[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY'S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION
PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 23, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-82
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
-----
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-234 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California JOE BARTON, Texas
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts Ranking Member
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
GENE GREEN, Texas CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado Mississippi
Vice Chairman VITO FOSSELLA, New York
LOIS CAPPS, California STEVE BUYER, Indiana
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
JANE HARMAN, California JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
TOM ALLEN, Maine MARY BONO, California
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois GREG WALDEN, Oregon
HILDA L. SOLIS, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
JAY INSLEE, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JIM MATHESON, Utah MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
______
Professional Staff
Dennis B. Fitzgibbons, Chief of Staff
Gregg A. Rothschild, Chief Counsel
Sharon E. Davis, Chief Clerk
David L. Cavicke, Minority Staff Director7
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana Ranking Member
Vice Chairman GREG WALDEN, Oregon
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
GENE GREEN, Texas TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAY INSLEE, Washington JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio)
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex
officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Bennie Thompson, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Mississippi, prepared statement............................. 2
Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 4
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 5
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 7
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, prepared statement............................. 8
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 9
Hon. Jan Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, prepared statement................................ 10
Witnesses
Richard Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and the
Environment, Government Accountability Office.................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Answers to submitted questions............................... 259
Adam Scheinman, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Answers to submitted questions............................... 261
Richard Stratford, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation.................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Answers to submitted questions............................... 298
Submitted Material
GIPP Status Report, March 25, 2008............................... 57
Subcommittee exhibit binder...................................... 58
COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY'S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart
Stupak (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stupak, Green, Schakowsky,
Inslee, Dingell (ex officio), Shimkus, Walden, Burgess, and
Blackburn.
Staff present: Richard Miller, John Arlington, Scott
Schloegel, John Sopko, Kyle Chapman, Dwight Cates, and Alan
Slobodin.
Mr. Stupak. This meeting will come to order.
Today we have a hearing entitled ``Combating Nuclear
Proliferation: The Effectiveness of the Department of Energy's
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program.'' Before I
begin I would like to make two quick comments, if I may. First,
I want to welcome my good friend John Shimkus as the new
ranking member of the subcommittee. You inherit a very good
staff on the subcommittee and we have a distinguished history
of working together in a bipartisan manner and I know it will
continue with you. I look forward to continuing that
relationship and working with you in your new role as ranking
member.
Second, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the
work of Chairman Bennie Thompson of the Homeland Security
Committee. The GAO report that is the focus of today's hearing
was produced for the Homeland Security Committee, and we
appreciate the work on this important issue. I would also like
to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement
from Chairman Thompson regarding the GAO report and the IPP
program. Without objection, the statement will be entered in
the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Stupak. Each member will now be recognized for an
opening statement, and I will begin.
Protecting the United States from a nuclear attack is one
of our top priorities. Last year this subcommittee examined our
ability to detect radioactive material being smuggled across
our borders. Today's hearing will examine efforts to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our subcommittee
intends to hold additional hearings this year to explore
whether our government is doing enough to control, interdict
and secure loose nukes and other weapons of mass destruction
throughout the world.
There have been several recent examples of nuclear material
and knowledge falling into the hands of dangerous individuals.
In 2007, enriched uranium was interdicted in eastern Slovakia
and Hungary. In 2006, stolen highly enriched uranium was seized
in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Last year North Korea
exploded its first nuclear device in their continuing quest to
develop nuclear bombs. Where did North Korea obtain their
nuclear expertise? From the rogue metallurgists behind
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr. A.K. Khan. Dr. Khan not
only sold nuclear technology to North Korea but also to Libya,
Iran and a fourth recipient whose identify has not yet been
disclosed. Unfortunately, even though the United States
provides Pakistan with more than $1 billion per year in aid,
the Administration has apparently been unable to interview Dr.
Khan to unlock all the secrets about his proliferation
activities, information that could prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons to other nations or terrorists.
At the end of the Cold War, it was estimated that the
Soviets employed 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear experts, 65,000
bioweapons professionals and 6,000 chemical weapons experts.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many of its
weapon scientists and engineers suffered significant cuts in
pay or lost their government-supported work. In response to the
national security threat that unemployed or underemployed
scientists would sell their knowledge to terrorist groups or
countries of concern, the United States Department of Energy
established the Initiative for Proliferation Program, IPP, in
1994. The IPP was developed as a means to engage in transit
weapons of mass destruction scientists into peaceful commercial
activities. The State Department operates a parallel program by
helping former WMD institutes retain Soviet-era scientists in
new missions using two science centers, one in Russia and one
in the Ukraine. Nine years ago the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) studied the effectiveness of the IPP program and
issued a report that was critical of the program. A February
1999 report found that 63 percent of the money was spent in the
United States, more than half the money going to DOE national
labs. Only 37 percent of IPP funding went to Russia's
scientific institutes. Overhead, taxes and fees further reduce
the amounts actually received by Russian scientists.
In response, Congress modified the program capping the
spending at the national laboratories to 35 percent and
required the Energy Secretary to review projects for commercial
potential and terminate those which ``are not likely to achieve
their intended commercial objective.'' Today we will hear the
results of a new 15-month GAO follow-up audit. It appears it is
even more critical than their 1999 review. For example, GAO
found that 54 percent of those hired on IPP projects it audited
did not claim experience with weapons of mass destruction, the
key goal of the IPP program. GAO also found that despite the
fact that the State Department has graduated 17 institutes from
their proliferation program because they determined that these
institutes were self-sustaining, the DOE has continued to front
35 projects in Russia and the Ukraine at those 17 institutes.
The GAO investigation questioned whether the IPP program may
actually be contributing to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction since its funds have been used to recruit and
retain new scientists who are too young to have worked on
Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction programs. At the same
time, GAO also noted that some of the former weapons institutes
being assisted by IPP are enjoying newfound prosperity. One has
a marble-lined foyer with an art collection thanks to a gift
from a former scientist. This begs the question of whether the
institutes need U.S. funding to sustain employment for their
scientists.
There are a number of additional questions that I look
forward to having answered today about the continued need for
the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, whether
there is a system in place to adequately evaluate the
effectiveness of the IPP programs, whether the Russians should
assume funding responsibility for the program and whether DOE
can evaluate the proliferation threat risk associated with
ending funding for IPP. The DOE needs to evaluate whether the
money spent through the IPP program would be better spent in
other parts of the world where local economies are not doing as
well as in Russia and there may be a greater risk or temptation
for scientists to sell their knowledge to terrorists or
countries of concern.
Let me make this point clear. Cooperative threat reduction
programs run by the Department of State and the DOE are
valuable. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program
in particular has given former Soviet scientists a reason not
to sell their knowledge to state or terrorist actors who want
to develop a nuclear device. While the non-proliferation
mission is important, it is imperative that we as Members of
Congress assess DOE's past performance and future strategy to
determine whether the projects funded by the IPP program are
continuing to provide the intended non-proliferation benefits.
That concludes my statement.
Mr. Stupak. I would like to now turn to my friend, Mr.
Shimkus, for his opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to be
with you and your very great staff and I look forward to
working with you. I also want to recognize Chairman Thompson
for asking for this report. It has been very valuable and I
think it helps lead our discussions.
Today's hearing will focus on a report by the GAO that has
identified several serious problems with the DOE's Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, program. GAO's findings
raise serious doubts about the overall benefits of this non-
proliferation program. GAO will testify that DOE has overstated
the accomplishments of the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention program and has failed to develop any meaningful
criteria or performance measures to explain whether the
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program is working.
We know DOE has funded thousands of Russian scientists but
DOE has failed to demonstrate that this effort has led to any
meaningful reduction in the non-proliferation threat posed by
the former Soviet weapons scientists and what we are addressing
today is the old trust but verify and let us see the results of
the money that we are spending.
Furthermore, GAO has informed us that DOE has even funded
scientists at Russian institutes who pose no proliferation
threat or risk and who have no technical background in weapons
of mass destruction. More importantly, DOE has overlooked
several critical opportunities to reduce proliferation risk.
For instance, the State Department has provided us with a list
of 18 critical high-risk Russian institutes where brain drain
is a threat. The committee Minority staff compared the State
Department's high-priority list with a list of Russian
institutes DOE is currently funding. Only three of the 18
highest priority Russian institutes identified by the State
Department are currently funded through DOE's IPP program.
GAO's report shows that DOE has not focused its resources on
the highest risk institutes in Russian. Only last year, 13
years since the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
program was created, did DOE finally begin to develop a risk
prioritization system for targeting scientists at the Russian
institutes. GAO will also testify that there is poor
coordination between DOE and similar non-proliferation programs
at the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and I
guess there are also programs with the Department of Defense
and Health and Human Services. With such an apparent
duplication of effort and failure to coordinate, we should
examine whether these programs could or should be consolidated.
Congress appropriated $30 million for the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention program in 2008 in the Omnibus Bill,
and of course, there is no specific line item but the original
budget request was around $21 to $22 million. There is an
overall increase. We have questions on how we are spending the
money to begin with. The question is, why increase portions of
that?
Who is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program
intended to benefit and why isn't Russia participating? Does
Russia share the same concerns about the threat of terrorism
and non-proliferation concerns? If they do, then it is time for
them to contribute some money to help solve the non-
proliferation threat. Where is the United States' return on
investment? In coordination with the Energy Information
Administration Committee, Minority staff has calculated that
over just the past 3 years the United States has imported 150
million barrels of oil from Russia at a total of $8.68 billion
and we have imported 49 billion barrels of fuel oil at a total
price of $2.35 billion. This $11 billion in wealth transferred
from the United States to Russia is enormous and it is one of
the reasons Russia is running a budget surplus. Clearly Russia
can afford to participate in the IPP program. In light of
Russia's growing wealth, I think it is clear the Russian
government could step up to the plate and help address the
proliferation threat posed by its own scientists.
If we decide to continue the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention program into the future, DOE must first demonstrate
that it has corrected serious management problems identified by
GAO. If DOE demonstrates that the program is salvageable, the
second step would be to get a cost-share commitment from the
Russian government before we initiate any new Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention program projects at Russian
institutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. I thank the ranking member for his statement.
I next turn to the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Dingell, for an opening statement. I am going to ask Ms.
Schakowsky to take the chair as I have to testify at another
hearing, and I will be back as soon as I get done. Mr. Dingell
for an opening statement, please, sir.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
courtesy and I commend you for holding this hearing on nuclear
proliferation. This is a very important subject and it is an
issue of grave importance, given the continuing political
instability in central Asia.
I want to observe first of all that I watched this program
as its inception when I visited Russia and the Soviet Union at
the time of the collapse of the then-Soviet Union. At that time
it was a good program and it seemed to be focused and that it
also seemed to have purpose and a sense of administrative
solidarity. It has been regrettably virtually unreviewed and
un-looked at by the Congress for a number of years and it is
time that it be looked at very carefully to see to it that it
has carried out its original purpose and whether in fact the
program is doing what it should, given the way the world works
today.
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, IPP,
had at its inception a noble purpose. It must be noted that the
central goal of this program was to provide proper incentives
to the scientists who would be helped by it so that they would
direct their expertise in peaceful ventures in partnership with
private U.S. companies rather than to work for rogue states or
terrorist groups, a matter of great importance then and of
great importance now. This is certainly an innovative and
useful approach today as it was then, and it was useful in
preventing the spread of nuclear technologies then and now.
Since that time, however, the landscape has changed
dramatically. Russia is now thriving. It is the largest oil
producer in the world. It is the second largest oil exporter
after OPEC. Its economy is booming. Unemployment is declining
rapidly there. In short, given Russia's economic turnaround, it
appears that the time has come for the IPP program to show
Congress how it works, how it is justified, what it is doing
and whether or not it has an exit strategy that would be useful
in terms of our other policy questions and its own concerns.
Moreover, there is a serious question as to how effective the
program has been. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
notes that an audit sample found that more than half of the
scientists funded by the IPP program may not have had any
weapons-related experience. In addition, the Department of
Energy's assertions that the program has created thousands of
long-term private-sector jobs for former scientists cannot be
objectively verified. This underscores the basic question of
whether the IPP program is funding the right people and perhaps
whether it can be made to work at all. It is also curious to
observe that it just might be that this is a program which is
funding competition for our own industry using our taxpayers'
monies.
I must voice my own skepticism about the efficacy of the
IPP program. It is hard to imagine that today's Russian leaders
would allow our Energy Department to employ their top weapons
scientists. Indeed, DOE's senior officials informed the
committee staff that the Russians would never let us anywhere
near anyone they really care about. The deputy director of the
IPP program concurred in that assessment.
Mr. Chairman, I begin by noting that the program was born,
as I have said, with a noble purpose and I have no doubt that
those who run this program do so with the best of intentions.
There is, however, often a thin line between the noble and the
nave. Finally, while today's hearing is focused on nuclear
proliferation, I note that the IPP program and parallel
Department of State programs are not limited to scientists who
worked only on nuclear weapons but may also include scientists
working with chemical and biological weapons. The Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigation has already initiated
investigation into the proliferation of high-containment
bioresearch laboratories with the first in a series of hearings
on that subject held in October and more to come in this year.
I would be interested to learn the extent to which DOE and the
State Department may be involved in the funding of former
biowarfare scientists or the construction of bioresearch
laboratories in developing countries.
Mr. Chairman, you are doing great work and I look forward
to exploring these issues further in this and in other hearings
to come. Thank you for your recognition.
Ms. Schakowsky [Presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Walden for an opening
statement.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I waive my opening
statement given that we have got votes coming up within the
hour, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Burgess--Dr. Burgess. Excuse me.
Mr. Burgess. Again, in the interests of time, because we do
have votes coming up, I will submit my statement for the record
and wait on the witnesses, and yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:]
Statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess, MD
Thank you Chairman Stupak. Before I begin my brief remarks
I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new Ranking
Member, John Shimkus. I believe that this is one of the most
important subcommittees in Congress, and I look forward to
working with you on the many important issues that comes before
the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee.
Throughout our nation's rich history, we have faced many
threats to our national security, whether it was in the 1700's
from England, the 1800s from the Civil War, the 1900's from the
Soviet Union, or in present day, from Al Qaeda. We have endured
times of war and proactively sought measures to prolong times
of peace. However, as the times and enemies change, so must our
strategy.
