[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING TO EXAMINE THE JOINT
PERFORMANCE OF APHIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, AND CBP, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN
PROTECTING U.S. AGRICULTURE FROM
FOREIGN PESTS AND DISEASES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HORTICULTURE AND ORGANIC AGRICULTURE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-29
Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
agriculture.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota, Chairman
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania, BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Ranking
Vice Chairman Minority Member
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa JERRY MORAN, Kansas
JOE BACA, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia JO BONNER, Alabama
STEPHANIE HERSETH SANDLIN, South MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Dakota STEVE KING, Iowa
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas MARILYN N. MUSGRAVE, Colorado
JIM COSTA, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana Louisiana
NANCY E. BOYDA, Kansas JOHN R. ``RANDY'' KUHL, Jr., New
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio York
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
EARL POMEROY, North Dakota JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
JOHN BARROW, Georgia TIM WALBERG, Michigan
NICK LAMPSON, Texas
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
TIM MAHONEY, Florida
______
Professional Staff
Robert L. Larew, Chief of Staff
Andrew W. Baker, Chief Counsel
April Slayton, Communications Director
William E. O'Conner, Jr., Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture
DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California, Chairman
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas, Ranking
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee Minority Member
TIM MAHONEY, Florida JOHN R. ``RANDY'' KUHL, Jr., New
JOHN BARROW, Georgia York
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
Keith Jones, Subcommittee Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Cardoza, Hon. Dennis A., a Representative in Congress from
California, opening statement.................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Goodlatte, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from Virginia,
opening statement.............................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Mahoney, Hon. Tim, a Representative in Congress from Florida,
prepared statement............................................. 9
Neugebauer, Hon. Randy, a Representative in Congress from Texas,
opening statement.............................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from
Minnesota, opening statement................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Witnesses
Jurich, John, Investigator, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House
of Representatives, Washington, D.C............................ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Shames, Lisa, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.............. 82
Prepared statement........................................... 83
Taylor, James L., Deputy Inspector General and Acting Assistant
Inspector General for Audits, Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.; accompanied
by Kathleen S. Tighe, Deputy Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington,
D.C............................................................ 92
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Bronson, Hon. Charles H., Commissioner, Florida Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services, Tallahassee, FL............. 115
Prepared statement........................................... 117
McClung, John M., President and CEO, Texas Produce Association,
Mission, TX.................................................... 120
Prepared statement........................................... 121
Nelsen, Joel A., President, California Citrus Mutual, Exeter, CA. 123
Prepared statement........................................... 125
Submitted Statements
Neff, Michael W., Executive Director, American Society for
Horticultural Science, Alexandria, VA.......................... 137
HEARING TO EXAMINE THE JOINT
PERFORMANCE OF APHIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, AND CBP, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN
PROTECTING U.S. AGRICULTURE FROM
FOREIGN PESTS AND DISEASES
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic
Agriculture,
Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Dennis
A. Cardoza [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Cardoza, Etheridge, Davis,
Mahoney, Barrow, Gillibrand, Peterson (ex officio), Neugebauer,
Kuhl, Foxx, Conaway, and Goodlatte (ex officio).
Staff present: Adam Durand, Alejandra Gonzalez-Arias, Keith
Jones, Scott Kuschmider, John Riley, Kristin Sosanie, Patricia
Barr, Bryan Dierlam, John Goldberg, Pam Miller, Pete Thomson,
and Jamie Weyer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS A. CARDOZA, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM CALIFORNIA
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the
Horticulture and Organic Agriculture Subcommittee to examine
the joint performance of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security in
protecting the U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases
will come to order. I would like to welcome you all here. I
heard from my Ranking Member, Mr. Neugebauer, that one of the
elevators is not working. That is why he was late. And I
assured him that I was not in charge of that part of this. We
are very happy to have him and the rest of the Committee here
today.
We are here to look at protecting the United States from
agricultural pests, from foreign pests and disease, but the
issue at hand as most of the audience is well aware; hidden
within the authorization of the Homeland Security Department
was a little noticed provision that mandated Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Services, 1,800 agriculture inspectors to
move from USDA to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security's Customs and Border Protection Division. This move
was made in order to consolidate customs and border enforcement
into one agency, a decision I am sure was made with all good
intentions in mind.
However, as the GAO reported in 2006 since the transfer of
these USDA employees to Customs and Border Protection has not
developed sufficient performance measures that take into
account the agency's expanded mission or to consider all the
pathways by which prohibited agricultural items or foreign
pests may enter the country. In essence, the GAO found that the
Department of Homeland Security was not meeting its mission to
guard our domestic agricultural industry from foreign threats
at the border. This deficiency cannot stand and should not be
tolerated. Stopping foreign pests and prohibited agricultural
products from entering the U.S. might not be as sexy a topic as
stopping weapons or drugs, but it is certainly as important.
These are six and eight-legged terrorists that can wreck
havoc on our nation's agricultural industry by costing billions
of taxpayer dollars in eradication efforts and decimating our
ability to access new export markets. While I certainly would
prefer to see these inspection employees moved immediately back
to USDA where I believe they belong, my greater concern is that
wherever they are right now, they must certainly have the tools
and the resources at their disposal to do their job effectively
and efficiently. Today with the input from our esteemed
panelists, I want to take an in-depth look at the staffing,
training, and morale problems that persist within the homeland
security apparatus.
With this information the Committee Members will be more
prepared when the Agriculture Committee and the Homeland
Security Committee hold a joint full Committee hearing now
scheduled for November 1. While today's hearing will focus on
the problems persisting within our nation's agriculture
inspection programs the joint hearing in November will focus on
possible solutions to this impending crisis including
encouraging USDA and the Department of Homeland Security to
develop a standardized reputable training program that properly
identifies and assesses the major threats posed by foreign
agricultural pests and disease. Preventing pest and disease
infestation is a paramount concern to all of American
agriculture but primarily to our specialty crop industry. As
Chairman of this Subcommittee, I have vowed to fight for them
on this issue, and I promise again today that I will not back
down.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardoza follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dennis A. Cardoza, a Representative in
Congress From California
I would like to welcome everyone to the Subcommittee on
Horticulture and Organic Agriculture's review of the joint performance
of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture and Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security in protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and
disease.
But to the issue at hand, as most of the audience is well aware,
hidden within the authorization of the Homeland Security Department,
was a little-noticed provision that mandated Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service's 1,800 agricultural inspectors to move from USDA to
the newly created Department of Homeland Security's Custom and Border
Protection Division.
This move was made in order to consolidate customs and border
enforcement into one agency, a decision that I am sure was made with
all good intentions in mind.
However, as the GAO reported in 2006, since the transfer of these
USDA employees ``Customs and Border Protection has not developed
sufficient performance measures that take into account the agency's
expanded mission or consider all pathways by which prohibited
agricultural items or foreign pests may enter the country.''
In essence, the GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security
was not meeting its mission to guard our domestic agriculture industry
from foreign threats at the border. This deficiency can not and should
not be tolerated.
Stopping foreign pests and prohibited agricultural products from
entering the U.S. might not be as sexy as stopping terrorists, weapons
or drugs but it is certainly just as important.
These are six and eight-legged terrorists that can wreak havoc on
our nation's agricultural industry, costing billions of taxpayer
dollars in eradication efforts and decimate our ability to access new
export markets.
While I certainly would prefer to see these inspection employees
moved immediately back to USDA, where I believe they belong, my greater
concern is that wherever they are right now, they must certainly have
the tools and resources at their disposal to do their job effectively
and efficiently.
Today, with the input from our esteemed panelists, I want to take
an in-depth look at the staffing, training and morale problems that
persist within Homeland Security. With this information, Committee
Members will be more prepared when the Agriculture Committee and the
Homeland Security Committee hold a joint Full Committee hearing on
November 1st.
While today's hearing will focus on the problems persisting within
the our nation's agricultural inspection programs, the joint hearing in
November will focus on possible solutions to this impending crisis
including encouraging USDA and the Department of Homeland Security to
develop a standardized, reputable training program that properly
identifies and assess the major threats posed by foreign agricultural
pests and diseases.
Preventing pest and disease infestation is a paramount concern to
all of American agriculture, but primarily to our specialty crop
industry. As Chairman of this Subcommittee, I have vowed to fight for
them on this issue and I promise again today that I will not back down.
I greatly appreciate the panelists for their willingness to testify
here today and with that I would like to invite the first panel to
begin.
The Chairman. I greatly appreciate the panelists' work, and
their willingness to be here to testify. And with that, I would
like to recognize my friend and Ranking Member, Mr. Neugebauer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RANDY NEUGEBAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM TEXAS
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, thank you, Chairman Cardoza, for
calling today's Subcommittee hearing. Much of what we do in
Congress is about national security, and protection of our
country's agriculture is an important component of national
security, one that the Agriculture Committee should take
seriously, and does take seriously. Certainly it is impossible
to prevent the introduction of all foreign agricultural pests
and diseases into our country but we also know an effective
agricultural inspection at our borders and ports goes a long
way in minimizing the introduction of these threats. These
pests and diseases cost farmers millions of dollars in lost
production and put many out of business; not to mention the
huge cost to states and the USDA to contain and eradicate these
pests.
It is imperative that our Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection service, a cooperative effort between USDA-APHIS,
and the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border
Protection Division is performing at an optimal level. We know
performance has been sub-par in the past few years since the
transfer of the inspection responsibilities to CBP. The DHS
Inspector General, the GAO, and the independent investigator
from the House Agriculture Committee have all concluded that:
staffing was insufficient; interagency coordination was weak;
vital data was not being collected in the field; inspections
and interceptions decreased; and staff morale suffered. These
reviews have brought many shortcomings to light. To their
credit, CBP and APHIS have acted on many of the
recommendations, but the question is and what we want to hear
today, has enough been done?
The question before us now is whether agriculture is coming
out ahead in this transition of inspection services to Homeland
Security, is there sufficient emphasis in coordination within
CBP for the agriculture mission when the agency is tasked with
other important border security missions or are APHIS and CBP
truly incompatible agencies keeping the agricultural security
mission from becoming a success. The Agriculture Committee sent
a strong message through efforts to return the inspection
functions to USDA in the House farm bill, but we can't make
that change without the concurrence of the Homeland Security
Committee. I hope the witnesses today can help us better
understand why some of the things have gone wrong, whether
anything is going right, and what Congress may need to do to
help make sure that our nation has the best agricultural pest
and disease protection possible.
This Committee has a responsibility to make sure that
agriculture is fully protected. And, Mr. Chairman, I look
forward to hearing from these witnesses today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Neugebauer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Randy Neugebauer, a Representative in
Congress From Texas
Thank you, Chairman Cardoza, for calling today's Subcommittee
hearing. A central and large part of Congress' work concerns national
security. Protection of our country's agriculture is an important
component of national security that we on the Agriculture Committee
take seriously.
Certainly it is impossible to prevent the introduction of all
foreign agriculture pests and diseases into our country. But we also
know an effective agriculture inspection at our borders and ports goes
a long way toward minimizing introduction of threats.
These pests and diseases cost farmers millions of dollars in lost
production and put many out of business, not to mention the huge cost
to states and USDA to contain and eradicate these pests.
It is imperative that our Agriculture Quarantine Inspection
Service, a cooperative effort between USDA-APHIS and the Department of
Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection division, is
performing at an optimal level. We know for performance has been sub-
part in the first few years since the transfer of inspection
responsibilities to CBP.
The DHS Inspector General, the GAO, and an independent investigator
from the House Agriculture Committee have all concluded that staffing
was insufficient; inter-agency coordination was weak; vital data were
not being collected in the field; inspections and interceptions
decreased; and staff morale suffered.
These reviews have brought many shortcomings to light. To their
credit, CBP and APHIS have acted on many of the recommendations. But
has enough been done?
The question before us now is whether agriculture is coming out
ahead in this transition of inspection services to Homeland Security.
Is there sufficient emphasis and coordination within CBP for the
agriculture mission when that agency is tasked with other important
border security missions? Or are APHIS and CBP incompatible agencies,
keeping the agriculture security mission from becoming a success?
The Agriculture Committee sent a strong message through efforts to
return the inspection functions to USDA in the House farm bill. But we
can't make that change without the concurrence of the Homeland Security
Committee.
My hope is that the witnesses today can help us better understand
why some things have gone wrong, whether anything is going right and
what Congress needs to do from here to ensure our nation has the best
agriculture pest and disease protection possible. This Committee has a
responsibility to the American people to make sure agriculture is fully
protected.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Neugebauer. I would like to
now recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, a good
friend, who did a fabulous job getting the House version of the
farm bill passed before the farm bill expired. We are looking
for our friends in the Senate to get busy with their portion of
the farm bill any day now. But, Mr. Chairman, thank you for all
the work that you did during the writing of the farm bill on
our side. And I would now like to recognize you for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing and for your excellent persistent work
that you have done on this issue. I know this topic has been a
priority of yours for some time and you called repeated
attention to APHIS inspections during the farm bill process
both in Committee and on the House floor. And I know because of
jurisdictional issues we couldn't do all that you wanted to do
in this regard. We couldn't do all that we should have done,
but we are going to keep the pressure on and keep this topic on
the front burner. I welcome today's witnesses, and particularly
I want to welcome John Jurich, who is on our first panel this
morning. John is the Investigator of the House Agriculture
Committee having been with this Committee for 7 years.
Earlier this year John performed a review at the request of
this Committee under then-Chairman Goodlatte to examine
coordination between APHIS and the Customs and Border
Protection staffs following the 2002 transfer. This Committee
has had longstanding issues with the APHIS transfer, and having
read the report Mr. Jurich compiled those concerns, and in my
opinion, were well founded. He visited almost 20 ports from
coast to coast, interviewed hundreds of employees and produced
a very interesting report that calls into question the priority
of agricultural inspection under our chief government agency
responsible for protecting our borders from threats of all
shapes and sizes.
We will also hear from the Government Accountability Office
and from Homeland Security's Inspector General, who will also
testify that much needs to be done at the border level to
enhance security of our nation's food supply although they are
getting a little carried away. I don't know if Members are
aware but over the weekend the duck and goose season started in
Canada, and somehow or other they got the bright idea that they
were going to enforce the bird flu deal and they apparently
confiscated 4,600 ducks and geese, including 160 from some
friends of mine who went ballistic over this, and they want
some heads to roll. But I don't know what in the world is going
on over there that they don't know if these ducks are dead and
they probably don't have much of a chance to go infect anybody
else at that point.
Apparently on Monday they realized the error of their ways
and changed the rule, but we may see if anybody knows any more
about that this morning. Anyway, these agriculture inspectors
who were interviewed by our witnesses say that the agriculture
inspection mission has been threatened by the transfer. Mr.
Jurich's investigation revealed that the transfer itself caused
a major shake-up in staffing where many experienced and able-
bodied inspectors were transferred to other agencies or left
the workforce altogether. Those who have remained feel as if
the prevention of plant pests and diseases are very low on the
Customs and Border Patrol priority list. Even worse, people who
should be performing vital inspections are tasked with data
entry or other cursory exercises which do nothing to protect
our nation's food supply.
We know that if foreign pests and diseases are allowed to
threaten our food supply, they cause serious damage throughout
the agriculture food chain from producer to processor to
retailer to consumer. Last month the State of California was
forced to establish a 114 mile quarantine zone around the City
of Dixon after discovering Mediterranean fruit fly infestation.
Farmers and growers in that area, big and small, are going to
lose tens of thousands of dollars a week in sale of fruits and
vegetables and will continue to do so until inspectors are
certain that the medfly is no longer present, a process that
will take, we are being told, at least 9 months or maybe
longer.
If we do not get a handle on this situation and get these
jurisdictional issues ironed out, this kind of thing will
continue to happen. It is my hope here today that the
discussion will provoke serious and pointed questions when the
full Committee gathers in the future to take up this issue by
speaking with Acting Agriculture Secretary Conner and Homeland
Security Chairman Chertoff. So I welcome today's witnesses. I
look forward to their testimony and appreciate the Chairman
making time for me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Collin C. Peterson, a Representative in
Congress From Minnesota
Thank you, Chairman Cardoza, for calling this hearing today and for
the excellent and persistent work you have done on this issue. I know
this topic has been a priority of yours for some time and you called
repeated attention to APHIS inspections during the farm bill process,
both in Committee and on the House floor. I know because of
jurisdictional issues we couldn't do all that we wanted to do in this
regard. We couldn't do all that we should have done, frankly, but we
are going to keep the pressure on and keep this topic on the front
burner.
I welcome today's witnesses and in particular I want to welcome
John Jurich who is on our first panel this morning. John is the
Investigator of the House Agriculture Committee, having been with the
Committee for 7 years. Earlier this year, John performed a review at
the request of this Committee under then-Chairman Goodlatte to examine
coordination between APHIS and the Customs and Border Protection staffs
following the 2003 transfer of APHIS out of USDA and over to CBP as
part of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
This Committee has had long standing issues with the APHIS transfer
and having read the report Mr. Jurich compiled, those concerns were
well founded. He visited almost twenty ports from coast to coast,
interviewed hundreds of employees, and produced a very interesting
report that calls into question the priority of agricultural inspection
under our chief government agency responsible for protecting our
borders from threats of all shapes and sizes.
Indeed, we will also hear from the Government Accountability Office
and from Homeland Security's Inspector General who will also testify
that much needs to be done at the border level to enhance the security
of our nation's food supply. After reading the testimony presented
today, it is clear CBP must address several management problems to
reduce the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and
diseases.
Those agricultural inspectors who were interviewed by our witnesses
say that the agriculture inspection mission has been threatened by the
transfer. Mr. Jurich's investigation revealed the transfer itself
caused a major shakeup in staffing, where many experienced and able-
bodied inspectors transferred to other agencies or left the workforce
altogether. Those who have remained feel as if the prevention of plant
pests and diseases are very low on the CBP priority list. Even worse,
people who should be performing vital inspections are tasked with data
entry or other cursory exercises which do nothing to protect our
nation's food supply.
We know that if foreign pests and diseases are allowed to threaten
our food supply, they cause serious damage throughout the agricultural
food chain, from producer to processor to retailer to consumer. Last
month, the State of California was forced to establish a 114 mile
quarantine zone around the City of Dixon after discovering a
Mediterranean fruit fly infestation. Farmers and growers in that area,
big and small, are going to lose tens of thousands of dollars a week in
sales of fruits and vegetables and will continue to do so until
inspectors are certain that the medfly is no longer present, a process
that will take at least 9 months, maybe longer. If we do not get a
handle on this situation and get these jurisdictional issues ironed
out, this kind of thing will continue to happen.
It is my hope that the discussion today will provoke serious and
pointed questions when the full Committee gathers in the future to take
up this issue by speaking with Acting Agriculture Secretary Conner and
Homeland Security Chairman Chertoff. I welcome today's witnesses, I
look forward to their testimony, and I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to recognize
that you have been a tireless advocate in support of what we
are trying to do here, and thank you for your leadership in
many areas. Now I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of
the full Committee, Mr. Goodlatte, who initially sent out the
investigator to start looking into this area. Thank you for
your work, Mr. Goodlatte, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GOODLATTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM VIRGINIA
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, and I want to first thank you,
Chairman Cardoza, for holding this hearing today, and for the
leadership that Congressman Neugebauer, our Ranking Member, has
shown as well. I have been concerned about how the Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection program has been faring in the Department
of Homeland Security for quite some time. Early in 2005 while
serving as Chairman of the full Committee, I assigned our
Committee Investigator, Mr. Jurich, to look into this issue,
and I am pleased that he will be a witness at the witness table
today to share his results and conclusions with the
Subcommittee.
As we consider this issue, there should be no mistake about
the fact that the Members of this Committee and all of our
constituents are fully committed to the war on terrorism. The
creation of a Department of Homeland Security struck many as a
logical step in that effort. Further, given the importance of
protecting the production capability of our rural areas this
Committee recognized that DHS should have a role in protecting
agriculture as well. When I sat on the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, I had hoped that by raising concerns with
DHS early in the process of merging the legacy Agriculture
Customs and Immigration inspectors into the Customs and Border
Protection Program DHS program managers would understand the
importance of the agricultural inspection mission which had
been entrusted to them, and proper management of the program
would be a priority. Yet, 5 years and at least three audit
investigations later, we remain concerned that AQI is not a
priority, and many of us have come to the conclusion that the
AQI program simply does not fit in with the law enforcement
structure of the Customs and Border Protection program.
It is my understanding that DHS believes that its principal
mission is to protect this nation against intentional acts of
terrorism. This is without a doubt a vital mission. Protecting
our food supply against the intentional or unintentional
introduction of foreign pests and disease is an equally
important mission. When it comes to plant and animal pests and
disease the end result of crop or livestock illness or
devastation is the same regardless of intentionality. What DHS
program managers have failed to appreciate is that the AQI
program mission is equally concerned with the intentional and
unintentional introduction of plant and animal diseases and
pests. In its efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, I believe
that DHS has relegated its responsibility of protecting
agriculture to the back burner as evidenced by the reduction in
the number of inspections and interceptions.
Over the years hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,
countless man hours, and a wealth of education and experience
have been devoted to the AQI function, and the current
management of the program stands to put all of that in
jeopardy. Those with experience in this field understand the
old adage, ``An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.''
If an accidental introduction of foot and mouth disease were to
occur it could cost our economy tens of billions of dollars and
possibly decimate our domestic cattle herd. Compare this to the
simple investment of time and personnel and preventive measures
to adequately safeguard our agricultural production against the
introduction of such foreign diseases, and you could begin to
understand our concern with reports that DHS is dropping the
ball in this mission.
In our zeal to focus the attention of the intentional
threat to America, we cannot afford to neglect our
responsibility to protect against the introduction of threats
facing our agricultural producers. After a trial period of
nearly 5 years, I continue to be concerned that the simple
logic of this prevention equation is lost on the program
managers within the Department of Homeland Security. It is my
hope that now that this and subsequent hearings will be jointly
held with the Committee on Homeland Security on this issue we
will finally raise awareness of our concerns within the
political circles of DHS, and we will see a new found and
permanent commitment to insuring that the AQI program does not
wither on the vine.
Again, I want to thank Chairman Cardoza for his focus on
this issue, as well as Chairman Peterson, and I look forward to
the testimony of today's witnesses. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodlatte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress
From Virginia
I want to first thank Chairman Cardoza for holding this hearing
today. I have been concerned about how the Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection (AQI) operational port inspection program has been faring in
the Department of Homeland Security for quite some time. Early in 2005
while serving as Chairman of the full Committee, I assigned our
Committee Investigator Mr. Jurich to look into this issue. I am pleased
that Mr. Jurich will be at the witness table today to share his results
and conclusions with the Subcommittee.
As we consider this issue, there should be no mistake about the
fact that the Members of this Committee and all of our constituents are
fully committed to the war on terrorism. The creation of a Department
of Homeland Security struck many as a logical step in that effort.
Further, given the importance of protecting the production capability
of our rural areas, this Committee recognized that DHS should have a
role in protecting agriculture as well.
When I sat on the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I had
hoped that by raising concerns with DHS early in the process of merging
the legacy agriculture, customs and immigration inspectors into the
Customs and Border Protection program, DHS program managers would
understand the importance of the agricultural inspection mission which
had been entrusted to them and proper management of the program would
be a priority. Yet, 5 years and at least three audit investigations
later, we remain concerned that AQI is not a priority and many of us
have come to the conclusion that the AQI program simply does not fit in
with the law enforcement structure of the Customs and Border Protection
program.
It is my understanding that DHS believes that its principal mission
is to protect this nation against intentional acts of terrorism. This
is, without a doubt, a vital mission.
Protecting our food supply against the intentional or unintentional
introduction of foreign pests and disease is an equally important
mission. When it comes to plant and animal pests and disease, the end
result of crop or livestock illness or devastation is the same
regardless of intentionality. What DHS program managers have failed to
appreciate is that the AQI program mission is equally concerned with
the intentional and unintentional introduction of plant and animal
diseases and pests. In its efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, I
believe that DHS has relegated its responsibility of protecting
agriculture to the back burner as evidenced by the reduction in the
number of inspections and interceptions. Over the years, hundreds of
millions of taxpayer dollars, countless man hours, and a wealth of
education and experience have been devoted to the AQI function. And the
current management of the program stands to put all of that in
jeopardy.
Those with experience in this field understand the old adage: ``An
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' If an accidental
introduction of foot and mouth disease were to occur, it would cost our
economy tens of billions of dollars and possibly decimate our domestic
cattle herd. Compare this to the simple investment of time and
personnel in preventive measures to adequately safeguard our
agricultural production against the introduction of such foreign
diseases and you can begin to understand our concern with reports that
DHS is dropping the ball in this mission. In our zeal to focus the
attention on the intentional threat to America, we cannot afford to
neglect our responsibility to protect against the introduction of
threats facing our agricultural producers.
After a trial period of nearly 5 years, I continue to be concerned
that the simple logic of this prevention equation is lost on the
program managers within DHS.
It is my hope now that this and subsequent hearings to be held
jointly with the Committee on Homeland Security on this issue will
finally raise awareness of our concerns within the political circles of
DHS and we will see a new-found and permanent commitment to ensuring
that the AQI program does not wither on the vine.
