[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DIRECTION AND VIABILITY OF
THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-32
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 3
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania................................. 23
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress
From the U.S. Virgin Islands................................... 25
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 28
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 38
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 29
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 33
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 24
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From
the District................................................... 18
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Colorado.......................................... 32
The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington................................... 21
Witnesses
Mr. Joseph Ricci, Executive Director, National Association of
Security Companies:
Oral statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Mr. Gary Schenkel, Director Federal Protective Service, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Oral Statement................................................. 11
The Honorable Hanes L. Taylor, Deputy Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. David L. Wright, President, American Federation of Goverment
Employees, Local 918, FPS Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Attachment 1: Briefing on the Federal Protective Service,
Transition to FY 08 Budget, December 20, 2006............ 46
Attachment 2: Federal Protective Service, Staff Allocation
Model, FPS National Staffing Model Team June 2005........ 49
THE DIRECTION AND VIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE
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Tuesday, May 1, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Norton, Jackson Lee,
Christensen, Langevin, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Green,
Perlmutter, Lungren, Reichert, Dent, and Bilirakis.
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``The Direction and Viability of the Federal Protective
Service.''
I yield myself as much time as I may consume for an opening
statement.
We are here today to discuss the future direction of the
Federal Protective Service, also known as FPS. FPS was
established in 1971 as a uniformed protection force in the
federal government. The FPS mission then and now is to secure
government-owned buildings and protect the millions of people
who work in or visit those buildings every day.
The importance of the FPS mission became clear long before
9/11. The 1995 terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah
building in Oklahoma City brought home the fact that federal
buildings could be targets for terrorist attack.
So unlike many scenarios which could happen, we know that a
terrorist attack on a federal building has happened. Knowing
that such an attack has happened should cause us to increase
our resolve to fortify our resources so that it will never
happen again. Because the department is charged with keeping
the federal sector secure from attack, FPS guards are often our
first line of defense.
So we are here today to get some clarity concerning the
department's vision for FPS's future. Currently, FPS has about
1,100 guards who are federal employees. An additional 15,000
private security guards protect the lion's share of federal
buildings through contracts with FPS. The contracts for these
private guards are the largest single item in the FPS budget,
and every year the cost of hiring private guards grows.
In fiscal year 2006, FPS paid private guards $487 million
to protect federal buildings. In fiscal year 2007, FPS will pay
$577 million for private guards to protect federal buildings.
So in 1 year alone, the cost of private security guards has
increased by $90 million. This is a 20 percent growth rate. It
is the duty of this committee to assure that this 20 percent
growth in payments to these contractors represents money that
is well spent, effectively administered, and properly overseen.
The American taxpayer demands that of us.
But at this point, we cannot say that the department is
effectively using this money. Both the department's inspector
general and the GAO have found that FPS has been lax in its
oversight of these security contracts. The IG found that FPS
had paid $121 million to contractors without requiring all of
the necessary paperwork. I know that $100 million may not seem
like a lot to people around here, but in Mississippi that is
real money.
Given this continuing need for security at federal
buildings and the growth in security guard contracts, it would
be logical to think that the department would increase FPS
personnel, but this is not the department's plan. We have been
told that the department actually plans on reducing and
reassigning FPS guards. Instead of increasing FPS personnel,
the department plans on increasing the number of private
security contractors.
The department's plan needs strong contract oversight to
succeed. Yet, the department's inspector general and the GAO
have questioned the FPS's ability to adequately monitor and
oversee both the billing and the performance of these private
contractors. And while the use of private guards may not be a
problem, we should remember that without adequate contracting
oversight, we will remain unsure of the safety of our federal
buildings and the security of the millions of people who visit
them every day.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
FPS was established in 1971 as a uniformed protection force in the
federal government. The FPS mission--then and now--is to the secure
government owned buildings and protect the millions of people who work
in or visit those buildings every day. The importance of the FPS
mission became clear long before 9/11. The 1995 terrorist attack on the
Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City brought home the fact that
federal buildings could be targets for terrorist attack.
So unlike many scenarios which could happen, we know that a
terrorist attack on a federal building has happened. Knowing that such
an attack has happened should cause us to increase our resolve and
fortify our resources so that it will never happen again. Because the
Department is charged with keeping the federal sector secure from
attack, FPS guards are often our first line of defense.
So we are here today to get some clarity concerning the
Department's vision for FPS's future. Currently, FPS has about 1100
guards who are federal employees. An additional 15,000 private security
guards protect the lion's share of federal buildings through contracts
with FPS. The contracts for these private guards are the largest single
item in the FPS budget. And every year the cost of hiring private
security guards grows.
In Fiscal Year 2006, FPS paid private guards $487 million to
protect federal buildings. In Fiscal Year 2007, FPS will pay $577
million for private guards to protect federal buildings. So in one year
alone, the cost of private security guards has increased by $90
million. This is a 20% growth rate. It is the duty of this committee to
assure that this 20% growth in payments to these contractors represents
money that is well spent, effectively administered and properly
overseen. The American taxpayer demands that of us.
But at this point, we cannot say that the Department is effectively
using this money.
Both the Department's Inspector General and the GAO have found that
FPS has been lax in its oversight of these security contracts. The IG
found that FPS had paid $121 million to contractors without requiring
all of the necessary paperwork. I know that $100 million may not seem
like a lot around here, but in Mississippi that is real money.
Given this continuing need for security at federal buildings, and
the growth in security guard contracts, it would be logical to think
that the Department would increase FPS personnel. But that is not the
Department's plan. We have been told that the Department actually plans
on reducing and reassigning FPS guards. Instead of increasing FPS
personnel, the Department plans on increasing the number of private
security contractors.
The Department's plan needs strong contract oversight to succeed.
Yet the Department's Inspector General and the GOA have questioned the
FPS' ability to adequately monitor and oversee both the billing and
performance of these private contractors. And while the use of private
guards may not be a problem, we should remember that without adequate
contracting oversight, we will remain unsure of the safety of our
federal buildings and the security of the millions of people who visit
them every day.
Mr. Thompson. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Bilirakis of
Florida for an opening statement as ranking member.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
This hearing presents a good opportunity to discuss the
changes being implemented by the Federal Protective Service.
FPS has recently announced plans to refocus its mission,
realign its workforce, and strengthen security standards. These
efforts are intended to improve FPS's ability to deter, prevent
and respond to threats and vulnerabilities at federal
facilities nationwide.
I would like to thank our two panels of witnesses for being
here today. I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Taylor and
Mr. Schenkel, who will provide insight into the future of FPS
and the benefit of taking a risk-based approach to secure
federal property.
I also look forward to the testimony of our second panel,
including Mr. Wright and Mr. Ricci. I would especially like to
thank Mr. Ricci for being here on behalf of the National
Association of Security Companies. It is important for members
of the private security industry to be engaged in the debate
over the protection of federal facilities.
This hearing presents a good opportunity for FPS to clarify
its newly focused mission and to discuss the important roles of
contract security. Contract guards work with federal, state and
local law enforcement to provide security at GSA-owned and GSA-
operated buildings, U.S. military bases, as well as nuclear
power plants nationwide.
These guards are required to meet government-specified
training and performance standards. Therefore, all 15,000
guards protecting GSA property under contract with FPS are
required to meet FPS training and suitability requirements.
These requirements include criminal background checks, firearm
certification, 80 hours of basic training, and first-aid and
CPR training. Contract guard compliance with FPS standards must
be properly monitored by FPS to ensure the success of its
mission. While it is important to note that DHS inherited many
of FPS's budgetary and administrative issues, the department is
responsible for addressing these shortfalls and ensuring that
federal facilities receive proper protection.
According to ICE, a number of FPS activities will be
consolidated or eliminated as FPS transitions to the fiscal
year 2008 budget. Among these, FPS will have no federal
oversight on-site presence in approximately 50 cities; no
proactive surveillance patrol; and a reduction in FPS federal
officers in New York and Washington, D.C. While department
officials report that FPS is not anticipating a budgetary
shortfall and that these changes are only part of a realignment
effort, several press reports indicate that a shortfall may
range from $40 million to $80 million.
The department is responsible for addressing those
shortfalls, if they exist, and ensuring that federal facilities
receive proper protection. If FPS is committed to fulfilling
this responsibility, and contract security companies are
willing to meet training and performance standards set by FPS,
I think we should expect FPS to successfully implement its
performance goals and to realign using a risk-based approach to
security planning.
I would like to thank our witnesses in advance for their
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Other members of the committee are reminded that, under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome the first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, the Honorable James L. Taylor, is the
deputy inspector general for the Department of Homeland
Security. He previously served as a deputy chief financial
officer and director for financial management at the Department
of Commerce.
Our second witness, Gary Schenkel, was appointed director
of the Federal Protective Service, one of the five divisions of
the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in March 2007. A
retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Schenkel has
significant leadership experience in wide areas.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Taylor.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. TAYLOR, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and members of
the committee to discuss DHS's IG's work related to the Federal
Protective Service.
My testimony today will focus on the Federal Protective
Service's oversight of its contract guard program and financial
management issues as a basis for our comments on FPS's new
strategy related to its mission and overall reduction of
manpower.
As part of its overall strategy to ensure the physical
safety of government employees and visitor, FPS largely uses
contract guards to deter crime in and around federal buildings.
FPS guards play a crucial and highly visible role in the FPS
mission. They are deployed at roving as well as fixed posts
where they often operate security screening devices such as
magnetometers and X-ray machines. Contract guard services
represent the single largest item in the FPS operating budget,
estimated to be over $575 million in fiscal year 2007.
As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the
contract guard workforce has more than doubled and now numbers
around 15,000 nationwide. FPS has become increasingly reliant
on its contract guard force, having less than 1,000 uniformed
FPS officers nationwide.
Previous GSA inspector general and GAO reports noted
numerous deficiencies in contract guard qualifications and FPS
oversight of guard contracts before FPS was relocated to DHS.
Accordingly, in 2006, we initiated an audit of FPS's oversight
of contract guard contracts in the national capital region. Our
objectives were to determine whether effective controls were in
place to ensure that qualified contract guards are deployed at
federal buildings in the national capital region, and if FPS
effectively monitors contractor performance and if guard
company invoices were being paid timely, according to the
Prompt Payment Act on a nationwide basis.
We concluded that FPS was not consistently deploying
qualified and certified contract guards. Guards were on-post
without current suitability determinations or with expired
certifications. Thirty percent of the guards in our sample had
at least one expired, but required, certification. For example,
we identified guards with expired background investigations,
medical certifications, and expired domestic violence
certifications.
We identified guards that were on-post with expired
suitability determinations, including in one instance a guard
who was still on-post 7 months after having been found
unsuitable due to a felony assault conviction. We found
security guards who are not armed where they are supposed to be
armed. Guards were armed at posts designed to be unarmed, and
guards did not have top secret or secret security clearances at
posts that required such clearances, and non-citizen guards who
were not carrying the required work permit cards.
These deficiencies occurred because FPS personnel were not
effectively monitoring the contract guard program. While the
contractor has a primary responsibility for ensuring that all
contract provisions are met, inadequate contractor oversight
can result in the government paying for services it did not
receive and placing FPS protective facilities, employees and
visitors at risk.
We also found that FPS was not paying invoices for its
contract guard services nationwide in a timely manner. Of the
more than 25,000 invoices paid nationwide from October 1, 2004
to November 21, 2005, 88 percent were not paid within 30 days
as required by the Prompt Payment Act. As a result, FPS paid
more than $1.2 million in interest penalties to these
companies.
We found that a central cause for FPS's inability to pay
private guards timely was FPS's transition from GSA to the ICE
financial management system. An independent auditor contracted
by ICE to perform an audit of DHS's financial statements
confirmed that finding. They also concluded that the
integration of FPS's accounting processes from GSA to ICE
created numerous issues with the integrity of FPS's transaction
data and represented a material weakness in ICE's internal
controls. FPS budget and financial officials informed us that
inadequate training prior to the transition and the difficulty
in using the financial system also contributed to the invoice
payment problems.
In our report issued last October, we made four
recommendations to the regional director of the national
capital region, and one
recommendation to the director of FPS to strengthen controls
over its contract guard program. FPS operations are funded
solely through security fees and reimbursements collected from
federal agencies for FPS security services rendered. FPS
charges individual agencies for security services based on the
building's identified security level and building-specific
security needs.
Funding issues have been a problem for FPS even prior to
its transfer to the Department of Homeland Security. GAO
reported this in 2004 when they said security fees collected in
the past by GSA were not sufficient to cover the cost of FPS
operations and that the deficits were covered by GSA using
monies from its federal building fund.
Meeting the agency's workforce reduction targets in the
plan identified by the department carries with it attendant
risks. Without careful planning, proposed staffing and service
reductions could lead to uneven effects across the nation,
perhaps placing some facilities and its employees at risk. FPS
could experience a significant loss of workforce skill and
knowledge and skills and balances across its regional offices.
To address these challenges before they become problems,
FPS needs to proactively develop appropriate strategies to
ensure necessary staff levels and competencies are in place to
carry out the agency's mission and effectively protect federal
buildings, employees and visitors.
Continuous monitoring of attrition within FPS will allow
the agency to more readily identify locations that require
special attention to ensure that mission-related
responsibilities are not negatively impacted.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
be happy to answer any questions you or the committee members
may have.
[The statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim Taylor
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Jim
Taylor, Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss work the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) has
completed related to the Federal Protective Service (FPS).
My testimony today will address our concerns about the Federal
Protective Service's oversight of its contract guard program and
financial management issues as a basis on our comments on FPS' new
strategy related to its mission and overall reduction of manpower.
The Federal Protective Service
The Federal Protective Service, established in 1971 as the
uniformed protection force of the General Services Administration (GSA)
for government-occupied facilities, is responsible for policing,
securing, and ensuring a safe environment in which federal agencies can
conduct business by reducing threats posed against approximately 9,000
federal government facilities nationwide.
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FPS was transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security and retained its responsibilities for
protecting the buildings, grounds, and property owned, occupied, or
secured by the federal government under GSA's jurisdiction. In addition
to GSA facilities, the Act also provides FPS with the authority to
protect properties held by DHS components that were not under GSA
jurisdiction. FPS was moved from GSA, Public Building Services, to DHS,
effective March 1, 2003. Within DHS, FPS is part of the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Directorate.
FPS Contract Guard Services Oversight
As part of its overall strategy to ensure the physical safety of
government employees and visitors, FPS uses contract guards to deter
the commission of crime in and around federal buildings. Guards are
deployed at roving and fixed posts, where they often operate security-
screening devices such as magnetometers and x-ray machines. FPS guards
play a crucial and highly visible role in the FPS mission, often the
first, and sometimes the only, contact visitors have with FPS at a
facility.
Contract guard services represent the single largest item in the
FPS operating budget, estimated to be $577 million for fiscal year
2007. As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the contract
guard workforce more than doubled and now numbers around 15,000. FPS
has become increasingly reliant on its contract guard force, having
less than 1,000 uniformed FPS officers nationwide.
Previous GSA Office of Inspector General and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports noted numerous deficiencies with
contract guard qualifications and FPS oversight of guard contracts.
Accordingly, in the fall of 2005, the DHS OIG began an audit of FPS's
oversight of contract guard contracts in its Region 11--the National
Capital Region (NCR).\1\ Our objectives were to determine whether (1)
effective controls are in place to ensure qualified contract guards are
deployed at federal buildings in Region 11; (2) FPS' Region 11
effectively monitors contractor performance and compliance with
contract provisions; and (3) contract guard company invoices were paid
timely according to the Prompt Payment Act nationwide.
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\1\At the time of our audit, the NCR contract guard program
consisted of 54 guard service contracts that provide approximately
5,700 guards to protect 125 facilities.
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We concluded that FPS' Region 11 was not consistently deploying
qualified and certified contract guards. Contract guards were on post
without current suitability determinations or with expired
certifications. Thirty percent of the guards in our sample had at least
one expired, but required, certification. For example, we identified
guards with expired background investigations, medical certifications,
and expired domestic violence certifications.
We identified guards that were on post with expired suitability
determinations, including in one instance, where we identified a guard
was still on post as of January 2006, although NCR adjudicated the
guard unfavorable in May 2005 due to a felony assault conviction.
Also, security contractors were not performing their security
services according to the terms and conditions of their contracts. For
example, we found security guards who were not armed at armed posts as
required; guards who were armed at posts designated to be unarmed;
guards who did not have Top Security or Secret security clearances at
posts that required higher level clearances; and non-citizen guards who
were not carrying their required work permit cards.
These deficiencies occurred because FPS personnel were not
effectively monitoring the contract guard program. While the contractor
has the primary responsibility for ensuring that all contract
provisions and requirements are met, FPS is required to actively
monitor and verify contractor performance.
NCR's 12 Quality Assurance Specialists (QAS) are responsible for
the day-to-day inspection and monitoring of the contractors' work. The
role of the QAS is critical to monitoring contract guard performance,
as they are the primary NCR personnel on-site who can verify compliance
with contract provisions and requirements. NCR's eight Contract Section
personnel are responsible for processing deductions to contractor
invoices due to noncompliance issues uncovered by the QASs.
However, the QASs were not consistently submitting their inspection
reports to the NCR Contract Section, and for those that were submitted,
most were not submitted in a timely manner. In addition, Contract
Specialists were not making deductions to contractor invoices when
appropriate. Specifically, they did not process potential deductions
from contractor invoices totaling almost $1.3 million when guard
companies failed to comply with contract requirements.
FPS explained that these lapses were due to understaffing.
Inadequate contractor oversight can result in the government paying for
services it did not receive, loss of monies resulting from contract
deductions due to nonperformance, and placing FPS-protected facilities,
employees, and facility visitors at risk.
Federal Protective Service Financial Management and Contractor Payments
The Federal Protective Service continues to face financial
management challenges from its transition from the General Services
Administration (GSA) to the Department and, specifically, to ICE. Our
October 2006 audit of FPS contract guard service operations found that
FPS was not paying invoices for its contract guard services nationwide
in a timely manner, resulting in a violation of the Prompt Payment Act.
Of the 25,557 invoices paid from October 1, 2004, to November 21, 2005,
88 percent were not paid within 30 days as required by the Prompt
Payment Act. As a result, FPS paid more than $1.2 million in interest
to guard companies that are contracted by FPS to protect federal
buildings for late payments made during this time period. We found that
a central cause for FPS' inability to pay private guard contractors
timely was FPS' transition from the GSA Financial Management System to
the ICE Federal Financial Management System (FFMS) on October 1, 2004,
and occurred before the system was adapted to meet the unique financial
and budgeting requirements associated with FPS' business processes.
The DHS, Office of the Under Secretary for Management, originally
directed that the FPS transition from the GSA Financial Management
System to the ICE FFMS be completed by October 1, 2003. Following the
initial review of the unique financial management requirements needed
to support the FPS offsetting collections program, the transition date
was extended to October 1, 2004. FPS officials said that, despite
attempts to explain FPS business processes and FFMS needs to the ICE
OFM, problems with adapting the FFMS to FPS needs remained and
suggested that the transition to the ICE system be postponed. However,
DHS required FPS to transition to the system on October 1, 2004,
despite concerns about the system's ability to meet FPS needs. ICE
financial management staff had assured the staff of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, in a briefing on February 17, 2005, that the
FPS transition would be completed by March 31, 2005.
However, problems with contractor payments and the transition to
FFMS continued. In a May 6, 2005, memorandum to the Assistant Secretary
for ICE, the Director of FPS outlined what he considered systemic
problems and issues with the FFMS and reported that problems with
contractor payments had, in fact, worsened since the transition. An
independent auditor contracted by us to perform an audit of DHS
financial statements \2\ also concluded that the integration of FPS'
accounting processes from GSA to ICE created numerous issues with the
integrity of FPS transaction data and represented a material weakness
in ICE's internal controls.
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\2\ DHS' Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal year
2005, November 15, 2005, Department of Homeland security.
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FPS Budget and Finance officials in Region 3 and FPS Headquarters
officials informed us that inadequate training prior to the transition
and the difficulty in using the FFMS also contributed to the invoice
payment problems. These officials indicated that the system is
difficult to navigate and that errors are time-consuming to correct.
Follow-up on OIG report on improving FPS contract guard oversight
We issued ``Federal Protective Service Needs to Improve its
Oversight of its Contract Guard Program,'' OIG-07-05, on October 30,
2006. In this report, we made four recommendations to the Regional
Director of the NCR (Region 11), and one recommendation to the Director
of FPS to strengthen controls over its contract guard program.
Since our audit was issued in October 2006, we have updated FPS
progress on implementing our recommendations to improve management of
its contract guard program. We consider 2 of the 4 recommendations
resolved and closed. The actions planned and taken by FPS to improve
their contract monitoring efforts should ensure that contractors are
deploying qualified and certified guards at federal facilities in the
National Capital Region. However, we consider two recommendations still
open and unresolved:
1. We recommended that the Regional Director of the National
Capital Region review all inspection reports and proposed
deductions for the period March 1, 2003 through the present and
initiate collection actions on all contracts found to be
deficient. In response to our inquiry as to the status of
recommendation implementation, FPS stated that contract terms
required deductions to be collected within 30 days after the
month of performance making it contractually impossible to go
back and collect contract deductions that should have been
previously identified and taken. We asked FPS to provide us
with the information from their guard contracts that
specifically state that collections are limited to 30 days
after the performance period.
