[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-77]
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REGARDING
AL QAEDA
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
meeting jointly with
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 25, 2007
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45-513 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ADAM SMITH, Washington California
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARK E. UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
------
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas, Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
Alabama MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
MIKE THOMPSON, California
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
Nancy Pelosi, California, Speaker, Ex Officio Member
John A. Boehner, Ohio, Minority Leader, Ex Officio Member
Michael Delaney, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 25, 2007, Implications of the National
Intelligence Estimate Regarding al Qaeda....................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 25, 2007......................................... 57
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2007
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REGARDING AL QAEDA
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hoekstra, Hon. Peter, a Representative from Michigan, Ranking
Member, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence............. 5
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence..................... 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence; accompanied by Mary Beth Long, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Peter
F. Verga, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense; Michael E. Leiter, Principal Deputy Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center and Director of the
Interagency Task Force on Homeland Threats, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; and Edward Gistaro, National
Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, beginning on page........... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr................................... 78
Gistaro, Edward, joint with Michael E. Leiter................ 94
Hoekstra, Hon. Peter......................................... 71
Hunter, Hon. Duncan.......................................... 68
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 63
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California,
Committee on Armed Services................................ 76
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 61
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence
Estimate ``Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the
United States'' dated April 2006........................... 103
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Eshoo.................................................... 109
Mr. Issa..................................................... 109
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Hunter................................................... 113
Mr. Skelton.................................................. 113
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REGARDING AL QAEDA
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Meeting Jointly with the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington,
DC, Wednesday, July 25, 2007.
The committees met, pursuant to call, at 1:13 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the Armed Services Committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome today's
panelists. Joe Clapper, thank you for being with us, Secretary
Long, Secretary Verga, Mr. Leiter and Mr. Gistaro. Everyone is
here. So thank you.
This is a very special hearing today, as you will soon
learn, that this is pretty much a once-in-a-decade hearing, and
we appreciate you being with us today.
We convene to examine and discuss the implications of the
recent National Intelligence Estimate, also known as NIE. We
are joined by and welcome our colleagues from the Intelligence
Committee.
The NIE is entitled: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S.
Homeland. The unclassified key judgments contained within
include pronouncement that the most persistent threat facing
the U.S. homeland over the next three years is the one posed by
terrorists and especially al Qaeda. As a Nation, we find
ourselves in this strategic situation after pouring billions of
dollars and thousands of troops into Iraq. This tremendous
sacrifice has diverted our Nation from the real war on terror
and subjected the Nation to an unacceptable level of risk.
This committee has spent a great deal of time looking at
the strain on our service members as well as on our equipment.
We are tasked with ensuring that our military is ready to
respond to the next contingency wherever it may be. But we must
also ensure that we can deal with today's threats, and I am
deeply concerned that we have not paid sufficient attention to
the places that threaten us the most.
Chasing windmills has kept our eye off the more important
struggle, the ones with roots in Afghanistan. The recent NIE
points this picture out clearly, an unstable region within the
borders of Pakistan described as strong and resurgent al Qaeda,
that warns of a heightened threat environment. In short, it is
not good news.
We have asked today's panelists to join us for a discussion
about the scope of the NIE, its assumptions, its implications
for our Nation.
As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am also
concerned about the implications for the Department of Defense
(DOD). Must we re-examine the Department of Defense's force
posture? Must we re-assess the Department of Defense's
modernization priorities? Must we revamp the Department's
policies in order to address the near-term-threat scenario?
These are the pressing questions that I look forward to further
examination.
Let me first then recognize the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Silver Reyes, for any comments he
may have; and then I will go to Ranking Member Hunter and
Ranking Member Hoekstra; and I will have some administrative
comments shortly thereafter. Mr. Reyes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. Good afternoon.
As chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I am pleased at this opportunity to conduct our
work in open session and to convene a hearing with my
colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee. Especially
since I also serve as a member of the Armed Services Committee,
I know how closely our committees work together to safeguard
our Nation and empower our military and intelligence
professionals.
I want to also add my personal welcome to our panel of
experts.
When focusing on an issue as important as al Qaeda, which
is the topic of today's hearing, it is critical that our
committees work closely together. I want to thank my good
friend and colleague, Ike Skelton, the chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, for his leadership and his
partnership, as well as our two ranking members, Mr. Hunter and
Mr. Hoekstra.
Today, we will specifically focus on the resurgence of al
Qaeda as reflected in the July 2007, National Intelligence
Estimate entitled: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland. I
would like to thank our witnesses for joining us here today
because your testimony will help our committees work together
to examine this very critical issue to our country.
Our efforts to defeat al Qaeda and protect our Nation are
not separate intelligence or military issues. In order to
defeat this most urgent threat, all instruments of our national
power must work together seamlessly. This joint hearing
reflects that approach.
Four years ago, President Bush told the American people
that al Qaeda was on the run and that they are not a problem
anymore. However, the NIE released earlier this month indicates
that today our Intelligence Community believes otherwise. The
NIE states that the U.S. homeland will face, and I quote, a
persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three
years and that al Qaeda has regenerated key elements of its
homeland attack capability.
Essentially, the NIE reflect that al Qaeda is not just a
problem but the most serious threat to our Nation's security.
This is a grave issue, and it is critical that Congress know
how our country can protect itself and ensure that this does
not happen again.
One of our main challenges is that, while the Bush
Administration assumed al Qaeda was no longer a threat, the
Administration has focused our resources in Iraq. This war,
which costs the American people approximately $10 billion a
month, has diverted needed funds and personnel from eliminating
the threat of al Qaeda.
The NIE, however, points out that the al Qaeda threat
emanates from Afghanistan and Pakistan and not Iraq, and the
United States has missed critical opportunities to address that
threat. Moreover, there are signs that the war in Iraq has had
an even greater negative impact. It appears that our presence
in Iraq may actually be helping al Qaeda.
As the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism
noted, the war in Iraq has become a recruiting tool and
training ground for terrorists; and, as the new NIE assesses,
al Qaeda's association with al Qaeda in Iraq helps al Qaeda
raise funds and recruit operatives, including for attacks
against our country.
These are critically important issues to the American
public, and I look forward today to a productive hearing that
will not only tell us more about the threat laid out in the NIE
but how we can best fight this threat more effectively. The men
and women of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the men and women
of the U.S. Armed Forces and the American public as a whole
deserve this careful consideration.
Finally, as I have consistently noted since assuming the
chairmanship of the House Intelligence Committee, the threat of
terrorism is not a political issue. There is no room for
partisan politics in the realm of national security. So I look
forward to working with all of my colleagues, both Republicans
and Democrats, to further safeguard our Nation; and, as always,
I invite all of them to work with us.
Thank you again for joining us here today, and thank you to
the members of our respective committees who are here as well.
I would now like to turn it back over to the chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from California, the ranking member of the
House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hunter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you and House Intelligence Committee
Chairman Reyes for holding the hearing on a topic that I think
is very critical to both committees, and let me join you in
welcoming our witnesses today. I think it is important that
they are here.
Over the last week or so, we have been bombarded by lots of
public statements that I think have ignored or misrepresented,
innocently or intentionally, the findings of the latest
National Intelligence Estimate. So, to our witnesses, your
testimony is therefore timely and welcome, as it should
hopefully correct many misstatements that are currently
circulating.
I think this summary captures what the Intelligence
Community and the policymakers and other experts have said
about the al Qaeda threat and what many will point to as a most
important finding in the NIE, and that is that al Qaeda is
resurgent.
As we discuss the terrorist threats that confront our
homeland, we are going to examine our security strategy based
on what the enemy is doing and could possibly do. However, we
can't lose sight that the summary that we provided is very much
the same view of the situation as al Qaeda's; and I think we
have to remember that, in 2004, Osama bin Laden said this, and
I quote: The world's millstone and pillar is in Baghdad, the
capital of the Caliphate.
And later Zawahiri, his number two and principal
strategist, clearly laid out al Qaeda's strategy for Iraq; and
he said, and I quote: The first stage, expel the Americans from
Iraq. The second stage, establish an Islamic authority or
emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the
level of a Caliphate. The third stage, extend the jihad wave to
the secular countries neighboring Iraq. Unquote.
Al Qaeda has been waging an offensive war against us and
our values for a lot of years, and the group's clearly stated
desire is to see us, the West, and the freedom that we
represent defeated and destroyed.
Bin Laden's view of the importance of Iraq has never
wavered, nor his desire to attack us again on our soil. Yet,
despite al Qaeda's effort to break our will, we are also
resurgent, in our view, and continue to deny the very
opportunities bin Laden hopes to exploit.
The recent surge in Iraq--and I would commend all my
colleagues to take a look at especially the activities in Anbar
Province and the progress that our Marines have made there. But
the recent surge in Iraq, our continued strong military
presence in Afghanistan and our unwavering dedication to the
Iraqi and Afghan people have pushed al Qaeda back. Our
worldwide efforts, as mentioned in the National Intelligence
Estimate, have constrained al Qaeda in its operations.
I would just say to folks who find it extremely unusual
that we have not sustained another attack on American soil, I
would remind my colleagues that we have had an aggressive,
forward-leaning operation against al Qaeda since the strike on
9/11. It is difficult to plan an attack when some of your
planners don't show up at the meeting because they have been
killed or captured; and that is what has happened on many, many
occasions.
I think we have got to put today's discussion in
perspective. I am greatly concerned with al Qaeda's resurgence
in the Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan, and I have
expressed my concern in a February letter to the President on
that point.
In al Qaeda, we are facing a determined, persistent foe who
demands our continued dedication and resolve. They pose a
continuing and grave threat to our Nation. We all know that. We
can't focus our efforts solely on the group's physical base in
the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, or in Iraq. It
seeks to export violence from these regions not just to
neighboring countries but also to the U.S. homeland. It seeks
to inspire violent cells in Europe, Africa, Asia and the United
States.
I think we people who thought that the operations were
confined to Iraq and to Afghanistan were shocked from this view
with the events that took place in Great Britain a couple of
weeks ago. It seeks to use cyberspace and emerging technologies
to facilitate its operation, and it seeks to terrorize our
nations with violence.
But, most of all, al Qaeda seeks to break our will; and
that is something we cannot allow. We have a say in what
happens, and we cannot limit our perspective on the threats
that we face and the impact we can have on those threats.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony and
discussion of today's hearing and especially as we hear about
the actual assessments found in the NIE, the National
Intelligence Estimate, not the many misstatements circulating
in the press.
As the National Intelligence Estimate rightly states, al
Qaeda poses the greatest terrorist threat to our Nation, but
the estimate addresses a much broader range of terrorist groups
and threats, and I truly hope that we will examine the overall
terrorist assessment and what we can do to address the myriad
threats we face. Let's not limit our perspective and discussion
to a narrow portion of this very important subject.
Mr. Chairman and Chairman Reyes, thank you for bringing
this very important joint hearing to our respective committees.
I look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the
Appendix on page 68.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
Now the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Hoekstra.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER HOEKSTRA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MICHIGAN, RANKING MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. It is good to be
with you and Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hunter.
It is also good to welcome this distinguished panel to be
with us today. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I want to start out today by pointing to a
critical piece of intelligence, perhaps the most important
piece of actionable intelligence written in the unclassified
NIE. It states, quote: We judge that the United States
currently is in a heightened threat environment, end of quote.
When you read a statement like this, it is impossible to
not have your thoughts returned to 9/11, that fateful morning
when al Qaeda attacked the United States in a way that none of
us will ever forget. I think of what I felt that day. I can
only imagine what the families who lost loved ones faced on
that day. I can only think of the emotions that went through
this Nation as we watched this attack and the aftermath played
out on live TV.
When I think of all this, I can only help but ask one
question, have we as a Congress done all we can to strengthen
our intelligence capability to protect our homeland? Have we
given the people who are in front of us today the necessary
tools to keep us safe? Have we sufficiently prepared the Nation
for the long struggle we face in the fight against radical
jihad?
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today we have to answer to
that question ``no.'' We have assembled before us top officials
of DOD intelligence and counterterrorism; and for the next
several hours we will subject them to all manner of speeches,
questioning, while ignoring perhaps the one critical area the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has told all of us,
told Congress and the American people, the tool that he needs
and the tool that needs our attention today. It is a
comprehensive modernization of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).
Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Director McConnell explained the problem very
clearly. Quote: There are circumstances in which the government
seeks to monitor for purposes of protecting the Nation from
terrorist attacks the communications of foreign persons who are
physically located in foreign countries, and the government is
required under FISA to obtain a court order to authorize this
collection. End of quote.
Further explaining the challenge, Director McConnell has
stated: We are missing a significant portion of what we should
be getting. End of quote.
The Director of National Intelligence is telling us we are
missing vital intelligence that our Nation should be collecting
to protect our homeland, foreign intelligence from foreign
terrorists in foreign countries, and we can't collect it.
The NIE that we are going to be talking about today says we
judge that the United States currently is in a heightened
threatened environment. If I haven't ever heard a clearer call
for action, this is it. This is a wake-up call for Congress and
for America. At a time of increased threat, we are handicapping
ourselves in the fight against al Qaeda and radical jihadism.
The hearing we should be having right now, that we should
have had already and should have completed, is one on moving
legislation to fix this FISA problem and close this terrorism
loophole. We have a known intelligence problem, we face a
heightened terrorist risk, we have a simple fix to address one
of the major FISA problems, and we have over a week before
Congress goes on recess.
Al Qaeda is not going to take a break. They haven't taken a
break while this loophole existed, they won't take a break
until we fix it, if we fix it, and they won't take a break
while we take a recess during August. Congress needs to fix it,
and we need to fix it before we go on recess.
Why? In a video released on July 5 entitled: The Advice of
One Concerned, Zawahiri lays out al Qaeda's strategy which was
built on the notion that, in this world, there are outlying
states in places such as Asia and Africa and other parts of the
world and there are the core states. They are the center of the
global system. Who are the core states? America and the
European Union.
The tape goes on. Quote: The only way to confront them,
according to al Qaeda's theory, is by taking the war from the
outlying states to the central states or the core states, in
which case the damage and the consequences of this damage will
take place in the central states. End of quote.
It means that they are planning and they want to attack us
here in the United States. The tale of the tape is clear, al
Qaeda believes it is winning in Iraq, laying the foundation for
a post-America Caliphate with its center there and ultimately
extending the jihad wave to the rest of the world.
