- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., Alabama JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida KAY GRANGER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Paul Terry, Kris Mallard, Linda
Pagelsen, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
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PART 4
Page
Army Posture..................................................... 1
Army Acquisition Programs........................................ 99
Navy Posture..................................................... 145
Navy / Marine Corps Acquisition Programs......................... 279
Biological Countermeasures and Threats........................... 325
Statements for the Record........................................ 439
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-476 WASHINGTON : 2009

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania JERRY LEWIS, California
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia RALPH REGULA, Ohio
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York JAMES T. WALSH, New York
JOSE E. SERRANO, New York DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
ED PASTOR, Arizona TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
CHET EDWARDS, Texas TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., Alabama ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York KAY GRANGER, Texas
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania
SAM FARR, California VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia
JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan DAVE WELDON, Florida
ALLEN BOYD, Florida MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
MARION BERRY, Arkansas DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
BARBARA LEE, California JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
ADAM SCHIFF, California KEN CALVERT, California
MICHAEL HONDA, California JO BONNER, Alabama
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas

Rob Nabors, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

----------

Wednesday, March 12, 2008.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 ARMY POSTURE

WITNESSES

HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. We will come to order. This is another open
hearing that we have had in a series of open hearings that we
have had this year. I just want everybody to know that. I don't
know who the hell is running the Pentagon, because you have got
them all over here, for crying out loud. And General Melcher--
--
General Casey. They don't let us out alone, Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. And General Melcher, who has spies every place.
He doesn't miss a trick. Anything that happens, he knows and he
has cause to make sure that we know that he has been around,
that he understands what is going on. But we want to welcome
Secretary Geren, former Member of Congress, who does such a
good job as Secretary of the Army, and General Casey, one of
our premiere commanders in the history of the Army. We welcome
you to the Committee and look forward to your testimony. Mr.
Young.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I do have a very long opening
statement, but I am going to just say welcome to our
distinguished witnesses today. But I would like to explain, Mr.
Chairman, the fact that there are many hearings taking place
and most of our members on this subcommittee are senior
members, meaning they are either chairman or ranking member on
other subcommittees that are meeting today. So at least for a
while, you are going to have to put up with just a few of us.
But welcome. We look forward to your testimony.
Secretary Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman
Young. We have a full statement that we have submitted for the
record and I would like to just offer some summary comments.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection.
[Clerk's note.--The Fiscal Year 2009 Army Posture Statement
for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the
Army is printed at the end of this hearing.]

Summary Statement of Secretary Geren

Secretary Geren. It is an honor for General Casey and me to
appear before you and talk about our Nation's Army. It is an
Army that has been built by partnership between the Army and
this Congress and it is a partnership that is older than this
country and a partnership that is affirmed by our Constitution.
The President's budget for 2009 is before the Congress, $141
billion for the Army. As is always the case, the Army budget is
mostly about people and operations and maintenance to support
people. Our 2009 budget, two-thirds of it, our personnel,
operations and maintenance to support those people.
Creighton Abrams told us people aren't in the Army, people
are the Army. And this budget reflects that reality. Today, we
are an Army long at war. We are in our 7th year in Afghanistan,
and shortly we will have been 5 years in Iraq. It is the third
longest war in American history, behind the Revolutionary War
and the Vietnam War, and it is the longest war we have ever
fought with an all volunteer force.
Our Army is stretched by the demands of this long war, but
it remains an extraordinary Army. It is the best led, best
trained and best equipped Army we have ever put in the field
with Army families standing tall with their soldier loved ones,
soldiers that re-enlist and families that re-enlist with them,
an Army of volunteers, volunteer soldiers and volunteer
families.

SOLDIERS DEPLOYED

Mr. Chairman, we have 250,000 soldiers deployed to 80
countries around the world as we sit here today with over
140,000 deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. And our 140,000 in
harm's way are our top priority. We never take our eye off of
that ball, and this budget and our supplementals ensure that we
provide those soldiers what they need when they need it. And
today and over the last 6 years, our reserve component, our
Guard and Reserves, continue to carry a very heavy burden for
our nation. Since 9/11 we have activated 184,000 reservists and
268,000 guardsmen in support of the global war on terror, and
they have answered the call to respond to domestic crises here
at home time and again.

ARMY FAMILIES

And as you well know, we are one Army today. The active
component cannot go to war without the National Guard and
Reserve. And the challenge before us is to continue the
transformation of the Reserve component into an operational
reserve and this budget helps further that goal. And the
strength of our Army, Active Guard and Reserves comes from the
strength of Army families. Our Army families are standing with
their soldier loved ones, and we owe them a quality of life
that is equal to the quality of their service.
Over half of our soldiers today are married. The other day
when we testified in front of Senator Inouye's Committee, he
said the unit he was in in World War II, 4 percent married, 96
percent single. Today, over half are married. It is a very
different Army. When a married soldier deploys, he or she
leaves behind a single parent household and all the challenges
of that family dynamic. When a single parent deploys, he or she
leaves a child in the care of others. And today nearly half, 48
percent of all of our soldiers who deploy have a child age 2 or
younger.

FAMILY PROGRAMS

In the 2009 budget, we are doubling funding for family
programs. We are adding 26 new child-development centers to the
35 that Congress gave us last year, thanks to the leadership of
this Committee. And over the past year, with your strong
support, we have expanded the availability and reduced the cost
of child care for Army families. We have asked much of
volunteer spouses who carry the burden of family support
programs. And that burden grows heavier with each deployment.
With this budget we provide them help and full-time support
in family readiness support systems and other full-time support
for those spouses. In late 1990s, Congress launched the
privatized housing initiative, something that the military
didn't embrace fully. Congress led the way and today that is
one of the most successful initiatives we have in the Army,
providing quality of life for our soldiers. We have replaced
housing with homes and housing with great neighborhoods in the
residential communities initiative.

MEDICAL PROGRAMS

In 2008, you gave us resources to hire needed medical
personnel and to do research in the signature wounds of this
war, TBI and PTSD. And we have stood up 35 warrior transition
units around the country to serve our wounded, ill and injured.
And we continue to make progress on that front. And we will
continue to grow our knowledge and prove our care for those
that have mental challenges that come from the wounds of this
war.

ACQUISITION

In our budget, we also look to the future. We never want to
send our soldiers to a fair fight and the budget continues our
investment in the programs of tomorrow, future combat systems
which will not only shape the future of our Army, but it is
spinning out technologies in today's fight. The Army
reconnaissance helicopters, the UAVs, light utility helicopter
and the joint cargo aircraft, we thank you all for your support
in the past. It is an important part of the future of this
Army.
Mr. Chairman, we are a Nation long at war and we are an
Army out of balance. But our Army remains strong, it remains
resilient. Those who look to find the hollow Army that we
experienced in the 1970s will not find it in this Army. Every
year, 170,000 men and women join our Army. Every year 120,000
proudly re-enlist. They are proud of who they are and they are
proud of what they are doing. Mr. Chairman, members of this
Committee, thank you for your support of those soldiers in
uniform and the support of those families. With the partnership
we have with this committee and with this Congress, we are a
strong Army. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Summary Statement of General Casey

General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Young,
members of the Committee, it is my first appearance before this
Committee as the chief of staff. So I welcome the opportunity
to provide some context for the 2009 budget. I do have a long
opening statement, but I really would just like to leave five
points with you here. Let me just hit those five points and I
will say a few words about each one.

ARMY BALANCE

First of all, as we think through this 2009 budget and the
supplementals that accompany it, we have to do so with an eye
on the futuristic strategic environment, which I see as one of
persistent conflict and one in which uncertainty is the only
certainty. Second, I worked hard to define the right words to
describe the Army. And what I will tell you, today's Army is
out of balance and out of balance is not broken or hollow. The
Army is an extremely resilient, competent, professional combat-
seasoned force. But we all know that we can't do the things
that we know we need to do right now.
Third, we have a plan, which with your help can put the
Army back in balance over the next 3 or 4 years. And it is
centered on 4 imperatives. Sustain, repair, reset and
transform. And I will talk about those in a second. Fourth, as
we work to put the Army back in balance, we cannot take our eye
off the future. And to ensure that we have a versatile, agile,
campaign capable Army to deal with the uncertainties of the
future environment.

PERSISTANT CONFLICT

And lastly, I just want to make sure everyone understands
that the Army is not standing still and we are moving out on
the most ambitious transformation program all the while that we
are fighting today's battles and I will give you a little
status report on where we have come over the last few years. So
let me just say a few words about each of those. First of all,
as I said, I see the future as one of persistent conflict. And
I define persistent conflict as a period of protracted
confrontation among State, nonstate and individual actors who
are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish their
political and ideological objectives. And against that
background, the global trends that I see are pushing things in
the wrong direction. I think it is going to exacerbate and
prolong that period of confrontation. What am I talking about?
Globalization. Globalization is going to have positive and
negative effects, clearly it is enhancing the quality of life
all over the world, but the distribution of those effects are
uneven and if you look south of the equator, primarily and
South America, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia.
What you see are the beginnings of a have and have not culture
that can be exploited by the different terrorist groups.
Technology is another double edged sword. The same technology
that is bringing knowledge to anyone with a computer and hookup
is being used by terrorists it export terror around the globe.
Demographics, some of the populations of these developing
countries where the terrorist groups have their roots are
expected to double in the next couple of decades. And the two
that concern me most, weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of terrorist and safe havens where they can plan and export
with impunity because local governments can't or won't take
care of them.

ARMY BALANCE

So as I said, against that backdrop, I see a future where
the only certainty is uncertainty. Second, we are out of
balance. And what do I mean by that? We are consumed by the
current and we are deploying to support the current conflict in
a way that is just not sustainable for us over the long term.
And we need to continue to work to do that. And as a result, we
can't do other things as rapidly as we would like. Our soldiers
and family support systems are being strained, our Guard and
Reserve are performing magnificently, but in a way that they
were neither designed or resourced for.
So we have a lot of work to do to put ourselves back in
balance, and that is my third point. Sustain, prepare, reset
and transform, our four imperatives. Sustain, we must support
and sustain our soldiers and families. They are the heart and
soul of this Army. And they are our ultimate asymmetric
advantage over any enemy that we face and we must continue to
support and retain them so this force can remain as viable as
it is in the future. Prepare. We cannot back off our commitment
to send soldiers into combat with the best equipment, training
and manning. And we are absolutely committed to working with
you to do that we have made great strides in this regard thanks
to your help, but we cannot slack off for a minute on that.

RESET

Third is reset and reset applies to both our soldiers and
to our equipment. And reset is another area with your help we
can make great strides. $17 billion in the 2007 supplemental
reserved the downward spiral we are in. But we need to continue
to reinvest in our reset if we are going to sustain a versatile
force for the future. In my view, the money that you are giving
us for reset is the difference between a hollow force and a
versatile force for the future.

TRANSFORMATION

And lastly, transform. And as I said, we can't take our eye
off the future and our transformation is a holistic effort. We
need to transform how we train, fight, modernize, and support
our soldiers and families. We are looking broadly across the
Army at transforming ourselves and all those efforts. Number
four, I said you can't take your eye off the future, and we
have recently published a new capstone doctrinal manual, Field
Manual 3 (FM-3), Operations. And it is the first major
doctrinal publication since September 11th, and it is designed
to put us on a track to take advantage of the lessons that we
have learned in the last 7 years at war and to build the type
of Army we are going to need for the future.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

A couple of points in this. It describes the future
security environment that I talked to you about briefly in my
opening statement. Most importantly, I think it raises
stability operations to the level of offense and defense. And
there is--it is designed around an operational concept that
says Army formations will simultaneously apply offense, defense
and stability operations to seize the initiative and achieve
decisive results, it is a big step for us.
Third, it elevates the commander's role in battle command
and in solving the complex security problems we are going to
face in the 21st century. Fourth, it elevates information
operations and recognizes the importance of information in
winning 21st century wars.

MODULAR CONVERSION

And lastly, it reinforces that despite all this futuristic
talk and discussion, the soldier remains the centerpiece of our
formations. And lastly, just on my fifth point, we are not
standing still. I know you have been--we have been talking to
you over the past several years about what we are doing with
modular organizations. We are 70 percent of the way through
modular conversions. That is the largest organizational
transformation of the Army since World War II. We are about 60
percent of the way through what we call rebalancing, taking
soldiers who had cold war skills that weren't as necessary as
some of the skills we need for the 21st century and converting
them.

GROW THE ARMY

So that process has gone forward. We have accelerated the
growth of the Army that you see in this year's budget from
fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2010. We have reset over
120,000 pieces of equipment. Our Army medical action plan and
soldier and family action plan are greatly increasing what we
are doing for our wounded warriors and our families. And our
depots, your depots have been recognized by industry with 12
shingo awards for effectiveness and efficiency.

SERGEANT GREG WILLIAMS

So, yes, the Army is stretched. Yes, we are deploying at
unsustainable rates. But, yes, we are also not standing still,
but moving forward with your help. And I will close, Mr.
Chairman, with the story about the quality of the soldiers that
I see around our Army. I was in Alaska before Christmas, and I
was asked to present a distinguished service cross to Sergeant
Greg Williams. Sergeant Williams was on a patrol in Baghdad in
October 12, 2006 with his squad. They were ambushed from three
directions, and the ambush was kicked off by four explosively-
formed penetrators all aimed at this one vehicle. The blast
knocked him out. It set the vehicle on fire. He woke up with a
broken eardrum, his legs were on fire. He put his fire out. He
grabbed the aid bag, ran off the track, began treating his
fellow soldiers. He realized the lieutenant was still in the
burning vehicle.
He ran back on the burning vehicle, grabbed the lieutenant,
dragged him to safety and began treating him. He recognized
that because they were still taking fire no one was on the 50
caliber machine gun on the Stryker. He ran back in the burning
vehicle, which, by the way, contained about 30 pounds of TNT,
and explosive detonating cord, got on the 50 caliber machine
gun, brought it to bear on the enemy and broke the ambush.
That is the kind of soldier that we have in today's Army.
They are men and women that you can all be proud of. So I would
just say that I thank you for your support and what you have
done for the Army here over the past several years. We are on
our way to putting ourselves back in balance. This 2009 budget,
the rest of the 2008 supplemental and the 2009 supplemental
that will accompany it, will take further steps on a continuous
road to progress. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much.

TIMELY FUNDING

Mr. Murtha. When Mr. Young was chairman, we put a lot of
money into reset because we knew there was an immediate
problem. We realized it was absolutely essential to get the
equipment rehabilitated and we got it out as quickly as we
could. We are trying to convince our leadership to get the
supplemental--this supplemental out sooner rather than later
and I think they are amenable to that. It is just a matter of
timing and getting the--other than the defense part of the
supplemental ready.

FIFTEEN-MONTH TOURS

The thing I worry about the most, the thing that--Mr. Young
and I go to the hospitals all the time. I saw four young
soldiers yesterday, one woman who was a gunner, and she
couldn't stand up because she had a head injury, but she was
very enthusiastic. Three others, one had lost a leg, one was in
a wheelchair and the other was with them. But I am inspired by
them. Every time I go to the hospital, I am inspired by their
ability to overcome all the difficulties they put up with in
combat. But this 15-month tour, this morning I had breakfast
with a group of people, this fellow said he lost his son on a
15-month deployment. The 15th month he lost his son. But he was
upbeat about it. He said his son was a PFC and he was a hero to
him. And I think that is the way most of the families feel,
that these young folks who are doing their work, it takes a lot
of courage and dedication and it is inspiring to me to see
them. But also I saw a woman in the hallway not long ago. She
stopped me. Her husband is in the Army and she had a son in the
Army that was killed in Iraq, and she had a son in the Army who
committed suicide. These 15-month deployments are too long.
General, when can we see that being reduced? When can we see it
is so hard on the family, so that this extra 3 months, what is
your goal in these deployments?
General Casey. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. We recognize this, and
in fact, we have sent a team under a brigadier general to visit
each of the brigade units deploying from 15 months. They tell
us three things, just as you said, 15 months is too long, 12
months home is too short and you need to show us a little
daylight here about how this is going to get better over time.
So our goal is that when the force levels in Iraq get down
to 15 brigade combat teams in July as is programmed, we at that
time will be able to shift back to 12-month tours. And I fully
expect that we will be able to accomplish that. The next thing
we have to do is increase our dwell time at home and that will
increase as we continue to grow this force over the next
several years.

MILITARY FUNDING

Mr. Murtha. One of the things that I have stressed, and I
have talked to both of you privately about this, as this war
winds down, whoever is elected President, there is going to be
less money available for the military because the public is
demanding that--there is more money spent on infrastructure, we
have bridges that are deficient, all of these problems that
domestically are going to be competing with the military. So I
think we have to speed up the program that we are talking about
for the future of--any of the systems as you are working on
them. We think last year we started changing direction of some
of the programs like the Navy, we put a few more ships in. We
will put more ships in this year. We are looking at trying to
get this thing moving as quickly as we can before the money
runs out.
So I think it is imperative that you keep looking, you keep
studying what we can offset some of these things with. And I
hope you would come forward to the Committee before we pass our
base bill. And we intend to offer the supplemental with the
base bill this year. So I am hopeful that--the 2009 bill I am
talking about. We are hopeful that you will give us some
suggestions before May when we mark up the bill, at least that
is when I anticipate marking up the bill. I don't know if we
will get a bill this year. I don't know if the bill will be
signed into law this year.
Just because of the political situation, the new President
going to be elected and so forth. So we are going to do
everything we can to get it passed. A continuing resolution is
the worst thing we could do because it just completely ties our
hands in doing anything that is visionary and focuses on the
future. But I would predict it is going to be very hard to pass
legislation--not only domestic legislation, but a defense bill
this year. But we are going to go forward. We are going to get
it over to the other body and do the best we can in this
Committee. But my advice is think about what you said, the
future, but think about what we can do to readjust the
requirements and recommendations you are making so we get an
opportunity to digest them before we mark up our bill.
General Casey. We will do that.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

ARMY BUDGET REQUEST

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General
Casey, your comments on the Army being unbalanced and we are
needing to fix this by 2011 is very timely. Chairman Murtha and
I have been talking about this for months, the fact that we
need to look ahead and we need to be able to rebuild whatever--
rebuild, reset, recapitalize, whatever, or rebalance our
military after we are basically finished with Iraq and
Afghanistan. But you talk about a $265 billion a year to
accomplish this. How did you arrive at the $265 billion? What
would you do with that $265 billion?
General Casey. I am not familiar with the $265 billion
number, Congressman. It is not a number that I have used. If
you look at what our base program is and the supplementals that
accompany that base program over the last year or so, it
basically comes out to about the number that you just
mentioned. And that is just a fact. To fight the war and to
continue to sustain the force over time and to prepare for the
future, that is about what it takes.
Now, I think you know in the supplementals, about 70
percent of the supplemental is spent in the theater on people
and operations. And so that part of that $265 is really the
cost of the war. The other 30 percent of that is reset and
procurement for things like force protection and MRAPs and
those kinds of things. So that number you mentioned is about
the number that is based on supplemental that we need here over
the next several years to fight the war and to continue to
prepare for the future.

RESET AND GROWTH

Mr. Young. Do you have an indication of how much of that is
for replacing or resetting equipment? How much it of is growth
and the end strength of the Army? Do you have a breakdown for
that?
General Casey. I can tell you that these numbers I am going
to give you are spread over a period of time. But we started
off before our modular conversions here with about $56
billion--my predecessor Pete Schoomaker used to call them holes
in the yard. And the modular conversions, which converted our
brigade combat teams and our brigades to the types of
organizations we need in the 21st century, and also to sustain
the war effort added about--again, this is over 5 or 6 years--
$100 billion or so of equipment requirements.
And by and large, we have funded the bulk of that through
base and supplemental funding, primarily base funding, over the
last several years. I mean, this really started in 2004. So we
are making progress in the direction that we need to be going.
It is just going to take us a few more years to finish it up.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. Young. I understand it is not going to be done
overnight, and we are talking about a major rebalancing. When
you mentioned MRAPs, General--and just a short time ago we were
pushing really hard to get as many MRAPs as we could into the
theater and we appropriated a lot of money for MRAPs and then
the Marines recently came out with a position statement
announcing they were going to reduce their MRAP requirement by
about 40 percent. Does the Army have a similar--I think General
Odierno was quoted in a USA Today story, said the Army's
requirement for 10,000 MRAPs would probably drop. Is that
accurate?
Secretary Geren. Right now we are funded for 10,000 MRAPs.
Our estimate right now, we have a range that we will need will
be somewhere between 10 and 15,000. The JROC just recently
approved 12,000 for the Army. We are still fine tuning the
final number. But we are not going to drop below where we are
now. The theater is looking at what the proper ratio--I think
initially there was a thought that we would replace all up-
armored HUMVEEs with MRAPs. A year ago General Odierno talked
about replacing all 19,000 or 17,000 at the time with MRAPs. I
think what we have learned since then is that there remains a
role for the up-armored HUMVEE. It is lighter, it offers some
tactical advantages over the MRAP in certain situations.
So we are still trying to work out what the proper ratio
is. Is it two-thirds MRAP, one-third up-armored HUMVEEs? But we
are going to have in theater by the end of the year about
10,000 and by early February we will have another 1,500. The
MRAPs have performed very well. We have had 48 MRAPs that have
been hit with IEDs or EFPs. We have only had one KIA as a
result. So they are an important part of the Army presence in
Iraq and we are going to be moving the RG-31s into Afghanistan.
And as we look to the future, we are trying to assess what the
role is long term. But the Army will not drop below the 10,000
that we already have programmed, and we will likely go above
that probably closer to 12.
Mr. Young. Well, I appreciate the information you gave on
the success of the MRAP. And it is still, as you said, of the
48 IEDs or roadside bombs, only one casualty, which is a pretty
good record.
Secretary Geren. And the soldier that was killed was
actually on top--he was a gunner. So we have not lost a single
soldier that actually was in the protection of the MRAP body
itself.
Mr. Young. Well, that is a good news story.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young and I are going to have to go vote.
We have less than a minute left. So, Mr. Moran.

ADMIRAL FALLON STATEMENT

Mr. Moran. It's just a motion to adjourn that we are going
to have all day long, Mr. Chairman. That is all it is. It is
just a motion to adjourn. You just called on me, right? General
Casey, Admiral Fallon was just forced to resign. He was head of
the U.S. Central Command. So I got a copy of the quote that led
to that resignation. He said that--and I am quoting--this
constant drumbeat of conflict with Iran is not helpful and not
useful.
I expect that there will be no war and that is what we
ought to be working for. We ought to try to do our utmost to
create different conditions. ``What America needs,'' Fallon
said, ``is a combination of strength and willingness to
engage.'' Do you agree with Admiral Fallon?
General Casey. Of course, Congressman, I have known Admiral
Fallon and his wife, Mary, for years.
Mr. Moran. I know that. That is why I asked.
General Casey. He really worked hard to do what is right
for this country.
Mr. Moran. He is a great American.
General Casey. He is a great American. And both he and his
wife Mary have given a lot to this country. Now, you are asking
me if I agree with the statement that you just read. I mean,
that is very much in the policy realm, far beyond my current
job as the Chief Staff of the Army.
Mr. Moran. You know, Admiral Fallon and you are four-star
generals and it doesn't seem to me this is all that
controversial a statement, frankly. It should be consistent
with American foreign policy as well as our military policy
which ought to be integrated, I think. But I was interested to
see how you would respond.

IRAN

General Casey. Well, I would give you my personal view here
since you have asked for it on our dealings with Iran and I
will say first Iran is clearly being unhelpful in our efforts
in Iraq and they are supporting sectarian groups who are using
equipment supplied by Iran to target our soldiers. And I have a
problem with that. Now, that said, we need to continue our
efforts to get them to stop doing that, and I do believe, as I
think your quote said, it will take both primarily diplomatic,
but also strength on our part to ensure that they stop
undermining our efforts there and providing material that is
killing our soldiers.

OUTSOURCING REPORT

Mr. Moran. But our mission vis-a-vis Iran is primarily a
diplomatic one at this point more than a working toward any
kind of military confrontation. But I don't want to put words
in your mouth and I understand you have that statement now on
the record. I appreciate that, General. General, this
subcommittee has been beside itself because of the outsourcing
of much of this conflict in Iraq, it is nice to see you, Mr.
Secretary. It is nice to have a friend, a Secretary of the
Army. But that doesn't mean I am going to be any lighter on
you, of course, as you would expect. We have determined not
only because we have basically been badgering the witnesses now
for 3 years, that there are about 140,000 contractors in Iraq.
About the same number of uniform personnel.
Now, you were required--the DoD is required to come up with
an interim report that is due this year in October. That has to
provide us with the number of contracts, the number of
contractor personnel, the dollar value of contracts, the use of
competitive procedures, the number of contractors providing
security services and a number of areas of significant concern.
Have you put in place a structure for--to acquire that
information that you can give it to us in an understandable
fashion?
Secretary Geren. We have devoted a great deal of time over
the last several months focusing on the whole contractor issue
in Iraq and Afghanistan. And our latest estimate on the number
of contractors in Iraq actually is considerably up over the
number that you quoted. We have around 190,000 contractors.
Mr. Moran. You have 190,000. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to
underscore that there are now 190,000 contractors in Iraq.
Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Let me ask you. Would you break that down--is
that worldwide 190,000 or just in Iraq.
Secretary Geren. That is Iraq.
Mr. Moran. It is almost twice the numbers we had last year.
Secretary Geren. I believe that is Iraq alone, but it may
include Afghanistan, which is a much smaller number.
Mr. Murtha. Please break it down for the record because the
contractors cost a lot more per individual. So the Committee
needs--I cut back on contracting money last year and the Senate
wouldn't go along as much as I wanted to--at least the
Committee recommended to the Senate. So this really worries me
that we are doing so much with contractors and I would like to
know generally what--specifically what we are doing? In other
words, some categories of how they are working. I understand
food services, I understand some of these different areas, but
break it down for us. You are talking about more contractors
than you are talking about troops on the ground.
Secretary Geren. We do. And we will break it out for you.
Many of them are in troop support, they are food service,
laundry, transportation and many of the basic support services
that before we downsized the military as much as we did in the
1990s many of those functions we kept in house, but now we do
contract them out. Many of those are lower paid contract
employees in the food service industry. Some are high paid. The
security contractors tend to be higher paid. But when you are
comparing the cost of the contractor to a soldier, those
contractors obviously are employed for a limited term. They
don't have the full range of benefits of a soldier, nor do they
have the extended employment. But Dr. Gansler did----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, draftees are employed for a
limited amount of time also.
Mr. Moran. And they don't get paid a lot either.
Mr. Murtha. They don't get paid near as much. I think we
really need to get our handle on this contracting thing because
we get the impression there are less troops but then we are
increasing the number of contractors which is why I need to see
the categories to.
Secretary Geren. I will provide that to you, as well as
third party nationals and how many Iraqi nationals, we will
provide that full information.
Mr. Murtha. Also, are these sole source contracts? We need
to see how many times we have competed and who were competing--
who were competing for the contracts.
[The information follows:]

There are approximately 163,591 Department of Defense contractor
personnel in Iraq and 36,520 in Afghanistan for a total of 200,111. The
services being provided in support of our mission in Iraq and
Afghanistan include the following categories: base support (43
percent), construction (28 percent), security (7 percent),
transportation (4 percent), communication support (4 percent),
translator/interpreter (5 percent), and others (9 percent).
In fiscal year 2007, the Joint Contracting Command--Iraq/
Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) executed 2,477 contract actions (which included
the issuance of task and delivery orders, purchase orders,
modifications, and contract awards) totaling $7.5 billion. Of the total
contract actions 2,269, or 92 percent, were competed using full and
open competition for a total of $7.3 billion. A total of 208 contract
actions, or 8 percent, were not competed, totaling $157 million. Of
those 208 contract actions, 32 were based on ``only one responsible
source'' authority, and 104 cited the ``unusual and compelling
urgency'' exception to full and open competition which is used when the
agency's need for the supplies or services is of such an ``unusual and
compelling urgency'' that the Government would be seriously injured,
unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources.

RECYCLED WATER

Mr. Moran. That means we have got about 350,000, about a
third of a million Americans there in Iraq. And oftentimes,
they don't distinguish the difference between a contractor and
a uniform person who is acting under orders and conducting
themselves with discipline. I want to ask you about the fact
that Kellogg Brown & Root/Halliburton has been providing our
soldiers with recycled sewer water and it has caused disease
according to investigations that have been conducted.
Do you have an ability either of you, General and Mr.
Secretary, to call those people before you and dress them down?
Tell them that this is unacceptable, that we don't pay for
sewer water that is going to cause disease among our soldiers?
Do you have any way of holding these guys accountable?
Secretary Geren. We do. And the report that you referred to
was done by the Department of Defense. That matter has been
corrected. That was back in 2004, unacceptable. They understand
that and we rarely check the quality of the water. One of the
things we have learned over the last year is we were not where
we needed to be as far as providing contract oversight.
As a result of the task force we started last summer, we
have hired a considerable number of additional contract officer
representatives to manage these contracts, make sure we are
getting what we ask for. We are doing a better job of
supervising all of the contract operations in theater, got more
personnel, more oversight and more accountability.

DINING FACILITIES

Mr. Moran. Well, let me ask you because, you know, I know
it may seem to be a small matter. But the Army requested more
than a billion dollars and then another billion dollars, $987
million. So basically, $2 billion in supplemental funds for
subsistence for DoD civilians in the global war on terrorism.
Ice, food and water for authorized DoD civilians and
contractors. Now, they eat in DoD facilities. A reasonable
estimate would be that the per person cost is $14,000 per
person to eat in DoD mess facilities.
Now, I think it might be useful to find out how many
civilians are fed in Army messes in Iraq. Does the Army track
who is eating in these mess halls? Do we track the contractors
that are eating there, or do we charge back the cost of the
food that they consume? You know, when you are talking about
almost 200,000 people, these kinds of things become pretty darn
expensive. And I think--I was told by somebody that had just
got back from Iraq, and in fact, I saw some of this, we were--
there was a long line in the morning when we were going into
the green zone.
And then I saw other people coming around the line and
going in another entry gate who looked like civilians. You
couldn't distinguish them and I asked who are those people who
don't have to wait in this long line? And they said, oh, they
are from Halliburton. They run the place. So they don't have
to, you know--they take that for granted, that nobody is going
to delay them and they take for granted that they can eat in
the Army mess and they can use these other amenities and we are
paying for it, and then paying them through the nose for the
contract services that they are supposed to be providing.
We only find out after the fact, maybe 3 years after the
fact the kind of service, the quality of services or lack of
quality that they are actually providing. Do you have any way
of accounting how this money is being used or how many of them
are using Army messes and do you charge back to the contract
for that cost?
Secretary Geren. Let me get you the detailed information on
the mess hall issue. We have looked into that in great detail
over the last couple of years and I will provide that for the
record. Let me just real quickly make one other correction. I
am afraid I misunderstood. Most of those contract employees we
talk about are not American nationals. And so it is close to
half are from the region. You don't have all of those civilian
contractors subsisting on our subsistence system.
[The information follows:]

Department of Defense (DoD) employees are authorized logistics
(such as food, water, billeting, etc.) and security support privileges
when deployed with the Armed Forces. Logistic and security support for
contractors authorized to accompany the force are addressed in the
contract and are priced and negotiated before the contract is awarded.
It costs approximately $23.00 daily per person for food. This does not
include related transportation, storage, or labor costs, but does
include six liters of water per day. Meals being provided in support of
our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan are prepared by Kellogg, Brown and
Root (KBR) under the LOGCAP III contract. KBR is required to keep
records of the number of meals served and the government is authorized
to audit such records.
DoD also has implemented the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to account for and provide visibility
of all DoD contract personnel within the contingency operations
battlespace. The Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS), a
component of SPOT, will also enhance visibility. The JAMMS will be able
to scan the contractor personnel's Letter of Authorization to identify
any additional authorizations, privileges or government support that
contractor personnel are entitled to under the contract.

LABOR COST

Mr. Moran. Mr. Secretary, that is the last and then we will
move to the next question. But that is the last thing I wanted
to get to. Because the other thing we have here is that they
are hiring people, people from the Philippines, wherever they
can get cheap labor because they make a higher profit margin,
the cheaper the labor they bring in. And a lot of these
contractors are not making the effort to provide employment in
a country where you have got almost 65 percent unemployment,
real unemployment and yet they are bringing in all these
workers from other parts of the world who are willing to
perform the labor at the cheapest rate possible and the--it
matters not to the contractors that you see all these Iraqis
looking for work and, of course, a lot of these young kids we
are not members of al Qaeda and Iraq, but they are looking for
to make a few hundred bucks by planting an IED or something
because they have no other means of subsistence.
Are we aware of the problem of bringing in all these
foreign workers that cause even further resentment on the part
of the Iraqis who don't have any jobs?

OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS

Secretary Geren. We oversee those contracts. We do employ
many Iraqi nationals in our subsistence programs over there.
And I will get you the full detail and the breakdown, how many
come from out of country and how many come from in country.
When you look over all at the performance of the contractors it
has overall been good, taking these type of services to remote
areas and building the support systems from scratch. But it is
not to say there haven't been some terrible abuses. We have had
people go to jail. There will be more people to go to jail
there have been problems.
But overall, they have provided good quality support to our
soldiers for the most part. The soldiers are satisfied with the
food support, the other type of creature comforts that are able
to be provided in a very office tier environment. But it is not
to say on the margins we haven't had some serious problems, and
we are more aggressively trying to root those out and long term
it is a big challenge for us. The size of the Army we have
today, we had Dr. Gansler, who did a thorough analysis for us
and helped us look to the future in the area of contracting. He
was the Under Secretary for Acquisition under President
Clinton. A distinguished academic in this area.
And he said with the size of our military today, when we
consider ourselves as an expeditionary Army, we have no choice
but to go to war one half khaki, one half contractor, and one
half uniform military. That is what is takes to deploy our Army
today with the size of Army that we are. As we try to move more
people from tail to tooth. And more people into operational
positions. We relied more heavily on contractors. So we have
really accepted that as the future and we are trying to do a
better job of preparing the contracting oversight within the
Army.
I will tell you one quick thing and then I will stop. But
we saw in the 1990s and into this last decade, the number of
contract personnel in the Army, both civilian and military,
declined dramatically. Then we saw this major ramp up in the
need of contracting. We didn't have the full-time personnel in
positions to properly manage it. We didn't and a lot of
probabilities we have today are a result of that.
We had people leaving the Army because there was no future
in the contracting field. We have instituted reforms now.
Tomorrow at Fort Belvoir, we are going to stand up the Army
Contracting Command, a two-star command. We are going to have
two one-stars under it. We are going to have seven contracting
brigades. Commanded by colonels.
So we are going to start rebuilding that bench and
rebuilding the professionalism in the contracting workforce not
only in the military but in the civilian workforce. It is not
only a military problem across our government. We have really
lost a huge percentage of our contracting workforce at a time
when the demand went up precipitously. And so we have got a lot
of work to do in that area. But we are moving in the right
direction. We will provide better oversight.
[The information follows:]

According to a recent U.S. Central Command quarterly contractor
census, there are 163,591 total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq. Of
this total, 31,325 are U.S. citizens; 56,368 are third country
nationals; and 75,898 are local national Iraqis who make up a majority
of our contracted workforce.

According to a recent U.S. Central Command quarterly co there are
163,591 total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq. Of this U.S. citizens;
56,368 are third country nationals; and 75,898 are 1 Iraqis who make up
a majority of our contracted workforce.

Mr. Murtha. Ms. Granger.

QUALITY OF RECRUITS

Ms. Granger. Thank you. Back home the folks, when I go home
every weekend, always ask about you and send their best and are
very appreciative of what you are doing. Tammy Schultz, who
studies ground forces for the center for new American
security--I think you know that is a think tank that works with
security and studies defense policies and he stated in January
that Army recruiters were signing up--signing up the required
troops each year but to grow the force, they are doing this by
allowing less qualified recruits with lower test scores,
raising the maximum enlisted age and making other concessions
to depth and quality.
I would like you to address that and say is that true. And
if so, of course what that--I would say General Casey would
probably be the one. I don't know whichever one will answer
that. But have we lowered our standards and how do we answer
that question?
General Casey. I will start off here and then let the
Secretary add a few words. As I indicated with the story about
Sergeant Greg Williams, we are getting very committed, very
capable men and women into the Armed Forces. Now, as you look
at the standards, our own metrics by which we measure quality,
primarily high school diploma graduates, the top three mental
categories and the bottom--the fourth mental category, the
lowest. And in two of those three, we are meeting our
standards. We are meeting them in the top three mental
categories and in a very low percentage in the bottom mental
category.
We are taking in now less than 90 percent high school
diploma graduates. And that is a degradation that I believe is
acceptable to increase the size of the force. Now, that is the
only degradation and we are committed not go below 80 percent
which is where we were in 2006. So I believe that we are----
Mr. Murtha. Will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. Granger. Yes.
Mr. Murtha. I think I saw figures down to 79 percent.
General Casey. We were at 79 in 2007, that is correct.
Mr. Murtha. And also that the waivers were twice as many
with drug-related and--felony and misdemeanors.
General Casey. Waivers is a different story. I don't know
if you want to talk about that one.
Secretary Geren. I can speak to the waiver issue. And we
have seen an increase in waivers. We have gone--I think they
have tripled in over the last 6 years. But the waiver process
has actually been a great success. It is a very labor-intensive
process. If we could choose a whole Army that way with that
kind of scrutiny, we would have a better Army. But it is too
labor intensive to do that. The waiver process is a 10-step
process. When a candidate comes up that needs a waiver for
whatever reason, it goes through 10 steps in the approval
process finally with a general officer signing off on that
waiver candidate. And we found--we did a study of the 17,000 we
brought in under waivers from 2003 through 2006. They actually
scored higher on the aptitude tests. They had higher promotion
rates, they had higher retention rates, and actually had higher
awards for valor.
But again it is too labor intensive. You can't recruit an
entire Army that way. But it is a program that has brought good
quality soldiers into the Army. But we are concerned about
those issues. Recruiting an Army in the middle of a war is
hard. We have never done this before. We have always had a
draft to be able to fall back on. But intangibles are as
important as these objective metrics in telling you whether or
not you have got somebody that wants to serve in the military.
The fact that 170,000 young men and women are raising their
right hand and joining the Army, I mean, you consider Active
Guard and Reserve. We have 170,000 men and women join our Army
every year, the size of the entire Marine Corps and it tells
you a lot about a young person that going to join the Army in
the middle of a war knowing full well he or she is going into
combat.
It tells you something about the heart and sense of
mission. So we feel good about the men and women that are
joining. Their performance has been excellent. We have got some
long-term issues and you as a teacher appreciate some of these
challenges. As a Nation, high school diploma grads are
shrinking. In certain parts of the country, we have a very low
percentage of high school diploma grads. We have got an
increasing problem with obesity. Only three out of 10 young
people made all of our objective criteria for joining the
United States Army. Three out of 10. That is a national
problem.
So we take from that top 30 percent, and we as a Nation and
we as an Army are trying to reach out and try to figure out how
we get the rest of those 70 percent to be better qualified to
join the Army, better qualified to be a better citizen and
contributing citizens. But it is a tough environment. But we do
have young men and women who are willing to join in the middle
of a war and they are fine young people.
Ms. Granger. I completely agree, they are fine young
people. And I have had exactly the same experience as the
chairman. I have lost 22 from my district in Iraq and I visited
personally or spoken to every--the parents of all of those. And
without a single exception they said how proud they were and
that they are--it has all been sons, that their sons or
husbands were doing exactly what they wanted to do and were
trained to do and were very proud of what we are doing.
So you are doing a wonderful job, and I have had that
experience in every base that I have visited. But it is a tough
one to keep those standards up. I agree exactly with what you
said, and I remember as a high school teacher having students
who really didn't know what they were going to do, where they
were going to go and hadn't had a lot of discipline and went in
the service and were completely different people in a very
short period of time. Better spouse, better parent, better
employees, better citizens.

MENTAL HEALTH

Let me ask you something, Mr. Secretary. We talked about
this before and that is mental health issues with those who are
serving and those who have served and how do we make sure that
they get the health care that they need. And we had a hearing
here on this committee that was disturbing because some of the
plans were hiring mental health care professionals and how many
that we were going to need to deal with, you know, when you
come back from combat or these long deployments, which was
literally impossible because they don't exist, all those mental
health care professionals.
So what are we doing for those who are currently deployed
and engaged in combat actions and then for those who have
served that may have problems that may come back that may not
show up for some time?
Secretary Geren. The issues that you raise in that are
addressed on a very broad front in the military. And major
challenges. The shortage of mental health professionals, it is
a problem across the country and it is a problem in the
military. It is a problem that is particularly acute for the
Army because so many of our installations are in rural areas.
You have a higher percentage of mental health workers in large
urban areas than you do in the Killeen, Texases or the Lawton,
Oklahomas or the Fayetteville, North Carolinas. So it is a
problem for the country and it is a problem for the Army
because of where we are located.
This Committee has been a great help to us in providing us
additional resources to try to attract mental health
professionals into the Army. We are----

FUNDING FOR MENTAL HEALTH

Mr. Murtha. Let me interrupt the gentleman. We put $900
million last year in the subcommittee. And I suggested to them
that they should hire a cadre of mental health professionals
all over the country. And they are doing that. They are going
to hire not necessarily--not like contractors--we are talking
about folks that are contracting for this particular reason
because they are available. I think one agency said they had
50,000 health psychological--psychiatrists and so forth and
they are working their way through that. So it will be a
competitive process.
So I think if this works the way I hope it will work, we
will have the people available in the rural areas which will be
able to take care of them. Because you and I see the same
problem.
So consequently, those people come home and they have no
place to go. They have nobody to talk to and they have a hard
time adjusting. Well, I think the combination of what we have
done is going to make a big difference for the National Guard
as well as the Reserve or anybody that gets out on a discharge.
I think we are making some progress in there and I appreciate
what you are asking for.

MENTAL ILLNESS STIGMA

Secretary Geren. This Committee--you have really led the
way in that regard for us out of that--$300 million of that is
going into research. We have $261 million of it that has gone
into actual care in the Army system. I would like to mention
one other initiative that I think has made great progress in
this area for the Army, and I think it will end up benefiting
the whole country. One of the biggest challenges in mental
health area is to get people who need it to come forward and
get it. And it is a stigma, it is a stigma in private life and
it is even more of a stigma in the Army.
The middle of last year we started a program to teach every
single soldier, all one million soldiers and make this same
training available to families, teach them how to spot the
symptoms of post traumatic stress, traumatic brain injuries,
how to identify those problems and where to go and what to do
about it, and we have now taught that program to about 900,000
soldiers, still working to get the last 100,000.
Every new soldier that comes in, we call it a chain-teach
program. But it is a program where they actually have face-to-
face teaching. And it has already shown results that--we do
these mental health tests every year. We just finished the
fifth one, MHAT-5, and it showed that the stigma is going down.
More people feel comfortable coming forward in dealing with
mental health issues.
Secretary Geren. That will be one of our biggest issues,
because mental health issues addressed early are so much easier
to treat than mental health issues that become acute.
So we are working to address the stress. We are hiring more
personnel. We are developing innovative programs. We are trying
to train all the leaders in the Army to be better at spotting
mental health issues before they become problems.
But it is a challenge for us, and it is a challenge that
the military has always struggled with in wartime. The
experience people are having is not something that you get
anyplace else other than war, and they bring a lot of mental
and emotional problems with them. And those also spill over and
affect the families. And so we are working to try to address it
with the soldier and with the families.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Another thing that we are working on--and as good a job as
anybody I have seen. They are sensitive to the stigma that is
involved in PTSD. Commanders understand, and they reach out to
the soldiers and say, ``Look, don't worry about being afraid.
Don't worry about it.'' I was really impressed by the
counseling, the screening and so forth.
We are going to go vote, and we will be right back.
[Recess.]

QUALITY OF RECRUITS

Mr. Murtha. Before I go to Mrs. Kaptur, I just want to make
sure--I heard so often from the Army about high school
graduates. I voted against a volunteer Army; I voted for a
draft. I think everybody ought to have a chance to serve. Less
than 1 percent of people in this country are making sacrifices,
including the families. I mean, the families are making
sacrifices with the troops. So I was for a draft, because I
think everybody ought to be involved.
But the point is, the Army used to come over here and say,
``We have to have high school graduates. That is the reason we
have a volunteer Army that is doing so well.'' Now you are
saying you accept--I mean, I know what happens. I know that you
can't get them, so you have to rationalize in your own mind.
But I hope we are not going down the road we went after
Vietnam, where we had to dump thousands of troops out because
they weren't physically fit and they weren't qualified. And I
remember going to the leaders, and I was Chairman, I said,
``These guys cannot handle the job, and you had better get rid
of them, and they did.'' And you were probably a captain or a
major, at the time.
General Casey. Or a lieutenant.
Mr. Murtha. And you got rid of a lot of people. You
remember that. Charlie Horner remembers it.
General Casey. Charlie was a captain, yeah. [Laughter.]
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

COST OF ELECTRIC POWER

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always enjoy
listening to what you say.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Welcome, General. Thank you very
much for being here today.
Let me ask for the record, Mr. Secretary, could you provide
the amount of funds that the Department of Army spent in the
year 2007 on power, an aggregate number for all the utility
expenses at your various bases, and then for your fuel costs in
2007. Could you have your accounting people provide that to the
record?
Secretary Geren. We will certainly provide that.
Ms. Kaptur. And could you let me know, compared to 2006 and
your projections for 2008, are those numbers likely to go up or
down? And I am looking at your domestic as well as global
costs.
Secretary Geren. We will provide you that.
[The information follows:]

The Army spent $617 million on electric power purchased from
utility suppliers in fiscal year (FY) 2007. In addition to purchasing
electricity, the Army operates three plants that generate electricity.
The cost to fuel those plants in FY07 was $24 million.
Despite the fact that the Army met the reduction goal in the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 by increasing efficiency
and reducing energy use per unit area by 8.4 percent from the 2003
baseline to 2007, the total cost for energy utilities at Army
installations increased from $753 million to $1.099 billion over the
same period. In addition to energy utilities, we spent $1.539 billion
on fuel for vehicles in FY07, of which $1.421 billion was used in
tactical vehicles.
Due to increases this year in the cost of fuel and other energy
commodities such as electricity and natural gas, total costs for 2008
are likely to go up both domestically and globally.

RESERVE COMPONENT HEALTH CARE

Ms. Kaptur. All right, thank you.
I wanted to ask your help, Mr. Secretary and General Casey,
if you could, on the issue that Congresswoman Granger
referenced, and that is the health of our soldiers. And I would
invite you, as I did the medical witness panel that we had
about 2 weeks ago, to look at the health concerns of the 983rd
Combat Engineering Unit in my district, whose commanding
officer sits in Chicago.
This unit was deployed to Iraq. It sustained at least one
loss and several injuries. And what is happening to those
soldiers is that, as they come home for care, because it is in
a more suburban or rural area and they come from all around--
they come from deep in the rural counties of Ohio; I think we
have even got a couple Hoosiers in there up in Michigan--what
they come home to is a place, a unit, a building with trucks
and equipment, but no medical care around there.
There is a clinic, a VA clinic, in the city of Toledo.
There is a VA hospital up in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There is a
state nursing home 2 hours away, hour and a half east, that is
partly VA-run and partly State-run. And most of the psychiatric
issues that come to rest often go to the chaplain at the
nursing home or a group of VA people who aren't trained for
that necessarily in the city of Toledo. But, for the most part,
these people are not served properly.
What I am looking for is a model. If you could use this
area, which has no big base like Fort Bliss, we don't have a
mother hospital--we are trying to link our VA system to our
medical college now. It has never been done that way. But these
poor soldiers, many of whom came up to me and told me they had
problems, some with traumatic brain injury, plus PTSD--it is
all disorganized. The care is disorganized.
I think it would be very helpful, at the same time as we
work at the national level, to find some prototypes at the
local level, where the pieces don't fit together, and then ask
ourselves, how to we fix this? Because if we can fix this, then
how do we use that model in other places?
So I would really invite you to come, to take a look. These
are really good soldiers. It is a reserve unit. You know,
again, it is not regular, it is not active duty. There has just
got to be a better way to do this. There has to be a better way
to pool those dollars and make this work for those soldiers.
We have tried to work with the State of Ohio--General Wayt,
the head of our guard in Ohio, a wonderful person. We have
tried to work with some of our hospitals in the State of Ohio,
who are the best in psychiatric care. They have said to me,
``Marcy, the worst experience of our careers has been in trying
to work with the Department of Defense.'' I said, ``It is the
biggest bureaucracy in the world.'' And they said, ``Boy, you
don't say.'' I said, ``Don't give up. Don't give up. We are
going to get this done.''
And so I just suggest to you, come down to where we live.
Turn the hour-glass upside down, come down to where we live and
are trying to care for these folks coming home. So, I invite
you.
And I don't want to get anybody in the 983rd in trouble.
That is not my purpose here today. It is a great unit. All
their soldiers need is care.
General Casey. No, Congresswoman, you are identifying
something that we are seeing in a lot of different places with
our guardsmen and reservists as they come home. And, as you
suggest, with the dispersed nature of how these folks live and
where they are based, it is a much more difficult problem.
And I would like to take you up on your offer, because I
think--we are working hard on this. The Secretary and I have
issued a family covenant that recognizes the five greatest
needs of our families, both active and reserve component. But
we acknowledge that it is a much more difficult challenge in
effectively implementing that with the Guard and Reserve.
And even though we are working toward an integrated family
support network--we have an actual program where, ultimately,
you will be able to plug in a zip code and get the different
kinds of services that are available to you there.
But I would like to take you up on that. Let's get some
folks together and take a look at this and maybe, as you
suggest, use this as a way to look at rurally based units and
figure out how we can do better at providing them the care and
services they need to recover from extended deployments.
Ms. Kaptur. You know, General, thank you for that.
You just reminded me, in the middle of all of this, then
the Veterans Department sends in a veterans center, and I meet
the guy. I said, ``Where did you come from?'' He said, ``Oh,
they just sent me up here from Cincinnati.'' I said, ``Well,
where is your office?'' He goes, ``I live out of my car.'' He
says, ``I go from place to place.''
I thought, okay, so there is another stream of money coming
in here. But it is really not very well-organized at the local
level, and so I would appreciate your assessment.
Right across the street from this particular facility is a
Guard tactical fighter squadron for F-16s, a huge complex. No
medical care there. When we welcome our MP units back home from
Iraq, they come to that base because they fly them in, you
know, and then they are just scattered all over the place.
I need your experience and would value how we get the VA
and the DOD and our local people to work together with our
State. You know, how do we structure this differently for this
set of returning vets?
For the record, I was going to ask the Secretary, can you
also provide for me, for the years 2006, 2007 and your
projections for 2008, how many psychiatrists were on the
payroll for the DOD hospital system or any contracted services
and how many psychiatric nurses? Is it going up? Is it going
down? Is it staying the same? I am very interested in those
numbers.
[The information follows:]

I am only able to address the number of psychiatrists and
psychiatric nurses employed by the Army. The overall number of Army
psychiatrists has remained relatively constant over the last three
years while the number of psychiatric nurses has been steadily
increasing. In addition to filling positions in our military treatment
facilities, about 20 psychiatrists and 20 psychiatric nurses deploy
with each Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom rotation.
In 2006, the Army employed 181 psychiatrists and 161 psychiatric
nurses. This consisted of 127 military and 54 civilian psychiatrists
and 96 military and 65 civilian psychiatric nurses.
In 2007, the Army employed 171 psychiatrists and 179 psychiatric
nurses. This consisted of 120 military and 51 civilian psychiatrists
and 94 military and 85 civilian psychiatric nurses.
Currently, the Army employs 178 psychiatrists and 196 psychiatric
nurses. This consists of 125 military and 53 civilian psychiatrists and
87 military and 109 civilian psychiatric nurses.
In June 2007, the Army Medical Department initiated contracting
efforts to hire an additional 64 psychiatrists and 31 psychiatric
nurses to fill recognized shortages that created gaps in service
delivery. As of March 21, 2008, we have been able to contract for 25
psychiatrists and 13 psychiatric nurses to meet this need. In addition,
to meet emerging behavioral health workload requirements generated by
the Global War on Terror, the Army has committed to growing military
behavioral health specialties including 24 additional military
psychiatrists and 15 additional military psychiatric nurses beginning
in 2008 and 2009.

FOOD FOR IRAQIS AND AFGHANIS

And, finally, my last question is, for the people of Iraq
or Afghanistan, for the soldiers that are out there in the
field, are we feeding the Iraqi people in any way? Are we
literally handing out meals to the Iraqi people at any place?
Or are they food self-sufficient in both Afghanistan and in
Iraq?
General Casey. From my experience, we have only on occasion
had to provide food, and that was usually after a major
military operation--in Iraq. I can't speak to Afghanistan. But
my impression is that we don't have any kind of a military
program that routinely feeds Afghanis and Iraqis. But I am a
little dated.
Ms. Kaptur. Is sustenance an issue, with everything that is
going on there? Is this an issue for the Iraqis?
General Casey. I will tell you, Iraq is the land between
two rivers. It has some of the most fertile land that I have
ever seen. And they do fairly well at feeding themselves.
[The information follows:]

It is not generally the mission of U.S. Armed Forces to feel
civilian populations. Department of State officials typically provide
this function using pre-configured humanitarian rations that they
procure separately from military rations. The Department of Defense
(DoD) feeds any host nation detainees in its custody and on isolated
occasions has fed military members of Iraq and Afghanistan who were
training with U.S. forces. However, the DoD is not and has not been
engaged in any significant feeding of the general populace of either
country.
Meals being provided in support of our mission in Iraq and
Afghanistan are prepared by Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) under the
LOGCAP III contract. Current information indicates that there is no
known instance of Iraqi or Afghanistan civilians being fed by KBR,
unless they are being deployed to support a mission by U.S. or
Coalition Forces or are direct employees of either KBR or one of its
subcontractors. Today, KBR and its subcontractors employ over 7,200
local nationals to accomplish the LOGCAP mission. Currently there is no
existing policy which requires the feeding of Iraqi or Afghan civilians
other than detainees.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston.

BUDGET PROCESS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, it is good to see you.
I have a question on the supplemental budget. I am very
frustrated with these emergency supplementals because there is
nothing emergency in the nature of so many of them. Certainly,
there is an urgency, but it appears to me that we have gotten
in a habit of doing very, very large supplemental budgets as a
way of getting around normal budget procedures.
And I wanted to hear your comments on that and see what
could be left out of a supplemental that should be in the
regular order, normal budget process.
Secretary Geren. Well, in this budget, we are working to
try to migrate the costs that are predictable into the base
budget. This 2009 budget has 43,000 soldier end-strength moved
from the supplemental into the budget for the first time. So
where we see these as ongoing costs or expenses, we are working
to migrate them.
There are other areas that we know that we are going to
have. The MRAPs are going to be part of the inventory for a
long time. Looking to migrate some of the support costs there.
But from the Army perspective, we are trying to look down
the road and anticipate a future in which there will be
increasing pressure on these supplementals. And where we do
have predictable and ongoing costs, we are looking to try to
migrate them into the base budget.
But the way we are operating today, there is no way that we
could provide the support to the soldiers within the base
budget. But it is a long-term issue that we are working to
address.

COST OF WAR IN IRAQ

Mr. Kingston. There was an article the other day that came
out that said that the cost in Iraq is $12 billion a month. And
then there was a subtitle that says, GAO I think says, it is $7
billion to $6 billion a month. So probably somewhere between $6
billion and $12 billion for the costs in Iraq, and I am not
sure what was included in that.
Do you know how much Iraq is costing the Army a month? Do
you have a number like that?
Secretary Geren. We have used the estimate in the O&M area
and personnel of--well, let me get that for the record. I don't
want to--I am afraid I will get it wrong, so I will get back
with you.
Mr. Kingston. Well, your portion of that probably is the
lion's share anyhow, I would imagine.
Secretary Geren. It is.
Mr. Kingston. And then would you have it broken down as to
what you would anticipate and what would be in the regular
budget request versus in the supplemental?
I mean, just to kind of play with some numbers, let's just
say the Army's portion of that is $5 billion a month, and maybe
$2 billion in equipment, $3 billion in personnel. I don't know
how it would easily break down. But you know that if we stay in
Iraq, you are going to have a continued expense of that $5
billion at some level, right?
And is that in the Pentagon budget request, or is that kind
of held for the supplemental?
Secretary Geren. Largely in the supplemental.
Mr. Kingston. Well, isn't it time to stop doing that?
Secretary Geren. Last year----
Mr. Kingston. And one other the question. Is that an OMB
call or a Pentagon call?
Secretary Geren. That would be an administration call.
Mr. Kingston. So it is OMB.
Secretary Geren. Yes.
Last year, the President's budget and the supplemental were
forwarded through the Congress at the same time. You know,
obviously they won't be this year.
But how the supplemental is actually managed through the
Congress and whether it is handled differently than the regular
budget request for funding is a congressional decision rather
than an OMB decision or administration decision.
Mr. Kingston. So if Congress decides to take that
supplemental and put some of it into the general budget, then
the Pentagon is okay with that?
I am not asking you to speak on policy there. But I think
one of the problems that most members have is we know, or we
tend to know--we will be voting on the budget today, and we
will tend to have some general breakdowns of what it is for
Medicare, what it is for education, what it is for defense,
whatever. But then when it comes to a supplemental, we don't
pay as much attention to it, because it usually has the word
``emergency'' in it, and it always does have a few genuine
emergencies in it. But it seems to me that we are really not
watching the fiscal dollars here as much as we should.
And when you think about the great challenges that you have
on reset and some of the other things that you had already
pointed out, if it wasn't for the Chairman and Mr. Young and
some great allies here, you would not have that.
But it also seems to me a little bit maybe disingenuous on
the part of the administration to count on friends in Congress
to take care of the resets through the supplemental process
when you know, as you have testified, General, that it is a
huge expenditure and a huge challenge. And it seems like
whatever budget is submitted, therefore, is, sort of, not
really the real picture.
You know, it is so important that the supplemental is no
longer just an add-on for emergencies but it is part of the
bread and butter of what you need to operate. Is that right, or
have I grown cynical?
General Casey. No, you are right. In fact, in response to
Congressman Young's question, I said that we need around $100
billion a year in addition to the base program to take care of
the costs of the war and the supplemental. So, yes, I mean,
there are significant costs to us that are not in the base
program.
The only thing I would say--and some of them are costs that
we can't know 18 to 20 months in advance. You know, for
example, the numbers of brigades that are in Iraq, that will
change, that will affect costs. Probably not immediately, but
over time it will gradually affect costs.
[The information follows:]

The cost of the war in Iraq averaged $7 billion per month for the
Army last fiscal year. This cost equated roughly to $1 billion for
military personnel, $4 billion for operation and maintenance, and $2
billion for procurement.