Again, I want to thank Chairman Cardoza for his focus on this
issue. I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and I yield
back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Congressman Goodlatte. The Chair
would request that other Members submit their opening
statements for the record so that witnesses may begin their
testimony and it will be assured that there is ample time for
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahoney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tim Mahoney, a Representative in Congress
From Florida
I want to thank Chairman Collin Peterson, Subcommittee Chairman
Dennis Cardoza, and my colleagues on the Committee. I would also like
to thank Commissioner Bronson and our other distinguished guests for
taking the time to talk with us on this important matter.
I'd like to start by saying that the stakes are high for Florida.
On average, Florida sees the introduction of one new pest every month!
This one statistic alone is staggering in its implications for
prevention, control, and eradication of devastating pests and disease.
The effects of invasive pests and diseases can be devastating. In
my district, the Village of Wellington is home to a large equestrian
industry and is the home of the National Horse Show. When several
horses tested positive for equine herpes, the show was nearly cancelled
and many competitors chose to stay away anyway. Through the efforts of
the Florida Department of Agriculture, this outbreak was limited to 10
premises, with 18 infected or presumed infected horses, and six deaths.
These efforts required approximately 4,000 man hours of Division
employee time and other Department related expenses exceeded $130,000.
Without the rapid detection and an immediate response provided by
FDACS, the potential losses could have been enormous.
In this year's Agriculture Appropriations bill alone, the House
appropriated $1.7 million for Citrus Canker/Greening research, on top
of the millions of dollars that the state and Federal Government have
already spent to eradicate this problem from Florida. The Ag
Appropriations bill also provides $36 million for a Citrus Health
Response Plan as a management tool for citrus canker because USDA APHIS
has determined that complete eradication is just not feasible. I am
proud that we are able to provide this level of support to our states
and our local producers who are on the front line.
However, I much prefer an ounce of prevention instead of millions
of dollars worth of cure. I hope that we all walk away from this
hearing with a clear understanding of the threat that pests and disease
pose to agriculture. But I also hope that we walk away with a clear
path to a solution.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I now would like to introduce the first panel
of witnesses. We have to my left Mr. John Jurich, Investigator,
House Committee on Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Welcome, Mr.
Jurich. Ms. Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and the
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington,
D.C. Mr. James L. Taylor, Acting Assistant Inspector General
for the Office of Audits, Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., accompanied
by Ms. Kathleen S. Tighe, Deputy Inspector General, Office of
the Inspector General of U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C. Mr. Jurich, the floor is yours. Please feel
free to proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOHN JURICH, INVESTIGATOR, COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Jurich. Chairman Cardoza, Ranking Member Neugebauer,
Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Goodlatte, and other Members
of the Committee, my name is John Jurich, and I am the
Investigator for the House Agriculture Committee. I have been
employed by the Committee for the past 7 years as an
investigator. Prior to that, I was an Investigator for the
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
for 22 years. I am pleased to testify before you this morning
about the review I performed on behalf of the Agriculture
Committee this past year. The review examined the degree of
coordination and cooperation between the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, APHIS, and the Customs and Border
Protection staff, CBP, between APHIS' policy making and CBP's
program implementation of the AQI function at ports of entry
across the country.
The review also examined the effect of the split
authorities on the performance of the agricultural mission.
During the course of the review, I visited nine cities and 19
ports of entries on the East and West Coasts and at land border
stations on both the Canadian and the Mexican borders. I
formally interviewed over 250 APHIS and CBP employees at these
ports of entry, at district state and regional field units, and
in headquarters offices in Riverdale, Maryland and Washington,
D.C. I also examined performance and financial data provided by
both agencies to confirm or to complement the oral statements
from field and headquarters personnel.
As my formal report to the Committee this past April
indicates, the results of the review are definitely mixed and
often troubling. The effect of the transfer of the AQI function
from the Department of Agriculture to Homeland Security has
been both traumatic and quite polarizing, especially for the
legacy agricultural field personnel. The transition itself from
APHIS to CBP was rife with turmoil. The CPB agricultural
inspectors lost their internal leadership, their professional
status, much of their independence and authority, many of their
managers and supervisors, considerable overtime, offices, cars,
computers, desks, a career ladder, and contact with their
former colleagues and technical resources in APHIS.
As a result of these negative factors, there was a
consequent exodus of agricultural officers from CBP back to
APHIS, to other agencies, and to retirement. As one legacy
inspector said to me in the field, ``the inspection staff voted
with their feet on the effect of the changes upon the
agricultural mission.'' A few examples of the initial problems
the agricultural staff at the ports have faced over the past
few years are instructive. At one location in the field the
agricultural compactor, which was used to destroy wet products
such as confiscated fruits and vegetables, broke down. When the
agricultural supervisor asked CBP management for the equipment
to be repaired or replaced, he was told there was no money in
the budget to do so. He was instructed by management to use the
facility's incinerator for such products.
He immediately objected to this order saying that such use
would also harm the incinerator. However, his objection was
ignored and he was told to follow orders. Within a few months
the seals of the incinerator gave out too, and that piece of
equipment was broken. Again, there was no money to repair or
replace the incinerator. The staff from that area which
included three ports of entry was obliged to transport all of
their seized items to a port many miles distant for destruction
at a time when they could not spare the officers. When this
became too onerous for the staff, the port management hired a
contractor to assume such a role. Eventually, CBP management
realized how expensive the contractor was and finally, after
nearly 2 years, replaced both pieces of equipment. What the
agricultural staff told me at those ports of entry that this
never would have occurred under APHIS. When something broke in
APHIS, it was immediately repaired or replaced.
At another port of entry a microscope used by the staff at
the airport wasn't used for years because the port officials
simply refused to buy a replacement bulb. Similar complaints
about the inability to obtain routine supplies and to replace
broken equipment surfaced at many of the ports I visited. In a
third port agricultural specialists were working out of the
trunks of their cars because they didn't have sufficient desks
and cabinetry in the warehouse to accommodate their equipment,
their manuals, and other inspection materials. That warehouse
was rather aptly called the ``house of pain.'' It was dank, it
was dark, and it was uncomfortable for the staff. They simply
didn't have accommodations to allow them to do their work
correctly.
With respect to the interviews of field staff, many of the
senior inspectors and supervisory staff at the ports of entry
stated that coordination and cooperation between the two
agencies, APHIS and CBP, was basically subordinated, was either
nominal or non-existent, and that the agricultural mission at
the ports of entry was basically subordinated to the agency's
terrorist, illegal alien, and illicit drug concerns. A minority
of the field inspectors held just the opposite view and
stressed the positive accomplishments of the transfer of
function for the agricultural mission. These accomplishments
included improved cooperation between the agriculture
specialist and CBP officers at the ports of entry, increased
use of electronic technology in administrative and programmatic
areas, better targeting capabilities, more discipline and
greater staff accountability. The performance data like
statements of field personnel is also somewhat contradictory in
character. Many of the general performance results have
suffered since CBP assumed full responsibility for the
agricultural function at the start of Fiscal Year 2004.
The numbers of inspections, clearances, and violations
trailed off in 2004, 2005, and 2006, in many major categories
and pathways. This was most evident at the airports with
dramatic reductions in the number of inspections, the number of
interceptions, and the number of written violations involving
both passengers and aircraft. There has been on the other hand
an increase in the number of regulated cargo clearances and
inspections and interceptions under CBP over the past 3 years.
Overall interceptions when you look at all the pathways, both
for cargo and for passengers, have declined. Animal products,
plant pathogens, and pests have all gone down since the
transfer of function from APHIS to CBP by 25 percent in pests,
21 percent in plant pathogens, and 11 percent in animal
products. Overall violations also dropped off markedly by 43
percent.
Communication and coordination between APHIS and CBP staffs
was also marked by contrasts. At headquarters levels in
Riverdale and Washington, D.C., the leadership and the liaison
staffs of the agencies worked well together. In the field there
was generally similar cooperation between CBP staff, the ag
specialists, at the ports of entry and the APHIS entomologists,
plant pathologists, and safeguarding specialists at local PPQ
inspection stations who carried out the identification of
interceptions, the inspection of viable plant products, and the
fumigation of infested commodities. There was, however,
somewhat less success at the port level within the pest risk
committees which were set up by CBP for the sole purpose of
promoting interagency coordination and cooperation.
Some CBP ports were much more successful than others in
establishing rapport with their local APHIS counterparts in the
Plant Protection and Quarantine Division, Smuggling
Interdiction and Trade Compliance units, Veterinary Services,
and Investigations and Enforcement Service. They met regularly,
discussed and resolved problems, provided physical access to
ports, shared program information and intelligence, assessed
risk and participated in joint blitzes or other cooperative
activities. Other port committees served only in a perfunctory
and formal manner as a forum to meet and greet without any
genuine collaboration between subordinate field units.
There was a fundamental conflict in the field between some
APHIS policy mandates and CBP inspection practices and
procedures. Such conflicts involved wood packing prohibitions,
the conduct of AQIM surveys, the in bond transit of regulated
products, and the release of cargo and passengers at the
expense of inspections. There were also systemic changes in the
organization of ports and the assignment of personnel into
compartmentalized units and shifts by CBP that have left the
actual inspection staff undermanned. The conflicts and changes
cited upon have compromised both the quality and the quantity
of AQI inspections in the field.
For example, at one border port I visited, two ag
inspectors spent the bulk of their time on computers inputting
data into CBP's ACE system and then sealing the trucks, while a
single specialist scurried from bay to bay in the warehouse
performing quick and cursory tailgate inspections of trucks
laden with agricultural products. All three inspectors said
this kind of inspection simply did not serve or protect
American agriculture. It should be noted that this port of
entry was a potential avenue for the entry of Mediterranean
fruit flies from Mexico into Southern California. Finally, I
asked all of the CBP ag personnel I interviewed what changes
would improve the present AQI function at the ports of entry.
Many simply said return the function to USDA. Others said
basically to increase the number of ag inspectors and
technicians at inspection points, near terminals, and at cargo
examination sites, supply the budgetary resources to fund
needed overtime, provide routine supplies and replace broken
down equipment, give agriculture a position and a voice in
management at the ports of entry that was sorely missed. There
simply was not an agriculture person in the decision-making
process at the ports of entry.
Fourth, promote the agricultural staff to the supervisory
and chief levels rather than relying on legacy Customs and
Immigration personnel to serve as first and second line
supervisors, and finally provide a means for better
communication and coordination between disparate agricultural
elements both within and among CBP ports. They also ask for
basically a much better means of communication and coordination
with both APHIS elements in the field surrounding the ports and
with state and with county health authorities. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jurich follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Jurich, Investigator, Committee on
Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Subcommittee Chairman Cardoza, Ranking Member Neugebauer, and
members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to testify before you this morning about the review I
performed on behalf of the Agriculture Committee this past year. The
review examined the degree of coordination and cooperation between the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Customs and Border
Protection staffs, between APHIS' policy making and CBP's program
implementation of Agricultural Quarantine Inspections at ports of entry
across the country. The review also examined the effect of the split
authorities on the performance of the agricultural mission.
During the course of the review I visited nine cities and nineteen
ports of entry on the east and west coasts and at land border stations
on both the Canadian and Mexico borders. I formally interviewed over
two hundred and fifty APHIS and CBP employees at these ports of entry;
at district, state, and regional field units; and in headquarter
offices in Riverdale, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. I also examined
performance and financial data provided by both agencies to confirm or
to complement statements from field and headquarters personnel.
As my formal report to the Committee this past April indicates, the
results of the review are definitely mixed and often troubling. The
effect of the transfer of the AQI function from the Department of
Agriculture to Homeland Security has been both traumatic and quite
polarizing, especially for the legacy agricultural field personnel. The
transition itself from APHIS to CBP was rife with turmoil. The CBP
agricultural inspectors lost their internal leadership, their
professional status, much of their independence and authority, many of
their managers and supervisors, overtime, offices, cars, computers,
desks, a career ladder, and contact with their former colleagues in
APHIS. As a result of these adverse factors, there was a consequent
exodus of agricultural officers from CBP back to APHIS, to other
agencies, and to retirement. As one legacy inspector said to me, the
inspection staff voted with their feet on the effect of the changes
upon the agricultural mission.
A few examples of the initial problems the agricultural staff at
the ports have faced over the past few years are instructive. At one
location the agricultural compactor, which was used to destroy wet
products such as confiscated fruits and vegetables, broke down. When
the agricultural supervisor asked CBP management for the equipment to
be repaired or replaced, he was told that there was no money in the
budget to do so. He was instructed to use the facility's incinerator
for such products. He immediately objected to this order saying that
such use would also harm the incinerator which was used for destroying
dry goods, not wet products. However, he was ordered to do so. Within a
few months the seals of the incinerator gave out too. Again, there was
no money to repair or replace the incinerator. The staff then from
three ports in the immediate area was obliged to transport all of their
seized items to a port many miles away for destruction at a time when
they could spare few officers. When this became too onerous for the
staff, the port management hired a contractor to assume such a role.
Eventually, management realized how expensive the contractor was and
finally, after nearly 2 years, replaced both pieces of equipment. The
agricultural staff was adamant that such conduct would never have
occurred under APHIS management.
At another port, a microscope went unused for years because the
port officials simply refused to buy a replacement bulb. Similar
complaints about the inability to obtain routine supplies and to
replace broken equipment surfaced at many of the ports I visited. In a
third port, agricultural specialists were working out of the trunks of
their cars because did not have sufficient desks and cabinetry in a
warehouse to accommodate their equipment, manuals, and other inspection
materials. The warehouse was aptly called ``the house of pain.''
With respect to the interviews of field staff, many of the senior
inspectors and supervisory staff at the ports of entry stated that
coordination and cooperation between the two agencies was either
nominal or non-existent and that the agricultural mission at the ports
of entry was basically subordinated to the agency's terrorist, illegal
alien and illicit drug concerns. A minority of the field inspectors
held just the opposite view and stressed the positive accomplishments
of the transfer of function for the agricultural mission. These
accomplishments included improved cooperation between agricultural
specialists and CBP officers at the ports of entry, increased use of
electronic technology in administrative and programmatic areas, better
targeting capabilities, more discipline and greater staff
accountability.
The performance data, like statements of field personnel, is also
somewhat contradictory in character. Many of the general performance
results have suffered since CBP assumed full responsibility for the
agricultural function at the start of Fiscal Year 2004. The numbers of
inspections, clearances, and violations tailed off in FY 2004, FY 2005,
and FY 2006 in many major categories and pathways. This was most
evident at the airports with dramatic reductions in the number of
inspections, interceptions, and written violations involving both
passengers and aircraft. There has been, on the other hand, an increase
in the number of regulated cargo clearances, inspections, and
interceptions under CBP over the past 3 years. Overall interceptions--
the animal products, plant pathogens, and pests that have been
confiscated at the ports of entry--have declined since the transfer of
function from APHIS to CBP--by 25% in pests, 21% in plant pathogens,
and 11% in animal products. Overall violations also dropped off
markedly by 43%.
Communication and coordination between APHIS and CBP staffs was
also marked by contrasts. At headquarters levels in Riverdale and
Washington, D.C., the leadership and liaison staffs of the agencies
worked well together. In the field there was generally similar
cooperation between CBP staff at the ports of entry and the APHIS
entomologists, plant pathologists, and safeguarding specialists at
local PPQ inspection stations who carried out the identification of
interceptions, the inspection of viable plant products, and the
fumigation of infested commodities.
There was, however, somewhat less success at the port level within
the pest risk committees which were set up for the sole purpose of
promoting inter-agency coordination and cooperation. Some CBP ports
were much more successful than others in establishing rapport with
their local APHIS counterparts in Plant Protection and Quarantine;
Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance; Veterinary Services, and
Investigations and Enforcement Service. They met regularly; discussed
and resolved problems; provided physical access; shared program
information and intelligence; assessed risk; and participated in joint
blitzes or other cooperative activities. Other port committees served
only in a perfunctory manner, as a forum to meet and greet without any
genuine collaboration between subordinate field units.
There was a fundamental conflict in the field between some APHIS
policy mandates and CBP inspection practices and procedures. Such
conflicts involved wood packing prohibitions; the conduct of AQIM
surveys; the ``in bond'' transit of regulated products; and the release
of cargo and passengers at the expense of inspections. There were also
systemic changes in the organization of ports and the assignment of
personnel into compartmentalized units and shifts by CBP that have left
the actual inspection staff undermanned. The conflicts and changes
cited above have compromised both the quality and the quantity of AQI
inspections in the field.
At one border port I visited two agricultural inspectors spent the
bulk of their time on computers inputting data into CBP's ACE system
and then sealing trucks, while a single specialist scurried from bay to
bay in the warehouse performing quick and cursory tailgate inspections
of trucks laden with agricultural products. All three inspectors said
that this kind of inspection simply did not protect American
agriculture. It should be noted that this port of entry was a potential
avenue for the entry of Mediterranean fruit flies from Mexico into
Southern California.
Finally, I asked all of the CBP agricultural personnel I
interviewed what changes would improve the present AQI function at the
ports of entry. Among their principal recommendations were the
following: (1) increasing the numbers of agricultural inspectors and
technicians at inspection points in air terminals and at cargo
examination sites; (2) supplying the budgetary resources to fund needed
overtime, provide routine supplies, and replace broken down equipment;
(3) giving agriculture a position and a voice in management at the port
level; (4) promoting agricultural staff to the supervisory and chief
levels rather than relying on legacy customs and immigration personnel
to serve as their first and second line supervisors; and finally (5)
providing a means for better communications and coordination between
disparate agricultural elements both within and between CBP ports.
I would ask that my report and the accompanying transmittal
memorandum be made a permanent part of the record of the Subcommittee
hearing.
Thank you,
John Jurich,
Investigator,
House Agriculture Committee.
Attachment 1
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Attachment 2
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Jurich, for a comprehensive
report, and we will be looking forward to asking you some
additional questions. Ms. Shames, it is your turn. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF LISA SHAMES, DIRECTOR, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Shames. Thank you. Chairman Cardoza, Ranking Member
Neugebauer and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be
here today to discuss our work on the Agricultural Quarantine
Inspection Program, AQI. This program is the first line of
defense to protect U.S. agriculture from either the accidental
or deliberate introduction of foreign pests and diseases. Thus,
the effective management of the AQI program is essential. This
morning I would like to focus on three key findings. First, CBP
and APHIS have taken steps that are intended to strengthen the
AQI program since its transfer; second, our survey of
agricultural specialists found that many believe that the
agricultural inspection mission has been compromised; and,
third, several management problems if not addressed could
increase the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests
and diseases.
First, regarding the steps CBP and APHIS have taken:
Training hours have been increased and now newly hired CBP
officers receive 16 hours of training on agriculture issues.
Also, based on our survey, 75 percent of the agriculture
specialists believe that they received sufficient training to
enable them to perform their duties. Agricultural specialists
have access to CBP's computer system that is designed to help
target high risk shipments and passengers, and to identify
companies that have previously violated quarantine laws. Joint
agency quality assurance reviews were started to ensure that
inspections comply with policies and procedures. We were told
that 13 were completed in Fiscal Year 2004 through 2006. Seven
reviews were underway in 2007, and seven are scheduled for
2008.
Last, all CBP district field offices established an
agricultural liaison position as of January 2006. Liaisons were
to help disseminate information between APHIS and CBP. However,
many agriculture specialists believe that the agricultural
mission has been compromised according to our January 2006
survey. While 86 percent reported feeling at least somewhat
prepared for their duties, 60 percent indicated that they were
doing either somewhat or many fewer inspections and
interceptions. In addition, there appear to be morale issues.
When asked what is improving, 18 percent cited working
relationships. However, the second most frequent response was
nothing, that is, 13 percent reported that nothing is going
well with their work. Ten percent were positive about their
salary and benefits.
When asked what should be changed or improved, responses
were: declining agricultural mission, 29 percent; working
relationships, 29 percent; and CBP chain of command, 28
percent. We note that these morale issues are not unexpected in
a merger. Among the lessons learned from private sector
experiences is that employees often worry about their place in
the new organization and productivity declines. We found
several management problems that may leave U.S. agriculture
vulnerable to foreign pests and diseases. CBP had not used
available data to monitor changes in activities. Our analysis
of the average inspection and interception rates before and
after the transfer showed significant increases or decreases in
some of the district field offices. During our review CPB was
unable to explain these changes. Recently CBP told us that it
is now routinely using these data such as in monthly reports.
The AQI program had an incomplete set of measures to assess
program performance. CBP carried over two performance measures
addressing international air and border vehicle passengers.
However, they address only two pathways and neglect others.
Recently, CBP said that it implemented measures for land, air,
and maritime shipments for Fiscal Year 2007 and plans to add
additional performance measures for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009.
K-9 teams are critical for targeting inspections. However,
their numbers have decreased from 140 to 80. In our survey, 46
percent of K-9 specialists said they were frequently directed
to perform outside duties. They were concerned that the dogs
were becoming less proficient. In fact, 60 percent of the 43 K-
9 teams failed proficiency tests in 2005. Currently, CBP tells
us that it has 94 teams.
Finally, CBP still lacks adequate numbers of agricultural
specialists. Positively, APHIS and CBP developed a national
staffing model to ensure sufficient levels at each port as we
had recommended. However, this model shows that as of August
2007, CBP still needs over 1,000 additional specialists. In
conclusion, although we have reported that CBP and APHIS have
taken steps intended to strengthen the AQI program, we found
serious management problems. Further, many agriculture
specialists believe that the mission has been compromised.
Until the AQI program is better integrated into CBP, U.S.
agriculture may be left vulnerable to the threat of foreign
pests and diseases.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you or Members of
the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Shames follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here to discuss our work on the Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program. Under the AQI program,
international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry
to seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests.
The AQI program is the first line of defense for agriculture, which is
the largest industry and employer in the United States, generating more
than $1 trillion in economic activity annually. The entry of foreign
pests and diseases can harm this important sector of our economy, the
environment, plant and animal health, the food supply, and public
health. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that
foreign pests and diseases cost the American economy tens of billions
of dollars annually in lower crop values, eradication programs, and
emergency payments to farmers. The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 heightened concerns about agriculture's vulnerability to
terrorism, including the deliberate introduction of livestock, poultry,
and crop diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease or avian influenza.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for
agricultural quarantine inspections from USDA to the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) effective
in March 2003, but left certain other agricultural quarantine
responsibilities with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS). APHIS's responsibilities are to set agriculture inspection
policy, provide related training, and collect AQI user fees. Beginning
in March 2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists who had formerly
reported to USDA became CBP employees, as CBP incorporated the
protection of U.S. agriculture into its primary anti-terrorism mission.
In addition to protecting U.S. agriculture and other functions, CBP's
mission is to detect and prevent terrorists and their weapons from
entering the United States, interdict illegal drugs and other
contraband, and apprehend individuals who are attempting to enter the
United States illegally. CBP faces a daunting task in protecting U.S.
agriculture from accidental or deliberate introduction of diseases or
pests, while attending to these missions.
After examining concerns that the transfer of agricultural
inspections to CBP could shift the focus away from agriculture to CBP's
other mission priorities, we reported in May 2006 on the coordination
between USDA and DHS and made several recommendations to help ensure
that U.S. agriculture is protected from accidentally or intentionally
introduced pests and diseases.\1\ USDA and DHS generally agreed with
the report's recommendations. In preparing this report, we surveyed a
representative sample of CBP's agriculture specialists on their work
experiences before and after the transfer and included the responses to
the survey's 31 multiple-choice questions in the report.\2\ The survey
also asked two open-ended questions: (1) What is going well with
respect to your work as an agriculture specialist? and (2) What would
you like to see changed or improved with respect to your work as an
agriculture specialist? In November 2006, we separately reported on the
common themes in the narrative responses.\3\ My testimony today is
based on these two reviews. We conducted the reviews from April 2005
through October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems
Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and
Disease, GAO-06-644 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006).
\2\ Specifically, we drew a random probability sample of 831
agriculture specialists from the approximately 1,800 specialists
(current as of Oct. 14, 2005) in CBP. In general, strata were defined
by the number of specialists at the respective ports. We conducted a
web-based survey of all specialists in the sample. Each sampled
specialist was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account
statistically for all specialists in the population. Thus, the
percentages given for each question or theme can be generalized to the
entire population of CBP agriculture specialists and are estimates (at
the 95 percent confidence level). We received a response rate of 76
percent.
\3\ GAO, Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists' Views of Their
Work Experiences After Transfer to DHS, GAO-07-209R (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 14, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This morning I will focus on three key findings:
CBP and APHIS have taken steps intended to strengthen the
AQI program since the transfer of inspection responsibilities
from USDA to DHS following passage of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002. CBP and APHIS have expanded the hours of agricultural
training for CBP officers and developed a national standard for
this training; given agriculture specialists access to CBP's
Automated Targeting System to focus inspections on higher-risk
passengers and cargo; and established a joint review process
for assessing compliance with the AQI program on a port-by-port
basis. Lastly, CBP has created new agricultural liaison
positions at the field office level to advise regional port
directors on agricultural issues. We have not assessed the
implementation and effectiveness of these actions.
