[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-177]
THE F-22 PROGRAM
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 19, 2008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas California
ADAM SMITH, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
KATHY CASTOR, Florida DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Lynn Williams, Professional Staff Member
Ben Glerum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, November 19, 2008, The F-22 Program................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, November 19, 2008..................................... 35
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2008
THE F-22 PROGRAM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee............................... 1
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking
Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee....................... 4
WITNESSES
Van Buren, David M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force, Acquisition and Management.......................... 6
Young, Hon. John J., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics....................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Saxton, Hon. Jim............................................. 39
Van Buren, David M........................................... 48
Young, Hon. John J........................................... 42
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Dogfight Over F-22 Requirement Reveals DOD Schisms, in
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 18.............. 53
Letter to Hon. Robert M. Gates from the House Committee on
Armed Services, dated October 31, 2008..................... 56
Lockheed Martin November 20, 2008, letter to the Aeronautical
Systems Center, 478th AESW/PK, Subject: Contract FA8611-09-
C-2900--F-22 Lot 10 Production Aircraft--Advance
Procurement--Funding/Termination Liability (TL)
Requirements............................................... 58
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 63
Mr. Saxton................................................... 63
Mr. Wilson................................................... 63
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Abercrombie.............................................. 67
Mr. Miller................................................... 71
Mr. Saxton................................................... 71
THE F-22 PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 19, 2008.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:38 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Abercrombie. Aloha. Thank you all for coming today. I
have an opening statement, as does Mr. Saxton, and then we will
get right to Mr. Young and to Mr. Van Buren.
This afternoon we indeed welcome John Young, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(USD/AT&L), and Mr. David Van Buren, the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and
Management, to provide testimony on the F-22 program. Mr. Young
has been extraordinarily helpful and hardworking, I want to say
as well, add that, not always the same thing, Mr. Young over
the past year.
And, Mr. Van Buren, I am happy to see you again. Your work
before with Novasol and other high-tech innovation commitments
as you have made before I think make you particularly helpful
with regard to acquisition and management, and it is nice to
see you.
The primary issue we plan to address at this hearing is the
Department of Defense (DOD) apparent intent to not fully
implement section 134 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). Having started out in such a complimentary fashion, I
am sure you knew, Mr. Young, that I would then follow that up
with my observations with regard to our defense bill.
Section 134 authorizes the obligation of up to $140 million
to sustain F-22 long-lead component production from November
until March, to preclude program cost growth, and to avoid
prejudicing a decision of the incoming Administration on
whether to procure additional F-22 aircraft beyond the 183 now
planned.
Earlier this year, Secretary Gates and other officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) testified that
they wish to defer the final decision on F-22 production line,
the closure of same, to the next Administration. However, the
Department's budget request for the fiscal year 2009 did not
include either advance procurement (AP) for additional F-22s in
fiscal year 2010 to sustain production or funds to shut down
the F-22 production line. We were told by the Air Force that
because the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not provide
advance procurement to sustain advance procurement of the F-22
components, that the cost impact of the program would be $500
million if the decision was made in March of 2009 to proceed
with additional F-22 aircraft procurement. Since the Office of
the Secretary did not provide the funding, Congress did,
authorizing and appropriating $523 million for the advance
procurement in the fiscal year 2009 National Defense
Authorization Act of 20 additional F-22s for the fiscal year
2010. In other words, we tried to combine a policy decision
with the necessary funding to implement that policy as best we
could understand it and manifest it in the defense bill.
The authorization act limited the obligation of this $523
million to $140 million until the next President certifies by
March of 2009 to the congressional defense committees that
either more F-22s--for either more F-22s or shutting down the
F-22 production line is in the national interests of the United
States, either procuring more or shutting down the line. And we
would take guidance then from that, not necessarily agree to
it. That is not the issue before us today, nor do I intend--I
hope the Members won't necessarily pursue that argument today
or that proposition today.
On October 14, the authorization act was signed into law by
President Bush. Shortly thereafter, the Air Force submitted an
acquisition strategy proposal to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to obligate the $140 million, to implement section 134,
and to support a November 27 contract award. But that request
was denied. I hope that that will be addressed today.
On November 10, Secretary Young, in an acquisition decision
memorandum (ADM), directed the Air Force to proceed with
advance procurement of only 4 aircraft, with an option for 16
after January 21, 2009, the inauguration date, and limited that
obligation to only $50 million, asserting this will have little
or no cost impact to the program. This is my understanding, Mr.
Young. The Air Force had informed the subcommittee in July that
$140 million would be required by November to avoid a cost
impact to the program if a decision were to be made in March.
By the way, parenthetically, Mr. Young and Mr. Van Buren, I
am going over all of this not because I don't think you know
it, but there may be those observing who do not, and to make
sure that we are coming from the same set of premises even
though you may disagree with them or have a different
perspective, I want to make sure that you know what my
reasoning is and what I think the sequence of events were as I
understood them to be.
So to repeat, the Air Force had informed us that the $140
million would be required--these numbers were not picked
arbitrarily, I assure you, nor were they capriciously picked--
to avoid a cost impact on the program if a decision were to be
made in March to proceed with additional F-22s. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense, as mentioned, now indicates that
instead of $140 million, $50 million is sufficient. Obviously I
have to be concerned about that because that was not the
information that we received from the Air Force. If there is a
disconnect between the Office of the Secretary and the Air
Force, we need to know it, and we need to know why and how.
The Air Force currently estimates that with only $50
million for obligation in November, that this will increase the
program cost by $200 to $500 million. That is my information.
If the decision is made to buy 20 additional aircraft,
depending on when the decision is made--excuse me, let me--to
increase the program cost by $200 to $500 million, if the
decision is made to buy 20 additional aircraft, depending on
when the decision is made after January 21, that is why I say
$200 to $500 million. I am not trying to just slip numbers in
to inflate the numbers. It depends when the decision would be
made on the 20 additional. Conversely, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense indicates there will be little or no
additional costs. There is a huge discrepancy here.
We hope to find out today why OSD declines to fully
implement section 134 of the National Defense Authorization Act
to preclude the expenditure of up to $500 million in additional
costs if the new Administration decides to proceed with the F-
22 procurement.
In sum, Mr. Young, Mr. Van Buren, my concern here is that
you may be contending that the $50 million is sufficient, and
therefore maybe could say, well, yes, we understand that the
number in the defense bill, which we are bound to observe by
law, is $140 million, but we can do that for $50 million. If
so, I am going to need to know how you think you can do that in
the light of what information we have been receiving that
would--the expenditure of the $50 million in lieu of the $140
million, we are told anyway, will engender a much greater cost
of so many millions of dollars per copy of the F-22 should a
decision be made down the line.
And that is information we, in fact, got from the Air
Force. We are not trying to run around you, we are just simply
receiving information on inquiry by the staff.
So that is where we are right now. And the implication of
that in terms of the relationship between branches of
government is serious. That is another reason for having the
hearing now before we--rather than just waiting until January
until the new Administration comes in.
The Congress rules. The Pentagon can propose, and not only
propose, but admonish and engender and do all kinds of--make
all kinds of propositions and put forward recommendations. And
as you know, Mr. Young, particularly in our relationship, I pay
very close attention to what you have to say. I have great
respect and consideration for your work effort and the quality
of that work effort with the people with whom you have
associated yourself. Nonetheless, in the end, the Congress
makes the decisions, and we have to live with that. And this
instance, then, it seems to be almost--I won't say willful in a
pejorative sense, but a willful rejection of what you have been
ordered to do.
Now, if there is good reason for that because circumstances
have changed, that is one thing. But that is why I think the
hearing is so important today that we not lose sight of the
fact that the Congress in the end writes a defense bill for a
reason, because that is the policy that has evolved. And at
least as far as this committee is concerned and the defense
bill is concerned, it is a consensus document. It is not an
arbitrary document imposed by the one party over another, let
alone one branch of government over another. It is a considered
document that has the input and imprint of a bipartisan
majority, clear majority, virtually unanimous in the sense of
this defense bill.
And with that, and with reference to that, I want to now
ask Mr. Saxton for his remarks and indicate yet once again for
the public record my respect and admiration of Mr. Saxton and
my gratitude to him for his mentorship while I served in this
Congress, and express at the beginning of his remarks my
sincere hopes for all the best in his future.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY,
RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thanks
for the kind words. I appreciate them very, very much.
Mr. Chairman, you raised, not surprisingly, I suppose,
since we have been working this issue together for quite some
time--you raise the same questions that I would raise in my
opening statement. And so I will refrain from going through the
whole thing.
I just would say, Mr. Young, I would ask you today, we hope
you can explain how you determine that $50 million would be
adequate to keep the long-lead suppliers under contract. That
is the main question. Our belief is that it would cost
something like $90 million more than that, and so, of course,
that is the $140 million figure that Chairman Abercrombie was
talking about. And I fear that the withholding of the $90
million may already be impacting some suppliers and driving up
long-term costs. And I think that is the basic question that we
would like to dwell on here today.
So, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my entire
statement be placed in the record.
Mr. Abercrombie. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Abercrombie. All witnesses' prepared statements will be
included in the hearing record. And we obviously have members
of the full committee and members from our subcommittee that
may be attending or are already in attendance today, and any
statements they have we will submit to the record, without
objection.
And, of course, they are welcome to participate, and I ask
unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to
participate in today's hearing after all committee members have
had the opportunity to ask questions, and seeing no objection,
non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate
time.
Mr. Young, before I ask you to proceed with your statement,
then, if I can just follow up on Mr. Saxton's observations just
a little bit, because I think I may not have made that entirely
clear in my remarks. I am concerned, as I am sure you are, with
the implications for suppliers. It is sometimes--it is I am not
going to say easy, but it can occur that we have discussions
here that tend to be somewhat abstract or observational, but
the real-life and real-time considerations for the
manufacturers and the suppliers of the component parts of these
terrifically complicated and difficult military platforms in
terms of assembly and movement, they just don't appear. They
have to be--and they aren't just assembled. Everything from the
raw materials to the component production is an extraordinarily
complicated and involved operation where real lives, payrolls,
production time schedules, management challenges and so on have
to be met. And that is part of the reason, again, for the
hearing, that if, in fact, there are costs associated with a
failure to anticipate correctly what is necessary to fulfill
the requirements of section 134 of the defense bill, if that
is, in fact, going to take place, we need to know.
We don't want that to happen because the adverse effect on
people's lives would be considerable, over and above the
efficacy of the procedures with regard to the actual production
itself of the F-22 and the numbers that would be suitable to
the strategic interest policy questions that are involved in
this. Okay?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
Secretary Young. Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member
Saxton, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am here to
testify about the Defense Department's plan for F-22
production. Consistent with previous Defense Department
decisions, the fiscal year 2009 budget nor the Defense
Department's draft of a fiscal year 2010 budget included funds
for purchasing additional F-22 aircraft.
Consistent with Secretary Gates' commitment to enable
President-elect Obama's Administration to review the F-22
program, the Department is taking steps to sustain F-22
production. First, I recently approved obligation of up to $50
million as partial advance procurement for four F-22 aircraft,
as you noted. Second, this Administration plans to propose the
purchase of four F-22 aircraft in the second fiscal year 2009
supplemental. These combined actions enable the next
Administration to make a decision on purchasing additional F-22
aircraft.
