- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
Alabama KAY GRANGER, Texas
ALLEN BOYD, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Paul Terry, Kris Mallard, Linda
Pagelsen, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________
PART 2
Page
Fiscal Year 2009 Department of Defense Budget Overview........... 1
U.S. Marine Corps Readiness...................................... 83
Army Readiness................................................... 139
Missile Defense Agency........................................... 189
Shipbuilding..................................................... 291
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

PART 2--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009
_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-474 WASHINGTON : 2009

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas JERRY LEWIS, California
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington RALPH REGULA, Ohio
ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana JAMES T. WALSH, New York
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JOSE E. SERRANO, New York JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ED PASTOR, Arizona ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina TOM LATHAM, Iowa
CHET EDWARDS, Texas ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
Alabama KAY GRANGER, Texas
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
SAM FARR, California DAVE WELDON, Florida
JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
ALLEN BOYD, Florida MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
MARION BERRY, Arkansas RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
BARBARA LEE, California KEN CALVERT, California
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JO BONNER, Alabama
ADAM SCHIFF, California
MICHAEL HONDA, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
Maryland
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida

Rob Nabors, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009
----------
Wednesday, February 13, 2008.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET OVERVIEW

WITNESSES

HON. GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

Opening Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. We want to welcome my good friend Gordon
England to the Committee; also Ms. Jonas and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs welcome to the Committee. I want to say, Mr.
Secretary, that I am sure that Secretary Gates got good care at
Walter Reed. And one of the reasons is because when Bill Young
was Chairman we poured good money into Walter Reed. I remember
going to Walter Reed years ago, not years ago, I guess a year
and a half ago, and visited a friend of mine who had cancer.
And he was in an un-air-conditioned room and they had a
temporary air-conditioner. And the maintenance was not up to
par. And we kept asking--Bill Young would ask, and I would ask,
Jerry Lewis would ask when he was Chairman, What do you need?
And they were hesitant under the former Secretary in order to
answer those questions, because they felt like they would be
restricted or constricted by the policy. We put the money in
anyway. And I think the care is much better. I know the
facilities--when I visit it now, I see a much better facility.
The amputee center is another example. We put money in, and
it was a couple of years before we could get the money released
in order to go forward. And yet they have done as good a job in
that amputee center as they did in Texas where they spent a lot
more money. This young major that handled that did a marvelous
job in handling the overall work of the construction and making
sure they had it. And, of course, most of the amputees come
through Walter Reed.
The concerns that I have is the readiness is slipping and
we are having to violate our own guidelines. And you have heard
me say this over and over again. We have had to waive more
troops than we have ever waived before. We got less high school
graduates in the system than we ever have before.
And I heard under the volunteer Army that we needed high
school graduates. And I know this: that when I left the Marine
Corps in 1955, and I went back in 1966, there was very little
change. Today the change is so different. I mean, the
technology is so great, you have to really be well prepared. I
haven't yet heard the same complaints I heard after the Vietnam
War where people were inadequately prepared. I worry that that
is going to happen if we continue to reduce the standards.
At one time we wouldn't even take tattoos, only high school
graduates. Now it went from 94 to 79 percent high school
graduates. And, of course, we waive twice as many people today
with criminal records, with drug problems, than we did before.
And I hope we are not going to get to the point where we were
in the Vietnam--or after the Vietnam era, where we had to get
rid of thousands and thousands of people who were inadequately
prepared. Admiral Mullen remembers this, because I am sure he
was part of the establishment that got rid of people during
that period of time.
Now, I received a letter. When Secretary Gates was before
the committee last year he said, I want to get rid of stop
loss. And we got rid of stop loss. I am not going to ask you a
question now, but I know we haven't gotten rid of stop loss.
A young fellow wrote to me and he said, I am on my fourth
deployment. Yet I asked the staff to check with the Department
to see how many people hadn't been deployed and they said 37
percent have not been deployed in the Army. And so he is on his
fourth deployment. He said he knows somebody else on his fifth
deployment.
One deployment in Vietnam, having been there, I know how
tough it was on the family, on me. Two deployments, three
deployments, we have to get this down so that these folks have
some family time. And yet we added money unanimously in this
committee to take care of the families, and you cut it by 39
percent.
Now, I know you were under constraints, and you have to
make a decision based on the amount of money you get. But I see
the families and I see the kids, I see the children in the
schools that are suffering from those extended deployments. It
is frustrating for us who have been in the forefront of trying
to make sure you have what you need.
For instance, we put $70 billion in a couple of years ago
when Mr. Young was the Chairman. We couldn't even get the
Department to tell us how to spend the money. You remember
this. We had a heck of a fight trying to figure out exactly how
to spend the money.
It has gotten better. Secretary Gates is a breath of fresh
air. We welcome him in. And every time I say that, I get claps
from all over the place when I am talking to a group because
they are so happy to see a new face in the Department.
But our troops deserve better, and I would hope that we can
work together. We have got two supplementals this year. I am
sure one is going to be $200 billion and one is going to be
$100 billion. I am sure we can work together with your advice,
with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs' advice, in coming up with
a--not only Iraq, but looking beyond Iraq.
The one thing I am disappointed in is to see the Secretary
say, well, we haven't used the F-22 in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Well, I understand that, but we have got to look beyond that,
and we have to decide is there a threat big enough that we need
to keep the F-22 line going. And I have seen what you have
said, but I think we have to look at the threat down the road,
because some of it is going to still be here next year and the
year after that.
I am not predicting that anybody is going to attack us, but
our committee has tried its best to make sure that it is always
bipartisan. The $550 billion we passed for the war, I voted for
every penny. Even though I disagree with the policy, I still
voted for every penny. And most of the Members on the Committee
have voted for every penny of that war. So we may disagree
about policy, but we certainly want to try to work in a
bipartisan manner to solve some of these problems.
With that I recognize Mr. Young for any statement he may
have.

Opening Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
want to welcome Secretary England and Admiral Mullen and Ms.
Jonas for what could prove to be an interesting day. And the
reason I say that is because I read your statements last night,
statements prepared by Secretary Gates, and also Admiral
Mullen. And you have touched on not only immediate issues of
today, but you have talked about requirements, problems,
possible solutions into the future. And I think that is good
because we have a lot of--we do have a lot of work to do.
Once we are not involved with Iraq, or in Afghanistan, we
have an awful lot of rebuilding to do. And it is essential that
we do that quickly and it is essential that we do that
properly. But we also have to do a lot of rebuilding with the
most important part of our military capability, and that is the
men and women who wear the uniform and who use the equipment
that we are talking about. And so we will get into some of the
questions on those issues after your testimony.
But I must say that I was just tremendously impressed with
the depth and the detail that both statements went into as I
read them last night and earmarked--maybe I shouldn't say
earmarked--but I earmarked a couple of the pages that I wanted
to come back to, and I reread this morning. So I will have some
interesting questions about those issues.
And, Mr. Secretary, if you would please express our
condolences to Secretary Gates about his accident and his
injury, and we hope that he recovers quickly.
We are happy you are here. We appreciate the job that you
do and your commitment to our young men and women who serve our
country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, if you will, we will put your
full statement in the record, Admiral Mullen's full statement
in the record, without objection. And, Ms. Jonas, summarize
your comments for us.

Summary Statement of Secretary England

Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr.
Young and members of the committee. Mr. Chairman, if I could
just make a comment, I do have the statement, the verbal
statement by Secretary Gates, and I would like to just give
that verbatim for him, if you don't mind.
I also want to comment on your comments regarding Walter
Reed. You are right, we did not have that right. I believe we
do have it right, or close to right, now. And a lot of great
work has been accomplished this year. But I do thank the
committee.
In a number of areas, by the way, you had it right and we
didn't, and I thank you for that. Regarding the Army recruiting
and readiness in terms of graduates and waivers, I can tell you
this is at the very highest level of attention by Secretary
Gates. I mean, obviously, we need a high-quality force. Quality
is much more important than quantity in this military. And so
it has his attention. I can tell you he tracks it, monitors,
has this discussion regularly, so he is exactly where you are
on these issues.
So, if you would allow me. By the way, Mr. Young, you are
right. I will tell you, more than anyone else in Washington, I
am anxious for the Secretary to be back on the job. So he
definitely has my best wishes to get well quickly.
So with your permission, I would like to read his opening
statement, please.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, first let me
thank you for your continued support of our military for these
many years. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the
President's defense budget request for fiscal year 2009.
Before getting into the components of the budget, I thought
it useful to consider this request in light of the current
strategic landscape, a landscape still being shaped by forces
unleashed by the end of the Cold War nearly two decades ago.
In recent years, old hatreds and conflicts have combined
with new threats and forces of instability, challenges made
more dangerous and prolific by modern technology. Among them,
terrorism, extremism and violent jihadism; ethnic, tribal and
sectarian conflict; proliferation of dangerous weapons and
materials; failed and failing states; nations discontented with
their role in the international order; and rising and resurgent
powers whose future paths are still uncertain.
In light of this strategic environment, we must make the
choices and investments necessary to protect the security,
prosperity and freedom of Americans for today and for future
generations. The investment in our military being presented to
this committee is $491 billion out of a total Department of
Defense request of $515.4 billion. That is because there are
some of the moneys under other jurisdictions. When combined
with war costs, the total defense budget request is about 4
percent of our gross domestic product. And this compares to
spending, as you have heard, levels of spending of GDP during
the Korean War of about 14 percent, and about 9 percent during
Vietnam. So these are large amounts of money, but fortunately
our economy has grown. So hopefully we are still at an
affordable level.
Our fiscal year 2009 request is a 7\1/2\ percent increase
or $35.9 billion over last year's enacted level. When
accounting for inflation, this translates into a real increase
of about 5\1/2\ percent. The difference consists of four main
categories, which are outlined in more detail in the
Secretary's submitted statement.
Overall, the budget includes $183.8 billion for overall
strategic modernization, including $104 billion for procurement
to sustain our Nation's technological advantage of recurrent
and future adversaries; about $158 billion for operations,
readiness and support to maintain a skilled and national
fighting force; about $150 billion to enhance quality of life,
and that is for paid benefits, health care and other services
earned by our all volunteer force; and approximately $20
billion to increase ground capabilities, and that includes
growing the Army and the Marine Corps and that alleviates some
of the issues that you discussed, Mr. Chairman, in terms of
growing our forces. It also includes almost $6 billion for
military construction. And the budget includes new funding for
critical ongoing initiatives, such as global training equipped
to build the security capacity of our partner nations and
security and stabilization assistance, foreign language
capabilities and our new AFRICOM Command.
In summary, this request provides the resources needed to
respond to current threats while preparing for range of
conventional and irregular challenges that our Nation may face
in the years ahead. In addition to the base budget, our request
includes $70 billion in emergency bridge funding that would
cover war costs into the next calendar year. And a more
detailed request will be submitted later this year when the
Department has a better picture of what level of funding will
be needed.
Now, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act requires
the Department of Defense to provide an estimate of cost for
the global war on terror, and we would like to be fully
responsive to this request. And in fact, last year I was--the
Secretary was voluntarily responsive to a similar request.
Now, some have alleged that the administration has taken
this position in order to somehow hide the true cost of the
war, and nothing could be further from the truth. The
Department has been very open about what we know about our
costs, as well as what we don't know. So the challenge we face
is that a realistic or meaningful estimate requires answers to
questions that we don't know, such as when and if the
Department will receive the request of $102.5 billion balance
of the fiscal year 2008 supplemental war request, and for how
much. And what, if any, adjustments at troop levels in Iraq
will result from the upcoming recommendations of General
Petraeus, Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We should also keep in mind that nearly three-quarters of
the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request will likely be spent
in the next administration, thus making it even more difficult
to make an accurate projection.
I have worked hard during my time in this job to be
responsive and transparent to the Congress. Nothing has
changed. But while I would like to be in a position to give you
a realistic estimate of what the Department will need for the
fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds, I simply cannot at this
point.
As I just mentioned, Congress has yet to appropriate the
remaining balance of last year's war funding request. This
delay is degrading our ability to operate and sustain the force
at home and in theater, and it is making it difficult to manage
this Department in a way that is fiscally sound. The Department
of Defense is like the world's biggest supertanker; it cannot
turn on a dime and cannot be steered like a skiff. So I urge
approval of the fiscal year 2008 GWOT request as quickly as
possible.
Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, and in closing, I do
want to take a moment to thank you and the subcommittee. Last
year and this year, it became clear to me that you had serious
concerns over how well the Department was dealing with the
large presence of contractors on the battlefield. A year later,
I must tell you that most of your concerns were well-founded.
We have discovered a number of problems, from alleged criminal
activity to lax management to inadequate legal and contractual
controls. As a result of investigations by the IG and the Army,
we will increase the number of contracting officers in Iraq
from 63 this past fall to over 300 by this April. Thirteen
individuals have been convicted of wrongdoing and 91 additional
investigations are ongoing. We are holding people in positions
of responsibility accountable. I know we have been keeping you
apprised of our efforts to better manage contractors on the
battlefield, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss this
topic further.
We have made significant progress in bounding the problem
and taking concrete action to address resource management and
procedural shortfalls. However, credit is due to the many
Members who raised this issue last year. You properly
identified this as an area needing my attention, and I thank
you.
And Mr. Chairman, if I can add also, I recall a
conversation with you where you recommended we add 1,000
contracting personnel, and my view was we needed 1,000
acquisition personnel. Well, it turned out we were both right.
But you are absolutely right; we did need more contracting
personnel. I just wasn't aware of it at the time. So I thank
you for that because we have also addressed that issue.
So I thank you for the opportunity to provide the comments
for Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Secretary Gates follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Murtha. Admiral Mullen.

Summary Statement of Admiral Mullen

Admiral Mullen. Good morning, Chairman, Representative
Young, distinguished members of this Committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today. And I, like
Secretary England, want to just express my great appreciation
for all you have done and the constancy of your oversight,
passion, concern and support. It means an awful lot and it has
made a big difference.
I am honored to join--and actually my prepared script here
says Secretary Gates, who couldn't be here--but Secretary
England and two individuals whom I greatly admire and
appreciate more than words can capture, serving with them in
these very, very challenging times and discussing with you the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget submission, and more
broadly, the state of our Armed Forces.
Let me speak for just a moment about the latter. The United
States military remains the most powerful and most capable
military on the face of the Earth. No other nation has or can
field or put to sea the superb combat capabilities resonant in
our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and, I would add, our
Coast Guard. This stands as a testament, of course, to the
brave and talented women and men who serve--Active, Reserve,
Guard and civilian, as well as their families.
I have been on record as saying they are the finest I have
ever seen. I meant it then and I mean it now. Each trip to the
field, each visit to a base and each hospital bed I stand
beside only reaffirms that for me. I know many of you have also
made such visits and can attest to the same. And so I also
believe our enormous strength speaks well of the hard work of
this committee and the Congress as a whole, as it does of the
American people who through you, their elected Representatives,
have invested heavily and wisely in our national defense.
We are grateful. We will continue to need that support. For
however powerful our Armed Forces may be today, that power is
not assured for tomorrow. That is why the budget we submitted
last week contains more than $180 billion for strategic
modernization, including $3.6 billion for the Army to continue
developing the future combat system and $3.4 billion to procure
20 more F-22 fighters and $6.5 billion to fully fund continued
development and testing, as well as production of the 16 F-35
joint strike fighters.
That is why it calls for money to continue building the
next generation aircraft carrier and guided missile destroyer,
increased spending on missile defense as well as the funding to
complete the stand up of AFRICOM. And it is why we asked for
more than $20 billion to increase the size of the Army and the
Marine Corps.
There are those who say that there isn't much new in this
budget, no big surprises. Maybe so. Quite frankly, we ought to
take a little bit of pride in that, because it says to me that
we looked pragmatically at all of our requirements, we did our
homework and that from a fiscal prospective we have a good
handle on where we want to go.
You know, a reporter recently reminded me, as investments,
budgets are really a type of strategy. If that is so--and I
believe it is--this budget reveals great balance in our
strategy for the future; a realization that as we continue
fighting in this long war and developing our counterinsurgency
warfare capabilities, we must also prepare for, build for, and
train for a broad spectrum of traditional warfighting missions.
A few weeks ago I was called to testify before the House
Armed Services Committee about our progress in Afghanistan. I
told them then that we were seeing only mixed progress and that
Afghanistan was, by design, an economy of force operation. I
told them we do what we can there.
I stand by those comments, even as more than 3,000 Marines
prepare to deploy there and even as Secretary Gates continues
to press our NATO allies for more support.
In Iraq things are going well, no question. Violence is
down, business is up. Al-Qaeda is clearly on the run, and the
political progress is beginning to move forward. Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus deserve a lot of credit for their
leadership and their results. So do all those men and women who
have made a difference. The surge of forces we sent them and
their innovative applications of counterinsurgency tactics have
markedly improved the security on the ground and created the
opportunity for progress in the economy and on the political
front. As both men have made clear, this progress is tenuous
and must be very carefully watched.
And I am sensitive to their concerns as we continue
bringing the surge brigades home. Conditions on the ground
count. But tenuous too, sir, are the long-term risks we take
with our security commitments elsewhere in the world if we do
not address the toll ongoing combat operations is taking on our
forces, our gear, our people and their families. The well is
deep, but not infinitely so. We must get Army deployments down
to 12 months as soon as possible. People are tired. We must
restore our Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities. They are
dangerously on the wing. We must stay dominant at sea, in
space, as well as cyberspace.
Others are beginning to pace us in the speed of war;
likewise, they are beginning to pace us in the technology that
is being fielded. We must do a better job identifying and
treating not only the wounds we see, but also the wounds we do
not see. Too many of our returning warriors suffer in silence.
This budget, by the way, allocates $41.6 billion to enhance
quality of life and provide world-class health care for the
entire force.
We must honor military families by enhancing GI bill
benefits' transferability, broadening Federal hiring
preferences for military spouses, and expanding child care
benefits in appreciation for their many sacrifices. And we must
remain persistently engaged around the globe, building
partnership capacity, improving international and interagency
cooperation and fostering both security and stability.
That is why I urge Congress to enact the authorities in the
Joint State Department/Defense Department Building Global
Partnerships Act. And that is why I urge this committee to
appropriate the remaining $102.5 billion of the 2008 GWOT
supplemental as soon as possible.
The art of war, not unlike the business of governing, is
about choices. Military leaders must make hard choices every
single day. Choices that affect the outcome of major battles,
the well-being of whole nations, and the lives of potentially
millions of people.
As we head into this new year with fresh assessments of our
progress in Iraq, a new push in Afghanistan, and our continued
fight in the long war against violent extremists, as we
consider the depth and the breadth of traditional capabilities
we must improve, please know that I and the Joint Chiefs remain
committed to making informed decisions, careful choices, and
choices which will preserve at all times and in all ways our
ability to defend the American people.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Ms. Jonas. No statement.

supplemental funding

Mr. Murtha. Well, I appreciate the comments by the
Secretary and the Chief. We hope we will have the supplemental
ready for leadership's consideration by the end of March at the
very latest. Well, by the end of February actually. So we hope
that--we don't know what consideration it will be because that
is a leadership decision, but it will be ready. We are looking
at it now. We are working with the Department, trying to come
up with what we feel is a balanced program for next year. It
used to be it was only O&M, but now we have gotten into
procurement. So it is a little bit different today and it will
be a little bit different than you requested.
Mr. England. That would be most helpful, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your speedy action here because this would be most,
most helpful to the Department.
Mr. Murtha. Well, we know how important it is because we
know from a planning perspective you need the money in place so
you can fulfill contracts and so forth.
Mr. England. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. But you mentioned taking care of the troops; 39
percent less for the programs which we added last year; taking
care of counseling, taking care of children in the schools and
so forth. What do we call that program? Family advocacy.
These troops not only suffer themselves, but the thing they
talk about--and when I was in Afghanistan just last weekend,
the commander said, We worry about the families. And, as you
know, that is the major concern of these troops: Are their
families being taken care of?
I go down to Bragg, Stewart and some of those places, and
they tell me the kids are suffering, the hospitals weren't
paying as much attention to the families as they should have
been. The administrator says they were. Then I went to the
wives club, who happened to be meeting, and they said, no, we
can't get in as quickly as we would like. So we worked it out
with the president of the club to call us periodically to make
sure we got that worked out.
So we keep putting money in, trying to make sure they have
what they need. And we hope the Department will understand that
those are a priority with us. Not only the troops in the field,
but the families themselves. And we will add that money back,
or at least I will make that recommendation to the
subcommittee.
With that I will ask, Mr. Young, any questions?

WOUNDED WARRIORS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. The last 20
years Mr. Murtha was Chairman of this subcommittee, then I was
Chairman of the subcommittee, then Mr. Lewis was Chairman of
the subcommittee, and then I was Chairman of the subcommittee
again. And now Mr. Murtha is Chairman again. But in that time,
I don't believe that the Defense Department could tell the
difference, because we all worked together to provide what our
Nation needed and what the members of our military needed,
without any regard to politics, partisanship or anything like
that.
And I am satisfied that we will do the same thing again
this year, working with you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Chairman,
working with you to determine what the needs really are and to
provide them.
Last year we did have, as Mr. Murtha pointed out, we had
some policy differences. We may have those policy differences
again this year. I am not sure of that. But we did have policy
disagreements. But it did not affect the ability of this
Committee to provide what, working with you, we determined was
needed for the security of the country. And we will do that
again. The hardware that you need, the equipment that you need,
training and training facilities that you need, we are going to
do that.
But one thing that continues to weigh on my mind, and
Admiral Mullen made the statement, that our people are tired. A
lot of our folks have been hurt in Iraq and Afghanistan. And
military medicine is really good. We have taken some hits, we
have taken some complaints about the fact that maybe we didn't
do enough, maybe we didn't do it right. But military medicine
is pretty good. And Mr. Murtha and I and most of the members of
this Committee have visited our wounded warriors at the
military hospitals, especially here at Walter Reed-Bethesda. My
wife, I know she bothers you all the time about problems that
she finds at the hospitals, but she spent a lot of time there
and she is really committed to these young kids and their
families.
And I wanted to just mention, last week Beverly and I both
went to Camp Pendleton and we visited the Wounded Warrior
Battalion at Camp Pendleton. And it was quite an emotional time
because we found Marines there who were in that battalion that
we had worked with them and their families when they were in
the hospitals here in Washington. And I will tell you, that was
quite an emotional time.
But at Walter Reed-Bethesda, the Wounded Warrior Battalions
and all of this is just really the first step, because when
they go into the follow-on system, VA system, I am not so sure
that the VA system was prepared, frankly, to handle the
tremendous seriousness of some of these cases. So what I would
ask you to do, Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Chairman, what about the
wounded warriors? Tell us--the equipment is worn out, it is
going to be fixed, it is going to be replaced or reconstituted
or reset, as the admiral's statement says. What about resetting
and reconstituting the human beings who wore the uniform, who
made the sacrifices and who got hurt? And I know in your heart
your commitment. But tell us something about what we should
expect to hear from you to work with you to take care of these
wounded warriors.
Mr. Murtha. Will the gentleman yield? We have a vote on
right now. If some of the members will go and vote, we will try
to continue the hearing without a pause. But you folks go vote,
and then I will go over later on. Mr. Young.
Mr. England. Mr. Young, if I could just try first, then I
will turn it over to the Chairman. Last year we put together,
myself and Gordon Mansfield put together a group called the
Senior Oversight Council. We brought in all the senior military
people, civilians from DoD and also VA. We met literally every
week. At that time last year, there were eight studies,
including Dole-Shalala, which was in the process of coming out.
We examined every single recommendation of every single study.
And, for example, in the area of PTSD and TBI, there were over
300 composite recommendations which we went through every
single one in detail and used that to craft the way forward for
both DoD and for VA, so that we would have seamless care
between the two departments and to make sure that we had the
right level of care for the departments.
And this Committee was extraordinarily generous, as I
recall, had $900 million they put forward for PTSD and TBI. And
Dr. Casscells, I know, came up and personally met a number of
times with Members, et cetera. So I will tell you that this is
at the highest level of attention of the Department of Defense
and also the VA.
And we have put together programs, care coordinators, for
example. Everything recommended by Dole-Shalala, everything
that we could do ourselves we have implemented or are in the
process of implementing. So we have worked to have individual
care people. Of course, we have improved a number of case
managers, a number of people who take care of everyone.
We have already started the Center of Excellence for PTSD
and TBI. And as you know, that will eventually move to the new
campus facility. It will be at the Walter Reed-Bethesda new
facility.
Ninety million dollars is being spent by the Fisher
Foundation because, frankly, we want other investment, we want
the American people involved. And that will be a center to
literally link all the VA and all the DoD centers of research
and universities and hospitals across the country so that we
get the absolute best care the Nation can deliver. Not just
within DoD, not just within VA, but literally across the
Nation.
So we are reaching out to everyone who has worked in this
area so that we can do the very best the Nation can do for our
men and women in uniform. Whatever their problem, whether it is
physical, mental, whatever, I mean we are trying to bring all
those resources together.
So I mean, a lot of this started with this Committee a
year, 2 years ago. And I believe that we have responded very
positively in this regard. And this will be a long-term effort,
literally, between the Congress, between the best America can
provide in terms of medical and psychological help, and the VA
and DoD. So I believe this has the senior attention and we are
making significant progress for our people. And I will have the
Chairman make a comment.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young, Secretary Gates has pretty clear guidance. The
first priority is get the best people, the right people, to the
fight. The second priority is take care of everybody that is
wounded and the families. And it has been both within that
guidance that an awful lot has been--and quite frankly, a view
that was expressed by this Committee many years ago. I can
remember when this war first started, actually. And so we have
done an extraordinary amount.
But to me that is a beginning. And this is a long-term,
very difficult challenge. And if I were going to lay it out, my
view is that we need to figure out as a country how to take
care of these young people whose lives have changed forever in
a way that takes care of them for the rest of their lives.
These are people who have sacrificed enormously and are looking
at decades of challenges in many cases. And while it isn't
inexpensive to do this, it is within the resources of this
great Nation to take care of these people who sacrificed so
much.
My concern is as an Active Duty officer, I both know and
have learned a great deal about our medicine and what happens
internal to the medical side. But these people I cherish, when
they get discharged I pass to another institution, and that is
the VA. And I am not very knowledgeable about the VA. And then
when they pass through the VA, they pass back out into our
society. And to me the connection between when they are
fighting and injured and what changes they go through when that
happens--and again it is certainly those who are injured, but
also the families, through the military care system into the VA
care system and back into our society.
We won't have this right until the people of America reach
all these young people in their community that they care about
a lot and make sure that their future is as good as it can
possibly be. When I interact with the injured and their family,
they want to be the best they can be, they want to be as normal
as they can be, they want to contribute to society, those that
are physically injured and those that are challenged because of
the psychological trauma that they go through.
So how do we connect from their sacrifice to put them in
place, in a good place for the rest of their lives? And we have
got a long way to go in that regard. I as Chairman am very
committed to that, could care not one wit that they are no
longer attached to the Active Duty side. And I worry a great
deal about the system that is to take care of them well beyond
my reach. So anything you can do to support that, I would
greatly appreciate.

FOLLOW-ON CARE

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, if I can, just one further.
Admiral, you and I have discussed this particular case numerous
times, and I am going to mention the Marine's name, with his
approval and with approval of the family. But it was a Marine
that my wife and I met. He is from our area in Florida. And we
met him when he first came into the hospital at Bethesda as a
result of gunshot wounds. And he was pretty much in a
vegetative state. He really had no comprehension at all. And
there was a real question whether he was going to survive. But
the medical folks made him survive. He lived.
He went to the end of the VA system and they took good care
of him, but they decided that he would never get any better and
they were just going to take care of him for the rest of his
life. The family wasn't satisfied with that and they moved him
to a private facility that you know of in California. And this
young Marine now is walking, he is talking, he has appeared in
court on several important issues to himself and his family, he
has made decisions, and he is, frankly, living a life.
He is injured. He will never be as well as he was before he
was shot. But this is a case--I am not sure that we can do this
with every similar injury--but this is a case where he was
given up, but his family wouldn't allow him to be given up and
he is back among the living again. And it is a real miracle.
What do we have to do to get these kids that kind of care
when it appears they are at the end of the road?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, this is Sergeant Cooley.
Mr. Young. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. And he is one of five Marines that were at
this facility and who had been in the same kind of state. And
it is a facility in Pomona, California. And I was told about
this from a mother who had been living with her very badly
injured son for a year and a half. And her name is Nalita
Bagley, and she is a mother of Jose Pacino, who is a Guard and
Marine, former Marine, who is a Guard out of--National Guard
soldier out of Massachusetts. And first of all, we need to talk
to the mothers and the spouses. They know a lot about our
system. And we need to be connected to them. Because they--and
they don't mince words either. And so we work hard to try get
that feedback. And Deborah travels with me a lot to talk with
spouses.
I believe the vision is we need to be able to--we need to
reach to the incredible capabilities that this country has and
connect again with the local communities who, I think if they
know, they will reach out. How do we do that becomes a
question. I spoke a month and a half ago with a group of
orthopedic surgeons from all over the country here, who were
working the physical aspects of the injuries, because it is
leading-edge stuff with these injuries right now. And I asked
them to go back and figure out how to reach those who are
injured in their communities and figure out how they can push
in as we push out.
I think it is in that connection that some of this can be
solved. But mothers and spouses know a great deal about our
system. Mrs. Pacino knows as much about our system Active,
Army, Guard, Marine Corps, VA, as any person that I have met.

HEALTH CARE CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

Mr. Murtha. Let me say that I met yesterday with your top
medical people. And in line with what Bill Young is asking, I
said to them, in the psychological side and emotional side we
just can't hire enough people to take care of them. And we have
so many people that are from the countryside in the individual
areas. What we need, as much as I dislike contractors, we need
to look at what we do with TRICARE and have a separate thing
for people who are in this situation. And they are looking at
it. In other words, a case worker who knows the same as the
mothers and wives know, and can direct them to the right place.
And when you look at the two correspondents that came back
so well and then you look at the case that he is talking about
and the cases I know about--well, all of us know about--if
somebody pays attention they can get the right care. If we
don't, sometimes they get lost in the system. That is what we
don't want to happen.
So I think this new idea that we are promoting with the
Center of Excellence and spreading it out throughout the
country and then having case workers take care of the person
not only through the fact they have been in the military
hospital, but through the VA system. If they got a problem they
can call that person. And they only have maybe 14 or 15 cases,
or whatever it is, but they have a network of physicians all
over the country that they can call on to take care of them.
So I think we are moving in the right direction and I
appreciate what you are saying and I can see great progress
that will be made. We are not there yet, but we are making it.
Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, that is the approach that you
describe. We now have case workers. They come into our system
while they are with us in DoD. They are literally assigned for
life. They know about private institutions, they know about
care facilities, they know about VA specialized care, they know
about DoD. And their role is to work with the families, the
person, within the system.
They know about educational opportunities, all the benefit
programs in the Federal Government, Labor Department,
everything. And their role in life is to be one on one and to
stay with that person and always be able to provide expert
counsel and advice to both the wounded warrior and the families
so they can provide the best care wherever that may be.
And it transcends DoD. I mean it goes across VA into their
community. So they stay with them, I mean, literally, quote,
lifetime commitment, hopefully the same person, at least for a
long time, until people change out. So that is it, but we have
a test case now. I believe we have like 20-some care managers
assigned as we expand that this year.
But that is the approach that we are doing. And by the way,
that was a Dole-Shalala recommendation, by the way, was to have
this sort of top-level care case manager for every single
person.
Mr. Murtha. Well, we appreciate that. Mr. Lewis.

EARMARKS

Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have an
adjournment motion on the floor. There is about a minute and a
half left. Members are beginning to come back. Frankly, I have
missed an adjournment resolution before. What that has to do
with I will mention in a moment.
But as I look at--first off, I miss the Secretary, but I
would like to have you share with him our concern about his arm
and also share with him the fact that I came within a fraction,
on my patio last night, of slipping on the ice as well, and
these are dangerous times, you know.
But Secretary England and Admiral Mullen, I can't help but
notice that the Defense Department is very clever in the way
they get their work done. You have, over time, stolen two of
our very, very fine women to help care for your work. Tina
Jonas is sitting with you. Valerie Baldwin was with the Army
for a while and has now come back to the private sector.
But it does take talent, and ofttimes these ladies are
among our best. We don't like you stealing our good people,
however. And so I put you on notice, we are going to watch with
great care as we go forward.
Having said that, the adjournment resolution involves some
of the games that sometimes take place in the House when there
is confrontation between the two sides. But the issue at hand
involves the vote, up or down, on FISA, whether we can continue
the opportunities we have to protect America by way of
intelligence channels. And it is being suggested that the next
step will be a motion to extend the current law by 21 days. The
President has indicated that he will veto that. And our people
are trying to send a signal that we are going to support that
veto.
Frankly, it is really unnecessary in my judgment, but a
very, very important item. Making sure that you all have the
information, in a timely fashion, that comes by way of
telephone activity in a foreign country, some of it coming
through our country, is a critical issue. And it is a shame to
me that we are wasting our time doing this today, but I think
it will be settled very shortly.
Having said that, the work that our men and women are doing
in the Middle East and around the world is fantastically
accelerated by the expansion of the values of two facilities
that are very near and dear to my heart. The National Training
Center for the Army, NTC has been in my district up until this
last election from the time it was organized. The Marine Corps
facility, 29 Palms, is one of the most important training
facilities of the entire country, but especially of the Marine
Corps. Fabulous advancement has taken place there. Much of that
advancement has taken place by way of a controversial item that
is around these days that I would hope the Secretary, as well
as you gentlemen, would pay attention to.
We have improved money flows available for activity that
the Department wasn't quite ready for by way of a thing called
earmarks, that dramatically impacted the activities at both the
29 Palms Marine Corps Base and also at NTC. But speaking to
what the Chairman had to say earlier, sometimes those kinds of
deposits of funds do other things that are important to
families on those bases.
For example, for the longest time the first two-thirds of
the existence of NTC elementary school children had to be
bussed 35 miles one way to go to school, and then later in the
day come back, obviously putting pressure on those families. It
was absolutely beyond what should have been reasonably
considered okay. It was an earmark that built an elementary
school facility at the NTC. And the Congress responded by
saying this is a family matter that helps us attract and keep
these families in our service.
So I just wanted to mention to you, as I run off to try to
make this vote, that sometimes within your budget priorities
you can't do everything that maybe even you would like to do.
And sometimes people on this committee recognize that even
special funding--namely, something that the President didn't
ask for or even the DoD budget didn't ask for--can make a big
difference in the lives of our people.
So, remember, earmarks have a role to play. It is not just
the earmark that caused the Predator to be available in Bosnia,
not just the earmark that affected up-armored Humvees, et
cetera, but, rather, sometimes for families as well. So maybe
you ought to whisper in the ear of some of those people at the
highest level that, from time to time, the committee actually
tries to help in special ways.
So I am going to wander off, Mr. Chairman, and try to make
that vote and I appreciate you letting me take the time.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. Cramer [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you for your
comments. Welcome, all three of you, before the subcommittee.
You know we take our business, our relationship, with you very
seriously. And please pass on to the Secretary our concern
about him and our regrets that he couldn't be here with us this
morning.
I am going to ask a few questions and then we will go back
to the regular order of events here. Also, tell the Secretary
that I personally appreciate his comments, I believe in Munich,
in the last few days about NATO particularly. And a number of
us have made trips to Europe and are trying to interface with
the European Parliamentarians, the governments there, to let
them know that our concern about Afghanistan and NATO's
participation in Afghanistan is so ``harem scarem''--those are
my words--and so unstructured, and it needs to be looked at in
light of the current threat and the current problem there in
Afghanistan.
But Secretary England, I would like to bring you back to
missile defense, ground-based missile defense, and ask you a
series of questions. Would you say that the threat to the
United States from missile attack has increased or decreased in
the last 10 years?
Mr. England. I would say it has dramatically increased, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cramer. And I want you now to address the issue of the
third site.
Mr. England. I am sorry; address what, please?
Mr. Cramer. The third site in Europe that can enhance our
capability to defend our Nation. There are doubters in the
United States Congress about that third site. Could you offer
information to us about that?
Mr. England. Well, I can just comment that it is an
important site, it is a defensive site, so it is important for
Europe in terms of defense capability, also important for the
United States. So there has been continuous dialog with
European countries about installing a third site and radar to
support that site, because it is important from the total
context of missile defense, particularly for threats that might
originate in that arena.
So the Department continues to pursue that. It is important
as part of the total, quote, laydown of the whole missile
defense. And so it is important, and we do continue to pursue
it. It is important to America, it is important to our friends
and allies.
Mr. Cramer. Speaking of MDA, they recently issued an RFI on
the GMD system. And an MDA spokesman told Jane's Defence Weekly
on January 16th of this year, that the Agency was considering
breaking the GMD system into as many as eight different parts.
Why would the Agency try to break apart a system that is not
broken? If you, Secretary England, can't answer that, I would
like information back about that.
Mr. England. Unless the Chairman has some information, that
is one I would have to get back with you, but I would be
delighted to do so and will make an appointment to do it with
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) sent out a Request for
Information (RFI) to industry on November 19, 2007, in which
they identify eight potential acquisition risk areas associated
wtih potential competition as well as potential breakout of
various system components. However, the intent of the RFI is
not to break the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
into eight different parts, rather to gauge what, if any,
strategies might be available to mitigate those known risks.
Further, MDA intends to gather sufficient information to
determine what, if any, impacts, such as unacceptable schedule
delays, may result by breaking out activities or components
into competitive acquisitions.
MDA's current acquisition alternatives include segregating
the program into distinct contracts with periods of performance
starting in January 2009: (1) Continued Spiral Development,
System Evolution, and Integration within GMD and into the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); and (2) Performance
Based Logistics (PBL) in support of the fielded GMD system.
[Note: Each of these contracts will serve as follow-ons to the
current Boeing GMD contract.] RFI respondents were asked to
assume these activities are performed as separate contract
vehicles. The information gained from this exchange of
information with industry will better inform the government on
the best way forward on spiral development, test, fielding,
sustainment of the GMD element, and the integration of GMD into
the BMDS. The government may even consider other acquisition
alternatives and suggestions offered by industry.
No decisions have been made at this time, including the
number and types of contract vehicles. Anticipated decision for
the agency will occur prior to the contract end, December 31,
2008.

Mr. Cramer. And then, continuing on to missile defense.
Does the SECDEF believe the existing inventory of tactical
missiles that we have are sufficient to address an emerging
threat, or emerging threats, around the world, such as in North
Korea, that continues to get a little more sophisticated and
antagonistic, and in China and Russia as well?
Mr. England. So, again, I will get back to you. We do have
24 ground-based intercepters. We also have sea-based
intercepters in terms of what his ultimate number is. And,
again, Mr. Chairman, I will get back with you on that subject.
[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense does not believe the existing
inventory of ballistic missile defense interceptors is
sufficient to counter the future ballistic missile threat. To
date, MDA will have fielded 24 Ground-Based Interceptors in
Alaska and California; 25 Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3)
interceptors on 12 Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers;
and 21 SM-2 Block IV sea-based terminal interceptors. This
interceptor inventory provides an initial defensive capability
to defend the U.S. homeland and provides very limited
protection for deployed forces and friends and allies.
MDA has programmed funding to increase the size and
capability of its ballistic defense interceptor inventory. By
2013, MDA will have fielded 54 Ground-Based Interceptors in
Alaska, California and Europe; 133 SM-3 interceptors on 18
Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers; 96 Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense interceptors in 4 fire units; and 100 SM-
2 Block IV sea-based terminal interceptors. This interceptor
inventory will complete the defense of the U.S. homeland but
will be insufficient to fully protect deployed forces and
friends and allies from emerging short-to-intermediate range
ballistic missile threats.
The Joint Staff recently completed a comprehensive analysis
on the projected ballistic missile threat to determine whether
the current planned inventory was sufficient. This analysis
called the Joint Capability Mix II (JCM II) found that the
Department's planned ballistic missile inventory was inadequate
to meet the future threat and recommended the acquisition of
additional ballistic missile defense interceptors in the near
future. The Department of Defense plans, during the POM 10
budgetary process, to address the future shortfalls in the
ballistic missile defense interceptor inventory.

Mr. Cramer. Those are my issues, and I thank you for your
participation here today.
Mr. England. So, Mr. Chairman, we will make an appointment
with your office and we will follow up in detail on this topic
with you.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you. Mr. Hobson.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

Mr. Hobson. If my Chairman, Mr. Visclosky, is ready, he has
a series of questions. You are not? Apparently not. Okay.
I am going to go ahead and ask a question that I had hoped
to follow in tandem to him, but I am going to ask it now, and
then I will follow up with Afghanistan later. Mr. Visclosky is
Chairman now of the Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee, I am the Ranking Member on Energy and Water. And
I think it is incumbent upon the administration to develop an
overall strategy for nuclear weapons. It must be formed
cooperatively with this Congress. And the sooner you do that,
the sooner we will be able to make the hard decisions about
what steps we must take to ensure a safe, reliable
appropriately sized stockpile of weapons.
U.S. military strategists and financial people, Tina, have
to know that our nuclear weapons are going to work. If we
accept that confidence drops as our weapons get older, we have
to pick a path. And I see only three realistic options:
maintain a larger stockpile. You all know I think we should be
able to reduce our current stockpile weapons, and I really
don't like this option, but it is there.
Secondly, pursue a technological option that improves the
reliability of the weapons. And that is what RRW was intended
to do, as I understand it, but we all have problems with the
way the administration has pursued this option. And three,
restart nuclear testing.
Right now, our confidence in the current stockpile is based
on years of test data. But as our weapons get older and older,
the test data becomes less relevant. Now, I don't like that
option, and we have some machines that may be able to do that.
Unattractive as these choices are, they may be the only ones we
can think of.
Mr. Secretary, are there options that you are considering?
Do you see a trade-off between stockpile size, nuclear testing,
and pursuing the technological option? And, third, will you see
any need to both maintain the current stockpile and build a
stockpile of RRWs?
Mr. England. We have pursued the RRW. I am not familiar
with your comment about all the problems with RRW. I know we
have not received all the funding we have requested. But
obviously, going forward, our desires are to develop an RRW,
much more reliable warhead. With that, then, I think there are
some options about potentially reducing the stockpile. But
first we need to move forward with the RRW.
So, Mr. Hobson, at least my understanding of this is around
the RRW as the way forward.
Mr. Hobson. You will find a lot of differences within
Congress in the manner in which both NNSA and the Defense
Department approached RRW and that is why there is pushback on
RRW as you see it today.
But let me ask another question too, because the RRW is
really not probably something you have worked on, but it is
something that really needs to be looked at. What we do with
the stockpile in the future and how we handle it?
Over a quarter of the Department of Energy's budget is
focused on nuclear weapons activities or dismantling them,
monitoring them, and extending their lives. I have often
wondered if this arrangement made sense. What I mean by that is
your Department develops the strategy for using these weapons
for what their operational requirements are, how many are
needed and that sort of thing. The Energy and Water
Subcommittee is left in the position of having to come up with
the money to pay for them, often taking funding away from
energy programs or funding for levees. I have heard some
complaints that Defense asked for the pie in the sky sometimes
because they don't have to pay for them; it doesn't come out of
your budget, so ask for everything.
Do you think this current arrangement makes sense or what,
if anything, would be lost by requiring the Defense Department
actually to pay for what they are requiring? Will we get more
bang--a kind of bad word--more bang for our buck if we looked
at it that way rather than having Energy--you guys just say,
``Oh, we want this'' and the guys over at NNSA just kind of bow
and scrape and say, ``Yeah, because it doesn't come out of your
budget, it comes out of their budget,'' which comes to Energy
and Water.
Mr. England. Mr. Hobson, I was not aware that we were not
paying for these programs with Department of Energy because--
Okay. I guess that is a surprise to me. I always thought we
were funding those development programs and funding the DOE
labs to do work for us. So I thought there was a money transfer
to DOE to do this. I guess I am surprised.
Mr. Hobson. There may be some minor moneys, but the
majority of money comes out of Energy and Water accounts. You
build the delivery systems, the weapons. And the weapons
development is funded by Energy and Water. And those labs are
basically funded out of Energy and Water.
Mr. Visclosky. If the gentleman will yield. It is a Defense
function, but Energy picks up the tab.
Mr. England. So, Mr. Hobson, we will look into that, sir. I
wasn't aware of that.
[The information follows:]

The question of whether or not the funding responsibility
for the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities
should be transferred to the Department of Defense (DoD) has
arisen in the past. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1985 (Public Law 98-525) directed the President
establish a Blue Ribbon Task Group to examine this very
subject. The 1985 President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear
Weapons Program Management concluded that ``the advantages of
the current arrangement include checks and balances for nuclear
weapon safety, security, and control; excellence and vitality
of the national laboratories; . . .'' and ``the present
relationship between DoD and DOE for managing the nuclear
weapon program is sound.'' Congress subsequently created the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) in 1986 to strengthen the
management oversight between DoD and DOE on nuclear weapons
matters.
The NWC is a senior-level, interagency body responsible for
the oversight and management of all matters relating to nuclear
weapons. This is the forum where requirements from both
Departments are discussed, reviewed and endorsed. It is also
the forum for resolving differences in priorities and reaching
consensus on nuclear weapons issues, including questions of
budget and program priorities. The NWC is also responsible for
developing reports associated with management of the nuclear
weapons stockpile, including the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Memorandum (NWSM) that specifies the size and composition of
the stockpile. This annual plan specifies out-year requirements
and is coordinated and agreed to by both DoD and DOE and
provided to the President. Through the NWC, DOE plays an active
role in nuclear stockpile decisions.

Mr. Hobson. Okay. If I have any time left--do I have any
time left?
Mr. Cramer. One more question.

AFGHANISTAN POLICY

Mr. Hobson. Okay. Mr. Murtha and I went to Afghanistan. We
went about a week or so ago. And we may differ on some things
about Afghanistan, but I think we are pretty close on most
things.
But I came away very disturbed about Afghanistan. I think
Afghanistan is winnable, but the Europeans, in my opinion, are
not doing their part. Some of them are not. But a number are.
The Dutch, the Poles, our continent. There are a number of
people fighting. There are other people with caveats that
aren't fighting. And we are spread thin. And we need about
3,000 more people over there to make sure that we can get in
the humanitarian aid which is needed. Because everybody I
talked to, including your commander, sir, tell me that beyond
the military side, we need more people in there doing
agriculture types of things.
For example, they grow vegetables there. Fruits like
pomegranates have to be sent to Pakistan to be processed
because they don't have the warehouses and the facilities
there. We could help them.
We have a great program going to train the police. The Army
is about 80,000. And every person I talk to says they will
fight, especially if we are around. But the police, they have
had some problems with. They have got a new program that is
working with the police.
The problem is that the European members of NATO, many of
them will have such caveats on their troops, or have a
different mission in their mind, that we can't seem to get it
coordinated.
Now, the Afghan Government turned down Lord somebody, to
come in and try to be the czar to get this working together.
What are we going to do? This is a basic managerial problem.
General McNeal, I think, did a good job. He is frustrated
because he couldn't get it all done that he wanted to get done.
Then the second thing we ran into was the procurement of
equipment. We are out there watching some contractors working
with the police force, and they have got a pistol that
everybody says doesn't work. It has got a firing-pin problem,
was just one of the problems. But we bought it. It is U.S.-
made. It was supposed to be a copy of something but it doesn't
work right. And we asked, How did we buy this? And nobody knows
how we bought it, but we have thousands of them.
And if Mr. Murtha comes back, he may get into that
question, because we were very upset to find out that we are
procuring weapons that don't work and giving them to the Afghan
police, who are trying to change.
So I would like you to tell me, one, how are we going to
solve this problem to get more troops in there? How are we
going to get more people to do the kind of work that they need
to build their economy back up, which they seem to be willing
to do, with help? And thirdly, what are we going to do about
procurements on weapons?
Mr. Cramer. Before you proceed to answer, we are in the
middle of a vote now on the floor, 15-minute vote, motion to
adjourn, another motion to adjourn. We will keep the hearing
going. After the answer to this question, Mr. Moran, you will
be the next questioner. So if the members could rotate, we will
just keep the hearing going.
Mr. England. Sir, nobody has worked harder to try to press
the NATO allies to provide more capability against what we
believe the requirements are. We are at least 3,000 short. As
you indicated, we are going to send 3,200 Marines there. That
is a temporary deployment.
Mr. Hobson. Seven months.
Mr. England. Yes, sir. It is a combination of both fighting
capability as well as training capability. We have got 25
provincial reconstruction teams that do the kind of development
work that I think we need to do more of. If I were going to
pick the center of gravity, it would be to train the police and
this--I think you are talking about this focus district
development program.
Mr. Hobson. They take the guys out, the whole group out,
put a new group in. And some of the mayors are saying, Leave me
the new group. They don't want their guys back.
Admiral Mullen. And we have big challenges there, but we
are early. This program is fairly new. We are cautiously
optimistic, although that program comes by way of a shortfall
of not being able to get police trainers. So it is a creative,
innovative program that, quite frankly, Major General Bob Cone
put together, who is responsible for that.
I think the center of gravity is the police. It is two
things. It is the development piece, as well as the
development--the police, right--the maturity of the police. As
you indicated, this is a country that--this is a country that
has been at war for 30-plus years. The Afghan Army is a good
fighting army. And so the training that we are doing with them,
we are seeing them produce more and more capable both leaders
and units, companies, battalions, to fight. And I think that is
a very positive indicator.
At the same time, overall, I have called the results mixed
because we have got to have more capability across the board. I
was a NATO commander in 2004-2005. So I understand the
frustration. Generating forces is a big challenge. And as
Secretary Gates has pointed out, many times these countries are
coalition governments.
The comment earlier that was made about dealing with their
Parliamentarians, I think, is a very positive one. And I don't
know how NATO is going to produce more until that connection is
made. And what I worry about, quite frankly, is more and more
of that burden just coming our way.
Mr. Hobson. But do we have the capability of handling that
burden in a timely fashion? Because many people will say that
in the next 6 months to a year, this is either won or lost.
These people are going to decide whether it is worth sticking
with the new way, which is our way--I am talking about the
Afghanis--or are they going to slide back to the people they
think are going to be there later on? Especially if the
Europeans don't step up.
Admiral Mullen. First of all, I think to Lord Ashton's
position, I think that needs to be filled as rapidly as
possible. We need somebody to coordinate all the other aspects
of the requirements over there. I am not one who believes that
in 6 to 12 months this is going to be either won or lost. The
challenges that are there are obviously longstanding. I don't
think we are on a critical edge where it goes one way or
another.
That said, as I indicated in my opening comments, this is
an economy of force. It has been an economy of force. That, by
definition, says we need more forces. We don't need several
hundred thousand there, but we need more than we have in order
to make a difference. And we need to have a unity of command
that gives--I mean, General McNeal is the ISAF commander--a
unity of both vision and sort of a strategic end state that we
are all reaching for. And there are disagreements on that right
now across NATO and all the countries--many countries view it
differently. And I think bringing that together from the
leadership standpoint is equally important.
Mr. Hobson. The British general told us--who was McNeal's
predecessor--that one country sent him tree huggers. He didn't
need tree huggers. He needed people who were willing to go out
at night and do the job. And that was a British general saying
that. That wasn't our general.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I understand. I think many of the
NATO countries went into this looking at this from a
stabilization aspect as opposed to a security aspect from the
standpoint of counterinsurgency. We have got a
counterinsurgency there. We have got to basically eliminate
their effects in order to provide the kind of environment that
will allow economic and political development and maturity to
occur.

PROCUREMENT OF PISTOLS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Hobson. Does anybody know anything about the pistols?
Admiral Mullen. The only thing I would say, I don't know
anything about the pistols, sir, except we are focusing
actually much more--and Secretary England specifically leads
this--we are focusing much more on the FMS program through
which all of--a significant amount of equipment, certainly,
that we buy passes. And this would be an example of one of the
reasons we need the focus.
But I specifically don't know how--I can get back to you--
how we got these pistols, how many we bought or what the
problem is.
Mr. Hobson. Thousands.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. But I don't know how we got there
and we obviously need to fix that.
Mr. Hobson. But nobody else there in country knew either
and that was a problem. But anyway, I share your optimism about
Afghanistan. But I don't think the Europeans really understand
at all this dope that comes out over there winds up in their
countries, not our countries, and more people die in Europe
from that dope than that they are having killed in Afghanistan
where we could do something about it. And I think that is
something that the administration needs to work on more in
getting that done.
But Jack and I were both there and it is actually different
than--I have been there a couple of times, and it is actually
different in different ways. But the one thing that is there
that you do sense, there is a willingness to want to do--which
is refreshing to see, because I have talked to people who have
both been in Iraq and are there. And the guys that are here
have a different perspective about this country than they had
about Iraq when they were in Iraq. And they think they can get
it done.
So, you know, that is a positive. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cramer. Mr. Moran.

TROOP SURGE IN IRAQ

Mr. Moran. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Under Secretary
and Madam Controller. I am sorry for all the disruption, but
those things happen. It is too bad because you have got a lot
to share with us.
I want to get back to Iraq for a moment--because I share
Mr. Hobson's view that Afghanistan might be winnable, although
I think it is becoming less so, and largely because of the
political considerations in Europe. We have lost, really, the
support for military commitment on the part of NATO in Europe,
and I understand Secretary Gates trying to renew that. But I
don't think it is working with the European people. And we are
going to have to--what I would expect that the subcommittee
would be prepared to send more troops over to Afghanistan.
But that raises the issue of Iraq again. We have now
provided $525 billion. The Secretary says there is going to be
another $170 billion necessary. And that brings us up to $700
billion. A lot of money, when we were told originally that this
was going to be--what did they say, $25, $50 billion or
something, and that oil would pay for it all. I know the
Chairman remembers those original numbers. They seem quaint
today.
But this is really serious stuff. Now, Chairman, do you
agree with what General Petraeus has told us, that a military
victory is not what we are necessarily seeking nor is it
possible in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Completely.
Mr. Moran. So we are not looking for a military victory.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
Mr. Moran. So, given that, the surge has quelled the
violence. But the real question is, has it achieved the
political reconciliation that does constitute the victory that
we are looking for? I don't see it. I don't see this Shiite
government making the real substantive, genuine efforts that
are necessary to create an inclusive, stable government in
Iraq, bringing in the Kurds who are now doing their only thing
in the north and all they care--they still can't fly the flag
up in Kurdistan. And this government doesn't seem to be
reaching out to the Sunnis in any truly meaningful way, or even
releasing the Sunnis that are kept in jail, thousands of them,
for largely political purposes. So do you see us making real,
substantive, political progress, Chairman?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, actually over the last year--and I
went to Iraq--I mean, I have been a number of times, and I went
to Iraq right after I took over the job in October. And I was
back over over the holidays, and I go back soon. And what I
have seen--and I think this was largely well known--is a fair
amount of progress in the provinces; in other words, what I
would call provincial reconciliation. And that is not going to
solve the whole problem, but we have been very encouraged by
that. And with the space that the surge security--the
additional security that the surge has provided, the
development of this concerned local citizens, this 70- to
80,000 who now are going to provide for their own security and
the beginnings of the connection between the provinces
politically and the central government, which is heretofore--or
at least for the last 3-12 decades had not existed. Certainly a
lot of hard work.
And in my view, Ambassador Crocker and his team, as well as
General Petraeus, but particularly Ambassador Crocker working
on the political aspects. And if we don't get it reconciled
politically, nationally, then I don't think there is a
solution.
As I indicated, this isn't about a military victory. They
recently passed a deBaathification law that will go into effect
here within a month; literally this morning as I showed up, I
was told that the national government passed the amnesty law,
their budget, as well as a Provincial Powers Act. Now, that to
me is a lot of progress nationally, given the challenges that
they have across the competition at that level. So I am
actually very encouraged by that. I have watched it. They have
been working this process very, very hard. It is obviously
still a new government. Great challenges.
But the political process appeared to me to be evolving
painfully slow at times. But literally in the last 24 hours,
these three big major laws were passed, which I think is
clearly a big deal, a big step, and made in great part possible
by the security that they have had in order to be able to do
that.

FUTURE OF IRAQ

Mr. Moran. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know that your commanders
are reporting back to you on a regular basis and the decision
was made to arm the Sunni warlords because they are the ones
that are making the real progress against al Qaeda in Iraq,
because the al Qaeda, Sunnis, they live in the Sunni
neighborhoods. And it is the Sunnis that have paid the worst
price for their viciousness.
So the Sunni warlords are now armed. So they are shooting
the al Qaeda instead of Americans. The problem is once those
thousands, or however many al Qaeda leaders have gone, killed,
captured or banished, what are they going to do with those
arms? They are going to turn it back on us? Are they going to
turn them on the Shi'a government to take back the government?
Are they just going to foment a more violent civil war?
Can you address that because it seems to me that ought to
be a serious concern in the long run.
Admiral Mullen. I think it is a serious concern, and in
this whole counterinsurgency--in the counterinsurgency and what
we are trying to do, the center of gravity really is the Iraqi
people. And they will eventually drive the governmental
outcome.
I understand your concerns, sir. But I don't get that from
the commanders on the ground, that that is an immediate
concern. That it would be a possibility? I certainly suppose
so, and one we would certainly be concerned about. We have made
a huge difference with respect to al Qaeda and Iraq and they
are very much on the run. Not done. Very violent. You have seen
that just again recently. So clearly that is going to continue
to evolve.
But I have gotten no feedback from General Petraeus or
Admiral Fallon that we think that is immediately on the
horizon. Is it a possibility? I certainly think that is out
there as well. But by and large, we are optimistic that we are
moving in the right direction there. To guarantee it will never
happen again, I don't----
Mr. Murtha [presiding]. I am going to interrupt the
gentleman. We are going to adjourn after--if the next vote is
called.
So, Mr. Frelinghuysen, if you will keep your question to
about 5 minutes, and then we'll get to Mr. Dicks. And if there
is another vote, we will adjourn until a future time.
Mr. England. Can I make one comment, Mr. Chairman, just
because I think it is really important in this discussion with
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran, the military is not going to win, but these are
counterinsurgency, two sides of the same coin. One side is
security and the other side is economic development. So you do
have to have economic development, long term, for security. You
need security, short term, for economic development.
I think what is very encouraging is that there is economic
development. In the last 2 months, for the very first time, we
have foreign direct investment in Iraq. There are now outside
companies, not countries but companies, that have decided a
security bond--the security environment is such that they are
willing to commit their capital. And there are now a lot of
companies that are in Iraq actually, literally, looking for
opportunities for investment.
For the CLCs, that is very important, these concerned local
folks, the Sunnis you talked about, because we do have programs
to reintegrate them, to train and reintegrate into, literally,
the economic system. And ultimately that is the most important
thing, is developing an economic system that can support
democratic----
Mr. Murtha. I hate to interrupt you, Mr. Secretary. Because
of the time constraints--you know, we have been over this. I
said the most important part of this was economic development.
As a matter of fact, you can look at Afghanistan where the
economic investment has been reduced in half, from a billion to
500 million. So it is a combination of things, as you know.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief. But I would like to focus a few minutes, if I may, on
our National Guard role. We have about 3,200 New Jerseyans that
are about to deploy to Iraq. They are undergoing training,
preparing to deploy in June. It's the single largest deployment
of the New Jersey National Guard since World War II. It means
half of our Guard will be over there, and the rest will be back
in New Jersey to get ready for whatever might come their way.
For many of these men and well, these are not the youngest
soldiers, but certainly like other members here, I thank all of
those who serve, all of you for your leadership, all those who
are volunteer Guard, Reserve, regular military.
What should those soldiers see when they get there? And
what can you say about the issue of predictability, if there is
any, about the potential for future requirements on their part?
I guess that would be directed to you, Admiral.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I think for any of them that have been
there before individually, I think they will see a dramatically
different landscape than what they saw the last time.
Clearly, as was expressed by the Chairman, I am very
concerned--and in my remarks--very concerned about the stress
on the force. We are trying to work the National Guard and
Reserve rotation back to 1 year deployed and 5 years at home.
We are not there right now but we are working in that
direction.
I want to commend the National Guard and the Reserve for
what they have done since this war started, since we were
attacked, has been truly enormous and we could not be who we
are without their participation. And in terms of the overall
Guard and Reserve posture, I think that is an issue.
And Mr. Pinero issued a report recently. I felt this way
for years, that part of what is going to change as a result of
this is our posture in the Guard and Reserve for the
foreseeable future. We are moving so fast, sometimes it is
difficult to predict exactly what it will look like. But these
soldier citizens have made a huge difference and I think will
in the future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Would you comment further on the Pinero
report? Marine general, obviously. Fantastic credentials. I
mean, the headlines were that we have appalling gaps, we
wouldn't be able to--back home--I come from a 9/11 state. So
when I go to town meetings, a lot of people, obviously, have
angst and anger and concern and apprehension about the war, the
deployments of Regular and Guard and Reserve. But they are also
concerned about what is going to be ready as part of our
military arsenal in the case of natural disasters, or, for that
matter, God forbid, some sort of a catastrophic event.
Admiral Mullen. We have made a lot of improvements. I don't
agree that everything that Mr. Pinero put in his report. For me
it represents the kind of transformational message that I think
we are going through with our National Guard and Reserve. How
that exactly is going to come out in the long run, I don't
know.
Clearly we are concerned about that relationship in terms
of providing the capability for the Guard in each State. We
have invested there some $32 billion over the next--since 2007,
I think it is about $46\1/2\ billion in the Guard. We are
coming up in terms of percentage of equipment on hand. We are
not where we need to be. For the first time, though, that
equipment will be the same equipment that our Active Duty army
has. It will be frontline equipment, so they will be able to
respond.
Recently, if I looked at the California fires, there was
the team, it was the Guard, Reserve, there were Active, led by
NORTHCOM, and also the entire Homeland Security team that
responded very well. So certainly there are concerns.
I think this report should serve as a catalyst for us to
have a national debate about what we should do for the future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me credit both Chairman Murtha and
Mr. Young on the resource issue. This is one where substantial
investments have been made. It is the question of where they
are all going to be sent. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Admiral.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks. And, Mr. Dicks, I have said that the
next vote, we will go to the very end but then we are going to
adjourn the committee. So if you would keep it as concise as
possible, as you always do.

F-22 RAPTOR

Mr. Dicks. I will do my best, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, Secretary England, it is good to see you
both. Tell us what happened on the F-22? What we are concerned
about--did the Air Force request advance procurement for
additional F-22s be included in the 2009 budget request when it
is sent to your controller? If so, why did you remove the
funding? What happened here? Or is there going to be money for
four planes? There is a lot of confusion.
Mr. England. No. That is not what happened. In the fiscal
year 2009 budget, we had $400-and-some million to shut down the
line. That was the plan.
Mr. Dicks. What happened to that? That didn't show up
either.
Mr. England. So there was $400-some million to shut down
the line, was what had been in the program, and there are no
airplanes in the outyears. And so the decision was to convert
that, to take that out and not to put the shutdown money in the
budget this year. So we took that money out and we put it in
the O&M account so the Air Force would have money to better
address the F-15 issue. So then at that point, the line does
not shut down because we took the shutdown money out. So it
doesn't shut the line down.
The Air Force would have liked to have converted that
money, Mr. Dicks, to a long-lead procurement. On the other
hand, there are no future airplanes in the budget, so that
would have been difficult to do.
Mr. Dicks. Didn't you have to do one or the other? Didn't
you have to either put in the advance procurement or put in the
money to shut down the line?
Mr. England. So, instead, what we decided to do was----
Mr. Dicks. I like giving the money to the F-15.
Mr. England. So the decision was, instead, that in the
past, the Congress had not allowed the Air Force to buy
replacement airplanes where they wanted to buy F-35s because
they were not in production. So they have some airplanes that,
because of either damage or wear-out or whatever, that have
been denied. So the decision was this year, since the F-22 was
in production, they could ask for those replacement airplanes
in GWOT because in the past, again, they have been denying GWOT
because the airplane is not in production. This airplane would
be in production. That is probably about four airplanes. That
would basically keep the line open at some very low rate, but
it keeps the line open. And, frankly, then it defers the
decision on the F-22. I mean, basically that is what it does;
it defers the decision.
My view was, and I think the Secretary certainly will agree
with this, is that at this point in time we should not preempt
the next administration by just literally shutting the line
down at this time.
So that was the decision, that we would not shut the line
down. We do not have any airplanes in the future years, so this
is something that will have to be reexamined. Frankly, my own
recommendation is--I mean, my strong feeling is that we have
enough F-22s and they are designed for a specific mission. We
have enough to do that mission. And we need to go on with the
joint strike fighter program, which is the next fifth-
generation airplane.
So the question is, do we continue to buy F-22s for the
next administration, or do they do the commitment where we have
a lot of investment in the joint strike fighter. But, again, it
is now a deferred decision.
I believe it was the right decision to let that on the
table and let the next administration decide, rather than
preempt that at this time.
Mr. Dicks. Admiral Mullen, do you have any comment on that?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. I mean, I am familiar with what
happened. Certainly you know, probably better than I, we have
certainly had this coming together for years. It is a huge
challenge just because of all three variants. This isn't a
surprise. We have got to have fifth-generation aircraft for the
future. I think the question that is out there is how many?
This is 183, I think, plus an additional 4. And I think this
decision needs to be--needs to take in effect that we are down
162 F-15s right now. And that was a surprise.
So I think there needs to be a balance here. But I also
think the future fifth-generation aircraft is the JSF in all
three versions. And we have got to get that right. That is also
a new program. New programs sometimes struggle.
Mr. Dicks. Slip.
Admiral Mullen. I mean, that is not uncommon. I think we
need to approach this from a balanced perspective.

PROCUREMENT RATES

Mr. Murtha. If the gentleman would yield, let me add
something to this. The maintenance costs have gone up for the
F-15, 236 percent. The flying hour costs have gone up 87
percent--the F-15, I am talking about. And the manhours per
depot maintenance per airplane has gone up 800. My concern is
that we are buying such small quantities. And what the
Secretary said is absolutely true--and I have challenged the
Air Force. Tell me what the threat is so that we can make a
decision about whether we need it. And Secretary Gates and I
talked about this very thing.
The problem I see, though, and I worry about, we produced
86,000 aircraft in 1943. We produced 30,000 tanks more than
Germany produced in the whole 5, 6 years of the war. We are
buying 400 aircraft this year. And we are buying at such a low
rate, it costs us so much more. So we have got to keep that in
the equation at the same time. We are trying to come up with an
agreement between you folks and us about, okay, what can we
buy? How can we buy it at a better rate and get rid of some of
these? Can we get rid of the 15s and put the F-22s, if they can
show us what the threat is?
Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, I mean, look, I agree completely
on this. We do have to get the rate up. The economic order
decline is the joint strike fighter was one airplane for three
services with a lot of commonality. If we start eating in the
joint strike fighter procurement, we will find ourselves in the
same position again, even with joint strike fighter.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah, well, I understand that concern. But when
you talk about the number of airplanes we can produce with the
industrial base we have, this is a concern--past Iraq, I am
talking about. I am not talking about in Iraq. I am talking
about past Iraq. But we will talk a number of times about this
with the Air Force and with the Defense Department.
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman to yield.
Mr. Dicks. I yield.
Mr. Young. Someone listening to this conversation would
almost get the impression that the joint strike fighter, the F-
35, would be a replacement for the F-22. That is not the case.
The F-22 and the joint strike fighter have two different
missions. They are two different aircraft. And I just wanted to
make sure that there is no misunderstanding that when we talk
about the fifth generation, it is not replacing the F-22. That
is a correct statement, isn't it, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. England. It is correct, with a proviso, Mr. Young. The
proviso is that the joint strike fighter performance and the F-
22 performance is extraordinarily close. So the F-22, of
course, was designed many years ago. It goes back to the 1980s
in my career, goes way back. The joint strike fighter is a much
newer airplane, so it also has very similar, if not in some
cases better performance with other attributes. So I believe
this is something that is very important that we look at
carefully, Mr. Chairman, because it will affect the future
ofairpower for all of our services.

AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

Mr. Dicks. One additional question. Secretary England, is
your office conducting an analysis to determine the cost/
benefit of modernizing the engines on the C-5 versus procuring
additional C-17s? We have been through a number of these big
battles. And over the years, the cost of operating the C-5 has
been very expensive compared to the C-17. So where are we on
that one?
Mr. England. Sir, we are in a Nunn-McCurdy, Mr. Dicks. And
part of that is to look at costs----
Mr. Dicks. This is on the C-5?
Mr. England. C-5. So we are looking at the C-5 in terms of
Nunn-McCurdy and decisions on C-5 could indeed affect C-17. So
that is still in the works, but I believe that is within a week
of coming out. So very soon that recommendation will be coming
out from Mr. Young, AT&L. So that will be the result of that
study.

AGING AIRCRAFT

Mr. Dicks. Just one final comment. Again, the aging of the
aircraft, all of our aircraft, except for like the F-22 and the
C-17s, is getting older and older and older. These planes now
are 25 years old.
I think we have to worry about the Navy in the same
situation. They have got--with the F-18, it is a little newer.
But aren't you concerned about this aging aircraft issue across
the board?
Mr. England. I am. But I will make a very blunt statement
here. In the case of the Air Force, they have an aging fighter
fleet, but on the other hand they will spend $65 billion, and
we have 183 F-22s. So I mean, at some point we have to decide
not to buy the very costly high-end airplane and buy the
quantity. And so that--and by the way--
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, we are going to be looking at
this. And the development costs and the development time is
also a concern: 5 years for the 16; 5 years for the 15; 19
years for the 22; and I don't know how many years for the JSF.
And these are the kinds of things that we will debate and work
out.
Mr. Tiahrt.

PROCUREMENT REFORM

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand you are
trying to wrap this up. I would just have two requests, that
Secretary England or somebody get back on.
Number one, I would like to appoint a contact for your
current procurement reform. I know you have assigned somebody
to do that. And we have some ideas that I would like to share
with you, and perhaps change because of that.
[The information follows:]

Mr. Shay Assad, the Director of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy (DPAP), is responsible for procurement
reform. Representative Tiahrt's office has been notified with
this information. A meeting between them to discuss the issues
of concern to Representative Tiahrt will be scheduled based on
availability in the upcoming months.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FIREFIGHTERS

The second thing is that we have been talking to the Forest
Service, Mr. Dicks and I, in our Interior Subcommittee. And
under the fire that was fought in Southern California, we have
heard some reports that when the Marines were involved with--
they brought in their light utility helicopters, the new ones,
and they were unable to assist the Forest Service because of
underperformance. For some reason it couldn't get off the
ground. I wonder if there was some report that was done at that
point in time about the performance of the light utility
helicopter during what was called the ``witch fire'' in
Southern California. And I would like to know if there is
something that we could read about that.
Mr. England. We will get you data, Mr. Tiahrt. I don't
know. At one point there was a question about did we have
problems with the helicopters. I think it was determined that
was not the case, but we will get you that data.
Mr. Tiahrt. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information follows:]

Marine Aviation units based in Southern California
supported fire fighting efforts during the October 2007
wildfires with fire suppression, VIP lift, and surveillance.
Fire suppression was provided by the CH-53E Super Stallion
while VIP delegation lift and aerial surveillance was provided
by the UH-IN Huey. As a light utility aircraft, the UH-1 does
not carry a significant payload and would not have been an
effective fire suppression asset. Neither aircraft performance
nor maintenance was a factor for Marine Aviation in support of
the Southern California firefighting effort. The Marine Corps'
newest light utility aircraft, the UH-1Y model or ``Yankee'',
did not participate in the wildfires. The UH-1Y has not been
operationally fielded and currently has only limited numbers
used for training and operational test.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your appearance
today. And Mr. Hobson alluded to my line of questioning
earlier. On Energy and Water, we have responsibilities for
funding the nuclear complex, if you would. And in last year's
budget request, the administration had $88.8 million set aside
for the reliable replacement warhead in the Energy and Water
bill. They had a request for $30 million in the Defense
appropriations bill. In the end, there were no moneys provided
in the Energy and Water bill. There were $15 million provided
in the Defense appropriations bill.
And not so much a question, although I have a question as
to why the administration continues to pursue the policy when
there was pretty clear language last year exhibited in the
omnibus as to the RRW. My upset, I must tell you, is several-
fold. One is that over the last year, the progress that I have
seen made on behalf of the administration--and I use that term
generically across the board, whether it be Defense, whether it
be Energy, whether it be State, whether it be the Intelligence
Community--the progress we made here is on the complex 2030,
the whole rationalization of downsizing of a nuclear complex.
The only progress we made was that they took off the 2030
because now they don't have any time frame at all as to when
they are going to downsize the complex.
And the point I would make and that I have been making for
the last year, Mr. Hobson has been making, and the members of
the Committee, if we as a Nation--not the Bush administration--
if the United States of America does not have a policy that has
been formulated as to how you are going to use these weapons in
the future, how we are going to protect ourselves from these
weapons in the future and what are we going to have as far as
our nonproliferation issue? Why should you proceed with the
next generation of weapons?
I would take the time, if I could, Mr. Chairman, for a
couple of minutes. The American Association for the Advancement
of Science--and I would just set the stage with this from their
report relative to the RRW--said that a panel observes that
there have been several plants redo the nuclear weapons complex
over the years, and none have reached fruition, in part because
of their scope and long time scale. The panel believes that any
plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise must have a clear
rationale and bipartisan basis if it is to be sustained over 25
years, over a generation; because once it is in place,
obviously conditions change, but administrations and congresses
are going to have to live with it.
There was very clear language in the House report on Energy
and Water this past year for the fiscal year 2008 bill that the
Committee directs the Secretary--and, of course, in this case
it is the Secretary of Energy--in consultation with the
Department of Defense and Intelligence Community to submit to
the Appropriations committees a comprehensive nuclear security
plan.
And if I could for the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to have the contents of that report language included. And the
fact is that report language was then also referenced in the
omnibus language in December in which it was stated that
Congress agrees to the direction contained in the House and
Senate reports requiring the administration, in consultation
with the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA,
the Department of Defense--including the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Strategic Command and the Intelligence Community and other
appropriate independent, nongovernment science and security
advisory organizations--to develop and submit to the Congress a
comprehensive nuclear weapons strategy for the 21st century.
Besides the NNSA, which is not within your particular
bailiwick, but you happen to be sitting here today and are a
part of the issue because you are the customer so to speak--
besides dropping 2030 from the nomenclature as far as
downsizing the nuclear complex, is there any sense on your part
that the administration is going to follow through on this and
begin to look at a long-term national strategy so we know what
we need a new weapon for?
And I would also go on, if I could, as long as I have
raised that issue, with submitting for the record, Mr.
Chairman, about six or seven quotes from House and Energy
Appropriation Committee reports, Senate Energy and Water
Committee reports, Senate Armed Services Committee report, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency report that says that we need a
wider analytic and public debate on big nuclear questions, the
future role of nuclear weapons, the limits of deterrence in the
early 21st century; and, finally, Senator Nunn, who before our
subcommittee, said that on the RRW itself, if Congress gives
the green light to this program in our current world
environment, I believe that this will be misunderstood by our
allies, exploited by our adversaries and complicate our work to
prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons.
So to your knowledge, is there any work being done on such
a strategy so we know why we need a new nuclear warhead?
Mr. England. Mr. Visclosky, I mean, this is sort of a long
question here. I think this is going to a take longer answer
and one that I, frankly, can't provide to you. So we are going
to have to get back to you on the subject and talk about it in
more detail.
Mr. Murtha. Let me make sure I understand. Do you want to
put this in the record, Mr. Visclosky, the reports? I just want
to make sure----
Mr. Visclosky. I would just say sections of the report that
deal specifically with the congressional direction to the
administration as to what they are going to do. My upset, Mr.
Chairman, being that after we zero this and add specific
directive language, that we need a comprehensive, bipartisan
generation look at this issue as to how are we going to use
these. How does this play in----
Mr. Murtha. What I am asking, though, Mr. Visclosky, what
do you want us to put in the record? I want to make sure they
understand what needs to go in the record.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. I would like to know what, in this
case, the Department of Defense is doing in conjunction with
developing and submitting to Congress a comprehensive nuclear
weapons strategy for the 21st century, which was in the--that
was language in the omnibus package.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection, that will be part of the
record.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--The Department did not provide a response
for the record.]
Mr. Dicks. If you would yield just for a second. Who at the
Department would answer a question like that about nuclear
warheads?
Mr. England. It would be our policy department. I mean, our
policy would pull together all the aspects with the Department
of Energy and State and work across the administration with the
Congress. It would be our policy department, Mr. Dicks.
Admiral Mullen. The other thing I would say, Mr. Dicks, is
I know General Cartwright has spent an extraordinary amount of
time on this as well, so he would clearly be a participant.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Good.
Mr. Visclosky. And I would, as long as the general's name
is mentioned, testified before a subcommittee and indicated
after an extensive dialogue that there was not such a strategy
last year.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.
Admiral Mullen, today who stands a better chance of making
it through Basra? An Iranian patrol or an American patrol?
Admiral Mullen. I was in Basra over the holidays. It has
been turned over, by and large, by the British. And I think I
guess one of the metrics that is very important to me is since
the British started to do that, the level of violence with
respect to them has gone down dramatically. Clearly there are
challenges there locally with respect to how security is going
to be maintained in the future.
The strategy, we believe is, it was time to do that.
Certainly the British felt that way. And by and large, I think
it has worked in that direction. That doesn't mean that we are
not going to have significant challenges down the road there.
You know, we are concerned about the Iranian influence
coming--you know, the Iranian Shi'a influence in the south.
Clearly I think, from that standpoint and the violence that
they oftentimes both support and foment, and their influence on
the jam specifically. And I think that will continue to be a
challenge.
I am not sure I can answer your question from the
standpoint of specifically who would stand a better chance of
survival. The violence down there has also gone down. It is a
safer place than it was a year ago. But it is certainly not
eliminated. And it can be--it can still be a very dangerous
place.
Ms. Kaptur. Some would say that Iraq is a failed state,
sir. The Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds don't want to live together,
they don't get along. We are asking our military to fill the
political gap, and our military is doing a phenomenal job of
doing what they are trained to do. But how long do you think we
are going to be required to remain in Iraq with our military
serving as the glue that holds the place together?
I believe one of our Senators said 100 years. What is your
estimate? Five years, 10 years? What are we talking about here?
20, 50?
Admiral Mullen. I think I have said before, ma'am, it is
years, not months. Exactly how many, I don't know. In fact, I
am encouraged by the fact that in the last 24 hours that the
Iraq Central Government has passed three laws that have been a
big challenge that--I am sorry--their parliamentary body has
passed three laws. That is a lot of progress, and it has been a
challenge.
I think the security has been--the security environment
having gotten better put them in a position to be able to do
that. The economic development, which has gotten better, needs
to continue as well. As far as a specific length of time, I
couldn't--I wouldn't want to predict exactly. But I think it
will be for a significant period of time.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

Ms. Kaptur. Could I ask you, Secretary England, there is an
author, Clyde Prestowitz, who has written a book, Three Billion
New Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the
East. And in this book he talks about the advanced technologies
in the United States. Their development has slipped.
In fact, in 2003, Thomas S. Hartwig, the former scientist
at TRW and chairman of the Department of Defense Advisory Group
on Electronic Devices, told Congress that the structure of the
U.S. high-tech industry is coming unglued, with innovation and
design losing their tie to prototype fabrication and
manufacturing, and that advanced semiconductor production
needed for a new generation of weapons was migrating to Asia.
He goes on to say the following: My question really is, who
at the Department is concerned about this and how are you
addressing it?
Prestowitz makes the point that our country needs to use
Russian, Chinese and European rockets to launch space
satellites; that Boeing's decisions to outsource production of
the wings on its 787 dreamliner had to be done abroad; The lack
of U.S. Firms that had the capacity to manufacture the advance
systems for military night vision capacity; French licensees
have sold equipment to China; and finally, the U.S. dependence
on China for a large number of strategic metals, including
tungsten, yttrium, magnesium, and timonium and indium. They
talk about this whole issue of R&D and whether we are able to
keep up.
Who at the Department focuses on this? What are your
comments on his statements? And how can we best address these
concerns?
Mr. England. Also, Ms. Kaptur, a couple of comments. First
of all, just the day before yesterday, we had a whole briefing
dealing with technology in the United States, what we call,
quote, future shocks. I mean, what is going to happen in terms
of energy and weather? What are the things that can happen,
disruptive things that can affect us?
One of them, of course, is this whole area of technology,
which is a concern of the Department because we rely on
advanced technology. Obviously, that is what is important to
our Nation. It is a concern to us--keep in mind that we are a
very, very tiny part of both our national--it used to be we
were dominant in this area. We are no longer dominant. Compared
to our U.S. economy, we are a very small part of the U.S.
economy, certainly a small part of the world economy, and
indeed, as part of globalization, goods and services move
around the world.
And so it is of interest and concern to us, and we do try
to make sure that we have the capabilities we need here in the
United States. We do have an office within AT&L that looks at
this and worries about this all the time. And, of course, we
also have our own institutions like DARPA, who work the front
end of this. They give us a leading indicator of what is going
on in all of these high-tech areas.
So we have our own DARPA, which is a couple of billion
dollars a year. This year in the 2009 budget, by the way, you
will see that we have recommended an increased level of R&D in
terms of the basic sciences, because we feel like we need more
work, and Secretary Gates personally asked that we increase
those accounts. So 2009, you will see that we have increased
our expenditures in basic science and technology; that is,
research in important areas to the Department of Defense. So I
am not sure there is an answer to this. I mean, there are huge
global trends that we are a part of and that we try to work
within and moderate to the extent we can.
But I would tell you, this is an area of great interest to
me personally. I came out of industry and did a lot of this
work. It is also of interest to Secretary Gates, who, of
course, came out of the university environment where we do a
lot of our S&T-type work in the country. And I know it is of
interest to our military--I mean, we have regular discussions
on this subject.
But, again, I will tell you that at one time we were
dominant, say, in the semiconductor because we literally bought
most of the semiconductors. We did a lot of the research. But
now we are a very, very small part of those enterprises. I
mean, we are probably 1 percent or less in many of those
endeavors. So we no longer have the leverage we had in the past
because of just the growth of the economy.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentlewoman has expired, Mr.
Boyd.

ACQUISITION COST ESTIMATING

Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I
apologize for being late. Everybody has a hearing scheduled
today. And, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your service and you
being here.
My question has to do with the Department's CAIG; that is,
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group. Are you familiar with that
group?
Mr. England. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Boyd. That is the group who under the Department's
policy is supposed to develop independent estimates for major
acquisitions. And it appears to those of us in Congress that
that group and those estimating procedures by that group are
not being used and followed by the Department.
And it also appears that, as a result, many of the programs
are underestimated and then cause budget problems down the
road. Would you speak to that? And are these appearances that
we have from the congressional level true or not?
Mr. England. Mr. Boyd, I would say they are largely not
true because we actually have--I won't say a rule--a policy
within the Department. If we have a CAIG estimate when that
goes forward, we go with the CAIG estimate. In terms of our
funding profiles in the outyears, we use the CAIG estimate
unless we decide for some overriding reason that we shouldn't
use the CAIG. I mean, typically the CAIG estimate will be
higher than the military estimate. And so we will in almost all
cases go with the CAIG estimate unless there is some specific
rationale why we believe there was some error or some change in
circumstances; that is, the historical basis that they may use
may no longer apply, et cetera.
So we do try to make this informed. We don't just follow
every single recommendation of the CAIG. But by and large, we
do rely on the CAIG estimates.
Mr. Boyd. When you don't use the CAIG estimates to rely on
those, and you use some other estimate--by your own statement
there, you said usually that is the lower estimate--do you find
that those estimates pretty much hit the mark? Or are they low?
Do you have any historical perspective on that?
Mr. England. I am not sure I have a historical perspective.
In almost every case, we actually go with the CAIG and in most
cases, usually it would be long term. So, for example, if there
was a whole new way of building an airplane--and I would say
just take Boeing in the commercial sector with their new 787
composite airplane--I mean, you would expect that the aluminum
airplane building in the past probably would not apply in terms
of cost estimates to build that. Well, if we go to radical
changes in our technology such that the historical trend may no
longer apply, then we examine that. But I would say that is an
exception and not the rule.
Mr. Boyd. How long has CAIG been in place, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. England. A lot longer than I have been around.
Mr. Boyd. Is it part of the problem? I mean, we do have
some problems, don't we?
Mr. England. We do. And, look, it is a fair question,
because here is the debate about the CAIG. If you put a higher
in than the program manager estimates the program can cost--the
program manager estimates a certain cost and the contractor--we
end up with a cost of the program. If we then put in the CAIG
estimates much higher and if we then program the higher money
in the program, then you can be pretty certain that that money
will be spent on the program. Right?
So to some extent, people will say it is a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The CAIG is always right because indeed if you
program that amount of money, that is what the program cost
will be. I mean, it is a debatable point in terms of the CAIG.
And therefore, I don't think we can just blindly go with the
CAIG. I do think you have to look at this and at least question
this, because otherwise you can end up actually spending more
money than you would like on some of these programs.
Mr. Boyd. Secretary England, the disruption caused by
faulty budgeting or estimating is greatly disruptive to your
Department and the Congress in terms of how we appropriate our
dollars, raise our dollars, spend them and so on.
Mr. England. Can I make a recommendation? I will tell you
that my experience is that the most disruptive thing is not
knowing over a significant period of time what the level of
investment will be. I mean, we get, by definition, yearly
appropriations. You never know quite what they are going to be
year to year. So contractors don't necessarily invest over a
long period of time because they don't know what the outcome
will be.
Multiyear contracts are very good. Stable funding over long
periods of time is the best thing we can do to control costs or
reduce costs. And that is within the Department across--I mean,
in every enterprise, I think that is the case.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
You could also say that supplementals ought to be inside
the regular budget, which gives us a better advantage. You can
also say that the military estimates in many cases are lower so
they can sell the program to Congress, and we have to pay the
bill in the long run. So there are all kinds of ways of looking
at this and we try to work it out between the committee.
And Mr. Young and I don't have any questions, but Mr. Dicks
has a question.

DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE

Mr. Dicks. Just one that Ms. Kaptur brought up that I don't
think was fully talked about. And that is this question of the
quality of the work that is being done out there. I get the
impression that--I don't know if we have an aging workforce
with these contractors, but we seem to see a lot more problems
in terms of ordinary work that ought to be done pretty easily,
winding up not getting done right. And delaying the programs
and--especially in the classified arena. We have seen a number
of examples in recent years of just shoddy performance.
Are you worried about this?
Mr. England. I am. And I think it is a systemic issue, not
necessarily shoddy workmanship. I think the issue is more of an
opportunity to get a lot of experience. You know, again, if it
was World War II and Mr. Chairman mentioned all--I mean, if you
graduate as an aeronautical engineer in your lifetime going
forward, you could have worked on, like, 100 different
airplanes. And then in the 1970s it was 80. And now in your
lifetime, you work on one or two airplanes.
So how do people get the experience, because literally the
number of programs are large but small. So there is not the
variety, I think, for engineers and managers and everyone else
to gain experience along the way.
And so, yes, I believe that is a concern, Mr. Dicks, but I
don't have an answer to that. But I----
Mr. Dicks. Is there also an aging workforce out there in
these contractors? And I thought this point was raised, that we
just seem to see so many programs in trouble now, and
especially in the high-technology area, where we used to be so
good in our national technical means, the satellites in
particular.
We seem to see failure, after failure, and it is across the
board. It is everybody. It is all the big companies.
Mr. England. We may be reaching too far too fast, Mr.
Dicks. We always want the next technology, so we reach far and
maybe that is something--and we do----
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary, we get estimates which we know
very well are underestimated, and then they give you a figure
of what they want to build. And in the end, the design is not
completed, whether it is the Navy, the Air Force. And when you
were the Secretary of the Navy, you got rid of thousands of
people in order to build more ships. And those ships never got
built because they stole the money and spent it someplace else.
We have got all kinds of problems we have got to work out.
We have an opportunity here in this next budget to straighten
out some more of these problems, and we appreciate your coming
before the committee. We appreciate your dedication and look
forward to working with you to come up with a budget we can all
live with.
The meeting is adjourned until 2:00.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Personnel--Recruiting and Retention

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to
attract and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and
operational effectiveness. While the services have generally
met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, the GAO
reports that the Army and Marine Corps have experienced
shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties such as
health care, human intelligence collection, and explosive
ordnance disposal. There is growing concern within the
department as to how the services can meet current operational
demands with what appear to be chronic shortages in these
occupational specialties. In addition, there is growing concern
that recruitment standards may have been relaxed to meet
numbers.
Secretary Gates, the Committee is very concerned regarding
the recruitment and retention for mission-critical occupational
specialties (MOS). For example there continues to be a shortage
of nurses in the military and many billets remain vacant. Given
the wartime environment that we are in, can you explain to the
Committee what methods are currently available to recruiters to
remedy this problem?
Answer. Each Service focuses on maximizing the effect of
its respective recruiting programs, advertising campaigns, and
retention programs to target critical or hard-to-fill skills.
Health professional recruiting is especially critical, and the
Services are placing increased emphasis in this area. We are
very appreciative of the new authorities offered by Congress to
help us meet these challenges, particularly the increases in
bonus limits and the ability to reduce the military service
obligation for health professionals in critical medical
specialties. The Services use a variety of incentives--
enlistment bonuses, educational benefits, and college loan
repayment--to encourage youth to serve in critical military
occupations. These incentives are also used by the Services to
attract high quality youth, even-flow the training base through
seasonal use, encourage enlistment for longer terms, and reward
advanced education. Reenlistment and retention bonuses are used
to encourage continued service while maintaining the desired
force profile.
The Army is experimenting with new incentives under the
``recruiting pilot'' authorities granted in the Fiscal Year
2006 Defense Authorization Act to expand the recruiting market
targeting high quality young men and women for service.
Additionally, the Army has a special program designed to meet
one of its most critically short and mission-essential needs--
Arab Linguists. This ``09L'' program has been extremely
successful in meeting this need, with over 1,000 native-
speaking linguists recruited and available for the front lines
in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The young men and women that enter the armed forces stand
among the best of American youth, above average in every
facet--smart, fit, educated, moral, and reflective of the
society they serve to protect. For over 20 years, the Services
have met or exceeded the Department's quality benchmarks for
Active duty recruits. Although the Army missed its high school
diploma graduate benchmark in 2007, the Department of Defense
(DoD) met its overall goal: 90 percent of Active duty new
recruits were high school diploma graduates. This compares
favorably to the national average in which about 70 percent to
80 percent graduate from high school with a diploma. In
addition, DoD exceeded its aptitude quality benchmark, with 68
percent of new Active recruits scoring in the top half of the
Armed Forces Qualification Test, well above the DoD benchmark
of 60 percent.
Question. Secretary Gates, has the Army and Marine Corps
analyzed how these occupational specialties have consistently
been under-filled, and what is the operational impact of these
shortages?
Answer. Personnel shortages have not, in my tenure,
resulted in our failure to meet critical mission needs
communicated to me by a Combatant Commander. The Department
uses Joint solutions to address immediate shortfalls through
``in lieu of taskings,'' in which all Services are called upon
to meet immediate operational shortfalls. The Reserve
components also have provided valuable contributions to address
specialty shortfalls.
The Services evaluate their personnel readiness by
analyzing how well they are matching the requirements of the
billets to the Service members assigned to those billets--in
terms of both skill and grade. Service members in skills that
are in short supply, either because the qualifying standards
are difficult to obtain or the skills are in high demand
outside of the military, are often called upon to do more
frequent rotations in order to ensure units are operationally
ready.
To ensure that high operational readiness can be sustained,
the Department, over the past five years, has developed a
rebalancing effort in the Services that initially transitioned
89,000 billets in less-stressed career fields, for example,
field artillery, to more heavily used specialties, such as
Military Police, Civil Affairs, and others. As of this year, we
have rebalanced about 106,000 billets, and the Services have
planned and programmed an additional 99,000 billets for
rebalancing between fiscal year 2008 and 2012. Although the
amount and type of rebalancing varies by Service, key stressed
capability areas include: Engineers, Intelligence, Special
Operations, Military Police, Infantry, Aviation, Space and
Combat Air Superiority. By 2012, we expect to have rebalanced
about 205,000 billets. Rebalancing is a continuous and
iterative process. The Department will continue to work closely
with the Services as they review and refine their rebalancing
plans to achieve the right mix of capabilities and alignment of
force structure. This will greatly help reduce stress and
support the Operational Reserve by providing a deeper bench for
those skills that are in high demand.
For Service members who are deployed more frequently,
compensation programs and the authorities provided by Congress
give the Department the flexibility to package these
authorities in the form of special incentive pays to ensure the
compensation is fair and equitable. For example, the Department
recently established the ``Post Deployment Mobilization Respite
Absence'' program which provides administrative absence days
for Active component Service members deployed more than 12
months in any 36-month period and to Reserve component Service
members deployed more than 12 months in any 72-month period.
The number of administrative absence days depends on how many
months beyond 12 months the Service member is deployed. An
administrative absence is the same as a day of non-chargeable
leave. Additionally, Active and Reserve component members
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and involuntarily extended
beyond 12 consecutive months, or deployed for 12 months within
a 15-month period, still qualify for the $1,000 per month
compensation for any month or portion of a month served by
involuntary extension. Administrative absence recognition is
for additional respite and supplements the broader compensation
mentioned above.
Question. Secretary Gates, are you concerned that the
strain of multiple deployments will discourage good individuals
from joining the Armed Forces or re-enlisting and staying in?
Answer. Recruiting: Today's military recruiting environment
may be the most challenging to the all-volunteer force (AVF).
Never in the history of the AVF, have our armed forces faced a
recruiting environment as challenging as they have during the
past several years. The global war on terror has placed
unprecedented demands on the Services as our volunteer military
is now into its seventh year of a protracted war in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As such, youth willingness to serve, the heart of
our AVF, is declining, and influencers of youth (e.g., parents
and teachers) are less likely to recommend military service
today than in recent years. Despite this, all Services met
their numerical recruiting goals in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, as
well their February 2008 year-to-date goals, and we project
that all Services will meet their numerical goals in FY 2008.
Retention: We have studied the retention rates of those
deployed--the Army's retention rates of initial term and mid-
career soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120-140
percent of their goals since FY 2005.
As of February 2008, the Army and Marine Corps--our most
heavily deployed Services--have exceeded their year-to-date
retention goals; and the Navy met 98 percent of their aggregate
year-to-date goal. The Air Force met 99 percent of their mid-
career goal, but fell short in their initial (less than 6 years
of service) and career (more than 10 years of service) goals.
This was due to its force shaping efforts, coupled with its FY
2008 funding priorities.
However, the Army's increase in end strength, along with
its reorganization into a modular concept, requires
proportionally more mid-grade officers--and so we are closely
monitoring retention in these grades to assess how much concern
is warranted.
Question. Secretary Gates, please describe the standards by
which candidates are measured. Have these standards been
relaxed in any way to achieve the aggressive recruitment goals?
Answer. The Department has not relaxed enlistment
standards. All new recruits are carefully screened and
qualified for military service. The Department generally
reports recruit quality along two dimensions--educational
achievement and aptitude. Both are important, but for different
reasons.
We value recruits with a high school diploma because years
of research and experience tell us that those with a high
school diploma are more likely to complete their initial three
years of service. About 80 percent of recruits with a high
school diploma will complete their first three years of
service, whereas only about half of those who failed to
complete high school will make it. Those holding an alternative
credential (e.g., General Equivalency Diploma) fall between
these statistics. The Department's benchmark for new recruits
with a high school diploma is 90 percent and it has met or
exceeded that benchmark since 1984.
Aptitude is a separate indicator of quality. All recruits
take a written enlistment test, the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery. Those who score at or above average on four
of the subtests measuring verbal and mathematics skills (which
comprise the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)) are in
Categories I-IIIA. We value these higher-aptitude recruits
because their trainability and job performance generally
exceeds those in the lower aptitude categories. The
Department's benchmark for new recruits is 60 percent scoring
in AFQT Category I-IIIA, and it has met or exceeded that
benchmark since 1986.
Question. Secretary Gates, DoD standards on qualification tests
call for at least 60 percent Category 1 to 3 (the higher end of
testing) and 4 percent Category 4, the lowest end. While the
Departments of the Navy and Air Force have followed that standard, the
active Army chose a higher standard of 67 percent in Categories 1 to 3,
and 2 percent in Category 4. However, now the Army plans to revert to
the lower standards of the DoD guidelines, which basically lowers the
IQ standards for recruits. Do you believe that this will reduce the
average effectiveness of Army units? Do you plan on lowering the DoD
standards further to assist the Services in meeting their recruitment
goals?
Answer. No, we do not believe this will reduce the average
effectiveness of Army units. All new soldiers are not only qualified
for military service, but meet the standards for training in their
military occupational specialty. With regard to enlistment standards,
the Department has not changed the recruit quality standards
(benchmarks) since 1993, when those benchmarks were first established,
and there are no plans to do so. The purpose of the recruit quality
benchmarks is to ensure that recruit performance is sufficient to
complete military missions. ``Recruiting at the benchmarks'' means that
we are recruiting cost effectively for the desired level of force
performance. The benchmarks were originally set to yield the
performance levels of the force that fought in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. If economic conditions are such that recruiting can be conducted
above the benchmarks (more Armed Forces Qualification Test Category I-
IIIAs and more high school diploma graduates) at little or no
additional cost, that is fine. However, recruiting at the benchmark is
the target. Although the military recruiting environment is
challenging, the Army met its numerical recruiting goals in fiscal year
(FY) 2007, and in the first quarter of FY 2008. With regard to recruit
quality, the Army achieved the Department of Defense (DoD) aptitude
standard in FY 2007, and we expect it to meet that measure in FY 2008.
Army fell short of the DoD high school diploma benchmark in FY 2007,
and remains short through the first quarter of FY 2008. Since this
educational benchmark is used to predict first-term attrition, the Army
hopes to ameliorate the effects of not meeting this benchmark by
implementing other initiatives to reduce first-term attrition.
Question. Secretary Gates, recruiting and retention goals are often
relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility
into how each occupational specialty is staffed. Will you provide the
Committee with details on recruiting and retention by specialty code?
Answer. The Department examines recruitment and retention data for
critical skill occupations. The Services use the following criteria in
identifying approximately 10 percent of their occupational specialties
as most critical for recruiting, and 10 percent of their specialties as
most critical for retention.
For purposes of determining if a skill is critical, the following
criteria are used:
Be, have a history of being, or project to be,
short;
Requires high training and/or replacement costs;
Is in high demand in the civilian sector;
Is challenging to recruit into;
Is crucial to combat readiness; and/or
Is a low density/high demand skill.
See Tables 1 and 2 for the most recent information.

TABLE 1: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RECRUITING ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE
[December 2007]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2008 total FY 2008 Percent of YTD
Specialty accession FY 2008 accession accessions to- accessions
requirement mission to-date date accomplished
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Critical Recruiting Skills
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infantryman......................... 11362 1425 1479 104
Cannon Crewmember................... 1879 245 268 109
Field Artillery Computer Systems 683 117 110 94
Specialist.........................
Multiple Launch Rocket System 280 19 16 84
Crewmember.........................
PATRIOT Fire Control Enhanced 419 44 23 52
Operator/Maintainer................
Air Defense Command, Control, 297 38 31 82
Communications, Computers and
Intelligence Tactical Operations
Center Enhanced Operator/Maintainer
PATRIOT Launching Station Enhanced 666 81 73 90
Operator/Maintainer................
M1 Armor Crewman.................... 1388 100 118 118
Microwave Systems Operator- 224 33 16 48
Maintainer.........................
Multi-Channel Transmission Systems 783 59 54 92
Operator-Maintainer................
Signal Support Systems Specialist... 2150 382 386 101
Military Police..................... 3341 382 353 92
Intelligence Analyst................ 598 104 83 80
Human Intelligence Collector........ 910 129 131 102
Signals Intelligence Analyst........ 372 90 86 96
Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic...... 2623 435 444 102
Bradley Fighting Vehicle System 267 26 25 96
Maintainer.........................
Health Care Specialist.............. 3659 489 483 99
Chemical, Biological, Radiological 787 98 94 96
and Nuclear Specialist.............
Motor Transport Operator............ 3098 555 567 102
Explosive Ordnance Disposal......... 431 54 49 91
Petroleum Supply Specialist......... 2056 303 312 103
Food Service Operations Specialist.. 2143 145 141 97
Parachute Rigger.................... 618 92 99 108
Electronic Devices Repairman........ 387 72 42 58
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................... 41,421 5,517 5,483 99
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Critical Recruiting Skills
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Field....................... 2520 610 614 101
Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) forces..... 1089 237 252 106
Special Warfare Combat Crewman...... 285 55 63 115
Second Class Diver.................. 200 39 48 123
Basic Explosive Ordnance Tech....... 213 28 28 100
Cryptologic Technician Interpretive. 462 96 63 66
Enlisted Aircrew.................... 613 116 121 104
Enlisted Aircrew Rescue Swimmer..... 636 88 63 72
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................... 6,018 1,269 1,252 99
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Corps Critical Recruiting Skills
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Support.................... 688 126 123 98
Aircraft Mechanic................... 2297 421 554 132
Air Crew/Flight Mechanic/Navigator.. 379 69 86 125
Aviation Operations................. 331 61 76 125
Aviation Electronics Tech........... 1286 235 255 108
Electronics Maintenance............. 1095 200 122 61
Transportation...................... 2043 374 276 74
Fire Direction/Control Specialist... 338 62 38 61
Cryptologic Linguist................ 281 51 35 68
Intelligence........................ 715 131 161 123
Infantry............................ 6013 1100 1535 139
Marine Corps Security Forces........ 584 107 128 120
Marine Corps Security Forces 484 89 87 98
(Personnel Reliability Program)....
6 yr Infantry Bonus................. 300 55 71 129
5 yr Infantry Bonus................. 900 165 90 55
Reconnaissance Bonus................ 399 73 84 115
Military Police..................... 966 177 217 123
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................... 19,099 3,496 3,938 113
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force Critical Recruiting Skills
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airborne Linguist................... 174 67 67 100
Combat Controller................... 222 56 56 100
Intel Applications.................. 338 78 78 100
Imagery Analysis.................... 171 29 29 100
Linguist............................ 480 64 64 100
Network Intelligence Analysis....... 226 52 52 100
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 189 33 33 100
Escape.............................
Pararescue.......................... 410 71 71 100
Internal Avionics System............ 326 66 66 100
Aircraft Structural Maintenance..... 334 73 73 100
Fuels............................... 286 77 77 100
Explosive Ordnance Disposal......... 174 55 55 100
Security Forces..................... 3786 714 714 100
Aerial gunner....................... 51 8 8 100
Air Traffic Control................. 672 127 127 100
Tactical Air Command & Control...... 173 41 41 100
A-10, F-15 & U-2 Avionic Systems.... 62 20 20 100
Munitions Systems................... 695 149 149 100
Armament Systems.................... 960 227 227 100
Special Vehicle Operations.......... 23 11 11 100
Pavements & Construction Equipment.. 147 49 49 100
Structural Maintenance.............. 173 62 62 100
Utilities Systems................... 121 29 29 100
Engineering Assistant............... 152 28 28 100
Weather............................. 197 52 52 100
Fire Protection..................... 428 65 65 100
Aerospace Medical Service........... 636 132 132 100
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................... 11,606 2,435 2,435 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TABLE 2: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RETENTION ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE
[December 2007]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Army Critical Retention Skills
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Mid-Career Career
Authorized/ -----------------------------------------------------------------
Specialty (MOS) assigned YTD YTD YTD
YTD elig retained YTD elig retained YTD elig retained
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field Artillery Tactical Data 2965/2772 59 49 38 36 11 10
Systems Specialist...........
Field Artillery Radar Operator 695/582 14 13 9 8 4 4
Signal Support Systems 7808/7386 190 152 109 94 45 41
Specialist...................
Corrections................... 1212/1170 29 23 14 9 12 12
Intelligence Analyst.......... 4860/5073 133 106 96 84 45 37
Combat Medic.................. 18186/17647 349 262 348 335 161 148
Motor Transport Operator...... 16750/15702 341 295 212 201 107 102
Explosive Ordnance Disposal... 1470/1133 24 18 13 11 7 7
Petroleum Supply Specialist... 9956/9663 241 189 133 117 60 59
Parachute Rigger.............. 1663/1426 45 40 59 54 17 17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Navy Critical Retention Skills
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zone A Zone B Zone C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Specialty (Rating) Authorized/ FYO8 FYTD FY08 FYTD FYO8 FYTD FY08 FYTD FY08 FYTD FY08 FYTD
assigned 1st QTR 1st QTR 1st QTR 1st QTR 1st QTR 1st QTR
goal reenlist goal reenlist goal reenlist
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Propulsion............... 10811/10996 168 183 100 87 38 41
Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance 138/67 2 2 1 3 0 0
Corpsman........................
Field Medical Service Technician. 6772/7747 51 92 33 70 24 43
Medical Deep Sea Divine 121/86 1 0 0 0 0 0
Technician......................
Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance 51/35 NA NA 0 0 1 2
Independent.....................
Navy Diver....................... 1275/1002 14 15 6 13 5 6
Cryptologic Technicians 999/1757 13 34 11 16 4 9
Interpretive (Linguist NEC).....
Explosive Ordnance Disposal...... 1064/901 7 10 8 13 3 22
Fire Controlman AEGIS............ 2198/1933 19 46 16 48 3 9
Special Operations............... 2159/1896 34 41 19 31 21 24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Marine Corps Critical Retention Skills
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st Term Subsequent
Authorized/ -------------------------------------------
Specialty (MOS) assigned YTD YTD
YTD goal retained YTD goal retained
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosive Ordnance Disposal................ 568/431 23 64 15 60
Counter Intelligence....................... 675/442 27 47 16 56
Reconnaissance Marine...................... 1630/1215 49 52 19 70
Intelligence Specialist.................... 1566/1258 32 71 22 94
Fire Support Man........................... 627/508 12 22 6 24
Middle East Cryptologic Linguists.......... 230/200 4 15 3 8
Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguists......... 169/97 4 9 2 2
Artillery Electronics Technician........... 82/65 2 4 1 0
Aviation Meteorological Equipment 57/49 1 0 1 2
Technician................................
Light Armor Vehicle........................ 984/992 18 29 8 22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Secretary Gates, with the increases in
reenlistment and enlistment bonuses, do you feel that the
funding for recruiting and retention initiatives is sufficient?
Answer. Yes, we stand by the President's budget request for
bonuses as sufficient to sustain strong recruiting and
retention.
Question. Secretary Gates, how do the Army and Marine Corps
recruiting commands plan to adapt to meet the new end-strength
requirements. What are the short- and long-term implications
associated with sustaining a heightened end-strength?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps' end strength growth may
require increases in both recruiting and retention goals.
Achieving the higher strength levels will be driven by how
quickly the Army and Marine Corps programs grow. Continued
congressional support of recruiting and retention programs is
essential to sustain the All Volunteer Force in the midst of
its first protracted war. Sufficient resources must be
committed to sustain military recruiting and retention
programs.

Personnel--Dwell Time

Question. One essential element in maintaining troop morale
during wartime is to provide some guarantees that there will be
time to rest between deployments to combat zones. This rest is
officially called ``dwell time.'' At one point dwell time for
the U.S. Army was a ratio of 1:2, 12 months in combat, 24
months at home. Due to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Army
dwell time has evolved to a 1:1 ratio. However, on April 11,
2007, Secretary Gates announced a new policy that active Army
units now in the Central Command area of responsibility and
those headed there will deploy for not more than 15 months and
will return home for not less than 12 months. The Marine Corps
sends its units to Iraq for seven months, with seven months
intended at home station. However, because of mounting strain
on our military from the war in Iraq, dwell time has been
reduced.
Secretary Gates, there have been numerous articles
regarding DoD consistently reducing `dwell time' for our combat
units. Do you expect that `dwell-time' standards will be
further relaxed or changed?
Answer. We do not expect to reduce our dwell time
standards. In fact, our goal is to increase the dwell time for
our ground forces by reducing the number of deployed Army
Brigade Combat Teams by July of this year and increasing the
size of the Army and Marine Corps. Even with these plans, we
must recognize that the operational tempo of our forces is
largely driven by the situation on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Question. Secretary Gates, the Army dwell time ratio at one
point was 1:2, then 1:1, and now its 15 months in theater and
12 months at home, which equates to less than a 1:1 ratio. The
Marine Corps dwell time is seven months in theater and seven
months off. Has there been any evaluation as to whose system is
better?
Answer. The various Services deployment paradigms are a
function of the mission, culture, and needs of the individual
Service. In that sense, the ``best'' way is that which works
for each individual Service. These deployment patterns were
developed over time to address many factors. For example, the
Marine Corps deploys forces at and below the battalion/squadron
level for seven months at a time, while units at higher command
levels generally deploy for a year. This deployment pattern
aligns with Marine Corps recruiting, retention, and skill
training goals.
The Department-wide goal for all Services, regardless of
deployment length, is that Active component forces are to
attain a dwell ratio of 1:2 and Reserve component forces are to
achieve a dwell ratio of 1:5.
Question. Secretary Gates, during dwell time it is our
understanding that in addition to being home, our servicemen
and women are also suppose to go through training. However,
with dwell time being reduced, what steps are in place to
ensure our forces get the proper training?
Answer. Regardless of dwell time, we continue to ensure our
forces receive the proper training prior to deploying.
Deploying organizations receive high quality training that is a
combat multiplier for our forces. An important component of
that high quality training for brigade combat teams,
battalions, and some enabling units is the combat training
center rotations at the National Training Center, Joint
Readiness Training Center, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Training Center. If deploying combat forces are unable to
attend the training at the combat training centers due to
deployment timelines, the combat training centers have
conducted mission rehearsal exercises for the deploying forces
at their home station utilizing local training areas. For those
forces that do not routinely attend combat training centers,
other training venues and capabilities are leveraged; but
regardless of the training venue, the Army and Marine Corps
chains of command validate the mental, physical, and cultural
combat readiness of units prior to deployment. In addition to
its Pre-Deployment Training Program, the Marine Corps is
developing a standards-based Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Exercise program to maintain proficiency in core war fighting
functions for the future. For routine Navy employment, the
Fleet Response Plan provides units trained and ready over a
longer period of time irrespective of dwell. For Navy support
to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom,
Sailors receive training specified by the theater through the
Joint Sourcing Training Oversight process administered by
United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Dwell
does not impact this training. The Air Force ensures similar
training and, like the Navy, dwell time does not impact their
training.
Question. Secretary Gates, is the training that the troops
are receiving limited to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)?
Answer. No--The Armed Forces of the United States do train
for executing a range of military operations. However, given
current operational demands, the Army and Marine Corps major
training venues, the National Training Center, Joint Readiness
Training Center, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training
Center, are primarily focusing their efforts on the training
requirements to specifically prepare forces for the GWOT. The
bulk of the Navy and Air Force major training programs support
the broader range of military operations; however, Air Force
and the Navy forces identified to support current operations
also focus their efforts on specific training requirements in
preparation for GWOT deployments. The Marine Corps has reported
that heavy training for counterinsurgency, coupled with the
short dwell time, does limit their ability to maintain
proficiency in core competencies. However, they continue to
train Marine Expeditionary Units to be proficient in
specialized missions in support of their global employment.
Question. Secretary Gates, how much did last years
``surge'' effect `dwell time' for the Services?
Answer. The answer depends on the Service. We have seen
little, if any, affect on individual dwell time for Navy or Air
Force personnel. In the Marine Corps, two battalions were
extended by the surge and this had a small effect on overall
Marine Corps dwell time. For the Army, we increased both the
number of forces and the ``Boots on the Ground'' (BOG) time.
These individuals are likely to have a BOG-to-Dwell ratio of
less than 1:1.
Question. Secretary Gates, when dwell time is cut short
what steps are in place to make sure that our servicemen and
women are compensated?
Answer. On April 18, 2007, the Department established the
Post Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence program which
provides administrative absence days for Active component
Service members deployed more than 12 months in any 36-month
period and to Reserve component Service members deployed more
than 12 months in any 72-month period. The number of
administrative absence days depends on how many months beyond
12 months the Service member is deployed. An administrative
absence is the same as a day of non-chargeable leave.
On May 24, 2007, the Department authorized the Secretaries
of the Military Departments to pay Assignment Incentive Pay of
$200 per day, not to exceed $3,000 monthly, in lieu of
providing administrative absence, to those Reserve component
members who are also government employees and cannot legally
receive their civilian pay during days served on Active duty
and who specifically elect the payment option.
Active and Reserve component members deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan and involuntarily extended beyond 12 consecutive
months, or deployed for 12 months within a 15-month period,
still qualify for the $1,000 per month compensation for any
month or portion of a month served by involuntary extension.
Administrative absence recognition is for additional respite
and supplements the broader compensation mentioned above.

[Clerks note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, February 13, 2008.

U.S. MARINE CORPS READINESS

WITNESSES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN G. CASTELLAW, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES

Introduction

Mr. Moran. The Committee will come to order.
This afternoon we will hold a hearing on Marine Corps
readiness. We will focus primarily on near-term readiness
issues related to personnel training and equipment repair,
reset and battle loss replacement.
We are very pleased to welcome two distinguished general
officers as our witnesses. Lieutenant General Amos is currently
the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
But I understand there is hot news out that you have very
recently been nominated to be the number-two, the Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps, which is a big deal. And
congratulations, General Amos.
General Amos. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Lieutenant General Castellaw, the Deputy
Commandant for Programs and Resources is our other witness.
And both officers are well-qualified, obviously, to discuss
these readiness areas and to answer the questions of the
committee.
Gentlemen, we thank you for being here.
And the Committee is very much concerned about the
readiness of the Marine Corps. Our Marines are performing
magnificently in Iraq, Afghanistan and other difficult places
around the globe. We are proud of their service, yet we realize
the burden that repeated deployments places on them and their
families.
In very short order, the committee will be reviewing the
requests for the fiscal year 2008 supplemental while continuing
to review the service's request for fiscal year 2009. So your
responses today will better help the committee to determine
whether adequate resources have been requested for the many
programs that support the Corps. We look forward to your
testimony and to a spirited and informative question-and-answer
session.
Before we begin our testimony, though, I would like to call
on our ranking member, our friend Bill Young, for any comments.
Mr. Young.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I want to add my welcome to our distinguished panel,
Lieutenant General Amos and Lieutenant General Castellaw.
Congratulations on your nomination. I hope our brothers and
sisters in the Senate will move quickly to confirm that
appointment, and we look forward to working with you in that
new capacity.
The Marine Corps, as usual, is being stretched pretty thin,
and you are being asked to send some additional troops into
Afghanistan to prepare for this anticipated spring offensive.
At the same time, the Corps is trying to grow the force to
202,000 active-duty Marines by 2011--an aggressive goal by
itself when you consider all of the challenges of
infrastructure, training, resetting some of the old equipment
that has been worn out, recapitalization. You have a big task
ahead of you, and the Marine Corps, of course, is always ahead
of the curve on taking care of their problems.
And if you can keep my constituent, General Mike Regner,
under control, you will have really made a major
accomplishment.
I want to welcome you both.
Welcome, Mike Regner, too--as I said, my constituent. Proud
to have you here.
We are proud of the United States Marine Corps, and we look
forward to your testimony.
Mr. Moran. General Amos, if you would like to summarize
your statement, we can put the entire statement in the record.

Summary Statement of General Amos

General Amos. That would be great.
On behalf of General Castellaw and I, we want to thank you
for the opportunity to tell a Marine Corps story. It is a good
one.
We are here on a mission today, and the mission is on
behalf of the Marines and our family members that are out
there: 186,000-plus Marines and over 300,000 family members.
We want to say thank you to this Committee. We look back
over the last several years, 4\1/2\ years, of really hard
combat. This Committee and the members that have gone before
you have supported us with gusto. And it has paid off. It is
paying off in Iraq, it is paying off in Afghanistan, and it is
paying off on the home front. So we want to thank you for that.
If you would take our statement, please, our joint
statement, and put it into the record. And General Castellaw
and I stand ready for your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint statement of General Amos and General Castellaw
follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Moran. Thanks, General. Thanks for supporting you with
gusto, and that was it.
General Amos. That was it, sir. I want to thank you, and we
are ready to take your questions. We are looking forward to it.
Mr. Moran. All right. That is fine.
Would you like to start off, Bill?
Mr. Young. That would be fine.
Mr. Moran. Go ahead.

BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Young. In the budget that has been presented now to
us--and we had somewhat of an overview of that this morning
with Secretary England and Admiral Mullen--are your needs being
met? Is the request adequate? Are there things that you need
that haven't been requested in the budget?
General Castellaw. Sir, he is getting promoted, and I get
to do the answering.
Sir, again, I just want to echo General Amos's appreciation
to the Congress, and particularly to this Committee, for the
support that we have been given. We have had great
opportunities within the Department in our relationship with
the Congress to identify those things that we truly need.
The Marine Corps is proud of our history. And, in fact,
what we try to do is be good stewards of the Nation's scarce
resources. When we talk about that, we are not only talking
about the appropriations that we get from the Congress, but we
are talking about the great men and women who are truly, truly
the number-one resource that we have in the Marine Corps.
We will continue to work within the Department and with you
to identify those additional items, those additional things
that we need to take to war with us. And as we identify them
and we work with you, we will note them and we will appreciate
the support that you, I am sure, will continue to give us.
Mr. Young. But, General, with the additional Marines being
sent to Afghanistan, there will be additional equipment
required, personal equipment, body armor, weapons, other types
of vehicles. Will they be fully equipped when they do deploy to
Afghanistan?
General Amos. Sir, they will be. As you know, one of the
units is a Marine expeditionary unit coming off the East Coast.
And they come with all their equipment anyway. In other words,
they were already planning on deploying aboard naval shipping.
So they are coming with everything that they have.
Now, there is no question they are going to be plussed up
with what we call enablers. Some enablers are people and
different kinds of capabilities. But there will also be some
equipment: things from signals intelligence kind of things,
counterintelligence, human intelligence, plus-ups and that kind
of thing. So they are.
And the equipment that the battalion that is coming out of
Twentynine Palms that will go into Afghanistan, we will move
equipment both from in theater, mostly from in theater, over
from Iraq, equipment that is not being used that we have
forward in stores and that type of thing. But they will have
everything that they need before they go in.
Mr. Young. So they will take it with them? They will have
it right with them as they deploy?
General Amos. Absolutely, sir.

TRAINING

Mr. Young. Will they have completed training that you would
normally want a Marine to have completed before he is deployed?
General Amos. They are, Mr. Young. They will leave next
month, and they will have completed all of what they call
Predeployment Training, PDT. The battalion was focused
primarily into Iraq, and they were going to go at a later date,
and they have been reoriented.
So, you know, the command down at Quantico has built a
pretty rigorous training schedule. And using the model that we
have in Iraq, but modifying it for Afghanistan with the kind of
things they expect to be able to do and be required to do,
both--not only that, training police, things that we don't
typically do--we put that whole package together, to include
hiring Afghan role-players.
And they are a Twentynine Palms-based unit, 3rd Battalion,
7th Marine. So they are already there, which makes it pretty
fortuitous for us. We can put them up in the higher parts, the
higher elevations of Twentynine Palms, and it is actually
almost exactly the same elevation in the country that they
would be going in, terrain-wise.

WOUNDED WARRIOR BATTALION

Mr. Young. General, a week before last, my wife and I
visited the Wounded Warrior Battalion at Camp Pendleton, and we
had a chance to see some of the Marines that we had actually
met while they were at Bethesda in the intensive care, and
worked with them and their families at the time. And that was
quite an emotional reunion with some of them.
But I have to tell you, the United States of America is
fortunate to have the type of Marine that we have, because
their attitudes, despite their injuries, despite their
sacrifices, their attitudes are just unbelievable. And you
cannot visit with them and not come away with a tremendous
inspiration and appreciation for the United States Marine Corps
and the men and women that make up the Corps.
So thank you very much for the good job that you do, and
all of our Marines, and thank you for being here today.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

DWELL TIME

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Young.
I would like to ask questions about another aspect of
morale. Obviously, it is critical to be trained and fully
equipped. But the amount of rest time between combat
deployments is also critical to maintain morale. It is not in
statute. This Committee has tried to put it in statute, because
DOD has so changed what had been a traditional ratio. In fact,
used to be a year in theater and then 2 years at home. The
Corps is now deploying, we understand, for 7 months in combat
and 7 months rest time. But we wouldn't have gotten involved if
there hadn't been such a radical departure from the norm to
deal with the demands of the Iraq war.
We asked Admiral Mullen today--and Secretary Gates broke
his arm, apparently, so he wasn't able to make the hearing. But
we were told that DOD is going to try to get back to a more
traditional dwell time.
I would like to ask you, either of you, if you think that
the Corps is going to get back to a more traditional ratio of
combat versus rest.
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, we hope to get there. That is
certainly the goal of our Commandant. And that is really one of
the driving factors between the 202K growth, was to try to get
us some dwell time.
As you know, our infantry battalions, we have 26 of them
right now. We will grow to 27 later on this year. The good news
story is that the two that we built last year down at Camp
Lejeune, one deploys next month and the other one deploys in
September. So having just stood both those battalions up, one
of them leaves next month to go into combat. So that is
designed to relieve some of the stress and increase the dwell
time.
But there are other units besides our infantry battalions.
Our EOD personnel, military personnel, our unmanned aerial
vehicle squadrons, intelligence communications, our truck
companies--almost every one of those units are on what we call
a 1-to-1 dwell, gone 7 months, home 7 months. And even home 7
months, it is a little bit of a misnomer, because you have to
leave early enough to relieve the unit that you are there with.
So there is an overlap. So truth in lending, they are probably
home 6\1/2\ months, maybe 6 months.
So the dwell is an issue with our Commandant. The forced
growth will mitigate that and will give us the opportunity to
get to a 1-to-2. And that is the goal in the long war. As long
as our country is engaged in this long war, then our goal in
the Marine Corps is to get to a 1-to-2. We appreciate your help
with your approval of the 202K, the support of equipment and
buying people. That is our solution, to get to a 1-to-2. Our
long-range goal in peace time is to get to 1-to-3.
Mr. Moran. Is there any compensation, General, for Marines
that have had their dwell time cut short substantially? I am
curious, in order to make this surge work, what is the shortest
dwell time that a Marine combat unit might have experienced,
for example?
General Amos. I think, as I look back on the ones that have
gone through this thing, I think the shortest ones are units
like our unmanned aerial--what we call VMU, our unmanned aerial
squadrons. They fly our UAVs. They are on about a 1-to-.85. And
some of our communications battalions are that way, simply
because we just don't have enough of them.
Within the unit--and that is just unit now. Within when you
start talking individual personnel that have unique skills, we
have some of those folks that are less than a 1-to-1 dwell as
well.
So I think the average is, if you were to pin me down and
say, writ large, across the Marine Corps what would it be, it
would be slightly better than 1-to-1. But the average combat
units that you see going over there are about a 1-to-1.

RE-ENLISTMENT BONUSES

Mr. Moran. In order to meet your recruitment and retention
goals, you have had to offer substantial cash bonuses, we
understand. Do you happen to know how much you have included in
the budget for that, for the enlistment and re-enlistment
bonuses?
General Castellaw. What we are doing--it has been growing
each year. But we have had great success. We are maintaining,
in terms of our enlistments, above 90 percent of high school
graduates. The quality has not been impacted. We have
continually met or exceeded the enlistment numbers.
And we are exceeding our re-enlistment numbers. In fact, we
exceeded in this recent year, in 2007, the amount of accessions
and the amount of re-enlistments by about a total of 2,500
people, more than what we had tagged. So we continue to be
successful in doing that.
The numbers, the dollars that we have in bonuses now have
grown from $200 million, in that neighborhood in 2007, they
went to about $400 million here in 2008, and we are projecting
in the neighborhood of about $600 million, a little over that,
in 2009. So we are seeing an increase in the amount that we are
putting into those things, monetarily, that encourage Marines
to re-enlist.
What we do is we don't put a lot on the front end. People
join the Marine Corps to be Marines. On the back end, we are a
merit-based organization, and we look for those individuals who
want to stay, and then that is where we put our bonus dollars.
Mr. Moran. You must lose a number of them, though, to
private security contractors, because they are certainly
offering better benefits and much higher pay. Are you looking
into competing with other means, obviously, but possibly
expanding GI benefits, tuition credits, small business loans
and so on when they get out, in order to keep the best people?
Because we are not just talking about quantity, we are talking
about quality, obviously.
General Castellaw. Sir, again, as I indicated to you, we
are good stewards of the Nation's resources. We will
continually look for those things that fit the Marine Corps and
what we need to ensure that we keep those quality individuals.
But as I indicated, the first-term re-enlistment has been up 10
percent over the last year.
Mr. Moran. It has been up 10 percent?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir, first term.
If you look at the second term--and these are the careers,
these are the people who have already made the decision to stay
in--that is up 5 percent. So, with what we are doing and with
the incentives that we are providing, we continue to meet and
exceed what our goals are.
So, again, we will do what is necessary to make sure that
our people get what they deserve and that we maintain the
quality that the Nation expects of our Marine Corps.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Lewis.

TWENTYNINE PALMS MARINE CORPS BASE

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your being here. The
quality and capability and the importance of the Marine Corps
to our national security is, I think, obvious to anybody who
will look. But congratulations for the fabulous job you all are
doing.
From time to time within the Marine Corps budget, after it
gets through the DOD process and probably OMB process as well,
it doesn't give you everything that you might want. So once in
a while, there is a need for extra funding. Sometimes that
extra funding is described as an earmark. And far be it from me
to suggest that earmarks are important, but I would like to
have you perhaps provide some testimony relative to the value
of some earmarks that have affected, I think, directly affected
the Marine Corps.
That which has happened in Twentynine Palms, that training
facility, in recent years is almost entirely the result of
earmarks, now in excess of something like $100 million over
time, including the improvement of the ranges, including the
creation of the village that the President visited not too long
ago--a fabulous, fabulous training facility, competing very
well with the NTC that is just down the road.
So I, frankly, would like to have you react to the money
that this Committee has seen fit to put in that direction,
specifically at the Twentynine Palms Marine base, but otherwise
as well. The base happens to be in my district, so I have a
small little prejudice, but otherwise.
General Amos. Congressman, you are well-known at Twentynine
Palms. And I would like to comment about that from the training
perspective and the value added. And then General Castellaw can
pile on, as our head money man and resource man.
I have watched that range at Twentynine Palms change from
when John and I were Captains and we used to not want to go out
there. In fact, we looked for reasons to miss deployments when
our squadrons went out there, because it was just--it wasn't
the austerity and it wasn't the hardness, but it was kind of a
combination of everything.
And I will tell you, the training at Twentynine Palms now,
in fact, it is my all-time favorite base to go visit and spend
time with Marines out in the field, because it is a first-
class--in fact, I think it is world quality. I was over in
Israel not too long ago, visiting their ground forces, looking
through training, and they have some great facilities, but they
pale in comparison to Twentynine Palms.
And I would agree with you, I think it easily rivals NTC.
It now has joint certification from Joint Forces Command; I
think you know that. That gives us a lot of capabilities to tap
into joint capabilities across this country, to include a T10
line which now allows data passing in virtual simulation all
across America all tied into a single command post at
Twentynine Palms, if that is where we want to put it.
But the villages, for those of you who haven't been there,
the villages that have been built there, the money that has
been given to the Marine Corps to hire Iraqi role-players, we
have what we call a military operations in urban terrain, a
MOUT facility, we have several of them, where we train our
battalions. But we have one that is about half done up in the
very northern part, as you know. And that has been--we have
been the beneficiary of that earmark. And that will be--I don't
know what is the largest in our country, but I haven't seen any
larger or any more capable than that will be.
So the entire facility at Twentynine Palms is becoming a
gem in the Marine Corps. And to be honest with you, had it not
been for this Committee and your strong support, Congressman
Lewis, it could have just atrophied and been the way it was
when General Castellaw and I were youngsters. So I think it has
been a grand slam home run, and it is exciting to go out there.
Thank you.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
General Castellaw. Sir, I was in Iraq over the holidays,
and I had the opportunity to go on a patrol with some Marines
who had benefitted from the training out at Twentynine Palms.
And I was in a MRAP as we were moving around. And they gave
personal testimony--I am a Southern Baptist, so I put a lot
into testimony--of the training, the use that they got out of
that training there.
So that is what we need to continue to be successful, is to
have those opportunities and those facilities that are world-
class that allow us to be successful, just like those people,
those Marines and Sailors I was with in Iraq. So thank you.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, we all know the role that the Marine Corps
has played in theater. They are our point. But in the meantime,
when it comes to budget time in DOD, oftentimes they end up
with the short end of the stick. And there are very important
items that ought to be funded that oftentimes are left off the
table, things like housing and otherwise. I mean, the work that
this Committee has done with that facility, beyond the ranges,
beyond the village, but providing adequate housing, trying to
satisfy some of the fundamental needs of the families that are
out there really in the boondocks, the Committee has done a
good job. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Well, thank you, Mr. Lewis. And you make a very
good point, that there wouldn't have to be some of these
earmarks if the priorities were built into the budget in the
first place. And this may be one of those case where it should
have been.
Mr. Lewis. More funding for defense all across the board.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Bishop.

PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT SETS

Mr. Bishop. Yes, sir.
Gentlemen, welcome.
I have a couple of questions. I am interested in the
prepositioned equipment sets. The Marine Corps drew upon the
prepositioned equipment sets to sustain your operations in Iraq
to outfit the new units that were standing up as a part of the
end-strength increase. And just this past December, our staff
visited the Marine prepositioning program and viewed the
equipment there, and it was apparent that the set in Norway is
not currently being rebuilt.
So my questions are, what is the readiness posture of the
maritime prepositioning squadrons? What will be the impact of
the proposed increase in end strength in the units on the plan
to reset the Marine Corps prepositioned equipment sets? What is
the timeline to have all of the prepositioned sets returned to
their desired readiness? And do you have sufficient depot and
production capacity available? Do you have enough money to do
it? And do you intend to add the MRAP vehicles to the
prepositioned equipment sets?
General Amos. Congressman, I will do my best to try to
remember all that, but let me start with the ones right on the
back side of it.
There is no attempt, there is no plan right now to put the
MRAP vehicles on prepositioned ships. That doesn't mean it may
not happen, but we are working through exactly what we are
going to do with our MRAPs to be good stewards of them, where
they will likely need to be used around the world. There will
be other places that MRAPs, I promise you, that MRAPs will be
the vehicle of choice, the same way they are on the major
highways in Iraq right now in the very dangerous part. But
right now, today, there is not a plan to put MRAPs on there. We
have three----
Mr. Bishop. Is there a reason why there isn't a plan for
MRAPs?
General Amos. Well, there is, sir, because they are very
large, they take up an enormous amount of room. And when we
have an MPS ship, that whole squadron, that five--some MPS
waters are six ships; a couple of them are five--and that
equipment is tailored for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that
is going to be employed coming across the beach in an assault
echelon kind of operation, or, excuse me, a sustainment kind of
operation.
It doesn't mean, again, we can't put it on there, but it
does mean that we would probably take MRAPs, if I was guessing
right now, put them on other naval shipping and get them into
the theater if the theater-specific requirement was there for
that. I mean, it is a great vehicle. We are very appreciative
of it. To date, I don't believe we have lost a single Marine in
any of the MRAPs that have been attacked. I don't think we have
lost a single one. So it has been a huge success story, and we
are very grateful.
The three MPS squadrons' worth of ships, each with a
brigade's worth of sustainment vehicles, equipment, tanks,
artillery, water, ammunition, engineering supplies, one of them
even has Navy Seabees gear on it, we have hospitalization gear
in some of them--we have three of those. MPS-3, the one in
Diego Garcia, is 100 percent. MPS-1, which is sourced off the
East Coast, normally in the Mediterranean, that is down, as of
today, down to around 42 percent. A couple of ships are down at
Blount Island right now. The remainder of those ships will come
in by June, and we expect MPS-1 to be back up to about 80
percent of its principal end items.
So MPS-1 will get up to 80 percent. We would like to get it
to 100 percent, but we are cross-loading equipment, much of
which you bought for us.
Mr. Bishop. Do you have enough money to get it up to 100?
General Amos. I don't think--well, I am going to let John
answer that.
Mr. Bishop. That would help us, I mean, because we want you
to be reset. And we don't want to be caught with the proverbial
pants down in the future.
General Castellaw. Sir, we have benefitted and are
benefitting and will benefit from approximately $10 billion in
each of the last 2 years. And when we talk about in the
baseline, the money that we got for grow-the-force and also the
money that has been designated for reset.
The Marine Corps has a lot of wants and needs, and so what
we do is we prioritize where we need it to go. So the guy and
the gal who is in the gun fight gets the stuff first. We give
them the best that they got. Anybody that goes to Afghanistan
or Iraq or Africa or deploys with the 31st MEU and the WESTPAC
have the best equipment that the Marine Corps can provide. Then
we go down through the other priorities. And as the equipment
comes in, then it goes to those priorities.
We stood up, as General Amos indicated, two battalions,
infantry battalions, last year. And we had other units that
stood up, as well. This year we will stand up another infantry
battalion and other additional units. In the coming, as we grow
the force, will, in 2009, 20 additional units, plus
reinforcements.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I guess my question really is, do you
have the resources that you need to make all of those units
meet the high standards of readiness at the time that they are
stood up, or do we need to try to look at trying to give some
additional resources, make some additional resources available
for that?
General Castellaw. As we stand up these units, we are
matching the equipment. Right now, what we have to look at, in
addition to getting the money, is whether or not the industry
and the others can actually provide the equipment. So, right
now through 2007 and 2008 and going into 2009, we have the
pipes full. It takes anywhere from 18 to 48 months to deliver
equipment. So, right now, we are pretty well filled, in terms
of the pipes.
Now, we will continue, as we see what goes on in
Afghanistan, as we see what goes on in other parts of the
world, as we look at what attrition we may have on the
equipment we got, then we will identify those additional assets
that we are going to require.
Mr. Bishop. But, basically, what you are saying is you have
the equipment for the deployed forces, and the nondeployed
forces, though, are not at readiness in terms of equipment?
General Castellaw. We have not filled up all of the
equipment sets here in CONUS, and we have not completed the
reset. Again, as the stuff comes in, as I indicated, the guys
going to the fight get it, and then we are putting it in as we
can with the remaining priorities.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

HOUSING CONDITIONS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me compliment some of those who support
you greatly. Your Marine Corps league in my State is second to
none. And I have Pete Haas as one of my constituents. And some
of those Marines may be 80 years old, but they would re-up if
they could. They are enormously proud of their service.
And I know Congressman Young and Beverly have done some
fantastic things with the Marines. But the way that you look
after one another--we have had some losses in our State, and
the way the Marines wrap themselves around the families of
those who are lost, I mean, I wish it could be emulated by some
of the services, other services. I am not criticizing the other
services, but it is truly remarkable.
A couple of questions, not in order of priority.
A couple of years ago, I was out at Camp Pendleton.
Anything been done about those gang barracks? I know Marines
never complain. I know you have other financial priorities. But
some of those guys who come back, I was led to believe, and I
saw it myself, some of those conditions were pretty deplorable.
Any improvements that you can report? And have we been giving
the means for you to take care of some of that.
General Castellaw. Sir, that it is a very good observation.
In fact, even today we had some people praying that the fires
out in California would take away some of those barracks
earlier.
But the good news is this, is that by 2012 we will have
achieved our initial goal of the BEQs. And what we are going at
is a 2.0, we call it, which means that for every two
individuals they share no more than one head facility. So that
process is in work. $2 billion is what we are going to be
spending on MILCON this coming year. We have projects at every
location in the Marine Corps right now, in terms of----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I know you never complain.
General Castellaw. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But, you know, having seen it firsthand,
something needs to be done. I mean, they deserve better. If you
are married and you have some sort of quarters, that is
something else. But for some of these people, I mean, full
speed ahead.
General Castellaw. Sir, we have 9,000 spots that we need to
fill in family housing. After this coming year, we will be down
to about 5,000. Our goal--and Commandant is beating us on the
head just like you are to get the projects under contract and
get to this 2.0 for the enlisted and to get the family housing
deficits down to as low as possible.