It is the duty of Congress, of this subcommittee, to
reevaluate and reassess government programs, especially those
programs of national security interest. What works, what
doesn't? What is the best use of the taxpayer's dollar? Today,
we will be discussing the Initiative for Proliferation
Prevention Program. The program's intent, created in 1994, was
to reduce the proliferation risk posed by weapon scientists in
the former Soviet Union. Was this intent fulfilled? Is this
program still effective? I welcome our witnesses from National
Nuclear Security Administration, the State Department, and the
Government Accountability Office to address these vital
questions; and therefore, help to better secure the safety of
our nation.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this important
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
----------
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. Madam Chair, I have a statement I would like to
ask be placed into the record and just note, this is the second
time in a decade that we have received a report critical of the
IPP program and I appreciate the Chair having this hearing
today and the oversight, and I will yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Statement of Hon. Gene Green
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on
"Combating Nuclear Proliferation: The Effectiveness of the
Energy Department's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Program."
Following the end of the Cold War, many believed the threat
of attack from the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was over.
Little did we know then that these same nuclear weapons
would pose as severe a threat today as they did at the height
of the Soviet Union's power.
We no longer face brinkmanship with another world
superpower, but 9/11 proved just how dangerous weapons can be
in the hands of those who despise our nation's way of life.
Terrorist organizations have declared war against the
United States. In this battle, we must assume that no weapon is
out of reach, too expensive, or too destructive for our enemies
to use against us.
Rouge nations, such as North Korea and Iran, have also
shown that they will act against the will of the international
community to develop dangerous weapon capabilities.
Our efforts to keep nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations or rogue
nations have broadened greatly since the passing of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act in 1991.
Today Congress spends over $1 billion across three agencies
- the Department of Energy, Defense, and State - for our
nonproliferation efforts.
One such DOE program, the Initiatives for Proliferation
Program, or the IPP program, was created to reduce the threat
that scientists with expertise of weapons of mass destruction
might provide that expertise to states or terrorists to
threaten the U.S. or our allies.
It aims to achieve this by focusing on the twin goals of
creating nonmilitary work and long-term job creation for
weapons scientists in Russia and other former Soviet Union
countries.
I hope today's hearing will shed some light on whether or
not these goals are being achieved.
For the second time in a decade, the Government
Accountability Office has issued a critical report on the IPP
program and has provided recommendations for improvement.
Questions continue to loom regarding the program's lack of
clear performance metrics and accurate reporting methods.
Congress has stepped in before to remedy deficiencies in
the IPP program, and should do so again if the program fails to
achieve U.S. nonproliferation and national security objectives.
I welcome our distinguished panel before us today, and I
look forward to a lively discussion.
I yield back the balance of my time.
----------
Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Blackburn?
Ms. Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will yield back
my time. I will place my statement in the record so that we can
move forward with our witnesses. I think we all have lots of
questions.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me just say a few words and I will put
my statement in the record.
Nearly 14 years have passed since the IPP program began and
I am just very proud that this committee under the leadership
of Chairman Stupak is looking into this, and this is exactly
what the Oversight Subcommittee ought to be doing, looking at
programs of all sorts, but I think maybe in particular those
that are kind of obscure and yet lots of taxpayer dollars are
going their way to evaluate those, so this is indeed a very
important hearing.
My task at this point is to swear in our witnesses, so if
they would--the witnesses are Mr. Robert Robinson, Managing
Director of Natural Resources and the Environment of the GAO;
Mr. Robinson is accompanied by Mr. Glen Levis, Assistant
Director of Natural Resources and the Environment; Mr. Adam
Scheinman, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security at the Department
of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration; and Mr.
Richard Stratford, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation at the
Department of State. I want to welcome the panelists, and it is
the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under
oath, so please be advised that witnesses have the right under
the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during their
testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel?
Then if you would, please rise and raise your right hand to
take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Schakowsky. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
replied in the affirmative, and you are now under oath.
Ms. Schakowsky. And now we will begin first with Mr.
Robinson.[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jan Schakowsky
Thank you Mr. Chairman for yielding and for holding this
hearing on such an important issue.
At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is
believed that the Soviets employed between 120,000 and 130,000
experts on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. With
the Kremlin disbanded there was real fear that these suddenly
unemployed scientists would sell their skills to the highest
bidder. This fact presented a clear threat to the United States
and the rest of the world. To prevent this from happening, the
Congress created several programs, including the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) intended to identify and
procure employment for these experts in civilian research.
Nearly 14 years have passed since the IPP program began and
yet today marks the very first time that Congress has conducted
an oversight hearing on its effectiveness. Like many of my
colleagues, I think that it was prudent for our government to
have been active in ensuring that these brilliant minds did not
end up working for rogue nations like North Korea or Iran, or
terrorist organizations. I also believe that it was not the
intention of Congress to create an endless source of financing
for this program, but rather to provide immediate assistance to
help these scientists find employment, after which the United
States would gradually remove itself from the process. Despite
this, evidence presented today by the Government Accountability
Office suggests that in fact, the Department of Energy has "not
developed an exit strategy for the IPP program."
I look forward to hearing from our panelists today so that
we may learn more about the IPP program including whether it
has been effective to date and lastly whether the program
remains necessary in light of the rapidly improving economy in
Russia.
I am particularly interested in hearing Mr. Scheinman's
reactions to several findings in the GAO report including the
fact that 54 percent of the scientists paid through the program
claim to have no experience with weapons of mass destruction
and 60 percent of those audited had not been soviet era
scientists.
These facts seem to indicate that the IPP program may no
longer serve its intended purpose and may need to be either
reformed or phased out.
Again Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing and I look forward to hearing from each of our
panelists and I yield back the balance of my time.
----------
Ms. Schakowsky. And now we will begin first with Mr.
Robinson.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROBINSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Robinson. Thank you very much. We are happy to be here
today. I would want to put into the record that I am pinch-
hitting today for Gene Aloise, who was responsible for and
conducted this work under his leadership. He is unfortunately
undergoing medical treatment and is not able to be here today.
There are many details that emerge from our analysis of
this program, Mr. Chairman, and I want to use my 5 minutes to
lay out a few commonsense observations about the program that
led us to our conclusion that the program needs to be
fundamentally reassessed. I am focusing my remarks here because
while DOE largely agreed with our recommendations, it disagreed
with us on this issue. At the outset I want to say and mirror
the comments that many of you have made that there is no doubt
that the program has served a very useful purpose in helping us
get through a dangerous period of high proliferation risk
coinciding with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The
program helped former Soviet-era weapons scientists through a
period when they had either lost their jobs or suffered
significant cuts in pay that could have led them to sell their
knowledge to other countries or terrorist groups trying to
develop weapons of mass destruction. Now, however, 14 years and
$300 million later, the circumstances that led to the program's
creation have dramatically changed, most notably, greatly
improved economic conditions, particularly in Russia where 80
percent of the program's projects have been directed. With $100
barrel oil feeding the thriving Russian economy, the threat
that former weapons scientists will need to sell their
knowledge outside their country appears to be significantly
lessened. These economic conditions also raise questions about
whether the Russian government could take on greater
responsibility in this area. There are probably pockets of
vulnerably at certain weapons institutes but these could be
identified during the reassessment we called for. Our
discussions at numerous institutes across Russia and Ukraine
and with a senior Russian atomic energy agency official confirm
the view that the program may no longer be relevant to today's
realities. Many officials told us, in fact, that their bigger
fear is that the scientists will emigrate to the United States
and Western Europe and not to countries of proliferation
concern.
Our analysis of the program's operations provide further
support, we believe, for the need for fundamental program
reassessment. Over half of the scientists being funded at the
97 projects we reviewed did not claim any weapon-related
experience in the documentation we reviewed. Instead of being
used to support former Soviet-era weapons scientists, the
authorized design of the program, funding is now being used to
attract, recruit and retain younger scientists that were too
young to have had this experience. In this way, we may actually
be helping sustain the continued operation of institute
activities or, at a minimum, help the institutes develop
technical capabilities that we ultimately may have to compete
against. Ultimately, and importantly, DOE has not updated its
metrics to judge the extent to which the program is actually
reducing proliferation risk, and this is where we want to make
sure the energy is concentrated here today, or adjust
priorities so that funds can be targeted to the areas of
highest need.
Just as troubling, there appears to be no exit strategy for
the program. Unlike the Department of State, which has
developed criteria specific in nature to graduate certain
institutes from the program, DOE has developed no comparable
strategies. As a result, DOE continues to support multiple
projects that State ceased funding because it concluded that
they no longer used U.S. assistance. Likewise, DOE is now
expanding the program to other countries and purposes. It is
now providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya. The
program is also developing projects to support another DOE
program, GNEP, aimed at expanding the use of nuclear power in
the United States and around the world. These efforts could
very well have a useful national security purpose but it is not
consistent with the original intent of the program and has
occurred without a clear mandate from Congress.
To address these and other concerns, our report presented
11 recommendations, 8 of which DOE concurred with. In
particular, they agreed with our program management
recommendations dealing with developing better processes for
verifying WMD backgrounds of participating scientists, seeking
congressional authorization to expand the program outside the
former Soviet Union and working with the State Department to
better coordinate its similar programs.
As I said earlier, DOE disagreed with our recommendation to
fundamentally reassess the program but based on the evidence
presented in our report and summarized here today, I believe
this recommendation is sound and, at a minimum, should include
a thorough analysis of risk, a focused prioritization of
program resources on the highest risks, and a clear exit
strategy that includes specific criteria for graduating
countries, institutes and scientists from the program.
As the Comptroller General has said on many occasions, the
Federal Government is on an unsustainable fiscal path, making
it imperative that all Federal programs be efficiently focused
on the highest priorities. There is no reason that this
standard should not be applied to the IPP program.
Thank you, and I look forward to the discussion that
follows.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Scheinman.
STATEMENT OF ADAM SCHEINMAN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Scheinman. Thank you, Chairwoman and Mr. Shimkus. Let
me thank the committee for inviting me to testify today. I
certainly welcome the opportunity to discuss the Global
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, which is one
of a number of nonproliferation programs under the National
Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy.
The GAO review of the GIPP program raises important questions
and offers a list of recommendations. As noted, many of those
we support, and I look forward to sharing our view of the
program.
The need to prevent weapons of mass destruction
proliferation through engagement of weapons scientists,
engineers and experts has been a consistent policy objective of
the United States including successive U.S. administrations. It
is a goal in the National Security Strategy issued in 2002
which calls for ``strengthened efforts to prevent rogue states
and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and
expertise needed for weapons of mass destruction.
To advance that policy goal, GIPP uses technical expertise
within the Department of Energy and the national labs to
redirect former WMD personnel in other countries to peaceful,
non-military work.
GIPP engages directly with personnel in Russia and former
Soviet states, many of whom are employed by institutes not yet
fully enjoying the benefits of Russian economy turnaround. The
program provides the United States with an established
capability to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging risks
and opportunities in the nonproliferation arena.
Through GIPP, roughly 115 projects are underway in more
than 100 institutes and facilities in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia and Uzbekistan. Projects were
launched more recently outside of the former Soviet Union
including in Iraq and Libya, as has been noted. Taken together,
the GIPP has engaged many thousands of WMD scientists and
experts, which we view as an impressive achievement that serves
our nonproliferation objects and our Nation's security.
Most GIPP projects involve a U.S. industry partner. Through
its industry outreach component, GIPP has facilitated
partnerships that are commercializing technologies that are in
use today including landmine detectors, needle-free injectors,
prosthetics, radioisotopes for cancer treatment and so on.
Russian scientists and U.S. industry benefit from these
partnerships.
At the State Department's request, GIPP responded to a
nonproliferation imperative in Libya following Libya's decision
to abandon its WMD programs, and we partnered with the State
Department in Iraq. We are also prepared to engage elsewhere
including North Korea if the circumstances warrant it.
Notwithstanding our limited programs in Libya and Iraq, the
bulk of GIPP work today remains in Russia. We recognize of
course that in many respects Russia has changed in 15 years
since scientist redirection got underway. Russia's economy is
more stable and conditions in the closed cities are certainly
improved. Accordingly, the threat of scientist migration is not
one that gives us the greatest concern today.
But the absence of high risk of scientist migration doesn't
imply zero risk or that the job is done. And in our view, as
long as proliferation demand exists, we have a requirement to
cooperate with others to impede supply, whether that involves
improved expert controls, better border security or scientist
engagement. Absence of high migration risk does imply that the
manner in which GIPP has been traditionally carried out merits
recalibration, as noted in the GAO report, and this is the path
that we are on, started at the request of the NNSA
administrator in 2006.
At the administrator's request, GIPP conducted an internal
assessment much along the lines outlined by the GAO in its
principal findings. Our conclusion in that assessment was that
scientist engagement is contributing to nonproliferation goals
and should continue but should be oriented to better meet the
current threat. It should also contribute to technologies more
supportive of the NNSA mission, whether that involves
technology for nuclear safeguards, for nuclear security or
proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems. We certainly
want to ensure that our partners have a strong security culture
and that requires engagement of scientific personnel.
The conclusion of our internal review was approved by the
administrator and endorsed a number of specific outcomes which
I will highlight here.
First, in light of the changed threat environment, GIPP
would adopt a more focused approach, emphasizing those
institutes and facilities involved with enabling WMD
technologies or expertise and where the program can provide a
stabilizing influence.
Second, recalibrate the program to advance core NNSA
nonproliferation missions, which I outlined a moment ago.
Russia will be one of our most important partners in the effort
to ensure that the global expansion of nuclear power is carried
out in ways that reduce proliferation risks, and that is why we
thought it makes sense to focus on proliferation resistance of
the fuel cycle. Russia is a leading supplier and user and has
nuclear energy expertise and facilities that rival ours in the
United States, so we have an interest in continuing our
engagement with Russia to ensure that a fuel cycle that evolves
is one that is safer and more secure than the current
generation. GIPP is one vehicle that can help that process.
Third, in response to changing requirements and program
improvements, GIPP has reduced budget and uncosted balances.
Our annual appropriation peaked in 2002 when the program was
funded at $57 million and is today at roughly $30 million. In
addition, budget allocations to projects in Russia have been
reduced.
Fourth, the program opted to cancel its Nuclear Cities
Initiative.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Scheinman, just to note, you are a
minute over now, so if you could wrap up?
Mr. Scheinman. I will wrap up. We have canceled programs.
