[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-173]
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: TODAY'S EFFORTS AND
TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENTS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JEFF MILLER, Florida
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
Steve DeTeresa, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Sasha Rogers, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, September 16, 2008, Defeating the Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Today's Efforts and
Tomorrow's Requirements........................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, September 16, 2008...................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: TODAY'S EFFORTS AND TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 3
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
WITNESSES
Beasley, William, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics)..................................................... 7
Berkson, Bradley M., Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Office of the Secretary of Defense............................. 4
Kamiya, Maj. Gen. Jason K., USA, Director, Joint Training
Directorate (J7), U.S. Joint Forces Command.................... 8
Matthews, Tom, Director, Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)........ 7
Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., USA, Director, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization..................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 33
Beasley, William............................................. 47
Berkson, Bradley M........................................... 36
Kamiya, Maj. Gen. Jason K.................................... 49
Matthews, Tom................................................ 45
Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F...................................... 40
Snyder, Hon. Vic............................................. 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Snyder................................................... 61
DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC
THREATS: TODAY'S EFFORTS AND TOMORROW'S REQUIREMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 16, 2008.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:22 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order. Good afternoon.
We apologize for the delay and a couple of votes.
Welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
hearing on Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
Other Asymmetric Threats. This is the committee's first public
hearing to discuss these issues.
The reason we are here today is that the IED remains the
number one cause of casualties to the coalition and the forces
in Iraq. More than half of the U.S. deaths due to enemy action
have been the result of IEDs. Although IEDs are not a new
threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in
Iraq, and are on the rise in Afghanistan. They promise to be a
weapon of choice for a long time, potentially, into the future,
around the world.
Since former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General
Abizaid, called for a Manhattan Project-like effort five years
ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly $14 billion to
the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts. This effort has
grown from a 12-man Army task force to the Joint IED Defeat
Organization, or JIEDDO, which currently employs a staff of
about 3,600 government, military and contract personnel.
We have two primary questions today: How is JIEDDO doing
against the threat? And, second, what should be the future of
JIEDDO? JIEDDO's mission is to defeat the IED as a weapon of
strategic influence, so today's hearing will provide an
opportunity to hear how the organization is doing in this
critical and difficult mission, and how we measure success in
this fight.
We are also here to discuss the future of JIEDDO's
capabilities. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense has made
the institutionalization of JIEDDO one of its top 25
transformation priorities to complete before the end of the
year, it is no surprise that there are plenty of opinions about
what to do with an organization or a mission that is well-
funded.
The Department itself has done two recent key assessments.
The Program Analysis and Evaluation Study Group recommended
leaving JIEDDO intact, and to start migrating its budget into
the base defense budget. To this point, almost all of its
funding has been in the supplemental, and, therefore, not
authorized to the House Armed Services Committee.
On the other hand, the Combatant Commanders' Senior
Warfighter Forum, while recognizing the accomplishments of
JIEDDO, question whether some of its capabilities were now
mature enough to transition to standard defense, combatant
commander (COCOM) or service organizations.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also
conducting a study on JIEDDO, on behalf of this committee,
authorized last year, and our staff has been working with them.
In the best of all possible worlds, we would have enough
money to go around for all good ideas, and it is clear that
JIEDDO has had many good ideas. In this world, though, our
responsibility is to make sure we can balance funding between
many must-have capabilities.
One question we in the Department have to consider is what
we will do as other asymmetric threats come along. Should this
JIEDDO inherit them, or will that dilute its focus, which is
claimed as its core strength? Should we build a new JIEDDO-like
organization for each new threat as it comes along? Can we
afford that if we don't transition mature capabilities to
standard organizations?
And we present those questions and thoughts today as open
questions, because I don't think there is any member on this
subcommittee that comes in with any prejudice or bias or
answers to the questions and thoughts that have come forward.
Our panel of witnesses represents JIEDDO, the Department
and Joint Forces Command: Mr. Bradley Berkson, the director of
Programs Analysis and Evaluation at the Office of the Secretary
of Defense; Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, Director of the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO;
Mr. Tom Matthews, Director of the Warfighter Requirements and
Evaluations, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense; Mr.
William Beasley, Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisitions Cell,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense; Major General Jason
Kamiya, Director of the Joint Training Directorate, U.S. Joint
Forces Command.
I also wanted to acknowledge the presence today of six
distinguished members of the Afghan parliament, who are
attending today as part of the House Democracy Assistance
Commission's second Committee Operations Seminar.
Welcome. Let us give them a round of applause.
[Applause.]
Dr. Snyder. We appreciate you all so much, for being here.
And I would like to tell you that the delay because of votes is
atypical, but it is not. So you have learned one of our
experiences around here already, today.
Mr. Akin is recognized for any comments he wants to make.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and, good afternoon
to the witnesses.
We appreciate your all being here today.
Today's hearing is very timely, for a number of reasons,
not the least of which is the pending change of
Administrations. There is no question that the new Secretary of
Defense will want to continue the Joint Improvised Explosive
Defeat Organization's excellent work. But the organizational
questions, and how to best sustain this concentrated effort are
difficult. And it is important to get those issues on public
record.
I applaud the Department's initiative in building such a
comprehensive, effective organization, as JIEDDO. As we know,
IEDs quickly grew into the most deadly weapon deployed against
our troops, and it appears to be insurgents' weapon of choice
for the foreseeable future, anywhere in the world. As long as
we have the most powerful military in the world, no one will
attack us directly.
Asymmetric threats will be the order of the day. And IEDs
are tailor-made for insurgents--cheap, made from readily
available materials, easy to build, employ and trigger.
Obviously, we need to institutionalize the competencies of
JIEDDO to counter this ongoing threat, as well as the threat
from powerful explosive form penetrators, EFPs, to our forces.
That said, JIEDDO was a large organization, working directly
for Secretary of Defense, with responsibilities and
acquisition, training, doctrine, intelligence, and operations;
combining the functions of a combatant command and a military
department in an ad hoc fashion to solve an important, but
narrow, problem.
As an added complication, JIEDDO funding is provided
through supplementals, which will not continue forever. The
witnesses will be relieved to hear that I do not have an answer
to this very complex problem that I want to impose on the
Department.
I do think the mission of JIEDDO is critical, and must
continue, with two caveats. First, I don't see how JIEDDO can
reasonably be sustained for the long term with the current
structure and funding mechanism. Second, I believe JIEDDO may
be performing some redundant functions that are better left to
the military services or combatant commands.
Thank you, again, for our witnesses, for being here today,
and to address these and other important questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Dr. Snyder. Thanks, Mr. Akin.
What we will do is we will begin down here with Mr.
Berkson, and come on down the row.
We have that very attractive clock in front of you that
goes from green light; and with one minute, goes to a yellow
light, and then to the red light. It is a five-minute clock. I
put that there more for your indication of where you are at.
Don't feel like you have to come to an abrupt stop when it goes
on. It just gives you a sense of where we are at. But, then, I
know members will have questions, also.
So, Mr. Berkson, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF BRADLEY M. BERKSON, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Berkson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Brad Berkson. I am the director of the----
Dr. Snyder. Pull that in. Pull those microphones in close
to you, if you would.
Mr. Berkson. Sir, I am Brad Berkson. I am the director of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis and
Evaluation organization. I am joined today by Lieutenant
General Tom Metz, from JIEDDO, Tom Matthews, from the Under
Secretary for Intelligence's office, William Beasley from
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), and Major General
Jason Kamiya, from Joint Forces Command.
The Department of Defense (DOD) aggressively supports
JIEDDO and its institutionalization. In 2006, Deputy Secretary
England established JIEDDO for the Department's efforts to
rapidly and systematically reduce the effects of IEDs against
our forces. Since then, JIEDDO has done a tremendous job, and
has acted to respond to the disruptive threats posed by IEDs,
and the networks behind them.
The Secretary and its most senior military and civilian
advisors have concluded there is a continuing need for this
organization, and we have done--indicated so by funding JIEDDO
in the base budget to the tune of about $500 million, in both
the 2008 and 2009 requests. In fact, we have, in the future
year's defense plan, increased that funding close to $1 billion
by fiscal year 2013.
The enduring value of an organization like JIEDDO, that
rapidly acquires and fields IED capabilities, and the fact that
we funded it in the base budget, continues to support our view
that IED and its defeat will be important in the coming years.
That is why we put it in the base budget.
As we are looking at 2010 and, and this committee has
mentioned, looking at the future, it may be, in fact, that we
need to increase the funding in the future base budgets, for
this organization to continue.
Currently, JIEDDO reports to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and he works in close coordination with the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The direct linkage between JIEDDO
and our most senior leadership reflects the priority this has
in protecting our troops; furthermore, it facilities oversight
at the highest levels of the Department.
Congress has entrusted the department for JIEDDO, and
represents--and this senior-leadership oversight of that--
represents our effort to manage that at the top level of the
organization.
Finally, as we think about institutionalizing this
organization, the talent and the people at JIEDDO will be
critical. Funding this organization in the base budget and
indicating that we are committed to it through that funding,
indicates to people that General Metz has to hire that we are
going to support this organization in the future. And I think
it sends a very strong signal to those people when we do so.
Finally, the fact that the DOD has engaged in this counter-
IED fight has potential for duplication. Here, again, having
this single point of contact in the JIEDDO organization
provides an opportunity to have a joint forum for collecting
and synchronizing all of these issues in one place; thus,
JIEDDO is able to leverage the DOD and interagency, including
intelligence, rapid acquisition, research and development (R&D)
and training, and bring a formal array of forces toward the
single end of saving lives.
Our soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen deserve nothing
less.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berkson can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Berkson.
General Metz.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS F. METZ, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
General Metz. It is a pleasure to appear before you today.
Mr. Chairman, my opening remarks will be abbreviated.
Therefore, I respectfully submit a more detailed written
statement for you, for the record, and look forward to speaking
in more detail during the question-and-answer period of today's
hearing.
Leading the Joint IED Defeat Organization is an honor and a
genuine pleasure. I represent an organization staffed with
personnel who passionately serve our men and women in uniform
with a keen sense of urgency.