If al Qaeda intends to fight us globally and here in the
homeland, we must be prepared to do the same. We cannot expect
to leave one part of the battlefield without consequences on
another part. In short, it is my fear if we precipitously leave
Iraq, al Qaeda has every intention of following us home.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing what the
witnesses have to say about the NIE key judgments that we face
a heightened terrorist risk, what challenges the Intelligence
Community faces in collecting against those terrorist threats
and what they are doing to address those challenges and any
recommendations they have for Congress to strengthen our
intelligence capabilities against a terrorist threat.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoekstra can be found in the
Appendix on page 71.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentlemen.
Before I recognize Secretary Clapper and the other
panelists for opening statements, let me offer a few
administrative comments, if I may.
Let me first suggest that you make your comments as
succinct as possible. Without objection, each of your prepared
statements will be placed in the record. Those on the Armed
Services Committee are used to my comments staying in 25 words
or less. You can say it in a few more words than that, but do
your best to condense your comments because there will be a
good number of questions.
Let remind everyone we are in open session. We should
refrain from any discussion of classified information. A closed
briefing will be held immediately after this session, and
members should proceed to room 2216. I remind everyone that
classified matters can be discussed in the follow-on meeting,
not here before us today.
Also, given the large size of the gathering, we intend to
strictly adhere to the five-minute rule and recognize those
present at the time of the gavel according to the seniority and
alternate between the majority and the minority in the
respective committee memberships.
Members arriving after the gavel with be recognized in
accordance with the order of the arrival, again, alternating
from majority to minority.
Ladies and gentlemen, 5 minutes means 5 minutes, not 5
minutes and 15 seconds, because we really need to get as many
in as we can.
With that, Secretary Clapper, we appreciate you being with
us today, and each of you. The floor is yours, General.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY MARY BETH LONG, ACTING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS; PETER F. VERGA, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE; MICHAEL E. LEITER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER AND DIRECTOR
OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON HOMELAND THREATS, OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; AND EDWARD GISTARO,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR TRANSNATIONAL THREATS, OFFICE
OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.
Secretary Clapper. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Chairman
Reyes, Congressman Hunter, Congressman Hoekstra, and
distinguished members of the committees.
First, let me thank you both or thank you all for your
strong support for the Department of Defense and for the
Intelligence Community and for conducting this unique two-
committee hearing, which is symbolic of the confluence of the
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.
We are here, as you indicated, this afternoon to discuss
the implications of the recent National Intelligence Estimate
on the terrorist threat to the homeland. A couple of
introductory comments.
As I said in my confirmation hearing in March, as Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, I am not in the business
of doing analysis or producing intelligence, so I am not going
to produce any new intelligence here today.
Second, I am supported by subject matter experts whom I
would like to introduce from the Department of Defense: Mr.
Peter Verga to my immediate left, the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense; and, to his left, Ms. Mary Beth
Long, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs. To my right, from the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, Mr. Mike Leiter, who is the Deputy
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and the
Director of the Interagency Task Force on Homeland Threats;
and, to his right, Mr. Edward Gistaro, National Intelligence
Office for Transnational Threats and a principal author of this
National Intelligence Estimate.
Six years after September 11th, 2001, we have not suffered
a successful attack on our homeland. This is not for lack of
will on the part of our enemy. Al Qaeda and al Qaeda extremists
have carried out terrorist attacks in more than two dozen
nations since 9/11. Al Qaeda has and will continue to attempt
visually dramatic mass casualty attacks here at home; and they
will continue to attempt to acquire chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear materials. And if they are successful
in obtaining these materials, we believe they would use them.
As the NIE makes clear, we face a resilient and resourceful
enemy that will make every effort to protect and regenerate key
elements of its capability to attack us and others.
Allow me to make three points about this NIE and what it
means for our current security environment. The findings of
this estimate are not a surprise. We are at work with an enemy
not confined in national boundaries or a single ethnic group.
Our fight against extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan and around
the world has kept our Nation safe from attacks here at home.
This war, like all wars, is not an engineering project. The
task and challenges cannot be laid out ahead of time and
accomplished according to a predetermined schedule. As the
troops say, the enemy gets a vote. We must and will continue to
transform and adjust and respond accordingly.
The NIE makes it clear that our operations in Iraq are not
distinct from the war on terror. To quote what I consider a
most salient point in the NIE, al Qaeda will probably seek to
leverage the contact and capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq, its
most visible and capable affiliate.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, thank you for
your attention. We look forward to your questions, and I
appreciate your willingness to accept our statements for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clapper can be found
in the Appendix on page 78.]
Secretary Clapper. I believe Mr. Gistaro has an opening
statement as well. Mr. Chairman, if I may defer to Mr. Gistaro.
The Chairman. Mr. Gistaro, I suppose after you give your
testimony--to whom do we go next, General?
Secretary Clapper. That is, I believe, it. There are two
opening statements, myself and Mr. Gistaro.
The Chairman. Fine. Mr. Gistaro, please.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD GISTARO
Mr. Gistaro. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for having us here today. I will be very brief,
since the unclassified key judgments have been submitted to the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
I think one important thing for the committee to understand
is this is an estimate that couldn't have been written several
years ago. It is because of congressional reforms, it is
because of the DNI, it is because of the Intelligence Reform
Act, it is because of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Commission findings that we were able to have a brand new
community participate and produce this estimate.
Certainly we have the traditional members of the
Intelligence Community fully involved--Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National
Security Administration (NSA), National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency (NGA) and others. I think what was new were our new
partners in the community--National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). I think it is very important to
note that they were full participants from the beginning in the
production of this estimate and particularly when we are
dealing with threats to the U.S. homeland, threats from
homegrown terrorist groups and threats from single-issue
terrorist groups that the FBI follows very closely. It was
their input that made this estimate possible. I think for that
point it is very important for the Intelligence Community that
this paper was produced and we were able to produce it as a
new, broader community.
I will not go into the key judgments at this time, sir,
since they are part of the record and out of respect for the
committee's time. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Gistaro and Mr. Leiter
can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]
The Chairman. As I understand it, General, Mr. Leiter, Mary
Beth Long, Mr. Verga do not have opening statements.
Ms. Long. That is correct.
Secretary Clapper. That is correct.
The Chairman. Then if those are the prepared opening
statements, I will resume mine and call upon the chairman of
the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, a couple of points that I think are very important.
We have learned many things post-9/11, one of which has been
that, as we give our military and law enforcement agencies
every conceivable tool that we can in order to protect us, we
also have to be mindful that we don't want to have the
terrorists succeed by compromising the rights of our American
citizens. I think that is a basic and fundamental
responsibility of the Congress.
I say that because when we provided the legislation, the
PATRIOT Act, we provided some key tools that now we have found
have been used inappropriately. One example was the national
security letters that were utilized by the FBI.
I think it is important that we do our business in a very
careful and orchestrated, regular way; and I think it is
vitally important that all of us understand that, in terms of
addressing whatever changes need to be made under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, as my ranking member mentioned,
we want to do that. We want to give and make the adjustments
that are necessary, but we also want to be careful doing that.
So, over the course of the last month, month and a half, we
have been having hearings to address that very issue. We have
been trying to understand exactly what issues and what problems
those that have had to work with FISA have had to address as
they went about their business. At some point in the fall, we
will look at whatever legislative fixes need to be made.
A lot I think depends on information that you give us about
the threat, and certainly the NIE is one issue that we want to
be very careful in evaluating. But I also think that we don't
want to be stampeded to make changes that ultimately we may
have to change because we didn't do it carefully and in a
regular way.
So we are addressing those kinds of issues. We don't want
to do something that is not carefully thought out.
In that vein, there are some options that we are looking at
to be able to perhaps give the Director of National
Intelligence the flexibility to do the kinds of things that he
has told us are necessary. So we are not just sitting on our
hands. We are working very quickly and very importantly in a
structured way to get to that.
But I guess one of the fundamental questions that I would
like the panelists to address is the following. It is two
parts. I want to know if the war in Iraq has made Iraq a more
hospitable situation for al Qaeda than it was before the U.S.
invasion, number one. Number two, is al Qaeda using our
presence in Iraq to help recruit terrorists around the world?
And what specifically is al Qaeda doing, as you pointed out in
the NIE, to be a concern to us in the way that it is gathering
strength? Answer that question with three parts.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
With regard to the second part first, sir, the Community
sees three different ways that Iraq impacts the threats to the
U.S. homeland.
First, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is the only affiliate of al
Qaeda that has stated its intention to attack the U.S.
homeland. That is number one.
Number two, we are concerned that the al Qaeda core in
Pakistan might be able to leverage some of the capability of al
Qaeda in Iraq for its own plotting against the U.S. homeland.
Third, sir, as you pointed out, al Qaeda in Pakistan,
Afghanistan has made the conflict in Iraq a central point in
its own propaganda; and it has used the conflict there to raise
resources, recruit and to energize the broader extremist
community to focus on attacks against western interests, U.S.
interests and the U.S. homeland.
With regard to your first point, sir, as the President
spoke yesterday, Zawahiri pledges allegiance to bin Laden in
2004. We certainly see very close ideological ties between al
Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda core. We see shared experiences and
personal histories between the leaderships in the
organizations, and we see some overlapping of certain
facilitation networks.
Al Qaeda in Pakistan tries to provide strategic guidance
and encouragement to AQI, but it also defers to AQI to make
tactical decisions on the ground with regard to its operations
inside of Iraq.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter, please.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, you have made clear in your statements that al
Qaeda wants to attack America. I guess my first question would
be, is there compelling evidence for the securing of the
southern border of the United States against that backdrop? I
am talking about the 2,000-mile southern border.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, there is no doubt that al Qaeda
has an expressed interest in penetrating U.S. homeland defenses
either through legitimate or illegitimate means. In that
regard, the southern border clearly poses a challenge for the
U.S. Government to secure the entire homeland.
Mr. Hunter. Second, you have made a point also that al
Qaeda has established what we denied them in Afghanistan in the
initial campaign, which is safe haven. And it was done
initially after the Pakistan forces made a deal with tribal
leadership and in that narrow strip of land, the Waziristan
area, to the effect that they would pull out Pakistan forces in
return for vague assurances that the tribes would not work with
and would ``distance'' themselves from al Qaeda, as vague as
that sounds.
In recent times, the Pakistan government has reacted, now
has sent in some military forces. There has been some contact
and some confrontation. Give me your view on whether the
Pakistan reaction is adequate, whether it is working, whether
it is working to deny safe haven and to scrub that area or
whether it is simply a symbolic reaction, a ceremonial
reaction.
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, at this point, let me make two points. In
the estimate, we talk about the global counterterrorism efforts
that have been very effective over the last five years. I think
we have to give a tremendous amount of credit to Pakistan,
which has been a critical ally in this fight. President
Musharraf has faced at least three assassination attempts
personally because of his assistance to us.
Some of the most critical arrests that have occurred of
senior al Qaeda members have occurred in Pakistan by the
Pakistanis. As you noted, sir, they have lost hundreds of their
soldiers and police in this fight. We have to give them credit
for that.
I think al Qaeda is now in a part of Pakistan that is
largely inaccessible to Pakistani forces. The Pakistani
government always has been and it is a difficult operating
environment for them.
I think the efforts that you refer to, sir, are only in the
first week or so of implementation; and so at this point it is
much too early to try to provide an assessment of the impact of
these latest Pakistani moves on the safe haven in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
Mr. Hunter. Why do you say they are inaccessible?
Mr. Gistaro. I think there are a number of different
reasons. The topography is very hostile, very barren. I think
the population that does exist there has always been outside
the control of Islamabad and is sympathetic to al Qaeda both in
terms of its religious ideology as well as their tribal
traditions of hospitality to outsiders. It is a very difficult
environment for outside forces to operate in.
Mr. Hunter. I understand it is difficult, but it is not
inaccessible. The 10th Mountain Division soldiers have gone up
to 10 and 12,000 elevations in Afghanistan and carried the
fight to the enemy. Has the Pakistan government indicated that
they are not going to try to penetrate these areas at all, or
are they trying to penetrate them?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, we are rapidly getting outside my area of
expertise.
Mr. Hunter. I will pursue that later. Let me just ask one
last question.
Clearly, al Qaeda has now been involved in high-visibility
bombings of civilian populations in Iraq that have been spread
across not only American television, international television,
but television in the Arab world. Has that diminished the
popularity of al Qaeda, the bombings of civilians? In newscasts
which identify the bombings as being attributed to al Qaeda,
has that diminished their popularity in the general Muslim
community worldwide? What is your take on that?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, to the extent that we can measure how
those attacks are broadcast on Arab television and such, I
don't think we have detected an increase in the criticism of
AQI. But what I would like to do, sir, is take that question
for the record and get you a more authoritative answer.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hoekstra.
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think, as the panel has stated, AQ in Iraq has become
affiliated with AQ core or al Qaeda, as we historically know
it, is that correct?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. Operating then with bases in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, in Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. I am sorry?
Mr. Hoekstra. Having bases or located in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and in Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. And that--probably attempting to communicate
on a regular basis between those locations to share strategy
and direction.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir. But I think, because of U.S. and
allied efforts in both the south Asia theater and in Iraq, that
ability to communicate at times is quite difficult.
Mr. Hoekstra. That at some times we may have disrupted it.
We also have established that they pretty much have a
similar series of objectives, which is to be successful in
Iraq, destabilize the region, eliminate the State of Israel,
attack the West and establish the Caliphate, is that correct?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. They have set it in different orders at
different places. They share the objective of attacking the
United States and the West.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. And it is possible that as they are
communicating, or trying to communicate, they might--is it
reasonable to assume that they might try to share information
about the type of training that might be necessary to attack
the U.S.?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir. I think a lot of that destructive
expertise is made public on the Internet.
Mr. Hoekstra. It may also be appropriate they will try to
talk about how they may finance an attack against the West or
the United States?
Mr. Gistaro. I have not seen evidence of that, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. If they are going to plan on attacking the
United States, wouldn't we expect they would be talking about
how they would finance an effort like that?
Mr. Gistaro. That is entirely possible, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. Wouldn't they also have to talk about who
would carry out an attack like that?
Mr. Gistaro. That is also possible, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. What the target would be.
Mr. Gistaro. Possibly.
Mr. Hoekstra. Methods.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. The timing.
Mr. Gistaro. Possibly.
