. Powers. You are correct. The federal coordinating
officer is the primary federal official. We are all emergency
management that is related to Stafford Act issues. The federal
coordinating officer is the primary leader in the unified
coordination group. He or she brings synergy to the federal
agencies and is the person with the fiduciary responsibility,
the FCO, the federal coordinating officer, as given under the
Stafford Act.
The role of the FCO complements the PFO. The PFO has three
roles. First of all, he is the personal representative of the
secretary of homeland security.
Ms. Norton. Is not the federal coordinating official also
the representative of the secretary?
Mr. Powers. He is, but the principal federal official is
the personal representative of the secretary.
Ms. Norton. Is he paid more than the federal coordinating
officer?
Mr. Powers. It depends on the situation. They may or may
not be.
Ms. Norton. Why do you need two officials who apparently
report to the secretary, when in fact that was precisely the
kind of confusion that we was reported in Katrina? Now, you
have somebody being paid at a time when this committee was
asking about funding that is not available for WMD, for
example, in post-9/11 task forces. We have senior officials
over officials who report to the secretary.
You need to explain to me who is in charge. If there is
somebody who says ``I come from the secretary,'' and there is
somebody else who says, ``I am the federal coordinating
official,'' and I am in one of these areas which has just had a
disaster, who is in charge?
Mr. Powers. The person in charge for the federal response
under the Stafford Act is the federal coordinating officer.
Ms. Norton. So why do we need a highly paid senior DHS
official and a highly paid principal federal official,
alongside the federal coordinating officer, who is the only
officer recognized by law--the only one recognized by law? And
here I am sitting in Podunk, Nevada, or someplace--pardon me,
Nevada--and these two people report. How am I to know who is
really in charge? Or am I left to try to figure out who I
should really relate to? What is the point?
Mr. Powers. During an event, there are a lot of people who
respond. There are a lot of agencies that respond. There are
the state coordinating officers, federal coordinating officers.
There is a senior law enforcement official who responds, who
does not report to the FCO. And there are other people--
Ms. Norton. I know what these other officials do. I am
trying to find out what the principal federal official does. I
understand who he reports to. I want to know what he does.
Mr. Powers. He is the one who coordinates these groups of
various disparate groups.
Ms. Norton. That is now what the federal coordinating
official does, although his word says that he is the
coordinating official. That is what his title is.
Mr. Powers. The way the national response plan is laid out,
that is his title. I agree with you. But the role of the
principal federal official is to coordinate all of the
responders, all of the senior-level responders, kind of the
chairman of the board, so to speak, and to get the teams to
work together.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I just want to note for the
record that I have tried in my other committee, which also has
jurisdiction over FEMA, to find out why we have these
overlapping officials. I am very seriously concerned. I mean
it. If I am in some catastrophe and these two guys report and
salute and say they are representing the secretary, I am
seriously confused about who it is who is in charge. I have no
reason to believe that the federal government ought to be
paying for two people to be in charge post-Katrina.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, Ms. Norton.
Can you follow up with the staff and let's see if we can
try to answer this question at another time, maybe working with
Ms. Norton, to see if we can sit down and try to get this down
as soon as possible? If we can try to do it later on this week,
it would be really good.
Can you just send me a little note to say that you all have
done the meeting? Okay. Thanks.
At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the
gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen, for 5
minutes of questions.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
this hearing.
My first question would be to Mr. Devir. You responded to
Mr. Dent's question about the move back to the Department of
Health and Human Services. If I remember correctly, during
Hugo, that is where the DMAT team was to begin with. So it
seems to me that that is where it properly belongs.
My question is about the coordination now between HHS and
DHS. Has that been exercised? Is that operationally seamless
coordination between the two? It was back in 1989, but a lot of
things have changed in FEMA since then.
Mr. Devir. Yes, ma'am. It has been exercised. There is an
additional point that impacts that. That is the fact that the
assistant secretary for preparedness response in Health and
Human Services is a new under secretary under law. That
position has just been appointed, Admiral Vanderwagen, by the
president.