2. We recommended that the Director of the Federal Protective
Service work with the ICE Chief Financial Officer to implement
corrective actions to adequately address internal control
deficiencies and payment timeliness issues noted here and in
our annual financial audit report issued in November 2005.
ICE and FPS were responsive to our recommendation and have taken
steps to implement corrective actions to adequately address internal
control deficiencies and payment timeliness issues. In response to our
final audit report, FPS stated that in addition to the Tiger Team
efforts referenced in the report, ICE had put into place a Financial
Action Plan (FAP) to address findings from the 2004 and 2005 financial
audits including those that relate to FPS issues. The Project
Management Office has worked with various offices and stakeholders to
develop the plan, and is overseeing the implementation of the FAP. The
FAP includes a project to improve invoice processing.
However, we consider this recommendation open until implementation
of the various steps outlined in the agency's response to our final
report are complete.
FPS Budget Shortfall and Future Changes in Strategy
FPS operations are funded solely through security fees and
reimbursements collected from federal agencies for FPS security
services rendered. FPS charges individual agencies for security
services based on the building's identified security level \3\ and
building-specific security needs. Funding issues have been a problem
for FPS even prior to its transfer to the Department of Homeland
Security. GAO, in 2004, reported that the security fees collected in
the past by GSA were not sufficient to cover the cost of FPS
operations, and that the deficits were covered by GSA using monies from
its federal building fund.
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\3\ Buildings are categorized along five levels; Level V is the
highest in terms of building security and Level I is the lowest. Levels
are assigned primarily according to the number of tenants within a
facility and also takes into consideration the square footage of office
space, volume of public contact, and tenant agency mission functions. A
facility's designated security level translates to minimum security
standards that must be met. FPS conducts periodic risk assessments to
validate a facility's security standards and countermeasures in place
as well as to determine whether additional security enhancements are
needed.
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In response to the GAO report, FPS recently unveiled a new strategy
and focus to provide security services and to reallocate its manpower.
The agency will change its focus to setting security standards and
ensuring compliance with those standards. FPS says it will target its
efforts and resources according to a risk-based model, concentrating on
federal facilities with security levels III and IV. Another aspect of
its new strategy calls for a reducing manpower from about 1200 to 950
positions through out-placing to other ICE and DHS components through
attrition. In response to the OIG report, FPS has already taken steps
it believes have strengthened its monitoring and oversight of the
contract guard program.
Meeting the agency's workforce reduction targets through out-
placing and attrition carries with it attendant risks. Without careful
planning of its workforce, proposed staffing and service reductions
could lead to uneven effects across the nation, perhaps placing some
facilities and its employees at risk. In some locations or offices
within FPS, the agency's most knowledgeable employees may be the most
likely to leave FPS and not be replaced. FPS could experience higher
attrition in major urban centers as compared to regional and field
locations. These factors may result in a significant loss in workforce
skill and knowledge, skills imbalances, with some areas and locations
hit harder than others.
To address these challenges before they become problems, FPS should
be proactively engaging in workforce planning and implementing
appropriate strategies to ensure necessary staff levels and
competencies are in place to carry out the agency's mission and
effectively protect federal facilities, employees and visitors.
Continuous monitoring of attrition within FPS will allow the agency to
more readily identify locations that will require special attention to
ensure that mission-related responsibilities are not negatively
impacted.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you or the Committee Members may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Mr. Schenkel.
STATEMENT OF GARY SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE
Mr. Schenkel. Chairman Thompson, distinguished members of
the committee, as the director of the Federal Protective
Service, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the long and proud history of FPS, the business
improvements that have been made over the past 2 years, and my
vision for where we are heading in the future.
As you may know, I began serving in my current position 1
month ago today. Prior to joining the FPS, I was the assistant
federal security director at Chicago Midway Airport, where I
oversaw the strategic planning and business management of TSA
operations and worked closely with both government and private
sector partners to ensure the highest levels of security,
without sacrificing efficiency and service.
Before joining the TSA, I served as the assistant deputy
superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, where I served
as the director of training and recruitment, and was
responsible for employee relations and labor matters, including
establishing a strong working relationship with the Chicago
police union.
I was recruited for my position with the Chicago Police
Department while serving in my 29th year as a U.S. Marine.
While serving in the Marines, I attained my bachelor of fine
arts degree, master's in public administration, and graduated
from the Amphibious Warfare School and the Marine Corps Command
and Staff College. These experiences prepared me to wide-
ranging responsibilities over large geographic areas,
exercising centralized control over dispersed decentralized
operations.
I am confident that my leadership and security experience,
as well as my background in organizational transformation,
security planning for public facilities, logistical planning
and business administration, will enable me to make a
significant contribution to the success of FPS.
FPS is a critical part of ICE's overall mission through its
protection of our federal facilities, the public that conducts
business in those buildings, and the federal employees who work
there. FPS uses a layered security approach that includes
conducting security assessments, offering emergency planning
services, and providing law enforcement services at more than
8,900 federal facilities nationwide.
FPS provides a wide range of activities performed by over
15,000 contract security guards and nearly 1,200 government
personnel. Primarily composed to police officers, special
agents, and inspectors, contract security guard employees of
the private sector companies under contract with FPS perform
six post access controls and screening functions. FPS officers
perform patrol activities and respond to calls for service,
while FPS special agents investigate crimes on federal property
and perform intelligence and analysis functions.
FPS inspectors are uniformed law enforcement officers that
possess full authority and training of the FPS police officer.
However, inspectors are also duly trained as physical security
experts and provide comprehensive security services, including
building security assessments and implementing and testing
security measures and monitoring and overseeing the contract
guard force.
For fiscal year 2008, the president's budget supports 950
full time equivalent personnel that would be aligned with our
national infrastructure protection plan priorities and risk-
based methodology. The president's 2008 budget fully maintains
existing levels of contract security guards. FPS will set
security certifications for these contract guards and will
increase its emphasis on ensuring compliance with the
standards. Coupled with the contract guards are the FPS
inspectors who will develop security policy, standards, provide
building assessments, and monitor agency compliance with
security standards.
On the financial management front, FPS has struggled to
cover all of its costs within its fee-based structure. In
fiscal year 2006, $29.4 million was reprogrammed to offset a
projected existing FPS deficit. In fiscal year 2007, FPS is
projected to be financially solvent due to the implementation
of basic financial controls and a number of cost-cutting and
cost-avoidance measures that began in 2006.
These cost containment efforts have enabled FPS to use
funds for more critical operational needs. For example, in 2007
FPS conducted a law enforcement basic training class, along
with a Physical Security Academy, PSA, class. We call for an
additional two more classes in fiscal year 2007.
ICE has been engaged in a top-to-bottom review of FPS's
operations to address critical issues, while continuing to
provide the highest level of security protection and services
to its clients. In addition, FPS must also play an additional
role in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan as a
sector-specific agency for government facilities.
The NIPP provides a comprehensive framework for the
protection of government facilities, transportation facilities,
key infrastructure assets, and other facilities from potential
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.
I welcome the opportunity to share this panel with Deputy
Inspector General Taylor. FPS has received outstanding support
and guidance from the Office of the Inspector General and is
working diligently to ensure we address the findings made
concerning our contract guard program.
We also have an important partnership with our contract
security guards, and we welcome the input from such an esteemed
organization like the National Association of Security
Companies, NASCO, and look forward to a strong and long-lasting
partnership.
I am also extremely pleased to be here with Inspector David
Wright, union president, a gentleman that I have had the good
fortune to meet with previously, and a true gentleman that I
look forward to working with for the refinement of this process
in the future.
The coming years will be filled with significant change for
the FPS program and its dedicated workforce. It will take
several years to accomplish our efforts. ICE and FPS now have
the right plan to strengthen this vital capability.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important
oversight hearing. I would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Schenkel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary W. Schenkel
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and distinguished Members of
the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
share information about the Federal Protective Service (FPS), business
improvements made over the last two years, and a vision on where we are
going as a program in the future. Bottom line--since merging into U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003, FPS has been
focused on strengthening its capability to execute its core mission.
The goal was and still is to implement a more effective FPS, ensuring
that our nation's critical Federal facilities remain safe and secure.
We now have a plan to succeed in this goal.
THE ICE MISSION
The ICE mission is to protect the American people by enforcing the
law against terrorists and criminals who seek to cross our borders and
threaten us here at home. The FPS program is a critical part of that
mission through its protection of our Federal facilities, the public
that conducts business in those buildings, and the Federal employees
who work there. FPS uses a layered security approach that includes
conducting security assessments, offering emergency planning services,
and providing law enforcement services. These activities are performed
at more than 8,900 Federal facilities nationwide.
FPS BACKGROUND
The FPS program delivers integrated law enforcement and security
services to Federal agencies housed in General Services Administration
(GSA) owned and leased facilities throughout the United States and its
territories. FPS services cover a wide range of activities that have
been performed by over 15,000 contract security guards and nearly 1,200
Government personnel, primarily composed of police officers, special
agents, and inspectors. Contract security guards are employees of
private sector companies, under contract with FPS, that perform fixed-
post access control and screening functions. FPS police officers
perform patrol activities and respond to calls for service, while FPS
Special Agents investigate crimes on GSA controlled property and
perform intelligence analysis functions. FPS inspectors are uniformed
law enforcement officers that possess the full authority and training
of FPS police officers; however, inspectors also are dually trained as
physical security experts and provide comprehensive security services
including building security assessments, implementing and testing
security measures, and monitoring and overseeing the contract guard
force.
On an annual basis, FPS conducts nearly 2,500 building security
assessments and responds to approximately 1,500 demonstrations. In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, FPS conducted more than 1,000 criminal
investigations for crimes against government facilities and employees
and arrested more than 4,000 criminals and fugitives for committing
crimes on Federal property. Additionally, contract security guards
seized more than 800,000 weapons and other prohibited items prior to
their entry into Federal facilities. FPS provides services to nearly
1,500 facilities categorized as Security Level III or IV (highest risk
facilities).
ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT
Since FPS' creation in 1971, various studies and reports have been
conducted concerning the program and its role in the protection of
Federal employees, the buildings that house them, and the public that
conducts business in these buildings. These studies were conducted
throughout the history of the FPS while it was a component of GSA, and
have continued since its transition to DHS. Many of these studies have
highlighted serious management and operational challenges facing the
program, including systematic funding issues.
I commend Assistant Secretary Myers for taking a strong, proactive
role in getting to the root causes of the issues that have faced FPS
over the last several years and for working diligently to fix them and
enhance the program's effectiveness. In FY 2005, ICE established a
Tiger Team to assist FPS in addressing its financial and acquisition
management challenges and to recommend process improvements. This was
the result of numerous DHS and Congressional inquiries related to late
payments to FPS contract guard vendors. Although the Team focused on
financial and acquisition management problems that had plagued FPS, it
also identified other management and mission concerns for further
evaluation. The work of the Tiger Team has resulted in significant
progress being made in financial and acquisition management over the
past year. These changes have improved financial and acquisition
management by boosting compliance with the Prompt Payment as well as
increasing training and resources to the contracting function.
Improving Acquisition Efficiency. As mentioned, we have made some
initial strides on shoring up the acquisition functions. First, the
acquisition functions have been consolidated under the ICE Head of
Contracting Activity. Through consolidation, FPS has standardized
processes and procedures, improved utilization of contracting staff,
and achieved economies of scale. This directly responds to an audit
published in October 2006, in which the DHS Inspector General cited the
need to improve the oversight of the FPS contract guard program in the
National Capital Region. While this continues to be an area of focused
attention, I am pleased to report the following significant progress:
- Hired a Contract Guard Program Manager for the National
Capital Region;
- Conducted a region-wide post audit;
- Developed and implemented Standard Operating Procedures for
the guard program which outline the monitoring, tracking of
contract deductions, and suitability processes;
- Increased the number of Contract Officers Technical
Representatives (COTR);
- Provided enhanced training to all personnel involved in the
inspections process; and as previously mentioned,
- Centralized guard acquisition functions under the auspices of
the ICE Office of Acquisition Management.
For the long term, a study was recently completed to baseline the
state of the acquisition function at FPS to develop a path forward for
instituting improvements. The study identified several critical areas
that require additional focus. These areas have been incorporated into
our FPS vision moving forward.
Establishing Sound Financial Management. On the financial
management front, FPS has struggled to cover all of its costs within
its fee-based structure. In FY 2006, $29.4 million was reprogrammed to
offset a projected existing FPS deficit. In FY 2007, FPS is projected
to be financially solvent due to the implementation of basic financial
controls and a number of cost-cutting and cost avoidance measures that
began in FY 2006. These included a streamlining of the Megacenter
function to reduce unnecessary administrative support costs; reducing
the FPS vehicle fleet where appropriate; restricting discretionary
travel, overtime and training; restricting hiring and promotions to
only the most critical; and deferring non-mandatory space moves, among
others.
These cost containment efforts also have enabled FPS to use funds
for some critical operational needs. For example, in FY 2007, FPS
conducted a law enforcement basic training class, along with a Physical
Security Academy (PSA) class. Plans call for two additional PSA classes
for the remainder of FY 2007. Some key staffing needs are also being
addressed due to careful financial management. Critical operations
positions have been announced this year, providing for advancement
opportunities in both the management and inspector ranks. Moreover,
each FPS region has been given a defined budget providing for travel,
training, overtime, as well as for critical equipment and supplies.
Clearly, implementation of acquisition and financial management
business process improvements has put FPS on firmer ground. However, we
also understand that addressing management-related concerns is the
basis for ensuring the successful implementation of FPS' mission to
protect Federal facilities. As such, Assistant Secretary Myers formed a
second Tiger Team in May 2006 to review the FPS operations and
structure overall. This team's goal was to define clearly the mission
of the FPS; focus its resources toward that mission to ensure a stable
working environment; and fully align FPS with ICE and DHS. The results
of this second review were the foundation for the FPS Comprehensive
Action Plan (Action Plan) that is now underway.
FPS COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLAN
ICE has been engaged in a top-to-bottom review of FPS's operations
to address critical issues, while continuing to provide the highest
level of security and protection services to its clients. The move of
FPS to DHS from GSA presented a unique opportunity for the FPS program
to increase financial accountability and hone a clearly defined
homeland security function. We must act now to revamp the program and
improve its overall position within homeland security.
As mentioned previously, there is a well-documented case for this
program. FPS must be refined to set the gold standard for facility risk
assessments, identifying and investigating high risk incidents, and
security interventions in Federal facilities across the country.
In addition, FPS must also play an active role in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), as the sector-specific agency
for government facilities. The NIPP provides a comprehensive framework
for the protection of government facilities, transportation facilities,
key infrastructure assets and other facilities from potential terrorist
attacks, natural disasters and other emergencies. FPS Inspectors
possess expertise in the full complement of physical security and law
enforcement capabilities. As a part of their basic training, inspectors
successfully complete an intensive four-week Physical Security Academy,
held at our state-of-the-art facility at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center. Consistent with the NIPP, FPS is refocusing on its
core physical security mission to include:
Enforcing Interagency Security Committee (ISC)
security standards;
Conducting timely building security assessments;
Maintaining and overseeing a strong contract guard
program; and
Testing and constantly re-evaluating security
standards based on risk.
By leveraging the integration of FPS' security, response, and
recovery capabilities within the NIPP framework, a layered approach to
the security of Federal facilities will be achieved.
Together, the NIPP framework and results from the second ICE Tiger
Team review provide the underpinnings for the FPS Action Plan. The key
components of the Action Plan include:
Restructuring and streamlining the program to enhance
operational effectiveness;
Developing and implementing a clear strategy related
to the role of the FPS as the lead for government facilities
within the NIPP;
Leveraging resources in the areas of information
collection and criminal investigation;
Strengthening and standardizing the contract guard
function; and
Enhancing communication with FPS customers and
providing clear expectations of services.
The coming years will be filled with significant change for the FPS
program and its dedicated workforce. These changes will result in a
more focused program that produces greater security at Federal
facilities and for the people who work and visit these facilities. It
will also result in better service for the FPS customers and a more
productive partnership with the FPS program. Our commitment to the
protection of Federal facilities will remain front and center during
the refinement process. The mission must be focused and risk-based.
This is a responsibility that we share with all client agencies. We
must improve FPS' operational effectiveness and ensure that the primary
mission is met and that the costs of that mission are fully recovered
from our fee structure.
The Action Plan effort will result in a refined and refocused
workforce composed primarily of inspectors that possess dual
capabilities for providing law enforcement and physical security
services that are geared toward high-risk threats and closely aligned
with the NIPP. In addition, these resources will be realigned to high-
risk locations. This effort will also complete the overhaul of contract
management within FPS, which will result in improved contract
compliance, contracting cost reductions for client agencies, and
appropriate and strong contract management and will address the
concerns raised by DHS Office of the Inspector General. A critical
element in the Action Plan is a more active dialogue with FPS partners.
The FPS program will create a partnership with GSA and customer
agencies to delegate contract management and other authorities where it
improves the security posture of the facility and will ensure
compliance with FPS security standards.
FPS has established a program management office to track and
monitor the Action Plan. The program management office will ensure
Action Plan milestones are met and continue to refine FPS.
PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES
The President's FY 2008 Budget includes the resources to support a
refined FPS program. Specifically, it includes an increase in the
current basic security rate of $0.39 to $0.57 per square foot to
recover the costs for providing basic security services. The Budget
provides an additional $97 million in estimated fees above the FY 2007
level, including $37 million for increases in the demand for contract
guard services and $60 million associated with cost increases for
current services. The Budget supports 950 full-time equivalent
personnel that will be aligned with our NIPP priorities and a risk
based methodology. The President's FY 2008 Budget fully maintains
existing levels of contract guards. FPS must collect revenue for its
services and define its services for its customers.
Currently, FPS employs about 1,200 people including inspectors,
special agents, police officers, and support personnel. In addition,
the FPS program manages approximately 15,000 contract security guards
that serve as its front line in securing Federal facilities throughout
the nation. FPS will set security certifications for these contract
guards and will increase its emphasis on ensuring compliance with these
standards. Coupled with these contract guards are the FPS inspectors
who will develop security policy and standards; provide building
assessments; and monitor agency compliance with security standards.
These inspectors will also have law enforcement responsibilities. The
first line of security at Federal facilities will not diminish. A
realignment of its resources is necessary to improve the security
posture of Federal facilities. Personnel adjustments will improve FPS
mission execution, enhancing career opportunities for employees, and
improving customer service. ICE is employing various strategies to
align the workforce including Voluntary Early Retirement Authority. ICE
and FPS will work towards providing its employees with voluntary
opportunities to move into new positions and will provide other
incentive programs including developmental opportunities. These
developmental opportunities will provide employees with the ability to
train for new roles within FPS, ICE and DHS.
Assistant Secretary Myers and I are committed to involving the
program's employees in the refinement process. This includes involving
FPS employees in determining areas for improvement and providing
regular communication to employees, as well as FPS customers. To date,
over 700 employees have taken advantage of the opportunity to
participate in various studies. We appreciate the input of our
employees and will continue to keep them abreast of refinement efforts
through periodic updates and newsletters.
There is no question that this will be a period of change for the
FPS workforce. We realize that the employees are the greatest resource
in this vital program. The Action Plan effort will result in a more
stable work environment that is focused on its core mission. Employees
will be provided growth opportunities through the inspector ranks. The
current FPS workforce is deeply committed to the mission and we are
confident that they will meet all challenges to create the premier
physical security program in the Federal government.
CONCLUSION
Strengthening the FPS program as described in this testimony will
result in a more effective security service program for our Federal
workforce and the people who conduct business with the Federal
government, in addition to addressing numerous intra-governmental
studies and customer complaints. The men and women of the FPS are
dedicated and believe in the core FPS mission, as does the DHS
leadership team. We are aggressively moving forward to succeed in that
mission.
It will take several years to accomplish our efforts. ICE and FPS
now have the right plan to strengthen this vital capability.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member King, for holding
this important oversight hearing. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I yield myself 5 minutes for the first set of questions.
Mr. Taylor, could you explain to the committee what
improvements the OIG most recently called for in FPS and
whether any of those improvements have been installed?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. Thank you. We had five
recommendations for improving internal controls. The department
concurred and has taken action on three of the five. Most of
these had to do with doing follow-up on the requirements,
making sure that the quality assurance specialists are looking
in the system they use to maintain the requirements of the
contract guards, and change their operating procedures.
The plans for meeting those requirements, the department is
meeting or has told us they are going to meet. We have not
followed up to make sure that has happened, but they do have
the corrective action plans in place.