Our survey of CBP agriculture specialists found that many
believe the agriculture inspection mission has been compromised
by the transfer. Although 86 percent of agriculture specialists
reported feeling very well prepared or somewhat prepared for
their duties, 59 and 60 percent of specialists answered that
they were conducting fewer inspections and interceptions,
respectively, of prohibited agricultural items since the
transfer. When asked what is going well with respect to their
work, agriculture specialists identified working relationships
(18 percent), nothing (13 percent), salary and benefits (10
percent), training (10 percent), and general job satisfaction
(6 percent). When asked what areas should be changed or
improved, they identified working relationships (29 percent),
priority given to the agriculture mission (29 percent),
problems with the CBP chain of command (28 percent), training
(19 percent), and inadequate equipment and supplies (17
percent). Agriculture specialists typically provided more
examples or went into greater detail in answering these
questions and submitted 185 pages of comments about what needs
improvement--roughly four times more than their responses about
what was going well. Based on private and public sector
experiences with mergers, these morale issues are not
unexpected because employees often worry about their place in
the new organization.
CBP must address several management challenges to reduce the
vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and
diseases. Specifically, as of our May 2006 report, CBP had not
used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the
effectiveness of the AQI program, although the agency told us
it has subsequently taken some steps--such as publishing
monthly reports on inspections, arrivals, and seizures of
various prohibited items, including agricultural quarantine
material and pest interceptions--that we have not evaluated.
Moreover, at the time of our May 2006 review, CBP had not
developed sufficient performance measures to manage and
evaluate the AQI program. CBP's measures focused only on two
pathways--the percentage of (1) international air passengers
and (2) border vehicle passengers that comply with AQI
regulations--by which foreign pests and diseases may enter the
country, but did not consider other important pathways such as
commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo that may pose a
risk to U.S. agriculture. In early 2007, a joint team from CBP
and APHIS agreed to implement additional performance measures
for AQI activities in all major pathways at ports of entry.
Some of these measures were implemented in Fiscal Year 2007;
others are planned for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. However, we
have not evaluated the adequacy of these new measures for
assessing the AQI program's effectiveness at intercepting
foreign pests and diseases. In addition, CBP has allowed the
agriculture canine program to deteriorate, with fewer canine
teams and declining proficiency scores. In the past, these dogs
have been a key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for
detailed inspections. Lastly, CBP does not have the agriculture
specialists needed to perform its AQI responsibilities based on
its staffing model. Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP
said it had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared to
3,154 specialists needed, according to the model.
CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps Intended to Strengthen the AQI Program
CBP and APHIS have taken four major steps intended to strengthen
the AQI program since the transfer of responsibilities following
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. To date, we have not done
work to assess the implementation and effectiveness of these actions.
First, CBP and APHIS expanded the hours of training on agricultural
issues for CBP officers, whose primary duty is customs and immigration
inspection, and for CBP agriculture specialists, whose primary duty is
agricultural inspection. Specifically, newly hired CBP officers receive
16 hours of training on agricultural issues, whereas before the
transfer to CBP, customs inspectors received 4 hours of agricultural
training, and immigration inspectors received 2 hours. CBP and APHIS
also expanded agriculture training for CBP officers at their respective
ports of entry to help them make better-informed decisions on
agricultural items at high-volume border traffic areas. Additionally,
CBP and APHIS have standardized the in-port training program and have
developed a national standard for agriculture specialists with a
checklist of activities for agriculture specialists to master. These
activities are structured into an 8 week module on passenger inspection
procedures and a 10 week module on cargo inspection procedures. Based
on our survey of agriculture specialists, we estimate that 75 percent
of specialists hired by CBP believe that they received sufficient
training (on the job and at the Professional Development Center) to
enable them to perform their agriculture inspection duties.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The full survey results are available in Appendix II of GAO-06-
644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, CBP and APHIS have taken steps designed to better target
shipments and passengers that potentially present a high risk to U.S.
agriculture. Specifically, some CBP agriculture specialists received
training and were given access to CBP's Automated Targeting System, a
computer system that, among other things, is designed to focus limited
inspection resources on higher-risk passengers and cargo and facilitate
expedited clearance or entry for low-risk passengers and cargo. This
system gives agriculture specialists detailed information from cargo
manifests and other documents that shipping companies are required to
submit before the ship arrives in a port to help them select high-risk
cargo for inspection. CBP and APHIS headquarters personnel also use
this information to identify companies that had previously violated
U.S. quarantine laws. For example, according to a senior APHIS
official, the two agencies used this system to help identify companies
that have used seafood containers to smuggle uncooked poultry products
from Asia, which are currently banned because of concerns over avian
influenza.
Third, CBP and APHIS established a formal assessment process
intended to ensure that ports of entry carry out agricultural
inspections in accordance with the agricultural quarantine inspection
program's regulations, policies, and procedures. The process, called
Joint Agency Quality Assurance Reviews, covers topics such as (1) CBP
coordination with other Federal agencies; (2) agriculture specialist
training; (3) specialist access to regulatory manuals; and (4)
specialist adherence to processes for handling violations at the port,
inspecting passenger baggage and vehicles, and intercepting, seizing,
and disposing of confiscated materials. The reviews address best
practices and deficiencies at each port and make recommendations for
corrective actions to be implemented within 6 weeks. For example,
regarding best practices, a review of two ports found that the
placement of CBP, APHIS, and Food and Drug Administration staff in the
same facility enhanced their coordination. This review also lauded
their targeting of non-agricultural products that are packed with
materials, such as wood, that may harbor pests or diseases that could
pose a risk to U.S. agriculture. Regarding deficiencies, this review
found that the number of CBP agriculture specialists in each port was
insufficient, and that the specialists at one of the ports were
conducting superficial inspections of commodities that should have been
inspected more intensely. According to CBP, the agency took actions to
correct these deficiencies, although we have not evaluated those
actions. In September 2007, CBP said that the joint review team had
conducted 13 reviews in Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006, and seven
reviews were completed or underway for Fiscal Year 2007. Seven
additional reviews are planned for Fiscal Year 2008.
Last, in May 2005, CBP required each director in its 20 district
field offices to appoint an agriculture liaison, with background and
experience as an agriculture specialist, to provide CBP field office
directors with agriculture-related input for operational decisions and
agriculture specialists with senior-level leadership. The agriculture
liaisons are to, among other things, advise the director of the field
office on agricultural functions; provide oversight for data
management, statistical analysis, and risk management; and coordinate
agriculture inspection alerts. CBP officials told us that all district
field offices had established the liaison position as of January 2006.
Since the creation of the position, agriculture liaisons have
facilitated the dissemination of urgent alerts from APHIS to CBP. They
also provide information back to APHIS. For example, following a large
increase in the discovery of plant pests at a port in November 2005,
the designated agriculture liaison sent notice to APHIS, which then
issued alerts to other ports. APHIS and CBP subsequently identified
this agriculture liaison as a contact for providing technical advice
for inspecting and identifying this type of plant pest.
Many Agriculture Specialists Believe That the Agricultural Mission Has
Been Compromised
In Fiscal Year 2006, we surveyed a representative sample of CBP
agriculture specialists regarding their experiences and opinions since
the transfer of the AQI program from APHIS to CBP.\5\ In general, the
views expressed by these specialists indicate that they believe that
the agricultural inspection mission has been compromised. We note that
morale issues are not unexpected in a merger such as the integration of
the AQI mission and staff into CBP's primary anti-terrorism mission.
GAO has previously reported on lessons learned from major private and
public sector experiences with mergers that DHS could use when
combining its various components into a unified Department.\6\ Among
other things, productivity and effectiveness often decline in the
period following a merger, in part because employees often worry about
their place in the new organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The survey was available from November 15, 2005, until January
9, 2006.
\6\ GAO, Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a
Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-
293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002) and Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, based on the survey results, while 86 percent of
specialists reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their
duties as an agriculture specialist, many believed that the agriculture
mission had been compromised by the transfer. Specifically:
59 percent of experienced specialists indicated that they
are doing either somewhat or many fewer inspections since the
transfer, and 60 percent indicated that they are doing somewhat
or many fewer interceptions.
63 percent of agriculture specialists believed their port
did not have enough specialists to carry out agriculture-
related duties.
Agriculture specialists reported that they spent 62 percent
of their time on agriculture inspections, whereas 35 percent of
their time was spent on non-agricultural functions such as
customs and immigration inspections.
In addition, there appear to be morale issues based on the
responses to two open-ended questions: (1) What is going well with
respect to your work as an agriculture specialist? and (2) What would
you like to see changed or improved with respect to your work as an
agriculture specialist? Notably, the question about what needs
improving generated a total of 185 pages of comments--roughly four
times more than that generated by the responses to our question on what
was going well. Further, ``Nothing is going well'' was the second-most
frequent response to the question on what is going well.
We identified common themes in the agriculture specialists'
responses to our first question about what is going well with respect
to their work as an agriculture specialist. The five most common themes
were:
Working relationships. An estimated 18 percent of
agriculture specialists cited the working relationship among
agriculture specialists and CBP officers and management as
positive. These specialists cited increasing respect and
interest by non-specialists in the agriculture mission, and the
attentiveness of CBP management to agriculture specialists'
concerns.
Nothing. An estimated 13 percent of agriculture specialists
reported that nothing is going well with their work. For
example, some respondents noted that the agriculture inspection
mission has been compromised under CBP and that agriculture
specialists are no longer important or respected by management.
Salary and Benefits. An estimated 10 percent of agriculture
specialists expressed positive comments about their salary and
benefits, with some citing increased pay under CBP, a flexible
work schedule, increased overtime pay, and retirement benefits
as reasons for their views.
Training. An estimated 8 percent of agriculture specialists
identified elements of classroom and on-the-job training as
going well. Some observed that new hires are well trained and
that agriculture-related classroom training at the Professional
Development Center in Frederick, Maryland, is adequate for
their duties.
General job satisfaction. An estimated 6 percent of
agriculture specialists were generally satisfied with their
jobs, reporting, among other things, that they were satisfied
in their working relationships with CBP management and
coworkers and that they believed in the importance of their
work in protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and
diseases.
In contrast, agriculture specialists wrote nearly four times as
much in response to our question about what they would like to see
changed or improved with respect to their work as agriculture
specialists. In addition, larger proportions of specialists identified
each of the top five themes.
Declining mission. An estimated 29 percent of agriculture
specialists were concerned that the agriculture mission is
declining because CBP has not given it adequate priority. Some
respondents cited the increase in the number of cargo items and
flights that are not inspected because of staff shortages,
scheduling decisions by CBP port management, and the release of
prohibited or restricted products by CBP officers.
Working relationships. An estimated 29 percent of the
specialists expressed concern about their working relationships
with CBP officers and management. Some wrote that CBP officers
at their ports view the agriculture mission as less important
than CBP's other priorities, such as counter-narcotics and
anti-terrorism activities. Others noted that CBP management is
not interested in, and does not support, agriculture
inspections.
CBP chain of command. An estimated 28 percent of agriculture
specialists identified problems with the CBP chain of command
that impede timely actions involving high-risk interceptions,
such as a lack of managers with an agriculture background and
the agency's rigid chain of command structure. For example,
agriculture specialists wrote that requests for information
from USDA pest identification experts must be passed up the CBP
chain of command before they can be conveyed to USDA.
Training. An estimated 19 percent of agriculture specialists
believed that training in the classroom and on the job is
inadequate. For example, some respondents expressed concern
about a lack of courses on DHS's targeting and database
systems, which some agriculture specialists use to target high-
risk shipments and passengers. Also, some agriculture
specialists wrote that on-the-job training at their ports is
poor, and that CBP officers do not have adequate agriculture
training to recognize when to refer items to agriculture
specialists for inspection.
Lack of equipment. An estimated 17 percent of agriculture
specialists were concerned about a lack of equipment and
supplies. Some respondents wrote that the process for
purchasing items under CBP results in delays in acquiring
supplies and that there is a shortage of agriculture-specific
supplies, such as vials, gloves, and laboratory equipment.
These themes are consistent with responses to relevant multiple-
choice questions in the survey. For example, in response to one of
these questions, 61 percent of agriculture specialists believed their
work was not respected by CBP officers, and 64 percent believed their
work was not respected by CBP management.
Management Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture Vulnerable to Foreign
Pests and Diseases
Although CBP and APHIS have taken a number of actions intended to
strengthen the AQI program since its transfer to CBP, several
management problems remain that may leave U.S. agriculture vulnerable
to foreign pests and diseases. Most importantly, CBP has not used
available data to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. These data
are especially important in light of many agriculture specialists'
views that the agricultural mission has been compromised and can help
CBP determine necessary actions to close any performance gaps.
Moreover, at the time of our May 2006 review, CBP had not developed
sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program,
and the agency had allowed the agricultural canine program to
deteriorate. Furthermore, based on its staffing model, CBP does not
have the agriculture specialists needed to perform its AQI
responsibilities.
CBP has not used available data to monitor changes in the frequency
with which prohibited agricultural materials and reportable pests are
intercepted during inspection activities. CBP agriculture specialists
record monthly data in the Work Accomplishment Data System for each
port of entry, including (1) arrivals of passengers and cargo to the
United States via airplane, ship, or vehicle; (2) agricultural
inspections of arriving passengers and cargo; and (3) inspection
outcomes, i.e., seizures or detections of prohibited (quarantined)
agricultural materials and reportable pests. As of our May 2006 report,
CBP had not used these data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI
program.
For example, our analysis of the data for the 42 months before and
31 months after the transfer of responsibilities from APHIS to CBP
shows that average inspection and interception rates have changed
significantly in some geographical regions of the United States, with
rates increasing in some regions and decreasing in others. (Appendixes
I and II provide more information on average inspection and
interception rates before and after the transfer from APHIS to CBP.)
Specifically, average inspection rates declined significantly in the
Baltimore, Boston, Miami, and San Francisco district field offices, and
in preclearance locations in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland.
Inspection rates increased significantly in seven other districts--
Buffalo, El Paso, Laredo, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and Tucson. In
addition, the average rate of interceptions decreased significantly at
ports in six district field offices--El Paso, New Orleans, New York,
San Juan, Tampa, and Tucson--while average interception rates have
increased significantly at ports in the Baltimore, Boston, Detroit,
Portland, and Seattle districts.
Of particular note are three districts that have experienced a
significant increase in their rate of inspections and a significant
decrease in their interception rates since the transfer. Specifically,
since the transfer, the Tampa, El Paso, and Tucson districts appear to
be more efficient at inspecting (e.g., inspecting a greater proportion
of arriving passengers or cargo) but less effective at interceptions
(e.g., intercepting fewer prohibited agricultural items per
inspection). Also of concern are three districts--San Juan, New
Orleans, and New York--that are inspecting at about the same rate, but
intercepting less, since the transfer.
When we showed the results of our analysis to senior CBP officials,
they were unable to explain these changes or determine whether the
current rates were appropriate relative to the risks, staffing levels,
and staff expertise associated with individual districts or ports of
entry. These officials also noted that CBP has had problems
interpreting APHIS data reports because CBP lacked staff with expertise
in agriculture and APHIS's data systems in some district offices. As of
our May 2006 report, CBP had not yet completed or implemented its plan
to add agriculture-related data to its system for monitoring customs
inspections. However, in September 2007, CBP said it had taken steps to
use these data to evaluate the program's effectiveness. For example,
CBP publishes a monthly report that includes analysis of efficiency
inspections, arrivals, exams, and seizures of prohibited items,
including agricultural quarantine material and pest interceptions, for
each pathway. CBP also conducts a mid-year analysis of APHIS and CBP
data to assess agricultural inspection efficiency at ports of entry.
While these appear to be positive steps, we have not assessed their
adequacy to measure the AQI program's effectiveness.
A second management problem for the AQI program is an incomplete
set of performance measures to balance multiple responsibilities and
demonstrate results. As of our May 2006 report, CBP had not developed
and implemented its own performance measures for the program. Instead,
according to CBP officials, CBP carried over two measures that APHIS
had used to assess the AQI program before the transfer: the percentages
of international air passengers and border vehicle passengers that
comply with program regulations. However, these measures addressed only
two pathways for agricultural pests, neglecting other pathways such as
commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo. Further, these
performance measures did not provide information about changes in
inspection and interception rates, which could help assess the
efficiency and effectiveness of agriculture inspections in different
regions of the country or at individual ports of entry. They also did
not address the AQI program's expanded mission--to prevent agro-
terrorism while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
In early 2007, a joint team from CBP and APHIS agreed to implement
additional performance measures for AQI activities in all major
pathways at ports of entry. Specifically, CBP said that in Fiscal Year
2007 it implemented measures for the percentages of land border, air,
and maritime regulated cargo and shipments in compliance with AQI
regulations. Furthermore, the agency plans to add additional
performance measures such as percentage of passengers, vehicles, or
mail in compliance in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. However, we have not
evaluated the adequacy of these new performance measures for assessing
the AQI program's effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and
diseases.
Third, the number and proficiency of canine teams decreased
substantially between the time of the transfer, March 2003, and the
time of our review, May 2006. In the past, these dogs have been a key
tool for targeting passengers and cargo for detailed inspections.
Specifically, APHIS had approximately 140 canine teams nationwide at
the time of the transfer, but CBP had only 80 such teams at the time of
our review. With regard to proficiency, 60 percent of the 43
agriculture canine teams tested by APHIS in 2005 failed proficiency
tests. These tests require the dog to respond correctly in a
controlled, simulated work environment and ensure that dogs are working
effectively to catch potential prohibited agricultural material. In
general, canine specialists we interviewed expressed concern that the
proficiency of their dogs was deteriorating due to a lack of working
time. That is, the dogs were sidelined while the specialists were
assigned to other duties. In addition, based on our survey results, 46
percent of canine specialists said they were directed to perform duties
outside their primary canine duties daily or several times a week.
Furthermore, 65 percent of canine specialists indicated that they
sometimes or never had funding for training supplies. Another major
change to the canine program, following the transfer, was CBP's
elimination of all canine management positions.
Finally, based on its staffing model, CBP lacks adequate numbers of
agriculture specialists to accomplish the agricultural mission. The
Homeland Security Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 AQI
personnel from USDA to DHS. In March 2003, APHIS transferred a total of
1,871 agriculture specialist positions, including 317 vacancies, to CBP
and distributed those positions across CBP's 20 district field offices,
encompassing 139 ports of entry. Because of the vacancies, CBP lacked
adequate numbers of agriculture specialists from the beginning and had
little assurance that appropriate numbers of specialists were staffed
at each port of entry. Although CBP has made some progress in hiring
agriculture specialists since the transfer, we previously reported that
CBP lacked a staffing model to ensure that more than 630 newly hired
agriculture specialists were assigned to the ports with the greatest
need, and to ensure that each port had at least some experienced
specialists. Accordingly, in May 2006 we recommended that APHIS and CBP
work together to develop a national staffing model to ensure that
agriculture staffing levels at each port are sufficient. Subsequently,
CBP developed a staffing model for its ports of entry and provided GAO
with its results. Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP said it had
2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared to 3,154 such
specialists needed according to the model.
Conclusions
The global marketplace of agricultural trade and international
travel has increased the number of pathways for the movement and
introduction into the United States of foreign and invasive
agricultural pests and diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease and
avian influenza. Given the importance of agriculture to the U.S.
economy, ensuring the effectiveness of Federal programs to prevent
accidental or deliberate introduction of potentially destructive
organisms is critical. Accordingly, effective management of the AQI
program is necessary to ensure that agriculture issues receive
appropriate attention. Although we have reported that CBP and APHIS
have taken steps to strengthen agricultural quarantine inspections,
many agriculture specialists believe that the agricultural mission has
been compromised. While morale issues, such as the ones we identified,
are to be expected in the merger establishing DHS, CBP had not used key
data to evaluate the program's effectiveness and could not explain
significant increases and decreases in inspections and interceptions.
In addition, CBP had not developed performance measures to demonstrate
that it is balancing its multiple mission responsibilities, and it does
not have sufficient agriculture specialists based on its staffing
model. Until the integration of agriculture issues into CBP's overall
anti-terrorism mission is more fully achieved, U.S. agriculture may be
left vulnerable to the threat of foreign pests and diseases.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For
further information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames at
(202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Key contributors to this testimony
were James Jones, Jr.; Assistant Director, and Terrance Horner, Jr.;
Josey Ballenger; Kevin Bray; Chad M. Gorman; Lynn Musser; Omari Norman;
Alison O'Neill; and Steve C. Rossman also made important contributions.
Appendix I: Average Inspection Rates Before and After the Transfer From APHIS to CBP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1: Average Inspection Rates Before and After the Transfer From APHIS to CBP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average inspection Average inspection
District field office rate before (October rate after (March Difference a Statistical
1999-February 2003) 2003-September 2005) significance b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta 9.7 8.8 - 0.9 No
Baltimore 18.2 10.0 - 8.2 Yes
Boston 30.9 13.0 - 17.9 Yes
Buffalo 0.1 0.5 0.3 Yes
Chicago 18.0 18.5 0.5 No
Detroit 3.1 2.9 - 0.2 No
El Paso 2.9 4.4 1.5 Yes
Houston 13.2 12.1 - 1.1 No
Laredo 7.7 8.8 1.1 Yes
Los Angeles 12.5 10.4 - 2.1 No
Miami 35.8 23.1 - 12.7 Yes
New Orleans 37.6 41.8 4.3 No
New York 12.0 11.8 - 0.2 No
Preclearance c 7.8 3.4 - 4.4 Yes
Portland 13.0 12.6 - 0.4 No
San Diego 12.6 16.3 3.6 Yes
San Francisco 40.4 19.0 - 21.4 Yes
San Juan 62.4 57.6 - 4.8 No
Seattle 2.3 3.1 0.8 Yes
Tampa 19.6 30.7 11.1 Yes
Tucson 2.6 4.0 1.4 Yes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO calculations of APHIS's Work Accomplishment Data System, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005.
a Because of rounding, values in the difference column may not equal the difference between rounded inspection
rates.
b Statistical significance for each field office was calculated at the 99.75 percent confidence level so that
the confidence level of all 21 statistical significance outcomes, collectively, is about 95 percent.
c Preclearance inspections were conducted at 14 locations in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland. Individuals
arriving in the U.S. from those locations did not undergo another inspection upon arrival in the United
States. According to CBP, preclearance inspections were done only as a pilot and not as an ongoing program
within the agency.
Appendix II: Average Interception Rates Before and After the Transfer From APHIS to CBP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2: Average Interception Rates Before and After the Transfer From APHIS to CBP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average interception Average interception
District field office rate before (October rate after (March Difference a Statistical
1999-February 2003) 2003-September 2005) significance b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta 10.7 11.5 0.8 No
Baltimore 7.6 10.4 2.8 Yes
Boston 3.9 12.4 8.5 Yes
Buffalo 15.4 30.2 14.8 No
Chicago 6.8 5.6 - 1.3 No
Detroit 7.7 20.7 13.0 Yes
El Paso 9.4 5.7 - 3.7 Yes
Houston 7.9 8.4 0.4 No
Laredo 4.4 3.9 - 0.5 No
Los Angeles 7.4 8.7 1.3 No
Miami 5.3 5.8 0.4 No
New Orleans 5.9 3.5 - 2.4 Yes
New York 18.1 10.2 - 7.9 Yes
Preclearancec 10.1 24.4 14.2 Yes
Portland 9.6 14.9 5.3 Yes
San Diego 1.3 1.4 0.2 No
San Francisco 10.5 10.6 0.1 No
San Juan 6.1 3.5 - 2.5 Yes
Seattle 30.1 46.5 16.4 Yes
Tampa 8.3 3.0 - 5.2 Yes
Tucson 9.0 7.0 - 2.0 Yes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO calculations of APHIS's Work Accomplishment Data System, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005.
a Because of rounding, values in the difference column may not equal the difference between rounded
interception rates.
b Statistical significance for each field office was calculated at the 99.75 percent confidence level so that
the confidence level of all 21 statistical significance outcomes, collectively, is about 95 percent.
c Preclearance inspections were conducted at 14 locations in Canada, the Caribbean, and Ireland. Individuals
arriving in the United States from those locations did not undergo another inspection upon arrival in the
United States. According to CBP, preclearance inspections were done only as a pilot and not as an ongoing
program within the agency.
Related GAO Products
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation
of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:
September 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation
of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.:
August 17, 2007.
Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.:
April 12, 2007.
Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists' Views of Their Work
Experiences after Transfer to DHS. GAO-07-209R. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2006.
Invasive Forest Pests: Recent Infestations and Continued
Vulnerabilities at Ports of Entry Place U.S. Forests at Risk. GAO-06-
871T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase
the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.
GAO-06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006.
Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a
Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214.
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July
2, 2003.
Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of
Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington,
D.C.: November 14, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-
02-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Shames. We will get to those
questions in just a moment. I now would like to call on Mr.