So you are talking about a move within an agency that is
sort of going under a mini-reorganization, if you will. We are
aware of the fact that we do have to identify how those folks
will interface with one another. Going back to your point about
Hugo, the medical response has always fallen under ESF-8. So as
it relates to a medical need, the folks in Health and Human
Services, working with local officials, determine that there is
a need, FEMA had the overall responsibility for managing the
incident, and HHS always had responsibility for serving the
medical needs.
So that coordination has been in place, and we see the same
people in our meetings. They just may have a different name
tag.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay.
Mr. Powers, I think it was in your testimony--actually, I
was trying to find where I was reading about the type one or
type two task forces. Is that in your testimony? Well, in one
of the testimonies, the type one task force was described as
having specialized weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
I know in my district and other districts, we have the
civil support teams of the National Guard that also have
special weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
I was wondering, are these two agencies duplicating each
other? Is there an effort to make sure that their activities
are coordinated? Or are they different? Are their
responsibilities different?
Mr. Powers. Let's just say that the capabilities of the
National Guard complement the weapons of mass destruction
capabilities of the USAR teams. The teams do joint training. We
make sure that they complement, not compete, with one another
because during that kind of an event, you probably never have
enough resources and we need all the resources that we can
muster.
So the resources that the National Guard puts forward, the
resources that area available in the active Army and the DOD,
plus the resources that we have available in the USAR teams,
all complement one another.
Mrs. Christensen. I see Mr. Endrikat nodding. Let me ask
the question to Mr. Endrikat and Mr. Prather, and you can
respond to that question as well.
Do any of these teams, the search and rescue teams, exist
outside of fire departments? Are you aware of any that exist
outside of fire departments? We have a rescue in each island in
the Virgin Islands, and to me, they fulfill that role. I was
just wondering if they would qualify to be one of these task
forces, or must it be inside of fire services?
Chief Endrikat. No, ma'am. Most of the 28 are sponsored
primarily by fire agencies, but one example would be Texas A&M
University sponsors Texas Task Force 1. In the past, New Mexico
was sponsored by the University of New Mexico. So there are
some other agencies. There are also some emergency management
agencies at the state or local level that sponsor federal task
forces, but primarily they are mostly fire-based.
Mrs. Christensen. Did you want to add a response to the
question about the civil support teams?
Chief Endrikat. The WMD, I think in my written testimony, I
spoke to the difference between the type one FEMA USAR task
force and the type three FEMA USAR task force. The type one is
the one with the weapons of mass destruction capability. I also
referenced in my testimony that right now, we are about 5 years
into the technological shelf-life of our WMD equipment. We are
really struggling with how to maintain that capability in the
state-of-the-art effective way, without sustained funding
specifically dedicated for that.
But as Mr. Power said, the civil support teams and the DOD
teams that operate in a WMD arena, we do coordinate and we do
have very similar roles as far as the assessment of the WMD
event. I think our problem for all of our teams is how we
mitigate and actually engage in hot zone operations. We are
still defining that concept of operations across the board.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much.
At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the
gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I get to my questions, I want to mention an
emergency response team in my district. In Westchester County,
New York, a group of fire chiefs have formed a county-wide task
force to better handle certain emergencies. Members of the task
force including more than 75 firefighters, fire chiefs, have
received specialized training, including trench and building
collapse, mass casualty, HAZMAT, and WMD training.
This has proven to be a tremendous success. The task force
has responded to numerous emergencies in the community, and I
have worked with them for several years to secure federal
funds. Last year, a team from DHS went to Westchester to
document the task force's work and they use it as a prototype
to encourage other communities to develop their own teams.
After personally seeing the success of our local task
force, I am certainly appreciative of the work of all of our
witnesses in urban search and rescue teams, and disaster
medical assistance teams. I thank you.