I am often asked if the IED threat can be removed from the
battlefield, and my answer is, ``No.'' In its most fundamental
form, the IED is a lethal ambush. And men have been ambushing
their enemies for thousands of years. Over those years, the
ambush has become more and more lethal. However we can, and we
must, defeat the systemic use of IEDs to strategically
influence our citizens and leaders.
To date, our success has been dramatic. In June 2003, the
enemy generated more than one coalition-force casualty with
each IED he emplaced. Today, he must emplace over nine IEDs to
cause one casualty. The combined impact of that trend, and the
continued emphasis on disrupting the capabilities of insurgent
networks to generate, and then place, IEDs, has dramatically
improved the survivability of our forces.
As DOD's leader for counter-IED investments, we rapidly
integrate the efforts of academia, industry and interagency,
joint and allied forces, to focus and coordinate our
investments. We are currently working on 301 counter-IED
initiatives, and support a science-and-technology-investment
portfolio of 78 technology projects.
Additionally, we are currently responding to 87 Joint
Urgent Operational Needs Statements from our warfighters, with
109 separate initiatives. Our rapid acquisition process allows
us to provide the warfighter with valuable lifesaving solutions
in a period of 30 days to 24 months, depending on the
complexity of the technology.
During our first year, defeating the device was our central
focus in order to save lives and limbs of our warfighters. As
our positive impact grew along this line of operation, we
increased our focus on the offense, attacking networks that
finance, supply, recruit, construct, emplace, initiate and
record IED attacks.
Our focus on the attack of the network led us to developing
the Counter-IED Operations and Integration Center, commonly
called the COIC. The COIC is a paradigm change, because the
warfighter defines what is needed from the bottom up. Requests
for support from the COIC have grown significantly from 84 per
month in 2007, to a current rate in 2008 of almost 170 per
month.
In January 2008, the COIC assumed the support role to the
Baghdad Fusion Cell. Our efforts have led to the detention of
66 high-value individuals. During the past 18 months, in total,
the COIC has supported 213 missions, with a result in the kill
or capture of 691 high-value targets.
In order to effectively deliver new equipment and network-
attack enablers to our warfighters, we provide the force with
comprehensive training support, as well. We provide this
critical training support by rapidly synchronizing input from
our deployed field teams, unit debriefs, and in-theater
surveys, by migrating the results to all four services'
training bases to ensure deploying warfighters are training
against the most current threat, using proven tactics,
techniques and procedures.
We remain DOD's lead for strategic planning in order to
develop goals and provide priorities to counter IEDs for the
foreseeable future in the long war. We develop and publish
DOD's counter-IED guidance to support the combatant commander's
planning efforts, and continue to further refine and report
DOD's counter-IED performance measures to the Department's
senior leaders.
Mr. Chairman, we are making great progress. However, in
spite of our success, the IED remains the enemy's weapon of
choice in Afghanistan and Iraq. We currently see over 1,400 IED
events in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over 350 elsewhere in the
world, per month. These numbers can go higher because the enemy
can continue to exploit readily available technology and
rapidly produce IEDs in an unending cycle of innovation.
We must continue to apply pressure and make IEDs too costly
to produce, and too risky to employ, by relentlessly attacking
networks. The Joint IED Defeat Organization is organized to
combat this critical threat.
In closing, we look to the future. JIEDDO will aggressively
continue to lead DOD's efforts to find and develop capabilities
to counter IEDs and to enable attacks against the networks that
employ them. We must continue to anticipate and innovate faster
than a intelligent, ruthless and resourceful enemy.
I attribute JIEDDO's success to the flexible funding that
Congress has provided in the Joint IED Defeat Fund, the
Department's support to the synergy of our effort, and the
passionate professionals working in JIEDDO, both in the U.S.
and deployed.
I will do everything in my power to maintain and enhance
that passion and sense of urgency of our personnel. Our goal
remains clear: To defeat the IED as weapons of strategic
influence.
And I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Metz can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Dr. Snyder. I thank the gentleman.
Next, Mr. Matthews.
STATEMENT OF TOM MATTHEWS, DIRECTOR, WARFIGHTER REQUIREMENTS
AND EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE)
Mr. Matthews. Yes. Good afternoon, Chairman Snyder, Ranking
Member Akin and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the commitment of
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(USDI) to the JIEDDO defeat organization, and their important
mission.
I am Tom Matthews, the director of Warfighter Requirements
and Evaluations, within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, Warfighter Support.
I have been associated with JIEDDO and their efforts since
July of 2004. Today, USDI continues to provide policy oversight
of JIEDDO for the purposes of ensuring that JIEDDO receives the
intelligence-policy support they need, relating to the IED
problem.
Over the years, as JIEDDO has evolved and matured, I have
seen much value added in their efforts to unravel the IED
network, counter the devices themselves, and train U.S. forces
to face the greatest threat on the battlefield.
We must continue to have a focused effort. I am pleased to
be here with you today to answer your questions regarding
intelligence support to JIEDDO. Thank you very much for your
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matthews can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Beasley.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BEASLEY, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION
CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)
Mr. Beasley. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Akin, committee
members, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony
today.
I am Bill Beasley, the acting director of the Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell. The JRAC acts as the combatant commander's
agent, addressing the joint urgent operational needs and
immediate warfighter needs of their commands.
Established jointly by the Under Secretaries of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the comptroller, the
JRAC receives, for timely action, joint urgent operational
needs that have been certified by the combatant command, and
validated by the Joint Staff. The JRAC engages with many
organizations to provide solutions to the combatant command's
needs.
Since 2004, the United States Central Command has
identified several hundred joint urgent operational needs, of
which about half are counter-IED related. With some exceptions,
the counter-IED joint urgent operational needs are provided by
the JRAC to the Joint IED Defeat Organization for action.
The JRAC ensures actions are accomplished through its
participation in the Joint IED Defeat Organization's management
and advisory boards, and supporting oversight of the
organization for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The JRAC has supported specific Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization actions. In October 2005, at the
request of the Deputy Secretary, the JRAC provided management
assistance and oversight to meet the significant growth in
United States Central Command requirements for counter radio-
controlled electronic warfighter jammers, commonly called CREW.
This responsibility was transferred in 2007 to the Navy,
once the CREW single-service manager was established. The JRAC
additionally assisted the Joint IED Defeat Organization in
receiving determinations by the Secretary of Defense to use
rapid-acquisition authority to expedite crew-procurement
actions.
The JIEDDO has been an effective, an efficient and timely
provider of capability, from my perspective, to the warfighter.
This concludes my brief remarks. And I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beasley can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
General Kamiya.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JASON K. KAMIYA, USA, DIRECTOR, JOINT
TRAINING DIRECTORATE (J7), U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
General Kamiya. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Akin, and members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of General Jim Mattis, as the commander
of U.S. Joint Force Command (USJFCOM), thank you for inviting
me to appear before you today to discuss the many ways that
USJFCOM and JIEDDO support each other in the execution of joint
training.
I believe that our two organizations have worked very hard
in the past several years, in concert with the combat commands
and services, and have obtained much synergy in providing
joint-force commanders and staffs the most realistic training
environment possible, to meet the challenges posed in defeating
IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence.
But I believe that there is much more than can be done. As
we look to the future, and as IEDs and other asymmetric threats
continue to evolve, I believe that it is only natural for JFCOM
and JIEDDO to expand and formalize the training and support we
provide each other.
We look forward to future discussions that will lead to
clear definition of what the support will entail, and its
attendant resource requirements.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kamiya can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your testimony. Our
timekeepers are in the back there, and we will put ourselves on
the five-minute clock. And I will begin the questioning.
General Metz, where do you see the issue, currently, of how
other asymmetric threats fit into JIEDDO?
General Metz. Well, I think the enemies of our great
country recognize they--as you mentioned earlier, they are not
going to meet us in the deep blue sea or the light-blue sky, or
in the maneuver battlefields that we have been so successful
at. He will take us to a regular warfare the use those
asymmetrical weapons.
So as he evolves from the IED, I think that we will be in a
position to help the Department move in that direction--and
working hard to--to figure out how to get ahead of the enemy in
that thought pattern. We may not pick it right, but we would
like to be on the street corner--his next asymmetric weapon, in
order to go ahead and begin to design the defeat of those
future weapons.
Dr. Snyder. Well, two follow-up questions: One is that the
thought has been that the effectiveness that JIEDDO has had has
been because of its very laser-like focus on IEDs.
If you start expanding the list--you and I could sit down--
everybody in this room would come up with a list of potential
other asymmetric threats. And I will bet, with a crowd like
this, we could come up with a list of about 80, 207--I don't
know what the list would be.
Are you at risk of kind of drifting into losing that laser-
like focus on that one threat of IEDs, or is there going to be
a formal decision-making process that will be transparent to
the Congress, transparent to all the folks involved in issues,
that will say, ``We have now made a decision that it is no
longer going to be just an IED-defeat organization. It is going
to be IEDs and drug use. It is going to be IEDs and cyber-
threat''?
I mean, what is the process going to be, or is it going to
be a drifting into other areas?
General Metz. Sir, I don't think we will drift. We have
achieved our success because of that laser focus. And as you
have correctly pointed out, if we open the aperture too wide,
too quickly, we will lose that laser focus.
The Department directive that gives me my mission statement
and all the specified task--it is very clear that the IED is
what we need for its strategic influence.
So I think that the first step would be the Department
would issue a new directive that would redefine. And I am
confident we would be very careful not to open the aperture
very much, so that we could continue the laser focus.
But that laser focus has taught us a lot, especially about
attacking human networks. And I think there is a potential to
open the aperture a little bit, but certainly not enough that
diffuses our effort and lets us wander too far. We need to
maintain that synergy and laser focus on IEDs, currently, but
maybe an asymmetric weapon, in the future.
Dr. Snyder. Your discussion about other asymmetric
threats--is that currently a discussion topic? There has not
been any, in your words, ``widening of the aperture,'' to this
point?
General Metz. No, sir. That discussion is very informal.
And one that I engage in very cautiously, because I do not want
to lose the focus that we have gained with the IED.
Dr. Snyder. General Kamiya, in your written statement, you
list some potential concerns about any changes in how JIEDDO is
structured. And I forget how you termed the phrase about the,
oh, ``inherent risk to the warfighter in restructuring JIEDDO
during a time of direct engagement with the enemy.'' General
Metz has used the term several times here today, ``the long
war.''