James Taylor, Deputy Inspector General for the Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security to make
your testimony, sir. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JAMES L. TAYLOR, DEPUTY INSPECTOR
GENERAL AND ACTING ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.; ACCOMPANIED
BY KATHLEEN S. TIGHE, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Jim Taylor. I am
the Deputy Inspector General for Homeland Security, as well as
currently serving as the Acting Assistant Inspector General for
Audits for Homeland Security. We appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss our audit report on the
United States Customs and Border Protection agriculture
inspection activities, as well as other post-harvest work we
performed. I say we because I am pleased to have with me today
Ms. Kathleen Tighe, Deputy Inspector General of the Department
of Agriculture. The report we will be discussing was a
collaborative effort between the USDA-OIG and the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. On March 1,
2003, functions of several border agencies, including the
former U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Services were transferred to CBP upon
creation of DHS. CBP assumed responsibility for inspection of
agricultural goods arriving in the United States at ports of
entry. USDA retained responsibility for setting policies and
procedures in areas such as agricultural inspections, data
collection, and risk assessment.
In February 2005, DHS-OIG and USDA-OIG began a joint audit
of the agriculture inspection activities transferred from USDA-
APHIS to CBP. This audit assessed how well CBP communicated and
cooperated with USDA on issues relating to policies and
procedures, complied with established procedures for
agriculture inspections of passengers and cargo, and tracked
agriculture inspection activities. It also assessed the
effectiveness of USDA in providing CBP with the necessary
policy and procedural guidance to perform this critical
function. Our audit was a broad-based effort that generally
covered agricultural inspection activities from March 2003 to
February 2005. We tested procedures and controls and observed
inspection activities in areas such as agricultural quarantine
inspection monitoring and Work Accomplishment Data Systems.
To accomplish the audit objectives, we conducted field work
at CBP headquarters in Washington, and at ports located in
Chicago, Detroit, Laredo, and Miami, Florida. The AQM, which is
a risk assessment system that evaluates the effectiveness of
inspection activities at both traditional and non-traditional
pathways into the United States is one of the areas we
specifically identified issues with. We found that CBP sampling
did not meet requirements for 13 of 18 pathway activities at
the four ports we reviewed. Further, CBP supervisors did not
sufficiently monitor AQIM sampling requirements at the port
level to ensure sampling was performed as required and sampling
results were reported correctly, which is critical in helping
USDA predict potential future risks to agriculture from pests
and diseases.
Second, we identified issues with the accuracy of CBP's
Work Accomplishment Data System or WADS, which is used to track
ports' agricultural inspection activities. All four ports we
reviewed had WADS inspection activity errors. The errors
included both under and over reporting of data needed to
identify future agricultural risks. At the ports 107 of 148
WADS activity codes examined were reported incorrectly or
lacked supporting documentation to allow verification. CBP had
inadequate second party reviews of data input, a lack of
sufficiently trained personnel, and port personnel
misinterpreting APHIS instructions. Similar issues were
previously reported by the USDA when it reviewed APHIS prior to
the transition. At the time of our audit the agricultural
inspection staffing patterns were based on the staffing model
previously used by APHIS.
This model used WADS data to determine the staffing
required for each inspection activity. Before the transition,
USDA officials agreed with USDA-OIG that the existing staffing
models were not well suited to determining staffing needs for
cargo inspections. At the time of our audit CBP agricultural
specialist staffing had decreased since the transition. CBP's
agricultural inspection positions totaled 2,417 including
vacancies with 2,071 on board as of June 2003. As of February
2005, agricultural staffing had decreased to 1,721 total on
board, a 17 percent reduction. As of September of this year,
the total number of agricultural specialists has increased to
2,142. In addition, CPB had not developed comprehensive
performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of all its
agriculture inspection activities.
CPB used two performance measures, one for international
air passengers, and another for border vehicle passengers.
However, agricultural inspections related to air, truck, mail,
pedestrian, and maritime pathways did not have performance
measures. In all, we made 10 recommendations to DHS and three
to USDA to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
agricultural inspection activities. Management concurred with
all the recommendations and has reported implementation of all
but one. In addition to the work listed above, DHS-OIG has
conducted other inspections and reviews relating to post-
harvest food focused on prevention, protection, preparedness,
and detection efforts. The Federal Government is charged with
defending the food supply from international intentional
attacks and natural hazards. While DHS is not the designated
lead for a number of key activities in this area the Congress
and the President assigned DHS many important food defense and
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities.
Our report examined DHS activities related to post-harvest
food and focuses on prevention, protection, preparedness, and
detection efforts. Last, in 2005 we performed an assessment of
the proposal to merge border protection and immigration and
customs enforcement. The merger was proposed to place customs,
immigration, and agricultural inspectors at ports of entry
under a single chain of command. It was an effort to integrate
the seemingly common functions divided at the time among the
three Departments. We made 14 recommendations to overcome the
interagency coordination and integration challenges confronting
CBP. While not making specific recommendations on agricultural
activities our recommendations impacted policy affecting
integration issues for all the legacy functions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and we
would be pleased to answer any questions you and the Committee
Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of James L. Taylor, Deputy Inspector General and
Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss our audit report on United
States Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) agriculture inspection
activities at the border \1\ and other work we performed in post-
harvest areas. Our statement today focuses on these results. I am
pleased to have with me here today Kathleen Tighe, Deputy Inspector
General of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General (USDA-OIG). The report we will be discussing was a
collaborative effort between the Department of Homeland Security Office
of Inspector General (DHS-OIG) and USDA-OIG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Review of Customs and Border Protection Agriculture Inspection
Activities (OIG-07-32, February 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
On March 1, 2003, functions of several border agencies, including
the former U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), and U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), were transferred to CBP upon
creation of DHS. CBP assumed responsibility for inspection of
agricultural goods arriving in the United States at ports of entry.
USDA-APHIS retained responsibility for setting policies and procedures
in areas such as agricultural inspections, data collection, and risk
assessments.
In February 2005, with the DHS-OIG serving as the lead, DHS-OIG and
the USDA-OIG began a joint audit of the agriculture inspection
activities transferred from USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) to CBP. This audit assessed how well CBP communicated
and cooperated with USDA on issues relating to agriculture inspection
policies and procedures; complied with established procedures for
agriculture inspections of passengers and cargo; and tracked
agriculture inspection activities. It also assessed the effectiveness
of USDA-APHIS in providing CBP with the necessary policy and procedural
guidance to perform agriculture inspection activities.
Our audit was a broad-based effort that generally covered
agricultural inspection activities from March 2003 to February 2005. We
reviewed policies, procedures, and pertinent laws and regulations;
interviewed CBP personnel; and reviewed documents and records. We
tested procedures and controls, and observed inspection activities in
areas such as Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM) and
the Work Accomplishment Data System (WADS). To accomplish the audit
objectives, we conducted fieldwork at CBP headquarters in Washington,
D.C., and at ports located in Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan;
Laredo, Texas; and Miami, Florida. Areas of concern we identified
included:
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring--CBP's
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM) sampling
did not meet sampling requirements for 13 of 18 pathway
activities at the four ports we reviewed. Further, CBP
supervisors did not sufficiently monitor AQIM sampling
requirements at the port level to ensure sampling was performed
as required and sampling results reported correctly. AQIM
inspection results help USDA predict potential future risks to
agriculture from pests and diseases.
Work Accomplishment Data System--We identified issues with
accuracy of CBP's Work Accomplishment Data System (WADS) used
to track ports' agriculture inspection activities. All four
ports we reviewed had WADS inspection activity errors. The
errors included both under- and over-reporting of data needed
to identify potential agriculture risks.
Staffing--During our audit we found that CBP had not updated
the USDA agriculture specialist staffing model to ensure
staffing was sufficient and allocated in the most effective
manner. As such, CBP had no assurance that the model addressed
staffing needs and had the capability of adjusting to changes
in workload, processing time, complexity, and threat levels.
Performance Measures--CBP had not developed comprehensive
performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of all its
agriculture inspection activities. CBP used two performance
measures for agriculture inspection activities--one for
international air passengers and another for border vehicle
passengers. However, agricultural inspections related to air,
truck, mail, pedestrian, and maritime pathways did not have
performance measures.
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring
We identified issues of accuracy with AQIM at CBP. AQIM helps USDA
predict potential future risks to agriculture from pests and diseases.
AQIM is a USDA-APHIS risk-assessment system that evaluates the
effectiveness of inspection activities in both traditional and
nontraditional pathways into the United States. AQIM assesses the risk
posed by agricultural pests approaching ports, and measures the
effectiveness of the inspection program at mitigating that risk. AQIM
at the ports of entry consists of daily or weekly random sampling and
inspection of passenger baggage, vehicles, mail or cargo. The
information obtained from this sampling provides USDA-APHIS with
information on the potential future risks to the agriculture industry
from pests and diseases. Based on the AQIM inspection results, USDA-
APHIS develops an interception rate for the particular pathway, such as
air passenger, air cargo, and mail; the higher the interception rate,
the greater the risk.
AQIM is a statistically based system. CBP must provide USDA-APHIS
with a sufficient number of results from inspections at each port to
allow reliable risk assessments or to perform analyses that are
beneficial to the ports in allocating their staffing resources. CBP's
ability to better target its staffing resources to higher risk pathways
may be limited if the required number of AQIM inspections is not
performed and reported in a timely manner.
CBP's AQIM sampling (October-December 2004) did not meet sampling
requirements for 13 of 18 pathway activities at four ports. For
example, Chicago did not meet its AQIM sampling requirements for mail,
air passengers, and air cargo. Laredo did not perform AQIM sampling for
pedestrians for the 3 months (October-December 2004) reviewed. Detroit
did not have supporting documentation to verify the air passengers
sampling and did not take the required samples for truck cargo and
border vehicles. Miami under-reported mail for 1 month and did not meet
its sampling requirements for maritime-perishables, maritime tiles, and
solid wood packing. USDA-OIG had similar issues with AQIM when it was
with USDA-APHIS.\2\
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\2\ Recommendation 4, page 14, USDA Report: Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service Safeguards to Prevent Entry of Prohibited Pests and
Diseases into the United States (Report No. 33601-3-Ch, February 2003);
USDA Report: Assessment of APHIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, CBP supervisors did not sufficiently monitor AQIM sampling
requirements at the port level to ensure samples were performed and
reported correctly. During the course of our audit, CBP's Agriculture
Programs and Liaison (APL) started follow-up action on AQIM and other
data beginning the first quarter of FY 2005 to ensure the accuracy of
statistical data. Prior to conducting our audit, in FY 2004, ports
provided adequate results on only 53 of 153 AQIM activities. After APL
started its follow-up actions, ports showed some improvement by
reporting adequate results on 100 out of 153 AQIM activities.
In addition to taking an insufficient number of AQIM samples, there
were also problems with the methodology used in sampling. For example,
the AQIM plans developed in Chicago did not provide sufficient detailed
instructions on how to select the samples. Moreover, for air cargo, the
sample selection plan did not include the entire universe of perishable
products, as defined in the current USDA-APHIS requirements. Instead,
the sampling plan was limited to sampling vegetables from the
Netherlands. Perishables that are not sampled as required increase the
risk that the extent of pests and diseases in these perishables may not
be detected or known.
Prior to our audit fieldwork, USDA-APHIS had broadened its coverage
in certain nonagricultural items, such as solid wood packing materials
and Italian tiles, which are known to carry pests. However, samples for
other pathways, such as maritime freight containers and cargo-carrying
vehicles, were generally limited to incoming cargoes already known to
contain items of agricultural interest. Since other cargoes and
vehicles were not sampled, the AQIM process was unlikely to identify
pests entering through these alternate pathways. As noted in a USDA-OIG
2003 audit report, even a limited number of AQIM inspections performed
on nonagricultural cargoes could identify previously unknown pathways
that should be monitored as part of CBP's agricultural inspection
process. CBP and USDA-APHIS are currently working to address this issue
by further broadening the scope of AQIM coverage to pathways that
previously were not sampled.
In addition, USDA-APHIS had not developed an AQIM process for
incoming rail cargo. USDA-OIG identified this as an issue in a previous
report. Our 2007 audit report noted a previous USDA-OIG recommendation
that USDA-APHIS develop and provide to CBP a system of risk assessment
for rail cargo so that the degree of risk associated with this pathway
can be determined. Although USDA-APHIS officials had agreed with the
need for a risk assessment process, they cited operational
difficulties, such as the inability to obtain cargo manifests on a
timely basis, as a barrier to the development of a workable AQIM
system.
In our 2007 report, we recommended that CBP provide adequate
supervision and instructions to CBP personnel to ensure AQIM data
samples are complete, properly taken, and accurately recorded. CBP
concurred with our recommendation and reported that it issued a
memorandum on December 1, 2006, to Directors of Field Operations (DFOs)
reemphasizing the importance of AQIM guidelines to ensure daily AQIM
samples are collected and all forms are completed. The DFOs also
received a list of the AQIM required activities for Fiscal Year 2007.
USDA-APHIS officials reported that a pest risk assessment is being
developed for rail shipments, and its completion is anticipated by June
30, 2008. APHIS officials also have provided plans to expand AQIM
reviews to pathways that had previously not been covered.
Work Accomplishment Data System
We identified issues of accuracy with CBP's Work Accomplishment
Data System (WADS) used to track ports' agriculture inspection
activities. The WADS database includes a daily record of agriculture
inspection and interception activity, broken down by pathway (e.g.,
maritime, airport, land border). WADS identifies and tracks inspections
and interceptions at the ports using different program categories, as
well as numerous codes to denote specific activities under each program
category. For example, activity codes for one port included aircraft
arrivals, air passengers, and crew subject to inspection, air baggage
interceptions, air cargo inspections, and air cargo interceptions. Each
port is required to collect, report, and transmit this data to USDA-
APHIS. USDA-APHIS uses WADS data for setting risk management priorities
and for staffing recommendations.
CBP and USDA-APHIS cannot fully rely on the WADS data, which can
impair the agencies' ability to manage the agricultural inspection
programs and assess the results of those operations. At the ports, 107
of 148 WADS activity codes examined were reported incorrectly or lacked
supporting documentation to allow verification. CBP had inadequate
second-party reviews of data input, a lack of sufficiently trained
personnel, and port personnel misinterpreting USDA-APHIS instructions.
USDA-OIG identified similar issues with WADS when it reviewed USDA-
APHIS.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Recommendation 24, page 53, USDA Report: Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service Safeguards to Prevent Entry of Prohibited
Pests and Diseases into the United States (Report No. 33601-3-Ch,
February 2003); USDA Report: Assessment of APHIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All four ports we reviewed had WADS inspection activity errors. The
reporting errors included both under- and over-reporting of data. For
example, one port over-reported the number of agriculture inspections
for passengers in buses by 39,869 or 63 percent. The same port reported
102,600 inspections for bus passengers while the source documents
showed only 62,731 passengers were inspected. Another port's rail
pathway inspection and pest interception data were partially double-
counted, causing overstatements of 98 percent for both activities
(9,661 reported versus 4,877 actual for rail pathway and 172 reported
versus 87 actual for pest interceptions).
Three ports also lacked documentation needed to verify 14 WADS
inspection activity codes. For example, one port did not keep complete
and accurate source records for the codes. Records were not always
available for review purposes since some ports retained documents while
others did not.
WADS data was inaccurate for several reasons. CBP personnel cited a
lack of staff adequately trained in WADS input procedures. Also, the
WADS User's Guide did not specify the type or extent of secondary
reviews that were to be performed. These reviews were not always
adequate to ensure the accuracy of WADS data. In some instances, CBP
port personnel did not report certain items in accordance with
procedures outlined in USDA-APHIS WADS manuals. For example, at one
port, reportable and non-reportable pests for certain pathways were
recorded as a single line item rather than separate items as required.
Without accurate data, USDA-APHIS would not be able to set risk
management priorities and make staffing recommendations effectively.
As with AQIM, during the course of conducting our fieldwork, CBP's
Agriculture Programs and Liaison (APL) started follow-up action on WADS
and other data beginning the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2005 to
ensure the accuracy of statistical data. APL followed up with all four
field offices of the ports we visited and identified as having provided
inadequate results.
We recommended in our 2007 report that CBP provide adequate
instructions, resources, training, and supervision to CBP personnel to
ensure WADS data are accurately compiled and entered in the computer
system, and related records are properly retained. When needed, CBP
should obtain the assistance of USDA-APHIS for training and guidance on
WADS data.
CBP concurred with our recommendation and, in a subsequent response
to the report, outlined steps they have taken to address this issue.
For example, CBP reported that its CBP-USDA Data Analysis Team for
Evaluating Risk meets quarterly to review and address issues with data
quality concerning WADS, PPQ-280, and AQIM data. CBP's Office of Field
Operations, Field and Resource Management, is developing routines in
the Operations Management Report Data Warehouse to address data quality
and integrity issues.
Further, training materials, user guides, and instructions for WADS
and PPQ-280 will be available for field personnel. Field and Resource
Management's Strategic Planning Division has established a Data
Integrity Working Group composed of Headquarters and field
representatives who have responsibility to ensure quality controls are
developed and implemented in the field and port offices.
Staffing
During our audit we found that CBP had not updated the agriculture
specialist staffing model to ensure staffing was sufficient and
allocated in the most effective manner. USDA-OIG had identified this as
an issue with USDA-APHIS. CBP headquarters personnel determined the
number of agriculture inspectional positions nationwide and the number
to be allocated to each field manager. The field managers determine
staffing placement within the ports. CBP staffing levels and patterns
were based on the agriculture inspection staffing that existed at the
time of transition and were not based on an up-to-date, comprehensive,
nationwide plan, or assessment of risk.
At the time of our audit, the agriculture inspection staffing
patterns were based on the existing USDA-APHIS staffing model. This
model used WADS data to determine the staffing required for each
inspection activity. Before the transition, USDA-APHIS officials agreed
with USDA-OIG that the existing USDA-APHIS staffing models were not
well suited to determining staffing needs for cargo inspections.
Although CBP Headquarters officials indicated that they planned to
create a new staffing model, they had not established a timeframe for
completion.
At the time of our audit, CBP agriculture specialist staffing had
decreased since the transition. The CBP's agriculture inspectional type
positions totaled 2,417 (including vacancies) with 2,071 on board as of
June 2003. As of February 2005, agriculture staffing had decreased to
1,721 total on board, a 17 percent reduction. As of September 1, 2007,
the total number of Agriculture Specialists was 2,142.
We recommended in our 2007 report that CBP develop a staffing model
and a comprehensive nationwide plan for agriculture specialist
staffing. In response, CBP's Office of Field Operations reported that
it has developed an optimal staffing allocation model for CBP Officers
(CBPOs) and CBP Agriculture Specialists (CBPAS) at ports of entry. The
first phase of the model, focusing on CBPO-Air Passenger Processing,
has been completed and approved by CBP Management. The second phase, to
include the remaining components in air, land and sea, as well as the
CBPAS component, also has been completed and is awaiting CBP Management
approval. This model will be used as a decision support tool and
national guide for future allocation of resources. The model addresses
staffing needs and has the capability of adjusting to changes in
workload, processing time, complexity and threat levels.
Performance Measures
CBP had not developed comprehensive performance measures to monitor
the effectiveness of all its agriculture inspection activities. CBP
used two performance measures for agriculture inspection activities--
one for international air passengers and another for border vehicle
passengers. These current performance measures are the same ones USDA
previously used. A number of CBP agriculture inspection activities,
such as those for air and truck cargo, mail, pedestrians, and maritime
pathways, did not have performance measures. USDA-OIG had identified
this as an issue with USDA-APHIS.
We recommended in our 2007 report that CBP ensure that a
comprehensive set of performance measures is developed to monitor the
efficiency and effectiveness of all agriculture inspection activities.
CBP concurred with our recommendation and reported that it initiated
two new performance measures for measuring the agriculture mission: (1)
number of pest interceptions at ports of entry, and (2) number of
quarantine material interceptions seized at ports of entry. These
measures were shared with USDA prior to implementation. The new
measures facilitate USDA's ability to conduct and provide pest risk
assessments. This represents a good first step and CBP needs to
continue to examine its performance measures to ensure all agriculture
inspection activities are represented.
I have highlighted our office's work in the area of CBP agriculture
inspection activities. Previously, USDA-OIG issued two reports \4\ on
agriculture inspection activities, prior to the transfer of the
inspection activity to DHS, which had numerous recommendations that
addressed agriculture activities, and which are now a part of CBP. Our
review was to determine if problems that existed when agriculture
inspection activities were in USDA-APHIS still existed after their
transfer to CBP. Further, we coordinated with the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) during the planning stages of this audit
and it was decided that audit work in the areas of (1) Training of
Agricultural Inspectors, and (2) use of APHIS User Fees would be
performed solely by GAO, the results of which I believe they will be
discussing here today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ USDA Report: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Safeguards to Prevent Entry of Prohibited Pests and Diseases into the
United States (Report No. 33601-3-Ch, February 2003); USDA Report:
Assessment of APHIS and FSIS Inspection Activities to Prevent the Entry
of Foot and Mouth Disease Into the United States (Report No. 50601-
0003-CH, July 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other DHS-OIG Inspections and Reviews
In addition to the work above, DHS-OIG conducted other inspections
and reviews in the post-harvest area. We examined DHS activities
relating to post-harvest food, and focused on prevention, protection,
preparedness, and detection efforts.\5\ The Federal Government is
charged with defending the food supply from intentional attacks and
natural hazards. While DHS is not the designated lead for a number of
key activities in this area, the Congress and the President have
assigned DHS many important food defense and critical infrastructure
protection responsibilities. Our report examined DHS activities
relating to post-harvest food, and focuses on prevention, protection,
preparedness, and detection efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ DHS report: The Department of Homeland Security's Role in Food
Defense and Critical Infrastructure Protection (OIG-07-33, February
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We observed four main limitations in DHS' related efforts:
First, DHS could improve internal coordination of its
related efforts. DHS food sector activities are distributed
across multiple organizational units, and similar program
thrusts have emerged. Consolidated management attention is
required to reduce the risk of duplication and promote
collaboration.
Second, DHS needs to improve its engagement of public and
private food sector partners. Food sector partners were
frustrated by the quality and extent of DHS external
coordination in sector governance and information sharing;
mapping; and research, development, education, and training.
Third, DHS could do more to prioritize resources and
activities based on risk. DHS units have used different
approaches to prioritizing food sector activities in the
context of their larger missions and have not developed a
common perspective on food sector risk.
Finally, DHS must fully discharge its food sector
responsibilities. DHS has satisfied basic requirements in most,
but not all, areas of responsibility. The Department has not
submitted an integrated Federal food defense budget plan or
clearly established assessment standards for use in the food
sector.
Our report contained 16 recommendations to enhance DHS' performance
and improve the security posture of the food supply. DHS concurred with
12 of these recommendations.
We conducted a review of DHS' BioWatch program,\6\ an early warning
system designed to detect the release of biological agents in the air
through a comprehensive protocol of monitoring and laboratory analysis.
DHS, through the Science and Technology Directorate, provides
management oversight to this program. We determined the extent BioWatch
program management implemented proper controls for coordinating
responsibilities and funding with its partner agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ DHS' Management of BioWatch Program (OIG-07-22, January 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BioWatch program operates in various cities, but DHS still
needs to design and implement management controls to follow up on
deficiencies in field and laboratory operations. Further, DHS has not
properly enforced or monitored partner agency reporting needed to
coordinate BioWatch. The need to enhance management controls over
BioWatch exposes the program to possible mismanagement of funds and
could jeopardize DHS' ability to detect biological agents and protect
the populace of the United States.
We recommended that the Under Secretary for Science and Technology:
(1) address and rectify after-action and previous field operation
findings; (2) enforce Federal partners' requirements, including monthly
and quarterly reporting requirements; and (3) closely review and
monitor required reports submitted by its Federal partners to determine
and resolve discrepancies.
We also conducted a review of the DHS National Bio-Surveillance
Integration System Program.\7\ Recognizing a gap in national biological
threat analysis, in 2004, the President directed DHS to consolidate
Federal agency bio-surveillance data in one system. In response, DHS
began efforts to develop the National Bio-Surveillance Integration
System (NBIS), the nation's first system capable of providing
comprehensive and integrated bio-surveillance and situational
awareness. Our audit objectives were to determine (1) the efficacy of
DHS' plans, policies, and procedures for collaborating with other
Federal, state, and local stakeholders to gather and share bio-
surveillance information via NBIS; and (2) whether the system will meet
user needs, information security requirements, and privacy policies and
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Better Management Needed for the National Bio-Surveillance
Integration System Program (OIG-07-61, July 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We found that DHS has not provided consistent leadership and staff
support to the NBIS program. As a result of the repeated program
transitions and staffing shortfalls, planning documentation and
guidance have not been finalized, stakeholder communication and
coordination activities have been ineffective, and program management
of contractors has been lacking. We recommended that the Assistant
Secretary and Chief Medical Officer of the Office of Health Affairs
ensure that NBIS program management apply adequate resources to support
program management activities; develop a program plan, concept of
operations, and communications plan; and perform an information needs
assessment.
Last, in 2005, we performed an assessment of a proposal to merge
Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.\8\ The
merger was initiated to place customs, immigration, and agriculture
inspectors at ports of entry under a single chain of command and was an
effort to integrate the seemingly common functions divided at the time
among three departments.
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\8\ An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Border Protection with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (OIG-06-04, November 2005).
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We undertook an examination of the history of the organizations,
the roles assigned to them, and the degree to which they met their
interrelated goals, in the process interviewing over 600 individuals
from Border and Transportation Security, Immigration Custom Enforcement
(ICE), and CBP in 10 cities and at 63 ICE and CBP facilities.