Mr. Prather explicitly stated in his testimony that USAR
equipment is not used for everyday local events. The equipment
purchased is set aside for appropriate emergency use only. What
troubles me is that the federal government asks state and local
public safety agencies to do this, at the same time that the
administration has repeatedly proposed to cut funding for the
program.
Mr. Prather's testimony mentions that locals must pay $1
million for the federal government's $700,000 contribution. The
federal government reaps the benefit, but only pays 40 percent
of the cost. As an appropriator, I frankly have been far too
many examples of the department claiming that it fully supports
a program, only to propose that funds are cut. This is
unacceptable.
I suggest this to Mr. Powers. Why has the administration
proposed to cut funds for this program in recent years? And to
the other members of the panel, how would increased funding
assist your response to emergencies?
Mr. Powers can begin, and then we can hear from the others.
Mr. Powers. I will have to get back to you on the
department perspective on that. I can answer from the program
perspective, but not the department perspective.
Mrs. Lowey. Okay. So you are not aware of cuts in the
program?
Mr. Powers. I know that the budget was submitted for $25
million in 2008.
Mrs. Lowey. Okay. Do you have an opinion about it?
Mr. Powers. Pardon me?
Mrs. Lowey. You want to get back to me. Okay.
Do any of the others care to comment on the fact that the
local share is so high?
Chief Prather. I think your follow-up question was what
would be the operational capability if we were fully funded?
What difference would it make?
Mrs. Lowey. Okay.
Chief Prather. From my perspective, what would be different
is our second cache would be completed. As Ranking Member Dent
mentioned, the inspector general's report identified some areas
where we were weak and still needed improvement.
Much of that was based on the need for funds--the depth in
training, the operational exercises, to conduct those, the
readiness exercises, and a number of things that would
basically strengthen the program and allow us to fully fund the
federal program, as opposed to the locals having to do
something with our money for the federal program.
Mrs. Lowey. Before anyone else responds, let me throw out
some other ideas directly related. When a team is deployed,
there are backfill costs for those on the team who are first
responders. If so, does FEMA reimburse public safety agencies
for backfill costs? Perhaps you can respond?
Chief Prather. Yes. The $1.7 million figure that we are
talking about is the ongoing maintenance costs. It does not
take into consideration the actual costs of response. When we
respond, that is probably the place that we do get the full
funding, not only for the cost of the deployment, but also for
the backfill.
One of the things that is a problem there, which would be
addressed in the legislation Ms. Sanchez is considering
introducing, would be the workers comp reimbursements.
Mrs. Lowey. Did you want to respond? Yes?
Chief Endrikat. I just wanted to echo what Chief Prather
said. I think, Congresswoman, that one of the problems is that
the funding varies so much year to year. I am not quite sure
who suggested it or how we arrived at a fixed dollar amount,
but what really suffers is our ability to fully prepare and be
ready to go out the door.
I think increased funding, the one main area that it would
impact us and really benefit the citizens would be our ability
to train the way we should train, and to certify our people the
way they should be certified and credentialed.
Mrs. Lowey. My red light is on, so I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Ms. Lowey.
At this time, the chair will recognize for 5 minutes the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for allowing me this opportunity to ask a few
questions and also make a few comments.
Let me indicate to you that I had the opportunity to be a
congressman in 1998, and in 2000 we had floods in San Antonio.
The major cities like San Antonio can do the match, but little
communities like Seguin, Brownsville and those areas have
difficulty doing that. And so somehow we have to come up with a
different response to be able for them to react and be able to
compete with a major metropolitan area when the disaster hits
them. I think that there is something that we need to do about
that. I don't know what the answer is. Maybe you can come up
with that.
Secondly, is it correct to say that FEMA only responds
after the request for assistance from the state is given? And
is there anything proactive that FEMA can do, you know, right
after the event or during the event? I want to ask a second
question also, and then I want you to keep that in mind, Mr.
Powers.
The second question is, after a disaster occurs, it is my
understanding that infrastructure and personal damage
assessments are conducted in order to gauge the extent of the
damage. These are assessments that sometimes take days or
weeks. Is there any assistance that FEMA could provide while
the assessments are being conducted?