TRAINING BASE IN GUAM

Mr. Frelinghuysen. A brief comment. I don't think Guam will
know what will happen when--was it 8,000 or 9,000 Marines are
going to Guam? Could you tell us a little bit about that? They
are going from Okinawa to Guam. Could you tell us a little bit
about that move, how you are going to pay for it, you know,
what those Marines are going to be doing?
General Amos. Why don't I take the first part of that?
The final details on the plan are not that; they are not
finalized. It appears that we have a force layout in the
Pacific now moving a big chunk of Marines and our Sailors that
are part of the Marine team off of Okinawa and some of them to
Hawaii, a large percentage of them, roughly 10,000, to Guam.
There are training ranges up the Northern Marianas training
islands that we are trying to build into a collaborative
training base. In other words, you could put a couple of
battalions' worth of Marines and an artillery battery and a
couple of helicopter or V-22 squadrons and you may be pretty
limited in your ability to be able to train there. So you need
the ability to get off island to do some of that. So we are
developing, right now, the training plan on how we would use
that. We have yet to begin the environmental studies, which are
required, as you know.
So that is our plan. It does look like we are going to go
to Guam. It does look like a good fit for us. We will need some
help with the Northern Marianas training areas for training
ranges to develop capabilities. But I think we are going to
head in that direction, sir, but it is not finalized.

MRAP

Mr. Frelinghuysen. The figures that I heard for all the
military are in the billions of dollars. And I wasn't promoting
earmarks, but obviously it is one of those things that has to
be put in the overall mix to consider funding.
I just want to shift just back to what Mr. Bishop sort of
was involved in, the MRAPs. I mean, we have thrown our arms
around the MRAPs for the reasons that have been well-described.
They have minimized casualties.
The Army seems to be moving ahead with fairly large buys.
How would you characterize where the Marines are in that
regard? And if you aren't doing it as aggressively, are there
strategic and other reasons that you are not?
General Amos. Sir, again, I want to shout this from the
rooftops of Congress and say thank you, because I don't know in
37 years of being a Marine I have ever seen anything move
either through the industrial base or through the Department of
Defense or OSD or even Congress that has moved as fast as an
MRAP has. So it has been a tremendously good news story.
Honest to goodness, Marines love them. They feel very good
when they are in them. When you think about the casualties we
suffered with IEDs over the last 3 or 4 years, and we haven't
had that. I visited Iraq in November, looked at two staff
sergeants and a corpsman. And you may have seen the picture of
their MRAP. It was turned over on its side. It was one of the
medium-sized ones; it wasn't a small one. The whole engine was
out about 50 yards away, the front chassis was blown off, and
it was on its side. And these were the three lives that were in
it, and they stood there next to the vehicle and talked to me.
They were just completely--I mean, they were fine and very
appreciative.
So we love the vehicle. The situation, the Al Anbar
province has worked in our favor, as you know. And what we
found, not having deployed MRAPs over there except small
numbers on the highways for road clearance missions, what we
found when we put them down to our units, our companies and
platoons, and we tried to go off road with some of them, you
can get stuck. So they are really not off-road vehicles.
And so there is also a piece of this that--I remember going
into Rawah, and we drove in there on the outskirts of the town,
and everybody said, ``Okay, get out.'' Okay, we are going to
get out, and we are going to walk on a foot patrol with the
platoon that was there. And the reason they walked is because
they didn't want to send the wrong signal, because the people
of the town now believed that they were part of the solution
and they were part of the family to help them. If you drive
through there all gunned up and protected, you are sending
probably the signal you don't want to send.
So that is kind of the chemistry that has happened where we
are. It is not necessarily that way in other areas of Iraq, as
you know. So as we took a look at that, we took a look at some
of the mobility and the off-road mobility. We said, okay, how
many do we need? And the original buy was 3,700. That is still
a program of record for us. We are going, as you know, to the
JROC to get approval to lower that number to 2,225. We have
every intention of putting--it is a little bit less than 300 of
them into what we call our table of equipment for our
engineers, our EOD folks, explosive ordinance disposal, you
know, folks that do road clearance. So that will become a
permanent part of the Marine Corps and will be an enduring
requirement for that.
The rest, we are going to put some in Afghanistan when we
go in there next month. And we are working on the exact numbers
of that right now. We may end up taking a large slice of that
into Afghanistan. We have, I think I looked today, and we have
something around 900 or so MRAPs that have gone into the Marine
zone, 919 as of yesterday.
So we like them; they are successful. But there are
limitations on where you can go. Especially in some of the real
small urban areas, you can't get around a corner in that thing.
So I think the next question would be, well, okay, what are
you going to do with them, Marine Corps? And, first of all, I
want to promise you that we are going to be good stewards of
that, the same way we are all the rest of our gear. And I
suspect we are probably going to take some of these, preserve
them, have them forward deployed, maybe in the CENTCOM, Central
Command, area. If we ever go into nasty little places like
Somalia again, boy, MRAPs would be the one thing that everybody
would be clamoring for.
So I think you are going to see some forward and stores
kind of things, some prepositioned equipment there, and we will
bring some back to America. But we are going to take good care
of them. It is yet to be seen exactly what we are going to do
with them.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. Dicks.

TRAINERS FOR MRAPS

Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
And I appreciate your being here, and sorry I couldn't be
here for your testimony.
On the MRAP, when we did the up-armored Humvees and some of
those things, we bought some trainers. And as I understand it,
there is only one trainer Marine Corps has for MRAP. And
apparently these things are a little, somewhat, as you suggest,
a little bit difficult to handle.
Do you think trainers would make any sense here, in order
to get people prepared to use the MRAP when they are in
country?
General Amos. Sir, I think I know what you are talking
about. We had a couple, we call, surrogate vehicles out at
Twentynine Palms. They look like an MRAP. I am not sure whether
they were built by the same company, but they looked and kind
of smelled like one. But they really weren't one, in that they
weren't----
Mr. Dicks. Actually, I think they do these, kind of, in a
trailer. And like they do with the up-armored Humvees, they
have a trailer, and then the person is in there.
General Amos. A simulator.
Mr. Dicks. Yes, in a simulator. He thinks he is driving the
thing. And then introduce different scenarios to the driver.
General Amos. Congressman, I don't know of an MRAP
simulator, but I know exactly what you are talking about with
our seven-ton vehicles. They are called MTVRs, our big trucks.
And we have those; we have them out at Twentynine Palms. And
they--I mean, that is--because we have rolled some of these
seven-ton trucks. And you hurt a lot of Marines when you do
that.
And so we absolutely have gotten a lot of value out of
that. We have bought some. I can't tell you how many we put,
but we put some in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. I can't
tell you how many we have and would it be better to have more.
Mr. Dicks. Let me send you something on this, just so you
can take a look at it.
General Castellaw. Thank you.

V-22

Mr. Dicks. The other thing is, how is the Osprey doing?
General Castellaw. Sir, the V-22 is doing great. I also had
an opportunity to fly around Anbar in a V-22 that we have
deployed with the squadron over there. It compresses the
battlespace. I am an old frog pilot, which is an endearing name
for a CH-46, which is what the V-22 replaced. The frog does 120
knots; the V-22 does 240. Plus, it can go anywhere in Iraq
without refueling and return.
Mr. Dicks. I understand General Petraeus wants one, is that
right?
General Castellaw. Well, sir, we flew him around. He wanted
to get around and see the troops over the holidays, and there
wasn't any other aircraft that could take him in the time
allotted to the locations he wanted to go. He would have to
have done a combination fixed wing and rotary wing. With a V-
22, you can go anywhere in Iraq, as I indicated.
So the aircraft is being used in all the assault missions
that we have that type of aircraft for, plus in expanding the
usage of it. The maintenance man-hours per flight hours is 9.
To give you a comparison, the 46 is over 20. The 53 is 40.
Mr. Dicks. Is that the one that leaked from the ceiling,
the oil dripped down?
General Castellaw. Sir, if a helicopter doesn't leak, it
doesn't have any oil in it.
Mr. Dicks. I have been on a lot of Black Hawks. I have
never been on one that leaked, okay. But I was out there at San
Diego, and we were on some Marine Corps helicopters about 15
years ago, and they were just drip, drip, drip.
General Castellaw. That was probably a 53. They leak more
than 46s. But yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. I was just concerned.
General Castellaw. As I said, sir, if it is not leaking, no
oil. So you were all right.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. We did survive.
General Castellaw. But, again, 53 is over 40 maintenance
man-hours per flight hours. So the reliability and the
readiness of the aircraft is doing well also.
We will deploy the second squadron to replace the first
squadron later on this year. And then the third one will go
over after that. And so we are well along in the process of
transitioning.
Mr. Dicks. How many of these are we going to buy? How many
is the Marine Corps going to buy?
General Castellaw. 360 MV-22s.
Mr. Dicks. Where are we now in that buy?
General Castellaw. We have delivered approximately sixty.
Mr. Dicks. Sixty?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Has anybody ever thought about a multiyear on
this?
General Castellaw. Sir, we are that close right now to a
multiyear. And NAVAIR is negotiating with Boeing. We expect to
hear any day that we closed the deal on the multiyear.
In 2009, we are going to thirty. That is the number that we
want to maintain, thirty aircraft. That will allow us to
transition two squadrons a year, which is what our goal is.
Mr. Dicks. I understand one of them had an emergency
landing due to a hydraulic leak. Do we know what that is all
about, and can we get that fixed?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. On one of the control surfaces
there is an actuator, and there was a leak in that actuator.
There are three hydraulic systems on the V-22, so you have
triple redundancy. Everything worked. But the rules are that if
you have any kind of a leak or any indication that you may have
a problem, then you land. And so that aircraft landed at
Greenville. It was repaired and flew home the next day.
Mr. Dicks. They say you also had a second one that had the
same problem, and it had a hard landing a few months ago. Can
you comment on that?
General Castellaw. Sir, the one I remember that had the
hard landing, it was not that particular issue. We did have one
that had a hard landing at Camp Lejeune. And that was the exact
reason it had the hard landing. Right now it doesn't appear to
be associated with the issue that it was experiencing.
Mr. Dicks. If we buy these at a rate of 30 a year, can we
get the cost down even further, do you think?
General Castellaw. Well, that is what we expect to see when
we get this multiyear signed. Again, 30 is what that will
cover. It will cover 2008, which we bought 21. And then 2009
and on is 30. And the multiyear should bring the cost down.
Mr. Dicks. So that would be requested in the 2010 budget,
do you think? Would you request the multiyear next year, or
could Congress----
General Castellaw. Sir, you have already approved us going
to a multiyear. You have already, in your legislation, allowed
us to do the negotiation. So you are expecting us to close the
deal on this multiyear.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Tiahrt.

Remarks of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last December, the Department of Defense released
statistics about casualties in Iraq. And this is before we have
had such great success over the last year in reducing the
amount of casualties. And they listed them by service. The
least amount of casualties was the Navy, if I recall correctly,
then the Air Force, the Army. The most amount of casualties was
the Marine Corps.
But they also put in there the statistics for an African
American male living in Philadelphia between the ages of 18 and
25. And it was safer to be a Marine in Al Anbar province than
it was to be living in Philadelphia, which I found startling.
So I think it is a great tribute to the Marine Corps, to the
training and the leadership that you guys have provided.
And while we are mentioning training, General Regner and I
went to the Philippines back in 2000, I think it was. He was a
colonel at that time. When we landed and were trying to get
some things done, he bumped into a colonel in the Philippine
Army that he recognized from a class at Fort Leavenworth, which
opened a lot of doors for us, as I recall. That kind of
training I think is very important, because you don't know
where this Global War on Terror is going to take us next time.
And to be able to get off an airplane and look somebody in the
eye and remember his name when they serve under another
country's flag is very valuable. So please keep that in the
budget.
I think Congressman Frelinghuysen talked a lot about how
the Marines will do with what they got. And when it comes to
housing, a decade ago Dave Hobson held hearings in the MILCON
Subcommittee, and we brought in your top-ranking sergeant in
the Corps. And we asked him about military housing, and he kept
repeating, ``Sir, we are going to do the best we can with what
you give us.'' And, you know, I admire that, but also we need
to know the truth about where the shortfalls are, because if it
is equipment, if it is housing, if it is something we can do
for the families, for the troops, I think we all want to do
that.
One of the things I think we need to do for your boys and
girls that are coming back is to get some kind of screening for
post-traumatic stress syndrome. These kind of things are not
well-liked. Most people, even if they are suffering from some
traumatic event, are not going to admit it. So I think you
ought to put some kind of system in place that gets everybody
to take some of the stigma away.
This kind of stuff can fester for years. I have in Wichita,
Kansas, a VA hospital. There are Vietnam vets that I have met
that are still suffering from PTSD here some, in some cases, 40
years later, 30 years later. Some kids it is going to hurt.
They come back, and it festers. It ends up their families
suffer as well. If it is caught, I think we can make a
difference for these kids. And I think it is something you
ought to consider. As everybody comes through, take the stigma
away, everybody gets a screening, so that we get a chance to
save them from a life of misery, because that can happen.
I am also concerned about how we see cities like Berkeley
reject the Corps, reject the military. The mayor of Toledo did
something recently to turn down a military exercise for the
Marine Corps. I know my own cousins that are older than I am
that came back from Vietnam, some of them were spit on when
they came back to the country, and they felt that kind of
rejection. And I have to think that some of the problems that
these Vietnam vets have are related to that rejection that they
felt from their country. And I don't want that to happen again.
So if there is anything we can do to work out that. I think
we have great support in this country for the troops. But I am
concerned when I see some of these things popping up. And we
need to figure out a way to work with those cities to make sure
that this doesn't fester and become a problem as well.
I don't really have a question. I think you guys do a great
job. I want to thank you for the training, the way you bring as
many as you can home safe. And I admire the job you do. Thank
you.
General Amos. Sir, would you mind if I made a comment about
a couple of those points, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman?
Commandant Hagee, I guess probably about 3 years ago, made
the determination with regards to BEQs and how our Marines were
living, our bachelor Marines. And we had paid bills over years
with military construction money. And the person that ended
up--the group of young Marines that ended up being on the
receiving end of that, negatively, were a lot of our young
enlisted Marines with building and barracks. And so you are
absolutely right to be concerned about that.
But General Hagee, I think it was 3 years ago, said--
because this plan that General Castellaw talked about, about
completing all the construction and getting the Marines in the
right kinds of rooms, was going to go out. I mean, it was out
in 2015, 2016, 2017, because we just kind of kept shoving it to
the right of the FYDP. And General Hagee said, ``Drag it in,
men.'' And that is exactly what has happened.
So the decision was made several years ago under General
Hagee's leadership, let's build these out so you have all our
young E1s through E3s are living two to a room and all our
corporals, E4s and above, are living in a single room. They
have their own head. And so that is what is going to be
accomplished by 2012.
Well, in the meantime now, we are going to grow the force,
so we need more of that. And I think the numbers were,
somewhere out in 2014, we will have completed the rest of the
military construction.
But I just want you to know that from the building side of
the house, for our young enlisted Marines, help is on the way.
And you can see it at places like Camp Lejeune. I haven't been
to Pendleton in a while, but I will tell you, when I was at
Lejeune as the commander, we broke ground on two battalions'
worth of barracks that were appropriated out of this Committee,
brand-spanking-new ones. And we were gutting and renovating the
other ones. So, truly, help is on the way on that.
Regarding base housing--I am at Quantico now. And I had not
been here for 4 or 5 years. I had been out doing other things
in the Marine Corps. Came back, and all the, what I consider to
be, kind of nasty housing that we put our Captains and Majors
in while they are going to school down there, professional
military schools, they are all gone. They are living in
townhouses that any of us in here would go, ``Well, I would
like to put my family in there.'' They are absolutely
beautiful. I was at Miramar last week and saw the new housing
that is going up at Miramar.
So help is on the way, with regards to housing. And our
current Commandant has got the attention of his three-stars to
make this happen. So we appreciate your help on getting that.
And I think it is a good news story.
The PTSD screening, several years ago we went back in, in
March of 2004. We didn't understand it. It was kind of a soft
side of the Marine Corps that, quite honestly, probably a lot
of us just went, ``I don't know that we need to go there.''
That is not the case anymore. We have got programs, our OSCAR
program, where we are embedding mental health professionals in
our deploying battalions, Naval officers that are mental health
professionals in our deploying battalions.
We screen all our Marines, every single one, when they come
out of Iraq to go to Kuwait for a couple of days to kind of get
reoriented, turn their gear in and get cleaned up. And during
that period of time, they do their first post-deployment health
survey. Now, they can lie and cheat on that, I understand that.
But what we found was we are catching some kids that have some
symptoms and have some issues, that we are starting to pick it
up there.
What we found, about a year and a half ago, was that some
of these symptoms didn't start showing up until sometimes 3, 6,
8 months later. So we now go out at about the 180-day mark and
we bring these Marines back in by name, we track them by Social
Security number, and we make them do it again. So we are
screening them.
There are probably other things we need to be doing. But
this has caught our attention, because it is real. TBI is real.
And my sense in the fleet is that we are past the point of
manliness on this. In other words, we have some great Marines
that are very courageous that are feeling the effects of some
of this stuff, and they are coming forward. And so we are past
the point of ``I am a little bit ashamed, I have a stigma.'' I
am not saying it is completely gone, but I think we are headed
in the right direction, sir.

CONTRACTORS/CONTRACTING

Mr. Visclosky. Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you very much.
And, General, I appreciate your comments on travel by
helicopter. On contractor provided services, is there a process
or rules for as far as a cost evaluation of the discreet
services they provide that can't be provided by civilian
employees? And the reason I ask is that, excepting out
inflation, service contracts for these sort of services have
grown by about 75 percent in the last 10 years. And I am just
wondering if you could comment on that.
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. Any contracting we do, we go
through an evaluation process. What we have really tried to do
is to free up Marines so that we can use them in their primary
duties. So when we look at any particular areas that we are
looking at potentially contracting out, that is the first
thing. Are there Marines that we can take and we can reassign
them and get them into units where, again, they use what they
signed up to do? We have a process also where we continually
review that because you get a contract to, say, provide the
contract for chow hall support at Cherry Point, North Carolina,
it is continually reviewed. And if they don't meet the
standards, it can be recompeted and we can bring somebody else
in. So there is a set of standards in place. There is a process
in place where we try to ensure that we get the best buck for
the dollar and that, where it is appropriate, that we use
contracts.
Mr. Visclosky. Is there a determination when you make those
evaluations as to whether or not you should do it in-house with
other civilian employees who are on a permanent basis?
General Castellaw. Sir, there is a process called A-76, and
you are probably at least somewhat familiar with it. And what
we look to see is whether it is inherently governmental or not.
If it is inherently governmental, we are going to continue to
do it with Marines or with government civilians. If it is not,
then we'll look at contracting it out and using that type of
support in order to accomplish the mission.
Mr. Visclosky. So, in a sense, 10 years ago, you had, from
what you are saying, Marines doing a lot more nongovernmental
functions than they probably should have been at that time, and
they can be replaced by independent service contractors?
General Castellaw. What we did is looked at areas on where
we could again free Marines up to do their primary MOS. When
General Amos and I came in, Marines were doing chow hall duty
and cleaning plates and carrying out the garbage and doing
stuff like that. That is one thing that we contracted out. And
I haven't met a Marine yet who wasn't happy that we didn't do
it. So that is what we continue to look for, is for
opportunities like that.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. It also gives the Marines the chance to train in
their unit and do the thing, as you suggested, that they signed
up for. This was one of the things, I mean, there was a lot of
criticism 20 years ago in the military reform group about,
there were so many people doing this other kind of work and
that this was a better way to go.
Mr. Visclosky. Do you find contractors working beside
uniform personnel in instances doing essentially the same jobs
on occasion?
General Castellaw. In most cases, no. Again, I will stay
with the example of the chow hall. What you will have is you
will have a Marine that is running the chow hall. He will be in
charge. It will be usually a senior staff NCO. We will also
have cooks there that will work alongside the cooks that are
from that particular contracting organization. Why? It is
because when we go to the field and when we deploy and when we
do our expeditionary thing, we need cooks that know how to do
that. So there will be cases like this where, yes, they will be
working alongside them. But it will be for a good reason
because we want to use them in our primary role which is to be
an expeditionary force in readiness.

DWELL TIME

Mr. Visclosky. On dwell time, apparently the practice of
the current period of time with the Marine Corps is 7 months
and 7 months. And with the Army, it is about a year and a year.
Any reason as to the differential? And do you see benefits with
the 7 months, or is this something particular with the corps
that works better for you than a year and a year?
General Castellaw. Let me take a shot at that, and then
General Amos will jump in. I think it is our view and then both
of our spouses are heavily involved in working with the
families of Marines and Sailors that belong to these
organizations. And I can tell you that for us 7 month chunks
are about right. With 7 months, you still have the opportunity
to see the light at the end of the tunnel, to come back. And
even if you are on a one-to-one--and again it is really--most
Army units are on a one-to-one, too. Theirs just happens to be
12 months or--gone and 12 months back. But what we are finding
in the Marine Corps is that it is better for us morale-wise and
produces less stress on our families. Again, it is our culture,
because we grew up with all these 6-month deployments. For 20
years, I deployed 6 or 7 months at a time aboard ships going to
the Mediterranean. So that is a type of culture and environment
that we understand and we know how to plan our lives around.
And it continues to work for us.
General Amos. Our regimental headquarters, all of the
headquarters that are commanded by colonels and generals are
there for 13 months. In other words, so we rotate the units
underneath them. The battalions and the squadrons come in for 7
months and go out. You know, they are on the 7-month rotation.
The only reason why the headquarters are not on 7-month
rotations is we want continuity. In other words, we don't want
the disruption. We don't want seams that the enemy could
exploit. So we put the headquarters--and we just said, you have
to suck it up. You are there for 13 months. And during that 13
months, they get to come home for 2 weeks back in the
continental United States. I mean, it is not like 2 days
traveling, you know, going one way in 2 days instead of 3, so
you are really home for 10 days. It is when you hit home, you
hit your home for 2 weeks. Many years ago, in Vietnam, we would
go over there for 3 months. And that is a long time. I did not
go to Vietnam, but I got in at the tail end of it. And I was
gone for 13 months as a young married lieutenant, and it was a
long, long 13 months.
As General Castellaw said, 7 months, Marines just
appreciate it. When the Commandant came out and he kind of dug
in on that thing and said Marines are going to go for 7 months,
you couldn't hear it, but you can imagine the high fives that
went up around the Marine Corps from all the young corporals
and sergeants and lieutenants who said, good, the Commandant is
taking care of me and my family. So it is a morale issue, and
it works for us. That is probably about as good an answer as I
can give you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. One more question on the same theme----
Mr. Lewis. That question was great.
Mr. Visclosky. I found that the culture had been
essentially the 6-month rotation, but I find that interesting,
yeah. On dwell times, given the stress and the responsibilities
you have, are many of those being cut short, or are you seeing
in some instances less dwell time at home for members of the
Marine Corps? And if so, how do you try to compensate for that
when it does occur?
General Amos. Sir, we have units that are what we call one-
to-one. We have a couple of units that are a little bit less
than one-to-one simply because they are one-of-a-kind
organizations. For instance, our unmanned aerial squadrons or
UAV squadrons, we have only got two of them. Now, one of the
things that has happened is we are buying more UAVs, and we are
going to, 202k growth is going to give us some more bodies. So
now we will have the equivalent numbers of people where we can
parcel them out. But right now, they are gone for 7 months,
excuse me, yeah, gone for 7 months and home whatever .85 of 7
is. Something probably around 6 months. And then they go again.
So we do have some units that are less than that. Our
explosive ordnance disposal, the military police, intelligence,
human intelligence, UAV, some of our helicopter squadrons are 1
to 1. Our infantry battalions are 1 to 1.2, yet we still have
infantry battalions that are home for 1 to 2. But the average
across the 26 active battalions we have right now is 1 to 1.2.
So there are some that are less than one-to-one. We are going
to 1 to 2 with the 202k growth. When we get up to 202k growth,
assuming we don't spread ourselves real, real thin, much
thinner than we are right now, then we will find ourselves to a
1 to 2 dwell across the Marine Corps.
Mr. Moran. Thank you. But we are going to have to start
speeding this up a bit because we are told that we may have
votes at 3:20, in about 10 minutes.
Mr. Kingston.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I wanted to ask you about, and I am not sure who
wants the question, But in terms of recruiting and retention, I
understand that you have met your recruiting and retention
goals. But the GAO said that there are some shortages in
occupational specialties, human care, human intelligence
collection, explosive ordnance disposal. Is that correct? And
what is being done about that?
General Amos. Sir, you are absolutely right. We have met
our goals. We are ahead of them as a matter of fact. Some of
those, like linguist human intelligence, explosive ordnance
disposal, when you become an EOD Marine, you generally go up,
you come up through the ordnance field. You are doing business
in ordnance. And by the time you become a sergeant and you have
shown a level of maturity that you can go off to school and
then become, and if you have the inclination, then we will send
you off to explosive ordnance disposal school. So it is a
little bit like buying vehicles, putting them under contract.
It takes each unit 36 months before you can finally get them
out the other end. That is what happens with some of these
folks.
Signals intelligence or cryptologists, EOD, that takes a
lot of schooling. And we generally will put some young guys in
every now and then, but usually there is a level of maturity
that we want to have to begin with to go in there, as you might
imagine, if you are going to go out there and do some of this
either intellectually or some of the physical things, like our
EOD folks. So, there are. The 202k build when it is done is
going to satisfy our requirements for what we, all these low
density, high-demand kind of MOSs. But the truth is, even in
2011, when we finish 202k, there will probably still be some
shortages in some of those unique MOSs while we grow; in other
words, while we mature those select kind of Marines to go into
those fields simply because it takes a lot longer to train them
and a higher level of maturity than it does for just a basic
mechanic.
Mr. Kingston. When you recruit someone the first time, what
is your targeted group? I mean, just generally, to get it, when
I say ``first time,'' generally to get them in the Marines
without any specialty or anything like that? What do you look
for? And specifically, I am wondering about second-generation
service members. If their parents were in, does that make the
recruit probably more likely as a target to join?
General Amos. You know, I am a second-generation; my dad
was in the Navy. He didn't talk to me for many years when I
joined the Marines, but he loves me now. I don't know. My
children are not and I don't--I am not a recruiter, so I
probably can't answer that precisely. I will tell you, though,
that our target audiences, the young 18, 20-year-old man or
woman, high school graduate and as you know, the DOD standard
is 90 percent. We are over 95 percent. We recruit a very high
mental group. When I say that in public, people look and they
go, that is an oxymoron, you are the Marines, what do you mean
getting a very high mental group? But we do, we do. And we
attract a small segment of our society that likes physical--you
know, they are physically inclined, and they want to be
challenged.
Mr. Kingston. How does something like what happened in
Berkeley affect--what is--do you just kind of ignore the City
Council and their silliness, or does it just annoy you to the
extent that you want to react or at least among peers verbally
react?
Mr. Moran. Let's make the answer short because we have
votes.
Mr. Kingston. Mr. Chairman, everybody else has been having
10 or 15 minutes. This is an extremely good question and you
know it. And it will be my last one.
Mr. Moran. How long----
Mr. Kingston. The Chairman is real interested in this
answer.
General Amos. Honest to goodness, the--once we kind of--it
certainly takes a Marine and immediately, you know, your veins
begin to pop out, and then you settle down and you take a look.
And what is interesting for us is there is such a network of
former Marines across this country that we never have to say
anything. We saw it happen with the attorney that defaced our
deployment Marine's car up in Chicago. He ended up in front of
a judge; that was a former Marine. The prosecutor was a former
Marine and the policeman that arrested him was a former Marine.
So there is enough of us, a connection across the country quite
honestly, and the loyalty to its Corps by the American people
that they kind of take care of it. And it seems to be happening
that way in Berkeley. So we are actually just sitting on the
side lines. It is interesting reading it in the newspaper.
Mr. Kingston. It is like picking on a Notre Dame fan, Mr.
Chairman. You just can't do it and get away with it. I
appreciate it, and I yield back.
Mr. Moran. Ms. Kaptur.

Remarks of Ms. Kaptur

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Generals, very much and thank you for your service
to our country. I am curious. In your testimony, where did the
phrase ``the long war'' come from? Was that your own?
General Amos. Ma'am, that was actually coined by, I think,
General Abizaid when he was the commander of Central Command. I
believe he was the one that coined the long war. It has been
supported by a whole host of studies. The Commandant has a
vision group that has been in business now for about a year to
try to look out on what the world is going to look like in
2025. And it seems to support General Abizaid's thing about
generations of warfare of the kind we are in right now.
Ms. Kaptur. And how long is long?
General Amos. I think you are probably talking 20 years.
That seems to be the default position that I hear as I talk to
other Services and think tanks. Probably several generations,
but probably out for at least another 20 years.
Ms. Kaptur. Now, when one discusses the long war as going
back 5 years, the United States had some allies in this effort.
Is it your impression that, as we move forward, there are fewer
allies involved with us? And I am talking about on the ground
inside of the places in which we are fighting. What is your
estimate of the allied support for this long war?
General Amos. Ma'am, I had 2 years in NATO. And so I was
there when we went from 16 countries to 19, and I worked
alongside our allies. So I think that will be cyclical
depending on the leadership of the countries that support our
allies. I will tell you that we have some stalwart allies, like
the Australians and the U.K., New Zealand. They are right
beside us and have been beside us and fought alongside of us
when we crossed the border in March of 2003. So I can't tell
you how the allies are going to work because I think that is
going to be dependent on the leadership.
Ms. Kaptur. Is it not true that foreign forces from many
countries have been reduced now to a level around 10,000 from a
level maybe four or five times that much 5 years ago?
General Amos. Are you talking about in Afghanistan, ma'am?
Ms. Kaptur. And Iraq.
General Amos. I will have to take that for the record
because I truly don't know the numbers.
[The information follows:]

Currently, there are approximately 10,000 troops from 31
countries serving with the United States in Iraq. Coalition
Forces in Iraq peaked at just over 25,000 around December 2004.
Currently, there are approximately 40,000 troops from 42
countries serving with the United States in Afghanistan.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. I think my statement is correct. I
think that it has been reduced by about four-fifths in terms of
participation in on-the-ground combat. If you could provide
those figures for the record, I would be very grateful. Also,
our allies were supposed to provide funding, and that funding
has not materialized. I think they paid up about $12 billion.
They were supposed to have much more than that, four or five
times that much in the pot. If you could kindly provide for the
record the amount of funding that has come from other countries
and which country, I would be very grateful.
I keep hearing references to World War II. This doesn't
look like World War II to me. But maybe somebody has a
different take on it, and I would be very interested on how
they do view it over at DOD. Let me just say, Congressman
Tiahrt, I'm sorry he is not here right now because he
referenced my home community of Toledo. I get a little
sensitive about that. And he made some statement about our
mayor, Carty Finkbeiner, who is a mayor--he has been a life-
long public official in our area and, I feel compelled to ask
some questions for the record here. I want to also state that
our community and region just deployed another 2,500 soldiers
to Iraq from the Reserve and Guard, the largest deployment
since World War II. So I don't think we have anything to
apologize about for our community and its patriotism. But I
have to inquire as to how the Marines--and what happened in our
community was there was a unit that had come from Grand Rapids,
Michigan, and deployed in the center part of our city. There
was some sort of mix up in the city. I don't know what it was.
But normally, Toledo, when it sees Marines, it is at Toys For
Tots at Christmastime and holiday time and Hanukkah time. This
was a different sort of presence. And, yes, they had been there
before. My question is, can you provide me information on--
under what authority the Marine Corps is taking its Reserve
Units and deploying them to American cities? I would like to
know which cities you are deploying to. I would like to know
under what terms those units are being deployed. Are they
paid--are they paying the city governments or local communities
for their presence? I would like to know what types of weapons
they carry and whether those weapons are loaded or not. And
what are the terms of engagement, both with the local community
and with the local police or whatever? And could you--are you
aware of these deployments around the country, these exercises
going into civilian communities?
General Castellaw. We have been training in various
locations throughout this great Nation of ours for years and
years. There is a process that we have in place where we engage
with the local authorities and make plans for doing that. As
you indicated, there appears to have been a communications
problem that occurred in this particular case. But for many,
many years now, we have successfully been training in various
locations, New Orleans, Charlotte, San Francisco, Yuma,
Arizona. And again, we think a pretty good process for engaging
and planning with it and doing those things that do not disrupt
the local citizenry. So, you know, I think we will all do a
post mortem on this and see what the issue was so it won't
happen again. I don't think any of us want that.
Ms. Kaptur. I would like a special briefing by whoever is
in charge of the Reserve Units that developed these plans for
around the country. Because what happened to our mayor, in my
opinion, regardless of whoever thinks he is at fault or
whatever, for him to become the butt of contention on all these
shock jock shows around the country is unfair to his life
because he has been a very dedicated public official and made
the butt of jokes across this country. And I don't agree with
him on everything, but this is not right. And I don't know
quite what happened there, but it is really--for somebody in
the political realm to see this happening in their community
and not be able to stop it--I got home, all this stuff is all
over the TV, you know, 3 days before you come over here to make
your testimony. Maybe it is all just coincidental. But I have
to tell you, Toledo, Ohio, doesn't like it because we have very
patriotic people. We are in all the branches of the service.
And for our mayor and the highest elected officials of our city
to get in a fight over this, this is ridiculous. And so I
would--are you in a position to come and someone see me
separately on what actually, not just happened there, but what
these plans are across the country?
General Castellaw. Ma'am, it is our duty to make sure that
the people that we protect in the United States understand what
we do, and you know, we do not want this to occur just as much
as you do. And I understand----
Ms. Kaptur. It is a public relations nightmare.
[The information follows:]

Lt Gen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally
met with Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue
and answer her questions.

Mr. Moran. But, General, if you wouldn't mind perhaps
getting the appropriate people to discuss the details with Ms.
Kaptur, the Committee would be appreciative.
General Castellaw. We would love to.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Chairman, I will pass.
Mr. Moran. Thanks very much, Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Rothman.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Chairman.
Generals, thank you for being here. Thank you for your
careers, your sacrifices and those of your families. I will ask
two questions so I can get the answers. Hopefully--they are
complicated big questions, and I apologize for the small amount
of time that I have to ask them in. The National Defense
Research Institute from RAND Corporation did a
counterinsurgency study that just came out, a public study. And
I don't agree with everything they have in the report, but they
say that in order to address our counterinsurgency needs, we
need to, quote, ``reduce reliance on large-scale ground
presence, to support civil capabilities of the local
governments, to make more and smarter use of information, to
prepare and enable local forces and to perform critical
military tasks that only our forces can perform''. Do you buy
that as your role as Marines? And if so, in whole or in part,
does your budget reflect your acceptance or rejection of that
notion of how you should conduct counterinsurgency? That is
question one. And question two, I apologize for putting you on
the spot. But I read that the Marine Commandant suggested that
it might be a good idea to send Marines to Afghanistan to help
out and that that proposal was rejected in large measure. Can
you comment on what difference you think the Marines could make
in Afghanistan? And what was the basis for that proposal? And
when we can expect the Marines to be in Afghanistan.
General Castellaw. I will take your second question first
to give my compatriot there a little bit more time to think
about your first one. First of all, 3,200 Marines are going to
Afghanistan in the spring. Our job in the Marine Corps is to
provide this nation and the leadership options for use of our
forces. And certainly we continue to provide those--that advice
to the leadership within the building, and when appropriate,
the Commandant, one of the Joint Chiefs, has a responsibility
to provide that to the President. And he meets with the
President on a regular basis and that President avails himself
of that particular advice. The Marine Corps is an expeditionary
force in readiness. We have various capabilities, other than
our primary role, and we are exercising that now in terms of
operating in Iraq. But, as indicated, the situation there now
continues to improve. I think we have been very successful, and
so we will continue to look for options for Marines to be used
where their particular talents may be best utilized, and we
will make those recommendations and then the leadership will
decide where the Marines need to be.
The Marines right now on a one-time basis are being ordered
to Afghanistan. We will send a battalion, as General Amos
indicated--I am sorry, sir, I think you weren't here when
General Amos talked about it--out closer to the border. We'll
have the Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is a balanced--what
we call a MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force which will
operate in the south. It has helicopters. It has Harriers. It
has ground mobility. It has combat service support. And it will
fill a role in that part of the country. So, yes, we are going
to Afghanistan. Right now it intends to be one deployment. And
we think that the situation as it exists in Afghanistan right
now, that we can make a difference there, too.

HYBRID WARFARE

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, general.
General Amos. Sir, I have not read the RAND study, and I
thought I had read a lot of what was going on with this. So I
apologize. But I am just--but if they are dealing with
counterinsurgencies, and I took notes here as you talked about
reduced reliance on large scale forces, there is a fashion that
is going around that, and I have heard this in other quarters,
where we no longer need the ability to have what we would
typically call traditional, traditional forces, to perform
traditional missions because of where we are headed. I think
there is a piece of that that probably is truthful. If you take
a look at, and we talked a little bit earlier about the long
war, what the war is probably likely going to look like, the
kind of wars we are most likely going to find ourselves
involved in, not necessarily wars, but issues, countries,
nation building, stateless people moving back and forth across
borders driven by national disasters in some cases, driven by
extremism of one kind or another in other cases. And that is
the kind of thing that we call in the Marine Corps hybrid
warfare. And it is--back in 1996, General Kulak talked about
the three-block war where he said: Men, you can expect to be
handing out candy and food and medical supplies in one block,
go down to the next block and try to get the populace under
control in a kind of peace enforcement kind of a thing, a
little bit like we did in Kosovo. And then in the next block,
you will find yourself in full scale combat. And all within the
same unit, probably all in maybe one day. And that is a little
bit what hybrid warfare is like. So if you take a look out, and
I think that is what RAND is referring to, that kind of future,
which is not necessarily the most dangerous thing, but it is
probably the most likely thing that we are going to be involved
in, then I would agree that we need to adjust forces and
capabilities. And I think that is the key, capabilities.
Mr. Rothman. General, my question was, does your budget
reflect the need for this hybrid capability?
General Amos. Sir, I am going to say yes because we are
building, in this 202k build, we are building capabilities to
be able to operate successfully in that kind of environment.
And what are those? Those are people that are military
policemen, intelligence, reviewing, language training, culture
training, both professionally here and resident and
nonresident. So the answer is yes. I believe we are, yes.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, general.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Dicks has a follow-up question.

MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Dicks. What happened, there were going to be 2,500
Marines into a Special Forces Unit? Is that still going
forward?
General Amos. Sir, it is called Marine Special Operations
Command. It is headquartered down in Camp Lejeune. It comes
under SOCOM, Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson. And it
is not 2,500 yet. It is going to be at 2,500. It is at 1,200
right now. And as we grow the Marine Corps force, again it is
just like equipment. We are sharing assets across the Marine
Corps as we cross level. So we are doing our best to get that
force fleshed out. But truth in lending, it will be a couple of
years before we reach 2,500. But it exists. They have already
deployed. And it is under command of a two-star general right
now.
Mr. Dicks. When you come home on these 7-month deployments
and you are back 7 months, do you have the equipment you need
to train with or is that an issue like it is for the Army and
the Guard?
General Amos. It is an issue right now. And it is not so
much an issue, I don't think, that the money is not there, and
General Castellaw can talk. I think he will tell you the money
is there. It is just a function of production. We are spread
loading, cross leveling across the Marine Corps the equipment
at home station, so that when units are deployed, they have got
exactly what they need. The units that are preparing to deploy.
They have exactly what they need. And the units that have just
come back, quite honestly, are at a readiness level that is
less than the other units. So until we get to a point where all
the equipment shows up--and again, it is, a lot of it is
production. It is a function of physics. They can't make it.
Some of these lines were closed. And so we have asked or we
bought new equipment that replaces that. So some of our units
back home are not at the same level as our deployed units.
There is no question about it.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Lewis.

COUNTERBOMBER CAPABILITY

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One question. It is my understanding, General, that you are
quite familiar with this effort, maybe in the center of doing
it, that the Marines are sending this month 12 modern person-
borne IED suicide bomber detection systems to Iraq which will
be integrated. And the purpose is to get a better handle on
using these systems and effectively identifying ahead, with
better timing, such devices. Can you describe what you are
doing there, and what you think the potential is?
General Amos. Yes, sir. About a year ago, the Commander of
Marine Forces Central Command came to me, only because I have
got the war-fighting level, I have got the experimentation,
science and technology out of Quantico, and we are plugged into
the Office of Naval Research. And he said, hey, we need what we
call a counterbomber capability. Not so much because we are
seeing the suicide bombers in the Al Anbar province because,
quite honestly, we are not relatively speaking. We did before.
We had vehicle born folks. But we are not seeing it like they
are seeing it perhaps in other areas and certainly you are
starting to begin to see in Afghanistan. But he said, let's see
if we can develop one. So we already had some techniques and
some capabilities. But we went to the Office of Naval Research,
Admiral Landay. And he has an effort--now it is called Naval
Innovation Lab. It is called NaIL. And we asked him to put $10
million towards the development of a counterbomber capability.
And they have done that. Now, I have seen it. I have gone out
and watched it in action. We are going to deploy 12 of them.
The forces, we have just turned over the forces in Iraq just
within the last 2 to 3 weeks and the new command from Camp
Pendleton who, you know, Major General----
General Castellaw. I just went blank, too.
General Amos [continuing]. John Kelly. Excuse me. Don't
tell him I couldn't remember his name. John Kelly just took
over, and we have trained John's forces with this equipment.
And so we have delivered four sets?
Mr. Lewis. That is our John Kelly.
General Amos. Your John Kelly. That is exactly right. That
is why I am embarrassed. I will hear about it on an e-mail
tonight. But we have deployed four sets already. We are
deploying another four. And this is a manufacturing issue right
now. It is not a matter of money. The money is there. And then
we are going to deploy another four in Afghanistan. This is a
radar capability. It shows promise. We haven't deployed it in
tough conditions yet in the freezing cold and the 125 degree
weather. So it is yet to be seen exactly, so we are in the
experiential phase. But we decided we are going to push this
into country to get this.
Now, this correlates with some other capabilities we have
got. We have got a thermal imaging capability. We have got
backscatter vans. I mean, we are trying our best to get ahead
of this counterbomber business. But I think right now I am
excited about it; I am anxious to see how it works.
Mr. Moran. The gentleman from Georgia.

TRAINING

Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
General, I just want to associate myself with the words of
Ms. Kaptur. I don't understand the Toledo, Ohio, issue either.
It doesn't quite seem like the public discussion of it has been
accurate. It would appear that there was a major paperwork
snafu somewhere along the line that this wasn't cleared because
I was not aware that the Marines were training in cities and
urban areas until you just said that they were. But when you
respond to her, I would like to be included in that because it
does--I am confused by the whole matter. I don't think the
press has given us an adequate explanation.
General Castellaw. Well, good, sir. Again, we will be more
than happy to provide whatever information we can that you
need. But we have been training--when I was back in my youth, I
deployed to New Orleans, and we trained in urban operations in
New Orleans, landed 46 on the old Schlitz Brewery right down
from the New Orleans Picayune newspaper. So New Orleans knew we
were there. We made appropriate coordination with them. And it
is extremely valuable training. What we are talking about is
getting training that allows our Marines and the Sailors that
go with them to be effective in those type of environments. And
training has been extremely, extremely valuable for us. But it
is extremely important that we maintain the relationship with
the local communities which gives us our support and of who, of
course, our ultimate responsibility for their defense lies. So
I am very glad that this issue came up so that at least we can
talk with you and explain to you what is going on to at least
allay some of your concerns if you have any on that.
Mr. Moran. General, do you think they had prior approval of
the government, the local government?
General Castellaw. Oh, yes, sir. Again, you work with the
local--for instance, the FBI for a time being provided a
liaison that worked with the local authorities, and we had the
structure set up to do this. And as I said, we have been doing
this with great success for a long period of time and something
happened here. We will find out what it is. We do not want to
scare the people of Toledo or San Francisco or Yuma, Arizona,
or any place like that. But most of all, we want their support.
We want your support. We will find out what went wrong. We will
talk with you about it. We will explain what happened, and we
will go forward because we need your help and support to be
successful.
Mr. Moran. Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. Kaptur. I just want to thank the gentleman from Georgia
for offering, and the General, state for the record what year
were you deployed to New Orleans?
General Castellaw. Yes, ma'am, New Orleans.
Ms. Kaptur. What year?
General Castellaw. This was 1988.
Ms. Kaptur. 1988. And how many urban units would you have
deployed this year, Reserve Units into urban areas?
General Castellaw. Ma'am, I will get the record for that.
That is not my area of expertise. And again, it is so routine,
you know, that we really don't give a lot of notice to it. Let
me get the people who are responsible for that and along with
them, they will come and talk with you and explain what we are
doing.
[The information follows:]

Lt Gen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally
met with Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue
and answer her questions.

Ms. Kaptur. And I really think that, I mean, at some point,
as this proceeds, I believe, Mr. Chairman, but our Mayor and
our community, we have to repair this. And 2 years ago, we had
Sailor of the year from Toledo. So we are pretty sensitive. We
are a port city. We like Marines. But that was really
unfortunate.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS

Mr. Dicks. Just on the 7 months in and 7 months out, have
you done any research to see if the post-traumatic stress--it
seems intuitive that it would be less with people that have
been there for less time, unless they were obviously in very
violent combat. Is there anything to suggest that that is a
positive aspect of this?
General Amos. Sir, there has not been any clinical effort
done to try to determine or make a correlation between lower
amounts of PTSD and 7-month deployment. The one thing I can
tell you, having spent 4 years doing that, that before I came
to the job I have got, that the morale factor among family
members and the willingness for family members to stand by
their Marine, whether it be a man or a woman, and say goodbye
to them and have a smile on their face and kind of get through
the deployment even during very dangerous times, a lot had to
do with the fact that they knew they were going to be back in 7
months. So, right now, it is intuitive goodwill. But there has
been no clinical effort.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Boyd.

READINESS

Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Generals, both, for your service. I have one
brief question. One of you answered earlier that one of your
roles was to give the leaders options for security, and
military purposes. It is my understanding and this Committee's
understanding it has been reported that the Marines that are
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are well equipped and well
trained. Would you agree with that?
General Amos. Sir, they absolutely are. They are every bit
equipped and well equipped with everything they need to include
special things that you would need in Afghanistan that you
might not need in Iraq. And trust me, they are very well
trained.
Mr. Boyd. Secondly, it is also my understanding from
previous hearings we have had here that the Marine Corps is
almost totally focused on Iraq and Afghanistan and would be ill
equipped and trained to deal with a major contingency in some
other part of the world. Is that a fair assessment?
General Amos. Sir, your first statement that we are almost
unitarily focused on Iraq and Afghanistan is absolutely
correct. The size of our force, 187,000 and rotating as we do,
we are a singularly focused force. And that was the beginning
reason and rationale behind the growth to 202,000 by our
Commandant. He said we have got to be able to do some of the--
Congress has tasked us; we have legislation that tell us the
Marine Corps has to be a forceable entry force to come from the
sea. We have a directive from the strategic planning guidance
to be able to put two Marine Expeditionary Brigades ashore from
the sea, forceable entry. I mean, that is kicking the door
down. And we have got, the Commandant has said, we have got
generations of Captains now that have never been aboard a ship.
So as we grow the force, we get some more elasticity, more
dwell time. And then, and it is our responsibility as the
leadership of the Corps now to make sure we provide the
training environment, the shipping. That is why Twentynine
Palms is so critical to us, to be able to do the fire and the
maneuver and the other things.
Mr. Boyd. So it would be a fair statement to say, if there
was some major contingency someplace else and the Marines were
asked to go there, that you would have to adjust that focus? It
would be a serious adjustment and change?
General Amos. Sir, if there was a major contingency, my
first point would be the Marines would step up to the plate.
That is not bravado. We have done it. We did it during Korea
when we came down after World War II. We were down to 27,000
from 300,000 during World War II. And President Truman and
Secretary of Defense Johnson said, you don't need a Marine
Corps anymore. And one year later, we are developing plans for
Inchon. So the Marines will step up to the plate. There is
enough experience with some of the older guys, the old gunnery
sergeants that we could put together a force that could come
from the sea and do our Nation's bidding. I promise you that.
It would not be without pain. What we want to do is get
ourselves ready to the point where we can do that across the
full spectrum of operations all the time the way we have always
been in the past. But we are solely focused right now, and that
is why the bill and your support for the bill is so critically
important.
Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Generals, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TRAINING

Mr. Dicks. Will the General give just one last point for a
second. The Army is doing counterinsurgency training now. Is
the Marine Corps doing something different when they are home
for 7 months?
General Amos. Sir, because of our deployment dwell time, we
are focused almost solely on what goes on inside of Iraq. In
other words, counterinsurgency training, operating in that kind
of environment, that is why we need to get something--a little
more elasticity in there so that we can do the other kind of
training, the fire and maneuver, bring three battalions to
Twentynine Palms. The land expansion at Twentynine Palms is
critical for that. So we can do the kind of training that the
Nation expects its Marines to do. Quite honestly, we are the
only forceable entry force our country has, and we want to be
able to train in that arena.
Mr. Dicks. Why not go in with V-22s instead of little
boats?
Mr. Moran. That will be our final question.
General Castellaw. Sir, a V-22 can go anywhere in the
world. What happens next is what we have to focus on.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, General Amos. Thank you
General Castellaw.
Thursday, February 14, 2008.

ARMY READINESS

WITNESSES

LT. GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, U.S. ARMY
LT. GENERAL STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8, U.S. ARMY
LT. GENERAL MICHAEL D. ROCHELLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, U.S. ARMY

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. The hearing will come to order.
We will start a little earlier. We appreciate that today
because we may be disrupted to vote. So, hopefully, we will be
able to have enough time to let you say what you have to say.
I don't think there's any committee that's ever done more
to make sure of that readiness is funded. We will work with you
and let you work with us. I think we can do the best we could
with the circumstance.
I welcome you to the committee and ask Mr. Frelinghuysen if
he has any comments.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. No comments.
Mr. Murtha. We will listen to your testimony. If you will
put your full testimony in the record, we will get right down
to questions.
General Thurman, whoever is first.

Summary Statement of General Thurman

General Thurman. I will go first. I do have a short opening
statement for you, sir, if you will allow me, as you have
studied my written statement that I have provided.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Young and distinguished
members of the House Appropriations Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to allow me to speak to you and let my
colleagues and I come over and talk to you about the state of
Army readiness. On behalf of the United States Army and all the
wonderful soldiers and civilians and our family members, I
thank you for the continued congressional funding and support
that you provided us.
The readiness of our all-volunteer force depends on your
consistent and committed investment in our training, equipment,
total transformation and our people. Your funding and support
also ensures that the Army will achieve the strategic depth
needed to successfully execute missions across the full
spectrum of operations.
Before I continue, I would like to introduce members of the
Army staff who are here with me.
To my left is Lieutenant General Michael Rochelle, who is
the Army G-1; and to my right is Lieutenant General Speakes,
the Army G-8. To my right here is Major General Vinnie Bowles,
Deputy G-4. Then to my left here is Ms. Barbara Sisson, who is
the Director of Installation Services.
After two deployments in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, I now know that the progress never unfolds inevitably.
Progress is always carried forward by the men and women of this
country who serve a cause greater than themselves. For that
reason, I want to publicly thank our soldiers, the true
strength of the Nation, whose patriotism and courage exemplify
all warrior ethos.
Every soldier has a choice of whether to serve our Nation,
especially during a time of war, and that clearly defines their
role when special services require long separations from their
families.
I must thank the families who have served this country as
well as anyone who has ever worn this uniform. Families
continue to show that they too, believe in serving one's Nation
by their numerous sacrifices. And we all know there will be
more, and we thank them for that.
Mr. Chairman, our Army has demonstrated extraordinary
flexibility in leading the strategic demands posed by
globalized asymmetric threats. The total Army is feeling the
cumulative effects of nearly seven years of war in what we
believe is an era of persistent conflict. This has led to our
Army being out of balance. We are stretched; we are not broken.
Four imperatives will enable the Army objectives to restore
balance by 2011, and that's what the Chief of Staff of the Army
has placed as our number one priority--getting back in
balance--and that will allow us to build the required readiness
for the future.
First, we must sustain our soldiers, families and our
civilians. Second, we are obligated to prepare soldiers for
success in current operations. Third, we must reset to restore
the readiness and depth for future operations. Finally, it is
critical that we continue to transform our Army so that we have
full spectrum capabilities to meet the demands of the 21st
century.
I would like to state for the record, if you would allow
me, what we believe we need to do to achieve full spectrum
readiness and restore that strategic depth.
First, we must accelerate the growth that our Army has been
authorized, which is more than just increasing manning but,
rather the growth of personnel, equipment, and facilities.
Second, we must build sufficient strategic depth for full
spectrum operations to fulfill increasing global demands in our
formations, in order to meet combatant commanders'
requirements.
Third, we must continue to obtain your full support that
you give us, in a timely manner so we are allowed to transform
our Army and be ready to meet the current operations and future
contingencies.
Again, on behalf of nearly 1.1 million soldiers, families
and our civilians, we want to thank all of you for your
tremendous support that you have given us. It's not lost on us
what you have done, and we are grateful for it.
I will save any further comments on readiness for the
question and answer period and thank you for allowing us to
come over here today and speak to you and respond to your
questions. We stand ready to answer your questions, sir.
[The statement of Lieutenant General Thurman follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. All right, well, we appreciate what you have
just said.
You know our concern about your readiness. I remember when
we went to the all volunteer Army, and I voted against it,
because I felt that we couldn't sustain a long deployment
without a draft. We lost that battle, but I remember during
that period of time I kept hearing we have got to have high
school graduates. Well, high school graduates dropped from 94
to 79 percent. We didn't take anybody with tattoos for a while.
We are now waiving criminal records and drug problems. We are
waiving twice as many as we waived before. I know it's a very
difficult task for you folks when you are given a certain
number of people you have to reach out to.
And I can remember when I went into the Korean War, this
guy next to me, they said, raise his arm; and he raised it
about this high. That's fine, they said. So there are different
standards at different times when you take people in.
But what I worry about is that the technology is so vastly
different than it was when I was there. I went in 1955, I got
out and went back in 1966, and the only thing that was changed
was the alphabet.
There are some big changes in the last 10 years. Anybody
that is in the service today has to know a little bit about
computers, and you have to be educated better than you used to
be.
I went to Aberdeen a couple of years ago, and they couldn't
even do one push up. I know you get by with some people not
doing one push up, but I worry about Afghanistan and Iraq. I
was in Iraq at Thanksgiving. I was in Afghanistan just last
weekend. Two people sitting at the same table had diabetes.
Now, we had the Surgeon General in--no, it wasn't the Surgeon
General but a colonel who was an expert in diabetes. We
recommend against anybody going to the battlefield with
diabetes. I don't know what these people's jobs were, but I
hear all kinds of stories of people that should have a medical
deferment, but they are being sent into combat.
Of course, I hear the other thing about how hard it is on
the families. This administration cut 39 percent of the money
out of the money that we put in to help with the counseling and
taking care of family, what we call ``the family approach.'' We
are going to restore that money. We are going to make sure that
the medical benefits go to the people who should have them.
Admiral Mullen gave me a book yesterday about PTSD. This
goes back to World War II, Korea. I am going to tell you
something. I remember it just like that. I mean, I know what he
is talking about, having been there myself. I know how it
affects somebody who is in combat. The more they go back, the
harder it is for them. And there will be a long-term impact and
cost to the U.S.
So we need to address this readiness as quick as we can,
because our procurement is either a $200 or $300 billion
supplemental for the short term right now. And we better make
sure that you work with us, telling us what we need so we put
the right mix in, because whoever is elected next time, will
likely call for a lot of cuts.
You talk about increasing personnel. Well, you know better
than anybody else when you start to decrease the budget,
personnel costs are the things that come first because they are
100 percent outlay in the first year versus procurement, which
is 10 percent outlay in the first year.
I am going to go into equipment shortfalls, in the question
period, but we have seen it. We are trying to address it. This
year, we have a lot of help from you. We appreciate that. So we
appreciate your coming before the Committee; and the members. I
am sure, we will be here to ask you the questions that we ask
ourselves.
But we appreciate the work you are doing, and we appreciate
what the families are doing. I went up to Ft. Drum on Friday to
talk to them about some of the problems that I have seen in the
papers. Sometimes it doesn't turn out to be that way.
I was pleased when I was in Afghanistan. It wasn't as bad
as I was reading the newspaper. I thought it wasn't going as
badly as some people were projecting. Of course, this is
wintertime. They don't exactly go out and do the fighting in
wintertime as far as Afghan goes, but the military is doing
their jobs.
Admiral Mullen said we can't win this militarily. He agrees
that you have to get the State Department involved in it. They
have been hesitant to get involved. We have done everything we
could to try to shift the responsibility for construction and
infrastructure improvements and so forth. We haven't had much
success, although it looks like we are starting to get there a
little bit, what the parliament did and military security being
a little better, so things look a little better.
But the American public is speaking and saying we cannot
bear $343 million a day. We have got to figure out the best way
ahead this year, because none of us know what's going to happen
next year.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

FORCE GENERATION

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we are enormously proud of you and all those who
serve under you. I know the chairman and all committee members
thank you for your service and recognize that we have an all-
volunteer Army.
I should say for the record, Mr. Chairman, I was one of
those drafted.
Mr. Murtha. And he did pretty well for himself.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I did. I had a good life for a draftee.
I am not sure we need to go back to that system, because,
obviously, today we have a military that is highly motivated,
well educated and, I think, well supported by this committee.
General Speakes, you and I have talked; and, as we speak,
we have about 3,200 New Jersians, a number of the 50th Infantry
Brigade Combat Team going to Iraq. On the issue of Army force
generation, where do we stand relative to that program?
General Speakes. Sir, what I would like to do is first ask
for help from General Thurman. He is the G-3. His job is to
orchestrate the staff and the Army through the ARPERGEN
process. My particular responsibility, then, is to ensure I
follow his guidance when it comes to such important issues as
equipping.
So let me ask General Thurman if he would be willing to
take that question on, and then----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The Army plan was--correct me if I am
wrong--on one-year deployment? Every five years?
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Obviously, the caveat is in there, but
can you talk about where we stand?
General Thurman. Congressman, if you would allow me, that's
a very good question.
What I would tell you up front, and I would just like to
talk about where we are up front in terms of our rotational
capacity, in terms of what the current commands are.
Currently, for the Active force, we are rotating for every
rotation down in either Iraq or Afghanistan at about just--as
you know, it's 15 months down there for Active Army. For the
Reserve components, it's 12. It's 12 months from total
mobilization.
What we want to get to, our goal, is to get for our Reserve
components every year that we are deployed, that would be 12
months, and we would like to spend at least five years back in
dwell. Now, currently, we can't get there from here.

DWELL TIME BETWEEN COMBAT ROTATIONS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Tell the committee where we are now.
General Thurman. Okay, that is a very good question.
Where we are right now, for the AC, we are rotating at
about a one for one-deployment cycle to about 8 months.
Now, what we have done, if we spend 15 months down range
for the Active, then we want to guarantee at least 12 months
dwell. So we are rotating less than really a one-to-one right
now, 1 year deployed, 1 year back at home.
For the Reserve components, your combat formations are
rotating at about a 1-year deployment mobilization period for
them. Because we are in the 12-month mob period, 4 years back
home is what we got.
Now, we have some units that are less than that. It's about
a 1-year and then a 3.3-year dwell.
For your specific question on the 50th, we do know about
that formation. I can get you the exact details of where they
stand, equipping and personnel, because we have gone forward to
the Department to ask that we alert these formations at least
24 months out, so we can make sure that they have got the
amount of personnel and equipment for the mission set that they
have been given. We put them on our Army force generation cycle
that allows us to have X number available at any one time and X
number in a ready pool and in a reset train.
But that is what we are trying to do, what you stated up
front, but we can't meet that goal right now.
[The information follows:]

The 50th IBCT, currently in New Jersey, is scheduled to
deploy in late FY08, location: Iraq, Baghdad (T). As a next-to-
deploy unit, the 50th IBCT has equipping prioritization over AC
and RC units not slated for deployment. HQDA ensures their
equipping needs will be met, given the constraints of competing
equipping needs of other next-to-deploy units, equipment
requirements of units currently deployed, and stock levels.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. So the Army force generation model is a
work in process?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. It is a work in process, given
the demands that we have. A function of that model is the
amount of supply that we have, and the demand is greater than
supply right now.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. How would you characterize the other
components besides, obviously, having enough troops to do the
job? And, obviously, they are motivated. They, obviously, have
families behind them that are concerned. How about the matching
of equipment and training? Where does that fit into the overall
equation?
General Thurman. Sir, the way we prioritize the manning and
the equipment is we have a Department of Army master
prioritization list. I am the guy that has responsibility for
prioritization of the Army resource priority list that I give
to either General Rochelle or General Speakes to fill from
based on, one, we want to make sure that the current force that
is deployed has exactly what they need. That is priority one.
Then that is, for the next priority, or the next deployers,
that when they fall in that readiness cycle, we start
addressing Reserve component concerns. At two years out, right
now, is when we try to take a look at what their overall status
is, if they are under title 32.
The third priority that we have is our institutional
generating force capability; fourth priority are folks that are
in a reset train. Frankly, we do not have enough people and
equipment, given how we are trying to grow the Army and fill
the demands to have everybody up right now. So that is how we
have to do that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Could you tell the Committee what
percentage of the force has been deployed once, twice or or
three times or more?
General Thurman. General Rochelle can tell you the exact,
by component.
[The information follows:]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5
Component Deployment Deployments Deployments Deployments Deployments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC........................................ 212,369 84,304 19,951 4,018 1,080
ARNG...................................... 118,884 13,702 755 35 3
USAR...................................... 55,552 6,483 536 33 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, by component.
General Thurman. He can tell you that with the exact
numbers, by AC that has been deployed for Army National Guard
and Army Reserve.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And you build into this overall
equation--as we are working on the next supplemental, you know,
you are building the needs of what we are talking about into
that supplemental?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. We are trying to project what we
believe is the demand. We meet whatever the COCOM requirements
are globally, but, in particular with Afghanistan and Iraq,
it's what the CENTCOM commander, what they ask for and request
for forces. We try to anticipate that and build that in the
Army force generation model.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. Murtha. Let me add to what the gentleman is asking. We
have been working with the Army. We have found shortages in
bases for military construction and in the bases for the people
that returned from Germany and from Korea. They are going to
transfer I think it's $2 billion to military construction to
take care of the shortfall, but they wouldn't be prepared when
they got back, in everything the Army told us.
The other thing we are looking at, when I was out in Fort
Bliss, I noticed they had a substantial shortage of military
construction for medical structures. This has been going on for
years. This is something that people must make a decision on.
Okay, we need this. Or We need that. There will be large costs.
So we don't get the medical stuff taken care of. That is almost
$5 billion.
We trimmed it down to $4 billion. We are going to try to
put $2 billion in this supplemental and $2 billion in the next
one. So we will add $2 billion for infrastructure in military
construction and another $2 billion for medical structures, and
infrastructure for the services' bases in the United States.
Now we are going to look at--and see what they need.
But our experience has been, when we looked at the
hospitals, they have been sorely underfunded for a long time;
and we want to make sure that our personnel get the best
medical care wherever they go, and the benefits they deserve.
We also hear from CBO that the $70 billion we have
provided, has been used in part for ground vehicles, that will
be up to date a couple more years. So if we robustly fund those
products for the next two supplementals, we think that you will
be in a lot better shape.
Now, still, the Army is in bad shape. You can voice it any
way you want to, but there is no question, in my mind, when you
have to send people with diabetes into the area even though the
surgeons say don't do it, when you have people who have been
deployed as often as they have been, and when you read this
book that Admiral Mullen gave me about PTSD, you realize the
tremendous pressure on these troops and their families during
their period of time.
So I appreciate what you go through as trying to set the
priority. We want to work with you; and, as Mr. Frelinghuysen
said, we want to make sure we do everything we can to get you
through this period of time and get you back to a stance you
can address world events in case something happens in the
future. This Iraq war is one thing. But we also have to worry
about what might happen down the road and be prepared to
deploy; and right now we are not ready to do so.
General Thurman. We can get those deployment figures from
General Rochelle at some point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Do you have those figures?