If we put on hold all things that changes we think
government might need to do, because we are involved in a war,
we could be trying to declare a time-out for a long time. I
mean, I don't think that is a very good reason not to want to
do things more efficiently.
Now, you may have concluded that there isn't any reason for
change. And I accept that as one of the options. But to say
that because we are engaged in direct combat, we should not
consider changing structure--that, you know, creates the
certainty that we will have some problems--perhaps not with
JIEDDO, but certainly other areas of government, if we are
going to be resistant to any change because we are at war.
How do you respond to that?
General Kamiya. First of all, let me clarify that the
inherent risk in changing what JIEDDO's clear focus is today is
a consideration. It is not a reason to not move and change.
It is a consideration that must be accounted for in terms
of, ``Where does the risk lie, and for how long?'' And for
planning purposes, we just want to make sure those questions
are answered as we move forward.
Dr. Snyder. My time is up.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The hearing we are having today, to some degree, follows in
the footsteps of one that was a more closed hearing. I think
that the thing that becomes kind of a question is, you start
with 12 people. They end up with 3,600 people.
How, exactly, does that work? And do we have, within the
Army, or within the military, kind of these specialist
organizations? How many of them do we need, and how does this
thing fit in the funding? How does it work in terms of the
overall organizational structure?
I think, obviously, the first thing to do, when you have a
serious problem, is to organize to fix a problem and get it
under control, which you have all done a great job of doing.
The question, then, is, later: How do you integrate that, and
how do you put that together? How do you fund it, and,
structurally, how do you define exactly where the limits and
sides of the thing are? And how do you not run into the problem
that we have thousands of examples here at our capital of all
kinds of overlapping and duplication?
And so I think that was part of the chairman's comments.
They are certainly some of mine--kind of a question mark. How
does that fit in in the future? That is why I started with a
new administration.
And Mr. Berkson, this--obviously, you don't have to solve
this problem, you know? Or probably don't, anyway. But, still,
you have had a good perspective, and you are taking a look
future-wise. Your job is to be planning out as to how this
works.
If there are any comments along those lines, it would be
helpful to us, I think.
Mr. Berkson. Thank you, Congressman.
You have highlighted a bunch of the challenges of this
organization. First of all, you have given--the Congress has
given--the Department a very rare----
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Berkson, would you pull that microphone
right close to you?
Mr. Berkson. I am sorry.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
Mr. Berkson. The Congress has given the Department an
opportunity, through the JIEDDO fund, to, literally, work
inside the enemy's time loop. We have taken that so seriously
as to have elevated its oversight to the Deputy Secretary, and
to keep them laser focused on what you have authorized us to
do.
The challenge will be, as we go forward--as those threats
emerge and evolve, we may, in the future, have to look outside
of IEDs as that asymmetric threat that is killing our people.
And this is the challenge that we have been dealing with, as we
think about the future.
We have funded this organization. We think it should be
institutionalized into the future. But, again, me telling you,
in 2013, what exact technologies, training, organizational
solutions, intelligence integration, we will have to have, is a
very difficult task. So this is the dilemma that we think about
as a country.
Mr. Akin. Do you see us transitioning, in a sense, from
IEDs to other types of asymmetric threats that are similar
characteristics? Do you see it expanding that way?
Mr. Berkson. As they have ever come up, we have been very
quick to take them out of the charter of JIEDDO. So, so far,
things other than IEDs are not in JIEDDO's charter, one, and
two, the primary threat to our troops on the battlefield is
this particular weapon.
If you think about the things needed to push in another
direction, it would be the enemy has found an alternative
asymmetric tool that has deadly effects on our people, and
that, again, we need to focus and shift on.
But I think all three of those have to come together at
once; the threat, its impact, and our need to respond to it to
save lives. And, again, if any of those three are missing, it
is difficult to imagine that you would push them toward another
direction, until we actually needed to deal with it.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
And thank you for your testimony.
Our defense establishment faces a difficult decision. That
is, ``Where do we spend the limited dollars that we have in
preparing to better prosecute the kinds of military activities
we are engaged in now, which involves enemies that, in no way,
even approach being a peer--or, to invest in the kind of
equipments that we will need if, in the future, we have a peer
and we, certainly, could have a peer in the future?''
The granddaddy of all asymmetric weapons, of course, is a
nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). And this isn't
just the asymmetric weapon of choice for a peer. It is also a
potential weapon of choice for a relatively small country, or
even a non-state entity. Because all you need is a trans-
steamer, a Scud launcher, which can be purchased on the open
market, and a crude nuclear weapon.
The ultimate nuclear weapon, of course, was described to us
by the Russian generals, who told our EMP Commission that the
Soviets had developed, and they had a enhanced EMP weapon that
would produce 200 kilovolts at the center, which, if detonated
300 miles high over Iowa or Nebraska, would produce an EMP lay-
down of 100 kilovolts per meter at the margins of our country.
That, I think, is considerably higher than anything we ever
built to, or tested to. During the Clinton years, because money
was short, we waived EMP hardening on almost all of our new
weapons systems.
If, in battle, there was a large EMP lay-down, like 100
kilovolts per meter--it could be very much higher than that at
the center--how much warfighting capability would we retain?
Mr. Berkson. Congressman, I am aware of some of the work
done by the EMP Commission. The exact response to, and our
system's capabilities against EMP are classified, frankly. And
we would have to have a kind of a closed session to actually
discuss that.
So I would need to follow up with you on that.
Mr. Bartlett. What I am told for an open hearing like this,
is that our command control, we hope, is reasonably hardened.
That is like me having my brain and spinal cord work okay, but
no arms and legs. I am not sure that hardening command and
control when you have got nothing to control, after a robust
EMP lay-down, makes much sense.
Would you agree?
Mr. Berkson. At the level of classification we have here, I
can't really respond to the exact capabilities of our weapons
systems in an EMP situation.
Mr. Bartlett. And as vulnerable as our military is, the
commission found themselves very much concerned about what
happened to our national infrastructure. They issued a second
report, focused primarily on the national infrastructure.
How do we make the decision as to where to spend our
precious dollar? And a robust EMP lay-down, nationwide, would,
as the EMP Commission said, ``essentially end life as we know
it.''
There is a book that is about to come out, called, ``One
Second After,'' which is a very interesting one-year scenario
about what might happen. How do we determine what the real
priorities are?
Isn't this kind of an example of tyranny of the urgent?
Clearly, these things we are doing now are urgent. The tyranny
of the urgent--almost always, the urgent sweeps the important
off the table. How do we make these decisions?
Mr. Berkson. Sir, I am the executive secretary of what is
called the Deputy's Advisory Working Group. We are a group of
folks that support the Deputy Secretary; includes the under
secretaries of the Defense Department, and the major service
players, both military and civilian.
And, literally, two to three times a week, we meet to
discuss all of the resource-allocation decisions for the
Department. We receive classified briefings. We talk about the
various tradeoffs that are involved. And we have deliberations
that, you know, are very heated and contentious. In fact, my
major role in that process is bringing facts and information to
the table to weigh those balance and trades.
So our process is that. We look at those various tradeoffs.
We, then, make our recommendation to the president. And he
submits them to you. And that is how the process works from our
side.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And since I just arrived, I have not had the benefit of
hearing the testimony that has been given. And so, therefore, I
will decline to ask any questions.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
Thank you.
I wanted to ask--I will start with General Metz--but anyone
else who wants to respond: What is your endpoint? Very
specifically, the IED Defeat Organization--what is the endpoint
for when you say, ``Mission accomplished. We have got 3,600
people. We will transfer 3,500 of them to other
organizations''?
General Metz. Sir, that endpoint, in my mind, would be the
defeat of the IED in Afghanistan and Iraq--its strategic
influence--as my mission statement from the DOD directive
indicates.
I would certainly fall a little bit short of an implied
task, which would be to ensure that the organization was ready
to move on to that next potential asymmetric threat.
But I think, given the current DOD directive that asks me
to lead, advocate and coordinate all of DOD's efforts against
the IED as a strategic weapon, the end game would be--is when
we defeat it.
Again, as I said in my opening statement, we won't run the
ambush off the battlefield, but I think the systemic use of the
IED as a strategic weapon can be defeated by making it so risky
to those in the network--to their life, limb or capture--and
the cost to the network constantly going up--that they move on
to something else.
So that would be the end game that I would see.
Dr. Snyder. There is not some measurable goal, or--you, in
your statement, specifically mentioned the drop in numbers of
attacks in Iraq, and the increase in Afghanistan.
You are not watching those numbers or have articulated a
specific number at which you would say, ``That is----''
General Metz. No, sir. We have not, because I think that
would be dangerous, given the influencing fact of just a few--
--
Dr. Snyder. Right.
General Metz. It would be dangerous to establish a number
just above or below that----
Dr. Snyder. Right.
General Metz [continuing]. Breakpoint.
Dr. Snyder. And, I think you are right.
Do any of the rest of you have any comment on that issue
of, ``What is our endpoint?'' You all should feel free to jump
in to any of these questions, by the way.
Mr. Beasley. Sir, I would just say the--you know----
Dr. Snyder. [OFF MIKE.]
Mr. Beasley. It is largely a force-protection measure. So
as long as we have troops in contact and in risk, in harm's
way, you need to continue that effort for, if nothing else, the
force-protection aspect of it.
Dr. Snyder. Some of combatant commanders believe that
JIEDDO is a temporary organization to rapidly focus on this
problem of IEDs, but that operations and funding should be
transferred to existing organizations, when appropriate.
How do you respond to those thoughts?
General Metz. Sir, my response is that, within a couple of
months of replacing General Meigs, the Deputy Secretary
reiterated that we would remain in our current form. We would
continue to work for him. We, already, have worked some money
into the base budget.
I took that as--in my own mission analysis--that we were in
a long war, and this was going to be a tough weapon system to
beat. And I believe that we must continue the passion that we
have got to beat this particular weapons system. And I think we
are on that path.
Dr. Snyder. Any other comments?
Mr. Berkson.