I just went through another disaster in Eagle Pass. As far
as I am concerned, it took too long to respond. I, prior to
being here, had experienced a disaster that occurred in El Paso
during a flood, and that took too long to respond. I want to
just give you an embarrassing situation. Ten people lost their
lives in the tornado, three in Mexico and seven in the U.S.,
there in Eagle Pass.
I had gone to Mexico because the military had come to San
Antonio when we had some 20,000 people from Katrina, and they
had come in to feed some of the people there, and they stayed a
pretty good long time there in San Antonio feeding them. So I
went and paid my respects to some of the people in Guerra
Negros, because they actually got hit hard.
I am here to tell you, I was impressed with them. They had
doctors on the field. They had a pharmacy there. They were
given tetanus shots. They had mobile units doing X-rays. They
were cleaning. They finished up and it was worse on that site.
After 7 days, my judge down there and my mayor calls me and
tell me that the state of Cohilla just asked if they could come
and help us. Our president hadn't moved yet.
And it wasn't because we hadn't asked, because the governor
had asked. Senator Hutchison had asked. Senator Cornyn had
asked. I had asked. We had sent letters. I had personally
handed a letter to the president on Thursday, and the accident
occurred on Monday. And we still couldn't get a reaction.
I want you to know those people read the paper on both
sides. They know how they responded on the other side, and on
this side, what we were still hearing was--and this is the
frustration part of it--I go there Thursday after the votes, 3
days later, the response is these kind of arguments: ``Well,
don't clean up your area because it is going to reflect on your
insurance. No, you cannot pick up that stuff because you are
not going to get reimbursed by FEMA.''
Don't quote me on this. It might be Red Cross. It could be
the Salvation Army. ``Don't accept any money for anything
because that is going to be deducted``--those kind of stuff
going on, when there are people that were in need, and
everybody was over here, and the accident occurred over here.
And so if you could respond to those two comments, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Powers. The first question on the lack of response. The
Stafford Act requires us to follow certain protocols, which we
attempt to do. FEMA has tried very hard over the last 6 months
to assume a much more proactive posture. In some cases, we have
provided commodities, as we call them, support things before a
disaster is declared. But when we do that, we ask the state to
sign an agreement, to say that if a disaster has not occurred,
that they will either reimburse us for the cost of those
materials or will replace them in-kind.
I don't know the particulars of the incident that you are
describing in that particular piece. As far as working with the
state, for example Eagle Pass, the incident occurred around the
25th of April, I think. We had a FEMA person physically with
the state on the 26th. We started the damage assessments on the
26th. We have to do those with the state. We cannot do those by
ourselves. It has to be a joint thing.
So many times we are finding that, and I don't know if it
was the case at Eagle Pass, but the states are not ready as
quickly as we are ready to do the--
Mr. Rodriguez. You are right. Mr. Chairman, it is a real
problem. In this case, we had a good mayor and a good judge,
and actually a governor that declared it early. But if the
ground troops are not experienced or don't know, they are only
going to do based on, and it is a first-hand experience. So
somehow it is not working.
Mr. Powers. During Eagle Pass, we did provide tarps before
the declaration. We did provide--
Mr. Rodriguez. I got there on Thursday, and on Thursday the
first thing I saw was another rainstorm coming and they weren't
there, because I asked them to, if nothing else, get those. It
occurred Monday. This was Thursday, and whatever little things
they had. And by the way, I do want to congratulate, because
when you do get there, your people are very conscientious and
they are really hard-working. I have nothing but praise.
But somehow, we need a better system that reacts much
quicker. If the Mexican government can beat us and take care of
it and get to the chase, my God, what is wrong with our
picture?
Mr. Powers. We try to counsel the state. For example, on
the Eagle Pass, we provided hygiene kits. I personally approved
that on Saturday afternoon. We did not have a declaration.