DEPLOYMENT DATA

General Rochelle. I would be happy to give you those
figures, sir.
First, before I do that, though, let me make it clear that
at any point in time when one looks at the Army, we have to ask
ourselves, how many individuals have deployed in the current
force, the snapshot we see today? How many are coming in
through the initial entry pipeline who are destined to units
who are going to deploy?
Here is the large question that rarely gets asked. How many
people have ever deployed by components who have left the
force? I am afraid I only have one component figure for that
latter figure that I would like to start with.
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring freedom, a little over a quarter of a
million people from all components who have deployed have left
our formations. So, with that as a background, let me present
you the figures that you asked for.
Mr. Murtha. You add to that, I think, 37 percent have never
been deployed, never been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. At
least, that's the figure Admiral Mullen gave us yesterday,
right?
General Rochelle. That is a correct figure, sir. Again,
that is a snapshot in time.
For the Active component, if we take a look at the numbers
who have deployed, who are currently deployed or have deployed,
that is 63 percent today. But add to that, add to that another
45,000 who are pending deployment--meaning they are in units
that have a deployment order, and they will deploy with that
unit--that is 45,000 more.
We then aggregate individuals who are in the training
pipeline, new adds, if you will, new enlistees, new officers.
That number grows to 80.4 percent of the force, Active
component force, that has deployed on a deployment order and
initial entry training and will deploy for the Army or for the
National Guard. Thirty-seven percent of the National Guard has
deployed.
What I am afraid I cannot give you on the National Guard is
those other components, but one can assume that another 10
percent, 20 percent are on deployment orders from the G-3 of
the Army or in initial entry training. So that that would kick
that number up, in my estimation, to between 42 and 57 percent.
The Army Reserve, sir, 32 percent; and, likewise, I would
estimate another 10 percent, which would make it in the 42, 45
percent of the Army Reserve has been deployed. It's a very
daunting figure.
What I did not give you, sir, is for those other components
that are carrying a substantial burden, as you know, the
numbers of soldiers who have deployed, who have left the
formation. But I would be happy to provide that.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, sir.
[The information follows:]

Deployed Since 9/11

Component Losses
AC............................................................ 152,209
ARNG.......................................................... 45,911
USAR.......................................................... 34,888
--------------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________

Total..................................................... 233,008

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Let me pass for the time being because Mr.
Cramer was here before me, and then if I could go.

TACTICAL MISSILES

Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here.
Yesterday, we had Secretary England and Secretary Gates;
and I asked about missile research funding trends. The Army has
historically spent RDT&E money on the development of missile
systems. However, I am getting the impression that the recent
plans indicate that there is some degree of comfort with the
current inventory of tactical missiles.
I know, General, that you asked for a capability gap
analysis way out. We have got a number of threats. I don't know
that we are ready or can anticipate what the threats will be in
years from now, but my concern is that if all of a sudden we
are only developing one tactical missile program, the JAGINT
program, is that smart for us in the long run? Would you share
some of your concerns, General Thurman, on that?
General Thurman. Congressman, on the 21st of December, we
sent a request to assess the capabilities. We asked him to
assess the overall capabilities of gaps on missiles inside the
Army. We did ask that.
Now, as we were trying to look to the future is the reason
that I sent that request down to Lieutenant General Mike Thain
to assess our current capabilities and see if, given the
operational environments that we may see in the future, if we
got that right.
Mr. Cramer. How long will that take?
General Thurman. I don't know the exact time, but, what I
told him yesterday is go assess that capability, go see if we
have a gap and to come back with me on that estimate, that is
what I would tell you.
[The information follows:]

On 21 Dec 07, the Army G-3 signed a memo directing the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command to conduct an Army Missile
Capability Gap Assessment that looks at future Army missile
capability needs in the context of a Joint force. Discussions
are underway to ensure assessment scope, use of current
analysis results and completion date will identify and provide
recommendation/direction for any potential missile capability
gaps. We expect to provide the results by the FY12 President's
Budget submission. No Congressional update is currently
scheduled.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. Cramer. I want to follow up with you on that. I want to
switch to the MRAPs. How many MRAPs does the Army currently
have in Iraq and in Afghanistan?
General Thurman. Sir, currently, fielded today--and these
are today's numbers, because that changes every day--there are
1,429 in Iraq.
Mr. Cramer. In Iraq alone?
General Thurman. Of which 1,175 have been fielded to our
soldiers, if we are operating with that.
For Afghanistan, MG Rodriguez asked for an operational
needs statement, and their requirement is 615 of the RG-31 Echo
Light for Afghanistan. We are starting to ramp up. We have got
the priorities changed through Central Command, changed the
prioritization on the Iraq vehicle, and the Joint Staff
approved that back here.
We have now diverted 615 that will go into Afghanistan,
because there was concern with that IED threat in Afghanistan.
Mr. Cramer. From here forward, what is your acquisition
goal?
General Thurman. Sir, as it stands now, the interim
requirement that we have right now is 10,000 MRAP. We are
studying what we need over and above that for the future.
That's the interim requirement. I will let General Speakes
speak on that as the Army G-8. That is what we are doing right
now. We are doing a follow-up assessment with the theaters.
General Speakes. Sir, as you know, we are doing this whole
MRAP process in collaboration with the Army and the Marine
Corps. At this point--we are doing this by increments.
Mr. Cramer. Ten thousand over what period of time?
General Speakes. Ten thousand is our total requirement
right now, based upon the last JROC validated requirement for
the Army as a part of the joint picture. The issue in all of
thisis that it is a continuously evolving picture, so we have a
requirement to provide an update to the Joint Staff next week.
And what that will do is lead to the JROC setting a new a
requirement for the Army that will then go into the Office of
the Secretary of Defense; and we anticipate about the first
week of March that the Office of the Secretary of Defense will
make the decision on the next increment. The Army will be the
principal service, we believe, that will be involved in that.
So we expect somewhere in early March that the Secretary of
Defense will announce any adjustments to the current MRAP
requirements.
Mr. Cramer. How have the MRAPs performed?
General Thurman. Sir, I would tell you that they have
performed in a very good manner, and I will just cite a couple
of examples. In cases with IED strikes, which would have
probably destroyed an 1114 up-armored Humvee, an M-1114 or M-
1151, we have seen our soldiers walk away from them.
Mr. Rothman. Microphone, please.
General Thurman. I am sorry. We have seen our soldiers walk
away from them.
The interim response out of our soldiers is they are very
pleased with the vehicle, because it allows us to move through
those areas, particularly in Iraq, and move our logistical
formations, medical, and help them better get through the
environment. That is a dangerous environment, as you well know,
in Iraq, particularly with the improvised explosive devices.
But that is our initial assessment, and we have got about a
10 percent initial assessment, but it has been very positive,
is what I would tell you.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hobson.

AFGHAN POLICE PISTOLS

Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have ask so many questions it will take all
afternoon, but I am just going to start on two.
Pistols. The chairman and myself were in Afghanistan--maybe
you anticipated from yesterday I was going to ask pistols
again. We bought pistols for training the Afghan police. The
guy--I won't use the language in here that the guy used with
us, but there was a trainee there that comes from Pennsylvania,
none of them had any good things to say about that pistol. It
has a bad firing pin, just to say one thing.
Do you have any comment on the pistols?
General Speakes. Sir, let me first provide some background
on the request that was made in Afghanistan.
Late in 2007, the Afghan security service requested over
9,900 M9 Berettas. There was a lack of Berettas in the Army, so
what the office within the Army that is charged with overseeing
this did was to go ahead and decide to purchase the M9s as a--
--
Mr. Murtha. What was the time schedule there? What period
of time are we talking about?
General Speakes. Sir, this is done in response to a request
that happened in the late fall time period. I don't have any
specifics for that. I can provide them.
Mr. Murtha. 2007?
General Speakes. Yes, sir, this is late 2007.
So, due to a lack of available extra M9s in the Army
inventory, the decision then was to go ahead and purchase a
commercial version of the M9 pistol from Beretta. That was the
process that was gone through, and that is how the Afghan
security forces got a commercial variant of the M9 pistol.
Mr. Hobson. It's not a Beretta. It is Smith & Wesson.
General Speakes. Sir, that is not my information----
Mr. Hobson. I will tell you, with all due respect, sir, we
were in Iraq. I saw it. He saw it. It is not a Beretta. That is
bad enough, because the Berettas didn't perform either. But
this is a variant. It is a Smith & Wesson purchased pistol--and
we can't find out who purchased it, what office purchased it,
or how many of them they purchased.
I am astonished that nobody knows. Nobody knew there.
Nobody knows here. And they bought thousands, sir. What
happened, we are told by the guys who use them, that it's a
variant of the Beretta. Actually, it's a variant of the Glock,
I think. And they got caught and yelled at by the Glock people,
so they modified it some more. And when they modified it, it
screwed it up.
So, very bluntly, I don't think anybody knows what we
bought, and it is a waste of money, and we are trying to tell
these people in weapons--first of all, I don't like the 9-
millimeter to begin with, but that is another's story.
Could I ask one more question, and then I will stop. I will
switch total subjects, gentleman.

CAMP MCCOY, WISCONSIN

Some months ago, maybe, or longer, I went up to Camp McCoy.
I don't know if any of you know where Camp McCoy is, but it's--
--
General Speakes. Wisconsin, yes.
Mr. Hobson. It is a Reserve unit. Some of my kids are up
there. My TAG caught hell from the Army, because he took me up
there to see our kids, and I saw the camp as well.
In 1960, I went to the Volk field across the way and stayed
in similar buildings that you have got there today. They are
all World War II barracks, which we put 111,000 plus kids
through there in training.
The field training is fine, but they live in outrageous
old-type conditions. They don't make it in the line because the
Reserve and the Army has got so many things that they don't
give them any money to fix this place up. I think it's
outrageous that we send 111,000 kids for training up there, and
this is a base that was used even before all this up tempo.
And they can't get any money except out of hide to do any
repair up there, and they can't get any money to build or
rebuild new stuff up there. It's not on the FYDP because it is
below the line, and there are about six other bases like this.
This is one I know about. This is one I visited.
Before long, one of those barracks is going to catch on
fire, because they have a lot of heavy electrical stuff on them
now they can't fix them up fast enough. The chow is right out
of World War II. It shouldn't exist in this day's world. What
really ticks me off--and I am an Air Force guy. I can go right
next door to Volk field and it's all fixed up. And they are
just training--they are doing Guard and stuff training over
there.
These guys are going out in the field, and they are being
treated terrible, before they go, in these barracks. I think
the big Army ought to look at this thing and get something done
about it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GUARD AND RESERVE FACILITIES

Mr. Murtha. Let me add to what Mr. Hobson said.
I went to Bragg, I went to Stewart and found the same types
of facilities for the Reserve and Guard. Now I hope that this
money that we are putting in will take care of that.
For instance, the Guard and Reserve came in and had
inadequate facilities, to say the least. Mr. Etheridge, who
represents Bragg and complained for a long time about a sewage
line that wasn't taken care of, I think we finally got that
taken care of.
But I know the pressure that is on you folks to spend money
on the troops in Iraq. But, in the meantime, we have troops
that are in training that have inadequate facilities. I hope
you go back and relook at what you already gave us. You gave us
an estimate of what you needed, and I hope that is in that
estimate, because we need to make sure that the Guard and
Reserve have facilities as good as everyone else has. I know we
are looking at dual equipment in the next go around for the
Guard and the Active Army.
I know that right now we don't have the best equipment in
the training cycles, so they go and have to relearn what they
are doing when they get to Iraq.
So we can't rush over these problems. We have got to really
fix them. That is what it amounts to. That is what we are here
for. We have got to hear what the problems are so we can fix
them. But we can't fix them if nobody tells us what the hell
going on.
Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. That is what the problem is. That is why this
Committee and the ranking member are so good. These guys can't
come--if I hadn't raised heck about this, they wouldn't have
been back in to see me. This isn't even my State. But because I
had been there and I saw it, I was able to get them in. You
have got to use us when you can use us. Fortunately, they came
back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Yes, I think it's changed since Secretary Gates
came in. I see a new openness here. When I talked to the
Secretary this morning, asked him how he is feeling, he said he
is not feeling too well. Broken arm in three places, he not
feeling too well. But, at any rate, there has been more
openness there.
Mr. Dicks, I am going to go vote, if you will assume the
chair.
Mr. Dicks. I will ask a few questions.
Mr. Murtha. You have 10 minutes.

READINESS

Mr. Dicks [presiding]. Have you talked at all about
readiness yet, how you measure readiness?
General Thurman. Sir, we have not specifically been asked
that. I haven't been asked that question of how we measure
readiness.
Mr. Dicks. Why don't you talk about that a little bit,
gentlemen?
General Thurman. First off, with our readiness reporting
system, if a unit that is not assigned a directed mission, we
have four levels of readiness--or, actually, five levels of
readiness in our metrics, C-1 through 5.
Mr. Dicks. But C-1 is the best, right?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. That is measured in terms of
personnel, equipment, availability, on-hand equipment,
equipment readiness and training for units that get an assigned
mission. And we use also a percent effectiveness rating for the
mission that they have been given when they are deployed into
combat, if that formation is going to be used for something
other than it was organized, designed and equipped for. And so
that is how we do it.
Mr. Dicks. Right now, most of the units are being trained
to do counterinsurgency, and that is it, right, to the deploy
into Iraq?
General Thurman. Sir, that is correct, and that is one of
the things that is a concern of mine as the Army G-3. Because
we have got to get back to full-spectrum readiness, in my mind,
to be able to operate across that full-spectrum of conflict.
Mr. Dicks. Why don't you describe the things that they
would be doing if they were trained for full-spectrum? What
equipment would they train on? What would they be doing for
full spectrum versus what they are doing now so the committee
will understand what is and isn't happening?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. I would be very happy to answer
that question.
Across the spectrum of conflict, as you stated, we are
primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. So we are
not training on the high end for major combat operations.
What am I talking about? If you take an armor brigade
combat team or one of our transformed brigade combat teams,
they are task organized to fight on the high end.
What am I talking about in terms of the business to be able
to deliver in direct fires? The synchronization that is
required for fire support, for maneuver--fire maneuver on the
high end takes more training. It takes more repetition.
So, given the deployment cycles we have right now, we do
not have the sufficient time to train across that entire
spectrum and do all of those tasks collectively to be able to
synchronize in a combined arms fashion on the high end of the
spectrum of conflict, because we have some units that we are
requiring to--for example, let's take an artillery unit. They
may be required to go down and perform something other than an
artillery mission. That goes on. So that may be in lieu of
formations to fill holes for transportation formations or
military police. We have had to do that as we are trying to
build enough depth back into the force. That is how we would
explain that by different types of missions that we would get.
Mr. Dicks. So is there anything other than major combat
operations that they might be training for, just major combat
operations in counterinsurgency? I mean, if you were doing full
spectrum, are there other things that you didn't mention?
General Thurman. Sir, across the spectrum of conflict, the
way we look at that and see the strategic environment right
now--if you look at from today out through at least 2020, 2025,
we have done those traditional training missions. We said--and
I would tell you this as a former division commander. I used to
think if I was trained on the high end and I could do all that,
then I could do everything across that spectrum.
I don't believe that any more because now we are forced to
operate in and around populations. We are forced to understand
cultures. We are forced to understand an enemy that is not a
state-on-state enemy. It's an enemy that uses assymetrical
warfare. So now we are in--if you look at that strategic
environment as a more irregular warfare, perhaps disruptive or
catastrophic.
So what we have looked at in the Army is how we focus and
train these formations to meet the needs of the future. So that
range across the spectrum is from stable/peace, unstable/peace,
uncertainty and general war.

SUBJECTIVE READINESS RATINGS

Mr. Dicks. Now, I have been concerned about this ability of
the commanding officer to raise their readiness rate. Can you
explain to me under what circumstances that occurs? Is there
pressure applied from any source for these commanding officers
to raise the readiness rates?
Mr. Murtha [presiding]. Meaning artificially, just give
them a new----
Mr. Dicks. Well, do commanders make a subjective decision
that units are really better off than what their equipment and
training and everything looks like. For example, we probably
are a three, but they raised it to a two or a one as they
deploy into Iraq.
General Thurman. Congressman, I can answer that. What I
would tell you is we measure our readiness--the readiness
report is an objective assessment, and that is with the
personnel on hand, the equipment on hand, and the equipment
readiness in training. We will allow that commander to upgrade
or downgrade one level of C rating. We have put metrics in
place.
We want them to tell an honest assessment of readiness. We
want to make sure that we do not mask or exaggerate readiness
levels, and we look every month at every readiness report
because now we can see down through all the units with our
readiness reporting.
So we encourage those commanders to call it like it is and
tell us what their no-kidding state of readiness is.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. I will be back.
Mr. Murtha. There has been no individual in the Congress of
the United States who has worked harder on readiness than Bill
Young. Health care is his big issue, but readiness comes second
to health care. He understands how important health care is
based on readiness and readiness based on health care. So I had
to drag him from another hearing to make sure he got here to
talk to you about readiness.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and I am going to
apologize to you and to our witnesses. The only reason that I
was at the other subcommittee is that General Peake, whom I am
sure you all remember from being Surgeon General, was our
witness. I really felt compelled to be with General Peake
because we have an adopted Marine son who was shot in Kuwait.
General Peake was there at the time and performed the surgery
that saved his life. So I really wanted to be there, Mr.
Chairman. You know Josh very well.
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
Mr. Young. But on the issue of readiness, Chairman Murtha
is really right that this whole subcommittee is concerned about
readiness.
I want to go just a little bit beyond today. Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, what is the
situation with our Army in the event that you had to be
deployed, you had to face another situation somewhere other
than Afghanistan or Iraq? Are we able to meet another
obligation?
I know one time we used to talk about two major regional
conflicts, that we could handle two without any difficulty. We
don't hear that conversation any more today, but what is our
situation with readiness as it relates to another unexpected or
even expected eventuality?
General Thurman. Congressman Young, first off, are we ready
for another contingency? As you know or may not know, that we
have several operational plans that the Joint Staff has for--
COCOM to respond to whatever the contingency may be. A U.S.
response would be joint. It is hard to discuss without getting
into a classified forum for those types of crises.
I would tell you, as I stated up front, that our concern is
we have really eaten into the strategic depth of the Army, and
that is why we have got to continue our growth.
Mr. Murtha. And our forward deployment of supplies?
General Thurman. That is correct, sir.
The other piece of that that is important is our Reserve
components. That helps us build back strategic depth and gives
us that operational force that we need to meet these potential
crises. That is one of the things that we are concerned about,
and we are trying to build that back as fast as we can.

SOLDIER STRESS

Mr. Young. General, we do the best we can to provide
whatever the Army or the Defense Department-wide advises us
that is needed to accomplish the mission and to protect our
groups while they are performing that mission. We know that we
have worn out a lot of equipment. We have had to step up to the
plate with appropriations to reset Army. We already reset the
Marine Corps.
But, yesterday, Secretary England made quite a statement
where he and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen,
were there. And Gordon said, our troops are tired. So we are
not only wearing out our equipment, we are wearing out our
troops. If our troops are tired, that has got to affect
readiness.
I realize we are trying to grow the size of the Army so
that deployments don't have to be as long. There is more dwell
time between deployments. We realize that, and we understand
that program. But if we run out of troops, where do we go?
I mean, these guys are tough. Chairman Murtha and I both
see them at the hospitals, especially, when they have been
wounded and they come into Walter Reed or Bethesda. You can be
really proud of them. They are tough. Their attitudes are just
unbelievable. They are a tremendous inspiration. But they are
wearing out, and there is only so much we can get out of a
human being. What do we do?
General Thurman. Congressman Young, my number one concern
every day that I work is how we can take the stress off the
force.
What I would tell you, 15 months is too long. We know we
need to get back to something that is more palatable to our
soldiers and their families.
Dependent upon demand, we are doing our very best to look
at how we do things smarter in terms of how we reset these
formations when they return and we take time for soldiers and
families to reintegrate and give them--take-a-knee-type event,
if they could, for at least the first six months, and we don't
have any directed training. We are working that out right now.
But that is a concern of ours. We know we have got to
reduce the amount of boots on the ground and expand the amount
of dwell time before they are called back. That is something
that I have worked on. That is my number one priority that the
Chief of Staff of the Army has given me, to work that and look
across the whole formation of how we can do that better and
smarter.
Mr. Young. Well, sir, I hope I don't sound critical in my
questioning and in my statements, because I think you all have
done an unbelievable job, and I think your troops have done an
unbelievable job on the ground. We are here to support.
I think you will find this committee is prepared to provide
whatever you identify to us that you need. I am certain the
chairman has made that commitment over and over again, and I
certainly make that commitment. So if there is something that
you need from us, we will provide it. The only thing we won't
provide is if we don't know about it.
Thank you very much.
Again, just please pass on to your troops that the members
of this Committee understand what they go through and we
appreciate the sacrifices they make and the really good job
that they do.
Thank you for being here today.
General Thurman. Yes, sir, thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. Moran. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday, when we had the Marine Corps
testify, they said that the current MRAPs in the Iraq theater
have substantial challenges navigating urban warfare. They are
not designed for off-road expedition, they have to stick to the
highways and they often get--when it rains, they get stuck in
the mud.
So their conclusion was that this MRAP vehicle that we put
so much money into, and an enormous amount of money to just fly
them over there, would be better served for forward positions
in another area in another region, rather than mission-critical
operations in Iraq. Maybe send them to Afghanistan, although I
don't even know if they work in Afghanistan.
I would like for you to respond, because what I have heard
is fairly positive about the MRAPs, but maybe you are supposed
to say that. I would like to know what we are going to do with
all of these MRAPs, plus I don't know how many more we are
sending--how many more, thousands?
Mr. Murtha. They said they have 10,000 already produced.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
I think I was at this hearing. I don't quite remember the
tone that the gentleman is reflecting here.
I heard the Marine Corps say, thank God for the MRAPs and
the lives that have been saved--they haven't lost a single life
since they were there. So I don't remember--this is a much
different hearing than the gentleman from Washington heard.
Mr. Moran. Well, I don't know what the gentleman from
Washington heard.
Mr. Dicks. I think the staff heard it----
Mr. Murtha. Just a minute, Mr. Moran has the time, but
4,000 has been sent by the government, according to the staff,
and 10,000 are ordered, is that accurate?
General Thurman. That is accurate for the Army, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Do I have my time back here, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. You certainly do.
Mr. Moran. It turns out they did say that, Mr. Dicks. It's
possible you weren't there at the time. They said all the
things I said, not what you said.
Mr. Dicks. Well----
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman from Washington let the
gentleman from Virginia----
Mr. Moran. Nevertheless, since it was my time, I am going
to restate they have difficulty navigating in urban areas. They
get stuck, and they have to stay on the highway because they
can't go off road.
But my bottom-line question is, what are we going to do
with all the thousands of MRAPs we have over there when the war
in Iraq is over? What are we going to do with all of those?
General Thurman. Congressman, those are very good
questions. Your latter question, I will tell you we are looking
at how many of those we think we need to put in our Army
preposition stocks. We are evaluating that right now as we look
to the future.
The first portion of your question, it depends on where you
are at in Iraq. In some of the areas, if you are in a confined
area, at least in the urban, the roads are in there, and you
know there are obstructions in there with the way their prior
distribution center is set up, and it is hard to navigate in
and around, just like it is for other vehicles.
But I would tell you, without that--and I will just use a
vignette that I experienced with what I saw the other day. We
had one about 600 pounds of explosives, and it tipped the MRAP
over and, unfortunately, the soldier killed appeared to be
crushed, but the other three walked away from it.
It's that confidence--soldiers have to have confidence in
that equipment, confidence in themselves, their leadership and
know that we are going to do everything we can to adapt to that
threat. But some of the road networks are pretty bad in Iraq.

SUBJECTIVE READINESS RATING UPGRADES

Mr. Moran. I understand that, but we were told that they
were going to be able to navigate all those roads.
The subjectivity of some of the evaluations of the combat
brigades is of concern; and the question has been raised, of
the Army's combat brigades reporting the highest level of
readiness, how many of the Army's combat brigades would be able
to report C-1 if the commanders were not allowed to
subjectively upgrade their readiness?
We ask that because we understand that there is a fair
amount of subjective upgrading. Of course, that impacts on the
Army's overall readiness picture and makes it look better, but
it is not necessarily consistent with the traditional means of
grading a combat brigade.
Can you respond to that?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, Congressman.
For selective upgrade or downgrade, we have metrics--first
off, that is a commander's report, and I will tell you I have
not seen any pressure on commanders to report better than what
they are. As a matter of fact, we don't want them to do that.
With the current metrics that we have from the Department
of the Army, a unit commander, let's say a brigade-level
commander, he can upgrade one level or downgrade. We don't want
to take that flexibility away from a commander. There may be
cases in terms of training where he thinks he has done what he
needs to do to meet the training requirements.
If they want to go to a higher level of readiness, then
it's going to take the approval of the next higher commander to
approve that. So we put metrics in place because we want our
commanders to tell it, to call it like it is, because they know
we are going to call on them. I feel pretty good that we are
not putting that pressure on these commanders.
Mr. Moran. Well, we have been told, General, that most of
the combat brigades that have been deployed to Iraq would not
be receiving a C-1 rating if it was based on the objective
component measures, but that it is becoming commonplace for the
brigade commander to increase to C-1, that it is not
necessarily giving us an accurate reflection of the readiness.
Now, that is why we ask these questions, so you can put
that on the record.
General Thurman. Congressman, what I would tell you is,
sir, I would be more than happy, in a closed forum or
classified forum, to sit down and give you the status of every
Army unit and show you who has upgraded and who has downgraded
in their overall C ratings.
Mr. Moran. I don't think they want the status of every Army
unit, but it is a concern, and it's worthwhile to discuss it. I
appreciate that.
I think we are going to need to go vote.

MRAP

Mr. Dicks [presiding]. You go right ahead. Mr. Murtha and I
are going to rotate. But if you want to go and vote, that's
fine.
And just to get back to the point that Mr. Moran made, and
he was right. They did say they did have mobility problems in
getting around corners in tight urban situations and they did
have issues.
The thing that I picked up on the positive side was that
they haven't lost a single Marine since they have been in the
MRAPs, and the Marines loved it for that purpose, because they
saved lives.
What is happening with the Army? How effective is the MRAP
then for the Army?
General Thurman. Sir, Congressman, I would tell you it has
been in our initial assessment very good. We have lost at least
one that I know of right now that was catastrophic, and I won't
want to get into the classification of what actually happened
to the vehicle, but it has been very positive as I tell you. I
mean, we track that on a daily basis.
Mr. Dicks. So it was a good decision to put MRAP over in
Iraq, from your perspective.
General Thurman. As my perspective, sir, as the Army G-3.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. And we have Humvees, we have Strykers, we have
the right mix now between the Humvees and the MRAPs--or have
you got your requirement, your full requirement of MRAPs yet,
or do you want a different mix or numbers than you have?
General Thurman. Sir, we do not have our full requirement
of the stated requirement that the theater has asked for.
Mr. Dicks. What is that? Do you know?
General Thurman. The current acquisition number, as we
discussed, I believe, earlier, was 10,000. We are evaluating--
and I went back just this last Saturday and asked the theater
to come back to us with an operational assessment and tell us,
you know, one, what is the operational assessment so we know
what the future requirements are and how is that vehicle
performing and what do we need to do with it. That is an
ongoing assessment right now.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has
expired. Was it your time that expired?
Mr. Dicks. No, it wasn't. I gave him triple time.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, it might be of interest to know
that Mr. Dicks did acknowledge that the Marine Corps did say
that in terms of the mobility of the vehicles.
Mr. Dicks. And they also said, thank God, they liked the
vehicles.
Mr. Murtha. The Marine Corps has talked to me about the
difficulties. You just pointed out the difficulties. I have
seen an M-1 tank where the turret was blown off; and I worry
about head injuries, too. They may not have been killed, but we
want to look into head injuries when these things are blown up.
So it's a program where you wanted it, troops wanted it,
they put the money into it, and it's probably one of the
biggest procurement programs in the history, $21 billion.
Because the troops wanted it, we came up with the money.
Mr. Rothman.

TRAINING

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, thank you for your services and your sacrifices
throughout your career and those of your family. We do
appreciate it.
A couple of questions. I know that Mr. Dicks, my colleague
from Washington, asked this while I was upstairs in terms of
what are our forces being trained for. Is it strictly limited
to the terrain, temperature and types of combat that we are
experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan or are there other things
we are training for?
In general, I heard there are other things we are training
for. Because, yesterday, the Marines were here to tell us that,
unfortunately, they were not being trained for anything other
than the kind of combat that they are going to fight in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Could you respond?
General Thurman. Congressman Rothman, yes, sir.
Currently, we are focused entirely on counterinsurgency
operations. Once again, it's the amount of supply that we have
in our Army forces to meet the COCOM demands. We know we need
to build that depth back to train for full-spectrum operations.
Mr. Rothman. General, does your budget request this year
provide for funds to expand the training to include other
potential theaters?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, it does. And our training
accounts, when we get the amount of time back home, that we
can, in fact, train for full spectrum. Time is one of the
resources that we have. Because we have to turn our Active
units around with our brigade combat team so fast that it takes
about 18 months to train for full spectrum operations. We are
not doing that right now.

DWELL TIME

Mr. Rothman. In your understanding, is the Army--have they
announced plans to provide 18 months back home?
General Thurman. Sir, we have not announced that. Our goal
for--rotational goals right now is we would like right now for
every year deployed, for 12 months, we would like to get back
home for two, but we can't meet that right now.
Mr. Rothman. Go away for 12, be back for two?
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Or be back for 12?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, right now, our goal currently is
one to one.
Mr. Rothman. Oh, I see. Go for 12 months, back for 24?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, but it's only one month rotation
policy for the AC down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

FULL-SPECTRUM TRAINING

Mr. Rothman. Well, let me just offer my observation that
there is something fundamentally wrong with a policy that would
not allow us to train for other theaters. It simply shows the
limits of our capability to do the extent we want to stay in
Iraq or Afghanistan.
Something has got to give, but I don't think it can be
facing future threats. As someone once said, that is not
planning, that is wishful thinking, that there will be no
threats for which we need to be trained. But that is my
observation.
Unless--so you need to hear from higher ups. You are just
waiting for the time to train, but you say there is money in
the budget to train if you are given the time. Is that correct?
General Thurman. Congressman Rothman, if I could just be
clear, we don't have any policy that says we won't train for
full spectrum. The fact of the matter is, given the current
global demand, we cannot--we do not have the time available to
train for full spectrum operations. That is the current state,
given where we are with demand.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. Rothman. If I may go on to another subject just
briefly, last year, the Army testified that the future combat
systems program is critical to the future capacities of the
U.S. Army. Just last week, however, the Secretary of Defense
said that he had concerns about the program in view of the
pressures on the defense budget, in terms of balancing the
budget pressure and the modernization goals which are to be
addressed by the future combat systems. Can you address the
issue of whether you are still pushing for the Future Combat
Systems and how you would accommodate this pressure on the
budget and these modernization goals?
General Speakes. Sir, I would be glad to discuss that.
The first point is the Secretary of Defense was asked a
hypothetical question. He was asked to project, based upon a
budget downturn, what the pressures would be on the Department
of Defense. The Army recognizes that in the event of a budget
downturn that everything we do has to be reevaluated.
The points that I would like to make overall is--the Future
Combat System is the centerpiece of our Army modernization. It
is the way that we take a force that is being trained and
shaped to fight today and move it to the future. As you have
already addressed, we don't want to be focused solely on
counterinsurgency operations. We want to be full spectrum, as
General Thurman has outlined earlier.
To do that then, in our base budget, we have a plan for
Future Combat Systems. It is a part of our overall investment
strategy. FCS is never more than one-third of that funding
strategy. So the point is, it's affordable, it's deliberately
designed to be the critical element that moves us forward, gets
us to the next decade with critical capabilities and
continuously cascades new capability to the force.
The other thing that we think is very important is it is
designed for how we are seeing the battlefield evolve. It is
not last decade's plan for last decade; it is this decade's
plan for the next decade. So we are working very, very hard. We
are very optimistic.
If we were to take you to Fort Bliss this summer, you will
see the lead elements of FCS right now being used by soldiers
who are evaluating it to see if it has the promise to be
brought to the Army right away.
Through spinouts every two years you will see elements of
FCS hit the force. We are really excited about that. Many of
the early elements of FCS are already in combat today.
For example, as you take a look at the frag kit five that
is on Humvees, that frag kit has elements of the armor solution
that will be a part of the main ground vehicle. If you take a
look at the UAVs that are flying overhead, if you take a look
at the robotics we are using against IEDs, all those are
elements we are trying to help shape and prepare for the
future.
So FCS is affordable, it's absolutely necessary, and the
Army leadership is absolutely committed to it.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Let me say something about FCS now. You know, I
have given a challenge to yourself and General Casey. We are
quite willing if we can see you folks willing to take a short-
term chance in order to put some money in it.
He and I talked just yesterday. We sat down and talked
about how much of a chance he could afford to take in order to
come up with FCS.

TRAINING READINESS

What worries me, FCS is one thing. Of course, the money
worries me too. But when you say 18 months--and I have known
this for a long time--to train people in conventional type war
or what we consider conventional type warfare, and we are
training them all in the type of warfare that we always do.
We're going to make an invasion or whatever. It is that we
train them for that particular task.
We got a hell of a problem here. When it takes 18 months
and they are only home 8 months and something happens someplace
else, everybody in this room can see we have a problem in the
future with the number of people we have available to us.
What I worry about, what is going to come down first thing?
What is going to come down? Personnel is coming down, because
that is 100 percent, and the other stuff is 10 percent outlay.
So I hope that you will come up with something--I hope you
will come up with the money that adds to that money. And we are
not going to get this done if we don't come up in the next 2 or
3 years with a big pot of the money.
What I saw, they weren't ready to go with a lot of stuff,
but we ought to get what we are ready to go with.
Mr. Hobson.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. Hobson. I want to talk about one of the things that you
have been able to do is attract people. Although when we have
talked in the past, you have dropped your standards. Good you
get into that.
Mr. Murtha. I did. I talked about the possibility, talked
about tattoos, I talked about waivers and so forth. I didn't
talk about enlistment bonuses, which breaks my heart we have to
pay captains and majors to stay in.
Mr. Hobson. Do you have any plan? Well, let me go back----
Mr. Murtha. We didn't have to when he went in.
General Thurman. The 1994 Bush administration----
Mr. Hobson. The 1994 Bush administration, but he knew a
little more on retaining.
This committee has had an attitude that we will fund if you
will ask for people. We had a huge spike trying to get the Army
figure, and we asked the committee to do that. I don't know the
numbers or how you are growing them, but I am concerned that
the programs for not only retention but for getting this
recruitment, which I am amazed that you are able to do, but do
you have any programs to get away from having to get to pay
huge bonuses and lessening the standards for the Army as we
move forward and we can attract people? Because I am concerned
with the war coming down we have to get people.
Mr. Hobson. The heart of the Army, the heart of any group
is its people and retention of those people.
What kind of new plans are you all coming up with to make
this work? Because our objectives--the Chairman gives out the
number about the number of people from West Point, officers who
are leaving. I can tell you that my recruitment--and I have a
very strong military, with the Air Force, Wright Patterson in
my district--but my applications for the first time in the
academy have gone down, just the number of people coming in to
apply for it.
So we need to reinvigorate this program. Some people are
calling for the draft. I don't want to go back to the draft.
But do you have any programs to change this?
General Rochelle. Congressman Hobson, let me address your
question as the Army G-1, with a little bit of experience in
the business of recruiting.
I will tell you, first of all, that indeed it is
challenging at any time to recruit for an all-volunteer Army. I
have had two tours, if you will, in the front lines of
recruiting, and I can speak firsthand of how challenging it is.
But, first of all, I would have to say that we are blessed as a
Nation that this young generation of millennials, as they are
commonly referred to, in my estimation, really are the next
great generation. They are stepping up to the plate.
The Chairman spoke a little bit earlier in his opening
remarks about high school graduation and expressed a little bit
of trepidation. We are concerned about that. But there is a
trend that I would like to refer to that is much, much larger
than the Army, and the trend goes a little bit like this: Fifty
percent of all the minority youth who enter high school today
will not graduate. Seventy percent of every young American who
enters high school today who is at or below the poverty level
will not graduate from high school. And across the Nation, 30
percent, irrespective of race or ethnicity, irrespective of
socioeconomic status, will not graduate from high school.
In spite of that, the Army is still--no, we are not hitting
our 90 percent high school degree grad that is the DOD
standard. But in spite of that, we are hovering at 80 percent
and will not go below 80 percent high school degree graduates
in 2008, fiscal year 2008.
The key metric, if you may--all are important, but the key
metric is the one--those who score in the upper 50th percentile
of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. Because
that, more than anything, reflects trainability. The high
school degree, which was adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, really
speaks to stick-to-ittiveness.
To your question, it is going to require innovation for us
to remain viable and continue to grow the Army. We are on a
very, very positive track right now for growing the Army ahead
of schedule, the schedule approved by the President. But it is
going to take innovation. We are employing innovation, and I
will name just two.
We recently launched a partnership with the Army National
Guard called Active First. The National Guard, sir, as you have
stated and several have alluded to, is ubiquitous across our
Nation. There are places where it simply would not be
profitable to have a recruiting station and several recruiters.
So the partnership calls for a young person to be recruited by
the National Guard, trained and then employed, upon completion
of training, for a period in the active force.
Mr. Hobson. Let me follow up for just a second, and then I
have to go vote. The Guard does another thing that is good. In
my State, we will pay 100 percent for a kid to go to college at
a state institution in the State that is public or the similar
amount to a private school within the State. That has got us a
lot of quality young people.
The second thing, I don't know whether you are doing--are
you doing a GED program for these young people, where you can
get them a high school equivalency while they are there. I
think you can help society as a whole with these numbers if you
will get them GEDs. And if the Army cares about them and you
give them structure in their life, these kids can then achieve
in the future, not only in the Army but elsewhere.
General Rochelle. Sir, you are reading my mind, because
that was my second point, my second point of innovation. At
Fort Jackson, South Carolina, later this year, we will employ
and launch a program that was designed and will be spread
across larger if it proves very profitable--and we think it
will--which is designed to do precisely that.
Mr. Dicks [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bishop.

MODULAR BRIGADE STRUCTURE

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
And welcome, gentlemen. And I, too, had conflicting
subcommittee responsibilities.
But following up on Mr. Hobson's point, let me just say for
the record I appreciate, General Rochelle, your willingness and
the willingness of the Army to meet with the Congressional
Black Caucus in addressing some of the concerns that were just
touched upon in your answer to Mr. Hobson's question.
I am concerned about some issues regarding modularity. The
Army is in the process of converting to a modular brigade
structure while at the same time fighting a war with half of
the active component brigades deployed in combat theaters. In
fiscal year 2006, there were 51 brigade combat teams, and of
course, by the end of 2008, we are expecting to have 69.
Can you discuss the utility of adding an infantry battalion
to each of the modular brigades, presumably to increase combat
power, without requiring increases in command and logistical
functions? Do you think that makes sense? And is the Army
exploring such an idea?
And tell me what the impact of modularity is going to be on
the equipment requirements. If additional equipment is
required, is it funded? Is it fully funded, I might ask?
And what would you think--and this is probably the more
complicated of the questions--what is the desired number of
brigades in the force-generation pool that will allow us to
achieve 1-year dwell time and 1-year combat tour? And added to
that, what would be the number of brigade combat teams
necessary to sustain a rotation of 2 years at home for every
year that it is deployed?
Mr. Dicks. Why don't we let him answer that? I think that
is a lot of questions. Then you can follow up.
Mr. Bishop. Okay.
General Thurman. Congressman Bishop, your first question,
the training and doctrine command is looking at the modular
concept in terms of do we have the structure right. And, as you
know, that would add more spaces to that formation, because
with the force structure allowance that we have, that we have
been authorized to grow in the AC, is 547.2. Having fought
these formations, we always probably want more, but it gets
into what is affordable out there and looks at the overall
capability we have to have.
In respect to modularity, I think, as it stands right now,
we have 38 that we have converted on the AC side plus enablers
and two nonmodular brigades, for a total of 40.
We are growing the Army as fast as we can. And what we are
trying to do by fiscal year 2011 is have a total on hand of 76.
And I can go into detail on the actual force mix. And that is
48 on the active, 28 on the reserve components.
Your specific question on what does it take in the Army
force generation to have available, as I understand it, at a 1-
to-1 ratio I believe you asked. That would be 24 brigade combat
teams, programmed right now, as we get to 76, and five Army
National Guard combat teams, for a total of 29. Additionally,
that would give us a rotational capacity in that program--that
is what is in the program--of about 236.8K of rotational
capacity with enablers. And that would be what we would be
trying to do to put on that force-generation model of what is
available, what is ready, and what is in the reset trained.
Now, right now, given our demand, the reset trained and
ready is compressed, so we can't get to that. That is why it is
so important for us to get as fast as we can to the program
growth, so that we can get that capability. I will tell you
that the capabilities in those formations is very good. And you
have the combat power in there, at least in this environment,
that you can rapidly task organize, given that mission, and
apply combat power to decisive point with that. So I would tell
you, I think it is going to take that stress off as fast as we
can grow it.
Now, I will defer to General Speakes to answer the
equipment challenges that we have with modularity.
Mr. Bishop. What about the 2-to-1?
General Thurman. Oh, I am sorry. To get to a 1-to-2, given
a 76 brigade combat team growth for the AC, that would be 16
brigade combat teams. That is what would be on that 1-to-2-
cycle, with approximately 106,000 or 107,000 of enabling forces
at rotational capacity. And then for a 1-in-4 with our reserve
components, because they are part of this equation, we would
ask them to provide four brigade combat teams. That is at the
programmed growth of 76 brigade combat teams. And we are
trying, by the end of fiscal year 2011, to have that completed
and have grown that capability.
Mr. Murtha [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Does Mr. Frelinghuysen have any questions?

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, I do, certainly before Mr. Dicks
comes back, because he is going to reclaim that time. Before he
comes back, let me thank you, General Speakes, for the emphasis
added in response to Congressman Rothman. I mean, it would be
catastrophic if we did not continue, even as expensive as they
may be, our investments in the Future Combat Systems. We might
as well put up a white flag. I mean, we would not be able to
proceed with modernization unless we make those investments.
Would you make the connection between modularity, the
brigades we are sending out in the field now that are modular,
which are all about flexibility, and the flexibility that will
come--are there going to be Future Combat Systems modular
brigades? Could you talk a little bit about that?
General Speakes. Sir, I can.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I know we are spinning the technology
out. To some extent, the technology is futuristic being put to
use.
General Speakes. Right. Sir, what we have been able to do
is the program that General Thurman just laid out takes and
puts the modular formations across our Army. And it is
magnificent because, as General Thurman said from his personal
experience as a combat commander, you have the flexibility, the
agility and the sustainability to be about, to be successful in
today's battlefield.
What my challenge is right now, I am behind, because, you
see, what I am doing right now is taking equipment that was
designed in the 1970s and 1980s, in large measure, and we are
adapting it and trying to modernize it to try to fulfill this
modular vision, but we know it is not really what we want. What
we really want is equipment that is common, that has incredible
force protection capabilities, that has much more agility and
much more sustainability.
We are seeing the initial elements of that in these Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams, which have a common platform and the
ability to almost have a network capability for command and
control. It gives us a vision of where we are headed. The next
step in this will be Future Combat Systems, because----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are marrying future combat system
technology now to the modular units that you are setting up?
That is sort of what I wanted----
General Speakes. Exactly. And then what you will see is all
this common equipment in the brigades that already have been
successful in combat. So instead of using 1970s and 1980s
technology, stuff that was designed for the Cold War, we will
have common platforms, much more survivability, much more
lethality, much more force protection capability. So those are
the things that we are seeing in Future Combat System that we
are so excited about.
Mr. Murtha. We still have $160 billion to $200 billion
which we have to find. So you are going to have to do some
hustling.
Mr. Dicks, before we adjourn.

RESET

Mr. Dicks. Okay. Let me ask you, on this very question, how
are you going to decide what you are going to fix of all of
this equipment that we are bringing back, the so-called reset,
and how much are you going to just wait to get the new stuff?
I mean, I hope we don't go replace all the equipment and
then buy new equipment. I am sure that is what Mr. Murtha is
worried about here, accelerating the Future Combat Systems.
This is the time to fill the holes with the new equipment if it
is there.
General Speakes. Exactly. So in the near term, what we have
is, to fulfill what General Thurman needs, every formation
coming back has to be made ready to go again. That is what we
are doing with reset, thanks to your generous support. So what
we are doing now is returning formations within a year with
equipment that is ready to go. And that has been a tribute to
the resourcing you have given us for reset.
Mr. Murtha. What we are saying is, in the future, if you
want the Future Combat Systems you are going to have to take a
chance on not resetting and rehabilitating as much as you want
to in order to get the other, or we are not going to be able to
find the money, because it is such a big bill.

MRAP

Mr. Dicks. One final thing. On the MRAP again--and I want
to say this for the record. There is no MRAP being built in
Washington State, but I just want to give a fair hearing here.
We have done trainers for the uparmored Humvees. They are
kind of in a container, and these guys go in and train on this
thing. I am told, General Thurman, there is only one trainer
for the MRAP. Do you think it would be a wise investment to do
some more of these trainers, since we are going to be using
this thing?
Mr. Murtha. Particularly in Washington State.
Mr. Dicks. No, it has nothing to do with Washington State.
General Thurman. Congressman Dicks, sir, what I would tell
you is that requirement has not been fully brought into me, as
the G-3. Now, you asked me, do I think we need to have trainers
for these vehicles? I think we have to evaluate that and look
at that.
Any time that we can substitute a training system out
there--and that is a trade-off with money now and funding--
absolutely. You know, we have done that with a lot of our
equipment. But right now, I have not got the full requirement
on that.
Mr. Murtha. I appreciate that answer, and we have to go
vote again. So we will adjourn the Committee until the week
after next.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Cramer and the
answers thereto follow:]
Missiles
Question. The Army has historically spent RDT&E money on the
development of missile systems; however recent plans suggest the
Administration feels comfortable with the current inventory of tactical
missiles. Tactical missile development is declining in such a manner
that in a few years the Department of Defense will only be developing 1
tactical missile program, Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM)? Does
General Thurman believe the readiness of our current inventory of
missiles is sufficient to address an emerging threat such as North
Korea, China or Russia? Does the General feel comfortable the United
States Army can continue to sustain a healthy industrial base for
future tactical missile research and development as threats emerge and
the requirements for Army readiness change?
Answer.
(1) Is current missile inventory sufficient to address emerging
threats such as North Korea, China, or Russia?
In accordance with guidance from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Army requirements are based upon approved scenarios and
Defense Intelligence Agency Threat Reports. We have not received
scenarios or threat reports for all of the areas listed. The Army
conducted extensive modeling and analysis to determine munition
requirements for OSD approved scenarios. Based on a comparison of these
munition requirements and Army inventory, some missile systems fully
meet FY15 requirements while other missile systems require additional
procurement to do so. However, missiles have a limited shelf life, and
Army inventories of critical missiles begin to decline without
additional procurement in the FY15 President's Budget request. Army
inventory projections also are predicated upon receipt of FY08 and FY09
supplemental funds.
(2) Does the G-3 feel comfortable the U.S. can continue to sustain
a healthy base for future tactical missiles?
The Army recognizes the health of the Missiles Industrial Base is
an issue. At present, we have an unsurpassed capability in Close
Combat, Aviation, Fire Support and Air Defense. The result is limited
upgrade or develop of new missile systems. In response, the Army has
initiated a missile capability gap analysis to highlight emerging
capability gaps, help focus the President's Budget requests in FY12-17
to ensure capability gaps do not develop, and to ensure that the U.S.
retains the industrial base capacity to counter emerging threats.
Question. I have heard rumors that the Army G-3 has requested an
Army Missile Capability Gap Assessment and is expecting this assessment
to address the POM 2012-2017. Is this Assessment going forward as
requested and can this Subcommittee expected to be undated once this
assessment is finalized?
Answer. On 21 Dec 07, the Army G-3 signed a memo directing the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command to conduct an Army Missile
Capability Gap Assessment that looks at future Army missile capability
needs in the context of a Joint force. Discussions are underway to
ensure assessment scope, use of current analysis results and completion
date will identify and provide recommendation/direction for any
potential missile capability gaps. We expect to provide the results by
the FY12 President's Budget submission. No Congressional update is
currently scheduled.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cramer.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow.]
Modularity
Question. The Army is in the process of converting to the modular
brigade structure, while fighting a war, with approximately half of the
active component brigades deployed to the combat theaters. In fiscal
year 2006, the Army had 51 brigade combat teams. By the end of fiscal
year 2008 the Army plans to have 69 brigade combat teams.
Please discuss the utility of adding an infantry battalion to each
of the modular brigades. The idea is to increase combat power without
requiring a significant increase in command and logistical functions.
Does this make sense and is the Army exploring such an idea?
Answer. The Army continually assesses the utility of the modular
force designs and applies changes based on lessons learned and
operational experience. The Army must balance the strategic risk of
preserving the All-Volunteer Force in persistent conflict, the
operational risk of providing sufficient capacity to support joint
force rotational requirements, and the tactical risk of maintaining
sufficient capability within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to conduct
successful full spectrum operations. The current BCT design includes
one Recon & Surveillance Squadron with three troops and two Maneuver
(Combined Arms Battalions) with 4 companies each. This design has one
more maneuver company than a legacy brigade. Adding a third combined
arms battalion would make the BCT ``more capable'' than previous
designs, but would increase the size of a Heavy BCT by 812 personnel
and an Infantry BCT by 848 personnel which would add an additional
56.1K Soldiers at a cost of over $4.8B per year across the force. In
addition, the increase of 68 Maneuver Battalions would generate an
equipping bill of $2.5B.
Question. What is the impact of modularity on equipment
requirements? If additional equipment is needed, is that equipment
fully funded?
Answer. The transformation of our force has driven up the
requirements for equipping. The current plan from 2005 to 2013 provides
$174.9B in procurement ($41.0B for the Reserve Component ($29.4B to
ARNG and about $11.6B for Army Reserve) and $133.9B for the Active
Component) from the base budget to meet these increased requirements;
however, because of pre-modularity shortfalls, the Army depends on
supplemental appropriations to close the gap between new requirements
and existing equipment and modernization shortfalls. Our greatest
concern would be a loss of supplemental funding support for this plan,
resulting in an inability to fully meet the Army's equipment
requirements across all components and the unhinging of the Army's
Equipping Strategy.
The Army had significant equipping challenges prior to 9/11.
Particularly noteworthy were the equipment shortages and lack of
modernization in the Reserve Components. Because of the need to
integrate the Reserve Components to meet the demand of persistent
conflict, the Army has adopted a new total force operating strategy
that resources units based on their deployment window, regardless of
component. The previous incremental ``tiered'' resourcing strategy
resulted in late deploying Active and most Reserve Component units
being equipped last and with the least modernized equipment. Additional
funding gained through supplemental spending will fill shortages and
modernize outdated equipment in the force and fund payback plans for
diverted Reserve Component equipment. The Equipping Strategy is linked
to the Army Campaign Plan which reflects the time-phased transformation
of the Army into the modular force.
Question. Has the Army been able to meet the schedule for forming
modular brigade combat teams? What have been the key challenges in
terms of personnel and equipment?
Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010
and Modular BCT growth by the end of FY 2011. The most significant
challenges to meeting this timeline are:
(1) Manning: Ensuring manning programs provide for the recruitment,
development, distribution, sustainment, retention and associated
systems critical to building and maintaining the all volunteer force.
Logistics, Military Intelligence, and Aviation Captains and Majors are
among the major manning challenges.
(2) Equipping: How to best balance funding to minimize risk to the
current force and maintaining the momentum in Modernization to ensure
the viability of the Future Force. Battle Command Systems, trucks, and
night vision devices are three of the major equipping challenges for
Brigade Combat Teams.
Grow-the-Army-Brigades
Question. Currently, and over the next several years, the Army is
adding end-strength and equipment in order to form six new infantry
brigades.
When will the Grow-the-Army brigades be available for combat
deployment?
Answer. As a matter of course, the GTA BCTs will be available for
deployment one year after they activate. The Army will activate one
additional BCT in each year from 2008-2010 and three BCTs in 2011. By
the end of FY 2011 all GTA BCTs will be available for deployment.
Question. What is the status of manning, equipping and training the
Grow-the-Army Brigades?
Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010,
BCT growth by 2011 and equipment growth for the BCTs by 2015. To
monitor our progress in meeting these goals, the Army conducts a
monthly Force Validation Committee process to synchronize resourcing
functions for select units that will deploy or convert within a given
window. This process brings together the Army Staff and supported
commands to identify and resolve manning, equipping and training
issues. Using current readiness data as a baseline, the Force
Validation Committee projects the status for each unit as it builds to
its scheduled deployment or conversion date. Units that are not
projected to meet stated readiness goals on their deployment or
conversion date are intensively managed at each level to adjust
resources and mitigate shortfalls.
Question. Is the necessary equipment for the Grow-the-Army Brigades
fully funded?
Answer. The Army's current program from 2008-2013 provides a total
of $68.6B to include $17.0B in procurement to support the Grow the Army
plan's original 2012 BCT timeline. The Chief of Staff has approved an
accelerated Grow the Army Plan timeline that will have all BCTs in the
force by 2011, and will require an additional $2.6B in funding for
personnel and training.
Question. Will all the new brigades be light infantry brigades?
Answer. The GTA initiative was based on increasing rotational depth
and filling global operational demands as quickly as possible. The
growth of six AC Infantry BCTs was the optimal way to accomplish the
rapid growth with a structure suitable to meeting current operational
demands in an era of persistent conflict. This decision is subject to
review based on the results of Total Army Analysis and the Quadrennial
Defense Review. This process will analyze existing requirements,
current operational demand, and projected future demand to ensure we
have the appropriate mix of Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs within
the force and across the Active Component and Army National Guard.
Reset Funding
Question. General, Congress provided $17.1 billion for Army's reset
needs in the fiscal year 2007.
Please update the Committee on the execution of the $17.1 billion
provided for Reset in fiscal year 2007?
Answer. In FY07, the Army executed $16.4 billion of the $17.1
billion provided for Reset. The Army was unable to spend the remainder
of the funds toward Reset due to operational changes in the Theater
that resulted in less equipment returning to the States than planned.
The Army reprogrammed these dollars toward the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle, a high priority force protection item. In total, the
FY07 funds Reset of 25 brigade combat teams: 20 completed during in
FY07 and 5 are completing in FY08.
Question. What are the key production challenges facing Army Reset
in terms of industry and depot capacity? Are you facing any major
capacity problems?
Answer. Our primary challenge is the receipt of timely, adequate
funding. The Army requires the remaining $7.6 billion in FY08 GWOT
procurement no later than Memorial Day to remain on schedule for FY08.
Timely receipt of these dollars leads to maintaining the necessary
workforce, procuring of additional spare parts and contracting with our
industrial partners which leads to the necessary production. Since FY03
the depots have doubled their direct labor hours from 12.5 million to
27.1 million (projected) in FY08, tracked vehicle Reset increased 200
percent, radar and Stryker Reset increased 100 percent, and all other
systems' Reset increased 50 percent. Additionally, new procurement
increases equipment on hand ratings, allowing units to start training
earlier and improve the Army's strategic depth.
Our depots currently are not operating at full capacity. We
currently are at 27.1 million labor hours and have the capacity to go
to 40 million labor hours. We are operating at the necessary capacity
to meet current requirements with available funding. Each depot's
production capacity utilization is being optimized in accordance with
the commodity the depot repairs and the Army's rotation schedules. In
FY07, 109,249 items were scheduled to be Reset. By the end of FY07, the
actual Reset completions totaled 123,425 items--30 percent over
schedule. In FY08 we plan to complete 130,000 items. As Army
requirements change, depot production will increase as necessary to
meet them. Our only requirement is for predictable, early funding,
which is essential to allow for the timely procurement of repair parts,
adequate production planning, and the hiring and training of necessary
personnel.
Pre-Positioned Equipment Sets
Question. The Army drew upon pre-positioned equipment sets to
sustain initial combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired
and replaced in pre-positioned sets only to be dawn out again for the
surge.
What is the readiness posture of Army pre-positioned sets today?
Answer. The readiness posture of the Army Prepositioned Stocks
(APS) available equipment sets for APS-4 are at 88%-95% of fill. The
APS reconstitution plan will ensure all the other APS equipment sets
will have a readiness posture of 95-100% of fill.
(1) APS-4 in Korea and Japan is available; it is comprised of an
HBCT (95%) and a tailored Sustainment Bde (88%). APS-4 will be
completed by 4th Qtr FY 08.
(2) APS-3 Afloat has a Port Opening Package capability in Guam AOR
at 90% of fill. This set consists of a temporary afloat set of 20 units
(twelve port opening and eight medical units/teams) loaded aboard the
USNS Pomeroy. The full Sustainment Bde Set will be completed in FY 11.
(3) APS-5 is issued and is planned for reconstitution when no
longer required for ongoing operations in accordance with APS Strategy
2015.
Question. Is additional funding needed to repair and reset pre-
positioned equipment sets as the surge brigades depart from Iraq?
Answer. APS funding has been incorporated in the Supplemental
request and identified as part of the Reset funding and in Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) FY 10-15 process. The total cost of APS
reset is $8.9 B in both Operations Procurement (OPA) & Operations
Maintenance and Army (OMA) funds through 2015. Army will reconstitute
APS by 2015 with the continued support of Congress to fully resource
the budget requests for Army equipment (Supplementals and POM 10-15).
Question. What is the time line to have all the pre-positioned sets
returned to their desired readiness?
Answer. The APS stocks were used to support Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to accelerate the build of
the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The Army has developed an APS
reconstitution timeline to support the approved Army Prepositioned
Stocks (APS) Strategy 2015, the FY 10-15 Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) (based on equipment availability) and Army resource
prioritization.
Current Year:
APS-5: Infantry Brigade Combat Team
Near Term:
APS-5: Heavy Brigade Combat Team #1
APS-3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #1,
Sustainment Brigade #1
APS-2: Heavy Brigade Combat Team
APS-5: Infantry Battalion
Mid Term to 2014:
APS-3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #2,
Sustainment Brigade #2
APS-5: Fires Brigade, Sustainment Brigades
#1 and #2
Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-
positioned equipment sets?
Answer. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP), will be
incorporated into APS-5 and APS-3 when no longer required for
operational use (variant type TBD). MRAP availability will be based on
the results of Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Tactical
Wheeled Vechicle Strategy.
Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the
uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are pre-
positioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of action
to take the equipment from the pre-positioned sets and use it to outfit
modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army brigades?
Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) is a strategic asset that
has proven its value in every recent major contingency. APS provides
the strategic responsiveness to deploy globally to any contingency
operation. The last four years of the GWOT in Iraqi, have demonstrated
that the APS program is flexible, responsive, and critical to the
Army's ability to deploy forces in support of the Combantant Commander
requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. APS was used
to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of modular
BCTs and Grow The Army effort limits the ability to rapidly reinforce
forward units by air movement. Current operational plans and future
planning scenarios to include requirements that use APS sets. The Army
complies with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007 to
identify any APS sets utilized and the plans to reconstitute those APS
sets annually.
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP)
Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and
Explosively Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could
be applied to the HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type
trucks to provide greater force protection. The Army seemed skeptical
at first about acquiring MRAPs in large numbers.
General, what is the current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs?
Answer. The current AAO for MRAPs is 10,000 systems (based on the
September 2007 interim requirement). A new interim requirement for
MRAPs of 12,000 systems is currently in staffing. The final requirement
is dependent on many factors, including future actions taken by the
enemy.
Question. How many MRAPs does the Army have currently fielded in
Iraq; and how many in Afghanistan?
Answer. As of 4 March, the Army has fielded 1,333 MRAPs in Iraq and
8 in Afghanistan.
Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal?
Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by
October 2008 and field them by December 2008. If a new interim
requirement of 12,000 is adopted, it is anticipated that these systems
could be produced by February 2009 and fielded by April 2009.
Question. How have the MRAPs been received by soldiers, and how
have the MRAPs performed in terms of mobility and utility; and how have
they performed when they have been attacked by various threat weapons?
Answer. In his initial assessment, LTG Odierno reported the
fielding of MRAP vehicles has had a positive impact upon crew
survivability in Theater. Although in some operating environments, it
came at the expense of maneuverability and mobility. Nevertheless,
these limitations were expected and most units are ``eagerly awaiting
additional vehicles.''
Due to the low densities fielded, there has been no opportunity to
do side by side ``best of breed'' analysis. It is premature to tell
which variant of MRAP is superior or to provide definitive feedback on
performance, final numbers and/or category mixes.
Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPS?
Answer. A two-thirds MRAP to one-third Up-Armored HMMWV fill per
Brigade appears about right as a fielding plan. However, it is
premature to tell which variant of MRAP is superior or to provide
definitive feedback on performance, final numbers and/or category
mixes.
Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded?
Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint
Program Office reports sufficient funding to procure 12,000 systems for
the Army.
Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in
Iraq is over?
Answer. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting tactical
wheeled vehicle analyses that include: 1) mission roles and profiles;
and 2) threats and capabilities of the various fleets including the
MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and HMMWV. The initial results of
those analyses will influence POM decisions; the Force Mix Brief to
Congress; and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense in JUL 08. The Army's Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive
the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet
current and emerging threats.
Contractors and Readiness
Question. The Department of Defense has made a major effort to
outsource support functions in order to allow soldiers to remain
focused on core military skills and duties. The proliferation of
contractors performing support functions ranges from the dining
facility to aircraft maintenance. Contractors are working side-by-side
with military forces at home station and in the combat theaters.
What is the commander's role in defining contractor duties; in
supervising contractors; and in disciplining contractors?
Answer. Primary oversight of contractor performance and conduct
falls to the cognizant contracting officer, and is generally dictated
by the terms of the Government contract.
Contractor employees are required to comply with all guidance,
instructions, and general orders issued by the Theater Commander, as
incorporated by the Government's contract, including those relating to
force protection, security, health, safety, or relations and
interaction with local nationals.
Commanders may refer contractor criminal misconduct to DoD/
Department of Justice under MEJA, and if jurisdiction is declined, may
then consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2, UCMJ in
coordination with DoD.
Question. Training scenarios at the National Training Center and at
other locations include role players who represent the Iraqi
population. Do Army training scenarios include role players for
contractors, such as contractor security personnel?
Answer. Army maneuver Combat Training Centers primarily use
personnel assigned to their Opposing Force cadre to replicate the
various contractors in theater, including private security contractors.
In many instances the centers use Arabic-speaking personnel to role-
play contractors working on U.S. Field Operating Bases, since U.S.
forces in theater are in day-to-day contact with Arabic contractors.
Army maneuver Combat Training Centers are working to integrate into
training scenarios actual personnel from contracted companies.
Every Army maneuver Combat Training Center also challenges
deploying forces to work through Rules of Engagement and Escalation of
Force scenarios that involve private security contractors in
Situational Training Exercises or scripted situations during their
Mission Rehearsal Exercise. Training of unit contracting officials at
Combat Training Centers occurs, but is limited due to constrained
resources (time, expertise and dollars) that are focused on other
mission-essential training tasks and capabilities.
At maneuver Combat Training Centers, unit officials are trained on
the basics of the contracting process from start to finish, and
specifically on how to manage Commander Emergency Relief Program (CERP)
contracts to completion in coordination with role players for ``local
contractors,'' Provincial Reconstruction Team members, and
representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development. With
the Battle Command Training Program, division and corps staff officers
discuss best contracting practices with actual subject matter experts
from theatre. Additionally, a Joint Personnel Recovery Activity
workshop is given, which discusses the accounting and recovery of
contractors on the battlefield.
Recruiting and Retention
Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract
and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and operational
effectiveness. While the services have generally met their aggregate
recruiting and retention goals, the GAO reports that the Army has
experienced shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties such
as health care, human intelligence collection, and explosive ordnance
disposal. There is growing concern within the department as to how the
Army can meet current operational demands with what appear to be
chronic shortages in these occupational specialties. In addition, there
is growing concern that recruitment standards have been relaxed to meet
numbers.
Gentleman, the Committee is very concerned regarding the
recruitment and retention for mission-critical occupational
specialties. For example there continues to be a shortage of nurses in
the military and many billets remain vacant. Given the wartime
environment that we are in, this Committee is extremely interested in
what resources are currently available to recruiters to remedy this
problem?
Answer. Specialties such as Special Forces, Explosives Ordnance
Disposal, Air Defense and Transport Operators are examples of mission
critical occupational specialties that are targeted through a
combination of our highest enlistment bonuses and educational
incentives. Currently, 27 critical skills are at the highest statutory
incentives levels, receiving enlistment bonuses of up to $40,000 and
the Army College Fund of up to $74,000 or loan repayment up to $65,000.
The NDAA06 raised maximum recruiting bonus limits for all Army
components ($40,000 for the Active Components and $20,000 for the
Reserve Components) and we recently initiated a High School Diploma
Grad targeted program, Army Advantage Fund, which will enable many
Soldiers to make substantial down payments on a home or business in
exchange for a service commitment. Recent legislation expanded the
student loan repayment program to offer a broader range of loans for
repayment and enhanced educational benefits for our deployed Reserve
Component members. We have targeted enlistment and re-enlistment
bonuses as well as the Army College Fund to our most critical skills
and training programs.
Through targeted re-enlistment incentives, the Army is addressing
specialties that are currently short due to rapid growth and
transformation. The incentives for each specialty are adjusted semi-
annually using the Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Review Board.
Shortages in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and
some others are continually targeted for some of our most robust
incentives.
Question. Has the Army analyzed why these occupational specialties
have consistently been under-filled, and what is the operational impact
of these shortages and what resources are needed to fill these
positions?
Answer. From a recruiting perspective, the Army has conducted
internal analysis as well as utilized sources such as RAND and the Army
research Institute and studies from outside agencies. Factors ranging
from the requirements for security clearances, aptitude test scores,
difficulty of training and propensity toward military service have all
been cited. Each critical skill is evaluated at a minimum on a
quarterly basis to determine needed changes, receive input from
training proponents and to develop innovative targeted recruiting
initiatives. On February 1st, the Army instituted the Army Advantage
Fund as an innovative tool to reach a more diverse audience through
guaranteed down payments for a first home or small business. There is
potential to expand into other markets as well. The critical skills are
the Army's most expensive recruiting targets and will require continued
funding at levels needed to attract and retain these Soldiers.
The operational impact of Soldier shortages in certain skills
jeopardizes the unit's mission and places Soldiers at greater risk.
Having the required amount of Soldiers in the right skills and grades
is essential to ensure units are fully functional and have the right
leadership, experience, training oversite, can provide for the health
and welfare of Soldiers. Shortages magnify Soldier stress through
longer hours and more frequent deployments.
Question. Is the Army concerned that the strain of multiple
deployments will discourage good individuals from joining the Army- or
``re-upping'' and staying in?
Answer. There are certainly challenges with recruiting during a
period of protracted war with the added strain of multiple deployments.
However, we are optimistic about the Army's ability to find, recruit
and enlist the Soldiers we need to grow the force. The Army was able to
meet or exceed its recruiting goals in Fiscal Year 2007 in all of its
components.
Retention is monitored very closely given the high operational
demand and multiple deployments experienced by most of our NCOs.
Multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are currently not having
an adverse impact on enlisted retention. In FY 2007 the Army achieved
or exceeded the retention mission in every component. To date for FY
2008, all components are exceeding their year to date (prorated)
missions. The retention rates in deploying units have consistently
exceeded 100% since FY05. For instance, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in
Baghdad on Independence Day, this past year. More than 100 Army Reserve
Soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, January
18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary
for the Army Reserve. Continued high retention rates are a significant
indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that
Soldiers believe in what they are doing and value the traditions of
service to the Nation.
Question. DoD standards on qualification tests call for at least 60
percent of recruits to be Category 1 to 3 (the higher end of testing)
and 4 percent Category 4, the lowest end. The Army had chosen a higher
standard of 67 percent in Categories 1 to 3, and 2 percent in Category
4. However, now the Army plans to revert to the lower standards of the
DoD guidelines, which basically lowers the IQ standards for recruits.
Do you believe that this will reduce average effectiveness of Army
units?
Please describe the standards by which candidates are
measured.
Do you expect these standards to be relaxed further to
achieve the aggressive recruitment goals?
Answer. The Army adjusted to the DoD standards in August 2005, in
line with the rest of the services, of 60% TSC I-IIIA and 4% TSC IV.
Prior to that time Army had internal a goal of at least 67% Test Score
Category (TSC) I-IIIA, and no more than 2% TSC IV. The Armed Forces
Qualification Score (AFQT) average score has ranged between 56.5% and
57% since FY04 so adjusting to DoD standards has not affected the
quality of the force.
Applicants are measured based on the percentile in which they score
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Test Score Category
(TSC) I-IIIA includes those applicants who score in the top half (50th
percentile or higher). TSC IIIB includes those who score between the
31st and 49th percentile. TSC IV includes those who score between the
10th and the 30th percentile, of which the Army typically only enlists
those in the 21st percentile or higher. The lowest category is TSC V
(9th percentile or lower). By law, the military does not enlist TSC V
applicants.
The recruiting environment remains challenging and Army remains
focused on recruiting a quality force in line with DoD quality mark
standards.
Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to
Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how
each occupational specialty is staffed. Will you provide the Committee
with details on recruiting and retention by MOS?
Answer. The Army monitors the strength of each MOS carefully to
ensure each required skill is properly manned and maintained. Due to
several factors, including high entrance standards, high volume
requirements, and undesirable duties, recruiting and retention is more
difficult for some MOS's. To compensate, the Army uses priorities and
incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, to shape the recruiting and
retention efforts by MOS.
The Active Army is meeting its year-to-date goals for overall
recruiting and is generally doing well at the MOS level. However, there
are a few MOS's that are below their targets, including: Patriot Fire
Control Operator/Maintainer (81%), Microwave System Operator (49%),
Military Intelligence Systems Maintainer (74%), and Psychological
Operations Specialist (76%). As the year progresses, the recruiting
force places special emphasis on these MOS's to ensure that each
critical skill is manned to the required levels. One way the Army does
this is through the quarterly Multi-component Enlisted Incentives
Review Board (MEIRB) which aligns incentives and priorities with the
needs of each MOS. For example, Microwave System Operator now receives
the highest enlistment bonus available to assist in achieving its
annual target.
As the Army continues to transform and grow; the Army Retention
Program will continue to adjust, encouraging the right Soldiers with
the right skills to reenlist to meet the manning requirements of a
growing Army. In a time of war and sustained operational demand,
retention is a significant indicator of the quality of our leaders and
the commitment of our Soldiers. Currently, the Army is meeting or
exceeding its objectives in each category (initials, mid-careerist and
careerists). Through targeted reenlistment incentives, the Army is
addressing specialties that are currently short due to rapid growth and
transformation. The incentives for each specialty are adjusted semi-
annually using the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Review Board. Shortages
in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and
some others are continually targeted for some of our most robust
incentives.
Question. With the increases in reenlistment and enlistment
bonuses, do you feel that the funding for recruiting and retention
initiatives is sufficient?
Answer. Base funding alone is not sufficient to cover recruiting
and retention initiatives. Currently, all three Components rely heavily
on the Supplemental to fund recruiting and retention programs. In FY08,
the Active Component Supplemental is expected to account for 68.7% of
total Active recruiting and retention funding; the Reserve Supplemental
is expected to account for 20.6% of Reserve recruiting and retention
funding; and the National Guard Supplemental is expected to account for
40% of total National Guard recruiting and retention funding.
Question. How does the Amy recruiting command plan to adapt to meet
the new end-strength requirements? What are the short- and long-term
implications associated with sustaining a heightened end-strength?
Answer. The Army recruiting command has both increased the number
of production recruiters and developed several new recruiting programs
in order to meet recruiting goals dictated by the increase in end
strength. Two notable programs are: Active First, where Soldiers who
enlist in the National Guard first serve a tour on Active Duty; and the
Recruiter Assistance Program, where Soldiers who refer a recruit to the
Army are paid a cash bonus if the recruit completes Basic training. In
addition to these programs, the incentive bonuses offered to Soldiers
for both enlistment and reenlistment continue to increase.
The short-term implication to sustaining increased end strength is
that the Army must rely on Supplemental funding to meet recruiting and
retention missions. The long-term implication is that the Base program
will need to be significantly increased in order to guarantee
continuing success of recruiting and retention incentives and programs.
Growth in Contractor-Provided Services
Question. The Army's obligations on service contracts rose from
$3.8 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $22.9 billion in fiscal year 2007.
(Per 2009 President's Budget). This is a growth of $19.1 billion, or
500% over 10 years (inflation accounted for 17% of this growth).
Over the same period, the Army's obligations for civilian pay rose
$2.4 billion, or 51% (pay raise accounted for 30% of this growth).
Who in the Army has oversight for ``contract services''?
Answer. The oversight of services acquisition is the shared
responsibility of requiring activities, contracting activities, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
(ASA (ALT)).
The ASA (ALT) retains responsibility over the acquisition of
services. The ASA (ALT) delegated authority to review and approve
service acquisitions with a total planned value of $500 million or more
to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy & Procurement)
(P&P). Prior to approving any acquisition of services with a total
planned value of $1 billion or more, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) must be notified.
Acquisition of services with a total planned value of $500 million
or more are reviewed by the Army Service Strategy Panel (ASSP), chaired
by the P&P. Since April 2003, twenty-eight (28) Army service
acquisitions valued at above $500 million have been reviewed under
these procedures. These acquisitions represent a total estimated value
of over $249 billion.
Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) provide the day-to-day
oversight of the contractor's performance. CORs help ensure the
government obtains quality services, on time, and at the level and
prices specified in the contract.
As of February 23, 2006, the Secretary of the Army requires Army
HQDA Principals and Senior Commanders at Army Command, Army Service
Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to be responsible for
the approval for requirements for contracted services. The Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) reports these
requirements directly to the Secretary of the Army.
Question. How are Army commanders at the various levels of command
trained to manage contracting out for services?
Answer. The United States Army has a wide range of schools that its
officers attend throughout their career and before they enter into
command positions. Examples:
Command & General Staff School, Command & General Staff
College
School for Command Preparation, Command & General Staff
College
Garrison Precommand Course, Army Management Staff College
General Officer Senior Command Course, Army Management
Staff College
The Command & General Staff School provides a core course entitled
F-106, Military Contracting and Ethics. This course covers: (1) why and
how the Army uses contracting to effectively support military
operations, (2) considerations and effective planning for contracting
support, (3) types of contracts--what and how they provide support to
include their capabilities and limitations, (4) authorities and
responsibilities for identifying requirements, drafting statements of
work, and overseeing contractor performance, (5) role of the
contracting officer's representative, and (6) obligations and
restrictions concerning oversight of contractor personnel.
In addition, exercise training venues, such as the Combat Training
Centers, are incorporating realistic contracting training scenarios
into operational training.
Question. The Army is forming a new Contracting Command with a two-
star commanding general. Has the general officer been selected yet?
Answer. No, a general officer has not yet been selected as the
commanding general for the new U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC). The
ACC is currently being headed by Mr. Jeffrey Parsons, a Department of
the Army civilian who is a member of the Senior Executive Service. The
position will eventually be filled by a two-star general.
Question. The Army now has a Contracting Command located at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia and an Army Contracting Agency. Is there a degree of
duplication and potential confusion in having two seemingly similar
organizations at two different places?
Answer. The U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) and the various
contracting organizations within the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)
will be transformed into the new U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC),
that will fall under AMC. There will be no duplication as the ACA will
be disestablished once the new ACC becomes operational. The realignment
of ACA and the creation of the ACC will provide the most efficient
structure to effectively execute installation and expeditionary
contracting for the Army. This reorganization will help avoid confusion
because it will provide a centralized capacity to support the
warfighter and provide one contracting face to the customer.
Question. What is the Army doing to increase the number of
available contracting professionals, and to ensure those professionals
have the necessary skills and status to be effective?
Answer. The Army is increasing the number of contracting personnel.
In January 2008, affected Army commands and organizations were tasked
to evaluate their manning needs and submit concept support to support
their personnel requirements. Concept plans are due to the Army G-3 by
March 31, 2008. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) Contracting Oversight plan has already been
submitted to the Army G-3. To date, we have received increased
requirements for 478 military and 815 civilians. In addition, we are
moving forward with the following initiatives aimed at increasing the
stature and career development of the Army's contracting personnel:
The Army is opening more command opportunities for
military contracting officers and we are working on adding five General
Officer positions based on the recommendations from the Gansler
Commission.
We are now capturing expeditionary contracting lessons
learned and incorporating them into our doctrine and contingency
training system. We are also developing a battlefield contracting
community of interest where lessons learned will be posted.
We are adapting training exercises to stress rapid
acquisition, logistics, and contracting in expeditionary operations;
include contracting operations and planning requirements in all
military exercises.
The Army Contracting Campaign Plan task force is exploring
ways to foster civilian participation in expeditionary operations, such
as:
authorizing long-term medical coverage
providing civilian medals for service
providing optional life insurance for civilian
employees
removing the need for a waiver to the annual pay cap
Question. Has the Army accurately determined those functions that
are defined as core functions, and those that are considered as non-
core?
Answer. The Secretary of the Army's policy letter of September 4,
2007 states: ``We must transform to meet enduring requirements in our
core competencies with Military and Civilian employees, and only use
contractors for surge or specialized needs.''
The Army has accurately determined those functions that are defined
as core and non-core based on the applicable Department of Defense
(DoD) policy, which provides broad latitude for using military,
civilian employee or contract in a given function depending on the
facts and circumstances.
The Army uses the DoD Manpower Mix Criteria in Department
of Defense Instruction 1100.22 to determine what functions are military
essential, inherently governmental, exempt from private sector
performance (core functions) or available for contractor performance
(non-core functions).
The DoD Manpower Mix Criteria is based on risk
considerations, the law of war, the statutory definition of inherently
governmental, command and control, rotation base and career
progression, as informed by applicable Status of Forces Agreements,
international agreements and other statutes.
The characterization of a function under the DoD Manpower
Mix Criteria varies depending upon the facts and circumstances:
Security functions in a high threat environment are
inherently governmental except where there are ``rules for the
use of deadly force'' that limit the contractor's discretion
and there is adequate governmental oversight to assure
compliance with those rules.
Interrogation is inherently governmental but may be
contracted under a statutory exception authorizing the use of a
personal services contract if there are sufficient governmental
oversight personnel to limit the discretion of the contractor.
Providing advice to governmental decision makers is
normally not inherently governmental except when the
government's ability to make independent decisions is eroded
through the loss of expertise.
Question. Do you find that contractor personnel generally end up
working along side of military personnel, doing much the same work, but
the contractor costs the government three or four times the pay of a
lower ranking enlisted soldier. How does that make fiscal sense?
Answer. In many cases, contractor personnel end up working along
side of military personnel, doing much the same work, but the
contractor costs the government three or four times the pay of a lower
ranking enlisted soldier. However, the pay of a Soldier and the total
cost of a contract is not the appropriate comparison. The cost of the
contractor is the complete cost to the government, but the Soldiers'
pay is only one cost component. The full cost of a Soldier includes:
non-taxable basic allowance for housing, non-taxable basic allowance
for subsistence, health care costs, the GI bill, re-enlistment bonuses,
the cost to train and recruit a Soldier, permanent change of station
moves, and retirement accrual.
The specific difference in cost of a contractor and a Soldier will
vary depending on the type of work performed, but comparing pay of a
Soldier to cost of a contract will always overstate the difference, and
fails to consider operational priorities and limitations.
The decision to use contractor personnel as opposed to military
personnel is based on long-term cost rather than per hour cost, as well
as availability of military personnel, and prohibitions against using
contractors to perform inherently governmental functions. When the
decision was made to reduce the size of the standing Army as part of
the ``peace dividend'' in the early 1990s, it increased our need for
contractors to provide non-inherently governmental support and
logistics functions in order to free up our military personnel for
combat operations. The majority of the support and logistics functions
had to be contracted to free military enlisted and officers for the war
effort. Each enlisted or officer performing an administrative function
reduces the available forces.
In a fiscal analysis, the comparison is between the cost to sustain
the Army on a war-footing throughout periods of relative peace, while
maintaining the capability to perform the full range of both military
and administrative mission, against the cost to sustain the current
force structure augmented with contractor personnel.
Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT)
Question. The U.S. Army Surgeon General chartered the Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) in July 2003.
Its mission was to assess OIF-related mental health issues and to
provide recommendations to OIF medical and line commands. The MHAT
conducted group interviews and surveys of soldiers. Many of the
soldiers who participated had been engaged in combat. This was the
first time in history soldiers were surveyed in this manner regarding
behavioral issues during active combat.
On May 4, 2007, DoD released the fourth MHAT study since 2003.
MHAT-IV was conducted in August and October of 2006 and assessed more
than 1,300 soldiers and for the first time nearly 450 Marines. The
commanding general of Multinational Force, Iraq, also requested a
first-ever study of battlefield ethics with the participation of
soldiers and Marines currently involved in combat operations. Survey
participants were not selected to be representative of the entire
deployed force. Units were specifically targeted for this survey
because they experienced the highest level of combat exposure.
Gentlemen, according to the Mental Health Advisory Team report,
soldiers who deployed longer (greater than six months) or had deployed
multiple times were more likely to screen positive for a mental health
issue. What steps are taken to assure that these soldiers get the
proper attention?
Answer. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)
continues behavioral health research prevalence and intervention
studies aimed at reducing mental health problems of Soldiers across the
deployment cycle (e.g., Battlemind Psychological Debriefing, and
Expressive Writing). Operationally, the Task Force 62 Medical Brigade
conducts continuous and ongoing prevention activities throughout the
deployment cycle in Theater. Depending on OPTEMPO and identified need,
Combat Stress Control units will deliver customized services to units
based on assessed needs and requests by the unit commander.
MHAT V Soldier Survey data further underscores the importance of
the 6-12 month in-Theater timeframe for when Soldiers are most
susceptible to behavioral health problems. Task Force 62 Behavioral
Health personnel are focusing outreach for units that have been in-
Theater more than 6 months.
Finally, Army Leadership has mandated that all Soldiers receive
Post-Deployment Battlemind Training upon return from operational
deployment.
Question. The 2006 adjusted rate of suicides per 100,000 soldiers
was 17.3 soldiers, lower than the 19.9 rate reported in 2005, however
higher than the Army average of 11.6 per 100,000 soldiers. Does the
Army have proper resources to provide counseling to soldiers?
When soldiers need counseling who provides this
counseling?
Answer. Yes, the Army has proper resources to provide counseling to
the deployed force. When required, counseling is provided by forward
deployed behavioral health providers. There are approximately 200
mental health providers and technicians (150 Army and 50 Air Force)
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and approximately 30
mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force, and 2
Navy) deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In a typical month, over 1,800 new service members are seen in
behavioral health clinics, and over 3,000 command consultations are
conducted regarding the morale and mental health of the fighting force.
On average over 5,000 behavioral health appointments occur per month.
There are four restoration centers that provide 3-5 day inpatient
treatment programs, with a ``return to duty'' rate of 93%. The
corollary outpatient ``return to duty'' rate is 99%. Less than one half
percent of the fighting force is evacuated annually for psychiatric
reasons.
Question. The Mental Health Advisory Team found that both soldiers
and Marines reported at relatively high rates--62 and 66 percent,
respectively--that they knew someone seriously injured or killed, or
that a member of their unit had become a casualty. What mental health
assistance is available to our soldiers who are still in combat?
Answer. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and
technicians (150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); and approximately 30 mental health
providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force and 2 Navy) supporting
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each brigade combat team (BCT) has a
behavioral health section assigned directly to them, also known as
organic assets, and operates in the BCT area of responsibility. In
addition, OIF has the equivalent of 4 deployed combat and operational
stress control (COSC) detachments conducting area-wide behavioral
health and COSC services. OEF has organic BCT behavioral health assets
and the equivalent of 1 COSC detachment.
Traumatic Event Management (TEM) is the approved U.S. Army term
used to define any support activities taken to assist in the transition
of military units and Soldiers who are exposed to Potentially Traumatic
Events (PTEs). The goal of TEM is to successfully transition units and
individuals, build resilience, promote posttraumatic growth (PTG), and
increase functioning and positive change after enduring a trauma.
TEM is taught to Army behavioral health personnel during the COSC
course, currently taught 6 times per year at San Antonio, TX. TEM is
also published in all Army behavioral health field manuals and includes
the use of both individual and group support activities to address the
impact of PTE on units and Soldiers who are routinely exposed to it as
a result of conducting military operations.
Both organic behavioral health assets (division) and echelons above
division (Task Force 62 Medical Brigade) provide services to units and
Soldiers after critical incidents such as firefights and improvised
explosive device attacks. Also, Chaplains are indispensable parts of
the team taking care of Soldiers after combat losses.
Question. According to the Mental Health Advisory Team,
approximately 10 percent of soldiers reported mistreating non-
combatants or damaging their property when it was not necessary and
less than half of soldiers would report a member of their unit for
unethical behavior. Is there any concern that with lower standards
these incidents could become worse?
Answer. No, there is minimal concern that these incidents will
become worse. MHAT V found that unethical behaviors did not change
significantly relative to 2006. Battlefield ethics issues have been
incorporated into the AMEDD combat and operational stress control
(COSC) and into the Battlemind Psychological Debriefing program
developed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In addition, Army
generated a new COSC concept, known as ``remind'' that addresses threat
of dangerousness to others and the risk of unlawful behaviors. This
concept is being fielded actively through behavioral health channels
and will be published in existing COSC doctrine.
Question. Please explain what the Army has done to address the
Mental Health Advisory Team findings? Can you provide a list to the
committee regarding what recommendations were followed and which
recommendations were not?
Answer. MHAT V reviewed all MHAT findings and reported the results
for each. The review is included in the MHAT V report dated February
14, 2008. The review addresses a total of 46 recommendations including
4 redeployment recommendations, 19 deployment recommendations, 4 post-
deployment recommendations and 19 sustainment recommendations. A
complete list of recommendations with the status of each is enclosed.
Question. What is the cost of a Mental Health Advisory Team and how
many more reports do you think there will be?
Answer. I expect annual MHAT missions will continue as long as
combat operations exist in support of the Global War on Terrorism. We
have significantly reduced the costs for these assessments in both
personnel requirements and expenses. MHAT 1 required a 12-member team
that remained engaged in the assessment and reporting process for
approximately 6 months. MHAT V was accomplished with a 4-member team
that produced a final report in about 2 months. I expect future MHATs
will continue to use this smaller, more financially efficient
configuration. Regardless of the team's size, it will still require
extensive planning and support.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Tuesday, February 26, 2008.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