Mr. Berkson. I guess I would amplify that. I looked, on the
app of the Deputy Secretary, at this particular question. We
have been looking at this question and evaluating it on an
ongoing basis.
The challenge in an organization with three-plus-million
people and $500 billion is you are going to have seams between
functions, between organization services. This organization has
been set up to optimize a defeat of IEDs. So the seams that are
created for this structure are between services or functions or
other pieces of the organization.
We looked at, and continue to evaluate, the pieces of
JIEDDO, and where it might fit, and how it would connect, and
come back to the concern that optimizing for defeating IEDs and
their networks is the key issue we want to organize this
particular function for right now.
So you take those various tradeoffs, and you say, ``Right
now, it makes sense for the Department to be optimizing for
that end, given the impact that these are having on our
forces.''
I think as that either changes, or other requirements
emerge, that is a continuing piece of work we will be looking
at.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. It was, I think, mentioned in the previous
hearing that one of the things that you had done with the
organization was to reinforce the structure with people that
had had, actually--like detectives from police departments and
people who were used to doing, basically, criminal
investigation--that type of research and that type of logical,
piece-by-piece thinking, in order to try and move from evidence
to find a direct suspect.
What percentage of people in your organization have that
kind of a background, and do you have enough people to draw
from?
General Metz. I can get to you the exact percentage. Of an
organization of over 3,000, it will be a small number. But that
small number is making a tremendous impact.
And you are referring to the law-enforcement program, where
we have put members of the law-enforcement community of 20, 30
years' experience, and marry them with a brigade commander or a
Marine regimental commander, so that they can bring that
experience to the battlefield, because each one of those
individual IED events is certainly more like a criminal event.
And, therefore, they can use that tremendous experience that
they have, that sixth sense of knowing where to focus the
investigation.
So the number is a very small number, but I think we are
adequately sourced with those professionals at the brigade and
regimental level. And the program is one of our most successful
programs.
Mr. Akin. Just to follow up on that, is a significant piece
of information the various aerial assets that we have that
would help provide some historic information as to who has been
visiting a particular place at a particular time?
General Metz. Yes, sir.
We started with the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
Systems (JSTARs) and the movement target indicators and, often,
could use the archived data from that. With other initiatives
now, with full-motion video, and we can get even greater
resolution, we are finding the value of the archived data that
the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center can mine for us
is helping us solve a lot of very tough problems.
I believe that the data-mining and turning the
information--using it for knowledge for the warfighter is one
of our real successes.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
And thank you, Madam Chairman--I mean, Dr. Chairman. Excuse
me.
Dr. Snyder. I didn't get enough sleep last night. I just
couldn't come up with a quick comeback. I apologize. You gave
me a straight line. I just couldn't respond to it.
I want to ask about the issue of oversight and the
structure, and you and I talked about this the other day,
General Metz. But the question is oversight by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense sufficient as, perhaps, we define
oversight?
What do you all--let's start with you, Mr. Berkson, and
maybe hear what other people have to say.
Mr. Berkson. The oversight, again, the Deputy provides this
is, literally, a monthly meeting, at least, to go through all
of the efforts of General Metz and the organization.
He looks for the priorities. He looks for the metrics of
performance. He evaluates the programs and proposals that are
being made. He looks at the budget and how both--it is being
executed. He looks at the program's effectiveness. So it is a,
you know, an ongoing review at the--again, at the Deputy's
level, from a management standpoint.
And, again, given----
Dr. Snyder. Some of us might be a little skeptical. I think
he is a remarkable man, but there is a lot on his plate right
now. And you all are a relatively new, somewhat fluid
organization.
And when we think about oversight, we think about finding
the things that are not going right, that some people out there
amongst your 3,600 employees may not want General Metz to know
about.
And so the question becomes: Is the monthly meeting
sufficient to be doing that kind of evaluation--assessment--
have the time to troubleshoot when something flares up? That is
the question we may have on this side.
Mr. Berkson. Yes, I mean, the first line of defense on that
is a three-star general, whose job is to focus 100 percent of
his day on that effort, who has combat experience, and has led
groups of people and managed money.
And so I think our first--his first--check in the system is
a competent and experienced leader overseeing the day-to-day.
Dr. Snyder. Right.
Mr. Berkson. At the next level up, again, there are checks
and balances in the Defense Department, as you are well aware.
And if there are issues or questions of malfeasance, we have
inspector generals, we have audits, we have contract audit
agencies, a number of mechanisms.
From the fiscal and programmatic oversight, the services
execute most, if not all, of the funds that JIEDDO programs.
So, again, each of the service-acquisition agencies and
executives has a specific statutory and regulatory requirement
to certify as to the effectiveness of those programs.
So, while, you know, the deputies' once-a-month interaction
may not seem a lot of oversight, given all of the other checks
and balances we have in the system, it is, I think, a quite
good one. And, again, relative to the priorities of the
Department of Defense and the Nation, this is what is killing
our troops, and that is why he needs to spend time on this, and
why we think it is important----
Dr. Snyder. That is a fair statement.
When I hear you--by the way, Mr. Berkson, it is not that
you should lay awake at night worrying about this. Whenever I
hear the word ``synergy''--I think you used it--it makes--I get
cold chills. I think whenever somebody uses the word
``synergy,'' they are covering up something--there is some kind
of nebulous little world of people not quite sure what their
authority is or what they are supposed to be doing, and so we
are going to call it ``synergy,'' and we are going to kind of
fuse our efforts together. So I get nervous.
But, you know, I think, you know, the staff, here, spent
quite a bit of time trying to sort this out. And it is hard for
us to figure out exactly who does what. You know? I mean they
have met with people. It is a hard thing for us to sort out,
when you start talking about, ``There will be military branches
that spend the money,'' and, well, are those--you know, what
kind of relationships are those? And who follows the money?
Now, this may be just the nature of government, but it
seems like you all are a special breed, right now, for trying
to do something that we all agree is very, very important.
Do you envision that, as we move along, we will move in the
direction of more contracts, less contracts--to the work
being--migrating more into the military side of government, the
civilian side, the ratios staying about the same? Any of you
had any thoughts about that?
General Metz. Sir, I have thoughts about that, because one
of my responsibilities is to lead and look deep in time, and
broad in space. I think that much of the low-hanging fruit,
especially in our line of operation that we call ``Defeat the
Device,'' has been harvested. Nevertheless, we are still
looking for those answers to very complex, technological
challenges.
So I think because we have found things that did not work,
because we have turned away some proposals that we knew, from
our experience, would not work. We have archived that. And so
as good ideas come in, I am--there is an ever-thicker filter
for them to pass through.
And so I think there probably will be less contracts as we
refine our ability to understand the different initiatives that
may influence defeating the IED.
Back to your earlier comment, I would add that the DOD
directive gives me the authority, under $25 million, to make
decisions. And I think the experience that I have gained over
my career allowed me to carefully and accurately make those
decisions.
Above that number, there is a senior resource-steering
group that must all be coordinated with to approve, before it
goes to the Deputy Secretary for a final approval. That group
includes many of the principals in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. It includes the services.
So, virtually everything we do gets a very transparent and
thorough vetting before we make final decisions; having said
that, we have a very fast process that makes that work for the
warfighter. And my experience tells me we have got the right
checks and balances in place to protect the resources that you
have given us.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Conaway--five minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Well, I thank you.
I apologize for just walking in, and will try not to plow
ground that has already been plowed 11 dozen times.
As we look at Afghanistan and the IED threat there, there
are some public reports about troops there wanting vehicles
that are more nimble than the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicle (MRAP) because it just doesn't work in the Afghani
terrain. It works well, I guess, in urban settings, and those
kinds of things.
Does that redesign, or addressing that issue, fall under
what you guys are doing? Or is that entirely somebody else's
line of work?
General Metz. Sir, fundamentally, we have gotten away from,
in my organization, the platforms, whether they are ground
platforms or air platforms. But we do help coordinate. And,
certainly, the soldiers that are fighting in the Afghan terrain
probably do need a lighter, more maneuverable vehicle than the
MRAP.
Having said that, though, I think the troops, anywhere, are
appreciative of the MRAP, because it has, clearly, saved
soldiers----
Mr. Conaway. Yes. No. There was no question, I mean, no
implication that the MRAP wasn't doing its job. It is just that
they can't go as far in an MRAP as they might--as something
more nimble--could get that further with that protection--is
what they want. No criticism meant on the MRAP.
Addressing the financing system--I mean, how do we--does
that fall under your purview, where we--not our financing,
but--the way IEDs are being financed in both theaters--going
after those players?
General Metz. Yes, sir. We watch and, certainly, work at
the levels at which my organization can work, and coordinate
with the interagency. But financing networks that can put out
the vast quantities that were put out in late 2006 and through
the first half of 2007--those quantities required a lot of
money.
And so we, clearly, watch the finances, which is very
closely related to the supply chain. And we are watching the
supply chain very carefully. But much of that is in some of the
interagency, that we could talk about at a closed hearing.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
I would like to know what role--and I hope that this has
not been gone over yet--what role should Congress play in
improving our Nation's ability to combat IEDs and other
asymmetric threats?
General Metz. Sir, I think that role is being executed
right here, today--the oversight, so that we are transparent
with the resources that the taxpayer has given us. We owe that
transparency, certainly, to the degree in the open hearing that
we can share that.
There was some criticism, I think, constantly, about my
organization, that we may not be transparent enough; that we
often hide behind the classifications. I have looked at that
very carefully, and I have made a personal decision that I will
not give the enemy any advantage from my discussion of IEDs.
Having said that, with the Congress, with industry, with
academia, with whomever I am working, I want to be as
transparent so that we get all the help we can get. And so your
oversight is one way that I think is actually helping us to
ensure that we are headed down the right paths.
One of the very powerful tools that we are given through
the Joint IED Defeat Fund is--are the resources that are not
tagged to a particular function, like research and development,
or procurement, or operations, so that we have the flexibility.
And that flexibility is a very powerful tool when you are
fighting an enemy that is not respectful of our budget cycle;
an enemy that is innovative, very intelligent, ruthless. And in
an information age where the sharing of that information is the
speed of light--so the flexibility that--the funds that you
have given us is a very key part of our success.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir.