We made 14 recommendations to overcome the interagency coordination
and integration challenges confronting ICE and CBP. While not making
specific recommendations on agriculture activities, our recommendations
impacted policy, affecting integration issues for all legacy agency
functions (Immigration and Naturalization Services, Customs and USDA-
APHIS) transitioned to CBP.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We would be
happy to answer any questions that you or the Members may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. The Chair would like
to remind Members that they will be recognized for questioning
in order of seniority for Members who were here at the start of
the hearing. After that, Members will be recognized in order of
arrival, and I appreciate the Members' understanding. We will
now start the questioning, and I will begin. Mr. Jurich, in
your testimony you state that transfer of the AQI function to
CBP has been traumatic for the legacy field staff and the
inspection staff voted basically with their feet. Can you
describe the effect on performance of an organization when it
suffers an exodus experience by the staff in this way, and can
you draw a correlation between the lack of experienced staff
and your observations of marked declines in interceptions?
Mr. Jurich. Mr. Chairman, I think the relationship with the
correlation is obvious. I was told that almost every port of
entry that I visited that the very best of the agricultural
specialists and their supervisors had left. When I got there in
2005 and 2006 the staffs were basically halved, and I think it
had three effects. One, you lost the productivity of the best
people. They were the ones making the most interceptions. You
also lost CBP having people in house that were the best to
promote. That was a secondary effect. The effect on
interceptions and inspections was obvious. It is just that the
interceptions went dramatically down especially at the
airports.
You also had legacy customs and immigration supervisors and
chiefs making decisions that adversely affected the
agricultural mission, and that caused an intense amount of
grief and unhappiness and morale problems amongst the staff.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. If I look at the testimony
from all three of our witnesses who have presented so far today
the only conclusion that I can make is that the process of
border inspection is in a shambles. When you lose half your
people the testimony is dramatic to me. Mr. Jurich, can you
give us two or three concrete examples of things that you saw
that were simply unacceptable?
Mr. Jurich. When the transfer occurred at many of the
larger ports there was not a sufficient understanding amongst
the managers and the first and second line supervisors from the
other legacy agencies that took part in determining the role of
the inspectors in protecting agriculture. They were the first
line of defense for American agriculture in the country. I
think that the mission was devalued by a majority of the
supervisors and chiefs. They did not understand it, and
basically they treated the staff as either garbage collectors
or bug collectors and didn't understand what they were doing,
serving a valuable part of the American agriculture impeding
the insects and plant diseases from dramatically affecting
Americans agricultural economy. That is about it.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Shames, you state in your
testimony that three districts, Tampa, El Paso, and Tucson
experienced a significant increase in their rates of
inspections, yet significant decreases in their interception
rates. This is an alarming finding. It seems red lights were
flashing but either no one was paying attention to the data or
understanding its significance. Does this indicate a problem
with the data in the reporting system or was CBP management
simply ignoring the warning signals?
Ms. Shames. You are right, Mr. Chairman. We did find
anomalies in the data that would cause alarms, and we thought
required further analysis. CBP told us that they would not
explain why interceptions were increasing or decreasing and
likewise inspections were increasing or decreasing. So you are
correct to identify that there are two issues: first, that they
weren't using the data that they were collecting but there is
an underlying issue that the data are reliable, and there may
be some question about that as well.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, you state in your
testimony that there were serious accuracy problems with the
Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring System. You
further stated that CBP agreed with your recommendations and
issued a December 1, 2006, memorandum reemphasizing the
importance of the AQIM guidelines. Given its significance were
you given the opportunity to review or comment on this memo?
Mr. Taylor. No, sir, we did not.
The Chairman. Thank you. Do any one of you wish to further
elaborate at this time on your general observations?
Specifically, my question is based on the fact that I believe
that you probably saw things that you have not elucidated yet:
Mr. Jurich, in particular, can you give us any example of what
you saw where--you actually saw that pests got through the
border. Was that something that you witnessed firsthand?
Mr. Jurich. I did not see any pests get into the border,
but I was--what I had heard from some of the inspectors and
most of the management is that the basic agricultural
inspection function was devalued and it was subordinated to
anti-terrorism, drugs, guns, money, intellectual property right
concerns. On the part of CBP it is that agriculture stood
firmly in last place by way of budgetary resources, manpower,
equipment, supplies, and things like that. There are many
troubling things about the review that are not mentioned in the
testimony. For example, there was almost as much criticism by
the younger officers who have recently gone through Frederick
to the new officer training and who are looking to leave as
soon as they got to the ports of entry. They didn't have the
taint of APHIS experience and basically they were unhappy with
their role and with the support they got from CBP and
management.
At one port I visited in late 2006, as I stopped by the
SITC office and talked with the SITC supervisor, APHIS
Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance, he had an
announcement out for a GS-11 position, a safeguarding
specialist or SITC inspector, and he said that out of the 15
applicants, 12 were from CBP, and it included two supervisors
at CBP at the 12 level who were willing to take a downgrade to
get out of the agency. This is very troubling because it calls
into question everything that is done since 2003 to 2006 to
help stem the exodus of their agricultural specialist
personnel.
The Chairman. I totally agree, Mr. Jurich. Thank you for
your testimony. Mr. Goodlatte, would you like to question our
witnesses?
Mr. Goodlatte. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask all
of our witnesses this question. Is the mission of safeguarding
the United States from foreign pests and diseases being done as
well by DHS as it was by the U.S. Department of Agriculture?
Mr. Jurich?
Mr. Jurich. No, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Ms. Shames.
Ms. Shames. Our work didn't look at that question
specifically. It is clear now that there are management
problems and morale issues that could affect the conduct of
agricultural inspection at DHS. We didn't do a comparison with
the DHS performance versus the USDA performance.
Mr. Goodlatte. Do you have plans to go back and do that?
Ms. Shames. We could at Congressional request.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. We didn't look at that as well, sir. There are
two answers I could give you. One is that if the over 50
recommendations that were made to APHIS and to CBP before, and
after the transition, were followed then we think that they
could make substantial progress in improving agricultural
inspections, as well or better I don't know. The second part of
the answer is that the data that we try to look at to compare
activities before and after were not sufficient to come to any
kind of a conclusion as to what was going on before the
transition or after.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced by
Mr. Jurich's one-word answer. However, if the Committee thinks
that there is further doubt, I would join in making such a
request to the GAO or to the DHS Inspector General's office
that they do go back and do some comparative looks at what kind
of personnel were available, the qualitative work that was
done, the number of interceptions that were made during the
time it was under USDA control and the time it has been under
DHS control. It might be very useful information.
The Chairman. Mr. Goodlatte, I couldn't agree more. I will
speak with the Chairman who has stepped out of the hearing to
see if we can't coordinate a joint request to do exactly that
because I am compelled by the testimony of Mr. Jurich as well.
A simple no answer is very clear to me as well. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have some more
questions. This Committee has raised questions about the
commitment of pest and disease protection at the Department of
Homeland Security since the original conceptual conversations
about creating DHS. The June 2007 report of the APHIS-CBP joint
task force on improved agriculture inspection is such a
complete list of concerns we have raised that it could have
been written by this Committee. Why shouldn't we just admit
things have not worked out and return this function to the USDA
where program managers will make it their first priority. Mr.
Jurich.
Mr. Jurich. There are a few things that CBP has done that
improved the performance of the agricultural mission. If you
could take those back with you, I agree with you.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. Ms. Shames.
Ms. Shames. We did have a chance to look at the task force
and the implementation plans that it prepared as well, and it
acknowledges that the agricultural function has lost its
significance when bumped up against anti-terrorism and drug
interdiction priorities. We found what was positive with the
implementation plans: that they sent tasks to be done; they had
time frames; there were accountability offices; and also
required reporting requirements. We feel that this at least
lays a road map for further oversight and at least to measure
any sort of progress or improvements that may be made on the
part of DHS. If there is any criticism that could be made is
that these implementation plans are 4 years too late, and
should have been done at the time that the one look at the
border looking at an integrated border security approach was
starting to be envisioned and to anticipate then that there
would be these integration problems.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, both the OIG and the
GAO audits highlighted the need for DHS to develop a
comprehensive set of performance measures to monitor the
efficacy and effectiveness of the AQI program. Specifically
with regard to the OIG recommendation the Department of
Homeland Security concurred and indicated that a system had
been put in place on October 1, 2006. Interestingly, I am told
that the new Assistant Commissioner for Customs and Border
Protection spoke to a meeting of the Association of State
Departments of Agriculture last week stressing the need for his
agency to develop systems to collect information and analytical
data on pests and disease interceptions. Can you comment on
this obvious contradiction?
Mr. Taylor. I cannot, sir. I am not aware of the comments
that were made by the Assistant Commissioner.
Mr. Goodlatte. Are you aware that such a system was put in
place on October 1, 2006?
Mr. Taylor. We were told that it was, yes.
Mr. Goodlatte. Have you confirmed that? Have you verified
that it is operational?
Mr. Taylor. No, sir. We have not gone back to confirm.
Mr. Goodlatte. I would add that to the list, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I totally agree. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Mahoney.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the
panel for coming in today to talk about such an important
issue. In my State of Florida we are being bombarded by one
invasive species or disease a week, and greening, which is one
of the issues is pushing the citrus industry to the brink of
extinction. So this is a very important matter for all
Floridians. And I would like to make an observation. It appears
based upon the testimony that the focus or the preoccupation on
the part of FEMA is with terrorism. And organizations like
FEMA, which protect the lives of people post disaster have been
mismanaged.
And thanks to Dave Paulison, a great Floridian, we have
gotten some sanity back into that organization but there is
still a question as to whether or not it has gotten to the
right level to operate. Now we are talking about the same issue
with agriculture, and it is very interesting to hear your
testimony. I guess the first question I would like to ask
everybody is if your testimony is based on observations or
review over what period of time? Mr. Jurich?
Mr. Jurich. Late 2005 to late 2006.
Mr. Mahoney. Okay. Ms. Shames?
Ms. Shames. We completed our audit work in early 2006, and
our survey was as of January 2006.
Mr. Mahoney. Okay. Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. The time period from March 2003 until February
2005.
Mr. Mahoney. Okay. And I guess, Ms. Tighe, is that it?
Ms. Tighe. Yes. We had----
Mr. Mahoney. Working together?
Ms. Tighe. We were working together, yes.
Mr. Mahoney. It was a collaborative effort.
Ms. Tighe. The same period as Mr. Taylor stated.
Mr. Mahoney. Okay. So that gets us to basically through
2005 and clearly there is a concern as to the performance
during that period of time. I would be interested in any
observations. Has anything improved? Has there been any changes
at DHS that have increased the performance of this organization
in terms of being able to protect American agriculture? Mr.
Jurich?
Mr. Jurich. They have introduced the AQI function to the
electronic age utilizing a variety of electronic systems. It
has improved their targeting capabilities both at the airports
and with respect to cargo. They have a number of systems in
place that help them with targeting people and cargo. That is a
dramatic improvement. They also did something on discipline and
conduct issues. APHIS was a little loose in the field,
tolerated a lot more than CBP does. However, I think CBP is
basically a draconian kind of organization, paramilitary, and
it has destroyed the morale of the people by depriving them of
a lot of their independence and authority that they had under
APHIS supervision and management.
Mr. Mahoney. Do you feel that there is still a morale
problem within----
Mr. Jurich. Absolutely, absolutely.
Mr. Mahoney. Ms. Shames?
Ms. Shames. CBP has taken some action in response to the
recommendations that we made in our report. For example, they
have increased the number of the K-9 teams. They are putting in
place a more robust set of performance measures. They are also
putting in place better mechanisms to insure that the user
fees, that the monies are coming over from APHIS to USDA, but
let me quickly add that we haven't evaluated these actions to
see if they get to your point whether or not they contribute to
improved performance.
Mr. Mahoney. Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. The CBP and USDA were provided 13
recommendations, and they accepted every recommendation, and
they have informed us, and again we haven't gone back to follow
up to make sure that they have actually completed all the
actions. They reported to us that they have completed all but
one of those activities, which would show at least management
is taking it seriously and that APHIS and CBP are trying to
jointly make this work.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Next we have Ms. Foxx.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask any of you
to respond to this, but I am always curious as to how we have
so much difficulty getting agencies to move on even simple
issues. It has been brought to my attention that there is a
problem with simply creating e-mail lists so that people are
properly--what I hear constantly in these kind of hearings is
the problems again about getting people to move on the simple
kind of issues. You just said that CBP has taken the 13
recommendations, and they are going to be moving on them. But
things like creating the e-mail list, I understand they didn't
even have a good e-mail list to send out information to people.
They couldn't verify whether their e-mail list was accurate for
the agricultural specialists to get information out to them.
But are we getting them to really respond to things like
correcting their e-mail list and saying, ``Yes, we are doing
this and verifying that that is happening.'' Tell me about
that, please, the policy manual updates, getting that
information out to people. Mr. Jurich.
Mr. Jurich. From testimony from the agricultural
specialists themselves at the field level many of them were
getting the policy mandates immediately via the electronic
system, but they were coming from APHIS in Riverdale from the
manual section right to the ports of entry and to the
specialist directly. Where you had the alerts, manual changes
or other things, policy directives going through from Riverdale
to the Reagan Building in Washington, D.C. down to the district
field offices to the ports there were a lot of problems. The
specialists simply were not getting stuff in a timely fashion
not within the chain of command. It is very structured, and it
takes a long time for information to flow down.
Ms. Foxx. Is anything being done to clarify that so that it
doesn't take a long time to get? I mean with our modern
technology it is ridiculous that it takes a long time to get an
e-mail through a chain of command. It seems to me that that
ought to be done very quickly.
Mr. Jurich. It was obvious to me that the APHIS means of
communication was far better than CBP's. What CBP has done to
improve things, I don't know. I don't know given the chain of
command and going from level to level will ever change the
speed of delivery.
Ms. Foxx. And will you have any other recommendations on
how to make that happen?
Mr. Jurich. I think with respect to the alerts, I think
what they should do is what APHIS did; basically eliminate some
of the mid-levels and send the stuff immediately to the
officers themselves. CBP is resistant to that, send it both to
the officers and down the chain of command so that the
intermediary levels have it but at least send it to the
officers immediately.
Ms. Foxx. Could we get some response to whether that is
going to happen or not?
The Chairman. Ms. Foxx, I think we absolutely deserve that
response, and my observation to your questions, to Mr.
Goodlatte's questions, to all of our questions so far is that
it reminds me of an old I Love Lucy show where, ``You got some
`splaining to do, Lucy.'' Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
for being here, and I apologize for being in and out because I
have two hearings going on at the same time. Mr. Jurich, let me
thank you for the work you have done over the past year because
it is important. And it is important information for us to know
and for the American public to have. My question is this--and
we heard some things we don't have and what we need--my
question to you is what can we do in the near term to alleviate
this situation and bring these inspections up to standard
because we are just waiting for answers doesn't correct the
problem. The problem is still out there and the American people
want results, so what can we do to correct it in the near term
because what we have been hearing today is quite large in
scale.
Mr. Jurich. I will give you the answer that the majority of
the field personnel gave me.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay.
Mr. Jurich. And that is, one, remove the function and
return it to USDA and to APHIS or remove the agricultural
element from CBP and let it be a stand alone function under the
Department of Homeland Security where they have their own
leadership, their own management, their own supervisors, their
own policies and procedures, and are basically not subordinated
to other concerns.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, sir. Ms. Shames, in your
testimony you brought up a point about the whole employee
management system and problems that arose in the transfer, and
we just heard some comment on that as well. And I think we all
understand if you move people from point A to point B
especially after years somewhere else there tend to be
problems. My question to you is from that standpoint what is
the answer to this issue? How do we fix that problem very
quickly to get the results we need to get, not for this
Committee but for the American people?
Ms. Shames. I am sorry to say that there is really no quick
answer to it, and what we had said, and what we are on record
as saying, is that for a major change management initiative
such as this, a huge merger such as this, then it can take at a
minimum from 5 to 7 years. It is not to say that it shouldn't
be monitored on a very frequent and regular basis. Certainly
the employees are at the heart of any sort of merger and there
ought to be communication and pulse surveys to make sure that
their needs and concerns are addressed. But I think the
constant monitoring of the implementation plans to basically
make sure that the actions that are proposed are addressed and
taken, and then to see if there is any improvement based on
what they have laid out. But there is no quick solution for a
merger along the lines of what happened here.
Mr. Etheridge. But I think I am trying to get an answer of
how to get the results we want. I understand the management and
other pieces but productivity is also the issue of dealing with
products coming and going. You are not saying yes about the 7
year issue.
Ms. Shames. No. That is something that is real-time and
needs to be addressed, and unfortunately what private sector
experience has shown is that there is a decline in productivity
with a merger along these lines so this is very consistent with
what you and others have predicted would happen in a merger
along these lines.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, you have heard
comment from everyone today. My question to you as it deals in
this whole issue of more of a management issue, more of a
funding issue. I know there isn't a simple answer but the facts
are we have a new Department doing a new job and yet we are
doing some of the same jobs, and the jobs have got to get done.
What is your comment on this area?
Mr. Taylor. I think it is critical for the success of this
mission, and it is an important mission, for the Department to
ensure they are adequately funding, staffing, and training the
activity. There is a combination of factors there that the
Department and management has to address that we pointed out in
our report. But the funding issue is something that APHIS and
CBP need to work closely together on to make sure that----
Mr. Etheridge. Well, let me help narrow it down a little
bit. Can you give us some sense of a schedule that you will use
to follow up with the CBP to insure that corrective action is
indeed in place and what a time line will be?
Mr. Taylor. Sure. In fiscal or calendar year 2008 we plan
to follow up on the recommendations for----
Mr. Etheridge. 2008 is a long year.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. That is 12 months. Can you give us a time
line a little tighter than that?
Mr. Taylor. At this time I cannot, sir, but I would be
happy----
Mr. Etheridge. Can you get back to us with it?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir, I can.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I am going to turn this over to Mr. Conaway,
but just briefly did anyone do a review on funding sources?
Ms. Shames. Mr. Chairman, we did report on the user fees,
and what we found was that APHIS was not giving CBP the user
fee funding that covered all of the costs, the CBP could not
depend on when it would receive the funding or how much it
would receive. In fact, in two fiscal years there was a
shortfall of $125 million. Now we understand that APHIS and CBP
are working together to ensure more regular, consistent amount
of transfer of funds but it is something that we reported on as
a contributing factor.
The Chairman. That is one heck of a shortfall. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, folks, for
being here. My private sector background was to be on the
receiving end of a merger where I was in senior management of a
small bank that was acquired by a big bank. We had huge
problems that mirror what you have had there, but the issue is
management and management attention. Can Ms. Shames or Mr.
Taylor or someone give us an organization chart and point to
the manager slot that failed to make the changes necessary to
make sure that agriculture inspection maintained its proper
priority in looking at things coming across the border. Can we
find out where on the organization chart that failure occurred,
and take some actions to decide what to do with those managers
or at least begin now 4 years later to hold that layer of
management specifically responsible for making sure that this
works?
Ms. Shames. Our response would be that accountability
starts with top leadership and cascades down.
Mr. Conaway. Exactly, but there is somewhere in the chain
that broke down. I am guessing that the Secretary of Homeland
Security said let us do this. Somewhere between his comment and
the ground there is a break in the chain. Can you back track
through the chain and find out where the emphasis on
agricultural inspection became so limited that the mission has
looked like it is failing?
Mr. Jurich. The management slot that failed was the
management slot that never existed both at the district field
offices and at the ports. There was no one in management in
those areas at the district field office level or the port
level to represent agriculture. A person with agricultural
education, agricultural training, agricultural experience, and
that was a fault in setting up the system the way they did.
Mr. Conaway. There is a management layer above that person
that should have done it. Let me ask another question. We
sometimes learn from our failures. Have we been able to have or
have we had outbreaks of food borne illnesses or pests or other
things that we were able to trace back through the system to
see where the inspection at the ports failed to catch that food
borne illness or those pests? Are there circumstances where we
actually learn from our mistakes?
Mr. Jurich. APHIS would be better prepared to answer that
question.
Mr. Conaway. Have we--maybe we have not had any food borne
illnesses or any pests that came through the borders. Maybe
this thing is working the way it should.
Mr. Jurich. There are moths in San Francisco in the East
Bay that are a blight.
Mr. Conaway. Have we been able to trace those back through
the system to see where the inspection process failed to catch
the moth or whatever?
Mr. Jurich. I can't answer that question.
Mr. Conaway. A lot of heads shaking around. Apparently not.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. No, sir, we cannot identify any.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Is that something that is unreasonable
in terms of trying to make sure we inspect the way we are
supposed to and improving those inspections, is it unreasonable
to have in place a system that says if we let something sneak
through how did that happen? Is that irrational?
Mr. Taylor. No, accountability is critical.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. And speaking of that, Mr. Taylor,
someone has given AQI, which is an interesting acronym--I am on
the Armed Services Committee, and I spend more time talking
about Al-Qaeda and Iraq than I do agriculture quarantine so I
had a bit of a jolt there when I looked at that. AQI was given
a clean audit report and yet the recommendations seem to not
support necessarily a clean audit report. Mr. Taylor, can you
give us a quick 101 on what your audit standards are, what kind
of audit--I am a CPA, but what kind of audit standards you are
held to?
Mr. Taylor. Sure. We are held to the Federal financial
audit standards provided by GAO. The CBP itself received a
clean audit opinion. We did not look below at the fees
themselves, the collection process, and separately opine on
that. We did look at the fee collection process in terms of
whether they were being properly accounted for and whether they
were being properly collected, not of the policies in terms of
how the amounts were determined. Customs and Border Protection
is the only entity within DHS that has been receiving a clean
audit opinion.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. So the collection of user fees and the
accounting for that is being done well?
Mr. Taylor. We found no problems, no significant problems.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you for your questions, Mr. Conaway. It
is clear from your questions and others that the conduct of
this agency is just shameful. It is just very serious. Mr.
Neugebauer.
Mr. Neugebauer. I thank the Chairman. I want to go back to
a little bit of a follow-up from the Chairman's question, but
during the course of your individual investigations were any of
you able to determine if all of the AQI funds currently being
transferred to DHS are being solely used for AQI operational
port inspections?
Mr. Taylor. We did not look at that in our joint review.
Mr. Neugebauer. And I guess the question is it sounds like
from your answer or the previous answer to the Chairman's
question we did an operational review from the inspection
process but we are not tracing the resources.
Mr. Taylor. We had coordinated with GAO. They were looking
at the fee side of the program so we stayed with the
operational side. We made a conscious decision not to look at
the fee side because of the overlap.
Mr. Neugebauer. Do you think the resources flowing to those
particular--that is a part of the process to make sure that the
job gets done, and if there aren't resources getting to the
inspection process then you can't expect--have higher
expectations of the inspection process, I wouldn't think.
Mr. Taylor. That is true, sir.
Mr. Neugebauer. So that is probably something we probably
need to do sooner rather than later?
Mr. Taylor. We have been discussing with the staff
performing some reconciliation and trying to provide some
information working with CBP.
Mr. Neugebauer. And I think you probably already alluded to
that but there is a lot of discussion going on here today about
whether to return this to the old way. We already have made the
transition to the new process. In your review as our colleague
from Texas said, mergers are kind of like marriages. There are
some things to work out. I would think it would break down into
two different areas, the structural change and the cultural
change. And in view of the deficiencies that you found, and
they are fairly substantial, and I understand some of this is
2005 data and hopefully things are better today, but I just
would be interested to hear from you how much of it was
structural and how much of it was cultural that led to some of
the deficiencies. Mr. Jurich, we will just start with you. We
will just go down the line.
Mr. Jurich. I would not term it a cultural change. I would
term it a cultural collision. I think it was about 50/50. Some
of the structural changes that they made had an obvious
deleterious effect upon the agricultural function. Not having
agricultural managers present to help make decisions, replacing
agricultural supervisors and chiefs with legacy immigration and
legacy customs officials who knew nothing about APHIS or AQI
policy and procedures. I think the compartmentalization that
Customs and CBP has done over the past few years has had few
good effects, but what it did is dramatically reduce the number
of people at the airports and at the cargo examination sites
who do the actual inspections, and consequently it resulted in
a reduction of the number of clearances, the number of
inspections, and the number of interceptions, and that is the
core of the agricultural mission at the ports of entry.
Mr. Neugebauer. Ms. Shames.
Ms. Shames. I have to agree with Mr. Jurich that the
cultural change was a huge factor in part of this, that the
people issues need to be attended to, and it is important
especially in a function like this where it is so dependent on
keen inspections and interceptions that people are concerned
about the transfer and concerned about how people see
themselves in the new organization. And it is clear from our
survey, which we can generalize to the whole agricultural
specialist population where there were many severe issues,
negative issues.
Mr. Neugebauer. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. I think the cultural issues make it very
difficult to resolve the problems that occur when you try to
bring something like this together. We looked at processes and
the programs, the structure of the organizations in trying to
properly report and properly track and properly staff. And we
saw a lot of problems with this as those are more of the
structural issues. But if you have significantly different
cultures it makes it very difficult to resolve those problems,
and that is a lot of what has been taking so long Mr.
Neugebauer.