There were two areas where we do not have resolution. One
was on the request or recommendation that the department go
back and look at prior billings from the contract guard
services. When you have the number of inadequacies in the
contract guards that we discovered and that were in their own
systems, there is a provision that allows FPS to go back and
deduct payments. We recommend they go back and do that.
FPS has told us that because they only gave themselves in
the contract 30 days to go back and make those deductions, that
they are probably unable to go do that. So they did not concur
with that recommendation. At the time that they were trying to
identify these inadequacies in the contracts, we have to recall
they also were not making their payments to the contracts in 88
percent of the cases. So they really didn't give themselves
enough time to go back and adequately look at the contract
vouchers to make sure the services were provided and the
quality assurance specialists weren't at the time following up
enough to make sure they could make a case for making the
deductions.
The second area was broader. It was that they needed to
look at the voucher process and systems and improve their
internal controls. We have not heard back from the department.
I think they had a response due to us March 30, and I think
they are still working on it. Those were the two areas where we
don't concur.
Chairman Thompson. Now, are you saying it was due March 30?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, can you respond to those
two issues as to whether or not there is some plan to look back
at prior billings, or if not, what are the future plans on
looking back as the IG has indicated? And to some degree,
whether or not there are enough internal controls that have
been set up with the vouchering system going forward?
Mr. Schenkel. I think I can answer the first part first in
a little bit greater detail. As you may know, we have
transitioned from GSA into ICE and picked up on their financial
acquisition management program. We have made some great
strides. In fact, back in 2006, we have established the Debt
Management Center where all invoices are consolidated, and
invoices are sent to. So we have the ability to track them, and
then they are reviewed before they are sent out.
We have made an agreement to go back to 2006 and review all
of the invoices from the national capital region, which Mr.
Taylor addressed here as part of the ones that have not been
addressed. We are reviewing all of the fiscal year 2007
invoices. In addition to that, we are looking at the
feasibility and cost feasibility, if you will, of going back
prior to the 2006 timeframe.
We have a limited staff. I am a bit concerned about how
much we would recoup from these invoices that may not have been
prepared properly, or we may have been overcharged for. I am
not sure that it would be a benefit to the Federal Protective
Service or the federal government at this point. I think that
it bears review and we will do that.
In regards to the oversight of the individual contracts and
the contracting within the national capital region, we have
assigned additional personnel to accumulate and review the
contracts the invoices, and a second person who will take those
and then do a second review before they are passed forward for
payment.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
So is it your expectation now that the 88 percent ratio of
being late with payments will be reduced?
Mr. Schenkel. I can say safely that since fiscal year 2007
began, we are at 99.7 percent completion in payment for all of
our invoices.
Chairman Thompson. Can you, just for the members of the
committees' information, did you identify why those invoices
had such a delinquent status in the department to start with?
Why was FPS late on paying invoices?
Mr. Schenkel. We did not have sufficient staff in place for
the review and passing them through the appropriate channels. I
think with the establishment of the Debt Management Center up
in Burlington, Vermont, where all of the invoices now go for
review, I think we have accomplished a great deal in that area.
Chairman Thompson. So is it your testimony that we are
doing 99.7 percent?
Mr. Schenkel. We are doing 99.7 percent in fiscal year
2007.
Chairman Thompson. That is good. That is excellent.
Are you aware of that, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. No, sir.
Chairman Thompson. We might have to ask you to look at
that. That is an excellent record.
Mr. Taylor. It is.
Chairman Thompson. You are to be congratulated if it can be
documented.
I now yield to Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schenkel, like many on this committee, I am very
concerned that some contractors in the D.C. region were not
performing their security services according to the terms of
their contracts, such as having appropriate security clearances
for their posts. Who is responsible for monitoring this?
Mr. Schenkel. The contracting officer, the technical rep
that had to be assigned to that specific contract. That is one
of the areas that we are moving to improve in by going to an
all inspector-based force to provide them contracting agency
technical rep training as well, so they can ensure compliance
with the contract and appropriate performance of the contract.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Now that FPS will be realigning
its workforce based on risk, can you ensure that there will be
sufficient security at all federal buildings throughout the
country?
Mr. Schenkel. Based on risk, yes, I can. I think that is
why we made the determination that it is necessary to go to the
inspector-based force. I think that at a point, because all of
our law enforcement capabilities are also entwined with our
inspectors, that a distraction could possibly be created by
federal police officers responding and patrolling, as opposed
to paying attention to the specific building security
assessments in a timely manner and providing that oversight,
and placing those appropriate countermeasures, again based on
risk.
Risk continuously changes. It is not a static. It is
something that has to be reviewed on a regular basis. I think
that is the justification why we would be able to enhance the
security at federal facilities, as opposed to detract from it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Can you assure this committee that
while reducing the number of FPS employees, safety and security
of federal property, as well as personnel and visitors, will
not be compromised?
Mr. Schenkel. Again, I would return back to my comments
regarding the inspector-based force. We have 50,000 contract
guards that are certainly our most visible security
countermeasure. By appropriately assessing and staying abreast
of the threats that surround federal buildings, both from
criminal elements and terrorist elements, that we are in fact
enhancing the security of the buildings. Plus, our
relationships are strengthening with local law enforcement for
initial response. I think that the safety and security of our
federal employees and those that do business in our federal
buildings are being enhanced.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schenkel, can you explain to the committee the role
between the inspectors, as I understand it, and just the
security personnel?
Mr. Schenkel. Security personnel being the contract
security guard, sir?
Chairman Thompson. That is correct.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes. The contract security guards are a
countermeasure. They provide access control, fixed position
monitoring, and in some cases some patrol functions. They are
in place based on the expertise that is displayed by a Federal
Protective Service inspector. The Federal Protective Service
inspector, as we move to the all inspector-based force, will
also have additional contracting technical representation
training to ensure that their performance is up to standard and
maintains the standard that meets or exceeds the federal
standards that we have established.
Chairman Thompson. So are those individuals in a
supervisory capacity of the contract screeners? Do they work
the same post as the screeners? What is the relationship?
Mr. Schenkel. The relationship primarily is with the
contract guard company. The contract guard company is held
responsible for the performance of their contract guards. The
Federal Protective Service inspectors, and in my view, every
one of us that belongs to the Federal Protective Service, is an
extra set of eyes to ensure compliance with the contract. If
there is a lack of performance or a denigration of performance
on behalf of a contracted security guard, we go to that
contractor and take corrective action.
Chairman Thompson. So all your inspectors have received
this training and everything necessary for that to take place?
Mr. Schenkel. Not all of them yet. That is part of the
transition plan or the refinement plan for the Federal
Protective Service.
Chairman Thompson. Please provide us with the written
transition plan for the department that includes timetables.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. I now recognize the gentlelady from the
Virgin Islands, Ms. Donna Christensen.
I am sorry, Ms. Norton from the District of Columbia.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, sir. I do believe I was here first.
Mr. Taylor, given the contracting issues that you report,
do you believe that FPS would be better able and more
efficiently to perform its duties if it were independent within
the Department of Homeland Security, rather than a part of ICE?
What does being in ICE give it?
Mr. Taylor. We haven't addressed that.
Ms. Norton. What is it doing there? What does it have in
common? Why does that help FPS?
Mr. Taylor. Sure. I am not all that familiar with the
legislative history of how FPS became part of DHS other than
that--
Ms. Norton. I am asking you another question, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. I am sorry. I am having trouble hearing
you. I am sorry.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry. I am asking you about FPS now as a
part of ICE, as opposed to FPS being independent within the
Department of Homeland Security. What benefit is it to 2
million federal employees to millions more who go to Social
Security and visit our buildings for other services, millions
who come as visitors? What benefit is it to have the agency
absorbed not only within the Department of Homeland Security,
but within ICE, particularly considering the problems of
efficiency you have found?
Mr. Taylor. Sure. I think that initially no matter where
FPS would have been located within DHS, the problems would have
been similar, for two reasons, one of which is specific to FPS
and the problems that they had in terms of getting adequate
funding and having adequate funding, even when they were at GSA
and coming over to DHS.
Secondly, as our other audits in the financial statement
area have indicated, there weren't a whole lot of places in DHS
they could have gone where they would not have had similar
financial management issues, because DHS's financial management
systems have not been able to get--
Ms. Norton. My question is about making it independent
within DHS. I am saying, what value is it? We see a bureaucracy
on top of a bureaucracy. There are lots and lots of complaints
about DHS and bureaucracy. But when you have a bureaucracy
within a bureaucracy, I am trying to find out what is the
value?
Mr. Taylor. I think from our perspective, if you created
FPS as a separate entity within DHS, which I guess that is the
core of your question--should it be independent within DHS.
Ms. Norton. That is what it was at GSA.
Mr. Taylor. Right. If it is independent within DHS, you
would have to recreate all the infrastructure that they have at
ICE.
Ms. Norton. Why? That is what DHS is there for.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. DHS, that is supposed to be the overhead and
the infrastructure. Is this the ICE infrastructure we are
dealing with, who then reports to the DHS infrastructure?
Mr. Taylor. By ``infrastructure,'' ma'am, I am talking
about the financial systems, the procurement support systems.
DHS corporate doesn't support an entity the size of FPS
directly, and so they would have to create that kind of entity
in order to support them, if they were independent within DHS.
As an initial reaction to the question, the benefit is that
they don't have to recreate all that.
Ms. Norton. The FPS is the federal police force for every
federal agency, for every federal entity. Mr. Schenkel, have
you ever led a line police force? Do you have any police
training yourself of any kind?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. I was the only civilian, if you
will, that led sworn police officers in the Chicago Police
Department.
Ms. Norton. Yes, I have your resume here, and you boast of
that. I am asking you another question. The question is, you
are now essentially the police chief for the federal police
force. That position has always been held by somebody with line
law enforcement experience, not only management experience. I
am asking you, have you any law enforcement experience other
than the management experience you had in Chicago and in the
federal government?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not a sworn officer, ma'am, if that is
what you are asking.
Ms. Norton. I am concerned about the reduction in sworn
officers. Let me read to you what the difference is between the
inspectors and the sworn officers. Officers, in homeland
security terms, peace officers have as their mission, and by
``peace officer,'' that is somebody who carries a gun, who has
training the same place as the Capitol Police train.
Mr. Chairman, we sure bulked up here, a 50 percent increase
in the Capitol Police Force. We see a huge decrease in the
police force who guards our constituents in federal buildings,
not to mention 2 million federal workers. The mission was to
interrogate suspects who display violence and irrational
temperaments, seek out and question witnesses and suspects, to
preserve the peace, prevent crimes, arrest offenders, provide
crime prevention guidance, and police assistance during
emergency situations.
Now, let's look at the new mission for the FPS that the FPS
relies on for inspectors, who I understand are also peace
officers. Are they all peace officers?
Mr. Schenkel. All of our inspectors, ma'am? Yes, ma'am,
they are sworn officers.
Ms. Norton. All right. Here is what these peace officers
now have among their duties: presents employee awareness
programs; conducts crime prevention studies; conducts physical
security surveys; and coordinates minor repairs of electronic
security systems.
I have to ask you, Mr. Schenkel, what then is to be done
about--and here I am again quoting the mission of the FPS
officer--investigating criminal incidents, disseminating
terrorism-related intelligence, and conducting joint terrorism
task operations.
Who will perform these functions if the FPS officer is
either being converted into some kind of an inspector and the
rest is falling to security guards, most of whom are not even
peace officers, as I understand it. Who is to perform these
core terrorism and crime prevention functions with the rapid,
rapid decrease in the number of peace officers, people who
carry guns, people who are the same kind of police officers
that guard and guarantee the safety of members of Congress? Who
is to do this job?
Mr. Schenkel. I am glad you asked that question, ma'am,
because I think that gives us an opportunity to really explain
the full function of the Federal Protective Service. It is not
just police officers and it is not just inspectors. It is a
system of systems, if you will, to include membership on joint
terrorism task forces around the country that pass intelligence
information, terrorism-related information, to our regional
intelligence agents, that also pass that then on to our
regional directors.
The system then has a policy or a performance measure that
then disseminates that kind of information out to the
appropriate sources to include our contract security guards
when necessary in appropriate functions. So it is not just the
function of the federal police officer to respond to an
incident. It is an overall system.
Ms. Norton. I just read what the function was, sir. I am
trying to find out who is going to do the core terrorism and
patrol functions, for example. There is a huge reduction in
peace officers. And yet you have MOUs with local law
enforcement--or so it is claimed; we have not been able to get
any of them--that says that they will agree to do this police
function. How can that happen if it is security guards who have
replaced the peace officers?
Mr. Schenkel. Because that is exactly the way the system
functions, ma'am. We have 15,000 extra sets of eyes and ears
out there in addition to our sworn officers, who are officers
and inspectors, and our memberships on the joint terrorism task
forces, and our relationships with local law enforcement, who
are always the primary--
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this time. I just
want to indicate that the point of the question was that an MOU
with the Dallas police force is that you will do what we are
not doing, and the Dallas police force expects you to have a
peace officer who can in fact make the arrest, and that will
not be the case if the contract guards, or in many cases, no
guards at all because of the huge reductions at FPS.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
For the record, does that security guard have arrest power?
Mr. Schenkel. No, he does not have arrest power, other than
citizen's arrest power.
Chairman Thompson. So they don't have--
Mr. Schenkel. No, they are not sworn officers, sir.
Chairman Thompson. So those 15,000 people you reference
that act as eyes and ears really can only just see the
situation and report it to somebody else.
Mr. Schenkel. And they have limited response capability
based on their positions.
Ms. Norton. Call 9-1-1, in other words.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Washington, Mr.
Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will just start out with, I was a sworn police officer
for 33 years; rose from the ranks just up until 2 years ago; a
patrol car detective; SWAT commander; precinct commander; and a
sheriff for the last 8 years of my career in Seattle.
I do understand the importance of a layered approach to law
enforcement. We had community service officers. We had
screeners. We had private security. We had retired deputies who
had limited arrest powers within certain buildings within the
county. And then we had our deputies and investigators who made
up the rest of the 1,200 employees with the sheriff's office in
King County.
But I want to make sure that we are headed down the right
path for the right reasons this morning. So I understand the
concept, but is it really the driver behind the decision to cut
250 commissioned people to provide better service? Or is really
a financial decision that we are making here? I do understand
there are some financial issues that you are dealing with.
Do the security guards get paid less than the commissioned
and inspectors?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, they do. Contract security guards get
paid less.
Mr. Reichert. What are the savings that you would estimate
that you might make in making that change from 250 commissioned
to the security guards?
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, in all due respect, they are not truly
related in their relationship as to their performance or their
functions. The Federal Protective Service, the police officers,
the inspectors, provide the oversight and in some cases the
response, where the security guards provide the perimeter
security, the limited control of access, et cetera.
Mr. Reichert. I do understand that. We have the same
arrangement with the Seattle Police Department and the King
County Courthouse, where we have a contingent of men and women
who work within the courthouse who do have arrest powers on a
limited basis only within that building, and then call on the
Seattle Police Department for backup. But there is a savings
that you will realize if you cut 250 commissioned FPS versus
hiring.
Are you going to hire an additional number of security
guards?
Mr. Schenkel. There is no anticipated plan to hire
additional security guards. The focus will be to effectively
employ and train the remaining members of the Federal
Protective Service.
Mr. Reichert. So the 250 that would lose their jobs will be
retrained?
Mr. Schenkel. First of all, no one is going to lose their
job. Everyone has an opportunity, or will be given
opportunities for a variety of methods to transition out of the
Federal Protective Service--combinations of early retirements,
separation incentives. But most importantly, there will other
opportunities, primarily within ICE, that they will qualify
for.
Mr. Reichert. So is it a matter of then managing the 15,000
security personnel that you already have in a more efficient
way to cover the loss of 250 bodies that were doing some job
prior to this cut?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. The most effective use of our
Federal Protective Service can be in the effective management
and emplacement of control measures.
Mr. Reichert. What is the command and control set up? Who
do they report to? What is the command structure for the
security guards? Who is responsible for managing the security
guards? Do they have a chain of command that they follow?
Mr. Schenkel. We have a contract program manager in every
one of our regions. In addition, the regional director and his
staff, which is then broken down into districts and areas, they
provide the oversight as well.
Mr. Reichert. These are not security company employees.
These are federal government?
Mr. Schenkel. No, these are Federal Protective Service.
Mr. Reichert. Were they commissioned people?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry?
Mr. Reichert. Were they commissioned people, or are they
commissioned people?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, they are sworn officers. Yes.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at
this time. I yield.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Carney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very happy we are holding this hearing today. I think
it is very important to get eyes on what is going on with FPS.
Mr. Taylor, this first question is for you. In his
statement, Mr. Schenkel noted that the core mission of FPS is
of course to do the assessments on federal installations across
the country, but we are cutting the time we do those from 4
years to 6 years. Is that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. There is a proposal we are looking at. Right
now, our level three, level four buildings get an assessment
every 2 years. Our level one and two buildings get an
assessment every 4 years, again, based on risk and other
determining factors that coincide with some other DHS programs.
We may extend that. We may contract that. It is still to be
determined.
Mr. Carney. Okay. When do you anticipate you are going to
have that plan in place?
Mr. Schenkel. The plan right now is to maintain the level
threes and fours at every 2 years, and the ones and twos every
4 years.
Mr. Carney. Oh, it is?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Very good.
I have a little bit of background in counterterrorism, too,
and I am watching how quickly enemies evolve and how quickly
they learn our vulnerabilities. I think it would be an
egregious oversight to extend the amount of time we do these
reviews. I think we need to do those as diligently and as often
as is practical, not extend them to 6 years certainly.
I had a couple of questions also for Mr. Schenkel, even
though you answered Mr. Taylor's questions. We are losing at
the street level a number of officers, but we are plussing up
deputy positions. Is there a way to justify that?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry. I don't understand. Are you
speaking of the inspector positions?
Mr. Carney. The deputy director positions in DHS. Is that
correct? At the FPS level? We are losing street-level FPS
officers, correct?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct.
Mr. Carney. Okay. We are plussing-up or adding deputy
directors?
Mr. Schenkel. No, we are not adding deputy directors. What
we are doing is filling vacancies and posting them as internal
announcements with the intention of filling most, if not all,
of the open positions with people from internal to the FPS.
Mr. Carney. Okay. No further questions at this time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California,
Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for this hearing.
Colonel Schenkel, your experience in the Marine Corps, I
would take it, has given you a background in looking at risk
and assessing risk and attempting to come up with comprehensive
plans to deal with the particular threat.
Following up on Mr. Reichert's questions, can you tell us
that this plan that has been laid out and is going forward is
based on a more efficient array of your personnel and assets to
protect the mission you have, which is to protect the federal
buildings? Or is it an effort to try and do a job with
restrained resources? Those are two different things, or they
could be the same thing, but I would really like to get a sense
of where you are going on this.
Mr. Schenkel. We are looking at the more effective use of
the personnel that we have available. Our determination on the
numbers was done over a series of months, but one of the most
recent was done in a regional directors conference in
approximately the February timeframe. What we did since that
time is then validate that process and distribution of our
assets and resources, that being the effective use of the
inspector force.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask a very simple question. If I am an
employee at a federal building in San Francisco, and I go to
work there every day. What difference do I see when this plan
is in effect versus what it used to be, number one?
And number two, if I see something that concerns me about
someone who might be a danger to me, my fellow employees or the
building, to whom do I report that? And is it any different now
under this plan than it was before?
Mr. Schenkel. It will be completely transparent.
Mr. Lungren. So what do I do? Who do I say, ``I saw a
suspicious package out there.'' Do I tell the security guard?
Is there someone else I should tell? And has the response
changed?
Mr. Schenkel. No, the response has not changed. In all but
the exclusive jurisdictional facilities that FPS has sole
jurisdiction for, the primary response is and always has been
call 9-1-1. You can also, if you do see something and you do
not feel the exigent circumstance, you can always contact the
contract security guard or one of the Federal Protective
Service employees in the area, who will then have to call in
appropriate authorities on top of that to investigate,
depending on the circumstances.
Mr. Lungren. What percentage of your contract security
guards carry weapons?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not 100 percent sure. I would have to
get back to you on that, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Is it more or less than 50 percent?
Mr. Schenkel. Much more than 50 percent. I would say the
preponderance of them carry weapons.
Mr. Lungren. And they have only citizen arrest powers.
Correct?
Mr. Schenkel. They also have the right to protect
themselves and to protect the lives of others with those
weapons, if that is what you are asking, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask you this. In June of 2006, a
visitor to the DHS headquarters here in D.C. used a fake
matricula consular card as identification and was allowed to
use the building. According to the article that I read, this
card was not a very good fake ID. It listed Tijuana, British
Columbia as the date of birth, and the address as 123 Fraud
Boulevard. I know that is one incident, a kind of obvious kind
of thing.
What do you do in response to a breach of security like
that? How well trained are the security guards to be able to
identify something as fake? And in that particular instance,
can you tell me what happened to the guard or guards involved
that allowed this person entry into that building?