General Kamiya. Sir, from a joint-training perspective, I
can tell you that my organization and JFCOM, at large, takes
increasing the return on investment--making every dollar
count--very, very seriously.
For us, as we look to the future. I have already described
in my written statement the many ways in which USJFCOM and
JIEDDO support each other in joint training. As we look to the
future, though, there are opportunities to expand this
partnership, and, again, even given the current resource
levels, to multiply, in my judgment, the return on investment.
Let me give you a couple of examples. First of all, we all
acknowledge that JIEDDO is developing a training COIC that will
replicate and be a portal, if you will, to introduce the array
of capabilities and lessons learned, that JIEDDO is learning as
an organization--into the training environment.
We are, currently, engaged in dialogue with JIEDDO and the
Army to make sure that this training COIC does not become
overly service-centric, that it addresses the C-IED, that it
addresses the counter-IED training requirements of multiple
services, and can, in addition to what support it. It can
provide our JFCOM Mission Rehearsal Exercise Program, primarily
designed for joint forces going to the CENTCOM Area of
Responsibility (AOR)--it can, over time, help us with exercise
planning and support.
We provide the support to two exercises per COCOMs each
year. So you can see how this can eventually lead to JIEDDO
support to a multiplicity of combatant commanders, globally.
The second area where we believe that we can, perhaps--
would provide a greater return on investment--is for the way
our organizations provide support to service-training programs.
We acknowledge the way JIEDDO's Joint Center of Excellence at
Fort Irwin helps the services meet C-IED training requirements.
Inside my organization, we also manage, on behalf of the
Department of Defense, a program known as a Joint National
Training Capability, that is designed to provide service-
training programs with a joint context. And let me give you a
couple of--an example of where, sir--Mr. Chairman--using that
word ``synergy,'' if I may--exists.
In fiscal year 2007, the JIEDDO's Joint Center of
Excellence and our Joint National Training Capability Program
partnered together to field a closed cellphone network at the
Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana.
That capability was primarily designed to defeat the
network; to replicate, in a closed way, cellphone capabilities.
However, when you look at the broader array of training
requirements across the services, that same closed-loop
cellphone network can also provide opportunities to enhance the
Army's opposing-forces capability at the Joint Readiness
Training Center, as well as, potentially, meet some Joint
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Capabilities.
So, again, while the leading effort was to counter and to
enhance C-IED capabilities, if you have someone like my
organization, like the Joint National Training Capability
Program--look--and a much broader array of a joint task, you
can easily see how a C-IED investment for the same amount of
money can impact on other service requirements.
So those are two examples of the way, from a joint-training
perspective, we can enhance the Department's and Congress's
return on investment.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. I want to ask about the Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) study on the human-network-attack part of this. They
identified a significant number of DOD initiatives, but
recommended there be some kind of a champion to coordinate. And
I assume that you all have had some discussions with them.
Do any of you have any thoughts about who should be that
champion?
Mr. Berkson. Right now, that is the vice chairman, as the
former STRATCOM commander----
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry. Could you speak a little----
Mr. Berkson. The vice chairman, as the former STRATCOM
commander, surfaced that issue a number of, I think a couple of
years ago. And we have been looking at it. I don't think we
have come to a determination of the management approach going
forward, for that.
Obviously, JIEDDO has a big role in that, and probably
plays one of the largest roles in having expertise on
countering human networks, from the standpoint of both
expertise and the dollars being invested. But as far as I am
aware, we haven't made any change or coordination--agent or
such for a human-network attack.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Beasley, I wanted to ask about acquisition.
Probably Duncan Hunter, who, at that time, was chairman of the
committee, was very concerned about. During a time of war, we
felt like it was probably both our faults things couldn't be
bought as quickly as they needed to be bought to respond to the
needs of the folks--on the men and women on the ground in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
And do you think that the models that you all have come up
with--that there is lessons to be learned throughout the
acquisition process, on how to move things along quickly, and
still get the quality and delivery times that you all want?
Mr. Beasley. I believe there are many, many lessons we can
learn, and----
Dr. Snyder. Is your mic on there, Mr. Beasley?
Mr. Beasley. Yes, it is. Can you hear me?
Dr. Snyder. Yes. Yes, thanks.
Mr. Beasley. I do believe there are many lessons we can
learn. In fact, we are taking on a project at this moment--Lean
Six Sigma-related methodology--to look at the rapid-acquisition
processes, which I will describe as urgent-needs processes. And
I will explain that in just a moment--within the Department, to
include the four services, special operations commands
(SOCOMs), JIEDDO, and my own Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC)
process, to determine if there are common lessons that we can
apply across the Department to more effectively do the rapid
acquisitions, and also export those recommendations to the
defense acquisition system.
Back to the urgent needs, we say ``rapid acquisition.''
Generally, we are in the urgent-needs process, in that other
organizations----
Dr. Snyder. I think that is a better name. Yes.
Mr. Beasley [continuing]. Actually acquire the capability.
Dr. Snyder. You are going to come up with some kind of a
formal, written document that--what you learned? Is that what
your end point is--so you are studying?
Mr. Beasley. We will make recommendations to the Under
Secretary of Defense AT&L. The----
Dr. Snyder. You anticipate there may be some
recommendations for Congress, as far as statutory changes that
need to be made? Or do you have a sense of that yet?
Mr. Beasley. We haven't gotten that far yet. Clearly, that
is on the table, if we can see some changes that could be made.
Again, one of the things we found in the Department is the
Department has many, many authorities that it can't exercise,
to do things rapidly. It is getting the will of the people who
actually have to execute those authorities to take the
initiative to execute them.
It is often difficult, at the low-level program manager,
individual contracting officer, to expedite actions when you
need them. In fact, I carry around a letter from the other
body--Senators Biden and Bond--that starts off with
``unconscionable bureaucratic delay in the Department,'' and
``rapid acquisition.''
I remember those words of that letter. And my objective is
to cut through the bureaucracy and get the capability to the
warfighter. I don't see that bureaucracy is an inhibitor within
JIEDDO. They are organized to address the needs of the
combatant commands that they are supporting.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you. I hope you will--and I am sure you
will--share with us anything you think we ought to know about
it--that we might be helpful with in the process.
General Metz, I was fumbling through my notes here. Was it
3,600 personnel that you think you--was that the number you
used--3,600 personnel?
General Metz. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Now, of those 3,600 personnel, how many of them
are contract personnel?
General Metz. Sir, a large majority of them. I can----
Dr. Snyder. Thirty-one hundred or so?
General Metz. Sir, I can provide a matrix that outlines all
the military, government, civilians, contractors that are on
the joint manning document, and contractors that are hired to--
for particular projects, all the way to those that are hired
for a particular initiative. But we have got all that data. And
we can certainly provide that.
Dr. Snyder. Is that probably about the proportion in the
2,600 or 3,000 range of contractors, out of that total number?
General Metz. Yes, sir. That is pretty close.
Dr. Snyder. Now, how do you all evaluate, or do you have a
process for looking at those numbers of contractors and
concluding, ``Well, wait a minute. This is probably an
inherently governmental function that should more properly be
handled through the normal hiring process.'' It would probably
be cheaper for the government through the normal hiring
process.
Do you make that determination? Did you make that
determination in all 2,600 or so contractors?
General Metz. Sir, I would like very much to move that
ratio much more in favor of uniformed and government civilian.
And that effort has been improving ever since--even before I
took the job. I know General Meigs was concerned, and had
started that effort.
But we still have, because of the rapid nature at which we
are doing business, a need to be able to be flexible and be
able to use the money to hire the people to do something very
quickly for us.
Again, I think it is an issue--a rightful issue--to make
sure we have got the right government control. And I am
watching that very carefully. And I think we are moving in the
right direction, albeit maybe not as fast as we would like to.
But I think we have got a clear definition of where we want to
go, and improve that ratio.
Dr. Snyder. Let me see if anyone else has any questions.
Mr. Akin.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Johnson.
I wanted to ask, with regard to the COIC and JIEDDO--did--
in your all's minds, do those need to always be linked, or do
you see it as they could go separately, or are there advantages
or disadvantages that--talk to me about that, General Metz.
General Metz. I have often described the COIC as a mega-
initiative. You know, we began to develop the COIC based on the
specified tasks in the DOD directive that we needed to maintain
and joint-operation and intelligence picture.
As we developed that, we learned that mining the Web pages
of all those different commands is a very timely and energy-
consuming effort. The COIC was able to develop abilities to go
into databases inside the DOD and bring that information to
analysts.
Great young men and women, many of whom were contractors,
but working for the government, developed algorithms that
allowed us to mine that data and create knowledge for the
warfighter. So in the near term, I would strongly recommend
that the COIC remain part of my organization.
As it develops its ability to fight human networks and
becomes very mature, there could be a place downstream, where
you may want to look at it as an entity that could--to work for
someone else.
But I would be very cautious. Because of that razor look at
IEDs, we are learning so much about fighting these human
networks, that I would keep it, you know, certainly for a
period of time, under the DOD directive that forces us to look
at the IED.
Dr. Snyder. You had mentioned earlier the flexibility.
Maybe it was you, General Kamiya.
Or maybe it was you, General Metz--that the flexibility in
moving money around--I think it was in response to Mr. Johnson
about that--that you would have flexibility from Congress,
moving money around.
Have you had situations where you, in moving initiatives
into one of the branches of the military--that because they
have different ways of budgeting, and more--less flexible
funding methodologies--that it has caused some problems for
getting the same job done? Or have you had occasion where you
just decided not to make the move because of the lack of
flexibility? Has that been a problem?
General Metz. Sir, I think that--and I will let Mr. Berkson
add to my comments. This is a subject that is constantly on my
mind, and constantly being worked, because we are working
within--because of the three-year money, we are able to work
with great flexibility. As our enemy is working inside our
budget cycle, so are we.
When we mature an initiative, there will always be some
friction with the services as that good initiative needs to be
picked up by the services. I don't envision the Joint IED
Defeat Organization being a sustainer of a particular,
especially material, initiative, and many of the non-material
initiatives for very long.
But because of the budget cycle, we need to make decisions
as we mature that initiative to work with the services on when
they are capable of picking it up. And in many cases, either
supplemental dollars for us to carry it, to when they can pick
it up in their program, or they pick it up on supplemental
dollars to eventually drive it into their program. But there is
going to be a natural friction because the enemy is making
decisions inside our budget cycle.