Mr. Kingston. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
Mr. Murtha. I think what the gentleman is saying is so
important. If you remember, last year the subcommittee asked
Secretary Gates to put it in, the supplemental, the
supplemental in the base bill. He nodded his head because he
agreed with us. That didn't mean he could do it.
But there is no question they can't plan, we can't plan,
when they just put a supplemental out which is supposedly
emergency funding. We know very well what it is going to cost,
within reason. It used to be supplementals were a few billion
and we dealt with them very expeditiously. Now, they have
become part of the process.
We have to get back to budgeting. And if you don't count
supplementals, you don't do any legitimate budgeting. For
instance, a little item like re-enlistment bonuses and re-
enlistment pay went from $157 million to over $1 billion, a 537
percent increase. Those are the kinds of things that--reset,
put all the reset in the supplemental.
So you are absolutely right. We have to get back so we can
get this thing under control, so they can plan and we can know
what the costs are.
Mr. Bishop.

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the Chairman and Mr. Kingston are really on to
something. I recall when the subcommittee organized last year,
one of the things that the Chairman indicated was that it was
very, very important for us to try to get control of this
budgeting process so that we could get away from putting so
much stuff in the supplementals so we could actually plan for
the war, and that it was actually publicly disclosed.
I want to go to another subject. You know, we understand
that the equipment readiness is really a function of both
procuring equipment in desired quantities and maintaining that
equipment in acceptable operational status. And, of course, the
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in high
usage rates under very demanding environmental conditions,
which has resulted in the loss of significant--excuse me--under
difficult conditions, and a lot of it has been destroyed as a
result of combat.
What are the most serious equipment shortfalls, in terms of
equipment on hand and equipment maintenance, ground combat
vehicles, support vehicles, aviation and communications? And
what is the Army doing to reduce the equipment shortfalls and
to speed the repair of equipment?
And, of course, with the 15-month deployments, who takes
care of the equipment that is left back home? Is that equipment
that is left back home state-of-the-art, or is it mostly
obsolete equipment? And if it is, what are we going to do about
it?
And how are you inventorying the equipment left back home
and equipment that is being destroyed? I know at one point you
had--I think Dimensions International was contracted, they were
doing some of the work. I think that company has now been
bought by Honeywell. But they were inventorying stay-at-home
equipment. And it is my understanding a lot of that equipment
is obsolete, so that when units come back, when they are in
that dwell time, they really can't train on that equipment when
they are back at home station.
And the other question with regard to the inventory process
is whether or not you all have implemented the RFID bar code
technology for utilization in conducting the inventories and
keeping up with the equipment.
Secretary Geren. I don't know the answer to your--I know we
do use bar code. I don't know how widely we do use it. I will
have to get back to you for the record on that question.
If we have used up equipment at a rate because of the war,
not only in equipment that is destroyed in combat but equipment
that is just being worn out at four and five times the rate
that we planned--so we are certainly stressing the system, not
only to produce it but to keep it fixed and keep it
operational. We use the reset budgets in the supplemental that
you all have given us. The depots are operating at about twice
the capacity that they were in peacetime. So that is a big part
of our effort to keep the equipment ready and available to
soldiers.
Every unit that we send into combat has the equipment that
they need. All of our nondeployed units have some challenges
when it comes to having the right equipment.
[The information follows:]

The Army has no immediate plans to implement RFID technology
(passive/active) for conducting inventories. However, the Army uses
RFID technology to track the location of equipment while in-transit. By
October 1, 2008, we will have fielded handheld devices to operators of
the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced system (PBSUE).
PBUSE is the Army's web-based, state-of-the art, combat service
support property accountability system for garrisons, program managers,
and tactical environments. PBUSE's enterprise asset database has
improved asset visibility and accountability by providing ``any time,
any place'' data access for property accountability users. For example,
for the commander, it provides a real time view of assets and allows
the commander to access the system for queries without having to depend
on the PBO and multiple sources to gather, prepare and present the
information. These handheld devices are capable of reading printed
barcodes and unique item identifiers placed on supplies and equipment.

EQUIPMENT FOR TRAINING

Mr. Murtha. Will the Secretary yield?
I mean, let's go back here. When they are in the United
States, they are not training on the same equipment that they,
when they go to war, that they have once they go overseas. I
mean, we have been through this over and over and over again.
We know the shortages. I know that there is only one armored
Humvee in some bases. I know there are all kinds of shortages
where they don't have the equipment to train on in the United
States that they are going to go to war with.
So, you know, we need to hear the facts so that we can try
to help correct this thing.
Secretary Geren. I hope I didn't say anything that would
contradict what you just said. Our nondeployed troops do not
have their equipment fill. We train using, in some cases,
shared equipment. And there are some items of equipment, up-
armored Humvees and now MRAPs, that they train in-theater on
those. We don't have them back here on the training base.
So, because of the equipment shortfalls, we share among
units. As a unit gets closer to deployment, they have more of
their equipment filled. And some of it, they pick it up in
theater. And some of it is left behind in theater that they
fall in on.

READINESS IMBALANCE

Mr. Murtha. Well, I think that falls in line with what
General Casey said earlier: imbalance. For instance, if we
wanted to deploy, we not only would not be able to deploy
because we don't have the equipment, we wouldn't be able to
sustain the deployment at all. I am talking about deploying
outside of Iraq or Afghanistan. That is the thing that concerns
me the most, because it is so uncertain.
Our intelligence wasn't right with the wall coming down.
Our intelligence wasn't right in Iraq. Our intelligence is not
right over 50 percent of the time. I used to have, in my
district, the guy, Phil the Groundhog, that predicted the
weather. He is more accurate than the intelligence agencies
are. [Laughter.]
But you can see why we are so concerned about the future of
the Army, because we know the circumstances, and we have been
trying to fix it.
General Casey. If I could, just to piggyback on what the
Chairman said, and I did talk about it a little bit earlier,
but you already have invested in fixing the equipment problem.
We are not finished yet, but, as you know, it takes about 2
years from the time you give us the money until that equipment
is in the hands of a soldier. And so that process has started,
but it needs to continue here for the next several years until
we can get ourselves back in balance.
The other thing I just mentioned is that we have made huge
strides on equipment accountability. And we have both in
theater and at home. And we have put our Army Materiel Command
in charge of the stay-behind equipment that you talked about
several years ago. And we are getting much more efficient in
getting that equipment to the right place and, if it needs to
be refurbished while the unit is gone, getting it into a depot
to get it fixed up.
So I think we are doing much better on property
accountability and on the management of the stay-behind
equipment.

EQUIPMENT FOR HOME STATION TRAINING

Mr. Bishop. The visit that I made to see some of that stay-
at-home equipment and the refurbishing, none of the
refurbishing was up-armoring. Well, if so, it was very little
of it. So that what they were actually refurbishing back on
base, as I understand it, was not the same equipment that is
up-armored that is being used in theater.
And, of course, you know, that is a concern, because
whenever they come back to train, with the parts of the units
that are in dwell time, you know, they won't be able to
actually work on what they will have to deal with if they have
to go back to theater or deploy someplace else.
Secretary Geren. There are certain important parts of the
equipment set that we don't have back here in the training
base. And the training takes place with that real equipment in
theater. MRAP is a great example, where every MRAP we can
produce we are putting in theater, so there is not an
opportunity for soldiers to train on MRAPs in the United
States.
Mr. Murtha. Mrs. Kaptur, we are going to finish up before
this vote ends, so if you have any additional questions.
Secretary Geren. No, but I was just agreeing with your
point. We are working to fill those, but there are certain
types of equipment that we have not been able to fill all the
need in theater. And that requires us to do work-arounds
through shared equipment and training in theater to make sure
that the soldiers get the training that they need on that type
of equipment.

COST OF RESET

Mr. Bishop. What is your current estimate of the total
reset requirement for fiscal year 2008 for operation and
maintenance and procurement funds? Does the fiscal year 2008
wartime supplemental funding request, as amended in October,
fully fund the Army's reset requirements for 2008? What is your
estimate for the reset requirement for 2009? And how has the
surge affected the reset?
Secretary Geren. The funding that we have in 2008 does
cover our estimate of the reset costs for this year. We are
still working on the estimates for the 2009 reset number. I
would estimate that it would be somewhere in the same range.
But we are spending about $18 billion, $17 billion to $18
billion a year on reset. You all gave us that in 2007. We have
asked for that in 2008.
In the supplemental that you all passed in December, you
gave us $10 billion of the $18 billion that we needed, and we
are still waiting on the $7-plus billion. And if we get past
Memorial Day, that is going to start causing us a problem in
purchasing long-lead items. So that is an area, when
considering the 2008 supplemental, that the need is about to
become urgent. The money is in the request, but only $10
billion out of $18 billion has been approved by Congress. And
that, very soon, will be a problem for us.
Mr. Bishop. If there is a pause in the drawdown of the Army
units in Iraq, how will that impact reset?
Secretary Geren. Well, the longer the equipment stays in
theater, the less demand we have on the depots here at home.
And we have tried to anticipate, as the surge does draw down,
anticipate that equipment coming home, making sure we have the
capacity in the depots in order to handle it, as well as the
funding to handle it.
But the projections that we are developing for 2009 take
into consideration the surge drawing down.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
We have talked about this. We want to look to the future.
We want to make sure we balance out reset with the future.
Mr. Kingston, do you have any more questions?
Mr. Kingston. I might submit some.
Mr. Murtha. Okay.
Do you have any discussion, Ms. Kaptur?

LONG TERM CARE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Very quickly, General Casey, there are two young men from
my district who are terribly wounded, Army. One is Matthew
Keil, K-E-I-L. I understand he is somewhere outside of Fort
Bliss, Texas, now in some type of care facility. And also
Matthew Drake, who--no, wait, that is wrong. Matthew Keil is
somewhere in Colorado in some type of private facility. I might
be getting this wrong. I am not sure where they are. That is
one of my questions. Matthew----
General Casey. That is okay. We will get the details from
your staff.
Ms. Kaptur. And they are both terribly wounded.
My question really is, is the family satisfied with what
the military did? Because one of these young men, Matthew
Drake, is not in a military facility. He needs 24-hour-a-day
care, and he became suicidal, and he cannot handle some of his
limbs.
And so my question is, what went wrong? Did anything go
wrong? Are we doing everything we can for these young men?
Okay, so those two. And then----
General Casey. We will have somebody get with your staff
and get their names, and we will follow up with you.

ATTEMPTED SUICIDE RATE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much.
And then I would like to know what the attempted suicide
rate is for people in service 2006, 2007, 2008, and also upon
discharge, wherever they are, out there in the system, what do
you see happening to folks once they come home, as you track
those numbers?
[The information follows:]

Suicide attempts are among the most difficult events in mental
health on which to obtain statistics because there is a spectrum of
suicidal behavior that ranges from thinking about suicide, to non-life
threatening gestures (i.e. superficial lacerations), to more serious
attempts and to actual death. Researchers define what constitutes an
``attempt'' differently, which leads to significant reported variations
in suicide attempt rates, even within the same population.
In 2007, the Army standardized the reporting of suicide attempts by
clarifying the definition of an attempted suicide as an event which
causes a person to be hospitalized for the behavior. Our older data
(2006) is not directly comparable with data from 2007 and beyond
because it includes attempts that did not result in hospitalization. At
the end of 2008, we will be able to more directly compare 2007 and 2008
data on attempted suicides.
The Army does not track the behavioral health status of Soldiers
once they are discharged. We do not have any record of suicide attempts
by former Soldiers following their separation from service.

My second question, very quickly, relates to contracting.
Kellogg Brown & Root is doing all of the food, ice and water
that is being served in Iraq. And do they make the decisions on
the subcontracts?
Mr. Murtha. We asked about those questions, Ms. Kaptur. We
want a detailed list of the parameters of the contracting, how
they handle it, where the different money is spent and so
forth.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, did they ask about Agility, the
companies Agility and Supreme, whether they are a prime
contractor and where they are headquartered? Those are two
separate companies.
General Casey. Agility, and what was the second one?
Ms. Kaptur. Agility and Supreme.
General Casey. Supreme.
Ms. Kaptur. And are they a prime contractor, and where are
they headquartered?
General Casey. We will.
Ms. Kaptur. Okay.
[The information follows:]

Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) is a prime
contractor, headquartered in Kuwait. Supreme Food Services, Inc., is a
prime contractor, headquartered in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme are
the two prime contractors for food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.
Agility serves Iraq and Kuwait; Supreme serves Afghanistan.

CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Geren. If I could correct the record, I was in
error earlier, Mr. Chairman. That 196,000 contractors is the
entire theater: 155,000 in Iraq and 30,000 in Afghanistan. I
would just like to stand corrected.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much.
If you will get those questions back for the record.
Secretary Geren. We certainly will.
Mr. Murtha. The Committee now adjourns until 1:30.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the
answers thereto follow:]

Stability Operations

Questions. The Army recently released the latest updated version of
its operations manual--the first update since 9/11. The manual, for the
first time puts stability operations--or nation building--on the same
level as combat. The Army states that this reflects the past six years
of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda Afghanistan and insurgents in
Iraq, as well relief efforts after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It
requires Army leaders to think and act flexibly, with the understanding
that operations may require initiatives that do not require combat.
What does this change mean for the troops in the field? What, if
anything, will be done differently?
Answer. Soldiers in operational units can expect their leader to be
better prepared for the diverse set of missions they will be asked to
execute. Commanders and their staffs will approach their missions more
aware of the non-combat ways and means to success and plan accordingly.
As Soldiers receive professional military education throughout their
careers, they can now expect to see concepts regarding non-combat
approaches integrated into the curriculum. This will infuse an
understanding of the full spectrum of conflict throughout the force and
enhance the capabilities of our Soldiers to operate across the spectrum
of conflict.
Question. How will this be reflected in soldier training?
Answer. Training for Army forces deploying to Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom currently prepares them to
perform stability operations tasks (in addition to offense and defense
tasks), to apply lethal and non-lethal capabilities, and to respond to
exigencies arising from mission circumstances. Training and mission
rehearsal/readiness exercises for deploying units are focused on the
mission they will perform when deployed and on the operational
conditions they will face when deployed.
The Army is developing, and will soon publish, standardized lists
of mission essential tasks based on the operational construct described
in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. These standardized lists will
formally establish the offense, defense, and stability tasks on which
units are expected to train before shifting, when required, to a
specific directed mission.
The Army has revised, and will soon publish, FM 7-0, Training the
Force. This training doctrine will reinforce the precepts in FM 3-0. In
particular, FM 7-0 will emphasize that units must prepare to conduct
full spectrum operations (a mix of offense, defense, and stability
operations) for any assigned mission. Additionally, the Army is working
to identify and distinguish levels of training capability for stability
operations that are possible, desired, required, and critical to ensure
continuing readiness of Army forces for stability operations in the
future.
Question. As you know, you serve side by side with other Services.
To the best of your knowledge, have they adopted a similar strategy?
Answer. The other Services have adopted similar or complementary
stability operations strategies. In August 2007, the Air Force
published their Irregular Warfare doctrine and revised their Foreign
Internal Defense (FID) doctrine to address the requirement to support
friendly foreign governments prosecute their own counter insurgency
campaigns. This tenet of stability operations is also in Army doctrine.
The Marine Corps teamed with Army doctrinaires to write and publish the
current Army counter insurgency doctrine. As a result, the guiding
principles of both services stability operations doctrine are nearly
identical. Finally, Joint doctrine, to which all Services adhere,
addresses stability operations in the same manner as each of the other
Services.

Future Combat Systems

Question. When Secretary Gates testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee he stated that growing costs of the Army's Future
Combat System, makes it ``hard for to see how that program can be
completed in it entirety''. He went on to say that ``in light of what
are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the
future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at
carefully''.
Is it the Army's intent to continue FCS as it is currently defined,
or can we expect major changes to the program?
Answer. The Army is committed to funding and delivering the very
best capabilities to the Soldier. Continued investment in FCS is
essential to providing these critical capabilities our Soldiers need
today and in the future. Investments in FCS have produced technologies
that are making a difference in combat today and will continue to make
a difference tomorrow. The Army continues to adapt and mature the
brigade's requirements to reflect lessons learned from Iraqi Freedom,
Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as our own results from the Army
Evaluation Task Force. As Soldiers adapt to these new technologies and
the enemy adapts new strategies, we anticipate that our requirements
will continue to mature.
Question. How are we to balance the competing pressures of Growing
the Force and resetting/recapitalizing equipment with the funding
demands of FCS? Are there any other tradeoffs to be made?
Answer. FCS is part of a comprehensive modernization strategy--a
strategy that takes a balanced approach between the current and future
force. FCS is less than three percent of the current budget. FCS is
projected to be a third of the Army's base investment program at its
peak in fiscal year 2015, which is in turn about one-fourth of the
Army's base budget. The Army requires adequate resources to meet
current commitments and prepare for future threats; we must do both to
sustain dominant landpower.
Question. As you know, FCS was downsized about two years ago from
18 to 14 systems. There are now rumors that yet another major
restructuring of the FCS program is in the works.
Is another restructuring in the works?
Answer. Future Combat Systems will remain the cornerstone of Army
modernization. The Army is currently building the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) for fiscal years 2010-2015. Through this process, the
Army will review requirements from the Soldier, Global War on Terror,
and current programs of record, striking a balance within the available
resources. The Army will formally deliver its POM requirements to the
Office of Secretary of Defense by mid-July 2008.
Question. Has the Army begun to look at any alternatives to FCS,
such as upgrades to legacy systems? If not, why?
Answer. We have examined the feasibility of upgrading current
platforms, and we have found that current platform upgrades are vital
to current operations but are not a suitable alternative to FCS.
Current platforms are severely challenged to accept newer technologies
due to space, weight and power constraints resulting from incremental
modernization over time. Continued investment in current platform
upgrades, however, ensures the viability of future technology
insertions to include FCS Spin-outs.
FCS is the right solution for the future which impacts the entire
Army. Five years of requests from combatant commanders confirms what
the Army needs: increased lethality, survivability, battle command on
the move, battlefield awareness, and sustainment. FCS best fills these
needs. Further, FCS technologies are validated in the hands of combat
experienced Soldiers from the Army Evaluation Task Force, Fort Bliss,
Texas.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow.]

Reported Readiness

Question. Virtually all of the Army's major combat units are either
currently deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, recovering from such a
deployment, or preparing for another such deployment. Because of this,
essentially all non-deployed major combat units report low readiness
scores.
Many defense policy experts and some military officials have
expressed concern that with so much of the U.S.'s ground forces
committed to existing operations, it would be very difficult for the
U.S. to respond to a new crisis. At the same time, the very high level
of commitment to existing operations features prominently in
justifications for increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps.
Gentlemen, the Committee understands that units deploying to
Afghanistan and Iraq are reported to be well equipped and well trained.
However, in a similar hearing last year at this time we were told that
the Army was almost totally focused on the Iraq and Afghanistan
missions and that generating equipped, trained and ready forces for any
other contingency would be very challenging.
Other than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, what is the threat
that you are preparing the Army to deter or defeat?
Answer. In addition to preparing forces for counterinsurgencies in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must also prepare for contingencies that
require forces to operate across the full range of military missions.
Current operational requirements for forces and limited periods between
deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment
of preparing for the full range of military missions. The Army is
consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and is unable to
provide for other contingencies as rapidly as we would like. With your
support we will continue to rebuild readiness, achieve balance, and
restore strategic depth for future challenges.
Question. Does the Army currently have a strategic reserve?
Answer. Yes, the strategic reserves are those formations which are
not deployed or next to deploy. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model synchronizes the planning, prioritization, and resourcing for
sustainable force generation, to include adding depth for strategic
needs.
Question. Given the state of the Army's combat units today, how
well prepared would the U.S. be to respond to any new military crisis
that might occur?
Answer. We are a combat-seasoned force with the best current forces
in the world. We would respond with our sister services to other
crises, but not as rapidly as we would like.

Future Combat Systems (FCS)

Question. The Army capstone acquisition program is the Future
Combat Systems. It is 14 systems including eight manned ground
vehicles, unattended ground systems, the Non-Line of Sight Launch
System, two unmanned aerial systems, plus the soldier and high speed
wireless communications.
The FCS request for fiscal year 2009 is $3.6 billion (RDTE =
$3,272M; Procurement = $331M). Procurement funds are requested to spin
out maturing technology to the current force brigade combat teams.
The FCS program will field a total of 15 brigades, by fielding one
brigade a year starting in 2015. FCS brigades will comprise 15 of the
Army's total of 76 combat brigades. The Army's will add a new set of
complex vehicles to an already burdened system that currently supports
Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Strykers and Paladin
Artillery. General Casey, will FCS, when fielded, only add to the
Army's logistical complexity?
Answer. FCS is being built to enable more efficient logistics
support in the future. We have intentionally designed the FCS systems
to realize 70 percent commonality between systems to reduce the number
of unique components that will require support by the logistics
systems. The FCS systems are also being designed with three to four
times the reliability of the current force systems, thus helping to
reduce the logistics burden through fewer parts required, fewer
mechanics to install them, and fewer mechanics to install them, and
fewer trucks to carry them. The FCS network fully integrates the
logistics software applications with battle command to allow Soldiers
logistical decision support concurrently with battle command. This
network enabled logistics capability will require smaller stockages of
spare parts to achieve required readiness.
Question. FCS is expected to cost a total of $160 to 200 billion.
Can the Army afford FCS?
Answer. The Army can afford FCS. FCS is currently less than three
percent of the Army's base budget. At its peak, in fiscal year 2015,
FCS is projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment
account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total
budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed eight percent of the
Army's budget in any year.
Continued investment in FCS is essential to deliver the
capabilities the Army needs. Investments in FCS have produced
technologies that are making a difference in combat today. These
include advanced vehicle armor being used to protect Soldiers in High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles; precursor FCS Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles; and robotics being used to locate and defeat Improvised
Explosive Devices. We are leveraging the FCS investment to provide
capabilities to the current force through Spin-outs, but we need to get
these capabilities to our Soldiers faster.
Question. Can the Army accelerate the FCS program, given additional
resources?
Answer. Yes. Currently the Army plans to begin fielding the Future
Combat Systems Brigade Combat Team in 2015 with the first-half of a
brigade. Thereafter, a brigade will be delivered each year until 15
brigades have been fielded. The delivery rate of brigade combat teams
is governed by available funding. Additionally, the delivered quantity
of the spin out maturing technologies we deliver through spin outs and
the congressionally mandated fielding of Non-Line of Sight-Cannon is
directly correlated to funding.

Modularity

Question. The Army is in the process of converting to the modular
brigade structure, while fighting a war, with approximately half of the
active component brigades deployed to the combat theaters. In fiscal
year 2006, the Army had 51 brigade combat teams. By the end of fiscal
year 2008 the Army plans to have 69 brigade combat teams.
What are the key differences between a modular brigade combat team
and the previous brigade structure?
Are modular brigades smaller than the previous brigades?
Answer. Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are larger than
previous brigades because structure that had been previously task-
organized from the division base is now organic, enabling modular BCTs
to train as they will fight. Key differences between previous brigade
structure and modular BCTs are: (1) modular BCTs are designed with
organic combined arms battalions and organic combat support and combat
service support; (2) the number of maneuver companies in each brigade
increases from 10 to 11; (3) modular BCTs include a reconnaissance
squadron to provide a more robust suite of intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities; (4) battalion and brigade staffs are
more robust and include organic psychological operations (PSYOP), civil
affairs, and public affairs capabilities; and (5) command posts are
satellite based, more robust, and linked to national assets. Any
modular BCT can be attached to any division, corps, or joint
headquarters without extensive augmentation or reorganization to any
operation across the spectrum of operations.
Question. Please discuss the utility of adding an infantry
battalion to each of the modular brigades. The idea is to increase
combat power without requiring a significant increase in command and
logistical functions. Does this make sense and is the Army exploring
such an idea?
Answer. The Army continually assesses the utility of the modular
force designs and applies changes based on lessons learned and
operational experience. The Army must balance the strategic risk of
preserving the All-Volunteer Force in persistent conflict, the
operational risk of providing sufficient capacity to support joint
force rotational requirements, and the tactical risk of maintaining
sufficient capability within the brigade combat team (BCT) to conduct
successful full spectrum operations. The current BCT design includes
one reconnaissance and surveillance squadron with three troops and two
maneuver combined arms battalions with four companies each.
Question. What is the impact of modularity on equipment
requirements? If additional equipment is needed, is that equipment
fully funded?
Answer. The transformation of our force has driven up the
requirements for equipping. From 2005 to 2013, we plan to provide
$174.9 billion in equipment through the base budget ($41 billion for
the Reserve Component (RC): $29.4 billion to ARNG and about $11.6
billion for Army Reserve, and $133.9 billion for the active component)
to meet these increased requirements. Premodularity equipment
shortfalls require supplemental appropriations to help close the gap
between requirements and existing equipment and modernization
shortfalls. We need continued Congressional support for this plan.
Without it, we will be unable to fully meet equipment requirements
across all of our components.
The Army had significant equipping challenges prior to 9/11.
Particularly noteworthy were the equipment shortages and lack of
modernization in the RC. Because of the need to integrate the RC to
meet the demand of persistent conflict, the Army has adopted a new
total force operating strategy that resources units based on their
deployment window, regardless of component. The previous incremental
``tiered'' resourcing strategy, which resulted in the active and most
RC units, who deployed later, being equipped last, and with the least
modernized equipment. Additional funding gained through supplemental
spending will fill shortages and modernize outdated equipment in the
force and fund payback plans for diverted RC equipment. The Equipping
Strategy is linked to the time-phased transformation of the Army into
the modular force.
Question. Has the Army been able to meet the schedule for forming
modular brigade combat teams? What have been the key challenges in
terms of personnel and equipment?
Answer. Yes and we are on track to complete personnel growth by
2010 and modular brigade combat team (BCT) growth by the end of FY
2011. The most significant challenges to meeting this timeline are
manning and equipping.
Our most significant personnel challenges are providing sufficient
captains and majors in the logistics, military intelligence, and
aviation specialties. Our equipping strategy minimizes risk to the
current force and maintains momentum in equipment modernization. Our
three most significant equipping challenges are battle command systems,
trucks, and night vision devices.

Grow-the-Army Brigades

Question. Currently, and over the next several years, the Army is
adding end-strength and equipment in order to form six new infantry
brigades.
When will the Grow-the-Army brigades be available for combat
deployment?
Answer. The Grow the Army (GTA) brigade combat teams. (BCTs) will
be available for deployment approximately one year after they activate.
The Army will activate one additional BCT in each year from 2008-2010
and three BCTs in 2011. By the end of FY11, all GTA BCTs will be
available for deployment.
Question. What is the status of manning, equipping and training the
Grow-the-Army Brigades?
Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010,
BCT growth by 2011 and equipment growth for the BCTs by 2015. To
monitor our progress in meeting these goals, the Army conducts a
monthly Force Validation Committee process to synchronize resourcing
functions for select units that will deploy or convert within a given
window.
Question. Is the necessary equipment for the Grow-the-Army Brigades
fully funded?
Answer. The Army's current program from 2008-2013 provides a total
of $68.6 billion to include $17.0 billion in procurement to support the
original Grow the Army 2012 brigade combat team (BCT) timeline. The
Army has approved an accelerated Grow the Army timeline that will have
all BCTs in the force by 2011, and will require an additional $2.6
billion in funding for personnel and training.
Question. Will all the new brigades be light infantry brigades?
Answer. The Grow the Army (GTA) initiative was based on increasing
rotational depth and filling global operational demands as quickly as
possible. The growth of six Active Component (AC) Infantry BCTs was the
optimal way to accomplish the rapid growth with a structure suitable to
meeting current operational demands in an era of persistent conflict.
This decision is subject to review based on the results of Total Army
Analysis and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This process will analyze
existing requirements, current operational demand, and projected future
demand to ensure we have the appropriate mix of Heavy, Infantry, and
Stryker BCTs within the force and across the Active Component and Army
National Guard.

Equipment on Hand Readiness

Question. The Committee understands that equipment readiness is a
function of both procuring equipment in the desired quantities, and
maintaining that equipment in an acceptable operational status. Combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in high usage rates
under very demanding environmental conditions, additionally, some
equipment is damaged or destroyed as a result of direct combat.
What are the Army's most serious equipment shortfalls in terms of
equipment on hand and equipment maintenance: in ground combat vehicles;
support vehicles; in aviation; in communications?
Answer. The Army's most serious equipment shortfalls are in
tactical wheeled vehicles. The current shortfalls are due to converting
to the modular force, growing the Army, and requirements in Theater.
The Army has no significant shortfall in ground combat vehicles. For
aviation, the only significant shortage is the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior.
This system is no longer being produced and will be replaced by the
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter beginning in fiscal year 2011. For
communications, the Army's most significant shortage is in Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical telecommunications hubs, as well as
battlefield communications suites which provide long-haul
communications and command and control. The Army is meeting all
requirements for deployed forces and has an equipping strategy to
eliminate these shortfalls over time.
Equipment maintenance funded by reset dollars has enabled deployed
forces to maintain equipment readiness levels greater than 90% for
ground equipment and greater than 75% for aviation equipment for the
last five years.

Reset Funding

Question. For fiscal year 2008, the supplemental request that came
up with the budget included for Reset $7.8 billion in Operation and
Maintenance and $5.8 billion in procurement funding for a total of
almost $14 billion. That budget request was updated in October. In
December Congress provided a bridge fund to ensure continued support
for our deployed forces and to avoid breaks in funding for key
procurement programs supporting Reset.
What is your current estimate of the total Reset requirement for
fiscal year 2008 for Operation and Maintenance and Procurement funds?
Answer. For fiscal year 2008, the Army's total revised reset
requirement is $16.9 billion. This includes $7.8 billion in Operation
and Maintenance and $9.1 billion in procurement funding. In the fall of
2007, the Army amended its initial request and increased the
procurement request from $5.8 billion to $10.5 billion. This additional
procurement funding was requested to replace battle losses, worn-out
theater provided equipment, and replenish Army Pre-positioned Stocks
(APS).
In the 2008 bridge funding, the Army received $10.7 billion. This
included all of the $7.8 billion requested in Operation and Maintenance
funding and only $2.9 billion in procurement funding. A procurement
shortfall of $7.6 billion remained from the amended request. This was
reduced to $6.2 billion through contracting efficiencies, program
termination, and fact of life changes. The remaining procurement
dollars are required by May 26, 2008 to preclude delays in the reset
and recapitalization of Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).
Question. What is your estimate of the Reset requirement for fiscal
year 2009?
Answer. The Army's request for reset funding will be included in
the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental request, which has not yet been
released by The Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Prepositioned Equipment Sets

Question. The Army drew upon prepositioned equipment sets to
sustain initial combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired
and replaced in prepositioned sets only to be dawn out again for the
surge.
What is the readiness posture of Army prepositioned sets today?
Answer. The readiness posture of the Army Prepositioned Stocks
(APS) available equipment sets for APS-4 are at 88%-95% of fill. The
APS reconstitution plan will ensure all the other APS equipment sets
will have a readiness posture of 95-100% of fill.
(1) APS-4 in Korea and Japan is available; it is comprised of a
heavy brigade combat team (BCT) (95%) and a tailored sustainment
brigade (88%). APS-4 will be completed by 4th Qtr FY08.
(2) APS-3 Afloat has a Port Opening Package capability in Guam at
90% of fill. This set consists of a temporary afloat set of 20 units
(12 port openings and eight medical units/teams) loaded aboard the USNS
Pomeroy. The full sustainment brigade set will be completed in FY11.
(3) APS-5 is issued and is planned for reconstitution when no
longer required for ongoing operations in accordance with APS Strategy
2015.
Question. What is the time line to have all the prepositioned sets
returned to their desired readiness?
Answer. The Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) were used to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to
accelerate the build of the brigade combat teams (BCTs). The Army has
developed an APS reconstitution timeline to support the approved APS
Strategy 2015, the FY10-15 Program Objective Memorandum (based on
equipment availability) and Army resource prioritization.
Current Year:
APS-5: Infantry Brigade Combat Team
Near Term:
APS-5: Heavy Brigade Combat Team #1
APS-3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #1,
Sustainment Brigade #1
APS-2: Heavy Brigade Combat Team
APS-5: Infantry Battalion
Mid Term to 2014:
APS-3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #2,
Sustainment Brigade #2
APS-5: Fires Brigade, Sustainment Brigades
#1 and #2
Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-
positioned equipment sets?
Answer. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles will be
incorporated into APS-5 and APS-3 when no longer required for
operational use (variant type TBD). MRAP availability will be based on
the results of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Strategy.
Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the
uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are
prepositioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of
action to take the equipment from the pre-positioned sets and use it to
outfit modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army brigades?
Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) is a strategic asset that
has proven its value in every recent major contingency. APS provides
the strategic responsiveness to deploy globally to any contingency
operation. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has demonstrated that the
APS program is flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability
to deploy forces in support of the Combatant Commander requirements and
adapt to changing strategic requirements. APS was used to support both
OIF and OEF. Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of
modular BCTs and Grow the Army effort limits the ability to rapidly
reinforce forward units by air movement. Current operational plans and
future planning scenarios include requirements that use APS sets. The
Army complies with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007
to identify any APS sets utilized and the plans to reconstitute those
APS sets annually.
Question. In November 2007, the Army announced a new Army
Prepositioned Stocks Strategy 2015. Please outline the new strategy,
and what are the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009?
Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Strategy 2015's equipment
sets provide a balanced suite of global capabilities which will foster
the Army's rapid deployment to both combat and Steady State Security
Posture operations. The end-state for APS Strategy 2015, illustrated in
the attached diagram, consists of five APS sets. APS-1 consists of
Operational Project stocks to support both Homeland Defense and
Combatant Commands. APS-2 consists of one heavy brigade combat team
(HBCT) set to support European Command's, African Command's (AFRICOM),
and Central Command's (CENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). APS-3
consists of two Infantry BCT sets with Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and/or
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle wheel augmentation sets,
two sustainment brigade sets and two ammunition ships, which are multi-
apportioned to support Pacific Command's, AFRICOM's, and CENTCOM's
AORs. APS-4 consists of one HBCT, one sustainment brigade set, and Army
watercraft to support Pacific Command's (PACOM) AOR. APS-5 consists of
one HBCT set with UAH and/or MRAP wheel augmentation, one fires brigade
set, two sustainment brigade sets, and Army watercraft stationed at the
Kuwaiti Naval Base. APS-5 also includes an infantry battalion set with
a forward support company, with UAH/or MRAP wheeled augmentation sets
in Afghanistan to support CENTCOM's AOR.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

APS-2--($13 million), funds operations to maintain
limited equipment and ammunition at Livorno, Italy and Medical
Supplies at Pirmasens, Germany to include support to War
Reserve Stocks for Allies--Israel.
APS-3--($157 million), funds operations to maintain
equipment for the port opening package and funds lease
operations of one large, medium speed roll-on, roll-off (LMSR)
for the port opening package, three LMSRs in reduced operating
status-10, and two ammunition container ships. Also funds
personnel to begin the reset of equipment and secondary items
for APS upload that will occur in FY10. It does not pay for the
two remaining LMSRs we downloaded and placed in reduced
operating status--30.
APS-4--($59 million), funds maintenance and operations
to maintain the full unit sets and operational projects in
Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. Operational projects will be filled
using FY08 and FY09 Supplemental funds.
APS-5--($57 million), funds reset of the prepare-to-
deploy-order (PTDO) infantry BCT and planned reset of the heavy
BCT. Funds the $12 million annual Oman access fee.
War reserves secondary items--($102 million), funds
the purchase of items with expiration dates (mostly medical)
that need to be replaced in APS-4 and operational projects.
Also funds the purchase of APS-2 authorized stockage level/
primary load list/unit basic load stocks. Buys upgrades in
medical sets currently on-hand in Korea.
With the continued support of the Congress, the Army will be able
to return equipment to prepositioned stocks by 2015.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and
Explosively Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could
be applied to the HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type
trucks to provide greater force protection. The Army seemed skeptical
at first about acquiring MRAPs in large numbers. General, what is the
current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs?
Answer. The current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs is 10,000
systems (based on the September 2007 interim requirement). A new
interim requirement for 12,000 MRAPs is currently in staffing. The
final requirement is dependent on many factors, including future
actions taken by the enemy.
Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal?
Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by
October 2008 and field them by December 2008. If a new interim
requirement of 12,000 is adopted, it is anticipated that these systems
could be produced by February 2009 and fielded by April 2009.
Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPS?
Answer. A mix of approximately two-thirds MRAPs to one-third Up-
Armored HMMWVs per brigade appears about right. However, it is
premature to tell which variant of MRAP is superior or to provide
definitive feedback on performance, final numbers, and/or category
mixes.
Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded?
Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint
Program Office is adequately funded to procure 12,000 systems for the
Army.
Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in
Iraq is over?
Answer. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting
tactical wheeled vehicle analyses that include: (1) mission roles and
profiles; and (2) threats and capabilities of the various fleets
including the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and HMMWV. The
initial results of those analyses will influence programmed objective
memorandum decisions; the Force Mix Brief to Congress; and the Combat
and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is
an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities
available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging
threats.

Contractors and Readiness

Question. The Department of Defense has made a major effort to
outsource support functions in order to allow soldiers to remain
focused on core military skills and duties. The proliferation of
contractors performing support functions ranges from the dining
facility to aircraft maintenance. Contractors are working side-by-side
with military forces at home station and in the combat theaters.
How important are contractor services to military readiness at home
station, and at forward deployed locations?
Answer. Contractor services are an essential part of military
readiness. In 1955, the Executive Branch determined that the government
should not compete with its citizens. Therefore, federal agencies
generally obtain commercial services from the public sector. After the
Vietnam War, the Department of Defense's force structure was
drastically reduced and after becoming an All Volunteer force in 1973,
the Army increased the number of support contractors. The Department of
the Army focused on rebuilding its military war fighting core functions
and relied more on contractors to provide administrative, logistics,
and other support functions.
In the early 1990s, the Army reduced military and civilian
personnel to take advantage of the peace dividend with the end of the
Cold War. These personnel cuts significantly reduced the number of
government civilians and Soldiers performing operational,
administrative, and logistics support functions for the Army. As a
result, these functions were obtained via contracts which enabled the
Army to reduce the number of officers and enlisted personnel performing
administrative functions. Today, Army operations require a mix of
military, civilian, and contractor personnel to deliver global
logistical support and capabilities to meet the needs of our war
fighters both at home station and forward deployed.
Question. What is the commander's role in defining contractor
duties; in supervising contractors; and in disciplining contractors?
Answer. Primary oversight of contractor performance and conduct
falls to the cognizant contracting officer, and is generally dictated
by the terms of the government contract.
Contract employees are required to comply with all guidance,
instructions, and general orders issued by the Theater Commander, as
incorporated by the government's contract, including those relating to
force protection security, health, safety, or relations and interaction
with local nationals.
Commanders may refer contractor criminal misconduct to DoD/
Department of Justice under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA), and if jurisdiction is declined, may then consider the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) in coordination with DoD.
Question. Training scenarios at the National Training Center and at
other locations include role players who represent the Iraqi
population. Do Army training scenarios include role players for
contractors, such as contractor security personnel?
Answer. Army maneuver Combat Training Centers (CTCs) primarily use
personnel assigned to their opposing force cadre to replicate the
various contractors in theater, including private security contractors.
In many instances the centers use Arabic-speaking personnel to role-
play contractors working on US Field Operating Bases, since US forces
in theater are in day-to-day contact with Arabic contractors. Army
maneuver CTCs are working to integrate scenarios, which include actual
personnel from contracted companies.
Every Army maneuver CTC also challenges deploying forces to work
through Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force scenarios that
involve private security contractors in Situational Training Exercises
or scripted situations during their Mission Rehearsal Exercise.
Training of unit contracting officials at CTCs occurs, but is limited
due to constrained resources (time, expertise and dollars) that are
focused on other mission-essential training tasks and capabilities.
At maneuver CTCs, unit officials are trained on the basics of the
contracting process from start to finish, and specifically on how to
manage Commander Emergency Relief Program contracts to completion in
coordination with role players for ``local contractors,'' Provincial
Reconstruction Team members, and representatives of the US Agency for
International Development. With the Battle Command Training Program,
division and corps staff officers discuss best contracting practices
with actual subject matter expert from theatre. Additionally, a Joint
Personnel Recovery Activity workshop is given, which discusses the
accounting and recovery of contractors on the battlefield.

Recruiting and Retention

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract
and retain competent personal to assure readiness and operational
effectiveness. While the services have generally met their aggregate
recruiting and retention goals, the GAO reports that the Army has
experienced shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties such
as health care, human intelligence collection, and explosive ordnance
disposal. There is growing concern within the department as to how the
Army can meet current operational demands with what appear to be
chronic shortages in these occupational specialties. In addition, there
is growing concern that recruitment standards have been relaxed to meet
numbers.
Please describe the standards by which candidates are measured.
Do you expect these standards to be relaxed further to achieve the
aggressive recruitment goals?
Answer. The Army adjusted to the DoD standards in August 2005, in
line with the rest of the services, of 60% Test Score Category (TSC) I-
IIIA and 4% TSC IV. Previously, Army had an internal goal of at least
67% TSC I-IIIA, and no more than 2% TSC IV. The Armed Forces
Qualification Score (AFQT) average score has ranged between 56.5% and
57% since FY04, so adjusting to DoD standards has not affected the
quality of the force.
Applicants are measured based on the percentile in which they score
on the AFQT. TSC I-IIIA includes those applicants who score in the top
half (50th percentile or higher). TSC IIIB includes those who score
between the 31st and 49th percentile. TSC IV includes those who score
between the 10th and the 30th percentile, of which the Army typically
only enlists those in the 21st percentile or higher. The lowest
category is TSC V (9th percentile or lower). By law, the military does
not enlist TSC V applicants.
The recruiting environment remains challenging and the Army remains
focused on recruiting a quality force in line with DoD quality mark
standards.
Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to
Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how
each occupational specialty is staffed. Will you provide the Committee
with details on recruiting and retention by MOS?
Answer. The Army monitors the strength of each MOS carefully to
ensure each required skill is properly manned and maintained. Due to
several factors, including high entrance standards, high volume
requirements, and undesirable duties, recruiting and retention is more
difficult for some MOSs. To compensate, the Army uses priorities and
incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, to shape the recruiting and
retention efforts by MOS.
The active Army is meeting its year-to-date goals for overall
recruiting and is generally doing well at the MOS level. However, there
are a few MOSs that are below their targets, including: Patriot Fire
Control Operator/Maintainer (81%), Microwave System Operator (49%),
Military Intelligence Systems Maintainer (74%), and Psychological
Operations Specialist (76%). As the year progresses, the recruiting
force places special emphasis on these MOSs to ensure that each
critical skill is manned to the required levels. One way the Army does
this is through the quarterly Multi-component Enlisted Incentives
Review Board, which aligns incentives and priorities with the needs of
each MOS. For example, Microwave System Operator now receives the
highest enlistment bonus available to assist in achieving its annual
target.
As the Army continues to transform and grow, the Army Retention
Program will continue to adjust, encouraging the right Soldiers with
the right skills to reenlist to meet the manning requirements of a
growing Army. In a time of war and sustained operational demand,
retention is a significant indicator of the quality of our leaders and
the commitment of our Soldiers. Currently, the Army is meeting or
exceeding its objectives in each category (initials, mid-careerist and
careerists). Through targeted reenlistment incentives, the Army is
addressing specialties that are currently short due to rapid growth and
transformation. The incentives for each specialty are adjusted semi-
annually using the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Review Board. Shortages
in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and
some others are continually targeted for some of our most robust
incentives.

Dwell Time

Question. One essential element in maintaining troop morale during
wartime is to provide some guarantees that there will be time to rest
between deployments to combat zones. This rest is officially called
`dwell time'. At one point dwell time for the U.S. Army was a ratio of
1:2, 12 months in combat, 24 months at home. Due to the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) Army dwell time has evolved to a 1:1 ratio. However,
on April 11, 2007, Secretary Gates announced a new policy that active
Army units now in the Central Command area of responsibility and those
headed there will deploy for not more than 15 months and will return
home to home stations for not less than 12 months.
Gentleman, there have been numerous articles regarding DoD
consistently cutting `dwell time' for our combat units, do you expect
that `dwell-time' standards will be further relaxed or changed?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense's current policy is that Soldiers
will receive a minimum of 12 months dwell in between deployments. The
Army hopes to gradually increase dwell time beyond 12 months.
Question. Gentleman, the Army dwell time ratio at one point was
1:2, then 1:1, and now it's 15 months in theater and 12 months off, the
Marines' dwell time is seven months in theater and seven months off.
Has there been any evaluation as to whose system is better?
Answer. As I understand the Marine Corps force deployment model, it
is very similar to ours. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are
rotating their combat forces at slightly less than a 1:1 deployment to
dwell ratio. Army combat units currently spend up to 15 months
overseas, with at least 12 months to reset and prepare. In other words,
Soldiers are deployed 15 months out of 27 months. Marines deploy for
seven month rotations with only six months back or, for two cycles, 14
months for seven month rotations with only six months back or, for two
cycles, 14 months deployed out of 26 months.
Question. It is our understanding that during dwell time, in
addition to resting and spending time with family, soldiers are also
supposed to go through training. However, with dwell being cut short,
what steps are in place to make sure our soldiers receive the proper
training?
Answer. Before deploying, unit commanders in all Army components
(Active, Reserve, and Guard) are required to prepare their unit for the
tasks essential to successful accomplishment of the unit's directed
mission. Additionally, unit commanders ensure personnel have
accomplished pre-deployment training required by the gaining combatant
commander, as specified in training guidance of the appropriate Army
Command that is providing forces to the gaining combatant commander.
When necessary, deployment is delayed until these requirements are met.
To assist unit leaders in accomplishing training required of their
directed mission, the Army provides a mission rehearsal exercise to all
deploying brigade combat teams at Army maneuver combat training centers
or, by exception, at their home station. These exercises require unit
personnel to perform mission essential tasks in realistic situations,
under conditions approximating the operating environment of their
directed mission, against an unpredictable opposing force, under the
watchful eye of subject matter experts. A similar computer-driven
mission readiness exercise is provided to deploy headquarters by the
Army's Battle Command Training Program.
Question. Is the training that the soldiers are receiving limited
to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)?
Answer. Currently, dwell time is insufficient to allow most Army
units redeploying to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom to train on any operational theme other than their directed
mission. Units exclusively prepare to conduct offensive, defensive and
stability in an irregular war, or counterinsurgency, campaign for the
operational environment they will encounter in the Central Command area
of operations.
As dwell time increases, units will be able to devote increasing
amounts of training time to the core tasks they were designed to
perform in major combat operations as well as irregular warfare. This
strategy increases our readiness for unforeseen contingencies.
Question. How much did last year's ``surge'' effect `dwell time'
for soldiers?
Answer. Deployment lengths and dwell times are a function of
available supply and global combatant commander demands. The CENTCOM
commander demands over half the available brigade combat teams (BCTs)
in the Army's inventory. To enable the combatant commands, in
particular the warfighting commanders in OIF, to employ necessary
combat and enabling capabilities, the Army took an additional force
management risk during 2007 and 2008. Any reduction in surge forces
levels will allow a return to more sustainable deployment lengths. We
continue to examine ways to reduce that further. The Army's short-term
goal is to give active component Soldiers at least the same amount of
time home as they are deployed (1:1 ratio) and to have reserve
component forces mobilized for 12 months every four years (1:4 ratio).
The Army's long-term sustainable goal is to allow active component
units and Soldiers three times the amount of time home as they are
deployed (1:3 ratio), or 27 months home for every nine months deployed.
The Army's long-term goal for the reserve component is 12 months
mobilized for every five years not mobilized (1:5 ratio). The recent
approval of the Army's accelerated Grow the Army plan is designed to
more rapidly improve the deployment to dwell ratio for units. Army
initiatives could bring the Army back into balance beginning in 2011.
Question. Gentlemen, when dwell time is cut short what is done to
help the families of deployed soldiers?
Answer. The Army is committed to a deliberate reset of our people
following each deployment. During periods of dwell time, Soldiers and
Families face a number of demands that compete for their time. The
Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) program provides a roadmap for
commanders, units, and installations before, during and after
deployments. The DCS directive applies to both Active and Reserve
Component Soldiers and Families. Execution of the directive's checklist
ensures that critical redeployment and pre-deployment tasks are
completed and that Soldiers and Families are provided support resources
when issues are identified.
The Army provides a host of support services to Families during
dwell time. Military Family Life consultants provide reunion and
reintegration support to Soldiers and their Families to reduce
deployment stress. New Parent Support Program home visitors perform
visits to support the needs and training of parents with children aged
three and younger, and to identify Families at risk and reduce
incidents of child neglect or abuse. The Family Advocacy program
provides education and prevention services that help Families cope with
challenges before, during, and after deployment. Other programs include
Virtual Family Readiness Groups, Employment Readiness Program, Army
Integrated Family Support Network, and Army Family Team Building
Training Program.
Child and Youth Services programs assist Families by providing
extended hours, around-the-clock, and hourly child care; respite/
reintegration care; reduced program fees for deployed parents; outreach
and support services; and communication with deployed parents.
Operation Military Child Care and Operation Military Kids support
geographically dispersed Families by helping Soldiers locate Army-
sponsored, community-based child care at reduced rates and providing
outreach services, such as tutoring, skills classes, transportation,
support groups, mobile technology labs, camps, etc.

Growth in Contractor Provided Services

Question. The Army's obligations on service contracts rose from
$3.8 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $22.9 billion in fiscal year 2007
(per 2009 President's Budget). This is a growth of $19.1 billion, or
500% over 10 years (inflation accounted for 17% of this growth).
Over the same period, the Army's obligations for civilian pay rose
$2.4 billion, or 51% (pay raise accounted for 30% of this growth). Who
in the Army has oversight for ``contract services''?
Answer. The oversight of services acquisition is the shared
responsibility of requiring activities, contracting activities, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
(ASA (ALT)).
The ASA (ALT) retains responsibility over the acquisition of
services and has delegated authority to review and approve service
acquisitions with a total planned value of $500 million or more to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy & Procurement) (DASA
P&P). Prior to approving any acquisition of services with a total
planned value of $1 billion or more, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) must be notified.
Acquisition of services with a total planned value of $500 are
reviewed by the Army Service Strategy Panel, chaired by the DASA P&P.
Since April 2003, 28 Army service acquisitions valued at above $500
million have been reviewed under these procedures. These acquisitions
represent a total estimated value of over $249 billion.
Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) provide the day-to-day
oversight of the contractor's performance. CORs help ensure the
government obtains quality services, on time, and at the level and
prices specified in the contract.
As of February 23, 2006, the Secretary of the Army requires
Headquarters, Department of the Army principals and senior commanders
at Army Command, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting
Units to be responsible for the approval for requirements for
contracted services. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) reports these requirements directly to the Secretary
of the Army.
Question. How are Army commanders at the various levels of command
trained to manage contracting out for services?
Answer. The Army has a wide range of schools that its officers
attend throughout their career and before they enter into command
positions.
Command & General Staff School, Command & General
Staff College
School for Command Preparation, Command & General
Staff College
Garrison Precommand Course, Army Management Staff
College
General Officer Senior Command Course, Army
Management Staff College
The Command & General Staff School provides a core course entitled
F-106, Military Contracting and Ethics. This course covers why and how
the Army uses contracting to effectively support military operations;
considerations and effective planning for contracting support; types of
contracts--what and how they provide support to include their
capabilities and limitations, authorities and responsibilities for
identifying requirements, drafting statements of work, and overseeing
contractor performance; role of the contracting officer's
representative; and obligations and restrictions concerning oversight
of contractor personnel.
In addition, exercise training venues, such as the Combat Training
Centers, are incorporating realistic contracting training scenarios
into operational training.
Question. How does the work that contractors perform differ from
the work that civilian employees perform?
Answer. The Army uses the manpower mix criteria in Department of
Defense Instruction 1100.22 to determine what functions are military
essential, inherently governmental, exempt from private-sector
performance, or available for contractor performance. In general terms,
contractors perform commercially available functions and government
civilians perform inherently governmental functions. The area in
between, functions exempt from private-sector performance, is a less
distinct area. An example of a function exempt from private-sector
performance is the ``contracting'' function. Managers and leaders need
to be able to exempt the ``contracting'' function from private-sector
performance even though it is commercially available. When performed as
a ``contract specialist'' this function is commercial but closely
related to inherently governmental functions. At the same time the
government needs to have a career path to more senior levels where this
function performs inherently governmental duties as a ``contracting
officer''. In order to develop government ``contracting officers'' we
must have government ``contract specialists''.

Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT)

Question. The U.S. Army Surgeon General chartered the Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) in July 2003.
Its mission was to assess OIF-related mental health issues and to
provide recommendations to OIF medical and line commands. MHAT-V was
also deployed to Afghanistan for the first time. The MHAT conducted
group interviews and surveys of soldiers. Many of the soldiers who
participated had been engaged in combat. This was the fifth assessment
of soldiers via surveys in OIF and first time for OEF soldiers in this
manner regarding behavioral issues during active combat. On May 6,
2008, DoD released the fifth MHAT study since 2003. MHAT-V was
conducted in August and October of 2007 and assessed more than 2,279
soldiers and for the first time 889 soldiers from Afghanistan. Units
were specifically targeted for this survey because they experienced the
highest level of combat exposure.
Gentlemen, according to the Mental Health Advisory Team report,
soldiers who deployed longer (greater than six months) or had deployed
multiple times were more likely to screen positive for a mental health
issue. What steps are taken to assure that these soldiers get the
proper attention?
Answer. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research continues
behavioral health research prevalence and intervention studies aimed at
reducing mental health problems of Soldiers across the deployment cycle
(e.g., Battlemind psychological debriefing, and expressive writing).
Operationally, the Task Force 62 Medical Brigade conducts continuous
and ongoing prevention activities throughout the deployment cycle in
Theater. Depending on OPTEMPO and identified need, Combat Stress
Control units will deliver customize services to units based on
assessed needs and requests by the unit commander.
MHAT-V Soldier Survey data further underscores the importance of
the 6-12 month in-Theater timeframe for when Soldiers are most
susceptible to behavioral health problems. Task Force 62 Behavioral
Health personnel are focusing outreach for units that have been in-
Theater more than 6 months.
Finally, Army Leadership has mandated that all Soldiers receive
post-deployment Battlemind training upon return from operational
deployment.
Question. The 2007 adjusted rate of suicides per 100,000 soldiers
was 17.3 soldiers, lower than the 19.9 rate reported in 2005, however
higher than the Army average of 11.6 per 100,000 soldiers. Does the
Army have proper resources to provide counseling to soldiers? When
soldiers need counseling who provides this counseling?
Answer. Yes, the Army has proper resources to provide counseling to
the deployed force. When required, counseling is provided by forward
deployed behavioral health providers. There are approximately 200
mental health providers and technicians (150 Army and 50 Air Force)
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and approximately 30
mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force, and 2
Navy) deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In a typical month, over 1,800 new service members are seen in
behavioral health clinics, and over 3,000 command consultations are
conducted regarding the morale and mental health of the fighting force.
On average, over 5,000 behavioral health appointments occur per month.
There are four restoration centers that provide 3-5 day inpatient
treatment programs, with a ``return to duty'' rate of 93%. The
corollary outpatient ``return to duty'' rate is 99%. Less than one-half
percent of the fighting force is evacuated annually for psychiatric
reasons.
Question. The Mental Health Advisory Team found that both soldiers
and Marines reported at relatively high rates--62 and 66 percent,
respectively--that they knew someone seriously injured or killed, or
that a member of their unit had become a casualty. What mental health
assistance is available to our soldiers who are still in combat?
Answer. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and
technicians (150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); and approximately 30 mental health
providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force and 2 Navy) supporting
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each brigade combat team (BCT) has a
behavioral health section assigned directly to them, also known as
organic assets, and operates in the BCT area of responsibility. In
addition, OIF has the equivalent of four deployed combat and
operational stress control (COSC) detachments conducting area-wide
behavioral health and COSC services. OEF has organic BCT behavioral
health assets and the equivalent of one COSC detachment.
Both organic behavioral health assets (division) and echelons above
division (Task Force 62 Medical Brigade) provide services to units and
Soldiers after critical incidents such as firefights and improvised
explosive device attacks. Also, chaplains are indispensable parts of
the team taking care of Soldiers after combat losses.
Question. According to the Mental Health Advisory Team,
approximately 10 percent of soldiers reported mistreating non-
combatants or damaging their property when it was not necessary and
less than half of soldiers would report a member of their unit for
unethical behavior. Is there any concern that with lower standards
these incidents could become worse?
Answer. No, there is minimal concern that these incidents will
become worse. MHAT V found that unethical behaviors did not change
significantly relative to 2006. Battlefield ethics issues have been
incorporated into the AMEDD combat and operational stress control
(COSC) and into the Battlemind psychological debriefing program
developed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In addition, Army
generated a new COSC concept, known as ``remind'' that addresses threat
of dangerousness to others and the risk of unlawful behaviors. This
concept is being fielded actively through behavioral health channels
and will be published in existing COSC doctrine.
Question. Please explain what the Army has done to address the
Mental Health Advisory Team findings? Can you provide a list to the
committee regarding what recommendations were followed and which
recommendations were not?
Answer. MHAT V reviewed all MHAT findings and reported the results
for each. The review is included in the MHAT V report dated February
14, 2008. The review addresses a total of 46 recommendations including
four redeployment recommendations, 19 deployment recommendations, four
post-deployment recommendations, and 19 sustainment recommendations. A
complete list of recommendations with the status of each is enclosed.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Question. What is the cost of a Mental Health Advisory Team and how
many more reports do you think there will be?
Answer. The expected annual MHAT missions will continue as long as
combat operations exist in support of the Global War on Terror. We have
significantly reduced the costs for these assessments in both personnel
requirements and expenses. MHAT 1 required a 12-member team that
remained engaged in the assessment and reporting process for
approximately six months. MHAT V was accomplished with a four-member
team that produced a final report in about two months. Future MHATs are
expected to continue to use this smaller, more financially efficient
configuration. Regardless of the team's size, it will require extensive
planning and support.