It is my understanding, based on discussions with industry,
personal discussions, that the taxpayer will not pay
significantly higher costs for additional F-22 aircraft if
decisions are made to obligate additional advance procurement
funds in January followed by a Presidential certification and
decision in March. Delaying these decisions could increase the
costs of the airplanes; however, spending additional advance
procurement at this time could waste taxpayer dollars in buying
parts for airplanes that the next Administration may not
purchase.
As I understand it, the key issue for this hearing is to
discuss whether DOD should obligate additional funds for all 20
aircraft now, essentially prejudging the next Administration's
decisions.
One aspect of this discussion revolves around industry
estimates of higher prices for F-22s based on the timing of the
release of advance procurement funds. I would offer a caution.
First, these are industry estimates that have not been
negotiated. Virtually every contract discussion I have seen
starts with higher industry prices and estimates. All such
issues need to be aggressively negotiated, and a public hearing
is not the place to lend credibility to these estimates or to
conduct the negotiations.
I question the claim that delaying obligation of $90
million of advance procurement for long-lead items by 2 months,
2 months that include Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years,
can increase the cost of airplanes by $200 million or 6\1/4\
percent. Further, this is only a discussion about a delay in
the partial funding of long-lead items. If approved in the
supplemental, four fiscal year 2009 aircraft in the
supplemental will actually be an acceleration of the F-22
program.
The Department is acting responsibly consistent with
Secretary Gates' commitment and congressional direction seeking
to ensure that each tax dollar is used carefully and
efficiently. I appreciate the chance to explain the Defense
Department's actions on the F-22, and I am anxious to answer
your questions.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Young can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Van Buren, would you like to give a
statement or supplement Mr. Young's remarks?
Mr. Van Buren. Yes, I have a statement, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Saxton, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here before you today to discuss F-22A future
procurement. As you know, fifth-generation fighters like the F-
22A and the F-35 are key elements of our Nation's defense and
deterrence. Both the F-22 and F-35 represent the latest
generation of fighter aircraft. We need both aircraft to
maintain the margin of dominance on which we have come to
depend. It is this margin that grants our air and ground forces
the freedom to maneuver and to attack. The F-22 and F-35 each
possess unique complementary and essential capabilities that
together provide the synergistic effects required to maintain
the superiority across the full spectrum of conflict.
The F-22 has established a world-class production program.
Lot 6 deliveries were completed ahead of schedule at a rate of
about two per month. Additionally, deliveries of Lot 7 Raptors
begin this month. And the first lot of the three-year multiyear
procurement contract we awarded in July 2007 has been started.
When the plant delivers the last aircraft of Lot 9 in December
2011, we will have completed the current program of record of
183 Raptors.
The Air Force greatly appreciates congressional support and
the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) commitment to keep the F-22
production line viable until March 2009 to allow the next
President to decide if additional F-22As are in the Nation's
interest. To meet this aim, the Air Force is moving forward
with a Lot 10 of F-22A aircraft. Per OSD direction, the program
has commenced contract actions for advance procurement of long-
lead parts and materials for 4 aircraft, with the option for
advance procurement of an additional 16 Raptors. We believe the
strategy meets the goal of ``setting the table'' until the new
Administration makes a decision concerning the future of the F-
22A program.
Based on the direction in the 10 November 2008 acquisition
decision memorandum, or ADM, the program released the aircraft
and engine request for proposals on 17 November and plans to
award an undefinitized contract action, or UCA, on 26 November.
The solicitations will be based on a ``not to exceed'' for
advanced procurement of four aircraft, followed by a request
for firm, fixed proposals following the 2009--March 2009
Presidential certification.
In addition, the solicitations also included requests for
``not to exceed'' options for advance procurement of 16
additional aircraft, also with delivery in calendar year 2012.
Full funding for Lot 10 must be included in the fiscal year
2010 budget should the next Administration's certification,
required 1 March 2009 by the fiscal year 2009 National Defense
Authorization Act, support continued production.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren can be found in
the Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Before we go to questions from the
Members, I want to, Mr. Young and Mr. Van Buren, so we are
again on the same page and we can have a fruitful discussion--I
want to make sure I understood what you were saying. First,
with regard to this hearing, I certainly don't expect you to be
conducting, nor do any Members here--conducting negotiations in
public here, but you can't conduct negotiations with the
committee either in public. The defense bill is not negotiable
with the Defense Department. The defense bill is the defense
bill, and you obey what the defense bill says. Period. That
holds for the Pentagon and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Now, with respect to a supplemental budget, that is not--
the defense bill is the defense bill. One of the things that
has loused everything up--one of the things that has messed
everything up is this constant utilization of a supplemental
budget, and I think you agree with me on this, Mr. Young, and I
think Secretary Gates agrees, is that we should not be doing
regular order defense business that is the subject of the
defense bill and the subsequent appropriations in
supplementals. That is one of the reasons we are in trouble.
And the defense bill, and the appropriation that was associated
with the defense bill, clearly try to avoid doing exactly that
by authorizing and providing funds for up to 20 F-22s. That was
the will of the Congress both in terms of authorization and
appropriation.
So why we are talking about four or any number in a
supplemental bill and referring to it as acceleration is beyond
me. I don't know that a supplemental is going to pass, or when
it comes, or what is involved in it. The defense bill states
explicitly what it is that Congress expects to have done. What
a supplemental does or doesn't do or how it arrives--and that
don't come through this committee. A supplemental simply goes
to the appropriations, and that is a separate issue entirely
from what we are here meeting today.
And finally, 4 versus 20 aircraft, again, it is the
decision of the Congress. In your testimony here on page 4,
this approach provides an adequate bridge until at least
January 2009 without imposing significant costs. It is
inappropriate to spend an additional $90 million procurement
for the 16 aircraft the Nation may not purchase. The Congress
has decreed that this 20 is to be what the next Administration
deals with, whether it was a McCain Administration or an Obama
Administration. It is not up to you or the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to determine what an adequate bridge is.
The Congress has determined what the adequate bridge was. The
Congress has determined what was appropriate.
If you can show us that there is significant savings on the
20, that would be one thing, but to make a decision or to make
a proposal that you have decided or the Secretary has decided
or the Bush Administration has decided you are not going to go
toward the 20 in my judgment says that you are not going to
obey the law.
What the Obama Administration does or does not do with
respect to the production of F-22s is an issue entirely
separate from the question of the provision of the funds for
the procurement of the 20 aircraft, long-lead procurement of
the aircraft.
Now, with that, I will turn to--who is first on the list?
Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Chairman, it is my intent to let the
gentleman on my left ask questions during my time, if that is
all right with you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Representative Gingrey will start.
I hope, Representative, you understand my proposition here.
Dr. Gingrey. Absolutely.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and Ranking Member Saxton. Thank
you for yielding your time to me. I will direct my question to
Secretary Young.
Mr. Young, according to the November 18th Aerospace Daily
and Defense Report, and I am going to quote, the Defense
Secretary staff has told Air Force planners not to talk to
congressional staffers and to work only through the Office of
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, and
Acquisition Chief John Young, yourself. Insiders on Capitol
Hill contend that the Defense Department has been and is
continuing to withhold F-22A funds, as the chairman said, in
defiance of the law and the intent of Congress and attempt to
punish the Air Force.
So my question to you, Mr. Young, why the gag order? Why do
you want the Air Force not talking to Capitol Hill?
That is the question, Mr. Young.
Secretary Young. I am not aware of any such gag order. So
if I could, I have traded correspondence and discussions with
members of this committee staff almost daily for the last two
weeks. The Air Force, I know, has communicated with this
committee and staff, and I am not aware of any such gag order.
Dr. Gingrey. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Young, the article
speaks for itself.
And, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit this
article for the record.
Mr. Abercrombie. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 53.]
Dr. Gingrey. The previous Air Force leadership was forced
out, we know that, in large part due to their disagreement with
you and Mr. England on this issue, and I suspect that the
reason you don't want the Air Force talking to Capitol Hill is
that there is an internal disagreement on the program, and the
Air Force, in fact, feels that OSD is wrong on this issue and
that more F-22As are needed.
Now, look, I am looking to move on to the second point in
this article. Let me get to the second point because my time is
limited.
The second point of the article, that you are acting in
defiance of the law and the intent of Congress. That is exactly
what the chairman just said to you.
Mr. Young, in your opinion, what was the intent of Congress
in section 134 of this year's Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act? What was the intent of section 134? Now I
will let you respond.
Secretary Young. I am going to step back and comment on one
comment you made, and that is Secretary Gates made a decision
about the previous Secretary and the previous Chief. I was
never a party to that discussion. I wasn't part of it. I wasn't
asked my views on anything, and to my knowledge F-22 had no
bearing on his decision. So----
Dr. Gingrey. Fair enough, Mr. Young. Go ahead and respond
to my question in regard to section 134.
Secretary Young. Section 134, strictly read, said that we
can obligate up to $140 million. It does not require us to
obligate $140. We can obligate $140 million up to the
certification by the President that should be delivered no
later than March 1st and no sooner than January 21st.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Young, let me reclaim my time, and maybe I
could yield to the chairman or to the ranking member in regard
to that. I think the language in section 134 is very specific
in regard to that. I don't think it gives you the option to say
that you are going to, in your own discretion, allocate $50
million of the $140 million. The language in the bill calls for
$500-and-something million for advance procurement and $140
million to be allocated before the first of the year. Where are
you coming from in regard to that?
Secretary Young. Could I try to answer several aspects of
this question?
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Young, if you will wait a moment, Mr.
Gingrey said he would defer to us on that issue so that it is
clear what the question is. My understanding is that up to $140
million, yes, if you could--if you needed to spend less than
that to take care of the long-lead funding for the 20, nobody
is going to argue with that. If you had to ask for more than
that in order to fund the long-lead 20, presumably you would in
a supplemental budget or even in the 2010 budget proposal,
because in the question of the supplement, that, in fact, is an
emergency, that the number that was there is not adequate and
therefore requires more funds. That is a legitimate proposal to
put forward or to put it in the 2010 proposal.
But the question of the 20 was not at issue. It wasn't a--
it is not a question of whether or not you want 20. That is
what the Congress said was going to be done. And if the next
Administration wanted to make a decision about the F-22, to
addition or close it or whatever it is, they would have to do
it on the basis of the provision for the 20. If it was less
than 140, that is one thing. But my understanding of what we
did, and I was here when we did it, was that the bottom-line
issue, the bottom-line number is 20 aircraft. How much needed
to be spent in order to accomplish that task in 134 could be up
to 140. Is that clear then, Mr. Gingrey? Are we on the same
page?
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, I think we are on the same page,
and my understanding of it, to take it a step further, the only
stipulation that we included was that you not obligate more
than $140 million before the new Administration reviews the
program and they make a decision on the path forward.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is right. It says, ``Not more''--
quoting in part, ``Not more than $140 million may be obligated
until 15 days after the certification required by subsection
(c) is received by the congressional defense committees,''
which means the decision of the next Administration.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Young, your rationalization here for
limiting it to $50 million, I think, is weak, given that you
received a letter from the chairman and ranking member of this
subcommittee, and it states clearly that your actions are
largely inconsistent with statements made during the past year
by senior Department leaders, and that not obligating $140
million immediately would effectively preclude the procurement
option of further F-22As by dramatically increasing the cost of
procurement because of line closure actions that would be taken
under your scenario that would have to be reversed. The letter
states that the Department is expected to approve the Air Force
obligation of $140 million for F-22 advance procurement,
consistent, Mr. Young, with section 134 of the National Defense
Authorization Act.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit this letter
for the record.
Mr. Abercrombie. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 56.]