Mr. Hoekstra. I mean, isn't that the kind of information
that you as an Intelligence Community are trying to get from al
Qaeda? If you believe that they are going to attack the United
States, that you are trying to figure out where are they
training for this, how are they financing it, who is going to
do it, what the methods are, what the timing would be?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoekstra. And a lot of that communication would be
happening in the areas where they are located, which would be
the ungoverned areas in Pakistan and what AQ in Iraq is doing.
Mr. Gistaro. I think that is a possibility, sir, but,
again, we do not see that.
Mr. Hoekstra. You do not see that. Is perhaps part of the
reason we don't see that is that is the kind of information
that the Director of the DNI is talking about when he says that
we are missing significant parts of information?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think as a Community, and certainly as
reflected in the estimate, we take very seriously our own
intelligence gaps and what we do not know.
Mr. Hoekstra. Again, it is not the primary focus, but this
is just pointing out and highlighting this kind of information
as to the financing, the participants. This information that we
are trying to get when foreign terrorists are communicating in
foreign locations, that is the kind of information that we need
to get and that we are significantly blind to, at least as
Director McConnell has identified it.
I hope again that this is an issue that we address before
we recess and go on break in August.
With that, I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen.
According to my information sheet here, going down the list
of those who were here when the gavel went down, Mr. Cramer
from Alabama, five minutes.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all the
chairmen and ranking members, witnesses for this opportunity
today, as tough as it is in this open hearing, to address
issues that are at this level of sensitivity.
Based on what I have heard so far, are you saying that al
Qaeda and al Qaeda in Iraq are one and the same organization?
Mr. Gistaro. The way the relationship is described in the
NIE is al Qaeda in Iraq is an affiliate organization to al
Qaeda in south Asia.
Mr. Cramer. Let me help you with that. Then the answer to
that is, yes, they are basically one and the same organization?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, as the President described yesterday, we
are dealing with al Qaeda that has a decentralized command and
control structure; and I don't want to leave a false impression
that we are talking about a monolithic organization.
Mr. Cramer. So if, as the NIE reflects, we are concerned
about a threat to the homeland here, who calls that shot from
al Qaeda?
Mr. Gistaro. The primary concern is al Qaeda in south Asia
organizing its own plots against the United States. What we are
concerned about is that AQI, as the most visible and capable
affiliate of al Qaeda, has also expressed an interest in
attacking inside the United States.
Mr. Cramer. What kind of presence did al Qaeda have in Iraq
in 2003?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, by 2003, Zarqawi had established his
presence inside the country; by 2004, he was pledging his
loyalty to bin Laden.
Mr. Cramer. Can you measure or compare their presence in
2003 versus their presence in Iraq today?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, beyond the top leadership, I think that
is a question we would either have to answer in closed
session----
Mr. Cramer. All right. Then I will defer that to the closed
session.
In the NIE, it states that the threat from al Qaeda is
through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups.
What are those regional terrorist groups?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, in addition to AQI, we are very concerned
about the Sunni jihadist groups in north Africa, formally known
as the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le
Combat), now again pledging loyalty to al Qaeda and renaming
themselves al Qaeda in the Maghreb.
Mr. Cramer. And to what extent is al Qaeda capable of
placing operatives in the United States? Or, in your opinion,
do they have operatives already in the United States; and, if
so, in what number? Generally speaking.
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, we do not see and the FBI does not see al
Qaeda figures here inside the United States with links back to
the senior leadership at this time. What the NIE talks about is
our concern that we see increased efforts on the part of al
Qaeda to try and find, train and deploy people who could get
into this country.
Mr. Cramer. And then--``why'' questions are always tough--
why haven't we eliminated the threat in al Qaeda leadership in
Pakistan?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, as we talk about in the paper, I think
the critical variable here is safe haven and being able to find
a physical space in what is essentially the wild west of the
tribal areas of Pakistan with which to rebuild capabilities.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Jim Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clapper, please feel free to refer this question
to whoever on the panel may be the most appropriate to answer
it, or yourself.
In 2006, it appeared from here that al Qaeda pretty much
had their run and could go wherever they wanted, do whatever
they wanted pretty much in Iraq, with the exception of where
our Special Forces and others got in their way. More recently,
we have seen press reports and other reports that in the al
Anbar Province the tribal leaders turned against al Qaeda and
essentially banished them from that province. More recently, we
have seen evidence that the same thing is happening in the
Province of Babil, of Diyala, of Salah ad Din, of Ninawa and in
Baghdad itself.
Would you give us an update on that or please have somebody
tell us what you know about that.
Secretary Clapper. Sir, I read the same reporting; and I
think this is in large measure a case of the enemy of my enemy
is my friend. I think this is a case of increasing
disenchantment with AQI on the part of many people in Iraq. So
that is a trend that appears to be emerging.
Mr. Saxton. What does that mean to us from the standpoint
of our involvement in the conflict in Iraq?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I think it reflects the effect of
our sustaining the attacks on the offensive against AQI; and,
more specifically, I think it is a reflection of the
effectiveness of the surge.
We all look forward to the report that General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker are expected to render in September about
what the significance of these indications mean.
Mr. Saxton. Do you think that part of it may be that the
tribal leaders and those fathers and mothers in the tribe are
observing what it is that al Qaeda is about and have decided
they don't want it for their children?
Secretary Clapper. Sir, that is certainly possible. I don't
purport to be the expert on what the dynamics are, but I would
think that sort of thing certainly plays out in their minds.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
Let me ask another question. I happen to represent the town
in New Jersey, Cherry Hill, where the Fort Dix--the group that
became known as the Fort Dix Six were arrested. The indictment
against them said that they were inspired by al Qaeda, and I am
wondering what that means to us exactly and also what role the
Internet play in bringing groups like that together and
providing training opportunities for them and also if we know
whether groups such as the Fort Dix Six have direct contact of
any kind with al Qaeda members outside the country.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, certainly the Fort Dix Six
represent something which is becoming an increasing concern for
us over the past several years and that is radicalized, violent
extremists within the United States who are, as you said,
inspired by al Qaeda. It is something that both the Department
of Homeland Security and the FBI and the National
Counterterrorism Center focus much of our attention on.
We have not--as I believe Mr. Gistaro mentioned, we have
not received any communication between those individuals and
senior al Qaeda leadership. That is certainly something that we
fear, but it is not something that we have seen.
With respect to the use of the Internet and the value of
the Internet, undoubtedly al Qaeda and other violent extremist
groups have come to use the Internet quite effectively both for
communication, direct person-to-person e-mail, also for
radicalization through Web sites, as well as propagating
information about how to build and use certain weapons.
Mr. Saxton. Have you any evidence that there are other
groups that are of similar nature that currently exist in the
states?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I think for both intelligence and
law enforcement reasons it would be inappropriate for me to
comment in the open session, but we would be happy to talk to
you in closed session.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith from the State of Washington.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of questions I want to focus on, al Qaeda's
strength in Iraq and then the best way for us to policy and
different ways to get at them in their safe haven in the FATA
region of Pakistan.
Focusing on the strength in Iraq piece, we have heard a lot
about how a lot of the local Iraqis have turned on al Qaeda,
and I think Mr. Saxton points out a lot of good reasons for
that. What is our assessment now of their relative strength
with the Iraqi population? Certainly they have the ability to
commit terrorist acts. Do they still have some number of Iraqis
who are sympathetic with them actively working with them?
I know at one time they had very sophisticated in some
towns sort of almost their own little government structures set
up in different towns and different places. Does that still
exist in some places? Do they still have the Iraqi support? Or
have they descended down to the point where primarily their
strength is simply the foreign fighters coming across the
borders giving them the strength to make attacks?
If you can assess what their strength with the population
is. I ask that because a safe haven requires some support from
the local population.
And juxtaposing that with the situation with Pakistan where
they seem to have that support from the local population, how
should we go about upending that support? The local tribal
leaders have clearly given safe haven in the FATA to elements
of al Qaeda. What is our best way to work with Pakistan to
uproot them?
I have a bias there; and that bias is I don't think
threatening Pakistan and saying you have to do more, you have
to do more is the best way to do that. We need to show Pakistan
we are a long-term partner. By and large, I think the Bush
Administration has done that. I want to make sure that we don't
change course.
If you could hit those two areas, whoever you think it best
to answer it, I would appreciate it.
Secretary Clapper. Let me take a stab at it, and I will
defer to others.
I think, as Mr. Gistaro indicated, we have to give Pakistan
credit for what they attempted to do. With respect to the FATA,
President Musharraf has embarked on a longer-term program of
social improvement, economic improvement in the ungoverned
areas, but this will only have payoff on a long term, certainly
probably beyond the timeframe of the NIE, which was three
years.
Mr. Smith. Is there hope, in your opinion, for getting the
tribal leaders to sort of turn on al Qaeda in a similar way
they did in al Anbar in the FATA?
Secretary Clapper. I don't think we should have great
expectation of this, given the tribal dynamics in the FATA. But
as well, though, I think we would be remiss, as the Pakistani
government would be remiss, without attempting to make some
positive changes in the quality of life, if you will, of the
tribes in that area. However, there are deep-seated, long,
historical dynamics that I think are going to make that a
challenge.
As well, I think we have also attempted to provide
assistance to the Pakistani government, the Frontier Corps and
their ability to observe improvement in intelligence
surveillance reconnaissance, sharing actionable intelligence
with the Pakistanis, providing equipment, helicopters, night
vision goggles and the like to help them better observe what is
going on and take appropriate action.
This is going to be a long-haul process, not something that
is going to occur, certainly I don't think a demonstrable
change within the three-year timeframe of the NIE.
Any other comments?
Mr. Smith. If you could hit the Iraq piece, because my time
is limited. I agree with you, and I think we need to make that
long-term commitment to Pakistan as a matter of policy, we in
Congress as well as the Administration.
If you could hit the Iraq piece, al Qaeda's strength there.
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, estimates vary within the Intelligence
Community as to the size of AQI. I think it is safe to say most
would agree there are several thousand members in the
organization. Ninety percent of those members, those foot
soldiers are going to be Iraqis, we believe.
In terms of the motivation for people joining, it differs I
think based on what part of the country. If you are in a mixed
area, AQI's argument that you have to join up to protect your
Sunni brothers and sisters from the Shi'a is a more compelling
argument. If you are in a place like al Anbar, I think they
probably try to use the religious argument.
Mr. Smith. They are not having a lot of success right now.
Mr. Gistaro. No, sir, especially in a place like Anbar. I
think people have decided that that harsh, coercive form of
Islam is not what they want to live under.
Mr. Smith. The big judgment--and I know al Qaeda wants to
control Iraq. A year ago they stated that they did, even though
they didn't. So there is no question that is their ambition.
Isn't it highly unlikely, given the situation with the Shi'a,
the Kurds, the way the Sunnis feel about them, that al Qaeda
would have the local support necessary to get any meaningful
control of Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think if you go back to the Iraq
estimate of January of this year, it talks about not taking
over the country per se but pockets within Iraq that they might
be able to exploit.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen.
The gentleman from New York, John McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen
and good lady, thank you for being here.
Mr. Secretary, you probably heard the opening reference by
the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee about
the 2006 NIE. I just happen to have a copy of it. It speaks
about Iraq being a recruiting tool cause celebre, in the
terminology of the NIE. Do you recall that document from
memory? I know this is not precisely on point of our topic
today.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHugh. Let me put it a different way. You would agree
that it is the assessment of the Intelligence Committee or
Intelligence Community that Iraq is serving as a recruiting
mechanism for al Qaeda in Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHugh. I think that it is interesting in 2006 the
document then went on to say, ``Should jihadists leaving Iraq
perceive themselves and be perceived to have failed, we judge
fewer fighters would be inspired to carry on the fight.''
Does that mean the way to beat their recruiting is to beat
them? Is that what it was saying?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, as I read that key judgment, I think it
is more focused on the people who are actually inside of Iraq
right now fighting us.
Mr. McHugh. Let me ask it a different way.
What kind of recruiting tool for al Qaeda, in general, at
large would an American defeat in Iraq serve?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think the two estimates do make the
judgment that if al Qaeda perceives a victory in Iraq, that
that will embolden them, and they will use that for their own
purposes to generate resources and enthusiasm for their cause.
Mr. McHugh. As you pursue in the multiheaded hydra of
Iraq--and let us agree that they are not all the same, yet they
are creating affiliations--do you think Iraq and Afghanistan is
an either/or situation, or do you think we ought to be focusing
on potential success in both?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I think we should--this is a
global--it is a global campaign, and so I don't think it is
zero sum or either/or. It is both.
Mr. McHugh. So when some suggest that, you know, we are
diverting resources away from Afghanistan, away from the
mathematical judgments that may assume, you would agree,
perhaps, that our actions in Iraq are indeed important in the
war against al Qaeda?
Secretary Clapper. Yeah. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. McHugh. I thank you.
I was interested in the line of questioning that the
distinguished Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committee had,
where I believe it was correctly stated that you don't have any
indication, no sources, no information that these groups are
having contact in the United States. It seemed to be a total
lack of threat, is that--or certainly lack of information as to
your ability to assess the threat.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, what I would say is we have
strategic warnings of al Qaeda's intent to strike either
Western Europe or the homeland. We continue to look at various
individuals throughout the world to try and determine their
links to al Qaeda or other al Qaeda affiliates.
Mr. McHugh. So, thus, the reason for the heightened threat
level in the United States, even though we don't have any
specific threat against the homeland; am I correct in that?
Mr. Leiter. Correct.
Mr. McHugh. I would also say--thank you, gentlemen.
I would also say that I certainly, from my perspective on
both this committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the
Intelligence Committee, I think that Mr. Hoekstra's opening
comments about concerns with respect to the adaptability and
the efficiency and effectiveness of FISA, as we know how it
operates and how it is not operating, now to demand our
immediate attention, not in the fall but now.
I share the Chairman's and others' concerns very deeply
that we have to have a balanced approach in how we authorize
our intelligence services. If the cost of defeating the
terrorists is the loss of our basic pillars of freedom, then it
is a pretty hollow victory.
But there are things about FISA that I think we have
learned very clearly--and I hope we get a chance to talk a bit
about this more in the closed session. That is, not bringing
into question American citizens' rights that totally involve
the ability to find out what foreign terrorists and foreign
places are saying, doing, thinking, and threatening to do
against the United States, and we ought to be acting now.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. His time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
In May of 2003, President Bush said that al Qaeda is on the
run, that the group of terrorists who attacked our country is
slowly but surely being decimated, and right now about all of
the top al Qaeda operatives are either jailed or dead. In
either case, they are not a problem anymore.