We have considered transitioning our activity from assistance
to partnership as noted in the opening statements, and
consistent with GAO recommendations, we plan to update program
guidance, produce a strategic plan and enact a number of other
improvements that I will be happy to deal with in the question-
and-answer period.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to the
questions.
[The prepared statement of Adam Scheinman follows:]
Testimony of Adam M. Scheinman
Summary
The Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP)
is a nonproliferation program of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). Its purpose is to advance U.S. policy
objectives by impeding access by proliferators to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) expertise. The program was established
in 1994 to address the risk of Russian and Soviet scientist
migration, and has evolved to address risks in other countries.
Given improved economic conditions in Russia, and at the
request of the NNSA Administrator, NNSA examined and reassessed
GIPP in 2006. The assessment concluded that the program should
continue, but should be oriented to address the current threat
environment and the NNSA nonproliferation and nuclear security
mission. The Administrator also endorsed programmatic and
management changes to strengthen the GIPP program. Specific
improvements include:
Prioritizing engagement with Russian/Former Soviet Union
(FSU) institutes and facilities involved with enabling WMD
technologies;
Recalibrating the program to advance NNSA nonproliferation
and national security objectives, including technology projects
that promote international safeguards, nuclear materials
security, and proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel
cycle;
Reducing budget and uncosted balances;
Cancelling the Nuclear Cities Initiative;
Promoting the goal of project cost-sharing with partners;
and
Continuing engagement with new partners (i.e., Libya and
Iraq).
As noted in the response letter to the GAO, NNSA agrees
with many of the report's conclusions. While we note concerns,
the program plans to implement many of the recommendations, or
is already implementing similar reforms, to ensure a more
effective program. NNSA will implement these recommendations
with the understanding that scientist redirection activities
are important to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation
goals.
Testimony
Thank you Chairman Stupak and Mr. Shimkus, and allow me to
thank the Committee for inviting me to testify today. I welcome
the opportunity to discuss the Global Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program, one of a number of
nonproliferation programs managed within the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
The GAO review of the GIPP program raises important
questions and offers a list of recommendations, many of which
we support. I look forward to sharing our view of the GIPP
program, especially in relation to the recently released GAO
report in the course of my statement, which I submit for the
record.
The need to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation through engagement of weapons scientists,
engineers and experts has been a consistent policy objective of
successive U.S. administrations. The Department of Energy's
program in this area was established in 1994, and it is
identified as a goal in the President's National Security
Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, both issued in 2002. The National Security
Strategy calls for "strengthened nonproliferation efforts to
prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the
materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of
mass destruction."
To advance this policy goal, GIPP uses the technical
expertise within the Department of Energy and the national labs
to redirect former WMD personnel in other countries to
peaceful, non-military work.
GIPP engages directly with personnel in Russia and former
Soviet states, many of whom are employed by institutes not yet
fully enjoying the benefits of the Russian economic turnaround.
The program also provides the United States with an established
capability to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging risks
and nonproliferation opportunities in additional countries.
Through GIPP, roughly 115 projects are underway at more
than 100 institutes and facilities in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. Projects were
launched more recently outside of the former Soviet Union,
including in Iraq and Libya. Taken together, the GIPP has
engaged many thousands of WMD scientists and experts - an
impressive achievement that serves our nonproliferation
objectives and our nation's security.
Most GIPP projects involve a United States industry
partner. Through its industry outreach component, GIPP has
facilitated partnerships commercializing technologies in use
today: this includes land mine detectors, needle-free
injectors, prosthetics, and radio-isotopes for cancer
treatment. Russian scientists and U.S. industry both benefit
from these partnerships.
At the State Department's request, GIPP responded quickly
to support nonproliferation priorities in Libya following its
decision to abandon all WMD programs. We also partner with the
State Department in Iraq, and are prepared to engage elsewhere,
including in North Korea if circumstances warrant it.
Notwithstanding our limited programs in Libya and Iraq, the
bulk of GIPP work today remains in Russia. We recognize, of
course, that in many respects Russia has changed in the fifteen
years since scientist redirection work got underway. Russia's
economy is stable and conditions in the closed cities are much
improved. Accordingly, the threat of scientist migration is not
one that gives us the greatest concern today.
But the absence of a high risk of scientist migration does
not imply zero risk or that the job is done. To the contrary,
as long as proliferation demand exists, we have a requirement
to cooperate with others to impede supply, whether that
involves improved export controls, better border security, or
scientist engagement. Absence of high migration risk does
imply, however, that the manner in which GIPP has been
traditionally carried out merits some recalibration.
This is precisely the path we are on, started at the
request of the NNSA Administrator roughly 18 months ago.
At the Administrator's request, GIPP conducted an internal
assessment, much along the lines proposed by the GAO in its
principal findings. Our conclusion was that scientist
engagement is contributing to our nonproliferation goals and
should continue, but oriented better to meet the current
threat. It should also contribute technologies more supportive
of the NNSA mission, whether that involves technology for
nuclear safeguards and security or proliferation-resistant
nuclear energy systems or ensuring that our partners have a
good security culture, which requires engagement of scientific
personnel.
The conclusion of our internal review was approved by the
Administrator. Allow me to address a number of specific
outcomes, nearly all of which correspond to comments in the GAO
report.
First, in light of a changed threat environment, GIPP would
adopt a more focused approach, emphasizing those institutes or
facilities involved with enabling WMD technologies or expertise
and where the program could provide a stabilizing influence.
Second, as I've alluded to, GIPP would calibrate the
program to advance core NNSA nonproliferation and nuclear
security imperatives. This includes directing new funds towards
projects in Russia that support strengthened international
safeguards and contribute to sustainable nuclear materials
accountability and control, a high priority of our bilateral
nuclear security agenda with Russia.
Russia will be one of our most important partners in the
effort to ensure that the global expansion of nuclear power is
carried out in ways that reduce proliferation risks. Russia is
a leading nuclear supplier and user and has nuclear energy
expertise and facilities that rival our own in the United
States. Hence, we have an interest in continuing engagement
with Russia to ensure that the nuclear fuel cycle evolves in
ways that are safer, more secure, and less prone to
proliferation than the current generation of technologies. GIPP
is one vehicle that can help that process.
Third, in response to changing requirements and program
improvements, GIPP reduced budget and uncosted balances. Annual
appropriations peaked in 2002, when the program was funded at
$57 million. The FY 2008 budget request was $22 million, and we
are not planning for significant out-year increases. In
addition, budget allocations to projects in Russia have been
similarly reduced.
Fourth, the program opted to cancel its Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI), a joint program launched during Russia's
economic crisis. The program's cancellation allowed for a
savings of $10 million.
Fifth, consistent with the trend away from assistance and
towards genuine partnership with Russia, GIPP determined that
it would promote the principle of project cost sharing. This is
consistent with a recommendation in the GAO report; we fully
support it.
Taken together, these actions represent significant change
that will strengthen the program.
They also complement management reforms undertaken over the
past few years, including those recommended by the GAO in past
audits of the program. This includes a new, automated project
management system to improve internal record keeping; a
reduction in the program's uncosted balances by nearly 50%; and
incorporation of a "sunset clause" in GIPP project approvals to
ensure that work gets started promptly and accomplished on
schedule.
As the GAO recommends, there are additional steps the
program can take to improve its management and process. Many
are underway or will be accelerated. This includes streamlining
our payment system for scientists that work on GIPP projects;
updating performance metrics; improving our ability to verify
the WMD bona fides of participating foreign scientists; and
further reducing uncosted balances.
Consistent with GAO recommendations, by the end of this
fiscal year we also plan to update our program guidance;
produce a strategic plan that will better align the purpose and
implementation of the program; and more effectively articulate
an exit strategy.
In fact, as noted in our response letter published in the
GAO report, while we have concerns, we say that "the report
contains useful recommendations," and "can be helpful if it
helps to spur the implementation of constructive program
changes." We adhere to that position.
To be sure, we have not agreed to every recommendation. We
do not believe, for example, that a fundamental reevaluation of
GIPP is merited at this time. Nor do we believe that the
program has outlived its usefulness, which the GAO report seems
in places to suggest.
GIPP is modest in terms of budget - a tiny fraction of the
total NNSA nonproliferation budget - but its purpose and need
remain: our nonproliferation interests demand that we continue
to address the proliferation threat in all its dimensions,
including the risk of expertise being sought out and exploited
by proliferator nations and organizations. Remaining directly
engaged with these scientists through the GIPP program is an
important part of the effort.
Thank you for your attention and I look forward to our
discussion.
----------
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Stratford.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD STRATFORD, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION
Mr. Stratford. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. At the outset,
let me make a minor correction to the record. I am not
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau. I am the
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the nuclear side of the
Bureau and I have only been doing that for about 3 weeks. In
real life, I am the U.S. rep. for both the Nuclear Suppliers
Group and the Zanger Committee, and I am also the person who
negotiated both the United States-India and the United States-
Russia Agreements for Cooperation. That is my normal end of the
business.
Today I have a written statement for the record but I just
want to pick out a few high points for the attention of the
committee. Most of the statement deals with so-called Science
Centers program which consists of the International Science and
Technology Center in Moscow and the Science and Technology
Center in Ukraine, which support efforts to reduce the risk of
WMD terrorism by engaging and redirecting scientists, engineers
and technicians in the former Soviet Union who have biological,
chemical, nuclear or missile expertise. Now, we do that by
approving and funding projects that are directed through those
two centers. Those projects are reviewed in an interagency
process to address issues including proliferation risk,
consistency with U.S. policy, technical merit and market
potential. Now, there are annual financial audits of the
centers' operations and the Defense Contract Audit Agency and
our scientists also conduct annual audits of projects.
One of the things I have heard here so far is about cost
sharing. We are engaging host states to increase cost-sharing
funding of projects. We have a memorandum of understanding with
Belarus where they contribute funds directly to institutes and
we are also funding projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan,
splitting the cost 50/50.
Now, there is a slight difference between what DOE focuses
on and how we focus our program. We are less focused on the
individuals than we are on the institutes. We started with
about 200 institutes that we thought needed to be made self-
sustaining so we focused the projects at the institute and
tried to make them self-sustaining in the longer term. Now, one
of the other things I heard was the need for an exit strategy,
and our exit strategy is to make those 200 institutes self-
sustaining. We hope to do that with about 20 a year. We hope to
be out of this by 2012, which means we have a goal to get there
from here. I think the program has generally been successful.
Our overarching goal, as I said, is to help these institutes
become self-sustainable, and when they are, we define that as
``graduation'' from the program.
Now, one of the other things I heard, oh, well, DOE is
still funding projects at institutes that have graduated. That
is true, but we do too. We can make a finding that an institute
is self-sustaining but then after the fact we may look at the
institute and say you know what, there is still a residual risk
there regardless of whether it is self-sustaining and there may
be something we can do about it through the Science Center
program. Regarding the GAO's recommendations to work with NNSA
to develop a joint plan to better coordinate the IPP program
and our programs, the answer is, we concur. We are prepared to
try to more closely coordinate program elements and will
consult with DOE on implementing this recommendation.
Madam Chairman, let me stop there but let me also say that
with respect to the Science Center programs, we do have
difficulties from time to time, so I don't want to leave the
impression that all is sweetness and light. Sometimes Russians
can be difficult. Right now, for example, they think they have
a right to know what we pay people that we send to support the
institute. They also have an issue with appointing a finance
officer, who we happen to think is necessary. I hope we are
going to settle that very shortly. But I just want to make
clear that there are difficulties from time to time and we have
to try to sort those out with our Russian host government
colleagues.
I am going to stop here and I am very pleased to answer any
questions the committee might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stratford follows:]
Testimony of Richard J.K. Stratford
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about
one of State Department's successful programs to prevent
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related
expertise. We believe that the Science Centers program has been
effective over the years and we appreciate the support we have
received from Congress. We work through two multilateral
centers in Moscow and Kyiv to redirect the activities of
personnel capable of contributing to the development and
deployment of weapons of mass destruction. This is an era of
global terrorist threats that need to be met, while at the same
time dealing with rising costs and budget constraints. These
realities require us to continually assess our own efficiency
and effectiveness while ensuring that important
nonproliferation work continues to get done.
Review of Department of State Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
Let me say a few words about our Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) programs generally. State's CTR programs have a
global mission to redirect weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
expertise worldwide. We do this by coordinating and overseeing
the U.S. participation in and funding of the Science Centers to
engage former Soviet Union (FSU) era biological, chemical,
nuclear, and missile expertise through the centers in Moscow
and Kyiv, the International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC) and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), as
well as scientist engagement efforts in Iraq and Libya.
State's redirection effort also includes the Bio-Industry
Initiative (BII), which creates international commercial
opportunities and public-private partnerships for former
weapons scientists thereby promoting self-sustainability,
reconfigures several large-scale former Soviet biological
weapons production facilities for civilian biotechnology
purpose, and engages self-identified former weapons personnel
in projects aimed at accelerating drug and vaccine development
to combat highly infectious diseases. Finally, State
coordinates the BioChem Redirect (BCR) Program, which redirects
former Soviet chemical and biological weapons personnel into
peaceful sustainable civilian work and engages high risk
facilities, with participation of U.S. experts from the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).
Even as we continue to work in Russia and the FSU, State's
CTR programs also provide us with the capability to address the
new and emerging global WMD threats that we face, including in
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. State's Biosecurity
Engagement Program (BEP), which seeks to prevent bioterrorism
by reducing terrorist access to potentially dangerous
biological materials, equipment and expertise, initially
focused on countries and regions outside the FSU where emerging
bioscience sectors, highly infectious disease outbreaks, and
terrorist threats coexist. Similarly, State's Chemical Security
Engagement Program (CSP) engages experts from around the world
to decrease the chemical threat by improving chemical threat
awareness, improving chemical security and safety best
practices in academia and industry, and increasing chemical
security and safety by fostering collaborations between
chemical professionals in academia and industry.
In addition to meeting critical nonproliferation
objectives, these programs advance Department of State efforts
toward transformational diplomacy by building and maintaining
ties to regions and countries of U.S. national security
interest and by helping states, institutes and individuals
build the capacity to help themselves. CTR programs also
promote economic development and self-sustainability for
institutes and individuals while achieving their mission of
reducing the threat of WMD proliferation worldwide.
U.S. Engagement at International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU)
The Science Centers program consists of the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science
and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) in Kyiv and supports
efforts to reduce the risk of WMD terrorism by engaging and
redirecting scientists, engineers, and technicians in the FSU
who have biological, chemical, nuclear or missile expertise. In
addition to redirecting former Soviet WMD personnel, the
Science Centers projects also aid civilian scientific research.