Ms. Tighe. We certainly saw within APHIS based on our audit
work just prior to the transition, the transfer to Customs, the
same sort of structural and process issues that in fact we
ended up reviewing with DHS-IG's office. We also did a look-see
during the transition process at other issues going on, and
noted some of--in general terms--the delays to fixing the
structural issues caused by cultural problems. Things were just
taking too long. I think some of that--as testimony is given
here today--is understandable given the fact that you have two
agencies coming together and things are going to slow down a
bit. But they certainly led to delays over several years, and
in dealing with many of the issues we pointed out in 2003. So I
think it is really both.
Mr. Neugebauer. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Neugebauer. I would like to
open this up to one more quick round of questions. We need to
get our other panel up here, but I think there are a couple
more questions that still need to be asked, and I would like to
begin with that. I want to make a point in asking this
question. Former Secretary Ann Veneman was from my district and
a good friend, and we had a number of discussions with regard
to the K-9 units, and she put a high priority on those K-9
units in the inspections when she was Secretary, feeling that
that was something that was the front line of defense in many
cases. We received testimony, and I believe it was Ms. Shames
who said that there were formerly 140 units, K-9 units. That
was reduced to 80. Now there are 92 but only 60 percent, was
that correct, that testimony, that only 60 percent passed
muster?
Ms. Shames. Right. And in 2005 there was a proficiency
test, and only 60 percent of the K-9 teams were proficient. And
what the K-9 inspectors told us is that because they were being
pulled off of direct K-9 inspection responsibilities their dogs
were in effect sidelined and were losing some of their skills.
The Chairman. So basically what we have is an original
mandate under Ms. Veneman's tenure where her priority and her
focus was that we needed at least 140 K-9 units to do the job,
and in effect what we have effectively are 30 units that are
currently capable of meeting those needs. Is that a correct
assumption?
Ms. Shames. Well, that test was done in 2005 so we can't
project that the proficiency has stayed at that level since
then. We did contact CBP to try to update the information when
the hearing was called. They have increased the number of teams
from the low that we reported from 80 to 90.
The Chairman. I gave them credit for 92 when I made the
calculation for 30.
Ms. Shames. But we have done no further analysis to see if
the teams are as proficient as they ought to be.
The Chairman. I am going to ask my colleagues to be able to
ask further questions but I got to tell you what I have
witnessed today is worse than I thought it was when we included
in our bill to move the agency out of the Department. We have
heard the testimony that there are simply cultural differences
that preclude the new agency from working with the former
inspectors. You have seen them voting with their feet. I want
to give the panelists one further opportunity just to elaborate
on any point that they may wish to present to the Committee
that they haven't had an opportunity to do, so far. Mr. Jurich,
do you want to make any observations?
Mr. Jurich. Let me relate one instance because I think it
shows both what has gone well and what has gone dramatically
wrong in the agency. In San Francisco, I believe last year or
maybe the year before, an agricultural technician intercepted a
box destined for southern California with citrus cuttings in
it. The citrus cuttings were contaminated with canker. The
technician turned the package and the citrus cuttings over to
the agricultural specialist for resolution; ``Look what I
found, here it is.'' Once he saw what it was and could see that
there was a problem with the cuttings, which were not
enterable, much less they were also disguised. It didn't come
in identified as citrus cuttings, it came in as something else.
It was being smuggled into the country.
He went to his supervisor and said, ``I seized these
cuttings.'' And the answer, ``I am telling you to get something
done,'' and the supervisor's retort was, ``Look, we are here to
protect the country from acts of terrorism, what do you expect
me to do?'' He was not an agricultural supervisor. He was
legacy Customs and Immigration. The agricultural specialist in
this instance got on the phone and called APHIS. He called the
SITC staff, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance, and
informed them. They came right over, seized the items, and both
CBP and APHIS worked together to resolve the issue. CBP got ICE
involved and they actually prosecuted the person who was
responsible for importing the cuttings. APHIS went out into the
groves where there were other citrus trees and burnt them all
because they too were contaminated.
What happened to the officer who made the seizure was he
was told by his supervisor, ``Never again are you to call SITC.
You violated the chain of command.'' He also within a month was
taken from the mail center and sent to the airport to work
opening passenger baggage. He went from purgatory to hell.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Jurich, I will tell you the person
who did that should be fired, and we should as a Committee look
into this even further. Anyone else? Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this sort of
follows on with the example that was just cited, but I would
just like to give Mr. Jurich one more opportunity. You suggest
that morale is deteriorating particularly among the legacy
agricultural inspectors. This conclusion seems to be backed up
the GAO's review. What is it about DHS' management of this
program that is driving morale down among these highly
dedicated and experienced civil servants?
Mr. Jurich. I think it is the cultural issue. APHIS was a
regulatory agency. CBP is primarily an enforcement agency.
APHIS has a scientific bent. CBP has a law enforcement bent.
The APHIS staff work with hand lens, with flashlights, with
microscopes. The CBP staff works with automatic pistols with
glocks or whatever. There was at the larger ports a major rift
between the staffs. They did not get along together. There were
a lot of petty jealousies and a lot of bickering and a lot of,
``You are bug collectors, bugs before drugs, drugs before
bugs,'' and things like that, and that has continued to this
day. It perhaps is a little better with the CBPOs coming out of
FLETSI. You received a little bit of agricultural training--16
hours.
But it also has had one adverse effect, some of the
agricultural specialists told me that CBPOs with 3 days of
training think that they can make regulatory decisions about
products they find without referring them to the ag folks which
is again bad. But the cultural differences are immense. It is a
chasm.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Mahoney.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know protecting
American agriculture is not as sexy as going after Osama Bin
Laden, and I appreciate again the testimony. It just seems to
me that there is--and it is not for this Committee obviously
but there are a lot of questions raised about the wisdom behind
DHS, and as somebody prior to coming here, having been involved
in well over 100 mergers and acquisitions, when something is
started based on politics as opposed to mission driven
objectives that in many cases you have a situation where you
find yourself having an unclear idea of what the mission is and
how things should work. And I guess the sense is that there may
have been a mistake that the government made in trying to
create this new agency with regards to agriculture, and we
don't really know based on this testimony what the current
status of that is today. I don't know how we would go about
getting a real update on how well the agency is performing,
CBP.
But my question for the panel is let us say we have come to
the conclusion and that this was a terrible mistake and we need
to undo it. Mr. Jurich, is this irreversible at this point in
time? Is there a path back to where we were before we merged
the functions into DHS?
Mr. Jurich. I think there is, but it would be difficult to
wrench everybody back to USDA or to an independent agency, but
I think that the mission of agriculture under CBP will never be
primary, and that is the basic core of the matter. It is
subordinate and it will always be so whether it be drugs,
terrorists, illegal aliens, money laundering or gun smuggling.
Mr. Mahoney. Ms. Shames, any thoughts on that in terms of
doing this?
Ms. Shames. As Mr. Jurich suggested, there would be other
merger issues to return AQI to USDA.
Mr. Mahoney. Well, now I am going to get Ms. Tighe involved
here. She is the expert on this. What are your thoughts
representing the Department of Agriculture?
Ms. Tighe. It is worth pointing out that there were certain
issues in APHIS prior to the functions moving to DHS that made
it a less than optimally run organization for purposes of doing
effective border inspections. Based on the recommendations we
have made that existed before the transition that are now being
acted upon, things seem to be moving on a modest upward trend.
Now the question is what would happen should the function move
back then to APHIS. We still have to deal with them
implementing the things they have told us they are going to
implement.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, do you have a comment
that you would like to make?
Mr. Taylor. I agree with Ms. Tighe on this. No matter which
way you go the coordination requirements between CBP and APHIS
do not go away. You can pull it back, but you still have a lot
of the same issues you need to address.
Mr. Mahoney. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I have to make an observation at
this point. When the United States engaged in the Manhattan
project when we had our tails down because we were bombed at
Pearl Harbor we didn't say that we couldn't get it done, we
just got it done. And we are being invaded by other folks
here--other things. We are invaded by pests. And this Committee
is telling the bureaucracy out there whether they are listening
or not that this is an important function, and it is time to
get it done; and that is what seems to be a disconnect here.
Mr. Neugebauer.
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, I agree exactly. There has been a
listing and whether it is a cultural problem or if it is a
structural problem we have to fix that. We can't wait around to
see if we are going to move it back--what are we going to do--
but a lot of people don't realize that agriculture is a
national security issue, and whether you want--one of my
friends said whether it is sexy or not but it is a national
security issue. How we feed America, making sure Americans have
safe food, making sure that we have the agricultural
infrastructure in place to be able to feed America, and if we
have a disease or something that comes into this country and
inflicts a substantial problem with American agriculture, we
have got an issue.
And so I think the Chairman is exactly right and I
appreciate Ranking Member Goodlatte's initiative early on in
this process, but we have heard what the problem is. I think
what we need to hear is pretty quickly how we are going to fix
those problems, rectify them. If we have people that feel like
that is not my job, then we need to give them a new job or they
need to go find a new job. But just to say we don't like this
structure or we don't like this cultural arrangement is an
unacceptable answer and not one that I think this Committee is
willing to take. And so as we move forward, Mr. Chairman, I
will be working right along side you and the Ranking Member and
the Chairman of the full Committee. This is something we have
to get right.
The Chairman. You are absolutely right, Mr. Neugebauer. I
think we are unanimous in that observation. I want to direct
the clerk, I don't know how to do this formally, but I would
like the answer of Mr. Jurich to Mr. Mahoney's question
highlighted in the record so that when we have the full
Committee hearing in a couple weeks, I want that to be the
start of where we begin that hearing because, frankly, what he
said in answer to Mr. Mahoney's question in my mind summarizes
the entire problem very well.
With that, thank you all for your testimony. Thank you for
your work. Thank you for your honesty in trying to get to the
bottom of this question. I would like to now call up our second
panel. Have the witnesses approach their places at the table.
We are going to start this hearing back up. I announced the
recess would be until 12:20 and I intended to keep to that time
line. So Mr. Mahoney is here, and we know that other Members
will be coming back. I realize that Members have some
significant challenges. We were actually preferring to put this
hearing over until 1 p.m. but some of the witnesses have
airplanes to catch, and we don't want to hold you up. You have
been so gracious to be here. So we are going to take your
testimony, start it. As the Members come in, we will
acknowledge that they have ability to ask questions, and we
will try to encourage everyone to get their say in, but we will
go ahead and take the testimony at this time.
Let me formally introduce panel number two if I can find my
information. Mr. Mahoney, you go ahead and introduce Mr.
Bronson since you have made that request.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a my pleasure
to introduce to the Subcommittee Charles Bronson, Florida
Commissioner of Agriculture, and a person who has a record of
public service and goes back a little bit of ways. He is a
fifth generation Floridian and traces his roots in agriculture
back to 1635. I hope you were making money back then, Mr.
Commissioner. But as Agriculture Commissioner he manages the
largest state Department of Agriculture in the country with
more than 3,700 employees. Mr. Bronson's priorities include
overseeing the state's vast agricultural industry and helping
to promote products, safeguarding the state's food supply,
protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices
and managing about 1 million acres of state forest.
Commissioner Bronson has received numerous honors and awards
including an FFA honorary national degree for outstanding
personal commitment, a Nature Conservative Legislative
Leadership Appreciation Award, a Florida Farm Bureau
legislative award, and both Florida Sheriff and Florida Police
Chiefs Association legislative awards.
The only thing bad I can say about him is that I think he
went to the University of Georgia, and that is not usually a
problem unless we have an occasional game against them. But it
is with great honor, Chairman Bronson, that you are here. You
have made the State of Florida proud. You are a great leader in
agriculture, and I have enjoyed having the opportunity of
working with you, and I look forward to hearing your testimony
today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Mahoney. We also have with us
today Mr. John McClung, President and CEO of the Texas Produce
Association, Mission, Texas, and I would guess that you are
here at the request of Mr. Neugebauer. It makes sense to me.
And welcome to the Committee, and I am sure Randy welcomes you
as well. And from my area, not quite from my district, but a
good friend for a number of years, Mr. Joel Nelsen, President
of California Citrus Mutual. He hails from Exeter, California.
Welcome, Joel. Thank you for being here. And thank you for
being a tireless critic of what is going on and keeping me
informed of this because you have driven a lot of the facts
that we are here today listening and taking this testimony from
your personal experience.
I have to tell you that I was sharing some of the previous
testimony we had received on that San Francisco incident with
citrus canker, and every Member that I mentioned that to during
the period of votes that we were just talking about were
absolutely outraged that someone who does their job gets
demoted for that. So we have a tremendous amount of work to do
on this topic. But thank you for being here with us. We are
going to start with Mr. Bronson. Mr. Bronson, please feel free
to begin with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES H. BRONSON, COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, TALLAHASSEE,
FL
Mr. Bronson. Thank you, Chairman Cardoza. Thank you very
much for having me here today to talk about issues at the State
of Florida level concerning these serious matters and to
Representative Mahoney, a good friend who has been a very
strong supporter of agriculture in our state and in the
country. You heard my background. We do have the largest
Department of Agriculture in the country, state Department of
Agriculture. And we have some very highly qualified individuals
doing the very same jobs that USDA does at the Federal level
and very extensive, I might add. I know that the Committee has
had a longstanding concern about the ramifications that have
arisen from the AQI functions going over to the Department of
Homeland Security. I also wanted to thank Representative
Goodlatte for his efforts in the past and currently on these
issues.
And I will tell you that I was at a meeting in Oklahoma
when the decision was made to make this move, and there wasn't
a single Commissioner of Agriculture elected, appointed
Secretary or Director of Agriculture in the country from any of
the states that thought this was a good move.
The Chairman. On a bipartisan basis.
Mr. Bronson. On a bipartisan basis, absolutely. And it is
because you have a law enforcement function, and I think DHS is
doing a great job of protecting us against incursion from those
who would attack us, but it is a different mission when you are
looking for pests and disease. And I just want to make sure
that everybody understands I still respect what DHS is doing
from that standpoint. We need to look at, which I think is one
of the most dangerous positions we can be in is in letting
plant and animal pests and disease come into our states and
into this country that is going to cripple our state economy
and our Federal economy and therefore cripple our national
security from our food supply, quality and quantity as well as
the protection of our people from different diseases that could
be spread.
We face a unique challenge. We have 28 ports of entry, 14
deepwater ports, 14 international airports. We have over 50
million visitors who come to our state every year, and we
receive over six million tons of perishable cargo annually: 88
percent of the flour imports, 55 percent of the fruit and
vegetable imports, and 85 percent of the plant imports that
come into our country come through the Port of Miami. That
coupled with our climate almost ensures us to be a breeding
ground for any pest or disease, both plant and animal, that may
be brought to our state. We find one new plant or animal pest
or disease a month in the State of Florida, and it is a
constant battle with us and costs us billions of dollars over
the years to take care of these problems.
Since the transfer of AQI in 2003 there has been a 27
percent increase in the number of new plant pests and diseases
discovered in my state.
The Chairman. Can you repeat that, sir?
Mr. Bronson. Since the 2003 transfer there has been a 27
percent increase in the number of new plant pests and diseases
discovered in the State of Florida. And these are some of the
examples, the chili thrips, which can attack numerous plant
types, and, by the way, the nursery industry is our first
industry of the state now and citrus has been moved to second
because of canker and greening problems that we have had. We
have the South African longhorn beetle, and some of the states
are fighting longhorn beetles in other areas of the country,
rice cutworm, gladiolus rust, and we have spent over $400,000
on that disease alone because it is very dangerous to our
industry. And now we are looking at the sugarcane, orange rust,
and, by the way, we have over 400,000 acres of sugarcane
growing in the State of Florida, and it is one of our major
crops, so we are very concerned about that.
At the writing of this report, Mr. Chairman, Members, we
had 25 counties in the State of Florida out of the 67 that had
citrus greening. Since this report was written, and by the time
I got here today, two more counties have been found with citrus
greening in the State of Florida. We are now at 27 as of today.
And because of this greening, we had to implement new
regulations that mandate all citrus plant production must be
inside approved structures of greenhouses. In other words
everything will have to be grown from the ground level inside
greenhouses before it is reintroduced into any of the fields.
We have lost over 900,000 trees or actually we are 900,000
trees short of what we need to replant, and we have raised the
price of those young trees from $4.00, what they were worth,
now to over $10.00 because of the lack of the numbers that we
have for replanting.
The estimates to the citrus industry alone which is a $9
billion industry and has over 900,000 jobs--or 90,000 jobs in
the state's economy is going to cost that industry about $375
million annually for all these pest and disease problems that
we are having and how to handle them. Nearly 18 percent of all
foreign pests and disease interceptions are in Miami, the
highest rate for any city. And I am not as much concerned about
what they are catching right now because we have determined
based on all kinds of reports that we have seen that less than
6 percent of the actual products are able to be inspected
because of a lack of inspectors and those types of things. I am
worried about the 94 percent of those products that come
through our state and into our state and go to your states, and
what is left there that didn't get caught and what is being
spread there is what is in my opinion shocking.
We receive a high volume of commercial and passenger
traffic from the Caribbean, and we know that because of USDA's
working with us and our own inspectors how much activity of
pest and disease is in the Caribbean as well. Eighty percent of
all animals can pass zoonotic diseases onto humans, 80 percent.
That is how dangerous allowing one of those animals that is
diseased out before it has been properly kept in quarantine.
And you not only have the disease spread from animals to humans
of some very bad diseases but you also have some spread through
feces and other things of animals back to plant material that
have caused some things. Mr. Chairman, in your own state that
can happen if you don't catch these animals in time.
No one believes that port exclusion activities will
completely eliminate the introduction of foreign pests and
diseases. We understand that but the quicker we find out about
them and be able to work between the states and Federal
Government agencies the quicker we can get around it. In short,
Mr. Chairman, the most important thing that we have to make
sure is no matter where this Congress decides this AQI should
go if the manpower is not adequate and the funding doesn't
follow, we won't be any better off than we are right now, and I
hope that however you decide to do this that the manpower and
the money will follow. That is my statement, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bronson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles H. Bronson, Commissioner, Florida
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Tallahassee, FL
My name is Charles Bronson and I am Florida's Commissioner of
Agriculture. My Department, the Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services (FDACS), is the largest state Department of
Agriculture in the country with over 3,700 employees. FDACS has a broad
and varied statutory mission in Florida that covers everything from
food safety and forestry to consumer services and aquaculture. These
are in addition, of course, to the plant and animal duties borne by
most state departments of agriculture. Even with all of these areas of
operation, FDACS spends the majority of its time and resources on
protecting our agricultural industry from the spread of pests and
diseases. Agriculture is Florida's second largest industry with farm
gate receipts over $7.8 billion and an estimated annual economic impact
of $97.8 billion. Protecting this industry from pests and diseases is a
job that we simply cannot afford to fail at.
I want to express my appreciation to the Chairman and Ranking
Member for not only inviting me to testify on an issue that has great
importance to my state of Florida, but also for all of your actions
relative to bringing the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI)
program back to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). I
know that this Committee has had a long standing concern about the
ramifications that have arisen from the transfer of AQI to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am very grateful to Ranking
Member Goodlatte for his foresight in ensuring this Committee never
allowed the AQI functions and the ensuing transfer problems to fade
away from Congressional scrutiny. Over the last 4 years, I have been
very outspoken about my concerns regarding the lack of attention the
agriculture function was receiving from DHS officials and I appreciate
the time he and his staff have given to our concerns.
Let me be clear, I am extremely supportive of the role that DHS
plays in protecting our shores from intentional terror attacks. They
have done a phenomenal job in carrying out that specific mission.
Unfortunately, DHS has been trained to focus on people and cargo that
would purposefully harm U.S. citizens and businesses. Agricultural
pests and diseases are almost always brought into the U.S. by people or
companies who do not intend to cause harm. Whether a foreign traveler
who brings fruits, vegetables or meat products to family and friends or
a foreign company that has exported a product to sell here, both of
these can cause tremendous economic damage if not properly inspected,
and appropriate mitigation measures employed, for pests or diseases.
This economic damage can equal, if not exceed, those caused by
intentional acts. I sit here before you today knowing all to well the
economic impacts a foreign pest or disease can have on both an
agricultural sector as well as a state's economy.
In Florida, we face a unique challenge in that we have over 28
ports of entry (including 14 deep water ports and 14 airports), nearly
50 million visitors a year and six million tons of perishable cargo
that enters our state every year: 88% of the flower imports, 55% of the
fruit and vegetable imports and 85% of the plant imports that come into
the country come in through Miami. That, coupled with a climate that
ranges from tropical to temperate depending on where you are in the
state ensures that our agricultural production is at great risk of a
pest or disease incursion. In fact, historically, we discover one new
foreign plant or animal pest or disease a MONTH in Florida. It is a
battle we fight on a daily basis.
Since AQI was transferred to DHS in 2003, there has been a 27%
increase in the number of new plant pests and disease incursions in the
state of Florida. Chili thrips, South American longhorn beetle,
gladiolus rust and citrus greening are just a few examples. Chili
thrips is a serious insect that attacks over 100 different plants and
is a major pest of strawberries, cotton, soybeans and chilies. We have
spent over $400,000 on eradication efforts for gladiolus rust and the
damage the longhorn beetle is causing to trees in my state is still
being determined. Even more serious and economically damaging than
these is citrus greening. The presence of this disease, now in 25 of
Florida's counties including some of our largest citrus production
areas, has resulted in the implementation of new regulations that
mandate all citrus plant production must be inside approved structures.
The consequences of these regulations to Florida's citrus industry is
that we are 900,000 trees short of what is needed for new plantings and
the price of new citrus trees has increased from $4.00 per tree to over
$10.00. Total costs of this disease to an industry that contributes $9
billion and 90,000 jobs to the state's economy have yet to be fully
calculated but preliminary estimates suggest it will be in excess of
$375 million annually.
In fact, the last few months have resulted in detections of two
potentially devastating pests--sugarcane orange rust and the rice
cutworm. My Department, working in conjunction with USDA-APHIS, is
still in the process of delimiting these infestations given their
recent detection, but I have no doubt there will be both economic and
ecological impacts felt in my state from them.
Nearly 18% of all foreign pest and disease interceptions are in
Miami, the highest rate for any city. But I am not as concerned with
what they are catching. It is what they aren't that is the problem. And
unfortunately, due to Florida's plant and animal diversity, I usually
find out about what they missed when we find it on a plant or animal
species in Florida. If we can get to it quickly, then the costs can be
contained. But if we don't catch it quickly and it has spread, then the
costs to the Federal Government, the state government and industry can
be enormous. While quarantines can help mitigate the spread, the
reality is that they will never be 100% effective. And we can't always
count on our exporting countries in this effort. For some, a pest or
disease that could have devastating impacts in the U.S. is not a
problem in its native habitat so there is no recognition of risk.
Others, including some in the Caribbean Region, have no functioning
plant protection organization. Florida receives a high volume of
commercial and passenger traffic from the Caribbean and so we have been
actively involved in efforts within USDA to mitigate the risks these
countries pose to my state through both onshore and offshore
activities.
But it is not just plant pests and diseases that cause me concern.
Recently we have received reports of birds imported as pets bypassing
quarantine facilities in Miami. Or animal hides brought into the
country for taxidermy purposes arriving with ticks attached yet DHS
failed to notify USDA. Further, there seems to be a lack of rigorous
enforcement of cleaning and disinfection procedures for animal and
animal by product (such as semen) shipping containers. Believe me when
I say hearing stories such as these cause a state Agriculture
Commissioner to lose sleep at night.
No one believes that port exclusion activities will completely
eliminate the introduction of foreign pests and diseases. But neither
will offshore threat identification and mitigation efforts alone. In
fact, APHIS relies on close collaborations with the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the
Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES)
for surveys, risk assessments and research for both their onshore and
offshore activities. These collaborations are an integral part of
APHIS' operations. The port exclusion activities are critically
important since many of APHIS' offshore mitigation activities are
deployed based on DHS' pest/disease entry interceptions. We must
therefore, have a functioning and effective AQI if APHIS' overall risk
identification and mitigation strategy is to be successful.
Florida is a good example of a situation where the global
marketplace, increasing imports of agricultural goods and the number of
international travelers overwhelms our safeguarding systems to
effectively deter establishment or achieve early detection.
Unfortunately, this situation is not unique to Florida. I recently met
with my colleagues around the country during our annual National
Association of State Departments of Agriculture meeting. Pest and
disease is always on the agenda as it seems we are fighting a never
ending battle. My good friend in Hawaii, Sandra Kunimoto, the Chair of
the Hawaii Department of Agriculture, shared with me that the varroa
mite, a pest that devastates honeybee colonies, was recently discovered
on the Island of Oahu which has the potential to cause millions of
dollars in damage to Hawaii's queen bee producers who, due to their
previous mite-free status, have built a thriving queen bee industry.
She also shared with me the devastation the erythrina gall wasp has
caused to native trees throughout the state, killing many different
species and requiring significant resources for tree removal. In
addition, the culturally significant taro plant is threatened by a
disease that has been detected on imports of a different type of taro
called dasheen. While DHS has told Hawaiian officials about the amounts
of taro that have been intercepted, they will not divulge any
information as to inspections or the destination of the shipments so as
to allow Hawaiian officials to conduct inspections of intended
destinations in the state.