Dr. Gingrey. Let me just say, Mr. Young, in not following
the law and the intent of this Congress, under what authority
are you acting? Under what authority are you acting? Is it up
to you to decide which laws the Department will follow and
which they will flout? Why are you substituting your will for
the will of Congress that was signed into law by the President?
If you can explain that to this committee and this
subcommittee, I am sure it will be very enlightening to these
Members.
Secretary Young. Can I----
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes, of course.
Secretary Young. I would ask time to answer these many
comments that have been made.
Mr. Abercrombie. We have time.
Secretary Young. The key for me constantly as imposed on me
by this committee and the Congress has been to not waste any
taxpayer dollars. I am seeking to navigate multiple views of
this issue. The Congress has a view as articulated in the
language. I won't cover that again.
This Administration, in my opening statement I articulated
that view, which is that additional F-22s are not required. The
law does not require me to buy these planes as 20. I have
sought diligently to work with industry and understand if it is
possible to buy these airplanes, the advance procurement for
these airplanes--not the airplanes; as the chairman rightly
said, this is a discussion about the advance procurement--can I
buy that advance procurement as 4 plus 16 instead of 20 and
impose no additional costs on the taxpayer and preserve the
total flexibility and option of the next Administration to come
and discuss with the Congress whether they want to buy the
airplanes behind the advance procurement. And that is the
option, having convinced myself that that is possible, we have
sought to execute. It is consistent with the law, I believe, to
execute the advance procurement as 4 plus 16. And so in
January, the other 16 airplanes could be obligated, which would
take the balance of obligation up to $140 million.
And I believe that is reasonably consistent. If that option
of 4 plus 16 was not totally consistent with trying to make
sure the taxpayer didn't pay more for the airplanes, we would
have had to look more carefully at that option. That is my
fundamental goal here is to obligate money and preserve the
option, as the Congress has sought to do, without incurring
costs that are punitive to the taxpayer and without necessarily
committing this Administration or the next Administration to
airplanes for which it is not yet decided whether they will
budget for those airplanes. And I do fully understand that
Congress still has a decision to make with regard to buying
those airplanes.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, assuming that I have a little
bit of time left to respond to that----
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes. Then I will go to Mr. Ortiz.
Dr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Young, I understand the explanation you just gave
to the committee, and I am not questioning your sincerity at
all in trying to--in your discretion or your opinion, you are
trying to save the taxpayers money. I don't know that you
really have the discretion to do that, because it would seem to
me that when this committee passes a National Defense
Authorization Act, and we have a defense appropriation or
authorization act here, an appropriations act, and the
President signs that, and you have got clear language, I just
don't see where you--where your authority comes from.
I have already made that point, but I am going to grant you
the benefit of the doubt in regard to your sincerity in wanting
to save the taxpayers money, but as we see it, as this Member
sees it, you are doing just the opposite, because in doing so,
you get to January, January 20th, when the new President is
sworn in, and the long lead time, we have already--it has
already gapped. It has already gapped. A lot of these vendors,
particularly those involved in titanium production products, it
would be a large cost, in the hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars,
to start that. And then there is the issue of the tail-up
costs.
I think it is just not reasonable to expect that the Obama
Administration is going to immediately on January 21st look at
this issue and say, oh, yes, of course, now let us get the
other $90 million for the other 16 advance procurement so we
can get ready to make a reasonable decision to whether to
continue the program. What you are doing inadvertently--I am
not accusing you of doing it intentionally, but inadvertently--
you are fostering the shutdown of this program, and I think
that could be disastrous for the defense of this Nation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time, and I appreciate your
generosity with me.
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, could I address those
comments, please?
Mr. Abercrombie. Not just right at this moment. Does that
upset you?
Secretary Young. It seems a little unfair, sir, but you are
the chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Fairness is my middle name.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. Go ahead.
Secretary Young. Okay. You are very kind.
Mr. Abercrombie. That is the first time in my life I have
ever been accused of being unfair as a chairman, and I wouldn't
want to have that on the record or have you disappointed. So
you go right ahead.
Secretary Young. I don't think I meant to accuse you of
being unfair, but his comments are out there, and I need to
address them if I could. I will try to be brief, sir. Thank you
very much.
Twenty airplanes in a year is about 1.67 airplanes a month.
That is about 2, 2\1/2\ months' worth of airplanes, and I did
agree in the ADM to let the Air Force negotiate an option for
the other 16 airplanes of advance procurement so it could be
done seamlessly in January. I believe this gets the next
Administration into January and beyond.
As I said, I can't fix--the delaying decisions will take
time, but I think the suggestion that I should make the
decision about those 16 airplanes in that advance procurement
over the next Administration which will have to see it through,
manage it and budget to buy the planes behind it would be
presumptuous on my part, so I am not sure I should make that
choice.
Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate the chance.
Mr. Abercrombie. There is a clear disagreement as to what
your duty is here with respect to how we see it from the
defense bill side and how you think we have written it. Maybe
the language needs to be written more clearly in the future,
but that--I will grant you that your interpretation, I think,
clearly is at odds with what the overwhelming majority, if not
the unanimous, view of this Armed Services Committee is.
Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
welcome our witnesses to our hearings.
Mr. Abercrombie. Having fun?
Mr. Ortiz. You know, I know that the Congress passed a
budget last year, but I am just wondering is the Defense
Department and Air Force talking to one another? Are you
engaged in----
Secretary Young. Yes, sir, on a regular basis.
Mr. Ortiz. I think one of the reasons that we are here is
that we are looking at the possibility of whether 20 planes
will keep the line open or whether we can do it with $50
million. And then we talk about the possibility--and I know
that a lot of things are on hold now because we have a new
Administration coming in. Are you all talking to the new
Administration? Do you have anybody in the new Administration
coming in that you are talking to?
Secretary Young. Those discussions are just beginning, sir,
and I am confident--and one of the top items on my list for
discussion with the appropriate people in the new
Administration is this F-22 decision, because it is a major
decision, as the chairman has pointed out.
Mr. Ortiz. So if we wait, I mean, if we don't keep the line
open, and we wait to see if the Administration decides to go
ahead and buy whatever needs to be bought, would that be too
late in the line if we do not provide this money; would the
line be shut down?
Secretary Young. Sir, I think, as the chairman has tried to
very concisely frame the issues, I believe the Department's
actions will keep this line open and allow total open decision
space for the next Administration. That decision that I am
trying to make and trying not to spend 16 airplanes' worth of
long lead before they can make that decision and spend 16
airplanes of long lead that might not be used if they don't buy
those airplanes, as the chairman has said, is not consistent
with the congressional view to obligate the long lead for 20
airplanes. But those are two separate issues. What we are doing
unquestionably keeps the line moving forward.
Mr. Ortiz. And I know that you say that you have been
talking to either staff members or members of the committee
about the issue that we are discussing now. Most of us have
been gone for some time because we were involved in elections.
So, you know, I am really sure this committee wants to do what
is best, but, as Dr. Gingrey just stated a few moments ago,
there are a lot of rumors circulating out there, oh, the
Defense Department is punishing the Air Force for not doing
this and not doing that. I don't think that that is the case,
but, you know, rumors do float all over the place.
I just hope that between now and the next few days that you
can talk to the new Administration coming in and a decision can
be made, because we are looking at saving money if we can,
because once you shut that line down, it is going to be very
costly to operate it, open it up, and the prices of the items
and airplanes we are trying to buy might skyrocket.
This is the only question I have, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to yield to some of the other Members.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson is next, to be followed by--Ms. Giffords will be
after that.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank
you for being here today, and I share the concerns of
Congressman Ortiz about what we are facing.
And, Mr. Van Buren, what is the unit procurement cost
impact of delaying the decision on advance procurement of 16 F-
22s until March 2009?
Mr. Van Buren. Mr. Congressman, obviously the cost of the
Lot 10 production is going to be above the $143 million unit
procurement cost of the multiyear procurement through Lot 9.
And we are working through--we have had the ADM now for a
period of about nine days. We are working through multiple
options. We are trying to minimize the price impacts above that
$143 million number to the taxpayer. There is a range of
options that are being looked at now.
I can tell you that we receive or I received just this
morning the ``not to exceed'' prices for the advance
procurement for those prices, and frankly we simply haven't
gone through it and evaluated it, but it does appear to be
consistent with the numbers that were passed in the
appropriations bill.
Mr. Wilson. And your response actually gives me greater
concern as to any precise numbers. Does the Air Force agree
that providing advance procurement for four F-22s in November
and an additional advance procurement in January will bridge
the F-22 program with little or no additional cost to the
taxpayer?
Mr. Van Buren. We are working through multiple iterations
of that bridge right now in recommendations to take back to
Secretary Young. And I must tell you that I have seen a lot of
absolute numbers fly around. I am not personally comfortable
with those numbers because I don't have firm, fixed price
quotes. What I do have from the contractor is a ``not to
exceed'' quote which is consistent with the numbers that were
provided to Congress that made up the appropriations bill of
2009.
Mr. Wilson. Well, the general ranges or ``not to exceed''
would be helpful, so I hope those are provided to us today.
Mr. Secretary, if by congressional direction $140 million
is obligated to the F-22 long-lead items, and the new
Administration decides to terminate the line, how much of the
$140 million will provide parts and other items for the
sustainment of the F-22 or production of the Joint Strike
Fighter?
Secretary Young. I think we would have to get an answer to
you for the record for that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 63.]
Secretary Young. To be honest with you, there is a lot of
confusion about the $140 million. It is not, as I think the
chairman had hoped for, an analysis of the specific parts that
need to be purchased in order to ensure that we can produce 20
F-22s. It is an assumption that we would, under regular order,
buy all the parts for F-22 that are required, i.e., the five
long-lead parts, the $523 million worth, and as of March 1st
the government's termination liability if those planes weren't
purchased would be $140 million. There is a smaller subset of
that $140 million, which is the set of parts we really must buy
to avoid breaking production lines and looking suppliers.
Mr. Wilson. As I conclude, again I want to thank you for
being here, but I do hope that there will be greater
specificity in terms of what the numbers are as we proceed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Ms. Giffords had to do a room pick. She had to leave. As
you know, where you are going to have your office takes
precedence over everything else, otherwise you are in the
hallway. So she has no choice on that. And I mistakenly told
Representative Sestak he was next, and it is clearly Mr.
Marshall, and then Mr. Sestak will follow.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young, it has been pretty difficult to follow the back-
and-forth here, but your last statement seems to me to be the
clearest one to date. Basically the idea is that of the 523, we
said no more than 140 can be obligated, which gives the next
Administration the opportunity to decide whether or not to
continue with the acquisition process. And what you figured
out, at least in your opinion, is that we can obligate a lot
less than the 140, 50 million to be precise, and essentially
accomplish the exact same objective at no additional cost to
the taxpayer, and, in fact, a substantial saving to the
taxpayer if, in fact, the new Administration decides not to
move forward with the acquisition of additional F-22s.
What I have heard from staff is that your decision to limit
this to 50 million and to only four F-22s in Lot 10 could have
the impact of adding additional cost up to $500 million if, in
fact, the new Administration decides to move forward with
additional F-22s.
In your testimony, what you say with reference to that is
that if the decision whether to move forward is delayed until
March, and at that time the new Administration decides to move
forward, then the Department of Defense, quote, only faces
estimated additional costs on the order of amounts Congress has
permitted DOD to obligate. I take that to mean--I am a little
nervous about the ``on the order of amounts.'' It would be nice
if you simply said it is still going to cost us more than 140
million, and a total of 523.