Our Science Centers program focuses on evolving the Science
Centers in Moscow and Kyiv toward partnerships with host
governments, and continuing to engage and promote transparency
and self-sustainability at high priority former WMD institutes.
The Department of State acts as the U.S. representative in
the two international science centers, the ISTC and the STCU,
as well as our related redirection efforts, the BioIndustry
Initiative (BII) and the Bio-Chem Redirect Program. Under the
direction of Acting Under Secretary John C. Rood, each of these
State-led efforts meets critical national security goals and is
driven by threat information on nonproliferation and counter-
terrorism. Thus, we work closely with the entire U.S.
interagency to identify the most pressing global threats for
all of our Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs, including
the Science Centers in the FSU. State has authorities for the
Science Centers Program through the Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR): chapter 9
of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2349bb et seq.). Additionally, the Science Centers support the
objectives of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, the United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, and the President's National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism.
U.S. Government funding for cooperative threat reduction
activities, including the ISTC and STCU, is appropriated by the
U.S. Congress to the Department of State, Department of Defense
(DoD), and the Department of Energy (DOE) as the main entities
charged with fulfilling the 1992 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program mandate. Under the Nunn-Lugar Program, the
three Departments work very closely on complementary efforts to
lessen the global threat of WMD materiel and expertise
proliferation from the FSU.
Focusing Funding to Achieve U.S. Nonproliferation Goals
While we had heavily funded general science projects with
nonproliferation and scientific merit in the past, since the
beginning of 2007 funding of regular projects has instead been
concentrated on a small number of institutes that face the most
important proliferation risks. In 2007, State worked closely
with other U.S. agencies, including the Department of Energy,
to focus Science Center activities on the highest priority
institutes in the FSU and to help those institutes become
financially self-sustainable. We have engaged with the other
funding countries at the ISTC and STCU in a discussion about
how to help institutes achieve those objectives and have
approved new programs for 2008 at both Centers to achieve
institute financial self-sustainability.
Projects under consideration for funding are reviewed in an
interagency process to address issues including proliferation
risk, consistency with U.S. policy, technical merit, and market
potential. These reviews also address the risk that the
projects might inadvertently contribute to increasing the
military capabilities of the recipient states, including
Russia. Reviews are conducted on hundreds of proposals annually
and there are also annual financial audits of the Centers'
operations and a sample of U.S.-funded projects. The Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and our scientists also conduct
audits of selected projects annually.
Transformation of the Centers to Meet Global Nonproliferation Goals and
Become Self-Sustaining
In order to address new and emerging global WMD threats,
State led discussions at the ISTC about exploring opportunities
to transform it through joint nonproliferation and counter-
terrorism projects, as well as joint projects in countries
outside Russia and the CIS. State participated in drafting a
Strategic Vision document for the ISTC outlining graduation,
global nonproliferation, and efficiency goals. The Russian
government is also addressing the question of how to transform
the ISTC. In 2008, State intends to continue the discussion
about transforming the ISTC to meet the emerging, new
proliferation threats and to inaugurate a similar discussion at
the STCU, a topic heavily stressed at its September 2007
Advisory Committee meeting.
In addition to funding for regular scientific research and
development projects, Partner project funding, both from other
U.S. Government agencies and U.S. private industry, is an
increasingly important funding component at both Science
Centers. Funding for Partner projects from the U.S. and other
countries continues to rise and is essential for the future of
the Science Centers to sustain their important nonproliferation
work. For this reason, we have emphasized the importance of
expanding efforts to attract global partners to the Science
Centers and have contributed funding to these efforts towards
making the Science Centers self-sustainable in the future.
These objectives contribute to our vision of the
transformation and evolution of the Science Centers toward a
greater partnership between the financing parties, member
nations, and the Centers to jointly address emerging, global
nonproliferation challenges. Evolving cooperation on the
redirection of former Soviet defense industry scientists to
peaceful scientific pursuits is an excellent basis for
cooperation on joint counter-terrorism nonproliferation
programs and nonproliferation programs in other nations outside
the FSU.
Host State Cost-Sharing
State is also engaging host states to increase cost-sharing
in the funding of projects. In 2007, the ISTC signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with Belarus wherein Belarus
contributes funds directly to its institutes for items such as
equipment when projects are funded through the ISTC. State also
jointly funded Targeted Research Initiative (TRI) projects
through the STCU in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, splitting the cost
50/50, between the funding parties and the host state
respectively. For 2008, State aims to continue the tradition of
joint-funding TRIs with Ukraine and Azerbaijan and hopes to
reach an agreement with Moldova on sharing the costs of TRIs.
State has also encouraged this kind of scientific and
nonproliferation cooperation with host states at the ISTC,
specifically by requesting Russian funding for projects and
staff salaries.
Achieving Institute Financial Self-Sustainability
In place of State's previous levels of regular project
funding, the U.S. has focused its funds toward specific
institutes to achieve self-sustainability and "graduation" from
State project funding. We re-evaluated the emphasis on regular
project funding in favor of multilateral partnerships to meet
emerging global nonproliferation and cooperative threat
reduction challenges and needs. Therefore, we proposed to meet
this objective by emphasizing scientific institute self-
sustainability and "graduation" from U.S. regular project
funding.
Of the thousands of scientific institutes in the ISTC and
STCU member nations, we categorized approximately 200 core
institutes as "priority" institutes for a self-sustainability/
graduation discussion. We determined that many of these
institutes were already self-sustainable and have grouped the
remaining institutes by the year in which we believe they can
reach financial self-sustainability through ISTC engagement,
implementing an institute-specific self-sustainability plan,
and by gaining enough funding on their own.
Our over-arching goal to redirect FSU WMD expertise
includes giving these and other institutes the tools to become
self-sustainable - to be able to conduct peaceful world-class
research and development by attracting national and
international funding independent of regular project grants
from the U.S. (and perhaps other financing parties) via the
ISTC or STCU. We define this as "graduation" from U.S. regular
project funding. We will look to the ISTC and STCU to help us
to implement this vision, but we will continue to work closely
with individual institutes and the Science Centers to develop
individual sustainability plans and a systematic approach to
self-sustainability.
One self-sustainability component has been, and will
continue to be, commercialization in its largest sense, meaning
greater emphasis on national and international industrial
partnerships to develop technologies and entities with market
potential. Aspects of commercialization are already in place at
the ISTC via its commercialization program know called
Innovation Initiatives (formerly the Commercialization Support
Program) and at STCU through the Targeted Research Initiatives.
For both these commercialization initiatives, State has worked
with and drawn from the Department of Energy's own
commercialization efforts in the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention program.
Regarding the GAO's recommendation to work with the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
and the Secretary of Energy to develop a joint plan to better
coordinate the efforts of DOE's Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention Program (IPP) and the ISTC's Innovation Initiatives,
State concurs with the recommendation to more closely
coordinate these program elements and will consult with DOE on
implementing this recommendation. We expect that self-
sustainability for many institutes will be achieved through
contribution to host government peaceful priorities - leading
to increased host government funding for the institutes.
In 2007, State led discussions on creating institute
sustainability programs at both Centers. A presentation on the
need to graduate institutes to self-sustainability was given to
both Centers' at their fall Governing Board meetings in 2006,
and the U.S. hosted a multilateral discussion with participants
from both Centers and the funding parties on how to create and
implement an institute sustainability program, as well as
discussed what the measures for success would be. For FY2008,
State has made it a priority to advance the Center's newly
approved programs for institute financial self-sustainability
and to contribute significant funding for these programs. For
example, the U.S. has added a day of meetings to a routine
Coordination Executive Committee meeting this March in order to
discuss how institute-specific sustainability plans at the ISTC
will be implemented by the funding parties. Similar discussions
will also be held at upcoming STCU meetings. In this spirit,
State is working with the Centers to focus all remaining and
additional activities on improving the financial self-
sustainability of scientists and institutes.
Exit Strategy
We have developed an exit strategy for leaving the
scientists engaged and the institutions that employ them better
prepared to sustain themselves in peaceful work. The ISTC and
STCU are now major nonproliferation implementation platforms
and complement other USG programs, including the U.S.
Department of Energy's IPP and the U.S. Department of Defense's
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and programs of
other governments. These coordinated programs engage WMD or
dual-use scientists in peaceful research and also design and
fund services, training, and competency building to guide
former Soviet WMD/missile and dual-use experts toward economic
self-sustainability and a permanent transition to stable and
peaceful civilian employment.
The Department of State seeks to "graduate" to financial
self-sustainability approximately 20 former Soviet defense-
related institutes across the biological, chemical, nuclear,
and missile spectrum per year up to 2012. Also, our discussion
on transformation of the Centers to address global
nonproliferation goals is based on the need to position the
Centers so that they may continue to sustain themselves in
their important work as well as engage host states in global
nonproliferation aid and activities without direct foreign aid
from the U.S. and other funding parties. Further, by expanding
the Partners Program, we hope to increase private investment in
the Centers as State gradually reduces funding in order to
redirect resources to other State programs which aim to address
new and emerging global proliferation threats.
Challenges
While the Science Centers program has been successful in
many areas, State faces a challenge as we seek to strategically
transform the two centers and our redirection efforts through
those centers. Our current efforts are targeted at transforming
the centers to focus on graduation and sustainability, joint
nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs, greater
financial responsibility on the part of host states, and
working cooperatively to address the worldwide terrorist
threat. State is working hard with all the stakeholders,
partners, and funding countries to accomplish these goals.
Conclusion
We will continue to carefully review DCAA audit reports,
taking special note of recurring problems, and will follow up
with the Centers about those issues. Also, we will continue to
ensure that 50% of scientists on a project have WMD expertise
as a guideline for funding decisions. We are also working with
the science advisors from the national labs to improve the
effectiveness of our programs.
We believe that better cooperation and partnership on
nonproliferation issues between all U.S. agencies redirecting
expertise in the FSU, and specifically between Science Center
parties, deepens the bonds between all constituent parties,
thereby strengthening the shared nonproliferation mandate and
contributing to global betterment as well.
As we continue to address proliferation concerns in Russia
and the former Soviet Union (FSU), we also must address new and
emerging proliferation threats in regions with high terrorist
presence and/or activity through other threat reduction
programs of the Department of State that address chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats reduction
worldwide.
Thank you.
----------
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
We will begin the questions now. Let me start with a few
myself. Mr. Scheinman, Mr. Robinson asserted that the DOE
disagreed with the recommendation to fundamentally reassess the
IPP program. Is that accurate, and why would that be? It seems
to me that in your opening statement that you talked about many
things that would I think add up to a kind of fundamental
reassessment, so why wouldn't we start from the beginning and
reassess this program?
Mr. Scheinman. I think the answer is that we feel we have
already conducted that fundamental assessment, or reassessment
of the program, and it was done at the administrator's
direction, and if I had to guess, if we were to expand the
staff time to do it all again, I think we would come to the
very same conclusion that we reached and that is supported in
fact by many of the GAO recommendations, and that is the need
to focus on the threat as we perceive it today and not
necessarily as we saw it 15 years ago. The threat has clearly
changed. I think our focus has to shift from addressing the
risk of mass migration to a more focused approach and the
focused approach is based on our analysis of risk. We are doing
that, and in fact, we completed our----
Ms. Schakowsky. You went over many of those.
If I could ask Mr. Robinson, what about the kinds of
changes that DOE has already expressed a willingness to do does
not comply with this overall reassessment?
Mr. Robinson. Our understanding of the 2004 and 2006
assessments I think Mr. Scheinman is referring to is, it
doesn't quite meet what we would be looking for in a sort of
fundamental reassessment in that it doesn't get into a lot of
specifics. The 2006 in particular seems to be kind of a loosely
prepared set of observations, one of which, by the way, seems
to conclude that there isn't a heck of a lot of accomplishment
so far from the effort. But what we would be looking for is
something----
Ms. Schakowsky. You are saying that DOE concluded that
itself?
Mr. Robinson. Well, I mean, there is an observation in the
document that says something to the effect of after 11 years of
performance, we are not sure we have actually accomplished
any----
Ms. Schakowsky. Anything?
Mr. Robinson. No hard evidence that GIPP or any other
scientist engagement in the program has prevented the migration
of even a single scientist. So, I mean, that is an observation
that is incorporated in here but, you know, I wouldn't regard
that as the definitive observation of this. As I mentioned, it
is sort of a loose assemblage of information. Now, on the other
end, from what we understand, DOE is now embarking upon a very
precise reassessment of risk which is an outstanding idea. From
that, I think we would be looking for them to translate that
into, you know, specific institute-by-institute, person-by-
person kind of assessment of whether these funds should
continue to these locations, and then as we have emphasized in
the past, how do you know when you are finished or is this an
open-ended, never-ending insurance policy that is sort of
broadly cast. So that is the kind of specificity that I think
we may be somewhat disagreeing with.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Scheinman, isn't it the case that the DOE program
guidance requires 60 percent at minimum of the scientists have
to be employed during the Soviet era? I mean, many of us have
noted the fact that 54 percent of the scientists paid through
the program have no experience with weapons of mass
destruction. Sixty percent of those audited had not been
Soviet-era scientists. So, I mean, isn't this in noncompliance?
Mr. Scheinman. Well, the guidance that is quoted is
guidance. That is how we attempt to structure and to implement
the program. I think our view is that the preponderance of
individuals that are participants in all GIPP projects are
those who have WMD background, either related directly to
weapons or related to the underlying technologies, and I think
what we have come to learn is that these programs really only
work if we involve not just technologists who were born in the
1930s and the 1940s but younger scientists as well can help
bring technologies to the marketplace.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Let me now turn it over to our new ranking member, Mr.
Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Chairman. It is a great hearing. I
appreciate your time.
Mr. Robinson, the methodology was basically, you followed
the money, where the money was going, then you looked at the
resumes or the background of the people who were receiving it.
Is that correct?
Mr. Robinson. Our methodology was pretty wide-ranging and
fairly intensive, but relative to the background issue, which I
think is probably what you are referring to, the judgment that
so many of these folks did not claim weapons background, what
we did essentially was two-pronged. We asked the laboratories
that oversee the projects to basically fill out an Excel
spreadsheet for us on each one of the projects. We then
supplemented that information with review of records that--
DOE's records on payments and the like and so essentially we
are using DOE's own information, either directly provided
through an Excel spreadsheet presentation or our review of the
payment records.