And that friction, I think, is okay because it forces us to
really look at the initiative very hard and very critical,
should the service pick it up either as a program of record or
as a temporary effort. But it is something that we are watching
very carefully. And to date, in my experience--in my nine
months--the vice chiefs of the services and the staffs have
worked very closely together, and in a very cooperative way, to
track these main initiatives.
Mr. Berkson. Although it is, you know, at the end of the
Administration--and the next Administration will do what they
do with regard to 2010--but if you just take the timeframe, my
main job is looking at 2010 through 2015 right now.
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry. It is looking----
Mr. Berkson. My main job is looking at the years 2010
through 2015.
Dr. Snyder. Okay.
Mr. Berkson. So all of the issues that JIEDDO has to deal
with that need to be sustained in the longer term are issues we
look at, and are looking at, kind of in the year--two years
out.
The wonderful thing about the capability that JIEDDO has is
they are going to be dealing with things that happen in the
next two years. A month from now, we won't be able to predict
what they are. And that is the money that is very difficult, in
our process, to actually--those are the resources that are very
difficult to bring to bear in a timely fashion. It can be done
through supplementals, but even then, the timing is more
difficult.
So as you think about a transition of a program from JIEDDO
into the service, as you think about the two-year-and-out
window, that is the department and the kind of the natural
rhythm of funding that we think about as we do our annual
budget submission.
And, again, the work that General Metz does really kind of
encompasses the timeframe from this moment to the point in
which the President signs the appropriations bill. That is the
time that is the most, you know, critical for us for this
activity, but also the most difficult to do in the kind of
normal process.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Akin, do you have anything further?
Mr. Akin. Nothing further.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Conaway, anything further?
I wanted to give any of you that had any comment you wanted
to make about anything we talked about today your last shot at
the microphone today.
General Kamiya, anything further?
General Kamiya. No, sir.
Dr. Snyder. I appreciate you being here.
Mr. Beasley.
Mr. Beasley. Yes. Thank you very much.
Just----
Dr. Snyder. You have to pull that microphone in, though.
Mr. Beasley. Okay.
For Mr. Conaway--you asked about the light MRAP. I double-
checked my notes here. CENTCOM has submitted their joint urgent
operational need. That joint urgent operational need is at the
Joint Staff J-8 today for their validation. In fact, the
Department is leaning forward in assigning that to the MRAP
Task Force.
I think, in the press, you could even read some discussions
about that light vehicle and some of its characteristics to be
fielded to Afghanistan. So I see relatively quick turnaround in
getting that capability to Afghanistan.
Regarding oversight of JIEDDO, the director of JRAC has had
the opportunity to participate in the Deputy Secretary's
meetings over the last several years. And the meeting occurs
with both the Deputy Secretary and the vice chairman.
And their counsel is well-received. The direction vectors
they give to JIEDDO help inform both the senior leadership and
the director of JIEDDO in critical warfighting needs and
priorities--again, informed by the Deputy Secretary and the
vice chairman.
As was stated, there is a senior resource steering group, a
three-four-star-level board. They all have the opportunity to
weigh in on the oversight of JIEDDO at any time.
JIEDDO has a one-to-two-star board--representative from the
services--broad range across the OSD offices--policy,
intelligence, JRAC. AT&L has another office sitting on there--
Joint Staff--several Joint Staff offices. We all have the
opportunity to provide our guidance and counsel.
Back to the acquisition oversight. Again, the paradigm is
my organization, JIEDDO. We don't buy anything. Someone else
buys it. The oversight of the acquisitions falls under the
acquisition process established by the organization that is
doing that.
What we do is help push them to get them to make their
decisions, accomplish the acquisitions, the procurements, using
the authorities they inherently have--get those waivers and
deviations they may need--to get the capability to the
warfighter as quickly as possible.
Financial oversight--I think my experience with the
JIEDDO--that is a continuing, improving endeavor of JIEDDO.
Again, when they had 12 people as a task force, and they
suddenly grew to a larger organization, the financial oversight
may not have been perfect.
My deputy director of the JRAC is in the comptroller. I
have had discussions with him about the financial oversight.
They are looking at ways to even improve it beyond what it is
now. So my expectation is the financial oversight--the ability
to actually get the money obligated, and understand where it is
going to have additional improvements.
Regarding funding of JIEDDO. I want to emphasize that the--
we will call it ``colorless money''--enables JIEDDO to rapidly
respond to the needs of the warfighter.
The JRAC has the same type of fund. We use the Iraq Freedom
Fund. We have requested some additional funds in a rapid-
acquisition fund--colorless money. The JRAC has had very
limited appropriations in fiscal year 2008. And, as a result, I
have had to turn to the services and go through their processes
to get funding.
What I want to tell you is that process takes longer. If
you have the funding up front, like JIEDDO has the funding, you
can make the decisions. You can resource the capability. And
you can get it to the warfighter.
Over $2 billion in Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs)
have been funded, that are not counter-IED, in fiscal year
2008. Over $1 billion will be funded, or is expected to be
funded, in fiscal year 2009 that are not counter-IED. Had that
funding been available and not part of the second supplemental
reprogramming actions that have occurred over the last two
months, then some of these actions could have been accomplished
months before.
So what I am saying is, having the colorless money saves
months on getting the capability to the warfighter. And I can
document that for the non-counter-IED JUONs.
Thank you very much.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Beasley.
I notice you have got some pieces of paper there. I didn't
see an organizational chart there, which I think I would say,
``Thank God for that; that I don't have to look at that.'' I
think it would be a very complicated organizational chart,
trying to follow that around. But I appreciate your outlining
those concepts. I appreciate your service.
Mr. Matthews, anything further you want to say?
Mr. Matthews. Sir, nothing further than to say it is an
important topic. I appreciate you spending the time to look
into it. I hope you have got all the information you need to
make the right decisions. And the message is the same on what
is important and flexible and allows them the agility to make a
difference in a timely fashion. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Yes. Thank you.
General Metz, or Mr. Berkson, have----
Mr. Berkson. I just want to thank you again, on behalf of
the Secretary and the Deputy. This is something we want to work
with the Congress to find out how we can all be comfortable
getting to the best solution to save our soldiers' lives.
Dr. Snyder. Well, we appreciate you all being here today,
and appreciate your service. And we may have some questions in
follow up for the record. Or you all get back with your folks
and they say, ``Wait a minute, we should have informed about
such and such.'' Feel free to send that over to us, and we will
include that as part of the record and distribute it to the
membership also.
Thank you all.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 16, 2008
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September 16, 2008
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 16, 2008
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. In specific terms, please describe the current level of
interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA
support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting
from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-
IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information
between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal departments and agencies?
Mr. Berkson. JIEDDO benefits extensively from interagency support.
External agencies have provided JIEDDO with more than 100 personnel who
serve as liaisons with their organizations, as outlined in JIEDDO's May
2008 quarterly report to the Congress. These personnel are DoD points
of contact and catalysts for initiatives across the full range of
efforts necessary to defeat the IED threat at home and abroad. JIEDDO
works with other agencies to counter transnational threats through
information sharing and collaboration as well as technology transfer
programs. Local agencies and bomb squads have access to, and can
provide information to support, a database of improvised explosive
devices used around the world. This database is the repository for all
of the data on bomb-making methods collected from available sources,
including the military and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives. Researchers cull data from manuals and Web materials
generated by insurgents. Only cleared users can access the site, chief
among whom are the country's roughly 2,900 bomb technicians on 472
accredited squads.
Through collaboration and an expansive set of forums, information-
sharing networks, and outreach efforts, JIEDDO coordinates,
deconflicts, and collaborates on finding solutions to IED threats,
integrating its efforts with the substantial ongoing work of the armed
services, the intelligence community, interagency organizations, and a
broad range of public and private partners. These coordinated efforts
allow JIEDDO to provide the leaders of government agencies with a
single point of contact for counter-IED activities, while helping to
establish a common operational picture of IEDs and their employment
around the world.
Dr. Snyder. In specific terms, please describe the current level of
interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA
support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting
from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-
IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information
between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal departments and agencies?
General Metz. JIEDDO benefits extensively from interagency support.
Interagency collaboration is already fairly robust within JIEDDO and
there are no obvious shortfalls in our ability to leverage all the
assets of the U.S. government. JIEDDO has daily contact with multiple
interagency personnel including: resident LNOs from the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC); National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency (NGA); National Security Agency (NSA); Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
This support encompasses more than 80 liaison personnel from external
agencies working towards JIEEDDO's Counter-LED (C-IED) mission. These
personnel serve as the DoD point of coordination and catalyst for
initiatives across a full range of efforts necessary to defeat the IED
threat at home and abroad; they are embedded throughout the JIEDDO
headquarters and our C-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC).
JIEDDO works with other agencies against transnational threats by
information sharing and collaboration, as well as, technology transfer
programs. Government agencies and local bomb squads provide information
to support a database of IEDs used around the world. This database
stores all the data on bomb-making methods collected from available
sources, including the military and the ATF. Researchers also cull data
from captured manuals and internet available materials created by
insurgents. Only cleared users can access the site, and among the
visitors are the country's roughly 2,900 bomb technicians on 472
accredited squads.
Additionally, the JIEDDO Chief Scientist and Science Advisor is a
member of the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on
Domestic Improvised Explosive Devices. This group meets monthly to
discuss issues associated with the protection of the Homeland from the
threat of IEDs. Further, through Science and Technology, JIEDDO is
working with DHS to share information that will provide benefit to both
the warfighter abroad, as well as, to the protection of United States
citizens at home.
JIEDDO established its formal process for information sharing
through collaboration and an expansive set of forums, information
sharing networks, and outreach efforts. JIEDDO coordinates, de-
conflicts, and collaborates on finding solutions to IED threats;
integrating its efforts with the substantial ongoing work of the Armed
Services, the intelligence community, interagency organizations, and a
broad series of public and private partners. This allows JIEDDO to
provide senior leaders of government agencies with a single point of
contact for C-IED efforts, while helping to establish a common
operational picture of IEDs and their employment around the world.