But I take that to mean basically that there are no
additional extraordinary costs that will be incurred should the
new Administration move forward. So in effect your strategy
offers a savings in the event that the Administration decides
not to, and at the same time doesn't hold out the prospect of
large additional costs, perhaps an additional hurdle, as part
of the decision whether to move forward with additional F-22s.
What bothers me, of course, about that is just having heard
the possibility that there could be huge additional costs
associated with this decision, and could you clarify that for
us?
Secretary Young. Congressman, I think you have been
extremely articulate, maybe more so than me, in explaining this
situation.
There are concerns, as other members have articulated. I
think the chairman said it best. This is a very complex
production process that starts with raw materials and builds
sophisticated items. It is difficult to estimate all the
aspects of this, and that is why you hear ``on the order of.''
But I do believe we----
Mr. Marshall. You chose not to say on the order of $500
million as possible additional costs?
Secretary Young. Well, to be honest with you, sir, if I say
it is $500 million, that will be the starting point potentially
for industry negotiation. I am trying very hard not to endorse
those negotiations because there are other people--I actually
have leadership members who have built airplanes that do not
believe that some of the cost estimates for the gapping and the
delays are legitimate, and that industry can manage those
effectively to not have them be real.
I am not ignoring the industry estimates, but I am also not
granting them credibility. And so the way you said it is
exactly the right way. If we do nothing till March, I could
face--and that is what I was told by industry--a cost, a cost
which I would seek to negotiate away on behalf of the
government. I think the likelihood of that cost, a higher cost
of the airplanes in March, is probably real. If I give them----
Mr. Marshall. Well, could you give us your range of what
you think those additional costs might be?
Secretary Young. I would appeal to you, Congressman, not to
ask me to do that. I said it was on the order of what you
allowed me to obligate, so I have therefore clearly put it----
Mr. Marshall. You are worried that if you go ahead and
mention a figure that, as you put it earlier, that is going to
be the starting point for negotiation. Fair enough.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Marshall, will you yield to me for a
moment?
Mr. Marshall. I don't have a choice.
I mean, you are the committee chair with fairness in the
middle.
Mr. Abercrombie. In the interest of fairness, if you will
look to--you don't have it. Let me--I am looking to J here in
my folder. Let me give you something to work with. I think you
got a copy.
The Air Force gave us F-22 and F-35 procurement cost
estimates. And I am fully accepting what Mr. Marshall and what
you were trying to get at. The Air Force has provided an
estimated cost, and I presume that they are just--the reason,
they go from 143 now to--if you did, in fiscal year 2010, 20 F-
22s, it can, depending on the time frame, now, January and
March, the figures go from 143 to 153, 163 and then between 170
and 178. That is the Air Force figures.
And if I recall what you told Mr. Marshall in return, that
obviously a dispute can take place as to whether those numbers
can be negotiated down, or negotiated up for that matter.
Commodities prices are up and down in today's economic
situation, energy costs, all the rest of them factor in and
out.
But that would give--what Mr. Marshall is asking, and why I
asked him to yield to me, was to give him the actual numbers
that the Air Force has provided; and perhaps then you and he
can have a conversation at this point at least using the
estimated costs.
Secretary Young. So could I finish that one thought and
then add, I do believe if we do the 50 million now, and nothing
until March, the price of the airplanes could be higher by an
undetermined and unnegotiated amount. I believe the government
needs to, to avoid a cost to the taxpayer, obligate in January
some portion, possibly all the way up to the full 140 million.
And I think that action could insulate the government from
additional costs, subject to our negotiation with the
contractor.
And I apologize to be at some possible odds with the
chairman. I don't want to be. But I do believe a next
Administration needs to make that decision to obligate those
funds for those airplanes.
With regard to the numbers he gave you, the 143 is the
current multiyear cost, so that is a totally different--that
was negotiated at 60 airplanes under a multiyear. The 153 is
what the Air Force, working with industry, thinks could be a
price that reflects inflation as a single lot buy of 20
airplanes. And then there is estimating that is largely
informed by industry estimates that takes 153 up to 163, based
on the timing of advanced procurement.
I will certainly defer to Dave Van Buren, but my
understanding is these are not formal Air Force estimates of
the price.
Mr. Marshall. Let me, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Section 134 mentions two dates for decisions. One is
January 21 and one is March 1. Are you saying that prior to
January 21, the 140 million should be--pardon me, the balance
of the 140, the 90 should be committed?
Secretary Young. I am saying on January 21.
Mr. Marshall. So on January 21 it should be committed. Are
you suggesting----
Secretary Young. To avoid any additional cost to the
taxpayer in the event the airplanes are bought, and that is my
goal.
Mr. Marshall. And are you suggesting that the new
Administration might decide prior to January 21 that it is not
going to ask for additional F-22s; consequently, it might not
choose to obligate the additional 90 million, come January 21,
and then at some time between January 21 and March, announce
that it is not going further with the program? Is that what you
are suggesting?
Secretary Young. Or announce that they are going forward,
but they don't want to decide on January 21. It is just that
they will face some risk of the airplanes costing the taxpayer
a little more money if they buy themselves decision space
between January 21 and March.
Mr. Marshall. Again, your latest little round here, the
latest statement you made with the word ``or.'' So do you
contemplate that the new Administration might decide prior to
January 21 that it is not moving forward with the F-22?
Secretary Young. I try not to contemplate what the next
Administration will do at all. My job is----
Mr. Marshall. Well, if it is not conceivable to you that
they might choose, prior to January 21, not to move forward,
then, if you are not holding out that as a possibility, it
seems to me you might as well go ahead and commit the entire
140 right now.
I am a little confused as to what your strategy here is,
and you might be able to help me out.
Secretary Young. I am sorry, sir. Let me make sure I
understand. It would be my view that we would obligate the 50,
and then on January 21 or beyond, the next Administration needs
to decide whether to obligate beyond the 50 to a 140 and decide
whether to buy the airplanes or not. I believe all those
options are preserved.
Mr. Marshall. When is it that the cost jumps up? On the one
hand, you seem to be suggesting that if the additional $90
million is obligated January 21, there will be no significant
additional cost. On the other hand, you seem to be suggesting
that if there is a delay until March, we could face very
significant additional costs. And so it seems to me your advice
here, at least based on what you said a few minutes ago, is
that the new Administration should obligate the additional 90
January 21; don't delay, do it then to lock in costs. And if
you are saying that and at the same time saying they are not
going to make a decision by then, then it seems to me--well,
that is why I focused on the ``or.''
If you are not contemplating the possibility that the new
Administration will privately, not publicly, announce--will
privately make a decision the F-22 is not moving forward by
January 21, and you are saying if they don't decide that by
January 21, then they ought to obligate the additional 90, why
not obligate it now? I guess that is the simple way of saying
it, because the risk associated with delaying until March is,
from what you say, quite significant. It could be that we have
huge additional costs.
Secretary Young. I think it is to be negotiated. I think
the probability of additional costs, if no action is taken
until March, is reasonably high. I think the next
Administration can, as you said--I just really don't want to
speak in any way for the next Administration. But I am sure
they will contemplate this issue. They may even privately come
to a conclusion. And they have two choices.
On January 21 they can obligate the $90 million and decide
there is some chance between zero and 100 that they will buy
the airplanes, and they would rather preserve the option to buy
the airplanes at no additional cost to the taxpayer, or they
could choose not to obligate the $90 million and accept that
they still have a decision to be made between then and March
1st, but that decision may cost the taxpayer more money for
those airplanes. They have every option available to them, and
that is my job, to make available to them every possible
option.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Young.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Bartlett and then Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much for permitting me to sit
in on this subcommittee hearing.
Mr. Young, thank you very much for your many years of
service to your country.
I have a generic question that I need the answer to before
I can intelligently make decisions relative to the kinds of
things we are talking about today. I gather that in the
development of a budget, that the size of the pie is determined
and then the services cut into their individual pieces. That,
obviously, is a somewhat political process, and we need to have
the assurance that that is a rational cut. Then in trust
service priorities are developed, and then you submit your
budget to the Congress.
How do we determine whether the third priority for the Air
Force is above or below the third priority for the Army?
We clearly cannot procure all the things that we are
developing. We clearly do not have the money to prepare as we
would like for the two kinds of wars that we may be faced with
in the future. The kind of wars that we are fighting now
require none of this really high-tech type of equipment. But we
will one day face a peer, either a resurgent Russia or China.
China, this year, as you know, will graduate seven times as
many engineers as we graduate. That cannot continue for very
long and we still remain the world's undisputed economic and
military superpower.
When we come to decisions like we are faced with today, how
do we determine whether this is a higher priority than
something that the Army wants, and we clearly don't have the
money to support both of those?
Secretary Young. Congressman Bartlett, my experience in
that process is the first order is what you said: The budget is
sliced relatively amongst the services and the services
internally make that decision. Rarely have I seen an OSD
decision that would significantly--would adjudicate two
programs between two services on a relative priority basis. The
services build the heart of the budget, and they make those
decisions about their respective priorities.
Certainly, one thing I have discussed with both Secretary
Gates and Secretary England is a need for OSD to play a greater
role to ensure the joint and crosscutting capabilities are also
well addressed in the budget.
Mr. Bartlett. But if OSD doesn't do that, then we have to
do it. Where do we go for the information that would give us
the intelligence to make these kinds of decisions? I just have
no idea, when we are talking about a third priority for the
Army and a third priority for the Air Force, if they are equal.
One of them, from a national security perspective and long-time
concerns, may be well above or below the other. And if OSD
won't help us make those decisions, how do we make them?
Secretary Young. I think OSD can help with you that. I
mean, there are fundamental documents like the national
security strategy, and then there are independent offices, the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, PA&E, and my own
offices that have some of the data; and then the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) team which does some wargaming and modeling to
help inform those competing priorities in the relative warfare
value of them. So I believe we can help you with that.
And I think actually you are in the unique position to take
the service input and then OSD, PA&E inputs in fact on this
very F-22 issue, Program Analysis and Evaluation staff, I
believe, came and briefed on their study of the need for F-22.
You have access to the Air Force's view, as does the
Department, and you can absorb and evaluate all that
information. But you will potentially come to different
conclusions than even the OSD team does about the relative
priorities.
Mr. Bartlett. I have the concern that too frequently I
think the decision is made on the basis of who is the best
lobbyist for the base or the factory that is their district. I
don't have any base in my district that is threatened. I don't
have any manufacturer in my district which is threatened. And I
think that too often here the decision as to which way to go is
made by the person that most effectively lobbies for that
cause. That clearly is not what we ought to be doing. It ought
to be determined on the basis of what is the best thing,
broadly, for our military and for America.
I would hope that in the future that we will get more help
than we have gotten in the past. You can't--everything can't be
top priority. We just do not have the money to fund everything;
and in the future we are going to have even less money, so we
are going to be faced with even tougher decisions here.
I want to thank you for very much for your service. The
best of luck, sir, in your future.
Secretary Young. I hope we are doing what you are asking,
and I think you have heard those beginnings of that from
Secretary Gates. In his testimony he has testified that he has
seen the analysis and he believes that we are on a path to the
right mix of, in this particular space, F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighters (JSF), and so we are presenting you the Department's
view.