Mr. Shimkus. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Scheinman, you heard the opening statement where I went
through the approximately $11 billion of U.S. payments for
energy resources to Russia. In the Department of State program,
they have asked for cost share or assistance by governments.
Have you asked for that from the Russian government?
Mr. Scheinman. I don't believe we have asked for that to
this point but one of the outcomes from our assessment that was
conducted at the request of the administrator was that we move
precisely in that direction. And so as look to projects in
fiscal year 2008, where incidentally we see a shared set of
interests between what we want and what we think would be in
Russia's national interest, which is nuclear safety, security
and better safeguards that we can pursue that kind of cost
sharing.
Mr. Shimkus. It is my understanding that assessment was
done 2 years ago?
Mr. Scheinman. The assessment was briefed to the
administrator in I believe the fall of 2006.
Mr. Shimkus. So the question is, if that was the fall of
2006, we have already gone 1 year. Have you asked Russian
participation financially in the program in the past year and
couple months?
Mr. Scheinman. I am not aware. I will have to----
Mr. Shimkus. Let me----
Mr. Scheinman. I accept the point. It is time to do that. I
would note that for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, at the time
we were thinking about renegotiating the government-to-
government agreement which lapsed and which we did not renew as
part of our drawdown efforts. We did have in there that the
condition of continuation with Russia would be cost sharing.
Mr. Shimkus. And Mr. Stratford, you mentioned in this line
of questioning the self-sustaining aspect and that even though
it is self-sustaining, there may be times to be of assisting.
In the self-sustaining analysis, are private-sector entities
part of this? In other words, it looks like GE and Ford are
partners in some of the IPP out of the DOE. There is a lot of
literature. Eastern Europe is kind of a hobby of mine, chairing
the Baltic Caucus, following Belarus issues, democracy issues
there, the Baltic countries. There is great movement by--there
are great recent stories about IBM being a worldwide business
company that is looking and hiring in St. Petersburg. A lot of
U.S. multinational corporations are there. Is part of the self-
sustaining aspect the private sector?
Mr. Stratford. Not nearly as much as DOE, and there is a
reason for that, which is that we ask our Russian colleagues
for examples to suggest projects that they can work on, and if
we like it we agreed to fund it if we think the lab is the
place that something needs to be funded. Now, those projects
are supervised by people from the national laboratories----
Mr. Shimkus. Sir, let me just try to--I only have 45
seconds left and I want to get this last question in because it
is really a question based upon our legislative
responsibilities. Is there a question about the movement of
these funds into Libya, the possible use of these funds into
North Korea should there be changes, Iraq? Is there a the clear
line of authorization with appropriations based upon the
initial language? I think it is the DOE program I am talking
about and I think your analysis says that we may need to effect
legislative language to clarify that. Mr. Robinson, is that
fair?
Mr. Robinson. I think that is a fair characterization. It
would be far preferable to have a clear sense of congressional
authorization to make this transfer and it is one of our
recommendations that I think DOE concurs with.
Mr. Shimkus. And as authorizers, I think we as a committee
would probably like to move in that direction.
My time is expired. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Walden.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to see if I have got this right, Mr. Robinson. Did I
hear you correctly say we have had 14 years, $300 million and
haven't identified one scientist in Russia that we have kept
from going out of Russia?
Mr. Robinson. What I was doing was quoting one of the
documents that the DOE has prepared in doing their
reassessment. It goes to the fuzzy nature of the program, that
it is hard to specifically identify anybody that was prevented
from doing something. That is correct.
Mr. Walden. And that half of the scientists of the 97
projects that were reviewed had no weapons background?
Mr. Robinson. Did not claim any weapons background in any
of the documentation that either the DOE labs provided or in
their own documentation submitted to DOE.
Mr. Walden. And then I guess things--you know, obviously
this program was begun with the best of intentions. I mean,
none of us wanted at the time of the collapse of the Soviet
empire or Soviet Union to have these folks just go out to the
highest bidder in the worst country in the planet, and so I
mean, it started with good intentions. A lot has changed since
then. And is the issue really now as much how they transfer
information as their physical movements? In other words, we
have supplied these institutes with fax machines and e-mail and
computers they didn't have before, and we know from oversight
hearings here on Los Alamos and everywhere else, even here we
see secrets that are taken out of secure areas to non-secure
areas. Is that happening as a result of--are we actually
investing in the new technology that allows them to share
without leaving?
Mr. Robinson. I can't speak to that specifically. I can say
that the Russians are quite, you know, appreciative of the
money that is provided because it has enabled them to recruit
and retain a whole new class of Russian scientists that
ultimately could do whatever down the road.
Mr. Walden. And isn't it true that Russia is engaged in
nuclear commerce with Iran including shipping nuclear fuel to
Iran?
Mr. Robinson. I believe that is publicly stated by Mr.
Putin.
Mr. Walden. And so isn't it reasonable to assume that we
are actually funding with money we are probably borrowing from
China to give to Russia to train nuclear engineers to help Iran
develop its nuclear energy?
Mr. Robinson. I don't think I have the evidence to either
support or refute that specifically but I guess----
Mr. Walden. Can either of our other two witnesses tell me
that is not happening with certainty?
Mr. Stratford. I don't think I would put it quite that way.
Mr. Walden. Well, I am sure you wouldn't but is it
happening?
Mr. Stratford. Well, the answer to your first question is,
yes, Russia is cooperating with Iran in the nuclear area. They
have transferred the Bushier reactor and they are now in the
process of transferring the fuel for that reactor and that does
not necessarily make us happy but that is what they choose to
do. Yes, you could argue that if you give Russia a dollar for
whatever purpose, it frees up a dollar that can then be spent
elsewhere whether it is a nuclear engineer going to Iran or for
other portions of the Russian nuclear program. Yes, you could
make that argument. But that having been said, do you want to
try to close a proliferation risk. Now, State is not normally
considered to be a program agency. If there was a consolidated
program with all of these things together at DOE, I suspect we
would not be clamoring for money to go to science centers. But
somewhere 13 or 14 years ago, somebody made a decision that
that was a good thing for State to do and having been handed
that task and having been appropriated funds, we are going to
do the best we can. That having been said, as I said, we do
have an exit strategy. We would like to be out of this business
by 2012 and have graduated all of these institutes.
I heard a line that are we trying to move money from Russia
over to other threats. Yes, we are. The amount of money that we
have asked for for the Science Center programs is declining. It
is going to keep declining. Is the money going to go elsewhere?
Yes, because we are putting more money into Iraq and we are
putting more money into Libya.
Mr. Walden. Mr. Scheinman?
Mr. Scheinman. If I may just add to that response, we
certainly have--I don't think you were implying we have no
evidence that any funding that we have provided to support
scientist engagement has found its way into proliferation
transactions, whether that involves information or direct
support from Russia to another country, and if anyone does have
that information, we would obviously be very interested in
seeing it. We would make adjustments in accordance with it. I
think the other half of my response would be that GIPP can be
measured in hard objective and tangible ways but I think it can
also be measured in terms of soft accomplishments, and among
those accomplishments are working with Russia on preserving a
security culture, hopefully improving the ethics of scientists
who are involved in those programs, and I believe that through
the access and the transparency that we have, we are making a
difference, even if I can't count it on my fingers and toes.
Mr. Walden. I guess we are just trying to figure out this
program created with the best of intentions to solve a very
real threat continues on and I guess we get these GAO reports
back, and it is hard to go home and defend handing out the
money to Russia, especially when we are sending them a lot
right now through oil payments and everything else, so their
economy seems to have really turned around, a lot of domestic
investment there, private sector.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Let me follow up along the lines of
something Mr. Walden said about, we have this agreement with
Russia but Russia has other bilateral agreements with other
countries such as Iran to develop nuclear, so any agreement
under the IPP program doesn't prevent Russia then from turning
around and transferring technology or information to other
countries such as Iran that they have an agreement with, is
there? Mr. Scheinman?
Mr. Scheinman. No, there is nothing to prevent Iran from
doing that. There is really no relationship though, as I see
it, between IPP projects and Russia's conduct except insofar as
our engagement keeps Russia focused on nonproliferation
projects.
Mr. Stupak. Don't the agreements we have with them to work
on certain commercial projects, can't that be a benefit not
only to Russia but other countries that they may have a
bilateral agreement with that we do not, that the United States
does not?
Mr. Scheinman. In theory, I suppose if we are working on
nuclear energy-related----
Mr. Stupak. Well, you have all these projects going on, I
think about 35 of them, that are developing new things
including reprocessing of fuel rods and which this country is
concerned about because the last 3 percent of reprocessed rods
is plutonium, weapons-grade plutonium. Isn't that a concern?
Mr. Scheinman. If we were to transfer technology to Russia
related to reprocessing spent fuel, a whole additional set of
controls are built in as a result of--
Mr. Stupak. Between United States and Russia, but not
Russia and Iran.
Mr. Scheinman. U.S. controls follow the technology that is
either replicated or material that is used from technology
provided. We do not provide that technology to Russia.
Mr. Stupak. Well, the significance of the program, and as I
said in my opening, I thought it served a valuable purpose.
State said they are closing their program down by 2012. DOE
continues to look for ways, it almost looks to like expand the
program. I think it is a slush fund for the national labs. That
is what I believe this program has turned into. But really, how
is the program as currently administered going to help when
Russian scientists in the IPP program receive about $35 a day?
Is $35 a day enough incentive to keep Russia weapons of mass
destruction from migrating to rogue states or to terrorist
groups?
Mr. Scheinman. Well, I think I can only answer that
question with respect to the support that we do have from
Russia to engage in these programs. They seem as interested in
pursuing the cooperative arrangements in partnership with
industry or with the national laboratories, so----
Mr. Stupak. Well, therefore, shouldn't private labs or
national labs or Russia take more responsibility? I mean, the
program as it is currently outlined, $35 a day isn't going to
keep anyone from doing anything.
Mr. Scheinman. Sir, we do believe that the program should
transition from one of assistance to partnership and that
implies cost commitment from Russia, and that is the direction
we hope to go.
Mr. Stupak. Well, then why does the State Department, they
are going to close theirs down by 2012, and why is DOE still
funding, as I said, 35 projects at 17 institutes which the
State Department has already graduated from the Science Centers
program? It seems like you are just, I don't want to say
duplication but State is winding it down, you are maintaining
or expanding.
Mr. Scheinman. I think we are focused on a different
community of institutes through our work. The State Department
has principally focused in recent years, certainly in the last
year, on institutes that are evolving towards self-sustaining
capacity whereas our programs have been focused on institutes
that haven't reached that mark, so there is a community of
institutes. We have been focused more on high-risk institutes
that haven't perhaps enjoyed the economic recovery of others
whereas the State Department has focused on institutes that are
in better shape. I note that the State Department's list of
high-risk institutes includes those that we are involved with,
and as Mr. Stratford said in his set of remarks, the absence of
a cooperative program doesn't imply no risk. There is still
risk at a number of these institutes that are in a better
economic position just by virtue of the technology and
expertise that they possess.
Mr. Stupak. But GAO also points out that these so-called
institutes you are talking about, those scientists who worked
in the Soviet era are gone. Now you are training new ones which
really sort of in a way creates proliferation, not
nonproliferation. So do you want to comment on the last point
about the 17 institutes which State has already graduated? Why
shouldn't DOE be graduating institutes?
Mr. Robinson. Well, our clear position is that there needs
to be some very specific criteria for graduation, that these
things shouldn't go on into perpetuity, that if you are going
to have an insurance policy, it shouldn't be so completely
open-ended, protect against every possible risk that might come
down the pike. We don't have enough money to do that in the
world. So I think what we are looking for here is getting a
very precise set of graduation criteria and then apply them
while also focusing whatever program activities are conducted
at the highest risk, the real risks of proliferation, not
training, you know, new scientists to do other things.
Mr. Stupak. Are you developing that criteria, specific
criteria so you can graduate?
Mr. Scheinman. Yes, we plan to do that in the coming year.
As the GAO recommended, we plan to articulate and implement an
exit strategy that includes that set of criteria and does
provide us to wind down in Russia, which we have been doing.
Mr. Stupak. OK, you say that. Let me show you tab 3. Do you
have the binder? Would you hand it to Mr. Scheinman there,
please? Do you have one in front of you? I think it is tab 3 on
the table in front of you. It is the IPP program guidance dated
2002, which was transmitted to the committee last week, and
turn to the area of page 78. It should be flagged there for
your convenience. Because you say that and I am a little
concerned because when I read it, and I am on page 78 here, and
I think it is highlighted there for you, ``IPP requires that a
preponderance of the staff working on its projects have had
weapons of mass destruction relevance experience before 1991.
The meaning of preponderance is taken to be 60 percent as a
bare minimum. Two-thirds would be better, and anything above
that, better still.'' Then it says, ``Add note for HQ. This
needs to be changed to read 50 percent once the current GAO
business is over. The dictionary definition for preponderance
includes 50 and above but GAO is right, we should have changed
this at the point when the practice was modified.'' Do you see
that there, Mr. Scheinman?
Mr. Scheinman. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. So it looks like you are just going to change
the text here just to get GAO off your back and you go back to
what you want to do.
Mr. Scheinman. That is an unfortunate----
Mr. Stupak. But it accurately reflects the attitude at DOE;
let us just say what we think we want them to hear, we will say
what we think they want us to hear and then we will go back and
do what we always did.
Mr. Scheinman. No, sir, I don't believe that is correct,
and I would refer you back to our assessment that was conducted
at the request of NNSA Administrator Brooks where we outlined
the requirement to change our focus to deal with the threat as
we see it today and not the threat as we understood it to be 15
years ago, and among the recommendations in that report is that
we develop an exit strategy and implement it, that we focus on
the community of institutes that might present risk and thereby
change our focus in the metrics and performance process,
instead of counting numbers of people, to count institutes
where we understand risk to be, number 2, and number 3, to
focus our work in areas that are more directly supportive of
nonproliferation including safeguards, security and
proliferation resistance. That is what we are about.
Mr. Stupak. Well, there is skepticism because it seems like
State is moving forward with this program that has outlived its
usefulness where you guys are still not doing it. Let me ask
you one more question and then Mr. Inslee showed up, I will
turn to him. Nuclear cities--Russia shut down about 10 cities
that had nuclear. You don't have any program in those 10
cities, do you?
Mr. Scheinman. Russia didn't shut down the cities.