Mr. Rodriguez. On the Saturday a week after? But on
Thursday, what I witnesses also, and I don't have any
experience in this except my other two experiences--and I
apologize, I am going out of the time--but I am walking the
scene. I am walking the scene. I am seeing these people go
through the mud and stuff looking for little pictures. And I
know how important that is for someone who has lost somebody's
lives, to find a picture.
And I am also seeing the Red Cross going and giving food.
These people don't have any gloves. This is after Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. This is the fourth day out there;
no running water out there. So you know they are not cleaning
their hands. They don't have gloves, and this is 4 days after
the disaster.
Those are I would presume things that automatically ought
to be done from the very beginning. I just figured, look, you
have to get some gloves for the people because they were giving
out hot dogs, and they needed the food, and they needed water
to drink, but I knew that they were going to be dirty, because
they were out there working. So basic stuff like that.
And on the Mexican side, I went and toured it. They were
lined up to get tetanus shots earlier, and they had taken care
of most of them by then. They had a mobile unit to provide
prescription drugs and medicines. For rural America, that we
don't, number one, anytime you know that 300 homes have been
destroyed, you are going to find 300 homeless people, because
in rural communities you don't have the housing. In an urban
area, you do. In a rural community, you can cut to the chase
and figure out that you are not going to have housing for 300
families. That is an easy assessment to make by any rocket
scientist.
So you also can look at in terms of looking at some of
those basic needs. So somehow we have to get you down there a
lot quicker. If somehow you can come back and have some
suggestions to us, because what you have there is not working.
Mr. Powers. The system as it is currently set up requires
the states to invite the federal government in, and invites
having us just march into their state. As long as that
particular piece is in there, our hands are somewhat tied in
that we cannot just tell the governor we are coming in anyway,
unless it is to save lives. We can do that to save lives, but
just for the response after a disaster, we have to wait for an
invitation.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, and I understand that. I realize the
importance of local control, Mr. Chairman. But there are some
states that are more equipped than others, and somehow maybe we
need to come by and be close by and see how we can educate. Or
maybe we need some response teams that allow that process to
occur, because there are some states that would say, ``No, we
are willing to take care of it.''
By the way, the people were there. The Red Cross was there.
The Salvation Army was there. Do they get reimbursed for that
later?
Mr. Powers. No, we do not reimburse them.
Mr. Rodriguez. Okay. Because I know they were there, and
what was surprising, some of the dialog that was going on,
because anytime someone is telling me what a great job they are
doing, you know, I am going to judge it based on what the
people are telling me. In this case, if you compare what
happened in Eagle Pass on our side versus what happened in
Guerra Negros on the Mexican Side, it is day and night. It is
day and night.
I don't know whether we are looking at who is going to get
the contract to clean up or who is going to pay for what as a
number key issue. I understand that is important, too. I
realize it, but maybe you can give some thought to how do we
correct this situation so that we can cut to the case right
away and be responsive. Because after living on those sites,
the first 2 or 3 days are okay. After a week, it gets old. It
gets old. Thank God in those communities, you have a lot of
relatives, and they go live with their relatives. But in some
of the communities, you might not have that same kind of
support.
The other one that occurred prior to me being a
congressman, when I was out there campaigning, in El Paso, the
same thing. It took 14 days for the president to react. Maybe
there is a way that after the governor calls it, that you guys
can react right away.
For example, if you have a president that reacts, and you
might have one that doesn't, but we could have a situation
where the governor calls it, then automatically react, and then
you can always say, ``You know what? It is not to that level,
but they need our assistance,'' and then come back; versus not
going in there until 14 or 15 days later, when it is no longer
an emergency. Somebody else has done it.
Mr. Powers. In the case of Eagle Pass, it took a few days
before the declaration was requested. It was approved, I think,
in 1 days.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, 1 day for you, but for back home it was
a week. The Mexicans were already offering work. So I told
them, ``Hey, get that help,'' and then when I announced in San
Antonio that the Mexicans were coming to help us, then the
president that same night did it. I don't have to do that.
There is no need for us to be doing that, playing those games.