In the 2006 NIE, you said that we had seriously damaged the
leadership of al Qaeda and disrupted its operations.
And now today in the 2007 NIE you say that al Qaeda has
rebuilt its capabilities and that they are in a safe haven and
they are doing well.
What happened? How do we lose this ground? How do we go
from on the run in 2003, to today, where al Qaeda is rested,
training, and successfully recruiting new al Qaeda members?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, with regard to the two National
Intelligence Estimates, if you take the 2006 estimates, I think
the next sentence in that key judgment says that al Qaeda will
remain the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. interest and
U.S. homeland in 2006.
Mr. Thompson. I understand that. But we went from a well-
stated position where we are gaining the upper hand, to a
position now where they are in a safe haven, they have
increased their training, they have increased their recruiting.
They are gaining great success, and we should be very concerned
about that. What happened?
Mr. Gistaro. I think the key development there is they were
able to relocate their leadership node to an area where it was
much more difficult to get at them.
Mr. Thompson. This is the Federal Administrative Tribal
Areas?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. What happened? We took our eye off of them?
We allowed them to reoperate, regroup and replenish?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think an alternative way to look at
that is we took away the safe haven in Afghanistan. They went
to urban areas in Pakistan. Working with the Pakistanis, we
pushed them out of the urban areas of Pakistan.
Mr. Thompson. Was Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Iraq when
we went into Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. No, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Where did we take the safe haven away from
them?
Mr. Gistaro. Afghanistan, the urban areas of Pakistan. We
pushed them out of the urban areas of Pakistan to South
Waziristan. And then in about March of 2004, the Pakistanis
went in and pushed them out of South Waziristan. They relocated
to North Waziristan and other places in the Pak/Afghani area.
Much more difficult for the Pakistanis to find them and do
something about it.
They used that safe haven to regenerate the operational
leadership that is involved in developing and executing
external operation.
Then we also saw cases that the top leadership was able to
exploit that comfort zone in the tribal areas to exert a little
more influence on the organization. And then the fourth
component is we see their operational tempo of bringing people
in to train for Western operations picking up.
Mr. Thompson. As I recall, Secretary Rumsfeld had called
off a raid on senior al Qaeda members in that Pakistan area
because he thought it was going to create a--or stated that it
was going to create a rift between our allies and Pakistan and
our country.
Were those press reports correct?
Secretary Clapper. Sir, we looked at that and actually did
not pin that down to a specific case in point. Operations are
planned and occasionally called off for a variety of reasons.
They are reviewed, you know, at subsequent levels. So I don't
know about the specific case. It could well have happened.
Mr. Thompson. Can you comment on our relationship with our
Pakistani allies today and whether or not Musharraf is doing
all that he could do to let us operate in, and his forces also
operating in the Federal Administrative Tribal Area, to go
after these safe havens?
Secretary Clapper. Well, if the criterion is the Pakistani
government doing 100 percent of what we might like, probably
not. I do think, though----
Mr. Thompson. In your judgment, are they doing all that
should be done in order to ferret out these safe havens?
Secretary Clapper. I think they are doing what they can,
given the constraints that were--that Mr. Gistaro previously
outlined with the dynamics, et cetera----
Mr. Thompson. I hate to interrupt.
Can we count on these safe havens continuing to be safe for
quite some time to come?
Secretary Clapper. No, sir. I think our objective will be
to neutralize, not eliminate but certainly make this safe
haven, as we have the others, less safe and less appealing for
AQ.
Mr. Reyes [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gistaro, what is the date that the NIE was issued?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I believe it was last Tuesday.
Mr. Thornberry. So the key judgment that we are under a
heightened threat is applicable for last Tuesday?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. It is not a heightened level of threat for
this fall? It is a heightened level of threat now.
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think what we said was because of al
Qaeda's undiminished intent to attack us here, because we see
the regenerating capability that we are entering a heightened
threat environment for the duration of the three-year time
estimate on the paper.
Mr. Thornberry. So that heightened threat level will
continue until you tell us different, I guess, or you have
other facts, something else happens that in some way reduces
that threat?
Mr. Leiter. If I may, I want to draw a slight distinction
between the National Intelligence Estimate and the daily
counterterrorism intelligence that we process.
In that regard, we do think we are in a heightened threat
of strategic warning right now. And whether or not the three-
year period stays the same, we have a separate and distinct
heightened concern now.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Gistaro, I want to ask about one other thing. In the
public key judgments of the NIE, it seems to me you put a lot
of emphasis on evolving threat, adaptable enemy; they are
watching what we do and they change accordingly.
Seems to me in that situation, information is more critical
for us than ever about who is doing what and what methods they
are looking at and that sort of thing; would you agree?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. I am interested. In the opening statements,
a couple of times it was mentioned that the al Qaeda threat
emanates from the Pak/Afghan border. And you just had a number
of questions about the safe haven that they have been allowed
to establish again.
But a number of authors and scholars would say that we are
putting too much emphasis in some ways on a physical location.
As a matter of fact, somebody I heard recently said al Qaeda
has an ideology that has become a movement.
And I would like for either of the two of you to address
that.
If we were to wipe out every al Qaeda person in the
Pakistan and Afghanistan area, does that mean we can start
carrying shampoo onto airplanes again? Does that mean we don't
have to screen all cargo, which apparently is in a bill that we
are about to vote on?
Talk to me about safe havens, and if we knock out number
one and number two, does that mean we don't have to worry
anymore?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think all of the things you just listed
would definitely have an impact on the threat that we face. I
think it is important to know that later in the key judgments,
we really do talk about and focus on that globalization and
technology developments mean that people are able to become
alienated, find others who share their alienation, become more
radicalized, group together and find destructive expertise,
without ever having gone to a training camp or put themselves
in contact with a terrorist leader.
The homegrown terrorist threat, I think that is much more
enduring.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Leiter, that is where I want to go
because the thing that has concerned me the most--I think the
military folks are doing a good job. We are doing, with some
exceptions in intelligence, we are doing okay. But I worry
about a national strategy to combat the ideology. NCTC has that
tasking to develop a national strategy that goes across
military and--but combating a movement, an ideology that has
become a movement, is not something we do very well. Can you
reassure me that we are doing better than it looks like we are?
Mr. Leiter. I absolutely agree. Ideology, you can take
everyone out of the FATA but the ideology will live on to some
extent. The national implementation plan the President signed
and approved in June 2006 sets forth four strategic objectives.
One of those four is winning the war of ideas. And that plan is
a blueprint for the entire U.S. Government. And it is not just
the people sitting up here. It is the State Department,
Department of Homeland Security, it is all of the departments
that deal with the quote/unquote, ``war of ideas.'' And I think
that plan, which has now been in place for about a year, we
have seen some progress. For example, the creation of a
counterterrorism messaging center within the State Department
under Secretary Karen Hughes.
These are initial steps.
There is no doubt that when we call this a long war, it is
because ideology and extremists' views are not reversed
overnight, and I believe that we have to attack this and work
at this at all levels, the most extreme, and also into the
liberal elites of the Muslim world.
Mr. Thornberry. I hope we can develop a greater sense of
urgency on that as well as the other issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
Ms. Tauscher.
Ms. Tauscher. I think the reason we are at somewhat of a
wide variance on importance of what is happening right now is
because there is a wide variance of what is happening in the
two NIEs. These are documents that are not similar, in my mind,
having read both of them. If they had been transposed--for
instance, last week was the 2006 document--I would certainly
feel a lot better.
The problem is that the 2006 document is kind of like a
sleeping pill; take it and you are going to feel better
tomorrow. Unfortunately, we woke up and we have the 2007 NIE
which set my hair on fire. It is unambiguous about the current
threat, and it says to me that we have not been successful in
dealing with the threat of al Qaeda, its ability to recruit,
its ability to reconstitute itself.
And that something--I am suspicious--that something we have
been doing has caused us to not be able to defeat what everyone
has agreed for a very long time is our number one enemy: people
that really, really want to kill us and are really trying hard
to do it.
And I think that if we all kind of agree on where we are
right now, if that is true, then we have every reason to be
concerned.
What is it that has caused us to not find and kill Osama
bin Laden? Because he is hiding in the FATA?
Mr. Gistaro. Ma'am, if I could just address the difference
between the two NIEs, I think they are different papers trying
to answer different questions.
The 2006 estimate was really looking at the underlying
trends driving extremism within the Sunni community worldwide.
This paper that we are discussing today is much more tightly
focused on intent and capabilities to attack us here. And I
think that those different--the different focus of the two
papers may explain why we have different language and
perceptions. They have radically different----
Ms. Tauscher. With all due respect, they seem like they are
written by different people, with different methodologies,
setting a framework for people to understand.
This is the difference between, gee, I am really worried
there may be something happening up the street, you may want to
walk faster. That is one set of comments. The other is run,
run, run, run for your life. That is the difference between
these two documents.
Now, if you are trying to tell me that this is about
somebody writing in a different style or that different
methodologies were used, I don't really think that is what you
mean to have me believe.
Mr. Gistaro. No, ma'am. I think they were trying to answer
fundamentally different questions.
Ms. Tauscher. Can I make a suggestion? Until the problem
changes, until we find and kill Osama bin Laden, that is all I
really want from you people is to tell me what the status of al
Qaeda is and whether they have, in fact, reconstituted
themselves, which is what you tell us they have, that they have
refinanced themselves, that they have rested, that they have
actually franchised themselves into Iraq and probably other
places, all the time while I think many of us thought, and
certainly my constituents believed, that we were trying to get
them.
Mr. Leiter. If I may, there is a historical event which, to
at least some degree I can talk about in open session, which
changed this trend, which is the North Waziristan peace
agreement. And Pervez Musharraf has noted the agreement that
was signed for North Waziristan has not necessarily helped
eliminating the safe haven in the FATA. So that was something
that was just before the 2006 NIE.
Ms. Tauscher. But with all due respect, you have gone
through the chronology of 2001 to 2007, where you basically
said this is like a balloon; you push here, it bubbles out over
there. We have watched them hop, skip, and jump pretty much
with freedom and ability to reconstitute from Afghanistan to
Pakistan urban areas to South Waziristan to North Waziristan.
They can move pretty much where they want in that whole entire
area, and have for the last seven years. And we haven't found
them and killed them.
Mr. Leiter. Respectfully, ma'am, some of them have been
found and killed, and I would just note that it is not a
constant trend either way. We have had ups and downs. The
elimination of the Afghan safe haven did diminish capabilities
for a period, and they did reconstitute somewhere, and they
were chased from the urban areas, and they did reconstitute
somewhere.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, if I can make a suggestion. I think
these NIEs have to be congruent with each other. They have to
be side-by-side documents. We have to have a way to look at
them and say, this is what you told me the last time and this
is where we are going up or down. Simply a little thing like
this or a little thing like that can be very helpful.
We can't have this complete divergence as we have had in
these two documents, because it causes a tremendous amount of
anxiety for the population when they hear about the NIE on
divergence, and for those of us who think we are watching this
closely, to see such a swing from what our expectations have
been--that we have actually decapitated these guys in 2006, and
now they are traveling around wherever they want
reconstituting, refinancing, and being more robust.
Mr. Leiter. And my last note would be, ma'am, that the NIEs
really are snapshots in time so they don't come out all that
often.
Ms. Tauscher. You better take them from the same camera
because the pictures have got to look a little bit familiar.
Mr. Leiter. I would say the stream of intelligence we have
seen has tried to provide those regular updates.
Ms. Tauscher. I will yield back.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. I would like to thank you all for being here
today. And I particularly appreciate your sincerity and your
concern that indeed we are in a long war. We are in a global
war.
I, in reading the national intelligence report, was, like
so many people here, so saddened to see the regeneration of al
Qaeda and particularly to see that it is coming from the
ungoverned tribal areas of Pakistan. I have had the opportunity
to visit Pakistan four times. I visited with President
Musharraf. It hasn't been stated here today, but he himself, he
has been subject to at least four assassination attempts by
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), affiliated with al Qaeda.
I actually feel like President Musharraf is doing the best
and his military is doing the best that they can under the
circumstances, and indeed maybe they have learned a tragic
lesson based on the treaty that they had in Waziristan.
Additionally, I see it in their interest to create border
security with Afghanistan, which is beneficial to Afghanistan.
Additionally, to create border security with India. India has
lost 60,000 people due to cross-border terrorism coming out of
Pakistan.
But we truly are--I am very grateful for the government of
Pakistan, and I think it is to the interest of the people of
Pakistan that there be stability.
Another point I want to make, too, is that with the
terrorist threat emanating largely out of the ungoverned tribal
area of Afghanistan, I believe that it shows that our troops
are indeed on the offense in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and this is
stopping the terrorists' capabilities of a direct threat to the
United States. And so I am more grateful than ever for the
American military being on the offense.
It has been stated that the great concern we have are safe
havens. The Washington Post has identified that if we are not
successful in Iraq, that safe havens would be created with
terrorist training camps to attack the United States.
I would like to know--is this the issue of safe havens? Is
this how an insurgency, a terrorist organization, can best
threaten the American--or worst threaten the American people?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir.
Mr. Reyes. Can I ask you to pull your microphone pretty
close?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think we have identified physical space
where people can come, gather, and plot as a fairly important
ingredient in the ability of terrorists to develop and execute
a plot.
That said, it is not absolutely required. We see
indications that people are able, without ever going to a camp
or safe haven, able to radicalize themselves, find like-minded
individuals, gain destructive expertise and actually conduct
attacks.
Mr. Wilson. Three weeks ago, we had the extraordinary
circumstance of physicians in England and London and then at
Glasgow. Has it been determined what training they had or what
was the inspiration? And indeed the attack on the Glasgow
airport certainly should concern the American people. That
looked like any school in the United States. It looked like any
supermarket.
We need to understand the threat to our country as
evidenced by Glasgow.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, we are working very, very closely
with the British intelligence and law enforcement officials,
and we certainly look at what happened there and try to apply
that to preventative measures here in the United States. Beyond
that, because of very strict British laws, I think it is
difficult for us to comment in open session.
Mr. Wilson. And additionally, the success of killing al
Qaeda leadership of Algeria, Egypt. Zarqawi himself in Iraq has
stated that there hadn't been progress. Well, indeed, the
leadership around the world has been killed, even though
obviously they have successors.