Training Iraqi Security Forces

Question. General Casey reports in the media seem to suggest a
transition, change even some disarray in the way the Army adapts to the
mission of training the security forces of another country . . . Iraqi
security forces in particular. From about 2006, the Army devoted
considerable resources and personnel to stablishing a training
capability at Fort Riley in Kansas. Now the Army seems to be walking
away from that plan and is transferring the mission to Fort Polk,
Louisiana, or even assigning the mission to the Army Special Forces.
General Casey, in the Army's counter insurgency doctrine, is
training the security forces of the host country to fight the
insurgents an Army core function?
Answer. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) clearly
articulates the requirement for developing host nation security forces
and recognizes that U.S. forces help host nation military,
paramilitary, and police forces conduct counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations, including area security and local security operations. U.S.
forces provide advice and help find, disperse, capture, and defeat
insurgent forces. Concurrently, they emphasize training host nation
forces to perform essential defense functions. These are the central
tasks of Foreign Internal Defense, a core Army Special Operations
Forces task.
In the Army's capstone manual, FM 3-0 (Operations), Army forces
combine the three core U.S. military missions of offensive, defensive,
and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an
interdependent joint force. Within the core mission of stability
operations, one of the primary tasks is civil security. In situations
where host nation capability for civil security is inadequate, Army
forces provide most civil security while developing host nation
capabilities. As soon as the host nation security forces can safely
perform this task, Army forces transition civil security
responsibilities to them.
The Army is drafting a new FM 3-07 (Stability Operations) to expand
on the discussions of security assistance from FM 3-0 and FM 3-24 and
to better reflect our known requirements for security force assistance.
FM 3-70 recognizes that security assistance involves more than just
training, equipping, and rebuilding, and advising host nation forces.
This effort requires a broader interagency approach beyond the military
instrument of national power.
Question. Does the Amy need to establish an advisory corps?
Answer. Future requirements to train and advise foreign security
forces can be addressed with a combination of special operations
forces, small scale specialized forces, US embassy military groups, and
full spectrum modular forces. The Army must be ready to train and
advise foreign security forces through both pre-conflict security
cooperation activities, such as ongoing efforts in Colombia and Saudi
Arabia, and post conflict conditions, such as our current efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The type of training and advising required will
span the ministerial level through the institutional Army and from
national Army headquarters to small tactical units. The ministerial
level requires Joint, possibly interagency solution that the Army can
contribute to, while foreign Army institutions will require assistance
from the Army's institutions such as Training and Doctrine Command.
Foreign Army headquarters can be trained and advised by similar US Army
headquarters, and at the tactical level, Army modular forces are
ideally suited to train and advise.
For all these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their
core function--something not necessarily resident in an advisory corps.
For example, US Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are
experts at conducting their wartime function and can therefore train
and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. However,
before Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, they must
prepare for the unique aspects the mission entails. To that end, the
Army is creating an enduring advising training capability. This
institution will exist at Fort Polk and will have the capability to
prepare individuals or units to serve as trainers and advisors from the
tactical to ministerial level.
Question. The Committee understands that in September of 2007 the
Army evaluated the program to train the trainers at Fort Riley and
found serious shortcomings in the training and in the soldiers that
were being assigned as trainers. General Casey can you elaborate on the
problems with the training program at Fort Riley and what is being done
to fix it?
Answer. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1/1 ID) runs the
training program at Fort Riley, and although they have faced many
challenges, they are doing an excellent job.
The 1/1 ID is currently assigned 824 of 825 authorized Soldiers.
Fifty-five are transition team (TT) veterans filling critical cadre
positions, with an additional 17 contracted instructors. There are also
75 full time and 153 part time contracted role-players supporting the
training program.
The training program at Fort Riley continues to improve. Transition
teams conduct the majority of their training from Forward Operating
Base (FOB) ``Army Strong'', which replicates a FOB in Iraq. The 1/1 ID
has four language labs with instructors and has also been fielded the
latest Army simulators, including the HMMWV Egress Assistance Trainer,
the Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator, and a medical skills trainer.
Additionally, selected TTs deploy to the Combat Training Centers to
train with brigade combat teams, and the Army is studying how to expand
this further.
New doctrinal publications are being developed and written for
transition teams. The 1/1 ID published a Combat Advisor's Handbook. The
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance published the
2nd edition of their TT Handbook, and the Air Land Sea Application
Center is developing Multi-Service Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
on Training Security Force Advisor Teams.
The Army has taken several steps to improve the overall selection
of TT Soldiers, encouraging volunteering for TT duty, and providing for
career enhancement. As of April 1, 2008, all TT Soldiers are placed on
permanent change of station to Kuwait, providing incentives such as
follow on assignment options and a cost of living allowance. Soldiers
now receive a skill identifier for completing the training at Fort
Riley and serving on TTs. Selection boards are provided instructions to
favorably consider TT duty. Finally, some Branches currently consider
it a key and developmental assignment, and the Army is studying how to
expand this to other TT Soldiers as appropriate.
Question. Is it true that senior Army commanders wanted minimum of
33 percent of the instructors at Fort Riley to have prior service as an
advisor, but in fact only 6 percent had prior experience as an advisor?
Answer. Yes, when the Army moves this mission from Fort Riley to
Fort Polk, 30 percent of the instructors returning from Training Team
(TT) missions are to be assigned to TT instructor requirements.
However, several factors influence obtaining this goal. Some personnel
have their choice of assignment upon completion of their tour of duty
and simply choose not to return as an instructor. Many of the team
members are from the other services or the Reserve Component and are
not available as instructors. Current analysis indicates the goal of 30
percent of the TT instructors having TT experience is achievable by the
time the TT mission relocates to Fort Polk in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2009.
Question. The Committee understands that many officers in the Army
fear that advisor duty is an assignment that is considerably less
career enhancing than is a tour of duty with a combat unit. What is the
Army doing to ensure that those who take assignments as advisors are
treated fairly and have an equal opportunity for career advancement?
Answer. The Army is acutely aware of the unique benefits derived by
officers serving in combat advisory positions in Transition Teams (TTs)
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of various compositions that
prepare host nation forces to shoulder the responsibility for internal
security and civil stability and restore critical infrastructure. We
have adjusted our guidance for active and Reserve Component promotions,
commands, and professional military education selection boards to
highlight the criticality of these TT/PRT assignments. We stress that
``special attention should be paid to officers serving on Transition
Teams in the current environment and foreseeable future. The invaluable
experience these officers are receiving in these tough assignments will
posture them for success in future leadership positions in the
operational environment . . . The board should understand the
challenging nature and demands of these jobs and provide appropriate
consideration in the overall evaluation of each officer's record.''
In addition, the Army is modifying its officer professional
development and career management guidance to add these TT/PRT
assignments to its list of jobs considered key to the development of
the officer and contributing directly to an enhanced ability to serve
at higher levels of rank and responsibility.

Operation and Maintenance for Contract Services

Question. The Committee continues to try to understand what is
financed with the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding. One use for
O&M is for ``contractual services.'' The following table shows actual
and requested funds:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army O&M--Dollars in billions
--------------------------------
1997 2007
Actual* Actual 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Request:
Federal personnel compensation..... 6.0 5.4 5.5
Service via contract............... 4.5 22.9 9.9
Advisory and assistance .4 3.0 .5
services......................
Contracts with the private 3.9 3.1 1.3
sector........................
Maintenance of facilities...... .1 10.1 5.6
Maintenance of equipment....... .1 6.3 2.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FY 1997 is shown in FY 2008 dollars

The committee added $24 million to the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) in FY
2008 to improve contract management oversight. Has the Army seen any
improvements in contract management as a result of this additional
finding?
Answer. The DCAA and the DCMC are responsive to the Army's requests
for services. The $24 million in additional fiscal year 2008 funds for
the DCAA and DCMC for improvements in contract management and oversight
is welcomed and attests to the importance of these functions. While it
will take time to assess the impact of this additional funding, the
Army is taking immediate steps focused on training Army leadership
regarding their responsibilities and role in contract oversight.
Current Army actions include assessing opportunities to improve
contingency contracting training at the Combined Training Centers and
expanding the mission of the Battle Command Training Program to include
acquisition professionals to train brigade, division, and corps
organizations.

Fuel Efficiency

Question. The Army O&M account finances tank and aircraft
operations, to include the cost of fuel. The FY 2008 budget is
underfunded because fuel costs have been higher than anticipated.
However, ``fuel efficiency'' is not a factor in the contracting process
for engines or equipment.
What is the unfunded requirement for fuel in fiscial year 2008?
Answer. The current FY 2008 unfunded requirement (UFR) for fuel is
$468 million. The rise in oil prices from $91.14 at the time of the
budget estimate submission to the current Defense Logistics Agency
price of $127.58 per barrel created the UFR. The UFR is part of the
revised FY 2008 supplemental appropriation request.
Question. What was budgeted for fuel in fiscal year 2009 and what
do you now expect the costs to be?
Answer. The Army budgeted $825 million for fuel in FY 2009 based on
an estimate of $115.5 per barrel. DoD has not identified a price
increase in fuel for FY 2009.
Question. Going forward, should the Army consider ``fuel
efficiency'' in the contracting process for engines?
Answer. Yes, the Army definitely should consider fuel effbiency in
the contracting process for engines. Engines that are more efficient
provide enhanced operational range allowing units to extend operational
areas while consuming less fuel. Additionally, it is a good economical
decision, since more efficient engines means less operational support
costs for fuel. When considering life cycle costs of the equipment and
the rising cost of fuel, fuel efficiency is an excellent investment for
the Army.

Subsistence Costs

Question. The Army requested $1.065 billion and $.987 billion in
supplemental funds for subsistence for DoD civilians in GWOT in fiscal
years 2007 and 2008 respectively to finance: ``ice, food and water for
authorized DoD civilians and contractors''. DoD estimate that there are
about 5,000 ``authorized DoD civilians'' and 140,000 contractors
deployed to OIF and OIF.
The Army's most current 2008 supplemental request includes $987
million for food, water and ice for ``authorized DoD civilians''.
How many civilians are fed in Army messes in and around Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. There is no source of information to determine the total
number of civilians being fed. For the first five months of FY08, the
Army estimates that it is feeding an average of 84,000 civilians, or 58
percent of the DoD estimate of 145,000 civilians and contractors. There
are several factors to consider. First most civilians live in built-up
locations where commercial meals are readily available from U.S.
vendors. Second, a large number of contractors are local nationals,
third-country nationals or employees of sub-contractors operating in
and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) reports
47,000 such employees as of April 4, 2008. Many of these employees
supplement their diets on the local economy and do not eat full time in
Army messes.
Question. How does the Army track who is eating in the mess halls?
Answer. When an individual enters an Army dining facility
supporting OIF and OEF, their eligibility to dine is confirmed and they
are counted before being served. Dining facilities at fixed locations
rely on a manual procedure wherein the number of diners, with civilians
counted separately from military personnel, is visually identified and
the count is entered on a manual headcount form. It is not feasible to
collect and record meal headcounts at remote forward operating bases.
As a result, a full and accurate headcount for OIF and OEF diners is
not available.
Question. How does Army track contractors eating in the messes and
charge back the cost of the food that they consume? Is that always
done?
Answer. When a contract includes a requirement to feed civilians in
OIF and OEF that must dine in military/government dining operations,
contracting procedures require that the cost of contractor personnel be
reduced by the costs of feeding. The large KBR contract was executed
this way; however, it is not known if absolutely every contract has
been properly executed pertaining to feeding costs. We believe that the
largest contracts are being executed properly.
Question. How many prime contractors provide food, water and ice to
the Army messes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait?
Answer. There are two prime contractors for food in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Kuwait. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company)
headquartered in Kuwait; and Supreme Food Services, Inc., headquartered
in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme are the two prime contractors for
food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Agility serves Iraq and Kuwait;
Supreme serves Afghanistan. Most water for food preparation and
drinking in Iraq comes from water bottling plants under a contract with
Oasis International Waters, Inc. In Kuwait, Defense Supply Center
Philadelphia provides bottled water sourced from various subcontractors
within that country. Water sourcing in Afghanistan resembles Kuwait
except that the subcontractors are obtained by Supreme Food Service.
Ice throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait come from a network of
subcontractors under KBR.
Question. How does a local company become a subcontrator for ice,
food and/or water?
Answer. The government's relationship is with the prime contractor,
and in the case of food, we do not dictate a process to select
subcontractors. The government does dictate requirements for quality
and sanitation, of course. In some cases there are subcontractors to
subcontractors outside the direct purview of the government.
Question. Why would the Army airlift ice, food and/or water into
Afghanistan?
Is there a risk of spoilage and contamination when
subsistence is transported some distance?
How are airlift costs factored into the contract cost?
Answer. The Army does not airlift ice or water into Afghanistan;
however, there are occasions when airlift is used to move foods by air.
Airlift is used when adverse security conditions or natural conditions
like weather or natural disaster make road passage impossible or too
slow to meet feeding requirements. Airlift is always the last choice
for transportation.
Question. We know that the Kellogg Brown and Root Company is one of
the prime contractors for dining facilities in and around Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Does KBR make the decisions on subcontractors to supply
food, ice and water?
Answer. KBR operates dining facilities but makes no decisions on
subcontractors to supply food and water. Food decisions are made by
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia and water decisions by the Army
element of U.S. CENTCOM. KBR does make decisions on subcontractors to
provide base camp services, including ice, in their large LOGCAP
contract.
Question. Is ``Agility'' a prime contractor? Where is it
headquartered?
Answer. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) is a prime
contractor, headquartered in Kuwait.
Question. Is ``Supreme'' a prime contractor? Where is it
headquartered?
Answer. Supreme is a prime contractor, headquartered in
Switzerland.
Question. How effective are the major defense contactors in Iraq
and Afghanistan in hiring local subcontractors?
Answer. The major defense contractors are very experienced and
effective in hiring local subcontractors. Local subcontractors are
their best sources for responsive service and reasonable costs.
Question. Should we have a contracting team dedicated to reviewing
what would be the best valve for the government by contracting with
local vendors deemed capable of handling major end items vs. having the
major defense contractors let all the local contracts?
Answer. The Army has this agreement with Defense Supply Center
Philadelphia. The Afghanistan First Program is a good example that
started with bottled water. Current initiatives to involve local
vendors include ice and fresh fruits and vegetables.
Question. Can you tell us how local subcontractors are monitored?
Answer. The Army uses contracting officer representatives (COTRs)
to provide oversight for DCMA on LOGCAP and other prime contracts, but
does not directly monitor the prime contractor's subcontractors. In
cases where a subcontractor is one of several providing a product or
service directly to the Army, the Army again uses its COTRs to monitor
performance.
Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) food
for civilians eating in messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. The amount requested for all three countries combined for
FY07 was $.965 billion; for FY08 $.675 billion. The Army's request does
not compute the three countries separately. The $.675 billion request
for FY08 is from the amended Army request, which is smaller than the
original requested amount of $.987 billion.
Question. How many prime contractors supply food to the messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. There are two prime contractors for food in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Kuwait. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company)
headquartered in Kuwait; and Supreme Food Services, Inc., headquartered
in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme are the two prime contractors for
food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Agility serves Iraq and Kuwait;
Supreme serves Afghanistan. Most water for food preparation and
drinking in Iraq comes from water bottling plants under a contract with
Oasis International Waters, Inc. In Kuwait, Defense Supply Center
Philadelphia provides bottled water sourced from various subcontractors
within that country. Water sourcing in Afghanistan resembles Kuwait
except that the subcontractors are obtained by Supreme Food Service.
Ice throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait come from a network of
subcontractors under KBR.
Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) water
for civilians eating in messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. The Army computes requirements using a meal cost factor
that includes bottled water for meals. The daily bottled water
requirement of six liters is 10.4 percent of meal cost including water.
The water only request, therefore, is $.100 billion for FY07 and $.070
billion for FY08.
Question. How many prime contractors supply water to the messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. There is a single prime contractor for water in Iraq;
however there are multiple subcontractors for ice everywhere and for
water in Afghanistan and Kuwait.
Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) ice
for civilians eating in messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. The Army does not source ice from DLA. Virtually all ice is
provided by KBR subcontractors under the large LOGCAP contract. Ice is
included with many other life support services (housing, utilities,
etc.) in a single per day base camp operational cost factor; therefore,
the specific cost of ice cannot be determined.
Question. How many prime contractors supply ice to the messes:
in Iraq?
in Afghanistan?
in Kuwait?
Answer. KBR is the prime contractor supplying ice using multiple
subcontractors.

``Benefits'' to Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan

There continues to be a heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The DoD did a head count last summer and estimate that DoD
employed 138,000 contractors (at the time the count was done). The Army
manages and funds the logistical support contracts in theater and
therefore funds the cost of dining facilities there.
Question. When contracts are drawn up, do they include products or
services that the Government must provide the contractor?
For example, if you have a team of contractors going into
Baghdad to supervise the building of a school, are they eligible to eat
free of charge at the Government mess in the Green Zone?
Answer. The DoD civilian employees are authorized logistic and
security support privileges when deployed with the Armed Forces.
Support for Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF) will
be written into the terms and conditions of the contract. Logistic and
security requirements are addressed in the contract and are priced and
negotiated before the contract is awarded. It costs approximately
$23.00 for food per person per day. This does not included
transportation, storage or labor costs, but does include six liters of
water per day.
Question. How does Army track contractors eating in the messes and
charge back the cost of the food that they consume?
Is that always done?
Answer. The DoD has implemented the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to account for and provide visibility
of all DoD contract personnel within the contingency operations battle
space. The primary purpose of the Joint Asset Movement Management
System (JAMMS) (which is a component of SPOT) is to track assets. JAMMS
has the capability of accepting a scan of a contractor personnel's
letter of authorization (LOA). The LOA allows persons residing with
U.S. forces to be afforded Contractor Authorized to Accompany the Force
status, which provides them access to mess facilities and protected
status in accordance with international conventions.

Joint Contracting Command--Iraq/Afghanistan

Question. JCC-I/A is a relatively new command. Initially created by
a November 2004, U.S. Central Command Fragmentary Order [FRAGO] covered
only the Combined Joint Operations Area [CJOA] Iraq. It officially
opened its doors on Jan. 29, 2005. However, a subsequent July 2005
FRAGO expanded the organization's responsibility to include CJOA
Afghanistan. Their fiscal year 2006 workload through June included
awarding 19,500 contract actions worth $3.4 billion. They have 235
folks in the command--including mostly GIs, with DoD civilians, local
nationals and contractors.
How does the Army interact with this organization?
Answer. The Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army, Policy & Procurement--Iraq/Afghanistan (OADASA (P&P-I/A)
provides contingency policy expertise for procurement operations and
rear support to the Head of the Contracting Activity at the Joint
Contracting Command--Iraq/Afghanistan on all procurement policy issues.
Subject matter experts develop and analyze contingency contracting
policy, in conjunction with the other services, Director for Defense
Policy and Procurement, and in interagency issues. OADASA (P&P-I/A) is
the principal advisor to the ASA (ALT) on procurement matters related
to Iraq/Afghanistan and provides support for HQDA, reconstruction
efforts with DoD, HQDA, and interagency partners, and recruiting and
deploying military and civilian personnel to Iraq.
The JCC-I/A also interacts with the Iraq Transition Assistance
Office, which assists executive departments and agencies in concluding
large infrastructure projects in Iraq and facilitates Iraq's transition
to self sufficiency, and it maintains an effective diplomatic presence
in Iraq with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Gulf Region Division,
Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq, Multinational Force--
Iraq, and Multinational Corps--Iraq. The JCC-I/A also interfaces with
the Embassy in Afghanistan.
Question. From your perspective, has it improved operations?
Answer. As a major subordinate command of Multi-Nationl Force--
Iraq, which manages contracting operations for both, Iraq and
Afghanistan, JCC-I/A has implemented improvements and received
recognition. The Chief Acquisition Officers Council recently recognized
the JCC-I/A with the 2007 Contract Management Award. The award
recognized JCC-I/A's innovative use of ``Effects Based Contracting''
during construction of the Rule of Law Center, a protective enclave for
Iraqi justice system personnel and facilities in Bagdad. The JCC-I/A
contracting officers delivered an initial operations capable, 900
detainee prison and judicial complex in 26 days. The ADASA (P&P)
assists JCC-I/A in developing and implementing annual long range
contracting support plans, which encompasses contracting agency
transitions, funds reconciliation, disposition and reporting.
JCC-I/A is providing more Iraqi firms an opportunity to obtain
reconstruction contracts, which facilitates job growth and strengthens
the Iraq economy. Iraqi firms have now received more than $1 billion in
reconstruction contracts.

NDAA Institutes Contracting Reform

Question. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Public
Law 110-181, contained a number of provisions related to contracting
oversight improvement, including Section 863: CG Reviews/Reports on
Contracting. This provision stated that every 12 months, the
Comptroller General shall review contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan,
beginning with an interim report due October 1, 2008. This report shall
include:
# of contracts, contractor personnel
$ value of contract
Use of competitive procedures
# of contractors performing security services
Areas of significant concern
What sort of system does the Army have in place now that will
enable it to comply with the direction provided in this Act?
Answer. A Memorandum of Understanding between DoD, Department of
State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development required
by Sec. 861 of Public Law 110-181 has not yet been signed. However, the
agreed upon common databases as repositories of information on
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan are the Federal Procurement Data
System--Next Generation (FPDS-NG) and Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT). The current release of SPOT pulls the
consolidated data directly from FPDS-NG.
The Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan does not currently
input contracting data directly into FPDS-NG, but collects it in a
local database and feeds data for input into a stand-alone system. The
Director, Defense Procurement, Acquisition Policy, and Strategic
Sourcing is taking steps to ensure that the required data is available
in FPDS-NG. Other systems currently in use that collect contract data
in theater include the Joint Contingency Contracting System, US CENTCOM
Contractor Census, and CENTCOM data report.
Question. How difficult will it be for the Army to provide this
type of information on contracting?
Answer. Currently, the basic contract data is provided by
extracting data from the existing local databases and then manually
inputting the data into the Federal Procurement Data System--Next
Generation (FPDS-NG). Although it is a cumbersome process, it has
proved to be successful in providing a consolidated source for this
basic data. However, the inclusion of real time data into the FPDS-NG
would provide a more seamless collection of real time data.
Question. Does the Army have one central repository for all of its
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. All original contract files and contract documents are
required to be maintained by the contracting office, which is standard
contracting procedure. However, copies of contracts and modifications
and other relevant information is also provided to and maintained by
the organizations that are assigned contract administration
responsibilities. There are central repositories for contracting data.
The FPDS-NG currently collects contract data from all Army contracting
commands with the exception of those located in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which has been collected separately due to operational concerns. The
Director, Defense Procurement, Acquisition Policy, and Strategic
Sourcing is taking steps to ensure that that required data is available
in FPDS-NG.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.
The Fiscal Year 2009 Army Posture Statement follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Wednesday, March 12, 2007.

ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

WITNESSES

DEAN G. POPPS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
LTG N. ROSS THOMPSON III, MILITARY DEPUTY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Introduction

Mr. Bishop [presiding]. The Committee will be in order. I
would like to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Tiahrt, for a
motion.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move that those
portions of the hearing today which involve classified material
be held in executive session because of the classification of
the material to be discussed.
Mr. Bishop. So ordered. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Tiahrt. My pleasure.
Mr. Bishop. This afternoon, the Committee will hold a
closed hearing on Army acquisition. We are pleased to welcome
Mr. Dean Popps, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and Lieutenant General N.
Ross Thompson, III, who is the Military Deputy to the Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Army For Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology. These gentlemen are well qualified to discuss Army
acquisition and to answer the questions of the Committee.
Secretary Popps and General Thompson, thank you for being
here this afternoon. We are here to talk about the acquisition
of Army equipment, and the Committee is very concerned about
the readiness of the Army in terms of equipping our forces.
Systems are becoming ever more complicated, and too often in
developmental programs a desire to begin production overruns
technology maturity and then we are faced with delays and
restructures.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program remains the core of
the Army acquisition, and the FCS calls for a total program
cost of over $160 billion. The request for fiscal year 2009
calls for 3.6 billion. Ideally the system will field the latest
in high technology and a fleet of vehicles that have mostly
common vehicle systems. Still the FCS will upon completion
comprise only 15 of 76 total Army combat brigades. And one of
the challenges that is facing the Future Combat Systems is how
to efficiently spin out the maturing technology to the existing
fleets of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and Strykers.
So as U.S. participation in the war in Iraq winds down,
funding for the Department of Defense will become extremely
tight and the ability of the Army to maintain funding for the
Future Combat Systems will prove to be very challenging for us.

ARMY AVIATION

The request for Army aviation totals a little over $5
billion, including $439 million for 28 armed reconnaissance
helicopters, money for 63 Black Hawks, 264 million for 7 joint
cargo aircraft, and a little over a billion for Chinooks. The
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program seems to be back on
track after a slip of a year, and the program is producing 12
aircraft with fiscal year 2008 funding and the fiscal 2009
budget calls for 28.
Requested funding for the weapons and tracked combat
vehicles totals $3.7 billion, including $175 million for 119
Stryker vehicles and $1,181 million for the M1A2 tank and
Bradley upgrades.
Questions from the members of the Committee will likely
address these programs and many others, and I think we can look
forward to a very interesting and useful question-and-answer
session.
Mr. Secretary, I understand that you will be the only one
making a statement. You may proceed with your summarized
statement and of course your entire statement will be placed in
the record. Welcome, and you may proceed, Mr. Popps, with your
comments.

Summary Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Popps

Mr. Popps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member,
Congressman Tiahrt, Congressman Moran, Congressman Cramer. Good
afternoon to all of you. And the remainder of the distinguished
members of the Committee coming in and out, thanks for the
opportunity to be here today and to help discuss the fiscal
year 2009 President's budget and Army acquisition programs.
As you said previously, sir, the Principal Military Deputy
to our Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, General N. Ross
Thompson III, is sitting to my left and here today. And I
respectfully request that our joint statement be part of the
record for today's hearing. As our predecessors, the Secretary
of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, did very
eloquently earlier today, let me thank all of you on behalf of
all of us for everything that you do for the men and women in
uniform. And although we are very prideful that our soldiers
have the very best technologically and are advanced and capable
and physically fit and can win any fight, that would not be
possible without your strong support. So we thank each and
every one of you profoundly.
Mr. Chairman, I took the reins as the Army Acquisition
Executive and the Acting Assistant Secretary for Acquisition on
3 January of this year, 60 days ago. My predecessor, the
Honorable Claude Bolton, retired at that time and he had a very
distinguished career of 6 years and many of you were very
familiar with him and had very good and close relationships
with him. So I want to make that part of the record and let you
know that I have served for 60 days, and I assume I am going to
continue to serve here unless the President or the Secretary of
Defense has another nominee through the end of the
administration. I have served as the Principal Deputy through
2004; however, much of my work has been involved in working
with the Corps of Engineers and Iraq reconstruction issues.
I want to thank you for your patience with me today as the
new guy. This is why General Thompson and I have a very good
relationship. Our doors are open. We meet 4, 5, 6 times a day,
and right now what we are doing is we are doing a lot of troop
leading as we have complex executions and many milestones and
other issues that are up on the table for Army acquisition.
So I am here today to have a very candid conversation with
you. I promise to tell you everything I possibly can. I want to
talk openly and candidly. Because I think there is a very
interesting dynamic going on here, just as you said in your
opening remarks, and that is the marvelous legacy systems that
are in theater right now that are performing so well and that,
yes, have to be reset and recapitalized and how they are
transitioning in a linear fashion with the insertion of
additional technologies and ending up hopefully in the future
with the Future Combat Systems. So it is an aggressive path and
together we will have to forge a way ahead.
General Thompson may want to have a few opening remarks.
After that, I would be glad to answer your questions. Thank
you.
General Thompson. Chairman Bishop and Congressman Tiahrt
and Congressman Moran and Congressman Cramer and Congressman
Rothman, I am just glad to be here today and I don't have a
prepared statement that I wish to read. I just want to thank
you for your support in the past. I am glad to be teamed up
with Mr. Popps. Over the last 60 days, we established a very
good working relationship, and I am confident that all the
23,000 members of the acquisition workforce in the Army will
continue to be good stewards of the taxpayers dollars, and we
are prepared to answer your questions today.
[The joint statement of Mr. Popps and General Thompson
follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Bishop. Thank you. Before we start questioning, I
certainly want to ask Mr. Tiahrt if he would like to make some
opening remarks.

Remarks of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just got a few
things I would like to say. And I don't have any prepared
remarks, so I am going to talk from the heart. Both of you are
fine gentlemen. You have had fine careers with the government,
and I respect you greatly. But I have to tell you we have a
procurement system that is broke. It has absolutely been a
travesty in what has been happening.

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

We should have noticed this when the replacement for the
presidential helicopter purchased by the Navy went to a foreign
supplier. We should have known it when the Light Utility
Helicopter went to a foreign supplier. And now with the air
refueling tanker going to a foreign supplier, it is as plain as
the nose on our face. Our system is broke and we have all these
legacy systems that the chairman brought up that are currently
in theater and they are performing very well. But if any of
those replacement systems for those legacy systems came up
today, it would go to a foreign supplier. If we were going to
replace Air Force One today, we couldn't win it because it
would go to a foreign supplier.

ILLEGAL SUBSIDIES

Why would it go to a foreign supplier instead of having
American jobs? It would go there because we don't account for
illegal subsidies. This very company that is providing the
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is currently in court defending
itself against illegal subsidies that USTR is bringing against
it. And by you buying a product from it, you are giving them a
better case. And when the Air Force buys a product from them,
you give the EADS Company, the foreign suppliers, a better case
for these illegal subsidies. We have one branch of the
government saying it is illegal and another branch saying we
don't care, we are getting a good bargain. And we are selling
out American jobs to do it.

LEGAL SUBSIDIES

So our system is broke. Another thing that we don't give
any consideration for is legal subsidies. They get their health
care paid for by the Federal Government. They get their
workmen's compensation paid for by the Federal Government. They
get other benefits for their employees like vacation paid for
by the Federal Government. You require every American supplier
by your cost and accounting standards to put those costs in the
price. There is no way to get around it.

BUY AMERICAN ACT

Another thing that you don't account for is the way you
waive regulations on the Buy American Act. You have a
memorandum of agreement within the Pentagon where you say those
are our allies and we are not going to let them have to put up
with all of this paperwork. But an American supplier, by golly,
the cost and accounting standards say you better comply and you
better account for every nickel you spend complying with those
regulations. Three things that I just gave you that are unlevel
playing ground for our suppliers, for our American workers. An
unlevel playing ground. They can't win. We can't win. We just
can't win in this kind of circumstances. And the last thing
that we should be doing, and it is going to take legislation
because I know you guys don't account for it, when you lose
American jobs you lose American revenue. And American workers
pay Federal income tax. A French worker doesn't seem to pay any
income tax in America. I know there is good legal reasons why
they wouldn't. But we never take that into consideration. And
on the aerial refuel tanker, it is so egregious that it is more
than 10 percent of the total cost of the contract. So a $35
billion contract, when you take into account the lost jobs just
believing the contractors, then you are going to see $3.8
billion in lost revenue. So what does your $35 billion contract
cost the Federal Government? It costs us $38.8 billion. And we
never take that into consideration.
We are losing American jobs and the Department of Defense
is responsible for it in part. So as we come to our questions--
and thank you for the indulgence, Mr. Chairman--when we come to
our questions I have got some very specific questions about the
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) contract and where I think we
have gone wrong.
Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. Gentlemen, let me ask
you some questions about, first, the Future Combat Systems. The
Future Combat Systems program will field 15 FCS brigade combat
teams. 61 brigades will remain non-FCS. What will be the
benefit to the 61 non-FCS brigades of the FCS developed
technology?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. The intent of the FCS program
is to field 15 brigades. But the thing that we are doing with
the FCS is taking the technologies that are available today and
we will spin them out, in our terminology, to the current
brigades, the other brigades that are out there. So we have got
the program structured right now with three different spinouts
to take the technology that is being developed under FCS and
put it with the current force units. Those spinouts will begin
to field in the 2009-2010 time frame for the first spinout. The
second spinout is 2 years after that and the third spinout is
subsequent to that. So what that enables us to do, especially
with the communications infrastructure and the network
infrastructure is be able to have the other 61 brigades
interoperate with the FCS brigades when the FCS brigades are
fielded in full. And we are also looking right now very
aggressively at how do we accelerate even more of the
technologies that are being developed under the FCS into the
rest of the Army.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS FUNDING

Mr. Bishop. Could you field the FCS faster if more funding
were available?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, we could. The way I would
answer that, though, and that is part of what we are looking at
internally because that question has been asked by Chairman
Murtha, who is not here today or at least not right at this
moment. And so we are looking at how we would do that based on
both the technology readiness and also the production base
availability.
Mr. Bishop. Will the FCS capabilities be fielded to Army
units beyond the brigade combat teams?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, they will. Right now the focus
is on the brigade combat teams, but the network capabilities in
FCS clearly have to be part of the rest of the Army because it
is not just the 76 brigade combat teams. There is about 230
other types of brigades in the Army that are the support
brigades that also need to be able to interoperate with the
brigade combat team. So it is mostly the network technologies
that we are looking at. And also one of the major things that
we have done with FCS over the last couple of years is the
armor protection and the survivability protection as a result
of the threats in theater have been largely funded--the
technology funded by the FCS program, but it has been that
level of funding in the FCS program that allowed those
technologies that have allowed us to improve the up-armored
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) now on the
sixth improvement to the armored protection on those, and
really the fundamental underpinning for the protection we put
on the MRAP vehicles as well.

EQUIPMENT UPGRADES

Mr. Bishop. Let me ask you then, would it be advisable or
do you think it would be a good idea for the Army to take a
pause in upgrading the older combat vehicles such as the tanks
and the Bradleys and focus more of the available funding on the
Future Combat Systems?
General Thompson. I don't think a pause is kind of the way
I would put it. There is a need to continually upgrade all of
the systems that are out there. But it is how much investment
and how much capability do you think you need before you go to
the next generation. From a philosophical perspective--and I
say this not just before this Committee, I say it a lot--there
is always going to be probably three or at best two different
generations of technology in ground combat systems, wheeled
vehicles, and helicopters. It is unaffordable to try to put the
latest generation of anything out there across the entire Army.
The Army is just too big, with too many demands, and the pace
of technology is too great.
But in HMMWVs right now, for example, we are on the fifth
major upgrade to the HMMWVs. On tanks we are on our fourth
major upgrade of the tank. We are on our fourth major upgrade
of the Bradley. We have got similar upgrades in our aviation
platforms, and those upgrades need to continue to happen so
that they can interoperate based on the battlefield demands
that are out there today. But it is a question of the right
level of investment in today's forces before we go to the
future with FCS.

RESET

Mr. Popps. Mr. Chairman, if I can kind of amplify an
important point that was brought up about reset and recap,
there is no question that due to the battle damage, battle
loss, and so forth, a certain amount of these legacy systems
that are going to be either in theater or here in depots
organically are going to be reset. And so that is an important
point. A lot of this stuff has to be reset just to work. Don't
confuse that with a full recapitalization, which could go down
three or four levels, which could include the insertion of a
million or $2 million worth of new technology on, say, each one
of these platforms.
So those are the choices as we proceed together as the
Committee and the Army about what are we trying to do here, how
much reset and how much full recap? If you tilt--I am sorry,
sir.

FCS SPIN OUT STRATEGY

Mr. Bishop. In that regard, I guess I was curious to know
whether or not in making those choices you think it would be a
viable plan to spin out the FCS communications, situational
awareness, UAVs and sensor technology to the existing armored
combat vehicle fleets and then defer the development and
production of a new fleet of ground vehicles. Would that be an
appropriate choice?
Mr. Popps. I will let General Thompson give a more
amplified answer. But I think the answer is where we can spin
out and where it makes sense, we are doing so and want to do
so. Because that helps the fight now and it helps those legacy
systems be better than they are. If the question then becomes
do you pause and try to do more on that side and not proceed
with manned ground vehicles, I think as a department we say,
no, we wouldn't want to pause because the future is with the
manned ground vehicles. The future is with the joint tactical
light vehicles, the JTLV, and others. So I think that is our
preferences.
Mr. Bishop. General Thompson?
General Thompson. The spinouts, like I said, Mr. Chairman,
are being looked at on what we can put in the current force
today. The FCS program in simple terms has got manned ground
vehicles, it has got unmanned ground vehicles, it has unmanned
air vehicles, and it has got the network. So those are the four
big parts of FCS, if I can parse it that way. Clearly we want
to put as much of the technology that is available and that can
interoperate with the current brigade combat teams that are out
there, but the key thing for us is the future operational
concept, the way that we see warfighting in the future, and
General Casey mentioned this morning the FM 3-0, which is the
doctrinal template, putting stability operations on an equal
footing with offense and defense.
We see the current environment out there that we have in
Iraq and Afghanistan today to be the way that warfare is going
to face us for the next 20 years. And for us to be able to
fight in that kind of an environment, you want to put the best
capability out there from a materiel perspective. So if you
paused and delayed the materiel solutions that are reflected in
the FCS program, you would not have the ability to fight that
operational concept and that would put our soldiers at a
disadvantage.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Tiahrt.

ILLEGAL SUBSIDIES

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We talked or I talked
briefly about the illegal subsidies and the waived regulations
that give an unfair advantage to the European competitors. Part
of those regulations that the Pentagon has waived for these
NATO allies of ours, these 21 countries that are mentioned in
the memorandum of understanding within the Pentagon, they
include the regulations on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
they also waive the International Trafficking in Arms
Regulations, or ITAR.
Now, this company that you bought this helicopter from, the
Light Utility Helicopter, has been seen and has been reported
in the open news that they have been to the Iranian air show.
Now, part of our government is trying to put an embargo on
Iran. The very same company that you bought this helicopter
from is not complying with us as an ally or helping us as an
ally. They are over there showing them videos about their navy
helicopter and trying to sell helicopters to the Iranian
Government. They have been in Venezuela trying to sell stuff to
Hugo Chavez. We know this for a fact. They have also been in
China trying to sell military products in China. And we caught
them bribing the Saudi Arabians and forced them to back down on
a plane deal with the Saudi Arabians, the very same company
that you are buying this helicopter from.
Did you ever think to check with the CIA or the DIA and say
what are these guys doing in illegal trafficking of arms or
what are they doing with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Because
I think it is very clear that this company would have been
disqualified had you done just a little bit of research in this
procurement.
But instead we offloaded these American jobs to Europe
because they are our allies, and they are cutting us down from
behind. They are circling around, flanking us, and they are
selling stuff to our enemies or at least they are trying to do
it and we know they are trying to do it and we have caught them
trying to do it, and yet we are more than willing to ignore
that, to ignore that they are getting illegal subsidies and go
ahead and buy from them. Why aren't you taking into
consideration these two regulations that are waived and the
corrupt practices that go with them?
Mr. Popps. My answer to you, sir, is that--and I know you
had a former life as an acquisition professional. When you look
at our lane, we are a very narrow lane. And we are subject to
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal
Regulation (DFAR), all of the policies that have been sent down
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And it is very
difficult for us to move outside of those boxes. Sometimes we
can speed a train up or we can make a train slower.

WAIVERS TO ACQUISITION REGULATIONS

Mr. Tiahrt. I know you have a very narrow set of
requirements that you have to live with, and the Federal
Acquisition Regulations are very clear. But this is a
memorandum of understanding within the Department of Defense
that waives these very regulations that allows this company to
get away with it. It is not the intent of Congress, it is not
the intent of the American worker or the American people. It
is--you know, it was somebody in the Pentagon at some point
that said we have got to expand our industrial defense base and
we are going to use our allies in Europe to do it even if it
costs us jobs because we think it is good policy. And the truth
is these guys are undercutting us from behind.
Now, in this contract you also have a manufacturing plan
that says this LUH is going to be built--supposedly eventually
finally assembled in Mississippi but also there were parts
going to be manufactured all over the United States. And the
proposed content for American work was 65 percent. But that
included logistic support, that included training, that
included procedural trainers, engineering services, other
various aircraft kits that go with it. It doesn't include the
manufacturing of the airplane or the helicopter itself. You
have counted everybody else, including, it seemed like, the
dockworker that unloaded this foreign made helicopter off a
foreign ship and the teamster that hauled it to the military
base. It seems like everybody else is included except the
people that make the fuselage itself or the helicopter itself.
I know for a fact that Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas,
was to get the manufacturing of the Light Utility Helicopter,
but EADS said, well, we have got a production line set up now
and it is going pretty good, so we are going to keep that work
back in France.
The ICE Systems in Manhattan, Kansas, makes electronic
systems and wire harnesses. They were in the proposal that was
selected by the Army. It was part of the manufacturing plan.
And EADS said, well, you know, we are doing this work in Europe
now and we think we are going to do pretty well. We are just
going to keep it in Europe.
And the floorboards were made by another company. It is not
Grumman, but it is another company. Kaman, Manufacturing, which
is nationwide. They are in Connecticut mostly. But they were
going to do the floorboards and the firewall in Wichita,
Kansas. That work too was pulled back to France.
I mean, do you take in consideration the manufacturing
plant and hold them accountable for their promises that are a
basis of the judgment to select that product? I mean, it may
not be a requirement. But when you have a PCO and a buying team
looking at this, they are saying, you know, we have all these
American jobs, this looks like a pretty good deal, but it gets
sucked back to Europe.
How do we account for that? How do we hold them accountable
for what they are proposing?
Mr. Popps. I don't know of any contractual way that we can
hold them accountable for that.
General Thompson. They are accountable for the 65 percent
of the components being manufactured in the U.S., and they are
adhering to that, which is in the contract.

U.S. MANUFACTURING CONTENT

Mr. Tiahrt. Excuse me, General. And I apologize, Ross, for
reinterrupting here. But that includes things that are outside
the manufacturing process. When you talk about logistic
support, logistic support is not an EADS thing. That is
somebody that has to be close to the action, right?
General Thompson. Right.
Mr. Tiahrt. So by definition, it is going to be close--the
domestic helicopter is going to be close to the base of the
operator. Training the same way, American pilots, the trainer
has got to be here. Procedural trainer, probably going to be
here. I mean, the things that are included in this U.S. content
of 65 percent, they are not the manufacturing. I mean, it ought
to be 65 percent of the American manufacturing. And I don't
know that you have any contractual requirement, as I recall, to
actually say, well, you are now at 64 percent and we are going
to fine you. I mean, I don't know that you have any mechanism
to hold them accountable. Do you?
General Thompson. I have not looked at the details of the
contract. But based on the discussion we are having here, we
will go back and look at that. But the 65 percent ties back to
statute. I do know that of the 345 aircraft that we plan on
buying, the first 40 were manufactured overseas. The other 305
are to be primarily assembled and manufactured in Mississippi.
The first aircraft manufactured in Mississippi has been
approved by the FAA, so the first one manufactured here has
been done. So they have lived up to that part of the
contractual arrangement.
[The information follows:]

Per Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
225.872-1, the restrictions of the Buy American Act and the Balance of
Payments Program do not apply to end products produced by qualifying
countries. The EADS-NA is a registered Dutch corporation from the
Netherlands, a qualifying country, as is Germany where the aircraft was
initially produced. Although EADS-NA is exempt from the Buy American
Act and is therefore not contractually bound to meet its requirements,
they have instituted a self-imposed goal of 65 percent aggregate U.S.
content. The EADS-NA is working towards this goal by setting up a
duplicate production line in the United States using American labor,
services, and suppliers. The duplication of this production line is on
schedule.

Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Chairman, I can go on a long time, but I
know other people want to ask questions. So thank you for your
indulgence.
Mr. Popps. And, Congressman, if I might, just to add a
thought, there are some things that bound us with these 19 and
21 countries that include treaties that there is just not
anything we can circumvent. And I am thinking of the BAA and
the TAA.
Mr. Tiahrt. You are right, and we need to change some of
those agreements.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. Bishop. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of weeks
ago, Pete Geren directed the Army's existing contract agency to
be replaced by a new command and that new command is designed
to have broad authority over the acquisition of a great many of
the military's purchases. The Army is required to hire about
1,400 additional contracting personnel because its acquisition
workforce is simply too small and poorly prepared to deal
especially with the war in Iraq.
But 5 years into the war we are being told that it is going
to take 2 to 3 years to hire the personnel and another 5 to 10
years before they are properly trained and have enough
experience to handle the contracting job that they are being
set up to handle. The Army command is going to be situated at
the (Army Materiel Command) AMC at Fort Belvoir.
Why does it have to take so long to hire these people? It
seems to me that there is a critical need to do this as fast as
possible, and I don't know why it is going to take 5 to 10
years before they are trained. I understand they will be more
experienced 5 to 10 years later, but why the holdup? It seems
to me we ought to be out of Iraq by the time these contracting
personnel are prepared to oversee the contracts being let to
Iraq.
Go ahead, General. Either one of you can respond if you
would like.
General Thompson. Your numbers are accurate. We are going
to stand up the Army Contracting Command. As a matter of fact
tomorrow will be the standup of that provisional command to
address some of the issues pointed out both by the Gansler
Commission and the work that Ms. Condon and I testified before
this Committee just a few months ago about what we were doing
to look not just with the Gansler Commission but also to look
internally.
The demand for contracting professionals across the Federal
Government has never been higher than it is today. And so part
of the reality is there is a shortage of, last time I looked at
the numbers, of almost 2,000 contracting professionals just in
the National Capital Region. We do think it is probably going
to take us 2 to 3 years to be able to recruit those numbers, I
think 5 to 10 years for them to be trained. That is obviously
to get them a lot of experience. But we think once we bring the
individuals on board, because of the defense acquisition
workforce requirements that are mandated in law, to get
somebody to a Level II certification to be able to do
contracting takes some training and 2 years of experience. So
once I bring somebody on board, 2 years after they are a part
of our acquisition contracting workforce, we think they will be
sufficiently trained to be able to do expeditionary contracting
and, as Congressman Tiahrt knows, that in the contracting world
in particular you get a warrant based on your level of
expertise and based on the level of confidence that your
superiors in contracting have in your abilities. So your
warrant is tied to a certain dollar threshold and certain
complexity of contract actions.
So my short answer would be, yes, it is going to take us 2
to 3 years to be able to bring on 1,400 more people. Part of
that is a reflection that as we are bringing them on you have
also got a lot of the current acquisition workforce that is
getting ready to retire and will retire. So it is not a static
situation. So I am going to have to bring on more than 1,400 in
order to grow it by 1,400. And then I think in about 2 years
after you bring any one individual on, they will be to a point
because we have aggressively looked at where we are going to
train them and how we are going to do that where they can be
able to do contracting for us.
Mr. Popps. And, sir, a context for you. This was a long,
slow decline that is going to take an equal amount of slope to
come back up. To give you a perspective, 15, 16 years ago, the
acquisition in contracting workforce in the Army was
approximately 160,000 people. 15, 17 years later it is now at
42,000 people, with half of those people eligible for
retirement and, since 9/11, anywhere from six to seven times
the workload with regard to contract actions. So it has been a
long slow decline that I assume was part of the peace dividend
and then following 9/11, great increase in loads and in
contract actions, both in modifications and new contract
actions, and that is where we are today.

ACQUISITION MILITARY OFFICERS

In addition, I think General Thompson should tell you a
little bit more about inside the military what is being done to
stand up two or three or four more general officer billets and
also to really create an earlier accession point for
acquisition military officers. It is really considered much
more of a career field than somebody would want to be in and
stay in because there is rewards for higher rank and so forth.
Mr. Moran. General Thompson.
General Thompson. And I appreciate that opportunity. I
mean, one of the things we have done since last August is we
have grown the number of contracting brigades from 4 to 7. We
have grown the number of contracting battalions that we had
planned on having from 8 to 11, and the number of military
contracting teams have grown by over 50 to now 171.
The Army Contracting Command that stands up tomorrow will
be headed initially by a two-star equivalent SES, Mr. Jeff
Parsons, who is an absolutely outstanding contracting officer.
He is a career Air Force officer, retired as a colonel with 26
years of contracting expertise in the Air Force. We don't have
a contracting general officer at the two-star level today to be
able to head up that command. We will in the future.
You know, one of the things that the authorization
committees have asked us is what legislative proposals we are
putting forward, and right now we have gone through all of that
vetting inside the Army and the Army, provided Secretary Geren
agrees with the paperwork that is sitting in his office right
now, at least at the staff level, endorses the need to have
five more general officers to be able to do contracting. We
have given instructions to recent promotion boards both at the
general officer level and at the colonel level to pick the
right people at the senior level to be able to manage
contracting, and then creating the other opportunities gives
you a viable career path, I think, to be able to bring in
quality military and also quality civilians because this is a
recognized career field that has got a lot of potential. So the
only way you bring in good people at the bottom and keep them
there is to give them a growth path so they can see that there
is opportunities at the top.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Kaptur.

ARMY CONTRACTOR WORKFORCE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. I
am wondering if you have the following information.
On the contracted services that we fund through Army, from
information we were given the amount of those contracted
services has gone up 500 percent since the start of the war. We
have now, I think one of you stated or earlier this morning,
there were 190,000 contracted employees inside of Iraq. Is that
a correct number?
Mr. Popps. We will stand by what Secretary Geren told you
initially, ma'am. But I caution you to keep the bends straight
in terms of which contractors and--there is a lot of different
segments there.
Ms. Kaptur. That goes to my next question, which is of
those 190,000, what are they doing? And how many of them are
foreign nationals and from which countries? They said 50
percent of them were foreign nationals, and I was very
interested in having for the record the information on what
those--if you could break those up into categories for me so I
can really understand what--like, what would you guess the
number one category is of contracted employees inside of Iraq?
Mr. Popps. Iraqis.
General Thompson. Iraqis. Well over 50 percent. And I will
pull the information out of one of the notes that I have got
here and maybe I can answer that question for you and not take
it for the record. But it is broken up between U.S. military--I
mean U.S. citizens, which is the smallest percentage, third-
country nationals in Iraq, and then the vast majority, over 50
percent, are Iraqis.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. If you were to take the largest
category of, let's just say, the Iraqis, what are they doing?
The largest category of----
Mr. Popps. Reconstruction.
Ms. Kaptur. So they are involved in reconstruction
projects.
Mr. Popps. Reconstruction, yes, ma'am. Capacity building.
There are currently----
Ms. Kaptur. They are doing that under which companies?
Mr. Popps. It depends, ma'am. It could be under Iraqi
companies. I know that we have made a huge turn in the last 3
or 4 years trying to find Iraqi companies to do the work. In
some cases Iraqi companies will employ Iraqis and they will
employ third-party nationals.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. And then what about--construction is
first and what is category 2? Would you just guess?
Mr. Popps. Capacity building, all kind of services, yes,
ma'am, providing water, food, catering, whatever the life
support system is there, base support services. So what has
really happened is there has been a very concerted move to get
away from American companies, putting Americans in theater to
do high priced things under American contracts. And what has
happened is the value of most of the dollars that has been
spent, have been spent, and have been increased by 10, 20, 30
percent because of the ability to use the local economy. Now
that wasn't true early on because it was hard to identify in
2003 and 2004 just who the local economy was and who you could
work with. But by 2005, 2006, and 2007, that economy has
matured and it has enabled people seeking contractors and
subcontractors to go out and contract directly with the Iraqis.
For instance, the Joint Contract Command for Iraq and
Afghanistan, if it has a water project or a power project or a
primary health care clinic project or something, and they are
free to deal directly with Iraqi contractors.

CORRUPTION IN CONTRACTING

Ms. Kaptur. You know, it is interesting because when we
were over in Iraq about a year ago, we met with our Department
of State officials and AID officials who were pulling their
hair out over the corruption involving contracts that they were
monitoring, working with Iraqi instrumentalities. So I am very
interested in getting the architecture, so I can begin to
ascertain more factual information about how many people you
are stating for us from which countries? And then which tasks
are they performing and the amount of money attendant to those?
So then we can look at those different categories and begin to
answer--get answers to our questions----
Mr. Popps. With one caveat. It is hard for the Army to give
you the complete answer because the theater is so complex and
that answer and all of those statistics really are tracked at
the Department of Defense OSD level who is responsible for
that. So we will try to give you what we have on Army contracts
and people that we know are on Army contracts. But just
respectfully I submit it is a much larger topic that Army
doesn't track.

CONTRACTS FOR FUEL

Ms. Kaptur. Now, are you involved in any oil contracting,
acquisition of oil for any purpose inside of Iraq?
Mr. Popps. Not that I know of, other than perhaps for Army
purposes. I mean, fuel is purchased under the LOGCAP contract
for the forward operating bases and so forth. But other than
operational needs--I mean, are we in business with the oil
people or something?
Ms. Kaptur. Yes.
Mr. Popps. No. No, ma'am. Not that I know of, no.
Ms. Kaptur. So all of the Army fuel comes from Kuwait or
someplace else?
Mr. Popps. It comes from wherever it is contracted for.
Generally under the LOGCAP contract. I would assume--is there
another fuel contract?
General Thompson. Yes. I mean, there may be some things
bought under the LOGCAP contract. But for the Defense
Department (DoD), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the
Defense Energy Support Center has got the global
responsibilities for DoD to purchase fuel in all parts of the
world. So they are the enterprise DoD contractors for fuel. And
so DLA lets all of those major contracts. There may be some
local contracts where something is needed right away. But for
the most part that is done by DLA. I mean, that is something
that has been done for many, many years.
Mr. Popps. But no one is doing their own deals. This is all
centrally managed.
General Thompson. Ma'am, if I can----
Ms. Kaptur. On oil?
Mr. Popps. Yes, ma'am.
General Thompson. Your specific question about the breakout
of the contracting workforce in Iraq, this is end of fourth
quarter 2007, so this data is about 5 months old. But there are
17 percent of the contractors in Iraq that were U.S. citizens,
30 percent were third-country nationals, and 53 percent were
host country nationals, Iraqis.
Ms. Kaptur. Okay. And I would appreciate for the record how
many individuals that is out of the 190,000.
General Thompson. And I have got those numbers both for
Iraq and Afghanistan. And then what we will do is what you
asked this morning to the Secretary and the Chief, is break
those out into what categories those contractors are working
in.
[The information follows:]

According to a recent U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Quarterly Contractor Census, there are 163,591 total contractor
personnel on Department of Defense (DoD) contracts in Iraq. Of
this total 31,325 are U.S. Citizens, 56,368 are Third Country
Nationals, and 75,898 are Local National Iraqis who make up a
majority of our contracted workforce.