Mr. Stupak. I didn't say shut down the cities. I said shut
down the nuclear program in 10 cities, right?
Mr. Scheinman. Well, no, nuclear programs continue in those
cities.
Mr. Stupak. But there are about 10 of them?
Mr. Scheinman. There are 10----
Mr. Stupak. Do you have programs going for those scientists
in those cities?
Mr. Scheinman. We do have a number of projects that involve
those cities but the Nuclear Cities Initiative itself we
decided to cancel in part because the focus of that program was
frankly beyond our means to implement.
Mr. Stupak. Well, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, you called
it, right?
That was one program that came underneath the IPP. That one
is sort of shut down so why can't this one be shut down?
Mr. Scheinman. The focus of the Nuclear Cities Initiative
was to deal with the risk of mass migration and to focus on
jobs and defense conversion. Our view of the program following
our assessment with the administrator was that that is not the
way we need to conduct this program, that the risk is not mass
migration, the risk is that proliferators whether they are
countries or terrorist organizations are going to target
specific institutes because of the technology that they
possess, so our program therefore made--our objectives made
less sense in the Nuclear Cities Initiative context and require
adjustment in the IPP context where we are going to focus not
on jobs and defense conversion but on promoting technology
partnerships that promote our nonproliferation objectives.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Inslee for questions.
Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
Mr. Scheinman, I am just looking at the--there is a program
guidance requiring 60 percent at a minimum of scientists who
have been employed during the Soviet era to be involved but I
am advised that that hasn't been met. Could you comment on
that?
Mr. Scheinman. I believe we have engaged certainly more
than 50 percent of former WMD scientists. I don't know that we
have attained the goal of 60 percent, which is a goal we still
hope to--we strive to meet.
Mr. Inslee. I should--in fairness, it was a reference to a
GAO audit of 97 IPP projects and they found fewer than half, I
am advised.
Mr. Scheinman. We don't agree with that number. Based on
our records and our checks which we conducted again just after
the--or as the report was coming forward, our review shows more
than 50 percent of participants have WMD expertise.
Mr. Inslee. And it is fair to say you are going to continue
that effort to boost that, I hope?
Mr. Scheinman. Correct. And I would just add, if I may,
that based on the direction that I have recommended the
program, promoting safeguards, security and related
nonproliferation topics, the community of experts that we would
draw from are more clearly related to WMD either expertise and
technology or the enabling technologies. That is very much what
we plan to do.
Mr. Inslee. We encourage that. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Walden, any further questions?
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
our witnesses and I want to thank the GAO.
You know, it seems like every year hundreds of scientists
retire from our own weapons laboratories at Sandia National
Lab, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and the nuclear weapons
scientists have vast and detailed knowledge regarding our
weapons systems and capabilities. What do we do? What does the
Department of Energy do to make sure that our own retired DOE
weapons scientists aren't sharing their knowledge and what are
we doing to recruit new people into this field so that we are
keeping pace with technology?
Mr. Scheinman. That is a good question. I think you will
find that across the Department of Energy and its national
laboratories, it is certainly my experience, and I have
visited, I think, virtually every lab and site, that you will
not find stronger patriots than those who have gone through our
nuclear weapons programs and production facilities. That being
said, every technology transfer, whether that is an e-mail or
work that might be conducted for a foreign partner, has to run
through a rigorous set of export controls and internal reviews,
so I think we have been in pretty good shape, not to say that
there hasn't been hardship in locations where facilities have
closed down.
Mr. Walden. But my question was more about our retired
scientists and I am not questioning their patriotism at all,
but I am just saying, some people as we know, we have had
intelligence experts in our various agencies that have been on
the take and been busted but after years of damage to America's
security; do we have a plan in place to kind of monitor our
former nuclear scientists? I mean, we seem to have a lot of
plans in place to deal with the Russians.
Mr. Scheinman. If those programs and plans are in place, I
am not aware of them. It would be another part of the
Department of Energy that would take interest. But to answer
the other half of your question, we certainly are struggling in
the United States with respect to our own brain drain, not in
terms of the transfer of information to other countries or
organizations but just the mere fact that we have been out of
the nuclear energy business so long that the associated
infrastructure associated with nuclear power has attritioned
and we need to rebuild it, and it is very much one of our
interests--an interest of my program is to build the next
generation of safeguards and nonproliferation experts so that
we can regenerate that level of expertise across our labs.
Mr. Walden. Mr. Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. Just to elaborate and expand upon that, this
is a significant national issue. It is not just in the weapons
side but in the nuclear power side if we are going to build,
you know, a substantial number of new plants, the NRC side, and
it is not just the scientists themselves. We have had
consultation with a lot of folks in academia, and the
availability of professors to teach the next generation of
nuclear scientists is drastically diminished.
Mr. Walden. Good point.
Mr. Robinson. So it is actually slightly better than we
might have otherwise imagined.
Mr. Walden. And while you have the microphone there,
according to GAO testimony, the Department of Energy has wasted
a significant portion of the IPP budget due to mismanagement.
Now, we know at Los Alamos we have experienced countless
security incidents that have compromised classified information
and frankly put the Nation's security at risk. This oversight
committee over the last few years has conducted both public and
classified and closed hearings on this problem. Do you think
that the money we wasted on the IPP program would be better
spent on security improvements at Los Alamos where we know
classified information is not always handled properly? Do I
need to hold up my J-B Weld prop again?
Mr. Robinson. Mr. Walden, that is a tough question. The
amount of money going into this program, the IPP program, is
not huge. It is almost two different things. It is hard to know
exactly, you know, how a transfer would----
Mr. Walden. Well, the question is somewhat rhetorical in
its nature.
Mr. Robinson. OK. I took the bait unnecessarily then.
Mr. Walden. No, no, it has a serious piece to it as well,
and that is----
Mr. Robinson. Well, no, as you well know----
Mr. Walden [continuing]. We keep an eye on Los Alamos and
elsewhere and I think they have made improvements but----
Mr. Robinson. As you well know, we have done a vast amount
of work and continue to do a vast amount of work on physical
security at Los Alamos. We are doing a huge project right now
on cyber security, given all the extensive problems that have
been experienced. So our investment on that initiative is even
much bigger than it is on this side of the house, frankly. We
are working with you on that.
Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Robinson, and gentlemen, thanks
for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Robinson, that cyber security at Los
Alamos, since we have had so many problems, that could be done
at a different nuclear lab, right?
Mr. Robinson. I am sorry?
Mr. Stupak. The work being done at Los Alamos on cyber
security, that could be done at a different lab, could it not?
One where they have security? Well, we do three hearings a year
on Los Alamos breach of security. Some of us think it has
outlived its usefulness. Now, I will get myself in trouble and
all my New Mexico friends will be calling me but----
Mr. Robinson. I was going to say, there are a great many
folks in New Mexico on both sides----
Mr. Stupak. Yes, there are.
Mr. Robinson [continuing]. That would object to any comment
on that.
Mr. Stupak. That is true. I won't put you on that position.
Ms. Schakowsky, questions, please.
Ms. Schakowsky. Just a couple of things. I do find it
really troubling that one, there is no evidence that any one
person could be identified, according to the DOE, Mr. Robinson,
Mr. Scheinman, that actually was deterred from being in a
situation that would put us at risk, and there is also no
evidence, Mr. Scheinman, that it has, you said, increased
proliferation, which means there is no--I don't know if that
means and maybe you can answer me that no one has really looked
at that. I mean, the whole thing seems to me that it has kind
of been a little--there has been very little oversight, that it
has developed a kind of life of its own. People have decided
what its mission is from time to time and changed it or
expanded it, and that measurements, you talk about soft things,
well, that is all fine except that, you know, we are talking
about a lot of money and I think that taxpayers and the
Congress would like some metrics anyway that would say we know
that this program is doing what it was intended to do. These
are really more in the way of comments.
Let me just ask you this. The current budget now from DOE
is what? Did you say it is down to 30 something?
Mr. Scheinman. Roughly $30 million.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thirty million, and Mr. Stratford, on the
State side. How much is that?
Mr. Stratford. For science centers for fiscal year 2008, we
have asked for and will probably get $12 million total.
Ms. Schakowsky. And there are other agencies that are also
funding certain aspects of this as well, I was told, even
agriculture or there is other money involved in these programs.
So, you know, a million here, a million there, it begins to add
up, and I just feel like--I congratulate the committee and the
GAO. I get this feeling that there are probably a lot of
programs like this that have been around for a while and nobody
is really looking at them, and the fact that the mission has
changed and you want it to change pretty extensively regarding
countries that are involved, I couldn't agree more with Mr.
Shimkus, who said I think the Congress needs to--if we are
going to change this mission, then we better get involved.
Congress better get involved in deciding whether these
resources are going to go, and also providing the oversight but
you wanted to comment, Mr. Scheinman, go ahead.
Mr. Scheinman. Well, I certainly take all of your points
and I don't want to take issue with any of them. I would just--
with respect to soft and hard metrics, my point was that only
soft metrics count. That is clearly not the case. We need to
have measurable metrics that help guide our priority ranking,
that help guide implementation, that----
Ms. Schakowsky. So in regard to the initial objective, are
there any metrics that would indicate that this program has
been a success?
Mr. Scheinman. I think we can measure the success of the
program through the level of engagement. I don't think we can
measure success by absence of an activity. I think we do have
information that these programs have made a difference in very
real terms in terms of institutes perhaps working with us
instead of with suspect partners. I would have to provide that
information in another setting. But we do have the challenge of
essentially----
Ms. Schakowsky. But wait. So you agree that there is--or
maybe it was you, Mr. Stratford, that there is a relationship
with Iran that is bilateral and has nothing to do with us, and
isn't that in regard to the institutes?
Mr. Stratford. There is a relationship with Iran in terms
of the Bushier reactor and the fuel for it. Remember, what we
are trying to do is to get institutes to be self-sustaining, so
our metric is simple: have we graduated institutes; have we
stopped providing assistance to a particular institute?
Ms. Schakowsky. Yes, although you said that having said
that earlier, that just because an institute has graduated
doesn't mean that there aren't still risks and deserve U.S.
dollar support.
Mr. Stratford. That is correct in certain instances. But
even if we graduated every single institute, I still can't
guarantee that two or three scientists from Institute X
wouldn't decide that Iran was looking very promising as a place
of employment. That can still happen. Now, if we thought that
was going to happen, I suspect we would try to do something
about it, and I don't know whether that would be another
project at that institute or whether we would find some other
way to address the problem. The problem doesn't go away. The
question for us is, can we make most of it go away by reducing
temptation and can we reduce temptation by having an institute
be self-sustaining. We talk about Russia being richer. Yes,
they are, but that doesn't mean that the government hasn't
still cut loose some of its institutes and left them in a
precarious position financially. The one other thing I would
like to say is, what strikes me is that there are other
countries who think that the science center idea is a good idea
and are putting in money. Staff tells me that the annual budget
of the Moscow Science Center is about $100 million. All U.S.
contributions together are about $50 million of that. That
means we are getting a one-to-one matching grant just like
National Public Radio from other countries who have been
putting in the money to do what we do. So is our $50 million
leveraged? Yes, leveraged 100 percent because other people
think this program is worthwhile. I will stop there.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Well, that is at one institute. Let me follow
up Ms. Schakowsky's question this way. Are the institutes being
funded by DOE or State Department that are also working with
Iran?
Mr. Stratford. I don't know the answer to that question.
The science center in Moscow funds through projects a lot of
institutes. The question you are asking is, are any of those
who are getting U.S. dollars participating in the Iran nuclear
program?
Mr. Stupak. Right.
Mr. Stratford. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Stupak. Wouldn't we want to know that? How do you know
that the purpose and intent is what we except it to be than if
we don't know where they are working outside of cooperative
agreement with the United States?
Mr. Stratford. Well, we do know basically what goes on
between Russia and Iran, and I would have to check whether any
of the institutes that receive project funding from us are
connected with Bushier or fuel supply.
Mr. Stupak. Would you do that?
Mr. Stratford. That is a possibility but I don't know the
answer to it but I would be happy to try to provide that for
the record.
Mr. Stupak. How about you, Mr. Scheinman? Are there any DOE
institutes working with----
Mr. Scheinman. I am not aware of work that we are
conducting that supports the Bushier fuel supply. We also, with
the State Department and the entire U.S. interagency, obviously
are looking very closely at potential relationships between
Russia and Iran and we would gauge our decisions on projects
based on what we know, but I would have to go back and see
whether our work involves any of the institutes involved in the
fuel transfer, the reactor.
Mr. Stupak. OK. Well, we would like to have those answers
because I was going to ask this question but based on these
answers, you know, DOE funded a Lawrence Livermore study of 605
Russian scientists to address the brain drain. Now, that was
back in 2002, but 21 percent of those scientists said they
would go to rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, Syria or
Iraq if the project involved significant scientific interest
and the compensation was adequate. Well, if we are funding
institutes and we don't know if Russia then has a separate
agreement from those institutes we are putting money into with
countries like Iran, Korea or Syria, that would be a cause of
concern. And even though if you said well, we will give you
money, you can come work elsewhere, the Russian scientists, 15
percent of them said they are still willing to go to rogue
states for compensation or for the scientific challenge. In
fact, 70 percent said their preferred place is Germany, of all
places.
Let me ask you this question, Mr. Scheinman. Isn't it the
case that DOE's Initiative for Proliferation Prevention is
funding six projects under the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership, or GNEP, a DOE program to repossess, and I
mentioned earlier, spent nuclear fuel and develop fast
reactors?
Mr. Scheinman. Yes, we do have a number of projects that
are supportive of the general purposes associated with GNEP.
Mr. Stupak. All right. Did DOE suspend part of its guidance
that requires an industry partner to participate--you are
talking about a one-to-one match, Mr. Stratford was, but
industry partnership participation which is intended to ensure
the commercial application of the projects, correct?
Mr. Scheinman. The requirement in our guidance for industry
partnership is associated with commercial projects. All of our
projects are----
Mr. Stupak. So GNEP, there has to be a private industry to
show some potential for commercial application.
Mr. Scheinman. I think the level of technology at this
stage is only of interest to scientists and engineers. It is
not at the point of being of interest to the commercial market.
Mr. Stupak. Right. So why are you funding it then? If it is
supposed to be with a commercial partner, why are you funding
six of them when it is not commerciable and you can't have a--
and there isn't a private partner who will even go along with
you and it is also the conclusion of the National Academy of
Sciences, they issued a recent report saying you are funding
these six programs that have no commercial application, long
time coming, why are you funding these programs when it won't
be commercialized any time soon.