There are some in the Air Force that have a different view,
and in the Congress obviously, in providing a long lead, has
taken a different view than the Department. That will be the
hard thing for you all of us to adjudicate. But from Secretary
Gates down, there has been a hard look at that analysis and a
view that it is a higher priority to do other things in the
Defense Department than buy additional F-22s at this time.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Sestak, at long last. Sorry for the
mix-up.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, for a couple of years we had, I think, 23
aircraft one year and then the next year, single-year
procurement, another 23 of the F-22s, I think for a total of
56. And then we went into 3 years of multiyear procurement for
60.
Do you remember what the cost differential was between the
56 that we procured those 2 years and the 60 that we are paying
for that multiyear?
Secretary Young. I don't off the top of my head. I can get
that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 63.]
Mr. Sestak. The reason I am asking is, I asked my staff,
and the difference was $1.8 billion, which meant that a short
while ago, the Congress did not have a problem of procuring 4
additional aircraft, from 56 to 60, at the cost of $450 million
for each F-22. If that is the case, I am kind of not as taken
by these arguments on whether the additional cost of $100
million--or even if it does go up to $500 million, where were
we in Congress talking about the cost back then of $450 million
per each of those 4 additional aircraft as we went from 56 to
60?
I bring that out because--and I am setting aside the
constitutional issue for a moment because it seems that we have
kind of gone ashoal here on the matter of cost. And I do think
that is the right question, but in a much larger sphere, which
Mr. Bartlett got to well. And that--I think Mr. Gates made the
right decision here pragmatically. I am setting aside the
constitutional issue for a moment, although you seem to have
fine-tuned that with a 21 January decision date, which we know
is not realistic for Mr. Obama to roll in and make a decision
on that day.
But I kind of have listened to this debate in DOD about
more F-22s, and what Mr. Bartlett again so well brought
forward. I mean, we have lost $12 trillion in wealth in our
households in the last 6 months, and the costs that are
attendant to trying to reset our military forces in the future
after this war are enormous.
I have watched this F-22, which some have likened to the
Seawolf of the Skies, to where after three Seawolfs, they
stopped and went to a Virginia class ship as the Cold War
ended.
But we have taken this F-22 from dogfighter to air to
ground to close air support to cruise missile strike, and yet
if there was ever a case study for making sure this decision
was right, of billions of more dollars, before we either, at
the possible loss of $100 to $500 million, I think the quiet,
cautious brake you have put on this is well served, at least
for that to set up the F-22 as the case study to where you have
a Cold War-era product that has gone through four different, at
least I think, changes from dogfighter down to cruise missile
killer, at the end of its production line, but in the seventh
year of a global war on terror.
And if there was a case study to hold us all back, your
executive branch and this Congress to say, wait a minute, we
were willing to spend $450 million--excuse me, $1.8 billion for
four aircraft. We went from 56 to 60 multiyear buy. Maybe it is
worth a little bit of tax to make sure this right decision is
made, because Mr. Bartlett--and I wasn't going this path till
he spoke up--has laid it out well. This is bigger; I think it
is the case study of ``wait a moment.''
Do we really know what we are doing here when we talk about
a new era, and I go back to that analogy of Seawolf of the
Skies? Is there a comment on that?
Secretary Young. Actually, I would be most grateful for the
chance to comment.
I think there have been some comments today raising
concerns about the Department's support for F-22. It may be a
finer degree of detail. You are dealing with a very appropriate
and high-level picture. But the Department was on a path in the
2009 budget to only have, to have 100 increment 2 and increment
3.1 jets and then a smaller fleet of about 80 3.2 jets,
significant differences in capability.
To get more jets to the full increment 3.2 capability, to
make them full-up rounds, $6.3 billion of research and
development (R&D) is requested to go back into F-22 and approve
that architecture and backfit all those jets. This Department
has tentatively put that in the Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) 10 budget to make that F-22 fleet that we have and have
bought capable.
And so you have very rightly highlighted some tough
decisions. You can make different decisions and buy more F-22s
and have a high/low mix. We have supported tentatively in this
budget--and this budget will clearly be reviewed by the next
Administration--but tentatively supported making the F-22s we
do have fully capable assets at a very--at $6.3 billion of
procurement and something on R&D and something on the order of
$2 billion of procurement. So significant investment is still--
almost $10 billion is still going into F-22.
Mr. Sestak. If I could, I still am taken by the argument of
the constitutional intent, if not technicality. And I am not
dismissing that, but if I could make one other statement, I
think the issue that was well raised by the chairman on the
supplemental--I have kind of been discouraged, frankly, over
the last year or two that I have been here.
How could we have been putting into the supplemental anti-
submarine helicopters for the Iraq war? How could we have been
putting into the supplemental steaming days for the Navy that
traditionally are funded at 29 days every quarter, but now we
are slipping some of those in the supplemental? I think it is
an atrocity to all of a sudden come forward and say we are now
going to slip four F-22s or whatever into the supplemental that
is supposed to be serving our men and women in uniform.
There is a process, and I hope that as the year goes on,
next year, we get back into the right process, if I could.
But thanks for your comments. Go ahead if you wanted to
comment on that.
Secretary Young. Just one more comment on that. I won't
address the other issues. I think we would need the Comptroller
or others to.
On the airplanes, the Department has sought in some cases
to replace combat losses, and we did ask for Joint Strike
Fighters because we have lost some fighters in the war.
Congress denied those because it wasn't ready for production.
So the four we are talking about, while also serving as a
bridge on F-22, are really being asked for because they are the
available and producible airplanes for our combat losses.
Mr. Sestak. We procured those aircraft, and you know how it
is done. When we buy 100 aircraft, we already figure in how
many would be lost to combat. So that is a disingenuous
argument, and you know that. So I have to dismiss that.
But if I could close, I do think that how you set this up
is wise for us to think about this F-22, because these are
tough decisions if we really do want to--which I think Mr.
Rumsfeld wanted to do the day he took over--transform our
military.
Thank you.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity.
Mr. Young, I appreciate you saying earlier to one of the
other questions that obviously the analysis of how much planes
would cost would be placed at risk if we follow the procedures
you have outlined so far.
One of the things that has me concerned is, we do advance
procurement practices repeatedly, year after year, in this. And
as I am looking at section 134 of the bill, the B section has
the language of the $140 million.
Would there be--if that section had not been included in
the conference report, would there be any question in your mind
what the intent of this Congress, especially the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC), was as to the allocation of these
funds and the purchasing of these planes?
We authorized $523 million to do this program. In the
conference committee there was a question of the 140 million
that was placed in there. Had that language not been included
in the conference report, would there be any question in your
mind as to what the intent of this Congress was as to the
procurement, advance procurement, of these F-22s?
Secretary Young. I think I understand the intent of the
Congress, and I am trying to comply with the intent of the
Congress while preserving the next Administration's options,
and I believe the 4-plus-16 path is creating that opportunity.
Mr. Bishop. And this language was not the reason for you
coming up with this obscure approach to get to the 20?
Secretary Young. No, absolutely not, sir.
Mr. Bishop. So there was something else that confused you
as to what the intent of Congress was?
Secretary Young. I am not confused as to the intent of
Congress.
Mr. Bishop. Well, that is not what I am hearing from up
here on this part of the room. But let that be as it may.
OSD, and especially in your report, made a great deal of
effort on some of the studies that have been done. Can I simply
ask you about the Whitney Bradley Brown study which was
commissioned by OSD in 2006? It was funded by Congress and
approved by Congress, authorized by Congress.
Why has that study not been released?
Secretary Young. I am not aware of that. I will get you an
answer.
Mr. Bishop. I am making the assumption that--and I was not
here earlier, Mr. Chairman--but the assumption there are at
least 30 Air Force, Air Combat Command, OSD studies, including
the one by Whitney Bradley Brown, which have found different
numbers than the ones you certified in your opening statement
as appropriate for Air Force needs.
Am I wrong in that assumption? There are that many studies
that are out there with differing numbers?
Secretary Young. I am not aware. I reviewed, in preparing
for testimony, that there were at least three studies. One of
the most recent Air Force studies is six years old, has
fundamentally different assumptions, like two major combat
operations. The Whitney Bradley Brown study has some different
assumptions. The most recent is the Joint Air Dominance study
that has one major combat operation and endorses the 183
airplanes.
Mr. Bishop. So has the Whitney Bradley Brown study been
released?
Secretary Young. I don't know. I will have to get that for
the record, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 63.]
Mr. Abercrombie. Would you yield a moment, Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Maybe. Are you going to be kind?
Mr. Abercrombie. No.
On the Whitney Bradley Brown study, Mr. Sullivan will bring
us up to date.
Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Bishop, staff has a copy of the Whitney
Bradley Brown study if you need it.
Secretary Young. Thank you for clarifying that.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. I appreciate that because I did not
know its status or if it is classified, but the numbers are
significantly different than what the gentleman has given as
his recommendation; is that not correct?
Mr. Abercrombie. I can't answer.
Mr. Bishop. I can. You might as well say ``yeah.''
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, you are asking me, and I can't
answer with authority. But I understand what the point is. And
it is available, so we can clarify what that comes down to.
I can say, Mr. Young, that in all my exchanges with Mr.
Bishop, I would never want to bet that he was going to be wrong
when he makes an assertion. So I will take your word for it.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, you just don't know me well
enough. That is the only problem.
Mr. Young, I appreciate the opportunity of asking a couple
of questions here, and I appreciate that. I will just simply
close and yield back the rest of my time by saying 4 is not 20,
and I think the intent of Congress is pretty clear.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Reyes is next.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being
late, but I am coming from another hearing that I was chairing.
Mr. Young, one of the, I guess--and if I go over the same
area, I apologize. But we asked the Air Force to provide us the
cost estimate for a bridge. And I just heard my colleague on
the other side talk about ``4 is not 20.'' And so I don't want
to belabor that, other than to say that we are talking about
very important issues to our national security. And when we
authorized and appropriated the $140 million per aircraft that
we were told, that was the cost in order to make that bridge
happen.
What is the answer? And I wasn't here, so I apologize, but
how do you answer us on that one issue in the context of the
decisions that were made?
Secretary Young. Well, I want to make sure you understand
that the 140 million was actually assuming all 20 airplanes,
the advance procurement, was under contract and it was a number
that said if in March you stopped--and that was the termination
liability, that is what the government would have to pay. It
was not a number that was based on an analysis of the items and
the suppliers I must keep working in order to ensure I have the
opportunity to buy F-22s.
I have sought--because the bill to buy 20 additional F-22s
is on the order of $3 billion--that is money that is not
presently in the budget, and I have seen the construction of
the budget; and I would tell you, the Air Force will--it will
lead to some difficult choices in the Air Force to buy those
airplanes. And I want to be sure and respect that the Congress
may make those.
The Congress in the end will deliberate the 2010 budget,
but in leaving decision space for the next Administration, and
trying not to charge the taxpayer more money and trying to
comply with the congressional intent, I sought to construct a
strategy that would do 20 airplanes. That is 4 plus 16.
So we are on a path to obligate advance procurement for 4
airplanes, which is a solid initiation on the bridge on F-22,
and then an option that can be executed in January for the
remaining 16; and it lets the next Administration make that
decision to execute that option, hopefully, and buy the planes
if they choose to, with no penalty to the taxpayer, or choose
not to buy the airplanes and engage the Congress in that debate
about their view of F-22.
And so my goal, as directed by Secretary Gates, is to
create a bridge and let the next Administration have the full
ability to make a decision.
Mr. Reyes. So since I wasn't here, Mr. Chairman, so I
haven't been here when we authorized and appropriated for 20
aircraft at 140 million, we were not serious about that, or we
weren't taken seriously about that?