CORRUPTION IN CONTRACTING

Ms. Kaptur. Yes. And one of our biggest problems with the
government of Iraq is corruption. So you see where I am going
with the contracts that we are signing with Iraqi companies. I
want to better inform myself and ask--and follow some of these
contracts, quite frankly.
Mr. Popps. And, ma'am, one thing you will take comfort in
is again our contracting agencies deal over there with the
Iraqis. They do not deal in cash. And that I think is part of
the frustrations that the Iraqis might have with us. So you
see, we treat everything like an acquisition program. And if we
are going to purchase services for a water station and so
forth, those vendors are paid by check, they are paid where
everything is accountable for. So there is a great
misconception somehow that we are running around on the economy
using cash and so forth. That is not the case. We do business
there the same way we do business here. No contractor here
would be accepting a cash payment from the United States, and
the same thing doesn't occur there. It does not occur there.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

Mr. Bishop. The gentlelady's time has expired. Let me just
go back to Future Combat Systems again. The Government
Accountability Office released two reports on March 7th of this
year on the Future Combat Systems. One is entitled, quote,
``2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Army's Future Combat
Systems'', and the other is titled, quote,``Significant
Challenges Ahead in Developing and Demonstrating Future Combat
Systems Network and Software''. The GAO found that the
knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short of a program
halfway through its development schedule and its budget. A
demonstration of capabilities falls late in the schedule by our
commitment to production, especially spinouts comes early.
Complimentary programs, including Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) and the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T)
are not synchronized with the FCS and they are having their own
challenges. The requirement for software lines of code has been
re-estimated from 63 million to 95 million lines.
The GAO recommends the Army identify viable alternatives to
FCS. Does the Army have any viable alternatives to FCS?
General Thompson. Sir, I have looked at the GAO report and
I would answer it this way. First off, I have great respect for
what GAO does, and I mean that sincerely, and I know that David
Walker was up on the Hill yesterday and he leaves this week
after his tenure as the Comptroller General, and I think he as
an individual has really taken that agency to another level and
I am really pleased to see what he has been able to do to bring
all of the country's awareness to a higher level and things
like human capital planning and coming to grips with our
entitlement programs, et cetera. So that is my personal public
statement on behalf of the GAO because I really mean that
sincerely.
We have four full-time GAO employees embedded in the FCS
program, and we welcome their insights and I mean that
sincerely, too. Having another set of eyes, auditor eyes for
the most part in this case, pointing out things that we need to
address inside of that program or any program is good. The
Defense Department response back to that GAO report had input
from the Army, and most of the responses back said we concur
with what GAO is saying.
We have a yearly DoD level review on the FCS program
chaired by the Defense Acquisition Executive. We will have one
again this summer and then next year again when we get to the
preliminary design and review stage for the manned ground
vehicles for FCS. All of the issues that are raised by GAO, not
just in this year's report, but since 2004 they have done an
annual report on the FCS program. There is consistency in their
comments, but all of the things that they raise as concerns get
looked at in these very detailed reviews, whether it be
testing, whether it be requirement synchronization, or software
development. And so I am confident that the process inside the
Defense Department addresses these things in a way that
balances cost, schedule and risk.
To the specific report on software, there was a comparison
made between the FCS program, which is designed to put together
an entire brigade combat team of capability and make sure it
works together when it is fielded, and it compared to two
individual airplane programs. That is an apples and oranges
comparison, in my view. You know, 20 million lines of code
versus 90 million lines of code. About 75 to 80 percent of the
lines of code accounted for in the FCS program are either
commercial code that has already been written or government
code that has already been written. It is not new code we are
developing for FCS. And so that is a factoid that sort of
changes the perspective, in my view, on the complexity of what
we are trying to do. Well over 20 million lines of code
accounted for in that 90 million is the Linux operating system.
And so that is a commercially developed operating system, just
like the Windows operating system for Microsoft. And so we are
using the Linux operating system and then integrating other
software things with it.
So while I understand, you know, the GAO concerns, we are
addressing them. I am confident that we have a review process
both internal to the Army and DoD that will address those on an
annual basis. The FCS program in my view is very well managed--
it is very complex. But it is not so complex that we are not
managing our way through it in a very systematic way, balance
and risk.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. Do you have anything to add, Mr.
Popps?

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS TESTING

Mr. Popps. Mr. Chairman, just that we shouldn't forget that
this is among the most tested of programs. So the GAO
implication that somehow we need more testing or not, it hasn't
been enough and so forth, this is among--I think there is
currently 75 tests ongoing.
General Thompson. And those 75 tests that are ongoing are
an indication that we have reached the peak of the research and
development, the funding for research and development will now
start to come down, and the production funding for FCS will
start to go up. And there is a crossover point that we are soon
to reach. The fact that you have got 75 major tests ongoing in
FCS right now is an indication that we are getting ready to
move from research and development into testing, into low rate
production, and then into production.
Mr. Bishop. The GAO kind of keeps us informed of whether or
not we are--we have efficiencies and sort of helping quality
control, isn't it? Make sure that you are doing what you need
to be doing when you need to do it?
Mr. Popps. It does. And I ask you again to remember that we
have four GAO employees embedded within the program.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Tiahrt.

UH-72 HELICOPTERS

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a--EADS has
their helicopter headquarters in Germany and there is a concept
now that we have talked about here in America called corporate
inversion, and it is a tax scheme in which U.S. companies put
their headquarters in foreign countries so they don't have to
pay Federal income taxes. But there is an inverted methodology
to this where foreign companies get a U.S. front company and
then they suck all the profits back to the European nation or
of the foreign country so they don't have to pay any Federal
income taxes.
Do you have any mechanism in place to assure that the money
that is made, the profit that is made off of this program is
converted to Federal income taxes at the appropriate rate?
Mr. Popps. I know of no such check that we have to assure
ourselves of that.
Mr. Tiahrt. So this is another gap in our procurement
policy?
Mr. Popps. It is.
Mr. Tiahrt. All right. Getting more specific to the
helicopter, my understanding is that we--well, I am on the
Interior subcommittee and they were talking to us--the Forest
Service was talking to us about a fire in California, southern
California near a Marine--or a military base. And I think it
was called the Witch fire. And at that time, it had several UH-
72 I think you called them Lakotas. Maybe we should call them
Kaisers----
Mr. Popps. Lakota.
Mr. Tiahrt. Since they are a German company. UH-72 Lakota,
or Kaiser as it could be called.
General Thompson. We name our helicopters, Congressman,
after Indian tribes.
Mr. Tiahrt. I know. I was trying to think of a good tribal
German name that you could use, but none just pops into mind.
So Kaiser will have to do. The Lakota. My understanding is that
during this fire, that the UH-72 was grounded because it was
too hot in the cockpit operating in southern California for
pilots to be in the cockpit comfortably. It just simply got too
hot in the cockpit. And it wasn't because of the fire. It was
because of the ambient temperature outside of the cockpit and
the extra temperature generated by the jet engine itself of the
helicopter. So just in the simple operation of the UH-72, it
became too uncomfortable for pilots to operate it. And I also
understand that there was nothing in the specifications to
maintain a temperature for pilots within the cockpit. So
nothing was going to be done about that. But you guys have come
up with a fix, as I understand it, to put an air conditioner on
it. So now the air conditioner causes you to trade cargo weight
for air conditioner weight. So what compensation was given to
you by the manufacturer for this--what appears to be an
inability to meet specifications?
General Thompson. Well, you are right in your facts that we
did not have an air conditioning system in that utility
helicopter. We do now. They are not all integrated yet, but we
have now got the funding in place to be able to put the air
conditioning systems in all of the aircraft.
Mr. Tiahrt. So you are paying for their inability to meet
spec?
General Thompson. They met the requirement they had to meet
when they initially built them. The helicopters that have air
conditioning systems in them are--are attack helicopters
because they are closed cockpits. The utility helicopters, and
I have to go back and get the exact variance, not all of the
utility helicopters have air conditioning systems as part of
them because they have an ability to open the windows and have
the ventilation inside of the aircraft.
Mr. Tiahrt. Wouldn't it be a requirement, though, for a
pilot to be able to fly a helicopter and here we have an actual
circumstance in which they were unable to do that? It seems
like the ability to fly a helicopter is pretty essential when
you buy a helicopter. So I don't know how this wasn't a
violation of spec. I don't know why we are paying for this air
conditioning. For some reason we ought to have helicopters that
we can actually fly.
Mr. Bishop. Can I get a point of clarification? Are you
saying that the helicopter did or didn't have the specification
for air conditioning originally?
General Thompson. I will go back and check. But the
requirement around which the contract instrument was built did
not require them to put an air conditioner in that helicopter.
Based on those lessons learned, we have now adjusted the
requirement and we are putting air conditioning system those
helicopters.
[The information follows:]

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved LUH (UH-
72A Lakota) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) did not contain a
requirement or specification for an air conditioning system or internal
cooling requirement for the aircraft; therefore, the original Statement
of Work (SOW) as part of the Request for Proposal (RFP) did not have
specifications on cockpit or cabin cooling requirements. Based on the
foregoing, none of the offerors proposed an aircraft with an air
conditioning system as part of their LUH configuration.

Mr. Tiahrt. And we are paying for it?
Mr. Bishop. We have a 15-minute vote, and I think we have
got a little less than 10 minutes now. So I am going to go to
Ms. Kaptur, if you don't mind, Mr. Tiahrt. I think she has one
remaining question and I have a remaining question. And I think
we will close it out at that time.

FUEL USAGE FOR OVERLAND VEHICLES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me
another question. And I will be very brief and just ask in the
same way as I have asked for summary information on
contracting. And we are always happy to provide you backup if
you don't understand the request completely.
I also am very interested in your different classes of
overland vehicles and Bradley fighting, Abrams tank, your
medium tactical vehicle, trucks, MRAPs, Humvees. And I am very
interested in knowing from you how you look upon the power
systems that drive those into the future, how you are thinking
about those in terms of saving energy, the new energy systems
that are being included. For example, I know that is true in
the thinking about a Future Combat System. But I am interested
in how you are looking at the fleets that you purchase in terms
of designing new fuel systems, new power systems.
Do you have the ability, General, to provide that to us and
give us the numbers of vehicles you currently have in that
class, how many you intend to purchase, and how that--I am
interested in the power train. That is all I care about. And
how----
Mr. Popps. And the fuel source?
Ms. Kaptur. Absolutely. Is there a way for you to summarize
that for me? And then attach numbers to those so I can better
order my own thinking around for your overland transportation,
how you are thinking about the Army of the future and how----
Mr. Popps. Not only will we try to do that for you, General
Thompson has something to say to you. But I would like to bring
over some of the more senior members of the Army Science Board
to talk to you in your office about that, because they are
doing a great deal of work on fuel cells, battery energy and
sort of third, fourth, fifth generation stuff that you might
find very interesting.
Ms. Kaptur. Yes.
General Thompson. But holistically, ma'am, you have got
tactical power and you have got installation power. And what I
have asked the Army to do, not just the acquisition community,
but also the requirements community, we need to get our arms
around the many, many initiatives that are going on right now.
DoD has got a number of initiatives ongoing to get after energy
efficiency in the systems that we build. But what I am trying
to do is get my arms around our need for power and energy, both
tactically and installation wise, and how do we maximize the
strategy so that I don't need as much of a demand on fossil
fuel sources in the future.
My previous job at the Tank Automotive Command, a
tremendous amount of research in the hybrid electric. Hybrid
electric is the foundation for the power train in the Future
Combat System. Much work partnered with the automobile industry
up in the Detroit area around fuel cells and the potential that
fuel cells hold for the country.
So we will take that for the record and come back with a
comprehensive answer because it is just too complicated to
answer here.
[The information follows:]

The Hybrid Electric Vehicle Experimentation and Assessment (HEVEA)
effort that began in fiscal year (FY) 2006 focuses on the applicability
of hybrid electric to Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) mobility for
future systems. Ongoing experimentation measures hybrid vehicle
performance and fuel consumption over a variety of military standard
driving courses. The goal is to create physics-based models to use with
realistic driving scenarios as a tool to predict hybrid electric drive
cycle performance and fuel economy supporting future hybrid/
conventional acquisition decisions. The HEVEA program is currently
positioned to support the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
acquisition decision and will continue through FY 2009. The HEVEA
effort has also established HEV test methodology for military
application using accepted industry practices and Department of Energy
processes.
The Power and Energy Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL)
integrates and evaluates hybrid electric architectures including power
generation, energy distribution and control and thermal management. The
SIL enables power and energy components to be evaluated, for example
varying battery technology, and demonstrated in realistic scenarios and
architectures. These evaluations inform acquisition system programs and
component technology developers.
The goal of the assured fuels initiative is to reduce reliance on
fuels derived solely from crude oil by qualifying and then implementing
use of domestically produced alternative fuels at United States
installations. The objectives of this initiative are to expand the Army
technical database on alternative fuels, engage in specifications
development of alternative fuels, and to qualify/certify alternative
jet/diesel fuels for use in Army tactical/combat equipment and systems.
Current efforts are focused on qualifying ``synfuel blends,'' blends of
up to 50 percent by volume Fischer-Tropsch (FT) synthetic fuel with JP-
8, for use in Army tactical/combat ground vehicles. Qualification of
synfuel blends will be accomplished through performance evaluations in
selected engines and limited testing and demonstration of synfuel
blends in equipment and systems. This effort aligns with the synfuel
blends program of the Air Force and similar plans by the Navy. Synfuel
blends qualification has not yet started for Army-unique aviation
platforms.
The Fuel Efficiency Demonstrator (FED) focuses on demonstrating the
viability of significant decreases in fuel consumption, without
sacrificing the performance or capability, of tactical vehicles. This
would be accomplished by integrating potentially high-payoff fuel
efficient technologies and advanced lightweight materials in new and
innovative designs. The FED effort began in FY 2008 and is scheduled to
continue through FY 2013. Successful technologies may be incorporated
in future procurements for the JLTV.
The high power, high energy density lithium-ion battery effort
investigates manufacturing process improvements in the areas of
automated electrolyte filling, cell winding, bussing, closing,
electrical formation, and battery packaging. This FY 2004 through FY
2009 effort is also seeking to implement built-in quality control
procedure inherent at the production line to insure cell consistency
and improved yield. Finally the effort seeks to improve the
affordability of high power and energy density battery packs for HEVs.
Within the Army, we have basically two classes of vehicles--tracked
and wheeled. As a rule, we buy complete systems from contractors that
use commercially available engines to meet our performance
specifications. These engines meet current fuel efficiency and emission
standards at the time of the contract award. We try to keep the same
engine in the vehicle over the life of the contract for commonality
purposes. The Army does not develop engines for its ground vehicle
systems with the exception of the Abrams engine. Future Army vehicle
requirements document will have fuel efficiency as a key performance
parameter (KPP).

VEHICLE MATRIX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-hand
System Commercial engine thru 2008 Programmed in FYDP Fuel efficiency (KPP)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abrams................. No--Gov't developed 5,827 Only modernization of No
engine w/Textron existing models.
Lycoming AGT 1500.
Bradley................ Yes--Cummins............ 6,421 653..................... No
Stryker................ Yes--Caterpillar........ 2,443 1,132................... No
HMMWV.................. Yes--GM................. 121,000 27,244.................. No
FMTV................... Yes--Caterpillar........ 34,326 20,502.................. No
HEMTT.................. Yes--Detroit Diesel 13,978 3,469................... No
Caterpillar.
PLS.................... Yes--Detroit Diesel 3,965 1,580................... No
Caterpillar.
HET.................... Yes--Detroit Diesel 3,218 1,157................... No
Caterpillar.
M915................... Yes--Detroit Diesel..... 7,766 541..................... No
MRAP................... Yes--Caterpillar 12,000* 0....................... No
International Cummins.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*planned.

Ms. Kaptur. I thank you, gentlemen. This morning my chief
question was on power, and both at installations--I don't know
if you were here this morning. I don't think you were.
General Thompson. I was.
Ms. Kaptur. You were. Okay--as well as the vehicular side.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for allowing me those
questions in the record.
General Thompson. That is a great question, ma'am.

UNFUNDED ITEMS LIST

Mr. Bishop. I have got a question on the unfunded items
list. General Casey recently provided to the congressional
defense committees a list of items that are currently unfunded
that the Army would accelerate if additional funding were
available. Under cover letter, General Casey states that the
list focuses on funding Army National Guard shortfalls of dual
use items.
General Thompson, could you explain what is a dual use item
and whether or not the Army regularly procures hardware with
dual use applications in mind? And the list that was provided
to the Committee is in alphabetical order. Could you provide a
list that is in order of priority? And, finally, tell us why it
is that all the unfunded items are with the National Guard.
General Thompson. Dual use are things that can be used from
an operational perspective to meet a warfighting capability and
also can be used for homeland defense. For example, trucks,
engineering equipment, some of our radio systems are obviously
used in a warfighting scenario, but also can be used in
homeland defense. That is my definition of how I describe dual
use.
The list that was provided, it is not all shortages in the
National Guard, and it is in alphabetical order and not
priority order. We have acquisition objectives, how many of the
different types of things that we need to fill out our units we
would like to buy. And so that list is the reflection that you
have got a viable program today where, if more money was
available, you could buy some of those. And that is what is in
that unfinanced requirements list. But it is not all National
Guard equipment.
Mr. Bishop. Could you provide for the Committee, could you
just organize that list in terms of your priorities so that the
highest priority is first on the list so that if we do have
additional funding we can try to fund it in accordance with the
priorities?
General Thompson. Sir, the Army G-3 and trade-offs are
involved in setting the priorities. The acquisition community
doesn't do that. We will take that one back and look at that
list and see if there is a need to prioritize it. But that is
not something that we would do. The G-3 would.
Mr. Bishop. Could you pass it on to the appropriate folks
and let them know that the Committee is interested in having a
priorities list?
Mr. Popps. Yes, sir. We will take that on.
[The information follows:]

The Army's most critical unfunded requirements (UFRs) for FY09
focus on Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment shortages for dual-use
items. This UFR list was approximately $3.94 billion.
The original ARNG equipment UFR list has been modified by the Army
to account for substitutions for seven unexecutable lines on the
original list. The result is a slight decrease in the UFR, which is now
identified to be $3.93 billion. The adjusted ARNG equipment prioritized
UFR list is enclosed.
All lines on the current UFR list will have a positive impact on
ARNG readiness. The acquisition of this equipment will enable the ARNG
to train to a higher level of proficiency to meet both state and
federal missions while simultaneously supporting current overseas
missions. The most critical of the dual-use items are trucks (High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and Heavy Expanded
Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs)). The ARNG's on-hand quantity of
trucks is at a critical all time low. The receipt of trucks will have
an immediate impact on readiness and mission effectiveness.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Popps and General Thompson, for
your testimonies. It has been very helpful.
At this time the Committee stands adjourned until 10:30
a.m. tomorrow morning.
[Clerk note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)

Question. The Army has lost, in Iraq and Afghanistan, a significant
number of Kiowa Warrior helicopters, the current Armed Reconnaissance
helicopter. The new helicopter, the replacement for the Kiowa Warrior,
is finally in production after suffering approximately a one year slip.
Twelve ARH will be built with fiscal year 2008 funding. The fiscal year
2009 ARH program calls for the production of 28 helicopters.
Today, what is the shortfall in Army armed reconnaissance
helicopter fleet, that is, how many of the older Kiowa Warrior
reconnaissance helicopters is the Army short?
Answer. Current force structure requires 368 Kiowa Warriors in the
fleet; Army has 335 aircraft today. We are short 33 aircraft. There is
currently no production line capability for Kiowa Warriors for
replacement aircraft. The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) is the
planned replacement for Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopter.
Question. What is the status of production of the 12 funded ARH
aircraft?
Answer. The Army intends to seek the Defense Acquisition
Executive's approval to procure 10 aircraft at a Restructure Defense
Acquisition Board in July 2008. These aircraft will support the Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation planned for June 2010. The fiscal year
2008 appropriations bill language provided for procurement of 12 ARH,
however, $174.6 million appropriated for ARH only funds 10 aircraft.
Question. Has the Army taken delivery of any of the 12 ARH funded
in fiscal year 2008?
Answer. No, deliveries for the first 10 ARHs are planned from
November 2009 to June 2010.
Question. When will we see the new ARH operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Answer. Initial Operational Capability for ARH is scheduled for
January 2012. This will be the first ARH squadron ready for deployment
into an operational theater.
Question. The Army has requested funding for 28 ARH in the fiscal
year 2009 request. Is the program on track to build those 28 aircraft,
and over what time frame will those 28 aircraft be delivered to the
Army?
Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2009 request will allow the Army to
proceed with production of the 28 ARHs. The scheduled deliveries will
occur from July 2010 through June 2011.
Question. The U.S. Special Forces fly an armed reconnaissance
helicopter different than the aircraft the Army is buying. Why not fly
the same small, armed reconnaissance helicopter as U.S. Army Special
Forces?
Answer. The Army source selection process resulted in the selection
of the aircraft that best met the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved Capability Development Document.
Question. The ARH was originally proposed as an off-the-shelf
commercial helicopter with integration of the necessary military
hardware. Integration of military hardware has proven to be very
difficult. What was the initial planned unit cost for the ARH, and what
is the unit cost now?
Answer. The initial Average Procurement Unit Cost in base year 2005
dollars was $7.582 million. Based on the current program office
estimate, the current Average Procurement Unit Cost is $8.859 million
in base year 2005 dollars.

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)

Question. The Army's new light utility helicopter, called the UH-
72A, Lakota, is intended to provide general aviation support for
continental United States based aviation units of the active and
reserve components. As UH-72A aircraft become available for missions
such as MEDEVAC, the UH-60s will be freed up for combat unit
assignments.
How many aircraft are currently on order, and how many have been
delivered?
Answer. To date, 85 UH-72A Lakota aircraft are on contract and 24
aircraft have been delivered.
Question. The fiscal year 2009 request is for $224.5 million to buy
36 aircraft. When will these aircraft be delivered?
Answer. These 36 LUH aircraft are scheduled for delivery during
fiscal year 2010.
Question. What is the total acquisition objective? How many will go
to the active Army and how many to the reserve component?
Answer. The total LUH acquisition objective is for 345 aircraft.
This is an increase of 23 aircraft from the original acquisition
objective of 322 aircraft. The active Army will receive 145 aircraft
and the reserve component will receive 200 aircraft.
Question. So far all the UH-72A helicopters have been assembled in
Germany. When will assembly operations transition to facilities in the
United States?
Answer. Currently, seven of the 24 aircraft that have been
delivered to the Army are ``made in the US'' aircraft. Of the total
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) 345 aircraft, 305 will be made in the
US and 40 will be made in Germany. However, from the beginning of the
program, a portion of each UH-72A has been accomplished at the new
American Eurocopter Facility in Columbus, Mississippi to include
assembly, customization, paint, testing, and delivery. The EADS is in
the process of duplicating the entire German Eurocopter EC145
production line at American Eurocopter in Columbus, Mississippi. The
plan for transitioning LUH production is a phased, event-driven
approach consisting of overlapping Light Assembly Line (LAL), Full
Assembly Line (FAL), and Production Line (PL) phases. The FAL
operations are underway and PL operations will begin in April 2009. It
is important to note that the phased, event-driven production
transition and the phase-in of US sourcing is on track and is not
impacting on the Army's required delivery schedule. Production is now
increasing to four aircraft per month and all deliveries have been
ahead of schedule.
Question. Which units have received UH-72A helicopters thus far and
what is the near term fielding plan?
Answer. The UH-72A Lakota has been fielded to the National Training
Center (NTC) MEDEVAC at Fort Irwin, California; the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Flight Detachment at Fort Eustis, Virginia;
and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The
Army National Guard is scheduled to receive their first aircraft in
June 2008 at Tupelo, Mississippi.
Question. The UH-72A has had some difficulties with too much heat
in the cockpit due to the large glass bubble area and a lack of
ventilation or air conditioning. The Committee has been informed that
in some instances flights have been curtailed or limited due to
potentially over heating critical flight instruments. What is the
status of developing and fielding a solution for cockpit over heating?
Answer. The cockpit and cabin heat issue identified during the
Initial Operational Test (IOT) has been resolved. All aircraft will
have an approved ventilation kit and Environmental Control Units (ECUs)
that will be installed on all MEDEVAC and VIP versions of the aircraft.
All aircraft fielded now have the ventilation kits installed and ECUs
are in the process of being installed on the National Training Center
MEDEVAC and TRADOC aircrafts and will be completed by mid-May 2008.
Question. While using UH-72A helicopters for MEDEVAC operations at
field locations such as the National Training Center (NTC) problems
have been encountered with sand ingestion into the engine causing
unexpected wear. What has been done to solve the sand ingestion
problem, and why was the Army seemingly caught off guard with
encountering sand in places such as the National Training Center?
Answer. The EADS-North America and American Eurocopter began
development of an Engine Inlet Barrier Filter (EIBF) as a result of
customer input from commercial operations in similar environments. The
Army anticipated some long-term effects of the harsh desert environment
of the National Training Center, but the Army did not think the
environment would affect the aircraft as quickly as it did. The
confirming results of the Initial Operational Test (IOT) at the
National Training Center expedited the final development of the EIBF
that is now being installed on an aircraft destined for the NTC. This
aircraft is scheduled to be evaluated at NTC in late May 2008. After
the evaluation, all the fielded NTC aircraft will be retrofitted as
well as future aircraft fielded to NTC.
Question. Is the UH-72A performing in a manner that is sufficiently
acceptable for the Army to continue with procurement of the aircraft?
Answer. The UH-72A performance is exceeding all expectations.
Monthly aircraft deliveries have been ahead of schedule, the fleet
operational readiness rate has exceeded 90 percent, proving the success
of full Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) and all cost, schedule, and
performance metrics have been met. The UH-72A Lakota is critically
needed to replace the aging UH-1 and OH-58 aircraft that remain in the
active Army and the reserve components. The UH-72A is needed by the
Army National Guard to perform critical Homeland Security Missions and
will allow UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft to be shifted to tactical units in
support of the warfighter. The UH-72A Lakota program is a sterling
example of a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) acquisition for a military
application and remains a cornerstone of the Army's aviation
transformation.

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)

Question. The Joint Cargo Aircraft or JCA is planned to satisfy the
near battlefield cargo mission with greater speed and range than
helicopters, freeing up helicopters for other missions, and replacing
aging C-23s and some of the Army's C-12s.
The Army has five JCA on order and the 2009 request for $264
million will fund procurement of another seven aircraft. The Committee
is informed that the Army plans to procure a total of 54 Joint Cargo
Aircraft. As the program matures and deliveries begin, do you
anticipate a growing requirement for JCA?
Answer. Yes. At present, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is
identifying a requirement for a limited number of JCA. The SOCOM
submitted an Unfunded requirement (UFR) for two JCA in the FY09 budget.
The program office is not aware of any other emerging JCA quantity
requirements.
Question. Is the first JCA on track for a November 2008 delivery?
Answer. Yes, the JCA is on-track for an on-time delivery.
Question. The JCA is a joint Army and Air Force project. How are
the Army and Air Force versions of the JCA different?
Answer. Both services are procuring the same version of the C-27J
(Joint Cargo Aircraft).

CH-47 Chinook Helicopter

Question. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes funding for
16 new-build Chinook helicopters, and conversion of 23 older CH-47D to
CH-47F.
Will the 16 new-build helicopters replace aircraft that are being
retired or are you expanding the Army helicopter fleet?
Answer. The Army requirement is 513 Chinooks, which includes 452
CH-47F and 61 MH-47G aircraft. The current inventory is 458 Chinooks.
These shortages are in active and Army National Guard units. The 16
new-build aircraft will allow the Army to alleviate a portion of the
current aircraft shortage.
Question. The budget request includes funding to convert 23 CH-47Ds
to become CH-47Fs. What are the key difference or upgrades, and how
much of the old aircraft is salvaged to become part of the CH-47F?
Answer. The CH-47F Chinook is a major improvement over the CH-47D.
The CH-47F upgrade includes new machined airframes, a digital cockpit,
enhanced air transportability, reduced airframe vibration, an upgraded
aircraft survivability equipment suite and a digital automated flight
control system. The major dynamic components (e.g., gearboxes,
transmissions, blades, hubs) are harvested when the CH-47D aircraft are
inducted for conversion to the CH-47F. These components are then
recapitalized, to bring them to a like-new condition, and installed on
the CH-47F aircraft on the production line.
Question. The Chinook helicopter has been around for over 30 years.
Should the Army be looking for opportunities to leap ahead in
helicopter technology, lift, speed and all weather performance?
Answer. The Chinook has been a workhorse for the Army for the past
40 years. The CH-47F meets or exceeds all the current Army requirements
and is anticipated to be the heavy lift helicopter for the Army for the
next 20 years. The Army and Air Force are jointly developing a
requirements document for a Joint Heavy Lift aircraft. That aircraft
will be likely be a super short or vertical take off and landing
capable aircraft that will lift over 20 tons. That requirement is still
in the early stages of development and any resultant development
program would not begin fielding aircraft until the 2020 timeframe.
Even if a Joint Heavy Lift aircraft is developed and fielded, the Army
will continue to have a requirement for a Chinook-sized aircraft and
the CH-47F will fill that requirement.
Question. The Army had decided to produce all the new CH-47Fs with
the Common Avionics Architecture System of cockpit instrument display.
This was the system developed for Army Special Forces, and it was to be
the standard for all Army helicopters. The Committee is informed that
the Special Forces design has proven to be unnecessarily complicated
for the rest of the Army and that a redesign is needed. What is the
status of the cockpit display redesign and is that effort fully funded?
Answer. The cockpit has performed exceptionally well and there is
no indication that the cockpit is overly complicated or in need of a
redesign. The cockpit was flown by representative Army pilots during
operational testing and determined by the Army and Office of the
Secretary of Defense independent evaluators to be operationally
effective and suitable. The Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS)
equipped aircraft met or exceeded all operational requirements. To
date, the Army has fielded two operational CH-47F units and flown over
4,000 hours with the CAAS cockpit. Users at every level have been
pleased with the performance and capability of the CAAS cockpit.

Stryker

Question. The budget request for fiscal year 2009 proposes $1.1
billion for procurement of 119 Stryker vehicles, including 40 Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicles; and 79 Mobile Gun
Systems.
The Army had scheduling problems last year in that the unit
selected for field testing of the Stryker Mobile Gun System was
deployed in the surge. Has the necessary user testing been accomplished
and is the program approved to move ahead?
Answer. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) on the
Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) was successfully completed in November
2007. Funding for the Stryker MGS to move forward is pending our
compliance with Section 117 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). The U.S. Army is in the
process of fulfilling that requirement at this time.
Question. What is the status of executing the Stryker funding for
the current fiscal year, 2008?
Answer. The Stryker program expects to execute the majority of
funding for fiscal year 2008 between June-July 2008. The strategy
involves using the cost advantage gained through vehicle contract
efficiencies by combining program base funding and supplemental funding
contract awards within a 60 day period. With the fiscal year 2008 main
supplemental expected in June 2008, this provides a window of
opportunity from June 2008 through August 2008 that will allow a
potential cost savings of up to $45 million on planned Stryker vehicle
procurement. An additional $860 million in survivability enhancements
will also be obligated upon receipt of the main supplemental.
Question. The Committee is informed that the Army intends to
replace many of the M113 series vehicles, the work horse ``Armored
Personnel Carriers'' that are Viet Nam War vintage, with Strykers and
that replacing M113 MEDEVAC vehicles is a priority. Does the Army have
the necessary funding to procure the requisite number of Stryker
MEDEVAC vehicles to replace the M113s?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) President's Budget does not
provide funding for any Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicles (MEV) to
replace M113 ambulances. It provides necessary funding to complete
Mobile Gun System (MGS) and Nuclear Biological and Chemical
Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) requirements for the base Stryker
program which includes 7 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, the Ready to
Fight Fleet, Equipping Force Pool, and other Training and Doctrine
Command and testing requirements. Additionally, it provides funding for
procurement of 15 NBCRVs to begin FOX vehicle replacement.
However, the FY08 Global War on Terrorism request provides funding
for 231 MEVs to replace M113 Ambulances. Additional funding will be
needed to procure 670 more Stryker MEVs to replace the remaining M113
Ambulances in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams.
Question. Does the Army plan to add additional Stryker brigades to
the Army?
Answer. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), like all of the
Army's BCTs, are performing superbly in Iraq. Stryker Brigades provide
our combatant commanders a unique combat capability that ranges across
the full spectrum of military operations. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
fit into the Army Force Generation Model the same way as Heavy and
Infantry Brigade Combat teams do. Each of our Brigade Combat Teams
(Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker) is capable of full spectrum operations.
The Army's current plan is to build seven Stryker Brigade Combat teams;
six in the active component and one in the National Guard
(Pennsylvania). The Army recently received additional authority to
build 6 new BCTs. The Army continuously reassesses the mix of BCTs--
Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry--with analysis underway that will consider
the existing requirements, current operational demand, and our
assessment of the future capabilities needed to meet the strategy.
Additional maneuver BCTs of any type--Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry--will
likely reduce the Army's stress and begin to rebuild strategic depth
and flexibility.

Land Warrior

Question. According to the description in the Army's Weapon System
handbook for fiscal years 2007 to 2008, Land Warrior is a first-
generation, integrated, modular fighting system that uses state-of-the-
art computer, communications, and geo-location technologies to link
dismounted Soldiers to the digital battlefield. The Army equipped the
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, of the
2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington with Land Warrior to
conduct a comprehensive assessment of the system during that
battalion's tour in Iraq. By all accounts, Land Warrior performed well.
Basically, Land Warrior is a digital data sharing and
communications device that solders wear as part of their battle
uniform. Please expand on that limited description. What does Land
Warrior do for the soldier? How heavy is it?
Answer. Land Warrior is a 10 lb modular, integrated Soldier leader
system. It enhances the lethality, battle-command capability,
survivability, mobility, and sustainability of dismounted combat
Soldiers, enabling them to engage and defeat enemy targets while
minimizing friendly casualties. Land Warrior facilitates command,
control, and sharing of battlefield information and integrates Soldier
leaders into the Army Battle Command System network.
There are several components that make up the system. They include
a wearable, ruggedized computer; a Soldier Control Unit performing the
same functions much like a mouse we use on our personal computers; a
radio that transmits both voice and data; a navigation system that
provides Global Positioning System (GPS) location as well as dead
reckoning when not receiving a GPS signal when the Soldier is inside a
building or in dense vegetation; there is a Helmet Mounted Display that
shows map data, still satellite imagery, and the location of the
Soldier and his fellow Land Warrior in relation to the map or imagery;
the system incorporates a Close Combat Optic, Thermal Weapons Sight,
Daylight Video Sight, and a Multi-Function Laser and interfaces with
the M4 carbine and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon. The system is
powered by a rechargeable lithium-ion battery.
Question. General Thompson, what has been the feedback on the use
of Land Warrior in combat in Iraq?
Answer. The feedback from the field has been positive. It has made
the unit, 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, equipped with the
Land Warrior System more effective. Small unit leaders such as Platoon
Leaders have indicated that the situational awareness provided by the
system is a combat multiplier.
It gives these leaders the ability to plan and conduct operations
in terrain that they have never been in before, because of the
situational awareness that it provides. The confidence they have to
conduct operations in such conditions is increased because they know
where they are. They know where their other friendly elements are, and
they know where the enemy is. They can quickly adapt to changes in the
situation or the terrain as they take place.
It improves their mobility with the capability to identify
obstacles when encountered and quickly transmit that information over
the network so that it is displayed on other Land Warrior systems and
Combat Platforms, such as the Stryker, and the obstacle can be breached
or bypassed more rapidly.
It has improved their lethality with the ability to mass fires on a
target. Again, this is a direct result of the information that is
quickly transmitted over the network about enemy locations.
The Land Warrior system has proven to be a combat multiplier by
increasing battle command, lethality, and improving mobility.
Improvements in these areas have increased Soldier's survivability.
Question. The Land Warrior program has been cancelled, with no
funding requested for the program in 2008 or 2009. Based on positive
feedback from soldiers in Iraq, might the Army consider resurrecting
the Land Warrior Program?
Answer. There is certainly a need for a Land Warrior like system.
The capability that the Land Warrior provides has been proven and there
is a very strong basis of support by the 4th Battalion of the 9th
Infantry Regiment using the system in Iraq today. The strategy is to
move forward with this capability.
The concept would be that the next thing we need to do is equip a
Brigade Combat Team. The Brigade Combat Team would train with the
equipment as a part of their pre-deployment training and also as a part
of our process of preparing forces and certifying them for deployment.
They would then deploy with this capability.
We have a request in the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental Adjustment
for $102 million. That amount is approximately what it takes to equip
one Brigade Combat Team with this capability.
Question. Does the Army plan to equip additional units that are
bound for Iraq with the available sets of Land Warrior?
Answer. We have requested $102 million in the fiscal year 2008
Supplemental Adjustment. That amount is approximately what it takes to
equip one Brigade Combat Team with this capability. This request is a
direct result of an approved operational need that has been identified.
This funding will allow us to build, equip, train, and certify the unit
prior to their deployment early next year. We will continue to evaluate
additional requests for the equipment based on operational needs.
Question. Is Land Warrior fully compatible with FCS?
Answer. The Land Warrior system was designed to connect to the Army
Battle Command System using the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-
Below (FBCB2) network and the tactical internet enabled by the Enhanced
Position Locating Reporting System (EPLRS). We are leveraging this same
technology in the early phases of Future Combat System (FCS) and during
the experiments that are now being conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas
involving the first spinouts from the FCS program. Later this year some
Land Warrior systems that are currently deployed in Iraq will take part
in these experiments once they are returned from theatre. The Land
Warrior system will be interoperable using the same interfaces that
other FCS non-spinout combat platforms will use to connect to the
network.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)

Question. The budget request includes nearly $1 billion to procure
5,065 HMMWVs. The procurement would be a mix of armored HMMWVs and
armor-ready HMMWVs.
With the fielding of MRAP vehicles to accomplish many of the
functions requiring an armored tactical wheeled vehicle, and with so
many up-armored HMMWVs already purchased, why does the Army need so
many additional armored HMMWVs?
Answer. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are not
a replacement for the Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAHs). The MRAP Vehicles
augment the UAH fleet in theater. There is still a fleet requirement
within the Army for UAHs, both in and out of theater, and will be for
the foreseeable future. Additionally, the washout rate for an UAH in
theater is approximately 3.5 years and battle losses are approximately
125 vehicles per month.
Question. The total program for the HMMWV calls for 170,944
vehicles. Will that number be reduced as more MRAPs are fielded?
Answer. The current HMMWV Objective Table of Organization and
Equipment (OTOE) is 166,154 vehicles and the Modified Table of
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is 140,709 vehicles. The Army
anticipates that the HMMWV requirements in theater will decrease as
more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are fielded. We do
not, however, anticipate reductions in HMMWV requirements outside of
theater because the MRAP does not have the capabilities required to
fill the vast majority of HMMWV mission sets. The ongoing Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) and Program Decision Memorandum II/Combat and
Tactical Vehicle (PDM II/CTV) studies will identify those mission sets
and roles the MRAP can fill across the TWV and Combat Tactical Vehicle
fleets.
Question. Please explain for the Committee the characteristics of
new model HMMWVs, the XM1211; XM1212; XM1213 and XM1214?
Answer. The XM series (ECV2) is an improved version of the HMMWV
designed to achieve the objective capabilities defined within the
current HMMWV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) requirements. It
is not a new start system. It is being developed as an option to gain
back the performance, protection and payload the current HMMWV lost as
a result of adding armor (Fragmentation Kits (FK)). The current HMMWV
has a Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW) of 12,100 pounds (lbs), but it
currently weighs approximately 15,400 lbs with armor, Objective
Gunner's Protection Kit, and additional installed equipment. This is an
additional 3,300 lbs of GVW with no payload remaining. The XM series
will have FK5 equivalent integrated armor, a GVW of 17,000 lbs, and
have a payload of 1,800 lbs.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP)

Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and
Explosively Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could
be applied to the HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type
trucks to provide greater force protection.
General, what is the current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs?
Answer. The current Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) for MRAPs is
10,000 systems (based on the September 2007 interim requirement). A new
interim requirement for MRAPs of 12,000 systems is currently in
staffing. The final requirement is dependent on many factors, including
future actions taken by the enemy.
Question. How many MRAPs does the Army have currently fielded in
Iraq; and how many in Afghanistan?
Answer. As of 10 March, 1,434 MRAPs have been fielded to Iraq and 8
to Afghanistan. Additional MRAPs are fielded weekly.
Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal?
Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by
October 2008 and field them by December 2008. If a new interim
requirement of 12,000 is adopted, it is anticipated that these systems
could be produced by February 2009 and fielded by April 2009.
Question. Do the MRAPs as currently fielded protect against
Explosively Formed Penetrators? Will additional armor be added to the
MRAPs?
Answer. The MRAP family of vehicles provides Warfighters multi-
mission platforms capable of mitigating Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs), underbody mines and small arms fire threats which are currently
the greatest casualty producers in the Global War on Terror. In almost
50 IED and Direct Fire events, there have been a few minor injuries and
unfortunately one fatality. In a classified session, we can provide you
the details of the incidents.
Question. How have the MRAPs been received by soldiers, and how
have the MRAPs performed in terms of mobility and utility; and how have
they performed when they have been attacked by various threat weapons?
Answer. The majority of MRAPs have been operational for a
relatively short period of time (approximately 90 days), so the initial
feedback is just beginning to filter in. It is clear that MRAPs are
providing significant increase in Soldier Mounted Protection and saving
lives. We have tracked almost 50 incidents and experienced one
fatality.
MNC-I Commander: ``MRAP fielding has provided a decidedly positive
impact on crew survivability.''
2-502nd IN: Soldiers are very confident operating in this vehicle
because of the known improvements in armor protection; this leads to
more aggressive operations along routes less traveled.
Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPs?
Answer. Theater is evaluating the operational mix of MRAPs. The
final mix is still to be determined.
Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded?
Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint
Program Office reports sufficient funding to procure up to 12,000
systems.
Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in
Iraq is over?
Answer. The Army continues to work with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Staff to meet Joint Force Theater Commanders'
requirements for MRAP vehicles.
The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy is an ongoing effort to
ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground
wheeled vehicles to meet emerging threats.
The MRAP is being integrated into the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle base
strategy to balance Performance, Payload, and Protection. We are taking
steps to identify their long term role. One example is approximately
1,000 MRAPs are planned to fill new Route Clearing capabilities in
Engineer and Explosive Ordnance units.

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)

Question. The Congress appropriated just over $3 billion for FMTV
trucks in fiscal year 2007. The DoD Appropriations Act for fiscal year
2008 provided $1.8 billion for FMTVs. The Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2008 included, in the bridge fund, $146 million. Another $2.7
billion is under consideration in the main fiscal year 2008
supplemental. The fiscal year 2009 request proposes $290.5 million for
3,171 trucks and 2,743 trailers.
General Thompson please update this Committee on the status of
execution of the fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds that have been
appropriated for FMTV.
Answer. Of the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) $3,089 million appropriated
amount, 31 percent has been executed. The remaining will be executed in
April 2008. Of the FY08 $1,986 million appropriated amount, one percent
has been executed. The remaining will be executed in June 2008.
Question. Is the FMTV program experiencing production delays?
Answer. No.
Question. Is all appropriated and requested funding executable or
will the Army attempt to reprogram funds out of the FMTV program?
Answer. Yes. All appropriated and final Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) requested funds for the FMTV Program are executable.
Question. What is the status of the FMTV contract in terms of
planned extensions or new competitions?
Answer. The Army plans to award a one year sole source contract
with one year option to the current manufacturer in fiscal year 2008
(FY08). In FY09, the Army will award a three year competitive
requirements type contract. To avoid a break in production, the Army
will award a sole source contract to the current manufacturer to allow
for the new contractor to ramp-up its production.

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)

Question. Congress provided nearly $650 million for SINCGARS radios
in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act
provided $149.6 million for SINCGARS. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental
funding request proposed $2,248 million for SINCGARS. However, the
Congressional Defense Committees have recently expressed concerns that
the Army may be continuing with dated technology and that opportunities
may exist to satisfy communications requirements with more modern and
enhanced capabilities.
To what extent are SINCGARS radios Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS) compliant?
Answer. The SINCGARS is interoperable with JTRS. The SINCGARS
Waveform is one of the JTRS core waveforms and is a Key Performance
Parameter.
Question. Could the Army greatly increase the utility of tactical
radios by procuring radios that have multi-band capability and can
operate both military and wave forms commonly used by first responders
to enhance cooperation between National Guard units and first
responders? Are such radios available?
Answer. The Army has already procured in excess of 70,000 PRC-148
Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radios (MBITRs) which can interoperate with
State and Federal first responders. The PRC-148 MBITR has the APCO-25
waveform and operates in the spectrum of land mobile radios (LMRs) used
by state and federal agencies. Additionally, the Army has procured over
65,000 LMRs which are APCO 25 compliant.
Question. The Army Science board recently reported that the Army
should move away from SINCGARS to procure software-defined, Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) capable radios. Do you concur?
Answer. SINCGARS for what it does is the best radio for full
spectrum operations until JTRS is available. While both the Harris PRC-
152 and Thales PRC-148 are Joint Tactical Radio System compliant
multiband radios they cannot meet the specifications of the JTRS
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). For instance they cannot
cross-band, can only operate on one channel at a time, and the HARRIS
VRC-110 will not physically fit in some of our Combat Platforms (i.e.
Stryker, Abrams and Bradley).
Question. Is it time for the Army to prepare a new Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) and proceed with a new competition for
tactical radios?
Answer. The Army has reviewed the SINCGARS ORD and determined it
still meets the requirement for a combat net radio capable of full
spectrum combat operations. The Army is in the process of competing the
next SINCGARS procurement to the specifications of the ORD.

Abrams Tanks

Question. The Abrams tank has been around for about 30 years. The
budget request for fiscal year 2009 proposes nearly $700 million for
Abrams tank modifications and upgrades.
Does it make good economic sense to continue to upgrade a fleet of
vehicles that dates back 30 years?
Answer. Yes. The Army is equipping and modularizing 30 Heavy
Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) plus Grow the Army (GTA) (1 HBCT + 3
Combined Arms Battalions (CABs)), which includes the Abrams Main Battle
Tank. The Abrams Tank is one of the Army's highest priority
recapitalization combat vehicle programs. Although the Abrams Tank has
been in the force for 30 years, it continues to be the premier main
battle tank and will continue to play a key role in the front line
fighting force through 2050, complementing the Future Combat Systems
(FCS) BCT. The Army's vision is to maintain the viability and combat
effectiveness of the Abrams Tank through 2050. Therefore, it is
necessary to continue updating the Abrams fleet to ensure it provides
combat overmatch while remaining survivable, lethal, and sustainable.
As such, the Army intends to continue future critical RDT&E investments
in the Abrams Tank. When FCS begins fielding to the Active Component
(AC) in the fiscal year 2017 time frame, the M1A2 SEP will begin
cascading to the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the M1A1 fleet will be
cascaded out of the force.
Question. How will the Abrams tank fleet benefit from the advances
in technology that come from Future Combat Systems research and
development?
Answer. The planned Future Combat Systems (FCS) technology
insertions to the Abrams Tank will enable the Abrams Tank to maintain
combat overmatch and fight alongside FCS within the future battle
command structure, while operating within a common logistic structure.
The following are examples of planned FCS technology insertions to the
Abrams Tank: FCS Full Battle Command; System Computing (hardware and
software); Sensors; Network Transport Layer and Network Architecture;
Active Protective System (APS); Armor; and Line Replaceable Modules.
Question. The Committee is aware that the Army will have
essentially two Abrams tank fleets. Some tank-units will have M1A1
Abrams, and the rest will have the more capable M1A2 System Enhancement
version. Please explain the key differences between the two types of
tanks and the Army's plan for allocation to active and guard units?
Answer. The key difference between the M1A1 SA and the M1A2 SEP v2
tank is that the ``M1A1 SA is an Analog based system'' and the ``M1A2
SEP v2 is a Digital based system.'' Although both the M1A1 SA and M1A2
SEP v2 are equipped with a 1553 data bus, the M1A1 SA analog based
system is not capable leveraging the full capacity of the 1553 data
bus. The M1A2 SEP v2 is capable of leveraging the full capacity of the
1553 data bus. Another key difference between the two systems is that
unlike the M1A2 SEP v2, the M1A1 SA has no Commander's Independent
Thermal Viewer (CITV). The CITV on the M1A2 SEP v2 allows the tank
commander to employ the ``hunter/killer target handoff'' capability
between himself and the gunner.
The Army's allocation to the Active and National Guard units are
provided below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heavy Brigade Combat Teams M1A2 SEP v2 M1A1 SA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active....................... 16 2 Modularity
Endstate
ARNG......................... 1 6
Pre Positioned Stock......... 2 1
Equipping Force Pool......... 1 1
ARNG HBCT.................... ........... 1 Grow the Army
Initiative
ARNG Combined Arms Battalion. ........... 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

When FCS begins fielding in the FY17 time frame, the M1A2 SEP v2
fleet will begin cascading to the ARNG and the M1A1 SA fleet will be
cascaded out of the force.
Question. The fiscal year 2009 (FY09) funding request includes $351
million to upgrade M1A1s to the M1A2 SEP version. For the current
fiscal year, 2008, the base appropriation requested no funding for the
Abrams Upgrade program, but the Army requested $1.3 billion in
supplemental funding of which $225 million was provided in the bridge
appropriation. What is the long term plan for Abrams upgrades and will
the Army continue to depend on large supplemental appropriations to
fund the program?
Answer. No. The Army has fully funded, in the base budget, the
remaining Upgrades from FY09 through FY12 via the M1A2 SEP Upgrade MYP.

Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BFV)

Question. The Bradley program recapitalizes earlier variants of the
Bradley to A2 Operation Desert Storm variants, and to A3 variants.
What are the key differences between the two variants of the
Bradley fighting vehicle?
Answer. The key differences between the M2/M3A3 and ODS SA are the
lack of a Commander's Independent Viewer (CIV) on the ODS SA, and the
level of digital capability between the two variants. The CIV allows
the commander to employ the ``hunter/killer target handoff'' capability
between himself and the gunner, allowing greater situational awareness
and lethality for the crew. Also, while both variants have a digital
backbone (1553 data bus), several of the ODS-SA turret sub-systems
still communicate via analog channels. The M2/M3A3 is a fully digitized
system.
Question. How are the two variants allocated between active
component brigade combat teams, and Army Guard brigade combat teams?
Answer. The Active Army is allocated 16 M2/M3A3 Heavy Brigade
Combat Teams (HBCTs) and two (2) ODS-SA HBCTs. The National Guard is
allocated one (1) M2A3 HBCT and six (6) ODS SA HBCTs. Army Pre-
Positioned Stock (APS) is allocated two (2) M2/M3A3 HBCTs and one (1)
ODS-SA HBCT. The Equipping Force Pool is allocated one (1) M2/M3A3 HBCT
and one (1) ODS-SA HBCT. This allocation meets the approved HBCT
Modularity Endstate of 20 M2/M3A3 HBCTs and 10 ODSSA HBCTs. For the
Grow the Army Initiative (GTA), one (1) ODS-SA HBCT and three (3) ODS-
SA Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) have been allocated. Fielding of the
ODS-SA will begin in FY09. Finally, as FCS units are fielded, the A3
fleet will be cascaded to the Guard and the ODS SA fleet will be
cascaded out of the force.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heavy Brigade Combat Teams M2A3 ODS-SA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active....................... 16 2 Modularity
Endstate
Guard........................ 1 6
Pre Positioned Stock......... 2 1
Equipping Force Pool......... 1 1
Guard HBCT................... ........... 1 Grow the Army
Initiative
Guard Combined Arms Battalion ........... 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. For fiscal year 2008 the Army requested $140 million in
the base request, plus a total additional amount of $1.6 billion
between the bridge and main supplementals. For fiscal year 2009 the
budget request proposes $180 million in the base request. Will the Army
again depend on a large supplemental funding amount to support the
Bradley program?
Answer. No, not as large as the FY 08 supplemental (about 75
percent less). The FY09 supplemental request is for $394.8 million,
which procures 94 M2/M3A3s.

Army Pre-Positioned Sets (APS)

Question. The Army drew upon pre-positioned equipment sets to
sustain initial combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired
and replaced in pre-positioned sets only to be dawn out again for the
surge.
What is the readiness posture of Army pre-positioned sets (APS)
today?
Answer. The APS equipment is a proven enabler of the Army's ability
to rapidly project forces into an area of operations. Currently, most
of the Army Prepositioned Stocks are employed in support of the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT). However, the remaining APS equipment continues
to be in a high state of readiness and the Army has unit sets afloat
that support port opening operations as well. The Army has an APS
Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment
required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the Combatant
Commanders. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the
maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility.
Question. What is the time line to have all the pre-positioned sets
returned to their desired readiness?
Answer. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the Army has
an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the APS
Strategy 2015. The current approved timeline will reconstitute all of
the Army APS sets by the end of FY15, contingent on available resources
and operational requirements.
Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-
positioned equipment sets?
Answer. Future Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) APS fielding
will be based on the results of Training and Doctrine Command's
(TRADOC) Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and the ability to meet all
Army priorities. The current priority of fill for MRAP is for units
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring
Freedom (OIF/OEF) and not APS. As of April 6, 2008, the Army has
received 22 percent of its scheduled MRAP fieldings. As this fleet
matures in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), the Army will review the
vehicles' performance over time. In accordance with the APS Strategy
2015, APS sets will have Wheeled Augmentation Sets comprised of armored
wheeled vehicles which are currently up-armored High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).
Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the
uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are pre-
positioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of action
to take the equipment from the pre-positioned sets and use it to outfit
modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army brigades?
Answer. The last four years have demonstrated that the APS program
is flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to deploy
forces in support of Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements and adapt
to changing strategic requirements. Army Prepositioned Stocks are a
proven valuable strategic asset of the U.S. and enable the nation to
rapidly project power in order to deter the actions of any adversary.
Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of modular Brigade
Combat Teams and Grow the Army effort limits the ability to rapidly
reinforce forward units by air movement. The Army remains committed to
maintaining an APS pool of equipment in order to meet current
contingency planning requirements.
Question. In November 2007, the Army announced a new Army Pre-
positioned Stocks Strategy 2015. Please outline the new strategy, and
what are the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009?
Answer. APS Strategy 2015's equipment sets provide a balanced suite
of global capabilities which will foster the Army's rapid deployment to
both combat and Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) operations. The
end-state for APS Strategy 2015, illustrated in the attached diagram,
consists of five APS sets. APS-1 consists of Operational Project stocks
to support both Homeland Defense and Combatant Commands. APS-2 consists
of one Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) set to support European Command
(EUCOM), African (AFRICOM) and Central Command's (CENTCOM) areas of
responsibility (AOR). APS-3 consists of two Infantry Brigade Combat
Team (IBCT) sets with up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) and/or Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP)
wheel augmentation sets, two Sustainment Brigade sets and two
ammunition ships which are multi-apportioned to support PACOM, AFRICOM
and CENTCOM's AORs. APS-4 consists of one HBCT, one Sustainment Brigade
set and Army watercraft to support Pacific Command's (PACOM) AOR. APS-5
consists of one HBCT set with an up-armored HMMWV and/or MRAP wheel
augmentation, one Fires Brigade set, two Sustainment Brigade sets, and
Army watercraft stationed at Kuwaiti Naval Base. APS-5 also includes an
Infantry Battalion set with a Forward Support Company (FSC) with an up-
armored HMMWV and/or MRAP wheeled augmentation set in Afghanistan to
support CENTCOM's AOR.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Revised chart removed ``rotational units'' in APS-2 & 4, changed
ASF-V to ASFIII, HBCT symbols have been updated.
To meet the timelines of the APS 2015 Strategy, the Army requested
$317.5 million Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and $102.2 million
Army Working Capital Funds (AWCF) funds in the FY09 Base Budget for
APS. We are only funded for the operations we need. All funding
requests were adjusted to show issue of sets or current status of Ship
Leases. The FY09 Budget provides the following support:
APS-1--($31.5 million) Funds operations at Army
Sustainment Command to manage APS and maintenance and storage of
Operational Projects IPDS, LAMS, Force Provider, Water Support Systems,
and Bailey Bridges at Sierra Army Depot.
APS-2--($13.4 million) Funds operations to maintain
limited equipment and ammunition at Livorno Italy and Medical Supplies
at Pirmesans, GE to include support to War Reserve Stocks for Allies--
Israel.
APS-3--($156.7 million) Funds operations to maintain
equipment for the Port Opening Package and funds lease operations of 1
LMSR for the Port Opening Package, three LMSRs in Reduced Operating
Status--10, two ammunition container ships. Funds personnel to begin
the reset of equipment and secondary items for APS upload that will
occur in FY10. It does not pay for the two remaining LMSRs we
downloaded and placed in Reduced Operating Status--30.
APS-4--($58.5 million) Funds maintenance and operations to
maintain the full unit sets and operational projects in Korea, Japan
and Hawaii. OPROJs will be filled using FY08 and FY09 Supplemental
funds.
APS-5--($57.4 million) Funds reset of the PTDO IBCT and
planned reset of the HBCT. Funds the $12M annual Oman Access Fee.
WRSI--($102.2 million) Funds buys of potency and dated
items (mostly Medical) that need to be replaced in APS-4 and
Operational Projects. Funds buy of APS-2 ASL/PLL/UBL stocks. Buys
upgrades in Medical sets currently on-hand in Korea.
With the continued support of the Congress to fully resource the
Administration's budget requests for Army equipment, the Army will be
able to return equipment to pre-positioned stocks by 2015.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, March 13, 2008.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NAVY POSTURE

WITNESSES

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS

Opening Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. The committee will come to order.
Let me welcome the three of you to the committee, and
compliments on the way you handled the LCS. You got industry's
attention. And what we talked about before the hearing is so
important to try to work it out so that we can buy one of them,
the quantity. And I don't know how hard it is to fit in your
budget, but we do the best we can do, but your recommendations
make it easier for us.
We look forward to hearing your comments about whatever you
want to talk about. We are concerned about the Navy because we
have got so far behind in shipbuilding, so we would be
interested to hear how you are going to proceed. And I expect
to overcome or get to 313 ships.
Mr. Young.