Mr. Schenkel. In regards to that particular incident, the
matricula consular card is not an authorized, or is no longer
an authorized form of identification. Since that time, we have
also instituted and enforced that only government picture IDs,
government-issued ID--that could be local, state or federal
government identification card--is the only means of
appropriate identification that are authorized.
In regard to the individual contract security guard who
allowed that in, I do not know, but I can get the answer for
you.
Mr. Lungren. Wouldn't it be good to make sure that when
lapses like that occur, that at least someone is held
responsible--someone or some few are held responsible?
Mr. Schenkel. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Lungren. So you will get back to us on what happened in
response to that?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, colonel. I appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
In addition to that information, can you identify the
company that that particular security guard worked for and
whether or not the department took any disbarment or any
actions against them for that breach?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms.
Christensen, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If this question has been asked, I would apologize. But I
note that the risk assessments which are done now at 4 years
would be moving to be done every 6 years. Mr. Schenkel, could
you explain that?
And Mr. Taylor, could you comment on that as well? The
security risk assessments which are now being performed every 4
years at some federal buildings, why are they now going to be
done every 6 years?
Mr. Schenkel. Ma'am, they are not going to be. That was a
proposal that was put on the table based on risk, and we are
going to maintain the assessment at the 2-year intervals for
the level three and four buildings, and the 4-year level for
the level one and two buildings.
Chairman Thompson. Gentlelady, Mr. Carney asked part of
that question earlier.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay, thank you.
I think you have answered this one about the staffing.
Although you are reducing the staff, it is commensurate with
the risk assessments that are being done? The staffing levels,
even though they are being reduced, are appropriate to the risk
assessments?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am, because the inspector force are
the people who perform the security assessments at the
buildings. The federal police officer is not authorized to do
that because he or she is not trained. An inspector is a
federal police officer with the additional training of a public
security assessment specialist.
Mrs. Christensen. Are you reducing contract and staff, or
just staff, just the permanent staff?
Mr. Schenkel. The contract guard people will remain fairly
stable at roughly 15,000.
Mrs. Christensen. The department is not moving permanent
staff out to put them on contract, are they?
Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. Because that has been a practice in the
past.
Mr. Schenkel. Not in the Federal Protective Service case at
this point, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. The question was being asked about the
limitations of the guards, because you talked about officers.
What was the term you used?
Mr. Schenkel. The inspectors.
Mrs. Christensen. The inspectors.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. Your contract people would not be
qualified as inspectors, would they?
Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am. They are the officers that you see
in uniform that provide access control very similar to the way
that this building is protected.
Mrs. Christensen. And yet with the reduction in the staff
and the contract guards not being law enforcement officers, you
still are meeting the requirements, you are saying?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. Are you reducing your staff because of
funding, or because of the assessment?
Mr. Schenkel. We determined that the direction of the
Federal Protective Service had to be inspector-based. Based on
the numbers of buildings and the requirements for the
assessments, we determined the appropriate number.
Mrs. Christensen. I don't know if Mr. Taylor has any
responses to any of my questions. They were directed to Mr.
Schenkel, but if you had a comment, I would take it.
Mr. Taylor. I can offer one comment, ma'am. I think the
critical issue that you are getting at it what is the critical
mass for FPS to perform its core function. To be honest, we
haven't seen any more detail in the IG's office than what has
been offered in testimony and what is in the 2008 budget
presentation.
So we don't know any more of the details. But in looking at
this, our concerns would be what is FPS's assessment of its
core mission, and what is the critical mass to achieve the core
mission, which is what I think these questions are getting at.
Mrs. Christensen. Exactly.
Mr. Taylor. And so what is their assessment of what it
would take, and how are they going to meet that. That is the
kind of thing we would be looking for when we see the detailed
plan.
Mrs. Christensen. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any further
questions at this time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
One of the questions, Mr. Taylor, I think you could help
this committee with is part of your review found people with
expired certifications. You found guards who at the time of the
review were not on. You found guards with clearance lacking.
Let me get another point. You found some people with non-
citizenship papers.
Mr. Taylor. We found individuals who were non-citizens who
didn't have their work permit cards with them.
Chairman Thompson. Guarding federal buildings?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, can you assure us that
those items that Mr. Taylor's review found, that if he went
back with a subsequent review, that all of that has been
cleared up?
Mr. Schenkel. I would be cautious to say ``all,'' but I
will say the greater portion of it.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Taylor, can you say, was the fault
the contracting officer? Or was it the so-called ``inspector''
not checking on the contract? If we are moving to this security
force and we are elevating inspectors, I am trying to see how
somebody would find out whether or not these items your
investigators identified could be picked up and at what point.
Mr. Taylor. Sure. When we looked at the national capital
area, for example, where you have over 5,000 contract guards,
you had 12 quality assurance specialists that FPS has, who are
supposed to do the reviews and make sure, and do the site
visits, in addition to the contracting officers. You also have
a system called CERTS where they maintain all the requirements
of the contract guards are supposed to meet. All we did was go
into CERTS and pull out expired certifications and just verify
whether or not the guards were actually on duty, and in 30
percent of the cases, they were.
Chairman Thompson. So it was a fairly simple review
process?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. Just doing that visual verification
and then to ask things like we knew certain individuals weren't
U.S. citizens, but we asked for their work permit cards and
inspected them. We knew at certain facilities you needed a top
secret or secret clearance. Did they have them? Were they
properly adjudicated? And to make sure that all their
certifications were in place. We could go through their
systems, sample it, pull it out, and then went to verify the
results.
Chairman Thompson. I think, Mr. Schenkel, you can see a
little concern on our part. If the department is going in the
private contracting direction, whether or not there is ample
oversight for that to occur, or do we need to put the brakes on
it and say, ``Look, we are doing something that causes us more
concern.''
I am concerned that those people don't have a rest hour. I
will be honest with you. When I see the other mistakes
occurring, I am even more concerned that you have people who
are non-citizens, without work permits. You have people in
sensitive areas without the proper clearances. You have people
who should be armed who are not armed.
Obviously, all this could be readily picked up by just
going to the file. I understand the layered approach, but if in
fact all the layered approaches didn't pick this up, then we
don't have much of a system. That is a concern.
I now yield to the gentlelady from New York, who would be
impacted by this process, to Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You know, this is a very interesting hearing. As we are all
the way to the first line of defense for over 8,000 buildings
throughout our nation, the Federal Protective Service plays a
very important role in the Department of Homeland Security's
mission of keeping Americans safe. Although small in size, with
approximately 1,000 employees, evidence of hard work done by
FPS can be seen anytime someone walks into any federal building
administered either by GSA or DHS, or so we thought.
At the same time, FPS appears to have many of the same
problems that plague the entire department. Its contracting
situation, in my estimation, is really a huge mess. Its
leadership looks to be without direction. Employee morale is
low. And the entire agency appears to be in limbo, currently
stuck within ICE, unable to find a home in which it more
naturally fits.
I simply cannot understand how at a time when the U.S. is
spending more than ever on security, we can afford to reduce
the workforce that oversees the protection of our nation's
buildings.
Director Schenkel, can you tell us, of the over 300
employees you have proposed removing from FPS, how many work in
New York City?
Mr. Schenkel. If you can give me 1/2 second, I can tell
you: 101, in the region. I would have to break that out and
find exactly how many were in New York City.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. I would be really interested in that,
simply because based on what you have said today, that there is
an evolution of the mission of the FPS. It seems to shift a lot
of the responsibility into integration of contractors and local
law enforcement, which has historically for the city of New
York been a huge burden.
I wanted to find out from you, and sort of following the
line of the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms.
Holmes Norton. Can you tell us what type of incident command
structure has been put in place to avoid jurisdictional
conflict?
Mr. Schenkel. Particularly in New York City?
Ms. Clarke. That would be great, but I am sure it is
applicable wherever we go where you are shifting the burden to
the local jurisdictions and integrating contractors.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. That is kind of a broad question.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, but it is a very simple question because
when an incident occurs, we want to know who is responsible for
arrest. We want to know who is responsible for containing any
problems that may occur, and that they have the skills and
ability to do so, and that the financial burden of doing so
does not fall upon municipalities.
So I want to get a sense of what our role in the context of
what you have created actually is. That calls for an incident
command structure. Do you have one?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am, we do. I am a little confused as
to whether we are talking about a major incident or an
individual act of aggression, say, like violence in a workplace
or something.
Ms. Clarke. Whichever scenario you see fit.
Mr. Schenkel. Our contract security guards do have
authority to respond to a workplace incident, shall we way.
Let's just start a scenario here.
Ms. Clarke. Your contractor or--
Mr. Schenkel. The contract security guard and the FPS
police officer have the authority to respond. The FPS police
officer or inspector would have the authority to make the
arrest. The contract security guard, if you will, does have the
authority to contain the situation, to include restraining any
individual.
Ms. Clarke. And how do they go about this restraint?
Mr. Schenkel. Through their training, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Through their training?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. It just seems to me that, and I am a New
Yorker, so someone who is unlicensed to effect an arrest is not
a peace officer, and would not go very far with your average
upstart in containing a situation. Who do they report to when
it goes beyond their specific protocols as a security agency?
Mr. Schenkel. There would be a simultaneous call, not only
for the immediate action of a contract security guard that may
be on-site, but there would be a simultaneous call to either
local law enforcement or a federal police officer, whichever
one was in the closest proximity based on the priority of the
crime.
Ms. Clarke. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a
little bit more detail on response. It can be a local event. It
can be a terrorist event. What is the specific incident command
structure that is put in place? Particularly, why don't we use
New York City as an model.
Mr. Schenkel. Okay.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
One of the things we will look at is whether or not we are
pushing more on states and locals to secure federal properties.
I came out of local government, and if what I am hearing is
more of a burden on local law enforcement to do what we are not
doing by contracting with these local security agencies, I will
be concerned to look at that likewise.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member, for hosing these hearings. We greatly
appreciate it.
Mr. Schenkel, let me move as expeditiously as possible.
Currently, you are paying 39 cents per square foot for the
fees-for-services. Is this correct?
Mr. Schenkel. Basic security fee is 39 cents. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Would you explain what that means, please, the
39 cents-a-foot?
Mr. Schenkel. Every square foot of GSA property or leased
property under GSA, the tenant is assessed a 39 cent-a-square-
foot fee.
Mr. Green. You are requesting that this fee increase to 57
cents a foot. Is this correct?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Green. If you receive this increase, will you have to
reassign any employees?
Mr. Schenkel. We will have to reassign employees based on
skills sets and geographic distribution. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. And if you do not receive the increase, what
will be the circumstance?
Mr. Schenkel. We will have to determine other ways to
accomplish that same distribution.
Mr. Green. We live in a world, Mr. Schenkel, where it is
not enough for things to be right, they just also look right.
While what is occurring may be right, my suspicion is that it
doesn't look right to a good number of persons in the public.
It seems to some, I suspect, that we are privatizing the FPS;
that we are outsourcing responsibilities, duties and functions
that should be maintained by a licensed peace officer.
This causes a great degree of consternation. It puts you in
a tough position because you are right now speaking for the
executive branch of the government. You literally are the
president's voice at this hearing. So in understanding that you
are speaking for the President of the United States--and I know
you don't like to necessarily do this, but you are his voice
here today--are you saying to the American public that there is
no shortfall in your department?
Mr. Schenkel. No shortfall in regards to--
Mr. Green. To your budget needs.
Mr. Schenkel. We will remain solvent in 2007. We anticipate
being solvent for 2008.
Mr. Green. Are you saying that you do not need additional
FPS officers?
Mr. Schenkel. We have determined that we can accomplish our
projected mission of securing federal facilities and leased
facilities with the 950 number that we explained.
Mr. Green. So your answer is, you do not need additional
FPS officers to meet your mission requirements?
Mr. Schenkel. At this point, we have the 950 to effect--
Mr. Green. Mr. Schenkel, let me suggest this, and I am not
trying to play ``gotcha,'' but sometimes when people finish, I
don't know whether they have said yes or no. So I am going to
insist on a yes or no answer.
Are you indicating to the American public as a
representative of the executive branch, understanding that we
live in a world where there are some great concerns that are
going to have to be addressed, are you saying that you have
enough officers to do your job?
Mr. Schenkel. In support of the President's budget, I can
support the mission of the Federal Protective Service.
Mr. Green. We don't want you to support the budget. We want
you to protect people. Now, to protect the American people, who
are frequenting the facilities where our forces are deployed,
do you have enough FPS officers to do your job?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes.
Mr. Green. The FPS officers can arrest people, the licensed
officers, can arrest people based on probable cause. They can
do so without a warrant. The typical citizen to perfect an
arrest has to see the offense occur in his or her presence. Do
you agree?
Mr. Schenkel. In most cases, yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir. That is the way it is in most states
in the United States.
Are you saying that you, sir, are satisfied that the
contract officers are in a position such that they can protect
the American people in these various facilities without the
assistance of an FPS officer on-site?
Mr. Schenkel. They can deter and they can prevent, but they
will require a sworn officer, whether it be Federal Protective
Service or local law enforcement.
Mr. Green. But you do agree that at every station, you do
not necessarily have an FPS officer. Correct?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Green. Are you saying that at the stations where you do
not have an FPS officer, you, speaking as a representative of
the executive branch, are satisfied that the contract officers
will satisfy the needs of protecting the persons who are
entering and exiting the facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. I will say they will prevent and deter and be
an effective means of preventing and in some cases responding
to immediate situations. It will still require the services of
a sworn law enforcement officer?
Mr. Green. Then the question becomes--and this will be my
last question, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time--then are
you not comfortable? Let me rephrase it. Wouldn't you think,
then, that you need an FPS officer on-site to perfect the
necessary security needs, since they can only have limited
authority when it comes to detention of persons?
Mr. Schenkel. No, I do not believe we need a licensed or
sworn law enforcement at every single facility.
Mr. Green. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, I will allow you to think
about that answer that you just gave, because I think there are
some real concerns that some of us would have that we would not
have sworn law enforcement officers at our facilities. These
are different times. Some of us are real concerned that
outsourcing security to people who don't have arrest power is
not in our best interest. And so we are looking at this issue
very seriously. The public will demand no less than the
absolute best.
I think what I have heard so far is that sworn law
enforcement people with full arrest power provide the best
security, not contract security without arrest power. I think
the general public in most instances cannot tell the difference
when they go in a building. It is just at hearings like what we
have here today that highlight the issue. I think we have to be
very, very cautious on that.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Schenkel, I am going to ask you just a couple of
parochial questions first. I represent suburbs of Denver,
Colorado. There is a mega-center for FPS employees and
contractors at the Federal Center in Lakewood, Colorado. What,
if you know, are the intentions of the your department for that
mega-center?
Mr. Schenkel. There will be no changes there because that
is an exclusive jurisdictional site.
Mr. Perlmutter. That is good news. I am not going to yield
back yet, though, Mr. Chairman, even though he has answered my
parochial question. My next question, though, really does come
back to some of the comments you made in your prepared text. I
missed your opening statement, and I apologize.
There is within your paper a statement, establishing sound
financial management. And you said, to establish it these
include a streamlining of the mega-center function to reduce
unnecessary administrative support costs. What do you mean by
that?
Mr. Schenkel. At one point, we had contractors supporting
the transcription or transcribing oral testimony, as opposed to
officers filling out their own reports. We thought that was an
unnecessary requirement. We expect an officer to be able to
write his or her own report in the proper format and language.
Mr. Perlmutter. And this question applied to both of you,
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Schenkel. We talk about an unnecessary
administrative support cost, but as I understand it, one of the
problems that has occurred, and the reason that come under ICE,
is that you needed additional administrative support types of
departments or assistance or something. What is it that you
lost when you went from GSA and now you are under ICE, that
doesn't allow the FPS to really manage its own affairs?
I will start with Mr. Taylor. Does my question make sense?
Mr. Taylor. Yes. There were issues even at GSA. There were
a number of reports by the GSA inspector general, and GAO
released, that indicated some problems with overseeing contract
guards. So it is not a new issue. In addition, what GAO found
was that GSA was subsidizing the FPS. When FPS transitioned to
DHS, that subsidy was not included in the transition. What GSA
literally was doing was taking money from the federal building
funds and using it to support the rent and the costs for the
headquarters staff for FPS. That was not included in the base
rate at the time.
So when those funds were transferred to DHS, the cost of
actually running the headquarters function for FPS, the rent
and everything, all the administrative costs, did not come. And
so DHS started behind the eight-ball when they brought FPS
over. In addition, when they came over, FPS was converted to
ICE's financial system, and it did so in a way that they were
overwhelmed. They had 25,000 vouchers they had to pay for
contract guard services, and they weren't used to anywhere near
that kind of volume in their systems. And so their procedures
and their systems were just overwhelmed and they got behind,
and that is why 88 percent were paid after more than 30 days
late.
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you have anything to add to that?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you have anything to add to what he just
said?
Mr. Schenkel. Only basically to echo what he said. When we
came under ICE, there is no lie. We had some very difficult
transition problems, especially in support functions and
acquisitions. But since we have come under ICE after struggling
for several years, I think we have them under control and we
are well on our way to being much more effective.
Mr. Perlmutter. Does the 39 cents to 57 cents a square foot
cover that lost support cost or the subsidy that the GSA was
giving to the FPS? Is that what that is intended to do?
Mr. Schenkel. That is partial, yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. I can't remember the number. It was like
$97 million or $100 million. Is that what that rent increase or
that fee increase amounts to? What is your shortfall?
Mr. Schenkel. We don't have a shortfall this year, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay, so I am going to go back to Mr.
Green's questions. If you don't go to 57 cents, what do you
have to do? I see words like ``realignment'' and ``leverage''
and ``refocus.'' I am a bankruptcy lawyer. That is what I did
for a long time. Those are words that you see in bankruptcy
plans. I don't want to see that in the FPS. Okay? Those are
great words, meaning you are laying off; you are reassigning;
you are sending to different departments who may have a bigger
budget.
If you don't go from 39 cents to 57 cents, what are you
going to do?
Mr. Schenkel. We are going to have a struggle, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. No further questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here.
I want to echo the concerns of the chairman with respect to
this issue of contracting and not having a sworn law
enforcement officer on-site. I would have been more comforted
if you told me that you would have a sworn law enforcement
officer on-site overseeing the contract employees that you have
on-site, but I am not comfortable at all with the level of
contracting out of the FPS services that you have testified to
today. I just want to be on record as saying that, and echo the
concerns that the chairman has raised.
I had the opportunity to go to the Federal Protection
Service's headquarters in Boston during the Democratic National
Convention. I have to say I was very impressed. They did an
outstanding job in terms of what I saw with my own eyes, and
their capabilities to protect and to be involved in security
operations.
Let me just say, and I apologize if I will ask questions
that have already been raised. I apologize for coming in late,
but the Federal Protective Service particularly has
historically played a broad role in terms of securing our
nation's federal buildings, yet recently their funding I
believe has been neglected, which could ultimately hinder the
core mission of FPS.
I am particularly concerned that the administration's
fiscal year 2008 budget lacks critical funding at this key
agency. In fact, if left unchanged, FPS would need to cut
nearly 300 FPS agents, including 259 police officers, 31 K-9
inspectors, and 42 special agents.
Mr. Schenkel, you have already testified, and I believe I
am correct in understanding that you said that these cuts were
not based solely on budgetary constraints, but were based on
risk. Am I correct in understanding that?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct.
Mr. Langevin. Will these positions be cut from federal
buildings with lower risk, such as level one facilities? Or
buildings with higher risks, such as level four facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, to clarify some of the things that you
mentioned, a uniformed federal police officer inspector is one
and the same. An inspector is a federal police officer. He or
she is uniformed and is on-site. We have some ideas on some
strategies to perhaps place them in most level four and level
three buildings. The frequency and attention paid to the level
three and level four buildings in conjunction with some of the
other DHS initiatives is where we are going to focus our
efforts.
The effort is to use what available forces we have in the
moist effective manner. That is the effort of what we are
trying to accomplish here. That individual does provide
oversight to the contract security guards on-site.
Mr. Langevin. On-site?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
So are you through with your answer with respect to where
the positions would be cut from level one or level four
facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry, sir. I couldn't hear you.
Mr. Langevin. I said, the cuts, are you finished with your
answer with respect to these positions that would be cut from
federal buildings with lower risks? Or would they be done at
level four facilities?
Mr. Schenkel. Our intention and my plan of action, if you
will, is that there will be such a frequency at the level three
and level four buildings that our inspectors will be the
visible presence that your building security committees will
have face-to-face contact with, if not on a daily basis,
certainly on a very frequent basis. In the level one and level
two facilities, let's say it is a warehouse in a rural area,
the frequency will be less, but there will still be attention
paid to all facilities.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, let me turn to you. I am extremely dismayed by
what has been happening with respect to FPS. Mr. Taylor, you
stated that from October 1, 2004 to November 21, 2005, FPS paid
only 12 percent of their invoices on time. In your testimony,
you also stated that FPS has paid over $1.2 million in interest
to privately owned companies contracted by FPS due to these
late payments.