But, again, I want to thank you for your efforts and look
forward to the balance of your presentation.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
I would like to ask Secretary Clapper, in your--in the NIE,
the public part of it says the main threat comes from Islamic
terrorist groups themselves, especially al Qaeda, driven by
their undiminished attempt to attack the homeland.
On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the most lethal and
imminent threat, how much of a threat to the U.S. homeland is
al Qaeda in Iraq?
Secretary Clapper. It is difficult to put it on a scale. I
just would reiterate what the NIE stated, though, about the
professed intent of AQI.
Mr. Andrews. I understand about intent. I am asking about
capability. On a scale of 1 to 10, what is their capability to
attack the homeland?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, as the Intelligence Community has looked
at this issue, the judgment that they have stated is that
currently the bulk of AQI's resources are focused on the battle
inside of Iraq.
Mr. Andrews. So is that a 10 or is it a 1?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, one of the things we tried to avoid in
this estimate was to try and put a number like that, because it
can just be misinterpreted.
Mr. Andrews. Or perhaps misused.
I would ask a similar question about al Qaeda in the FATA
areas.
How do you assess its relative capability to attack the
homeland from the FATA areas? Is it greater than AQI in Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, as we look at both intent and
capabilities, I think with regard to AQ in South Asia, the
intent is totally undiminished in terms of capabilities, the
core elements of the capability they need to attack us here. We
see a negative trend from our standpoint in terms of safe
haven, leadership, and training and recruitment of operatives.
Mr. Andrews. Are they more capable or less capable of
attacking us from the FATA relative to Iraq?
Mr. Gistaro. We are primarily concerned with al Qaeda in
South Asia.
Mr. Andrews. So they are more capable in the areas of the
FATA than they are in Iraq, right?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Secretary Clapper, if we were to put aside the
difficulties with Pakistani politics, which is--I know we can't
do, but if the Pakistanis would let us do whatever we wanted to
in the FATA areas diplomatically, intelligence-wise,
militarily, to the extent that you would want to answer that
question in this forum, what would that be? What is the optimal
situation for us in the FATA areas?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I think probably a greater freedom
of action, first on the part of Pakistanis themselves. Even
though they have done a lot, if they could do more, and if
there were, I think, speaking personally, probably more freedom
of action on our part to engage in Pakistan.
I might ask Ms. Long----
Mr. Andrews. Let me ask a question.
If we received a report this afternoon that there was plans
fairly well along the line and we felt it was in our interest
to intercede with a Special Forces strike, are we able to do
that?
Secretary Clapper. Well, yes, sir. We would be.
Mr. Andrews. Why did you hesitate?
Secretary Clapper. Just was thinking about the extent to
which I would want to discuss that in open session.
Mr. Andrews. Okay. No. I understand that.
What suggestions that you could give us in open session
would you make as far as moving us closer to that optimal
position you just described? As a Congress, what could we do
that would help us move toward a situation where we have
greater freedom of movement in the FATA areas?
Secretary Clapper. I think if we simply continue the
efforts we have now underway, particularly the continuation of
the dialogue with President Musharraf, working with his
military, administrative interior, the aid and assistance that
we have flowing to Pakistan, I think we need to continue that
and, of course, accordingly would--we would hope the Congress
would support that.
Mr. Andrews. I think you understand this, but I want to say
it.
The American people, both Republican and Democrat, want
this job done by the United States to the extent that that is
achievable. We do not want to farm this one out. If it can be
done, we want it done by our people.
Mr. Verga. I wouldn't want the American people who might be
watching this to get the impression that if there were
information or opportunity to strike a blow to protect the
American people in the FATA that we would not take immediate
advantage of that opportunity.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you gentlemen, and lady, for being here.
I am intrigued by a couple of points and actually struck by
the same things that Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Thornberry were. So
let me ask you this, because when you look at the two NIEs, it
creates a great deal of consternation.
Is it possible that--well, let me put it to you this way:
Is our intelligence and understanding that much better, or is
our situation that much worse?
Mr. Gistaro. That is an excellent question, sir.
I think it is probably a little bit of both. I think one of
the reforms in the NIE process that has been instituted under
the DNI is that no NIE is sacred and that when we are going to
produce a new one, you don't start with the last NIE and assume
that one is absolutely true and you just have to go on from
there. You go back and do a zero-based intelligence review.
Mr. Cole. So we sort of need to look on our understanding
as evolving here and very difficult to say we got it right
then, so what we know now, we can draw a very straight line
from it.
Mr. Gistaro. As part of our trade craft, we absolutely try
to avoid that mind-set. That said, I think the intelligence has
changed in the last year. And the judgments in the current NIE
are driven by the intelligence we have seen in the last year.
Mr. Cole. Let me also ask you this. Again, I agree very
much with Mr. Thornberry's comments that we are dealing as much
with the movement as we are with a man or a group of men or an
organization.
If we got what everybody up here would want us to get, that
is we got Osama bin Laden tomorrow, and we are able to kill or
capture him, would it fundamentally change the nature of the
challenge or the threat that we are dealing with, or would that
still exist?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, the community actually spent a lot of
time talking about that exact point. Because it is in the
classified section of the paper, I would prefer to go into
detail on that in closed session if I could.
Mr. Cole. Absolutely.
Let me ask you this, then, and switch the focus and the
time I have got left to al Qaeda in Iraq.
And in your judgment, is our focus there a diversion or is
it still an integral part of the ongoing struggle with al
Qaeda? We are sort of chasing a lesser target there at a great
deal of expense, great deal of resources. Or is the focus there
still worthwhile?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I believe it is clearly still
worthwhile that that is the significant threat. It is a
significant component of the larger global AQ threat. So
absolutely.
Mr. Cole. Given the fact, Mr. Secretary, you know clearly
we have multiple struggles going on in Iraq. We have got civil
strife, we have got tension between ethnic and sectarian
groups. I mean, I don't mean to give you a challenge. Is it
even possible to disentangle these threads?
You know, we got a lot of policy pronouncement in
Washington that we should just focus on al Qaeda in Iraq, and
somehow everything that is happening domestically in terms of
the government or the rivalries or the jockeying of power is
sort of irrelevant.
Do we have the luxury of that kind of clarity and that kind
of isolation of the problem in an area as complex as Iraq?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I think you have accurately
characterized the complexity of the situation there. Certainly
the al Qaeda threat is crucial. It is crucial that we continue
our campaign against it. But that is against the backdrop of
all of the other complexities and the dynamics in Iraq.
And I am not sure it is possible to cleanly disaggregate
those various components of the complexity, as you correctly
allude.
Ms. Long. Congressman, if I could augment that answer.
Excuse the augmentation.
One of the things we are learning about al Qaeda is that
they play upon the societal divisions that preexist, whether it
is tribal, Shi'a, Sunni or otherwise. And by exacerbating those
tribal and other divisions, they actually play into the
criminal and other elements of what is going on in complex
societies like Iraq and in the FATA.
So your point is exactly right, sir. To disaggregate what
actually al Qaeda is focusing on, which is to force those
divisions in society to be a conflict against not only those
people but our brave men and women in the Coalition force is
very, very difficult.
Mr. Cole. I know I don't have much time. But, again, we
sort of do a lot of historic revisionism, but there is clearly
very adaptable multifaceted--well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
will hold that for another time.
Mr. Reyes. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you all for being here.
When you were asked about what has changed, I think one of
the things that you cited was the change in the Waziristan
agreement. And yet there has been some, I guess, points of view
that would suggest that it is not really just there in the FATA
regions that al Qaeda has been reconstituted, but in fact it is
across Pakistan, and that there are more problems than just
looking at FATA regions.
Would you agree with that and, if so, what do you believe
is the situation there as you get it in a broader context?
Mr. Leiter. I think we are talking about al Qaeda core
senior leadership. I actually would--the vast majority of what
we are talking about is in North Waziristan. So I would not say
it is a Pakistan-wide problem.
Mrs. Davis of California. Anybody disagree with that?
Okay. I know that there have been several articles that
would suggest that--that is great, and I wanted to give you a
chance to clarify that. Thank you.
One of the other issues that we focused on is that the
changes that have occurred in the al Anbar area and the fact
that both Sunni and Shi'a tribal leaders have come together in
many ways to fight al Qaeda. There is a downside to that, as we
know.
And I wonder in terms of the intelligence that you are
receiving, if you believe that we ought to be looking at that
downside, or that this is just a risk that we need to take in
terms of the strengthening in many ways of those tribal
communities and the tribal leaders as they fight al Qaeda.
I guess the follow-up question to that is if, in fact, we
are seeing that shift and that is true, is then al Qaeda in
Iraq being seen quite differently by at least that area of the
country and do--are they that much less a threat?
Ms. Long. Ma'am, I can address that from a non-intelligence
standpoint.
I am not sure what you are referring to when you say the
flip side. I think you may be referring to the public
discussion about arming the tribes or militia in al Anbar. And,
you know, from the statements of the Secretary, these were the
folks who were well armed to begin with. But it is very
important and you are exactly right that what has happened
there is a shift in attitude. And I believe it was Congressman
Hoekstra that pointed out that the important point of the
forcefulness behind the theory and the ideology of al Qaeda is
the attitude.
So when we take a look at the tribes, whether they are in
al Anbar, in other places where they made the fundamental
commitment to enforce the government, to reinforce the
government of Iraq and to counter what they consider are a
foreign and hostile threat, and that is al Qaeda in Iraq, that
is a good thing. And what we are trying to do is encourage that
by empowering them, by guiding them, and by institutionalizing
that effort.
Mrs. Davis of California. Are you saying from the point of
view of intelligence, then, there is really no downside to
that?
Ms. Long. I can't speak to the intelligence fact. I was
referring my colleagues to that point.
Mrs. Davis of California. I just wanted to have a chance,
because certainly some military leaders would suggest that it
is a very cautionary way to proceed and we certainly need to do
that.
May I just turn really quickly. I am trying to get a sense
in terms of priorities and certainly in terms of the Department
and where you have put your resources. Obviously they are
limited.
Would you say that--has there been a shift in resources
from the last NIE report than the report today, or the 2007
report? Does that NIE make a difference in terms of the way you
would utilize resources? And certainly individuals who were
focusing on whether it is al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Iraq, whether
it is Pakistan, the FATA region; have you shifted your
resources at all?
Secretary Clapper. I think in general terms, the NIEs have
simply served to reinforce the course that the Department has
been on. It has undertaken a lot of actions in response to this
shift and to focus on terrorism.
So changes in the unified command plan, the expansion of
our Special Operations capabilities, to name a couple of
specific examples. I think the NIEs have simply, despite
perhaps the somewhat different approach, different purposes,
but I think the underlying fundamental themes have served to
reinforce the direction the Department is taking.
At the same time, though, we have other issues that we
must--the Department has to wrestle with in terms of nation
states, potential nation states, peer competitors, et cetera,
apart from the war on terrorism.
Mrs. Davis of California. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady very much.
Mr. Mike Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank each of you for your efforts to answer our
questions today and for your service.
This document is obviously a very important one, and that
is, as you hear the questions of the members as we look to
issues of policy and of actions, it is something that will
guide us to a great extent.
It saddens me, though, that so many times the National
Intelligence Estimate is used for political purposes. Last time
when the National Intelligence Estimate came out, there was a
great amount of political hay that was made over al Qaeda's
reaction to our presence in Iraq. And I heard some of that
today as we went down the questions about al Qaeda.
And it just strikes me, because there is some of this that
just seems obvious.
And so I have a few questions for you that really have been
troubling me since we began the discussion on the last National
Intelligence Estimate as people have tried to take it and put
it forward to the American people for, I think, political
purposes that don't help our discussion.
Are there any of you that believe, or did you have any
intelligence information that would have indicated that al
Qaeda would have liked us more by our entering Iraq, or that
they would have been supportive of us entering Iraq? Does
anyone have any information that al Qaeda would have liked and
been supportive of us going into Iraq?
I suspect the answer is no. And the reason why I suspect
the answer is no is because whenever I hear someone make big
hay over al Qaeda is upset that we are in Iraq, I think that
should win a blooming obvious award, because we can't imagine
they would have thought anything else.
Now, I wasn't here when we voted to go here in Iraq. So I
am not one of those who is here to try to make the point of
what we knew and didn't know. But it just troubles me when
people try to make the point that Iraq is--about Iraq's--about
al Qaeda's reaction to our presence in Iraq, when it seems to
me it was pretty obvious what their reaction was going to be.
Looking to post-9/11, are there any of you that believed or
did you have any information that would have indicated that
after we were attacked on 9/11, that al Qaeda was done, that
they were satisfied with their attack on our country and that
on 9/12, al Qaeda posed no risk to our country?
Anyone?
No. I suspected the answer was no.
So today it would be back to the blooming obvious award
that al Qaeda would not have changed its intent.
Now, what is not obvious and what I think was so important
about Ellen Tauscher's discussion is it is not obvious that the
capabilities, the timing in which they have capabilities that
are waning, or the times that their capabilities are
escalating, and I look forward to our classified discussion as
we learn more of that.
The other question I have for you is, is there anyplace in
the Middle East where the United States has troops where al
Qaeda is not present? You don't have to tell me where. But is
it--is it a yes or a no? Is there a place where we have troops
in the Middle East where al Qaeda has no presence?
I would suspect the answer is no.
Mr. Leiter. We could probably give you very limited
examples, but yes.
Mr. Turner. Very limited. I appreciate you saying it.
It also seems to me that it is pretty obvious that there is
no one who would have suspected that our going into Iraq would
not have resulted in al Qaeda following us.
Something else that is not a surprise.
Well, turning to another portion of your report that we
have not discussed, you are talking about Lebanese Hezbollah,
and you go on to say that they might pose a threat for
attacking the homeland if it perceives the United States as
posing a direct threat to the group or to Iran. Obviously they
have been--we have seen significant military action that has
occurred in that area.
Can you please describe further what your thoughts are
there with respect to their views of the United States as a
threat and then their threat to us?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, this was one of the parts of the key
judgments that we scrubbed pretty hard from a security
standpoint, and I would much prefer to discuss it in closed
session.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I will wait for my questions there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I am going to call on Mr. Murphy right now.
And after he asks his questions, we are going to have a 10-
minute recess.
Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you Mr.
Secretary, distinguished witnesses for your testimony today.
Are you telling us that in the entire unclassified NIE,
that the name Osama bin Laden is never mentioned? And this fits
a pattern where even the President said about bin Laden, and I
quote, ``I truly am not that concerned about him,'' unquote.