JIEDDO designed its processes and procedures to ensure close
coordination with all Interagency and International partners within the
C-IED fight.
JIEDDO enjoys excellent partnerships with DHS and USNORTHCOM in our
focus on protecting the Homeland. JIEDDO supports the homeland security
C-IED fight through a full-time NORTHCOM desk officer who provides
daily C-IED intelligence liaison with NORTHCOM and other interagency
organizations regarding potential IED threats to the homeland. The
NORTHCOM desk officer also continuously monitors world-wide IED trends,
tactics, techniques, and procedures that terrorist or criminal groups
may implement with the intent or capability of attacking the homeland.
JIEDDO also maintains a full-time Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Desk officer who maintains intelligence
liaison with various interagency representatives regarding any
potential CBRNE nexus to the homeland IED threat. Both of these
analysts also have daily access to the ATF LNO assigned to JIEDDO,
thereby providing information sharing across U.S. governmental
agencies. Within JIEDDO, the NORTHCOM desk officer can exchange
information with the DHS through NORTHCOM contacts or one of several
DHS points of contact directly, depending on the information required.
JIEDDO's lead DHS LNO is developing a Concept of Operations (ConOp) for
implementation of JIEDDO (COIC) tools and methodologies against the DHS
problem set. JIEDDO receives ample support and is able to conduct
liaison with all required federal agencies through resident LNOs,
USNORTHCOM, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), DIA's Joint
Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism (JITF-CT), other COCOMs, or
direct points of contacts in support of the homeland defense C-IED
mission.
JIEDDO welcomes continued support from our IA partners, their
liaison personnel, and other identified personnel involved in the C-IED
mission.
Dr. Snyder. In specific terms, please describe the current level of
interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA
support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefiting
from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-
IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information
between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal departments and agencies?
Mr. Matthews. JIEDDO's connection with the interagency (IA) is
extensive. The IA has numerous liaisons to JIEDDO both here in the
United States and forward. The Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical
Center (TEDAC) located with the FBI at Quantico, VA is an IA location
where the sharing of IED related information is conducted. The TEDAC
coordinates and manages the united effort of Law Enforcement,
intelligence and military assets to technically and forensically
exploit IEDs across the interagency.
Dr. Snyder. In specific terms, please describe the current level of
interagency (IA) support to DoD's C-IED effort. What additional IA
support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefiting
from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DoD's C-
IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information
between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal departments and agencies?
Mr. Beasley. As Director (Acting) of the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell (JRAC), I do not have oversight of the level of interagency
support to DoD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) mission or
JIEDDO's exchange of information with the Department of Homeland
Security and other federal departments and agencies. The JRAC supports
the JIEDDO by assessing and forwarding C-IED Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONs), received from Combatant Commanders, to the JIEDDO and
through the JRAC's Director's membership on various JIEDDO Boards that
evaluate and recommend approval of C-IED initiatives.
Dr. Snyder. In specific terms, please describe the current level of
interagency (IA) support to DOD's C-IED effort. What additional IA
support would you like to see? How is our homeland security benefitting
from the large investment and significant accomplishments of DOD's C-
IED effort? Is there a formal process for exchange of information
between JIEDDO and the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal departments and agencies?
General Kamiya. One means of interagency support is participation
in the mission rehearsal exercises that USJFCOM conducts for joint
force headquarters designated for employment in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Horn of Africa. The exercises provide an environment for training and
collaboration between deploying headquarters, interagency partners, and
multinational participants. Interagency participants relevant to C-IED
efforts include Department of Treasury and Justice as well as DOD
intelligence agencies such as NSA.
Another avenue of interagency support is information exchange with
USJFCOM's Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE). KnIFE has
access to the Department of Homeland Security TRIPwire website that
catalogues IED technical information to assist domestic bomb squads and
the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) secure computer network that gives law
enforcement officers around the country access to sensitive but
unclassified information and intelligence reports. Also, KnIFE
coordinates with the Secret Service to receive current Threat Finance
information that can be shared throughout DOD and the interagency
community on KnIFE's Websites.
As KnIFE moves forward into other knowledge areas there will likely
be increasing areas of interaction and support required with the
various federal departments and agencies. USJFCOM is currently
analyzing requirements to determine prioritization of future KnIFE
knowledge areas. One example of this effort would be support for a site
on the KnIFE portal for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) information.
In the case of a WMD site, KnIFE would need to access data from a
variety of different interagency organizations to include DOE, FEMA,
DHS, ATF, FBI, and CDC.
USJFCOM is unable to respond with specific examples of how homeland
security is improved as a result of DOD investment in the C-IED effort.
It could be stated, however, that if the best means to secure the
homeland is by ``defending in depth'' then the work that JIEDDO is
doing to defeat the network that supports the use of IED's in the
CENTCOM AOR is helping to secure the homeland.
USJFCOM is not aware of formal processes used to exchange
information between JIEDDO and DHS.
Dr. Snyder. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the
COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some
expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its
original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with
existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address
these concerns? How are the COCOMs--JIEDDO's main customers--involved
in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?
Mr. Berkson. JIEDDO initiatives benefit from funding plans that are
transparent, analytically based, executable, and linked to the
sustainment plans for the initiatives. To that end, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and his senior advisors, including the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, review all JIEDDO expenditures
exceeding $25 million. The Deputy Secretary and his advisors also
review the associated initiatives to ensure that they are not redundant
with existing capabilities.
DoD fully recognizes the need for active COCOM participation in
discussions related to JIEDDO's future. Representatives from the COCOMs
have participated in JIEDDO ``cross brief '' conferences and program
review issue teams, and key elements of JIEDDO are staffed with liaison
officers who operate from forward locations in the COCOMs' areas of
responsibility. The COCOMs have also provided liaison officers to
JIEDDO to enhance communications and collaboration. The Joint Staff
also maintains primary, direct communications with COCOMs on all issues
concerning JIEDDO. The Joint Staff leverages the operational expertise
of the COCOMs and the Senior Warfighter Forums to identify issues,
priorities, and capability and resource mismatches.
JIEDDO's original purposes--to design, develop, and field counter-
IED capabilities well inside normal budgetary timelines--remain highly
relevant to our combatant commanders. The COCOMs confirm that JIEDDO
has provided a synergy unique within DoD, and that it has enabled joint
and coalition forces to respond effectively to the disruptive threat
posed by IEDs and the networks behind them. The Secretary continues to
consult with the COCOMs, along with his other military and civilian
advisors, to ensure that JIEDDO continues to meet this unique need.
Dr. Snyder. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the
COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some
expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its
original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with
existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address
these concerns? How are the COCOMs--JIEDDO's main customers--involved
in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?
General Metz. JIEDDO works deliberately to avoid duplication of
Counter-IED (C-IED) efforts. One area which we are especially careful
with is the Title X responsibility Services have to train and equip
their forces for employment by Combatant Commanders (COCOMS). Using our
chartered authority to Lead, Advocate, and Coordinate all Department of
Defense (DoD) C-IED actions in support of the COCOMS, JIEDDO works
closely with the Services to overlay vigorous, accurate, up to the
minute training experiences on to the existing Service pre-deployment
programs. This effort supplements, but does not supersede, Service
training efforts. JIEDDO leverages the acquisition infrastructure of
Services to harness their warfighting expertise and their acumen in
defense procurement. In the effort to lead, focus, and coordinate DoD
C-IED efforts, JIEDDO actively works with Services to avoid duplication
of their programs that contribute to defeating IEDs.
Both the Senior Warfighting Forum (SWarF) and the Deputy's Advisory
Working Group (DAWG) value the synergy of JIEDDO's Train the Force,
Defeat the Device, and Attack the Network lines of operation. JIEDDO's
ability to fuse information from numerous sources is leveraged by all
COCOMS. JIEDDO's main effort is delivering actionable and operational
information to identify and attack the cells and networks that are
conducting IED attacks against coalition forces, and civilians, in Iraq
and Afghanistan. COCOMs, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS), actively participate in DoD decisions regarding the
future of JIEDDO via a number of working forums (SWarF, DAWG, etc.)
where they have a voice.
JIEDDO, as a jointly manned activity of the Department of Defense,
operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. As JIEDDO's Director, I serve as the principal
advisor to both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on IED defeat matters. The COCOMs, JIEDDO's
principal customers, collaborate with JIEDDO through the CJCS and vice
versa. JIEDDO provides rapid responses to war fighter C-IED needs that
existing DoD organizations are unable to provide. Further, through
continuous collaboration and evolvement of the COCOMs in the
development and implementation of their C-IED plans, JIEDDO continues
to take proactive measures to provide a supportive and collaborative
role in each unique COCOM mission area.
Dr. Snyder. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the
COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some
expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its
original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with
existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address
these concerns? How are the COCOMs--JIEDDO's main customers--involved
in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?
Mr. Matthews. The IED problem still remains a clear and present
threat to our forces for the foreseeable future. The JIEDDO maturation
process has led to a number of initiatives to defeat what has evolved
into a sophisticated network. The JIEDDO program is reviewed by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other Department senior leaders for expenditure exceeding $25
million. The JIEDDO review process scrutinizes initiatives from the
services and the COCOMs. JIEDDO works deliberately to avoid redundancy
with existing DOD organizations. The Deputy's Advisory Working Group
reviewed the JIEDDO organization activities and functions and decided
in May 2008 to keep JIEDDO as an enduring organization.
Dr. Snyder. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the
COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some
expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its
original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with
existing DoD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address
these concerns? How are the COCOMs--JIEDDO's main customers--involved
in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?
Mr. Beasley. As Director (Acting) of the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell (JRAC), I do not have cognizance of the COCOM's concerns regarding
JIEDDO or its actions to address these concerns. The JRAC supports the
JIEDDO by assessing and forwarding Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
(C-IED). Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), received from
Combatant Commanders, to the JIEDDO and through the JRAC Director's
membership on various JIEDDO Boards that evaluate and recommend
approval of C-IED initiatives.
Dr. Snyder. At their April 2008 Senior Warfighting Forum, the
COCOMs were complimentary about JIEDDO's contributions, but some
expressed significant concerns about the organization outliving its
original purpose and expanding into areas that are redundant with
existing DOD organizations. What, if anything, is being done to address
these concerns? How are the COCOMs--JIEDDO's main customers--involved
in decisions related to JIEDDO's future?