DHS is responsible only for exclusion activities for pests and
diseases. If they fail in their mission, there is no consequence for
their inaction. The entities that have had to deal with the
consequences, USDA and all of its agencies that collaborate on pests
and diseases such as ARS, USFS and CSREES, as well as state and
industry stakeholders, have had little choice the last 4 years other
than to deal with the repercussions of DHS' failure in this arena. This
includes the significant costs associated with mitigation, suppression
and eradication activities. These costs can quickly reach the tens of
millions of dollars. Citrus canker, for example, ended up costing a
combined Federal-state total of nearly $1 billion.
DHS is fond of saying that with all three inspection entities
combined into one agency, there are more sets of eyes looking for
foreign pests and diseases. I look at it a little differently. I fear
that the inspectors are becoming a little like ``jack of all trades,
masters of none''. Moving AQI inspectors back to USDA accomplishes two
very important things. First, it ensures that agriculture inspectors
are dedicated full time to preventing a pest or disease incursion. But
also, and I would say this was perhaps even more important, it allows
the inspection workforce that remains at DHS to focus solely and
completely on preventing a terrorist attack or weapon of mass
destruction from damaging the United States. Neither one has their
mission diluted. Rather than weakening the current infrastructure, I
see a transfer of AQI back to USDA as strengthening both USDA and DHS
in their primary mission area.
Again Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing on
an issue that you can see I feel very strongly about. I look forward to
working with you on this issue in the future and would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Bronson. Mr.
McClung.
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. McCLUNG, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TEXAS PRODUCE
ASSOCIATION, MISSION, TX
Mr. McClung. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is John
McClung. I am the President of the Texas Produce Association
headquartered in the lower Rio Grande Valley. The Association
represents the interests of growers, shippers, and importers of
fresh fruits and vegetables, and I want to thank you for both
holding the hearing today and for allowing me to participate. I
am sure you know the fresh fruit and vegetable industry is
rapidly globalizing. The USDA has just released a study on
imports, and it points out that between 1990-1992 and 2004-
2006, between those two windows, average annual imports in this
country jumped from $2.7 billion to $7.9 billion worth of
fruits and vegetables.
It also reported that 44 percent of U.S. fresh fruit
consumption and 16 percent of fresh vegetables comes from
imports in 2003-2005. That is up 31 percent from about 20 years
earlier. Texas, as a southern border state with a strong
investment in produce, has been directly and substantially
impacted by that surge in imports. Twenty years ago, Texas was
the number three state in terms of fresh fruits and vegetable
production in the nation. We always lag behind California and
Florida. In 2001 when Congress passed the block grants that
were distributed based on sales volume to the states, we had
slipped to 10th place in production tied with New York, but
those numbers are very misleading because during that same time
period while our domestic production was slipping our imports
were increasing dramatically. We now are over half of what we
sell to the rest of the country as imports, most of it from
Mexico, and those numbers are increasing while domestic
production decreases, and that business is going to continue to
grow.
The core problem for purposes of this discussion today is
that as you increase imports you also increase the risk of
foreign pests, particularly imports that are coming out of
Latin America which has a pest base that is really problematic
for us. So we spend a lot of time in the Rio Grande Valley
trying to figure out how to avoid infestation by canker and
greening. Those diseases have been mentioned earlier today. We
watched those two diseases devastate the fresh citrus industry
in Florida, and in the process defeat the best efforts of the
state and Federal Government to prevent the introduction and
subsequently to curtail their spread. We are exceedingly
fearful that should either of those two diseases gain a
foothold in Texas they would decimate our citrus industry in
short order.
And those are only two examples. There is a long list of
potential pests that could be exceedingly damaging. Our shield
against those threats is the government's import inspection
service. Now everybody knows that following 9/11 AQI went over
to Department of Homeland Security. The industry at the time
believed the shift was unwise, but, obviously, the momentum
then was such that you didn't get very far with that argument.
Since then we have worked diligently trying to get DHS to put
the proper emphasis on AQI but we have been consistently
disappointed. In the dynamic, in the competition within that
agency between bugs, drugs, and thugs, obviously bugs get short
shifted. We are always playing second fiddle if not third
fiddle. And I don't see any way that that is going to change as
long as AQI remains under DHS. It is the nature of the animal.
I won't try and improve on the GAO review released in May
of 2006, but I will tell you that we generally agree with the
analysis. It is of real concern to us that DHS insists that
they are making progress and we see deterioration ongoing in
the inspection process. I am over my time limit. I will close
this out, but I do want you to know that before I came down
here today I called some of the folks that are DHS employees at
the Pharr/Reynosa Bridge, which is where most produce comes
into South Texas, and these are people I have worked with for
years, and there is a level of trust and respect, I hope, set
up. These people won't even talk to me about this. They won't
return phone calls. Finally, after multiple phone calls, I get
a call from some guy I don't know with Customs and Border
Protection, and his best effort is to refer me to a website in
Washington I can access if I want to know more about the
agency.
I have never seen these people so concerned about talking
about their situation.
The Chairman. Would you characterize it, sir, as
intimidation?
Mr. McClung. I am not on the receiving end of that. I am
reluctant to do so. I just know that they have always talked to
me before about important things that were worth discussing,
and I think that the testimony this morning was accurate. DHS
is an agency that discourages communication at least with the
outside, and I think that is what is going on here. Is it
intimidation for the agricultural inspectors? I think so. I
don't know that it is a systemic process but I know they are
certainly limited in what they are willing to say to you.
In any event, I think it is important to note that the
coalition of produce industry groups, 120 of us or so, that
have been working on farm bill issues are generally of the
opinion that our interests can only be served long term if AQI
goes back to APHIS, that it can't happen under DHS, and that is
based on the experience of trying to make it work under DHS.
What we ultimately need is an AQI program that works, that is
housed in the agency that puts foreign pest exclusion above its
other priorities, and that is not going to happen in DHS in our
opinion. I want to thank you for allowing me to appear today,
and I welcome any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McClung follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. McClung, President and CEO, Texas Produce
Association, Mission, TX
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. My name is John McClung.
I am President of the Texas Produce Association, headquartered in
Mission, Texas, in the Rio Grande Valley. The Association represents
the interests of growers, shippers and importers of fresh fruits and
vegetables. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to present my association's views on produce import inspections
and this nation's efforts to defend itself against destructive foreign
pests.
As I'm sure you know, the fresh fruit and vegetable industry is
rapidly globalizing. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has just
released a study entitled ``Increased U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruits and
Vegetables.'' That study points out that between 1990-1992 and 2004-
2006, average annual imports into this country jumped from $2.7 billion
to $7.9 billion. It also reported that 44 percent of U.S. fresh fruit
consumption and 16 percent of fresh vegetables came from imports in
2003-2005. That's up from 31 percent for fresh fruit and 9 percent for
vegetables in 1983-1985.
Texas, as a southern border state with a strong investment in
produce, has been directly and substantially impacted by the surge in
imports. Some 20 years ago, Texas was the number three producer of
fresh fruits and vegetables among the states. When the 2001 block
grants to horticulture were passed by the Congress, with distribution
based on sales volume, Texas had slipped to tenth place, tied with New
York. Importantly, that ranking was based solely on domestic
production. In reality, distribution from Texas to consumers nationwide
increased over those same years; the apparent discrepancy was, and is,
that over 50 percent of our sales within the state and outside the
state are of foreign produce, the great bulk of it from Mexico. In
2005, for example, Texas points of entry from Mexico recorded some
76,577 loads of fresh fruits and vegetables. At 40 to 44,000 pounds per
load, that's obviously a lot of produce.
Let me give you just one specific example. Last year, Texas
imported some 20,000 forty pound boxes of large limes from Mexico.
That's most of the limes we consume in the U.S. Go back 25 years or
more, and those limes came from Florida. There probably aren't 200
commercial acres of limes left in Florida, nor are there commercial
acres elsewhere in the U.S. By comparison, we only produced some 10,000
forty pound boxes of oranges and grapefruit combined, so our imports of
limes were about double our production of citrus in the state. And we
expect the business to grow. For Texas, that growth is driven by
greater consumer demand, and also by business realities. At the current
price of diesel fuel, it costs roughly $1000 to $1500 less to run a
truck to the East Coast if it comes through South Texas than if it
enters the U.S. further west. That makes a lot of difference to the
bottom line of importers and truckers alike.
I can't resist pointing out that unless the Congress is able to
quickly resolve the immigration reform issue, more and more of the
grower/shippers in Texas will accelerate the trend of moving production
to Mexico and elsewhere offshore. I have no one on the board of the
association, and few of any size in the industry, who are not working
both sides of the frontier. If we cannot secure labor in the U.S., we
will move operations to where we can find labor. Then we will have
succeeded in outsourcing yet another U.S. industry.
Back to the issue at hand. The core problem is that as imports
increase, so do the risks from foreign pests. We spend a lot of time in
the Rio Grande Valley trying to figure out how to avoid infestation by
citrus canker or greening. We've watched these two bacterial diseases
devastate the fresh citrus industry in Florida, and in the process
defeat the best efforts of state and Federal Government to prevent
their introduction and then curtail their spread. We are exceedingly
fearful that should either of these two diseases gain a foothold in
Texas, they would decimate our citrus industry in short order. We only
have some 28,000 acres of citrus in Texas, compared with about 700,000
acres in Florida and 335-350,000 acres in California. Our entire
commercial citrus production area is only about 50 miles long and maybe
20 miles deep, so we feel terribly vulnerable.
And these are only two examples of potential pests that could do us
grave economic damage in both our fruit and vegetable sectors. For many
years, we have battled against Mexican fruit flies in the Rio Grande
Valley, where we are at the northern extreme of their range. I am
pleased to report that because of an increased effort on the part of
USDA to suppress Mexflies in the state, we finally appear to be winning
that battle, at least for now. Any advances we have made have been the
result of expanded resources and focused attention from APHIS in both
the U.S. and Mexico. That is the kind of effort we need at our borders
to deal successfully with many other pests.
Our shield against these threats is the government's import
inspection service. Following 9/11, as we are all well aware, the
Agriculture Quarantine Inspection functions previously housed in the
Agriculture and Plant Inspection Service at USDA were transferred over
to the Department of Homeland Security. The industry thought the shift
unwise at the time, but the momentum could not be successfully
challenged.
Since then, we have worked diligently to try to get the Department
of Homeland Security to put the proper emphasis on AQI, but we have
been consistently disappointed. In the competition within the agency
between ``bugs'' and ``thugs,'' we inevitably play second fiddle. When
we complain, we always get various versions of two themes from the
agency; sometimes they tell us they are aware of the problem, they're
working on it, they just need a little more time. On other occasions
they tell us they have bested the early organizational problems and are
actually doing a better job of it than APHIS ever did. We simply don't
agree.
I won't try to improve on the GAO review of AQI functions released
in May of 2006, but I will tell you that we generally agree with that
analysis. It is of real concern to us that while DHS insists there are
more inspectors working on agriculture because of cross-training, in
fact the GAO study confirmed that even the previous APHIS inspectors
were doing fewer product inspections and more non-agriculture work. In
another telltale measure, some 60 percent of inspectors felt their job
was not respected by CBP officers and management.
In talking with inspectors and supervisors at the Pharr/Reynosa
bridge, which is about 5 miles from my office and is the most important
produce port of entry by far between Texas and Mexico, employees are
very guarded about what they say, but they are quick to tell you that
they can only skim the surface because they are just too few and
resources are too limited given the emphasis on border security and
terrorism.
I do want to note that we had our differences with APHIS, too, when
that agency was responsible for AQI. Perhaps one of the most vexing
issues for the industry was, and continues to be, the government's
insistence on working bankers' hours at the crossing points. It is the
nature of our perishable industry to want to move product in the
afternoon, after picking and packing in the morning, but it is
government's nature to quit for the day at about 4 or 4:30 in the
afternoon. So our trucks sit on the bridge approaches or in impoundment
lots over night. But that's a worry for another day, and in any event,
we in industry aren't always as efficient as we might be.
In fairness, DHS does seem to be trying to improve the AQI
function. But in the grand scheme of things, they are much more
inclined to put resources into counterterrorism than they are into
foreign pest prevention. The irony is that in economic terms, the real
terrorists may well prove to be the six and eight legged variety. One
credible recent study put economic damage from foreign pests at around
$120 billion annually. I'm not aware that terrorists slipping across
our borders are exacting such a toll. It is also obvious that there
were many difficulties during the long transition period between USDA
and DHS that have either been addressed, to some extent, or at least
papered over. And there are those who believe that it would be best at
this point to try to make the most of DHS rather than creating a whole
new period of upheaval by sending AQI back to USDA. But it is our
perception that import protections actually are eroding at the very
time they should be improving.
The coalition of some 120 regional, state and national produce
organizations working on farm bill issues--the Specialty Crop Farm Bill
Alliance--recommends a transfer back to APHIS. Our objectives are
simple to explain, if not to implement: we want a Federal AQI program
housed in an agency that puts foreign pest exclusion above all other
priorities, and we believe the experience of the past few years shows
that only can happen in the long run under USDA. We advocate
legislation consistent with the proposals from Chairman Cardoza,
Senator Feinstein and others to move AQI back to where it originated,
for good reason, in USDA.
Again, thank you for allowing me to testify today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McClung. Mr. Nelsen. Have at
it, my friend.
STATEMENT OF JOEL A. NELSEN, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA CITRUS
MUTUAL, EXETER, CA
Mr. Nelsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Members
of the Committee. As already noted, my name is Joel Nelsen,
President of California Citrus Mutual, which is a citrus
producers' trade association in California. Our membership is
throughout the state, 2,200 farm families farming over 300,000
acres of citrus, a value exceeding $1.3 billion. Where I live
is the number one agricultural region in the world. Where I
reside is the number one agricultural state in the nation. This
is a serious issue. In my written statement, I explain in depth
our credentials that allow us to speak on the issue. Simply
stated, we have been quarantined as a result of an invasive
pest, and we were the lead organization in the mid-1990s that
led the floor fight that changed the method of funding the
agricultural inspection program to what it is today.
The failure of our pest exclusion system that we face today
is one of cost borne by the Department of Agriculture, by state
government, by local government, and by stakeholders in
agriculture. The failures have manifested themselves to a point
where local government is demanding that we, the victims, help
defray the cost of eradication. At the Federal level the costs
have been so outlandish that OMB now requires sign off before
APHIS can engage in a major eradication program. Metaphorically
speaking that is akin to the fire captain seeking permission
from the mayor prior to engaging in fire depression and then
asking the victim for a check before he can release water from
the hose.
We understand the nuances of this program. We get the
budgeting. We understand the risks and the pressures. We have
been a valuable member of the USDA support team in the past,
and we will continue to do so in the future. We are now a
member of the DHS team that evaluates this program. They tried
to put more guard dogs in front of the door but it didn't work.
We still get in. Soon after Homeland Security was housed a
group of specialty crop association execs, John McClung and
myself are two of them, met with then Commissioner Bonner and
Assistant Commissioner Jay Ahern. We were assured that the
program would be better than ever. ``One face at the border
would work,'' they said. ``There are more inspectors now
working to protect agriculture,'' we were told.
``We are sensitive to the concerns, and we remain open to
stakeholder communications,'' so we were told. ``Training and
education will be cornerstones of the program,'' we were told.
``We have an excellent working relationship with USDA,'' we
were told. It sounds great. It sounds familiar. And we all know
it didn't happen. We now know that the quality of the program
has suffered tremendously. Notwithstanding the above, the dog
team program was allowed to deteriorate immensely. AQI dollars
were not properly utilized and there has been a massive
turnover in personnel. There never was the harmonious
relationship with the Department of Agriculture. We have come
from an understaffed, highly trained team to an understaffed
team of new personnel spread too thin with too many ports, too
many responsibilities, and too little ability to focus on the
agricultural mission.
We raise concerns that in the past 3 years no less than
five reports were issued all of which spoke to a deteriorating
system. I don't believe we need another report. I have listed
those in my written testimony and they are for everybody to
evaluate obviously. I, myself, conducted a minimum of four to
five meetings with DHS in the past 4 years seeking
clarification on improvement efforts. After the last report,
our specialty crop industry met with the authors at GAO. We
then unanimously came to a conclusion, the program must be
transferred back to the Department of Agriculture. Transfer it
back to the managers that understand the importance of the
program. Transfer it back to the team that trained line
employees. Transfer it back to the team that establishes the
benchmarks for success and establishes operational guidelines,
transfer it back to a home where the productivity and quality
of the program blooms rather than deteriorates.
Simply stated, it is now a management issue. It is
remarkable that the efforts of this Committee during the farm
bill debate, legislation introduced by Congressman Putnam, and
the introduction of S. 887 by Senator Feinstein to accomplish
that objective has all resulted in one thing, a massive
communication outreach by CBP-DHS to stakeholders such as
myself. Well, for me it is too late. This is why we supported
Congressman Putnam. This is why we supported this Committee's
efforts. This is why we are supporting Senator Feinstein and
her efforts. We are through with second chances, done with
third chances, and tired of fourth chances. It is not as if a
path for improvement had never been identified. It is simply a
fact that management did nothing with it.
The issue is one of management and focus. Do we accept
statements that management had been reborn and better
appreciates how best to accomplish the objective, or do we
transfer the program back to a management team that has created
the path for this rebirth. Almost 100 percent of the bullet
points for improvement identified in all of the reports signed
this past June require the creativity, direction, and training
by APHIS. Don't ask us to believe that the management team that
created the decline in operations is going to sustain that
which is being rebuilt for them now. Give it another chance.
Why? Why maintain the status quo? Let us have one team,
singularly focused, working in a climate where job performance
is recognized and rewarded. Transferring this program was a
good idea that just didn't work. Not recognizing that from a
management perspective just compounds the error. Adoptions are
a great thing but in most cases there is no place like home.
Move it back. Thank you for your time and attention to this
issue, and I appreciate this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joel A. Nelsen, President, California Citrus
Mutual, Exeter, CA
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee; as noted
my name is Joel Nelsen and I am President of California Citrus Mutual
(CCM), a citrus producers' trade association in California. Our
membership is statewide and consists of 2,200 farm families producing
citrus on almost 300,000 acres, with an economic value exceeding $1.3
billion. CCM greatly appreciates the opportunity to share our views and
concerns on an issue that is extremely important to the California
citrus industry.
Today I want to provide a justification for why CCM and other
industry organizations strongly support legislation to transfer the
Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) functions from the
Department of Homeland Security back to the Department of Agriculture
(H.R. 2629 and S. 887). We want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for
including this legislation in the House Agriculture Committee-approved
version of the 2007 Farm Bill, and we also want to commend Congressman
Putnam and Senator Feinstein for their leadership on this issue in the
House and the Senate. CCM strongly believes that this legislation is
necessary to ensure the protection of U.S. agriculture from the threat
of invasive pests and diseases.
As an industry totally reliant upon fresh fruit sales for economic
viability, we have always been sensitive to issues surrounding invasive
pests and diseases. We have suffered through quarantines in the San
Diego and Riverside areas. We have lost lemon sales in Ventura County
as a result a of medfly outbreak. Fruit flies in Fresno County have
limited our ability to export to China.
These quarantines adversely impact sales, require specific cultural
practices that destroy integrated pest management programs, cost jobs
and are a public relations nightmare. They have a tremendous negative
cost impact on state and local government not withstanding the hundreds
of millions of dollars allocated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The ripple effects are countless, ranging from transportation, ports,
and local businesses.
Our state and our industry was the first to partner with USDA and
utilize a sterile fly approach to eradication programs. Our industry
has always been at the forefront of efforts to maximize budget support
for pest exclusion activities at the state and Federal level. The
challenges in this area have been increasing, with the most notable at
the Federal level now being a mandate that the Office of Management and
Budget agree to eradication dollars before they are spent by USDA. I
submit that's synonymous with a fire chief calling a mayor and needing
to receive permission to race to a site in order to put out a fire.
The cost and frequency of these programs have now reached a level
that has triggered action by state and local government to seek
financial support to help underwrite eradication programs from impacted
stakeholders. Going back to my fire chief metaphor that's synonymous
with a home owner being forced to write a check to the fire captain
before the water is released. Specialty crop growers are the primary
victims in this alarming scenario.
In 1994, our organization, along with a sister group in California,
led the effort to change the funding methodology for agricultural
inspection at ports of entry. We led the charge for authorization and
then helped the Agricultural Committee in the floor fight with
appropriators. The existing method for funding port of entry
inspections was achieved during that fight.
I make mention of all this to emphasize the fact that we are an
integral part of and supporter for the ag inspection program. Staff
members of APHIS are very tired of me as I constantly participate and
advocate in their budget, policy, education and implementation
components of this valuable program. The Department of Homeland
Security is now becoming well aware of us also.
We have a passion for the program, we understand it and no other
agricultural entity has a greater working knowledge of this program.
This passion was first presented to DHS in 2003 when a small group of
CEO's from agricultural organizations across the country met with
Commissioner Bonner and senior assistant Jay Ahern. At that meeting we
were assured of the following: that the program would be better than
ever; that one face at the border would work; that there are more
inspectors working to protect agriculture with the merger of Customs &
Border Protection; that CBP is sensitive to our concerns and remains
open to stakeholder communications; that training and education will be
cornerstones of the program; and that we have an excellent working
relationship with USDA. These statements were elements of that
discussion.
Unfortunately, this situation did not materialize. Since then I
have had no less than six meetings at DHS headquarters in which I was
assured identified problems were being corrected. Identified problems
ranged from the slowness of the training program, adequate utilization
of AQI dollars, the reduction in interceptions, interagency battles, a
major deterioration of the beagle brigade program, and high staff
turnover, just to name a few.
In 2004, I took a copy of a California Department of Food &
Agriculture report entitled Protecting California from Biological
Pollution which dealt with invasive species, thereby emphasizing the
need to ``get the DHS act together'' so to speak. My colleagues and I
became alarmed at the attrition rate as new management styles and new
priorities encumbered the mission of USDA transfers. We soon asked
respective Members of Congress to initiate their own studies.
Below is a brief listing of what was collectively developed:
May 2004, a Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress on Border Security and Agriculture;
March 2005, GAO report determines that defenses against
agro-terrorism needs bolstering;
May 2006, GAO report states that Management & Coordination
Problems Increase Agriculture Vulnerability;
November 2006, GAO report to House Agriculture Committee
regarding Agricultural Specialists Views of Program Efficacy
after the transfer; and
February 2007, OIG report by DHS and USDA reviewing their
joint activity and program efficacy.
The DHS response basically was recruiting an APHIS employee to run
the program at DHS. The position was filled, but he had no staff nor
budget for too long a period of time. Meanwhile, institutional
knowledge left in droves, position vacancies remained and the quality
of the program suffered. That's the opinion of the industry which was
subsequently confirmed by the plethora of reports listed above. After
the November 2006, GAO report was published members of the specialty
crop industry requested and received a meeting with the report authors.
Our understanding of the report was confirmed. Our fears of quality and
quantity reductions were being realized. The people were over-extended,
management was not focused and our risk was magnified.
Thus, our industry came to the conclusion that enough was enough;
the program must be transferred back to where it belongs, at the
Department of Agriculture. The transfer was a well-intended effort that
just didn't work. Good ideas don't always work, but the real failure is
not recognizing that an effort is failing and doing nothing to correct
it. We mounted an effort to accomplish the only solution visible,
transfer of the functions back to the agency which believed this
inspection program was a priority. Transfer it back to managers that
understood the importance and the nuances of this inspection effort.
Transfer it back to a home where the productivity and quality of the
program blooms rather deteriorates.
That is why we encouraged Members of Congress to introduce
legislation to transfer the AQI program back to USDA's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service. The response by DHS to the introduction of
this legislation in Congress has been amazing. Rather than simple
verbal responses we received a game plan in writing. There was a joint
session with stakeholders and the two agencies (albeit with only a 2
week notice). Outreach exploded and a road map developed.
Communications were forwarded to Members of Congress as to how and why
the program is and will be improved. There's a massive effort, now, to
revitalize, reenergize and rebuild the program.
There's a greater appreciation of the mission, more enlightenment
as to how best to carry it out. It's almost as if a rebirth is
occurring and we should allow the status quo to mature. I've heard it
before and now it's in writing. We heard it in 2003. I heard it in a
meeting on December 9, 2004; July 19, 2005, and then again February 3,
2006. I have heard it in industry meetings and private discussions for
the past 4 years.
Well, we're through with second chances, done with third chances,
and tired of fourth chances. It's not as if a path for improvement had
never been identified. I read the reports, you read the reports but
nobody of consequence acted as a result of the reports. And now the
agencies and certain Members of Congress ask us for one more chance
with the status quo?
That fact remains that DHS has failed to properly implement this
component of their mission. But who pays the price? Stakeholders are
quarantined, USDA and states are responsible for the eradication
project, but from DHS all we get is another pledge. A close examination
of the training regime speaks to the fact that almost an entire team of
1,800 transfers has been hired and trained to replace original
employees. The diverse dynamics of the existing CBP mission may not be
compatible.