WITNESSES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY OBERING, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEVIN CAMPBELL, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE
AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
PAUL FRANCIS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Mr. Dicks. The Committee will come to order. We have a
motion from Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today, which involve classified material, be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Dicks. All those in favor of the motion signify by
saying aye. Aye. Opposed? The motion is adopted. I want to
welcome our witnesses today on a hearing on missile defense. We
have a very distinguished panel that should give the Committee
the benefit of several perspectives on where we are, where we
are going, and what challenges exist.
Our panel this morning includes Lieutenant General Henry
Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant
General Kevin Campbell, Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command; and Mr. Paul Francis of the
Government Accounting Office, where he is the director for
acquisition and sourcing management. These gentlemen appeared
before the Committee last April, and we are pleased to have
them back. First, I would like it congratulate the Missile
Defense Agency, in collaboration with the National
Reconnaissance Office, on the task last week in which a failed
U.S. satellite in a decaying orbit was intentionally destroyed
using a modified SM-3 interceptor launched from an Aegis
cruiser. This was great collaboration by MDA, Navy, and the
NRO. I also would like to point out that in recent years, our
missile defense programs have made some significant strides in
fielding missile defense systems to defend the United States.
It has deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic
missiles of all ranges, in all phases of flight. This progress
is the result of the efforts of many people in government and
industry, and should be noted. This progress also is the result
of very substantial investments of tax dollars.
Since 2002, Congress has appropriated almost $60 billion
for missile defense, while at the same time, allowing an
unprecedented amount of flexibility, such as an exemption for
many Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition regulations. The
fiscal year 2009 budget requests a further $10.9 billion for
ballistic missile defense programs. A major responsibility of
this subcommittee is to oversee the allocations of such funds.
You can be sure that we will work with the DoD to understand
the basis for its request, to take that into account as we move
forward in the appropriations deliberations. Included in the
'09 request is over 700 million, including military
construction, for a European site for ground-based missile
defense to include 10 interceptors and two large X-band radars.
Last year Congress expressed some reservations about the
pace and manner in which this initiative was planned. I expect
there will be further discussions about the European site this
year. Other areas that are likely to be of interest include the
ability of Congress to provide thorough oversight, given the
manner in which MDA budgets for programs, the lack of
independent cost estimates, and the comparison between General
Accounting Office (GAO) cost estimates and MDA estimates, and
the future of boost-phase defense.
Now, I will note that General Obering and MDA has come
forward with a new Block approach, which may answer some of the
issues that have been raised by the GAO. I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses, but first want to call on Bill
Young, our ranking Republican member, and former chairman of
this subcommittee and the full committee. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
just want to join in the congratulations for really a job well
done. It is pretty exciting to see how effective this shot on
the satellite was. And missile defense is such an extremely
important matter. This Committee has taken some raps over the
years because we have strongly supported funding for missile
defense, but the importance to our Nation cannot be
overemphasized. So just thank you very much for a job well
done. And I am interested in hearing any details about this
shoot-down that we might not have seen on television. Thank you
for being here.
Mr. Dicks. And Mr. Young, we are also trying to figure out
how General Obering is going to get the NRO to pay for this.
Maybe the GAO can help us on that. General, have at it.

Summary Statement of General Obering

General Obering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning, good morning Congressman Young, and distinguished
members of the Committee. I want to thank the Committee for the
support that we received over the years for this critical
defense program. As Director of the Missile Defense Agency, it
is my role to develop, test, and field an integrated, layered
missile defense system to defend the United States, our forces,
allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges in
all phases of flight. For 2009, we are requesting $9.3 billion.
Approximately 75 percent, or about $7 billion of this will be
allocated to near-term fielding and development. To lay the
foundation for this request, let me review why missile defense
is so critically needed. There were over 120 foreign ballistic
missile launches last year, significantly exceeding what we
observed in previous years.
North Korea's development of a long-range missile, their
advances in missile technologies, such as solid fuel, and their
export activities remain troubling. Iran continues to pursue
newer and longer range missile systems and advanced warhead
designs. Their actions underscore the need to field and
integrate long-range defenses with NATO's shorter range
defenses. As background for the 2009 request, let me provide an
assessment of where we are today.
Simply said, 2007 was the best year that we have
experienced in the missile defense program. We had historic
accomplishments in all aspects of our program, development,
testing, and fielding, and across all environments, land, sea,
and space-based. Thousands of men and women across this country
in government and industry made this achievement possible. We
have now fielded a system that may be activated on short notice
to provide protection in times of crisis and, if necessary,
defend the United States from long-range ballistic missile
attack.
In addition, we have fielded an initial capability to
protect our allies and deployed forces from medium and short-
range ballistic missile attack. We have now emplaced 24 long-
range interceptors in Alaska and California. We have modified
17 Aegis ships for tracking, with nine destroyers and three
cruisers capable also of engaging shorter range missiles with
the 23 Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors that we
delivered. And, in collaboration with the U.S. Navy, we began
upgrading the Aegis weapon system and delivered 18 modified
Standard Missile-2 Block IV interceptors for a sea-based
terminal capability. We expanded and improved the sensor
network to detect, track, and discriminate threat objects. In
addition to the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, we completed the
testing and integration of fixed radars in California and the
United Kingdom. We achieved partial mission capability on the
very transportable radar in Japan, and delivered another one
for testing in Alaska. We also conducted sea trials and
integration demonstrations with the powerful sea-based X-band
radar, now deployed to the Pacific Ocean.
The Agency also developed and tested new command, control,
battle management, and communications technologies to integrate
and improve the depth, range, and reliability of our defenses.
Our increasingly complex and realistic testing has continued to
bolster our confidence in these capabilities. I also want to
highlight that, as in the past, we will be spending about $2
billion in 2009 on testing alone. Our very active flight test
program in 2007 accomplished 10 successful intercepts in 10
attempts. This included a long-range ground-based intercept,
six Standard Missile-3 intercepts of both separating and
unitary targets, and three THAAD intercepts of unitary targets.
We have now demonstrated hit-to-kill successes in 34 of 42
attempts since 2001, and conducted 26 of 27 successful flights
since 2005. And we do not count the satellite event last week
as a test. We have now not had a major failure in our system in
our testing in over 3 years. This year also marked a major
success by our allied partner, Japan. In their December test
off the coast of Hawaii, they successfully intercepted a
missile warhead, marking a major milestone in our expanding
missile defense relationship. Yet the system we have today is
not sufficiently robust to meet war fighter requirements. Using
a new Block structure that you referred to, we plan to allocate
$1.7 billion in fielding new capability. Over the next few
ears, we will improve long-range defenses by fielding
additional silo-based interceptors in the United States and
upgrading the early warning radar in Thule, Greenland.
Upon reaching agreements with the Governments of Poland and
the Czech Republic, we will begin site construction for a
missile field and fixed-site radar. We also plan to deploy six
more Aegis-capable warships and an additional 36 Standard
Missile-3 interceptors, 48 THAAD interceptors in two fire
units, and up to 100 modified sea-based terminal interceptors
to protect against short to medium-range threats. We are
allocating about 2.4 billion in our development program to help
ensure America's missile defense capabilities remain effective
and reliable well into an uncertain future.
One of our most critical needs is the ability to deal with
complex missile threats, which would include multiple warheads,
advanced decoys, or other sophisticated countermeasures.
Therefore, one of our highest priorities is the Multiple Kill
Vehicle program for both land and sea-based interceptors, which
will allow us to handle these more complex threats. With the
launch of two demonstration satellites later this year, we will
also be able to move forward with the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System, which would provide a persistent global
detection, tracking, and fire control capability.
We are working to give this country its first boost-phase
intercept capability, which will enable the warfighter to shoot
down a missile shortly after it has been launched. The progress
made in the revolutionary Airborne Laser program has been
exciting and historic, and is on track for a lethal shoot-down
of a boosting missile in 2009. We are also planning the first
flight of our Kinetic Energy Interceptor in 2009, which will
deliver an alternative boost phase capability as well as a
midcourse capability. There are several other major efforts
underway, to include the U.S.-Japan cooperative development of
a follow-on Standard Missile-3 interceptor to give the Aegis
system an ICBM intercept capability, a more robust sea-based
terminal capability, studies of the potential benefits of a
space-based intercept layer, and our continuing advanced
technology efforts, to include our work with Israel to co-
develop very short-range ballistic missile defenses.
With our unprecedented success, we have also had some
setbacks. This past year we experienced only the second
complete target failure in 42 flight tests, but it was enough
for me to revamp our target program. I have made the transition
from the legacy boosters to the modern Flexible Target Family a
high priority for this year. In the Kinetic Energy Interceptor
program, we experienced nozzle failures in one of our second
stage firings, which is under investigation. We also
experienced some cost growth in the THAAD, Aegis and GMD
programs, which is being addressed within the overall missile
defense portfolio.
But as I stated at the beginning, 2007 was an outstanding
success, we are making great strides in 2008, and with your
support, we are looking forward to continued success in 2009.
America needs this critical defensive capability to protect her
people, her forces and her allies from this growing missile
threat. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Obering follows.]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Dicks. General Campbell.

General Campbell's Opening Statement

General Campbell. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young,
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for your
ongoing support of our warfighters and for your invitation to
speak before you today. Today, I will primarily address the
ballistic missile defense program from an operator's
perspective. I intend to focus my remarks on the roles and the
contributions the warfighters continue to play in the ballistic
missile defense development testing process, and provide an
assessment of missile defense capabilities to meet the present
threat. I will also briefly address the Army's integrated air
and missile defense construct. As the commander of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, a
subordinated command of the U.S. Strategic Command, I serve as
the joint user representative working closely with the Missile
Defense Agency, the services, and the various combatant
commanders to ensure that our national goals of developing,
testing, and deploying an integrated missile defense system are
met in an operationally sound configuration.
From my role as the user's advocate, I am able to report
with confidence that the combatant commander's input into the
ballistic missile defense system continues to expand. Last
year, I outlined a process established by U.S. Strategic
Command named the Warfighter Involvement Process. As a result
of the continued maturity of this program, we are seeing
substantial warfighter requested modifications incorporated
into the ballistic missile defense system. For example,
warfighter input led to the Simultaneous Test and Operations
capability for the ground-based missile-defense system. This
capability allows the users to maintain the system in an
operational status and conduct essential training while the
Missile Defense Agency can continue with testing activity.
Warfighter input has also led to dozens of software
modification enhancements to the command and control system.
Additional warfighter-initiated modifications will continue
this year.
From a program and budget development standpoint, the
Missile Defense Agency is recognizing the user's input and
including the operator's desired system enhancements and
modifications in the system development program. As we gain
more hands-on experience in understanding of the systems'
behavior, we are simultaneously improving our processes to
capture the combatant commanders' desired changes to the
fielded elements and the operational capabilities they need in
the near and mid-term. We are working with the Missile Defense
Agency to ensure those recommendations we make for changes to
the systems' development program are adequately addressed in
their programmatic decisions.
The operators have remained fully integrated in the Missile
Defense Agency's test program. Our involvement spans from the
development of test objectives to operators sitting at the
consoles and executing the engagements. Involvement in the
testing program allows us to gain more insight into the
systems. And with the success we have seen, our confidence
continues to grow in the elements we are currently operating in
today. The flight tests attract the most attention, but they
are just one aspect of a comprehensive testing campaign. Our
operators participate in more frequent ground testing hardware-
in-the-loop testing. These ground and hardware-in-the-loop
tests benefit the warfighter, the Missile Defense Agency, as
well as the operational testing agencies. Warfighters are able
to identify more effective methods for employing the systems
and assist the testing cadre and developers in identifying
problems long before we move to expensive flight tests. These
tests, in turn, influence further program developments. The
point is simply that the testing of these systems is a
community effort.
Today there are more than 20 countries with ballistic
missile technology, and the preponderance of their investment
is in the short- and medium-range ballistic missile capability.
Our operational commanders clearly recognize the threat we face
today from both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Today we cannot meet all of the combatant commanders' needs. We
work in close coordination with the Missile Defense Agency to
ensure that missile defense investment portfolio addresses the
warfighter needs for the near-term threats as well as for the
mid- to far-term threats from these threat countries.
Maintaining a balanced investment portfolio is critical.
Although we understand the inventories of short- and medium-
range missiles today are significant, we cannot lose sight of
the qualitative improvements nations are making to their
ballistic missile defense systems. Our investments for both the
near and far term must be informed by both the quantitative and
qualitative advancements our adversaries are making in their
programs. The users are conducting analyses and presenting the
Agency with recommendations for adjustments to the development
program.
For example, a recent study not yet approved suggests the
need for additional THAAD and SM-3 missile inventory to handle
today's short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat.
Ultimately, these findings will be presented to the Agency and
DOD for a program decision. In summary, we certainly recognize
the requirement to address not only the threat of today, but
also the need to develop new technologies to deter potential
adversaries from their continued investment in more advanced
ballistic missile technologies. Given the resource realities, I
believe the systems developer has struck a good balance.
Turning to my role as the Army's senior commander for
missile defense, let me briefly outline our priorities. Our top
priority within the Army air and missile defense community is
the continued development of the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense System of Systems. This integrated system will link
systems such that we can improve our capability to execute
terminal phase ballistic missile defense, cruise missile
defense, and force protection. Our objective is to network the
Army's air and missile defense systems, such as PATRIOT, THAAD,
and MEADS so that we can leverage all the sensors and shooters
we deploy on the battlefield and achieve a greater capability
against an array of threat systems.
Mr. Chairman, the Army is a member of the joint team
fighting an adaptive enemy, while transforming to meet future
threats. We will continue developing and fielding an integrated
missile defense for our Nation, for our deployed forces, and
for our friends and allies. I appreciate the opportunity to
speak on these important matters, ask that my written statement
be submitted for the record, and look forward to addressing any
questions you or the members of the Committee may have.
Mr. Dicks. Without objection, all the statements will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Francis from the GAO.

Opening Statement of Mr. Paul Francis

Mr. Francis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, members of
the subcommittee. I appreciate your inviting me here this
morning to participate in the discussion of missile defense. I
am not here as a technical expert or as an operator like
General Campbell. I am the auditor. And we are required by law
every year to report on the progress MDA has been making on the
program. And the material I am going to present today comes
from a draft report that we have over at the Department right
now for comment. And that report will be issued in March 15th
of this year. Some of the things I am going to say this morning
are similar to what I had said last year, but I think there is
some important new developments regarding oversight. And I
think I am going to spend a little time on those as well.
First, I am going to talk about Block 2006 performance and
cost. Block 2006 is the second increment of missile defense,
and it was completed in December 2007. And under Block 2006, a
number of additional assets were fielded. For example, more
ground-based interceptors, more SM-3 missiles, more Aegis ships
upgraded, and more radars fielded and upgraded. While there
were a lot more assets fielded, not quite as many as were
originally anticipated. In the area of testing, most test
objectives I think for the block were achieved. There were some
tests that were delayed. And we will have to pick them up
probably in the next year or so.
We weren't able to assess the overall performance of the
ballistic missile system against its overall objectives because
testing done to date is still not quite enough to anchor the
models and simulations that are used to project that
performance. And there is not yet enough realism in the testing
to enable the director of operational testing and evaluation to
render a determination as to operational suitability and
effectiveness, so I could not quite address that.
In the area of cost, the cost of the block increased by $1
billion. And that cost was accommodated by deferring some work
out to the future and moving THAAD into a different block of
missile defense. Deferring work does create some accountability
problems in that work that is deferred is no longer counted
against Block 2006. But the budgets did anticipate that work
being done. So to the extent that work is deferred, the link
between budget and work done does get weakened. And then we are
not able to do a total cost estimate for Block 2006 because
some of the work has moved out.
So the bottom line on the Block 2006, more capability
fielded, not quite as much as we thought, and somewhat higher
cost. Let me move now to the oversight issue. As the chairman
noted, that MDA does have unprecedented flexibility in its
ability to manage the program. And some of these things or
indications of flexibility are the ability to change goals,
they can defer work, missile defense can concurrently test and
field assets, and it can produce end items and field end items
with research and development moneys.
In addition, the decisions that missile defense makes do
not have to get approved by anyone else in the Department of
Defense. Other statutes that apply to major weapons system
programs do not necessarily apply to missile defense. So for
example, having a firm cost schedule and performance baseline
is not a requirement for missile defense. Tracking unit costs
vis-a-vis Nunn-McCurdy is not required. Independent cost
estimates are not required, nor is independent operational test
and evaluation.
Now, these flexibilities were given consciously to MDA, and
they enable the Agency to be very agile with its decision-
making. And I would have to say that Blocks 2004 and 2006 were
fielded more quickly as a result of having this flexibility. It
does create some challenges for oversight in that the decisions
of MDA are not always as transparent as other programs. And it
is more difficult to hold the program accountable for its
original results. But this is an area where I think some real
improvements are underway in the area of oversight. The new
block structure that the chairman and General Obering
mentioned, I think, is going to be an improvement over the
previous one. It is more aligned with missions. The quantity
and performance goals in the blocks will be baselined. MDA will
track selected unit costs and report on substantial variances.
And MDA will no longer defer work out of block. So that is
going to improve transparency and accountability. There is a
new Missile Defense Executive Board that has been set up. And I
think it is more substantive than its predecessors, has higher
level individuals on it, and I think a pretty strong charter
for providing advice and recommendations on investments,
strategies, and priorities. It does not quite have all of the
powers that a defense acquisition board would have, for
example. It won't necessarily approve decisions that MDA makes.
And the final area, I think, of improvement and oversight
comes with a congressional direction that missile defense is to
start using procurement funds to pay for operational assets. We
think this will improve accountability significantly, because
when you use procurement funds, you have to fully pay for an
asset in the year that you start requesting money. And that is
going to provide a lot of visibility over unit costs. And it is
actually cheaper when you fully fund.
And I think fiscal year 2009 was going to be the first year
that Missile Defense was going to start requesting procurement
funds. And I think they were going to go for THAADs firing
units 3 and 4. And I have seen the budget that those firing
units have been deferred to fiscal year 2010. So at least in my
reading of the budget I don't see procurement funds requested
yet in '09.
I will just wrap up with there is a few things that we
think MDA can do to further improve oversight of the program.
One is while certain aspects of blocks will be baselined, the
total cost of the blocks will not be baselined or independently
verified. We think that they should be done. Now, I think there
needs to be--there is some blocks that can reach so far in the
future there needs to be a reasonable discussion about what you
can do in estimating costs. I mean you can't be Draconian about
something that is that far in the future. But I think a
discussion can be had.
But other blocks are nearer term, and I think those costs
could be estimated. Second has to do with the unit costs that
MDA is going to report on. I think MDA will need to tell the
Congress, or you will have to tell them what assets you want to
track unit costs on, what criteria you will use to say what is
a significant cost increase, and what vehicle MDA will use to
tell you about the variances it is going to report.
And the final area, I think, is in testing evaluation. And
there has been quite a bit done to make tests more operational,
more realistic, but we think more needs to be done there. As I
mentioned earlier, MDA's testing is fairly concurrent with
fielding. And it does not provide for separate operational
testing. Now ideally, we would like to see less concurrency
there and more operational testing done. But short of that, we
have to accept the fact then that the testing MDA does is going
to serve two purposes: One is developmental. It has to show
that the design of the system functions as desired. But also
operational. There has to be enough information, I believe, to
allow the director of operational testing and evaluation to
render a determination of suitability and effectiveness.
And also the tests have to be robust enough for the models
and simulations to be anchored so overall performance can be
projected. So we think more work can be done there. Mr.
Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be glad to answer
any questions.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.

MULTIPLE WARHEAD TESTING

Mr. Dicks. One of the things that I remember from a few
years ago was when we talked about the robustness of the
testing was a multiple warhead test, where they would launch
and we would operate against multiple warheads. Have we done
that yet? Has that been attempted?
General Obering. Yes, sir. We launched on our Aegis program
this past November, we launched two targets that were in the
air simultaneously. And we intercepted them with two
interceptors in the air simultaneously. So that demonstrated a
multiple target capability and multiple interceptor in flight
at the same time. In addition, on long range flight tests that
we accomplished in September, the way that the target presented
itself to the kill vehicle, the kill vehicle when it opened its
eyes it actually saw multiple objects. It saw the warhead, it
saw the third stage of that rocket, it saw debris from the
separation that looks like very small--could be warheads. So we
had to go through--it had to vote on what was the warhead and
what was not. And I can show you video that shows it going
through that voting routine. And it selected the warhead and
hit that. So we feel very confident we are on a very good,
strong path there with respect to that particular capability.
Mr. Dicks. Well, as somebody who was here on this Committee
when President Reagan announced that we are going to have this
capability, I think for me at least, this is one of the first
times I really felt that we now have a deployed capability,
that there is something real with Fort Greely and Vandenberg
and all the Aegis ships, that we now have a real capability.
Now you both mentioned, though, that even with this
capability that we have, that it is not enough to meet what the
commanders need, both in terms of short-range and long-range
missile defense. How long will it take us before we will have a
what you consider a robust capability for this? And General
Campbell, if you want to answer this after General Obering.

SHORT-RANGE AND LONG-RANGE MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY

General Obering. Sir, if you look at what we have loaded in
our budget for after the 2013 time frame, we will have a total
of 54 of the long range interceptors. Forty-four of those will
be based in the United States, and hopefully 10 in Europe and
Poland. We would have about 133 of the sea-based interceptors.
We would have 18 ships from which we could fire those
interceptors. We would have up to three THAAD firing units,
with about 80-plus missiles associated with them. So that would
be a good start. Now, one of the things I think General
Campbell will tell you is they recently conducted a study as to
how much more do we need in terms of force structure, what they
call the Joint Capability Mix Study. And we have committed to
addressing that increase in numbers. It will roughly double the
production rates for the THAAD and for the Aegis such that we
can hopefully get to the numbers that they need to get to by
the 2015 time frame. So that is what we would intend to pursue
as part of our POM 10. And Kevin, if you want to interject.
General Campbell. I think if you just add up pure numbers,
if we look at threat countries we are never going to be in a
one-on-one state. So what we do, in addition to looking at how
many missiles do we need, we look at our offensive capability,
we look at intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and
other means of attacking their systems. So it is a total
solution. And I think what General----

GLOBAL STRIKE

Mr. Dicks. Which I think is critical. Deterrence is still a
very important capability. Credible deterrence is something
that we do have.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. Exactly. And I think if you
would listen to the commander of Strategic Command, he would
tell you that he is interested in having a prompt global strike
so that we can address some of these emerging threats. So it is
a total package. And again, we will never be at the point where
it is one on one or we have the majority of interceptors in our
favor. But we will have offensive forces.
Mr. Dicks. When this thing was first started, we talked a
lot about an accidental launch or two, that kind of a scenario.
This system we have now would be capable against that kind of a
threat, would it not?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
General Obering. In fact, we could handle a fairly, I don't
want to say substantial, but certainly an attack by let's say
less than a dozen missiles from North Korea, the system would
be able to handle that. And we do not believe they have those
right now.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Young.

SATELLITE SHOOT-DOWN

Mr. Young. What do we say to the friendly countries that
have accused us of using the shoot-down of the satellite as a
coverup for some scurrilous testing for anti-satellite
programs?
------

So we had to make all those capabilities. But to answer our
critics, and I am sure--I am headed to Europe later this week,
and I am sure I will be asked, we stated all along that while
our system had an inherent capability, it was not designed for
that, and we would have to make changes to accomplish this. And
frankly, we are much more concerned about the ballistic missile
threat from Iran primarily, and North Korea, which is what the
system is designed for.
------

EUROPEAN SITE

Mr. Young. I know that people all over the world were
really impressed with what you were able to accomplish, and
especially for those that recognized the tremendous technical
challenges that you had to face. So congratulations again. I
wanted to ask about the deployment of radar and interceptor
sites in Europe. And I understand that Poland has now made a
requirement that if we are going to put anything in Poland, we
are going to have to agree to modernize their military. Is that
a new requirement on the part of Poland, or is that something
we have been dealing with all along?
General Obering. Sir, it is a request that the Polish
Government made of us as part of the missile defense
negotiations. There had been talk earlier--there were always
talk in the back of the negotiations about how are you going to
protect this site, especially concern about the fact that they
were exposing themselves, as they described it, to the
Russians, and some other things. So there was always that talk
in the background. But as the negotiations proceeded, and I
think a key breakthrough came when their Foreign Minister,
Radik Sikorski, came over several weeks ago and met with
Secretary Rice, and they were able to come to an accommodation
that said, look, Poland is part of NATO, and they have to
remember that.
So the protection of NATO is part of the Article 5
protection of NATO. And I know that that was the gist of the
discussion. We know we have to protect these sites, and there
has to be defenses made. And so we agreed to separate that from
the missile defense discussions. And then that discussion will
take place in a separate venue.
Mr. Young. How serious is the Russian objection?
General Obering. Sir, when we pulled out of the 1972
Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the Russians didn't say a
word, not a word. And in fact, we were in cooperative
development agreements with them in terms of cooperation
through the missile defense exercises and other things. When I
announced to the Russians, specifically General Brzezinski,
back in 2003 and 2004 time frame that we had intended to expand
our coverage into Europe because we were very concerned about
what we saw going on in Iran, I did not get any major pushback.
It was not until we announced it was Poland and the Czech
Republic that Mr. Putin raised the flag and started making the
objections. I will tell you, and I have been involved, I was in
the two-plus-two discussions in Moscow in October, I have been
involved in the discussions with the Russians, and in fact,
just my chief engineer was with the Russians last week in
Budapest, they do not have a technical objection anymore. They
know that their argument about this changes the strategic
balance between the U.S. and Russia is just not valid. And that
has played itself out on the NATO stage. It is all
geopolitical. That is all it is. And I say all it is, that is
still significant, but that is what it has boiled down to for
the Russians.
We have gone to extreme measures in my mind to address
that. We stated that we would jointly monitor the threat,
meaning that we would be willing to have Russians observe what
we are observing with respect to the Iranian threat
development. And would they allow us to have folks at their
sites, for example, in Karbala in Azerbaijan. We talked about
sharing of data between our radar systems and their radar
systems.
And we talked about, I would propose that we build out
these sites, we integrate them and test them, and then we would
not bring them to an operational status unless the threat
emerged from Iran. And that argument, which I made to the NATO
Council and to the NATO-Russia Council, went over very well.
And our allies very much supported that. But Russia still has
not moved off the top dead center to try to jump into this
cooperation.
Mr. Young. Well, congratulations, again, on the very
exciting shoot-down of the satellite. That was good news. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
General Obering. Thank you.

SATELLITE SHOOT-DOWN--FUEL TANK

Mr. Dicks. I also think, I don't know if you mentioned
this, but the hydrazine was frozen. This was another aspect of
this.
General Obering. Yes, sir. What was so much concern here is
that the hydrazine was solid as a rock. The whole space craft
was dead. And they had no communication with it whatsoever. And
so we did everything we could to try to understand and gain
knowledge about it by imaging it and that type of thing with
our radars. And of course, we did not know where it was going
to come back in. We had no knowledge. And so but we were able
to confirm with three different phenomenologies the fact that
we did destroy the hydrazine tank. So we are very confident of
that.
Mr. Dicks. We were just talking about the fact that you had
to--didn't you have to get the satellite warmed up a little
bit?
------

Mr. Dicks. Mr. Moran.

SPACE TEST BED

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a number of
issues. I will try to touch on some that might be less likely
to be asked. The space test bed, the Congress eliminated that
program in the last year, and yet you are asking for new money
in this year's budget for it. Can you tell us why, when the
Congress removed all the funding for the activity last fiscal
year, you are coming at it again? Is it just quixotic or
masochistic or programmatic?
General Obering. Probably a little bit of all three, sir.
It is because we do feel strongly that--first of all, we think
that this country needs to look ahead. We cannot always be
looking in the present, and we have to continue to look ahead.
And we think it is important that as you have the debate on
Capitol Hill here as to where this Nation goes with respect to
its defense strategy, that that debate be informed. And so we
were just proposing to have experimentation so that we could
understand--you know, we may be having a false debate. We may
be thinking we can build a capability that, in fact, we cannot
because it is technically not achievable. So that was the
purpose behind it.
Mr. Moran. All right. That is a good answer.
Mr. Dicks. Would the gentlemen yield for just a second?
Mr. Moran. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. Tell us a little about the space test bed again.
Mr. Moran. Take your time, because this doesn't come out of
my allocation.
Mr. Dicks. It does not. An unlimited reservoir.
General Obering. There are a lot of unanswered questions as
to whether you could actually accomplish an intercept from
space. By the way, just to clarify, we intercept in space all
the time. That is where we live. Whenever you engage an ICBM,
or an intermediate-range ballistic missile, or a medium-range
ballistic missile, or even a short-range ballistic missile in
the mid-course phase, that phase is in space, whether you are
at 80 kilometers or 380 kilometers.
So we live in space already with our intercepts. But there
is an advantage to having a space-based interceptor that would
have the flexibility and mobility and global coverage, so to
speak, so that you could address emerging threats where you had
not anticipated them from before. Now, but there is, like I
said, there are questions about this.
First of all, there is long-term storage of propellant on
space. What is the command and control concept? Could you
actually do the seeking and the sensing that you need from
looking down in terms of boosting missiles or for a mid-course
intercept. A lot of questions. So we were trying to understand
what is possible, what is not possible so that we can, again,
inform this debate as we move to the future. Because I do
believe that first of all, a lot of people do not realize it,
but when they swipe their credit card at the gas station, that
is typically through a satellite. When you use your credit card
at WalMart, that is typically through a satellite. So we rely
on space very heavily. And we are a space-faring nation. And
historically if you look back, nations that do not protect
themselves, especially their lines of communication that they
depend upon do so at their peril. So I think it is important
that we continue this experimentation.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Moran.

THAAD FIRE UNITS

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for that
answer. I actually agree with you. I do think that is an
important area for research in particular. And so it would be
helpful for you to keep the Committee informed, assuming that
the Committee does not try to eliminate it again. But again,
looking for inconsistencies, the Congress allowed your agency
to continue to use research and development funds in fiscal
year 2009 to incrementally fund previously approved missile
defense assets, and we expected that you would continue in
other words procurement, spending procurement funds for the
THAAD.
And--but in this budget, there is no money for procurement
for the THAAD fire units or the Aegis BMD, SM-3 1A missiles.
And the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required it,
and yet there is no procurement funding in this budget. So
maybe you could clarify that.
General Obering. Sir, there is a couple issues. The first
one was in terms of the THAAD, the procurement--I think the
direction was after the first two fire units that we procured
with RDT&E, the next two, 3 and 4, that was delayed because of
cost growth in the program that I mentioned earlier. We delayed
the delivery of those units. But more importantly, by the time
that we were able to build a budget, the ability for us to be
able to generate the procurement program elements (PEs), which
is not done by us, it is done by the comptroller for the
Department, it got to be a bridge too far in being able to do
that for this budget. So our intent is that we would package
this for the 2010 proposal in terms of what would be
procurement in the RDT&E.
Mr. Moran. So that was a matter of timing?
General Obering. Yes, sir. It was awfully late when we got
the direction. And we already built the budget by then.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Mr. Moran. All right. Well, that explains it. I wanted to
ask about--and I guess this would go to you, too, General, the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System has a rudimentary
capability, we are told, to defend U.S. citizens against a
limited ballistic missile attack. Could you give us your
assessment of the training and personnel readiness to use such
a system in defeating a limited ballistic missile attack
against U.S. citizens?
General Obering. Yes, sir. And Kevin probably could--
General Campbell could probably step in here. My view of the
training and readiness from a manpower personnel perspective is
it is very, very good. The operators know what they are doing.
They know how to operate the system. We test that in a series
of demonstrations, readiness demonstrations as well as war
games and simulation. When we say that we handle a rudimentary
capability, what we are talking about is we can handle a
limited attack.
------

And we are going to fly against those. We have flown
against them in the past, and we are going to fly against them
in our next flight test for the long-range system. What I am
talking about is when you get into very complex
countermeasures, and I can't go into that level of detail here,
but things that really could begin to fool the radar and the
kill vehicles. That is when we need a combination of the very
powerful algorithms that we are building to net our sensors
together and the Multiple Kill Vehicle capability so that we
basically have a shotgun effect on each one of these
interceptors. And that is what we are talking about.
Mr. Moran. That is good. Could I ask one other quick one?
Mr. Dicks. Sure.

ISRAEL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Israel is currently
developing its own program to focus on the same kind of threat
that the THAAD currently defends against, and I have heard
partially with our funds, but they say that the U.S. has not
shared sufficient information as to the capabilities of THAAD,
and so that is why they need their own program. Would you
explain any legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S.
from disclosing such information? And if so, what would those
concerns be?
------

Mr. Moran. Put one of our missile defense----
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moran. Similar to the way we are putting one in Poland
and Czechoslovakia?
General Obering. Well, no, this is temporary, and it is
part of an exercise. We do this all the time in other areas.
Mr. Moran. So it is more mobile. It is not a permanent
facility, as it is in Europe.

STANDARD MISSILE-3

General Obering. Right. And I have had some success in
convincing them that they need to look at some of our
capabilities, that they could use them, for example, our
Standard Missile-3 capability and how we could land base that.
That would be very powerful for the Israelis. And we are
working through the nondisclosure policy, which we do not
control, but we have to go through that within the building to
make sure that any system technology can be protected, or at
least protected long enough so that it is not a threat to the
United States. So we are working through that right now. But we
do not need to be funding a multi-billion dollar interceptor
development program that we end up funding quite a bit of when
we have capabilities like THAAD and SM-3 that could suffice for
that.
Mr. Moran. So it is true, we are actually, at least partly
or in whole, funding their development of an alternative
missile defense system comparable to the one THAAD we already
have.
General Obering. That is not my intent to do that.
Mr. Moran. I understand. But that is, in fact, what is
happening. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Hobson.

EUROPEAN SITE AND NATO

Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here. I have a couple of problems. It looks to me
like in the European thing, here we go again. We are going to
wind up paying for it. Europeans are not going to pay for it.
NATO is not going to pay for it. We are dealing kind of outside
of, inside of NATO as we go deal with one NATO country or two.
They are not really excited about it. But again, we wind up
holding the bag protecting Europe when they won't protect
themselves. I have great frustrations with them right now in
Afghanistan because they are not playing their role the way
they should. And I do not understand why we keep doing this.
This is part of one long question, but why not use the SM-3
Block IIA missile that is under development rather than doing
this? And why do we not get NATO more involved in what we are
doing if we are going to be defending them?
General Obering. Okay, sir. First of all, let's go to the
solution as to why did we select 10 interceptors in Poland and
radar Czech Republic? Why not used the sea-based capabilities?
Two reasons primarily. One, the sea-based is not going to be
there for several years. We would not be able to deploy that
until probably 2016 or beyond. That is a major development that
we are just now kicking off. So there is no guarantee that that
missile is going to be available. In addition, it will cost
more than the 10 interceptors that we are talking about in
Poland and the radar in Czech Republic and the forward
deployable radar, it is about double the price because of where
you would have to put the ship locations.
Let me give you an example. The interceptors that we have
in Alaska and California, of which we would have a two-stage
version for Poland, is about 60 feet long. It is about 55
inches wide. It is a very big interceptor. It has a lot of
capability. You need that when you are going against an ICBM.
We would not have had, for example, from a Delta, what we call
a capability to engage a threat, we would not have had the same
issue with the GBI that we have with these used on the
satellite shoot-down because it is capable of intercepting
those speeds of targets. Now, if I could go back, the SM-3
Block IIA missile is 21 inches. So it is less than half the
diameter, and it is only about 18 feet long. So there is a size
difference here that matters in terms of its ability to deal
with the threats.
So consequently, you have a much more reduced defended
area. Even if we wanted to use the sea-based SM-3 Block IIA, we
would still need the radars in the Czech Republic, and much
more forward deployed in Southeastern Europe or the Caspian.
You have to have those or the SM-3 does not have a chance
either of being able to provide a defended area of significant
coverage to even be an alternative. So when you go through the
calculations, it is more expensive, there is no guarantee it is
going to be there. The missile that we are proposing for
Poland, the two-stage version of the three-stage we are flying
today is a very minor change, it is less than a $15 million
modification to those interceptors to be able to make them into
a two-stage version.
So it was a matter of programmatics in terms of convenience
and the most cost-effective. Now, to your other point about
NATO, we are engaged with NATO. I have briefed them probably
six or seven times, the North Atlantic Council, we are taking
our system, our command and control and battle management
system, and it will be integrated with the NATO Air Command and
Control System, NATO ACCS, that will form the backbone of their
NATO Active Layered Theater Missile Defense Program. So we are
making plans, in fact, we are going to have a demonstration in
June to pass radar data back and forth between the two systems.
Mr. Hobson. But who is going to pay?
General Obering. We are paying for the interceptors in
Poland, we are paying for the radar in the Czech Republic, and
the forward deployable radar. Now, what do we gain from this?
First of all, we gain defense of our forces in the region, of
which there is substantial number, against this growing Iranian
threat. We also are benefitting because we are able to cover
the radars in Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, which also
provides protection for the United States homeland against
Iranian attack, and it gives us a third interceptor site from
which we can protect the United States as well.
The coverage from Iran extends all the way for the majority
of the continental United States. So those are the benefits
that we are receiving from this arrangement. We are working
with NATO, and we intend to have this integrated within the
NATO architecture such that we can take advantage of NATO
radars and they can take advantage of our radars.
Mr. Hobson. I bet we will end up paying for all of it. That
is the problem I have. Let me ask one other thing. The Russians
offered--I mean, it is interesting, you say to me we are
willing to have the Russians come in and be on our site, and we
are willing to exchange information with them. The Russians
offered that to us in doing our thing. And I do not understand
what the Russians offered to do as an alternative to our
situation. We turned that down. Would you explain that to the
Committee?
General Obering. Yes, sir. They never offered to
participate in a what we call a joint regional architecture,
which is what we would like to do. They never did. What they
said was they would offer us data from their radar in Quubala
to show that the Iranians do not have the ability to be able to
strike Europe or he United States.

EUROPEAN SITE--JOINT OPERATION

Mr. Hobson. They never offered you a joint operational
situation as you offered them?
General Obering. No, sir. No, sir. Not to where we would
actually have set up a joint regional architecture where we
share data with them, they share data with us, we actually plug
our systems together. No, sir, they never did that. And it is
very frustrating with the Russians.
Mr. Hobson. They normally are.
General Obering. There was a launch in November that
occurred a day before the Russian talks here in Washington.
------

A 2,000-kilometer missile which one of the Russian experts
even admitted that if they had gone that far, they had the
ability to go much farther. And when we were meeting with them
here in Washington, they refused to acknowledge--at the
beginning of the talks, they refused to acknowledge they had
even flown the thing. And by the end of the talks they said,
well, yeah, we know they flew it, but we were not going to tell
you. There is a lot of disingenuousness between the Russians
and where we are right now.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Ms. Kaptur is recognized.

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. If
I were to ask you in the offensive missile capability for
various ranges, what are our most dependable missiles, how
would you answer that?
General Obering. Offensive?
Ms. Kaptur. Offensive. I know you are defensive, but I am
just asking. If you were to pick your workhorse missiles, what
would they be?
General Campbell. I do not know if I am qualified to answer
that. I have some time at U.S. Strategic Command, but if you
look at the operational readiness rates of our ICBM force and
our submarine force, they are extraordinarily high.
Ms. Kaptur. What about the Harpoon?
General Campbell. I do not know. I would have to get back
to you, ma'am.
[The information follows:]

Harpoon is an all weather, over-the-horizon, anti-ship missile
system. The missile is capable of being launched from Ticonderoga Class
Cruisers, flight one and two Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, F/A-18
aircraft and P-3 aircraft. The Harpoon weapon system, a longtime
venerable workhorse for the Navy, is currently being upgraded to a
Block III configuration. The Harpoon Block III program improves the
surface warfare mission area with data link and GPS capabilities. The
additional capabilities further increase Harpoon's accuracy, target
selectivity and provide for in-flight target updates. Through the
Department's foreign military sales program, approximately 30 foreign
nations possess earlier versions of the Harpoon missile system.

Ms. Kaptur. Offense, I was just questioning. Okay. So then
on the defensive side, since this is the largest research
program at the Department of Defense, do we have any capability
now?
General Obering. Yes, ma'am. We do have. We have the
capability on very short notice to activate the system. We have
done so many times in the past. We can shoot down a missile
launched at the United States from North Korea. We can destroy
that weapon. And we are confident that we can do that.

SEA-BASED CAPABILITY

Ms. Kaptur. From a sea-based capability?
General Obering. No, a land-based capability for a long-
range missile. That is the only capability we have today. The
sea-based would be capable of shooting down the shorter range
missiles. Let me give you an example. When the North Koreans
launched the seven missiles they did in the summer of 2006,
they had a very long-range weapon, the Taepo Dong 2, which was
multi-stage, ICBM-capable, which they did not tell us what was
on top of it, they did not tell us anything. And that system,
had that been a threat to the United States, we could have
destroyed that with the missiles, the interceptors that we have
put in Alaska and California. There were shorter-range
missiles, though, that were launched the day after.
And you may hear them call an extended-range Scud, a No
Dong, that type of thing. These are missiles that are within
1,000- to a 3,000-kilometer range, in that range. They could
have been destroyed by the sea-based missiles, the interceptors
that we deployed to the Sea of Japan and in that region. So
there is a layering that we are doing between our interceptors
to try to match the offensive capability as well.

THREATS

Ms. Kaptur. Okay. Then explain to me in layperson's terms
where is our vulnerability?
General Obering. Well, first of all, this strictly is
geared toward a North Korean and Iranian threat. So for
example, if you had the impression that----
Ms. Kaptur. The issue is range, General? Range? Where is
the----
------

Ms. Kaptur. Do they have the range capability yet, Russia?
General Obering. Oh, yes.
Mr. Dicks. They have ICBMs, just like we do.
General Obering. Right. We believe that the North Koreans
have range capability. We believe they have the ability to
reach the United States. .------.
Ms. Kaptur. So the real threat is numbers?
General Obering. Numbers, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Let me ask you for our current
research program on the defense side, how do you assure,
because you have so many contractors, that we actually protect
our intellectual property and our security? Dr. Clyde
Prestowitz has written quite a bit about how some of our most
sensitive defense technologies, particularly in rocket boosters
and electronic systems have been--we have been required to use
technologies from other countries and other suppliers. How do
you assure that we protect the technology that we have and the
intellectual property that we have? Is this a concern of yours?
General Obering. Yes, ma'am, it is. And of course, one
thing you want to make sure is you are not reliant on a foreign
supplier, for example, that could be put at risk or could put
your program at risk. We actually----
Ms. Kaptur. Do we face that in your program?
General Obering. Pardon me?
Ms. Kaptur. Do we face that in your program?
General Obering. There was a gyro, as I recall a laser
diode that was used in one of our green laser gyros several
years back, and we discovered that we were relying on a Russian
provider for that. We qualified an American supplier and came
off of that dependence.
Ms. Kaptur. Do you monitor your subcontracts carefully to
assure that?
General Obering. Yes, ma'am. That is part of what we try to
do. In fact, we have a whole organization set up that looks at
componentry and production of components in that regard.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. So you have a pretty high confidence
level there?
General Obering. I don't know if I have a high confidence
level because you never know what you do not know, but it is
something we are trying to guard against, yes, ma'am.

RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Ms. Kaptur. Okay. So in our research programs they are not
infiltrated through the contracting process. You have high
confidence level in that?
General Obering. I would not say high confidence level,
because again, I do not know what I do not know, but I can tell
you we try to take safeguards to address that.

PATRIOT SYSTEM

Ms. Kaptur. All right. May I ask a question on this when
Hezbollah was showering Katyusha rockets down on Israel, what
technology didn't they have to shoot those down? What was the
problem there? Too many?
General Obering. First of all, the PATRIOT system that they
have deployed is not effective against a Katyusha because a
Katyusha is such a short-range rocket that it is not airborne
basically long enough, nor is it cost-effective to be engaging
a very cheap rocket with a very expensive interceptor.
So one of the ways that--or one of the initiatives that we
are pursuing with the Israelis is how do we do that? How are we
able to take out these short-range rockets? And we have a
program called David's Sling that we are actually co-managing
with the Israelis to try to do that. So it is to try to get a
very inexpensive interceptor that we could use against that
type of threat.
Ms. Kaptur. I did not hear what you said, sir. What was the
name of it?
General Obering. David's Sling.

DAVID'S SLING

Ms. Kaptur. Oh, sling. David's Sling program. Can you tell
the Committee anything you learned about Iran's capabilities
based on, as you looked at what happened in Lebanon in terms of
their missile capabilities? This is offensive, obviously.
General Obering. The biggest lesson that I learned there,
frankly, personally is they did not fire--they did not fire--
Iran did not fire, obviously, any long-range weapons at Israel,
anything that we would be concerned about. But they did provide
Hezbollah with missiles, with the shorter-range missiles, and
that was very well documented in the intel community. And that
is of concern. When you have a state government providing a
nonstate actor, in this case, Hezbollah terrorist group, with
those missiles what is to stop the ranges of those increasing
and the capabilities of those increasing?
One of those concerns is obviously having a very capable
missile getting in the hands of these type of organizations and
being used against us, the homeland or against our allies. That
is one of the things I am very worried about.
Ms. Kaptur. I am sure there is a lot of trading that goes
on in the world in those components, isn't there, in those not
just manufacture, but trading arms trading, right?
General Obering. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Missiles of that size. Do I have time for one
more question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Dicks. I think the time has expired.
Mr. Kingston. We have to get everybody through here.

EUROPEAN SITE--RADAR

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I wanted to
ask you in terms of obtaining permission to build the long-
range interceptors and the fixed radar in Europe, you have to
get obviously the people in Poland and Czech Republic to agree
to it. Where is that in the process?
General Obering. Currently, we do not have any more
negotiating sessions scheduled with the Czechs because we
basically, as far as I know, resolved all the remaining issues
there. And so I would think that an agreement that could be
signed by their government and our government would be
imminent.
Mr. Kingston. And is that negotiated on kind of an
executive branch level in both areas? And I know you have to
have congressional approval here once that is done, right?
General Obering. It is negotiated at the executive branch
level, so it is--the State Department is leading those
negotiations. We are just supporting. We are in a support role.
The Department of Defense is in a support role. The State
Department is leading those negotiations with the Czech and
Polish Government. But the discussions with the Czechs are
going very well. The discussions with the Poles were going very
well. We had the change of government. It slowed down the
negotiating process somewhat. That has now picked up again. So
I do believe there is going to be an agreement in at least the
next couple of months.