Mr. Scheinman. I believe one project does in fact have a
commercial partner but the reason that we are pursuing this
work is associated with my earlier comment about focusing our
program on nonproliferation topics that are of interest to the
United States and hopefully of interest to Russia and that
includes the development of a proliferation-resistant fuel
cycle which will move us away from the current practice which
Russia now practices which is to separate plutonium from spent
fuel in pure form directly usable in weapons, encourage them
over time to transition to a system that doesn't separate that
plutonium in a pure form.
Mr. Stupak. Well, is it the Secretary's responsibility, in
this case Secretary Bodman, to determine whether or not
projects carried out under IPP are likely to achieve their
commercial objectives?
Mr. Scheinman. Yes, per the law, I believe, the commercial
potential is----
Mr. Stupak. There is the point. The law says they are
supposed to have commercial potential. You say one out of six
might, so why are we funding the other five contrary to the
law?
Mr. Scheinman. At least my understanding is that projects
that are approved for the purpose of being commercialized
require an industry partner. Not all of our projects are
approved for the purpose of commercialization. They are
approved for the purpose of pursuing basic or perhaps applied
research that we don't plan to pursue as a commercialization--
--
Mr. Stupak. So then why are we doing it under the IPP
program then? Why don't we just do it underneath our national
labs? Why are you using this program for something that the law
says it can't be done for? Why would you go there with it?
Mr. Scheinman. Well, I don't----
Mr. Stupak. Is it just in the interests of the Secretary
or----
Mr. Scheinman. No, sir, this is--our position is that the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is one that we should
support. It is the Administration's policy, and we have made
those decisions internal to our own management certainly with
briefings to senior management.
Mr. Stupak. Yes, right, but isn't it supposed to--the
programs you want to run are supposed to be under Congress
authorization, isn't it, not what you think might be a good
idea? The GNEP program, unless it has commercial application,
hasn't been approved by Congress.
Mr. Scheinman. Well, I think you can look at GNEP in
perhaps in two ways. One is----
Mr. Stupak. Yes, I look at it underneath the law and not
where you want to go with.
In fact, Mr. Robinson, isn't that one of the weaknesses you
pointed out in your report?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, our main issue with this is that it
feels a little bit like mission creep, you know, and we have
recommended that the relationship between GNEP and IPP be
clarified and I think DOE is embarking upon undoing that, but
it is the mission creep. What is the--we move the program into
infinity and that is what is our issue is. We think, you know,
this ought to be clarified.
Mr. Stupak. Do you want to comment on that at all?
Mr. Levis. No, only to the extent what Bob Robinson says.
We agree. We raised these questions about what authorization do
you have to move the program in this direction, what guidance
do you have, are there industry partners. These are the
questions that you are raising today. We had the same
questions.
Mr. Stupak. And as I said in my opening, I am not
necessarily--I think this program is a valuable program but I
think it has to be within the confines of what Congress has
authorized and how we spend money and how the programs are
being run. I mean, maybe we shouldn't have an IPP program
anymore. Maybe it should be a different program for nuclear
research or reestablishing the nuclear base and technology and
teaching in this country with the goal of nonproliferation.
Maybe that is a more sensible way to go, at least underneath
the authorization of Congress when we are spending $40 to $50
million a year.
Let me ask you one more question if I can, Mr. Scheinman.
Turn to tab 13 in the binder, please. This is a December 15,
2006, joint letter from Secretary Bodman and Director
Carichenko directed to President Bush and President Bush and it
is attached to a U.S.-Russian plan of action for implementing
GNEP, the global nuclear program there. Is this agreement non-
public or is it a public document?
Mr. Scheinman. This is currently a non-public document. My
understanding is that the office that directed it within the
Department of Energy has committed to the Russians that we
would seek their agreement before releasing it.
Mr. Stupak. Right. So before we can release this document,
we need the Russians to agree with us, right?
Mr. Scheinman. That is my understanding from the sponsoring
office.
Mr. Stupak. Since this is a government-to-government
agreement between the United States and Russia, why is it that
Russia determines whether the U.S. government's action plan to
develop GNEP should be kept a secret from the American people?
It is government to government. Wouldn't the government make
its own decision?
Mr. Scheinman. I don't think I would term this a
government-to-government agreement in the classical sense.
Mr. Stupak. Well, it is President Bush to President Putin.
Mr. Scheinman. Yes, it is a joint report of ministers to
two presidents. I believe the report could be treated as
confidential foreign government information which I think by
its own rules and requirements would provide that Russia would
have to agree to its release. As I say, I am happy to take this
back to the sponsoring office and----
Mr. Stupak. Sure. I mean, the assistant secretary for
nuclear energy or U.S. Department of Energy signed it and his
Russian counterpart did, but transparency is a cornerstone to
the U.S. nuclear program policy with respect to civilian use of
nuclear energy so I don't know how keeping it secret would
build the public trust in DOE's plans for GNEP, so we are not
going to make it public right now but I want to make it very
clear that we come back and give us an answer to contact the
Russian signatories so we can have public release of this
document. We think it is critically important, especially with
the GNEP program and the questions I have been asking you.
One more question. A couple years ago, I am still waiting
for an answer, Secretary Bodman on spent fuels--you know, this
country doesn't do it. We are probably about the only one that
doesn't do it. We have problems at Yucca Mountain with storage
and all this other. I asked him to revisit that policy. Has he
ever made any recommendations to President Bush to revisit,
overturn that policy? That policy has been in place since the
Carter years. Technology has progressed so much. I think it is
one of those things we ought to look at. Would you please take
that message back and see if we can get some answers?
Mr. Scheinman. I can tell you that it is being looked it
very actively.
Mr. Stupak. Good. I just hate to have all those years of
advocacy go down the drain.
I guess that concludes it. I thank all of our witnesses for
coming today. Sorry I was out for a bit. I was doing some work
on the Great Lakes so I had to go testify. I am glad to be
back. Thank you all. Good testimony, interesting issue. We will
back with further hearings on this subject. Mr. Scheinman, Mr.
Stratford, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Levis, thank you very much for
your time.
That concludes our questioning. I want to thank all of our
witnesses for coming today and your testimony. I ask for
unanimous consent that the hearing record will remain open for
30 days for additional questions for the record. Without
objection, the record will remain open. I ask unanimous consent
that contents of our document binder with the exception of tab
13, the one I just questioned on, with the exception of tab 13,
all of the rest of them will be entered into the record.
Subcommittee staff will work with the Department of Energy to
find an acceptable copy of tab 13 to enter into the record.
Without objection, the documents will be placed in the record.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing:]
Mr. Stupak. That concludes our hearing, and without
objection, this meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
GIPP Status Report, March 25, 2008
Interim Steps Taken
Placed on hold projects underway at institutes having
involvement in Iran's nuclear programs; final decisions to be
taken following completion of Energy/State Terms of Reference.
Cancelled 2 projects at one institute of concern.
Placed on hold two projects that involve Russia and
proliferation-resistance of the fuel cycle.
Met with U.S. interagency to discuss path forward for GIPP
and State redirection programs.
Outcome: State/Energy to update Terms of Reference for
project reviews to ensure consistent application by IPP and
ISTC. Aim is for interagency consensus on TOR within a month.
Briefed HECC staff on results of classified assessments in
response to Committee questions.
Proposed Path Forward (Subject to Consultations with Stakeholders)
Continue R/FSU projects that involve high-risk institutes.
Complete next phase of institute risk assessment to inform
future programmatic decisions.
Gain Russian agreement over next several months on
approach to cost-sharing.
Wind-down projects by end of FY 2010 that include no
institutes rated as "high risk."
Keep option of continuing projects at lower-risk
institutes when needed to gain participation by high-risk
institutes
Determine role of industry under a cost-sharing model.
Continue programs in Iraq and Libya (do not expect to
carry forward with Libya beyond 2011).
Maintain readiness to support projects in North Korea.
Pursue nonproliferation technology projects outside of
IPP; shift 2 existing advanced safeguards projects from GIPP to
NA-242's International Safeguards and Engagement Program.
Attain intra-Departmental and interagency agreement on
approach to advanced fuel cycle projects; cost-sharing could be
a condition of IPP support for approved projects in this area.
Shift cost savings to Safeguards/North Korea
denuclearization tasks.
Interim Findings Regarding Russia and Iran:
The HECC raised concerns over IPP work at certain
institutes. We have looked closely at these projects and have
reached the following conclusions:
No payments were made to individuals at institutes under
sanctions by the US Government.
No evidence of U.S. funds or technology supporting Iranian
nuclear projects.
IPP has funded projects at institutes that have conducted
work in Iran, though in some cases the reporting was acquired
after the IPP projects were complete.
Exhibit Binder Index
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Organizational Materials
1. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
Organizational Chart
2. IPP Mission and Program Description
3. IPP General Program Guidance, March 2002
4. List of 35 Projects Funded by DOE at the Same Institutes
Which Had Been "Graduated" by the State Dept. Program in the
Current or Previous Fiscal Years
5. List of Current IPP Projects
6. Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention--Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership Projects
Nonproliferation Statutes
7. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000: Public
Law 106-65, Section 3136--Nonproliferation Initiatives and
Activities
8. FY94 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act: Public Law
103-87, Section 575--Ukraine/Russia Stabilization Partnerships
9. Atomic Energy Act, Section 123
Government Accountability Office Reports and Correspondence
10. "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts
to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons
Scientist." GAO/RCED-99-54. (Executive Summary and Contents
only, the full document can be found in the Subcommittee's
Files.), February 1999
11. GAO engagement letter to DOE Secretary Bodman, re:
researching IPP program for December 2007 report, 10/11/2006
12. "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist
Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to be
Reassessed." GAO-08-189. (GAO Findings and Contents only, the
full document can be found in the Subcommittee's files.),
December 2007
U.S.-Russia Agreement
13. Transmittal of the Report of the United States and
Russian Federation Joint Working Group on the Development of a
Bilateral Action Plan to Enhance Global and Bilateral Nuclear
Energy Cooperation, 12/15/06
News Articles
14. Global Security Newswire article by Jon Fox, "GAO
Lashes U.S. Nonproliferation Program." 01/14/08
15. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russian) unattributed editorial:
Assistance from the United States Arrived to Wrong Scientists.
Washington is Ready to Turn its Back on Russian Closed Towns."
01/17/08
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Robert Robinson, Responses to Questions from Hon. Gene Green
1. Your study finds that 15% of the scientists hired in the
97 projects reviewed by GAO were born after 1970 and therefore
unlikely to have participated in Soviet-era WMD programs. Why
does GAO believe this may actually increase proliferation risk?
Has any analysis been performed to determine the proliferation
risk posed by younger scientists?
As we noted in our December 2007 report, officials at 10 of
the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed said
that IPP program funds have allowed their institutes to
recruit, hire, and retain younger scientists. DOE guidance for
the IPP program does not specifically prohibit participation of
younger scientists in IPP projects, but DOE has not clearly
stated the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists and
the extent to which they should be a focus of the IPP program.
We believe that DOE has a mistaken and naive impression of how
institutes in the former Soviet Union view the benefits of
allowing younger scientists to participate in the IPP program.
DOE's practice of allowing younger scientists to participate in
the IPP program has the unintended consequence of allowing
former Soviet Union institutes to use the IPP program as a
long-term recruitment tool and, thereby, may perpetuate the
proliferation risks posed by scientists at these institutes. In
our view, this is a very troubling issue that DOE needs to
address as part of a fundamental reassessment of the IPP
program.
We are not aware of any analysis done by DOE to assess the
proliferation risks posed by younger scientists.
2. Does the IPP program operate under any strategic plan
that understands the threat of WMD knowledge leakage, the final
goal of these programs and the strategy used to reach these
goals?
In recent years, DOE has conducted strategic reviews and
developed action plans for the IPP program, and has
commissioned studies to help it better understand the threat of
WMD expertise proliferation. However, we found that these
efforts have not produced a more up-to-date and appropriate set
of long-term goals and metrics for the program. For instance,
we found that the IPP program's long-term performance targets
do not accurately reflect the current size and nature of the
threat the program is intended to address because DOE bases the
program's performance measures on a 1991 assessment of the size
of the former Soviet WMD scientific community. Moreover, the
current program metrics - the total number of weapons
scientists supported by IPP grants or employed in private
sector jobs - are broad measures of program progress, but are
not complete or meaningful indicators of program progress in
reducing WMD expertise proliferation concerns within specific
countries and institutes.
DOE acknowledged these weaknesses in the IPP program
strategy, metrics, and goals. As a result, we recommended in
our December 2007 report that the Secretary of Energy, working
with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, conduct a reassessment of the IPP program that,
among other things, includes (1) a thorough analysis of the
proliferation risk posed by weapons scientists in Russia and
other countries, (2) a well-defined strategy to more
effectively target the scientists and institutes of highest
proliferation concern, and (3) more accurate reporting of
program accomplishments.
3. In your testimony, you often mention the Department of
State's strategy to "graduate" certain institutes from its
programs and that DOE has not developed its own criteria to
determine when participants "graduate" from the IPP program. Do
you feel State's "graduation" strategy is sufficient to
determine if scientists or institutes no longer require
assistance, and should DOE use State's "graduation" strategy as
a model for its own program?
We did not specifically take a position on the use of
State's strategy as a model for DOE's development of an exit
strategy. However, we believe that State's graduation strategy
for its Science Centers program contains important elements
that could serve as a baseline for DOE's development of a
transition or graduation strategy for the IPP program. As we
stated in our December 2007 report, State used a range of
factors, such as the institute's ability to pay salaries
regularly and to attract funding from other sources, when
making determinations about the self-sustainability of
institutes. DOE officials told us that they were aware of
State's approach and had discussed it with State officials.
4. In your testimony, you state: "DOE officials stated that
the IPP program metrics are not sufficient to judge the
program's progress in reducing proliferation risks. However,
DOE has not updated its metrics or set priorities for the
program on the basis of a country-by-country and institute-by-
institute evaluation of proliferation risk." After over a
decade in existence, why do you believe the IPP program has not
yet established adequate metrics or program priorities?
The specific reasons why DOE has not yet established
adequate metrics or program priorities are unclear to us.