My question is, how much would you say FPS still owes in
delinquent payments right now? And do you believe that FPS has
improved at all with respect to paying their invoices on time?
And finally, lastly, in your opinion--and I think you may have
already addressed this again, but I want to ask it again for my
understanding--can FPS be solvent by fiscal year 2008, as Mr.
Schenkel has claimed in his testimony?
Mr. Taylor. First, sir, the first part of your question,
the issues that were in our report that was issued last
October. The FPS did provide corrective action plans for the
majority of the findings and recommendations. I think Mr.
Schenkel mentioned earlier that down from a low of 12 percent
that we reported, that he is over 99 percent payments on time
currently. I can't verify that for you, but that is what Mr.
Schenkel is saying is going on.
So we were satisfied with the corrective action plan. We
thought it met our recommendations, so we think they were doing
better, and we keep hearing reports from them that they are,
and we will be looking at it. So I think from that standpoint,
things have gotten better.
Overall, can they do it by 2008? Can they make all the
corrective actions by 2008? We still have a couple of open
items with FPS in terms of internal controls over their
processes, and in terms of going back and looking at some of
the older vouchers, which are not really relevant to 2008.
So I think not only can they, but I think they have to,
because they are going to be reducing the size of the force
that is going to be there to oversee these contractors. So in
order for the plan that FPS is putting forward to be
successful, I think it is absolutely critical that they have
the procedures and the mechanisms in place to oversee these
contractors.
We already have 15,000 contract guards and we have a fixed
number of people to oversee those contracts. As the number of
people that are involved in the core functions of FPS are
reduced, I think it is even more incumbent on FPS to make sure
they have trained, qualified people overseeing the contractors.
So I think it is absolutely necessary.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I will just finish up by saying
that I am a supporter of FPS and appreciate the work they do in
protecting our federal facilities. I want to make sure that
they have the resources they need to do their job.
I hope that with respect to the kind of cuts we are talking
about that we are not being penny wise and pound foolish. I
will pledge my support to working with the chairman to continue
to follow this issue to make sure that FPS is properly staffed
and supported.
With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from Houston,
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much.
I know that my colleagues have asked many potent and
instructive questions. Let me thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I was attending a funeral this morning, and I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
I really have one focus, and I will ask one question and
submit others to the record in writing. But I know that there
is, one, a theme that has been used by the Federal Protective
Service, ``realignment.'' And might I join my colleague,
Congressman Langevin, in saying that you have my enthusiastic
support for the Federal Protective Service because not only do
I go in and out of federal buildings, but my office in Houston
is in one of the federal buildings.
I have watched contractor after contractor be changed over
for the security that is being provided. I have also seen full-
time employees of the Federal Protective Service doing an
enormous job. I have seen you move people around. You get to
know one person for a building or region, and then all of a
sudden, the person has disappeared, transferred somewhere or
cut.
So my concern is whether or not we are in fact meeting the
test of security of these buildings and our hard-working
federal employees, and hard-working American citizens who come
and go inside our federal buildings. I am aware that the
committee had asked you not to reduce its staff--I am sure
someone has asked this?until after the GAO study.
What I want to hear from you, Mr. Taylor, are we secure
with this rotating contractors so-called ``realignment,'' when
really it is cutting jobs? Can we feel that we have really
done--you know, what was the story after 9/11--did we do all
that we could do, beside the question of good intelligence? Are
we doing all we can do, with the fractures that are in the
system right now, to secure our buildings and the people who go
in and out?
Prepared Statement the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative
in Congress From the State of Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing on the effects
of reported budget and staff cuts on security and agency integrity. I
would also like to thank the Ranking Member, Mr. King, and to welcome
our four distinguished witnesses: the Honorable James L. Taylor, Deputy
Inspector General, from the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Gary
Schenkel, Director of the Federal Protective Service, from the
Department of Homeland Security; Mr. David L. Wright, President,
American Federation of Government Employees Local 918, FPS Union; and
Mr. Joseph Ricci, Executive Director of the National Association of
Security Companies. I look forward to hearing your insights on this
important issue.
Since its establishment in 1971, the Federal Protective Service, or
FPS, has fulfilled a crucial role as the uniformed protection force for
government occupied facilities. In 2002, the Homeland Security Act
moved FPS to the Department of Homeland Security, where it was placed
in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Directorate.
FPS relies largely on contract guards; these services represent the
single largest item in its operating budget. Despite the sizeable
amounts of funds involved (an estimated $487 million in FY2006), FPS
does not consistently deploy qualified and certified contract guards.
The FPS has established a pattern of failing to pay contract guard
service invoices promptly, and has accrued $1.2 million in interest on
late payments.
In order to avoid paying these penalties, the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Directorate instituted a process of default
payments. Using this system, from October 1, 2004 to November 21, 2005,
FPS paid $121 million in contractor invoices without necessary
supporting documentation. This was done against the negative
recommendation of the FPS Director of Financial Management, and it is
not currently clear whether these payments have been fully reconciled.
It is apparent, however, that serious financial mismanagement took
place, and that it has cost the Department financially.
In addition to the problems surrounding the use of contract guards,
external observers have noted an expected budget shortfall of $80
million this year, despite FPS denials. This shortfall has been
attributed to an inadequate transition to the management system used by
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Directorate, as well as the
refusal of the Department of Homeland Security to absorb FPS support
costs.
Despite denials of a budget shortfall, internal FPS documents
indicate plans to address funding deficiencies by cutting over 300
jobs. These eliminated positions would include 259 police officers, 31
K-9 inspectors, and 42 special agents, as well as 43 support positions,
including financial, human resources, and logistics officers. The
Directorate has so far refused to call this what it is: a rash of job
cuts, instead using the euphemism of ``re-alignment.'' And although it
has said that those removed from these 300 jobs will not lose
employment, it has yet to indicate how and where they will be re-
employed. Questions about the method of job transition and the
availability of training for new positions remain unanswered. The
Department has admitted, however, to plans to cut the total FPS
workforce from 1180 to 950.
With the reduction of the FPS police force, Department officials
have indicated that private contractors will play an increasing role in
the vital task of securing federal facilities. This is cause for
significant concern, as FPS has already been criticized for problems
with contract monitoring. According to the Office of the Inspector
General, FPS ``does not have the systems to track inspection reports
and contract deduction status.'' The case of former FPS Inspector
Michael Czecholiniski, who pled guilty in January 2007 to accepting
bribes from those he was responsible for evaluating, raises further
questions about the oversight of this program.
It is clear that there are serious problems within the system we
are entrusting to safeguard our nation's government facilities. I look
forward to the testimony and insight offered by our witnesses, and I
hope that we can engage in an informative debate with regards to the
future direction of this important program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, ma'am. What we found in our review, and we
focused mainly on the national capital region, but there have
been other studies that looked across the board at FPS, was
that at the time that we did the review, there were a lot of
oversight problems, and there were issues with the internal
controls and with the oversight and with maintaining proper
management of the contractor activities.
So that would be an extreme weakness, when you find 30
percent of the contract guards that we sampled on duty who
didn't meet the basic qualifications and the basic requirements
that are stated in the contract. That is a problem.
Going forward, I cannot tell you if having more contract
guards is necessarily a bad thing or a good thing. I go back to
the chair's opening remarks. But what I can tell you is that if
those issues are not corrected, if you can't manage the guard
force properly and you can't make sure that they are qualified,
and you can't stay on top of the contracting function, then it
does become even more problematic.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Schenkel, I do want to make note of
the fact that those that I have seen in Houston, in the Mickey
Leland Building, are hard-working, but you raised some valuable
points. Are we safe, Mr. Schenkel? You are the director of the
Federal Protective Service. We have the in-and-outs, the
transfers, the contracts. What is going on?
Mr. Schenkel. I think one of the things that we have to
keep in mind as well is that, either whether it be criminal or
terrorist, one of their methods of operation is looking for
consistencies or constant inconsistencies in any security
program; changing of the guard force positions and postures, et
cetera. That is part of the security posture that enhances
security. It doesn't detract from security.
If that is part of what you are asking, then I think?
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, I am not. What I am saying is that you
have a fluid and floating management structure. Managers don't
stay in place. They don't have enough time to train. Your
contracting situation is erratic. So I am asking you, with this
kind of confusion, do you feel that you can get your hands
around securing federal buildings and the people of the United
States?
Mr. Schenkel. That is why we are making the effort towards
refining the efforts of the Federal Protective Service. We came
over without a lot of experience in mission support. We had
extremely difficult challenges in acquisition and contracting
and management of those contracts over the past few years under
ICE, and then partnering with ICE and sharing some of their
assets and support.
We have been able to focus more on our mission, and quite
frankly we need to focus even more on our mission. That is why
we want to direct ourselves toward that inspector-based force
so we can concentrate on the security mission and not be
detracted by support functions that we did not have a handle
on, but at this point, I think we are making great strides in
getting a handle on those. I think our very recent record, and
I certainly won't brag on our past record, but in our very
recent record I think we are showing vast improvements in those
areas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you very much.
Let me thank both of the witnesses. I think that we need to
be hand-in-glove with this agency and the Department of
Homeland Security going forward. I have a sense of unreadiness
and uncomfortableness, not because they are not hard-working
persons, but I think Mr. Schenkel has made it clear that
getting a told of the mission, working under the context of
homeland security.
I think you have done the right thing with this hearing and
I hope that we can go forward with giving some assistance and
oversight. I thank the distinguished gentleman, and I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. Good morning.
Mr. Schenkel, what is involved in a security assessment at
a federal facility? From your testimony, I see that there are
8,900 federal facilities, but that you only do an average of
about 2,500 security assessments per year. So each facility
gets an assessment about every 3 1/2 years or thereabouts. Is
this enough to ensure that the security standards are being
met? What are the types of monitoring or checks that are done?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry. I didn't hear the last part of
your question, sir.
Mr. Dent. What are the types of monitoring or checks that
you are doing? I went through the whole litany here. So
basically, if you could just start off with what is involved in
the security assessment of a federal facility?
Mr. Schenkel. The building itself is assessed for its
location, the surrounding area, the priority of the operation
that it contains. For instance, a warehouse would obviously
take a far different security posture than a federal office
building. All of the surrounding area, the potential threats,
the history--everything is taken into consideration when a
building is assessed.
Mr. Dent. Also, according to your testimony, last year
there were more than 4,000 individuals arrested for committing
crimes on federal property. What are the most common crimes
that are committed and who makes those arrests?
Mr. Schenkel. Most of the arrests previously have been
bench warrant arrests. Individuals have been discovered that
already had a warrant out on them, and primarily local law
enforcement who shares jurisdiction at most of our facilities
made the arrests.
Mr. Dent. Does local law enforcement, do they always
respond? Or for what crimes will local law enforcement respond
and not others?
Mr. Schenkel. They will respond to any crime, based on the
priority. The constituents in the buildings, the leased
facilities, which three-quarters of ours are, three-quarters of
the GSA facilities are leased facilities in the public arena,
if you will. Local law enforcement has shared primary
jurisdiction.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. Do security measures differ between
federal facilities when the threat level increases?
Mr. Schenkel. The security posture changes. Depending on
available intelligence and information, whether or not the
facility actually reconfigures, in other words, do we add
additional security measures like additional metal detectors,
things like that, is dependent on the situation.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I have no further questions. I yield back.
Ms. Norton. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Chairman Thompson is absent for a moment and has asked me
to sit in the chair. I just have one more question before we
call the witnesses up.
You testified, Mr. Taylor, that part of the issue with
funding once the transition was made to DHS is that essentially
in order to fund the FPS, GSA had to rely not only on the per-
square-foot measurement, but had to reach into the building
fund, which of course is a revolving fund necessary simply to
rehabilitate and to build additional buildings, in order simply
to keep FPS whole.
Now, I understand that overhead, the costs paid to DHS to
administer FPS, is twice what it was at the GSA. Should that
not be enough to make up for whatever are the issues that are
requiring this terrific downsizing and use of security guards?
Mr. Taylor. We haven't done any work, ma'am, so I really
can't specifically answer what they are getting for their
dollar now versus what GSA gave them. I know that when they
came over, the shortfall was about $47 million, I believe, and
that was what initiated a lot of the initial funding concerns
with FPS and created some of the problems and required the
reprogramming that occurred in 2006.
Ms. Norton. So this is not only an efficiency. The
downsizing, the shifts that are made are not only a matter of
efficiency and doing the job better, but it is a question of
trying to make up for lost funds or funds that are not there.
Isn't that so?
Mr. Taylor. Those funds had to come from somewhere, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And they have not come in the DHS budget.
Mr. Taylor. No, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. I appreciate these two
witnesses for testifying.
I would like to call the next two witnesses: David Wright,
president of the American Federation of Government Employees,
Local 918; and Mr. Joseph Ricci, the National Association of
Security Companies.
Mr. Wright started his career in St. Louis and served as a
patrolman, and currently serves as president of this local, and
executive vice president of ICE Council 118.
The second witness, Mr. Ricci, is responsible for
operational aspects of the National Association of Security
Companies. This is the advocacy organization for contract
security services.
I am pleased to welcome you both here and to hear your
testimony at this time. Without objection, your full statements
will be entered into the record, and we ask that you testify
for approximately 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 918, FPS UNION
Mr. Wright. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair, members of the
committee.
On behalf of the Federal Protective Service police
officers, inspectors, special agents and support personnel, I
am David Wright, president of Local 918 of the National Federal
Protective Services Union. I am also a veteran FPS police
officer and inspector of 21 years.
FPS is responsible for policing and ensuring the safe
environment for federal agencies to serve the public and
protect 1.1 million dedicated civil servants at over 8,800
total properties in over 2,100 American communities. Madam
Chair, I am testifying before you shortly after the twelfth
anniversary of the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, defending the concept that federal
police officers on proactive patrol are the most viable
frontline protection against terrorism and crime in our federal
facilities.
The 2008 budget proposal increases the risk of criminal and
terrorist attack on federal employees, facilities and members
of the public by reducing FPS to less field personnel than at
the time of the Oklahoma City bombing.
Other federal agencies provide protection for some
government facilities, notably the Capitol Police that have
over 1,500 officers to protect congressional facilities in the
Washington, D.C. area. The Secret Service Uniformed Division
has more than 1,300 officers to protect the White House complex
and selected facilities. The Veterans Administration has over
2,400 officers to protect 154 medical centers nationwide. All
these agencies use extensive proactive patrol and 24-hour
service as integral parts of their effective strategy to detect
and deter terrorist and criminal activity.
The administration proposal claims to be proactive by
increasing the necessary performance monitoring of the 15,000
contract security guards that FPS uses to help secure
facilities. The proposal also begins to allocate resources for
security standards compliance monitoring, which should have
started in 1995, not 2008. This is their so-called
``proactive'' approach.
Citing agency documents which have since been denied as to
their relativity to the agency, the impacts of the reduction of
FPS to 900 FTE were recently described by the chairman of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee as including
no proactive patrol to detect and deter attack planning,
suspicious or criminal activity; no response to calls for
police service at federal facilities or to investigate crimes
where FPS will no longer have a presence; and no FPS presence
in approximately 50 current cities.
Participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is
reduced to 12 special agents from 24. Special agents available
to investigate serious crime are reduced to 14 from 58. There
is no night or weekend FPS police response or service anywhere.
The largest reductions are in New York City and Washington,
D.C. are due to proactive activity elimination.
This proposed 950-employee model is driven by deficits, not
a risk analysis by law enforcement or security professionals. A
proper workload allocation study completed in 2006 by a team of
FPS professionals considered threats and varying security
requirements of all facilities, ultimately determining that a
substantially higher requirement was necessary to protect our
federal facilities.
ICE is moving aggressively to implement its plan, despite
this committee's amendment to the DHS authorization bill that
would effectively put a halt to these downsizing efforts. A
previous GAO audit found that when FPS was under GSA, the
operating costs above the fees collected was approximately $139
million per year. None of this funding transferred to DHS and
that problem has never been remedied.
Over the past 3 years, the actual amount spent and service
provided to secure federal workers and facilities has declined.
Risks to employees and visitors increase each day as more of
our FPS law enforcement officers leave what they see is a
sinking ship. Congress needs to intervene and stop this effort.
In our view, the only interim way to accomplish this is to
ask the Appropriations Committee for approximately $38 million
in additional funding for fiscal year 2008. It is our
understanding that the House Appropriations markup is this
coming Thursday. We are seeking this committee's support in
this matter as an interim step until we fix the underlying
problems of FPS that I have outlined in my written testimony.
I am looking forward to clarifying some of the issues that
were spoken to in previous testimony, specifically why we are
not in a deficit at this point and the difference between
police officers, inspectors and contract security guards.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of David L. Wright
First I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be present
in my capacity as President of AFGE Local 918, the National Federal
Protective Service Union. I am the delegated representative of
approximately 1000 FPS employees to include federal law enforcement
officers and support staff.
FPS is responsible for policing, securing and ensuring a safe
environment for Federal Agencies to serve the public and protect 1.1
million dedicated civil servants at over 8800 total properties in 2100
American communities. These buildings often house sensitive, high-level
government offices and federal court buildings, numerous Agency
Headquarters such as FBI, EPA and USDA and public access facilities
such as Social Security and Immigration offices.
Mr. Chairman, one of the stated matters of this Committee's
interest was a reference to bribery--or at least one instance of
alleged bribery--at the Federal Protective Service.
One allegation of bribery, public corruption or compromise of
public office is ten too many. The Florida case specifically cited by
this Committee casts aspersions on a person, a work unit, a region and
an entire organization. I represent the workers of that organization
and I would like to state--on their behalf--that the men and women of
the Federal Protective Service are amongst the most conscientious,
honest and capable civil servants in this government. I wish to offer
some brief insight into the Florida case that does not come through--in
any way--in the media coverage or the Justice Department's press
release concerning the matter.
The facts--as reported in those media releases--tend to conflict
with, or do not completely embrace, our understanding of the actual
events of the case. More importantly, the portrayal of the subject
Inspector is a disproportionately dark characterization of an officer
that we know to be a noble man who made a serious ethical mistake in
judgment that was completely out of his historically demonstrated
character. We cannot color his act as anything less than wrongful, but
we can proclaim it as a serious, yet isolated, conduct anomaly within
an otherwise honorable and dedicated career. We cannot go into any
details to evidence our position, as the man's criminal sentencing lies
yet ahead.
My AFGE Council FPS associate has just spoken with this employee.
And while that former employee cannot speak to you or his FPS peers or
to the American taxpayer, he wanted you all to know how deeply
sorrowful he is for letting us all--and himself--down. He wanted to
express his sorrow and regret for making such a mistake. He prays that
those who know him will spread the word that he is not the evil, greedy
villain described in the written accounts. He asks for forgiveness and
begs to be remembered not solely by this one series of errant actions,
but--in balance--also by the sum of his career contributions and
service to the public good and safety. We are all entitled to one
mistake. And for his he has already paid a disproportionately high
price.
If this Committee knows nothing more about this man than a press
release and a private civil service newsletter article, then, in all
respect, you do not know this man. And while one apple can figuratively
taint an entire barrel, this incident--in reality--actually portrays a
single apple bruised by its mortal frailties, not one that is decayed
beyond redemption.
The Committee chose to include bribery at FPS as one of its agenda
items. I can say that in my 21 years of service here, that I have not
seen, nor am I aware of, any instances or practices of bribery. While
your concern over this subject is noted and appreciated, from the
perspective of the union, historical incidence of bribery at FPS is
virtually non-existent.
To move on to the situation that I was called here today for--Mr.
Chairman, I am testifying before you shortly after the 12th anniversary
of the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City. I find it disturbing that I am forced to defend the concept that
Federal Police Officers on patrol and Special Agents gathering
intelligence are the most viable frontline protection for Federal
facilities in these days of international terrorism.
After the 1995 terrorist bombing, GSA and Congress determined that
FPS required 1480 field personnel, an increase from approximately 970
at the time of the attack. This year, DHS reduced FPS to below 1200
then proposed 950 for 2008. The 2008 budget proposal increases the risk
of criminal and terrorist attack on Federal employees, facilities and
members of the public by reducing FPS to less field personnel than at
the time of the Oklahoma City Bombing.
I know that I need not remind anyone in this room, nor should I
have to remind officials at the Department of Homeland Security that
the three most infamous terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in our history
occurred either at federal buildings or in buildings which housed
federal agencies: the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City on April 19, 1995 and the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993
and again on September 11, 2001. Perhaps it is because of my long
service as an FPS Officer, but it is extremely difficult for me to
imagine a more likely symbolic/strategic target for terrorists than a
building housing U.S. government operations and officials.