APPROVAL OF EUROPEAN SITE

Mr. Kingston. And when you say in your testimony, you have
to have congressional approval, does the Senate have to sign on
or does it actually go through both Houses?
General Obering. I do not believe there has to be
Congressional approval, per se. You guys own the budget, the
funding of it. That is how you approve what we do is through
the funds. But this would be--and I understand--and I am not an
expert here, so you probably need to get the expert about what
Congressional approval would be needed for this agreement.
Mr. Kingston. Is that something, Mr. Chairman, do you know
does it have to be authorized? Because in your testimony, you
say assuming we can obtain agreements with Poland, Czech
Republic, and obtain Congressional approval to proceed. I was
just wondering----
Mr. Dicks. Staff says the MILCON site has to be authorized.

EUROPEAN SITE--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. Kingston. So it is a funding issue more than an
authorizing?
Mr. Dicks. Authorizing. You have to authorize it and then
fund it.
General Obering. Yes.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. But there is not--I just wanted to see
if there was some sort of a vote that took place free-standing
or anything like that.
Mr. Dicks. If somebody offered an amendment or in the
Committee or in the full committee or on the floor there could
be a vote.
Mr. Kingston. Well, that might be where Mr. Hobson could
have a vehicle for discussion of the European gratitude or
participation or whatever. There would be an opportunity for
people of his view, which I think a lot of us share, at least
partially, to have a bite at this apple.
Mr. Hobson. If I might add, I am advised that the MILCON
part is at least $2 billion, so that is a pretty good slice of
MILCON.
Mr. Dicks. Is that accurate?
Mr. Hobson. On the low side by MILCON standards.
Mr. Kingston. If you know, for example, an amendment like
that is going to be offered so there is opportunity to talk
about European participation do you have enough, you know,
firepower in terms of the political scene to come back and make
the case as strongly as you can? Because frankly, you know,
when I listened to you, I think you gave a very good answer,
but I would also sort of love to hear more that, hey, this is
all about us a lot more than them.
General Obering. Well, again, we derive benefit from this,
substantial benefit from this. The thing that we do not want to
have happen that we have already seen is the ability for the
Iranians to begin to coerce our allies and to start peeling
them off from us. We saw a little bit of that with respect to
al Qaeda and the Spaniards in Iraq. Now imagine if you had that
happen on a nation-state scale where you are holding entire
cities or nations hostage, how that could disrupt the alliance.

TARGETS

Mr. Kingston. General, I want to ask about the number of
MDA targets for the test program. Do you have enough targets?
And where do you get them?
General Obering. We have enough targets for fiscal year
2008, 2009. As I mentioned earlier, we have had some
difficulties in our targets program. We were using--we were
trying to save taxpayers' money. We were using the last
vestiges of the old Polaris motors that you remember from the
old SLBM, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. Now that we are
getting to kind of the bottom of the barrel there, we were
transitioning to a more modern, flexible target family. So we
do have enough targets to handle '08 and '09. We are looking at
'10 and beyond as part of our POM 10 activity and how we can
even more robust our targets program.

AEGIS BMD CAPABILITY

Mr. Kingston. Okay. I wanted to ask one more question, Mr.
Chairman. In terms of the Aegis BMD-capable ships, they are all
in the Pacific, right?
General Obering. Currently they are, yes.
Mr. Kingston. And there is two that are going to be
upgraded in the Atlantic?
General Obering. Yeah, but that is not our decision. That
is a part of the combatant commanders and the Navy's decision.
Mr. Kingston. But that is because there is so much focus on
North Korea?
General Obering. Right. And you could move those ships if
need be to the Mediterranean. And we have done that. We have
actually moved some of these Aegis missile defense-capable
ships into the Atlantic and the Mediterranean region.
Mr. Kingston. But you are comfortable, and I understand
that decision is not yours, but that we are okay in terms of
the Atlantic side.
General Obering. Yes, I am. And again, another initiative
that you may not be aware of is we are funding what we call
open architecture, which will allow every Aegis ship to be
ballistic missile defense capable. We are doing that with the
Navy. So that would tremendously expand the number of ships
available to the warfighters as we proceed with that.
Mr. Kingston. What kind of ship does it have to be?
General Obering. It is an Aegis, we use Aegis both
destroyers and cruisers. It is a certain configuration for
these Aegis ships, the 18 that we have.
Mr. Kingston. How many potential are there?
General Obering. There is more than 80 when we go the open
architecture.
Mr. Kingston. How long is the conversion? How long does it
take?
General Obering. It would be several years.
Mr. Kingston. How long per ship, though, would it take?
General Obering. I would have to take that for the record.
I will get back to you.
[The information follows:]

The Navy and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) are engaged in a
joint effort to integrate the Aegis BMD capability through the Aegis
Modernization Program's Open Architecture (OA) environment. In this
collaborative effort, the Navy is responsible for the development of
the OA computing environment including replacing Military Specification
(MILSPEC) equipment with Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment and
COTS-based Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP) integration with the
SPY-1 radar. The MMSP merges Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Aegis BMD
Signal Processor (BSP) functionality into a single common processor.
The MDA is responsible for migrating the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system
computer program into an open architecture computing environment and
integrating BSP functionality into the MMSP, resulting in BMD 5.0
weapon system computer program.
The end result of this joint program is a more robust, multi-
mission capability fielded in modernized Aegis ships. The Aegis OA
program is key to expanding the Aegis BMD capability to the entire
fleet of Aegis ships, with a proposed eventual total of 84 ships. The
modernization program also provides the foundation for the potential
implementation of Aegis BMD in allied navy ships.
The first Aegis destroyers are scheduled to commence their
modernization upgrade in FY 2012. The modernization upgrades include
not only OA but also other combat system and engineering improvements
funded by the Navy, requiring about one year to complete installation.

Mr. Kingston. Well, thank you.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Boyd.

MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLE

Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. I know these are very expensive programs that we are
talking about. And we really are chasing some technology that
leads us into uncharted waters in a lot of ways I am sure. I
want to focus my time on an issue that the Chairman brought up
in his opening question, and that is the issue of the Multiple
Kill Vehicle, the MKV. MDA is, as I understand, you explained
the deployment, operational--I mean, an operational capability
in the 2017 time frame.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Boyd. Is that correct? And you have awarded a contract
to Lockheed Martin to develop a carrier vehicle. And you expect
to have the research done sometime in the 2010 time frame as to
whether this technology can be developed?
General Obering. Yes. That is about right.
Mr. Boyd. It is my understanding that--and Mr. Francis,
this question might be more appropriately addressed to you,
that MDA has awarded two contracts for the development of the
carrier vehicle, but we don't know--for multi-kill purposes--
but we do not know yet whether we can--that technology is going
to work. What is the thought process about awarding two
contracts before we know whether the technology is going to
work or not?
General Obering. Let me take that.
Mr. Boyd. Okay. General Obering?
General Obering. That is exactly what you want to do. Let
me give you an example. When we started the ground-based
midcourse system, we had two versions of our long range
booster. We had an orbital version, what we called an OBV, and
we had a BV Plus version built by Lockheed. The reason we had
two is because we were not confident that either one of those
configurations would work. And we wanted to have a fallback
position in case one of them ran into some trouble.
Well, sure enough, we ran into trouble on the BV Plus. We
had an explosion out in Pratt & Whitney Chemical Systems
Division in California, and it wiped out our inventory of those
BV Plus configurations. When we gained enough confidence in the
OBV configuration, which we had flown two or three times at the
time of the explosion, we were able to jump from that to the
OBD configuration.
The same principle is true here. What you always want to
have is not have all your eggs in one basket. So if I could
have two kill vehicle suppliers, in this case, Lockheed Martin
and Raytheon, because they are the primary kill vehicle
suppliers, I can continue a competition between those, an
ongoing alternative source so to speak, and it really motivates
each one of the contractors. And we have seen that already when
we were running into problems with the kill vehicle for the
long-range system in terms of deliveries, supplier management,
supply chain management, that type of thing.
As soon as we awarded the Multiple Kill Vehicle to
Lockheed, the first in a demo contract, we saw the behavior of
Raytheon change to the good. So we want to continue that
behavior with both these contractors as we move to the future.
Mr. Boyd. Okay.
Mr. Francis. Mr. Boyd, if I may, I think you raised a good
question on MKV. And as General Obering said, he is trying to
have multiple ways to solve a problem and not have all of his
eggs in one basket. I think the question that you asked,
though, is a good one in terms of what we can afford and how
many options we can pursue. Because I think right now we are
looking at--I mean we do have an EKV that is a unitary system
that we are improving the discrimination on. In MKV, we are now
going to pursue two approaches to that. My understanding, and I
will defer to General Obering on that, is that it is not
necessarily going to be a competition, that we are going to
keep both of those going. And if they do not work, then we may
go back to a unitary system. So I think from a capability
standpoint you want to keep as many options as you can open.
But then you have to look at affordability, which how many
things--how many options can we afford to keep open?

MISSILE DEFENSE--A BALANCED CAPABILITY

Mr. Boyd. Okay. Thank you. I want to move to sort of a
related area. And again, I am just baffled by the cost of this.
Since 9/11, obviously the world has changed in so many ways.
And we were pursuing these efforts prior to 9/11 and everything
was going along pretty well, and all of our forces were in--
services were in good shape. But today that situation is
different.
General Campbell, the Army is in serious, serious need of
recapitalizing forces and equipment. Those are well documented,
documented every hearing we have in this room. And we all know
that we face constant evolving and increasing threats. How can
we afford the same unconstrained approach to missile defense
that we did prior to 9/11 that is not possible for the other
services? Can you speak to that or did I----
Mr. Kingston. Will the gentleman yield a second? Will the
gentleman yield? Because there was, I wanted to say, a lot of
criticism of the GAO in terms of the accounting, and the fact
that so much of this is very difficult for Congress to have
oversight the way you do your, is it element-based accounting
or nonelement based? But I read some of the GAO comments, and
it is very difficult to follow, and I just wanted to kind of,
you know, underscore what Mr. Boyd is saying.
General Campbell. I am not sure if I understood your
question. You talked about the Army, and we are out of balance
in that we are putting everything into counterinsurgency
operations and we have to bring balance back so that we have a
fully capable force across the spectrum of conflict.
Mr. Boyd. That is correct. That is the gist of the
question.
General Campbell. And the Army has done a good job, in my
view, of balancing their investment portfolio so that we can
get back to that balance. It is possible to do that. But as far
as getting into any detail with you, I am not prepared to do
that, to talk broad general purpose forces.

ALLOCATING MISSILE DEFENSE ASSETS

Mr. Boyd. And that really the general, the broad area of
how we allocate our resources given the occurrences and events
of the last--2001--7 years now almost, or 6\1/2\ years, and the
circumstances being completely different, and most of our
services, particularly the Army, in such dire need of reset
dollars and those kinds of things.
General Obering. Could I address that, if you do not mind?
I am glad you brought up 9/11, because if you look at all the
money we spent on missile defense, going back to Ronald Reagan
in 1983, it is about a hundred billion dollars as of last year.
The damage caused from 9/11 alone to New York was $83 billion.
And that wasn't a weapon of mass destruction. That was not SCUD
on a tub, on a ship off the coast coming into New York City. If
we had that, it would be in the hundreds of billions of
dollars, trillions of dollars, and tens of thousands of lives.
So to protect us against that, I think that spending much
less than 2 percent of our budget is reasonable in terms of the
overall strategic view. The other thing, if you stop and think
about it, is just think what would change if you have a
nuclear-tipped Iran providing an umbrella. We know they are
already sponsoring terrorist forces around the world. We know
that. Imagine if they had the ability to strike the homeland
with a nuclear weapon and how that would change some of the
calculations that we face in the future and not have a
protection against that, which is what we are building out to.
So I think from a strategic view and perspective, I think
it is reasonable to spend this amount of money on this
protection for not only our homeland, but our deployed forces,
not the least of which the last time we engaged in Iraqi
Freedom, for example, we had to defend ourselves against these
missiles.
The same thing occurred in the original Gulf War. More and
more countries around the world are saying ballistic missiles
are our Air Forces. So I think it is very prudent this Nation
invest a very small amount in terms of what that is. And if I
may to your point, sir, I respectfully--and I respect the GAO,
but I think that we do account for our costs. And we can show
you. In fact, the billion dollars that they talk about the
growth in Block 2006, that represents a 5 percent increase over
the life cycle of that. That is not significant. In fact, our
entire cost variance for all of our programs are less than 6
percent. So there is some that are worse performers than
others, like the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, but
overall, we account very closely for those. What we are trying
to do is move through this new Block structure that the
Chairman talked about. And they actually--they recommended the
new Block structure last year. We have gone to that now to help
them understand what our accounting is as well.
Mr. Dicks. It may help us as well. Mr. Rothman.

IMMINENT THREATS

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here, thank you for your service. You have an awesome
responsibility, and we appreciate it. Continue the diligence,
please, and Godspeed. My first question has to do with the
boost phase, or the defense against--during the boost phase.
The notion being that when do you know that you are going to go
after a particular missile that has been launched and is in
boost phase? The problem being you can have the greatest weapon
in the world, but if you do not permit yourself to fire it,
there is some deterrence in having the greatest weapon, but it
loses its deterrent value if everyone knows you are going to be
so uncertain about using it that you will never use it.
So how do you know, for example--is it the policy, for
example, that if a missile is launched from Iran that we are
going to take it out? Or do we first have to determine its
trajectory, the object that it is supposed to hit, the country
it is supposed to hit, and by that time, can we hit it in boost
phase?
General Obering. That is an outstanding question. That is
part of why we like to lay in what we call knowledge points to
determine what is the knowledge that we need to be able to
advance our programs. But to get to your point specifically,
what I envision for a boost phase defense is number one, if we
get a shot from the blue that Ahmadinejad wakes up one morning
and says I am going to launch a missile to New York City, that
would not be a boost phase defense in my mind because of all
the complications that you just talked about, not understanding
whether that is a space launch initially or just a test launch
or whatever. But very rapidly, we would know that it would be--
--
Mr. Rothman. But would he make a public announcement I am
going to New York?
General Obering. No.
Mr. Rothman. So you wouldn't even know where it is headed.
General Obering. That is right. So for something like a
bolt out of the blue, I think a boost phase defense would be
problematic. Where it would be more appropriate is when you
have indications and warnings that there is activity or that
there is hostilities, that type of thing, in which you know
that there is going to be--you know, you can tell, in fact, the
way we execute with the Aegis ships, for example, is we say,
okay, you have to defend this area and for any threats come out
of this location. Okay. That type of thing.
So there is going to be some indications and warnings, and
then a boost phase capability can be very effective in being
able to destroy those weapons while they are still in boosting
phase. There is another aspect that there is more telltale
signs than you believe. For example, one of the things we were
looking for out of North Korea is the injection angle. If you
are going into a space launch, for example, that injection
angle is very flat. If you think about the shuttle when it
launches, it rolls over and then it starts immediately to pitch
over, because it wants to convert all that energy into orbital
velocity.
A ballistic missile does not do that. It goes much steeper.
And so you get indications very quickly as to whether it is a
space launch or a ballistic missile launch, and then you can
propagate those through the command and control system.
Mr. Dicks. Also we have satellites that let us know almost
instantly when a launch has occurred.
General Obering. Yes, sir. We do.
Mr. Rothman. The question was would we attack it without
knowing where it was headed? But the general was saying there
are these telltale signs and specific areas of responsibility
so to speak that----
General Obering. Plus, if we were--let me just use a
concrete example. The Iranians launch from their northwest to
the southeast. That is their typical launch ranges. If we see
something coming out of there heading up north over Russia or
heading up over Europe, we know it is not one of their
launches.
Mr. Rothman. Let me ask you this. If we saw a launch from
Iran and it were not--we determined quickly that it was not
launched against any of our forces in the region or the United
States, are there circumstances where we would go after that
missile if we determined it was headed against one of our
allies? Or--any one of our allies?
General Obering. Yes. If it was determined to be headed
into one of our allies, one of our defended areas, meaning
Germany or Great Britain or Prague, whatever, yes, we would go
after it.
Mr. Rothman. Is Israel included in that umbrella?
General Obering. Israel would be included in a different
umbrella, but still part of the missile defense shield, yes.
Mr. Rothman. On the Iranian-transferred missiles to
Hezbollah, part of missile defense presumably is the
intelligence work and other defensive exercises, endeavors that
would, for example, blow up the component parts before they
ever got assembled, or once they got assembled, or once they
got to the factory or on the ship, et cetera, et cetera. Are
you involved in that or is another agency?
General Obering. No, sir. I am not involved in that.
Mr. Rothman. But that is certainly a big--that is, as you
fellows would say, a robust part of our defense operation, I
would assume. I would hope.
General Obering. I would certainly say that that--you know,
if you are looking at a holistic approach to missile defense,
being able to use what we call nonkinetic means are important.

IRANIAN THREAT

Mr. Rothman. Okay. Why then do we permit, or one would
imagine then with our robust intelligence services and all
these nonkinetic elements of our defense forces that we would
have--and satellites and humans, et cetera, we would know when
the Iranians are literally transporting these devices to
Hezbollah or to anybody. And so the question is why don't we
ourselves or assist others in the destruction of those missiles
before they get to the bad guys, the other bad guys?
General Obering. Sir, that is not my area of expertise, and
I do know that I believe that the United States has initiatives
that we are trying to do that type of interdiction. But let me
give you an example of some of our shortfalls. When the North
Koreans launched their missiles in the summer of 2006, we had
almost every intelligence asset known to this country looking
at that country, and yet they were able to roll out several of
their shorter-range missiles and fire them before we ever were
able to pick that up.
So this idea that we have some type of an omnipotent
ability to interdict in the supply chain or even just before
they launch is not very proper.
Mr. Rothman. May I just follow up with that? Do we accept
as a given that we will always not know what we do not know,
and never have that complete capability of being able to
anticipate a launch and then simply rely on other redundant
forces or whatever to cover that, or is it simply a matter of
providing more resources in order to address that shortfall?
General Obering. Sir, I think you have to do the whole
spectrum. I think you have to invest in resources to do that
interdiction that you talked about. I think you have to invest
in other nonkinetic means by interrupting their command and
control chains, that type of thing. And but you cannot rely on
that solely, because when you have a warhead in the air, you
have got to do something about it.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Bishop.

ISRAEL AND THAAD

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for
being here, for sharing your knowledge with us. I am going to
touch on two areas basically with our relationships with
foreign governments. Israel, for example, is interested in
developing a new program to focus on the threat that the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense currently defends. One of
the issues that they have raised is that the U.S. has not
shared information with them as to the capabilities of THAAD,
and thus they do not know if THAAD will work for them.
Can you give us an update on the U.S.-Israeli cooperation
and tell us to what extent the national disclosure policy is
preventing us from sharing missile defense information and
technology with our allies? What is the extent that that
national disclosure prevents us from sharing? And tell me
whether or not there are legitimate concerns based on that
national disclosure policy that would prevent us from
disclosing certain information and what those concerns would
be?
------

Mr. Bishop. What are the concerns that would prevent us
from disclosing information under the national disclosure
policy?
General Obering. Well, obviously we have a concern about
any sharing of information or technology that the Israelis
would, in turn, share with other countries. That is one thing
that is of concern. I know that we are also concerned that
their industry may take advantage of that technology vis-a-vis
our own industry to establish a competitive advantage. So there
are any number of reasons why people are concerned.
Mr. Bishop. I was wondering what those were.
General Obering. Well, there were certain things that we
would never, I mean, what we call the family jewels we do not
share, some of the detailed algorithms that we use in our
radars to distinguish warheads, some of the algorithms that we
use in our kill vehicles to do the discrimination that we use
today. Those are the types of things that we consider to be
very sensitive.

JAPAN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Mr. Bishop. Okay. With regard to Japan, over the past
several years the U.S. and Japan have conducted cooperation in
the missile defense area which has included the deployment of
an X-band radar in Japan and a joint fifty-fifty cost share
development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missile. What
is the status of our cooperation with Japan and are you
considering moving the second forward deployed X-band radar to
Japan? And thirdly, recently the MDA decided to incorporate a
modular kill vehicle into the Block IIA even though Japan has
only agreed to use the unitary warhead. How would that impact
our cooperation with Japan?
General Obering. I would say our cooperation with Japan is
extremely healthy and very robust. As you said, they share,
they were willing to host the Shariki radar in the Amori
district in the northwestern portion of the country. That is
proceeding very well, and we are sharing data from that radar
with the Japanese as well. With respect to our co-development
of these SM-3 Block IIA, we have a systems requirement review
that is scheduled for this March, or next month, that we began
the U.S. only requirements review for that system.
And again, that is proceeding very well. There was some
concern early on by the Japanese about the Multiple Kill
Vehicle program that you mentioned and whether it would impact
our development of the SM-3 Block IIA, and I am pleased to
report that I just got a letter yesterday from the Government
of Japan saying that they do not have any problem with our
approach on MKV. And so I think we put that all to bed now in
terms of that concern.

TESTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Bishop. Okay. With regard to your testing
infrastructure, the Committee has been informed that one of the
key elements limiting current missile defense test programs is
the lack of infrastructure. What specific actions can be taken
by us to improve the Missile Defense Agency testing
infrastructure and what are the costs associated with these
steps?
General Obering. Sir, first of all, the full support for
request for the money for our testing targets would be very
helpful. And I believe that, as I said, we are going to come
back for our next budget request in 2010 for our POM and we are
going to be focusing on targets and the test infrastructure as
a priority. But right now, many aspects of our test
infrastructure are not funding limited, it is primarily the
fact that we are maxing out the capabilities that we have. And
just in terms of tempo.
But targets has been a shortfall. That has been an area
that we need to invest more in. And that is what I said we are
okay for '08 and '09, but starting in 2010, we are going to be
requesting more emphasis there.

TARGETS

Mr. Bishop. How can you improve the number of targets?
General Obering. By increasing the funding for those, for
targets.
Mr. Bishop. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. And I want to thank Mr. Tiahrt for
being patient and a good sport and all the other attributes.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Tiahrt.

AIRBORNE LASER

Mr. Tiahrt. First of all, I want to congratulate you on the
tremendous success the programs had as far as ABL especially,
but the MDA in total. But the ABL, I think, has really now
shown all the key subsystems are working, and we are looking
forward to the lethal shot shootdown in 2009. Just talking
about open source information, we recently had a decaying orbit
on a satellite and we used a kinetic capability to try to knock
it down or effectively make it less dangerous. And I think that
we were successful. That kinetic capability is sort of a backup
for what the ABL is supposed to do. And in terms of the launch
capability, kinetic as a backup takes a long time to get there
compared to the speed of light.
So there is a big difference there. And I think the need
was verified again by this successful shootdown. But what was
not told, and just using common sense, the ABL also is a backup
for what was done by the previous or by the kinetic weapon. So
I think there is a great capability here that we are
developing. And that laser just does not point down, it points
up as well. And I think we kind of forget the real tremendous
tool this is to keep our country safe. I am a little concerned
about how we are funding it, though. And I have some firsthand
knowledge, because you know, in a typical program you have this
big bulge in front of manpower and talent, and then as the
first product becomes more secure and more technically
complete, then you start seeing this talent go off to other
areas.
And we are experiencing that in the modification area in
Wichita, where a lot of the engineers that worked on the first
unit and have gained a lot of great experience now are being
taken to other companies, other parts of the country, other
parts of the company. And those who want to stay are even going
to commercial ventures because we have not acted on tail number
2.
And so I am very concerned if you look at the request that
we made for this program in 2006 versus the request we are
making in 2009, we are seeing that a lot of the plan that we
had to move that second tail number in is being pushed way out
to the right. And I am concerned about that because of the loss
of talent. That alone will cost the program more money because
you have people that have to get back up to speed. They are
going to be back up higher on the learning curve that than they
were. And we are about 250 million behind this year where we
were planning to be in 2006. So we have got 3 years more of
information, but why are we reducing such a big amount on a
program that is doing so well, and why are we delaying tail
number 2?
General Obering. Okay, sir. As I stated before, first of
all, thank you very much for your support for overall program,
and especially for ABL. We base these programs on knowledge
points and their achievement of knowledge points. Airborne
Laser has achieved everything that we have asked them to do so
far. The big one left is to be able to put that high energy
laser on the aircraft, which we have got the six modules loaded
on today at Edwards, and then to get all the rest of the
installations on board and then get back in the air by the end
of this year, first part of next year to go forward with a
lethal shoot-down.
Now we have already learned, what maybe is not evident is
that we have a workforce, as you said, in Wichita that did a
lot of the modifications that supported the flying aircraft for
the low power flight testing. It is almost unavoidable that we
are going to lose some of those people in this transitory
period. Because we are learning tremendous amounts on almost a
daily basis, especially when we get back into our testing, that
is going to indicate that we are going to have to go into a
transition period not unlike what THAAD did. I will tell you I
think that is what we are facing right now is that we are going
to go into a transition period like THAAD where we flew in '99
and 2000, and we stood down for about 4 or 5 years, and we
assembled all that we learned, and we totally remanufactured
the THAAD program to where it is today, very successful, very
affordable, and moving ahead. And I think that we are going to
have something similar on ABL.
So it was premature for us to order tail 2 until we get
through this period of the lessons learned from the shoot-down,
how we can do and incorporate those lessons learned into a more
affordable design, and a more produceable design as we move out
for the fleet. So I think it is what I call a transition
period. And I wish I could say that there is ways we could
maintain that workforce, but in my mind, it is almost
unavoidable because we are not funding paced here, we are
technically paced.
Mr. Tiahrt. Well, there is a long lead time on the
aircraft, you know, just a green airplane, and you have got to
get a place in line, and then it has to be built, it has to go
through flight check before it is delivered.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tiahrt. If you wait until 2009 to order, you will be
sitting on your hands that much longer, because there is a
demand for this aircraft. I am very concerned about that. And I
hope you have factored into your schedule a second airframe. I
don't see an ability right now to change airframes, or a need
to. So the airframe itself, that long lead time should be
calculated into your churning the data and coming in, and so--
--
General Obering. Yes, sir. I understand. The 747 8F is what
we are looking at.
Mr. Tiahrt. It is a good airplane, and I think it is a
right choice, and it provides capability that you need. The GAO
ran a report, I was not going to mention it, but the gentleman
from Georgia did, but after going through the report, there is
some things that, you know, the GAO says this is how we do
business according to what is written. And in a lot of respects
that is old school procurement that is out of date and needs to
be revised. And some of the things I thought they were good,
you establish a base line as soon as you possibly could, which
I think that is good advice. But on some of the others, the
only--I think one of the comments they made is include only
blocks--include in blocks only those elements that will field
capabilities during the block.
Well, if you do that, then you can't shorten your schedule
when you have the ability. It is very rigid. And so I think the
way that you have managed the program is much better than the
way--the process the GAO wants you to follow would be. So I
want people to understand that GAO, I have great respect for
them as well, but they also are very confined in their
recommendations to what is written. And there is no thought
about what it should be. It is what it is.
And I think, you know, quality is a dynamic thing. And
improving procurement is a dynamic thing. We can always do a
job better. And successful corporations in America today do
that. They continue to look for a way to do the job better,
whether it is a small coffee shop or an aerospace company.
So I want the people to know here that we have I think a
good management team in place. And I think you are doing a very
successful job. One last thing I would like to mention, because
I am very concerned about this, in delaying this program we
continually see new people come on not only in the private
sector with the engineering staff, but also the public sector.
General, you have had a great track record here and have done
an excellent job, but even here on the Capitol on the Hill, we
have new staffers that come in like in HASC, and they question
the program. We have to reeducate them over and over again.
You know, every year it seems like we have to face somebody
on an authorization committee that needs to be up to speed on
this program. And it is a complex program. And it takes a long
time to get their security clearances, it takes them a long
time to understand the program. In the meantime they say, well,
we are not going to fund this because it is really not that
important. And it is a very important program. So as this
program gets delayed, I mean that is another reason for us to
keep it moving, keep the momentum up, keep the success going.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Bishop has an
additional question.

AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman and
the Committee for the indulgence. General Campbell, I
understand that all of the Aegis ballistic missile defense-
capable ships are currently assigned to the Pacific. And the
Missile Defense Agency only plans to upgrade two Atlantic fleet
ships to missile ballistic defense configuration.
What is the rationale for that decision, and do you have
any plans to upgrade additional Atlantic fleet ships? If not,
why not? And for General Obering, if all of the BMD-capable
ships are in the Pacific, what is the plan for using Aegis
ballistic missile defense to defend our troops and allies in
the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
General Campbell. Let me address this by saying no matter
what asset we are talking about, there is a process within the
Department where a combatant commander can come in and request
a force, whether it is a tank battalion, an Aegis ship. We have
a process such that we can shift an asset that is in the
Pacific to the CENTCOM AOR. So we do that as a routine, sir. So
these Aegis ships that are in the Pacific, and as General
Obering mentioned, we have already moved one before into----
Mr. Bishop. There is a time lag in that transition, though,
isn't there?
General Campbell. There is a time lag. It has to transit,
obviously. But again, out of context it is hard to answer the
question. But within the context of I have indications and
warnings that I need that ship in an AOR, we will begin moving
that ship as soon as possible to get it to that particular
area.
General Obering. And sir, one of the things that we could
move a ship into CENTCOM, and in fact, their area of
responsibility, and in fact, we have, but I want to use your
question, if I may, to make a major point. We have asked over
the years to fund systems engineering integration. What that
means, and I will give you an example, is we know now that if
we put a THAAD radar, if the THAAD unit that we are going to
put in Israel in on Juniper Cobra, if we tie that radar to the
Aegis ship the way that we tied the radars into that Aegis ship
to shoot down the satellite, we could actually have that ship
stand off from the coast outside of Silkworm missile range and
still protect all of Israel with its SM-3 interceptors.
That is the power of this integration that we talk about
between our land and sea-based components. That integration
comes at a price in terms of our systems engineering and the
ability to do that. So there is no reason why we can't take
those ships from the Pacific and use them in the CENTCOM AOR or
the EUCOM AOR. And there is no technical limitation there. And
we are trying to design the system to integrate it so we can
get the most from each of these components by doing this
integration.
Mr. Dicks. I think you are concerned about the East Coast
of the United States. Now, can you explain how the existing
system that we have deployed can protect the east coast of the
United States?
General Obering. Yes, sir. The SM-3 missile, the PATRIOT
missile has the ability to protect the east coast from short
range attack. Not from long range attack, but from short range
attack. So it has the ability to do that today. It is a matter
of if we chose to deploy them and to do that.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one follow-up
question?
Mr. Dicks. Yes. Mr. Rothman.

NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Mr. Rothman. Generals, you have given an extremely
impressive bit of testimony about our capability to deal with
missiles from Iran and North Korea and projecting other threats
in the future such that one would imagine that if the North
Koreans and the Iranians were rational actors, big assumption,
and knew of our capabilities they would be sufficiently
deterred from bad conduct. And we must plan for then for
irrationality, so that is off the table, because we will never
know whoever has their finger on the button whether they are
going to be rational or not. But are these actors, the Iranians
and North Koreans aware of our capability----
Mr. Dicks. Oh, yeah.
Mr. Rothman [continuing]. Such that they understand that
there would be a very--not only a very limited chance of
success of any offensive effort on their part, but of course,
the devastating response that they would feel?
General Obering. I have thought a lot about that. And I
will tell you my own personal view. You stated initially a very
important assumption is that if they are rational in their
decision-making. And one of the things we are counting on,
frankly, is that they are rational to the extent that if we
field effective missile defenses they will choose to no longer
invest in ballistic missiles because they realize there is a
defense against them. I think that has been the problem
historically is we have not had a missile defense system or
capability, and therefore countries like Iran and North Korea,
Libya and others chose to invest in those missiles. We would
like to be able to defer them or deter them from even investing
in those missiles to start with in the future.
But the one scenario I am really worried about is that you
have a group within Iran or within North Korea, or you could
almost pick another country that decides that they want to
strike a blow for radical Islam or whatever, and they are
willing to incur the potential retaliation that would come
their way and then they launch. I mean, that is what--when that
happens, you have to have the ability to shoot that down. You
can't talk to anybody, you can't offensively take it out, you
have got to have the ability to shoot that down. And if we can
prevent that from just one American city we would pay for this
program many times over.
Mr. Rothman. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.

STSS

Mr. Dicks. General Obering, please update the Committee as
to the present cost schedule and technical performance of the
STSS program.
General Obering. Yes, sir. We are launching two what we
call demonstration satellites this year. It is based on what we
call legacy hardware that was left over from the SBIRS low
program, frankly, from many years ago. I think we are investing
about $300 million, as I remember from the request, the budget
request.
Mr. Dicks. The cost of this program has gone up. Isn't that
right?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. There has been some discussion of a Nunn-McCurdy
breach. I guess maybe you are exempt from that.
General Obering. Yes. Well, the cost variance at the
completion of that particular contract is about 20 percent,
which would break a Nunn-McCurdy type of a tripwire. But the
program that we are going to launch this year is not the
program that we are going to build for that constellation.
These are demonstration satellites that demonstrate the
functionality. If it works, if we can show that we can do--and
for the rest of this Committee, what this is is right now all
we do from space is early warning. We get it, we say there is a
rocket launch, a missile launch, it is headed toward New York
or whatever. And that is it. We do not have--we do not have any
precise knowledge of the track. What we want to be able to do
is precisely track that missile from space the same way we
precisely track missiles with a radar.
And so that will allow us to engage them then. The
satellite constellation that we have envisioned after a 90-day
study that I had chartered says that we can provide----
------

and provide the same coverage that we were originally
envisioning with the STSS program. And it would be the same
functionality that we are demonstrating in the satellites this
year. So while we have had cost, schedule, and performance
technical delays with the program, it is on track to get in the
air this year. And we are restructuring that to take advantage
of frankly more modern technology and a more modern approach as
to how we do this constellation.
Mr. Dicks. STSS is basically SBIRS low as you suggested,
right?
General Obering. That is what is going up this year.
Mr. Dicks. Now SBIRS high, tell us about that.
General Obering. That is not my program. That is an Air
Force program.
Mr. Dicks. But I thought you know everything.
General Obering. Can I take you to my wife?
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Obering. SBIRS high is to replace the Defense a
Support Program satellites.
Mr. Dicks. DSP?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. What does SBIRS high provide over DSP?
General Obering. That gives us the early warning capability
to a better degree, and it is much more capable in terms of
sensitivity and that type of thing, but it still does not get
us the precise tracking that we need with the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System.
Mr. Dicks. So we are going to have a follow on to STSS?
General Obering. Yes, sir.

KEI

Mr. Dicks. Okay. Now, I want--about the Congressional plus-
up on the KEI program in '08. Please tell us what you are doing
to restore KEI to a full up weapons system and capitalize on
the mobility aspects in the program, or are you?
General Obering. Yes, sir, we are. In fact, the major
knowledge point that we had for airborne laser is it has got to
go shoot down a boosting missile. The major knowledge point
that we have for KEI is that it has to achieve a very, very
high acceleration booster flight in 2009. And we had taken that
program to a booster-flight-only program, frankly, because we
had not gotten the funding support on the Hill in the previous
years, and so we had to reduce it to that.
With the plus-up that we got last year, the 115 million net
plus-up, we are taking about 15 million of that to protect our
booster flight in 2009 because we ran into some problems on the
second stage firing, .------.
But we also took about $40 million of that to reinvigorate the
weapons system engineering and the mobility options aspect.
What that means is this is like a PATRIOT or THAAD on steroids.
So it is a much larger missile. It will still be in a
canister. It is still mobile. So we are using a lot of that
money to be able to do the weapons systems engineering. We are
also looking at taking about $37 million out of it toward the--
to accelerate the objective design, otherwise how we actually
do the land-based version of this capability. And then about
$20 million out of it goes to a kill vehicle development that
Raytheon is under contract for.
Mr. Dicks. How is Raytheon performing on that particular
contract?
General Obering. Well, we had actually pulled them back
very severely when we went to the booster only program. And
they have not been performing per se on the KV, on the kill
vehicle piece of that. Now they have responsibilities for the
overall interceptor for this, and they are the prime contractor
for the interceptor, reporting to Northrop, who is the prime
contractor for the entire program. So far so good with respect
to their performance. But again, the jury is still out on the
kill vehicle portion.
Mr. Dicks. We understand that you plan to spend 20 million
on a kill vehicle for KEI. Is that what you are talking about?
General Obering. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Will that 20 million be under the current KEI
contract?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. General, if the KEI program achieves a
successful booster flight in 2009, will you accelerate the
program?
General Obering. Yes, sir. I do not know if ``accelerate''
is the proper word, but we would certainly go for the full
funding for initially a land-based mobile capability, because
we believe that provides the most promise in the near term. And
eventually we could even sea-base the capability if we so
choose to.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Francis, anything else you would like to add
again? Talk about these blocks again. What again are your
concerns? You say they are going part way in the direction GAO
wants. But if you could convince them to do everything you
wanted, what would the final two or three things be?
Mr. Francis. Mr. Chairman, I think that the main thing
would be to develop a total cost estimate for those blocks that
I think are close enough along where you could reasonably do
that estimate and have those estimates independently verified.
I also think that, as I had mentioned before, for Missile
Defense to clarify what unit costs it is going to track, what
criteria they will use to report on those and how it will
report.
And I also think that to help the Missile Defense Executive
Board out there needs to be some things done on technology
development efforts in missile defense, which could comprise
about half of the budget. Right now they are not amenable to a
very strict baseline, but we think some things need to be done
to help the executive board get a good gauge on not only
technical progress, but matching technical progress with budget
and cost as well. So some kind of a construct to facilitate
oversight of technology capability.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. You want to comment on that, General?
General Obering. Yes, sir, if I may. First of all, the
GAO's report is draft. And we are still commenting on the
report that they have submitted. And there is a couple of
things that we are going to comment on. One is we do plan to
provide total cost estimates for the blocks to include life
cycle costs. And in fact, we engaged the CAIG, the Cost
Analysis Group at OSD to be able to do that. And we want to be
very careful on how we are reporting out on our unit costs
primarily because of just like I said before, we want to make
sure that we continue to do this as an integrated weapons
system.
And so we want to make sure that we do not have the
situation where we are reporting out on the costs of the tires
of an aircraft, for example, to put an analogy, as opposed to
reporting on the entire aircraft. And so we are going to be
careful as to how we report that out and what those variances
are. But if you will allow me a little bit of leeway, I want to
proceed carefully with the GAO's recommendations, because if we
are not careful, and Mr. Tiahrt kind of alluded to this, we
will end up looking like every other program in the Department.
And I do not think that is what we want to do. I think we
have shown the ability to get things out the door faster. And I
think we have shown an amount of cost accountancy that is
reasonable for the Department, and flexibility that is
necessary in the uncertain future. So I want to be careful as
to what we incorporate and what we do not.
Mr. Dicks. Well, and I can understand that. I think in
looking back on programs that we have done well in the
classified area, because a lot of times the flexibility and the
ability just to go forward and do it, like the F-117 stands out
in my mind, is a very important thing.
Now, General Campbell, in your statement, you talked a
little bit about the conditions up at, is it Fort Greely in
Alaska?
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Tell us about that. What are your troops faced
with up there in operating that base in the remote areas of
Alaska?
General Campbell. Mighty cold days and cold nights. But if
we go back----
Mr. Dicks. What can we do to help them?
General Campbell. We have worked with our own Installation
Management Command on the mission support side. And the one
lesson I have walked away with as we look at that, when we go
to Europe that you want to make sure that the mission support
side of this business is at the same level as the missile
defense capability. I think it is foolish not to invest in
both. The soldiers, the men and women that operate this are
just as vital to that system as the missile that is in the
silo.
So each time I go up there, we are continuing making
progress. The missile defense system is in good shape. They are
well trained. But on the mission support side, we still have a
little ways to go in providing them with the things that I
enjoy in Huntsville, Alabama. It shouldn't be really any
different in Fort Greely, Alaska, for that.
Mr. Dicks. Could you be a little more specific about what
the deficiencies are?
General Campbell. The type of deficiencies on the support
side usually relate to soldier care and family care. For
example, this post was a closed post, Fort Greely, in 1995. It
was brought back to life so we could support the missile
defense complex. So areas such as a community activities center
for families that had been closed years ago, so we have to go
in and get money to build a new one.
Mr. Dicks. You have families living up there?
General Campbell. Absolutely. Yes, sir. On Fort Greely. As
well as the Missile Defense Agency has folks living right there
at Fort Greely. So this is a vibrant place. There is a lot of
activity there. And we have to catch up on the mission support
side for these folks.
Mr. Dicks. I take it Vandenberg, that is pretty easy?
General Campbell. I am not--we have a very small element at
Vandenberg, on the order of seven soldiers to manage the silos
that are there.
Mr. Dicks. Why is that? Why is it different between Fort
Greely and Vandenberg?
General Obering. Colorado Springs is where we have the fire
control element. That is the backup for Fort Greely.
General Campbell. Right.
Mr. Dicks. But you have interceptors there, too, right?
General Campbell. No. Not at Colorado.
General Obering. Just at Vandenberg. We had interceptors at
Vandenberg and fire control at Colorado Springs. It just so
happens we have interceptors and fire control at Fort Greely.
Mr. Dicks. I got it. I got the difference. So the next
major test for you, General Campbell, will be in this European
scenario, if that goes forward. And again, give us some ideas--
I am on the military construction subcommittee as well. Give us
some of the ideas of what you are going to need over there.
General Campbell. Yeah. We have taken a look at it. And
right now, until the negotiation is complete, we envision that
we could have as few as 33 U.S. soldiers at the interceptor
site all the way up to 255. And those are estimates based on
what we have seen at Fort Greely. We do not know yet how much
the Poles will assist us with base security, for example, or
how much they will put into support infrastructure on the base
for the living quarters and those other support activities
diction.
Mr. Dicks. Is there an existing facility there?
General Campbell. There are buildings there from the Polish
force on that site. I personally have not been over there yet.
I do not think we have been on the site at all yet, even the
Missile Defense Agency, so we have not had a site survey done
to determine if we can refurbish those. But again, I will go
back to lessons learned at Fort Greely, if we find that those
are substandard, to me it is worth the investment to put in the
right barracks, the right dining facilities and support
facilities for those troops that we put there.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Now, looking out into the future, where
would you have--where would be the potential place for future
bases? I mean, you have got Fort Greely, you have got
Vandenberg, you have got maybe the European site. What would be
out in the future in the kind of robust system that you are
talking about?
General Obering. Sir, I believe that once we get the layer
of the 44 interceptors in the United States in Alaska and
California and the 10 in Europe, I think that is all we need to
do respect to silo-based defenses.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
General Obering. I think what we need to invest in, and you
will see that ramped up more and more in the budget, is in
mobile flexible defenses. So KEI, for example, and the ability
to move that around as you need to, the ship-based SM-3s, and
the SM-3 Block IBs and IIAs and IIB, frankly, which is that
Multiple Kill Vehicle variant. Having the flexibility to move
these defenses around as you need them I think is the way to
go. And the Secretary of Defense has asked me that before in
the past.
And I do believe we have enough with the silo-based shield
to provide that protection, that initial shield in terms of an
urgency with respect to North Korea and Iran. And then where we
may face in the future we don't know. It could be coming from
any azimuth. And to be able to have that flexibility would be
very useful.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Bishop, do you have anything further? All
right. The Committee will stand adjourned. Thank you very much.
The Committee is adjourned until Wednesday, the 27th, at 10
a.m., for a hearing on shipbuilding.
General Obering. Thank you, sir.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow.]

NRO Satellite Mission

Question. On February 20th, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) shot
down a non-functioning National Reconnaissance Office satellite. MDA
used a network of sensors to track the satellite, and then a modified
Standard Missile-3 from the AEGIS cruiser, USS Lake Erie. Most of the
debris from impact was expected to burn up on reentry within 24 to 48
hours and the remaining debris is expected to re-enter within 40 days.
Did this test prove the effectiveness of a U.S. anti-satellite
capability?
Answer. No. The satellite engagement was not a test of an anti-
satellite capability. The President decided to destroy the satellite to
prevent terrestrial damage or loss of life. His advisors presented him
with a range of options, including one involving the missile defense
system. Existing missile defense capabilities were subjected to an
extensive, one-time modification, and were employed in a manner for
which they were not developed to accomplish the mission. System
modifications to the Aegis ship used for the test were reversed, and
the unused interceptors were returned to their BMD configuration. MDA
does not maintain, nor is it developing, an anti-satellite capability.
Question. In a briefing to the press, Gen. James E. Cartwright, the
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that important
elements of the sensors for the nation's missile defense system had
been used. Could you describe the sensors that were used to conduct
this test?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Sensors program was
responsible for the BMDS sensor activities conducted during all phases
of the NRO Satellite intercept mission, including pre-mission planning
and analysis, real-time mission execution, and post-flight hit and kill
assessment. MDA sensors directly supported STRATCOM during all phases
of the mission. Multiple BMDS ground-based and mobile assets
participated, including 3 AN/TPY-2 X-Band radars, the Sea-Based X-Band
(SBX) radar, and the Ground-Based Radar-Prototype (GBR-P) X-Band radar.
The AN/TPY-2 radars provide homeland and regional defense and can
be integrated into the THAAD Weapon System. During this satellite
intercept, one radar participated from Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB), CA. A second AN/TPY-2 radar was located at the Pacific Missile
Range Facility where it is currently supporting THAAD flight testing.
The third radar was located at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) for
Limited Environment Testing and New Equipment Training prior to
fielding THAAD Fire Unit #1.
The SBX radar is mounted on a mobile, ocean-going platform that was
located in the vicinity of Hawaii for this mission. The radar provides
a unique capability to detect, track, and discriminate complex and
challenging threats. The radar is currently undergoing BMDS-level
testing to demonstrate operational capability.
The GBR-P was originally developed as part of the three year
National Missile Defense development phase to support flight testing
and system integration. It is located at the Reagan Test Site (RTS) in
the Kwajalein Atoll.
The External Sensors Laboratory (ESL) located at the Missile
Defense Integration and Operations Center was established to take
advantage of sensor systems that other agencies operate and apply those
sensor data to the BMDS mission. During this mission, ESL tasked
several electro optical sensors to observe the intercept point. Based
on these observations, ESL was able to confirm the hit within seconds
of the actual event. Further, the ESL provided some of the first
confirming analysis that the hydrazine tank had been breached.
Question. Has the conduct of the satellite shoot down, harmed, in
any way foreign cooperation with the Missile Defense Agency?
Answer. There have been no negative impacts on MDA's foreign
cooperation efforts as a result of this satellite shoot down. The
Director of MDA briefed information on the satellite shoot down during
a 5 March 2008 NATO North Atlantic Council (Reinforced) meeting (Allies
reinforced from capitals) and the feedback from the Allies was
positive.
Question. Did the Missile Defense Agency have other options for
intercepting the satellite, and were those options considered?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency and the Combatant Commands
examined options to include the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
long-range interceptor element and also the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) element. It was determined that the inherent
flexibility of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense element to place a
Standard Missile-3 equipped ship in an optimal position in the Pacific
Ocean was the best way to effectively engage the de-orbiting satellite.
Question. What was the relative size of the intended target (tank)
on the satellite as compared to the ``sweet spot'' on a ballistic
missile warhead?
Answer. The physical sizes of the satellite's hydrazine tank and a
ballistic missile warhead are roughly comparable. The relative size of
the sweet spot on a warhead is roughly similar to the relative size of
the hydrazine tank as part of the larger satellite.
Question. In the event of an incoming missile, about how much time
would the Aegis program have to be alerted and prepare to fire? About
how much time did the Aegis program have to prepare to fire on the
satellite?
Answer. The amount of time available for Aegis alertment and firing
preps is dependent upon a variety of factors, especially the
availability and quality of off-board sensor inputs. Available time
could range from seconds to hours or days or longer.
In the case of the satellite, the Aegis units involved had on the
order of several weeks advance notification of the need to engage, and
tens of seconds to actually initiate the successful engagement.
Question. How does the launch window for the satellite differ from
the launch window for a ballistic missile?
Answer. The actual launch window to shoot the SM-3 to intercept the
satellite was not significantly smaller than what would be expected for
intercepts of ballistic missiles, especially when deployed forward for
ascent phase intercepts.
On the other hand, while the NRO satellite mission was planned in
advance, there would likely be limited warning and preparation time in
the case of a hostile ballistic missile launch.
Question. The Aegis element required modifications before it could
fire on the satellite and successfully intercept its target. How long
did it take and what was the cost of making these modifications?
Answer. Aegis BMD was assigned the Satellite mission on 4 January
2008 and less than seven weeks later the satellite was successfully
intercepted. The total cost was $112.3M of which $93.4M was for the
Aegis BMD Program.
Question. Please describe the total cost of conducting the mission
to shoot down this satellite including missiles, modifications to the
Aegis and other systems, and any other costs directly related to this
mission.
Answer. The total cost of the mission has been assessed at
$112.361M and includes expenditures by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the
Aegis BMD Program Office, and other MDA radar and test assets. Detailed
expenditure information is below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item Description FY08 Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missile Hardware................... Replacement of 1 $14.100
Production Round.
Missile Modifications.............. Modifications; 10.675
Certification &
Simulation; Shipping
and Software Analysis.
Aegis Weapon System................ Software Testing; 6.055
Installation &
Checkout; Analysis;
Combat System
Engineering
Development Site
(CSEDS) Usage.
Data Analysis...................... MDIOC and Aegis BMD... 2.102
Ship............................... Mission Support and 1.364
Training.
Pacific Fleet Costs................ Fuel, Tanker 11.300
Availability and
Personnel.
Aegis BMD Developmental Program.... Buy back estimated 2 59.145
month schedule delay
to Blk IB development
and increased risk to
test program.
Sensor/Radar Utilization........... SBX, TPY-2's and GBR-P 2.920
Airborne Sensor Utilization........ HALO-I Mission Costs.. 2.537
Other Costs........................ Test Range, 2.163
Situational Awareness
and Communications
Nodes.
Engineering........................ Lethality Analysis.... ...........
------------
..................... 112.361
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. Taxpayers Paying for the Defense of Europe

Question. Based on the Administration's current plan, it seems that
the U.S. taxpayers will be picking up the costs of defending Europe
from ballistic missile threats.
Have you discussed this issue with the Europeans?
Answer. Yes. The Allies are aware of the large financial commitment
that the U.S. is making to the European deployment, which will also
provide additional protection to the U.S. while protecting the European
population and also providing protection for our deployed forces in the
European theater.
Question. If so, what type of contribution are they likely to make?
Answer. The United Kingdom and Denmark (host of the UEWR radars in
Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, respectively) as well as Poland (host
of the GBI site) and the Czech Republic (host of the European Midcourse
X-Band Radar) will provide a substantial contribution to the U.S. BMDS
and the Alliance by hosting these missile defense assets on their
territory.
Additionally, NATO Allies already have or are pursuing short- and
medium-range theater missile defense capabilities that will be
integrated into the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(ALTBMD) Program to protect deployed forces, including acquiring/
upgrading PATRIOT PAC 2/3 systems and co-developing the Medium Extended
Air Defense System. This will provide a significant contribution to U.S
and European security.
Question. How many missiles is Poland planning on procuring?
Answer. The Ground Based Interceptors deployed in Europe will be
procured by the U.S. These missiles will provide protection to the
European population and additional protection to the U.S. homeland and
our deployed forces in the European theater.
Question. What has NATO agreed to do with regard to missile defense
in Europe?
Answer. NATO Missile Defense Systems.
NATO agreed to develop the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) Program that will have a command and control
capability to link Allies' short range missile defense assets for
protection of deployed forces. In 2011, the ALTBMD Program plans to
deliver what it calls a ``lower layer'' capability (i.e., Patriot like
system). Future capabilities will include ``upper layer'' systems like
THAAD and SM-3. The Final Operational Capability for the ALTBMD systems
is scheduled for 2017.

NATO Missile Defense Policies

Secondly, at NATO's Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Heads of State and
Government (HOSG) agreed to conduct a study (the Missile Defense
Feasibility Study (MDFS)) to examine the feasibility of a system to
protect European territory and populations from long-range threats. The
MDFS was completed in 2006 and concluded that such a system is
technically feasible.
When the HOSG reviewed the MDFS at the Riga Summit in November
2006, it was decided that further work was needed to address remaining
questions in the policy, military, and technical areas of the MDFS.
These ``Riga taskings'' along with NATO Defense Ministers' June 2007
tasking to assess the implications of the US European Capability form
the basis of a report that will inform the discussion at the Bucharest
Summit planned for April 2008. This report on the Riga and Defense
Ministers' taskings concludes that the US European Capability will
provide substantial coverage for most of NATO territory.
The NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, attested to
the level of NATO agreement in his 19 April 2007 remarks:
``There is absolutely a shared threat perception between the
Allies. Allies all agree that there is a threat from ballistic
missiles.''
``The Allies are united on the issue, on the threat, and on the way
ahead.''

European Site and NATO Allies

Question. Several NATO allies have expressed concern about the
Administration's decision to deploy missile defense on a bilateral
basis (i.e., with Poland and the Czech Republic) rather than through a
NATO process.
Why did the Administration decide to move forward on a bilateral
instead of a multilateral process with NATO?
Answer. Forces operating under NATO auspices are not typically NATO
assets but force/capability contributions made by NATO members. This is
the common model that the U.S. has chosen to follow for the European
Deployment. We held significant discussions with our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization partners on a way forward to strengthen Trans-
Atlantic unity and improve protection for all NATO countries against
longer-range missile threats.
Question. What impact will this decision have on NATO?
Answer. The European deployment will provide protection to most of
Europe from the long-range ballistic missile threat posed by Iran.
Further, the planned interoperability of the U.S. Ballistic Missile
Defense System and the European Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (ALTBMD) will greatly enhance the effectiveness of both
systems, reaffirms the indivisibility of U.S. and European security
interests, strengthens deterrence and promotes regional stability by
giving U.S. and European leaders more options, limits the ability of
hostile governments to coerce European allies thereby indirectly
holding the United States hostage, and devalues the utility of
ballistic missiles.
Question. Could this potentially become a divisive issue within the
Alliance?
Answer. The U.S. is working hard to ensure a common understanding
among NATO allies of the proposed European deployment. On September 3,
2007, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated publicly that
there is ``absolutely a shared threat perception between the Allies.''
At the Bucharest Summit, NATO allies are fully expected to reach
agreement on a way forward for cooperation between the European
Deployment and NATO Missile Defense efforts.
Question. Could you provide us an update on our consultations with
NATO to date?
Answer. Public Diplomacy/Pol-Mil:
The U.S. has been actively engaged with its NATO partners on this
issue in a number of fora, both political and technical. We have
participated in and briefed on the proposed deployment in every North
Atlantic Council and NATO Russia Council Meeting since February 2007.
We have also played an active role within the Executive Working Group
as NATO moved forward to develop a position on the proposed deployment.
Technical:
Under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments
Directors, we have played a leading role on the Missile Defense Project
Group to ensure that accurate and comprehensive reports have been
developed for NATO's decision makers:
In June 2007, the NATO Defense Ministers tasked the Council of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) via the North Atlantic Council and
NATO's Executive Working Group to study the implications of the U.S.
proposed European Site.
In October 2007, the CNAD agreed to a report, the Defended Asset
Analysis Report, which indicated that the proposed U.S. European Site
provides substantial coverage to the Alliance against ballistic missile
attacks.
In March 2008, the NATO Missile Defense Project Group (tasked by
the CNAD to lead the June 2007 tasking), issued agreement on the
Executive Summary of the Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence
Ministerial Taskings on MD and a corresponding Annex with limitations
and assumptions of the report and noted the 215 page report main body.
This Executive Summary supports that the European Capability will
provide substantial coverage to most of NATO territory.
Question. Is there currently a formal NATO endorsement or approval
of the proposed deployment?
Answer. The NATO Heads of State will meet in early April in
Bucharest. They are expected to issue a report that is supportive of
the European deployment.
In June 2007, the NATO Defense Ministers tasked the Council of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD) via the North Atlantic Council and
NATO's Executive Working Group to study the implications of the U.S.
proposed European Site.
In October 2007, the CNAD agreed to a report, the Defended Asset
Analysis Report, which indicated that the proposed U.S. European Site
provides substantial coverage to the Alliance against ballistic missile
attacks.
In March 2008, the NATO Missile Defense Project Group (tasked by
the CNAD to lead the June 2007 tasking), issued agreement on the
Executive Summary of the Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence
Ministerial Taskings on MD and a corresponding Annex with limitations
and assumptions of the report and noted the 215 page report main body.
This Executive Summary supports that the European Capability will
provide substantial coverage to most of NATO territory.
Question. What formal requirements does NATO have for missile
defense in Europe?
Answer. NATO currently has a requirement to protect deployed forces
against ballistic missiles with a range of less than 3000 kilometers.
While NATO currently has this single requirement for protection of
deployed forces, it is also currently studying architecture options and
requirements for the defense of territory and population.

European Site and Polish and Czech Relations

Question. Until recently, there had been strong public support in
Poland and the Czech Republic for deploying U.S. missile defense
capabilities in their respective territories. However, over the past
several months, public support for the potential deployment has
decreased.
What have been the key reasons contributing to the change in public
opinion in Poland or the Czech Republic?
Answer. The U.S. is sensitive to the concerns of the citizens of
Poland and the Czech Republic and has assisted the host governments,
when requested, with information to inform their citizens and provide a
better understanding of our plans to base U.S. missile defenses in
their countries. We are complementing these efforts by engaging the
wider European community on our missile defense plans to communicate
how our efforts contribute to overall regional security.
Despite criticisms of the proposed deployment by some, the host
nation governments continue to support U.S. missile defense basing
plans. We are moving forward with plans to complete negotiations in the
next few months. These negotiated agreements ultimately must be
approved by the Polish and Czech Parliaments.
Question. Have the different political parties in Poland or the
Czech Republic have an influence over the negotiations?
Answer. We have enjoyed a productive working relationship with our
Czech and Polish counterparts regardless of their party.
Question. What impact will this have on our decision to move
forward?
Answer. It has not impacted our decision to move forward. We have
made good progress in negotiations with both the Czechs and the Poles.
Question. What impact do the local entities have over the
negotiations (i.e. mayors and local politicos)
Answer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both Poland and the
Czech Republic are responsible for negotiation of these agreements. We
are unaware of any direct influence from any local entities in either
country.

Use of THAAD and Aegis To Defend Europe

Question. One of the Administration's key rationales for deploying
a GMD site in Europe is to protect our forward deployed radars in
Europe. That said, if Iran decided to attack our European radars they
would use medium and intermediate-range missiles, the type of missiles
that THAAD and the SM-3 are designed to counter.
Why can't we use THAAD and the SM-3 missile to protect Europe,
especially the radars, from medium and intermediate range missile
threats? Isn't that what these systems are designed for?
Answer. Yes, we could use THAAD and Aegis BMD with SM-3
interceptors to protect locations in Europe, especially the radar
sites, from medium (MRBM) and intermediate (IRBM) range missile
threats. However, the number of ship stations, total number of ships
and/or total number of THAAD Fire Units to protect Europe on a 24/7/365
force alert posture would be cost prohibitive and could be susceptible
to increasingly complex threats. Aegis BMD and THAAD are ideally suited
as a complementary capability option to the European Interceptor Site
(EIS) to provide layered defense of key areas, defend the parts of
Europe that EIS cannot or provide some protection while the EIS is
being built. Each is designed for this capability.
For complete coverage of Europe and redundant coverage of the U.S.,
the best BMDS solution is a mix of THAAD, Aegis BMD and EIS working
together with land and space based sensors.
Question. Couldn't the SM-3 Block IIA missile, which we are
currently co-developing with Japan, protect most European population
centers from medium and intermediate range missile threats?
Answer. ------.
Question. What are the implications for the Navy's or the Army's
force structure requirements if an SM-3 or THAAD alternative were to be
pursued?
Answer. ------.

Two-Stage Ground-Based Interceptor for the European Site

Question. When MDA submitted its fiscal year 2008 budget, it
requested funds to continue the acquisition of GBIs for the European
site, but this time it stated those interceptors would have a two-stage
booster. The fiscal year 2009 budget submission continues this effort.
Has MDA conducted a study of the feasibility of using a 2-stage
booster at a European site? If so, what were the results of the study?
Has MDA conducted a test of a two-stage booster?
Answer. Yes, the MDA has conducted studies of the feasibility of
using a 2-stage booster at a European site. The results of this study
show using a 2-stage vice 3-stage booster is required to better defend
Europe against Iranian threats.
The 2-stage booster is being developed primarily to meet the needs
of the defense of Europe, but also expands protection of the U.S.
homeland with its capability to intercept long range ballistic missiles
targeting the U.S. Its shorter minimum engagement time is better suited
to engage threat ranges in the European Theater. The European
Interceptor Site (EIS), combined with mid-course and forward-based
radars, provides considerable redundant coverage of the U.S. and,
depending on the threat, defends Western and Central Europe and most of
Eastern Europe.
The 2-stage booster is a configuration of the currently deployed
and flight-tested 3-stage booster at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air
Force Base. The booster contractor will complete design modifications
to eliminate the third stage rocket motor and repackage the booster
electronics that were located on the third stage. Additionally,
navigation and guidance software changes will enable the interceptor to
perform mission profiles for two stages of flight versus three. The
common components between the 2-stage and 3-stage booster have
undergone significant ground, flight, and qualification testing as part
of the 3-stage development effort. Because the 2-stage interceptor
planned for Europe has fewer components than its 3-stage predecessor,
the 2-stage variant is a less complex version of the successfully
tested and fielded 3-stage interceptor.
The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 2-stage development
activity has started and a Program Critical Design Review is scheduled
to occur in December of 2008. Two flight tests will be conducted, both
from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, prior to the deployment
of the interceptors at the European site. The two flight tests include
a booster verification flight with an Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) mass simulator and an integrated flight test with an EKV and a
threat-representative target vehicle. These tests are scheduled to be
completed in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The GMD Fire Control (GFC) and
Command and Launch Equipment (CLE) software adapted for the 2-stage
interceptor will also be included in the 2-stage intercept flight test.
MDA has successful prior experience in modifying 3-stage boosters
to fly 2-stage missions. The Payload Launch Vehicles (PLVs) flown in
the GMD program's first ten Integrated Flight Tests (January 1997
through December 2002) were 2-stage variants of the standard 3-stage
Minuteman boosters. The 2-stage interceptor reliability will be
demonstrated through rigorous component qualification, integration
testing, ground testing and flight testing.
Question. What is the cost of retrofitting the booster from a
three-stage to a two-stage configuration?
Answer. The estimated cost for retrofitting an on-hand booster
stack from a 3-stage to a 2-stage configuration is $4.5M. The estimated
cost for retrofitting an emplaced 3-stage Ground-Based Interceptor
(GBI) to a 2-stage configuration is $8.83M.
To date, MDA has not retrofitted a booster from a 3-Stage GBI to a
2-Stage GBI, therefore the estimates provided here are based on a
combination of actual costs for tasks already performed as part of the
ongoing 3-Stage interceptor program, engineering estimates and
estimates derived from similar activities already performed.
Additionally, the cost of retrofitting shown below assumes a level of
manufacturing similar to the current program. If the manufacturing rate
drops, retrofit costs could be substantially higher.
The $4.5M estimate assumes the starting point is a completed 3-
Stage booster stack on hand at the Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC)
Missile Assembly Building (MAB) at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB),
CA. Three additional 2-Stage-related hardware items are necessary for
the retrofit:
Booster Avionics Module (BAM) adapter ring ($200k)
Wire harness installation modification ($350k)
2-Stage shroud (with relocated cutouts for the
Attitude Control System (ACS) thrusters ($750k)
The total estimated cost for additional 2-Stage specific hardware
is $1.3M.
Required work at the OSC MAB to convert from a 3-Stage to a 2-Stage
booster stack includes:
Disassembly of the booster stack to remove the third
stage ($500k)
Reintegration/retesting of the 2-Stage booster stack
to include the BAM adapter ring and the wire harness
installation modification ($2.7M)
The total cost of the booster stack disassembly and reintegration
work at the OSC MAB is $3.2M.
The $8.83M estimate assumes the starting point is an emplaced 3-
Stage Limited Defensive Capability (LDC) GBI, additional activities are
required to complete the de-emplacement, retrofit, and re-integration,
and re-emplacement of a 2-Stage interceptor. For example, assuming an
emplaced Fort Greely, AK (FGA) LDC GBI is the starting point, a
complete retrofit would incur the following additional costs:
Interceptor removal from silo and transportation to
the FGA MAB ($150k)
De-mate of the 3-Stage booster stack from the
Payload Avionics Module (PAM) ($100k)
Transport 3-Stage booster stack from FGA MAB to OSC
MAB ($183k)
Upon completion of retrofitting [$4.5M described
above], return transportation for the reconfigured 2-Stage
booster stack from OSC MAB to FGA MAB ($183k) [Transportation
costs to other re-emplacement sites will vary depending on
location, with European Interceptor Site (EIS) costs being the
greatest; however, EIS transportation costs have not been
determined.]
Reintegrate booster stack and PAM at FGA MAB ($3.3M)
Transportation from the FGA MAB to silo,
emplacement, and return to operations ($550k)
These additional costs total $4.33M.