Opening Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to forgo an
opening statement, but I want to tell a quick story that I
think will make everybody in the room feel good.
A young soldier donated bone marrow to save the life of a
patient through the bone marrow program that we created here.
The soldier, after he recovered from that bone marrow
extraction, was deployed fairly quickly to Iraq, and he was
assigned to a demolition team, to a group of marines. He called
us the other night and said, you know, he said, I was out on
patrol, he said, we hit a real really scary, difficult
situation. He said, I have never, ever seen anybody respond as
quickly, as efficiently, as effectively as those Marines. And
he said that his life's goal now is to finish out his time in
the Army and become a Marine. He couldn't get beyond telling us
how those Marines reacted and how just how great they were. He
is singing your praises, sir.
General Conway. Thank you.

Summary Statement of Secretary Winter

Mr. Winter. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today. I am here to present the Department of the Navy's
plan to support our Sailors and Marines in their mission to
defend our Nation against current and future challenges. The
President's fiscal year 2009 budget will assist the Navy and
the Marine Corps in accomplishing their complementary and
reinforcing missions, while building capabilities necessary to
meet future threats.
One of the primary responsibilities of our government is to
provide for the Nation's defense. Those responsibilities
include the critical requirements to organize, train and equip
our Naval forces. For the vast majority of citizens, the only
cost imposed on us is financial. America is able to provide for
the national defense with such a minimal impact on the
citizenry because we are blessed to have among us a generation
of people, patriots all, who volunteer to serve. They are the
ones who bear many hardships, accept many risks and go in
harm's way.
The pay and benefit funding levels in our 2009 budget
reflect the compensation levels necessary to continue to
attract and retain quality personnel in the Navy and the Marine
Corps. Furthermore, although we are doing well in our overall
recruiting and retention numbers, I emphasize the need for
special pays and bonuses to meet critical subspecialty needs
such as our requirements for nurses, physicians and GWOT-
stretched communities, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal
personnel.
It is because of the hard work of our Sailors and Marines
that we are making progress, fostering maritime security,
defeating terrorist networks, progressing towards a stable
Iraq, supporting the Afghan Government, countering piracy and
proliferation of deadly technology, rendering humanitarian
assistance and strengthening partnerships around the world.
Our Sailors and Marines have responded when called and
superbly perform their many missions in our Nation's defense.
It is truly an honor and a privilege to work with them and to
support them as their Secretary.
The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2009 budget meets
the challenge of resourcing the Navy and Marine Corps team
across a range of missions from partnership building to combat
operations. It invests in our ability to operate, sustain and
develop forces that are engaged in the Global War on Terror
while preparing the force for the challenges and threats of the
future.
We are requesting a total of $149 billion, a 7 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2008 baseline. This increase is
driven by factors such as rising oil costs and a critical
comprehensive growth of the Marine Corps.
Our fiscal year 2009 budget reflects three key priorities
which are consistent with those of previous years. They are,
first of all, to prevail in the Global War on Terror; secondly,
take care of our Sailors, Marines, their families, and
particularly the wounded; and lastly, prepare for future
challenges across the full spectrum of operations.
To help meet our first priority, prevail in the GWOT, we
are adapting our force for current and future missions to
include growing the Marine Corps, shaping the force by
recruiting and retaining the right people, and addressing
critical readiness needs. Among our most critical readiness
needs is the ability to train our Sailors and Marines for the
threats that they may encounter.
Unfortunately, our Navy has encountered increasing
encroachments in our ability to conduct critical training. We
recognize that there are on occasion impacts on the citizenry
at large associated with such training, but these are necessary
costs that are critical to the defense of our Nation. We take
extensive precautions to minimize the impact of our training.
We owe it to the American people, and we owe it to those
who serve to acknowledge that as in all things in life, there
are competing interests and trade-offs, and that we treat the
risks of sonar operation at sea or the impact of jet noise the
way we treat all public policy issues, balancing risks and
costs against legitimate national security interests. I commit
to you today that I will continue to keep you apprised of legal
challenges and their implications for readiness that we face
over the course of the coming year.
Mr. Chairman, if in the future we are unable to properly
train our Sailors and Marines, we will have failed to do our
duty to them and to the American people.
Another critical issue I would like to highlight concerns
doing right by those who go in harm's way. As Secretary of
Defense Gates has stated, apart from the war itself, we have no
higher priority than to take care of our wounded. Our wounded
warriors and their families deserve the highest-priority care,
respect and treatment for their sacrifices. Our 2009 budget
honors our commitment to ensure that our Sailors and Marines
receive the appropriate care, training and financial support
that they need.
Finally, to meet the challenges of the future, the 2009
budget provides for a balanced fleet of ships, aircraft and
expeditionary capabilities with the fighting power and
versatility to carry out blue- green- and brownwater missions
wherever called upon. Furthermore, I would like to note that
consistent with our commitment to ensure affordability and
timely delivery of capabilities, we have launched an
acquisition improvement initiative to provide better
integration of requirements and acquisition decision processes;
improve governance and insight into the development,
establishment and execution of acquisition programs; and
formalize the framework to engage senior Naval leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the strong support this
Committee and the Congress at large has given our Navy and
Marine Corps team. I want to thank you on their behalf. Our
Navy and Marine Corps is a strong, capable and dedicated team.
I appreciate the opportunity to represent them today, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Secretary Winter follows:]

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Mr. Murtha. Admiral Roughead.

Summary Statement of Admiral Roughead

Admiral Roughead. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young,
distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of our
600,000 Sailors, civilians and families, I appear before you
today.
Together with Secretary Winter and General Conway, I am
privileged to be a part of the leadership team that is
committed to our Nation's safety, security and prosperity.
Today our Navy stands ready with the agility, the flexibility
and the confidence to do what no other navy in the world can
do. Four weeks ago we successfully and temporarily converted a
portion of our sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense program to
engage a failing satellite.
Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense is here, it is real,
and it works. But that is only part of what your Navy does for
the Nation. We are exercising our new maritime strategy every
day, a strategy that is far more than just a glossy brochure.
Our carriers are projecting power in the Arabian Gulf, our
destroyers are demonstrating our resolve in the Mediterranean,
an amphibious ship is engaged in piracy operations on the east
coast of Africa, and another is delivering humanitarian
assistance to the west coast of Africa. Our frigates are
intercepting drug traffickers in the Caribbean Sea, our
Riverine forces are patrolling vital infrastructure on the
Euphrates River in Iraq, and our submarines patrol silently
around the globe.
We have 118 ships and over 58,000 people on deployment out
and about doing the work of the Nation. But as you so well
know, our operations come at a cost to our people, our current
readiness and the future Fleet, and those are my three
priorities. Our people, our Sailors, our Marines and their
families know they have your support. We must continue to
invest in their futures and in the young men and women of
America who will follow in their wake.
In the context of this generational war, it is imperative
that we continue to care for our wounded warriors and support
the health care needs of all of our Sailors and Navy civilians.
Likewise, your support for the critical skills reenlistment
bonuses has enabled us to retain the Sailors that we need.
Supporting our future force cannot be done without
readiness to fight today. To this end, quality shore
installations, responsive depot-level maintenance facilities
and unfettered ability to train responsively are necessities.
Where area access and shore support is denied, the Commandant
and I have been moving forward together with the sea-basing
alternative. These elements are essential to support our Fleet
Response Plan, which has enabled us to meet requirements and
will sustain us through the requested temporary carrier force
level adjustment.
Of my three focus areas, building tomorrow's Navy to be a
balanced, appropriately sized force is the most immediate
imperative and challenge. Fiscal realities, however, have led
us to assume more risk in shipbuilding, ship operations and
weapons. Achieving the 313-ship floor at current funding levels
will require us to improve processes, collaborate with industry
and make difficult decisions in the near term.
I am pleased that the first two DDG 1000 contracts have
been awarded. Our surface combatants are an essential element
of our force, and it is important that we do not deplete the
combatant line as we build toward 313 ships.
I remain strongly committed to funding those programs that
provide critical capabilities to our forces. There is no
substitute for the Littoral Combat Ship in closing the littoral
capability gap. Current F/A-18 Hornets are needed to assuage a
2016 strikefighter shortfall. Surface combatant superiority
will be maintained through DDG-51 modernization. Multimission
maritime aircraft will recapitalize our maritime patrol
antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and sea-based Ballistic
Missile Defense will ensure future theater and national defense
and enable access for our Joint Forces.
These critical programs for our future Fleet require
appropriate disciplined investment now. The 2009 budget and its
associated force structure plans will meet our current
challenges with a moderate degree of risk. Clearly we have many
challenges of which building tomorrow's Fleet is the greatest,
but with these challenges it is our opportunity to have a
balanced and global Fleet which will defend the Nation and
assure our prosperity for generations to come.
On behalf of our Sailors, our Navy civilians and our
families, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
you and for all the support for our Navy today and our Navy of
tomorrow. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you.
[The statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]

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Summary Statement of General Conway

General Conway. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I pledge to always
provide you with forthright and honest assessments of your
Marine Corps. I bear that in mind as I come to report to you on
the posture today of our Service.
In your written statement, I provided you a list of
priorities that would enable your Corps to best serve our
Nation's security interests both today and in the uncertain
future. But, in brief, our young warriors in combat are my
number one priority. Those magnificent patriots have been
extremely effective in disrupting insurgents and the al Qaeda
in the al-Anbar Province.
In the spirit of jointness, I must note that it is not just
Marines; rather Marines, Sailors and Soldiers are composite
over time that has brought success in the al-Anbar. Your
Marines are still supporting the surge in Iraq where we have
already shifted from population to protection to transitioning
security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces, and they
are actively stepping up to the task.
In answer to the most recent call from the Secretary of
Defense, we are also deploying more than 3,400 Marines to
Afghanistan. Your Marines will assist a joint force in either
gaining or maintaining momentum there. We fall in on our
expeditionary ethos of living hard and fighting well as part of
an air-ground team. This deployment will keep us at surge
levels well into October.
I have just returned from a visit to Iraq and Afghanistan,
and, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to report to you that
your Marines are demonstrating an amazing resiliency in the
face of multiple deployments to dangerous lands. In spite of
one-to-one deployment-to-dwell regimen that has virtually no
chance of getting better until the fall, the factors that we
track monthly to determine the health of the force, and those
include desertion and UA rates, suicide, divorce, child or
spousal abuse and reenlistment rates, are all as good or better
than they were in 2001.
We do have a significant issue with our families. Simply
put, they are proud of their contributions to this war, but
they are tired. We owe it to those families to put our family
service programs onto a wartime footing. For too long our
programs have been borne on the backs of volunteers, perhaps
acceptable during peacetime, but untenable during a protracted
conflict. The Congress has been exceptionally supportive,
enabling us to make good on promises to do more.
Of course, we look well beyond today in our obligation to
the Nation, and we have learned lessons of trying to build the
force as we fight. In our response to a clear need, we are
growing the Corps to 202,000 Marines. We do this without
lowering our standards, and we are ahead of our goals. During
the last fiscal year, we needed to bring aboard 5,000
additional recruits. We actually grew 7,000 additional Marines,
96.2 percent of them high school graduates.
But more than just manpower, this growth requires training,
infrastructure and equipment to meet the needs of our Nation.
You have helped us meet those requirements with steady support
and encouragement, and for that we certainly thank you.
The Marine Corps retains the mission to provide the multi-
capable force for our Nation, a two-fisted fighter, if you
will, able to destroy enemy formations with our air-ground team
in a major contingency, but also able to fall back on our hard-
earned irregular warfare skills honed over decades of conflict.
By far the most complex of our congressionally mandated
missions, amphibious operations require deliberate training and
long-term resourcing to achieve a high level of proficiency.
The operational expertise, special equipment sets and
amphibious lift are not capabilities that we can rapidly
provide in the face of a threat.
Finally, on behalf of your Marines, I extend great
appreciation for your support thus far, and I thank you in
advance for those efforts on behalf of your brave Service men
and women in harm's way. I assure you that the Marine Corps
appreciates the increasing competition for the Nation's
discretionary resources and will continue to provide a tangible
return on every dollar spent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to comment.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much.
[The statement of General Conway follows:]

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NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Murtha. Let me start out by saying that, you know, it
is one thing to talk about how we support the families. We have
put $400 million, this subcommittee did, last year. The Defense
Department cut that back to $240 million. I mean, that doesn't
look like it is supporting the families the way we think they
should be supported. They have inadequate facilities in many
places, they have inadequate counseling in many places. We do
the best we can between this subcommittee and the members of
this subcommittee, we try to make sure--we know how important
the families are to the members themselves that are serving
overseas. And it is discouraging when the Iraqis aren't
stepping up putting their money in, the Europeans are not
stepping up putting their money in. And the United States
taxpayer keeps putting more money into these--$343 million a
day.
But infrastructure is something we are going to try to do a
little bit more for, medical infrastructure, this year. We are
going to transfer money to the Military Construction
Subcommittee; also for just regular infrastructure. But the
shortages that we see and that you are talking about have to be
taken care of. But we hope we will be able to get started in
that direction this year. We see a change in direction. We want
to look past Iraq into the future because there is nobody more
than the Navy that prevents a war. You can deploy quickly, you
can deploy to an area where they understand the might and
military impact of the United States. And with the equipment
the shape that it is in, it is going to be more difficult.
For instance, I don't even need to ask you if we can get to
313 ships at the numbers that the administration is sending
over because it can't be done. And so we are going to add some
ships, or at least we are going to recommend to the
subcommittee that we will add some ships, to what you folks
have been able to--what OMB has been able to let you recommend
to the committee.

MARINE CORPS TRAINING

But let me ask you a question, Commandant. How long does it
take you to train somebody for amphibious warfare? What would
you say if you stop training from the current type training you
are doing and you start training for amphibious warfare, the
conventional-type operations?
General Conway. Sir, the issue is training certainly. But
the larger issue is trainers, for years, and my coming up
through the Corps, we always had this cadre of people who are
very well experienced in amphibious operations, kind of the old
hands who had been ship's company and had done multiple
operations or exercises. Those folks are steadily leaving us.
And we are not creating that cadre of trainers behind them. So
that is my larger concern.
It has been four years now since we have done major
amphibious exercises. I think it will be at least four years
before we can gain back some of that level of expertise and get
to a level of comfort to the point where that once again
becomes a core competency. And I may be optimistic thinking
that it is a one-for-one exchange. It may be worse than that.

CG(X) CRUISER

Mr. Murtha. This is a problem that we have when we are
training for this type of warfare and yet looking ahead trying
to get past. So one of the things that I worry about, repairing
equipment, nobody has done more than this Committee trying to
put in enough money for reset and rehabilitation. While I am
looking ahead, I am thinking to myself, if we don't start
buying new equipment, if we don't start getting past this and
buying the new equipment, we will never get to the point where
we need to get where we have less maintenance costs, less fuel
costs.
The Army came to this Committee about the FCS. Well, I have
always been worried about FCS because it is $160 billion, and I
don't see how we will get there. Well, they are trying to come
up with a way they can cut back on some of the reset and get to
the newer equipment, which reduces maintenance costs, reduces
fuel costs. One of the proposals we have had is jump right over
the destroyers and go to the cruisers which would be nuclear
power. Yet it is impossible to get there, from what I
understand, just because of the ship--the need to have an
industrial base. In fact, we wouldn't have any ships in some of
the shipyards. Is that a possibility at all?
Mr. Winter. Mr. Chairman, there are several aspects
associated with the ongoing DDG 1000 program. First of all, it
is a very different ship than what we envision for the cruiser.
It is the one mechanism of providing naval surface fire support
to the Marines. And it is an ongoing activity that is very, I
think, well planned and well established and critical to
maintain in terms of ensuring that the industrial base is able
to continue to evolve. At the same time, we need to make sure
that we set the right groundwork for the cruiser development in
the future.
We are still going through the analysis of alternatives
associated with the CG(X) program. I think the process is a
good one. I think the right questions are being asked. We also
need to make sure that we take the time to answer those
questions before we just run right into the development of that
program, sir.
Mr. Murtha. I hear two stories. One is that the nuclear-
powered cruiser will save us a lot of money in fuel costs, and
yet the up-front costs are so much, it would take 25 or 30
years to make up for that initial cost. Is that accurate?
Mr. Winter. Well, sir, I think there is still a question as
to what the break-even point would be. That is highly dependent
on the cost of oil, and numbers have been bandied about from
everything from $100-a-barrel oil, which is basically where we
are right now, to $300 a barrel of oil, depending upon what you
see is the future. And I can get estimates all over the map.
Depending on who I talk to, you will get estimates all over the
map. Depending on who I talk to, you will get different break-
even points.
The other issue is that in the commercial world, I could go
out in my old life and borrow money to be able to accommodate a
cost savings in the future. We can't quite do that here. And so
the additional costs associated with nuclear power for any of
our surface combatants would come at the expense of other top
line.
One other point I would make is that we know how to deal
with nuclear power. We have got a tremendous track record, and,
in fact, at this point in time, roughly half of the reactors
operational in the United States are operated by the Navy. At
the same time, I will tell you it takes a while to configure a
reactor plant for a vessel, and it does provide some
significant constraints. It is a lot easier to put a nuclear
reactor in a large ship like a carrier than it is to be able to
do it in a more volumetrically challenged vessel like a
destroyer or a cruiser.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

NAVY SONAR TRAINING

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Murtha in his statement and one of his questions
emphasized the importance of the Navy, and there is no doubt
the importance of the Navy not only to Navy and the Sailors,
but the Marines onboard the ships. And the mission of those
ships is extremely important. But protecting those ships so
they can perform the mission and protecting the crews onboard
the ships is important.
Brings me to the subject of training. We have seen in
recent times where we lost the training areas in Vieques, for
example; we have lost bombing ranges for one reason or another.
And now we are about to lose training areas for sonar; sonar
which is very, very important to protecting the ships to do
their mission and to protect the troops onboard.
You had an appeal to the Federal appeals court recently.
Your appeal was rejected. I assume that you are not going to
give up without a little more of a fight, considering the
importance of sonar training to the protection of our Navy.
Mr. Winter. Sir, I fully anticipate that we will be
submitting a brief shortly for the Supreme Court to appeal the
matter at hand associated with the southern California
operating area.
Mr. Young. Who will handle that? Will the Navy handle that,
or will the executive branch----
Mr. Winter. Department of Justice has the official
responsibility for the actual matters. We have a dedicated team
within the Department of the Navy within the General Counsel
Office, supported by the JAG Corps and the operational Navy
staff, providing the technical support to that activity.
Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, what will be the impact if you
lose that appeal?
Mr. Winter. I think that the impact could be very
significant in terms of providing a series of constraints on
our ability to train. Sonar is, I believe you know, and I would
like to make sure everyone else does understand--is a
phenomenology that in Iraq's, if you will, environment, sonar
operation depends upon where you are, what the water column
looks like, what the seabed looks like. And training of the
Fleet needs to occur in areas that mimic, if you will, the
operating areas that we expect to be encountering in our
future. Without the ability to fully engage in that training, I
think we would be hard pressed to argue that our Fleet was
prepared to deal with the future threat.
I would also note that the training activities that we
engage in take place over extended periods of time. It is not
just a matter of turning on a sonar, getting a quick reading
and deciding that you have got something worked. The engagement
between the submarine force and the surface force that is
trying to deal with it takes place over a long period of time.
The interruption of that training, even if a whale or other
marine mammal is seen at a great distance, can have a
significant impact on the integrity of that training exercise.
And so we have a lot of concerns. We believe we have put
forth a very good program right now. We have a series of 29
mitigation measures that we have operationally employed now for
several years, and these measures call for surveillance of the
test area, continuing observation, looking for marine mammals,
and a very studied approach of reducing power, and, if
necessary, turning off the exercise if a marine mammal gets too
close. That approach, that set of mitigation measures, has
proven to be very effective, and we have not had a single
documented case of injury or death to a marine mammal since
those measures have been put into place. To further build upon
those and to keep on constraining the test regime further and
further, which seems to be an approach desired by some out
there, I think would hurt us significantly. And I ask CNO to
comment.
Admiral Roughead. The challenges that are being posed by
new designs of submarines are significant. They are becoming
quieter, they are getting smaller, they do not have to come up
and recharge their batteries as often as submarines in the past
have had to do. They are difficult targets. And they are also
proliferating at a significant rate.
We estimate that in the next two decades the submarine
inventory in the world will increase by 50 percent, and that
poses a challenge to the sea lanes of the world. We must be
able to practice. We must be able to train. But we also have to
be able to train in those areas that allow us to not only
practice our antisubmarine warfare skill, because an adversary
is going to throw everything they can at us--they are going to
throw their submarines at us, they are going to attack us with
cruise missiles, with airplanes, with other ships, and that is
why we have to be in areas where we can bring all of those
types of challenges to our Sailors so that they know what it is
going to be like, and that they are properly prepared, that
they know how to use their equipment, and that they are going
to win.
Mr. Young. Recently Captain Carney took me to visit where
you train sea mammals to do some pretty exciting and pretty
important missions for the Navy. And some of the scientists
that we met with--and I asked the question, what is the effect
of sonar on the whales or the other sea mammals? Their
response, and they seemed to be in agreement, was that if it is
uncomfortable for the whale to be in the area where the sonar
is being exercised, he leaves. That seemed like a pretty simple
answer to me. And, you know, these were scientists. I assume
that they know what they are talking about. But I certainly
hope that you succeed, and that we are not denied, because as
the Admiral just mentioned this, how serious this threat could
be, and we all know about the Chinese submarine that recently
trailed some of our Navy vessels undetected. So I hope that you
are successful in that appeal to the Supreme Court.

AFGHANISTAN TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Chair, if I could ask a general question about the
Afghanistan deployment. NATO has said that we need about 7,000
additional troops in NATO. You are going to send 3,400 marines,
which is going to, according to your own statement, stretch you
really thin. What do we know about whether or not NATO is going
to actually step up and provide the additional 3,500 to 4,000
additional troops that we feel that we need there?
General Conway. Sir, I can only say, it is my perspective
that that is not a closed chapter yet. I know that the
Secretary and the Chairman attend frequent quarterly
discussions with our NATO partners and allies, and it is the
topic virtually on every occasion. So they continue to
encourage them, if they can't provide maneuver battalions,
provide police trainers, provide PRTs or provide soft kinds of
power that the Afghan Government needs to become more effective
in what it does for the people. So they continue to pound their
drum, sir. I think I can fairly well assure you.
Mr. Young. Well, it seems like NATO is not really stepping
up as they should. Hopefully we can find some way to impress
upon them the importance of not being undermanned there and so
that we can have a successful conclusion.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

CONTINUING RESOLUTION

Mr. Murtha. One of the things I just wanted you to send for
the record, I want to know what a CR would mean to you, because
I am not sure we are going to have a bill this year just
because of the problems that we have in both bodies. So send me
a document that shows what would happen if we had a CR rather
than a base bill this year. We will have a 2008 supplemental,
but I am not sure we will have anything but a CR to get us
through the rest of the year.
[The information follows:]

The Department of the Navy carries out programs that will need to
be executed at the beginning of FY 2009 that would require adequate
Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) apportionment should the Congress
implement CRA. These include Military Personnel bonus payments,
mobilization costs, food service contracts, operations contracts for
communications, equipment maintenance, facilities sustainment and
restoration, as well as logistics support. Special consideration would
also be required for multiple procurement contracts scheduled to fully
execute at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Operating under a CR impedes our ability to honor commitments and
award annual contracts. While the actual impact of operating under a CR
is dependant upon both the level of funding authorized and the length
of time approved, generally continuing resolutions are disruptive to
operations. Without adequate funding while under a CR, the Department
of the Navy may suffer readiness degradation of both deployed and non-
deployed Navy and Marine Corps forces. The ability to continue the
current pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will be met, but
preparing for the next rotation of forces or other contingencies may be
jeopardized. The Navy may have to reduce air operations, ship
operations, and combat support and delay ship depot maintenance. Also,
environmental restoration requirements, and annual Base Operating
Support contracts may not be issued along with Navy Service Wide
Transportation contracts. Lastly, active military pay accounts for both
the Navy and Marine Corps would likely be insolvent soon into the CRA
period without additional authority to continue bonus and mobilization
payments.

NAVY CONTRACTORS IN THEATER

Second is I would like to have the number of contractors
that the Navy has by category. I need to know whether security
people, whether there are service people, foreign nationals and
so forth. The Army is going to send me the same kind of list.
So I would appreciate it if you would send us that list so we
can find out. I was disappointed to hear that Secretary of the
Army had 190,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I
asked him the categories so we could see exactly what he is
talking about. I know we need contractors. Do you have
something?
Mr. Winter. Sir, just as a point of clarification, if I
could ask, you are talking about contractors in theater?
Mr. Murtha. In theater, yes.
Mr. Winter. In theater. Thank you, sir. I would be happy to
provide that.
[The information follows:]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2008 Type of contractor Total contractors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service............................................. 31
Security............................................ 0
Foreign............................................. 7
Logistics Support................................... 72
Maintenance Support................................. 113
Sustainment Support................................. 34
Training Support.................................... 96
Staff Support....................................... 19
Performance Based................................... 131
Comm Svcs Support................................... 52
Spectrum Management................................. 2
------------------
Total........................................... 557
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Information provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command, as the Navy
Global Force Manager. These FY 2008 estimates do not include Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative
for peacetime planning for the use of civilian contractors in wartime
and other contingencies. These contractors will perform selected
services to support U.S. forces in support of Department of Defense
(DoD) missions. Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows
the release of military units for other missions or to fill support
shortfalls. This program provides the Army with additional means to
adequately support the current and programmed forces.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a provocative
question there.
I have got a couple of questions, but first I want to make
a little observation, particularly to you, General Conway. So
my nephew Kevin pulls a Jack Murtha, and he drops out of
college so he can join the Marines, so he can fight in Iraq. So
he finishes up Parris Island, and he is all set. You know, he
is a football player-type guy, he is really gung-ho. And the
Marine Corps says, sorry, you have to go into financial
management training. We need all you smart guys to be going
into financial management. He says, financial management? I
want to go fight in Iraq. He says, well--he says, why financial
management? They said, well, the Congress is saying that we
don't have enough control over our spending, so we need to get
more people in financial management. So I blamed it on Norm
Dicks.
I do want to ask you about--oh, about recruiting and
retention, because there aren't a lot of Jack Murthas around,
quite frankly, and as a result you are having to spend about
$300 million on bonuses; $60,000 for specialty needs. How are
you doing on meeting those specialty occupational categories
that you so desperately need?
General Conway. Sir, we have been doing very well. We have
been very pleased with our ability at a time in the country
where the propensity on the part of all three major ethnic
groups is not to join the military. We have been pleased with
the ability of our recruiters to get out and to get into the
schools and bring in the numbers that we need. As I mentioned
in my opening statement, we thought we could keep the standards
high and do about 5,000 a year after adding about 300
recruiters to the field and some use of bonuses, but not large
numbers of bonuses, let's say, for enlistment. We apply bonuses
more for reenlistment really than we do for initial entry. We
have been able to manage all the fields pretty effectively.
And to your sort of vignette, sir, our recruiters tell us
if they had all just infantry MOSs, they could close out by
about the 10th of every month. That is the threat of great
young Americans out there that want to fight for their country,
if that is what the country is doing. We have a program, by the
way, that tries to get every Marine into the fight. So if your
nephew will be patient with us, there is every possibility or
maybe probability we will get him where he wants to go.
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Moran. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Can you do without these bonuses? I joined, my
three brothers joined, my dad and his brother joined. Can we do
without these bonuses? Can't we rely on patriotism to get these
guys in?
General Conway. Sir, if I had to separate out the Services,
and I don't like to do that because there is, I think, a
necessary inflection, that is what we do. We don't offer a
$40,000 college loan or a small business loan when you get out.
The bonus that an average Marine takes is probably on the order
of $3,000 to $5,000. And what we sell is the fact that you are
going to be a United States Marine. You are going to go fight
for your country, and you are going to be a Marine for life.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, Kevin didn't get a penny. And he
doesn't know of any--his father could have used it. Okay. I
have got another question here.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

This is a little more serious, so we are going to ask
Secretary Winter about the Joint Strike Fighter. Investment now
approaches about a trillion dollars, awful lot of planes, and
we are told that the total acquisition cost increased by more
than $23 billion because of higher procurement costs. The GAO
states that $288 billion for acquisition is unreliable because
it is insufficiently documented. And then the GAO found that
three independent defense offices separately concluded that
program cost estimates are understated by as much as $38
billion, and that the schedule is going to slip from at least a
year to more than 2 years.
You know, if we are spending nearly $1 trillion on the
development and procurement of an aircraft, we have got to make
sure that it meets our needs. And you really have to wonder
what is such a substantial challenge that is going to face us
in the near future for dominance of the airspace? We have got
it. Nobody has any interest in trying to contest us for
dominance of the airspace. And the GAO tells us that 90 percent
of the acquisition program is still ahead of us. I mean, we are
talking about an enormous amount of money.
Why do we need to be investing so much in an aircraft that
really seems to be more about winning the last war, the Cold
War, than dealing with the current threats to America's
security by people and groups that are never going to have any
jet fighters, even bombers, to contest air sovereignty? Do you
want to handle that?
Mr. Winter. I will take a crack at it, Congressman.
First of all, I will suggest that the JSF program, the F-35
program, is designed to provide us with a broad spectrum of air
support capabilities that deal with the current engagement as
well as any of the engagements that we are looking at in the
future. The value of tactical air is something that has been
proven time and time again, and for the most part, it relates
to being able to control the air, but also to be able to
project power from the air to the ground in support of ground
forces or naval forces that are within the area of
responsibility.
JSF is an overlay program, if you will. It has three
separate components. It supports the STOVL, the short takeoff
and vertical landing capability, that is critical to the Marine
Corps right now for our big deck amphibs. We really have only
one class of aircraft that is capable of flying off of them.
That is the Harrier. That is a very old aircraft. It is in
great need of replacement, and it is the core of our ability to
provide support to our embarked Marines and any future
amphibious operation that they engage in.
Similarly, the future for the Navy, the carrier variant is
the mechanism of providing future capabilities that will span
the spectrum of threats that we have to deal with for naval
aviation, to be able to project power from the sea or to be
able to deal with threats at the sea. A lot of the program is
still ahead of us because we are still in the process of
development.
We have established a program here of fly before you buy.
We are going through a detailed evaluation and development
activity to ensure that we have what we need. We are not going
to place orders for any of these aircraft for production
purposes until such time as we have had sufficient flight test
evaluation. That is coming up here very shortly. We expect to
see the STOVL first flight coming up here this year, later this
year, and I think that that will be a good milestone at which
point we will be able to evaluate where we are in terms of the
overall development process and where we think we will be in
terms of the future cost estimates.
Mr. Moran. It is a great answer. That is what you are
supposed to tell us. But, you know, the Navy and Marine Corps
are absolutely essential, are always going to be absolutely
essential, but we are getting to the point where this is kind
of a zero-sum game. When you put a trillion dollars into the F-
35, you are taking it from someplace else. And I really
question 2,500 jet fighters at a trillion dollars is the best
possible use of an enormous amount of resources that might
otherwise go into other needs to address the real current kind
of threat we face. But that is just a comment, and I appreciate
the answer. There is nothing wrong with the answer, but I am
not sure there isn't wrong with some of the policies.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

CHINESE NAVY BUILDUP

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for your service, and
those of you that look after in Iraq and Afghanistan and around
the world, and certainly to those who serve in the Navy doing
in their military occupations things they weren't trained to do
specifically, guarding those convoys and at time probably
prisoners, all sorts of things that are pretty key and
important to us.
One of the ways to discuss posture, which is sort of the
focus of this hearing, is to talk about what other nations are
doing. And I think quite a lot we focus on the build-up of what
is happening in China. I think maybe less attention is focused
on Russia. You are familiar, Admiral, with--you know the
incident in late 2006 of the Navy--Chinese Navy apparently
stalking the Kitty Hawk and putting up a submarine within
firing distance without supposedly being detected. I assume
that sub was a diesel. Do they have nuclear subs?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, they do.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I assume it was a diesel sub.
Then we read last November of a Chinese Song-class
submarine tracking the Kitty Hawk in the Taiwan Straits. It was
monitored by an antisubmarine aircraft watching the sub, and,
of course, it was described in the paper as, I quote, the first
direct military confrontation between the two nations' naval
forces since 1996.
Besides the obvious build-up of concern about the obvious
build-up of Chinese forces, what can you tell us about these
incidents as they relate to the--sort of the tactics and
strategies that you are looking at? How do we posture
ourselves, given these and other types of incidents?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And I was the Pacific Fleet
Commander at the time, and on the last incident that you
mentioned, I questioned the credibility of that news report.
But what we have done in recent years is we have looked at
the posture that we must have, particularly in the Pacific,
because the Pacific is a very important region for us from a
security standpoint, the allies that we have there, but also
economically, and it contributes directly to our prosperity. We
have shifted our carrier force so now we are biased more toward
the Pacific. We have done the same thing with our submarines.
We have forward home-ported some of our submarines in Guam so
that we have more presence, greater response in the Pacific
area. We continue to exercise with our allies and partners in
that region, and antisubmarine warfare is extremely important.
That is why the training is so important.
But it is also key to recall that in some cases countries
are able to export some of these systems, and so to simply look
at one particular flag and see that as a potential threat, I
think it has to be broadened out. Where are some of these
systems, advanced systems, finding their way? And that is
important to do as well.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But by all reports, you know, obviously
we have repositioned ourselves. But, you know, I assume some
people must be alarmed by the talk of the Chinese, you know,
producing, you know, a goal of 200 submarines. I am not sure
what the figure was in terms of surface vessels. And they do a
pretty good job of--for their own technological development.
And what they don't get there I assume they steal from us or
get from other sources.
I mean, in terms of sort of sounding the alarm here, you
know, while we talk about the size of the fleet, and we know
how expensive it is to bring new ships on line, are you
concerned about their build-up? I know we always go with the
old issue of, you know, overwhelming force, and we are--you
know, our capabilities are better. But the Chinese are no
slouches. And, there is often talk of 2015. But Chinese aren't
waiting to 2015. How do you gauge where the Chinese are going,
and how closely are we keeping an eye on their development of
new technology as well as the vehicles that carry them?
Admiral Roughead. Well, we watch naval developments around
the world, and clearly China is the navy that is increasing in
capability and capacity faster than any other navy on the
globe. There is no question in my mind, and I have had the
opportunity to meet with their leadership, with my counterpart,
on a couple of occasions, that there is no question that they
are developing what we refer to as a bluewater navy, a navy
that can range farther from their shores. They also have a much
longer view than others have. Their objective is to become a
significant regional navy.
There is no question that the issue of Taiwan is always
first and foremost in their mind, but as you look at the
development of the Navy, it is also a navy that is focused on
the sea lanes of communication and being able to assure the
flows that fuel their growing economy. So they are doing that.
But in addition to the hardware, it is also important that
we look at the people, and my first contacts with the PLA Navy,
the leadership tended to have gotten into their positions
through political means. The leadership in the PLA Navy today
came up through operational paths. They understand what it is
like to operate a navy at sea, and they see this vision of
their navy as a significant regional navy and, I believe,
expanding out and becoming global as time goes on.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The view is, at least from my reading,
is that there--what it may have been described as somewhat
political once, you would never call it amateurish, is that
they are doing--you know, they are sort of concentrating their
development of their military in a very highly professional
manner. I mean, it may not be mirroring our Special Forces or,
you know, your SEALs, but in reality they are emulating the
best of what is out there, and we need to be prepared for it.

UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES

Just on one system here, could you comment about the drone
combat squadron, who is--the whole issue of your seeking, I
think, a competitive prototyping in preparation of fielding a
first squadron of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Are those
carrier-based?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. That is part of a--kind of what
I would call a family of unmanned vehicles beginning with----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You have things going off carriers now?
Admiral Roughead. No, sir, we are not flying unmanned
vehicles off of our carriers. We are flying unmanned vehicles
off of some of our ships, but the article that you reference is
moving to an air combat vehicle, one that can provide striking
power off the carriers, and it is part of a stepped and phased
development.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. That is in some ways pretty
revolutionary given the fact that, you know, obviously the
whole issue of a man behind the controls, not that there aren't
men behind these controls, but one could view that as somewhat
of a major departure.
Admiral Roughead. Well, I think, sir----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Perhaps a positive departure.
Admiral Roughead. The significant thing is being able to
operate those airplanes, combat airplanes, off of an aircraft
carrier in an unmanned way. Our other unmanned programs address
other needs that we have in maritime surveillance. But this is
something that is fairly complex; landing on an aircraft
carrier, taking off can get pretty sporty, and we have never
done it with an unmanned vehicle before. It has a little longer
view than some of the other unmanned programs that we have.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen, did you get a bonus when you
went into the Army?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I sure didn't.
Mr. Murtha. Look where he has ended up, huh?
Mr. Moran. This is a random sample.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am glad you are leaving.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

INTERNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. Thank you for
coming today.
Admiral Roughead, I would like to ask you a question about
the structure of the Chinese shipbuilding industry. To what
extent does the Government of China subsidize the manufacturing
of and construction of ships there? And have you looked at that
issue?
Admiral Roughead. I have not done the economic analysis,
but my sense is it is heavily subsidized.
Ms. Kaptur. Is it really not an arm of the state and--of
their government?
Admiral Roughead. I would say that they are state
industries with a view toward becoming a dominant shipbuilding
industry in the world.
Ms. Kaptur. I agree with that. And the question I have,
coming from a maritime community that has suffered greatly over
the years with the loss of both hardware as well as the people
who make the ships, though we are not a deepwater port, what do
we do in your budget to capture every single dollar we can,
knowing that they are the primary producers in the world today,
correct? The work that was being done in Korea is now moving up
to China. I think if you look at the shifting nature of
shipbuilding in the world, what do we do with your budget and
every element of it, leasing, the leasing you are now doing,
phasing that out? How can we possibly compete with these
private companies in our country against a subsidized industry
like that? How do we use your budget to restore shipbuilding
capacity in this country and all the componentry that goes into
it? How do we do that?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am. I would say that my focus is
on building warships, and the quality, the sophistication of
the ships we build is unmatched by any nation in the world. But
it is important that we get to the capacity issue, and that is
why getting to the 313-ship fleet is so important to me as the
CNO.

LEASING OF FOREIGN BUILT SHIPS

Ms. Kaptur. Well, you also have many smaller vessels,
Admiral. You have vessels that carry ammunition, and you are
leasing those vessels now. They weren't built here. And I don't
see the Department as fully conscious of the threat that is out
there, particularly from China, in using every tool we have in
order to restore our waning capability on the seas for all
types of vessels.
Admiral Roughead. Mr. Secretary, do you want to take that?
Mr. Winter. If I could, ma'am, first of all, in terms of
the leased vessels, we are reducing our dependency on those
leased vessels. We are down from 22 leased vessels to 17 at
this point in time. These are short-term leases, under five
years, and they really represent an opportunity, if you will,
to surge and to be able to bring into support roles vessels
that are not currently being manufactured for which we do not
have a good economic argument for manufacturing the full-time
ownership of.
We are putting a lot of effort into investing in those
capabilities that provide the U.S. shipbuilding industry with
the ability to produce ships at lower cost, and this comes by
way of everything from contractual arrangements with the
individual yards to install a lot of technology which is
available elsewhere outside the United States for the most
part. That does assist us in terms of our surface combatants.
And in cases where that technology can be applied to yards that
support multiple applications--and unfortunately there is only
one of those yards right now, major yards, that is a Nassco
facility in San Diego which builds both Jones Act ships as well
as logistics support ships for us--there is value that they are
able to accrue both to their commercial endeavors as well as to
their activities for the Navy.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, Mr. Secretary, do you monitor where the
subcontracts go? For example, if a ship is taken to China, and
the front half is whacked off and something is welded on the
back, do you monitor your subcontracts to do everything
possible to make sure that everything is done in this country
rather than shipped somewhere else?
Mr. Winter. On all of our ships, most definitely, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. What about the electronics?
Mr. Winter. The electronics is the same thing. All of the
modifications to our ships are all done, they are all managed
and appropriately assessed by the Navy organizations that have
the responsibility for management.
Ms. Kaptur. Are they made in this country, sir?
Mr. Winter. Excuse me?
Ms. Kaptur. Are they made in this country?
Mr. Winter. Every ship in the Navy register, all of our
combatants are.
Ms. Kaptur. All of the vessels under your command are made
in this country, every single component?
Mr. Winter. Outside, not every single component, ma'am, but
the vast majority of them are. The vast majority of the
components are.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, I would appreciate a letter from you,
from your Department, that summarizes for me where you think
the challenges are to retain that production capacity in this
country.
Mr. Winter. I would be pleased to do that, ma'am.
[The information follows:]

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

MARINE CORPS TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Ms. Kaptur. All right. I wanted to ask General Conway,
thank you very, very much for your service.
What percent of the Marines under your command are serving
a third tour or more in combat in Iraq? Do you know that
number?
General Conway. No, ma'am, I don't. I take surveys every
time I hold a town hall, and of the audiences there routinely,
60 to 70 percent will have deployed. I will ask for a second
and a third time or even a fourth time, and a fifth time I will
ask for a show of hands. So I will say, increasingly we have
three-time deployers, but I would have to get the exact
percentage for you.
Ms. Kaptur. I would be very interested, and in the trend,
General. I am very interested in the trend if that is
increasing, which I think it is.
[The information follows:]

The current number of Marines per deployment are:
One Deployment: 93,511
Two Deployments: 32,996
Three Deployments: 3,683
Four or More Deployments: 154

General Conway. But the one thing, ma'am, I would explain
to you is that unlike the other Services, we will serve about a
three-year tour in the operational forces. And then we will
have our Marines and our officers go to what we call a B
billet, and it will be there for about three years, and then
they will come back to the operating forces. So we don't have
some of the people that spend seven, eight, nine years in the
operating forces consecutively to roll up some of these large
numbers.
Now, some of those folks are starting to come back because
we have been at this so long. This summer we are going to see
some people come back, I think, that maybe left the operating
forces in 2004, 2005, and we will have to see what the impact
is on that for our retention.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, my time has probably expired, but
I did want to ask the General if he could--
Mr. Murtha. I wanted to end this before the votes because
there is a series of votes. So we will go to Mr. Rothman.
Ms. Kaptur. Could I ask the General to provide for the
record, Mr. Chairman, the issue of urban warfare training in
U.S. cities by the Reserves, the Marine Reserves is an issue
that has hit our community directly, and it was very
troublesome what happened. I would like to know from you
whether this is happening in Active forces anywhere in our
country, if urban warfare training is occurring in U.S. cities,
and what are the conditions for that, or whether it is just
happening on the Reserve side.
General Conway. No, ma'am. It happens with the Active
forces. It has been happening since the mid-1980s almost
without interruption or without any incident. So I was a little
bit surprised to see the one happen as it did in Ohio.

[The information follows:]

LtGen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally met with
Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue and answer her
questions.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.

MARINE CORPS MISSION TRAINING

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your very distinguished service to
our country. The Marine Corps has many officers who have never
been deployed on a Navy ship, I have been told. Is that true?
General Conway. Increasingly, sir, that is true.
Mr. Rothman. Does that disturb you?
General Conway. Immensely.
Mr. Rothman. And with regards to that issue, as well as the
lack of training for amphibious landings, does this new budget
address that; and if so, how, please?
General Conway. Sir, it does indirectly. And it transcends
just amphibious operations. We are not doing live-fire maneuver
exercises anymore. We are not going to cold-weather training.
We are not going to jungle training. The part of the budget
that assists us in managing that and making it better is in
growing the force.
There are two reasons we wanted to grow the Marine Corps.
One was to be able to facilitate our deployment-to-dwell.
Second was to be able to provide relief in the process so we
could spend more time with the families and more time doing
training.
Mr. Rothman. And training for these other things?
General Conway. Yes, sir, exactly. If we can get this
deployment-to-dwell something more akin to seven months
deployed, 14 months home, we can sustain that. We think we can
do the training, and we think the families will be much
happier.

HEALTH OF THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. Rothman. Very good. I only have a few minutes.
There is this new issue of Foreign Policy magazine, the
March-April 2008 issue, which apparently contains a survey
which was conducted jointly with the Center for a New American
Security where they asked 3,400 officers holding the rank of
major or lieutenant commander and across all the services,
Active Duty and retired general officers and field grade
officers, about their views of the health of the military. And
here are some troubling findings.
They said that 60 percent of the U.S. military see the U.S.
military as weaker today than it was 5 years ago; 60 percent.
And with regards to the Marine Corps in particular, the
majority of the responses indicated that on a scale of 1 to 10,
1 being no concern about readiness effectiveness and 10 being
extreme concern, the majority of the responses indicated a 7,
indicating great concern about the health of the Marine Corps.
Would any of you gentlemen wish to address this?
General Conway. Well, since you left off with the Marine
Corps, sir, I will start and say that I think I would probably
be about a 6 or a 7 myself.
Now, in terms of the capability of the force, we are much
more capable than we were five years ago. We have more Marines,
we have more equipment, we have combat training. And I would be
much more comfortable sending that force into a fight than I
was leading the force into a fight in 2003.
But the concern I think these people are representing is
that our core competencies, which go well beyond
counterinsurgency, are not being trained to, not being
conducted these days, to make sure that we can go anywhere and
do anything for this country.
Mr. Rothman. And that will be addressed to your
satisfaction in your budget?
General Conway. Sir, the budget will help, but what we
actually need over time will be, again, more time spent at
home. You can do that through growing the force. You can do
that through reducing the requirement.
Mr. Rothman. Right.
General Conway. If the requirement is reduced, and we are
able to manage these deployment requirements more effectively
with a larger force, then we will be back to doing those
things, and we will be in much better shape as a result.

CHINESE NAVY BUILDUP

Mr. Rothman. And to the CNO, with regards to China, two
questions. One was, if I wrote this down correctly, you
questioned the credibility of the news report?
Admiral Roughead. Yes.
Mr. Rothman. Now, I am a lawyer by training. Are you
refuting the accuracy of the news report?
Admiral Roughead. The reference to the encounter in the
Straits of Taiwan, I would refute that.
Mr. Rothman. Okay. Good. And with regard to the buildup of
the Chinese submarine force, it seems like a considerable
effort on their part. And I heard what you said, that this is
their effort to protect their energy supplies, and they are
doing this to be a regional power, but you did say with
probability that they wish to become a global sea power as
well. Does your budget that you are submitting to us address
the challenges of this growing submarine fleet from the
Chinese?
Admiral Roughead. Our budget, sir, represents the balance
that we must have in the Fleet and the capabilities that we
have. It does address our ability to operate as a global Navy
and prevail.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much. I have to say it is hard
for me to believe that you are a 6 or a 7, Commandant. You are
not working out, huh?
The Committee is adjourned until 1:30.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Seabasing

Question. The Maritime Pre-position Force (Future) (MPF(F)) is the
backbone of entirely seabased operations. The Navy envisions this
capability as a fleet of 14 ships that will provide pre-positioned
equipment for a fly-in force, provide at-sea arrival and assembly of
this equipment, direct support of the assault chelon of the task force,
indefinite sustainment of the landing force and at-sea reconstitution
and redeployment of the landing force. The initial procurement of the
ships that comprise the MPF(F) was scheduled to occur in fiscal year
2009 but the Navy has slipped procurements to at least fiscal year 2010
and has removed some of the ships (Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier) for its
outyear budgets along with no plans for procurement.
Admiral Roughead, the plan for acquiring the ships that will
comprise the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) have changed
drastically since last year. Can you summarize the Navy's rationale for
this change and the plan for eventually acquiring these ships?
Answer. MPF(F) was initially envisioned to provide a pre-positioned
lift capability for a first responder, brigade-size force, which would
reduce reliance on facilities in the theater and minimize
vulnerabilities ashore early in a campaign. Within the last year, the
Navy/Marine Corps team has continued to refine the role of MPF(F).
Accordingly, the Navy has delayed procurement of MPF(F) platforms to
further analyze operational requirements and concepts of employment.
The Navy plans to deliver MPF(F) while balancing overall warfighting
requirements, costs, and industrial base realities. The Navy remains on
track to deliver the Full Operational Capability for MPF(F) in FY 2022.
Question. General Conway, as the use of the Maritime Pre-
Positioning Force, how will this impact the Marine Corps and were you
included in the decision process to delay ship acquisition?
Answer. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program is a
critically essential element of the nation's warfighting capability,
and shipbuilding programmatic delays should be avoided to ensure this
vital national capability becomes available as soon as possible.
The Marine Corps requires three Marine Expeditionary Brigade's
(MEB) worth of expeditionary warfighting capability and lift. We have
already accepted risk in our amphibious lift capacity by agreeing to
fiscally constrain shipping availability for each of our two assault
echelon (AE) MEBs from 17 to 15 ships. The Fiscal Year 2009 30-year
shipbuilding plan does not provide the exact mix of required LHA/LHD's,
LPD's, and LSD-41/49 equivalents, which further amplifies the risk
we're taking in our amphibious forcible entry capabilities.
The Marine Corps intends to fight any major contingency operation
as a Marine Expeditionary Force, which consists of three MEB
operational maneuver elements. The first two of those MEBs are intended
to be employed from the amphibious AE shipping described above, and the
third MEB maneuver unit will operate from MPF(F) to reinforce and
support the amphibious AE units.
The 30 operationally available amphibious ships required for 2.0
MEB AE, coupled with MPF(F)'s 1.0 MEB-level reinforcing and support,
and the Assault Follow-On Echelon (lifted by Military Sealift Command
black-bottom shipping) provide the 3.0 MEB necessary to enable a
seabased, MEF-level warfighting capability.
The Marine Corps continues to be an integral part of the decision
process within the Department of the Navy for programming and budgeting
of resources. We understand that budget and program realities force us
to make tough choices. In the case of MPF(F) and the rest of our
amphibious lift, we continue to work budget and program issues within
the Department of the Navy.

Reliable Replacement Warhead

Question. The Reliable Replacement Warhead was originally
envisioned to ensure the aging stockpile could meet its long-term
mission by improving the long-term reliability, longevity, and,
certification of the existing weapons and associated components.
However, the design effort led by the Department of Energy has
seemingly led to the development of a whole new program. Last year the
Committee markup removed all funding for Reliable Replacement Warhead
program. The budget request for fiscal year 2009 contains funding to
commence work on phase 3 engineering development portion of the program
despite the fact that all fiscal year 2008 funding for the Department
of the Energy was removed from the program.
Secretary Winter, the fiscal year 2009 budget request contains
funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to commence phase
3 efforts in 2009 despite the fact that there is no Department of
Energy funding for the program in fiscal year 2009. Is it prudent for
the Department of Defense to get so far ahead of the Department of
Energy on this effort?
Answer. No Navy effort on the Replacement Warhead is planned unless
approved and funded by Congress and coordinated with the Department of
Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration). FY 2009 funding can
be used to restart the Phase 2A effort if Congress concurs. It is
important that the Phase 2A study or a similar one be resumed in order
to properly inform the next Nuclear Posture Review. If not, the Navy
proposes to continue work on advanced fuse technologies and safety
architectures that have multi-platform/multi-service applications.
Question. Secretary Winter, is it the Navy's intention to support
further development of a new nuclear weapon with this funding?
Answer. No. The Navy placed FY 2008 funding on hold when Congress
zeroed funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
in the FY 2008 Energy and Water Authorization Bill. No Navy effort on
the Reliable Replacement Warhead is planned unless approved and funded
by Congress and coordinated with NNSA.
Question. Secretary Winter, in the context of the new nuclear
weapons strategy has the Department of Defense articulated a need for a
new nuclear weapon?
Answer. In February of 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council approved the program to pursue a replacement warhead to augment
the existing Navy strategic deterrent capabilities.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, March 13, 2008.

NAVY/MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

WITNESSES

JOHN THACKRAH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
VICE ADMIRAL BARRY McCULLOUGH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION)

Introduction

Mr. Moran [presiding]. The Committee will come to order.
And I want to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Young, for a
motion.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today which involve classified material be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Moran. So ordered. Thank you, Mr. Young.
This afternoon the committee will hold a closed hearing on
Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition.
We are very pleased to welcome Mr. John Thackrah, who is
the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research
Development and Acquisition; Vice Admiral Barry McCullough,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of
Capabilities and Resources; and Lieutenant General James Amos,
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development
and Integration.
These gentlemen are very well qualified to discuss
Department of the Navy acquisition and to answer the questions
of the committee.
Secretary Thackrah and Admiral McCullough and General Amos,
we thank you for being here this afternoon. We are here to talk
about the acquisition of Navy and Marine Corps equipment. The
Committee is very much concerned about the readiness of the
Department in terms of equipping the force. Systems are
becoming ever more complicated and too often in developmental
programs the desire to begin production overruns technological
maturity and we are faced with delays and restructures.
One only need flip the pages of the budget request to find
several programs where this reality has overcome good
intentions. As in years past, shipbuilding is the centerpiece
of the Navy's acquisition program. Also as in years past, the
Navy's request is insufficient to reach and maintain your
stated requirement of 313 ships. The committee is very much
interested in hearing how you plan on reaching your required
ship count when the administration, time and again, fails to
provide the necessary resources to do so.
We were very pleasantly surprised to see the budget
increase almost $2.5 billion for Navy and Marine Corps aviation
programs in light of the looming tactical aircraft shortfall.
This is certainly a step in the right direction.
So, gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to a
spirited and informative question-and-answer session.
Mr. Moran. Before we hear your testimony I want to call on
our very distinguished Ranking Member, our friend Mr. Young,
for his comments.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
want to share and join you in welcoming our very distinguished
witnesses to the table today. I agree with the Chairman's
statement on the 313-ship Navy.
Many years back, I was one of the original Ronald Reagan
supporters of the 600-ship Navy, but something happened between
then and now and we are struggling to keep up with 313. I think
you are going to have to accelerate your program even beyond
what the budget request indicates in order to do that.
I am also concerned about the fighter shortfall. As you
retire your F-18s in favor of the Joint Strike Fighter, which
has a few challenges of its own--and specifically the Marine
Corps, General, I understand that once your Harriers are gone--
and you might comment on the status of the Harriers--but when
your Harriers are gone and before you get the Joint Strike
Fighters you are without, the Marine Corps is without any kind
of a jet aircraft.
We would like to hear some comments about that. But other
than that, Mr. Chairman, we have a lot to do, so I yield back.
Mr. Moran. All right. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Moran. And thank you for making this hearing, and Mr.
Frelinghuysen and Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Secretary, we understand that you will be the only one
making a statement so you can proceed with your summarized
statement, if you wouldn't mind, and your entire statement will
now be placed in the record. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.