I do not believe that a transfer back to USDA would lead to another
degradation of the program or another ``cultural shock'' which was one
excuse after the original transfer. The employees would be working for
the management team that trained them, established the benchmarks for
improvement, established the operational guidelines and that have the
passion for the mission. That's defined as one team on the same page at
all times. That's defined as a management team that is singularly
focused and creates a climate of responsibility for optimum job
performance, satisfaction, reward, recognition and ultimately success.
It's now a management issue, not a line or personnel problem.
A tremendous amount of rhetoric is being disseminated regarding the
efforts and efficacy of the new personnel and new and improved program.
But the reality is that we have heard it all before. Sure, we all want
to believe in the new energy, but it's a management problem. The
framework does not exist at the Department of Homeland Security to
achieve the desired results. Four years worth of history proves that
point. Adoptions are a great thing but in most cases there is no place
like home.
CCM strongly urges Congress to enact legislation to transfer the
AQI program from DHS back to USDA's APHIS (H.R. 2629 and S. 887). We
believe this will greatly improve the AQI function and is necessary to
adequately protect U.S. agricultural producers and other stakeholders
from the threat and highly adverse impacts of invasive pests and
diseases.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to express CCM's views in an
effort to improve the efficiency of an important government program.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Nelsen. As I listen to the
three of you speak it is indicative to me what is wrong in
government so often, and it is a frustration that so many of us
have that I will go home and I will listen to my constituents
at a rotary club. They will say how come Congress isn't doing
something, and we are trying. And I don't know if we are going
to have to have Mr. Mahoney and I carry pickets in bug suits
out in front of the Department of Homeland Security but if that
is what it takes, we may just do that. But I will tell you that
we are not going to let this drop, and if I were the folks at
Homeland Security, I would be very afraid of what is going to
happen because we are going to keep after them and after them
and after them until they get the message.
Mr. Bronson, you state that new pests and disease
incursions in Florida have increased 27 percent since the
transfer in 2003. Do you have any sense on how much import
volume has increased since 2003?
Mr. Bronson. I can get you the volume figures. I will tell
you it has increased and of course our free trade issues are
bringing in more produce from various countries that have pests
and disease, and we knew that from the beginning so we know
that that is part of that increase as well. However, we know
there are not as many people inspecting. We know that the
morale level is low. I heard earlier, I think I heard a
statement saying that they trained the inspectors for pest and
disease--16 hours of training. Mr. Chairman, I have people who
have worked in this for 20 and 30 years, and they are still
learning about pest and disease. I am a law enforcement
officer. I am a state-certified officer, and I can tell you the
mindset is I can take a pathologist in plant and animal
diseases and train them to be a police officer a lot easier
than I am going to train a trained police officer to look for
insects, pest and disease that they don't understand, don't
know, and don't know how they react in the food supply. They
are just not going to be capable of doing that.
That is why I have my law enforcement division totally
separated from my plant and animal pest and disease inspectors
because if there is a violation of law they will call my law
enforcement agency and together they will go out and do the
process. But now I have got both issues covered, and that is
what I think needs to happen here again at the Federal level.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Mr. McClung, in your
testimony you expressed concern over the hours worked at
crossing points not matching product flows. It is my
understanding that AQI used to hire part-time seasonal workers
to more closely match harvest patterns. Can you comment further
on how this mix-match between hours worked and how produce flow
doesn't work?
Mr. McClung. We had a problem back in the APHIS days with
hours at the crossing points because the government likes to
knock off at the end of the day at 4 or 4:30 p.m. and in our
industry you pick in the morning and you transport in the
afternoon and the evening, and getting product across that
bridge is a key consideration for us so that problem was there,
but with APHIS it was much more flexible. You could work with
them. They understood the priorities, and we simply did a
better job. In addition, the people who were doing the fruit
and vegetable inspection did that. They did fruit and vegetable
inspection. They weren't pulled off to do other kinds of things
so the volume an individual could move was greater.
The Chairman. Mr. Nelsen, you have been a vocal advocate
for transferring this process back to USDA. There are some in
the Administration who say that moving it back would cause
further damage to an already demoralized workforce. I don't
know how that would happen exactly because frankly half the
workforce is already demoralized; but how would you
characterize your response to that?
Mr. Nelsen. I think it is bunk. The individuals that have
been hired now by DHS, approximately 1,200 of them, there were
1,800 transferred over. All of them had been trained by APHIS
personnel. All of them have been working under guidelines
developed by APHIS communicated through CBP to be certain.
Those people understand and appreciate the training that they
receive from the people and the knowledge base that they had.
All of a sudden they are back over at CBP where the knowledge
base doesn't exist, where the appreciation for the work product
no longer exists. You move those individuals, those line
employees back to the management team that has the passion, the
understanding, that actually trained them, there is naturally a
nexus where you are going to have a more common bond between
management and line employee. That doesn't exist now. That
merger as far as creating additional problems is a phony straw
man issue as far as I am concerned, and I am a manager.
The Chairman. Mr. Nelsen, if that gentleman hadn't done his
job at the San Francisco airport and that citrus canker had
gotten into the fields in California, can you speculate on the
potential damage that could have caused your industry?
Mr. Nelsen. Mr. Chairman, it is devastating. It was a
family that illegally imported root cuttings from their home in
Asia. They brought the product in on a minor scale to begin
with, and they got away with it. They had a nursery going.
Secondarily, they brought it in at a much higher volume and
that is what was inspected and ultimately discovered.
Fortunately, government fulfilled its enforcement obligations
and there was a major penalty to be paid here. Our industry is
a billion dollar industry. We would be facing the same turmoil
that our colleagues in Florida are presently undergoing.
It would be more devastating to us, because as a fresh
industry, you cannot produce fresh fruit for a fresh market
with a canker infestation. It is just impossible to do. At
least in Florida for the time being while they learn to manage
through this disease, they have the fall back position of a
products market. They do a much better job in that arena than
we can and ever will be able to do. But as a fresh industry, we
would have been devastated, 12,000 employees destroyed,
approximately, as I mentioned, 2,200 to 2,500 farm families.
Our industry creates another three-quarters of a billion
dollars in economic outlook in the State of California. It
would have been a devastating situation if that canker had been
allowed to be--canker infested root stock been allowed to be
planted in the state.
The Chairman. So basically this gentleman doing his job
going around normal chain of command saved the California
industry billions of dollars.
Mr. Nelsen. There is no question about it, and
approximately 12,000 jobs. Can I make a comment on that same
vein, Mr. Chairman? I didn't mean to interrupt you, but you
asked a comment earlier of the first panel or somebody did
about can we document where a failing has occurred since the
transfer to CBP. You are well aware, as we alluded to, the
situation we have in northern California with the light brown
apple moth. That moth only exists in two countries. It came in
from one of those two countries. A DNA profile has been done to
confirm where it came from. The only way it came in was through
the San Francisco airport. An offshore product is mandated to
go through a CBP system. That is a failure of the system. And
how much money have we spent on that program in the State of
California? How much local turmoil is going on between state
government and local government and citizens of that state? How
many nursery owners are presently losing their nurseries
because of the economic quarantine that they are being
impacted? That is a real life failure of CBP.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree more, Mr. Nelsen. I am going
to go over my time just a little bit and then I am going to
turn it over to Mr. Mahoney, but I just want to follow up with
saying the following. I spoke with Chairman Waxman about this
issue during the break, and I let him know that because he
doesn't come from an agricultural region what it means to his
area to investigate since he is Chairman of the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee. And as we know and as he remembers
there have been a number of times where his neighborhoods in
Los Angeles have had to be flown over and had eradication
efforts, malathion sprayed into the neighborhoods because of
the need of eradicating the pests in his area. He got it
immediately.
And I just would like to say that the fellow who found the
citrus canker in San Francisco and got transferred out and
punished for doing his job should get a silver medal from the
government, not transferred. And the fellow who did the
transferring should be screening--should be checking for IDs in
the line. Frankly, he is not qualified to clean latrines in the
airport, let alone do the job he is doing if that is the
attitude of what he has done. And, frankly, that is who ought
to lose their job. And we haven't done our job in Congress
until we pinpoint that person and make an example of his
malfeasance in his job.
Frankly, we have to make some examples out of some of these
people in order to make people understand that the job you are
charged with doing is something very important to this country.
And it makes me sick when people are totally malfeasant in
their responsibilities to take the kind of action that that
gentleman did. Thanks for enduring my editorial comment. Mr.
Mahoney.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, this is very
sobering today. And when I first got to Congress 10 months ago,
I had the opportunity to go to APHIS in Fort Pierce to begin my
education on this whole issue. And Mr. Neugebauer said it well
earlier on when he said that agriculture is no longer just
about feeding the population. It is a matter of national
security, and that this nation cannot find itself in a
situation where we are going to be dependent upon foreign
sources of food and to the extent that we access foreign
imports of food, we have to make sure that they are secure. I
mean take a look at what happened with China when we had a
couple of entrepreneurs that combined, held a third grade
education, and figured out how to taint our food supply. Could
you imagine what could possibly happen if you had somebody that
was a lot smarter?
But be that at is may, I think this panel gives us a very
interesting opportunity and that is, Mr. Bronson, I would be
curious to understand in terms of your considerable
responsibilities for the people of the State of Florida, could
you explain what the nexus is between what you manage and what
you are responsible for and what Department of Homeland
Security is. What do you depend on Homeland Security to do for
your organization and then could you just comment on how
effective they have been?
Mr. Bronson. Thank you, Congressman. I sit on the state
Homeland Security Board myself. I deal with those issues at the
state level. We work with Homeland Security at the Federal
level. Thanks to this Congress, or the previous Congress, and
my own state legislature, we were able to acquire two VACUS
machines, gamma ray trucks from the Federal Government, and two
from the state. They are all mobile and we have 23 interdiction
stations or inspection stations in the State of Florida, and I
can move those wherever I need to. First, I guess let me
explain by saying I have got qualified people that I will put
up against anybody at the Federal or any other state level.
They are highly qualified people with Ph.D.s, very well
trained. Law enforcement is very well trained.
Because of 9/11, when I lost one of my key personnel in
food safety, I hired a lieutenant colonel veterinarian to come
in and be our head person because I knew that he had worldwide
experience being in the military for those issues. As soon as
the veterinarian who handled the last Northeast breakout of
Avian influenza, the big one, retired from the Federal
Government, I hired him as my Chief Veterinarian in the State
of Florida because I wanted to be prepared for those issues as
well. So we are very prepared at the state level. I think where
the breakdown really happens is while we are willing to pass
information up the line from state to Federal so that they
understand what is happening to us and what we need to do, we
don't necessarily get that passed down. And I hold a secret
clearance. All of my key personnel, we went through the process
with the FBI to get a secret clearance thinking that we would
receive this information so that if a shipment was coming in
from a port, and we have asked for this information, if a ship
was coming in from a port that we know there is a pest and
disease problem, we already know that, that we would have an
opportunity to work with the Federal Government to make sure
that shipment was safe. We don't get that information, and it
is a shame because we have personnel that can handle that at
the state level and by the time we find out about it, we
already have it.
Mr. Mahoney, if they don't react fast enough through the
chain of command some of these pests and diseases can multiply
anywhere from 48 hours to 21 days. We could be in a mess by the
time the chain of command comes back down to us.
Mr. Mahoney. Is it fair to say that the people in the State
of Florida hold you responsible for making sure that these
pests and diseases don't come in, and you have people at these
ports and points of entry into the state?
Mr. Bronson. We do not have people at the ports. We usually
find out that we have a problem at our 23, and we are lucky. We
are one of the very few states in the country that has 23
inspection stations on our natural border to the State of
Florida. We find a lot of stuff coming into the state including
people hiding in boxes, stolen equipment, drugs, the whole
thing, and pests and disease, both plant and animal have been
detected at those stations. So we do the best job we can but I
can assure you when I had to go through people's back yards
ripping out citrus trees because we were doing it at the
commercial level, we had to do it at the back yard level to
keep the disease from spreading. We were getting ahead until
those 2 years of hurricanes hit us and then it just spread
everywhere.
I had people looking for my head for having to go do that,
but I felt it was my responsibility to do that. I felt I needed
to do my job, and I never shirked from that because I have
always believed that if you do the right thing for the right
reason, and you have science to back you up--they may be on you
but at least you know you are doing the right thing.
Mr. Mahoney. Has the situation, sir, in your opinion since
Department of Homeland Security has taken over this
responsibility, has it improved or has it deteriorated?
Mr. Bronson. Well, I would have to say this particular
portion has deteriorated and, like I said, they have done a
good job of keeping people from attacking us, from purposely
putting anything into our food supply. I think they have done a
great job at that. The problem is you can't take a fully
trained police officer and tell them it is important to look
for these tens of thousands of pests and disease because they
are not trained for it, they don't understand it, they don't
understand the economic dangers. We could actually lose more
naturally through pest and disease spread than we have ever
lost through purposeful introduction, and that is a fact.
Mr. Mahoney. If I may take a little more time, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I would be able to recognize the gentleman
after I let Mr. Neugebauer----
Mr. Neugebauer. That would be fine for the gentleman----
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you, sir. Last year coming up to a year
anniversary, we had this little situation in Florida where we
had a disease that was being brought in with horses that came
in from Europe. My understanding is that the quarantine
function looking at these kinds of issues is a Department of
Agriculture function.
Mr. Bronson. It is generally a USDA APHIS function in
coordination with Homeland Security, of course, for coming
overseas.
Mr. Mahoney. Did you have an opportunity to take a look at
and assess what happened there? I mean it almost wiped out what
I would call the performance horse industry, which would have
been a huge economic disaster for the State of Florida. Did you
ever determine what caused that?
Mr. Bronson. We at the state level pretty much know that
that particular horse was not kept long enough in quarantine
and probably did not show its true signs of being infected
while it was there, therefore, it was thought that it may be
safe. They released the horse, went through a series of pickups
with other horses in Virginia, North Carolina, and down the
line, came into Florida. Some of those other horses died. This
particular horse made it because it had already been infected
and made it through the worst part of the disease but it was a
carrier and also other horses.
Mr. Mahoney. Was that a failure on the Department of
Agriculture or Homeland Security?
Mr. Bronson. Well, it could have been--I am not going to
speak to that.
Mr. Mahoney. I am just trying to understand. We are talking
about maybe doing something different and bringing something
back to Agriculture, and if Agriculture has the responsibility
for doing quarantining and they are not doing a good job there,
then that makes me concerned about maybe moving it back so that
is really what I am trying to get at.
Mr. Bronson. Well, you are bringing up a good point though,
Congressman, because if shared information between state and
Federal Government was a little bit better, we already know
every country in the world, Mr. Chairman, every state has this
capability, and I want this to be very much stated here, we
have highly qualified people just as qualified as anybody at
the Federal level. They know and my people know where all of
the highly potential problems in the world are, every country
where there is bad disease, pest problems, that may be doing
trade with us. We already know that. If we were given enough
information ahead of time, we could also start looking for the
potential of these problems and actually help the Federal
Government by doing that.
Sometimes we don't hear about it until way after it has
already gotten there, and that is a big problem for us. As I
said, these diseases can take off so fast that it costs us
hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars to control them
at both the state, and this is what I want to get across, we
spend hundreds of millions of state taxpayer dollars fighting
this just as we spend Federal taxpayer dollars at the Federal
level fighting this. It was about a 54-46 split on the cost of
this, and it was right at a billion dollars in total fight for
canker alone in the State of Florida.
Mr. Mahoney. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Mahoney. Mr. Neugebauer.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McClung,
welcome.
Mr. McClung. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Neugebauer. It is good to always have a fellow Texan
here. We heard a considerable amount of testimony today
documenting the decline of AQI port inspection program since
its transfer to DHS. How has that impacted Texas?
Mr. McClung. Well, Texas is one of the major importers of
produce into the country; the bulk of it out of Mexico. Mexico
has many diseases, as do all tropical areas, that we don't have
in the United States so we are particularly sensitive to the
possibilities. We have spent years in the Rio Grande Valley
trying to control Mexican fruit fly because we are at the
northern limit of its range in the United States and in the
valley. We have finally gotten in this last year to where we
are within striking distance of really controlling that pest.
That is only because APHIS has put the resources and the effort
into the control program necessary to suppress the fruit fly.
That is a victory for APHIS, and it certainly is an
enormous benefit for us, but we are also concerned that there
are other diseases filtering up through Latin America that
APHIS is no longer dealing with because they are not finding
them because they are not inspecting any longer.
Mr. Neugebauer. Isn't it true, in fact, that the amount of
vegetables that we are importing has increased fairly
substantially just in the last few years?
Mr. McClung. Oh, it increases--every year it increases. The
USDA study I referenced earlier is saying that vegetable
imports are up. In 20 years they are up, they are now 16
percent of our vegetable consumption compared with 9 percent 20
years ago. That is a lot of product.
Mr. Neugebauer. I want to commend you for your proactive
meeting with USDA and DHS. One of the things, and it is kind of
what I heard Mr. Bronson saying just a little bit, is are there
working groups--always when the Secretary of Agriculture comes
in here, and he is talking about changing agricultural policy,
one of the things I am a big proponent is are you interfacing
with industry, are you getting their input because nobody has
more at stake on a lot of these issues than the producers and
the producer groups themselves, and so they are major
stakeholders. And I guess I would have a question to the panel,
do you feel like the resources that Mr. Bronson said you all
have databases and things like that, do you feel like the
stakeholders are a part of the team here? Do we need to
encourage our friends over at Homeland Security now and other
places that we need to make sure the stakeholders have a seat
at the table?
Mr. McClung. Well, you are well aware, sir, in the Rio
Grande Valley these days the Department of Homeland Security is
not beloved because of the fence issue which is an enormous
thing for us, but it has nothing to do really minimally with
the problem of foreign pests. You heard Mr. Jurich this morning
say that DHS is sort of paramilitary. That sounds a bit
overwrought on first blush, but I think it is true. We try and
talk to them. They are not very willing to talk to us. And when
I tried, I said earlier today, when I tried to talk to some of
the inspectors that either were previously APHIS or have come
into the agency after the merger with DHS, they won't even talk
to you anymore. They simply are not willing to tell you what
they really think and how they really feel anymore which is a
very sad issue in my mind.
Mr. Neugebauer. I am going to take that as a no, Mr.
McClung. Mr. Bronson.
Mr. Bronson. Well, once again I think the lack of
communication from the Federal level down to the local level is
very evident. I mean we are finding out things way too late. We
have so much capability in the State of Florida to react to
these issues and to help the Federal Government get around them
much quicker if they would just pass on the information. If I
got to get all my top people in my laboratories and my animal
and plant health in my law enforcement to try to get top secret
clearance to get that then I will certainly do that. I don't
think that is going to help either because I think the culture
is--this is Federal, that is state. They are just not going to
pass on that kind of information.
If you are trying to protect this country, and I don't care
from what, if you don't pass on information and make sure
everybody is prepared, I don't see how you protect the country.
Mr. Neugebauer. Along those lines, if we were to put
together that structure or encourage the Administration to put
together that structure, and if you don't have those thoughts
and ideas today, I think the Chairman and I would be very
interested, but I think that is something near term we could
encourage is putting together a working group with the Federal,
state, and local, and when I say local I mean different
producer stakeholder groups to be in the room and talk about
how to get this fixed because I think this Committee is
committed to make sure this gets fixed. We think it is too
important, and so there are some things we can do and there are
some things we can't do. I think one of the things we can do is
get the Administration folks at the table and begin to have
some dialogue on how we make this a better process because you
all have probably as good an idea on this as anybody.
Mr. Bronson. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could, these things
happen even though they are at the ports. These things happen
maybe at a Federal port but it really happens in every state
that this is found in. It actually happens in the state and
that is what I think has been forgotten here. While the Federal
mission is the ports themselves of imported products it is in
that state whether it is New York, Florida, California, Texas,
wherever it is, it is in the state as soon as it is found, and
that is why we need to be able to react very fast and know
about it immediately so that we can put our people into play.
Mr. Neugebauer. Just for my edification how long was it in
the issue in San Francisco, I guess it was, how long before
that information was widely disseminated that there was a
potential breach there?
Mr. Nelsen. Congressman, if I may answer that from
California, too damn long.
Mr. Neugebauer. Yes. That is kind of the way we talk in
Texas.
Mr. Nelsen. I figured you would get it there, yes, sir.
Last May I was notified and asked if I could participate in a
discussion such as you described. There was a stakeholder
meeting with APHIS to identify flaws. We were given 2 weeks
notice. I couldn't make it back here, times being what they
were, the scheduling. They put together a rather comprehensive
game plan, a lot of words on paper, but I think we got to go
back to the fundamental issue, do we believe that the existing
management structure at CBP can implement what we identify to
be flaws and corrective measures. That is the fundamental
question, ladies and gentlemen, and for me the answer is no. We
have tried it. The GAO reports, the Congressional Research
Service reports, the OIG reports, all of those reports gave
them road maps and they haven't done it. No more chances.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I think this has been a very informative
hearing, and I think we have some things we need to work on.
The Chairman. I absolutely agree. Mr. Mahoney was wanting
to ask another question, but what I would like to do is, Mr.
Mahoney, if you could submit those questions or mention those
to the witnesses and have them submit in writing their answers
to the Committee, I would appreciate it. I, and I think some of
them, need to catch a plane as well. Mr. Neugebauer, I want to
give you an opportunity to close. Maybe you have already done
that. And then I wanted to say a couple concluding remarks.
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, I thank the Chairman. I just think a
couple things that are glaringly evident from the testimony we
heard today, we have a problem, and it is not going away. Maybe
it has gotten better in some areas, maybe it hasn't, and I
think a full review of the structure and why the cultural
problems are not working and maybe the structure is causing the
cultural problems. I don't know, but we have problems and we
need to fix them. And I think the other piece of it is I am a
little discouraged to hear that we are not communicating more
with the industry and the other stakeholders whether it be the
states. And I think you are exactly right, the states and the
agricultural community within those states are very much a part
of those stakeholders. They are the people that have to bear
the consequence and the brunt of when we don't do our job, and
so to say this is a Federal issue and not a state issue, well,
that is easy to say until half of your citrus population has to
be burned or eliminated or fruits. There are just all kinds of
consequences, quarantines of thousands of animals. So I don't
like that kind of talk from our Federal Government. I think
sometimes we forget who our customers are.
I came from the private sector, and I tell my folks on my
staff we have 652,000 customers that are depending on us every
day to take care of what needs to be taken care of, and I would
hope that our agencies have that same attitude, and if they
don't maybe this Committee can help them with some attitude
adjustments. I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Neugebauer you and I think a lot alike in
many areas. I think you just summed up my feelings absolutely.
I tell my staff the same thing that you just indicated you said
to yours, and I do it on a fairly regular basis as well. I
would characterize this as colossal incompetence by the
Department of Homeland Security resulting in a colossal waste
of Federal tax dollars. Simply unacceptable. We are not meeting
the needs of our constituents. And I just think we have to do
better, and we are not going to quit until we find the right
people who can do better. Before we adjourn, we have already
had closing statements. I would just like to say under the
rules of the Committee the record of today's hearing will
remain open for 10 days to receive additional material and
supplementary written responses from witnesses to any question
posed by a Member of the panel. I want to especially extend
that courtesy to Mr. Mahoney, and if you would, Mr. Mahoney,
discuss your additional questions with the panel after this
because unfortunately we do have to call the hearing to an end
but I want you to have--you have done a great job asking
questions today, and I want to make sure you have a chance to
ask them all. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Horticulture
and Organic Agriculture is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael W. Neff, Executive Director, American
Society for Horticultural Science, Alexandria, VA
``Mid-pleasures and palaces though we may roam, be it ever so humble,
there's no place like home.''
Those famous words penned by playwright John Howard Payne 185 years
ago still ring true today. Like people and places, some Federal
agencies have a natural home where they operate more effectively. For
the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the American
Society for Horticultural Science (ASHS) believes that natural home is
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
As the professional society of horticultural researchers and
educators keeping specialty crop industries competitive, healthy, and
safe for consumers and the environment, ASHS maintains a keen interest
in APHIS inspection functions at America's border points-of-entry.
Fulfilling its mission for ``protecting the health and value of
American agriculture'', APHIS is our first line of defense against
harmful diseases, pests, and other harmful infestations. Left
unchecked, these contaminants could adversely affect the health and
safety of America's food, fiber, and ornamental plant supplies--
creating costly disruptions with both our domestic economy and
competitive edge in global agricultural trade.
Legislation creating the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
in 2002 shifted APHIS border inspectors to DHS. Yet recent studies by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) document declining
inspection rates at several key entry points, lack of coordinated
management programs, and insufficient staff levels adequately trained
to perform APHIS' assigned mission. Though operating under jurisdiction
of DHS' Customs and Border Protection Service, Federal salaries and
other APHIS resources remain under the purview of USDA's appropriations
budget. This includes administrative funds for inspection training as
well as regulatory and wage scale guidelines.
For the most efficient and effective use of resources, with on-site
expertise providing timely response to potential hazards in the food
inspection system, ASHS believes inspector specialists currently under
DHS' Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Program should be transferred
back to a unified arrangement under APHIS at USDA--its natural and
proven base of operations.
For more information on ASHS' view with this issue, please contact
Michael W. Neff, ASHS Executive Director, in Alexandria, VA, at 703-
836-4606, e-mail, [email protected].