The folks in the Eighth Congressional District of
Pennsylvania are concerned about him and about bringing him to
justice because he is the one who is responsible for the murder
of 3,000 innocent Americans.
So will you please explain to me why, and I quote, ``the
most authoritative written judgments on national security,''
end quote, does not include our efforts to capture and kill
Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, what we were trying to assess in the
estimate was the intent and capabilities of al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups against the United States.
Bin Laden's influence on that is discussed pretty
thoroughly in the paper. It was not to assess in broad terms
U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Mr. Murphy. Sir, in the whole NIE it is not--his name is
not mentioned at all in the NIE. He is still the leader of al
Qaeda.
Mr. Gistaro. No, sir. He is discussed quite a bit in the
body of the paper.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I have asked this line of questioning in
the past. I think it is important also getting to the bottom of
it.
The past 5 years, the aid, the $5.6 billion aid to Pakistan
to combat terrorism, it is about $80 million dollars a month
with no strings attached. No questions asked, no
accountability. And I believe it is quite disturbing that the
NIE states that al Qaeda has found a safe haven in the
Pakistani tribal region.
When I was in Pakistan and Afghanistan a few months ago,
they expressed a willingness to help out on the border region
and also the border of Afghanistan, and asked for the Afghan
Army to assist in their efforts. And currently the House of
Representatives and the Senate are working out compromises to
our bill implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
One provision that is being negotiated and I believe
incorporated into the final bill, is a section on Pakistan that
would limit aid to Pakistan unless the President issues a
determination that Pakistan is making all possible efforts to
prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign
control, including the FATA, the Federal Administered Tribal
Areas.
The Administration has proposed even this minimal effort to
promote accountability, stating it would be counterproductive
to fostering a closer relationship with Pakistan.
In light of the troubling findings of the NIE over
Pakistan's failure to fight terrorism, does this
Administration, in particular does DOD and NCTC oppose efforts,
such as those in the 9/11 bill, which demand accountability,
including specific benchmarks with respect to Pakistan's effort
in rooting out terrorism?
Ms. Long. I would like to go ahead and answer that on
behalf of the Department of Defense.
I would take some difference of perspective of your
statement regarding that no one holds Pakistan accountable. And
as a matter of fact, there are extensive exchanges between the
Department and the Pakistani government to account for and to
follow through on how the aid that we provide them is utilized.
For example, I believe it was Congressman Smith talked
about the policy implications and the policy lines of our
assistance to Pakistan. And those extend to development of the
military, as you are well aware, with the Frontier Corps, and
it also extends to non-kinetic measures such as economic and
other developmental efforts in order to bring stability from a
political economic standpoint to the FATA.
So I do believe that the Department in particular, and
while State Department is not here, does account for and does
follow very closely the utilization of the aid that is provided
to Pakistan.
Mr. Murphy. But the reality of on the ground is we knew
this intelligence before the NIE came out. We have known for at
least since I have been in Congress, for seven months, the fact
that we knew this was--this region of the world was a safe
haven for al Qaeda. And we continue to give $80 million dollars
a month to the tune of $5.6 billion to President Musharraf who
has called off his military, the Pakistani Army, and basically
outsourced this tribal area and allowed al Qaeda and the
Taliban to grow stronger and stronger.
Ms. Long. Once again, sir, I would disagree with you. To
date, approximately 700 Pakistani security services have died
in support of the effort to stabilize the FATA and other
regions. And I believe as of today, some 100,000 Pakistani
security forces are in that region contributing to the global
war on terror.
Mr. Murphy. Ms. Long, is it your testimony today that
President Musharraf has not called off the Pakistani Army in
that section, the FATA section, in the past?
Ms. Long. It is my testimony today that it is my
understanding that there is Pakistani military and other
security forces present in the FATA, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
We will now have a 10-minute recess, and Dr. Gingrey, you
will be the next member called upon.
Ms. Eshoo. Could I ask a courtesy of you to maybe announce
the order of members that are still to be called on?
The Chairman. Thank you. We can do that.
I have Dr. Gingrey, Mr. Loebsack, Mr. Wilson--Ms. Wilson,
excuse me. Mr. Holt, Mr. Franks, Mr. Sestak, Mr. Issa. That is
as far down as I can go as of this moment, if that helps any.
Ten-minute recess.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. We are back in session. The gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Gingrey.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Go right ahead, Doctor.
Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I want to thank
the witnesses for sharing their time with us this afternoon. It
has been a great hearing.
My colleague from Ohio asked the question a little while
ago, and he talked about the blooming obvious award to some of
his rhetorical questions. And I thought I would offer a couple
or few rhetorical questions as well, and I think the answer, at
least from my perspective, is blooming obvious, but I would
welcome the witnesses to actually answer the questions if they
felt qualified to do so.
And this is the first question, when a well qualified team
of cancer specialists--now, remember, I am an OB/GYN physician
so I am coming at this analogy obviously from the medical
perspective--but when a well qualified team of cancer
specialists agree on a plan of therapy for a patient's cure,
and this plan is based on all available medical information at
the time of initial treatment, and they apply that therapy
consistent with the known standards of care at that point in
time, yet the cancer comes back, is that medical team guilty of
malpractice?
Now the other question then is, if the answer is no, if
this same team, knowing that the successful treatment of this
recurrent disease, now the cancer has come back, it is going to
be much more difficult, much more difficult as we all know, so
they decide to withdraw their care from the patient and move on
to some other battle that they are more likely to be successful
in, would you then say that they are guilty of malpractice or
even abandonment of the patient? I think that blooming obvious
answer to this rhetorical question is yes.
We have all heard the old adage, and I am old enough to
remember when people would say, oh, goodness, you have got a
cancer, but don't let them cut on it, don't let that doctor cut
on it, because it will spread it.
And what I am getting at, we are talking about, we have
been here a long time today, we are really taking this National
Intelligence Estimate in regard to al Qaeda and the fact that
we went after the cancer with the best knowledge that we had,
the best of our ability at the time, and the cancer, al Qaeda,
according to the National Intelligence Estimate, has come back.
It has come back with a vengeance. It is going to be tougher,
and it is tougher to wipe them out because this spread a little
bit.
Do you gentlemen think that we should give up in a
situation like this, or should we continue to fight the cancer,
because there is still a chance for a cure?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I am not a medical doctor, sir,
but I think your analogy, and even though the questions and
statements are rhetorical, I think they are correct.
The answer to your first rhetorical question is, of course,
no. At least I don't think it subscribes to the common
understanding of what medical malpractice would be.
I think what we have here is somewhat of just a chronic
condition that is going to be with us for a long time, and we
have to, I think, resolve that this is a long running
condition. And hopefully we will find a cure for it some day,
as we will hopefully find a cure for cancer. In the meantime,
we have to attack it using a variety of means and methods, as
we are, and we have to take it on wherever it occurs and
wherever we can get to it.
Dr. Gingrey. Still got a little time for other answers.
Mr. Verga. Sir, I would obviously agree with you and the
only other additional comment that I would make is, while al
Qaeda is a very resilient organization, they have in fact
reconstituted themselves. I have a hard time imagining how much
worse it would be had we not undertaken the actions we have
undertaken since September 11th, and I have a vivid
imagination.
Dr. Gingrey. I will say this, in regard to that comment
about, oh, don't let the doctors cut on that cancer, I can
assure you, and I am not a cancer specialist either, but if you
just look at it and hope that it will go away and that you
don't disturb the hornets' nest and think they will like us, it
will surely kill you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Holt.
Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses.
I would like to follow on some of the questioning of Mr.
Thompson and Ms. Tauscher about the difference, and that you
have heard from others today, about the difference between the
NIEs where in 2006 it talked about seriously disrupting the
leadership of al Qaeda and now saying that it has reconstituted
and is as great a threat as ever.
You took a couple of--made a couple of efforts at trying to
explain some of the differences. At one point, you said, well,
we took away the safe haven in Afghanistan. But that, of
course, had happened long before the 2006 NIE. So that can't be
the explanation of what has changed. Then you said, well, the
policy of Pakistan and the tribal areas has changed. And that
certainly is true.
So let me just ask you to say it outright, are you or are
you not saying that the Pakistani policy, Musharraf 's policy
in the tribal area has changed in a way that has led to either
tolerating al Qaeda or aiding directly or indirectly al Qaeda?
Are you saying that?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, the North Waziristan Peace
Agreement contributed to al Qaeda developing over the past year
a safe haven. It made them more secure. If I can add one thing
though, you noted that taking away Afghanistan in 2001 couldn't
have any effect. My point was that this has not been a constant
evolution. That taking away the safe haven for al Qaeda in
Afghanistan in 2001 did for a period disrupt its ability to
plan and plot. Their movement to the urban areas gave them
opportunity to regenerate. Attacking them there allowed them to
move and so on and so on.
Mr. Holt. Well, I think that there is an important policy
implication of what you have just said about the change in
Pakistan. Let me go to another question; what sort of control
does al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Pakistan or wherever the leadership
is, have over al Qaeda in Iraq for tactics and operational
planning. What sort of control do they have?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think the President laid it out pretty
clearly yesterday.
Mr. Holt. I am asking you. You have studied this, and he is
getting his information from you, I hope.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir. I think what the President said was,
we do not see al Qaeda in South Asia exercising tactical
control over AQI. That they have deferred to AQI.
Mr. Holt. Now you also said in answer, Mr. Gistaro, in
answer to Mr. Thompson's question, that al Qaeda was not in
Iraq at the time that the U.S. went in. When did they go in?
When did they appear if it was after we entered?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think we--the Intelligence Community
looks at the 2004 swearing of bayat on the part of Zarqawi to
al Qaeda as the point where we started to talk about al Qaeda
in Iraq.
Mr. Holt. Why? Why did they go in?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think, and I defer to others on the
panel, there was a terrorist presence in Iraq. It decided in
2004 to align itself formally with al Qaeda.
Ms. Long. Congressman Holt, if I actually might clarify
just two points. You asked a moment ago about the policy
implications of the North Waziristan Agreement. It was unclear
from where the conversation left off, that agreement is no
longer in effect, sir, and in fact has been abandoned. The
Pakistani government made the policy decision to return the
army, which had maneuvered itself away from some of the centers
to garrisons and along the border. They have returned
significant forces to Northern Waziristan as well as realigned
the forces within Northern Waziristan.
So I didn't want to let that go with a misinterpretation
that the agreement was still in effect and, therefore, that we
had not and the Pakistanis had not made the appropriate policy
adjustments.
Mr. Holt. Let me just wrap up by saying, you have published
an unclassified version of this so clearly you mean it for
public consumption. It is leaving the public very confused. We
have gone from the President saying in 2003 that the nearly
one-half of al Qaeda senior operatives have been captured; and
then, a few months later, that nearly two-thirds have been
captured and killed; and a year later, maybe three-quarters
have been killed. We have gone from orange to yellow to red
warnings, and now we have conflicting NIEs barely a year apart.
It is leaving Americans very confused about what we really know
and whether what we are stating are facts or political
assertions.
Ms. Long. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go ahead and answer
that question.
The Chairman. Please.
Ms. Long. Sir, it is a confusing situation in part because
it is a complex situation and the nature of counterinsurgency
of terrorism, and particularly this target, is a very dynamic
target. And it has adapted and changed to our tactics and
procedures, and continues to do so. You are exactly right in
that we owe it to the U.S. public not to boil this down to
sound bites and to ensure that they understand the complexity
and the difficulty of this terrorist target, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Let's go back. We went
into Iraq in March 2003; am I correct? The answer is, yes. At
what point did we realize there was an insurgency? Anybody?
Secretary Clapper. I think soon after the end of active
hostilities.
The Chairman. That would have been around May 1st, 2003, am
I correct?
Secretary Clapper. I think we began to see early when-- I
was the director of NGA at the time, and I think we began to
see early signs that there was a coherent national thing, but
there were certainly the earmarks of an insurgency.
The Chairman. Was this basically the Baathists of
yesteryear of the Saddam Hussein Sunni group?
Secretary Clapper. I think it was a combination of
interests using terrorist tactics, Sunnis versus Shi'as;
disaffected Baathists, yes. Then, as things evolved, we began
to see the association with AQI or al Qaeda moving in and
exploiting the situation and galvanizing the terrorist movement
in Iraq.
The Chairman. When did the al Qaeda or foreign fighters, if
they are the same thing, move in and begin assisting the
insurgency?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, if you do go back, Zarqawi was already in
Iraq even before we invaded. I think he had started to
establish those networks to bring foreign fighters into Iraq,
primarily to be the suicide bombers that he started using with
increasing frequency in 2004 and 2005.
The Chairman. When was that?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir?
The Chairman. When was that? When was there a presence of
al Qaeda assisting or working with the Sunni insurgency? And
using May 1st as a focal point, from that point.
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, we began to use the term al Qaeda in Iraq
in 2004 after Zarqawi pledged his bayat.
The Chairman. So that would be the following year.
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Not until then.
Mr. Gistaro. We were certainly aware of Zarqawi and what he
was doing.
The Chairman. When were you aware of Zarqawi and what he
was doing?
Mr. Gistaro. We saw evidence he was in Iraq even as early
as I believe 2002.
The Chairman. When did he begin his activities?
Mr. Gistaro. Sir, I think this is something I need to take
as a question for the record to make sure I can give you an
accurate answer.
The Chairman. I am getting a little fuzzy there.
Mr. Tierney. Will the chairman yield. The fact of the
matter is Zarqawi was in Iraq, but he was there as an insurgent
independent; that he didn't even have a good relationship with
Osama bin Laden; in fact, Osama bin Laden rejected his
overtures until it was convenient for al Qaeda to take credit
for the kind of insurgency going on in Iraq. And at that point,
they finally accepted the overtures of Zarqawi. And all of the
insurgency activity he was involved in, on an entirely
different basis, became associated with al Qaeda, and that is
how the situation evolved.
The Chairman. Let's proceed.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you for
being here. Sometimes it is easy for those of us that have the
opportunity to kind of second guess you to forget that you are
the invisible front line of freedom in this country, and we
appreciate you very much. I know you have a difficult job.
I was struck by the comments of both Mr. Gingrey and Mr.
Turner about some of the obvious questions. And part of the
problem is that sometimes in this body, self-evident truths
have become less self-evident. And it seems like truth
sometimes gets disinvited from the debate. So if you grant me
diplomatic immunity, let me just try to do a little bit of the
same thing they did.