Mr. Powers. Congressman, pardon me for interrupting, we do
have to wait for the governor to submit the request to us. We
can't unilaterally just do that.
Mr. Rodriguez. I apologize.
Mr. Cuellar. No, you just now took your second line of
questioning, but go ahead.
Mr. Rodriguez. What you just said is a little game that
starts back and forth. My understanding was that the governor
had called it earlier, and then I heard that FEMA said, well,
they have to wait until they not only call it, but then they
have to ask for a certain type of help. Is that correct?
Mr. Powers. The damage assessment needs to be completed
before the president can respond.
Mr. Rodriguez. Let me tell you how that sounds, when you
are on the border and you are reading articles that it is
already taken care on the Mexican side. We are doing an
assessment. That is how it sounds. When people are hurting, oh,
no, we are doing an assessment 7 days after.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.
Let me just follow up on what Mr. Rodriguez is talking
about. I will give you 10 days from today to come up with an
outline, going through the Stafford Act, going point by point
saying, ``There is a disaster; this is the first step that
takes place; this is the second point, the third, the fourth,''
and then in between there, if you have any suggestions on how
we improve the process.
I can understand that we might wait for the governors and
all that, but there has to be something we can do to help the
individuals that are on the ground. I am talking about the
families that are up in the water. I know in my place, Laredo,
we sent water supplies and the fire department did a great job
in helping them. But there has to be a way, and I can
understand that there have to be certain steps that we take,
but I am just concerned about the bureaucratic steps that come
into play.
What I am asking you is to go step by step and where we can
effect some changes to help you. If you are constrained by
certain statutory issues, then let us know what it is. I am
looking at trying to streamline this for the process of trying
to bring the assistance down to the people on a much faster
basis.
Again, I can understand if there is something that
constrains you, let us know, because certainly I think Mr. Dent
and the members of the committee, working with a member who is
on the Appropriations Committee for the Homeland Security
Subcommittee, we certainly want to work with you to streamline
it.
So I want to make sure you understand: 10 days from today,
and I want you to include Congressman Rodriguez, and I just
talked to Graig about this, and with Mr. Dent's staff, to go
step by step, tell us where we need to maybe make some changes,
and tell us how we can streamline the process, simply because I
want to have a better process on how we can do this, because it
looks like time after time, we have a situation.
I can understand where, if you have a hurricane, you have a
little bit of advanced notice. A tornado is a little different
because it just happened. I have never heard of a tornado in
Eagle Pass in that area, so it was something very new for us on
the border. I had also asked to see if Mr. Jerry Moran can come
in, but I understand that he is in Kansas right now on this
same situation. I had asked Mr. Dent to see if we could get
somebody also, because those are the two tornadoes that I can
think of right now.
It is always good to have members who are facing that type
of situation. They are on the ground. I would ask you as you do
that, to include the committee staff on both sides, and Mr.
Rodriguez, so we can come up with a response. But I would like
to emphasize this, Mr. Powers, 10 days from today, I would like
to have something in writing. And then after I get that, I
would ask that we sit down again with the members of the
committee so we can go over this on how we can improve this.
Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Chairman, will you yield?
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rodriguez. Let me also just--and I have nothing but
praise. After you get in, you have some great people. I don't
want to take that away. I am not here to place blame. I just
want to know how can we expedite this; how do we make it
better.
I know you need more resources, too. That is part of the
problem, because we have been having more disasters. Then what
do we need to do. Do we need to establish more preparedness
teams that are sent out automatically throughout the country or
what?
So thank you very much. And I do want to thank you for what
you do when you do get there. Okay? Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes. Again, I emphasize what Mr. Rodriguez
said. The committee is interested in how do we work together.
That is what I want. I want to see practical solutions. I hate
playing these games of ``gotcha``-type of politics. Nobody is
trying to do that.
We are just trying to say, how do we streamline and make
the process better? Tell us how we can work together, Mr.
Powers, but I would like to see a timetable on this 10 days
from today, and see the response.