New Block Structure

Question. MDA established a new block acquisition approach in
response to Congressional concerns about transparency and
accountability. Whereas previously MDA developed capabilities in two-
year increments, it now plans to develop and field capabilities based
on specific threat sets. Five blocks are currently defined:
Block 1--Defend the U.S. from limited North Korean long-
range threats;
Block 2--Defend Allied/Deployed Forces from short-to-
medium-range threats;
Block 3--Defend the U.S. from limited Iranian long-range
threats;
Block 4--Defend Allied/Deployed Forces in Europe from
limited Iranian long-range threats; and
Block 5--Expand defense of Allied/Deployed Forces from
short-to-intermediate-range threats in two theaters.
In its recent draft report, GAO noted that the new block structure
does not address whether the assets included in a block will be
transferred at the block's completion to a military service for
production and operation. Officials across DOD recognize that transfer
criteria are neither complete nor clear given the BMDS's complexity.
Without clear transfer criteria, MDA has transferred the management of
only one element--the Patriot Advanced Capability-3--to the military
service for production and operation. MDA and the military services
have been negotiating the transition of responsibilities for the
sustainment of fielded elements--a task that has proven arduous and
time consuming.
How have the block priorities been determined?
Answer. MDA has three strategic objectives that drive our block
construct and budget priorities. The five blocks and non-block
(Capability Development) funding category are associated with the
strategic objectives as follows:
1. Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S.,
allies and our deployed forces against rogue nation attacks:
a. Homeland defense against long-range missiles from North
Korea (Block 1.0--Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean
Long-Range Threats)
b. Develop initial defense for deployed forces and allies in
regional conflicts (Block 2.0--Defense of Allies and Deployed
Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/
Theater)
2. Close gaps and improve this capability against rogue states:
a. Expand homeland defense against Iran (Blocks 3.0--Expand
Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range
Threats and 4.0--Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces in
Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the
U.S. Homeland)
b. Defeat larger and more complicated attacks (e.g., decoys,
multiple warheads) (Block 3.0 and Capability Development)
c. Extend deterrence, enhance defenses for deployed forces
and allies, and increase international cooperation (Blocks 4.0
and 5.0--Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from
Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters)
d. Extend U.S. decision time and complicate enemy planning
(Block 4.0 and Capability Development)
3. Develop options to dissuade and stay ahead of current and
emerging threats:
a. Leverage technological advantage to increase defense
effectiveness (Capability Development)
b. Build a foundation for global access and response
(Capability Development)
Question. How is this new block structure reflected in the budget
request?
Answer. MDA's budget is organized for FY 09 and through the period
of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) based on the existing
program element (PE) structure subdivided according to the new block
structure. For example, the BMD Midcourse Defense Segment PE has budget
projects for Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Blocks 1.0 (Defense
of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats), 3.0 (Expand
Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats), and
4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-
Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland).
Also, BMDS program funding that does not fit into existing blocks
(1.0 through 5.0) is assigned to four general categories:
Capability Development--technology programs that are
maturing and being considered for future blocks (Block 6.0,
etc.); for example, the defense of the United States against
complex countermeasures might draw on multiple kill
capabilities from the multiple kill vehicle (MKV) program
Sustainment--operations and support of weapon
systems, sensors, and command and control, battle management
and communications (C2BMC) components
Mission Area Investment--activities that support
multiple blocks and capability development activities and
cannot be reasonably assigned to a specific block or capability
development program (e.g. intelligence and security; modeling
and simulation; systems engineering and testing cores; safety,
quality, and mission assurance)
MDA Operations--activities that support the Agency,
such as Management Headquarters and Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC)
Question. How does the new structure meet the stated goal of
addressing Congressional concerns?
Answer. MDA's new block structure was designed to address
Congressional concerns about accountability and transparency and to
better communicate to the Congress, Military Departments, GAO, and
other stakeholders our plans and baselines and the continuing
improvements in BMDS capabilities that are expected to be delivered to
the war fighter.
Congressional concerns such as the movement of program content from
one block to another and our development program being schedule-driven
rather than vent-driven are addressed by the new block structure, which
has several key tenets:
Blocks will be increments of BMDS capabilities--
rather than biennial time periods--being fielded against
particular threats. They will represent a discrete program of
work.
When MDA believes a firm commitment can be made to
the Congress, blocks will have schedule, budget, and
performance baselines. Schedule delays, budget increases, and
performance shortfalls will be explained as variances.
Once baselined, work cannot be moved from one block
to another.
Question. Given that at the end of each block, MDA plans to have
fully-mission capable components, when does the agency plan to
transition and transfer such components to the military service?
Answer. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. 224, Ballistic Missile Defense
Programs, minimum criteria for the transfer of responsibility for
elements of BMDS from the MDA Director to the Secretary of a military
department is established by the Secretary of Defense. At the very
least, the criteria established for such a transfer shall address the
technical maturity of the program, the availability of facilities for
production, and the commitment of the Secretary of the military
department concerned ensuring procurement funding for that program, as
shown by funding through the FYDP and other defense planning documents.
Current status of planned transition and transfer for BMDS
components to identified Lead Military Departments is detailed on the
attached slide, ``Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Scorecard.''
Several dates are currently undefined, as element progress is event-
based vice time-based. As the BMDS meets MDA Director approved
Knowledge Points, it will progress through and be potentially available
for Early Capability Delivery, Partial Capability Delivery, and Full
Capability Delivery. After Commander, United States Strategic Command
has completed a Military Utility Assessment; USSTRATCOM will declare
Partial Mission Capability and Full Mission Capability. Actual transfer
dates will be agreed upon after close coordination between MDA and the
designated Lead Military Department.

Missile Defense Force Structure

Question. What efforts has the Department undertaken to assess
missile defense force structure requirements?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has initiated a number of
analyses, embodied in the ``MDA Summer Study'' effort and elsewhere, to
determine what baseline force would be required to counter long range
ballistic missile (LRBM) threats. These studies have been updatd
periodically to accommodate changes in the potential threat, technology
advances, and changes in National guidance.
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, previously
named Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization, led a Joint
Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study in 2006 to assess BMD force structure and
missile inventory needs in Major Combat Operations. This study evolved
into the Joint Capabilities Mix Study series, an iterative opportunity
for the joint communities of interest to explore weapon and force
structure options for the global BMDS. This effort includes the
Services, Joint Staff, combatant commands, MDA, Defense Intelligence
Agency, OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), Space and Missile
Defense Command, and Program Offices.
In addition to the Joint Capabilities Mix Studies, MDA, in
conjunction with the Services, developed the Ballistic Missile Defense
System Transition and Transfer Plan that specifies the roles and
responsibilities of various Defense organizations in the development of
BMDS force structure requirements, including Memoranda of Agreement
(MOA) with the Military Departments and Services providing for force
structure development. This plan includes Annexes for each element of
the BMDS that specify roles and responsibilities, programmatic
linkages, transition and transfer objectives and milestones, and
contract status.
Missile defense force structure is also explored within the
Department's Analytical Agenda effort using various Defense Planning
Scenarios and Multi-Service Force Deployment studies.
The Department also established the Missile Defense Executive Board
(MDEB) to ``oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans,
program priorities, and investment options'' for the BMDS.
Question. What are the military's force structure requirements for
current and future missile defense capabilities?
Answer. Current force structure requirements for missile defense
capabilities are found in applicable Service source documents, i.e.,
Navy Activity Manning Documents, Army Table of Organization &
Equipment, and the Air Force Definition of Operational Capability.
Current Service capabilities that map to the applicable source
documents are Patriot PAC-3, AEGIS Standard Missile 3, Ground Based
Interceptor (GBI), Upgraded Early Warning Radars, and the Cobra Dane
Radar. On-going processes that will help define the requirements for
future missile defense capabilities such as the European Component, X-
Band AN/TPY-2 Radar, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and
Airborne Laser are: (1) The Warfighter Involvement Process which
provides the important interface between the materiel developer and
warfighter identities of missile defense solutions that facilitate
effective development and employment of missile defense capabilities;
(2) The Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) which oversees
implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and
investment options concerning missile defense capabilities necessary to
protect our Nation and our allies from missile attack and makes
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; (3) The Joint
Capability Mix (JCM) studies led by the Joint Staff J-8 Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) which help
inform missile defense force structure requirements for various
scenarios and environments; (4) the Commander, United States Strategic
Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) Military Utility Assessment used to evaluate
the operational effectiveness, interoperability and operational
suitability of the current fielded system and, (5) the Warfighter
Prioritized Capabilities List, developed by USSTRATCOM (based on
combatant commander input) articulates warfighter capability desires
and is used to help the materiel developer, the Missile Defense Agency,
understand the warfighter's needs. The Missile Defense Agency in turn
develops the Achievable Capability List which identifies what
capability can be provided. This exchange informs the materiel
decisions that will ultimately impact force structure that is
delivered.

Boost Phase Defense

Question. The Department has indicated that it will make a down-
select in 2009 as to whether to proceed with the Airborne Laser (ABL)
or the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) as the prime boost phase
defense system.
What specific criteria (e.g., affordability, operational
effectiveness, etc.) will the Department use to make the down-select
decision between ABL and KEI?
Answer. MDA will consider criteria that will include affordability,
operational effectiveness, technology maturity, producability, ground
and flight test data, technical performance during build-up activities,
and other factors. Data and knowledge gathered during the build-up and
execution of ABL's ``shoot-down demonstration'' and the build-up and
execution of KEI's ``high acceleration booster demonstration'' will be
used to support any decision.
Directly comparing the two programs for a down select decision is
difficult because each program is designed to satisfy a Boost Phase
Defense capability with a dramatically different approach. A review
will require a very broad Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) view
that encompasses not only these two programs, but also the scope of
work and maturity of other related technology and development programs
within MDA. Other factors external to these programs may influence a
decision. These factors may include other investment opportunities,
program timing, total funding availability, BMDS functionality, as well
as dynamic warfighter requirements.
Question. Both ABL and KEI have key milestone tests planned for
FY09. If ABL fails to conduct the scheduled September 2009 shoot-down
demonstration or KEI fails to complete its booster flight test, what
impact will that have on the down-select decision?
Answer. A knowledge-based down-select decision is dependent on data
and knowledge from each program as well as data from external sources.
If either program fails to meet its scheduled milestone date, a broader
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) view will be taken to determine
if there is sufficient knowledge to make a decision at that time.
Several outcomes are possible: a decision to maintain both programs
until sufficient knowledge is obtained from the build-up and outcome of
the key milestone events, a decision to proceed with only one program
based on data and knowledge obtained to date, or a decision to proceed
with neither program due to other external factors such as funding
availability, technical viability of a third alternative, and dynamic
warfighter requirements.

Asymmetric Defense

Question. General Obering, we are very concerned about the
potential threat of asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland. Based on
these concerns, this Committee has added funding for the last two years
specifically for a review of asymmetric threats and our capabilities
against these threats. Future opponents will have many options for
attempting to deter, disrupt, or defeat U.S. use of military power.
Four broad options could be part of an asymmetric response to current
and foreseeable U.S. superiority in regional combined-arms warfare
capability. An example of an asymmetric threat is the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range ballistic or cruise
missiles. Even without operational use, the mere presence of such
capability would act as a regional-strategic shadow and might weaken
the commitment of key allies to any future U.S. military response to
regional aggression.
Please discuss current threats.
Answer. ------.
Question. Can you discuss the work you have conducted with these
funds?
Answer. In FY08, the HAC-D provided $10M to MDA to conduct
experiments, develop prototypes, test CONOPS, and recommend deployment
options for an integrated asymmetric missile defense capability that
would protect population centers from a ballistic or cruise missile
launched from a ship off of the U.S. coastline. Previous funding was
received in FY06 ($10M) and FY07 ($4.1M) to address the same Asymmetric
Defense Issue. Starting in FY06, MDA initiated, with Congressional
support, a three-phased approach to solving the problem. First the MDA
initiated an architecture study which assessed existing cruise and
ballistic missile capability that could be used to augment the existing
air defense architecture and provided recommendations for further
development. Second, MDA leveraged a planned Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) test in the National Capital
Region (NCR) in June 2007 to evaluate the Lockheed Martin Silent Sentry
III passive surveillance system against surrogate ballistic and cruise
missile targets in a realistic urban environment. Third, MDA funded an
Operator-In-the-Loop (OITL) experiment with participation from
NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, JIAMDO and the services in order to assess
capabilities and develop CONOPS for defense of the homeland against the
asymmetric threat.
MDA is using the FY08 funding to build upon previous architecture
studies, surveillance prototype testing, and OITL experiments to
initiate a multi-year effort to design and prototype an Element
architecture in the NCR to defend against asymmetric missile attacks.
This effort leverages the existing air defense infrastructure in the
NCR, called the Enhanced Regional Situational Awareness (ERSA) system.
This year, we are designing an upgrade of the existing ERSA
infrastructure to support necessary interfaces to additional sensors
and the integration of surveillance fusion processing necessary to
support surveillance and fire control functions for countering cruise
and ballistic missile threats. We are also designing threat
conditioning and intent assessment logic to assist the warfighter in
timely identification of positive-hostile threats. We are continuing to
conduct experiments and develop prototypes of surveillance technologies
that will support detection, tracking and fire control capability for
engagement of ballistic or cruise missile threats. We are continuing
associated systems engineering studies and assessments necessary for
overall integration and will continue to assess options for future
capability spirals. We are building upon the OITL experiment completed
in FY07 and will jointly fund an experiment in FY08 with JIAMDO which
builds upon the FY07 experiment to continue assessing architectures and
developing CONOPS with warfighter participation.
MDA has brought together a team of experts from MIT Lincoln
Laboratory, NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, JIAMDO, as well as the Army and the
Navy to assess the architectures being developed with this funding.
This work is being done in a collaborative environment with warfighter
and service participation. Additionally, MDA has also been requested to
write a report summarizing the results of our efforts to date. This
report was written in a collaborative fashion with the same team. The
report is in MDA's final Staffing process and we expect delivery to
Congress on or before June 2, 2008.
Question. What are our current capabilities? What about future
capabilities?
Answer. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, an initial
air defense architecture, called NORAD's Integrated Air Defense System
(IADS) was established in the National Capital Region (NCR). The
Command and Control connectivity of the IADS sensors and ground based
air defense assets is provided by the Enhanced Regional Situational
Awareness System (ERSA), which is an augmentation of the existing
Operation Noble Eagle. The details of this system are classified
SECRET, but will be provided in the Asymmetric Threat report to
Congress that will be delivered in June 2008 (please see response to
Question 38 for more specifics). In addition to the NCR IADS, a
Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense (D-HACMD) capability
was assembled by NORAD as an extension to Operation Noble Eagle. This
capability consists of AWACS surveillance aircraft, FAA and Sentinel
radars, fighter aircraft, Avenger surface-to-air missile systems, and a
mobile command and control capability, and, with adequate warning can
be deployed to a specific location for a heightened state of alert or
National Special Security Event. Integration of Patriot and Aegis into
the D-HACMD has also been demonstrated in a test event.
The future capabilities being proposed by the Missile Defense
Agency, in conjunction with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM, will leverage the
sensor and command and control infrastructure that currently exists. We
will add sensors for surveillance and fire control that will be
integrated into the existing IADS system in the NCR. Additional threat
conditioning and intent assessment logic will also be required in order
to assist the warfighter in timely identification of positive-hostile
threats that will be necessary to support the stressing timelines
required for the engagement of a short range ballistic or cruise
missile threat. This capability, once developed and demonstrated in the
NCR will form the basis for an architecture used to protect other
population centers. MDA (in consultation with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM)
has developed a Tiered structure to characterize the capabilities
required to protect a single population center, a region, a coastline,
or protection of the entire U.S. (or North America). The details of
these proposed architectures are classified as SECRET, and will be
provided in detail in the congressional report that will be delivered
in June 2008.
Question. How is DoD and MDA countering asymmetric threats?
Answer. It is assumed that this question is referring to the
definition of an asymmetric threat that is provided in the FY08 HAC-D
tasking, that being a cruise or short range ballistic missile launched
from an aircraft or a ship off of the U.S. coastline.
The Missile Defense Agency is rapidly prototyping, developing,
testing and fielding capability to protect the U.S., our deployed
forces and allies against ballistic missiles at all ranges and in all
phases of flight.
An air defense architecture was established in the National Capital
Region (NCR) following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to
provide a limited defense against airborne threats. Currently, this air
defense system has very little capability against cruise missiles since
they can fly low and have small radar cross sections, and has no
capability against short range ballistic missile threats that could be
launched off of the U.S. coastline. The Congressional funding mentioned
in the response to question #38 has provided MDA with the resources to
develop architectures and to prototype technologies and CONOPS that can
be used to implement a defense against asymmetric cruise and ballistic
missile threats, should this requirement become a national priority.
The FY08 effort is focused on the design and initial prototyping of
such a capability in the NCR. The details of this capability are
SECRET, but will be provided in the MDA's report to Congress on the
Asymmetric Threat, which will be delivered in June 2008.

Lack of Program Transparency

Question. In its February 2008 report, GAO recommended that to
improve the transparency of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
program, MDA should establish cost, schedule, and performance baselines
for those elements in system development and demonstration and report
against those baselines. MDA partially concurred with this
recommendation, but was concerned that an element-centric approach
would detract from its efforts to develop a single integrated BMDS. GAO
continues to support its recommendation because the element-centric
reporting approach reflects the way MDA requests funding and contracts
for development of the BMDS.
What reporting basis would MDA recommend to provide a similar level
of transparency as reporting against element baselines would provide?
Answer. Pursuant to Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375),
MDA established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for each
block configuration being fielded (biennial Blocks 04, 06, and 08 under
the previous block structure) and reported variances annually in the
agency's Statement of Goals (SOG).
In 2007, MDA established a new block structure to address concerns
about transparency, accountability, and oversight and to better
communicate to Congress and other key stakeholders our plans and
baselines and our continuing improvements in BMDS capabilities. Blocks
will be based on fielded capabilities--not biennial time periods--that
address particular threats, and each block will represent a discrete
program of work. When blocks are established, schedule, budget, and
performance goals will be defined for each block. These goals, revised
as necessary, will become baselines when MDA can make a firm commitment
to the Congress because we have a high level of confidence that the
baselines can be achieved.
MDA has established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for
Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range
Threats), 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-
Medium Range Threats in One Region/Theater), and Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand
Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats). We
have established goals, not baselines for Block 3.3 (Expand Defense of
the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats--Improved
Discrimination and System Track), Block 4.0 (Defense of Allies and
Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand
Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and Block 5.0 (Expand Defense of
Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in
Two Regions/Theaters). In the SOG that accompanied the President's
Budget for FY 2009, we presented these baselines and goals.
In each subsequent year's SOG, we will explain any significant
variances from schedule, budget, and performance baselines and the
reasons for re-defining block goals. We will also explain changes in
year-to-year funding plans for each block over the period of the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP). This level of reporting is a significant
enhancement to transparency.
MDA has also begun establishing unit cost baseline estimates for
BMDS capabilities being acquired and delivered to the war fighter. Our
approach is to build these estimates from the level of selected
components to be fielded (such as the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense Fire Unit) to the element (THAAD) level and eventually to the
block level. This latter calculation will be a full block cost baseline
estimate. Before establishing cost baseline estimates, MDA will request
an independent review by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG),
DoD's independent cost estimating unit.
Once the estimates are established, MDA will report any significant
cost variance to the Congress. This information will supplement the
reporting of acquisition cost at the BMDS level in the agency's annual
SAR. We are now in the process of determining the thresholds to report
such cost variations and will incorporate them in a MDA directive.
While our capabilities-based, spiral development program may not
provide the identical kind of information and baselines generated under
DoD Instruction 5000 for traditional acquisition programs, our
intention is to fully meet the transparency, accountability, and
oversight needs of Congress and other stakeholders.
Question. Would MDA adjust its budget requests and contracts to
match its reporting approach?
Answer. We are re-considering the current program element (PE)
structure that organizes our budget request. As of this time, however,
we intend to continue our practice of subdividing the existing
structure into budget projects tied to the five new blocks and non-
block Capability Development category. As for contracts, our intention
is to restructure contracts as appropriate to reflect the new block
structure, cost reporting requirements, and the transition to multiple
appropriations.

Use of Research and Development Funds by MDA to Incrementally Fund
Programs

Question. MDA has approval to acquire assets with research and
development (R&D) funds, which allows MDA to incrementally fund
procurements. This is unlike any other program at DOD.
Has MDA completed analysis to determine the overall effect of
incremental funding? That is, has MDA determined whether incremental
funding will result in a reduction of financial obligations in the
early years, but a greater outlay of funds in future years?
Answer. Yes. MDA has completed an analysis that compares the impact
of incremental funding to the full funding required when using
procurement funds. The results of that analysis show that in the near
term (FY09/10), fully funding the BMDS would result in budget
shortfalls that would require significant adjustments to our program
plans that would lead to delays in delivery of missile defense
capability to the warfighter. Separately, incremental execution fits
well with the spiral upgrade approach that MDA is employing for BMDS
development.
Question. Is there any reason, other than freeing-up funds for
other uses, that funding for the GMD interceptor has been stretched
from 3 to 5 years?
Answer. The funding profile for the GMD interceptor has not been
stretched to free up funds for other uses. Funding has been distributed
across fiscal years to fit within the available program allocation and
at a level to meet program requirements. The extended profile exists
because of the duration between the purchase of long lead for the
initial European Capability GMD interceptor in 4QFY09 and the final GMD
interceptor emplacement in 2QFY13. This results in a total funding span
of approximately four years and, from a budgetary standpoint, a funding
span which includes a total of five fiscal years. During this period,
the individual interceptor manufacturing time remains at approximately
three years and the complement of ten interceptors, #45-54, are
emplaced in Europe.
Question. Can you give examples of new threats that MDA was able to
address because it is incrementally funding fielded assets?
Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) program is
focused on the threat from North Korea and Iran. But the threat can
never be predicted with certainty, and MDA has used incremental funding
in a flexible ``capabilities-based'' strategy to exploit technological
opportunities and place capability in the war fighters' hands far more
quickly than could have occurred under a traditional acquisition
approach. This strategy has enabled us to field a BMDS capability that
currently provides a limited defense of the U.S. against
intercontinental ballistic missiles from North Korea and an initial
defense of deployed troops, allies and friends against regional
ballistic missile threats. We expect to continue using this
capabilities-based strategy to improve the performance capability of
the BMDS by fielding additional components as they are completed and
developing new capabilities to respond to the emerging threats of the
future.

GMD Flight Test Delays

Question. LTG Obering, GMD had planned a flight test in December
2006 that was delayed until June 2007 based on findings from the
September 2006 flight test. A ground test was completed in the 1st
quarter of 2008 and subsequent tests have been rescheduled.
What happened in September that would drive a delay in the test
program?
Answer. FTG-02 was a successful intercept test conducted in
September 2006. However, five observations related to the
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) were subsequently identified that
necessitated program attention which resulted in the delay of the
follow-on intercept mission (FTG-03) until May 2007. The five issues
involved: (1) EKV discrimination performance, (2) Divert Attitude
Control System (DACS) rough combustion, (3) sensor debris management,
(4) secondary infrared focal plane temperature management, and (5)
focal plane infrared reflections. After extensive ground testing and
analysis, all five issues were addressed via an EKV software update, a
change to the DACS fuel mixture, and a modification to the cleaning
process for the infrared focal plane cooling system. These mitigation
efforts were successfully demonstrated during the FTG-03a mission in
September 2007. These modifications were not exercised in the FTG-03
attempt in May 2007 due to a target anomaly during that mission.
Question. Can you explain reasons behind the rescheduling of the
three 3rd quarter 2008 tests?
Answer. In the April 2007 Integrated Master Test Plan (v.08.05),
the test scheduled for the 3rd quarter CY 2008 included the following:
FTG-05 (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Flight
Test)
FTT-10 (THAAD Flight Test)
FTK-01 (Kinetic Interceptor Booster Test)
STSS Space Vehicle Launch (SVL)
GTD-03 (Distributed Ground Test)
In the March 2008 Integrated Master Test Plan (v.08.10), the tests
scheduled for the 3rd quarter CY 2008 are as follows:
FTG-04
FTT-10
NFIRE-2b (Near Field Infrared Experiment)
GTD-03
The April 2007 schedule had one GMD flight test scheduled for 3rd
quarter CY 2008, not three. FTG-04 was rescheduled from the 2nd quarter
CY 2008 into the 3rd quarter CY 2008 due to required target hardware
modifications and the failure of a test-specific component in the
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that prevented the transmission of
telemetry. FTG-05 and FTG-06 were rescheduled into the 4th quarter CY
2008 and 2nd quarter CY 2009, respectively, due to the rescheduling of
FTG-04. FTT-10 is on schedule for execution in the 3rd quarter CY 2008.
FTK-01 is delayed for 2nd quarter CY 2009 due to Kinetic Interceptor
technical issues. SSTS SVL is now scheduled for 4th quarter CY 2008 due
to schedule issues with other non-MDA launches and technical issues
with the satellite payloads. NFIRE-2b was rescheduled due to higher
priority missions and is on schedule for execution in the 3rd quarter
CY 2008. GTD-03 remains on schedule for execution in the 3rd quarter CY
2008.
Question. What issues remain to be resolved?
Answer. None of the issues experienced during FTG-02 (September
2006) remain unresolved. The mitigation efforts were proven effective
on FTG-03a.
Question. How will this impact the current test plan for GMD?
Answer. None of the issues experienced during FTG-02 (September
2006) are impacting the current flight test program. The mitigation
efforts for the issues experienced during FTG-02 were demonstrated on
(September 2007) FTG-03a.

STRATCOM and the Number of Ground-Based Interceptors

Question. We understand the Missile Defense Agency currently plans
to terminate production of the GBI interceptors at 54 missiles.
Is this true?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency intends to complete fielding of
54 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) in 2013, representing the currently
planned full complement of operational GBIs. However, manufacturing
will continue beyond delivery of the 54th operational GBI in order to
permit GMD (and overall BMDS) performance and upgrade testing (ground
and flight) and stockpile reliability testing (ground and flight) in
2013 and beyond. Additional manufacturing is required to ensure
adequate spares and line-replaceable units (as part of the
refurbishment program).
Question. If so, what role did STRATCOM play in MDA's decision to
terminate production at 54 interceptors?
Answer. There has been no decision to terminate manufacturing of
GBIs. Manufacturing will continue beyond the delivery of the 54th
operational GBI. The Missile Defense Agency intends to complete
fielding of 54 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) in 2013, representing
the currently planned full complement of operational GBIs. However,
manufacturing will continue beyond delivery of the 54th operational GBI
in order to conduct GMD (and overall BMDS) performance and upgrade
testing (ground and flight) and stockpile GBIs for reliability testing
(ground and flight) in 2013 and beyond.
Question. What analysis has STRATCOM done to identify future GBI
requirements given current and future threats?
Answer. STRATCOM conducts an annual Military Utility Assessment
(MUA) of the fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) against
the current enemy threat. The MUA identifies the capabilities and
limitations of the fielded BMDS, including issues associated with
missile inventories. In the MUA 2008, identified limitations are being
linked, for the first time, to the recently developed STRATCOM
Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP is the collaborative
mechanism by which the Warfighter feeds back desired BMDS modifications
and future capabilities to the BMDS developer, MDA.
In addition, NORTHCOM is currently conducting a GBI study. This
study contains three phases.
Phase I--Provide USNORTHCOM/J31 with an analytical basis for
recommendations to MDA regarding future GBI-basing decisions at
Vandenberg AFB, CA.
Phase II--Assess performance trade-space between 2 and 3 stage
Orbital Boost Vehicle GBI based at VAFB and FGA ``what is the right
capability mix?''
Phase III--Quantify the operational benefits of an east coast GBI
site in the context of the projected 2012-2015 BMDS capability.
Question. Can you share that analysis with the Committee?
Answer. Although MDA works with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) reviewing and conducting
analysis with respect to Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs), USNORTHCOM
is leading the study on GBIs. According to USNORTHCOM, the study is not
complete and they have not drawn any conclusions. We believe USNORTHCOM
should provide Congress with the analysis.

Multiple Kill Vehicles

Question. MDA is developing the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) to
allow a single interceptor to engage a number of credible objects that
an enemy missile might deploy. The agency expects to deploy an
operational capability in the 2017 timeframe. In January 2004, MDA
awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to develop a carrier vehicle that
directs multiple kill vehicles with planned deliveries in 2014. This
concept, if successful, would benefit GMD and KEI. MDA also proposed in
the FY08 budget to have Raytheon develop an alternate concept in which
a lead kill vehicle would direct other kill vehicles. This concept, if
successful, would primarily benefit SM-3. In the third quarter of
fiscal year 2010, MDA will determine whether a carrier vehicle with
multiple kill vehicles is feasible or whether the program will move
forward with a unitary carrier vehicle.
If MDA finds that multiple kill vehicles are not feasible, how will
this impact the GMD and Aegis BMD programs and the kill vehicle planned
by the KEI program since you plan to stop all work on unitary kill
vehicle work this year?
Answer. BMDS Kill Vehicles will deliver both a unitary kill vehicle
for the SM-3 Blk IIA Cooperative Development missile with Japan and
multiple kill vehicle payloads for all midcourse weapon systems of the
future (Ground Based Midcourse Defense, Kinetic Energy Interceptor,
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile-3 Blk IIB).
To ensure delivery of kill vehicles to the BMDS, our evolutionary
acquisition strategy emphasizes use of proven technologies, early
development of key components and capabilities, realistic knowledge-
point testing and demonstrations. We began developing engagement
management algorithms, key payload components (sensors, divert and
attitude control systems), and a hover test bed to prove out these key
technologies and inform the Missile Defense Agency Knowledge Point
decisions. This early component development and testing will mitigate
technical, schedule and cost risk and prove out the kill vehicle
capability.
If through the component development and testing and knowledge
point decisions the Agency decides multiple kill capability is not
achievable in the near term, we will work with the Agency's System
Engineer to determine the best kill vehicle payload for the Ground
Based Midcourse Defense, Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense SM-3 Blk IIB weapon systems until multiple kill vehicle
is ready.

Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) Compared to Airborne Laser (ABL) for
Boost Phase Defense

Question. MDA awarded a contract in December 2003, which was to
continue through January 2012, to develop and test the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI). At that time, MDA stated that KEI was being designed
as a mobile capability to destroy intermediate and long-range ballistic
missiles during the boost/ascent phase of their flight. In 2005, MDA
selected the Airborne Laser (ABL) as its primary boost phase
capability, but continued development of KEI. We understand that a very
comprehensive study was conducted by DoD's Office of Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) that looked specifically at boost phase programs.
Have there been any studies that conclude KEI is the better choice
for a boost phase capability? If so, why has MDA chosen to continue to
pursue ABL as its primary boost phase capability? Can you provide us
with the PA&E study?
Answer. The MDA submitted a Boost Phase Intercept study Report to
Congress in April 2006 that described in detail the different boost
phase capabilities and limitations of the ABL and KEI. There was no
finding in this report that KEI was a better choice than ABL as a boost
phase capability. The development of this Congressional report included
significant interaction with PA&E and a detailed review of their
independent study results. MDA openly shared our technical and
programmatic data with the PA&E team, and we conducted several
technical interchanges with them to review and discuss findings. These
discussions with PA&E led to modifications of the MDA Report to
Congress. We recommend that Congress get the latest PA&E boost phase
study results from the PA&E team, to it is the most current and
accurate version of their study.
The ABL is our primary boost phase capability because it is the
only capability that can intercept all ranges of threat in the boost
phase. KEI boost phase intercept is limited to long range threats that
burnout in the exoatmosphere (greater than 100 km altitude). The ABL
has the potential to greatly augment our ability to defeat large raids
of short range and medium range ballistic missiles (our adversaries
have large quantities of these missiles) by significantly thinning that
threat in the boost phase.
The 2009 Knowledge Points for ABL and KEI, along with parallel
objective BMDS engineering and planning work, will provide us with the
performance, cost, schedule, and risk information we need to refine our
BMDS acquisition strategy for boost phase capabilities.
Question. Has KEI been redefined as a midcourse capability instead
of a boost/ascent phase capability?
Answer. No. The Agency recognizes that booster vehicle performance
required for boost phase intercepts is more than adequate to provide
midcourse intercept capability. KEI's mobility makes it attractive for
both BMDS mission areas. A decision on KEI's role(s) in the BMDS will
not be finalized until after its knowledge point event (first flight)
and the Airborne Laser's knowledge point event (lethal shootdown).
Question. Will the contract extension increase termination costs
should MDA decide to terminate KEI's contract in 2009 or is contract
termination not a possibility even if ABL remains the primary boost
phase capability?
Answer. Termination costs will not increase as a result of a
contract extension. Termination liability will not change in 2009 from
the current amount unless contract effort is increased or decreased, in
particular the number of contractor personnel performing the contract
and amount of material ordered. Potential contract termination costs
are appropriately tracked and funded not only for the basic contract,
but for any and all extensions. MDA plans to continue to execute its
evolutionary acquisition strategy for KEI consisting of knowledge point
events (the first knowledge point: Booster Flight--Development
Verification Test scheduled for 2009). MDA will determine or adjust the
future course of KEI based upon outcomes of knowledge point events.
Question. In 2009, the KEI program will flight test the
interceptor's boosters, a critical technology, to determine if they
will function as intended. In 2009, MDA will use the results of the
booster test and the results of ABL's lethality demonstration to decide
the future of the KEI and ABL programs. However, in 2005 MDA directed
the KEI program to incorporate the capability to engage missiles during
the midcourse phase of flight and KEI's contract is being extended
until September 2015. In testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee on the fiscal year 2008 budget, MDA's Director said that the
mission of KEI has not been redefined. KEI is still an alternative for
ABL should ABL fail in its lethality demonstration.
Does the FY2009 budget request reflect either the advancement of
evolution of the KEI program?
Answer. Yes. The plan in the FY08 President's Budget request was to
conduct as booster-only System Design Review in FY2009, but with the
additional funding appropriated by Congress in FY08 the KEI program has
been adjusted and it will now be a full KEI Weapons System Design
Review.
The FY2009 budget request includes two major components; element
engineering and interceptor. The element engineering work planned for
FY2009 is for requirements development for full mobile weapon system
for incorporation into the BMDS. The FY2009 budget request also
includes the effort necessary to complete preparations for and conduct
of the KEI knowledge point event (first flight). In accordance with the
Agency knowledge point acquisition approach, successful completion of
the knowledge point event will enable the advancement of the system
into full mobile weapon system development.
The Agency recognizes that booster vehicle performance required for
boost phase intercepts is more than adequate to provide midcourse
intercept capability. KEI's mobility makes it attractive for both BMDS
mission areas. A decision on KEI's role(s) in the BMDS will not be
finalized until after its knowledge point event (first flight) and the
Airborne Laser's knowledge point event (lethal shootdown).

Kinetic Energy Interceptor

Question. The FY2009 budget request contains $387 million for the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor program, which MDA has designated as a
replacement for the current GBI booster deployed in Alaska and
California. Previous budgets planned on KEI being a boost phase defense
platform.
Why are we planning to replace the GBI when we just began deploying
that system 4 years ago?
Answer. The Agency is not planning on any near term replacements of
the GBI boosters with KEI boosters. The Agency plan is to pursue GBI
booster spiral upgrades in close coordination with the KEI booster
development team. The GBI and KEI boosters provide different and
complementary capabilities to the BMDS. The MDA Engineering, GM and KI
Program Offices are developing plans for the coordinated acquisition of
common, core standards compliant booster avionics for the KEI and
future GBI capability spirals. This enables us to save significant
dollars through the integrated development of high cost components
needed by both KEI and GBI.
The MDA plan is to efficiently sustain and spiral upgrade the GBI
while adding new KEI capabilities to the BMDS such as boost phase
intercept or mobile midcourse.
Question. What is the expected lifetime of the GBI?
Answer. ------.
Question. In a midcourse role, how much more capability does KEI
provide as opposed to the GBI?
Answer. The high acceleration and mobile KEI complements the GBI by
providing the Warfighter additional midcourse engagement capabilities
in a layered BMDS. A forward-based KEI (based closer to threat
countries than fixed GBI sites) disrupts and limits our adversaries'
ability to selectively time the deployment of countermeasures by
expanding the midcourse intercept battlespace to shortly after threat
burnout. Furthermore, a forward-based KEI with a multiple kill vehicle
payload, reduces the number of credible threat objects (and threat
complexity) left for the later GBI layer to handle. The KEI can be
flexibly-based to defend Friends and Allies in Japan, Southern Europe
(forward of the European Site) or the Middle East against medium range
ballistic missile threats. The longer burn, silo-based GBI is not
designed to counter this threat set. The Agency is focusing the KEI
development and test program on the realization of layered BMDS
capabilities.
Question. If the objective for KEI is a mobile system, why invest
significant resources in a silo-based KEI system?
Answer. We are not investing significant resources in a silo-based
KEI system. At this point, silo-basing for KEI is best viewed as a
potential capability, much like a sea-based KEI is a potential
capability.
Question. If ABL and KEI are supposed to compete as a future boost
phase weapon, why have you removed everything but the booster portion
of KEI from this year's budget?
Answer. Boost phase weapon selection is based on two capability
demonstrations or knowledge point events; the Airborne Laser's lethal
shootdown and the KEI booster vehicle's first flight. The FY2009 budget
request for KEI includes funding to prepare for and conduct this flight
test as well as significant funding for requirements development for
the full mobile weapon system for incorporation into the BMDS. In
accordance with the Agency knowledge point acquisition approach,
successful completion of the knowledge point event will enable the
advancement of the system into full mobile weapon system development.

Airborne Laser (ABL) Costs for Full Deployment

Question. After a schedule delay, the Airborne Laser is now
expected to demonstrate a lethal shoot-down in 2009. Based on the
demonstration, you will make a decision on development of Tail 2.
What is the requirement with respect to the number of ABL's needed?
Answer. The final BMDS architecture to include number of ABL's has
not been defined. This decision will occur subsequent to the knowledge
point event (lethal shoot-down).
Question. For 24/7 coverage, how many orbits of ABL's and how many
ABL's per orbit are required? Is this similar to the requirements for
JSTARS and AWACS?
Answer. The number of orbits required will depend on the wartime
scenario. According to the Air Force Air Combat Command's Operational
Concept for Airborne Laser dated 1 Jan 2007, ABLs will be tasked to
engage ballistic missiles originating from one or more Named Areas of
Interest (NAIs). Once established in theater, the ABL will operate one
or two Combat Air Patrols (CAP) based on relative size and location of
the NAIs. Also according to the Operational Concept, five ABL aircraft
will be able to sustain two near-continuous 24/7 orbits, or three ABLs
will be able to sustain one near-continuous 24/7 orbit.
Similar methods are used for JSTARS and AWACS, but because these
are sensor and command and control platforms, the criteria are
different from the ABL weapon system.
Question. What is the basing concept for ABL? What is the plan for
delivering the chemicals into a forward-based location?
Answer. According to the Airborne Laser (ABL) Operational Concept,
developed by the Air Force Air Combat Command, dated 1 January 2007,
operational ABLs will be primarily based in the Continental United
States (CONUS), where the Main Operating Base (MOB) will be equipped to
handle and service the ABL aircraft and its unique weapon system. An
operational ABL will be able to deploy to Forward Operating Locations
(FOLs) world-wide. FOLs can be located at any operational location
where heavy cargo aircraft operate. Runways, taxiways, and instrument
approach requirements are similar to those for other heavy aircraft.
ABL will utilize common support equipment available at bases in
theater wherever possible to reduce the size of the deployment package.
ABL will require peculiar support equipment, such as Aerospace Ground
Equipment (AGE) to service the laser weapon. Transport of this
equipment will require military airlift. Exact airlift needs have not
been established. Aircraft hangars will not be required at the FOL.
Required maintenance will be accomplished on the flight line or in
back-shops. Sufficient workspace, shelter, and messing facilities will
be required for deployed operations and maintenance personnel. FOL
security personnel will be augmented with ABL security personnel, as
required. The amount of equipment and personnel will depend on the
operational scenario.
Pre-positioning of ABL laser fuels at pre-designated FOLs would
also hell ensure the immediate availability of chemicals upon arrival
of ABL aircraft during operational deployments. Air mobility or sea
transportation can then be used to replenish laser fuel farm reserves
as they are consumed. Options for transportation of extra chemicals are
currently being explored. Prior to mixing the chemicals and loading
them on the ABL the shelf life is unlimited.
Question. Do you have an independent cost estimate for an
operational ABL? What about the cost of forward basing?
Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) Program Element is a Capability
Development within MDA. As such, MDA has not requested the OSD Cost
Analysis Improvement Group to perform an Independent Cost Estimate for
ABL. MDA intends to request an independent cost estimate for ABL at a
later time, when programmatic uncertainties are reduced and prior to a
decision to commit resources for procuring and sustaining an ABL
capability.
ABL has a comprehensive Program Office Operations and Support
Estimate from 2002. We have worked closely with the U.S. Air Force, Air
Combat Command (ACC) on the update of their Operational Concept and are
in the process of gathering data to develop an updated cost estimate
for the operational ABL and forward basing. Initial estimates will be
available later this year.
Question. Can the taxpayer afford to buy the number of ABL's
required?
Answer. The affordability of ABL assets, along with the boost-phase
defense capability this BMDS Element would provide, will be among the
many factors that will be weighed by the Department in considering a
commitment to including the ABL capability in the BMDS. The ABL Element
of the BMDS has significant upfront investment costs. However, the
engineering estimate indicates a cost per shot which will be
insignificant relative to the cost of an equivalent missile
intercepting and destroying an enemy ballistic missile potentially
armed with weapons of mass destruction. At this time, however, no
conclusive decisions have been made on affordability or other issues
associated with ABL.

Airborne Laser (ABL) Against Potential Threats

Question. Even if ABL is successful in its lethality demonstration
in 2009, there are still many questions about how it would be employed.
What is ABL's capability against potential threats from China and
Iran with respect to ICBMs? What about other nations?
Answer. ------.
Question. What about potential overflight of a hostile nation?
Answer. Decisions about ABL flights over a hostile nation will be
the responsibility of the regional combatant commander with input from
the air component commander. This decision will take into effect the
operational environment, including factors such as hostile air-to-
ground defenses, friendly air support, and mission priorities at the
time of the potential overflight.
Question. Are there other programs currently in development at MDA
that are possible better options for boost phase defense?
Answer. As part of a layered defense strategy the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI) is the only other Element currently in development
capable of a Boost Phase mission. One additional benefit of the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor program is its potential multiple use application.
The Kinetic Energy Interceptor could provide the Ballistic Missile
Defense System a strategically deployable, land and sea-based
capability to defeat medium to long range ballistic missiles in the
boost, ascent or midcourse phase of flight. However, as a BMDS boost
phase defense asset, ABL has several characteristics that are unique.
As an airborne asset, ABL can be forward deployed quickly. Once
deployed, ABL will also be able to provide missile track information to
cue other U.S. and NATO assets. In addition, ABL's chemical laser
provides a relatively low cost per kill (less than $20k per kill).
Question. Are there other missions for ABL?
Answer. ABL has the potential to conduct many missions including:
Defensive Counter Air (DCA), High Value Airborne Asset Protection
(HVAA), Cruise Missile Defense (CMD), Counter Surface to Air Missile
(SAM), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and
Command and Control (C\2\).
The ABL program office is developing capabilities to support three
adjunct missions: Tracking debris from successful ABL missile
engagements, extended ballistic missile engagement ranges, and engaging
post-boost vehicles. The ABL program plans to conduct a series of
experiments and demonstrations proving the technical feasibility of
these adjunct missions following the ABL's lethality demonstration.

Airborne Laser (ABL) Countermeasures

Question. One concern with the deployment of ABL is the potential
impact of countermeasures that some countries either already have or
are developing.
Can we expect countermeasures to ABL?
Answer. Any fielded weapon system is likely to cause an adversary
to investigate potential countermeasures. There is currently little to
no evidence that potential threat countries have fielded
countermeasures likely to impact ABL. MDA is however actively
investigating the effectiveness of likely potential countermeasures and
methods for negating them. The details are protected within special
access channels.
Question. What are the types of countermeasures that countries may
develop to counter a laser weapon like ABL?
Answer. In general, adversaries may choose to develop
countermeasures that increase a missile's resistance to heating effects
of laser weapon systems. These countermeasures typically decrease the
effective range and/or lethality of an adversary's missiles because
additional weight is added to shield the missile from laser systems.
Alternatively, adversaries could attempt to decrease the effectiveness
of the ABL's tracking systems.
Question. Do certain countries already have countermeasures?
Answer. There is little to no evidence that potential threat
countries have fielded countermeasures likely to impact ABL. MDA is
however actively investigating the effectiveness of likely potential
countermeasures and methods for negating them. The details are
protected within special access channels.
Question. How do we counter the countermeasures?
Answer. MDA's investigation of potential countermeasures will
determine the effectiveness of those countermeasures and guide the
development of any necessary counter-countermeasures. The ABL has
various options for decreasing the effectiveness of an adversary's
countermeasures. The details are protected within classified/special
access channels.

Airborne Laserbeam Control/Fire Control Component

Question. This year the Airborne Laser program was late in
achieving one of its knowledge points--a ground test meant to prove-out
the operation of the element's Beam Contral/Fire Control component.
ABL's Program Manager signed-off on the completion of the test in
December 2006 after a 3\1/2\ month delay, but he did so with two
caveats. First, the software was not performing as intended and second,
the low-power laser, which is a surrogate to the element's high-power
laser in early flight tests, did not put enough power on the target.
ABL's Program Manager said these problems would have to be corrected
before the low-power system integration active flight testing begins.
The delay in achieving this knowledge point pushed ABL's planned
lethality test from 2008 to 2009. Now that we are in the FY 2009 budget
cycle:
Have the software and low-power laser problems been corrected? If
not, when do you expect them to be resolved?
Answer. Yes. During the Low-Power Integration Ground testing, MDA
collected data which ultimately led to determining the root cause of
the issues and correcting them. The software was upgraded as required
to complete all of the testing with no caveats, the surrogate's high-
power laser and other optical components were realigned, and multiple
successful aerial engagements were demonstrated. During these
engagements, adequate laser power was put on target; had the actual
High Energy Laser been used instead of the surrogate under the same
engagement conditions, a missile would have been destroyed.
Question. Is it likely that ABL's lethality test will be delayed
further?
Answer. The ABL element is on track to achieve a lethal
demonstration in 2009. The Airborne Laser successfully completed its
Low-Power System Integration flight testing in 2007, which culminated
in using all three of the aircraft's laser systems to detect, track,
and then engage a ``non-cooperative'' target aircraft. Since then, the
Airborne Laser element of BMDS and its contractor partners have been
aggressively refurbishing low- and high-power optics, sensors, and
laser systems and installing all of the hardware in the Airborne Laser
Aircraft required to begin High-Power System Integration ground testing
in the fall of 2008 and begin High-Power System Integration flight
testing in early 2009.
Question. Has MDA determined the cost impact of the recognized
delay in the lethality demonstration? What is the cost of the delay?
Answer. ABL rebaselined its Boeing contract in May 07 adding $250M
and 1 year to the schedule. The program was able to absorb the cost of
this delay within the President's Budget by reducing activities that
were not directly related to shootdown and assuming a higher level of
risk for the program.
Question. Did the contractor's failure to fully meet the objectives
of the 2006 knowledge point affect the fee awarded to the contractor?
Answer. Yes. The Airborne Laser element of BMDS award fee plan is
structured to evaluate contractor program and cost management, mission
success, and Knowledge Point execution. Knowledge point execution is
weighted the heaviest among the three areas. The award fee was
adversely affected as the challenges experienced during the 2006
Knowledge Point completion were considered in the overall assessment
and resulted in a reduced award fee.

Contracted Logistics Support

Question. MDA contracts with prime contractors for fielded elements
to provide logistics support for the elements and to collect and report
reliability data, including data on the frequency of breakdowns and the
cost of repairs.
What is MDA learning about the cost of sustaining fielded elements?
Answer. Sustaining fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
capabilities until they are transferred to the Military Services
remains one of our highest priorities, and we have learned that
sustainment costs are comprising an increasing portion of program
funding for each block. As additional elements of the BMDS have been
fielded (or are planned for future fielding) we are seeing sustainment
costs grow from about $105 million in FY05 to a projected total of
almost $956 million in FY13. We have also learned that we can more
efficiently manage sustainment costs when assets to be sustained are
grouped under a single contract vehicle rather than separate contract
vehicles. This advantage may be diminished or eliminated in future
fiscal years if the restructuring of contracts is required to
accommodate the use of multiple appropriations.
Given these significant costs, we are working through the Missile
Defense Executive Board to establish a set of business rules that will
govern the smooth transition of BMDS capability to the Services. Our
goal is to ensure that fielded capability is fully sustained during
this transition and to work closely with the Combatant Commanders and
Services to ensure the Services have significant lead time and program
information to continue operations and maintenance budgeting
requirements for the capabilities they will be responsible for
operating.
Question. Is MDA appropriately considering the cost of supporting
an element as the element is being designed?
Answer. Yes, MDA does consider the cost of supporting a system
during initial design and all subsequent associated reviews.
Sustainment is a key design element in both the System Requirements
Review and the System Design Review. Additionally, the early use of
Business Case Analyses of test system design and other factors for life
cycle affordability are part of the process that provides feedback for
improvement. Currently, Contractor Logistics Support has been the
common strategy for our fielded systems. As systems mature, an updated
Business Case Analysis is conducted to determine other support
strategies.
Question. How do award fees built into contracts affect support?
Answer. Award fees are used to influence favorable contractor
performance in support of MDA's logistics objectives, and can
positively affect targeted support provided by the contractor. In our
cost plus award fee contracts, the contractor earns a fee only when
successfully meeting contract performance objectives pertaining to
program and cost management, satisfactory accomplishment of key events,
and adherence to program mission success before fee can be earned. For
example, the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense (GMD) program has
established metrics which are reflected in its award fee plan to
measure performance for system availability, cost, training and support
to service transition and transfer. The THAAD program's award fee plan
includes a key event that requires contracted logistics support
products be sufficiently mature to support maintainability
demonstration and the achievement of user and contractor logistic
support test objectives. These features incentivize the contractor to
provide better than satisfactory logistic support to the Ballistic
Missile Defense System and its components.

THAAD and Enhanced Performance

Question. The Committee understands that THAAD's performance could
be enhanced/increased by adding a second-stage to the current
interceptor.
Have you done any modeling examining the contribution that an
upgraded THAAD could make to the overall missile defense mission?
Answer. ------.
Question. Does MDA plan to put any money into exploring this
option?
Answer. MDA has no present plans to fund any significant upgrades
to enhance the performance of the THAAD System.
Question. If not, why?
Answer. Existing funding constraints have made it difficult to fund
enhancements to existing development Elements of the BMDS. MDA is
provided a $1.5B/yr ``wedge'' for fielding and sustaining the BMDS.
Fielding and sustainment costs in FY09 are estimated at $3.6B, with
estimates of $3B/yr over the FYDP. The difference between the
estimated fielding and sustainment costs and the wedge reduces the
funding available for the further development of Elements. The
reduction in funding for development efforts makes it difficult to
sustain existing efforts, let alone provide funding for new BMDS
program enhancements and new capability development efforts.
Question. If performance could be enhanced by this capability,
would it decrease the number of THAAD Fire Units that would be
required?
Answer. Yes, if the THAAD interceptor was enhanced it would
decrease the number of THAAD Fire Units required. However, THAAD
enhanced performance is not a substitute or a replacement for the
defense provided by the European Interceptor Site.

Foreign Military Sales of Terminal High Altitude Area (T) Defense
(THAAD) to Israel and Other Countries

Question. Israel is interested in developing a new program to focus
on the same threat that THAAD currently defends. One issue they have
raised is that the U.S. hasn't shared information with them as to the
capabilities of THAAD and thus do not know if THAAD will work for them.
Can you provide us an update on current U.S.-Israeli Cooperation?
Answer. There are currently 3 significant US-Israeli initiatives:
baseline system for defense of Israel (Arrow Weapon System-AWS),
defense against short-range ballistic missiles (David's Sling Weapon
System-DSWS), and discussion of an upper-tier component of this defense
architecture.
Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP): The program's focus is to
upgrade the AWS to counter evolving longer range and more sophisticated
ballistic missile threats. In April 2006, Israel declared Block 3.0's
Initial Operating Capability (IOC). Block 4 is in the final design
stages and is scheduled to be ready for fielding in early 2009. The
current ASIP program ends in FY09; however, due to increased regional
threats, Israel requires an upper-tier system and received FY08 $20M to
perform risk mitigation and preliminary design. Israeli Aircraft
Industries (IAI) has proposed an Arrow III.
Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD/David's Sling): The
2nd Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah underscored the strategic
effect of short range, inexpensive ballistic missiles to civilian
populations. In 2006, Israel selected the DSWS proposed by Rafael/
Raytheon for their SRBMD solution. The goal is $350K per missile cost
(as compared to the $2-3M per Arrow or Patriot missile). Israel is
expected to request an additional $28M above the $45M PB09 to
accelerate the development and production. MDA plans to aggressively
engage Israel to make the DSWS a true joint international development
program and assess the military utility of this system for the U.S.
Upper-tier alternatives: Discussions continue which respond to the
evolving longer-range threat and provide for a layered defense with
multiple shot opportunities. Interceptor options discussed with Israel
include Arrow III (based on Israeli technology), the THAAD missile, and
a land-based version of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). Formal approval
has been granted (via EXCOM and National Disclosure Policy channels)
for disclosure of data and possible FMF sale for THAAD baseline and
extended range to Israel. In addition, sharing of SM-3 data has been
authorized to facilitate the ongoing discussions toward a possible
sale.
After the data sharing and joint discussions with Israeli, it was
agreed that THAAD does not met Israel's Upper Tier Requirements. MDA's
analysis of alternatives shows SM-3 to be the most effective answer,
but Israel is pushing for their indigenously developed Arrow III
solution. At this time, Israel has no interest in procuring THAAD FMS.
However, from a joint warfighting perspective, the Defense Policy
Advisory Group for which OSD (Policy) is a chair, directed the creation
of the Architecture Enhancement Plan that includes the deployment of
U.S. owned and operated THAAD in Israel as part of a joint combined
missile defense architecture.
Question. To what extent is National Disclosure Policy preventing
us from sharing missile defense information and technology with allies?
Answer. National Disclosure Policy does not prevent us from sharing
missile defense information and technology. It does prescribe a process
for ensuring appropriate interagency review occurs prior to sharing
information in order to protect national security and economic
interests. The length of the overall disclosure process is increased
when a separate LO/CLO (Low Observable/Counter Low Observable) EXCOM
ruling is required prior to gaining an exception from the National
Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC).
Question. What needs to be done to fix this?
Answer. Advance planning and clear articulation about what we
propose to share are the most important factors in ensuring timely
approvals in support of international programs. As a general rule,
review, assessment, and planning for release of U.S. systems and
technologies to specific partners and allies need to occur during the
development stage vice production/fielding.
Question. Are there legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S.
from disclosing certain information, and if so, what would those
concerns be?
Answer. Yes, when advanced systems and technology are being
discussed, there are legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S.
from disclosing certain information. In order to protect both national
security and economic interests, it is necessary to ensure that
technology is protected and that discussions are tailored to support
specific military and foreign policy objectives. The concern over the
potential for reverse engineering of advanced systems and unauthorized
third party transfer or sale of information and technology guide U.S.
technology protection activities.

Testing and Lack of Sufficient Number of Targets

Question. One of the key limiting factors of MDA's test program has
been the lack of sufficient number of missile defense targets.
Do you currently have a sufficient amount of targets to execute
your testing program?
Answer. Yes. Assuming our target development and production
activities proceed according to schedule, we plan to deliver sufficient
targets to execute the test program as it is laid out in the MDA
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). Specifically, in the MDA/TC
Production and Delivery Manifest for BMDS flight tests through FY10
there are seven (7) targets for THAAD, five (5) targets for GMD, seven
(7) for Aegis BMD, six (6) for cooperative tests with Japan's Aegis BMD
capability, four (4) for the PAC-3, three (3) in support of the SSTS,
three (3) for ABL, and three (3) in support of special experiments for
BMDS sensor technologies.
Having additional target inventory or having a spare target
available in the event of target failure does not mean a test could
proceed immediately with the backup target. MDA must take the time
necessary to conduct a root cause analysis to understand the target
failure prior to resuming or re-attempting the test.
Question. If not, what can we do to improve the number of targets?
Answer. The FY09 President's Budget submission represents the best
application of limited resources to meet the needs of the Missile
Defense Agency in providing an integrated, layered ballistic missile
defense capability to the warfighter. We, therefore, support the
President's Budget request. The Targets and Countermeasures Program has
limited flexibility to meet short-term, emergent, or contingency
planning requirements. Activities that would support a more robust
target program include the following priorities:
Priority: 1
$31.5M (FY09), $12.9M (FY10)
Implement a rolling spare and maintain minimal inventory as
contingency for additional short notice test events for Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense. Additional spare procurements optimize the
manufacturing capability/thru-put. This procurement will include LV-4
($25.7M), one reentry vehicle ($8.6M), multiple deployables and ejector
mechanisms ($9.1M), and support equipment ($1.0M).
Priority: 2
$7.8M (FY09)
Implement an Aging Surveillance program to monitor the reliability
and functionality of inventoried C-4s and Minute Man rocket motors. The
Flexible Target Family rocket motors are in DoD inventory with minimal
or no ongoing surveillance programs. The Director of MDA is developing
long term budgets and plans for ongoing surveillance activities that
will be prioritized within MDA's requirements as part of future budget
development activities.
$3.5M would establish the C-4 Rocket Motor composition and
characteristics baseline through the execution and analysis of static
fire testing in support of the Aging Surveillance program.
$2.2M would be required to develop a C-4 nozzle return and repair
capability. The C-4 has a defect in the first stage nozzle affecting
roughly 60% of the inventory. Residual volatiles in the motor off-gas
causing the material to shrink which sometimes results in nozzle throat
cracks. The C-4 Motors are screened for this Forward Exit Ring Crack
(FERC) defect prior to processing. However, this condition may worsen
over time, affecting larger portions of the C-4 inventory and
potentially occurring during rocket motor processing prior to target
launch.
$2.1M would be required for the Air Force Aging Surveillance
program for Minute Man (MM) motors which consists of propellant
sampling and testing to characterize chemical stability, component
testing (e.g., Ordnance Devices) to characterize performance, hot gas
generator and motor instrumented static firings, and technical analysis
of test results. Funding Aging Surveillance program would maintain
viability for use of flight-proven assets for future FTF missions and
in legacy target designs. MDA previously (FY06 and prior) funded the
Air Force Aging Surveillance program for these M55, SR19, and M57
motors, but began phasing out funding in FY07 (M55 AS discontinued) and
FY08 (SR19 unfunded) due to planned timeline for FTF implementation and
funding constraints.
Priority: 3
$25.6 (FY09), $5.6 (FY10)
Implement a rolling spare and initiate inventory to optimize
manufacture flow and support potential future short notice requirements
in support of AEGIS and THAAD program requirements by procuring one (1)
52" SR-19 (SR-19/57), one (1) MBRV-1, and one (1) Air Launch Carriage
Extraction System for Air Launch requirements.
Question. Would additional funds in this area be helpful?
Answer. Yes, Funding and maintaining a backup inventory of Flexible
Target Family hardware components would minimize target cycle time in
the event of mission failures, mitigate risk of critical path
schedules, and improve the ability to meet short-fuse new requirements.
As stated previously, additional target funding and inventory will not
necessarily mitigate all potential delays in testing because if a
target fails, MDA may need to take the time necessary to conduct a root
cause analysis prior to conducting a subsequent test.

Aegis and Atlantic Fleet Ships

Question. Gen. Campbell, I understand that all Aegis BMD-capable
ships are currently assigned to the Pacific, and MDA only plans to
upgrade two Atlantic Fleet ships to BMD configuration.
What's the rationale for this decision?
Answer. U.S. Pacific Fleet is the primary force provider of forward
deployed and rotational forces for both the Western Pacific and Middle
East regions, where the preponderance of the current threat resides.
Today the Navy has 12 Aegis BMD Engagement ships and five Aegis BMD
Long-Range Surveillance & Track ships that have been upgraded with BMD
capability. Eighteen Aegis BMD Engagement ships will be available by
the end of CY 2008. Additionally, the Navy will begin outfitting the
Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers with BMD capability as part of the DDG
Modernization program in FY 2012, expanding the number of BMD capable
surface ships to 62. The Navy is also examining opportunities to
include BMD capability in th Cruiser Modernization program.
Question. Do you currently have any plans to upgrade additional
Atlantic Fleet ships? If not, why?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) resources provided in
the President's budget will provide for 18 Aegis ships for Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD), including two destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet
by the end of CY08.
In addition, Navy is adding BMD capability on all DDGs through the
DDG Modernization program beginning in FY12.
MDA is working closely with Navy to ensure that future spirals of
the Aegis BMD capability are compatible with an open architecture. In
addition, the Navy is currently considering including this capability
in additional Aegis Cruisers as well. These upgrades will apply to both
Atlantic and Pacific fleet ships.
Question. Lt Gen Obering, if all BMD-capable ships are in the
Pacific, what's the plan for using Aegis BMD to defend our troops and
allies in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. I will defer to Commander, U.S. Central Command to discuss
plans for using Aegis BMD ships to defend our troops and allies in his
AOR. From my perspective, I work with the Navy to ensure the ships are
as capable and operationally flexible as possible to perform BMD
missions anywhere in the world. In this regard, the Navy is developing
an open architecture (OA) for the AEGIS combat system that will provide
BMD capability at relatively low cost to the rest of the fleet. We
closely watch the threat, and if the promises of OA do not meet the
current schedule MDA will work with the Navy to accelerate expanded BMD
capability.

Warfighter Involvement Process

Question. I understand that STRATCOM and MDA have developed a new
program called the Warfighter Involvement Program (WIP) to ensure
warfighter views are incorporated into the missile defense development
process.
What are the key elements of the Warfighter Involvement Program?
Answer. The Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) has been codified
in the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Instruction SI 538.3, Missile
Defense Warfighter Involvement Process. This document, closely
coordinated between STRATCOM and MDA, defines the goals and objectives
of the WIP; identifies roles and responsibilities of the key
stakeholders; and prescribes the processes for assuring the integration
of both near and far term Warfighter needs into Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) development. The key products of the WIP are:
STRATCOM Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) defines
Warfighter desired far-term future BMDS capabilities
STRATCOM Modification & Fielding Request List (MFRL)
describes Warfighter desired changes and additions to the
currently fielded BMDS
MDA Achievable Capabilities List (ACL) provides the
response to the PCL; articulates budgetary, programmatic,
schedule, and performance issues, as well as external-
dependency shortfalls, for each PCL item
STRATCOM Capabilities Assessment Report (CAR),
provides the STRATCOM assessment of the MDA ACL
The STRATCOM PCL refines COCOM priorities for potential MDA POM
adjustments and the Program Change Board (PCB) institutes the
adjustments. The result is an integrated BMDS development effort that
includes Warfighter-desired capabilities.
The STRATCOM MFRL communicates to the MDA desired modifications and
fielding requests after a capability is fielded. Requests are
adjudicated through the Missile Defense Management Structure (MDMS) and
approved by the PCB. The Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense monitors the MFRL.
In a parallel effort, MDA is currently developing a WIP Directive
and implementing Instruction that codify internal MDA responsibilities
and procedures to support the STRATCOM WIP. The Directive and
Instruction are in the staffing process and are due for publication
this summer.
Question. To date, are you satisfied with the Warfighter
Involvement Program?
Answer. Yes. In October 2006, MDA established the Warfighter
Support Center (MDA/DFO), collocated with the USSTRATCOM Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)
in the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) at
Shriever AFB, CO. The mission of MDA/DFO is to provide a direct
Warfighter link that ensures consistency and transparency in planning,
coordinating, and integrating between the Combatant Commands (COCOM)
and MDA. Over the past year this relationship has evolved, matured, and
enabled a new and unique MDA-Warfighter synergy, based largely on the
Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP).
Within the context of Continuous Process Improvement, the MDA 2007
Summer Study analyzed the existing WIP, focusing on the Prioritized
Capabilities List (PCL), one of the principal WIP products. The PCL,
developed by STRATCOM in conjunction with the other COCOMS, provides
MDA with the Warfighter prioritized list of future desired BMDS
capabilities, and constitutes a major input to future BMDS design and
development. The Summer Study WIP focus group developed a list of
recommended changes to the process that are being considered and
implemented, as appropriate, through a new STRATCOM Instruction, SI
538-3, Missile Defense Warfighter Involvement Process, and a
corresponding MDA Directive and Instruction.
Over time, implementation of the WIP changes will facilitate
integration of Warfighter operational requirements and desired
capabilities with the MDA system engineering process. The net yield
will be a more operationally effective and suitable Warfighter oriented
future missile defense capability.
Question. What happens if there's a disagreement between STRATCOM
and MDA on an issue? How are differences resolved?
Answer. There are several venues to alleviate disputes existing
between USSTRATCOM, representing the warfighter community, and the MDA.
As described in section 2.3 of STRATCOM's Warfighter Involvement
Process (WIP) directive, the CDRUSSTRATCOM has personal interaction
with the Director of MDA in addition to using the Missile Defense
Executive Board (MDEB) as a means to resolve disagreements. As directed
by JROC memorandum 133-03, Commander, USSTRATCOM employs the Global
Missile Defense Management Structure to integrate community input on
operational concerns and issues. Through the management structure and
through WIP interactions, many issues are surfaced and addressed from
the 0-6-level up to and including the Executive Steering Committee at
the 3-Star level.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM participates in MDA's Program Change Board
(PCB) and its subordinate supporting group, the Integration
Synchronization Group. The PCB is the MDA's single forum for managing
the development, fielding, and integration of the BMDS. The PCB, under
the authority of the Director, is the sole decision authority for
establishing and changing BMDS and element program baselines. Given its
function, it may also be used to resolve differences between the two
communities.
For conflicts between test and operations of fielded systems, there
is a rigorous asset management (AM) process. Using co-developed
instructions, MDA Directive 3000.1, BMDS Asset Management Planning,
Scheduling, and Execution; and USSTRATCOM Directive 538-1, BMDS System
Description and Asset Management, the community of BMDS stakeholders,
including all MDA program offices and all Combatant Commands and their
Service components, collaboratively plan, schedule, and execute all
BMDS test, training, exercise, and maintenance events/activity, while
ensuring missile defense operations can be executed as directed.
Question. Are there areas where the process could be improved?
Answer. The 2007 MDA/USSTRATCOM Summer Study established a
Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) evolution focus group to study WIP
improvements. This group, comprised of members from MDA and Combatant
Commanders (COCOM), reviewed WIP processes and documents to synchronize
Warfighter desired capabilities with MDA's engineering process. The
recommendations from the Summer Study are being implemented by both MDA
and USSTRATCOM, as appropriate.
The study team made the following recommendations:
Restructure the MDA system engineering process (SEP)
to incorporate warfighter input during appropriate points in
system design which includes the road mapping and define and
design phases. (process, participants, and overarching)
Add a new WIP activity encompassing warfighter
analysis of quantity, operating locations, and deployment
timing of systems prior to fielding. (process and product)
Restructure the change request process to permit
resolution of single element item, fielding, and training
requests in addition to system issues. (process and
participants)
Insert the Achievable Capabilities List (ACL) (MDA)
and Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) (USSTRATCOM) into the
evolved SEP with the goal of achieving consensus. (product and
overarching)
Modify the PCL to convey both a long-term vision of
the objective BMDS and more specifically defined capability
needs. (product)
Modify the USSTRATCOM WIP instruction to account for
these identified changes in the process and content of WIP
products. (documents recommendations)

STRATCOM Capabilities Mix Study

Question. LTG Campbell, STRATCOM recently completed a Capabilities
Mix Study, which outlines the combatant commander's future missile
defense force structure requirements.
Please discuss potential new requirements outlined in the study
that are present in the FY2009 budget submission.
Answer. The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization
(JIAMDO) briefed the findings of the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study
to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on February 21,
2008. On March 25, 2008, the JROC endorsed the study findings. The JCM
study findings provide for minimum quantities for combat operations in
certain contingencies in the 2015 timeframe. These findings recommend
minimum quantities of upper-tier (THAAD and SM-3) interceptors,
additional THAAD fire units, and modifications to the Forward Based
Radar (AN/TPY-2) program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has briefed
the Missile Defense Executive Board and the JROC on their plan to meet
the JCM study findings. It is anticipated that the study findings from
this recent iteration of the JCM will be included in MDA's Fiscal Year
2010 and out budget submission.