Ms. Long, when you mentioned that al Qaeda was very adept
at being able to not only assess but to understand the
political dynamics in a given area and to exploit those in ways
that are pretty insidious, do you not think that they also are
able to assess our own political dynamics here and exploit them
to a great degree as well?
Ms. Long. Absolutely. In fact, I believe that there is
intelligence as well as anecdotal information that they watch
our political dynamic as well as our dialogue very carefully in
order to gauge our weaknesses as well as our strengths.
Mr. Franks. I think it is probably one of the greatest
challenges that we have here, is that al Qaeda is an
insidiously intelligent and dangerous group that has profound
commitment to their ultimate end, and our challenge sometimes
is to diminish their capacity.
With that in mind, let me ask you again, Ms. Long, do you
think that al Qaeda feels emboldened and strengthened--and this
is a terribly unfair question to you; it is a political
question, but it also has a pretty straightforward answer,
probably--do you think al Qaeda is emboldened or encouraged by
calls in this body for us to withdraw from Iraq?
Ms. Long. I think debate about what we do in Iraq and the
manner in which we do it is very important, and I think public
dialogue and discussion about that is critical to our
democracy, and I think that, to the extent that individuals see
that both internally and externally, they know this is a
fundamental principle of America, that we have dialog.
I do think we need to be careful that we don't
inadvertently either dissuade our allies from being aware, and
knowing our commitment, as well as emboldening our enemies.
Mr. Franks. If they had a vote, Mr. Verga, do you think
that al Qaeda would vote for us to withdraw or to stay and
fight?
Mr. Verga. I think they would like us to withdraw.
Mr. Franks. Think they would like for us to withdraw. Let
me ask you, Mr. Verga, let me not characterize, what do you
think the reason is that we see this drawing into Iraq of al
Qaeda? Why are they coming into Iraq to fight us?
Mr. Verga. One, because we are there. We are fighting them
there because they are there. And they see it as an opportunity
to hand us a defeat which would help them get to their end,
which is ultimately an Islamic Caliphate that spans the world.
Mr. Franks. Osama bin Laden said not so long ago said, this
battle of two rivers, Iraq, is the critical battle. He said
that this is the important thing. So if Iraq is not important
to Osama bin Laden, if it is not important in the battle
against al Qaeda, if it is not important in the battle against
Islamic terrorism, if it is not important in the battle against
jihad, then somebody needs to explain that to al Qaeda, because
they don't understand.
Let me ask you, Mr. Verga, what do you think happens if we
withdraw too soon from Iraq before that government can stand?
What happens there? What does al Qaeda do, and what advantage
do they gain by that happening?
Mr. Verga. I think the biggest negative would be to
establish a Taliban-type state that we had in Afghanistan prior
to going into Afghanistan in a country which has much more
indigenous capability. Iraq is a much more advanced country
than Afghanistan was. And if you have an Islamic state bent on
exporting Islamic fundamentalism around the world, they would
have an operating base. I think the implications for the region
and the implications for the safety and security of America
would be profound.
That is my best professional judgment, that leaving Iraq
precipitously without setting the conditions for the Iraqi
people to be able to have a stable country is not in the best
interest of the United States.
Mr. Franks. I suppose it doesn't shock you to know that I
agree with you completely on that.
Mr. Gistaro, I think you mentioned earlier that the
assessment is that the potential capacity to attack the United
States comes more from al Qaeda in Asia than it does in Iraq,
but Iraq has probably the clearest open statement that they
want to attack the United States.
So I ask this question, it is a little bit fuzzy, but is it
possible that the reason that we deem the al Qaeda capacity in
Iraq to be less than that of al Qaeda in Asia is because they
don't have the safe haven in Iraq because our people are there
and are engaging them? Does that have anything to do with
diminishing their capacity?
Mr. Gistaro. Yes, sir. The Intelligence Community assesses
that AQI, the bulk of its resources are focused on the conflict
inside of Iraq at this time.
Mr. Franks. I guess, I am about out of time here, but I
want to thank all of you again. I hope that you stay with it. I
think this is the most dangerous enemy that we have faced in
terms of the ideological commitment that they have and that,
unlike some of the dynamics of the past, it is no longer an
equation of what is their intent, how can we diminish that; it
is the equation of, how do we prevent them the capacity to do
this country great damage, and how do we gain the confidence
and the cooperation of the Iraqi people? I would submit to you
that I believe that the rhetoric in this institution can have
two negative consequences: It can embolden the enemy and can
reduce the commitment on the part of our allies to cooperate.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. Sestak, it is my
understanding that Mr. Leiter must leave at this moment and
someone will take his place. Am I correct?
Mr. Leiter. I do, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you. Taking my place, and I apologize
for having to leave early, will be the NCTC's director of
intelligence, Andy Liepman.
The Chairman. The name again?
Mr. Leiter. Andy Liepman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter. Again, thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Leiter.
Thank you so much.
Mr. Sestak.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The largest phrase I will walk out of here with you is
yours, Mr. Gistaro, a safe haven, Pakistan. I can remember, I
guess during the war when we went into Afghanistan, General
Hayden, head of the NSA at that time, said to General Franks--
excuse me, Franks said to Hayden, give me some actionable
intelligence. And Hayden replied, give me some action, Franks,
and I will give you some intelligence.
We have a safe haven, so there is no action. They just sit
there, so we can't get intelligence, if Hayden's comment was
correct.
You said, General, that we want to use--we want to attack
it by every means, by a variety of means. Actually who probably
should be sitting here at this table is the State Department.
But you are the closest to it, Ms. Long, and then you, General.
How do you get action so you can get intelligence in what
you described as a safe haven that the might of America can't
get the intelligence in a certain place in the world? This is
for you, Ms. Long, or General, either one.
Ms. Long. I think there are a variety of ways of getting
action. We have talked a lot today about the kinetic aspects,
and I think what you are alluding to is, as a result of kinetic
activity, you can get prisoners or detainees or you can learn--
--
Mr. Sestak. Much more than that. To the General's point,
there is a lot of means to get action.
Ms. Long. I was starting there, and I was about to say that
actually I think one of the things we have learned, in al Anbar
for example, is it is the non-kinetic means is sometimes more
productive as an intelligence producer, and that is persuading
folks----
Mr. Sestak. How do we do that to Pakistan? What is the
action you recommend?
Ms. Long. We have a three-pronged effort that I think is
effective. And that is economic development so that the people
of the FATA and Northern Waziristan in particular see their
world changing so that they can affiliate themselves----
Mr. Sestak. Will that take time?
Ms. Long. Time.
Mr. Sestak. In the near term, because he is just sitting
there.
Ms. Long. One of the other things that we are doing near
term and actually as we speak is we are developing the
capabilities of the Pakistani army as well as frontier forces.
Mr. Sestak. But he has a treaty.
Ms. Long. That treaty is no longer in effect. And as a
matter of fact----
Mr. Sestak. Why did we wait? If the treaty was giving him
safe haven, why didn't we ask them to break it earlier?
Ms. Long. I think there is a misperception that we were
standing by as this treaty was in effect. That is incorrect. In
fact, our military and other efforts to not only provide
military and other support as well as economic development to
Pakistan were ongoing during the treaty, sir.
Mr. Sestak. General, any recommendations?
Secretary Clapper. As I said earlier, I just think we need
to continue on all fronts, whether it is assistance to the
Pakistanis. I think Ms. Long makes a very good point about it
is not just the kinetic.
Mr. Sestak. Would you change anything we are doing now to
try to get more action, or some action?
Secretary Clapper. I think we need to continue what we are
already doing.
Mr. Sestak. It hasn't produced anything in Pakistan.
Secretary Clapper. Well, I don't think that is necessarily
the case. I think it is producing something. I think the treaty
with the tribes in Waziristan was a good thing to try. It was
done in good faith. It didn't work out, and now it has ended,
so we try another approach. I think that is characteristic of
what needs to be done here, is to call on all forces, kinetic
and non-kinetic.
Mr. Sestak. General, can I follow up? You said attack by a
variety of means. When General Eikenberry left Afghanistan, he
was asked, does Iran work toward our interest in Afghanistan
for stability? His answer was yes at that time, not because
they love us, but because they didn't like al Qaeda and
Taliban, and put money into building roads. The National
Intelligence Council (NIC) had said that we would spiral into
chaos in Iraq if we redeploy precipitously in 18 months.
When asked, Dr. Fingar, did that include the influence if
it was to be one of the means by which we want to get stability
in Iraq to negotiate with him, to work with him to see if they
can have an impact, would that change your answer of spiraling
into chaos, since they don't, he said, want a failed
government, would that have changed your answer? He said
probably.
In attacking by variety of means these insurgents and all,
would working, in your intelligence estimate, with Iran help
address this problem in Iraq?
Secretary Clapper. Well, in the first instance, I think any
Iranian element that poses a direct threat to U.S. Forces in
Iraq certainly has been and will be dealt with. Beyond that,
the limited dialogue that Ambassador Crocker has had with the
Iranians to implore them to reduce, eliminate their engagement,
their support for the insurgents in Iraq is the right thing to
do.
Mr. Sestak. I am out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks
to all the witness for being here today. General Clapper, it is
pretty common knowledge that in order to get to al Qaeda, we
need to be able to surveil the al Qaeda network and their use
of modern telecommunications. How is FISA's inability to
provide you with the proper tool to effectively listen to the
terrorist communications impacting your ability to protect the
homeland?
Secretary Clapper. Sir, I think it would be best if we left
that for a closed session discussion.
Mr. Gallegly. Would it be safe to say that it is clear that
al Qaeda is using modern telecommunications?
Secretary Clapper. Absolutely, they are.
Mr. Gallegly. And it is important that in order to get
through to al Qaeda, we really need to get to the core by
getting through the network.
Secretary Clapper. Yes, sir, that is correct. That is, as I
am sure you appreciate, is why the interest in updating,
modernizing the FISA legislation, not only to improve the
efficiency of our attack against al Qaeda communications and
use of the Internet, et cetera, but at the same time to ensure
that civil liberty considerations are addressed as well.
Mr. Gallegly. But without getting into the specifics and
the overall effect on the homeland, the current status of FISA
does have an impact on our ability to do our job.
Secretary Clapper. It does. It is not as efficient and as
responsive as it needs to be, and that is a factor occasioned
by the huge change in technology that has occurred since the
original FISA legislation was enacted.
Mr. Gallegly. Kind of like between the Motorola cell phones
of 20 years ago that look like a shoe box compared to these
today that you can make a vanilla malt with.
Secretary Clapper. Even more basic than that. We have gone
from an era of putting alligator clips on telephone lines to
the technology you just indicated.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, General Clapper.
The Chairman. Jan Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both chairmen, and
I thank our witnesses today. In 2002, before the vote on the
use of force, I said, am I the only one who sees that the
emperor has no clothes? Well, now, many years later, most
Americans now see that the emperor has no clothes. What we have
been doing has simply not been working, in my view. Almost 6
years now after 9/11, when al Qaeda did attack us, 3,400-plus
American troops are dead; a thousand-plus contractors, who we
don't even count, are dead; tens of thousands of Iraqis; nearly
a half a trillion dollars borrowed; $12 billion a month; $12
million an hour. And the level of threat from al Qaeda we are
learning is high, perhaps as high as it ever was, and growing.
I wanted to just read something from the Strategic Reset,
which is from the Center for American Progress: The current
Iraq strategy is exactly what al Qaeda wants. The United
States, distracted and pinned down by Iraq's internal
conflicts, trapped in a quagmire that has become the perfect
rallying cry and recruitment tool for al Qaeda, United States
has no good options given the strategic and tactical mistakes
made on Iraq since 2002, but simply staying the course with an
indefinite military presence is not advancing U.S. interests.
So we heard the President say in May 2003, al Qaeda is on
the run. That group of terrorists who attacked our country is
slowly but surely being disseminated. Right now, half of the al
Qaeda operatives are either jailed or dead. In either case,
they are not a problem any more. Then we have talk about the
2006 NIE, and then the latest where al Qaeda has protected or
regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability.
This is six years later now.
And so we know also that al Qaeda in Iraq, which we are
talking about the threat from there, did not exist prior to the
U.S. occupation, and in Pakistan, now, we have what I call an
al Qaeda-free zone.
Mr. Verga, you said you don't want the American people to
get the wrong idea, but why wouldn't they? I am looking at a
July 25th, 2007, article that says a secret military operation
in early 2005 to capture senior members of al Qaeda in
Pakistan's tribal areas was aborted after top Bush
Administration officials decided it was too risky and could
jeopardize relations with Pakistan according to intelligence
and military officials.
Why wouldn't they get the wrong idea about our seriousness
about capturing Osama bin Laden? Let me make a few more points.
The other thing I don't understand is why we haven't
focused more on Saudi Arabia. Another article, July 15th, 2007,
in the LA Times: Fighters from Saudi Arabia are thought to have
carried out more suicide bombings than any other nationality.
About 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops
and Iraqi civilian and security forces are from Saudi Arabia;
15 percent from Syria and Lebanon; 10 percent from North
Africa, according to U.S. military official figures made
available to the Times.
So I wanted an answer about the threat, which I didn't see
mentioned in the unclassified report, from Saudi Arabia. So
those are two allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Finally, I wanted to ask your opinion then of what the
latest revealed strategy of the significant American role in
Iraq for the next two years, the joint campaign plan, could
yield us in terms of getting Osama bin Laden and those people
who really are trying to attack us, the bad guys that we know
who have killed us?
When I look at the articles about that two-year presence,
what I see is about trying to stabilize Iraq, reduce the threat
to Iraqis, but nothing about how we are really going to--seems
to me we missed the boat. We took a turn from Afghanistan where
we were fighting al Qaeda, and we went to a place that has only
enabled al Qaeda to organize to use our Iraq occupation as a
gathering point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Issa from California.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Long, Secretary Long, as a key advisor to the Secretary
of Defense this hearing is on Iraq, and I don't want to stray
too far from it, but I feel I must. As al Qaeda builds its
network of foreign fighter recruiting, and they clearly have
done that and used Iraq as one of the central recruiting
points, and of course, they continue to use Israel and the
plight of the Palestinians as another key recruiting.
But recently, near Tripoli, Lebanon, it was shown that a
huge amount of foreign fighters came into a Palestinian camp
and in fact, and I use the words of the prime minister, he
calls them al Qaeda-like, does not want to call them al Qaeda,
but they are clearly foreign fighters, clearly Sunnis, clearly
were recruited to come in, commit crimes and kill Lebanese
armed forces when they came to respond to a bank robbery.