I've been an employee of FPS since July 1986. From the moment I
entered service, I noticed the somewhat dysfunctional nature of this
Agency. I promoted from Police Officer to Corporal and eventually to
Sergeant in Management ranks in 1993. In 1994, FPS employees were
preparing for a dismantlement of the Agency and were given several
employee ``options''--even as we were providing round the clock
protection at the federal trials of the 1993 WTC bombing. On April 19,
1995, while on normal proactive patrol in Kansas City, Missouri, I
heard the news that shocked the nation. A terrorist bombing in the
heartland destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma--killing 168 federal employees, visitors and children.
At that point in time, Kansas City had approximately 20 full time FPS
police officers. Reports surfaced that Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols
had been in Kansas City and perhaps ``casing'' our Federal facilities.
There was one Federal Protective Service armed physical security
specialist stationed in Oklahoma City.
That day convinced me that changes were needed in the way that the
Federal Protective Service operated. Immediately, the Federal
Protective Service was ``off the chopping block'' due to Congressional
intervention. The June 1995 Department of Justice Vulnerability
Assessment of Federal Facilities was published and the incentive--
illuminated by Congressional oversight--was high to ensure measures
were being taken to protect the federal infrastructure, the employees
who worked there and the public that visited.
Crucial hiring ensued in 1996 and 1997 bringing the numbers of
Police Officers to Agency mandated 730 with a focus on hiring
experienced police officers. The intent was to get away from the
``security guard'' image. Suffice to say that the 1000 police officers
mandated by Congress by Public Law 100-440 was ignored. Through the
late 90's, FPS provided law enforcement and security functions at the
trials of the Oklahoma City bombers and continued at ongoing terrorist
trials in New York City. Nevertheless the FPS image could never
overcome the years of damage caused by neglect of our force.
Then came the horrible attacks on 9/11. Members of New York FPS
participated in the immediate emergency response to the attack. Their
dedication to duty and country resulted in several FPS officers being
injured to include one officer that spent months in rehabilitation
before being able to come back to the job. On September 21, 2001, FPS
Inspector Ron Sheffield was murdered at the McNamara Federal Building
in Detroit, Michigan during a response to a deranged individual--as a
direct result of the heightened security alert in the days after 9/11.
Under the leadership of FPS Commissioner Wendell Shingler, members
of FPS were proud as we moved over to the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security in March 2003, although we were confused by our
merger into ICE, along with certain elements of U.S. Customs Service
and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Even with the neglect
and animosity from DHS/ICE, the ensuing years showed that FPS was a
viable force--with commended participation in numerous incidents of
national significance--before ``incidents of national significance''
became a phrase in the National Incident Command System. Tactics,
training and equipment were upgraded to the level necessary for
response to a terrorist threat at any of the 8800 federal facilities in
our jurisdiction. 100 Hazardous Materials Technicians were trained. 60
K9 Explosive Detections teams were trained and formed. Emergency
Response Teams were formed around the nation. 16 Emergency Medical
Technicians were trained and equipped. FPS participated in events
ranging from protection of federal facilities during the Elian Gonzales
incident, the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics to the 2000 and 2004
political conventions, Savannah G8 Summit, World Bank and Seattle World
Trade Organization meetings and Presidential Inaugurations.
In August 2005, FPS elements--to include 200 law enforcement
officers and associated equipment were pre-positioned and subsequently
moved into the Gulf Coast in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. FPS Officers were commissioned as Louisiana State Patrol and
provided police services to the stricken New Orleans community
alongside New Orleans Police Department which had few operating
emergency vehicles. FPS was at the Superdome. FPS was at the Convention
Center. FPS assisted in the inspection and securing of numerous
chemical plants in Southern Louisiana. FPS participated in the rescues.
FPS was on the teams that were recovering bodies and controlling
traffic in the immediate aftermath until more federal help arrived. FPS
was thanked publicly by DHS Commissioner Michael Chertoff. Ironically,
FPS has been challenged by ICE as to its authority to respond to such
incidents and we have once again floundered. Lost in the huge
bureaucracy, our numbers have shrunk from the approximate 1530
employees on board as of 3/1/03--when we entered into DHS/ICE--to 1172
today.
Despite the obvious need to both invest in and re-build this
critical homeland security agency, DHS and specifically, ICE are
proposing to completely eliminate most direct law enforcement services
by FPS. Agency officials and documentation has confirmed to us that the
proposed cuts in personnel and service are due to be completed by June
30, 2007. 249 Federal Law Enforcement positions directly responsible
for law enforcement patrol and response to federal properties are to be
cut. 18 Police Officer positions would remain across the nation in 18
major metropolitan areas. 42 FPS Special Agent positions responsible
for prosecution of Federal crimes, intelligence gathering and
dissemination will be eliminated.
The Administration's budget submission offers this description of
its plan for FPS: ``In 2008 the Federal Protective Service will set
security standards and enforce the compliance of those standards to
protect federal facilities''.
But those few words in the budget submission belie a proposal that
is both dangerous and foolhardy in the post 9/11 world in which we
live. To quote directly from a portion of a PowerPoint presentation
(Attachment 1, three pages) prepared by U.S. ICE for FPS Regional
Directors, dated December 20, 2006 and titled: Briefing on the Federal
Protective Service, Transition to fiscal year `08 budget, on a page
titled ``Risk Assumed by [FPS] Transformation''; where the agency
describes the impact of the FPS proposal:
1. No proactive patrol to deter attack planning; and detect/
deter suspicious and criminal activity.
2. No response to calls for police service to protect Federal
employees and visitors or
3. investigate crimes at Federal facilities in areas where FPS
will no longer have a presence;
4. No FPS presence in approximately 50 current cities;
5. Participation in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces reduced
to 12 Special Agents from 24;
6. Special Agents available to investigate serious crime
reduced to 14 from 58;
7. No night or weekend police response or service anywhere
8. Largest reductions in N.Y. and Washington D.C. due to
proactive activity elimination;?
And the list goes on. The Administration proposal claims to be
proactive by increasing the necessary performance monitoring of the
15,000 contract security guards FPS uses to help secure facilities. The
proposal also begins to allocate resources for security standards
compliance monitoring, which should have started in 1995 not 2008. This
is their so--called a proactive approach.
The agency has since issued statements to employees and the Media
denying the relevance of the above cited document, describing a rosy
plan of reorganization or ``right--sizing'' which leaves out the above
particular highlights. Nonetheless, these are the facts as detailed by
the agency itself and they are shocking. The proposed 950 employee FPS
is driven by money--not a risk analysis by law enforcement or security
professionals.
A proper workload allocation study was completed in 2006 by a team
of FPS professionals with over 225 collective years of security and law
enforcement experience and in depth knowledge of effective risk
mitigation strategies. The study considered threats, varying security
requirements of facilities based on their security level and location--
ultimately determining that a substantially higher requirement was
necessary to protect our federal facilities (Attachment 2, 33 pages).
On April 25, 2007, I received email documentation of a meeting in
FPS Region 3 Philadelphia, between bargaining unit employees and Agency
management personnel reveals that the plan is moving forward. This
despite the recent GAO Audit requests by the House and Senate, numerous
Congressional Inquiries and this Committee's 3/26/07 Amendment to the
DHS Authorization Bill--that would require DHS to await GAO findings
before downsizing.
The Federal Protective Service is being starved of resources by
DHS/ICE. The Administration has said more times than I can count, that
we are doing all we can to protect the nation against terrorists and
terrorism. I doubt anyone could honestly call this FPS plan ``doing all
we can''. In fact, it is an abrogation of a critical responsibility to
protect this nation.
Interestingly, Mr. Chertoff has been silent on the subject of this
proposed reorganization of FPS that will result in the elimination of
249 police officer positions nationwide in addition to the approximate
350 positions that have already been lost. In effect this latest
reorganization attempt will be the virtual dismantlement of FPS as a
viable Federal response force. The proposed reduction to 950--announced
to the employees on 2/5/07 is a re-hash of old plans that have never
fully panned out over the years since 1986. The plan is still deemed as
``pre-decisional'' by the Agency in an effort to avoid discussions with
the Union.
Mr. Chairman, given the fact that ICE is moving aggressively to
implement its ill-considered plan and FPS is losing experienced law
enforcement officers on an almost daily basis, Congress needs to
intervene and stop this effort, certainly until the GAO report on the
agency is completed. In our view, the only way to accomplish this is to
ask the Appropriations Committees to initiate a reprogramming request
to DHS. We are only talking about money sufficient to take FPS through
the end of the year, but enough to stop the attrition. Reprogramming of
funds for fiscal year 1907 to return to the 1250 FTE level (which seems
to be the consensus to stabilize): 80 Police Officers at $121,000 per
year prorated at 6 months = $4,840,000.
We would also like to recommend changes for fiscal year 08. The
recommendations were developed from Agency proposed cuts and a
``stabilization'' effort at 1250 FTE: 259 Police Officers at $121,000
per year = $31,339,000; and 42 Special Agents at $150,000 per year =
$6,300,000.
A potential funding source for each of the above recommendations
would be the ``shared services fee'' that ICE currently charges FPS
approximately $52,000,000 per year--about $48,500 per employee at this
point. These shared services include GSA rent and IT charges of
approximately $24,000,000 that cannot be avoided.
However, the remainder of $28,000,000 is a ``tax'' imposed by ICE
on FPS for funding of unfair and ineffective Human Capital operations--
to include Employee and Labor Relations and Office of Professional
Responsibility. These offices are directly responsible for the fact
that DHS ranks last in employee morale.
I also urge the Committee to take steps to fix the three immediate
core problems of the Federal Protective Service that have resulted in
this fiscal and organizational mess:
(a.) The method by which we are funded--the current ``fee for
service'', ``accounts receivable''funding mechanism and
security charges through GSA rent is an inefficient holdover
from our days within GSA. Our recommendation would be
implementation of direct appropriations or at least a funding
mechanism whereby ``security charges'' from federal agency
``customers'' is budgeted and collected by Office of Management
and Budget. Dissemination of funds would be ``transparent'' to
the ``customer'' Agencies.
(b.) Our placement within Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The placement of FPS within ICE was a huge mistake from the
inception. A small Agency like FPS had no chance with the
immediate turf battles that developed between Immigration and
Customs personnel. Our recommendation would be our inception as
a ``stand--alone'' federal Agency within DHS.
(c.) Ensure that GAO conducts an extensive review of the
absolutely burgeoning costs of security guard contracts around
the nation. Implementation of Federal Civil Service GS-085
security guards at Security Level 3 and 4 facilities would
provide several benefits: security guards with federal
authority to intervene. At present, authority of contract
security guards is dependent on local and State laws and the
contract. Contracts can also be written that limit authority of
their employees to physically detain suspects.
Equally important would be two more proposals that would ensure the
long term viability of FPS as the premier law enforcement/security
Agency responsible for Federal properties:
(a.) Removal of the power of the Department to ``delegate' to
``customer'' Agencies the authority to ``opt out'' of payment
for law enforcement and security services provided by FPS--as
iscurrently being pursued by the Administrative Office of the
Courts and U. S. Marshals Service. As thisscenario plays out,
decreases in funding result in fewer police officers and FPS is
systematically stripped of its ability to respond effectively
and efficiently to its ``customers''--resulting in more
delegations.Federal Agencies are not receiving services that
they are paying .37 per square foot for A proposed increase to
.59 per square foot is pending--and service is being decreased
as we speak.
(b.) Codification of the Interagency Security Committee
Standards that is used by FPS to ``recommend'' physical
security countermeasures. At present, FPS can only make
``recommendations'' which have no binding authority on Federal
Agencies to implement security countermeasures.
I assure you that when these problems are fixed, FPS can institute
true reform, and become the Agency within Department of Homeland
Security absolutely responsible for protection of Federal facilities.
Mr. Chairman, members of this Committee, I urge you to reject the
ill-conceived initiative of downsizing--proposed by the Department
because of financial mismanagement and a faulty funding mechanism that
the Department has consistently failed to remedy. Before we decide to
eliminate this core FPS responsibility, let us pause and take a close
look at whether this is the direction we really want to go. Do we
really want to reduce this agency to an essentially regulatory body
with no real law enforcement responsibilities? Do we really want to
rely on a few hundred inspectors to oversee and insure compliance with
security guidelines for a vast work force of 15,000 private security
guards?
Any support that you, Mr. Chairman, and this Committee can provide
would be greatly appreciated--not just by the law enforcement officers
of FPS but by the thousands of federal employees, the visitors and the
millions of Americans worried about where the next terrorist attack
might take place. Thank you for your time.
Attachment 1:
Briefing on the Federal Protective Service
Transition to FY 08 Budget
Prepared for FPS Regional Directors
December 20, 2006
U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement
--------------------
Vision for FPS
--------------------
Vision for FPS in FY 2008
FPS will execute the DHS mission to protect the buildings,
grounds and property of the Federal Government as required by 40 USC
1315.
As the sector-specific agency for the Government Facilities
Sector in the National Insfrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) establish
and set standards for the sector. Plan to monitor compliance.
Focus only on GSA Facilities to the extent of available
security fees paid by tenant agencies.
Operate with the FY08 resources programmed in the President's
budget.
Use planning guidance with a risk-based model to leverage and
target limited resources.
The service delivery platform will generally be the inspector
position, which provides the full range of services.
Reimbursable services (e.g., support to FEMA ins responding to
natural disasters) will be maintained on set work authorizations or
agreements.
FY 08 FPS Activities
--------------------
FPS' Projected Lines of Business and Activities
Basic Security (standard fee from all tenant agencies)
Respond to reports of crime and calls for service to
protect Federal employees, visitors and facilities in
metropolitan clusters with high risk facilities and
concentrations of Federal employees.
Monitor alarms, receive calls for emergency service
and reports of suspicious activity, and dispatch appropriate
response.
Investigate crime to determine security
vulnerabilities and identify suspects.
Scheduled and pre-construction/pre-lease assessment of
threats/risk to facilities and identification of
countermeasures to reduce risk.
Implementation planning for specific countermeasures
to reduce risk.
Validate risks, verify compliance and risk reduction
measure (e.g. guard posts) effectiveness.
Assist facilities and agencies with BSC, OEP, COOP,
other emergency plans and security training.
Building Security (reimbursable services charged to agencies)
Procure, administer and monitor security guard
services.
Procure, and maintain security systems (e.g. CCTV,
Access Control, X-Ray etc.)
Coordinate/Monitor procurement and installation of
permanent countermeasures with GSA. (e.g. barriers, window
protection: etc.)
Specialized services and support to other agencies (mixed reimbursable/
standard fee)
Determine suitability of contractors working in
Federal owned and leased space
Law enforcement, investigations and security guard
services to agencies such as FEMA on a short-term basis (using
reimbursable overtime to continue basic services with all
incremental costs charged to assisted agency)
Organizational Structure:
Staffing
--------------------
Structure/Staffing
FPS will use 11 customer aligned regions (Same boundaries as
FEMA, SSA, EPA, VA, GSA etc). Approximately 85 field locations.
Approximately 50 field locations consolidated.
It will have 950 authorized postiions--249 Net from current
strength.
Management and Support (Highlights)
Acquision (contracting) remains consolidated in CCG+33
GFS SSA and ISA+10
Regional Guard Program Mgt (Will have 26)
National HG & Region Management --30
Area Commander (Will have 69)
Financial, HR, Logistic Support --43
Field Operations (Highlights)
Special Agent--42
K9 Inspector--31 (Will have 433)
Polic Officer--259 (Will have 18 for proactive patrol)
See also, PowerPoint Presentation below:
Attachment 2:
------------------
Federal Protective Service
Staff Allocation
Model Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \1\
������������������������������������������������������������������������
Purpose
Inform FPS Director of Staffing study methodology, results
and recommendations.
Obtain Director's approval of recommended staffing for
uniformed personnel and supervisors.
Determine next steps/future efforts for Workload
Allocation Team
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \2\
������������������������������������������������������������������������
Staffing Study Team
Formed to determine staffing required to accomplish the
FPS Mission at the regional level.
Representatives from each region.
Two working meetings and numerous conference calls.
Primary focus on FPO and Inspector workload.
Workload determined based on what should be done.
Determined annual time officer are available.
Developed recommended supervisory ratios.
Recommends a significant increase in personnel.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \3\
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Assumptions
Protection of facilities requires a proactive model that
emphasized patrols and risk reduction.
General threat situation does not change.
A prudent level of risk must be assumed.
Mission remains GSA Facilities only.
Facility security levels are a good measure of general
risk and amount of time required.
Where a facility is located affects the amount of effort
required--remote facilities require less effort than those in
metropolitan areas.
The average workload for a task at a particular security
level is the same in all regions.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \4\
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Risk Accepted
Time is allocated proportionally by security level--a
Level 1 receives 9% of the time of a Level 4.
68% of facilities and 47% of employees are outside areas
recommended for 24-hour patrol.
40% of facilities and 27% of employees are outside areas
recommended for weekday facility patrols.
Changes to threats and required countermeasures are only
assessed every two years for Level 4, every three years for Level 3 and
every four years for Level 1 & 2.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \5\
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Major Work Categories
Calls, reports and arrests.
Patrol and proactive activities
24-hour and weekday patrols in selected metropolitan
areas.
Community police patrols of all facilities.
Selective enforcement.
Liaison with other law enforcement agencies.
Guard post checks.
Travel to distant facilities.
Facility surveys, BSC, OEP and tenant training;
Specialized activities including WMD and K9.
Travel between local facilities, follow up, maintenance,
admin, etc.
Workload is expressed in average hours for a report type,
facility security level, or other function.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \6\
Slide #7 follows:
Federal Facilities (Continued)
8,923 total GSA facilities.
6 Level 5.
839 level 4.
712 level 3.
4,679 level 2.
2,56 level 1.
64 level 0 (Unoccupied, delegated).
60 level unknown.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \8\
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Call and Report Time
Each case type (incident code) was assigned a time
value to provide an average that included response, initial
investigation, backup officers and report writing.
Calls for service that do not result in a case were
counted as a half hour each.
Each report with an arrest equates to approximately
3.25 additional hours as a measure of complexity and for court
time.
167 total FPO and Inspectors for this activity.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \9\
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Patrol and Proactive Activities
24-hour and weekday Patrols in Designated Metropolitan
Areas.
Community Police Patrols.
Law Enforcement Liaison
Guard Post Checks
Travel to cities over 60 miles from a servicing FPS
Office.
934 total FPO and Inspectors for these activities.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \10\
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24-hour Patrols of Designated MSA
24-hour, 7-day patrols in MSA with 60 + Facilities &
6K Population.
Staffing based on hours covered for 3d shift and
weekends.
Seven personnel per MSA with three Areas counted for
NCR.
23 MSA proposed.
Includes Atlanta, Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, New
York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland Or., Salt Lake City, San
Diego, San Francisco, St. Louis, Seattle and Washington DC.
Hartford and Ft. Collins added based on region specific
requests.
175 total Police Officers for this activity.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \11\
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Weekday Patrols in Designated MSA.
Time to patrol facilities in MSA with 20 or more total
facilities with at least 3 Level 3 & 4.
Patrols primarily to check exterior areas and
entrances.
Average time based on Level 1 & 2 patrolled once a
day; Level 3 patrolled three times a day; Level 4 patrolled
four times a day.
All 24-hour, 7-day MSA inclued.
An additional 60 MSA recommended. Examples include
Providence, RI; Newark, NJ; Richmond, VA; Orlando, FL;
Minneapolis, MN; Omaha, NE; Oklahoma City, OK; and Anchorage,
AK.
349 total FPO and Inspectors for this activity.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \12\
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Other Proactive Activities
Community police patrols
proactive patrols of all facilities; Frequency
based on security level.
Meet tenants, check for suspicious activity
and crime conducive conditions.
Times based on average--actual time will vary.
311 total FPO and Inspectors for this
activity.
Investigated selective enforcement
Time to conduct emphasis patrols and
surveillance at facilities with frequent incidents.
Used to develop leads on reported crimes and
identify criminal or suspicious activity.
For facilities selected by commanders on an
irregular basis.
78 total FPO and Inspectors for this activity.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \13\
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Other Patrol Activities
Time for travel to facilities located more than 60
miles from servicing FPS office.
Time allocated based on community police
patrol frequency of highest security level in the city.
12 times a year for level 1 & 2 and 52 times
for level 3 & 4.
?? estimated total FPO and Inspectors for this
activity.
Guard Post Checks.
Time to check guard posts is allocated 30
minutes per guard post each week.
161 total FPO and Inspectors for this
activity.
Law Enforcement Liaison.
Meet with local, state and other federal law
enforcement.
Six hours a year for each city with additional
nine hours if the city has a level 4 facility.
18 total FPO and Inspectors for for this
activity.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \14\
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Facility Surveys, Building Security Committee and Tenant Training
Vulnerability and security assessments are conducted
based on the security level of a facility. Level 1 and 2
facilities every 4 years; Level 3 every 3 years; Level 4 every
2 years.
Pre-lease and requested resurveys each year average
75% of total buildings over 5 years.
BSC Meetings, including presentation of survey.
OEP Assistance, Practice and Tenant Emergency Data
Update
Tenant Training.