General Kamiya. USJFCOM does not have a current mandate to
coordinate discussions with combatant commands about JIEDDO's future.
The Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF) referenced in the question focused
on identifying required C-IED capabilities and a prioritized
descriptive set of capability attributes to inform the Department on
development of future capabilities. The SWarF focused on the ``demand
side'' of the warfighter challenge while a concurrent Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) directed that PA&E conduct a study focused on the
``supply side'' of the challenge; that is, how best to institutionalize
JIEDDO's functions in the Department with respect to operations,
intelligence, training, and acquisition. During the SWarF, combatant
commands presented perspectives on the JIEDDO organization to include
opining on functions that JIEDDO performed that could be considered
redundant with in-theater capabilities or better handled by another
organization within DOD.
These combatant command comments, in addition to prioritized C-IED
capabilities and attributes, were reported to VCJCS, briefed to the
JROC, and ultimately were used to inform the 18 April 2008 PA&E study
findings and recommendations. The PA&E study findings and
recommendations were presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Advisory Working Group (DAWG) in May of 2008. The PA&E recommendations
presented to the DAWG considered and incorporated combatant command
input from the SWarF and offered several courses of action that spanned
from maintaining the JIEDDO status quo, to three separate options for
distributing discrete JIEDDO functions across different DOD
organizations. While the Department's decision on these various options
is pending, the SWarF provided a viable venue for the combatant
commands to voice their needs and concerns to inform the Department's
decision on a way ahead for institutionalizing JIEDDO.
USJFCOM is unable to provide a specific response since USJFCOM does
not work with JIEDDO on this issue. It is feasible that future SWarF's
could be convened to address this issue but this is not planned at this
time.
Dr. Snyder. When available, please provide the committee the
Program Decision Memorandum discussing the institutionalization of
JIEDDO.
Mr. Berkson. Program Decision Memoranda are among the internal
working documents used in developing the President's budget request.
These documents are not released outside of the Department. Upon
completion of internal program and budget reviews, the Department
provides detailed budget justification documents to accompany the
President's budget request. These documents express the
administration's position on funding levels requested in the base
budget and across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Dr. Snyder. You testified that the IED will never be removed from
the battlefield, but that the endpoint for JIEDDO would be the defeat
of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence, as declared in your
mission statement from JIEDDO's DOD Directive. In specific terms,
please explain how you will know when this endpoint is achieved? Will
JIEDDO's effort continue at the current level until that endpoint is
reached or will it be scaled proportionately to the level of the IED's
impact?
General Metz. I believe that we will never be able to completely
eradicate the IED as a weapon used by our enemy, but must focus on
neutralizing its strategic effects. Thus, while the weapon may manifest
itself in many ways at the tactical level, we must understand that the
strategic intent of those who employ it is to weaken the resolve of the
American public, their decision makers, and our allies throughout the
world. Long after Coalition Forces have drawn down in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the United States will, in my estimation, need to maintain
an enduring and latent capacity to react to the threat of IEDs. If my
appreciation of the strategic threat is accurate, then American
warfighters can expect to face this tactical threat whenever they enter
a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. This has profound
policy implications for our future, and must be factored into any
future considerations concerning U.S. military engagement.
At JIEDDO, the matter of defeating IEDs is not based on counting,
but rather as one of tempo and effect that will impact the United
States and our allies, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but throughout
the world. Given the significant superiority of our conventional forces
against likely conventional threats, it is evident to JIEDDO that had
we not galvanized against this threat in the CENTCOM region, we would
certainly have had to combat it somewhere else. As the need for JIEDDO
is continuously expressed by the Combatant Commands (COCOMs),
principally by CENTCOM, the IED threat continues to evolve. JIEDDO must
remain easily adaptable to counter this fluctuation and provide C-IED
solutions in response to Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs).
Currently, JIEDDO's Operations Division has begun discussions with
United States Forces Korea in the Pacific Command's area of
responsibility concerning the potential of IED threats to U.S. and
Coalition Forces in the Pacific Rim and Northeast Asia. Similarly, we
have responded to appeals from United States Southern Command seeking
assistance in countering a significant IED threat to U.S. partners,
stemming from narco-terrorists within that region. As we continue to
adapt to new threats and tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, JIEDDO must
also support our COCOM partners in other areas of responsibility where
the IED threat is increasing.
There is ebb and flow that follows this weapon, our enemy, and the
strategic influence it holds over our warfighters. JIEDDO stands ready
and capable of responding to the adaptable IED threat.
Dr. Snyder. You testified that a metric for JIEDDO's success is the
fact that it takes more IEDs to cause a Coalition Force casualty than
it did before JIEDDO was established. However, this statistic does not
take into account the significant increase in IEDs emplaced nor does it
capture the total number of Coalition Forces', Iraqi and Afghan
Security Forces', and civilian casualties caused by IEDs. Additionally,
it can be argued that the decrease in U.S. troop casualties per IED can
be attributed to efforts outside of JIEDDO's main contributions, such
as increased armor protection on vehicles and the fielding of the MRAP
vehicles. JIEDDO's annual report highlights other metrics used to gauge
the intensity level of the IED fight and the impact of C-IED
initiatives, but it does not provide statistical data to support these
metrics. Can you please discuss JIEDDO's metrics for success in
defeating the IED as a weapon of strategic influence and provide
statistical data to support these metrics?
General Metz. Mr. Chairman, you are correct in the fact that the
enemy must emplace more IEDs to cause a casualty is a benefit of not
only JIEDDO's investments but also improvements in armor, the fielding
of the MRAP vehicles and perhaps most importantly, the actions of the
great American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines on the ground.
Some of the other JIEDDO metrics for success in defeating the IED
as a weapon of strategic influence can be sub-divided as follows;
metrics on overall IED activity, metrics on IED activity normalized by
Coalition Force (CF) levels, metrics on enemy effectiveness in
inflicting casualties on CF, and metrics that indicate changes in enemy
tactics, techniques, and procedures as a result of JIEDDO initiatives.
Each of these groups is used to evaluate JIEDDO's progress in defeating
the IED and inform leadership when adjustments in strategy are in
order.
Metrics on overall IED activity measures the total number of IED
incidents and divides those incidents into their component parts.
Currently, IED incidents are parsed as follows: IEDs Found and Cleared,
Ineffective IED Attacks, Effective IED Attacks, and IED Attacks with
Damage to Coalition Force Vehicles (a subset of ineffective attacks. In
these cases, the enemy initiated an attack with no CF killed or
wounded; however, the vehicle was damaged during the attack.).
Metrics on IED activity normalized by Coalition Forces takes into
account the overall CF presence in theater. These metrics are an
indication of the risk that CF are exposed to in each theater of
operation. These metrics were first established in September 2008 as a
way to compare the risk to CF in Afghanistan to Iraq. The following
metrics have been used and are being refined: Monthly KIA/WIA per 1000
CF Troops, Monthly IED Incidents per 1000 CF Troops, and Cumulative
Risk of IED Exposure/Casualty/KIA over a given time period.
Metrics on enemy effectiveness are a proxy for the level of effort
the enemy must expend to cause a CF casualty. These metrics include IED
casualty rates that are sub-divided between CF WIA/attack and CF KIA/
attack, and incidents per CF casualty.
Additionally, JIEDDO also tracks changes in enemy tactics,
techniques, and procedures. These metrics include type of IED, type of
triggering mechanism, and general location of the incident. Mapping
these trends against the introduction of JIEDDO incidents provide
insight into potential changes in strategy/tactics and the
effectiveness of fielded JIEDDO initiatives.
Statistical data to support these metrics is classified and we
would be happy to provide that in a classified forum. However, the data
shows that overall IED activity in Operation Iraqi Freedom OIF has
decreased. Specifically, IED incidents in September 2008 were
approximately 30% of their September 2007 and 25% of their September
2006 levels. Similarly, effective attacks against CF in September 2008
are 20% of their September 2007 totals, and 10% of their September 2006
totals.
Dr. Snyder. General Metz testified that in the future the Counter
IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) could be moved to another
organization in DOD to take full advantage of its human network attack
capabilities. Where in DOD do you think the COIC could go? Do you think
the COIC is a unique capability and one that should endure for future
fights against hostile human networks regardless of the type of threat
they choose to use against us? How does the COIC and its capabilities
compare with all of DOD's other human network attack efforts? Are any
of the COIC's capabilities redundant?
Mr. Matthews. The COIC's capabilities are similar to other
organizations in that they endeavor to fuse intelligence from all
sources not just HUMINT. The uniqueness of the COIC, however, is that
they are focused on the IED networks. If the COIC was to be moved to
another organization, it would be important for it to remain focused on
the IED problem. A diffusion/degradation of that focus would have
negative effects for our troops in contact. The insights that the COIC
has gained into network operations no doubt has a certain degree of
application to other network operations.
Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
add for the record?
Mr. Berkson. Not at this time. I would like to thank you for your
support of the Department's counter-IED efforts.
Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
add for the record?
General Metz. As I stated in my written testimony, I would like to
reiterate for the record that in JIEDDO's mission area of rapid
acquisition, JIEDDO responds to urgent warfighter needs through the
development and delivery of capabilities, normally within a period of
four-24 months. As DoD's leader for C-IED investments, JIEDDO rapidly
integrates the efforts of academia, industry, interagency, and joint
and allied forces to focus and coordinate key investments across the
tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace. JIEDDO uses
aggressive finding networks to identify solutions to persistently
difficult, high-priority, technical, and operational capability gaps.
While JIEDDO moves towards a stable future within the Department,
it is critical that rapid acquisition remains a priority. JIEDDO's
rapid acquisition capability is enabled by Congress's support of multi-
year, flexible funding. The flexibility of this funding allows JIEDDO
to remain agile in our C-IED fight.
Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
add for the record?
Mr. Matthews. No, but thank you for the opportunity to comment.
Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
add for the record?
Mr. Beasley. No, thank you, I have nothing further to add for the
record.
Dr. Snyder. Is there any additional information you would like to
add for the record?
General Kamiya. None.