Mr. Abercrombie. You are looking in the wrong direction,
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I just want to make sure I understand it.
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, that is the contention.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield to my
friend, Mr. Marshall, the remainder of my time.
Mr. Abercrombie. Sure.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Van Buren, I would like to follow up with you the line
of questioning that I had for Secretary Young.
Okay. So the plan at the moment is to take 50 and obligate
that, with the possibility of obligating the balance, 90. And
Secretary Young suggested that the new Administration probably
ought to make that decision by January 21, whether to obligate
the additional 90; and if the decision was made by January 21
to do so, there would be no significant additional cost.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Van Buren. There will be a cost above the 143 multiyear
cost, no question. What I am uncomfortable in doing right now
is giving you an exact cost above the multiyear procurement.
Mr. Marshall. Is it multiples?
Secretary Young. To be clear, there will be a cost above
the multiyear no matter what we do. Is that fair?
Mr. Van Buren. Yes.
Mr. Marshall. Well, I am trying to figure out--you would
help us greatly if you would just go--Mr. Van Buren, why don't
you try and take a shot at this, if you would simply tell us:
if the 140 were obligated now, versus 50 now; 90, January 21,
or 50 now; nothing until March 1, and then we scramble and try
and do something March 1.
And I suppose actually we should be thinking about the
legislative process here a little bit more. And the fact of the
matter is, if the new Administration says we are not interested
in purchasing this next lot of F-22s, we could say we disagree.
And that would take some time, and so there would be a
significant additional delay during which period of time
probably Members of Congress would be wondering whether or not
it was so wise to stick in the 140 bridge and whether we didn't
make a mistake by limiting the 523 at all--just do it. And then
we will argue with the next Administration whether or not we
should be buying additional F-22s.
But that is for another day. For right now we are just
trying to figure out this 140.
So can you tell us roughly what happens if we obligate the
140 now, versus just 50 and then 90, January 21; or we postpone
the additional 90 until March 1?
Mr. Van Buren. Well, I think as you change the dates by
which you obligate the money, you start to run into greater
risk with regard to subcontractor production lines that might
be gapped to some degree. You run the risk that it is not as
efficient as if, let's say, you were running a multiyear
procurement or tailing in exactly in line with the previous
procurement.
The order of magnitude of that is what I am comfortable in
giving you an exact number now. We have a not-to-exceed, which
is consistent with our previous numbers, which I just mentioned
we just received. We haven't done a thorough analysis of that
to look at the parts, look at the termination liability (TL)
component of that. And so--you have spoken of some numbers
earlier today. We don't have those cast in concrete, but they
are on the order of magnitude that you would look at at the
153.
Mr. Marshall. I didn't necessarily follow that. You said
``not-to-exceed.'' You are comfortable enough----
Mr. Van Buren. Congressman, you asked the question if we
proceeded with the turn-on of the 20 right now.
Mr. Marshall. Right.
Mr. Van Buren. And the best estimate I have is something on
the order of that 153 million. That is the delta between the
multiyear procurement and if we went out on a single-year
procurement of 20 aircraft.
Mr. Marshall. Well, I am also asking the question because
right now we are talking about no more than 20; we are not
talking multiyear. And at the moment the question is simply
whether it should be 140 obligated now or 50 obligated now. And
so if it is only 50 obligated right now I am trying to figure
out what happens on down the road, what additional costs. The
Secretary is raising his hand.
Secretary Young. At some peril to myself, but because we
ought to answer your question, there is an industry piece of
paper that says if we do 50 now, 90 in January, and the
President makes a decision in March, that strategy could cost
$200 million more.
Two weeks ago, when I discussed this with industry, it was
50, 90 in March, would yield probably no significant change in
the price. If we did 50 now and nothing until March, that would
be $200 million.
The numbers keep moving. People are doing legitimate
analysis of a complex program. The best indicator we can give
you is the ``not-to-exceed the offer.''
When I tried to construct this 4 plus 16 so the next
Administration had complete decision space, I was told buying 4
plus 16 advance procurement could cost more than buying 20 of
advance procurement. The Air Force today received a not-to-
exceed estimate which is a contractually useful number that
says, indeed, the advanced procurement obligated as 4 plus 16
will cost no more than we thought it would cost for 20.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The description of the not-to-exceed estimate provided by the
witness is contrary to the not-to-exceed estimate provided to the Air
Force, as shown in the Appendix on page 59, paragraph 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is excellent news. It reflects good cooperation
between industry and the government to try to hold the prices
for the taxpayer.
Mr. Marshall. Does that not-to-exceed contemplate that the
additional 90 will be forthcoming by January 21?
Mr. Van Buren. The not-to-exceed for the four aircraft is
valid until 26 November. The not-to-exceed for 16 aircraft and
20 aircraft is valid until 16 March 2009.
Mr. Marshall. Well, geez, it would have been helpful if you
guys had just told us that a little while ago.
But thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hayes, you are next. May I just preface your inquiry by
extending to you my aloha for your friendship and your service
on this committee. And I say friendship first, because that is
something that you extended to every Member of this House, and
most certainly to me. And I want to express to you that I hope
we will be seeing you in the future.
Mr. Hayes. Neil, thank you very much. I reflect the aloha
as well.
I remember our first encounter some 10 years ago. You were
sitting about right here, and we were talking about Hawaii
arising out of Kosovo somehow or another. But, anyhow, you have
been a wonderful friend, both to me and to the military.
Mr. Young, you have gotten a number of questions, and I
think if there was any lack of clarity, if Congress wanted to
spend the money buying the aircraft that the Air Force is going
to stay in the fighter business and be anywhere near
competitive with others around the world, we certainly badly
need these. And a few tankers to go with them would be nice.
On the $50 million question, how--when you talk to
industry; and I think that is a good thing--how does 50
million, I mean, how many joints and grease fittings do they
cover with 50 million? What is the data to keep them going at
50 million until January 21? How does that work?
Secretary Young. Well, as you know, the government was at
some risk here anyway because normal order, as done on the
previous F-22s, would be to provide full, advance procurement
(AP) early in the year, which would have been the full 523. We
were--you know, the money was parsed, and so at least I read
into the intent of Congress, and this may be important, a
limitation to 140 until the President could make a
certification. That parsing of the AP, in and of itself, gives
industry at least the opportunity to ask for higher prices
associated with that.
In reading the intent of the Congress and trying to be
careful with taxpayer dollars, we talked with industry about a
construct that would let us obligate the AP as 4 plus 16, and
four airplanes of AP as a fractional basis of 140 is less than
$50 million. But we wanted to make sure there were no
restraints and no restrictions and no underfunding of the
minimum supplier activities necessary for the lines to continue
and the four airplanes to be in process with advance
procurement, again, with the idea of having a line that is
healthy. But it is extremely dependent on the next
Administration to make a decision about continuing F-22
production. So the 50 was a fractional basis with margin, if
you will, of the 140 for four airplanes.
Mr. Hayes. So did they give you any idea of--the
manufacturers, of what the $50 million would be used to do and
how it would--and at the 50 million level, rather than 523, it
would really trickle down to the supply chain. What damage
would be done to the supply chain?
Secretary Young. We are certainly trying not to have damage
done to the supply chain, and there is actually one detailed
chart we could give you for the record that identifies the
specific suppliers who will build parts, at what periods of
time. And many of it, I am sure you are well aware, are some
specialty metals and castings that have to be done.
So the Air Force has a very good-quality understanding of
which suppliers are critical to the front end of building
additional F-22s; and we understand the funding addresses those
suppliers with a need to make another funding decision,
preferably in January.
One issue has emerged here recently, and that is on some
particular titanium ingot. And we are going to relook at that
issue and make sure we understand the health of those suppliers
to support this program, because there is a possibility that
the work they would do could be used in other aircraft
programs, including JSFs, if F-22 didn't continue; and
obviously continuing with them would make sure F-22 could
continue.
Mr. Hayes. Mr. Van Buren, do you have any different view of
the health of the industry and the supply chain based on your
position with the Air Force?
I mean, JSF and F-22 are two entirely different airplanes.
Mr. Van Buren. Well, we have indication that there may be
half a dozen suppliers out there for those specialty metals
that Mr. Young mentioned that may be at risk here. And I think
that is what we are trying to do in work--our response to the
ADM is to identify those specific folks and what is in the best
interest of the warfighter and the taxpayer for continuing that
line, to leave that option open.
Mr. Hayes. Well, with national security in mind, go back
and get all the money, spend it, get the planes and give me
some tankers to fuel them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Hayes.
I am going to just ask a couple of questions, and then we
will go to Mr. Gingrey to close out, unless someone wants
another round besides Mr. Gingrey.
Okay, just for clarification's sake--it may help us as Mr.
Gingrey follows up and concludes--I just want to make sure that
I understand and for the record.
To which analysis were you referring when you made the
decision about the four additional F-22s? I mean, why it wasn't
three or why wasn't it five? What was the rationale?
I think you have gone over this in effect, but I have lost
my way. Why were you deciding on the 4 plus 16? Why isn't it
five plus what, or et cetera?
Secretary Young. Secretary Gates had indicated in testimony
that he intended to request four F-22s in a supplemental, based
on a connection to combat losses for airplanes that we have
indeed lost. So that was the starting point for the discussion.
That discussion continued into my discussion with industry
about whether four and the timing would be valid with respect
to----
Mr. Abercrombie. Well, with respect to Mr. Sestak's
observation and so on--I don't necessarily want to repeat that,
but what I am driving at is that you mean it would have been
five if there had been five losses or six or one?
What if it had been no losses? There wouldn't have been any
proposal for anything, and we would have just gone for the 20?
The reason I am asking the question is, I think that Mr.
Marshall has caused me to reflect between your answers and Mr.
Van Buren's answers to Mr. Marshall. I am trying to figure out
how are we even at four then? Why are we doing anything?
Secretary Young. Well, I think you have rightly, and----
Mr. Abercrombie. Fairly?
Secretary Young. You have rightly and fairly provided
advance procurement that is needed so that that line is bridged
to the next Administration. And I must be honest with you, that
I did read some intent in the Congress' work and legislation
that said you did want the next Administration to be able to
make this decision. You restricted a portion of the 523 until
they can make the decision. And all my decisions are, I think,
trying to be consistent with that.
Mr. Abercrombie. But I am not--I understand that and I
accept that. I mean, I may not accept that I agree with it, but
I accept that that is what your reasoning is.
What I am trying to get at, in light of the discussion that
both of you just had with Mr. Marshall, on both occasions that
he engaged with you, I am trying to figure out why we are doing
anything at all, then, over and above what the intent of
Congress might or might not have been in your estimation.
Secretary Young. So you have provided funds to bridge the
line. That gives the next Administration a chance. We have
connected it to the fact that Secretary Gates and the
Department believe we legitimately should buy four additional
airplanes to bridge, or for the fact that we have combat
losses. And so I think that is the essential element that you
have provided us the opportunity to do.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay, I understand.
We are right back to what Mr. Reyes, then, most recently
put forward. We have a basic confrontation here as to what the
intent is and whether or not you are going to fulfill that
intent and what your interpretation is of what is required of
you that fulfills that intent. Because otherwise it would be
zero; if your reasoning prevails today, you wouldn't put
anything in here at all.
Secretary Young. I don't think, sir, it would be zero. But
trying to balance these multiple, competing interests--some of
which I kind of every day feel like come directly from you, to
be honest--the one thing I can do, definitely----
Mr. Abercrombie. They do.