490 Inspectors for these activities.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \15\
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Specialized Activities
K9 screening, training and care time
WMD reaction training time
One measure for those training and responding
with a local team
One for those training only.
NCR Tunnel, SRT and Honor Guard.
NCR Mobile X-Ray truck.
NCR full time WMD team.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \16\
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Supervision
The national performance review during Clinton
administration proposed employee to supervisor ratio of 1: 15.
Reason was current business practice calls for high ratios.
Ray Kelly NYPD commissioner stated, ``the problem is
federal law enforcement is NOT a business enterprise. . . They
are armed and have authority to conduct personal searches, make
arrests and use deadly force. That kind of authority demands
tight spans of control, close supervision, a rigorous chain of
command and oversight''.
FEMA-guideline for the Incident Command System, a
foundation of how we respond to an incident calls for a ratio
of 1:5.
LAPD uses 1:7 or less.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \17\
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Supervisor Allocation
One district director for each 3 commands--8 commands
equals 3 districts dependent on size and complexity.
Commander supervises 3 to 7 sergeant, FPO, Inspector
or PSS.
One Lead Inspector per shift for command of 8 to 15.
One supervisor and one lead for each night and weekend
shift.
Additional supervisors depend on complexity of command
mission and size.
Supervisor should supervise all FPO and Inspectors on
shift--no split by series.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \18\
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Average annual hours allocated base on facility security level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional to
selected Total with
Security Level All Facilities facilities with weekday patrol.
weekday patrol
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 1 30.25 21.58 51.83
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 2 58.5 21.58 80.08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 3 160 130.6 290.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level 4 337 260 597
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Includes community police patrols, selective enforcement, scheduled
surveys, BSC, tenant training and OEP.
Does not include call and report time, LE Liaison, guard checks,
travel, pre-lease surveys.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \19\
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Recommended Uniformed Personnel by Region (excluding supervisors)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
82 103 160 236 179 97
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region 7 Region 8 Region 9 Region 10 NCR National
Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
205 125 230 113 287 1,817
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current National Total of FPO, Lead PO,
FTO, PSS and Inspector is 730.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \20\
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Proposed supervision
District Director ?
Area Commander ?
Lead Inspector ?
Captain and Lieutenant ?
Sergeant 50?? (based on 24-hour/ weekend only)
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \21\
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Support and TMB Workload
Draft model from NCR for Mission Support Branches
Team has established draft standards.
Require additional data collection and
validation.
Region 7 has collected data on TMD
Major issue is SA workload to establish when
additional agents are needed.
Guard program and intelligence workload are
closer to completion.
Additional work to do in these areas.
Many allocations are based on number of
uniformed personnel.
Some based on number of commands etc.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \22\
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Other Issues
Issues with times standardization of which events are
reported under a particular event code, time captured in WEBRMS
for reports and Megacenter tracking of calls.
No FPS standard policy defining event cods and
listing which should be primary event.
No FPS standard policy on tracking of time for
reports.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \23\
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Backup and Deleted Slides
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \24\
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Time Available to Accomplish the Mission
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Available time
Computation Days Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Annual Time 260 2080
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non Patrol Time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lea19.5 156
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sick and Lim7ted Duty 56
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holiday 10 80
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training 17 136
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detail 6 48
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Physical fitness Time 26 208
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Available time 174.5 1396
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \25\
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The Threat
Threats include international terrorism, such as al-
Qa'ida,
Domestic terrorism.
Organized criminal groups.
General criminal activity in and around facilities.
Civil Disturbance.
Natural Disasters.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \26\
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Time Allocation for Travel between Facilities, Maintenance, Follow-up
and shift Briefings
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shift Briefing 20 minutes a day. 86
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle and equipment maintenance 1 hour a 52
week.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Follow-up, confer w/supv., respond to 117
email, time card, etc. 2.25 hours a week.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel between facilities 4.5 hours a 234
week.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Hours 489
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \27\
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Risk
``He who defends everything defend nothing.''
Fredercik The Great.
Risk expressed as a function of availability and
frequency of tasks.
Risk Levels are minimal, low, moderate, high and
severe.
Risk Elements:
Availability to respond to calls for service.
Frequency of facility patrols.
Frequency of facility surveys and what changes
trigger an out of cycle survey.
Time allocated for BSC support, OEP
development & practice and Tenant Training.
Frequency of guard post checks.
Frequency of K9 or x-ray screening of vehicles
entering or adjacent to facilities.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \28\
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Recommended Risk Level and Characteristics
Moderate Risk
Personnel available for response in designated areas
and MSA?
24-hour, 7-day patrols in MSA with 60 Facilities and
6k population. Weekday patrols in selected MSA with at least 20
facilities. Community Police Patrols and investigative
selective enforcement for all facilities based on security
level.
Survey based on security level every two to four
years; pre-lease or initial survey prior to occupancy and on
major changes.
Assist BSC with countermeasures and attend meetings.
OEP development and practice with updates of emergency data.
Awareness training one to four hours annually per facility
based on Level.
Check guard posts daily in designated MSA, others as
needed.
K9 and/or x-ray screening of delivery vehicles and
vehicles parked near selected facilities on a random basis.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \29\
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Other Risk Level Characteristics
Minimal Risk
Personnel available to respond to all calls
nationwide.
24-hour patrols in areas with over ten
facilities, weekly patrols of all facilities.
Survey every facility annually; re-survey on
any build-out or change in tenant agency.
K9 and/ or x-ray screening of all delivery
vehicles and vehicles parked close to level 3 & 4
facilities.
Low Risk
Personnel available to respond in all areas
with ten or more facilities.
24-hour patrols in selected MSA with at least
20 facilities, weekly patrols of all facilities.
Survey Level 3 & 4 facilities annually; others
bi-annually; re-survey on-major change and any change
in tenant agencies.
Check guard posts daily in MSA, weekly for all
posts.
K9 and/ or x-ray screening of all delivery
vehicles and daily screening of vehicles parked close
to all Level 4 facilities.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \30\
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Other Risk Characteristics (Continued)
High risk
Personnel available for response in major MSA.
24-hour patrols in MSA with 80 Facilities and
10k population. Weekday patrols of facilities in
selected MSA with at least 60 facilities.
Survey based on security Level every three to
six years; pre-lease survey for level 3 & 4 only.
Attend BSC meetings. OEP development
assistance with annual updates of emergency data. Check
guard posts weekly in designated MSA, others annually.
K9 available for response in 24-hour, 7-day
MSA.
Severe Risk
Personnel available for response in selected
areas only.
24-hour patrols in MSA with at least 80
Facilities and 10k population served. Patrols of Level
3 & 4 weekly, Level 1 & 2 semi-annually.
Survey LV 3 & 4 every 4 years, others at pre-
lease or occupancy only.
Attend BSC meetings. OEP development
assistance during survey only.
check guard posts monthly in 24-hor MSA,
others annually.
K9 available for response in 24-hour, 7-day
MSA only.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \31\
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Background
Previous FPS workload studies included Booz-allen in
1995 and PERF in 1999.
Booz-Allen assumed reduced Law Enforcement
tasks with primary response outside 22 cities by local
PD. Patrols of only largest buildings in 22 core and
satellite cities
Both studies understate leave, sick and
training. Neither account for physical fitness or time
deployed on details.
Neither provided for dedicated field
supervision.
Booz-Allen recommended 948 for uniformed
operations and protection activities. PERF recommended
1,197.
In the 10 years since the Booz-Allen study and
6 years since the PERF there have been significant
changes in the threat posed to Federal Facilities.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \32\
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Special Agent
One per JTTF city.
One general agent per district.
Additional general agents based on
investigative workload.
JTTF agent in city without general agent
should be available for up to 25% of their time to
assist with general cases.
Homeland Security FPS National Staffing Model Team Jun 2001 \33\
������������������������������������������������������������������������
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Let's go to Mr. Ricci.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH RICCI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Ricci. Congresswoman Norton and members of the
committee, thank you for your invitation to appear before the
committee to offer views regarding the direction and viability
of the Federal Protective Service.
My name is Joseph Ricci. I am executive director of the
National Association of Security Companies, the nation's only
organization dedicated to representing private contract
security companies. NASCO member companies employ nearly
450,000 trained security guards serving throughout the
government and commercial sectors.
NASCO is committed to initiating and supporting efforts at
the federal, state and local levels to raise standards for the
licensing of private contract security firms and the
registration, screening and training of security guards. Nearly
2 million people serve as private security guards domestically,
protecting federal facilities, critical infrastructure,
businesses and public areas, supporting federal, state and
local law enforcement.
Private security guards are often the first responder on
the scene of any security or terrorism-related threat and
private security protects up to 85 percent of the nation's
critical infrastructure. Protecting people and property from
accidents and crime, controlling the access, observing and
reporting are the principal role of security guards. Private
security companies and their guards support and complement law
enforcement and other first responders. They do not replace
these considerably better trained counterparts.
There are thousands of examples of law enforcement and
contract security working together to solve crimes, improve
security measures, and make our country safer and more secure.
Contract security is primarily regulated at the state level.
Currently, 40 states license or regulate private security
companies and security guards. Regulation at the state level
varies greatly, and there is a trend for increased regulation
led by the states of New York, California, Florida and
Virginia.
NASCO is constantly active at the state level, working to
increase screening and training standards. During the past few
months, NASCO has committed significant resources to
introducing legislation to license and regulate security in the
states of Mississippi, Alabama and Colorado--three states that
do not currently have any private security licensing, screening
or training requirements.
In 2004, with strong NASCO support, Congress passed the
Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, which
provided employers nationwide with the authority to obtain
federal criminal checks on their private security guards
through their states.
Tens of thousands of contract security guards are currently
protecting government facilities around the world and the
training qualification standards for contract security guards
are subject to regulations of the state where the facility is
located, but more so by the regulations and requirements of the
federal agency for which they are contracting.
One large federal customer for contract security is the
Department of Defense. DOD recently submitted a report to
Congress on contractor performance of security guard functions,
citing a performance survey done comparing contract security
guards and military personnel serving: ``The report confirmed
the ability of the contract guard force to meet specified
function requirements and the individual performance evaluation
demonstrated comparable abilities among the two sampling
groups, thus indicating the contract security guard performed
at the same levels as military counterparts.''
Currently, there are 15,000 contract security guards
working at facilities under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Protective Service. Training standards for the contract
security guards fulfilling FPS contracts are set by TSA, FPS
and the contracting agency or department, and are significantly
higher than any state requirements. The FPS requires that all
security guards complete 80 hours of pre-assignment training on
functions such as access control, traffic control, security and
fire systems, reporting and response, as well as 8 hours-plus
of on-site manual in-service training.
All contract security guards must pass an extensive
background check and a written exam prior to employment. Each
officer's required qualifications, certifications, and other
requirements are tracked in the FPS contract employment
requirement tracking system, or CERTS, and by the contracting
firm itself.
Although problems have recently been identified with
contractor compliance, we believe that through cooperative
efforts and the increased focus of FPS on inspections, these
issues can be quickly resolved. Earlier this year, NASCO
created an FPS Working Group in which NASCO member companies
and FPS officials are working together to increase the
effectiveness of oversight, management, and operational
capacity of FPS. Contract security companies and their guards
are working at government facilities.
Private security plays a majority role in America in the
protection of property, people and assets. In the private and
public sector, private security guards are relied upon as the
first line of defense against illegal, criminal and terrorist
activity. NASCO is committed to increasing the quality of the
selection, training and standards for private security guards.
We will continue to work at the local, state and federal
levels, and we welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on
these issues related to the oversight and regulation of private
security and specifically, contract security.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Ricci follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Ricci
Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King, and members of the
Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before the Committee
to offer views regarding ``The Direction and Viability of the Federal
Protective Service.'' My name is Joseph Ricci, and I am the Executive
Director of the National Association of Security Companies (NASCO).
NASCO is the nation's only organization dedicated to representing
private contract security companies, and NASCO member companies employ
nearly 450,000 trained security guards serving throughout the
government and commercial sector. Our members include:
Allied Barton Security Services
American Security Programs
Andrews International
Guardsmark
Industrial Security Services
International RAM Associates
Levy Security
SecTek Inc.
SecurAmerica
Securitas Security Services USA
Security Forces
Special Response Corporation
The Wackenhut Corporation
US Security Associates
WSA Corporation
NASCO is committed to initiating and supporting efforts at the
federal, state and local levels to raise standards for the licensing of
private contract security firms and the registration, screening and
training of security guards. Currently NASCO is working in several
states on legislation to increase standards for security guard
licensing, including Mississippi, Alabama and Colorado, states that
currently do not regulate private security. NASCO and its members also
worked closely with Congress and the Justice Department on the passage
and rulemaking for the ``Private Security Officers Employment
Authorization Act of 2004'' (PSOEAA) that granted employers of private
security guards a means to request federal criminal record checks for
security guards in every state.
In addition to serving as Executive Director of NASCO, I serve on
the ASIS International Private Security Services Council which provides
input for the ASIS Private Security Officer Selection and Training
Guideline. Developed and continually reviewed by security industry
leaders, this Guideline sets forth minimum criteria that regulating
bodies and companies can use for the selection and training of private
security guards.
The Role of Private Security
Nearly 2 million people are employed in private security
domestically compared to less than 700,000 law enforcement personnel.
Private security guards are guarding federal facilities, critical
infrastructure, businesses and public areas, working with the armed
forces in Iraq and at DoD installations, supporting the operations of
the Customs and Border Patrol, and providing screening at airports for
TSA. Private security guards are often the ``first'' responder on the
scene of any security or terrorism related incident, and private
security protects 85% of nation's critical infrastructure. Nearly 75
percent of private security guards work for contract security
companies, with the balance serving as proprietary or in-house
security. The vast majority of contract security firms employ many
former law enforcement personnel in senior management.
Contract security guards are trained to support law enforcement and
not replace law enforcement officers that received considerable more
training throughout their careers. Contract security guards have more
limited authorities than police and other law officers. Specific powers
vary by jurisdiction, but they generally correspond to the police
authorities of private citizens. Security guards may have other
authorities or may face further limitations to their police power
according to state licensing or other regulation, where it exists.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CRS Report For Congress, ``Guarding America: Security Guards
and U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection'' November 12, 2004, RL3260
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protecting people and property from accidents and crime,
controlling access, observing and reporting are the principal role of
security guards. They may enforce laws on their employer's grounds,
conduct incident interviews, prepare incident reports, and provide
legal testimony. They may be armed, as required by specific duty
assignments, consistent with state and federal laws governing private
ownership and use of firearms.
Private security companies and their guards are working to support
and complement law enforcement and other first-responders. There are
thousands of examples of law enforcement and contract security working
together to solve crimes and improve security measures making our
country safer and more secure. NASCO strongly believes contract
security performance improves through partnering with it clients to
develop and access the best solutions and capabilities.
The Regulation of Private Security
Contract security is primarily regulated at the state level.
Currently 40 states license and regulate private security companies and
security guards. Regulation at the state level varies greatly in
regards to screening and training. For training, requirements range
from a minimum of 4 hours or less of pre-assignment and no in-service
training, to 40 plus hours of training combining pre-assignment, onsite
and in-service. Background screening requirements range from local
criminal checks to national checks. There are greater requirements for
armed as opposed to unarmed guards, and they too vary according to the
state.
There is a trend for increased regulation at the state levels, with
leading states such as New York and California recently raising
training standards and hours and including proprietary or in-house
security guards into registration regulations. Training standards have
also recently been increased in New Jersey, and there is pending
legislation in the District of Columbia.
NASCO is constantly active at the state level, working to increase
screening and training standards, or simply trying to start the process
of licensing and registering security guards. Just during the past few
months, NASCO has committed significant resources to introducing
legislation to license and regulate security in Mississippi, Alabama
and Colorado, three states that currently do not have any licensing,
screening or training requirements.
NASCO has also supported raising security officer standards at the
federal level. In the early 1990's, NASCO pushed for passage of the
``Private Security Officer Quality Assurance Act'' which sought to
create minimum state standards for licensing, training and permit
access to federal criminal records for background checks. In 2004, with
strong NASCO support, Congress passed the Private Security Officer
Employment Authorization Act (PSOEAA) which provided employers
nationwide the authority to obtain federal criminal background checks
on their private security officers by going through the states.
Contract Security and the Federal Government
Tens of thousands of contract security guards are currently
protecting government facilities around the world. The training and
qualification standards for contract security guards are subject to
regulations of the state where the facility is located, but more so, by
the regulations and requirements of the federal agency with which they
are contracting. Contract security guards are qualified and able to
perform the security functions required of them by federal agencies
such as the Federal Protective Services.
One large federal customer for contract security is the Department
of Defense. In 2003, due to increases in security requirements after 9/
11 and the number of active duty and reserve personnel being sent
overseas, it was necessary that contract security guards fulfill
security roles previously performed by military employees. Congress
passed legislation temporarily lifting a restriction against the use of
contract security guards at U.S. military, and now there are 130 DoD
installations using contract security guards.
Pursuant to the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, DoD
submitted a report to Congress on ``Contractor Performance of Security
Guard Functions.'' \2\ The Report covered the subject of the
performance and cited a performance survey done comparing contract
security guards and military personnel serving as security guards
during a three-phase operational evaluation (OPEVAL) at two Navy
installations in December 2004. The Report stated that;
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\2\ Department of Defense, Report to Congress on ``Contractor
Performance of Security Guard Function'', January 2007.
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``Combined, the three phases of the OPEVAL confirmed the
ability of the contract guard force to meet specified AT/FP
function requirements at both the tactical employment and
installations operational levels. The individual performance
evaluation demonstrated comparable abilities among the two
sampling groups, thus indicating that contract security guards
perform AT/FP functions as well as military counterparts (87.3%
successful performance of required tasks for contract guards as
compared to 87.4% for military personnel)''
The DoD Report also noted that contract guards continue to develop
and foster good working relationships with the military law enforcement
elements on the installations where they are working, and it concluded;
``(t)he authority for the use of contracted security guards at military
installations gives DoD a viable and effective way to meet and adjust
the requirements of increased security guard functions.''
Contract Security and FPS
Currently there are 15,000 contract security guards working at
facilities under the jurisdiction of Federal Protective Service (FPS).
Training standards for contract security guards fulfilling FPS
contracts are set by GSA and FPS, and are higher than any state
requirements. The FPS requires that all security guards complete 80
hours of pre-assignment training on access and traffic control,
security and fire systems, reports and response, as well as 8 plus
hours of onsite and annual in-service training. All contract security
guards must pass an extensive background check and pass an exam prior
to employment and additional background checks every two years, as well
as complete annual refresher training, CPR and domestic violence
certification, annual weapons re-qualification, medical and first-aid
certification.
Performance and other standards for contract security guards (CSG)
are outlined in the Physical Security Handbook 440-2-H Chapter 9
including jurisdiction, determining need, cost, training, duties and
compliance. Standards and compliance are the responsibility of the
Contracting Officer Representative (COR), usually a FPS official with
physical security expertise who determine the needs of the facility and
executes the contract.
Each officer's required qualifications, certifications and other
requirements are tracked through the FPS Contract Guard Employment
requirements Tracking System (CERTS) and by the contracting firm.
Although problems have recently been identified with contractor
compliance, we believe that through cooperative efforts and the
increased focus of FPS on inspections, these issues can be quickly
resolved. NASCO supports the steps that ICE has proposed to improve the
monitoring of the FPS contract guard program by increasing the number
of employees trained to oversee the program, provide them with better
training, and use tracking mechanisms to ensure quality assurance.\3\
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\3\ September 13, 2006 Memorandum from Julie Meyers, ICE Asst. Sec,
to Richard Skiner, DHS IG, on the OIG Draft Report ``Federal Protective
Service Needs to More Effectively Oversee its Contract Guard Program.''
August, 2006.
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NASCO is also working closely with FPS to re-examine the role,
responsibility and tasks of contract security personnel to validate
that contract requirements and training are validated against actual
daily responsibilities and activities and that the training best
supports these roles.
Earlier this year, NASCO created a FPS Working Group in which NASCO
member companies and FPS officials can work together to increase the
effectiveness of the oversight, management and operational capability
of FPS and the contract security companies and their guards working at
FPS facilities. The FPS Working Group is currently in the process of
conducting a task analysis that will include the insight and expertise
of senior security management, supervisors, users and the security
guards themselves to determine the amount of time and criticality of
tasks to best validate training.
As with any service industry, especially in a market-driven
economy, problems surface and NASCO is committed to work with FPS to
solve these problems.
Conclusion
Private security plays the majority role in America in the
protection of property, people and assets. In the private and public
sector, private security guards are relied upon as the first line of
defense against illegal, criminal and terrorist activity, and NASCO is
committed to increasing the quality of the selection, training, and
standards for private security guards.
We will continue to work at the local, state and federal level, and
we welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on issues related to
the oversight and regulation of private security and specifically
contract security.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Ricci.
As you both could tell from the questions to the panel, on
both sides there is a concern that the core peace officer
function of the FPS be maintained, which is to say that there
be officers who have the same ability to do policing and
terrorism work as officers in our cities and certainly in
Congress and in the federal sector.