However, in its written comments on our December 2007 report,
DOE acknowledged "the need to give greater consideration
to.improving outdated metrics." It should be noted that in its
Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Request, which was
published in February 2008, DOE had still not updated its
metrics for the IPP program to reflect an updated assessment of
the size of the at-risk population of WMD scientists in the
former Soviet Union. DOE's most recent congressional budget
justification remains based on a 1991 National Academy of
Sciences estimation of this population.
5. In your testimony, you state that "the absence of a
joint plan between DOE's IPP program and the International
Science and Technology Center's Commercialization Support
Program raises questions about the lack of coordination between
these two U.S. government programs that share similar goals of
finding peaceful commercial opportunities for foreign WMD
scientists." Do these two commercialization programs overlap,
and should they be consolidated or restructured in any way?
We did not assess the extent to which these two
commercialization programs duplicate one another and offered no
opinion on whether or not they should be consolidated or
restructured. However, as we noted in our December 2007 report,
DOE, State, and ISTC officials told us the IPP program and the
Commercialization Support Program have a similar goal of
finding commercial opportunities for weapons scientists in
Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union.
According to ISTC officials, a key difference in the programs
is that the Commercialization Support Program can support
infrastructure upgrades at foreign institutes, but, unlike the
IPP program, it is not used to support research and development
activities. DOE and State officials stated that the programs
are complementary, but acknowledged that they need to be better
coordinated.
At the January 23, 2008 hearing, the Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State's International Security and
Nonproliferation Bureau testified that "aspects of
commercialization are already in place at the ISTC via its
commercialization program know called Innovation Initiatives
(formerly the Commercialization Support Program) and at STCU
through the Targeted Research Initiatives. For both these
commercialization initiatives, State has worked with and drawn
from the Department of Energy's own commercialization efforts
in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program." Both
DOE and State concurred with our recommendation to more closely
coordinate these programs.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Richard Stratford, Responses to Questions from Hon. Bart Stupak
Question:
You testified that the Department of State plans to sunset
funding for Russian institutes as part of its Science Centers
programs by 2012. Why doesn't the State Department view its
Science Centers program as a perpetual program? Aren't the
risks from scientist "brain drain" to rogue nations an ongoing
problem which would merit continued funding?
Answer:
State's Global Threat Reduction programs (GTR) are threat
driven and worldwide. Thus, if State reaches 2012 and has
graduated all the priority institutes on our Science Centers
Program list, but there are still proliferation threats from
FSU former WMD institutes or WMD experts, State will continue
to engage scientists in the FSU. It may be the case that in
2012, the threat in the FSU may not still exist, and State
would then use these funds to engage scientists at risk
elsewhere; however, that is years away. For now, State plans to
focus on engaging institutes that face the most important
proliferation risks and to also focus on graduating institutes
to financial self-sustainability.
Question:
What is the budget for FY2009 for the Science Centers
Program?
Answer: The estimated budget for FY2008 is $12 million
shared between the International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU).
No decision has been made about how to allocate our Global
Threat Reduction funds for FY2009 among the various program
elements worldwide. Since CTR's programs are threat driven, we
have been making 20% reductions to the Science Centers Program
budget on average per year, and this may help estimating the
budget for Science Center spending for FY2009.
Question:
What criteria does the Department of State use in selecting
and graduating institutes from the program?
Answer:
Institutes are selected to be on the priority list for
graduation based on an interagency review process. We started
our graduation process with a list of 200 institutes which we
believe need to become financially self-sustainable in order to
decrease proliferation risk associated with financial
instability. The U.S. considers and balances a variety of
factors relating to an institute's potential for financial
self-sustainability. Examples of the types of factors utilized
by the U.S. in making a determination about where an institute
should fall in the graduation continuum are:
Ability to secure grant funding from international, non-
Science Centers sources,
Possession of equipment/training/international
certifications required to secure outside funding or,
alternatively, the ability to meet such requirements through
short-term, intensive training or equipment provision,
Staff ability to write competitive grant proposals for
international funding bodies,
Ability to publish in international scientific journals,
Ability to develop a financial plan for long-term
sustainability,
Ability to pay staff salaries regularly from host
Government or outside (non-Science Centers) funding sources,
Capability of leveraging current or past Science Centers
funding to increase host Government interest and investment in
the institute,
Ability of institute to provide international access and
conduct business in an open, transparent manner,
Ability to engage in contract research and/or commercial
production (Note: For many research institutes in the former
Soviet Union, the Department of State does not expect
commercial success to be the most viable self-sustainability
solution.),
Understanding of intellectual property concerns/
requirements,
Designation of staff to handle intellectual property
issues for the institute as appropriate,
Number of international patents/capability of filing
records of invention.
Additional factors that may be taken into account when
determining an institute's graduation status:
Number of former weapons experts still employed at the
institute,
Security/location of materials at an institute that could
be vulnerable to rogue state/terrorist use,
Proximity of an institute to a region with terrorist
activity.
Once an institute has been identified as a candidate for
graduation, more targeted assistance can then be provided to
help the institute to meet one or more final objectives to
enhance self-sustainability and eliminate the need for U.S.
regular project funding. The U.S. believes that the Science
Centers and ISTC/STCU Parties can be instrumental in providing
this targeted assistance. The U.S. has also found that
capabilities assessments can be helpful as the first step in
institute discussions about self-sustainability planning as a
prelude to graduation.
Question:
If an institute becomes financially self-sufficient, but
continues to represent a proliferation concern, will the
Department of State "graduate" this institute under its
criteria?
Answer:
State continues to engage institutes that face the most
important proliferation risks, regardless of their graduation
status because residual risk may exist despite financial self-
sustainability.
Question:
Why should the U.S. continue to fund two "brain drain"
programs (Departments of State and Energy) with similar goals
and objectives to support weapons of mass destruction
scientists who were employed by the former Soviet Union?
Answer:
The Science Centers Program and Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP) are complementary. Under
the Science Centers Program, State acts as the U.S.
representative in the two international centers in the FSU.
State's programs focus on graduation and science projects and
are part of our fast-paced and extensive worldwide effort to
engage WMD scientists. State also funds initiatives at the
Centers such as Counterterrorism workshops, business training,
science advisory council meetings, communication support, etc.,
to redirect scientists to peaceful, sustainable civilian
employment. From our perspective, IPP offers unique
commercialization opportunities with U.S. private industry and
national laboratory partners. When the programs were created,
agencies viewed the Science Centers Program and DOE's IPP
Program as complementary and supplemental.
Question:
In terms of the Department of State's involvement in
scientist assistance programs in Iraq and Libya, what are the
key differences between the approaches used by the Department
of State and the Department of Energy (DOE)?
Answer:
State's Iraq Redirection Program and the Libya Scientist
Engagement Program are aimed at redirecting former WMD
personnel and those with WMD-related expertise in these
countries to peaceful, civilian activities. The Department of
State has the lead for diplomatic and policy guidance on
engaging WMD specialists in Iraq and Libya.
In State's redirection program in Iraq, we run our own
science organization in the Red Zone, parts of Baghdad outside
the International Zone perimeter, and also work to facilitate
employment matchmaking, carry out business development and
project management training, and support conferences and
technical programs. DOE does not have its own science
organization to carry out its work in Iraq. Rather, it partners
with an independent regional organization that has a Baghdad
branch office to provide technical scientific training and
research opportunities to Iraqis.
State efforts are coordinated with IPP through regular
meetings and correspondence, participation in weekly Iraq
Redirection Program-wide telecons, having IPP representation at
CTR-sponsored proposal review meetings, and through
coordination on strategic planning and upcoming events to
ensure effective and united USG policy formulation and
implementation.
In Libya, following its historic decision to dismantle its
WMD programs, Western assistance was requested in engaging
Libyan WMD scientists. The Libya Scientist Engagement Program
responds to this request by redirecting former WMD scientists
toward civilian careers that can enhance Libya's economic
development. The UK and DOE are partners in these efforts.
State works very closely with DOE which focuses primarily
on nuclear scientists in Libya, and we engage the entire
population of nuclear, biological, chemical, and delivery
systems experts. Efforts in Libya are highly integrated and we
rely on DOE's technical expertise while we address the broader
threat.
Question:
What is the Department of State's view about the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) finding that the Department of
Energy is currently funding 35 projects at 17 Russian and
Ukrainian institutes that the Department of State considers to
have "graduated" from its program? Does this make sense from a
proliferation perspective? Does the Department of State expect
that DOE will continue to fund institutes that have graduated?
What is the logic of this policy?
Answer:
State continues to fund graduated institutes that face the
most important proliferation risks. Even after an institute has
graduated, there may still be residual proliferation risk which
we have to address through continued engagement.
Question:
Please itemize in former Soviet Union countries that are
funded in whole or in part by the Department of State in 2008,
the amounts per institute, and the project funded.
Answer:
State makes project funding decisions at the Governing
Board meetings. At the ISTC, State funds science projects
during three rounds of funding per year and at the STCU, twice
per year. For FY2008, State has only funded projects at the
ISTC and the STCU during one round each.
At the STCU Governing Board meeting in November 2007, State
funded STCU Regular Project #3984 for $199,687. The main
institute is Frantsevich Institute for Problems of Materials
Science of National Academy of Science of Ukraine. The
participating institutes include Yuzhnoye State Design Office
of NSAU and the Georgian Technical University of Ministry of
Education and Science of Georgia. State also funded two
Targeted Research Initiative (TRI) projects in Azerbaijan. This
initiative is aimed to increase host state funding at the STCU.
The cost of funding the project is split 50/50, between the
funding parties and the host state respectively. One Azeri TRI
was STCU TRI Project #4520 for the amount of $24,966 with the
Azeri Institute of Physics. The second Azeri TRI was STCU TRI
Project #4523 for the amount of $24,866 with the Institute of
Zoology, Institute of Radiation Problems, and the Institute of
Chemical Problems.
At the ISTC Governing Board meeting in December 2007, State
funded ISTC Regular Project #3515 in the amount of $90,000 at
the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Federal Nuclear
Center - All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics
named after Academician E.I. Zababakhin (VNIITF). State also
co-funded ISTC Regular Project #3799 in the amount of $114,000
(half the cost) at the Khlopin Radium Institute, St Petersburg,
Russia with the supporting institute NPO Mayak, Oziorsk,
Chelyabinsk region, Russia.
These represent a small portion of what State intends to
fund over the course of the fiscal year.
Question:
Please describe the nuclear safeguards agreements and
verification procedures in place with Russia to protect and
prevent the re-export of information related to projects funded
under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership by DOE.
Answer:
GIPP/GNEP projects potentially involving export controlled
information or technology were structured to ensure that
technology flows from Russia to the United States.
Question:
Does the United States have a "123" Agreement for
Cooperation with Russia at this time? Has one been negotiated
and initialed?
Answer:
Negotiations with Russia on the text of an Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation ("123 Agreement") were essentially
completed in April 2007 and the text was initialed in Moscow on
June 29, 2007. In their July 3, 2007 Declaration on Nuclear
Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, President Bush and
President Putin noted the initialing of the text with
satisfaction and highlighted their shared view that the
Agreement, once signed and brought into force, will provide "an
essential basis" for cooperation between the United States and
Russia in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The remaining statutorily-mandated steps toward securing
the President's approval of the proposed Agreement and his
authorization to sign it are pending within the Executive
Branch. The Administration has not yet moved the proposed
Agreement forward for the President's approval.
Question:
What policy differences are there with Russia which has
caused the Department of State to refrain from submitting it to
the Congress for review? Does this include concerns about the
Bushehr reactor in Iran?
Answer:
The Administration does not regard Russia's support for the
Bushehr project in Iran as in itself a reason to withhold
signature of the Agreement and its transmittal to Congress. The
President has made clear his support for Russia's supply of
nuclear fuel to Bushehr because it demonstrates that Iran does
not need to possess the complete nuclear fuel cycle - with its
latent proliferation risks - to take advantage of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
For the United States, having an agreement for Peaceful
Nuclear Cooperation in place with Russia would provide a
framework for potential commercial sales of civil nuclear
commodities to Russia by U.S. industry. It would also
facilitate U.S.-Russia cooperation in developing Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP) technologies, in particular the
development of advanced fast burner reactors, the fuel for
which would likely be developed in the United States and then
be transferred to Russia pursuant to the 123 Agreement for test
irradiation.
Question:
How does the State Department perceive the risk posed by
certain institutes and WMD scientists? How does this view
differ from that of DOE's?
Answer:
Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs in the Office of
Cooperative Threat Reduction are threat driven. State consults
with the entire interagency on the risk posed by WMD expertise
globally and then target our programs to mitigate these
threats. CTR continues its redirecting efforts through the
Science Centers Program because State assesses there is still a
risk in the former Soviet Union of WMD expertise transfer to
proliferant states or terrorists.
State defers to DOE to explain its view on how it perceives
the risk posed by certain institutes and WMD scientists.
Question:
Is there benefit for State and DOE to collectively
establish a system for evaluating proliferation risk for
institutes and scientists to better target involvement in the
IPP and ISTC program?
Answer:
Yes. As State stated during the Congressional hearing on
January 23, we agree that we should work more closely to
evaluate proliferation risks and will work with DOE to that
end.
Question:
Some believe that due to Russia's increased financial
prosperity, and to verbal commitments made by top government
officials to help fund WMD scientists, that the U.S. should no
longer fund the IPP program. Despite the rhetoric, has Russia
made any tangible commitments to funding its own programs? If
the U.S. withdrew funding, would Russia fund their own Soviet-
era WMD scientists?
Answer:
State has been engaged in a dialogue with Russia to
increase host state contributions to the International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC). The U.S. and Russia have agreed
that it is in both of our interests to help institutes reach
self-sustainability. Russia is also increasing its own spending
in areas that employ former weapons scientists. For example,
Russian spending on public health spending has increased
greatly and this trend has greatly contributed to many Russian
biological institutes becoming financially self sustaining.
Question:
Can you further elaborate on State's "exit strategy"? Is it
simply to "graduate" institutes to financial self-
sustainability?
Answer:
Self-sustainability programming is designed to decrease the
resources necessary to engage WMD expertise in the former
Soviet Union by graduating institutes so that we can redirect
funds to emerging global threats.
However, State continues to engage institutes worldwide
that face the most important proliferation risks, regardless of
their graduation status because residual risk may exist despite
financial self-sustainability. Thus, our exit strategy is to
make institutes financially self-sustainable by 2012, but if in
2012 we perceive residual risks, we will still continue some
level of engagement.