Secretary Young [continuing]. I can honestly do is, I can
spend advance procurement for four airplanes because this
Administration intends to at least propose that those four
airplanes be bought.
Mr. Abercrombie. I don't really think there is a competing
interest here because, as I read the Constitution it is not a
competing interest. The Congress tells you what to do.
I grant you that there has been this idea of a unitary
executive and so on, all of that, the warm results of that we
have noticed ever since Watergate.
Well then, just one more: Have you had discussions with the
next Administration then--this also comes out as a conversation
that has taken place to this point. Have you then had
discussions with representatives of the next Administration
that would lead you to think that they could make a decision by
January 21?
Secretary Young. I have not had those discussions yet.
Mr. Abercrombie. Are you in discussion with the next
Administration?
Secretary Young. Those discussions are starting right now.
Mr. Abercrombie. Okay. Maybe we ought to get in touch with
them, too, to let them know what we think, because I certainly
hope the Obama Administration is going to understand that they
don't operate as a unitary executive either. And I am not
talking about the President-elect, but people who, you know,
represent him at this stage, because I think Mr. Marshall has a
very strong thumb on this issue in the sense of--and I think
that you have made clear today that these are very critical
decision-making dates, January 21 and March 1. Again, for good
or ill, that is what section 134 says. And whether it was a
good idea to write it that way or do it that way, that is what
is there until it is modified or altered.
So I guess my point is that if you are having discussions
with them, I think an emphasis to them that there are serious
implications in the January 21st date and the March 1st date
that need to really go forward. Not that I don't think that you
would, but I want it on the record that this hearing today has
made it clear to me that this has serious, down-the-line fiscal
and policy implications, for sure----
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie [continuing]. Over and above what agreement
or disagreement we might have at this point.
Well, absent anyone else requesting time, then I think I
will go to Mr. Gingrey; and I think that will be our concluding
exchange today.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I want to point
out that this is my first round. Of course, Mr. Saxton was kind
enough to yield to me earlier.
Mr. Abercrombie. Yes, I should have said that. I am sorry.
Dr. Gingrey. I don't want Secretary Young to think that I
am trying to get him with a double whammy here.
But of course I want to point out, Secretary Young, you and
I both are graduates of the Georgia Institute of Technology. We
are both co-op students. You went on, of course, to Stanford
and got a master's degree in aeronautical and astronautical
engineering. I went to the Medical College of Georgia and
became a medical doctor. So we do have a lot in common.
Mr. Abercrombie. He is about to operate on you, right now.
Dr. Gingrey. And I certainly am sharpening the scalpel, as
the chairman says.
Let me say this, though. I know when I was at Georgia Tech
I had very little opportunity to take any economic or business
courses. Now, in the last couple of months up here we have had
to, by fire, learn a lot about the economy, a lot of terms and
that sort of thing. But I doubt if you had much time either to
study a lot of economics.
But let's just say your plan that you recommended--and you
and you alone, you suggested that to Under Secretary England;
you worked with him in the Navy, and you are obviously close
friends and professional associates. And this plan of--instead
of spending the $140 million, you said, we are going to spend--
we are going to spend $50 million; and it is going to save, has
the potential of saving $90 million.
Now, let's say you were presenting that to the taxpayer as,
let's say, a derivative or a credit default swap or a
collateralized debt obligation or a mortgage-backed security;
and the taxpayer said, well, sir, with the green eyeshades, how
much money am I going to make if I purchase this financial
product? And you say, well, you are going to make $90 million.
That's the upside potential; you are going to make $90 million.
And John Q. Public says, well, what is the downside risk;
how much could I lose? And you say, well, it could be, you
could lose 200 million if this contract is not settled by mid-
January, late January or early February of 2009. Or if goes
late into March, you know, it could be $400 million.
I think John Q. Public, taxpayer, Joe Sixpack would say to
you, thanks, but no thanks.
And it seems to me--I mean, we have got bright people in
this room, and they are in the industry; and I see some Air
Force uniforms, and I know these people understand this issue.
But I am trying to kind of simplify it, because we have got a
lot of discussion here, back and forth. And to me, that is what
it is all about, aside from the fact that, to me, you are
flaunting the law, the language is clear, the language is
clear; and you have heard that repeatedly.
Now, you took this action, and I do have a question in
here, Secretary, if you just bear with me.
For several years the President's budget has not included
any funds for the multiengine program, alternate engine for the
Joint Strike Fighter, right? Am I correct on that, for several
years?
Well, you don't have to answer because I know I am correct.
But Congress, each year, has voted to restore funding, and
your office has obligated that restoration. In fact, in March
2008, your testimony before this committee on the Joint Strike
Fighter alternate engine, you stated, ``The Department will
comply with section 213 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008. We will ensure that in
each fiscal year where funds are appropriated there is
obligation and expenditure of sufficient amounts for continued
development and procurement of two options for the Joint Strike
Fighter Propulsion System, the engine. However, the Department
continues to believe that the investment required to develop an
alternate engine is more appropriately proposed for other
Department priorities,'' end quote.
That is you, Mr. Young. So although you disagreed with the
approach of Congress back then, you did act in accordance with
the law, didn't you, and the congressional intent?
So here's the question, finally: So why, when it comes to
section 134 of this year's Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act, are you not following this same logic?
Secretary Young. Can I offer a couple of comments?
I think, in selling the derivative investment idea, we
should at least also talk to the taxpayer about what the
military requirement is. And when Secretary England had a
meeting with me and the Air Force and everyone to try to make a
decision here about how to proceed on F-22 advance procurement,
he said, does the Air Force want to buy F-22s or not? Do you
need them and do you need them in the context of all your other
competing priorities?
And the Air Force said, we can't answer that question. We
are working to analyze that so we can offer an opinion to the
next Administration. They could not offer that comment.
Dr. Gingrey. Reclaiming my time, Secretary Young, that is
not what the Air Force testified to this committee.
Secretary Young. I am telling you what the Air Force
leadership, about two weeks ago, said to Secretary England to
help inform him on making a decision here.
And then, with regard to the second question, I would just
tell you that because I think we have constructed a package
that has the potential--not acknowledging all of these industry
estimates to not cost the taxpayer more money; and I am
constantly looking at being careful with that--we are compliant
in executing a 4 plus 16 strategy with section 134.
No one is ignoring the law, sir.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a concluding
statement.
I think that I made my point here. The actions of Secretary
Young--in my opinion and many members of this subcommittee, as
expressed here today--we think these actions are counter to the
law. They are counter to the intent of Congress and to the Air
Force's stated requirement in regard to F-22A Raptor.
Secretary Young's approach will not, in fact, save the
taxpayer one thin dime; and it could inadvertently--and I will
give him the benefit of the doubt here--it could inadvertently
preclude the procurement option for the next Administration.
Driving this cost up might cause them not to purchase a Lot 10
F-22 Raptor. And I worry that this approach was, well, it will
contribute to killing the program. And I hope, for the sake of
our national security, that Secretary Young will very strongly
consider reversing courses and comply with section 134.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall requested an opportunity just to follow up a
moment or two, and then we will conclude.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
taking a little bit more time on this.
Then not to exceed estimates that you got from industry, I
assume industry is going to be interested in talking with
whoever is signaled and identified in any way in the new
Administration about this particular issue and the decision-
making time frame within which the new Administration needs to
act if it is going to taking advantage of these ``not to
exceed'' estimates.
From your perspectives in the transition here, how will
that occur if you are not going to rely on industry to let
folks know? Will Air Force just make sure it gets done? Is that
basically what is going to happen, the blue suits here, the
people who are going to be around whether they are civilian or
not, are just going to make sure with the new Administration,
good gosh, something needs to be done by January 21? Does this
committee need to do anything? Do we need to send a letter to
the President-elect, that sort of thing? Could you give us
advice?
Secretary Young. I would let Dave Van Buren speak to this,
but for us, Secretary Gates has given us strict orders to have
transition documents, and I personally have an extended memo
that says--you know, because this is just one of many decisions
that have to be made. And so I intend in the very near term to
talk to them and communicate those issues, Secretary Gates'
direction to us. The President's direction is to make this
transition go smoothly. Some of them are major issues like war,
but acquisition has its own set of issues as we have talked
about today, and I will make absolutely certain in every
discussion with the transition team that this, along with
several other issues, must receive their attention immediately,
or certainly within the first six months. And that is how I
have structured my paper----
Mr. Marshall. Well, the problem with the first six months
is obvious, what we are talking about here timewise.
Secretary Young. I am sorry. What I have laid out is
decisions that need to be made in acquisition in the zero-to-
six-month period and therefore require an investment of their
time now. That range includes things other than F-22, and I am
sure the Air Force is doing the same. I will give Dave a chance
to comment.
Mr. Van Buren. We also have a long list of prioritized-
action items that we are to handle with the transition team,
and this certainly is the most immediate of them.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Abercrombie. In response to that, I can assure you that
as a result of today, we are going to make sure that transition
team knows that they better check in here, too, and not because
you won't make the best case that you can about all the things
that you just mentioned, but that they need to make sure that
they triangulate here between the transition team and the
Pentagon and the other leg of that triangle, or the other end
of that triangle is over here, so that we can avoid this kind
of thing as much as possible in the future.
By the way, I do want to say that I fully recognize that
this long language was not necessarily language that you put
forward. This was language that was developed in a conference
committee between the Senate and the House after all, and it is
not necessarily the language that I would have written had I
had my way or if Mr. Skelton had had his way out of the
conference. We did not. And perhaps that should serve as a
lesson to us about making sure when we come out with a
conference bill that we understand that there is going to be
some difficulties with language, and perhaps discussion with
the Pentagon in the future immediately upon the conclusion of
the defense bill might be in order, too, so that we don't get a
cross purposes two, three months or a year down the line as a
result of negotiations that we have to go through. It may not
be as explicitly clear to the Pentagon what we would like to
have happen, or we end up with people of good will and good
faith coming to different conclusions as to what was required.
In any event, I want to thank you both for your service.
This is the last hearing that the 110th Congress will have and
that we will have in this subcommittee, and I want to reiterate
to you, Mr. Young, my personal regards and gratitude to you for
your service. No one, to my knowledge, in government, let alone
in the Pentagon, devotes as much of his waking hours to trying
to do things on behalf of the interests of the Nation, and in
this instance, even more particularly, the national security
interests, than you. And I want to acknowledge that publicly
and extend to you my fond aloha for all that you have helped us
with in the 110th Congress.
Mr. Van Buren, that is not a slight to you. We just haven't
had the same relationship over the past year.
One last thing on that. I think the standard that you have
set in terms of how to go about evaluating things even if we
don't always agree to what that evaluation is, I think, is
something that the next Administration could well emulate.
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is extremely
kind, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Abercrombie. You are more than welcome.
With that, then, I will take my father's gavel and bring
this hearing to an end.
[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 19, 2008
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 19, 2008
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 19, 2008
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 19, 2008
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Secretary Young. If the next administration certifies by March 1,
2009 that it is in the Nation's best interest to terminate F-22
production, the Air Force estimates that, of the $50M authorized by
USD(AT&L) to be obligated for Advance Procurement of four (4) F-22
aircraft, $22M of titanium material and electronic components could be
transferred to F-22 sustainment and/or made available to F-35
production. [See page 14.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Secretary Young. The Whitney, Bradley, Brown (WBB) study was
released. The Department provided the House Armed Services Committee a
copy of the WBB study in January 2008. [See page 23.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK
Secretary Young. In Dec 2005, the Department restructured the F-22A
program by replacing the last two lots (lot 7 of 29 aircraft and lot 8
of 27 aircraft for a total of 56 aircraft) with a three-year
incrementally funded multiyear procurement alternative. This
alternative added $1.6B in FY07 to complete procurement of 60 aircraft
(lots 7-9 of 20 aircraft per lot). Due to incremental funding
requirements, the additional $1.6B in FY07 was required to fully fund
the MYP.