I certainly understand that there is a role for security
officers. The concern is with the elimination of officers in
very large numbers and with the inspector role, which appears
to be a largely management role, a paperwork role, a role that
has little to do with patrolling.
Some of these officers, Mr. Wright, the inspectors, as I
understand it, would normally be peace officers. Is that your
understanding?
Mr. Wright. Correct. FPS inspectors are full-time law
enforcements. However, our position descriptions and our roles
within the agency are largely administrative. A lot of time
spent preparing reports, preparing security assessments,
oversights of contract security guards and contracts. That
allows very little time for patrol.
Ms. Norton. The patrolling function is one that would be of
great concern to us. When we say ``federal facilities,'' that
hides a bunch of things. We are talking about every kind of
federal office, from members' offices, to offices where huge
numbers of people, some of them very troubled and very
disappointed with the federal government coming in related to
the huge number of services. Some of them could be veterans.
Some of them could be Social Security. Many of them would be
disabled people.
Do these inspectors continue to patrol in the federal
facilities where they are assigned? Or are they assigned to
federal facilities?
Mr. Wright. Inspectors are assigned to federal facilities.
In most regions, we serve in more of an administrative tasking.
Ms. Norton. Don't they have to travel to inspect? They
can't keep inspecting their own building over and over. Don't
they have to inspect other facilities as well?
Mr. Wright. Correct. I can draw my experiences as an
inspector in Kansas City. I was specifically responsible for 20
properties. Overall, I am responsible for every property in the
region VI.
Ms. Norton. Does that take up virtually all your time? Or
do you spend any time patrolling and doing the core peace
officer function?
Mr. Wright. My experience is that inspectors spend very
little time on proactive patrol and surveillance of federal
facilities.
Ms. Norton. So these peace officers in essence will be paid
as peace officers, will be carrying guns, but for the most part
will not be doing the peace officer function. Is that your
testimony?
Mr. Wright. We will do very little proactive patrol and we
will be available for emergency response.
Ms. Norton. Well, of course you won't be present,
apparently, in 50 cities. I don't expect that that will be the
District of Columbia, although the reductions in peace officers
are likely to occur throughout the country. But we understand
there will be at least 50 cities where there will be no peace
officers. Do you have any idea of which cities these will be?
Mr. Wright. No, I do not. The agency has insisted that this
plan is pre-decisional. Hence they have no requirement to
advise myself or my fellow officers of the plan.
Ms. Norton. You recognize that they say they have an MOU
with various jurisdictions, sometimes they have said as many as
30 or 31. They have not released those to either other
committees which have jurisdiction over the Federal Protective
Service, and I am on both of these committees. As I understand
it, these cities have been told that ``we will help you and you
can help us.''
We do not know that they have been told that some of these
places will have no peace officers whatsoever and that there
will be nobody on the weekends. Do you believe that it would be
prudent to have an MOU with a local police force where the only
presence would be security guards and not people who are
empowered to arrest?
Mr. Wright. Typically, an MOU would imply reciprocity. The
local police department would support the Federal Protective
Service and the federal government in times of need, and that
the federal government would reciprocate.
Ms. Norton. So they always have peace officers. The local
jurisdiction always has peace officers. So you are saying if
they have an MOU, there ought to be a peace officer or somebody
with the power to arrest always in order to reciprocate in the
MOU terms.
Mr. Wright. Correct.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Ricci, some security guards carry guns and
some do not. Is that correct?
Mr. Ricci. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. What is the difference in the training of those
who carry guns and those who not? And in the assignment of
those who carry guns and those who not? And can the ones who
carry guns make arrests?
Mr. Ricci. I think can say a little bit of what Director
Schenkel mentioned. The majority of the security guards that
are employed by FPS are permitted to carry arms. The permission
for arms and whether the guards are armed or unarmed is
determined by the FPS assessment when they do their risk
assessment and create the post orders, if you will, or the
project orders.
So the determination is done by FPS. The training is
significantly higher if they are armed. They do have to
recertify their weapons every year. They do have to go through
an additional training for use of force. So there is additional
training that is applied for anybody with weapons. I do not
believe that they have arrest powers.
Ms. Norton. So they are armed for what purpose?
Mr. Ricci. To defend themselves and to defend the property.
They have the authority to defend themselves, the people in the
building, and the property itself.
Ms. Norton. Of course, if an arrest is to be made while
they are holding a gun on somebody, they have to make sure
someone calls 9-1-1, so that somebody who can arrest the person
does come. Is that the case?
Mr. Ricci. They currently can detain. The officers are--
Ms. Norton. I could detain is somehow I could get
somebody--
Mr. Ricci. But they are trained to detain, ma'am.
Currently, the procedures and policies that we see that are in
place now are not really changing. The process right now is to
make two notifications, which are to both the FPS and to the
mega-center. Therefore, we get response. There are 8,800
buildings. There are only 1,200 FPS workers. So they are
obviously not in each building. So the current response is to
rely on local law enforcement.
Ms. Norton. I want to move on to the next member. I just
want to say we are dealing with terrorism, in times of
increased crime, and we see the reduction in the number of
officers and the increase in people who can detain. Let's see
if some of the thugs out here, knowing that you could only
detain, and some of the terrorists are satisfied with that kind
of oversight of federal facilities.
Mr. Reichert?
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Ricci, do you have law enforcement experience?
Mr. Ricci. I do not, sir.
Mr. Reichert. What is your background?
Mr. Ricci. My background is I worked in the contract
security industry for about the last 6 or 7 years, and also in
association management.
Mr. Reichert. Okay, thank you.
I first want to take a moment, Madam Chair, to thank the
director for his service to our country as a Marine. And also,
Mr. Wright, thank you so much for your service to our country
as a 21-year FPS officer.
I take it you two guys have known each other for a while?
Mr. Ricci. No, sir.
Mr. Wright. No. We just met this morning.
Mr. Reichert. Did you just meet?
Mr. Ricci. Absolutely.
Mr. Reichert. That is not good.
[Laughter.]
As you probably heard in my opening comments, in my first
round of questioning, I was a cop for 33 years so I get the
working with the security people. Sometimes late at night, in
my patrol car back in the early 1970s, the security person was
my backup. There is a great friendship and a great partnership
between the two of you in your professions. I know you are
aware of that.
But there are some issues that you have to deal with. One
of the things that really bothers me is this 30 percent of the
security guards didn't meet the requirements. What happened
there? Why was that?
Mr. Ricci. I think when we were talking about the 30
percent. They didn't necessarily meet the requirements because
they weren't carrying the specific cards or some of the
registrations were out of sync. We admit that that is a problem
and we want to work with FPS and we are trying to work with FPS
to make sure the search program is kept up to date; that the
contracting companies are in compliance and working to make
sure that they are maintaining higher standards of
recordkeeping. It is a process we are working on together in
partnership on it.
Mr. Reichert. As far as the management, we touched on this
in the first panel, the management of the security guards.
Maybe Mr. Wright you could comment on that. Is that left up to
the FPS officers?
Mr. Wright. Correct. Every FPS officer, police officers,
and inspectors are responsible for oversight of the contract
security guards. My comment would be this study was done in
NCR, and we have lost considerable numbers of police officers
and inspectors from NCR, while the duties have piled up on
inspectors, administrative-type duties have piled up on
inspectors.
We have to provide oversight. The problem is that the
manpower is not there.
Mr. Reichert. What is the rank structure within FPS?
Mr. Wright. There are actually two different chains of
command. You have a regional director, deputy regional
director, district director, and area commander. That is where
the chain of command splits. On one side, you have inspectors
and on the other side of the chain of command you have
sergeants, corporals and police officers.
As I say, all law enforcement officers within FPS are
responsible for oversight of contract security officers.
Mr. Reichert. Okay. So on both sides, sergeants, corporals,
and then the inspectors on the other side, have some oversight.
Mr. Wright. Correct.
Mr. Reichert. The inspectors, are they the ones that do the
follow-up work on crime? Who are your investigators?
Mr. Wright. The special agents. The response to a
particular crime could be either the police officers or the
inspectors. At that point, we would accomplish a preliminary
report, accomplish as much of a preliminary investigation as we
had time for and could on-scene, and then it gets turned over
to a special agent.
Mr. Reichert. Now, I used the figure of 250. Is it 300
people that may be eliminated, 300 positions? But they will
find jobs somewhere else.
Mr. Wright. Right. The plans that I have seen call for the
elimination of 259 police officers. These are individuals that
spend their full time patrolling and responding to incidents
and crimes.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Wright and Mr. Ricci, were you a part of
the discussion with your higher command structure in coming up
with the recommendation?
Mr. Wright. Absolutely not. The union was not invited to
participate in any aspect.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Ricci, were you part of the discussion?
Mr. Ricci. No, sir.
Mr. Reichert. How did you become aware of the fact that
they were looking at cutting 300 positions or so?
Mr. Wright. I knew by media articles in the summer of 2006
that there were definitely deficit problems. At that point, I
didn't concern myself with it because we have always pulled
through at some point or other. In November of 2006, the first
warning sign was shown when they cut police officers' and
inspectors' retention pay. That showed us that this deficit was
serious. That was at the end of November.
On about January 5, I was advised that the retention and
pay indeed had been cut, and that further plans to reduce the
agency were ensuing. On or about February 5, I was advised that
the agency was going down to 950 employees. At all times, I was
told that this move was due to deficit, although the FPS
management did put a picture on it as the evolution of FPS.
Mr. Reichert. Madam Chair, I recognize that my time is
beginning to expire here. If I could just follow up with two
real quick questions?
Ms. Norton. The chair would be more than happy, but staff
informs me we have to get out of the room at 12:30 and we have
three more members. I am sorry.
Mr. Carney?
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Wright, do you have any idea how many FPS officers
might decide to leave for private contractors if their jobs are
cut and what impact that might have?
Mr. Wright. With the announcement of the cut in retention
pay on November 30, we were at 1,220 officers. Over the years
since our inception into DHS in March 2003, we had attrited
from about 1,550 down to 1,220 on the day the retention pay was
announced as going away. Today, as I understand it, we are down
to about 1,170. I have had two good friends in the last 1 1/2
weeks leave FPS service, experienced officers. I have another
good friend out in San Diego that is leaving on May 13.
It is absolutely affecting morale. It is taking attention
away from the job, the issue at hand. I have officers out there
who have given their careers to FPS. They have dedicated their
time, their loyalty, and they are being let down. And now they
have to worry about their careers and their livelihoods.
Mr. Carney. This next question is actually for both of you.
What do we know about the certification maintenance of contract
officers in particular? Those who hold clearances, for example,
are their backgrounds done? Is it an SSBI? What is the
background there? Are there periodic reviews, up to date? That
kind of thing. Those are very important issues.
Mr. Wright. I can speak for region VI. I think one of our
problems is in each region, we used to have one or two
individuals dedicated to maintenance of these files and
clearances of security officers. Those positions have been
eliminated and sent into a central unit. For example, my guy in
Kansas City who handled the process from bringing them onto the
contract, ensuring everything was done--my guy in Kansas City
is no longer there. It is all handled somewhere at a central
unit.
This goes back to the inspector duties. FPS police officers
can be out there every day and handle a lot of this material,
but the inspectors are being overtasked with administrative
duties. It is just almost weekly we get another assignment.
That is a problem. That is how we fall away. Region VI is very
good at maintaining these contract security guard files, but it
is very labor-intensive.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Ricci, do you care to comment?
Mr. Ricci. To confirm what Mr. Wright said, the compliance
issues for certification and backgrounds and the other
requirements are kept dually. They are kept in the CERTS
system, but they are also maintained by the contract security
company. So there is a dual administrative function there. We
have to report that information to the FPS and it gets into the
CERTS system. So there is a process that is there.
There have been times in the past where there have been
delays in getting background checks, which I think are required
every 2 years for security officers. There have been a variety
of delays across the board in the whole government community.
So some of those delays have an impact on the ability to man
positions which we feel are critical.
Mr. Carney. Who pays for the background investigations?
Mr. Ricci. The background investigations are a part of the
contract.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Understood.
Thank you. No further questions.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Clarke?
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Mr. Wright, you and your fellow FPS officers work alongside
private contractors on a daily basis. How do you feel about the
role they have been given within the agency? And in your
experience, do you feel they are as reliable as FPS officers
and well enough trained to protect federal buildings in the
current climate?
Mr. Wright. None of this is to the denigration of any of my
security officers that I work with or did work with every day.
In level three and level four buildings, the higher-level
security buildings, I believe that these should be government
officers. That way, we can maintain the certification. Well, it
won't even be a certification. They will essentially be
government security guards.
It is a mixed bag. In Kansas City, we are somewhat
fortunate to have a good contract, a good solid contract.
However, there are holes and individuals do get hired by these
companies that really don't belong. They don't have a work
ethic. They are not vested in the government. This is just
another job, just another post.
On the other hand, we have a lot of former military police
officers, retired types, that come out and they are a bunch of
good guys, good backup. The problem is the authority. I think
one thing that has been neglected here today is the authority
of security officers is granted by each municipality. Whereas
Kansas City has pretty much a hands-off approach. Individuals
commissioned by Kansas City as a private security guard,
basically they will not put hands on anyone entering any
facility. Whereas I am sure it is different in other
municipalities.
Ms. Clarke. Let me just follow up. From just my
observations here, what has been described has been sort of an
imposed policy for deficit reduction.
Mr. Wright, was there any consultation with you or your
fellow officers, given the struggle that FPS has right now
about what some of the best practices could be for reorganizing
the agency, given its fiscal constraints?
You talked about how you became aware of how the
organization was going to be reorganized. Did anyone consult
with you or your membership?
Mr. Wright. Not at all. I lay this directly at the feet of
Immigration, Customs and Enforcement. I have served under
directors in FPS. Once we got to know each other, fairly
forthcoming. I though we could deal together. Immigration and
Customs and Enforcement, they are tough group to work for. FPS
is the little brother. As Mr. Jackson stated in his testimony
on April 18, FPS needs a big brother.
Well, we needed a big brother. We need a Wally Cleaver, and
we got Eddie Haskell. There is no respect for the union, no
respect for the employees.
Ms. Clarke. I heard in Director Schenkel's testimony that
DHS plans to reduce the FPS personnel by about 300 nationwide
and about 101 in the New York region alone. That really
concerns me. What impact is this likely to have on the
remaining FPS personnel in doing their jobs?
Mr. Wright. In clarifying the reductions, we have
inspectors, police officers, special agents. Police officers
are slated for the largest reductions. There will be 18 police
officers left in this nation. You have I believe 20 or 25
police officers in New York City alone, so basically you are
going to go down to one and leave it up to inspectors who have
all the administrative taskings to respond and patrol, which
that is being eliminated also.
What was the second part of your question?
Ms. Clarke. I wanted to get a sense of what is likely to be
the impact on the remaining personnel in doing their jobs?
Mr. Wright. The impact on the remaining personnel is FPS
inspectors, who are already overtasked, are going to be further
overtasked. We anticipate the last I knew adding about 150
inspectors, but the 400 or so inspectors we have on board now
average between 20 and 60 buildings apiece.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Wright. We have to go
to Mr. Green now.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, witnesses, for your testimony today.
Mr. Wright, on page four of your testimony, the third
paragraph down, the very last sentence, you make a very strong
statement that is almost an indictment. I shall read it, and I
would like to talk to you for just a moment about it: ``The
proposed 950 employee FPS is driven by money``--I assume you
are talking about the proposal to have 950 employees--``not
risk analysis by law enforcement or security professionals.''
So the proposal to have 950 versus another number, in your
opinion, is driven by money. Is that correct?
Mr. Wright. Correct.
Mr. Green. Without additional comment just yet, let me ask
you this. How do you know that it is not driven by risk
analysis?
Mr. Wright. In the days that the agency came to be somewhat
forthcoming, I was told that it was budget. I asked for any
plans, anything that could show me where did this 950 come
from, and that has never been provided.
Mr. Green. Mr. Ricci, are you aware of any risk analysis
that has been performed?
Mr. Ricci. I know that the FPS consistently does risk
analysis on the properties themselves in determining the guard
levels and the contracts and the post orders for the given
building.
Mr. Green. We are talking about now a risk analysis to
ascertain the appropriate number of peace officers versus
contract employees?
Mr. Ricci. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Green. My assumption is that you would not cross the
street before looking both ways. That is a risk assessment.
Would you agree that if we are going to downsize and outsource
and to a certain extent privatize, that there should be some
sort of risk analysis by a professional entity capable,
competent and qualified, of giving an appropriate summary as to
what the risks are?
Mr. Ricci. I certainly think that there ought to be
professionals consulted in regards to the operational impact of
any kind of reduction in force or change in the oversight and
compliance issues, and it ought to be something that is done
across the board involving both industry and government.
Mr. Green. Would you agree that if we have not had an
appropriate risk analysis, that someone is assuming a large
amount of risk, because if you don't understand the risk, you
are assuming the risk. So someone is assuming an inordinate
amount of risk if we haven't had such an analysis. Would you
agree?
Mr. Ricci. It all depends on what we are talking about in
terms of risk. I know Mr. Wright has a comment here, but I
think what we are talking about is a change in the force of
compliance--
Mr. Green. I understand, but if something occurs--God
forbid that it would--but if something occurs and we have not
properly assessed the risk, and we have inappropriate personnel
at a given station where this incident occurs, someone has
assumed the risk.
Mr. Wright. Someone has assumed a major liability. I will
say that the one FPS workload allocation study that has been
conducted by FPS personnel, personnel that are experienced in
law enforcement and security workload allocation, resulted in a
number of employees considerably higher, almost three-times
higher than the 950. I have provided that workload allocation
model for the record on disc, and I have an extra disc here.
Mr. Green. Has it been placed in the record, sir?
Mr. Wright. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Okay. Again, you agree, sir, that the risk is
something that we ought not assume without a proper analysis. I
assume you both agree.
Mr. Wright. Right.
Mr. Ricci. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. If it has not been done, would you agree that it
might be appropriate for additional action from without the
agency to intercede in some way, such that the risk can be
properly ascertained? Would you want to see the American people
unprotected? I think not.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Ms. Norton. I thank you very much, Mr. Green.
As I close this hearing, I just want to note that Mr. Ricci
in his testimony I think honestly concedes that there is work
to be done with respect to contracting. I know the testimony
that we have heard from Mr. Wright concerning the inspectors
and what looks like cutting the number of peace officers
virtually in half.
I do note that Mr. Ricci indicates that this can be done,
these contracting problems can be done--and I am looking at his
testimony--with increased focus of monitoring the FPS contract
guard program, by increasing the number of employees trained to
oversee the program, more effective oversight management and
operational capability of FPS.
The fact is that for the contracting duties for whatever
new or improved FPS we have, we are piling it on the people who
are already there and coming in diminishing numbers.
Mr. Wright. Correct. And that leaves no one for proactive
patrol and response to calls for service.
Ms. Norton. I am telling you this committee, Homeland
Security Committee, cannot possibly take the position that
there should be less protection of millions of Americans who
come into federal facilities than in the White House and in
this facility where we are now. And it looks like there is a
huge amount of difference.
If something happens in one of those facilities, I would
not like to be the one who said, well, we did all we can, when
it is perfectly clear that post-Oklahoma bombing, post-9/11, we
are cutting in half the number of police officers in federal
buildings who can make arrests.
Just one more question. You heard me ask the two witnesses
before you whether or not some of the problems would be
eliminated, particularly contracting problems, the problems
that seem to have gone to the heading of efficiency and
bureaucracy, if FPS was a stand-alone agency. Now, you
recommend that.
The answer to me made some sense, and that is, there has to
be somebody to do the overhead because they don't have an
infrastructure in DHS to handle one agency. GSA did it because
GSA was an agency. If in fact you were to stand alone, who
would handle the necessary administrative support?
Mr. Wright. ICE currently outsources all of our shared
administrative taskings to, well, labor relations is Laguna
Niguel. CIS provides that service. USDA prints our paychecks in
New Orleans. There are plenty of agencies out there that can
take on these tasks.
Ms. Norton. Well, they have given it to ICE, so they will
say somebody had to do it, and so ICE is doing it. We need to
discuss this, because this is a problem that really caused this
committee to have this hearing--these contracting problems and
the outsourcing of contracting officers, which is more
outsourcing, more problems of that kind. If there is to be
another iteration of this, then we need to discuss it. Yes,
they outsource this, that and the other, but somebody in ICE
has to be responsible for it, and therefore you have to have a
proxy somehow for what the GSA did for the FPS.
Mr. Green. Madam Chair, would you yield for one moment
please?
Ms. Norton. I cannot yield because I only took the liberty
of the chair, since I was told I better get out of here by
12:30. So I am going to close the hearing and ask that if
members have other questions, that they ask them directly, so
that I will not, in the name of the chairman, be accused of
keeping the next hearing from getting in here, since it is not
our hearing room.
Thank you very much for coming to this hearing. It is very
important testimony.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]