Summary Statement of Secretary Thackrah

Mr. Thackrah. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young and distinguished members of this
Committee, it is an honor and a privilege for Vice Admiral
McCullough, Lieutenant General Amos and me to appear before you
today to discuss the Navy and Marine Corps' acquisition
programs. With your permission, I would like to submit my
written testimony for the record.
Mr. Moran. So ordered.
Mr. Thackrah. As the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition since November 2007,
I serve as the Navy senior acquisition executive. Despite my
acting status I fully accept the authority, responsibility and
accountability for all Navy and Marine Corps acquisition
functions and programs.
The development of this budget has not been easy. Tough
decisions had to be made to balance risk and be responsible
stewards of the tax dollars entrusted to us.
I would like to briefly highlight part of my written
testimony. Our fiscal year 2009 budget procurement requests
$41.1 billion. Specific requirements include $14.1 billion in
funding for seven new-construction ships and $14.7 billion to
procure the 206 aircraft to meet our long-term consolidation
and recapitalization efforts. Noteworthy is for the first time
in a long while, Navy's budget does not fund any lead ships,
and our request is for over 200 aircraft.
With congressional support for our GWOT efforts, the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicle is making vital
contributions in protecting our Marines and Sailors from
improvised explosive devices.
The Department of the Navy is the lead Service for the
joint MRAP vehicle program. Since competitive awards began in
February of 2007 and principally as a result of the commitment
to streamline every acquisition action, the MRAP team has been
able to produce over 6,000 vehicles and has fielded, in the
hands of the user, more than 2,700 to two theaters of
operations in service.
In addition, our budget request includes $19.3 billion for
total RDT&E to transform our force with next-generation
platforms into mature technologies for our procurement
programs. S&T funding of $1.8 billion is also requested, which
equals a real growth of 6 percent from the fiscal year 2008
level, to ensure a robust base of options for the threats today
and in the future. To provide a balanced fleet of ships,
aircraft and expeditionary capabilities, we have to control our
costs.
Under Secretary Winter's leadership, the Department
launched an Acquisition Improvement Initiative to insert
discipline across the Department, without altering the existing
Department of Defense processes. The initiative includes an
acquisition governance which engages Navy and Marine Corps
leadership in a set of gate reviews on all programs for
agreement on definitive sets of requirements throughout the
acquisition review process.
We have also reinvigorated our acquisition workforce
investment.
Finally, to bolster our acquisition leadership, the Navy
has selected a three-star admiral to serve as my principal
deputy.
In closing, we have the most powerful naval forces in the
world and we are looking ahead to build on the strength in
order to prevent future wars. Our partnership with Congress and
the Navy and Marine Corps is necessary to sustain our position
in this uncertain world and to maintain the safety of our
Sailors and Marines.
I believe our budget request strikes a proper balance to
meet present and future challenges, follows on a long-term path
of program stability, and meets the requirements of this
partnership.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
welcome any questions you may have.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much Mr. Assistant Secretary.
[The joint statement of Secretary Thackrah, Vice Admiral
McCullough, and Lt. General Amos follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE

Mr. Moran. We appreciate your coming to testify and respond
to questions. I have just a couple I would like to ask.
But first I think I will ask General Amos about the MRAPs.
When lives are directly affected, when we know we can save
lives with a particular piece of equipment, money is really no
object; so it is a very distant secondary consideration. But
there is some concern about, for example, the flexibility of
MRAPs. In an urban area or from the Marine Corps' perspective,
even in a muddy area, there is limited flexibility. It just
doesn't operate as well as we would like. But the concern
arises, What are we going to do with these after the war is
concluded?
Do you have plans for--since we are shipping as many as we
can as fast as we can to the theater in Iraq--what are we going
to do with them once there is some political reconciliation and
we start to pull out of Iraq?
General Amos. Right now I think the number is 1,101 that
are in the Green Zone that belong to the Marines today. That
includes 38 that we are shipping into Afghanistan. So we are
going to use the ones--and our number, total buy for us, is
2,225, as you know when we talked the last time.
Mr. Moran. It is 2,225?
General Amos. Yes, sir. And we have got a little over 1,100
in theater right now. And as we continue to buy toward the end
of the summer, we will continue to put more in theater in the
Green Zone. Yet to be seen how many we are going to put in
Afghanistan, because we just don't know. We have got the early
forces, the 24th MEU, on the ground today, and eventually will
flow 3,400 Marines and Sailors in there. So we are not quite
sure. But we do know that--we anticipate there is going to be a
requirement on the major roads.
And you are absolutely right, Congressman Moran, this is a
worthwhile investment and it is a great vehicle. It is not an
off-road vehicle. And it is not a vehicle to use in many of the
little mud-walled, very tightly dense-packed urban areas that
we operate in. So it has an application.
Since we met the last time, since I came in here and
testified the last time and I was asked about--and I believe it
was Congressman Bishop who asked me about are we going to put
these on MPF, our Maritime Preposition Ships, and the answer is
we probably are. We are working on that. I told you at the time
that I wasn't sure how they would fit weight-wise.
A couple of things have happened since then. Number one,
there is a recapitalization effort about to take place where we
are going to be able to get rid of some of our legacy MPF
ships, get some LMSRs and be able to put more stuff. So I think
we are going to put some on MPF. We are not sure how many yet.
The total requirement, known requirement right now that we have
in the Marine Corps, enduring requirement, is for a little over
400 of them for the future. And that is for EOD, route
clearance missions, and that kind of thing.
So there is a difference, I know, between that and the
2,225, but there is an unknown Congressman Moran. And what I
want you to understand is--or believe--that we are going to
take good care of these things. We are probably going to end up
forward-basing a bunch of them in the CENTCOM AOR. If you think
about missions that we might do in Africa, that might be a
perfect vehicle for some of those kinds of environment. So
there is a question. We are not quite sure. But we are going to
take care of them. We are more than likely going to
preposition. We are probably going to cocoon a bunch of them.
And then we will have some on MPS. We are just not quite sure
yet.

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER PROGRAM

Mr. Moran. Thanks, General.
I only have one more area for questioning before turning it
over to Mr. Young. But this is to Secretary Thackrah. The
Presidential helicopter program has experienced well-publicized
cost growth over the last year, caused by a combination of
technical problems and requirement changes. The current request
before the committee for this program is over $1 billion, but
contains no schedule details beyond this fiscal year.
This marks the second consecutive year that the Navy has
requested a large amount of funding for a program with no
schedule details provided as justification. So you are asking
the Congress to take quite a leap of faith to appropriate over
$1 billion to a program with no long-term plan nor much of a
short-term plan.
When will the Navy provide an executable program schedule?
What is the root cause of all of the problems and turmoil on
this program?
Now, it appears that the Department is really just throwing
good money after bad in the hopes that things might get better.
So we would like to know what assurances you can provide this
subcommittee that the Presidential helicopter program is in
fact on track finally, and will actually field aircraft on the
schedule required by the White House. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Thackrah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
The Presidential helicopter program is, as you are aware,
segregated into two increments. Increment one of this program
currently has aircraft in flight test and is moving along
according to the schedule that has been advertised. Increment
two of this program is currently on stop-work and is pending
incremental funding and decisions on the way ahead from the
White House. Meetings have been ongoing relative to the status
of this program. We are expecting decisions imminently on the
final definition of increment two and where we will be going
forward.
The cost overruns that you refer to are well advertised.
They are real. We have requested additional funds. That was
largely due, as we have testified before, to a
misunderstanding, if you will, of requirements between the
Department of the Navy and the supplier. We have since sorted
all of that out, and we now have high confidence that clearly
that understanding is in place, it is understood. We now need
to get the final definition and decision on the final stages of
increment two.
Mr. Moran. Okay. It has been kind of a frustrating
experience; but I mean, we will take you at your word. It is
not you, but I have to say once more, you know, we will assume
those assurances. And we don't necessarily blame you, but it
has been a problematic program.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman would you yield? Who is the
supplier?
Mr. Thackrah. This is Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Moran. Don't say Northrop Grumman.
Mr. Thackrah. No, sir, this is Lockheed Martin.
Mr. Dicks. Lockheed Martin. And the helicopter comes from
Italy?
Mr. Thackrah. The base helicopter is an Augusta Westland
aircraft based on their commercial EH-101 aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. Mr. Young.

LPD-17 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General Amos, the number one unfunded requirement for the
second year in a row for the Marine Corps is an additional LPD-
17. We have already appropriated for nine of these ships, but
the fiscal year 2009 budget includes $104 million for closeout
costs. This doesn't appear to be compatible with what you
consider your needs to be. What do you have to say about that?
General Amos. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to comment
on that. And that is truly our number one unfunded priority. As
the Commandant says, we need the ship, we need 11 of them. The
program of record was 11 ships, it wasn't nine. Right now we
are going to spend $103 million in 2009 to essentially close
the line down.
I was down there with the Commandant and the other three-
stars in New Orleans about 3 or 4 weeks ago for an off-site.
Walked on board the ships, went on board the GREEN BAY, had a
tour of the shipyard, got to see the keel laid. It is quite an
operation. I am very enthusiastic about the ship, but we need
to continue with the requirement, Congressman, and so nine is
not enough. It is not going to get us what we need. So we need
the tenth LPD. We need to commit to it and then we need to move
on and build the 11th LPD as well.
Mr. Young. If we took the $104 million of the budget
request for closeout and then we applied that to another LPD-
17, how much more would we need?
General Amos. Sir, I am going to let Admiral McCullough
answer, but it is not going to be enough for advance
procurement, but it would put some seed money down. So it is
probably better off that Admiral McCullough answers that from a
money perspective.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, Congressman, I appreciate the
question. The cost of an LPD-17 is $1.7 billion. So if we took
the $103 million and applied it to that cost, we would need
roughly another $1.6 billion, sir.
Mr. Young. Could these LPD-17 hulls be used for any other
kind of ship?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. We are investigating that
right now, use of an LPD-17 hull as a replacement for our
afloat command ships. The MOUNT WHITNEY, which is deployed in
European theater and the BLUE RIDGE which is deployed in the
Pacific theater.
Mr. Young. Where is the disconnect? If the Marines feel
strongly that they need the LPD-17s, but the administration
asks for money to close out the line, there is a disconnect
here somewhere; that if the Marines feel like they need the
ships, we probably ought to be doing something about that
rather than closing the line.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. In the 30-year shipbuilding
plan, the Commandant specified a requirement for 33 amphibious
ships in the assault echelon: 11 aviation capable, 11 LPD-17s,
and 11 LSDs, 41 or 49 class. The CNO, Admiral Roughead, concurs
with General Conway's determination, so we agree with the
Marines' requirement.
That said, given the amount of money we had in the 2009
program and the demands across the entire Navy, both in
shipbuilding and other programs, we could not fit one in the
2009 budget. We have done some work to try to extend the
estimated service lives of some LHA-1 and LPD-4 class ships to
alleviate some of this concern. I grant you that those ships
will not, coupled with the ones we have, meet the entire
amphibious lift requirement in the assault echelon at 2.0-MEBs.
But given the amount of money and the priorities of the Navy,
that is the best we could do in fiscal year 2009. We will
revisit this in the POM 10 program, sir.
Mr. Young. If we all were to agree that we should provide
the advanced funding for additional LPD-17s, either in 2009 or
2010, our research has indicated that it would probably take
about $260 million to do that. Is that an accurate figure?
Admiral McCullough. Congressman, I believe that is close;
yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Okay. I think we need to think about this a lot
and try to make things happen right. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much Mr. Young. Mr. Vice Chairman
Dicks.

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT

Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask a question.
Where are we? How are we doing on the--I understand we have
problems with the P-3s and that--does that mean--are we going
to try to accelerate the Poseidon program? PA--what is it, PA-
8?
Mr. Thackrah. P-8A, sir.
Mr. Dicks. P-8A, better known as MMA?
Mr. Thackrah. Yes, sir, that's correct. Mr. Dicks, thank
you for that question. The P-3 aircraft is an aging aircraft.
We have been----
Mr. Dicks. Built by Lockheed Martin, isn't that correct?
Mr. Thackrah. That's correct, sir. We have put 39 of those
aircraft down, sir, as a result of some analysis that has been
done on the fatigue life characteristics of the wings on that
airplane. This does not indicate at all that there is a current
safety flight issue. It is an analysis that has been done,
based on fatigue testing, to say that we need to be paying
particular attention and preparing to replace certain sections
of the wings of those aircraft to assure that they are safe to
fly.
The pullout of those aircraft out of the fleet has prompted
us to look at various ways to maintain its capability within
the fleet operations, and multiple ideas are being considered.
One of those, obviously, is the procurement of replacement wing
components and the rebuild of those wings on the P-3. The other
of course is, as you mentioned, the acceleration of at least
one of the A capabilities provided by the P-8A MMA aircraft. We
are in the process of doing that analysis as we speak, and will
be evaluating that as part of our FY 2010 budget development
process.
Mr. Dicks. Admiral Roughead included $100 million as a top
priority on his unfunded priority list to accelerate the P-8A
production. How would that funding be used if it were provided?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. There are a couple of sets of
funding. There is $100 million that you referred to in RDT&E.
There is $364 million in fiscal year 2008 to work on the wing
box problem in zone 5 that Mr. Thackrah addressed, as well as a
need of about $312 million in fiscal year 2009.
Mr. Dicks. This is all in the existing plan?
Admiral McCullough. The 300 numbers I gave you on the
existing P-3s. The $100 million in RDT&E that the CNO referred
to is to accelerate the initial operational capability of the
P-8A Poseidon from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2012,
approximately 15 months.
Mr. Dicks. And for my colleagues, this is a 737 being done
at Renton, Washington?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. It is a militarized variant
of the 737 baseline aircraft, but there are a lot of
differences in the two aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. How is the program doing?
Admiral McCullough. The program is doing very well, sir. We
have the ability to accelerate it given the extra funds. That
would allow us to deploy three squadrons at IOC in fiscal year
2012 if we receive them.
Mr. Dicks. And they are using an inline production method;
isn't that the way they characterize it?
Admiral McCullough. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Why don't you explain that, because it is
relevant also to the tanker decision; because Boeing wanted to
do an inline approach on the 767, was downgraded for it.
Explain the inline method that is used on the 737.
Mr. Thackrah. Mr. Dicks, thank you for that question.
Boeing at the Renton plant in Renton, Washington as you
mentioned, transitioned, once their sales requirements demanded
it, to have a moving line for producing the 737 aircraft, not
unsimilar to the way most auto manufacturers make cars. Most of
Boeing's larger commercial aircraft are made in batch-line
setups, for example, up at their Everett, Washington facility.
But in Renton they went to a moving line that allowed them to
process 30 aircraft a month through that assembly line.
Mr. Dicks. Per month?
Mr. Thackrah. Per month.
Mr. Dicks. And they can militarize that airplane, as I
understand it, but they have to always--they have got all kinds
of regulations, like ITAR, that means you have got to worry
about foreign nationals and making sure they are not working at
the same place that a--and we waive all this for people--I mean
for other countries. We waive this regulation. They don't have
to meet this regulation, but we have to meet it; isn't that
right?
Mr. Thackrah. For the assembly of this aircraft, sir,
certainly Boeing will have to comply with the ITAR
requirements. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Dicks. But how do you feel about this program--I mean,
the MMA replacement? Do you think it is moving well now? I
understand there was some hiccup a couple years ago when they
first started this, but they have got this thing turned around.
That is what a development program usually is about.
Mr. Thackrah. Sir, this program is on track, meeting
schedule, and within the budget allocated.
Mr. Dicks. Is Boeing doing a good job as the integrator?
Mr. Thackrah. Yes, sir.

TANKER AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Dicks. Here is one issue and, General, I am going to
leave this up to you to help me on this a little bit. We are
under--we have been told, and people should realize that the
Navy and the Marine Corps use these tankers just like the Air
Force does; isn't that correct?
General Amos. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And one of the things we are told--and I would
like you to find out if this is accurate--that the 767
competitor would have refueled the Osprey, the V-22, but that
the Northrop Grumman larger airplane, because of speed
concerns, can't refuel the Osprey. This would be a big thing to
the Marine Corps, wouldn't it?
General Amos. Sir, we would want a tank off this airplane
and the Osprey. Now, I don't know that any Ospreys have gone up
and tanked behind a KC-135.
Mr. Dicks. Well, you can't do that. But the 767 we are told
would be able to do it?
General Amos. And I can't speak to that, sir.
Mr. Dicks. I thought it would be something you would want
to think about and evaluate.
General Amos. Sir, I will. I will take that back and--
seriously, because I will tell you what, we have got airplanes
now, we have sold a V-22 on its worldwide deployability. And we
do that with its great range as a result of in-flight
refueling.
Mr. Dicks. But the fact that if our new tanker, because of
its size and speed, couldn't refuel you, that would be a
serious detriment, wouldn't it?
General Amos. Sir, it would be something we would be very
interested in.
Mr. Dicks. I think you need to check into this, General,
and I will be eager to hear your answer.
General Amos. Sir, I will. We will get back to you on that.
[The information follows:]

The Marine Corps supports the need for a new strategic
tanker to support our tactical jet fleet and we look forward to
the possible operational flexibility the KC-X will provide if
it can refuel the MV-22. If the KC-X cannot refuel the MV-22,
the effect on the Marine Corps will be minimal as we are
capable of globally self-deploying the V-22 using our own KC-
130 aerial refueler aircraft.

Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha [presiding]. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, just following up on the MRAP, there seems to
be, obviously, a focus on what their use might be in future
wars. And I am not asking you to do an advertisement for MRAP,
but from what I hear from soldiers and marines, they are damn
lucky; they feel that those MRAPs have saved lives.
I wasn't here for the Army's testimony yesterday, but I do
understand that of the IED attacks on MRAPs I think we have
lost, I think, one soldier. But you would agree, despite what
we hear about issues of weight and flexibility, that on the
battlefield our marines and soldiers like them?
General Amos. Sir, they do. They love them. And I can
personally testify. I stood in front of two staff sergeants,
Marine staff sergeants and a Navy corpsman, and you may have
seen that picture of the Humvee--or, excuse me, the MRAP that
had the motor blown out, the whole front end blown off. And I
stood in front of them, in front of that vehicle, and all three
of them walked away and they are here today. And so they love
it. We love the vehicle. It just has restrictions. In other
words, there are places we just can't take it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They are damn heavy. I forget how much
they weigh.
General Amos. Sir, they are very heavy. And they are really
not an off-road vehicle. So if you start thinking about
mobility off highways and you are out over terrain, then what
kind of vehicles do we--we are buying vehicles like tanks, we
are buying vehicles like--we have our Light Armored Vehicles
(LAVs), we are going to buy the Marine personnel carrier that
off road will be able to stay up with mechanized vehicles of
forces advancing rapidly, and this can't. But there is a place
for it in our inventory, there absolutely is.
And because it is so new--remember, we just really started
getting large numbers of them in there this past fall. We are
still learning where it can go and where it can't go. And that
is the reason why we lowered the numbers 3,700 to 2,225, was
once we got enough in there and we began to actually use them
for operations, we began to realize that there are spots that
you just can't take it. But we love the vehicle and the Marines
love it.

LPD-17 PROGRAM

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you for your response.
Admiral McCullough, last year I quizzed your predecessor,
and this is sort of apropos of Congressman Young's questions
about the LPD-17, the condition of the San Antonio. That was
the lead ship. And it was a little bit unclear, but that ship
suffered some pretty massive cost overruns. It had some
problems with its sea trial.
Where is the San Antonio today? And as we are rolling out
other ships and moving ahead with various buys, how would you
characterize it?
Admiral McCullough. She is working with the Fleet right now
and they are doing amphibious operational testing with that
ship pretty much today as we speak.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So the ship is complete or incomplete?
Admiral McCullough. It is complete, sir. LPD-18, as you
know, was delivered with some outstanding work. That is in the
process of being corrected. LPD-19 was delivered complete.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So whatever the problems were, those
problems have been addressed?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. We have worked those issues
with the contractors, and the ships are being delivered ready
for us to use.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, I think I know the answer. General
Amos, you are looking for a buy of 10, right? And what do they
give you? You know, they obviously give you a huge ability to
deliver, but maybe you could expand on it.
General Amos. When you say----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The LPD-17s, why do you need, for
instance, 10?
General Amos. Sir, first of all, we are looking for the
10th one. We are actually looking for the 11th one as well, as
I stated earlier. This ship will have the ability to--and I
don't have the numbers in front of me, I can get them to you--
increase the capacity, the capacity to put vehicles and have
things like operating rooms, berthing for Marines, spots to put
airplanes on the back end of it, spots to put LCACs in the well
deck of the thing, has significant greater capability than the
current legacy ships that we have today.
It also has a stability capability where it can actually
stabilize itself weight-wise. It is a ballast and it is a
readjustment of fuel, and it has a capacity that some of the
older ships, quite frankly, don't have. So what you end up with
is a new LPD-17 variant, a ship that, quite honestly, you can
put an awful lot on.
What we are finding, because everything is getting heavier,
if we go back to some of our legacy ships, some of those
actually end up with stability and center-of-gravity issues, so
that you get to a point where you can't put anything more on
it. There may be room to put something on it, but you can't put
it on it because of stability.
So with a newer ship you don't have to worry about that. So
you end up with a greater capability, a greater square cubed
capability on the ships, and we get on with the construction of
the program of record.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And that is obviously endorsed by the
Navy as well; I mean the same reasons, the same abilities?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir; I agree with exactly what
General Amos said.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask you
because of your position in acquisition and development, a
question about JIEDDO. On too many occasions I have heard from
defense contractors in my district that JIEDDO has a single-
minded focus on supporting, really exclusively, new programs
and technologies developed for the Army. And many of these
companies have products with tailor-made applications to thwart
IED attacks, but they are not given serious consideration by
JIEDDO because they support primarily the Marine Corps.
So I would like to ask you, do you see any kind of bias in
the Marine Corps funding for the Army as opposed to project
approaches that might help the Marine Corps? Because the Marine
Corps is getting very little of this JIEDDO money, and that was
not the intention. The intention was to spread it out over all
of the services.
General Amos. Sir, let me open up on that because I worked
with JIEDDO over the last year and a half, and then perhaps the
Secretary can pile on. My sense was, to begin with, what you
have described was, that was my sense coming into the job 20
months ago, was----
Mr. Moran. You had heard the same thing?
General Amos. I did. I heard it. I can't sit in front of
this Subcommittee and say I saw this, this and this, but it was
challenging. I will tell you that I saw the changes take place
10 months ago. General Miggs and I, before he left, had a very
good relationship. I have known him for a long time. We sat
down and said, Let's make sure--and I basically confronted
JIEDDO with just exactly what you said. I said, Look, there are
two of us on the ground in this. You may have more forces on
the ground, but we have got a lot of Marines on the ground as
well, so we need to share the wealth here. And I will be honest
with you; I came away with, over the next probably ensuing 10
months, believing that we are getting our fair share of this
thing. He was very forthright.
We put a Marine, by the way, a colonel, as his chief of
staff. That began to help explain how Marines do business a
little bit differently than the Army on the ground. I am pretty
comfortable with where we are right now, Congressman Moran,
with JIEDDO. I shared your frustrations about 18 months ago
when I first got here, but I am not that way now.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. Moran. I have one other question. And I tend to sound
like a Johnny one-note on acquisition workforce, but the
Chairman has asked me to pursue this.
Mr. Thackrah, you mentioned your acquisition workforce
investment, but you were very unspecific. How much have you put
into improving your acquisition workforce? How many new
employees? What are you specifically doing? Because you know;
this has been a whack-a-mole kind of thing. We keep asking, you
know, What are you doing here? And we get assurance. And then
it turns out that people are drawn from another area.
The workforce acquisition, the acquisition workforce really
doesn't seem to get the kind of investment that it desperately
needs, especially in the Army and Navy. So if you would address
that specifically. How many people additionally are you
bringing on and how much money are you putting into that?
Mr. Thackrah. Congressman Moran, thank you for that
question. There are several specific things that we are doing
to address acquisition workforce. First of all, the budget, the
fiscal year 2009 budget that is in front of you, has an
additional $30 million in it specifically for the hiring of
systems engineers. This was directed and mandated as we
suggested it to Secretary Winter. He concurred. And the
additional funds are in our budget request.
Secondly, also in the fiscal year 2009 budget, is funding
for an additional 100 acquisition interns annually. Typically,
heretofore our acquisition intern program has hired 300 young
college graduates per year. This budget that is in front of you
is asking for 400 per year, so we are raising that level.
Beyond that, sir, we have a significant ongoing study
looking at our working capital-funded resources across our
warfare centers to evaluate what skillsets we are developing
and maintaining and targeting them towards three specific
areas, which are contracting professionals, program management
and systems engineering. What we are saying by highlighting
those three specific areas--because they are the three key
areas that we have, we believe, that will assure us acquisition
success--is that that may be at the expense of some other
skillsets that are of a lower priority in those working
capital-funded activities. These initiatives are some of the
things that we have that are very specific and ongoing, sir.
Mr. Moran. I am glad to hear that. I am not overwhelmingly
impressed that you are getting 100 more interns, but that is a
step in the right direction. I do hear--and this is the Navy--
that some of the experienced acquisition people are not
particularly well respected and they would rather bring in new
people. But there are some folks with a whole lot of experience
that just don't seem to be particularly appreciated in the Navy
acquisition pipeline.
But I mean that is--I don't have any numbers to show that
that is widespread. They are just anecdotal examples. But,
again, I would hope that this is going to be a priority for
obvious reasons.
Mr. Thackrah. Sir, thank you for that comment. And I would
say that not only within the acquisition community which I
lead, but Admiral Roughead, upon his recent arrival, has put a
significant priority on the civilian workforce within his
organization. And he too is looking at not only civilian but
Navy Captains, some of the acquisition professionals that have
achieved the rank of Captain and then either they hastily
retire or are hastily retired.
He is asking his staff to look at completely reviewing that
and finding out ways that we can incentivize Navy Captains to
stay longer that are acquisition professionals so that we can
take advantage of that talent that we have grown over the years
that they have been in those jobs.
Mr. Moran. Well, good for you. That is just the kind of
thing I hear. Once somebody turns 50, they got no use for you,
they want to bring in somebody new. And it is the people with
experience in acquisition that we need to keep. But I am glad
you are on to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NAVIES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.
Let me begin with Admiral McCullough. With a 313-ship Navy
prospectively, what would be the country that would then follow
ours and then the country after that that would have the next
largest Navy? And on what rating scale would you rate those
nations today? In other words if the United States has 313,
then who is next? Where does Russia fit, where does China fit,
and the way you look at the future?
Admiral McCullough. I had some folks pull up data for me.
The next highest Navy with respect to ships are the Chinese,
164 ships.
Ms. Kaptur. Today?
Admiral McCullough. Today, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. And how do the quality of those ships compare
to ours?
Admiral McCullough. As you know, China has embarked on a
military buildup. Some of their ships that have been delivered
are very capable ships, and some of their ships in inventory,
as you might imagine, were built on a former Soviet design and
are not quite as capable. But the material they are delivering
today is quite capable.
I would say the operational effectiveness of their force
and the capability of their developing noncommissioned officer
corps and their higher-level officers is increasing at a rate
greater than we thought it would. So they are becoming capable.
If you look at their proficiencies as compared to ours, I would
say it is not on the same par.
Ms. Kaptur. If you look at the numbers of persons in their
Navy versus ours, do you know?
Admiral McCullough. I will have to get that for you ma'am.
I don't know.
[The information follows:]

The United States Navy's FY 2008 authorized end strength is
329,098. Conversely, our intelligence estimate of the number of
people in China' People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is
approximately 255,000, while the Military Maritime Fleet of
Russia numbers approximately 150,000.

Ms. Kaptur. And who is after them?
Admiral McCullough. The next would be the Russian Navy. It
has got 108 ships currently. And as you just saw, the Kuznetsov
Battle Group had a deployment to the Mediterranean out of the
North Sea Fleet. She was met in the Mediterranean by a Slava
cruiser that had come from the Black Sea Fleet. And that ship
transited with the Kuznetsov Battle Group out into the Atlantic
Ocean and went to a port visit. And I think it was Lisbon, I am
not sure.
The Kuznetsov group then transited back to the north and
returned home. And her out-of-area deployment was approximately
62 days. The cruiser went back to her home in the Black Sea
Fleet; and I want to say she was out of home port about 25
days, but I would have to get the exact number.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. I appreciate this information. I am
sure every Member knows this already, but I would be very
grateful for just a little chart that your Department might be
able to produce for me that shows me the relative strengths of
our respective navies, not just in numbers, but in terms of
capabilities. Is there a way to do that that is understandable
to a layperson?
Admiral McCullough. Yes ma'am, I am sure there is. We will
do that.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. I would appreciate that very very
much.
[The information follows:]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States
Ship categories Russian Navy Navy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surface Combatants (carriers to 34 117
frigates)........................
Amphibious Ships.................. 21 31
Strategic Submarines (Ballistic 15 14
missiles)........................
Attack Submarines (Nuclear and 48 56
diesel powered)..................
Logistic Ships (Larger tankers)... 14 31
C2/Support (Intelligence and 32 \1\ 17
larger rescue vessels)...........
Minehunters....................... 0 14
Total......................... 164 \2\ 280
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Navy C2/Support number only includes T-ARS, AS, T-AGOS, T-ATF
and LCC ships.
\2\ Total U.S. Navy ship count reflected as of 31 March 2008.

The Russian Navy Order of Battle (OOB) presented here is
distributed across four geographically widely separated
fleets--Northern, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Pacific. The
Caspian Flotilla units located in the completely landlocked
Caspian Sea are not included. The presented OOB must be
understood in the context of the Russian Navy's primary
mission: to defend Russia while operating in adjacent seas out
to about 1,200 nautical miles from the Russian coast. Because
of significant differences in geography, history, training, and
mission, the size and capability of the Russian Navy cannot be
directly compared with that of the U.S. Navy.
The ship categories included in this listing generally
mirror those used by the U.S. Navy in its description of the
desired 313-ship navy. United States Navy ships listed are on
active duty. These totals do not include USN ships in reserve
or mothball status. SSGNs are listed under Attack Submarines
category.
Only the larger and more open sea worthy logistics and
other support vessels, comparable in function to those included
in the U.S. Navy 313-ship listing, are included. The Russian
Navy has many more auxiliary vessels of various functions.
Virtually all Russian Navy deployments beyond home waters
in the last two years have been conducted to project presence,
making port calls, and engaging in bilateral and multilateral
naval exercise and operational activity.
Due to the highly disparate geographic circumstances and
differences in mission scope between the Russian Navy and the
U.S. Navy, in contrast to the Cold War days of the Soviet
Union, meaningful direct comparisons are extremely difficult to
make.

Ms. Kaptur. Then I would like to ask you, Admiral, in terms
of strategic technologies as you look at the Chinese, the
Russians, and anybody else that is out there, what worries you
the most as we look at intellectual property, as we look at
advancements in everything from missile launchers to vessel
construction? Where do you see our greatest weaknesses?
Admiral McCullough. Trying to keep this in an unclassified
environment, the Chinese have built a quite capable access
denial force, both with ballistic missiles and their submarine
capability. That concerns us. We work hard to try to counter
that.
------ --
----.

But when I look at high-end technology right now, I would
say we look to the Western Pacific and what the Chinese are
doing.
Ms. Kaptur. In terms of the Russians, and maybe this is--in
terms of the Russians, we seem to be moving apart rather than--
our foreign policy is taking us in a direction that I don't
really care for in terms of the Russians. But do you see any
opportunities for cooperation on any level with the Russians at
this point to begin to stem some of the rising animosity?
Admiral McCullough. That is pretty much out of my lane
ma'am.
------ --
----.

I will take that for the record and get back to you.
[The information follows:]

The United States Navy and Russian Federation Navy (RFN)
have a robust agenda of activities that provides valuable
interaction between senior officials, staff-officers, and
operational units. These efforts are designed to build trust,
transparency and cooperation between our two navies. Some
examples include:
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE)--NATO's ongoing Maritime
Security and Counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean.
U.S. Navy and RFN units are active participants.
Exercise FRUKUS--An annual multi-lateral naval exercise
between France, Russia, UK, and US focused on improving
interoperability at sea. In 2007, the U.S. hosted in and around
Norfolk, VA. In August 2008, Russia will host in and around
Vladivostok.
Exercise NORTHERN/PACIFIC EAGLE--An annual bilateral
exercise focused on cooperation on Maritime Interdictions
Operations (MIO), Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Search and
Rescue (SAR), and tactical interoperability. The exercise
rotates annually between the North Atlantic (NORTHERN EAGLE)
and North Pacific (PACIFIC EAGLE). This year, Exercise NORTHERN
EAGLE will take place in July 2008 off the coast of Norway and
conclude with a U.S. ship visit to Severomorsk in conjunction
with Russian Navy Day.
Port Visits--The U.S. Navy and RFN routinely conduct
reciprocal port visits in Russia and the United States,
respectively. The 2008 U.S. Navy RFN ship visit plan includes
U.S. Navy ship visits to Russian ports in the Black Sea,
Berents Sea, and North Pacific; as well as Russian ship visits
to a U.S. Pacific port.
Naval War College Exercises--The U.S. Naval War College
(NWC) and Kuznetsov Naval Academy (KNA) conduct an annual
bilateral war game and command post exercise focused on
cooperative planning in support of multinational Humanitarian
Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. Last year's
exercise was hosted by Russia in St. Petersburg, and the 2008
event will be in Newport, RI.
INCSEA/Staff Talks--U.S. Navy and RFN staff officers meet
annually to review the status of the 1972 Incidents at Sea
(INCSEA) Agreement, plan inputs into the annual bilateral
military workplan, and openly discuss issues of mutual interest
or concern. Russia hosted the talks in 2007 in Kaliningrad, and
the U.S. will host in 2008 in Naples, Italy.
NCIS-FSB Cooperation--The Naval Criminal Investigation
Service (NCIS) has an active Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with its Russian counterpart agency (FSB) to enable information
sharing and cooperation on providing Anti-Terrorism/Force
Protection (AT/FP) to U.S. and Russian assets during ship
visits. Senior leaders from each agency also regularly
participate in joint leadership conferences.
Submarine Rescue and Escape MOU--U.S. Navy and RFN subject
matter experts are working on an MOU that institutionalizes
cooperation on submarine rescue and escape procedures and
practices. Experts from both navies also meet regularly in the
NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMWERG).
Black Sea Partnership Cruise (BSPC)--An annual multi-
lateral partnership cruise hosted by the staff of Commander,
Naval Forces Europe aboard a U.S. Navy ship in the Black Sea.
Last year, the U.S. invited all the Black Sea (+Azerbaijan)
littoral nations to embark Junior Officers and Non Commissioned
Officers (NCOs) on the USS Mount Whitney for a week of academic
seminars focused on general maritime safety and security, oil
spill mitigation, helicopter interoperability, NCO development,
and maritime operations. Although Russia was invited and did
not participate last year, we are actively encouraging their
participation in this year's partnership cruise.

ELECTRICAL POWER FOR NAVY FACILITIES

Ms. Kaptur. All right. And I have a final question. In
terms of the Navy, can you get me numbers on how much power the
Navy purchased in the form--for its facilities, for
electricity, whatever powers your systems, and fuel for 2007
and 2008, and what is your projection for 2009? How much are
you spending and what plans are in place to transition to
more--for less reliance on petroleum? How are you looking at
that issue over the next 20 years?
Admiral McCullough. That is for the facilities, ma'am?
Ms. Kaptur. For anything you buy related to power
production or consumption.
Admiral McCullough. Yes ma'am, but for facilities?
Ms. Kaptur. Facilities as well. How independently powered
are your facilities? How are your vehicles or ships powered?
How are you looking at the power trains that are used in them?
And with fuel efficiency and new power systems as a priority,
how does your Department look at that? Is this something that
somebody is in charge of? Is everybody power-conscious over
there?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, ma'am, we are very power-
conscious, because it drives cost. Now, the bases--I will get
you the answer for the bases. But for our ships and aircraft we
always look at the best way to power these devices. Now, jet
airplanes, we haven't figured out a better way to power them
other than fossil fuel. But we do look at the efficiency of the
engines that we put in our airplanes.
For ships, we explore alternate propulsion forms every time
we work on a new class of ships. And the Naval Sea Systems
Command has done a detailed study on that, everything from
direct energy conversion from nuclear reactors direct, to
drive, to fuel cells, to photovoltaic and nuclear propulsion.
So every time we build a ship, we look really hard at what the
power density or the energy density requirements are for that
particular ship class and what the current state of technology
is and what we can incorporate in those ships.
Ms. Kaptur. I know my time is up and I thank you, Admiral.
I would be real interested for your research, how many dollars
of your research budget are devoted toward energy independence
projects?
[The information follows:]

The following table itemizes U.S. Navy purchased power and
fuel:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 (actual) FY 2008 (est)--Note 1 FY 2009 (est)--Note 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost Total cost Total cost
Total units ($M) Total units ($M) Total units ($M)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shore:
Electricity (MWH)................................... 7,494,877 658.13 7,427,415 688.56 7,380,856 701.19
Natural Gas (MBTU).................................. 8,365,420 75.63 10,305,939 72.00 10,842,661 75.74
Fuel (MB)........................................... 2.07 184.93 2.08 227.82 1.96 205.91
Transportation Fuel (MB) Note 2..................... 0.34 30.81 0.24 28.90 0.24 28.47
Afloat:
Fuel (MB)........................................... 26.86 2,524.00 21.02 1,928.00 20.79 2,416.00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
MWH = Mega Watt Hour
MBTU = Million British Thermal Units
MB = Million Barrels

Note 1: Total Cost based off budgeted rate established in 2006.
Note 2: Transportation fuel includes 498,868 gallons of Alternative Fuel in FY 2007, an estimated 548,755 gallons in FY 2008, and an estimated 603,630
gallons in FY 2009.

The Department of the Navy Energy Board, under the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Installations and Facilities,
provides overall program guidance for facility energy
conservation and renewable energy resources. Commander Navy
Installations Command and Commander Naval Facilities Command
execute the Navy's shore facilities energy strategy.
The Navy is extremely power conscious, and aggressively
purses the conservation requirements of Energy Policy Act 2005
(EPAct05), Energy Independence and Security Act 2007 (EISA07),
and Executive Order 13423. In FY 2006 and FY 2007, Navy reduced
energy consumption by 12 percent from FY 2003 baseline required
by EPAct05 and EISA07.
The Navy constantly reviews facilities to reduce power
consumption requirements and reliance on fossil fuels as a fuel
source. Currently the Navy is:
Investing heavily in Energy Savings Performance
Contracts and private sector Energy Service Companies that
clearly demonstrate consumption savings.
Incorporating Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) green building, sustainable design,
and energy efficiency principles into new construction and
major renovation.
Evaluating use of commercial power and energy
conservation products.
Highlights of the Navy's Energy Program include:
Managing a world class 270 MW geothermal power
plant at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake and awarded a
second geothermal plant at Fallon, NV, which is projected to
come online in 2010. A 30 MW plant is projected to come online
at El Centro by 2012.
Operating two of the largest Federal photovoltaic
projects in the U.S. and two wind-farms at San Clemente Island
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, respectively, to provide electrical
power.
Constructing a bio-diesel production facility to
utilize cooking oil as fuel.
Aggressively investigating wave power and ocean
thermal power.
Installation of over 6,000 ground source heat
pumps.
With few exceptions, however, Navy installations are not
independently powered, but receive power from commercial
available power grids. Critical facilities have back-up
generators and the Navy has the ability to deploy mobile
utility systems should the need arise. Expanded use of
renewable energy sources reduce Navy's reliance on commercially
provided power.
Fossil fuels continue to be used as the major fuel source
for vehicles. The Navy continuously evaluates current fuel
infrastructure and vehicle fleet size/composition with the goal
of replacing petroleum vehicles with neighborhood electric
vehicles, hybrids, and alternative fuel vehicles. The ESIAct07
requires federal agency fleets to reduce petroleum consumption
and increase alternative fuel consumption so that by October 1,
2015, and for each ensuing year, each federal agency achieves
at least a 20 percent reduction in annual petroleum consumption
and a 10 percent increase in annual alternative fuel
consumption. Navy is currently on track and fully intends to
continue to comply with ESIAct07 through alternative fuel
vehicles and petroleum conservation initiatives. Current Navy
policy is that all new vehicles procured must be alternative
fuel capable, if commercially available.
The Navy is coordinating with, and leveraging the efforts
of the Department of Energy and other Department of Defense
components to develop alternative energy sources, provide
assured energy distribution, and reduce energy demand and our
dependence on foreign oil. The Navy's energy security research
investments focus on the Navy-Marine Corps unique aspects of
energy efficiency and alternative energy with projects that
range from basic science on advanced organic photovoltaic films
for Marine Corps applications; to the evaluation of stern flaps
for ships to reduce fuel consumption under the Ship Energy
Conservation Program; and to prototype demonstrations of ocean
energy harvesting concepts for shore-based facility power.
The Navy's energy security research projects in alternative
energy sources focuses on achieving the effective use of
alternative logistics--bio-based and synthetic--fuels in Naval
power systems, and their effects on the combustion process and
military equipment (engines, and fuel handling and distribution
systems); developing renewable energy technology such as
photovoltaics for Marine Corps applications and ocean energy
harvesting concepts for facility power and remote in-situ
sensors; and direct thermal-to-electric conversion for platform
power.
Research in energy efficiency and reduced fuel consumption
includes projects to develop high-efficiency fuel cells to
replace internal combustion engines for ship auxiliary power,
unmanned vehicles, and portable power sources for the Marine
Corps; studies on advanced fuel efficient aircraft engines; and
evaluation of variable speed drive pumps and stern flaps for
ships.
In the FY 2009 President's Budget request, the portion of
the Navy's research budget focused solely on ``energy
independence'' is approximately $70 million.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) energy security
investment plan (see chart below) identifies the primary focus
of science and technology funds--Alternative Fuels, Fuel Cells,
Direct Thermal-to-Electric & Thermal Energy Harvesting,
Photovoltaics, and Ocean and Mechanical Energy Harvesting. In
addition, the ONR investments under the Navy's Power and Energy
Science and Technology focus area will improve the power
conversion and energy efficiency of the next generation of
electrical systems targeted for future naval platforms; and the
investments in the Navy's Platform Mobility Science and
Technology focus area will improve the performance
characteristics of ships, aircraft and vehicles to provide
enhanced platform mobility while increasing energy efficiency.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Admiral McCullough. Yes ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REALISTIC COST ESTIMATES

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, the acquisition question Mr.
Moran asked, every time that you put an RFP out, you know very
well those ships are going to cost more than the company comes
in. The company comes in, and you make change orders, and then
in the end we have to pay the bill.
Now, we have encouraged the Navy to be more realistic, have
more design work before they go and put an RFP out. We hope
that you will do this. This is partly maybe acquisition, but it
is also the fault of the Navy because you want to build a ship,
you want to do it as quickly as possible, you want to do it in
a certain year--and I don't know what other reason--but we
can't afford to continue paying the bill. We can't plan when we
have no ability to--we have got supplementals, money is going
to be cut back. We have got a real problem here.
You have got to be more realistic in these proposals. For
instance, you take the LCS. You told us when you came before
the committee it was going to cost $188 million apiece. They
are substantially more, as you know. That does not include the
modules. The modules apparently are fairly well on target, but
the rest of them aren't.
So I hope that you will have more design work done before
you go to an RFP, so that we can have a more realistic proposal
and make a decision based on the actual cost of these ships.
You will never get the 313, the requests that are being made by
the administration. You are going to need our help, and we are
trying to help you.
But when we put--we are embarrassed sometimes when we put
ships in and then something comes up like the LCS with these
big cost overruns. I don't say the first ship isn't always
going to have some exception. But if you have a better design
and you are further along, I think you will have less of a
problem. At least that is what I see.
So I would hope that you would be more careful about that.
And the contracting out, I don't know how much you do in the
acquisition part of it, and I have asked the Secretary of the
Navy to give me a breakdown of contracting out, the categories
of contracting out, so we get some handle on how much money is
being spent; since we are reducing the size of the Navy by
28,000 how many contractors we hired in the meantime. So I am
sure he will be talking to the acquisition part.
We obviously need professionals in that program. And as far
as this IED program, I have never been happy. They have too
much bureaucracy. They don't seem to get anything out in the
field. They come and brief us and then--I have never seen the
results I would like to see from whatever we call them. What do
they call that?
The bureaucracy over there is unbelievable. I mean, we got
nothing but complaints about--no consideration from anybody
that has got ideas. And they keep increasing the number of
people and they don't come up.
So your experience is different than what I have heard, the
experience the Marine Corps has had, that they are taking care
of people. I don't see that happening. But at any rate, I
appreciate the problem you folks have. We are trying to help
you. We can't help you if we don't get reasonable estimates
about these ships. And the reason I was so anxious to get back
here is because I wanted to hear what you saw. And then we want
to help you get to the 313 ships that you are trying to build.
Mr. Visclosky, do you have any questions?
Mr. Visclosky. No.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

ATTACK SUBMARINES

Mr. Young. Mr. Secretary, let us talk about the fast attack
submarine for just a minute. The stated requirement by the Navy
is 48 of the SSNs. But as we look at the decommissioning rate
and we look at the build rate, we are pretty much convinced
that you are going to end up with about 40 rather than 48 fast
attack submarines. What happens--in the absences of those 8
submarines what happens? What do we do to fill the gap?
Mr. Thackrah. Mr. Young, I am going to ask Admiral
McCullough to help me with that one.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. First of all, when we added
the second submarine starting in fiscal year 2011, the minimum
number of submarines that we actually go to is 41.
Now, to mitigate the difference between 41 submarines that
you physically have and the 48 requirement, we have looked at
several things. One is to reduce the build time of the
submarines that we are building to 60 months. That buys us back
a couple of submarines.
Now, the second thing we have looked at is to extend the
lives of--I believe it was 16 submarines. And that buys us back
some of the gap.
And the third one was how we were going to operationally
deploy the submarines. And that was to increase some of the
deployments to 7 months. With those mitigating factors, we
think we can meet the forward presence requirements of our
submarine force while we are in the seven submarine delta of 41
to 48, sir.
Mr. Young. Admiral, is this plan reflected in the budget
request?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. The second submarine in
fiscal year 2011 is in the budget request; yes, sir.
Mr. Young. When do you think that--with this plan that you
have just described, when do you think we close the gap?
Admiral McCullough. I think that the gap in forward
presence in force structure is closed in about fiscal year
2033. The gap starts, if my notes are right, in about fiscal
year 2022.
Mr. Young. Fiscal year 2033? I don't know if you and I are
going to be here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Oh, sure you will, sure you will.
Mr. Young. We have had a lot of emphasis today, because
this is Navy and Marine Corps day. And Ms. Kaptur brought up
some interesting points.
And earlier this morning with the CNO and the Secretary, we
discussed some other issues relative to that. But to close the
gap in 2033, it looks to me like we are going to have what
could be a serious gap should there be a threat, especially
with the growing activity that you mentioned in response to Ms.
Kaptur with the Russians.
Mr. Murtha. Especially, Mr. Chairman, especially if they
push it out every year like they have been and they say, Oh,
next year we are going to put more, next year we are going to
put more.
Mr. Young. Well, as the Chairman has said so many times, we
would like to help. I don't think we are comfortable with
having a gap for that long with submarines. So if there is
something that we need to do, to consider to help close this
gap a lot quicker, you need to tell us; because I don't feel
comfortable with--if you need 48, but you are only going to
have 40, I don't feel comfortable until you get your 48.
Mr. Dicks. Just a couple years ago it was 56, as I
remember.
Admiral McCullough. Sir, there was a joint staff study done
in 1999 that said the requirement was 55.
Mr. Dicks. Close.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, that is very close. That was
before we reallocated the attack submarine force to put 60
percent of it in the Pacific and home-ported three of the
attack submarines in Guam. And that makes up the delta between
the 48 and the 55.
Now, when I talk about the delta being as low as 41 to 48,
it is not a delta between 41 and 48 for that whole time period.
The actual delta between 41 and 48 I believe is two years. And
I believe that is in 2028 and 2029. So it is sort of a valley
that comes back. And that is the extent of it.
Mr. Young. As the Chairman said, we want to help. So you
let us know what we can do to help. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. You can't keep doing these studies to prove
what you want to prove in order to get down to the budget
levels. I hope that is not what generated this study.
Admiral McCullough. No, sir. Not at all. We understand the
gap between the physical number of submarines and the
requirement. And that is why we took the mitigative actions
that we are taking to relieve that gap.
Mr. Murtha. The mitigative action, huh?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. It was the best word I could
come up with.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston.

SUBMARINE BASING

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, as you may know, BRAC recommended moving
submarines from Groton to King's Bay. And there is a big
capacity for additional growth in Kings Bay. Are you looking at
any plans to move anything to Kings Bay?
Mr. Thackrah. Sir, I am not aware of any other movement of
activities to Kings Bay, but I will take that one for the
record and come back to you.
Mr. Dicks. We are moving a few things out of Kings Bay out
west where the problems are.
Mr. Kingston. Actually we have done plenty of that. The
next question may be of interest to you, Mr. Dicks, anyhow. But
we have the space, we have people who are ready and willing to
take on additional missions and do some great things. If you
could get back to me and we could, you know, look at that, that
would be very good.
Mr. Thackrah. I would be more than happy to, sir.
[The information follows:]

The Navy regularly evaluates and assesses the global force
posture and strategic laydown of our afloat forces and
infrastructure. Before making recommendations for homeport
shifts, the Navy allows adequate time to assure all
considerations including national security requirements, total
costs, programmatic implications, impact on sailors and their
families as well as the current and future strategic
environment have been fully evaluated.
Currently, and for the immediate future, NSB Kings Bay, GA
is primarily an SSBN and SSGN base. The strategic placement of
SSBNs and SSGNs remains largely driven by the need for them to
efficiently maintain presence in their respective deployment
areas in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
2006. Additionally, the SSBNs and the SSGNs are limited to one
specialized location on each coast based on the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) I.

AIRCRAFT TANKER PROGRAM

Mr. Kingston. And my next question, and the reason why it
might be of interest to Mr. Dicks, this question was actually
raised to me by the appropriator who does not like the recent
decision of the Air Force on the tankers and said that Marine
One helicopters have had lots of problems ever since they moved
the contractor and said, Look at what happened to Marine One
and now we are about to do the same thing with the tanker
program. Are you familiar with that, Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Tiahrt is the expert on that. We
discussed this earlier and there is a lot of concern about this
approach. And, one, I think one of the major concerns--and I
always applaud the Navy for protecting their industrial base,
is that for some reason the Air Force doesn't--isn't as
concerned about industrial base as the Navy has been. As they
have protected their carriers, their submarines, their nuclear
power equipment for both. I mean this has been very well done.
And so what I worry about is--and then also--the
authorizers have created regulations now that make it more
attractive if you are an offshore company to bid on a contract
in the United States against a U.S. company because we have to
follow the Berry amendment, the Italian rules, ITAR, and these
things. And they are waiting in many cases for the Europeans.
And we have created an unlevel playing field and we don't even
take into account a subsidy when the WTO is bringing----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston's time has run out.
Mr. Kingston. Mr. Chair, I do have one other thing I wanted
to ask Mr. Dicks. Is that memorandum of understanding on which
countries are allowed under Buy American, is that an Air Force
or is that a DOD?
Mr. Dicks. DOD, they just did it. And it is a regulation.
Mr. Kingston. Well, with that----
Mr. Dicks. It could be changed.
Mr. Kingston [continuing]. My time has expired, so there is
no reason for you guys to answer the question now that Mr.
Dicks----
Mr. Dicks. I would be happy to yield back.
Mr. Kingston. That is okay. That is just a question I
wanted to raise.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks has a question.

CVN-21 AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Mr. Dicks. Yes. Well, actually, aircraft carriers do have
something to do with tankers. Tell us about your aircraft
carrier program. You are bumping up on the $10.5 billion
ceiling. That is a lot of money, by the way. And you know, when
you are doing a lot of new things on this carrier, and you know
with--so give us an update on the new carrier. This is the
first of a new line of carriers, isn't that correct?
Mr. Thackrah. That is correct. This is the Gerald R. Ford
class of aircraft carriers. We call it CVN-21. The design for
the ship, sir, is well along. I can provide you like, as part
of the record, if you would like, the percent complete on this
design. And we will be working with the contractor throughout
this summer finalizing the construction contract for that ship.
As you stated, sir, there are some significant new
technologies that are a part of this ship; that of the
electromagnetic aircraft launch systems and advanced arresting
gear systems that are all a part of that new ship, largely to
make it more efficient, reduce manning and so forth.
Mr. Dicks. Are you worried about this $10.5 billion ceiling
that the authorizers put on you that--if you keep adding
technology, can you do it and stay under that ceiling?
Mr. Thackrah. Sir, at this point we are not adding more
technologies to that ship. The basic configuration of that ship
is well defined. As I mentioned, it is well along in design and
at this point we don't predict that we will have any issues
with that ceiling.
Mr. Murtha. Well, let me warn you though, Mr. Secretary, in
the B-1--and I told this story and Members heard me say this.
We made a deal with Caspar Weinberger, $20.5 billion for 100
aircraft, the B-1s. So what happened? It didn't have what it
needed in order to go to war. I mean, be very careful when you
say--I am not saying you should increase the cost of it, that
is for sure. But be very careful when you make an agreement
that you can live with a certain level because there is all
kinds of technology that comes along that changes the plans.