The additional $1.6B did more than just buy 4 additional aircraft.
It repaired many areas affected by the Department's reduction from 279
to 179 aircraft in 2004. It provided for the Economic Order Quantity
procurement to support the multiyear and subassembly procurement of Lot
7 aircraft, as well as production support, logistics support, and
diminishing manufacturing sources. Additionally, funds kept the 5th
generation F-22 production line open an additional year, mitigated
risk, and preserved the option to add additional production lots in the
future. The average unit flyaway cost (UFC) of the 60 aircraft in the
multiyear contract is $142.6M. [See page 20.]
Lot UFC Total Production Cost7-9 (60 aircraft) $142.6M $8.8B (Airframes & Engines)
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 19, 2008
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE
Mr. Abercrombie. Secretary Young, you have made a point of the
amount needed to bring the F-22A to a common configuration. The
subcommittee would be interested to view this in context with other
aircraft programs. Please provide the RDT&E funds for each of the
following programs, B-1, F-I17, B-2, F-16 (all models and blocks), F-
22A, and F-18 (all models and blocks):
1. Total RDT&E funds obligated through FY 08.
2. Total RDT&E funds obligated from IOC through FY 08, and
3. Total RDT&E funds programmed in the FY 09 FYDP.
Please provide copies of all acquisition decision memorandums
issued for the F-22A in 2008.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Secretary Young. As of November 30, 2008, the F/A-18 and EA-186
Program has provided RDT&E funding for the following models, which are
captured in the F/A-18 Improvement Line included below:
F/A-18 Improvements (All Models & Blocks)
1) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated through FY 08: $10,482.8M
2) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated from IOC to FY 08: There is no
IOC associated with the F/A-18 improvements, because this Program
upgrades various systems, software, avionics, etc. associated with the
F/A-18 program. These upgrades allow for the program to respond
effectively with emerging future threats
3) Total RDT&E, Navy funds programmed in FY 09 FYDP: $505.2M
F/A-18 A/B/C/D
1) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated through FY 08: $6,746.3M
2) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated from IOC to FY 08: $429.3M (A/
B IOC in 1983, C/D IOC in 1987)
3) Total RDT&E, Navy funds programmed in FY 09 FYDP: No RDT&E, Navy
funds were programmed in FY 09 FYDP because A/B and C/D development
have completed.
F/A-18E/F *
1) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated through FY 08: $6,804.1M
2) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated from IOC to FY 08: $1.21M, IOC
in September 2001.
3) Total RDT&E, Navy funds programmed in FY 09 FYDP: No RDT&E, Navy
funds were programmed in FY 09 FYDP because E/F development completed
in FY 02.
* This data captures the F/A-18E aircraft development program only.
This does not include component improvements such as: Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), Automatic Carrier Landing System
(ACLS), Infrared Search and Track (IRST), Distributed Targeting (DTP/
MSU) or Sensor Integration which are captured in F/A-18 Improvements
line, above.
EA-18G
1) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated through FY 08: $1,599.9M
2) Total RDT&E, Navy funds obligated from IOC to FY 08: No RDT&E,
Navy funds were programmed from IOC to FY 08 because IOC is not
projected until September 2009.
3) Total RDT&E, Navy funds programmed in FY 09 FYDP: $232.7M
B-1 IOC September 1986
1) RDT&E through FY 08: $ 6,340.20M
2) RDT&E IOC thru FY 08: $ 2,676.82M
3) RDT&E in FY 09 FYDP: $ 309.14MB-2 IOC April 1997
1) RDT&E through FY 08: $17,645.20M
2) RDT&E IOC thru FY 08: $ 2,900.70M
3) RDT&E in FY 09 FYDP: $ 962.85MF-16 IOC October 1980
1) RDT&E through FY 08: $ 5,716.73M
2) RDT&E IOC thru FY 08: $ 3,211.55M
3) RDT&E in FY 09 FYDP: $ 769.81MF-22 IOC December 2005
1) RDT&E through FY 08: $ 28,500M
2) RDT&E IOC thru FY 08: $ 1,500M
3) RDT&E in FY 09 FYDP: $ 2,365MF-117 IOC October 1983**
1) RDT&E 2000-2008: $ 89.3M
2) RDT&E in FY 09 FYDP: 0 M
NOTE: For comparison across the programs, all funding has been
converted to base year 2008.
** The majority of RDT&E for F-117 was conducted under classified
appropriations, which is not reflective in these values.
I provided you copies of all acquisition decision memorandums for
the F-22A in 2008 in my January 15, 2009, letter to you.
Mr. Abercrombie. The Air Force and the prime contractor estimated
that the cost impact to the F-22 program of executing advance
procurement in accordance with the guidance provided in your November
10, acquisition decision memorandum, was as much as $500 million, if a
decision is made to proceed with the additional 20 aircraft program by
the new administration in March 2009, while you indicated that there
was no additional costs. Please provide an explanation of why your
estimates of the cost impact to the F-22 program varied so
significantly from those provided by the Air Force and the prime
contractor.
Secretary Young. The Not-to-Exceed (NTE) cost estimates provided by
the prime contractor detail price ceilings for the Advance Procurement
funding required for the purchase of four aircraft, an option for 16
aircraft, and a total lot of 20 aircraft. These NTE costs are the prime
contractor's best estimate at this time. The contractor's NTE estimates
indicate that the purchase now of AP for four aircraft and subsequent
exercise of an option for 16 will cost no more than a purchase of the
full twenty aircraft lot today. The NTE estimates are valid until March
16, 2009, providing the new Administration adequate time to make its
decision on future F-22A procurement.
Mr. Abercrombie. Please provide a listing of the items, costs, and
quantities for all items included in the $140M cost estimate provided
to Congress to fund advance procurement for 20 F-22s from November 2008
to March 15, 2009.
Mr. Van Buren. No specific itemized listing of parts was used for
the $140M AP funds required for F-22 AP through March 15, 2009. The
cost was determined based on historical procurement data from Lots 1-9.
Based on these actuals, the Air Force estimated that $523M would be
required to fully fund AP for Lot 10 of 20 aircraft. The Air Force then
generated a combined cost and termination liability curve and estimated
that $140M of that $523M total was required to continue AP through
March 2009.
Mr. Abercrombie. Please provide a listing of items, costs, and
quantities for all items included in the November 26, 2008 contract
with Lockheed for advance procurement for the F-22A.
Mr. Van Buren. The entire list of long-lead AP items and their
associated quantities, lead-times, and unit costs for two scenarios: 1)
four aircraft only: and 2) an option to procure 16 additional aircraft,
are detailed in the Pratt & Whitney (18 November 2008) and Lockheed
Martin (20 November 2008) Advance Procurement-Funding/Termination
Liability Requirements submissions (commonly referred to as the ``Not-
to-Exceed'' or NTE proposals) to the government. These NTEs identify
all long-lead items to be procured through September 2009 based on full
AP funding. The contractors are currently working with their suppliers
to determine a prioritized list of long-lead items to be procured based
on partial AP funding through 15 March 2009. The advance procurements
are shown in the attachments for Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney
engines and Boeing through 31 Mar 09.
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______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SAXTON
Mr. Saxton. Secretary Young's oral testimony included the following
statement: ``Can I offer a couple of comments? I think, in selling the
derivative investment idea, we should at least also talk to the
taxpayer about what the military requirement is. And when Sec England
had a meeting with me and the AF and everyone to try to make a decision
here about how to proceed on F-22 advance procurement, he said, does
the AF want to buy F-22s or not? Do you need them and do you need them
in the context of your other competing priorities? And the AF said, we
can't answer that question. We are working to analyze that so we can
offer an opinion to the next administration. They could not offer that
comment.'' Mr. Van Buren, does the Air Force have a requirement for
more than 183 F-22s to meet the National Military Strategy? If so, how
many F-22s do you need?
Mr. Van Buren. Congressman Saxton, the Air Force leadership is
reviewing whether to propose a change to the current F-22 program of
record. No decisions have been made and the Air Force leadership will
be prepared to discuss this with incoming officials at the appropriate
time.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. Mr. Young, in the spirit of protecting taxpayer
dollars, it is my understanding that providing an additional $140M in
funding for procurement of long lead F-22 items would serve ``multiple
purposes'' and prevent line disruption, schedule delays, and
significant cost increases. This $140M expenditure would go to multiple
purpose items that would be:
applied to the 20 new F-22 aircraft
used as F-22 spare parts if the program is cancelled
used as parts to meet F-35 requirements
Mr. Young, have you factored in funding ``multiple purpose'' long
lead items now that can be used as future F-22 spare parts or for F-35
requirements if the 20 new F-22 aircraft program is canceled? Such an
expenditure now would allow access to the open production lines and
prevent disruption. delays and cost increases.
Secretary Young. The Department has authorized the obligation of up
to $50 million for Advance Procurement in the context of a plan to buy
four F-22A aircraft as directed in a November 10 Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) to the Air Force. In an effort to maximize all options
for the next Administration, the ADM also allows the Air Force to
include a priced option for additional Advance Procurement for 16
aircraft. Furthermore, in an amendment to the aforementioned ADM, the
Department has authorized the F-22 program, as part of Lot 10 Advance
Procurement, to purchase long-lead titanium for 20 F-22 aircraft. These
materials would be made available to the Joint Strike Fighter Program
or other DoD programs requiring these materials, should the next
Administration decide to terminate the F-22A production line.
The Department has factored in using the Advanced Procurement
funding for multiple purposes. However, a large portion of Advanced
Procurement costs are related to contracting and procurement
activities, not material acquisition. If the decision is made to
terminate production, these sunk costs would be wasted and unavailable
for use for any other purpose. The Department believes that committing
any more Advanced Procurement funding would be an inappropriate use of
taxpayer dollars until a final decision is made. Actions beyond the
approved ADM efforts will quickly make these materials F-22 unique and
preclude use in the F-35 program. There is no requirement for
additional F-22 spare parts, especially if the new administration
decides not to purchase additional aircraft. DoD has been criticized
for buying excess spare parts.
The Defense Department has taken actions consistent with
congressional direction, limiting the obligation of tax dollars to
avoid excessive sunk costs while funding the activities and materials
that are essential to preserving F-22 pricing and production
continuity. This is a prudent approach that preserves F-22A options
with a conscious effort to minimize risk to the taxpayer.
Mr. Miller. Will you release additional funds now for long lead
items that could be applied to F22 spare parts or F-35 requirements?
Secretary Young. I have approved the Air Force to use up to $50M
for Advanced Procurement for four F-22A aircraft. Additionally, the Air
Force is authorized to use a portion of the $50M for the purchase of
long-lead titanium products for 20 F-22A aircraft. If the new
Administration certifies that continued F-22A production is in the
national interest, the remainder of the AP funds appropriated in FY
2009 will be used for the additional 16 aircraft. If the new
Administration certifies that is in the national interest to terminate
F-22A production, the titanium materials and products purchased will be
made available as F-22A spare parts or for F-35 requirements. No
further funding will be authorized until the new Administration
certifies under the timeline directed in section 134 of the FY 2009
National Defense Authorization Act.