I know we have gone over the time. I will reserve my
questions to another time, but I would ask Mr. Dent if he has
any follow-up questions at this time.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few, and I
will try to keep it pretty brief.
To Mr. Endrikat and Mr. Prather again, do you believe that
legislation is necessary to strengthen the urban search and
rescue task forces and their role in assisting states and
localities as they respond to an incident of national
significance? Have previous administrative attempts been taken
to strengthen these USAR task forces? If so, how did these turn
out?
Chief Endrikat. In relation to the legislation,
Congressman, I think right now we exist under a few sections
within the Stafford Act. That really allows us to respond, but
it doesn't allow us to do some of the proactive things that we
just heard from the congressman from Texas that are required to
better support the people.
The way the legislation is right now, our program is
statutorily, I believe, we are not fully funded, fully
authorized, fully empowered to do the things that we are
required to do. There have been some previous attempts that
have never gotten to this point. We have never gotten this far
before in discussing new legislation that would specifically
authorize our system and fund it adequately.
Chief?
Mr. Dent. All right. I will move on to Mr. Powers again.
Several of FEMA's emergency response teams have a
communications component to help reestablish communications
where necessary and to achieve interoperability among emergency
responders. Could you please discuss the communications
capabilities of FEMA's emergency response teams?
Mr. Powers. The MERS units that you talked about do have a
very robust communications capability. They have the ability to
restore local communications if the communications, for
example, at the local police or fire department are wiped out
due to the disaster, they have the ability to restore that
communications using their equipment, until the real systems
can be put back in place.
They have the ability to multiplex frequencies that allow
responders from various agencies who operate on different
radios, different frequency bands, different frequencies, to
use their normal equipment and have the equipment multiplexed
electronically that allows them to talk to another agency,
another jurisdiction.
They have a limited ability to restore cell phone systems,
to put up a temporary cell phone network that links into the
national system, until the national systems can be put back
into place.
They have the ability to provide the state EOC or the
incident command with communications capability via satellite;
video teleconference capability; as well as other capabilities
that can provide some limited access to the Internet and to the
FEMA network, also via the satellite systems that they have on
board.
They are available for the state and local responders, the
state operations centers, to use if they so need.
Mr. Dent. Also, I just wanted to follow up again, too, the
House and Senate conferees are eventually going to meet to
discuss H.R. 1 and S. 4--those are the 9/11 commission
recommendations and implementation legislation. They are likely
to discuss a provision contained in the Senate bill that would
establish a strategic technology reserve to pre-position or
secure interoperable communications in advance for immediate
deployment in an emergency or major disaster.
This technology reserve would be established and maintained
by the Department of Commerce. It is my understanding that FEMA
either already has such a capability or is in the process of
establishing such a capability. Is this true? And do any of
FEMA's response teams maintain reserve communications
equipment?
Mr. Powers. We do not have the capability that is described
in that particular legislation. In fact, we were curious as to
why the Department of Commerce was doing that instead of FEMA.
But we know that the government operates in sometimes unusual
ways. So we are hoping to integrate that into our disaster
communications and emergency communications system once the
equipment is procured.
Mr. Dent. Just very quickly, how would such a strategic
technology reserve be maintained by the Department of Commerce?
How would that interact with existing capabilities of FEMA's
emergency response teams?
Mr. Powers. I do not have an answer to that question right
now, but I will come back to you with an answer.
Mr. Dent. Quickly to follow up, how would such a Department
of Commerce capability be integrated into the incident command
structure?
Mr. Powers. I will again have to come back to you on that.
We are still in the development stages of all of the mechanics
of the deployment of the equipment.
Mr. Dent. Thanks.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the members for the questions.
The members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for you, and we ask you to make sure you respond to
them on a timely basis, in writing to those questions.
Again, I want to thank everybody for being here. We
appreciate the work and the public service that you provide. I
know that sometimes it is difficult, but we are all trying to
work together to make sure we do our job together.
Having no further business, the hearing stands adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]