V-22 DEFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM

Mr. Dicks. General--I just wondered if I could just do one
more, Mr. Chairman. I have waited very--just on the V-22, the
defensive system that we are now going to put on it, tell us
about that.
General Amos. Sir, are you referring to the gun?
Mr. Dicks. Yeah. I thought maybe it was an anti----
General Amos. It comes already with an antimissile. It is
what we call an ESM system. We have got similar systems on our
helicopters flying around Iraq right now. We have them on the
C-130s. It is a countermissile that pops out flares, it has
sensors on it.
Mr. Dicks. We already have that kind of system.
General Amos. Yeah. It has that, sir. What it doesn't have
and what we are looking at is kind of the next generation of
capabilities for IR missiles and these kind of things. In other
words, when somebody is looking at you with an IR source--and
we want to look at this, and there are capabilities that are
out there. But we are looking at them.
Mr. Murtha. I hate to interrupt. Mr. Visclosky.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much. Sorry for my late
arrival. And, gentlemen, I appreciate your attendance. I was
not able to attend the shipbuilding hearing. And just for the
record, I want to add my voice to the concerns that hopefully
were expressed about change orders and trying to, if you would,
bring some balance to the needs of the Navy and making sure
that we construct these ships in an expeditious and economical
fashion as possible, and could not make the hearing. I do want
to express my very strong interest in the issue and hopefully
the progress will be made.
Secondly, there are questions for the record. But, again,
as Chairman of the Energy and Water Subcommittee, we have
jurisdiction, obviously, over NNSA and would want some very
specific answers to the questions raised about the reliable
replacement warhead. And I would point out that in my time
here, Mr. Secretary, that in fiscal year 2009 for your budget
request there is funding for the reliable replacement warhead
program to commence phase III efforts in 2009, despite the fact
that we eliminated all funding in the Department of Energy for
this program in 2008.
And the question I would have: Is it prudent for the
Department of Defense to get out in front of the Department of
Energy, since they don't have one penny for this program in
their budget this year?
Admiral McCullough. I am going to have to take most of that
for the record. Right now I know we are doing upgrades on the
current warhead system. And this is a redundant capability.
Sir, what I would say is General Chilton from STRATCOM is----
[The information follows:]

No effort on Reliable Replacement Warhead by the Navy is
planned unless approved and funded by Congress and coordinated
with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Put the mike up a little bit.
Mr. Murtha. Could you tell us how it works? I am not sure
that--as many times as I have heard Mr. Visclosky explain this,
tell us the coordination, how you handle the coordination
between the warheads, the Department of Energy and yourself.
Admiral McCullough. Sir, that is not in my portfolio. And I
would be remiss to be discussing that. That is really not under
what I do.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate that. And, again, this is the
chance I have to show up. I want to make sure that my very
strong interest in this is expressed.
And essentially, Mr. Chairman, there is a proposal for a
replacement warhead and the concern that we have expressed on
Energy and Water is that until--and we have very specific
language in the omnibus--you have an overarching policy for
this Nation, not a particular administration or a particular
Congress as to what the needs are. So that we know what the
inventory should look like, so then we know what the size of
the weapons complex should be.
The problem is, because money for the complex and the
warheads itself does not come out of DOD but DOE, they are the
customer. There is a proposal for a warhead but there is not a
commensurate urgency at DOE, Department of Energy, as far as
what the rational size of that complex should be.
Mr. Dicks. Which missiles would this go on?
Mr. Visclosky. It is--I think I want to say it is the 80--
--
Admiral McCullough. Trident D5s.
Mr. Visclosky. Yes. But at this point, remember, it is not
which missile. That is the problem. People are thinking about
this individually. The issue is, what is your overall strategy,
and not for the Bush administration or even any incoming
administration, but our Nation's policy so we know what the
needs are. And then what are the warheads you need and then
what is the complex?
And my concern, Mr. Chairman, is in last year's budget,
there was emphasis on having maybe a reliable replacement
warhead online by about 2012, 2014. But the rationalization of
the size of the complex was 2013 and the only concession by DOE
this year was to take out 2030. As you know and which was
expressed here, 2030 is forever. And when you start building a
new warhead in place with the existing complex, and you create
a new constituency with new challenges, you are never going to
downsize the complex to whatever size it should be. And I do
not know what it is, but that should be determined by the
strategy before we go off spending more money on the warhead
before we know what the ultimate strategy is.
And I just want to again--this exact isn't the exact forum.
On the other hand, the Navy is the customer right now, and----
Mr. Murtha. I think what he is saying is so important. I
mean the Navy obviously has to tell DOE what it wants and why
it wants it. Somebody has to address the threat. Who makes that
decision? Who says to DOE, This is what we want?
Mr. Dicks. I think I can help here. It is Admiral Donald,
who is the four-star who replaced Admiral Rickover. You know,
not directly. He is the new Rickover. He does this with these
dual-hatted--working for the Department of Energy and the
United States Navy. So he is the guy that gets into all this
nuclear stuff.
Mr. Visclosky. This is an issue for DOD. This is an issue
for the Intelligence Community. This is an issue for the State
Department. This is an issue for DOE. And as a group of
scientists expressed about a year and a half ago--we had Sam
Nunn, former Secretary Perry testified before our Committee, as
well as General Cartwright a year ago--is what is the
overarching national policy? And then back up; what are the
needs?
And my concern here specifically is you have a budget
request for DOD to proceed for the discrete design when you
have no money in DOD to match up with it. And so we do have a
series of questions, and I realize our time is limited. But I
just wanted to make sure people understood I am very concerned
about this issue.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir. I understand and you know we
are on a D5 life extension program to continue the viability of
that weapon. Mr. Chairman, if I could, on behalf of Admiral
Donald, he has nothing to do with weapons. It is nuclear
reactors.
Mr. Dicks. It is just reactors?
Admiral McCullough. Yes.
Mr. Murtha. I thank the gentlemen. The Committee will
adjourn until after the recess.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Obey and the
answers thereto follow:]

Shipboard Control Systems

Mr. Thackrah and Vice Admiral McCullough:
What steps is the Navy taking in the development of the 313
ship Navy to increase commonality of equipment across the
Fleet?
Question. With the existing shipbuilding plan, how many
unique surface ship machinery control systems is the Navy
currently supporting?
Answer. There are 13 unique machinery control systems in
the Surface Fleet today.
Question. What are the plans for converting proprietary
legacy hydraulic control systems to more modem technology that
uses standard equipment?
Answer. Today there is no formal program to convert legacy
hydraulic systems on in-service ships. The Navy monitors the
supportability of shipboard hydraulic system components and
will consider alterations to more modem technology when
necessary. The Navy is designing new classes of ships, such as
DDG 1000 and CVN 78, with significant reductions in the use of
hydraulic systems where feasible to reduce life-cycle
maintenance costs.
Question. How are these efforts prioritized and funded?
Answer. The Department continues to strive to achieve
commonality at ship, system, and material levels. The
Department is analyzing and implementing where possible greater
modularity, open architecture, commercial technology, and
common equipment and specifications.
Priority in these efforts is established by the systems
engineering approach that permits tradeoffs of all available
technologies, including more modern control systems, and
provides a recommendation that is technically sound and
economically attractive based in system acquisition and
sustainment cost. Funding of these efforts for new construction
ships is funded in the SCN line. Funding for in-service ships
is established based on Fleet priorities to upgrade existing
obsolete or unsupportable ship systems and leveraging existing
technologies. Funding for in-service control systems is funded
in OM,N and OPN.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Obey.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow:]

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft

Question. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter tactical aircraft
represents the future of tactical aircraft for the Department
of the Navy, with 680 aircraft scheduled to be procured. Fiscal
year 2008 represents the first year of Navy procurement for the
F-35. The program has recently experienced some testing
problems with the engine for the Marine Corps' Short Take Off
and Vertical Launch (STOVL) variant. The problem with the
engine will slip the first flight of the Marine Corps' variant
and will likely slip the contract award for the fiscal year
2008 aircraft into fiscal year 2009. The engine problem
underscores the concerns with having a single engine supplier
for an aircraft that will make up such a significant portion of
the Nation's tactical aircraft.
Secretary Thackrah, the engine for the Marine Corps'
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter has recently experienced
some testing issues causing an engine failure. This incident
will delay the first flight of this variant of the aircraft.
Has the root cause of the engine failure been determined? How
long will first flight be delayed as a result of this failure?
Answer. Yes, the engine failure is believed to be the
result of high cycle fatigue failure of the third stage low
pressure turbine blade. The failure is consistent with prior
findings. Both Pratt and Whitney and PEO JSF understand the
causes of the failures and are conducting tests to confirm the
root cause, which will be completed in April 2008. The engine
failure will delay BF-1 first flight by 30 days. PEO JSF is
confident that BF-1 will achieve the CTOL flight clearance
following the root cause testing that will be completed in
April 2008.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, the Committee understands
that in addition to delaying the flight test, the actual Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing portions of flight testing will be
even further delayed. Do you plan on awarding the initial
production contract for the Marine Corps' variant of the
aircraft before this capability has been demonstrated?
Answer. The acquisition strategy for the procurement of Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) II STOVL aircraft has always
been to contract for these aircraft after the BF-1 STOVL
aircraft had flown in the conventional take off and landing
(CTOL) mode. The test plan will gradually expand the BF-1
flight test envelope to include STOVL operations by late in the
calendar year.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, do you expect this problem to carry
over to the other variants of the Joint Strike Fighter?
Answer. No, development is on-track. Fifteen SDD aircraft are
currently in production flow. Manufacturing quality is excellent,
though production line activities for SDD jets have taken longer and
cost more than planned, in part due to late supplier deliveries. Delays
in SDD test article deliveries due to production line inefficiencies
are not impacting the LRIP delivery schedule. DoD is closely monitoring
program progress on technical issues and risk mitigation. No known
technical issues preclude achievement of Service IOCs.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, in light of this issue with the Joint
Strike Fighter, has the Department of the Navy considered extending the
production run of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft to alleviate the
tactical aircraft shortfall that you are experiencing?
Answer: A plan to address the Strike Fighter Shortfall is being
vetted through the POM-10 budget process. Should additional aircraft be
required, a Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) acquisition strategy will be
considered by the Navy. Multi Year Procurement has offered substantial
savings in the past.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, in light of this engine failure, has
the Department of the Navy considered complying with Congressional
direction to fund the development of an alternate engine for this
platform?
Answer. This type of incident is not wholly unexpected in a
developmental program. Additional consideration of the alternate
propulsion system should not be based on this incident. All three 2007
Congressionally-directed engine studies are supportive of competition
in general, but do not obviate the Department's initial findings that
the expected savings from competition do not outweigh the investment
costs. All of the studies do identify non-financial benefits of a two-
engine competitive program, such as better engine performance, improved
contractor responsiveness, a more robust industrial base, increased
engine reliability, and improved operational readiness. However,
affordability is also a factor that the Department must consider.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, in your opinion, does this failure
not reinforce the need for having an alternate propulsion engine for
this platform since it will make up such a large percentage of the
Nation's tactical aircraft fleet amongst the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force?
Answer. This type of incident is not wholly unexpected in a
developmental program. The engine failure is believed to be the result
of high cycle fatigue failure of the third stage low pressure turbine
blade. The failure is consistent with prior findings. Both Pratt and
Whitney and PEO JSF understand the causes of the failures, and are
conducting tests to confirm the root cause, which will be completed in
April 2008. The engine failure will delay BF-1 first flight by
approximately 30 days. BF-1 first flight will be in conventional
takeoff and landing mode. There will be a gradual expansion of the
flight test envelope to include STOVL operations. Additional
consideration of the alternate propulsion system should not be based on
this incident.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, the F-35 program was recently
restructured by reducing some test aircraft and events to
increase management reserve for the development program. This
has resulted in an aggressive and compressed test schedule that
even if executed perfectly will result in over 250 aircraft
being under contract prior to conduction the final operational
testing for the aircraft. Is this a prudent course of action?
Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Mid Course Risk Reduction
plan reduces total development flight test aircraft from 15 to
13. The deleted aircraft are both mission systems aircraft (one
CTOL variant and one CV variant). Deletion of these two test
assets is consistent with a refined and optimized flight test
plan that capitalizes on unprecedented investments in program
ground and flying lab infrastructure for mission systems
verification. The Department assessed the risks of this
approach, and believes they are both acceptable and manageable,
and mitigation options are available if needed. The
Department's F-35 acquisition strategy includes an appropriate
amount of concurrency and the most effective balance of
technical risk, financial resources and the Services'
operational needs.

DDG-1000 Combat System

Question. The combat system of the Virginia Class submarine
has been extremely successful in that it is built on open
architecture concepts that can be quickly upgraded to take
advantage of technology advancement as the ship ages. The Navy
calls this concept ``Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial-off-the-
shelf) Insertion (ARCI)''. The Navy claims the DDG-1000 program
is being patterned after the Virginia program in its
construction phase. It would be extremely forward-thinking to
also model the combat system after the Virginia Class to ensure
the combat system stays current throughout the life of the
ship.
Secretary Thackrah, the combat system of the Virginia Class
submarine program has been successful largely due to the
concept of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion. Is the DDG-1000
combat system being designed along the same lines such that the
combat system can be upgraded without major ship modifications?
Answer. Yes, the DDG 1000 is an open architecture compliant
combat system designed to decouple hardware and software
developments so improvements can be economically incorporated
as they develop without major ship modifications. The DDG 1000
also isolates the combat system sensors and weapon systems from
the Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) so that
introduction of future sensors/weapon systems do not
significantly impact the core combat system hardware or
software.
Question. Secretary Thackrah, one of the big advantages of
the Virginia Class program is that the combat system can be
upgraded fairly easily (relative to legacy submarine and
surface ship programs). In fact, as submarines are delivered to
the fleet, they come with the most current version of the
combat system rather than the combat system that was available
when construction began. Can the same be said for the DDG-1000
ships? How easy will it be to modernize and update the combat
system of the DDG-1000 given that electronics become obsolete
every two to four years? How frequently will modernization
occur for this class ship?
Answer. DDG 1000 has made substantial investments in Open
Architecture which provides the ability to isolate the hardware
from the software programs and install technology updates as
needed. DDG 1000 plans to follow similar COTS refresh cycles
(hardware upgrades approximately every 4 years) in order to
introduce the latest COTS processors and middleware. The DDG
1000 program is working to identify the most cost effective
timeframe for a COTS technology upgrade that will not impact
the shipbuilders' ability to complete construction and testing.
Since the DDG 1000 employs a Total Ship Computing Environment
(TSCE) that is comprised of a homogenous set of COTS processors
that meet Open Systems standards, this will enable efforts to
modernize the combat system electronics.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, April 24, 2008.

BIOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND THREATS

WITNESSES

Panel I

DARRELL GALLOWAY, DIRECTOR, JOINT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OFFICE,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN REEVES, USA, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
TONY TETHER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. The committee will come to order.
I want to welcome this panel and the committee. We have
been working on this issue for a long time, trying to get some
semblance of some coordination between HSS and DOD to make sure
we knew what was going on, see if we could play a part in the
funding part of it.
I have had a concern for several years that we wouldn't be
able to produce the amount of vaccine we needed in case we had
a pandemic. HHS is farther along than I realized, but I think
the key if something did happen, for instance, I think you told
me over 20 million people died in World War I from the Spanish
flu then.
So we know there are programs of vaccination. We know there
are programs that the Defense Department does with anthrax. We
know there are programs that HSS does. But I think this is a
unique idea, where we do research and the private drug
companies participate; and I would be interested to hear,
though, what your feeling is, how much we need to be involved
from the Defense Department standpoint so the subcommittee can
hear what the threat is.
The thing that worries me the most is the fact that we
started a synthetic fuel program in the Carter administration,
and it turned out that we didn't have a customer, and oil
prices dropped from $30 to $10 a barrel. So, of course, the
program fell flat. And here I don't know that we will have that
problem, but obviously somebody has to be a customer. DOD can
be a small part of the customer.
But I am interested to hear and the committee is interested
to hear exactly what we need to be able to produce in case
something like this happens. So we welcome you to the
committee, and I ask Mr. Young if he has any comments.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much; and I want to
add my welcome to our distinguished panel of guests.
We are here today to review the efforts of the Department
to protect our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen and
airwomen from biological attacks. In this case, protection has
multiple meanings, including detecting and identifying the
biological threat, preventing it from doing harm by using the
best protective equipment and vaccines, and treating those
affected by it with proper therapeutics. So we are anxious to
hear today what it is that we are doing, and we want to be
supportive in any way that we can to make sure that these
protections are available to our warriors.
Thank you very much.

Additional Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. One last thing I will mention is when I was in
Kuwait about 10 days before the war started, they thought there
was going to be a biological threat, but they were well-
prepared for that. They had the protective gear they needed.
They were not concerned. They felt the heat and the wind would
dissipate the threat. So the troops were convinced that they
would be able to work their way through it.
Now, of course, it didn't happen. But the point was we were
prepared in case something did happen. So that is what I hope
this hearing will be able to conclude.
So if you will go forward with summarizing your testimony,
then we will put your comments in the record.

Summary Statement of General Reeves

General Reeves. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Young and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Defense,
the Army as the Executive Agent, and as the Joint Program
Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense regarding
the biological threats and biological medical countermeasures.
The rapid pace of biological technology development and its
proliferation through the information age and the globalization
of technology and expertise has broadened the threat context.
This makes uncertainty a defining characteristic of the present
and future environment.
The Department of Defense mitigates that threat from
biological threats using what we call a ``defense in depth''
strategy. Essentially, this strategy provides multiple
capabilities, a layered approach that reduces the risk if a
biological threat compromises or circumvents any one
capability.
Layers in the defense include personal protection--both
physical and medical protection--collective protection,
biological agent detection, along with warning analysis and
reporting, medical surveillance and consequence management,
including decontamination and post-exposure medical treatments.
Pre-exposure treatments, including vaccines, provide our
first level of defense. These significantly conserve combat
power, as opposed to post-exposure treatments. Pre-exposure
treatments take the aces off the table, threats such as anthrax
and smallpox, forcing potential adversaries to use
comparatively less effective biological agents.
However, we clearly can't anticipate every threat.
Additional mutual supporting layers of defense provide the
capabilities to detect, warn, protect, analyze and deal with
the consequences as needed.
Even with that progress, challenges remain. Specialized
testing facilities to evaluate our detection systems against
biological agents and biopharmaceutical research development
and manufacturing continues to be a lengthy, costly and risky
process. Specifically, medical biologic countermeasures
manufacturing poses a challenge due to the need for highly
trained and skilled personnel in meeting rigorous FDA
manufacturing standards. To address this challenge, we use
multiple commercial contract manufacturing organizations that
specialize in flexible manufacturing. This approach also
reduces the risk of a single point of failure. These contracts
are rated contracts under the defense priorities and allocation
system, giving the Department of Defense manufacturing priority
in the event of a national emergency.
Additionally, we work with the Department of Health and
Human Services to fund common pharmaceutical stockpiles for
routine military use and for military and civil emergencies.
The potential threat from the ongoing biological revolution
also requires developing broad spectrum countermeasures,
including new detection capabilities and medical systems.
Addressing these concerns, the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program initiated the Transformational Medical Technology
Initiative to rapidly identify and develop medical
countermeasures to these new threats; and Dr. Galloway will
speak to that in some detail.
Additionally, we are working with our partners in the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Office and in the Department
of Health and Human Services to investigate alternative
biopharmaceutical manufacturing concepts that are flexible
enough to produce a variety of medical products and are rapidly
expandable to support surge production requirements while
meeting FDA requirements and adhering to biosurety regulations.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify today.
Your continued support of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program is crucial for our military and for our Nation to
succeed in defeating the biological threat. We sincerely
appreciate your support in providing our Armed Forces the
resources necessary to develop and field a balanced biological
countermeasures capability. Together with your guidance and
assistance, we will continue to support ongoing operations,
improve our current capabilities and bring future technologies
forward to protect our military and the Nation against the
biological threat.
Sir, that concludes my statement.
[The statement of General Reeves follows:]

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Summary Statement of Dr. Tether

Mr. Tether. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for having me here today to discuss medical
countermeasures against biological attack.
If we are attacked with a brand new pathogen, one we can't
have stockpiled against, it is unlikely we could use today's
technology to produce enough of the new drug fast enough. DARPA
has been working on technology to break out of this strategic
conundrum. We started several years ago by challenging the
``one drug, one bug'' paradigm, by moving towards ``one drug,
many bugs'' or the broad-spectrum type of antibiotics that we
have today that could be used against many bugs. We are
extending this from drug design to production, trying to go
from ``one production line, one drug'' to ``one production
line, many drugs''.
An industrial base for this capability would blunt the
effect of any BW attack, thereby making it less valuable to the
attacker and less likely in the first place.
We are exploring two approaches to accelerating drug
manufacturing.
One is a facility that manufactures drugs but can
manufacture many different types and can be reconfigured
quickly and efficiently. DARPA has a study determining the
efficacy of building a facility that combines flexible
bioreactors with new technologies to produce large protein
biologics faster and cheaper than today. This study is trying
to make a business case for doing this, but it is not yet
complete. We will be complete probably in the next 2 months.
Another approach is adapting the organisms widely used for
industrial processes today so they can make highly purified
drugs in extremely large quantities. Our Accelerated
Manufacturing of Pharmaceuticals program is pursuing this
vision, creating technology to rapidly and inexpensively
manufacture millions of doses of biologics in weeks, instead of
the years required today.
We are working with both bacteria and fungus where there is
considerable industrial experience using them to produce
smaller, less complicated proteins for things like laundry
detergents and bio-enzymes for environmental cleanup, bugs that
basically eat dirt.
As an example, we are looking at using tobacco plants to
make these biologics. The tobacco we are using is grown
hydroponically under very tightly controlled conditions.
Special bacteria are then used to infect the leaves, bacteria
that cause the leaves to produce the protein that we want. A 10
by 10 foot tray of such tobacco should yield the protein for 1
million vaccine doses, the equivalent of 3 million chicken eggs
if done in that way.
In November, tobacco demonstrated that within a month it
could produce over 800,000 doses of a crude influenza vaccine
that was protective in an animal model, in this case, ferrets.
Tobacco has also produced an avian flu vaccine that could not
be made in eggs because it kills the eggs.
We will be testing these various technologies to see
whether they are speedy and flexible. The performers know they
have to produce a protein, but they don't know which one in
advance. In the actual test, they will be told a specific
protein but given only 3 months to produce it in a specified
quantity. We feel this approach keeps them focused on being
able to produce a wide variety of biologics, in quantity and
very quickly.
But let me hasten to add that, while this is great
progress, we are still a long way from FDA approval. At a
minimum, we must demonstrate that these vaccines are as pure
and effective as those produced conventionally in order to
receive FDA approval at the end of the day.
But, in summary, we are proud and excited about our work
and think it holds great promise to make BW attacks against us
less harmful and, accordingly, less likely.
Thank you all very much for your support of DARPA over the
years. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Tether follows:]

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Summary Statement of Dr. Galloway

Dr. Galloway. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the committee. I am honored today to testify before
your committee and appreciate the opportunity to describe for
you some of the important and innovative work that is being
managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on behalf
of the Department of Defense's (DoD's) Chemical Defense
Biological Program.
I would like to add that I also appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you in this panel with two associates, Major
General Steve Reeves of the Joint Program Executive Office,
with whom we work on a continuing basis, as well as Dr. Tony
Tether, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), where we have a continuing collaborative
relationship.
DTRA is the joint service agency that has responsibility
for consolidating many of those DoD elements that have a role
in responding to the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction. This would include, of course, chemical and
biological agents.
As the Director of DTRA's Chemical and Biological
Technologies Directorate, I am responsible for managing the
Science and Technology (S&T) portfolio within the Chemical
Biological Defense Program. It is within the context of our
close coordination with the Joint Requirements Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense as well as the Joint Program
Executive Office that our office is sometimes referred to as
the Joint Science and Technology Office.
Our overall mission within the S&T effort encompasses both
physical as well as medical countermeasures, as General Reeves
mentioned earlier. This covers everything from diagnostics to
detection to decontamination and so on. But our role is not
only to discover and validate technical solutions against the
threat of chemical and biological agents but to provide
detailed knowledge and information that is going to be required
by decisionmakers that may have to deal with any such incident.
But my remarks today will principally concentrate on the
establishment of a relatively recent program in medical
countermeasure development.
The Department of Defense has been increasingly concerned
about dealing with the threat of an unknown genetically
modified pathogen or other emerging pathogens. It is true that
the rapid pace of technological development in genetics and
molecular biology has provided unprecedented progress in
medical science. It offers much hope. But, at the same time, we
recognize the increased potential for our adversaries to
develop new weapons.
About 2 years ago, a new program was designed to develop
broad spectrum therapeutic countermeasures within the
Department of Defense; and I would like to talk a little bit
about that this morning. This program has been referred to by
General Reeves a moment ago as the Transformational Medical
Technology Initiative, or TMTI for short. The long-range goal
of this program is to develop an end-to-end integrated
capability to respond to and rapidly develop medical
countermeasures against an unknown biological threat.
TMTI differs from traditional programs in three ways.
First, its focus is the rapid development of broad spectrum
medical countermeasures effective against entire classes of
biothreat agents, instead of the usual or customary one drug,
one bug approach.
Secondly, it is an unprecedented aggressive consortium of
academic, industrial and DoD partners which concentrates and
integrates the emerging and best technologies available across
the world against a subset of pathogens which has been largely
ignored by the pharmaceutical industry. It is the strength of
TMTI that it concentrates and bears down with these emerging
technologies. The outreach of the program is international. It
is significant in scope.
Third, TMTI represents a new paradigm for medical
countermeasure development within the Department of Defense,
where essentially we are bringing the S&T portion of the effort
in line with, from the beginning, the advanced developer in the
process in an effort to shorten the overall process of drug
development as much as possible. In this context, we worked
very closely with General Steve Reeves' organization. We both
oversee this process.
At this point in time, I can report that the program has
identified at least a dozen potential investigational new drug
candidates that are in our current portfolio. Two of these have
recently initiated discussions with the FDA. Several of these
candidate drugs represent novel approaches in technologies, and
all would be significant medical achievements. We are very
excited about the program and the potential of these new
technologies.
Of course, in order to have an integrated capability for
countermeasure development, the manufacturing component is
essential. In collaboration with DARPA and the accelerated
manufacture of pharmaceuticals (AMP) program, we are presently
evaluating five manufacturing technology platforms; and, at
this point in time, several of these look quite promising. We
are very encouraged by the early results.
I wish to take a moment to point out that we are working
very closely with our interagency partners, and this entire
effort is a collaborative effort at many levels as we work
jointly to protect our Nation and our forces against these
types of threats.
Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with the
committee; and I look forward to your guidance and support as
we work together to protect our military and the Nation against
these threats. That concludes my statement.
[The statement of Dr. Galloway follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

VACCINE PRODUCTION RATE

Mr. Murtha. Let me say I am impressed by the direction we
are going. As I understand it, there is over $2 billion
authorized for this program. I think we need to know if there
is anything we can do to speed up the programs, anything this
subcommittee can do.
Now, one of the things I asked General Reeves, they were
slow in obligating money from either DTRA or DARPA, but he
thinks there was too much money maybe available initially and
there weren't enough plans. It sounds like you have got a good
plan, a public/private plan, and it sounds like the public is
deeply involved in this and HHS is deeply involved in it.
Of course, the Defense Department is a very small
proportion of the vaccines we need. But I always found the
Department of Defense is ahead of the game, or at least tries
to get ahead of the game, and could produce much faster than
the other agencies in some cases.
But tell us what the real threat is and what we see as the
goal. What are we trying to do here? I know what the threat is,
but how do we alleviate the threat? How to reduce the threat?
Mr. Tether. Well, I mean, I believe we can find the
technique. We are learning very--I think we have learned a lot
on if a new drug--a new bug comes along, to be able to discover
what kind of vaccine or therapeutic can be used against it. We
have gotten that part down. They used to take a long time, but
I think we now know how they do that.
Mr. Murtha. Give us an idea what you mean by a long time.
Mr. Tether. It used to be, actually, years.
Mr. Murtha. Years?
Mr. Tether. Yeah, years. If a new bug came out, to actually
find a vaccine against, it would take years. We believe we now
have that down to possibly weeks.
Mr. Murtha. So if you had a flu epidemic similar to what
happened in 1918 where 20 million people died, what would be
the result of your work that you have done so far?
Mr. Tether. Well, we could probably learn what the vaccine
was against that flu very quickly, but there is still the
problem, and the real problem is--we have got that part of the
problem I think well in hand or at least in hand. People may
disagree how well we have it in hand.
But after you have it, this manufacturing, in the
quantities to get it to the people--I mean, we are talking
about not just getting the one or two doses of the vaccine. We
are talking about getting millions and millions of doses of
vaccine. And that is the issue right now.
Mr. Murtha. Now, how do we help you solve that problem?
Mr. Tether. Well, I guess, you know, we are trying hard. We
have talked about techniques that we are looking at.
Mr. Murtha. Is there anything we can do money-wise to help
the situation?
What I am asking is, there is plenty of money authorized;
and it sounds like money is not obligated, because you at this
point haven't come to a conclusion that they can spend it
appropriately. And I agree with that. We shouldn't be just
throwing money at the problem. But is there anything we can do
to help you reduce the time it takes to get these manufacturing
installations up and running?
Mr. Tether. From my viewpoint, I think we are more idea
starved than we are money starved. I mean, we are funding every
idea that we can find. I mean, we are not funding people with--
we are funding everything that we can think of funding.
The only time from our viewpoint, DARPA's viewpoint, that I
am not sure how to solve it is when you get into this business
you end up having to go into animal and human testing; and that
means you have to go and create internal review boards,
independent review boards. And that takes time.
Now, even after that, because of the way we contract, say,
through the Army, when we go to them, it even takes more time
for them to look at what comes out to end up with the contract.
And sometimes we have had examples where it can take as long as
6 months to a year after we at DARPA have approved the work to
go on because of this process.
Now, the process is there for a good reason. It is to avoid
abuse, if you will, of people. So the reason for the process is
good.
I won't speak for General Reeves. Maybe he just needs more
people to help him.
Mr. Murtha. Here is what we are trying to get at. If it
takes you a year and you have an epidemic, obviously, it is too
late. What we are trying to decide is, is there an amount of
money that we could help the Department with that they could
speed up the process and be prepared to produce the vaccines in
a timely manner?
For instance, I hear what you are saying. I like the
concept. But what can we do to help? Is it just we can't do
anything until the ideas come forward?
Mr. Tether. Unfortunately, I think that is correct. I mean,
I know it is frustrating. It is frustrating for us.
Mr. Murtha. No. Well, I understand. DARPA has been in the
forefront in trying to fund these programs.
What do you think, General Reeves?
General Reeves. Sir, I would tell you, as it stands today,
the various options that are on the table are in policy review;
and the funding options are being looked at. There certainly
is, in my view, benefit in going forward rapidly with a
business case analysis and an analysis of alternatives to look
at how do we meet the manufacturing and surge requirements. And
given the potential multibillion dollar size of any kind of
facility, I think it is appropriate that we do the up-front
work first to assure ourselves that we are proceeding down the
correct path.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Galloway, you mentioned just briefly the collaboration
with other entities to work on this very serious issue, and I
assume that you are talking about maybe the Department of
Homeland Security? Health and Human Services? Are you working
with them at all?
Dr. Galloway. Yes, sir. We are working with DHHS most
certainly, Department of Homeland Security. We talk with the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We are meeting with the
folks at the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA). We have occasionally met with the folks from
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). So we have a pretty good
cross-section of representation across the different Federal
agencies on this effort.
Mr. Young. Is there an established working group or a
coordinating group or is it loosely structured? Or is it
structured?
Dr. Galloway. There is some structure to it. I have a
number of the key individuals from those organizations that
serve on various review boards and selection groups from our
organization. They have a very good view and knowledge of what
we are doing and how we are approaching it. We do meet on a
regular basis with all of those organizations; and, if
anything, I would characterize the situation as the level of
conversation and collaboration is increasing.
Mr. Young. Let me ask you about some of the entities that
you did not mention.
For example, after some of the terrorist attacks leading up
to September 11, 2001, the University of South Florida
established a center for studying biological threats and the
response to biological threats; and they have an ongoing
program. And I would expect that a lot of other universities or
research organizations are doing the same thing. Are you
coordinating with them?
Dr. Galloway. Yes, sir. We actually interface with a number
of particular academic organizations that do have programs. So
our office does communicate with those. There are some
congressional funds that have found their way to these
projects. So we do coordinate that. We are familiar with those.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Well, I think that is a very good idea. Because
I, frankly, have observed the program at the University of
South Florida; and I am really impressed with how far they have
come. And if you haven't been to visit their center there, I
would highly recommend that you do that, because I think they
have a lot to teach us.
Dr. Galloway. I have heard quite positive things. I have
not been there personally, but I know that they do communicate
with our staff. We are aware of their efforts.
Mr. Young. Well, I want to echo what the chairman said.
Whatever we can do to help on this issue, because it is
important to our troops in the field from a military or a
terrorist standpoint. It is important to us at home because we
know that terrorists have been trying to develop the ability to
use biological warfare against us, whether it is in a place
like the Capitol of the United States or whether it is on a
street someplace or what it might be. So what you are doing is
very, very important; and we want to be there to help any way
we can.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

TIMELINESS OF VACCINES

Mr. Murtha. I want to go back to the amount of time it
takes before something breaks out and the time it takes to get
to the vaccine that would protect people. What are we talking
about? Is it a year? Is that what I heard you say?
Mr. Tether. It used to be.
Mr. Murtha. Now it is how long?
Mr. Tether. Weeks.
Mr. Murtha. Take Type A flu.
Mr. Tether. I don't know. I would guess that we could
probably come up with a vaccine--what would you say?
General Reeves. Sir, the answer very much depends on
whether or not it is a known bacteria or virus. If we have----
Mr. Dicks. I am having a hard time hearing you.
General Reeves. I beg your pardon. It very much depends on
whether it is a known threat. In other words, if it is an
outbreak of a disease for which we already have developed a
vaccine or a therapeutic, then that is a much shorter
transition time than if it is an emerging threat that has been
genetically modified or has mutated in nature, which takes a
rather considerable amount of time not only to identify but
then to turn around and develop the manufacturing processes and
the delivery mechanisms to provide countermeasures.
Mr. Murtha. We have a facility that does research and then
translates that into the manufacturing. Do we have that process
in place at this point?
Mr. Tether. We most certainly have a program to do just
that; and, as I was saying, we worked hard on the front part of
finding the vaccine. And we do believe that--especially we know
what the bug is, to come up with that. It is after that, after
you know what the vaccine is, is to then be able to make it in
quantity that seems to be the remaining major issue.
Mr. Murtha. Is that where you have the private manufacturer
in place?
Mr. Tether. Correct. That is the program we were talking
about, advanced manufacturing of pharmaceutical, where we have
two studies going on. Well, one is a study to take existing new
capability to create a facility and the other is to look at
other more novel techniques of being able to make things fast,
like using bacteria to infect tobacco, as an example.
Mr. Murtha. Well, we are still--the possibility was not
having the correct vaccine for over a year? I mean, is that a
distinct possibility?
Mr. Tether. That is a distinct possibility, depending upon
if the bug is brand new and we have never seen it before, it
will take us a while to figure it out. But that is short
compared to the amount of time to make it. I want to really----
Mr. Murtha. I understand what you are saying.
Let me say how I got involved. Joe McDade, who used to be
on this committee and in Congress for 35 years--he is here. He
2 or 3 years ago mentioned this to me, and we have not had a
chance to have a hearing until now.
But you have got to find a way to tell us how you can help
to reduce the time it takes to produce the vaccine when we have
a real threat nationwide or worldwide. Because I am worried we
manufacture much of this vaccine overseas and they won't sell
it to us because they are going to have a threat themselves. We
need some guidance from HHS, which is going to be the second
panel, or you folks about what we can do in order to speed up
the process.
Mr. Dicks.

EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENT VACCINE TYPES

Mr. Dicks. Dr. Tether, maybe you can help us. There was a
process where the Department of Homeland Security was supposed
to go over to HHS to develop certain packages or programs to
deal with these issues, and that thing kind of broke down. At
least it did a couple of years ago. Has that changed now?
Mr. Tether. You know, Mr. Dicks, I really don't know. I
think you really need to ask the second panel.
Mr. Dicks. The second panel. You are not aware of that?
Mr. Tether. No, I am not.
Mr. Dicks. So when you were talking about developing these
vaccines, the manufacturing is the problem, right? What you are
saying is we can develop the vaccines, especially if we have
previously identified this flu?
Mr. Tether. Correct.
Mr. Dicks. But then the problem is getting it manufactured?
Mr. Tether. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. And a lot of the companies have come in with
innovative ideas. That is where DARPA is supposed to be the
lead in trying to develop new approaches to this. Are we
getting many innovative ideas from the private sector on these
issues?
Mr. Tether. Oh, yes. In fact, Darrell spoke of some.
Dr. Galloway. Certainly. I will be happy to give you some
thoughts on that.
At this point in time, we have been receiving a very robust
response from the industrial sector and the academic sectors.
We are presently engaged in some projects that are extremely
innovative and novel and that show absolutely a stunning
process. Key among these type of technologies are high-
throughput robotic systems that allow us to literally produce
large numbers of possibilities and screen them rapidly. With
the benefit of the rapid pace in the areas of genomics and
bioinformatics, we are seeing approaches in testing evaluation
as well as `de noro' drug development that are really
unprecedented. A lot of good ideas are out there, and we are
seeing these.
In fact, to come back to a question raised earlier, how
could the committee help, right now, we have a number of very
promising projects in the queue that we would like to engage.
An issue for us in this program is just stable funding. Just
simply put, we really are going to be able to deliver on the
identification of a number of what we call IND candidates,
investigational new drug candidates. The issue will be being
able to follow all the way through to see that they get through
clinical trials and so on. But the portfolio is very good right
now.
Mr. Murtha. Let me interrupt and just mention what the
staff mentioned to me before we started that we have taken
money out of this program because it wasn't obligated. You need
to tell us. You need to come to the committee staff and tell
them, look, we have got things going.
I agree with you. Stable funding is a key. But when we have
all these different people coming to see us from the Defense
Department, you need to tell us that, okay, if you take money,
here is what happens. So we are aware of it now, and you need
to make the staff aware of the problems.
Mr. Dicks. Are the people coming in--we have a company out
in Seattle that is talking about developing a pre-vaccine.
Would that be useful?
Dr. Galloway. Absolutely. What we are finding is that a lot
of the innovation that is out there are in these small biotech
companies. They are quite hungry, but they are extremely sharp.
They have some extremely promising technologies.
But I would like to add, and I think it is a significant
point, that we have actually managed to bring two of the big
pharma corporations into our portfolio. That is Novartis and
GlaxoSmithKline. That is a significant achievement within the
Department of Defense programs. Big pharma is showing increased
interest in what we are doing. They are watching very closely;
and, in fact, in some respects they are a bit of a challenge.
Because in a couple of cases they bought up a couple of these
small companies we have been dealing with, and then suddenly
they are gone. So we must be doing something right if big
pharma is paying this much attention.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Lewis.

VACCINE MANUFACTURING CAPACITY

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Tony, you and I got to know each other about the time that
Joe McDade was most active in the defense arena. And over the
years, I have watched DARPA with great care; and I must say I
am very, very impressed with the help they give the Department
of Defense in a variety of mixed ways.
This issue I have never heard discussed in our committee
before. But a little over a couple of years ago, when I
happened for a short time to be the chairman of the full
committee, I began spending time in other subcommittees where I
never served, including HHS.
The testimony from CDC relative to avian flu really got my
attention. Judy Gerberding is a fabulous person, but the
information she provided about our inability to respond if
there was an avian flu that metastasized and suddenly affected
human beings and began to move--the amount of time it might
take to get an effective vaccine was one thing, and that was
really serious at the time. A reduction in the time to identify
the vaccine is encouraging, I must say, but manufacturing at
any volume is way beyond our capacity.
Dr. Gerberding suggested to me that we probably would be
dependent upon France if the avian flu started moving in that
direction; And if it started moving in Europe, they sure as
hell wouldn't be sharing it with us very fast. And it seems to
me that it is a serious, serious priority there. I don't know
about the rest of the country.
I hear from Mr. Dicks for the first time that there is a
small company up in Washington that is working on this, and
Florida has people working on it as well. I thought all of the
pharmaceutical companies in the world existed in New Jersey and
not anywhere else. But, as a matter of fact, I will bet you----
Mr. Rothman. Where they belong.
Mr. Lewis. I would bet you that those companies do have
considerable interest in this subject area. And we are way
beyond the point we can wait. It has been 2\1/2\ years since we
had that conversation in HHS, and we have not made any serious
progress in terms of manufacturing capacity, let alone have any
knowledge of our decreasing time to identify what kind of
vaccine would be needed.
Norm, we can get the vaccine quickly to take care of your
throat. It is these other problems that really, really could be
serious. If we have the need to respond to hundreds of millions
of doses, for example, because of an outbreak that is the
result of some overaction on the part of our enemies, we have
got to have capacity.
So tell me what we are doing in terms of that capacity. I
think it is nuts for us not to be talking to CDC, to be talking
to big pharma, the small guys around.
I am not surprised. Dr. Galloway said that big pharma is
even buying up some of these companies. When we are dealing
with major problems in the Department of Defense, we always had
the ability to find small companies innovating, coming up with
great ideas to help us solve big problems. And what happens?
Big companies buy them up, and maybe the project goes forward,
and maybe it doesn't.
So I, frankly, want to see us reaching to small companies,
the universities around the country. This should be a very,
very serious--not just defense challenge. And there are other
budgets besides the defense budget to do this, and your advice
and counsel about that would be helpful as well.
Mr. Tether. As I said, Congressman Lewis, we have all been
working hard on the first part, find the vaccine; and little
companies and all that are very good at that.
Now let's say you found the vaccine. I don't want you all
to think we have that problem licked, by the way. Don't go
thinking there might be money there. Because we are still
working hard on that. It is coming up with the vaccine against
something you haven't seen that is going to take a long time.
But after you have it, making it in the millions and millions
of doses that are needed is really a major issue; and little
companies aren't geared up to do that. They are geared up to
come up with the vaccine, but then it goes to the next step of
how you are going to make it.
Mr. Lewis. Tony, it has been 2\1/2\ years ago since we
identified that problem. We said we have to be doing something
about that. But nothing is done that I know of that involves
our increasing or providing incentive to develop manufacturing
and the ability that involves millions of production very
quickly.
Mr. Tether. We at DARPA have really turned towards that
problem and the program that we talked about earlier, AMP, that
was also mentioned by Darrell. We really went out and looked
for the craziest ideas we could think of.
For example--this didn't work out by the way, but it was a
neat idea at the time--if you look at the way Tide is made,
Tide has these huge fermenters where they actually use bacteria
that comes up with the stuff that eats your dirt. And we
thought that is the issue. What if we could take that big
fermenter and have them make Tide on Mondays, Tuesdays,
Wednesdays and Thursdays and then on Fridays they make vaccine.
If we could have made that work, then we would have had an
industrial capability that there was for another purpose and is
sort of like a craft. Like we have on aircraft, where we buy
from the airlines, you know, the ability to go take their
planes. Then we could take over that plant.
So we had been looking at these ideas trying to look at
current industrial capability to see if we could take that
current industrial capability and then use it to make in
quantities these drugs and vaccines that have been discovered
through other processes. Some of it hasn't worked.
This tobacco thing looks really exciting. Who would have
thought that you take tobacco and you infect it with a bacteria
to make a protein and then that protein obviously is what is
your vaccine. Who would have thought that?
I mean, these are--now, to get this through the FDA
processes is still some time. But those are the kinds of things
that we have been looking at to try to overcome this.
On the other hand, we can go and put together a facility.
This study that we have ongoing is we could put together a
facility, but then it becomes a government-owned facility. It
is not useful for anything else. It is unfortunate. We could
make it useful for maybe making commercial drugs. But, short of
that, you end up with a facility that could satisfy this surge
problem, but----
Mr. Murtha. Here is what we are trying to do. We are trying
to help you reduce the time that Mr. Lewis found 2\1/2\ years
ago. You have looked at all these things. There has been no
major disaster happen in the meantime. We want to help figure
out a way to reduce--you are doing the research. That takes
time. But we have got to have a process where we manufacture
the vaccine once we discover it. And I think the ideas are one
thing, but we have to come up with a way to do it now.
As I understand it, the civilian side, the drug companies
are willing to put money into this as long as we buy the
product. And I think that is the key, isn't it, to buy the
product?
Mr. Tether. They do need a market; and that would, I
think--BioShield tried to do that.
Mr. Murtha. When you say a government--ammunition product--
we used to do ammunition plants, all kinds of things we used to
own and we have sold them off since that time, most of them.
But the point is, I don't know how much time we have. But
we have been 2\1/2\ years, and we are still not there, and if a
flu epidemic broke out we would have to depend on somebody else
to produce the damn stuff.
Mr. Tether. Yep. That's not a good situation to be in.
General Reeves. Let me suggest one model that we looked at
which is potentially private which is the public/private
relationship. As you suggested, it involves private enterprise
investing in the model. But in the larger sense there is a
trend in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, something
called contract manufacturing operations; and these are stand-
alone facilities whose sole function is to take developed
technology and put it into full-scale manufacturing and then
ultimately do what is known as fill and finish, put the bulk
content into a vial or some usable way of giving it to an
individual. That kind of a model, I believe, has a great deal
of potential for the future for both HHS as well as the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Murtha. We talked about you have to work with the
staff, telling them how you are going to do this, what we need
to do to help. There is plenty of money authorized. And what
Dr. Galloway says is, you know, you need a stable program.
Well, you have got to tell us what that stable program is and
how much money it would take so we have some idea of how we
solve his problem. We want to help.
Mr. Dicks. Would the chairman yield just briefly?
Mr. Murtha. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. Isn't it true that BioShield has been a flop?
Isn't that basically true? I mean, the first one they did was
Vac-Gen. It was $800 million for anthrax, and they came up with
nothing.
That is what I was talking about earlier. When you have
this relationship between the Department of Homeland Security,
when they are supposed to be doing threat assessments on these
various possibilities and then HHS doesn't do anything. That is
what we were told at the Homeland Security Committee. I think
maybe the next panel has to answer this. Unless somebody here
knows about it. Isn't it true that BioShield, after we spent
billions, has produced almost nothing?
Mr. Tether. Anybody want to answer that?
Next question.
Mr. Dicks. I think I know what the answer is. That is why
we are worried about this, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. We want to move this thing. So you have got to
tell us what you need in order to move it.
Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I am fine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Mr. Moran. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having this
hearing. It is great to hear people who are thinking out of the
box. This is the kind of area where we need a lot of that
thinking.
And particularly DARPA, it is wonderful things you are
coming up with in this area, but in so many others. Getting the
brainwaves to be able to move prosthetic devices, that is the
kind of stuff that DARPA came up with. It is terrific. So,
Tony, you are doing a great job; and it is good to see you with
your colleagues.
And it is not surprising our friend, Mr. McDade, urged that
we have this kind of hearing. So I know--thank you. It is just
that I talk so loud. I don't want to be obnoxious here, you
know. I don't want to--thank you, Mr. Dicks. You are my mentor.
Now, let me ask you about at Virginia Tech; and this goes
to DTRA, particularly. They developed this very substantial
computer model because they understand that, if you were to
have a natural disaster or terrorist event, one of the things
you have got to figure out is how do people behave, how do they
react in large population centers?
For example, if there is a dirty bomb, what happens with
the transportation infrastructure that is available? You know,
what do stores do, commercial enterprises, social institutions
and so on? And DTRA is figuring this out so that we are
prepared, not just with the people we have direct control over
but large population centers.
But my question is, when we get this kind of information,
are we coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security?
Because it is really a Homeland Security matter more than
Defense. You know, our military can't really intervene and
organize things and direct things and so on. It is going to
have to be the local responders, police, fire, EMT and the
like. They need to have the benefit of this information. So how
are we transferring this information, Dr. Galloway, to the
people on the ground that are the first ones that are going to
be asked to respond?
Dr. Galloway. Well, in this particular case, I am aware
that DTRA is involved in a project down there, but it is one of
those areas that doesn't happen to be in my lane, that I can't
really give you--so I will take it on the record and see to it
that you get an answer.
Mr. Moran. Good.
[The information follows:]

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Comprehensive National
Incident Management System (CNIMS) is designed to create a
``simfrastructure,'' or simulated infrastructure, which can be used to
model the effects of a pandemic incident on a population. The model
mimics human interaction, allowing for the use of numerous variables
such as treatment or quarantine options. The study affects overall
response planning and emergency preparedness, because analysts can then
examine how the disease spread throughout the simulation. In short,
CNIMS provides leaders in the United States military with essential
operational information about the populations that may be affected by a
possible crisis, such as an influenza epidemic.
This prototype application provides previously unavailable detail
and performance in scalable agent-based epidemiological models that
will be used by DoD planners and policy makers for analysis of optimal
responses to a crisis situation.
Thus far, studies have been run on Alabama's National Guard, Fort
Lewis, Washington, and Fort Hood, Texas. In response to a Combatant
Command request, DTRA analysts are planning to conduct studies of major
metropolitan areas in the United States. These studies will result in
more detailed contingency plans in specific locations and greater
understanding on the impact of the resident military populations.
The understanding of the phenomenology underlying pandemics and
other catastrophic events, natural and man-made, will be fundamentally
improved by the use of high-performance computing-based decision and
policy informatics. Our intent is to make this advanced capability
directly available to subject matter experts and decision makers--
providing for greater situational awareness and higher fidelity course-
of-action analysis/development and is a key part of our on-going
commitment to develop the best possible tools needed for crisis
management at the national level.
A comprehensive and unified national response to such an event
would require the sharing of situational awareness and the full
mobilization of national and international expertise and capabilities.
DTRA's relationship with USNORTHCOM is the liaison to the Department of
Homeland Security (which includes the United States Coast Guard, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security
Administration and Customs and Border Protection) and our linkage to
ensure effective interagency synchronization across the USG.
Additionally DTRA has entered into a Interagency Agreement with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This is in support of
the HHS modeling hub and it extends DTRA capabilities to provide onsite
HHS support for CBRNE exercises, operations and overall coordination.
Further development of CNIMS technology will support the analysis
of a range of problems such as urban evacuation, epidemiological
events, population risk-exposure estimation, logistical planning, site
evacuations, interdependent infrastructure failures and nuclear,
chemical, biological and radiological threats.

BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS MODELING

Mr. Moran. That is a principal concern. Because we have the
money and the chairman makes clear--he is probably the only
chairman of all of the Appropriation Committees that actually
ask witnesses how much money do you need. It is because he is
the only one that can produce any money. Everybody else, we are
lucky if we can stay on a continual resolution, even Interior.
So we are developing things in Defense that are really needed
in other areas of governmental responsibility.
I wonder if Dr. Tether or General Reeves have any comment
about this. If there is a biological warfare attack, have we
studied what is the likely reaction of large population centers
and how we deal with them? And if we do have this kind of
information, how are you transferring it to the local
responders?
General Reeves. Sir, I can answer the first half of your
question.
The program you referred to that is working with DTRA also
works with the Department of Defense model called the joint
effects model. And we in fact work very closely with DTRA in
leveraging that research so that we can provide our commanders
in the field the various modeling and analysis tools that are
necessary.
Now, that model is designed for tactical forces and forces
that might be operating in urban environments. To date, we have
not transitioned that to any first responders. So the answer to
your second question or the second half of your question would
be we haven't done anything.

SMALL BIOTECH COMPANY INNOVATION

Mr. Moran. Okay. Well, I mean, I prefer that you be honest
about it. But you understand it is something that you are going
to have to deal with at some point. We have got to transfer
that information.
One of the things that concerns me, we have been talking
about big pharma; and that in and of itself is a problem,
because some of the best ideas can come from these small
biotech firms, you know, a handful of really bright people who
really don't want to work for some large corporation. You know,
they come out of MIT or any number of institutions and they
come up with great ideas, but it is almost impossible to start
up any kind of drug firm today. The huge sums of investment
capital that are needed, it makes it really prohibitive for
small biotech firms to get into the production of vaccines or
other preventive measures. And, as you suggested, you come up
with a great idea, Novartis or somebody is going to buy you up
and then you are gone.
But I am afraid that, because we rely almost exclusively on
these large institutional corporations, a lot of the best ideas
don't make it. And one of the things DARPA I know does, you
develop these things and then you try to spin them off, get
some commercial off-the-shelf technology out there, but it is
so difficult to come up with investment capital to get it
going.
Can you address that at all? Or should it be a concern?
Dr. Galloway. It is a concern. A couple of thoughts that
come to mind are that you are correct, that, by and large, the
biotech industry has got a lot of ideas, a lot of innovation,
but most of them probably never figure to get to the
manufacturing stage. They are just not set up for that scale of
things and probably have a strategy that thinks along the lines
of being either bought out or getting to that bridge if and
when they ever reach it.
The manufacturing capability and the experience certainly
lies principally in some of the big pharmaceutical operations
or some of the organizations set up just for manufacturing.
However, it is also true that there is incentive, for example,
in the program where we are investigating broad spectrum
therapeutics, the development of and the identification of such
measures.
You know, a lot of these things are all driven by a
marketing and profit motive, if you will. There has to be
incentive for these companies to take on projects of this
magnitude. But in the development of broad spectrum
therapeutics, there could be a lot of incentive. We think this
is one of the reasons why a lot of these companies are looking
at us.
Because while we are looking for certain applications for
our needs as we see it in DoD or it gets to biothreat agent, if
some of these things are as broad spectrum as they appear to
be, they could have much broader utility and application and
therefore a market. And so I think that is partly why we are
getting an increasing amount of interest that is coming on
board.
For example, we are looking at an interesting drug
candidate that seems to be effective against the methicillin-
resistant staphylococcus auras. That is not a biothreat agent
that is in our lane. But it is of clear utility and
application. And so we would take something like that and make
sure that that was handed off to National Institutes of Health
(NIH) or somewhere to try to find application for that.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
What we are going to do now is move to the second panel,
and some problems that were brought to my attention is the FDA
approval. It takes so long to get through the process, 4 or 5
years. And what Mr. Lewis is talking about, we are just
scratching the surface here. And we will see the second panel,
and then we will start with you in the second panel. We know
your interest in it, but that is the panel that is going to be
as involved as anybody else. So let's have the second panel.
WITNESSES

Panel II

DR. MICHAEL E. KILPATRICK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION AND
READINESS PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS
ROBIN ROBINSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BARDA), OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES

Summary Statement of Dr. Kilpatrick

Dr. Kilpatrick. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee, Michael Kilpatrick, Deputy Director, Force Health
Protection in the Department of Defense. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Health Affairs in the
Military Health System.
As you know, the mission of the Military Health System is
to provide health services in support of our Nation's military
mission any time anywhere, and that includes proper
preparations for responding to biological threats. DoD
recognizes that anthrax and smallpox are lethal biological
threats. As a result, since March of 1998 more than 1.9 million
service members have received more than 7.4 million doses of
anthrax vaccine and more than 1.5 million service members have
been immunized against smallpox since December 2002.
On April 1, 2008, DoD began using the newly licensed
ACAM2000 smallpox vaccine. To educate our health care
providers, our service members, their families and other
beneficiaries around the world on biological threat protection,
we provide detailed vaccine information at the time of the
vaccinations and we use on-line educational briefings,
brochures and training videos. In addition, we use live
interactive Web casts in support of vaccination programs. DoD
also tracks suspected reactions to these vaccines. The Armed
Forces Health Surveillance Center collects severe adverse event
information from vaccinations as part of its mission to provide
continuous surveillance for the Military Health System.
The Vaccine Health Care Center Network provides educational
assistance to individuals who are concerned about their
vaccinations and assist individuals who experience a rare
adverse event. With every anthrax and smallpox vaccination, the
service member is provided an educational brochure that details
the possible adverse events and provides contact information
for clinical services.
An interagency agreement between DoD and the Department of
Health and Human Services establishes a framework to coordinate
mutual support in the event of a shortfall in critical medical
material when responding to or recovering from a public health
or medical consequences of a domestic catastrophic incident or
an incident of national significance.
For example, in 2006, in concert with the Implementation
Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, Health
Affairs issued policies and guidance on preparation and
response to a pandemic caused by bird flu virus. It is DoD's
policy to provide military personnel with safe and effective
vaccines, antidotes and treatments that will eliminate or
minimize the effects of potential health threats.
Mr. Chairman, protecting and preserving the health of our
servicemen and women is one of our highest priorities, second
only to the military mission.
I will be pleased to answer your questions.
[The statement of Dr. Kilpatrick follows:]

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Mr. Murtha. Doctor.

Summary Statement of Dr. Robinson

Mr. Robinson. Thank you. Chairman Murtha and distinguished
members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity today
to testify on behalf of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, where I serve as the newly appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary and Director for the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority, or BARDA. BARDA is responsible for the
development and acquisition and coordination of medical--
Mr. Murtha. Tell the Committee where you served before.
Mr. Robinson. I will come right to that, yes, sir. Before
the coordination of American countermeasures for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear threats, pandemic influenza
and emerging diseases for the civilian population, prior to
becoming the Board of Director I served for the last 3\1/2\
years as the Deputy Director for Influenza and Emerging Disease
Program, where we implemented strategic plans and policies for
medical countermeasures outlined in the President's National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.
First, allow me to thank you for your kind and generous
support of our efforts to prepare the Nation for pandemic
influenza and other hazards. I look forward to working with you
in my new role as we strive to build upon the successes of the
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Program and renew the focus of
our Nation's medical countermeasures portfolio for chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
HHS concurs with our Department of Defense colleagues on
the critical role that medical countermeasures play in our
normal national preparedness against threats, against these
threats and pandemic influenza, and the need for domestic
manufacturing facilities capable of producing these products.
We see medical countermeasure development and acquisition as
only one component of our overall preparedness efforts towards
an all hazards preparedness.
The policy of shared responsibility for preparedness
empowers many stakeholders, including the entire HHS
Department, our partners in the international community, other
Federal interagencies like the Department of Defense, State,
local and tribal territorial governments, the private sector
and ultimately individual people.
The central framework to support medical countermeasures
initiatives in the Federal Government is the HHS Public Health
Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise. This enterprise is
a coordinated interagency group that is led by the Assistant
Secretary of Preparedness and Response at HHS, Admiral
Vanderwagen, and includes the Centers for Disease Control, Dr.
Gerberding, the FDA with Dr. von Eschenbach, and the NIH with
Dr. Zerhouni, and partners for the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security and Veteran Affairs.
I would like to give you a few examples of where HHS is
coordinating and acting with our cousins at the Department of
Defense relative to medical countermeasure programs. HHS has
achieved a significant level of preparedness against a number
of CBRN threats. HHS and DoD subject matter experts are on the
CBRN threats committees to serve as interagency threat
determinations and product requirements setting panels to
inform U.S. Government policymakers. HHS and DoD share joint
stockpiles of AVA vaccine for anthrax and ACAM2000 vaccine for
smallpox and aligned research and development programs for many
medical countermeasures to CBRN threats by serving on
interagency project teams.
With regard to pandemic influenza, great strides have been
made over the past 3 years towards pandemic preparedness,
including the developments and acquisition and domestic
manufacturing infrastructure building of vaccines, antivirals,
diagnostics and other pharmaceuticals. The development of an
H5N1 vaccine resulted in the licensure last year representing
the licensure of the first pandemic like noninfluenza vaccine
and the number one medical breakthrough in 2007. HHS and DoD
coordinate stockpiling of this vaccine, the clinical
instability studies and, similarly for the antiviral
stockpiles, use contracts to give the best price for the
taxpayers.
BARDA and DoD just sponsored this week a symposium of
Federal Government R&D activities for rapid diagnostics to
detect novel influenza viruses. These joint analyses allow us
the opportunity to reference one another's portfolios that
reduce duplication but allow synergistic approaches like
stockpiling to proceed.
These represent prime examples of this integrative all
hazards approach that the Enterprise affords. Utilization of
the Enterprise and product portfolio approaches will continue
at HHS and DoD with other stakeholders to prepare the Nation
for pandemic influenza and CBRN threats.
Using some of these specific examples of accomplishments in
the pandemic influenza program and the successes in CBRN, I am
beginning to redefine how we at HHS with our Federal partners
can coordinate our respective programs to develop and acquire
these products for the establishment and maintenance of medical
countermeasure stockpiles as well as expand domestic
manufacturing search capacities for these products. The
Enterprise began a collaborative process that brings together
Federal partners for decisionmaking throughout the life cycles
of medical countermeasures. We are expanding that process for
coordination, to include the discussions on the strategy behind
the development of priorities and portfolios.
HHS and DoD are strategic partners with complementary
missions to provide integrated systematic approaches to the
development and purchase of necessary vaccines, drugs,
therapeutics and diagnostics for public health medical
emergencies.
In closing, sir, I thank you again for this opportunity to
discuss our coordinated efforts toward national preparedness
and look forward to many more visits with you to deliver news
of progress and find ways to make our Nation better prepared.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer questions.
[The statement of Dr. Robinson follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

PROTECTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest
of full transparency both Mr. Rothman and I come from New
Jersey, which we are very proud of our pharmaceutical base.
Whether you are a large pharma or a small pharma stable funding
is important. That is one of the issues here. It is not a
question of big companies taking over small companies. That is
part of a capitalistic system. But nobody is going to make
these types of investments if they have to wait on HHS to come
up with requests for proposals. With all due respect, it has
been pretty damn slow, maybe in some areas been expedited. But
my questions actually go to Dr. Kilpatrick.
Thank you both for what you do. This is the Defense
Appropriations Committee, and I want to be somewhat selfish and
ask particularly what we are doing for our armed services for
those in uniforms, in uniform relative to anthrax, smallpox or
radiological, nuclear. What are we doing in terms of protecting
our soldiers? I know it is a big question, but I would like to
sort of get a general overview of what we are doing.
Some of us remember the refusal of some people in the
military to go ahead with the anthrax immunization. Where do we
stand relative to a comprehensive program for those in the
military where we actually have a known quantity of people that
we are dealing with? Obviously, all volunteers; Guard, Reserve.
Where do we stand? How would you characterize it?
Dr. Kilpatrick. I think we stand in very good stead with
this. We have really focused the program on continuing to
educate people. Not just a brochure in the hand right before
the shot goes in the arm, but to really answer questions and
sit down with people and to really discuss with them what is
understood about the threat. We try to look at this on a
priority basis, saying what is the risk. And certainly when
people are deployed in a setting where we can't control the
environment, where we can't really control what is happening in
the environment, then clearly those are areas where a vaccine
is the most secure protection we can give somebody.
As General Reeves discussed, if you are in the detect to
treat environment, in a deployed setting, it is not
satisfactory to have an un-vaccinated population.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. As long as the information isn't secret
or confidential, where do we stand relative to anthrax?
Dr. Kilpatrick. As far as the vaccination program?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Right.
Dr. Kilpatrick. We are doing very well.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. What does that mean? Does that mean
anthrax isn't just a battlefield potential situation, obviously
it could happen here domestically?
Dr. Kilpatrick. It could happen domestically.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Where do we stand relative to those that
have been immunized?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Our program is to vaccinate all people
going into theater. That is the greatest point of risk. But we
are continuing to keep people's vaccinations up to date as they
return. So if they go to theater, get their series of shots,
and come out of the theater----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is this mandated?
Dr. Kilpatrick. It is voluntary for them to keep up. It is
mandated when they go to theater.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is voluntary to keep up?
Dr. Kilpatrick. To keep up when they come back, yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have an Appropriations Committee that
has been pretty generous towards investments in national
pandemic, you know, avian flu. What portion of that is
allocated and directed towards our armed services?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Toward the armed services, again, we have
worked very closely with HHS.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are familiar that there has been a
stockpile. So let us be selfish here for a minute. What
stockpile is for the military?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Well, the stockpile for the military is
really focused at where our people would be most at threat. And
we feel, again, that is going to be in a deployed setting in
areas where flu may start the pandemic. And that is where our
surveillance programs are going on. And so we have
prepositioned and forward deployed stockpiles of both vaccine
and antivirals that we could use to get to people in that area.
The national stockpile is what we would work in coordination
with HHS if that were an event nationally.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So it is there, it hasn't been utilized?
Dr. Kilpatrick. No, we have not used the vaccine that is
licensed.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And how about the award of the next
generation of modified, you know the smallpox virus, what could
potentially be something which is not the normal situation?
Where do we stand relative to that in our military?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Are you talking about the ACAM vaccine?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, the smallpox virus.
Dr. Kilpatrick. Right. And I think, again, the ACAM vaccine
is what DOD is using. And that is----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So all soldiers have that?
Dr. Kilpatrick. That is, again, for people going to
theater, is where it is required.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is required?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And what relative to radiological and
nuclear, what exists out there for our soldiers?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Again, from the radiological standpoint
there are programs out there to monitor, to surveil for
essentially laser or other radiological type exposures the
troops may get. All of the equipment that we would use, has
been evaluated and tested to make sure that the people
operating it, the operators, are safe. And so, again, there is
a surveillance program looking at that.
From a nuclear standpoint, it is going to be looking at
where are we with detection capability, and that is where those
detectors are present.