Missile Defense and Soldier Training

Question. LTG Obering, with the continued development and fielding
of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, DoD may now have a
rudimentary capability to defend U.S. citizens against a limited
ballistic missile attack.
What is your current assessment of training and personnel readiness
to use the system in defeating a limited ballistic missile attack
against the U.S.?
Answer. Assessment of training and readiness is a Combatant
Commander responsibility and final say should be theirs. However, MDA
does provide initial qualification training and we support proficiency
training at the individual, crew, and joint levels. We also provide
Ballistic Missile Defense System-Level Training and Education covering
the capabilities, limitations, and employment of the entire system to
the Combatant Command staffs--supporting their ability to develop
tactics, techniques and procedures to defend America. Based on the
training that we provide, I believe that the training and readiness of
ballistic missile defense personnel is excellent.

Missile Defense Capabilities and Transition to the Warfighter

Question. LTG Campbell, ballistic missiles and technology continue
to proliferate in the world. Some nations are using their developing
ballistic missile capabilities to threaten their neighbors. Our
deployed forces have a missile defense capability with PATRIOT and
fielding of Standard Missile 3 as the intercept or on the Aegis system.
Additionally, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has
successfully returned to flight testing and should soon be a deployed
missile defense asset.
Looking to the future, how are you working to transition these
missile defense capabilities to the warfighters and to determine the
appropriate asset mix of PATRIOTS, Standard Missile-3s, and THAAD
interceptors.
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing memorandum
of agreements with individual element lead Services to document the
transition process for procurement and sustainment. The U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) is assisting the other Combatant Commanders (COCOMs)
with understanding the capabilities and limitations of these systems in
development and how they may impact operations until they transfer to a
Service. We have several venues to assist the COCOM's in this,
including the Operational Readiness & Acceptance Process, the BMDS
Combined Element Review, and the BMDS Military Utility Assessment to
name a few.
We are continuing to refine the force structure requirements
through additional analysis and inform MDA of future COCOM capability
needs through the STRATCOM-led Warfighter Involvement Process, the
Joint Requirement Oversight Council process, and the Missile Defense
Executive Board.
Active defense forces are but one piece of the solution. Combatant
Commanders integrate attack operations, passive defense, and non-
kinetic options to meet the threat.

GAO Questions for MDA

Question. To carry out its mission, MDA, until December 2007,
executed an acquisition strategy in which the development of missile
defense capabilities was organized in 2-year increments known as
blocks. In 2007, MDA redefined its block construct to be based on
fielding capabilities addressing particular threats as opposed to the
biennial time periods that were the agency's past approach. MDA's new
block construct makes many positive changes such as establishing unit
cost for selected block assets, including in a block only those
elements or components that will be fielded during the block, and
abandoning the practice of deferring work block to block. However,
there are remaining concerns with the new structure as several issues
are left unaddressed. Specifically, the GAO was concerned that there
would be no block cost estimates. Instead, MDA will include all prior
costs for activities included in the block and an expected budget
baseline for each block activity. This will address the six years
included in DOD's Future Years Defense Plan.
Why can't cost estimates be made for nearer term blocks like 1.0
and 2.0--they have a large percent of work already completion?
Answer. MDA will build cost baseline estimates for the full costs
of all blocks, not just Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited
North Korean Long-Range Threats) and 2.0 (Defense of Allies and
Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/
Theater). We also intend to request an independent review of these
estimates by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG).

FY2009 THAAD Budget Request

Question. In the FY2009 budget submission for THAAD the request is
relatively the same as last year, just about $1 billion.
Can you explain how the funding profile has changed for THAAD from
FY2008 to FY2009 budget submission?
Answer.

CHANGES FROM PB08 TO PB09
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY08-13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PB08......................... 858.277 897.358 826.654 756.440 583.732 406,379 4,328.840
PB09......................... 867.064 864.899 689.924 619.949 450.639 343.618 3,836.093
Delta........................ 8.787 (32.459) (136.730) (136.491) (133.093) (62.761) (492.747)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The funding profile has changed as a result of the following
adjustments:
1. The FY08 changes were due to the Appropriation Conference
addition for the Juniper Cobra 09 exercise and various Congressional
undistributed reductions.
2. In the FY09-FY13 budget submission all AN/TPY-2 Radar efforts
were consolidated into the Sensors PE (0603884C). Therefore, THAAD
transferred all of their funding for the Fire Unit Radars and their
associated radar program office support to the Sensors PE (0603884).
3. There were also various Department of Defense adjustments and
miscellaneous internal MDA adjustments.
The table below provides a detailed listing of the FY08 to FY09
changes.

DETAILED CHANGES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY08-13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Add for Juniper Cobra............ 14.9 ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 14.9
Congressional Undistributed (6.113) ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... (6.113)
Reductions......................
THAAD Fire Unit Radar Funding .......... (40.000) (126.700) (126.600) (124.300) (54.600) (472.200)
Transfer to Sensors PE..........
Radar Program Office Support .......... (4.949) (5.098) (5.251) (5.408) (5.570) (26.276)
Transfer to Sensors PE..........
Various OSD PBDs/MDA Adjustments. .......... 12.490 (4.932) (4.640) (3.385) (2.591) (3.058)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals....................... 8.787 (32.459) (136.730) (136.491) (133.093) (62.761) (492.747)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. How can you spend that amount requested funding with the
delay of the fire units three and four?
Answer. Following the February 2008 House and Senate Authorization
Staffer Day briefing, the Agency made additional internal re-alignments
which have restored the $65M in FY09 to enable award of the THAAD Fire
Units 3&4 long lead contract as originally planned. The Agency has
confidence that budget execution for FY09 funds for the Terminal PE
will continue our track record of exceeding obligation and expenditure
goals. Program execution in FY09 is paced by the need for completing
critical activities on the THAAD Development contract, which was the
rationale for initially delaying Fire Units 3&4.
Question. Why does the budget submission not show a reduction due
to the fire units' delay? delay?
Answer. There were primarily only re-alignments between Fire Units
and Development funding within the Terminal PE to complete critical
activities on the THAAD Development contract, with no substantial
reduction to the total budget submission for THAAD.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, February 27, 2008.

SHIPBUILDING

WITNESSES

VICE ADMIRAL BARRY J. McCULLOUGH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
ALLISON STILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (SHIP PROGRAMS)

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. I want to welcome to the Committee Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Ms. Stiller, and Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources,
Admiral McCullough. We are delighted to have you before the
Committee and look forward to getting some advice about how we
can go forward.
I have been challenging the shipbuilding industry to come
in with more realistic goals, and they are saying, well, give
us a better design or more finished designed, and we will do
that. I think it is partly the Navy's fault and partly
industry's fault. But I have been challenging everybody. I
said, the Committee is no longer willing to keep paying for the
mistakes that are made by the Navy and industry. So I know that
we are getting closer, I think, to that kind of an agreement.
But we also need some advice about any additional ships. If
we took the ships that the administration sent over, we would
never get to what the Navy is saying that you need; and so we
are going to try--Bill and I are going to try to convince the
Committee that we need three or four more ships. I think they
finally sent over seven this year. We are going to find a way
to get to a number that will take us to 313 ships in much less
years. I think it would take 50 years the way they were going.
So we welcome you to the Committee and look forward to your
testimony.
Mr. Young.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to join the chairman in welcoming you to the
Committee.
We were one of the original--two of the original Ronald
Reagan 600-ship Navy folks. So we are a little disappointed. We
are trying to attain 313 ships. But we are going to do the very
best we can to do that. So we are anxious to hear your
testimony today.
We are very specifically interested in the direction of the
Littoral Combat Ships, since I understand there have been some
serious changes in what the ship is going to look like and what
it will do. Anyway, we are looking forward to what you are
going to have to say to us, and we may have some questions for
you. Thanks for being here.

Additional Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. The Littoral Combat Ships that Mr. Young
mentioned I think is a perfect example of what I am talking
about. We went in with inadequate design. I knew when they said
they cost $188 million, and I even commented in Committee, that
I doubted very much they will come in at that price. I realize
the first ships are going to be expensive because of the
changes and so forth. But I think a lot of this is solved if we
have a better design earlier so that industry can make a
legitimate design. I know you went out to shipyards that don't
normally do Navy work. But they complained about the changes
the Navy makes.
In the past, we have made mistakes by limiting the number
of changes the services could make, and the perfect example of
that is the B-1. We made a deal years ago that we would buy 100
B-1s for $20.5 billion with Secretary Weinberger. Well, we
built the B-1s, but they didn't have any of the things they
needed, and they sat on the runway during Gulf War 1991. So we
all realize there has to be some changes, but when you come to
4 or 5,000, just seems to me that is excessive. So we need
better design work.
So we look forward to hearing your testimony and any advice
you have. We want to put at least 10 ships in the inventory for
next year.
Secretary.

Summary Statement of Secretary Stiller

Ms. Stiller. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, it is a privilege for
Vice Admiral McCullough and me to appear before you today to
discuss Navy shipbuilding. I request that our written statement
be entered into the record.
The Department is committed to build an affordable fleet at
or above 313 ships tailored to support the National Defense
Strategy, the recently signed Maritime Strategy, and the 2006
QDR. For the first time in a long while, the Navy's budget does
not include any lead ships. This year, a total of seven ships
are included in the fiscal year 2009 President's budget: one
Virginia Class submarine, one DDG 1000 class ship, two LCS, two
T-AKEs, and one Navy Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). In
addition, although not part of the Navy's 313-ship structure,
the Navy will procure one JHSV for the Army in 2009.
I will now elaborate on the specifics of our request.
The Navy is requesting $2.1 billion of full funding for one
Virginia Class submarine in 2009, an advanced procurement for
the fiscal year 2010 boats, an advanced procurement for two
boats in fiscal year 2011. The Virginia Class construction
program is continuing to make progress toward realizing CNO's
goal of buying two Virginia Class submarines for $4 billion as
measured in 2005 dollars by fiscal year 2012.
Because of your support with the addition of advanced
procurement funding last year, the Navy has accelerated the
production of two Virginia Class submarines per year from
fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2011. The Navy also requests
approval for the next multiyear contract, which encompasses
eight boats planned in fiscal year 2009 through 2013.
Two weeks ago, the Navy awarded contracts for the
construction of the dual DDG 1000 lead ships to General
Dynamics, Bath Iron Works and to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request of $2.55 billion provides
full funding for the third DDG 1000 and advanced procurement
for the fourth ship. With recent approval from the Defense
Acquisition Executive for the follow ship acquisition strategy,
the Navy intends to utilize fixed price incentive fee contracts
through a competition for quantity for the remainder of the
class.
The Navy remains committed to the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) program, and LCS remains a critical warfighting
requirement for our Navy. The fiscal year 2009 budget includes
$920 million for two additional LCS sea frames. The Navy also
intends to execute the fiscal year 2008 appropriation for one
seaframe, utilizing the remaining funding and material from the
terminated ships.
Under an acquisition strategy approved in January, the
fiscal year 2008 and 2009 awards will be for fixed price
incentive contracts based on a limited competition between the
current LCS seaframe contractors.
The fiscal year 2009 budget also provides for procurement
of two T-AKEs in the National Defense Sealift Fund. The fiscal
year 2009 funding is for two ships, T-AKE 11 and 12.
The Joint High Speed Vessel program is currently in the
technology development phase. Lead ship award is anticipated in
late fiscal year 2008, with delivery of the first vessel in
fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2009 budget includes $187
million for construction of the first Navy funded JHSV and $173
million for the second Army funded vessel.
We have worked diligently to stabilize our shipbuilding
plan and move into serial production. The Navy remains
committed to ensure fiscal responsibility in shipbuilding
acquisition programs, as evidenced by the cancellation of LCS 3
and 4 last year.
Mr. Chairman, we would like to thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the Navy shipbuilding budget request for
2009. Vice Admiral McCullough would like to remark briefly on a
day in the Navy.
Thank you.
[The joint statement of Vice Admiral McCullough and Ms.
Stiller follows.]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of Admiral McCullough

Admiral McCullough. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member Young,
I am honored to appear before you with Ms. Stiller to discuss
Navy shipbuilding.
Before we begin, I would like to share with you what your
Navy accomplished one day last week on the 20th of February.
The fleet is 279 ships strong, with 127 ships underway, or
about 40 percent of our fleet. There are over 332,000 Active
component, 70,000 Reserve component, and 177,000 civilians
serving in your Navy.
Beginning in the eastern Atlantic, GEORGE WASHINGTON is
preparing for future forward deployment to Japan, while the
NASSAU Expeditionary Strike Group is underway to start its
deployment.
CROMMELIN, SIMPSON, STEVEN W. GROVES, and Navy P-3s are in
the Southern Command's area of responsibility conducting
counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean and eastern
Pacific.
In the European theater, COLE is operating in the
Mediterranean with the British, and SAN JACINTO is in the Black
Sea with NATO and Partnership for Peace Navies.
Supporting the African Partnership Station off western
Africa, FORT MCHENRY arrives in Cameroon; and HSV2 SWIFT is in
the Gulf of Guinea.
BAINBRIDGE and JOHN HALL are on station to support the
President's visit to the continent.
In the Central Command area of operations supporting Iraqi
and Enduring Freedom, HARRY S TRUMAN Carrier Strike Group
departs Jebel Ali and the TARAWA Expeditionary Strike Group re-
enters the Arabian Gulf.
Riverine forces are conducting a variety of missions in
country, while, in the air, Navy airborne ISR assets are
providing critical intelligence to the Navy and special
operations forces.
On the ground, 14,000 Sailors are employed as individual
augmentees. Six Navy led Provisional Reconstruction Teams in
Afghanistan delivered aid and reconstruction, while more than
3,000 medical personnel support operations.
Off the east coast of Africa, CARNEY, WHIDBEY ISLAND, and
OSCAR AUSTIN are supporting counter-piracy operations with a
coalition force.
In the Pacific theater, the NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group is
underway in the western Pacific, providing presence while USS
KITTY HAWK undergoes maintenance.
ESSEX Expeditionary Strike Group continues exercises with
the Republic of the Philippines forces.
The USS OHIO conducts the first-ever SSGN port visit to
Busan, Republic of Korea.
Finally, in the Pacific, the USS LAKE ERIE launches a
modified SM3 missile and successfully intercepts and destroys
an inoperable satellite containing a toxic hazard.
These are everyday examples of the balanced capability set
the 2009 fiscal year shipbuilding program will provide to meet
the challenges the nation faces with a reasonable degree of
risk. The Navy's 313-ship force structure represents the
minimum number of ships the Navy requires, the minimum
capability and capacity, if you will, to provide global reach,
persistent presence, and warfighting effects expected of our
Navy forces as outlined in the National Defense Strategy, the
QDR 2006, and our recently signed Maritime Strategy.
I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Navy
shipbuilding program, your support of our Navy, and I look
forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much.

FLEET SIZE

Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much.
The one thing that I keep worrying about is the threat down
the road in looking past Iraq. I have been arguing policy-wise
with the White House for a long time. But now I am trying to
concentrate on how we can stabilize the Armed Forces not only
to fight a war, to prevent a war.
I look back at Korea when they drew the line underneath
Korea, and the North Koreans attacked South Korea because they
didn't think we had an interest in the area. When they see we
are weak, or perceive us as being weak, then I perceive a
danger out there.
Intelligence people only spent a very short time on Russia
or China, and yet it takes us much longer to build ships today
than it did in the old days because of the sophistication of
these ships. So I think we have to start now.
Every time you say you are going to build 313 ships, you
come to us and you say, the out years are going to make up the
difference. Well, we have said, no, no, we are going to start
last year; and we didn't get as far as we wanted. But we hope
that we can come to an agreement with the Navy and the Senate
this year to build at least 10 ships.
A couple suggestions staff has made is to take one of the
1000s out and put in two more T-AKEs, because they are
stabilized platforms. I don't know if that is the right answer.
But we need some suggestion from you folks about which
direction to go. Our industrial base is so small and there is
so little competition that we need, obviously, competition.
But, on the other hand, we need to build as many ships as we
can. So we need to look at all the options.
I have been talking to Gene Taylor and Mr. Young about the
possibility of jumping over the 1000 and going to the nuclear-
powered cruiser. I would hope, and in talking to you privately
beforehand, I know the Navy is looking at that.
Finally, I want to compliment the Navy on the shot that you
just mentioned as if it were a routine thing, shooting down the
satellite. That was by far not routine. In everything that I
have heard, it was a complicated thing, and there had to be
some substantial changes made. And it shows you planning ahead,
how important it is when something like that comes about. If it
hadn't been for the money that was spent in research and
providing what was needed in that regard--and that started in
this Committee, what we called defense of individual ships. A
guy named Dave Killian came up with the idea. We kept putting
it in, and the Navy kept resisting what we were trying to do,
and finally you developed a much more sophisticated system than
we ever envisioned. But the point is we come up with some
pretty damn good ideas which have been very helpful in the long
run.
Mr. Young and I worked assiduously over the years trying to
make sure that you have what you need. I know that you have cut
back on I think 28,000 personnel in order to build ships. This
is when England was the Secretary of the Navy. That is what he
told me he was going to do. I liked that. I said, well, I worry
you're cutting back too many personnel because you lose your
flexibility. But, on the other hand, we want to start building
ships.
Well, they stole the money. In other words, the money went
someplace else.
Well, we are here to change that direction, to stabilize
it. We hope that the supplementals will become part of the
overall picture, rather than being separate from the base bill
that has been sent over here to us. Both Mr. Young and I have
said over and over again, put everything together so that we
can understand and plan ahead and work with you folks, coming
up with a viable defense or the strength we need to make sure
we prevent a war rather than get into a war.
So I appreciate the Navy's role. There is no other force
that can project yourself better than you can.
I worry you are talking about going down to 10 carriers.
That is the kind of thing that we get into with the military in
Iraq and Afghanistan, not having enough people, not being able
to deploy with the worldwide commitments that we have.
So I think you have got to rethink these things. I know how
expensive they are. But I know lethality is a lot more than it
was in World War II, and we don't need quite as many. But, on
the other hand, you could only force your ships out there so
often. You are going to have breakdowns, whether it is the air
wing or the shipbuilding itself.
So we want to work with you doing everything we can to help
you get going in the right direction.
Mr. Young.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
We are both committed to doing everything we can to make
the Navy as strong as it needs to be. So Chairman Murtha is a
very strong leader in making this happen; and the subcommittee
is very, very supportive.
He made one point that I think is important, and that is we
have got to look beyond the conflict that we are dealing with
today in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have got to look to what
might be the next event of hostility that we might face. Navy
shipbuilding and the Navy fleet, of course, is extremely
important to that question.
Let me go to the LCS, because in working with CNOs, the
present CNO and previous CNOs, LCS was very, very high up on
their priority list. We started to build two LCSs. One
contractor fell a little behind, had some problems. The other
contractor was quite proud of the fact that they were on track,
when all of a sudden the other contractor wasn't on track
either. So the Navy has decided to change the design, as I
understand; and the LCS of tomorrow will not be the LCS that we
anticipated yesterday.
Tell us about that. My understanding is that you are going
to a design that is very similar to a Coast Guard cutter. I am
not sure if that is accurate or not. I would like to have the
answer to that.
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, I will take part of the
question; and Allison will jump in where she thinks
appropriate.
First, we have not changed the warfighting requirement for
the LCS program since its inception. As you know, we started to
build this ship with very little of a firm design, and it was
an underestimation on both the part of the government and the
contractor on what the implementation of the vessel rules--what
the effect of that would be, if you will.
Mr. Murtha. Say that again.
Admiral McCullough. The implementation of the Naval Vessel
Rules. When we initially started this contract, the design was
immature and the Naval Vessel Rules had not been finalized.
Mr. Murtha. How far along was the design?
Ms. Stiller. When we signed the contract, about 2 weeks
later the Naval Vessel Rules were firmed up. What we did as
part of the contract was say we know they are not firmed up so
come back in and tell us what the implications are. And we did
adjust both contracts.
What Admiral McCullough has pointed out is both sides
underestimated the true impact of the Naval Vessal Rules. But
the Naval Vessel Rules are approved now, approved before we
signed the contract for DDG 1000, so we don't feel we will have
that situation on DDG 1000.
I will defer back to you.
Admiral McCullough. So we haven't changed the warfighting
requirements for the LCSs. The LCSs in what we propose in the
2009 program will be what we call flight zero plus LCSs. They
will only incorporate the minimum number of safety changes that
we feel appropriate for that ship. So there is no intent to
wholesale redesign any one of the LCSs.
We will perform sea trials and builders' trials and take
lessons learned from both hull forms and decide what changes,
if any, need to be implemented in the fiscal year 2010 ships.
The LCS meets a current critical warfighting gap in the areas
of mine warfare, response to high-speed maneuvering surface
vessels and littoral anti-submarine warfare. The LCS and its
mission modules have been designed to meet that warfighting
gap.
Sir, I have heard a lot of discussion about national
security cutters, but there is currently no warfighting
requirement in the United States Navy that sees a national
security cutter as a solution.
Mr. Young. Does your funding profile meet the needs of your
LCS requirements?
Admiral McCullough. Sir, when we revised the program due to
the cost growth that we saw on LCS 1 and 2 that subsequently
resulted in the cancellation of LCS 3 and 4, the profile we
have put in the budget is to build the number of ships that we
can with the amount of money that is profiled in the budget.
Our commitment is still to build 55 LCSs, and that will require
additional funding outside the FYDP.
Ms. Stiller. I would just like to add we also were given a
cost cap for LCS, and so the budget reflects that cost cap. The
provision does not allow us to adjust for escalation over time.
The cost cap is something we are going to come back to Congress
and ask to be addressed. Because a ship today isn't going to
cost the same as one way out there. Obviously, you will have
learning on the first ships that will counterbalance the
escalation impacts. But as you come down a learning curve the
cost cap may be a challenge.
Mr. Young. What is the status of LCS 1 and 2 now? What is
their construction stage?
Ms. Stiller. Concerning LCS 1, the program office projects
it is about 79 percent complete. That is as of December 2007.
We are going to go to builders' trials when the ice melts and
we are able to get underway, hopefully this spring. The good
news is both diesel engines were lit off, one yesterday, the
second one this morning. So the ship is in testing right now,
primarily, and things are going well.
On LCS 2 we are about 65 percent complete. This is the
Navy's estimate. That is also as of December 2007. They hope to
launch that ship once she is about 80 percent complete, and
that is predicted to be sometime this spring. She will also go
into test and trials as well. Both should deliver this year.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

Mr. Young. Let me shift to another issue, Mr. Chairman, if
I might.
Submarines. The Chinese have aggressive underwater
programs, the surprise that they gave the U.S. Navy by
surfacing a submarine very, very near one of our large ships.
Is this something that the Navy is dealing with? Do you have a
plan to find out more about what the Chinese are doing or how
they are doing it?
Admiral McCullough. Yes, sir, we do.
The Chinese have approximately 65 submarines. Some of them
are extremely modern, and some of them are not. We have a
variety of programs using distributive arrays that are in
research, development and evaluation to help us get at that
problem. The program of record for our advanced sonar system
for our surface combatants, the SQQ-89, AV-15. We have
accelerated in last year's budget to put additional assets on
our ships.
We are working on surface ship torpedo defense. We have
successfully demonstrated the guidance package on an anti-
torpedo torpedo that could be launched from a surface ship. We
recently completed a demonstration of detection, classification
and localization of a five torpedo salvo up in the Pacific
northwest.
We recognize that the Chinese have accelerated development
of their submarine program, and we have got several programs
and several research and development projects under way to
counter that threat, sir.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF SONAR

Mr. Young. You mentioned the advanced sonar program. We are
beginning to hear a lot about sonar and the effect of sonar on
sea mammals. Are you gearing up for a discussion of that issue?
Admiral McCullough. Sir, I am on the periphery of that
discussion with my counterparts on the OPNAV staff. But that is
not really in my lane. If you will, I would like to take that
question for the record.
Mr. Young. I understand that. Since you mentioned sonar, I
just thought I might take a shot at it.
Admiral McCullough. I understand.
[The information follows:]

The AN/SQQ-89A advanced surface ship sonar program utilizes the
existing hull-mounted mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar source, the AN/
SQS-53. Improvements to the system include upgrades to signal
processing and displays in commercial-off-the-shelf computers, a new
passive multi-function towed array for improved anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) performance, and software upgrades include improvements to the
acoustic waveforms.
Because the advanced system will use the same source as the
existing active sonar system, the AN/SQS-53, the source level will be
the same as that currently in use. MFA sonar has been linked with only
a very small fraction of marine mammal standings in a limited number of
geographic areas (specifically the Bahamas, the Canary Islands, and
Greece). Despite the limited number of strandings associated with
sonar, Navy is concerned about the potential for sonar to negatively
affect marine mammals. Navy is a world leader in funding research on
potential acoustic effects on marine mammals and is spending
approximately $18 million per year on research with ocean agencies,
academic institutions, and independant researchers around the world to
better understand what combinations of ocean conditions, geography, and
sonar use may lead to marine mammal disturbances.
For the U.S. Navy, the safety of Sailors and Marines is top
priority when carrying out our national security mission. A critical
part of this mission is defending Navy ships from the current and
future submarine threat. The only effective way to counter this threat
is training with active sonar at sea under simulated combat conditions
to detect these submarines before they strike. At the same time, the
Navy goes to great lengths to protect marine mammals and the
environment during training exercises.
The Navy has implemented an At-Sea Policy to guide compliance with
environmental laws, regulations and executive orders in the conduct of
naval exercises or training at sea. The most important element of this
Policy involves environmental analysis of all reasonably foreseeable
training activities on each of 12 range complexes in the United States.
The training activities being analyzed includes the use of MFA sonar
and its potential effects on marine mammals. These analyses have also
resulted in extensive coordination with other federal agencies
including the National Marine Fisheries Service.
Currently, all major ASW training exercises using MFA sonar
incorporate protective measures to ensure there is minimal effect on
the marine environment. Protective measures include: posting highly
trained lookouts; listening for marine mammals with passive
hydrophones; creating buffer zones within which sonar levels are
reduced if marine mammals are present; and ceasing sonar operations if
marine mammals are detected within a certain distance of an active
sonar dome.

Mr. Young. I had a chance 2 weeks ago to visit the Marine
Mammal Training Center in San Diego, and we had a long
discussion about the effect of sonar on those sea animals. It
is an issue that we are going to be faced with I think pretty
seriously as the days go on.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

DDG 1000

Mr. Murtha. Would you go through the DDG, what we are
looking at here with the 1000? In other words, was it three of
them now in line? If we were to take one out, what does that do
to the shipbuilding distribution here? If we take one out and
we go to two T-AKEs, what does that do to our distribution of
ships and capability to build ships?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. I will answer that from the
industrial base perspective.
You are right, the 2009 ship is the third of the DDG 1000s.
Like I said, we just awarded the two lead ships. The yards that
build those ships are General Dynamics, Bath Iron Works and
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding down on the gulf coast. T-AKEs
are built by NASSCO in San Diego. We have two T-AKEs in the
2009 budget already, and we feel when we balanced the seven
ships that are in the plan, we looked at it from an industrial
perspective and felt that was a good balance both in the
warfighting requirement, what with the warfighter needed as
well as the industrial base. To put two more ships at NASSCO,
they likely could not execute four in one year. They would have
to spread them out over time, the deliveries.
Mr. Murtha. How long would it take them to build the four?
That would end the program, right?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir, that would end the program. I would
have to look at the exact date. I don't know that off the top
of my head. But they likely couldn't execute four in one year.
They are only building one a year currently, and we felt that
could go to two a year. That is why we put the two in 2009. But
to go to four would be quite a leap for them.
Mr. Murtha. What we are looking at is if you take one of
the others out, that funds the LPD 17 and the two T-AKEs. We
are looking for how we can shift this and not affect
shipbuilding. So what happens to the shipbuilding industry? How
does this affect it? What is the problem we will have?
Ms. Stiller. The issue will be with the surface combatant
builders. Granted, you said an LPD, and Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding builds LPDs as well. So, in their case, it is
probably not as big of an impact as it would be to Bath Iron
Works, who is one of our two surface combatant providers. So
that would be where the industrial base would feel it the most.
Mr. Murtha. What does it look like, the profile for the
1000?
Ms. Stiller. DDG 1000, two ships in 2007. They were split-
funded between 2007 and 2008; and then one a year through the
rest of the FYDP, for a total of seven. So one in 2009, one in
2010.
Mr. Murtha. What kind of cost are we talking about and what
do you see as a cost growth?
Ms. Stiller. Right now, we don't estimate we have any cost
growth. We have about $2.5 billion in 2009 for DDG 1000, with
another $51 million for advance procurement for the next--
around $2.6, and then it goes down to $2.3, in that range
through the outyears where we will start to see the learning in
the ships.

COST REDUCTION EFFORTS

Mr. Murtha. So what is the difference in the platform
between a submarine and a 1000? They are going to get the
submarine down to $2 billion. That is what they are committed
to, and I think the Navy worked on getting them down to $2
billion. What is the difference between a surface ship, this
particular ship, and a Virginia Class submarine?
Ms. Stiller. As you know, sir, the Virginia Class
submarine--we have already delivered four Virginia Class
submarines and are continuing on that path. DDG 1000 is several
years behind where Virginia Class was. Concerning the Virginia
Class submarine cost reduction initiatives, we made an
investment in R&D to get at some of these cost reductions to
get to the $2 billion submarine in 2012.
The luxury here is you have more ships delivered and more
quantity in the class to get to that $2 billion a year, where
you only have seven ships in DDG 1000. Certainly, after you get
lead ships delivered, you can certainly look at cost reduction
efforts for the later DDG 1000s. But there are not going to be
too many to catch with only a seven ship class.
Mr. Murtha. We are trying to help you with this. We are
trying to get to the point where people know in the industry,
the Navy knows what we can afford over here in the Congress. I
know COTS has been a big part of them getting the price of the
submarine down and Navy pressure from the submarine. We are
doing the same thing, I assume, with the surface ships.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. We are how far along on the design of the 1000?
Eighty-five percent did you tell me?
Ms. Stiller. When we start production later this year, they
will be at 85 percent complete in design. That is very similar
to where the Virginia Class was when they started production.
In fact, they were right at 85 percent.
We also project the carrier CVN 78 will also be in that
range. That is because we have taken the steps to make sure
that we get the design mature, where we didn't have that luxury
on the LCS.

SHIPBOARD MANNING

Mr. Murtha. One of the other things this Committee has been
worried about is the number of people on the ships and the fact
that you are depending on technology to solve some of these
problems. Yet, if we have a major disaster, I worry there is
not going to be enough. I brought this to Admiral Mullen's
attention when he was CNO. He understands that, and I know I
have harped on that for years and years.
Are we getting down too low in the number of people? I
realize personnel costs are going to have to come down. If we
are going to procure and get our military back to the
capability it should be, and this is the first war in history
where we lost capability rather than increased capability with
all the services. In order to recapture that, we are going to
have to cut personnel costs. The Army is going to be the one
that suffers. The Navy has already lost some. The Air Force cut
back substantially and is still not buying the airplanes we
need.
But where are we in that regard? Where are we with the
numbers of people on these ships in case something happens?
Admiral McCullough. Mr. Chairman, we look carefully at how
we design the ships to get to the minimum crew that we can to
effectively operate the ship and maintain the damage control
standards. I think that is what you are concerned about.
In the LCS, we have a core crew of 40 folks, with 15 folks
for the mission package and an aviation det of about 20, for a
total of 75 people on the LCS.
In the DDG 1000, the core crew on that ship is about 114,
with an aviation det of 28. The technology advances that let us
get to the 114 folks had to do with human systems integration
in the ship's mission center that allowed us to reduce the
number of watch standers we had in the combat information
center; and advances in technology in the fire suppression
systems and the flight deck fire suppression systems, which let
us reduce the number of people we had on standby when we did
helicopter operations.
If you visit a surface combatant today, let's say a CG 47
or DDG 51 class, and you land in a helicopter, you will see
about 25 Sailors as part of the rescue and salvage crew in the
event that the helicopter crashed. The modifications that we
did in the DDG 1000 allow the firefighting to be done remotely
from the helo control station and the need for only two
additional folks to rescue the flight crew.
This has been demonstrated in an engineering demonstration
module, and we have tested it repeatedly. We put up fans to
replicate the wind that you would have across a flight deck
during a helo crash, which is essentially 30 degrees off the
center line at a speed of 30 knots.
Additionally, we took an EX 963 class ship to sea and
configured the general workshop with fire main, because there
isn't any fire main in the workshop on the 963. We put in the
fire suppression system that we will use in the DDG 1000. It
involves a series of smart valves that have flow and pressure
sensors in the control system. We put a 1,000 pound warhead in
the general workshop and detonated the warhead. The fire main
reconfigured itself and put the fire out in less than 10
minutes. Demonstrated it worked.
So we feel confident that the damage control safety of both
the DDG 1000 and the LCS are supported by the crew. Any further
reductions in crew size we would have to seriously look at what
technology was available.
As for personnel costs, as you state, the Navy has been
coming down in size. I said in my oral statement that we were
about 332,000 people a week ago. The goal is for 322,000
people. N1 has a very detailed program on that, Vice Admiral
Harvey.
I would tell you, even as we ramp the number of people
down, our personnel costs went up at about a percent and a half
a year. So personnel costs are huge to not only the Navy but
all the Services. We have to continue to get our arms around
personnel costs so we don't severely impact the procurement
accounts, as you referenced.
Mr. Murtha. I understand what you are saying, and I
appreciate--I assume there is redundancy built into this. For
instance, the exercise you are working, has a redundancy, and
you have tried to consider all the alternatives.
We went into Iraq. We had that problem. Many of us thought
we needed more people initially. The Secretary of Defense
disagreed with that. He said no, no, technology will take care
of this.
So you are telling me you are convinced that the technology
has enough redundancy, that no matter what happens, how many
people are killed or wounded on these ships, you will still
have enough to get that ship back.
I think it was the Cole or the Roberts, I think it was, was
hit out in the Gulf, and I went out to visit that ship at one
of the ports, I think it was Dubai, and it was right down at
the water level at the time. They told me the horrendous
stories about how heroic the crew had been in getting that ship
saved. Because it hit the mine. There was a hole as big as a
bus on the side of it. It kept coming down. But they got it
back; and, of course, we brought it back to the United States
and repaired it. The point was they had enough people to take
care of it.
Then the Navy cut out the firefighting, the damage control
school that they had at Guantanamo at the same time. The
captain of the ship had written the regulations for this. So
you can see our experience is that once you get into a combat
situation it is very hard to make the changes.
So I just hope that you are looking at whatever redundancy
is necessary. I know what you are talking about personnel
costs. You are going to struggle here for a while. But I just
worry we are not going to have enough people that, if something
dramatic happens on those ships, we are not going to have
people to take care of them.
Admiral McCullough. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you on the
DDG 1000 and what we have done with technical mitigation in the
area of damage control, I am confident in the area of
redundancy and capability that we have built in that ship that
allows us to get to the 114 core crew.

SHIPBUILDING FUNDING

Mr. Murtha. Is there any advanced funding we need to keep
this shipbuilding going? For instance, any advanced funding we
need in the supplemental or in the base bill for next year that
we need to put in to keep any of these programs going?
Admiral McCullough. I don't think there is anything that is
required in the supplemental or the base program that is
required.
Mr. Murtha. Advanced funding for the submarine. There is no
other program that needs any advanced funding.
Admiral McCullough. The budget lines that we have put in
the 2009 submittal, the President's budget 2009 contained all
the requirements we have for our programs as submitted in 2009,
sir.
Mr. Murtha. The problems we had at the shipyard down there
in the south from Katrina, are those all worked out now?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. We have re-baselined all the
contracts affected by Katrina, finished that the end of last
year, so they are executing to those new contracts.
Admiral McCullough and I were talking on the way over, LHD
8, who is under construction, also lit off diesels yesterday.
We are making forward progress down there as well.
We christened LPD 21 on Saturday in Avondale.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

LPD 17

Mr. Young. Let me go back to shipbuilding now. LPD 17. The
Marine Corps this year and also last year made this, an
additional LPD 17, their number one unfunded requirement. They
are really feeling strongly about this, considering what their
missions might be in the future years.
My big question is I think we are going to have to do this
for the Marines somewhere along the line. But if we don't do it
in 2009, is the possibility that you will begin to prepare to
close down that capability of building that particular ship?
Admiral McCullough. I will take the operational aspect of
that, Congressman.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has stated a requirement
for 33 ships in the amphibious assault echelon to deliver two
Marine Expeditionary Brigades. He specifically requested 11
aviation-capable ships, 11 LSD 41/49 class, and 11 LPD 17s. The
CNO has concurred. CNO Roughead has concurred with that
determination. So we understand and agree with the Commandant's
requirement.
That said, in the 2009 program, given the needs of the
entire Navy, we could not put an LPD 17 in the 2009 program.
Some things we have worked at to get at the Commandant's
requirement is looking at extending the service lives on some
LHA 1 class ships and some LPD 4 class ships. While it doesn't
get to the entire requirement, depending on the year and the
mix, we get to anywhere from 1.86 to 1.92 MEBs based on a 2015
agreed-to MEB baseline between the Navy and Marine Corps. We
will continue in future programs to look at when and if we can
put that ship in the program.
Ms. Stiller. I will just comment from the ``could you
execute it and where are you in the program''. We have
delivered the first three LPDs, and through LPD 25 are under
contract. We awarded that contract in December, exercised the
option on the contract in December. That ship doesn't deliver
until February of 2012.
There is a backlog of LPD work. As we went through the 2009
budget, we felt from an industrial base perspective we did not
have to put the ship in the FY 2009 Budget, that they could
wait and we could revisit as part of the discussions in POM 10.
Mr. Young. The answer to my question is, if we do not fund
the additional LPD 17, we will not close down the line.
Ms. Stiller. That is correct, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

VIRGINIA CLASS WELDS

Mr. Murtha. Tell us about the bad welds on the Virginia
class submarine. I know staff mentioned this to me. What was
the problem there? Where was it and what happened and what did
you do to correct it?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. This was an issue at Northrop
Grumman Newport News, not an issue at General Dynamics Electric
Boat. It was a procedural issue and a quality assurance issue
and who was overseeing what welds. Newport News took immediate
action to change processes and procedures. We have looked at
all of the weld issues on the Virginia Class submarine and have
come through all that; and, in fact, we just delivered USS
NORTH CAROLINA, which was a Newport News boat, on the 21st of
February.
I think we have come through the issue. We have put the
right processes and procedures in place at Newport News. We
don't feel that there are any issues that are going to hold up
production on the future submarines.
Mr. Murtha. Tell me how it was discovered, and it must have
gone a while before you discovered it. I remember years ago
going out for the first Trident submarine, and it had 5,000 bad
welds, and General Dynamics said they wanted us to pay for it,
and we didn't. They did it themselves. What happened here is
that all at once we had a lot of bad welds.
Ms. Stiller. That was a different issue in the Sea Wolf
days. That was a material issue that caused the problem.
In this particular case, it was oversight or supervision of
journeymen level folks doing welding and what procedures they
had to follow to report when they had to rework a weld, and
they weren't doing that necessarily. It got caught in a spot
check. That is why we wanted to make sure we knew how pervasive
it was.
Mr. Murtha. Were they in the hull or the piping?
Ms. Stiller. I believe just the hull. But I will get that
for you for sure, sir. I don't remember.
[The information follows:]

During routine testing of VIRGINIA Class submarines, the Navy
learned of weaknesses in non-nuclear pipe welding processes at Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News. The Navy has thoroughly investigated
the problem, taken corrective actions, and certified the ships safe for
operations. All of the affected welds have been pipe welds. An
assessment of the potential long-term impact of this issue is due from
General Dynamics-Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-
Newport News by April 15, 2008.

Mr. Murtha. So now there is no possibility of being in a
submarine in the Antarctic underneath the ice. I worry about
those bad welds. That is not a good thing.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. In any place we felt the weld needed
to be reworked, it has been reworked. The engineering
discipline NAVSEA has looked at, the technical authority has
looked at it in great detail.

SEALIFT OF MRAP VEHICLES

Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.
Let me ask one more question before I go to Ms. Kaptur.
This MRAP thing has always worried me. It took so long for
people to recognize the MRAPs overseas. One of the things that
I worried about them when I found out we are going to send them
by air was they cost $150,000 apiece. Now I understand we send
them by sea. Are those all U.S.-flagged ships that we are
sending them in?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Any ship that TRANSCOM or
Military Sealift Command uses has to be U.S.-flagged and U.S.-
crewed.
Mr. Murtha. If you don't have the figures, I would like to
know what it costs per MRAP by ship versus by air. It just kind
of worried me that we were sending them by Russian air. Or I
guess it was Russian airplane. I don't remember where the crew
was from, Kiev or someplace, but, at any rate, Russian air. I
think you get four in there, and none of our airplanes could
carry that many, so it was cheaper. It just shows you how our
capability has been degraded, and we don't have the things we
need out there now in order to get things like the MRAP
overseas.
[The information follows:]

USTRANSCOM uses these planning factors:
$18,000 via surface ship per MRAP
$135,000 via air shipment per MRAP (regardless of whether an
AN-124 or C-5/C-17 is used)

Ms. Kaptur.

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a few
moments to catch up. I apologize for being late. We have three
concurrent hearings on my subcommittees.
Let me turn to the issue of the leasing of foreign-built
ships. We have talked about this in past hearings. Secretary
Stiller, what are the Navy's long-term plans regarding the
practice of leasing foreign-built ships to augment your sealift
capacity?
Admiral McCullough, my question to you along the same
lines, what would be the impact to the Navy's mission if
Congress were to prohibit the Navy's ability to enter into
these leases on foreign-built ships?
Let's start with Secretary Stiller.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
Today, we have 17 long-term leases for foreign-built ships.
All of these ships are now U.S.-flagged. To get them to U.S.
Coast Guard standards, work was done in the U.S. shipyard to
bring those ships to U.S. Coast Guard standards. There are 17
of these long-term leases that were foreign built out of 32
leases right now. When I talk lease, I am talking greater than
6 months. Nine of these 17 won't be rehired at or before when
their lease is expired. The Navy has in our budget money to buy
out five of the MSC leases, two in 2008 and three in 2009.
Two of the vessels that are under long-term charter are
High Speed Vessels. The Navy and the Army intend to procure
Joint High Speed Vessels. When those vessels deliver, these
leases won't be continued.
There is also one Air Force container ship that the
requirement from the Air Force won't exist when the lease
expires, so we won't renew that lease.
Then there is one undersea surveillance support ship that
is going to be filled by reactivating a Navy asset.
Out of the 17, six of the 17 are from long-term leases that
were authorized for the MPS force back in 1986. But, again, all
of them have been reflagged to U.S. standards.
Ms. Kaptur. You said 32 or 35?
Ms. Stiller. Thirty-two total.
Ms. Kaptur. Thirty-two leases?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am. Thirty-two long-term leases, and
17 of those were foreign-built and then converted to U.S. The
remainder were built in the U.S.
Ms. Kaptur. Can you provide for the record what types of
ships are being leased?
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. The actual type and purpose and which
countries.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. And how much we are paying for those leases.
Ms. Stiller. Yes, ma'am.
[The information follows:]

The attached spread sheet provides a complete list of the 32 ships
currently under long-term charter to the Military Sealift Command
(MSC), including the type of ship, ship mission, country of origin, and
chartering costs.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Ms. Kaptur. Admiral.
Admiral McCullough. Ms. Stiller talked about which leases
we were buying out and how we were going to replace a lot of
those ships with LMSR takes from the Army, which are U.S.-built
ships. The ones that remain as foreign-built, if we were
prohibited or required to terminate the lease, are in our
maritime pre-positioning force. We would have to procure ships
to replace those. Those ships are not currently planned to be
recapped until the mid-2020s. So it would be an additional bill
that we would have to figure out how to fund to replace that
capability.
Ms. Stiller. I would also add, if the lease period was
reduced from the 5-year, it would also be costly to the Navy.
Because when an operator or a ship owner decides to lease the
vessel, he is trying to amortize it over the greatest period
possible. Five years would give him a better chance of paying
off what he spent to build the vessel than a 2-year period. The
cost would get passed along to the Navy as well.

SMALL BOAT DEFENSE

Ms. Kaptur. I am interested in smaller vessels. And you may
know, obviously, I am from a Great Lakes community; and we have
tried very hard to retain some ship repair capacity on the
Great Lakes. That is easier said than done.
I am wondering about your needs for smaller ships within
the Navy. A few years ago, a Toledoan was Sailor of the Year.
We are having all kinds of difficulty in our region of the
country repairing vessels, getting vessels constructed, getting
the Navy's attention to our region.
The Iranians seem to have a capacity to cause a little
trouble over there in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian
Gulf. What are your small ship needs; and, for a region like
ours, what role do you see that companies there or interests
there can play in helping to supply the Navy?
Admiral McCullough. Ma'am, as you know, we recently stood
up the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. We have developed
three riverine squadrons. The first one is in the process of or
has recently completed a deployment in the Haditha Dam
protection in Iraq. There are some small vessels associated
with the riverine squadrons but only three squadrons' worth.
As we look at the requirement for that capability, I have
to say we were not sure of exactly what we needed. I looked at
a myriad of small craft options to work in theater security
cooperation both in the Horn of Africa region, the Arabian
Gulf, and in the Gulf of Guinea region.
What we looked at initially is, since we could not define
the requirement because we don't yet fully understand the
mission, is to, for lack of a better word, service life extend
the patrol coastals, the Cyclone class ships that we currently
have. We have embarked on that at the tune of about $12 million
dollars a hull. I will tell you we continue to look at that
requirement; and, as we design it, we will better know what our
requirements for small ships are.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, I have to go cast my vote. Are
you going to continue the session?
Mr. Murtha. I think we will adjourn.
Ms. Kaptur. All right.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, very much, Secretary and Admiral. We
appreciate what you have said.
The Committee will now adjourn until Thursday at 10:00.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Obey and the
answers thereto follow.]

Shipboard Control Systems

Question. What steps is the Navy taking in the development of the
313 ship fleet to increase commonality of equipment across the fleet?
Answer. The Department continues to strive to achieve commonality
at ship, system, and material levels. The Department is analyzing and
implementing where possible greater modularity, open architecture,
commercial technology, and common equipment and specifications:
The Naval Sea Systems Command is looking for ways to
reduce hull types and potential Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E)
components with the potential to garner savings in testing, logistics,
supply, and training.
The Department is also assessing ship design commonality
opportunities, looking at product data interoperability, design tools,
Technical Warrant Holder tools for certification, and design community
tools coordination.
The Navy is even examining the possibility of strategic
sourcing with the Navy setting up commodities contracts which the
shipyards may then utilize to purchase from vendors. The objective of
the effort would be to allow economic order quantity purchases, while
maintaining multiple sources to ensure competition.
In the area of combat systems, the Navy continues looking for
efficiencies as well. Open architecture is helping the Navy evolve,
especially over the long-term. The Navy has already made a move to
increase the use of COTS-based systems. Aegis Combat System Baseline 7
Phase one on DDG 91 and follow is a major example. The Navy intends to
continue implementing Open Architecture further, by working towards
adopting Commercial Software Development practices, leveraging Open
Source Code offerings, and partnering with Small Businesses in
harvesting the ``best of breed'' in Software Algorithms.
Question. With the existing shipbuilding plan, how many unique
surface ship machinery control systems is the Navy currently
supporting?
Answer. There are 13 unique machinery control systems in the
Surface Fleet today.
Question. What are the plans for converting proprietary legacy
hydraulic control systems to more modern technology that uses standard
equipment?
Answer. Today there is no formal program to convert legacy
hydraulic systems on in-service ships. The Navy monitors the
supportability of shipboard hydraulic system components and will
consider alterations to more modern technology when necessary. The Navy
is designing new classes of ships, such as DDG 1000 and CVN 78, with
significant reductions in the use of hydraulic systems where feasible
to reduce life-cycle maintenance costs.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Obey.
Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto
follow.]

Littoral Combat Ship

Question. What is your best estimate for when the Navy will
complete the competition and select a single contractor?
Answer. It is vital that the Navy continue through first of class
construction challenges to complete LCS 1 and LCS 2. The Navy believes
that additional design maturity, production progress on LCS 1 and 2,
and a competitive contract award between incumbent suppliers will
enable the use of fixed price incentive terms for the FY08 ship
appropriated by Congress and the two FY09 ships that the Navy is
requesting. When these ships are delivered, the Navy will be able to
better evaluate their costs and capabilities, and to make decisions
regarding the best manner to procure the remainder of the class.
Acquisition strategies for FY10 and outyear ships have not yet been
formulated. OSD will conduct a Milestone B prior to FY10 procurement.
The Navy and OSD will consider the questions of single seaframe
assessment (or not) and the transition to full and open competition (or
not) as part of the FY10 acquisition strategy deliberations.
Question. What is your best estimate for when the Navy will accept
delivery of the first two Littoral Combat Ships from the contractors?
Answer. LCS 1 (FREEDOM) is under construction at Marinette Marine,
Marinette, WI. LCS 1 launched in September 2006, and is projected to
deliver in August 2008. LCS 2 (INDEPENDENCE) is under construction at
Austal USA, Mobile, AL. The Navy projects LCS 2 to deliver in December
2008.

LCS Mission Modules

Question. As we understand it now, the first LCS is scheduled to
arrive in Panama City in Oct. 2009 and the second LCS in Jan. 2010.
From now until then, the Mission Packages are scheduled to remain in
Panama City, which offers a lengthy opportunity to accomplish
intermediate testing that could reduce the risk of integration problems
when the LCS actually arrives.
What is the Navy doing during the next 1.5 years to ensure that the
integration of the Mission Packages to the LCS is successful?
Answer. The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program Offices, PMS
420, the LCS Mission Modules Program Office, and PMS 501, the LCS
Seaframe Program Office, are performing several activities to ensure
that the Mission Packages are effectively and successfully integrated
into the LCS ships. Ongoing integration activities for the next 1.5
years include:
Independent validation and verification (IV&V) of
interfaces to ensure that both the Seaframe and Mission Modules
conform to the approved Interface Control Document;
Land-based combat system and shipyard Seaframe
software testing of the Mission Package Computing Environment
with the Ship's Core Mission Systems to ensure interoperability
between ship and mission modules;
Shipboard testing of mission module components to
ensure that the launch, recovery, and shipboard handling (LR&H)
systems can adequately support the mission systems and
associated mission package equipment.
Question. What are the current testing plans for the Mission
Packages?
Answer. Each Mission Package has extensive testing plans:
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package Unmanned
Surface Vehicle (USV) integration testing is currently underway, and
its sweep payload will be installed and tested this spring and summer.
The MCM Detachment Sailors will support DDG-96's Remote Minehunting
System (RMS) Technical Evaluation and Operational testing this summer
and fall. MCM Mission Package #1 will be tested end-to-end in the
waters of Panama City, Florida, beginning in the second quarter of FY
2009.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package in-water
integration testing is currently underway. Unmanned Surface Vehicles
(USV) and their sensor payload will be tested in shallow and deep water
through the spring and summer. This fall (first quarter of FY 2009),
ASW Mission Package #1 will undergo end-to-end testing.
Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package will test fire the
Gun mission on the range at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren this
fall. The software for the gun will also be integrated and tested at
Dahlgren. This includes an end-to-end test firing against small boat
targets planned for early FY 2009. The Non-Line of Sight (NLOS)
Precision Attack Missile mission module will be tested with the Army.
Tests include:
Captive Flight Testing in the Gulf of Mexico during August
2008;
Multiple Restrained Firing Tests at Dahlgren over the next
12 months;
Guided Flight Testing of missiles in FY 2009.
Question. What funding is being provided for this and at what
level?
Answer. The mission module level testing is funded through the
RDTE,N appropriation PE0603581N, Project 3129, for LCS Mission Modules.
The LCS Mission Modules Program plans to apply $9.5M in FY08 and $29.6M
in FY09 toward testing.
Question. If the LCS schedule slips what are the Navy's contingency
plans for using the Mission Modules?
Answer. Mission Packages are not procured for a specific LCS hull.
They are procured at a rate to provide in-theater operational
flexibility for deployed LCS Seaframes and support forward staging of
sufficient Mission Packages to meet operational needs, while allowing
for a Mission Package maintenance cycle.
LCS is the ideal platform for deploying the planned operational
capability for Mine Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, and Surface
Warfare. The mission modules are designed to integrate seamlessly into
the LCS via a standard interface. This allows for these modules to be
operated from other platforms if a contingency requirement emerged.
Currently, there is no requirement for alternative platforms, and there
is no other ship in the U.S. Navy that can fully employ all three
Mission Package (MP) types. However, some platforms may offer
potentially satisfactory contingency capability for elements of
individual Mission Packages.
USD (AT&L) has directed the Navy to conduct analysis on the use of
the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package on alternate platforms.
Analysis is currently underway.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd.
Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto
follow.]

Shipbuilding

Question. Admiral McCullough, why is the Navy's Fiscal Year 2009
budget for new ship construction, including T-AKES's only $12.1
billion? This is $1.2 billion below the Fiscal Year 2008 funding for
new ships. Is your office not fighting for a larger percentage of the
Navy budget? Is the Navy being trumped by the needs of the Army and
Marine ground forces in Central Command and the expense of new
procurements for Air Force?
Answer. The Navy's base program in the Fiscal Year 2009 President's
Budget represents the best balance of warfighting capabilities within
fiscal guidelines. The Defense Department also balances capabilities
within its base budget to meet warfighting requirements.
Within the Navy budget, some factors pressurizing warfighting
procurement include significantly rising manpower and health care costs
in MILPERs; increasing fuel costs in O&MN; increased material, design
and manufacturing costs in ship construction; and accelerated depletion
of expected service life due to current operations in the Global War on
Terror. There are more requirements than Navy has resources which
equates to taking risk. The Navy's Unfunded Priority List outlines
areas where Navy took risks to its base budget in order to balance the
overall program.
Question. How are you going to rebuild a 313-ship Navy if more
money isn't budgeted for shipbuilding?
Answer. While the Navy's FY 2009 shipbuilding budget is less in FY
2009 than it was in FY 2008 ($12.4 billion versus $12.5 billion), it
represents the best balance of meeting requirements with the resources
available to the Navy at the time. In fact, when accounting for the
$588 million in Advance SSN procurement in the FY 2008 budget and the
$300 million in the FY 2008 budget allocated for additional T-AKE
funding, the total funding available to begin procurement of ships in
FY 2009 is actually approximately $13.2 billion.
It will always be a challenge for the Navy to procure the quality
and quantity of ships it needs for the future within the resources made
available to us--in this environment, it is critical that we balance
both the shipbuilding requirements and those demands of the myriad
other programs the Navy must support. As we have said from the start,
the Navy must provide well defined requirements that do not vary over
the life of the shipbuilding programs we currently have and the
requirements must be based on a solid foundation of analytic rigor that
does not allow for ``what we can do'' and only supports what we must be
able to do. The current Requirements, Resources and Review Board (R3B)
process and gate reviews introduced by the Secretary are all aimed at
meeting this need. The second step is getting in assist industry
energized to assist in cost control by facilitating capital investments
aimed at improving their efficiency and effectiveness in building what
we say we need at a reasonable and affordable cost. Once we can achieve
this step, it will permit us to introduce the stability that we all
know will achieve additional cost savings.
Question. Ms. Stiller, the high cost of Navy ships concerns me. I
understand that 35%-55% of the cost of a warship is in the weapon
systems, bought directly by the Navy and outside the control of the
shipyard.
How much cost control is the Navy placing on this 35%-55% cost?
Answer. Contracts with values over $50M are written requiring
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) reporting. Large cost/incentive
contracts are required to submit EVMS data directly to the Earned Value
(EV) Central Repository. This EV Central Repository improves data
analysis to facilitate timely and effective management action. Cost
Control Incentives are being added to contracts, and are focused on
objective and measurable results.
Question. Has there been any reduction in the cost of the weapon
systems over the past few years?
Answer. We are establishing a combat system product line approach
based on a common objective architecture that utilizes Government
controlled architecture and authenticated interfaces. This approach
facilitates incremental capability introduction, certification, and
testing, resulting in shorter timeframes and reduced costs for computer
program certification, Test and Evaluation.
Our future Surface Combat Systems will be created from a mix of
existing and new components, fully leveraging as much capability as
possible from previously developed efforts. This approach was chosen to
reduce the costs in procurement of weapon systems for new classes of
ships.
Question. How do these costs compare with shipyard costs?
Answer. Shipyard costs represent 72% of the PB09 shipbuilding (SCN)
budget, warfare systems costs are 18% and other government furnished
equipments costs are 10%. Most of the complex warfare systems are not
procured by shipyards. These percentages can vary based on the mix of
combatants in any given shipbuilding plan.

Life Rafts

Question. I understand the Navy is procuring life rafts to replace
older models removed from service due to age, fleet modernization, or
inspection failure. Currently, there are 1,200 of these older, MK6 life
rafts left in the fleet. It would cost $12,000,000 to purchase new
rafts to replace the older ones and additional funds for periodic
servicing and replacements.
Apparently, the Navy does not budget for these life rafts, but
rather makes procurement decisions for this particular item after
Congress has approved the Navy budget. This unpredictability results in
down-time on the production line, erratic swings in production, layoffs
and re-hiring of trained personnel, and higher per unit costs.
Why doesn't the Navy include life raft funding in its budget at a
stable level?
Answer. The President's Budget submission represents the best
balance between Navy requirements and resources. Although there is no
dedicated Budget Line Item (BLI) for the purchase of life rafts, the
Navy does purchase Mk-7 & Mk-8 life rafts for new construction and in-
service ships. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are purchased in
support of the end item construction of a ship using Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds and are provided as Contractor Furnished
Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. Life rafts for in-service ships in
need of replacement are available from either existing assets removed
from decommissioned ships or are newly procured via the Navy Supply
System using Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds.
Question. Is the Navy considering budgeting for life rafts--both
production and ongoing maintenance--in its Fiscal Year 2010 budget?
Answer. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are purchased in
support of the end item construction of a ship using Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds, and are provided as Contractor Furnished
Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. Life rafts for in-service ships in
need of replacement are available from either existing assets removed
from decommissioned ships, or are newly procured via the Navy Supply
System using Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds. The Fiscal
Year 2010 budget submission is predecisional, and it would be
inappropriate for the Navy to comment at this time on any changes in
our procurement approach.
Question. If you do NOT include funds in next year's budget
request, how would you procure life rafts? Are you relying on Congress?
Answer. No, the Navy is not relying on Congress for the procurement
and replacement of life rafts. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are
purchased in support of the end item construction of a ship using
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds and provided as
Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. In-service
ships utilize Fleet Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds to
procure replacement life rafts through the Navy Supply System on an as-
needed basis.
Question. Finally, if you do NOT budget funds, how would you work
with the manufacturer to help smooth out the solicitations in life raft
procurement?
Answer. Mk-7 and Mk-8 life rafts are Navy standard stock items. For
new construction, life rafts are purchased by the shipbuilder either
through the Navy supply system or through the shipbuilder's own
contracts and provided as Contractor Funded Equipment (CFE). For in-
service ships, replacement life rafts are procured on an as needed
basis via the Navy Supply System. The Navy Supply System utilizes past
procurement information to forecast demand and is dependent upon
qualified sources to fulfill the demand. The Navy Supply System has a
Performance Based Logistics contract (N00104-05-A-ZE01) in place with
RFD Beauford to provide life rafts.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow.]

DDG 51 Destroyer Program

Question. The Navy is completing construction of the 62 ships in
the DDG 51 program. The last year that the Committee appropriated
funding for the construction of new ships was in fiscal year 2005. With
the new DDG 1000 program just getting off the ground, there is a
possibility to procure additional DDG 51 ships to maintain the
industrial base until the DDG 1000 program ramps up.
Secretary Stiller, could the industrial base accommodate the
construction of additional DDG 51 class ships even though it has been
several years since that program has had new funding appropriated?
Answer. The FY05 President's Budget procured the final three ships
of 62-ship DDG 51 Class. Additional DDG 51 Class ships would be in
excess of that war fighting requirement and are not part of the Navy's
projected force structure. Based on current projected workload, either
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) or General Dynamics Bath Iron
Works (BIW) could absorb the workload of additional DDG 51 destroyers,
but numerous Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Contractor
Furnished Equipment (CFE) vendor base issues (including production
restart of major components, system obsolescence and configuration
issues) would need to be resolved in order to award and construct
additional ships at either shipyard. All material for the ships
currently under construction has been procured.
Question. Secretary Stiller, would the idea of constructing
additional DDG 51 ships be a good risk mitigation effort for the
industrial base given the maturity of the DDG 1000 program?
Answer. Although there are always uncertainties in shipbuilding,
and particularly for lead ship combatants, DDG 1000 has been in design,
development, and demonstration for almost six years. The Navy has
successfully, on cost and on schedule, built and tested the ten
critical technologies that provide the capabilities future ships need.
The ship's detail design effort is also on cost and on schedule, and
will be more complete at the start of construction next year than any
other previous surface warship. The Navy considers the risk in DDG 1000
sufficiently mitigated to begin construction. Although proven in
production and operation, the Navy does not require additional DDG 51
class ships. In addition, there are numerous ship and Government
furnished equipment (GFE) vendor base issues (including obsolete
equipment, new main reduction gear supplier, multiple ship
configuration issues, and production line re-starts) that would need to
be resolved in order to award and construct additional DDG 51 class
ships at either shipyard.
Question. Secretary Stiller, what is your estimate for how much a
DDG 51 ship would cost, considering the fact that there has been such a
long break in production?
Answer. The estimated end cost to competitively procure a single
DDG 51 class ship in FY 09 is $2.1 B. This estimate assumes current
ship construction profiles in accordance with the President's Budget
request for FY 2009 and the Navy's Report to Congress on Annual Long-
Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.
This estimate utilizes the latest audited Forward Pricing Rate
Agreements (FPRAs) rates. Impacts for production line restart and
contractor furnished equipment/government furnished equipment
obsolescence are included. Several ship and vendor base issues
(including equipment obsolescence, main reduction gears, configuration
change issues, and production line re-starts) would need to be resolved
in order to award and construct an additional DDG 51 class ship.
Question. Admiral McCullough, has the Navy considered extending the
production run on the DDG 51 program?
Answer. The Navy long-range shipbuilding plan seeks to ensure the
Navy's force structure meets its operational requirement in terms of
capability and capacity. This plan, consisting of 313 ships, includes a
requirement for 62 DDG 51 Class destroyers. The FY 2005 President's
Budget procured the final three ships of the 62 ship DDG 51 Class.
While changes in our overall shipbuilding strategy are always
possible, we believe the current mix of ships proposed in the FY 2009
budget represent the best mix of capability given available resources.

DDG 1000 Combat System

Question. The combat system on the Virginia Class submarine has
been extremely successful in that it is built on open architecture
concepts that can be quickly upgraded to take advantage of technology
advancement as the ship ages. The Navy calls this concept ``Acoustic
Rapid COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) Insertion (ARCI)''. The Navy
claims the DDG 1000 program is being patterned after the Virginia
program in its construction phase. It would be extremely forward-
thinking to also model the combat system after the Virginia Class to
ensure the combat system stays current throughout the life of the ship.
Secretary Stiller, the combat system of the Virginia Class
submarine program has been successful largely due to the concept of
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion. Is the DDG 1000 combat system being
designed along the same lines such that the combat system can be
upgraded without major ship modifications?
Answer. Yes, the DDG 1000 is an open architecture compliant combat
system designed to decouple hardware and software developments so
improvements can be economically incorporated as they develop without
major ship modifications. The DDG 1000 also isolates the combat system
sensors and weapon systems from the Total Ship Computing Environment
(TSCE) so that introduction of future sensors/weapon systems do not
significantly impact the core combat system hardware or software.
Question. Secretary Stiller, one of the big advantages that the
Virginia Class program has is that the combat system can be upgraded
fairly easily (relative to legacy submarine and surface ship programs).
In fact as submarines are delivered to the fleet, they come with the
most current version of the combat system rather than the combat system
that was available when construction began. Can the same be said for
the DDG 1000 ships? How easy will it be to modernize and update the
combat system of the DDG 1000 given that electronics become obsolete
every two to four years? How frequently will modernization occur for
this class of ship?
Answer. DDG 1000 has made substantial investments in Open
Architecture which provides the ability to isolate the hardware from
the software programs and install technology updates as needed. DDG
1000 plans to follow similar COTS refresh cycles (hardware upgrades
approximately every 4 years) in order to introduce the latest COTS
processors and middleware. The DDG 1000 program is working to identify
the most cost effective timeframe for a COTS technology upgrade that
will not impact the shipbuilders' ability to complete construction and
testing. Since the DDG 1000 employs a Total Ship Computing Environment
(TSCE) that is comprised of a homogenous set of COTS processors that
meet Open System standards, this will enable efforts to modernize the
combat system electronics.
Question. Secretary Stiller, will the government own the rights to
the combat system design or will the software and/or hardware component
design be proprietary and belong to the contractor?
Answer. Yes, with few exceptions. The Navy has at least Government
Purpose Rights (GPR) to the hardware and software components of the
combat system design.
Question. Secretary Stiller, do you envision the DDG 1000 will use
commercial off-the-shelf equipment to help drive down the cost of the
combat system? If so, will this commercial off-the-shelf equipment be
proprietary?
Answer. Yes, DDG 1000 will use commercial off-the-shelf equipment
to help drive down the cost of the combat system. The DDG 1000 Total
Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) uses a homogenous set of COTS
processors and commercial marketplace networking equipment that were
competitively selected. The use of mainstream COTS equipment in DDG
1000 will allow the Navy to gain the latest technology benefits and
continue driving down cost. DDG 1000 also has moved away from custom
built middleware to mainstream COTS middleware without sacrificing
system performance. The commercial off-the-shelf equipment will be
delivered with any Intellectual Property (IP) rights that the
commercial vendors maintain in order to protect their company private
investments. This is common across most commercial equipment vendors.
The DDG 1000 will only use well defined and published Open Architecture
interfaces which eliminate the potential for vendor lock into a
specific set of COTS equipment. This approach is inline with the Navy
concept of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI).

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]

W I T N E S S E S

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Page
Amos, Lieutenant General J. F.................................... 83
Campbell, Lieutenant General Kevin............................... 189
Castellaw, Lieutenant General J. G............................... 83
England, Gordon.................................................. 1
Francis, Paul.................................................... 189
Jonas, T. W...................................................... 1
McCullough, Vice Admiral B. J.................................... 291
Mullen, Admiral M. G............................................. 1
Obering, Lieutenant General Henry................................ 189
Rochelle, Lieutenant General M. D................................ 139
Speakes, Lieutenant General S. M................................. 139
Stiller, Allison................................................. 291
Thurman, Lieutenant General J. D................................. 139