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. And lastly, maybe a general question to
you both. The whole issue of the industrial base, I mean I sort
of get the feeling that DARPA is sort of setting up or perhaps
has always had its own shop. But, I mean, we have a pretty good
industrial pharmaceutical base. Where is HHS in terms of some
of these requests for proposals? Could you clarify a little
more?
Mr. Robinson. The industrial----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Every Member of Congress is obviously
approached by large and small companies in their district, all
with some new something which they view as an imperative. And
then there is a huge amount of frustration that your operation
over there is sort of going into sort of a state of semi-
paralysis. That may be an understatement.
Mr. Robinson. I would believe it is, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. How would you characterize it?
Mr. Robinson. I would characterize it--I will take the two
sides of the house, the pandemic influenza and then our CBRN.
First, the pandemic influenza, where I have served for over 3
years as the head of that program. Where with NIH looking at
the discovery in the early development and where we have been
responsible for the advanced development where we see things
that are going into the clinic, that they have been shown to be
safe, then to move those forward toward licensure of the
products so that we then can acquire those products and put
them into a national stockpile. We have done very well with
that, in fact. For our pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles we are
two-thirds of the way with that 40 million goal. However, we
have been able to, with our programs for advanced development,
be able to have a technological breakthrough. Not only the H5N1
vaccine was actually licensed last year, but we have new
adjuvant. These are immunostimulatory molecules that when
combined with the vaccine can actually make the vaccine go 20,
25-fold more people than normally. And so that is a real
breakthrough so that we can have sustained facilities here that
cannot overbuild. And that is really important for the
influenza industry because there is a market already for
seasonal vaccine and that with these adjuvants and other types
of molecules we actually can be prepared for a pandemic so that
300 million people then can get the vaccine in a matter of
months, not years.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I just think some members of the
committee, maybe all members of the committee, there has not
been sort of a sense of urgency.
Mr. Robinson. No. I am sorry that perception is there. But
on the pandemic influenza we have awarded 27 contracts to
grants for advanced development for over $3.7 billion. And we
have increased the manufacturing base of this country, not
foreign country, but this country, over two and a half-fold of
what it was 2 years ago when Dr. Gerberding testified. And
where we will be in 2012 is that we will be able to not only
supply the United States with what it needs for a pandemic, all
300 million plus, but also the United States to be an exporting
hub. And that is one of our driving forces for the U.S.
Mr. Murtha. What year is that?
Mr. Robinson. 2012, sir. Right now if we had a pandemic
this year we would be able to immunize upwards of about 200
million with our adjuvants which will be going toward licensure
application next year.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, on this point, does this cover
bird flu, too? Do you have a vaccine for bird flu?
Mr. Robinson. Yes. The H5N1 vaccine, that is for the avian
influenza that we know is our biggest threat at this point of
becoming a pandemic virus. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Kaptur.

AGRICULTURE RESEARCH

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.
From the previous panel I just wanted to place two questions on
the record and maybe they could get back to me.
I am very interested in the tobacco research that was
referenced in the written testimony, and I am very curious
about what you are doing to genetically manipulate the tobacco
leaf or the tobacco for the production of proteins and
nutraceuticals perhaps. This is something that as a member of
the Agriculture Committee I have a longstanding interest in,
even though I don't represent any tobacco growers. I just think
it is a magnificent plan and its potential is unmet. So I would
be very interested to know what you are doing along those
lines.
And then secondly in terms of ricin, I don't know enough
about the sources of ricin, but I know the castor bean is one
of them. And I don't know if it is the only one globally. But
if it is, I would like to know the research that is going on to
isolate the ricin from the castor bean, and if you are doing
research on that, and to what extent one could make that
particular seed, to phase it out in its current form globally,
since there are so few seed companies that exist anymore, and
what the potential is to completely take the dangerous part of
the germ plasm out and to make it available as an extraordinary
oilseed for the sake of the world.
So I am just very interested in those two areas. Anything
you could get to me on that would be greatly appreciated. Not
this panel, but the one sitting in back of you. They are
looking. Am I clear?
Dr. Galloway. Indeed. I will take your questions as an
action right away if I can answer them.
[The information follows:]

Ms. Kaptur. I am very interested in the tobacco research that was
referenced in the written testimony, and I am very curious about what
you are doing to genetically manipulate the tobacco leaf or the tobacco
for the production of proteins and nutraceuticals perhaps. This is
something that as a member of the Agriculture Committee I have a
longstanding interest in, even though I don't represent any tobacco
growers. I just think it is a magnificent plan and its potential is
unmet. So I would be very interested to know what you are doing along
those lines.
And then secondly in terms of ricin, I don't know enough about the
sources of ricin, but I know the castor bean is one of them. And, I
don't know if it is the only one globally. But if it is, I would like
to know the research that is going on to isolate the ricin from the
castor bean, and if you are doing research on that, and to what extent
one could make that particular seed, to phase it out in its current
form globally, since there are so few seed companies that exist
anymore, and what the potential is to completely take the dangerous
part of the germ plasm out and to make it available as an extraordinary
oilseed for the sake of the world.
So I am just very interested in those two areas. Anything you could
get to me on that would be greatly appreciated. Not this panel, but the
one sitting in back of you. They are looking. Am I clear?
Dr. Galloway. Indeed. I will take your questions as an action right
away if I can answer them.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is managing research,
under the Accelerated Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals (AMP) program, to
develop large scale protein expression platforms. The program's aim is
to develop a system for large scale production of U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved prophylactic (e.g., vaccines) or
therapeutic proteins. One such platform is the tobacco plant.
The AMP program was originated by DARPA and has been structured as
a 3-phase progressive demonstration of capability. Phases I and II are
funded by DARPA, and managed by DTRA, in conjunction with the Science
and Technology component of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense
Program (CBDP). It is planned that AMP Phase III will be both managed
and funded by the CBDP's Transformational Medical Technologies
Initiative (TMTI) program. Under the AMP program, tobacco was one of
five manufacturing ``platforms'' that are being evaluated and
considered.
The tobacco platform employs non-genetically modified tobacco
plants grown in a climatically controlled environment. After the plants
have matured, they are subjected to a process that includes submerging
them in a solution containing bacteria that has been modified to
contain the protein of pharmaceutical interest. After the process, the
plants are grown for approximately one week, to permit expression of
the relevant proteins and then are harvested. The relevant proteins are
then extracted. Under this program different species of tobacco plants
are being evaluated for suitability. Evaluation of the plants includes
optimization of protein production, as well as the cost of producing
relevant protein.
Ricin, considered an important biological threat agent, is found
only in castor beans (Ricinus communis). The castor bean is dangerous
as a biological agent due to its extreme toxicity, the worldwide
availability of the castor bean and the toxin is relatively simple to
purify from castor-oil manufacturing waste. The seed pulp left over
from pressing the castor oil contains, on average, about 5% by weight
of ricin. However, despite ricin's importance as a biological weapon,
it also may have medical use. These include the treatment of cancer and
as an adjuvant for mucosal vaccines.
Although ricin is only found in castor beans, a similar toxin to
ricin, abrin, is found in seeds of a plant called the rosary pea or
jequirity (Abrus precatorius). Abrin, however, is not known to have
been used as a biological weapon.
Under the CBDP, DTRA currently has on-going research programs to
develop prophylactic agents (i.e., vaccines) against ricin. A ricin
vaccine candidate is presently planned to undergo early safety (phase
I) trials. Additionally, we are managing research aimed at identifying
small molecule inhibitors for use as anti-ricin therapeutic agents.
However, our effort is focused on the conduct of medical
countermeasures to important biological and chemical threat agents. It
is not directed toward modification of castor bean plants or other
agriculturally related projects. Therefore, we are unable to
definitively comment whether efforts are underway to produce seeds not
containing ricin.

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF VACCINES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I have two major questions. One is I am very interested in
long-term consequences of immunization on several levels. The
rising autism in this country is one of my concerns, and no one
seems to be able to understand why this is happening. I am
wondering from the immunization of our soldiers and the numbers
of immunizations that you have been responsible for, what are
the long-term consequences of those? Do you have any time
series studies regarding the types of immunizations, and then
do you do profiles down the road, do you study what happens to
these soldiers, to their families, to their children?
Dr. Kilpatrick. There aren't any epidemiological studies
that are designed to look at that in specific as far as long-
term outcome of vaccines. We do have a Millennium Cohort Study
going on that is a 22-year study looking at service members'
health, and it would include what kind of vaccines they have
received. All of that is part of their medical record. It would
look at their health outcome over, as I said, the 20-year
period.
Ms. Kaptur. Doctor, do you study their children?
Dr. Kilpatrick. That study is really focused on the service
members that ask questions about their children, but it doesn't
have studies on their children, no.
Ms. Kaptur. So you are telling me that of the immunization
of our Armed Forces that there are no long-term studies done of
the consequences across generations?
Dr. Kilpatrick. To design a study to answer specifically
the vaccine effect is a part of multiple other issues that may
be part of that exposure of that person. And then subsequently
to children would be a study that would be extremely difficult
to design. I don't think we have ever done that with any
vaccine long-term. We have safety studies and we certainly have
studies looking at vaccines in a shorter term, but I think when
you take a look at a 20-year effect, those are obviously
complex studies that would take tremendous power and design to
be able to sort out multiple factors that may contribute to
either spouse or children medical health outcomes.

VACCINATIONS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Well, we have spent since 2001 $40
billion on biodefense, and it would seem to me that--what
immunizations are our soldiers getting on a regular basis now?
Dr. Kilpatrick. On a regular basis, they are getting much
as the American public gets: diphtheria, tetanus, making sure
that they are up to date with polio, making sure their measles
and mumps are up to date. And then the seasonal flu vaccine is
given to people on a regular basis. So that is the compilation.
In some threat areas, a meningococcal vaccine could be used
much as we are doing at college campuses when there is an
outbreak of meningitis.
Ms. Kaptur. What about those deployed to Iraq, initially
and now, are they getting different vaccines?
Dr. Kilpatrick. It is really the same vaccines; smallpox
and the anthrax are the two vaccines that are theater specific.
Ms. Kaptur. So they are continuing to get those, the
anthrax even now?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Yes, going to theater, yes.
Ms. Kaptur. And back in the 1990s our soldiers never got
anthrax, did they? Did they get them back in the first Persian
Gulf War?
Dr. Kilpatrick. In the Gulf War, Persian Gulf War, there
were some individuals, and I think the number is around 5,000,
who did receive anthrax vaccines, yes.
Ms. Kaptur. Okay. Have we ever done any studies on long-
term consequences on those soldiers?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Not those specific soldiers. We did not
have the accurate recordkeeping you would like to see in place.
Some people's records indicated they got vaccine A and others
there was no such indication done.

VACCINE STOCKPILE

Ms. Kaptur. Finally, could you answer this question? If you
were with Katie Couric on Evening News and you were asked, the
American people have spent $400 billion on biodefense since
2001, tell the American people what they have gotten for their
money, what would you say?
Mr. Robinson. From the biodefense area I think that we have
enough smallpox vaccine for all of us and twice over in fact.
For anthrax vaccine we are reaching our goals of 75. We are
working toward that. We are about a third of the way through
that. For other red nuke agents----
Ms. Kaptur. Seventy-five million people?
Mr. Robinson. That is correct. For the red nuclear threats
we have in our stockpiles at the strategic national stockpile
agents for a number of different things; Prussian blue,
potassium iodide, DTPA. That would be the amount that would be
required for that kind of threat. There are other things that
we are moving as we go forward toward reaching our goals over
the next several years.
Mr. Bishop. Will the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Kaptur. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Bishop. Did I understand you to say that you are one-
third of the goal of 75 million?
Mr. Robinson. We have about 28.5 million doses.
Mr. Bishop. So you don't have 75 million, you have one-
third?
Mr. Robinson. That is correct. The key there is that 25
million people is what we want to protect.
Ms. Kaptur. And in your opinion what do you think are the
most serious current threats facing our Nation from a
biodefense standpoint?
Mr. Robinson. From our observations and also with our
threat determinations the ones that I have already listed are
still on the table that we have to be very concerned about.
Ms. Kaptur. Smallpox, anthrax?
Mr. Robinson. Smallpox and anthrax are at the top of the
list. Botulinum.
Ms. Kaptur. What about ricin?
Mr. Robinson. Ricin is one of the threats that is on the
top and that there are antitoxins available for that.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.

FUTURE THREATS

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering if you
gentlemen from both panels could walk me through, please, the
detection and prevention aspects of this whole business. I
think General Reeves said that we have taken off the table
anthrax and smallpox, and that is quite a big statement. But
how are we surveying the battlefields or the other places
around the world where we might anticipate these things
emanating from? So if you could give me that scenario,
gentlemen, that would be great.
Dr. Kilpatrick. I think General Reeves is the best to
answer.
Mr. Rothman. And obviously it is related to, and I know
this is an open hearing, but related to where we are guessing
or our knowledge base as to where these threats are coming
from. What countries are producing the scientists, where are
they going and where is this information going?
General Reeves. I understand, sir. The direct answer is
twofold. We do it through both medical surveillance, as well as
through active detection on the battlefield, and I am speaking
now to the Department of Defense forces. Medical surveillance
obviously is going to look for infection in our troop
populations. In terms of our biodetectors we actually
physically put detectors on the battlefield to try to identify
what the specific threats are. The larger issue of those areas
that we might be going into, but yet we have no access to, is
going to be based on intelligence. And either what we have been
able to derive through intelligence and identify what we know
they may be working on in terms of a potential capability, or
it may be what we know are diseases that are already endemic in
that particular part of the world.
The particular challenge to our intelligence community for
the biological threat is that the same facilities that can be
used for good to make vaccines, those same large fermenters
that you need to make vaccines, can be used for evil. They can
be used to make a biological threat. So it is a very
challenging area to be able to identify exactly what is going
on, which is unlike the chemical or the nuclear threat, which
has a good series of indicators associated with it.
Mr. Rothman. I am assuming then that you can vouch for a
robust, active and conscientious program on the part of our
intelligence folks to be aggressively looking out for these
things?
General Reeves. Absolutely, sir. And I will tell you that
my office and Dr. Galloway's office works very closely with the
intelligence community.
Mr. Rothman. And are we working with the Department of
Homeland Security on discovering these various biological and
chemical--I'm sorry?
Mr. Dicks. Threat assessments.
Mr. Rothman. Outside of the U.S. borders and at the U.S.
borders?
General Reeves. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Rothman. With Homeland Security?
General Reeves. Yes, sir, we are. We work very closely with
the Department of Homeland Security. They identify a
prioritized list of threat agents, both chemical and
biological. We develop our list based on guidance from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and our intelligence community. And we
actually compare those lists to see where there is commonality
in what we need to do to develop countermeasures or
identification techniques.
Mr. Rothman. And why are anthrax and smallpox off the
table? In what sense did you mean that?
General Reeves. In the military we have the advantage of
being able to anticipate the threat and therefore vaccinate our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. And so in the sense of
saying that it helps take the aces off the table, what I was
trying to convey was the idea that since we have the luxury,
and I put that in quotes, of being able to prepare our Armed
Forces, unlike a civilian population, that we can anticipate
that and therefore reduce those specific threats.
Mr. Rothman. And a question if I may for Dr. Tether, who I
believe said something on the order now we can discover a
vaccine for new bugs quickly, you said that with some great
pride and almost as eureka, we discovered this and we can do it
now in a matter of weeks. In this open hearing what can you
tell us to give us confidence as to the nature of this
breakthrough that should give us confidence?
Dr. Tether. Well, it is not just one breakthrough. It is a
bunch of many things that have gone on over the last 10 years
we have been working on the problem. What I would rather do is
why don't I take it for the record. And I could actually be
more precise to you as to exactly what are the things that we
have done and why that statement is true.
[The information follows:]

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my remarks to the Committee
regarding the development of new vaccines and how DARPA is working to
change the entire paradigm of defense against biological threats.
We face a daunting problem in developing defenses against
biological attack. Strategies that attempt to use today's technologies
and methods to meet future, potential biological warfare threats are
seriously and inherently flawed technically, and would be prohibitively
expensive. First, it is nearly impossible to predict what threats might
emerge two decades into the future, particularly with the emergency of
``synthetic biology,'' which has now demonstrated the synthesis of an
entire bacterial genome from raw chemicals alone. Second, from the
moment a new pathogen is first identified--either a weapons agent or a
naturally emerging pathogen--today's technology and methods require at
least 15 years to discover, develop, and manufacture large quantities
of an effective therapy. It would be untenable and exorbitantly costly
to attempt to ``cover the bases'' by performing the extensive research
and development required to deal with a wide range of potential
threats, and then stockpile, maintain, and indefinitely renew
population-significant quantities of vaccines or other therapeutics
just in case one or more of those specific threats might emerge.
Over the past 10 years, DARPA has supported research to change this
paradigm by creating technologies to shrink the time from first
pathogen emergence to the production of millions of doses of effective
vaccines/therapeutics to sixteen weeks or less--in sharp contrast to
the 15 years or more that it takes today. To achieve this goal, DARPA
has divided the required research into the technical areas depicted in
the development timeline in Figure 1:

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Rothman. Okay. And is it appropriate to, or can you
talk about the sources of the scientific knowledge? I am
assuming it is Russia, North Korea, but you tell me. Where is
the knowledge base coming from, or is it so easily disseminated
on the Internet that now it is everywhere, to create these
sources of threats; biological, chemical or radiological to us?
General Reeves. Well, staying with the biological threat
for just a moment, sir. Of course we have the traditional
threats of naturally occurring disease. We have certain
emerging threats. And you heard a moment ago talking about
pandemic flu, SARS, drug resistant tuberculosis. We have
enhanced threats where people can do what is referred to as
bioprospecting. They go out and look for particularly virulent
strains of some particular threat. And then we have what you
heard Dr. Galloway speaking of earlier, which are the so-called
advance threats. And these are the genetically engineered or
genetically modified threats. And what I would simply use as a
matter of illustration is that the kinds of things that were
done in genetic engineering only a few years ago by
postgraduate doctoral students are today being done in colleges
and high schools. The rapid advance of biotechnology and the
development of genetic, the tools of genetic engineering, are
very widespread through both our university system as well as
through the Internet. And that concerns us greatly for the
future.
Mr. Rothman. And, again, please assure me, unless you can't
honestly, that the Department of Homeland Security is aware of
the ubiquitousness, if there is such a word, of the potential
threat here in the United States for that kind of bad conduct?
General Reeves. They are, sir. And we do work closely with
the Department of Homeland Security across all of our programs,
not only pharmaceutical, but also in detection and protection
programs to share common technology.
Mr. Rothman. My chairman is smiling.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONTINUITY OF VACCINE STOCKPILE

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The committee
understands that JAC has recently canceled the future
procurements, and back to anthrax, of the FDA approved anthrax
vaccine and that you plan to rely solely on HHS for procurement
of the vaccine doses that are needed for future vaccinations of
our military personnel. Since DoD has successfully managed this
contract in the past for assuring a continued supply of
vaccine, what assurances do you have from HHS that they will
maintain your supply chain, that they will give DoD first
priority for vaccine doses in the stockpile and assure that
there won't be an interruption in the supply for DoD if HHS
were to draw down its vaccine stockpile during an emergency?
And what assurances has HHS provided DoD that it will acquire
the additional doses of thorax to replace the doses that are
provided to DoD, as well as the other doses that have expiring
shelflives? And the final part of that is when will HHS have a
new contract for increasing the number of FDA-licensed vaccine
doses to reach that 75 million goal?
Dr. Kilpatrick. Well, I can start, and I will let Dr.
Robinson finish the answer, because it really was a joint
agreement as we went into this saying that this just logically
makes sense instead of trying to run two different contracts
and being in competition. We asked how do we work this together
and how do we do it concurrently. I think all the issues that
you raised were parts of that agreement that was clearly
spelled out. I think that as we look at how we manage that, we
are both very confident that DoD's needs will always be met,
that there won't be any issue on that. And I think it comes
from the production of--
Mr. Bishop. Let me interrupt you just a second. Mr.
Frelinghuysen suggested, with probably good reason, that HHS is
a little bit slow in its performance.
Dr. Kilpatrick. Well, again, I think this is an agreement
where the two organizations have really spelled out all the
details so that DoD is very confident that our supply will
continue to be met. I know HHS has continued to work on what
they are looking at in the stockpile. But the efficiencies of
scale and the contracting and I think moving this forward as we
are looking at the potential for even new vaccines being
developed in the future, I think that is really where this
agreement is headed, not just for today, but looking into
production capabilities in the future.
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Dr. Kilpatrick. I want to echo
what he said, and what he said is absolutely true in that the
different elements that you presented to us were in that
agreement, and that HHS is moving forward with the next one
this year to procure more of the vaccine. And as head of the
pan flu program we moved it expeditiously and we will move
forward with BARDA expeditiously on all our threats, not just
pan flu.
Mr. Bishop. When is the 75 million going to be reached?
Mr. Robinson. We see that as not only--we are buying what
capacity is there right now.
Mr. Bishop. I am sorry?
Mr. Robinson. We are buying what capacity that they can
make right now, and will continue to do that. We have the
advanced development of new products coming on. We will be
awarding contracts for the RPA.
Mr. Bishop. Let me repeat myself. When will the 75 million
be reached? That is as in the date or an expected date?
Mr. Robinson. We would like for the record to give you the
timelines on that in specific numbers over the next several
years, how much we would actually get for each year, if we
could do that, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Lewis, do you have anything additional?
Mr. Lewis. No.

UNFUNDED PRIORITIES

Mr. Murtha. Let me make a couple comments here, that having
the staff from HHS is so important. I understand last year it
was $870 million which got lost in between the supplemental
domestic spending, and so forth. I think you need to tell both
our staffs what that $870 million would have done. I think it
looks to me like the cell research is the key to moving this
thing forward faster, because if you can produce the research
using cells rather than eggs you reduce the time it takes in
the research.
And third, the manufacturing, which is the customer. So I
think we need to hear from you how we solve these problems or
what we can do to help in defense. I don't know that we can do
anything, but I think you can see the concern of the committee
about us trying to help. But the key thing is what will the
$870 million, and my staff says $1.2 billion may have been
needed to stabilize this thing. We don't want to wait until
there is a damn epidemic and then rush around and spend a lot
of money and not solve the problem. A lot of people die in the
meantime. As some people say, the valley of death means between
research and manufacturing. So we need you to tell the staff so
we get some conception of if we can help. We may not be able to
help, but we need to have an idea of what we can do.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield on that. I talk
with my colleague to my right from New Jersey about a lot of
things. He doesn't discuss his big pharmaceutical companies
with me too often. But I do understand from both of my
colleagues from New Jersey there is not a heck of a lot of
profit made by these companies by way of vaccine production,
but nonetheless they do have capacity. Further, it is suggested
that if we do have a challenge relative to being able to
produce huge volumes in X and Y, it is likely a relatively
minor investment relative to an existing capacity, wherever it
might exist, but it would be much more logical as long as the
government had access, much more logical than creating a huge
facility somewhere where we might have part-time employees turn
on the lights once in a while and wait for the emergency to
occur.
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir. First, I want to thank you, because
even though avian influenza and pandemic influenza is not on
the airways every moment like it was a year ago, your urgency
is shared by us, and I mean me personally. Relative to the $870
million, that money was to go for advanced development of the
cell-based vaccines to get those towards licensure of the
products over the next 2 years. Also for recombinant vaccines,
which would be able to produce the product in about half the
time that cell or egg-based would, so that was one of the
things. For advanced development of new antiviral drugs that--
--
Mr. Murtha. Go over that again. The $870 million would
reduce--what would it do?
Mr. Robinson. The second element of that would be for
recombinant vaccine development where they could actually
produce the vaccine in one-half the time that we see with the
standard egg-based and the new cell-based vaccine.
In a pandemic--let me just walk you through this, in a
pandemic we see that egg and cell-based facilities would be
able to provide the vaccine at 20 to 23 weeks after the onset
of a pandemic. We have walked through this, we have compressed
it as much as we possibly can, and that is really what the
manufactures and we know that it can happen. The recombinant
vaccines, however, provided an opportunity to break that down
to about 12 weeks. And so at HHS we are moving forward with, in
fact we awarded contracts this year, to advance development of
those types of vaccines, such as recombinant proteins,
recombinant DNA that would be able to have vaccines in half the
time that we would expect for egg and cell-based.
Mr. Murtha. But yet back so we understand. The $870 million
would in 2 years reduce the time it takes to do the research
towards cell-based versus eggs and consequently reduce the time
it takes to produce and get through the system faster?
Mr. Robinson. For the cell-based it actually gives us the
entire manufacturing capacity that we need to produce the 600
million doses that we would need for a pandemic. In addition to
that, we would have recombinant vaccines that would be able to
come online much sooner during a pandemic, about half the time.
Mr. Murtha. What would the shelflife be for the $600
million doses?
Mr. Robinson. For the 600 million doses right now what we
have seen is influenza vaccines normally have not been allowed
to go much longer than a year. And what we are seeing right now
is that as we keep our vaccines in bulk form, not in the final
vials but in bulk, we are seeing 2 and 3 years and going
forward that these vaccines are stable.
Mr. Murtha. And how long does it take--all right, you do
the research. How long does it take to get through the FDA
system?
Mr. Robinson. That still takes anywhere to go from the time
that you file an IND, to go into the clinic and try to
demonstrate safety and efficacy until the time that you are
licensed, the best that we can do is about 4 to 5 years.
Mr. Murtha. Well, see, this is why this is urgent. I mean,
we cannot afford----
Mr. Robinson. And we have a way of ameliorating that
timeline, and that is the Department has an authorization
called emergency usage authorization. If we see a product that
has been shown to be safe and it has some efficacy but it
hasn't been licensed yet, the Secretary can make a declaration
that that product could be used.
Mr. Murtha. But it is going to take some time to do that in
order to do it safe.
Mr. Robinson. No, we have those actually programmed such
that for pandemic influenza that the minute that it occurs that
that specific product would be mobilized and could be made and
then moved out and be given to an individual.
Mr. Murtha. Give this committee an idea of what we are
talking about. Give us an idea. You got the cell-based
research. How long does it take to get it to the market, to get
it produced, researched and produced into the market?
Mr. Robinson. For cell-based 20 to 23 weeks from the time a
pandemic occurs.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis. Excuse me, could I follow on that?
Mr. Murtha. Sure.
Mr. Lewis. I am presuming the timeline you just suggested
included approval by the FDA?
Mr. Robinson. In the cell and egg-based where we are moving
toward is if they are not already a licensed vaccine, because
influenza vaccines are licensed, then we would use the
emergency use authorizations which we will already have in
place as we go forward, so that part would not be any problem.
Mr. Lewis. Is there full cooperation with the FDA for a
process like this?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir, they are part of the process,
absolutely.
Mr. Lewis. And did that involve essentially setting aside
clinical trials or what?
Mr. Robinson. For the pandemic vaccine there would not be
clinical trials because the vaccines would be so similar to the
ones that are already licensed that we would be able to use
those under emergency usage authorization.
Mr. Lewis. We are talking about threats that are much
different than the well-established threats here potentially.
And so what we are really trying to do is have you help us with
developing processes for responding that will be sensible in
terms of review by organizations like the FDA, but at the same
time be able to be timely. We don't want this to be a
population control program. It is--well, I would be very
interested in having DARPA help us and you all help us know
where there are major problems in facilitating these timelines.
If you are not getting cooperation from the private sector, for
example, in a timely and responsive way we would like to know
that. If there are hangups with territory in an FDA location,
we would like to know that. The interplay between the
universities. I would think major universities around the
country are doing research in a variety of mix of these areas,
and what we don't know about all that and the way we are
coordinating those research efforts, I don't know anything
about them, but we sure should.
Anyway, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me tell you, we want to help you solve this
problem. That is the key. Mr. Dicks, do you have a question?

ANTHRAX VACCINE

Mr. Dicks. Yes. Dr. Robinson, when was BARDA created?
Mr. Robinson. In 2006, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Now, as I understand it, I want to correct the
record here, the number--how many threat assessments have come
over from the Department of Homeland Security to HHS?
Mr. Robinson. It is my recollection that there are 13. Yes,
13.
Mr. Dicks. And they have all been, whatever you do, you
approve them or agree with them or concur in them, that has all
been done, isn't that correct?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. That is good. Now, there was a problem with the
first anthrax contract that went out to a company, Vaxgen. It
is like $800 million, and we got nothing.
Mr. Robinson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Did we spend all the money?
Mr. Robinson. No, sir. $1.5 million was all that was spent
on that contract.
Mr. Dicks. $1.5 million, that is good. Now, understanding
you have developed several different anthrax approaches, is
that not correct?
Mr. Robinson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Can you tell us about that? These are contracts
that have just been let. They are smaller.
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir. One of the ways to go about this is
with the advanced development. There are small broad agency
announcements where we have awarded these contracts on a number
of different types of mixed generation anthrax vaccines. What
we see is those going forward, and we know not all of them are
going to make it, but by advancing development paradigm we can
take those that look really promising and move those toward
licensure and then those will become eligible, because we want
multiple products there in the stockpile for that threat.
Mr. Dicks. Now, I asked you about the bird flu vaccine. You
said that--is there some new strain of bird flu that we don't
have a vaccine for?
Mr. Robinson. No, sir. What happens is as normal human
influenza does is it genetically changes slightly. And what we
have seen is that is exactly what happens. In HHS we monitor
this through CDC and the World Health Organization. And our
stockpiles actually reflect to the year, actually to several
months ago, what is actually out there and circulating as the
biggest threats. And we will continue that monitoring of
different avian influenza virus, not only H5N1 but H7 and H9
viruses also.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman has a question.

SECURITY THREATS

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if this
question is for the Chair or for the panel. I understand and
appreciate all the testimony about naturally occurring diseases
and things like that. But being this is the Defense
Subcommittee I am concerned about and we are concerned about
adequate funding to address security threats to the United
States. How do we assure ourselves, Mr. Chairman, that the
intelligence community, A, has the incentive and, B, have the
resources to be looking for these things, these problems and
source of problems overseas? That old expression, an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure, I think is applicable.
So I don't know whether this panel can testify to that or
not.
Mr. Murtha. I don't think that this is as much
intelligence. I think we are really talking about the
possibility of a flu epidemic rather than anthrax. Anthrax of
course, as we all well know, is not contagious. So it is a
different situation.
Mr. Rothman. If the gentleman will yield. The genetically
altered threats that the General was talking about and Dr.
Galloway apparently are the most frightening because there is
so much unknown there and we don't have adequate ways to
address the unknown. So it would seem that that would be the
biggest threat to our Nation.
Mr. Murtha. Do you think you are getting adequate
intelligence? Are they paying attention to this? Is this
something we have any access to?
General Reeves. We do, sir. But clearly given the very
nature of being able to genetically modify an organism the
potentials are almost endless. And so part of what Dr. Galloway
and the chem-biodefense program is doing is looking at those
techniques that we can use generically to identify virulence in
a threat so that we can very quickly recognize what that
genetic modification is, how do we produce countermeasure and--
--
Mr. Murtha. Did you say before the hearing started it takes
up to a year sometimes to determine this?
General Reeves. It certainly could, sir.

EMERGENCY USAGE OF VACCINES

Mr. Murtha. Okay. I have one last question. How many times
have we used the emergency usage authorization?
Mr. Robinson. To my knowledge, sir, we have used it at
least a couple of times already. And we have preset documents
that are ready to go on different threats going forward.
Mr. Murtha. No adverse effect to the public?
Mr. Robinson. For those that we know, we only would put
those that have a good safety record going forward, that we
feel confident that they would not have severe adverse effects.
Mr. Dicks. For the military or is it for the civilians? Is
it for military or civilians?
Mr. Robinson. We know for civilians we do have that
authorization to do that, the EUAs yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. You can do it for civilians as well as the
military?
Mr. Robinson. That is correct.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you. During the first panel
I mentioned some of the work that was being done at the
University of South Florida when the subject of bird flu came
up, called to my attention. They did a tremendous amount of
research and work, not only nationally but internationally, on
the issue of bird flu. And if you haven't talked to them you
might want to do that, because I think they might have a lot to
offer.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much. The committee is
adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Rothman and the
answers thereto follow:]

Question. Dr. Galloway: The Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves, which reported out January 31, 2008, emphasized in their
findings the need for federal readiness to respond to national
emergencies such as use of weapons of mass destruction. What current
programs are underway at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to provide
medical response for emergency treatment of victims, in the event of
another terrorist attack?
Answer. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducts science
and technology research directed at improving medical response in
treating victims of terrorist threat agents by developing new
prophylaxis and therapeutics for chemical, biological and radiological
agents. Our research takes these potential medical products to the
point of readiness to file for an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Further
development that seeks to result in gaining an FDA license for these
products falls within the domain of the Joint Program Executive Office
for Chem-Bio Defense. Although the efforts are oriented primarily at
capabilities of interest to the war fighter, the products and methods
ensuing from this research have applicability to the public sector as
well. To this aim, DTRA attempts to coordinate, at multiple levels,
with Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) offices to avoid duplication and to ensure
that appropriate threats are addressed by our research programs.
Countermeasures Against Biological Agents
Research focuses on developing pre- and post-exposure medical
countermeasures effective against biological warfare (BW) threat
agents. These activities focus on preventing disease, or reducing the
lethal and functional incapacitating effects of an agent. The projects
managed by DTRA range from basic research to more mature research
efforts. Basic studies are focused on characterizing pathogenic
mechanisms, host immune responses to pathogens, and identification of
therapeutic and vaccine targets. Applied and advanced studies are aimed
at designing and evaluating novel therapeutics and the generation and
testing of novel vaccine candidates.
therapeutics
Therapeutics against bacterial agents
The objective of the task area is to develop therapeutic modalities
that reduce the lethal and functional incapacitating effects of
bacterial BW threat agents. Specific agents of current interest include
Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Burkholderia mallei,
Burkholderia pseudomallei, and Bacillus anthracis. DTRA funded research
supports the testing and evaluation of conventional antimicrobials in
order to provide actionable information regarding prophylaxis or
treatment options to healthcare providers in the event of an attack.
Research in this area also includes the development of next generation
antimicrobials capable of providing novel treatment options in the
event of an attack or outbreak with an antibiotic resistant strain.
Therapeutics against toxin agents
DTRA also conducts efforts aimed at the development of first in
class therapeutic modalities against toxins. The anticipated effects of
the use of this therapeutics are the amelioration of the lethal and
functional incapacitating effects of specific toxin agents. Currently,
primary focus is directed toward discovery and therapeutic development
efforts directed at botulinum neurotoxins (BoNT) serotypes A-G, ricin,
and staphylococcal enterotoxin.
Therapeutics against viral agents
Research is also currently being conducted in the development of
therapeutic modalities targeted against aerosolized viral BW threat
agents. Resources are currently primarily applied toward development of
therapeutics against filovirus (i.e., Marburg and Ebola virus),
alphavirus, and orthopox virus infection. DTRA funded research is
supporting the development of ST-246, a novel smallpox antiviral, that
could be used in the event of a variola (smallpox) attack. ST-246 is
safe in humans and is 100% protective in primates that have been
infected with the virus. Efforts are also directed at developing novel
antiviral therapies against CDC category A and B viral biothreat
agents, especially viral encephalitis and hemorrhagic fever viruses.
Efforts that support FDA licensure of these products are paramount to
deploying timely and effective medical countermeasures.
vaccines
Vaccines against bacterial agents
The program objective is to develop vaccines that protect
individuals against predicted battlefield doses of aerosolized Category
A and B bacterial biothreat agents. The program conducts basic research
to identify mechanisms of bacterial pathogenesis and host immune
responses. Studies are aimed at identifying protective antigenic
epitopes against Category A and B bacterial agents that may be
incorporated into an effective vaccine candidate. Applied research
involves testing vaccine candidates in tissue culture and small animal
models for immunogenicity/potency. If results are promising, the
candidates are further tested for their ability to protect laboratory
animals against challenges with the corresponding bacterial pathogen.
Vaccine formulations include recombinant proteins, and the use of novel
platforms to express target antigens. Past successes include
efficacious vaccines against Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis
(i.e., anthrax and plague). The program is currently working on
vaccines against Burkholderia sp., Brucella sp. and Francisella
tularensis. The program also is aimed at identifying protective
antigenic epitopes against bacterial biothreat agents that could be
incorporated into a multi-agent vaccine platform, and the development
of alternative delivery methods. The program's emphasis is the down-
selection of identified vaccine candidates for further, advanced
development.
Vaccines against viral agents
As for viral agents, the long-term objective is to develop vaccines
that protect individuals against predicted battlefield doses of
aerosolized Category A and B viral biothreat agents. Basic studies are
aimed at understanding mechanisms of viral pathogenesis and host
response, in order to identify protective antigens that may be
incorporated into vaccine formulations. Currently, the major thrusts in
this area are the generation of vaccines that protect against the
filoviruses (e.g., Ebola and Marburg) and alphaviruses [e.g.,
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE), Western Equine Encephalitis virus
(WEE) and Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus (EEE)]. The program's goal
is to develop a vaccine against each viral agent, either as a single or
preferably multi-agent (e.g., VEE/EEE/WEE) formulation. The vaccine
platforms currently being tested include inactive viruses, naked DNA,
non-replicating viral vectors, and virus-like particles. Again, the
focus is the down-selection of vaccine candidates for further advanced
development.
Vaccines against toxins
DTRA is also generating vaccines against Category A and B toxin
threats. A safe and efficacious vaccine against Botulinum neurotoxin
(serotypes A/B) was generated and transitioned to the advanced
developer in 1999. Likewise, a vaccine against Staphylococcal
enterotoxin B was also developed and is scheduled for an upcoming phase
I clinical trial. Currently, the program is evaluating a vaccine
against Ricin, which should enter phase I clinical trials in FY09/10.
Countermeasures Against Chemical Agents
An important area of DTRA's research portfolio includes projects
aimed at developing medical countermeasures to chemical agents,
including non-traditional agents. Some DTRA efforts are directed at
elucidating the mechanisms of chemical agent etiology with the
anticipation that identify new targets for next-generation
therapeutics. However, a priority is given to testing and development
of prophylactic, therapeutic and adjuncts to chemical agents. In
addition to development of modalities of treatment for chemical agents,
projects include developing state-of-the-art laboratory/fieldable
methods that detect exposure to chemical agents, such as nerve agents
and vesicants, in clinical samples.
Significant efforts are aimed at developing catalytic BioScavenger
or other than butyrylcholinesterase BioScavenger prophylactics that
provide protection against all organophosphorous nerve agents.
Additionally, medical therapeutics are being developed for the
protection of the nervous system against nerve agent threats. Some of
the medical countermeasures being developed here include
neuroprotectants, anticonvulsants, and improved cholinesterase
reactivators. DTRA also manages projects aimed at developing
therapeutic strategies to prevent or minimize injuries caused by
vesicant agents, namely sulfur mustard. Emphasis is placed on all major
routes of exposure to include the integument and ocular tissues as well
as the respiratory and systemic systems.
Countermeasures Against Radiological and Nuclear Exposure
Currently, no licensed non-toxic pharmaceutical agents or
diagnostic capabilities are suitable for use in military operational
environments for penetrating ionizing radiation. An aminothiol
compound, amifostine, is FDA approved for use in patients receiving
chemotherapy or radiation therapy, but amifostine's performance
degrading toxic side effects prohibit its use in healthy patients.
Other pharmacologic agents are available to physicians off-label, such
as hematopoietic cytokines (Neupogen^TM) for treating bone
marrow injury. Additionally, antibiotics are commonly used to treat the
infectious sequelae of radiological injuries, but they must be selected
appropriately to effectively treat exogenous and endogenous systemic
infections while not affecting beneficial intestinal normal
microfluora.
DTRA's research efforts in this area are aimed at preventing or
mitigating radiation-induced injury. The focus of DTRA's efforts,
therefore, is to develop broad-spectrum medical radioprotectants
against Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) and Delayed Effects of Acute
Radiation Exposure (DEARE), leading to chronic radiation damage (e.g.,
fibrosis and mutagenesis). These radioprotectants are envisioned to be
used prophylactically and/or therapeutically (i.e., post-irradiation
exposure). The development of radioprotectants (prophylaxis or
pretreatment) is unique to DoD strategy, and, as such, DoD is the only
governmental agency developing medical countermeasures to prevent
against ionizing radiation before exposure.
Specifically, countermeasures under development focus on the
effective treatment of respiratory and gastrointestinal systems
following radiological exposures. These studies are designed to support
FDA requirements for approval. The approaches include medical
countermeasures such as anti-oxidants, anti-apoptotic agents,
decorporation agents, and lung/GI rescue of cellular components against
ARS and DEARE. Although novel approaches are sought, more mature,
promising product candidates at later stages of development that
clearly demonstrate viability for use in this area are emphasized.
Additionally, chromosomal biomarkers aimed at development of
biodosimetry technology for diagnosis of patients following
radiological exposure is conducted.
Diagnostic Technology
DTRA also manages programs directed at developing new diagnostic
technologies. The ultimate goal in this area is to field complete
diagnostic systems (e.g., test platform assays and reagents) that will
confirm health threats and rapidly diagnose exposure to, or disease
caused by, biological warfare agents. The current program provides
support for established programs, including the Joint Biological Agent
Identification and Diagnostic System, Next Generation Diagnostic
System, as well as the Critical Reagents Program. In these regards,
guidelines have been established and standardized for assessing nucleic
acid assays and immunoassays, de novo clinical sequencing, and host
response biomarkers that provide a decision point for transition from
the tech-base to advanced development, leading, eventually, to FDA
approval.
Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative
The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative (TMTI) is a
unique program designed to provide an enterprise capability directly
geared to support a coordinated, rapid, and effective medical response
to all victims in the event of another terrorist attack. The
overarching goal of TMTI is to provide a sustainable capability to
rapidly respond to traditional, emerging and genetically modified
biological threats. TMTI is aimed at protecting the warfighter from
biological threats through three key performance enablers, which
provide proof-of-process and include:
Providing broad spectrum medical countermeasures
against intracellular bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fever
viruses
Developing platform technologies to identify and
counter unknown agents
Obtaining genetic sequences of threats to enable
rapid identification of agents and accelerate the development
of essential therapeutics.
The science of countermeasures has long revolved around the notion
of prophylaxis or treatment targeting a single organism; TMTI has
engaged early research to create platforms that support the enterprise
by targeting broad spectrum regions that will result in broad spectrum
therapeutics. The knowledge of the prevalence of these regions and the
effective blockers will enable rapid response to events and threats in
the future. The development of these platforms, including threat
identification, drug discovery and development, and accelerated
manufacture, will speed the response necessary for effective
consequence management. All of these will be done in concert with
Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Rothman.
Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto
follow:]

Question. General Reeves.
Until the development and deployment of the next generation of
detectors, the possibility exists of being attacked with an unknown
biological agent. The use of broad-spectrum therapeutics may help to
counter the uncertainty of the exact virus or strain of virus being
used as a weapon. For example, Ribavirin is the preferred treatment for
certain hemorrhagic fever viral infections, but it is worthless against
Ebola and Marburg infections. A broad-spectrum therapeutic could work
against all of them. In fact, in a bioterrorist attack, a broad-
spectrum therapeutic could conceivably be used before the actual
pathogen had been identified.
How effective are broad-spectrum therapeutics? What are their
drawbacks? Can these help alleviate some of the uncertainty?
Answer. Although we would be delighted to find, develop, and field
a true broad-spectrum therapeutic that will work against all threat
classes, this is highly unlikely, given what we know of pathogenesis
and host immune pathways. Our working concept of broad-spectrum
therapeutics involves countermeasures that will cross at least two
threat classes (e.g., a countermeasure that interferes with viral
capsid formation, a mechanism used by many viral classes). The
Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI) program
supports several efforts in this direction. It also addresses rapid
identification of unknown, newly emergent, or bioengineered agents. The
Chemical Biological Medical Systems (CBMS) program also addresses
threats with broad-spectrum agents; for example, our botulinum toxin
vaccine will protect against two types of botulinum toxin.
At present, the only truly broad-spectrum therapeutics we have are
antibiotics with a wide spectrum of action. We have no specific
therapeutics other than supportive therapy against threat classes such
as the weaponizable viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg,
etc.) or certain intracellular bacteria (e.g., Burkholderia,
tularaemia, etc.). Clinicians regularly institute broad-spectrum
antibiotic therapy before the results of culture and sensitivity are
known when patients present with what are believed to be bacterial
infections. This has been part of daily medical practice for decades.
This practice has long proven effective. The drawbacks of any
therapeutic are the side effects of the medication, as well as the
uncertainty that may result if we partly treat an infection before we
have clearly classified it. In theory, broad-spectrum therapeutics not
yet developed would share the same drawbacks.
It is not quite accurate to say the Ribavirin is the preferred
treatment for certain hemorrhagic fever viral infections. Ribavirin is
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only against
hepatitis C. It has indeed been proven effective against several other
viruses, such as Lassa, including some human experience. But it is not
approved for these indications. Ribavirin is not effective against
Marburg and Ebola viruses. Ribavirin is used by the Department of
Defense (DoD) as the preferred treatment for Korean hemorrhagic fever.
It is used, under an Investigational New Drug protocol, which involves
informed consent, at the 121 Army Hospital in Korea to treat the one to
five patients attended to every year. In this case, Ribavirin is the
preferred DoD treatment.
Question. Similarly, a major disadvantage with vaccine development
for specific virus strains is that it could be rendered worthless by a
single genetic modification to the virus. Because of that fact, there
exists the possibility that the military could stockpile large amounts
of vaccines and therapeutics that could be rendered useless.
Does the enemy have the sophistication to genetically alter a
virus? Is this something we should be more worried about?
Answer. Let me say first that there is no indication that any
terrorist organization has the capability to, or is attempting to,
genetically alter viruses. However, any nation with an advanced
biotechnology industry or capability could conceivably genetically
alter a virus, potentially rendering vaccines and countermeasures
useless. While no nation publicly acknowledges having either an
offensive biological weapons (BW) program or stockpile, a number of
countries, some of which have advanced biotechnology capabilities, are
assessed to have some BW capability. This is why development of broad-
spectrum therapeutics is important to the overall chemical and
biological defense program.
Question. Your recent Senate testimony refers to the use of
smallpox vaccine as a real achievement in additional readiness for the
warfighter. It is my understanding that currently some 20% of our men
and women in uniform cannot be vaccinated for a variety of reasons,
including contraindications such as eczema, autoimmune diseases, or
heart disease. Is there a gap in coverage, in your view? Is the
Department looking at ways to deal with this? Could options include
procurement of a therapeutic drug for those who are not vaccinated and
become exposed to smallpox?
Answer. Actually, about 9% of those screened for smallpox
vaccination have been found medically ineligible. The 9% that were not
vaccinated were due to medical exemptions based upon our stringent
screening guidelines to identify individuals who may be at a higher
risk of incurring smallpox vaccine related adverse events. The
Department of Defense (DoD) leadership balances the benefit of
protection against a biological attack using smallpox with careful
consideration of the potential risks of vaccination. If the risk of
attack increases, DoD can identify the individuals that were exempted
from vaccination and reconsider administering the vaccine or remove
those people from the high threat area. There are no absolute
exemptions to smallpox vaccination in a postexposure event. If the
smallpox threat materializes, these people would be protected by
individual or collective protection capabilities that we have fielded.
Additionally, the DoD continues to explore postexposure treatment
options, including procurement of therapeutic drugs and the use of a
smallpox vaccine that utilizes a weakened form of the viral strain used
in the vaccine. If there was a smallpox therapeutic licensed by the
Food and Drug Administration for that indication, procurement of such a
drug would indeed be an option. There are no such drugs today, but the
government technology base includes researchers who have participated
in studies involving two possible candidates, ST-246 and Cidofovir.
These technology base efforts may mature into advanced development
programs, if the results of research efforts attain appropriate
technological readiness levels.
Question. Dr. Kilpatrick. Last year, we heard about a toddler
suffering from complications of a smallpox vaccination given to his
soldier father. I'm told the child is alive and well today after a near
fatal experience. Has the Department conducted an analysis of this
situation, and if so what lessons learned have been gained as a result?
How does the Department plan to prevent similar situations in the
future?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) investigated the
circumstances leading to the case and has made changes to the program.
The Service member received a smallpox vaccine training brief and the
smallpox and anthrax tri-fold brochures. In addition, he completed the
standardized screening form before vaccination, as required. The
screening health care provider cleared the individual for vaccination
after reviewing his personal medical history. Although the Service
member annotated the screening form to indicate a prior history of
eczema and/or atopic dermatitis, the provider cleared him after the
consultation with senior physicians at the mobilization site.
The Service member initially reported the adverse event while
consulting the Vaccine Healthcare Center, as directed in the pre-
vaccination training brief. He reported that his scab separated
naturally around day 21, but he continued to take the added precaution
of keeping the vaccination site covered while in contact with family.
He reported extensive contact with the child, including sleeping in the
same bed, wrestling, and bathing.
The actions taken by DoD to reduce the possibility of a similar
case included:
Redoubling efforts to ensure quality health care provider
training at all vaccine administration sites.
Updating educational products, including online videos,
live Web casts, and in-person or downloadable presentations.
Holding training sessions at various DoD installations on
a rotating basis while interacting with as many health care providers
as possible.
Since May 2007, DoD has trained over 500 health care providers
involved with the DoD smallpox vaccination program. The message that is
consistently relayed to health care providers is that individuals with
contraindicating conditions should be excluded from the smallpox
vaccination programs.
In addition, DoD has released an updated clinical policy that
includes a change in its recommended vaccination site care
instructions. Because of this case and the potential for micro-shedding
of the vaccinia virus following scab separation, the updated policy now
directs Service members to continue active site care for 30 days after
vaccination and until the site is entirely healed. This exceeds the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's recommendation of
maintaining the precaution until the scab ``falls off on its own (2 to
3 weeks).''
The DoD vaccinated over 180,000 Service members in the year
following this incident with no additional serious cases of contact
transmission. Since the program began in 2002, DoD has screened over
1.7 million people and vaccinated over 1.5 million people.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Young.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto
follow.]

Industrial Base/DARPA-UPMC Study

Question. General Reeves. What is the current status of our
national industrial base for developing and manufacturing medical
countermeasures and for providing surge capacity during crises? Should
the DARPA-UPMC (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) study be
continued and expanded to find solutions to these issues?
Answer. Department of Defense (DoD) production strategies address
requirements for surge capability and industrial base concerns through
the use of rated contracts with Contract Manufacturing Organizations.
Typically, Contract Manufacturing Organizations have multiple
manufacturing suites that could be used in the event of an emergency to
support surge capacity. To address the need for surge capability and to
ensure availability of product, we have issued Defense Priorities and
Allocations System Delivery Order rated contracts for biological
countermeasures. This rating affords DoD products production priority
over unrated orders, including commercial orders. In the event of an
emergency, the Defense Production Act would also mandate industry to
use its resources to fulfill the needs of national defense on a
priority basis. This Act could be used to require pharmaceutical
manufacturers to produce biodefense medical countermeasures rather than
products normally manufactured in their facilities. There are other
production options to prepare for an emergency situation that would
negate the requirement for surge capacity such as producing and storing
frozen bulk material that could subsequently be put into smaller
packages for distribution in the event of an emergency.
If the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency-University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center (DARPA-UPMC) study is continued, it is
important that the Government maintain the long-term financial
commitment required to sustain the production facility. It is also
critical that the assumptions supporting that study be validated,
particularly the projection of the number of new advanced development
programs starting for both DoD and the Department of Health and Human
Services, since the number of countermeasures in production in that
facility impacts sustainment of the facility.

Drugs to Treat Radiation Exposure

Question. I am concerned about the military's commitment to
research and development of drugs necessary to treat radiation exposure
for our troops. While Homeland Security has a responsibility to address
this threat domestically, I believe there is a very real threat of the
use of a dirty bomb or other crude nuclear device against our deployed
troops in a tactical situation. What programs are currently underway to
utilize near-market mature drugs that may provide lifesaving treatment
for varying levels of radiation exposure? If the DOD is researching
such drugs, what are their plans to bring them quickly into service as
part of a standard deployment kit?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) is fully committed to the
development of life-saving medical radiation countermeasures that will
enable warfighters to survive otherwise-lethal radiation injuries.
Exposure to radiation results in a complex disease state, termed acute
radiation syndrome. The DoD and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) are working together closely to develop a suite of
medical radiation countermeasures to treat acute radiation syndrome. To
minimize the cost, schedule, and program risks of these development
efforts, both the DoD and the HHS have preferentially selected
candidate countermeasures which have already completed substantial
development. For example, the DoD's lead medical radiation
countermeasure, Prochymal^TM, had successfully completed six
Phase 1 or Phase 2 safety studies and initiated a Phase 3 clinical
study for a separate indication before being selected by the DoD as a
candidate medical radiation countermeasure. Due to the previously
completed developmental work performed by the contractor, Osiris
Therapeutics, Inc., the DoD will be able to field a product years
sooner than originally estimated.
Similarly, HHS solicitation for a medical radiation countermeasure
considers only those candidates for which an Investigational New Drug
application has been accepted by the Food and Drug Administration.
Acceptance of an Investigational New Drug application is a substantial
milestone in the drug development pathway and is the prerequisite for
commencing clinical studies. In coordination with contractor efforts to
develop and obtain Food and Drug Administration approval for medical
radiation countermeasures, the Joint Program executive Officer for
Chemical and Biological Defense coordinates with the Military Services
and medical logistics organizations to develop fielding and sustainment
plans for medical countermeasures. The DoD is leveraging near-market
candidate medical radiation countermeasures, collaborating closely with
HHS parallel efforts, and incorporating fielding and sustainment
planning early in the development lifecycle to deliver medical
radiation countermeasures to warfighters as soon as possible.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson.]

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W I T N E S S E S

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Page
Amos, Lieutenant General J.F..................................... 279
Bye, Dr. Raymond, Jr............................................. 451
Casey, General G.W., Jr.......................................... 1
Conway, General J.T.............................................. 145
Galloway, Darrell................................................ 325
Geren, Pete...................................................... 1
Johnson, Susan................................................... 455
Kilpatrick, Dr. M.E.............................................. 391
Lee, R.E......................................................... 440
McCullough, Vice Admiral Barry................................... 279
Panosian, Claire................................................. 445
Peluso, Karen.................................................... 455
Popps, D.G....................................................... 99
Reeves, Major General Stephen.................................... 325
Robinson, Robin.................................................. 391
Roughead, Admiral Gary........................................... 145
Tether, Tony..................................................... 325
Thackrah, John................................................... 279
Thompson, Lieutenant General N.R., III........................... 99
Winter, D.C...................................................... 145