One, how do you respond to that event? And two, which is
going to be more broadly for the panel, when we spend $12
billion a month in Iraq, what is the excuse of having a key
potential second front get only 20 Humvees when we promised
them three quarters of a billion dollars a year earlier at the
time of that attack?
As a matter of fact, at the time of the attack, just as a
little note, they only had 600 artillery rounds to put into the
target because we hadn't kept any of our significant promises
for resupply. I need to use about half my time on you and then
go to General Clapper.
Ms. Long. I can, actually, sir. You are referring to the
Lebanese armed forces (LAF) activities against the Palestinian
armed enclaves in Tripoli and northern Lebanon as well as some
of the activities that the LAF has undertaken in southern
Lebanon. The first point is, you are exactly correct that
foreign fighters have moved into Lebanon, and as you know, and
not the subject of this particular hearing, those have been in
order to strengthen Hezbollah as well as the activity going on
in the north that were contrary to the Siniora government. It
is important for you to be aware that the Department of Defense
as well as the Department of State have reinvigorated and
augmented our support to the Siniora government as well as
Lebanese armed forces.
As you are aware, sir, it wasn't until quite recently
chronologically that the Lebanese government, to the extent it
was one, was Syrian-backed, and some would argue a Syrian
puppet. Prior to that, you are exactly right, not a lot of
resources went into the building of the armed forces.
Mr. Issa. I appreciate your response, but I am going to
make a quick comment back. This is the typical talk we get in
these hearings and is nice to have a public hearing so we can
make a public answer.
It has been two years since the assassination of Hariri.
The March 14th coalition swept in a new organization, clearly
anti-Syrian, and the Syrians were driven out, and we pledged
to, in fact, support that legitimate government. The President
invited the prime minister and had him at the White House.
What I was asking, and I am going to have to go on to
General Clapper, but what I was asking is, why, when we spend
$12 billion a month, when the amount of weapons going into Iraq
and Afghanistan is so huge, we couldn't get more than 20
Humvees in a damn year? That is the question. It answers
itself. And I apologize, but your answer that it has been a
short term, a year or two of a nation that had no military,
whose 113s are lucky just to be diesel and not gas, who go back
to when I was a lieutenant, and then to say, well, it wasn't
enough time, is simply disingenuous.
Additionally, and I know you don't like being called
disingenuous, King Abdullah offered to ship and train from his
excess stock of our equipment, and we said no, and his
equipment still sits there.
Ms. Long. That is inaccurate. I apologize for interrupting.
We have gotten a lot more equipment into Lebanon than 20
Humvees. I will brief you and your staff as to the amount of
equipment.
Mr. Issa. I would look forward to it because I will compare
it with the list I received in Lebanon.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
General Clapper, the followup question for you, it is
interesting that you began your career as a lieutenant flying
over Laos and Cambodia. That was at a time when they were not
open antagonists to us; were they?
Secretary Clapper. That is right, sir.
Mr. Issa. They, in fact, simply were unable or unwilling to
fight an enemy of ours, and they were being used in order to
traffic in people who would kill Americans. And at that time,
in the beginning of your career, we would not accept that
foreign fighters and weapons and resupply came in through other
sovereign nations; we would not accept their sovereignty if
they were not able to maintain their sovereignty.
So my question to you today, from a standpoint of Iraq, is,
why is it we respect the sovereignty to the letter of Syria and
Iran while clearly foreign fighters, munitions and others,
either with or without the assistance of those countries, come
into us; why is it that we do not have a next-generation of
aircraft like the one you flew over Laos and Cambodia with eyes
and ears and, yes, munitions, if necessary? That is as to Iraq,
and obviously Pakistan would be exactly the same question.
How do you answer why what was right when you were a
lieutenant somehow is off limits as a Secretary?
Secretary Clapper. Well, the conditions were not quite--the
analogy is a little different. When I was flying the mission,
EC-47 missions, which were a World War II aircraft with World
War II engines at the time.
Mr. Issa. You were eating K rations when you got home.
Secretary Clapper. Of course, the target was specifically
the North Vietnamese military formations that were moving
through Laos, and the component of the Laotian government that
was supportive acceeded to that. And of course, the conditions
today I believe with Pakistan are just different.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
John Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to start by making a brief
statement as opposed to questioning, then hope to move to
questions. I just want to put enough on the record here to
clarify. There has been some other statements made about the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and I think some of it
may be construed as misleading by others. That act has been
changed dozens of times since it was first enacted, and it was
changed a number of times since 9/11. The President instituted
his program without ever coming back to Congress and asking
that any changes be made in order to take care of any
imperfections he might have seen in it.
We have had numerous hearings now, both open hearings and
classified hearings in the Intelligence Committee and
subcommittees. The Administration has barely been able to
articulate any particular problems with it, but the ones we can
gather are they may need some staffing of people, additional
staffing of people to implement the act as it is written. The
other is that the act already allows for foreign-to-foreign
communications to be intercepted. This Administration, for
reasons we probably can talk about in classified sessions, has
chosen to say it wants a warrant nonetheless.
We don't need to go to an extent that some people have
proposed, which would open up all United States communications
to indiscriminate interception, but I do want to state, Mr.
Schiff and Mr. Flake, in a bipartisan manner, Ms. Harman and
others have taken care of that issue in a piece of legislation
that failed to get bipartisan support. Senator Feinstein
introduced a similar fix in the Senate. I hope that people
won't get caught up in this hyperventilation to think this
Congress hasn't been acting on that. Rather than make it into a
political issue, I am hoping we can get back to legislation
that Mr. Schiff, Mr. Flake and Ms. Harman and others have filed
so we can clear up that issue and stop playing politics.
On another matter here, I think the NIE states clearly the
importance of eliminating key al Qaeda leaders. It states
specifically that the loss of key leaders, specifically, Osama
bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, of course, is
already gone, in rapid succession probably would cause the
group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded
individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of
these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements.
We assess that the resulting splinter groups would at least for
a time pose a less serious threat to the United States'
interests than does al Qaeda originally.
I suppose that was true back right after September 11,
2001, and that is why we went into Afghanistan and why the
entire Congress voted to go in. I also suspect, unfortunately,
it was remaining to be true when this President diverted troops
out of Afghanistan and into Iraq, which at that point in time
did not have any al Qaeda people involved in that situation.
And that is true today. It is still important to go after Osama
bin Laden and Zawahiri and other leaders on that basis, but yet
the President has disbanded a special intelligence group that
was focused solely on that avenue and has continued to support
the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, which some people would argue
isn't doing enough in that FATA area, the tribal area to take
care of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Does anybody here think it is not important at this time to
put some focus on trying to get Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri
and deal with that situation? Is there anybody here arguing it
is not important to go after them?
Assuming, then, that before Mr. Musharraf made the deal
with the tribal chiefs in the Waziristan area, we had unrest
there, we had Taliban, we had people that were causing
problems, that is why he said he made the pact, because he
thought that was going to get their cooperation in moving those
out, so it was a preexisting problem; it didn't happen because
of the pact. Now the pact is in place, and we have some
incidents that may have exacerbated the situation. The fact of
the matter is that he is now by some reports trying to
reinstitute those pacts.
Ms. Long, you say that that is not the case. So are the
reports that we are reading that this is still an effort on the
part of the Musharraf government to reinstitute the pacts with
the tribal leaders no longer accurate? You are uncertain, or
can you adamantly state the United States government is working
with Musharraf to be sure he doesn't reinstitute that policy?
Ms. Long. Sir, what I actually stated was that the Northern
Waziristan Agreement instituted last year arguably was violated
by both sides and has been abandoned by both sides and that
Musharraf has moved subsequent to that to not only reconfigure
figure the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army, but
also put more in the area.
Mr. Tierney. My time is running, but during the time when
that obviously wasn't working, why did the United States fail
to work with General Musharraf and convince him to do something
other than to stand by and abide by that pact and watch that
get worse?
Ms. Long. Sir, we were not standing by. As a matter of
fact, I myself traveled to Peshawar as well in order to
dialogue with the Pakistanis on the meaning of that agreement.
And in fact, that agreement, some would argue, was an attempt
not only to deal with the al Qaeda presence there but also the
Taliban.
As you are aware, the Taliban and other extremists in that
area are also a threat not only externally but internally to
Pakistan. We did not stand by. During that time frame, we
increased our aid to the Pakistani military, and we began
serious dialogue and efforts to train the Pakistani frontier
forces, which were the element that the Pak government at the
time was looking to as the primary element to reinstitute
stability to Northern Waziristan.
It is true that President Musharraf and various elements of
the Pakistani government are looking at a variety of means,
including small agreements in villages and other places, in
order to gain stability. Some would argue that the approach
isn't too different from the approach we are taking in al Anbar
in that they are looking to change tribal minds in order to
gain them on the side of what the Pakistani military is trying
to do, sir. So I can't categorically say there are no
agreements being contemplated at this time. I actually would
hope that the Musharraf government is looking at all means to
stabilize the region.
Mr. Reyes [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. There has been a lot said today, a lot
of questions. I hope I am not repetitive. I had to be at
another hearing and on the floor. I want to focus, I guess, and
I am not sure who on the panel could answer the question, about
the issue of terrorism on our borders.
I think, if you look at the history and where we are now,
when we went into Iraq, there were really no terrorists in Iraq
at that time. Al Qaeda, if they were, I think Saddam Hussein
probably would have killed them. Now I think we can all say
that with all the issues that are going on, that Iraq has been
a training ground for al Qaeda and is very serious.
The way I see the situation, and I have been there four
times, is, you have Sunni-Shi'a, and is almost as if we are the
security guards for the Iraqi government in Iraq right now. And
then you have al Qaeda there throwing bombs and doing whatever
needs to be done. I think clearly that the strategy has to
change in Iraq, and there are different opinions on that.
I heard the President on the radio this morning, and I
think, unfortunately, he made the argument that we need to stay
in Iraq because that is going to protect us from an attack on
our shores. Well, al Qaeda is throughout the world right now. I
think it is a very radical organization, and they recruit
people throughout the world.
I am very concerned about the threats in the United States.
I believe that one of the reasons we haven't had an attack is
that al Qaeda has been focused in a lot of areas, and they want
a big attack in the United States, an attack that is possibly
some type of nuclear attack. The only way we are going to stop
that, I believe, is through good intelligence.
My concern is, do we have the resources, from an
international level, which is what CIA and NSA are doing, to
get back to the United States, to our Federal, State and local?
FBI, who is really in charge; I think the Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) is probably the best resource we have to stop the
terrorism. The FBI is attempting to set up their own
intelligence, the national security branch. But I am very
concerned they are not where they need to be yet. They have
good leadership there, but they need a lot of resources, and
what makes it work is Federal, State and local.
My question is, right now, we know that when eventually we
leave Iraq, hopefully sooner than later, that Sunni and Shi'a
are going to still be having their issues, but al Qaeda that
are trained might come over to our borders and threaten us.
What are we doing to make sure that we are getting the
resources, the intelligence to our Federal, State and local,
that we are identifying the cells in the United States.
I will say one other thing; then maybe you can answer the
question. The only way we are going to ever deal with the issue
of terrorism, we are not going to be able to fight our way out
of it; we are going to have to get the Muslim community
throughout the world and let them come out and say, God does
not want you to kill, that there is a one percent or less of
Islam that is basically hurting our religion, and we are going
to have to rally; that is the way we are going to stop this
terrorism down the road.
Getting back to the United States, we have Muslim Sunnis
here, very active in the communities, do a lot. But they have
children who have been in a very insular society and yet have
gone to public schools. I am sure they have an issue with what
we do in this country.
What are we doing to help get the intelligence to our FBI
and our State and locals in the United States?
Mr. Liepman. Congressman, NCTC was formed partly as a
result of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions, and Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). One
of the primary motivations in that was to improve the latch-up
between our foreign intelligence operations at CIA and DIA and
such, and our law enforcement, FBI, DHS. And I see every day
analysts from the law enforcement side and the foreign
intelligence side sitting side by side with access to each
other's information. We are certainly not perfect yet. We are
still breaking through some stovepipes. But I think the sharing
environment between the two main communities is better than it
has ever been. We, in fact, are launching right now a new
endeavor to make available Federal products to our State and
local and tribal partners. We do that entirely through the DHS
and the FBI. We need to be careful that we give them the
information that is useful and we not flood them with the
amount of information that is available.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do we have the resources that are
necessary? There is so much money going to Iraq. Do we have the
resources to deal with that? That is my last question because
the red light came on.
Mr. Liepman. We are doing pretty well on that. Congress has
been quite generous to us so far.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And the communication between FBI and
Homeland Security.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger.
Ms. Eshoo.
Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for your
answers today but, most importantly, for your service to our
country. I can't help but think that you all in the positions
that you hold are trapped in a bad policy, trapped in a bad
policy.
As we examine the impacts of the key judgments in the NIE,
I believe it directs itself toward that. Now there is a huge
fall-off, as has been stated earlier this afternoon, between
the NIE of this year, of 2007, and the previous one. I think
everyone in this room and everyone in the country, regardless
of what their political affiliation is, would agree that the
statement in this NIE that al Qaeda has, quote, protected or
regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, is
bad news for our country.
I want to get to a couple of areas of questioning relative
to the NIE and the resources that are appropriated by us that
you have and how they are being used to address this. But I
first want to make an observation, before I get to that, on
what some of my colleagues have put forward today, which is
really very, very troubling, and I think misleading. It has
been suggested that we are blind, the term we are blind in
terms of intelligence on al Qaeda because of FISA.
Now the first question that comes to my mind is, how indeed
could this NIE have been put forward if in fact we are blind?
Does anyone on the panel believe that we are blind?
Secretary Clapper. No, ma'am.
Ms. Eshoo. That is the term that has been used. Does anyone
believe that we are blind?
Does anyone believe that we are blind?
No one.
I mean, it is very important to get down on the record,
because I think it is a disservice to what all of you do, first
of all, to suggest that. And we know better because fear is the
most powerful of human emotions. We owe more to the American
people than just trying to scare the hell out of them and say
after all of the expenditure of life and limb and the
investment that the American people are now making, $10 billion
a month in Iraq alone, that we are blind. So thank you for your
observation on that.
Now let me get to resources.
The NCTC. I would like you to tell the committee how many
people you have devoted to the shortfall that the DNI or the
gap that the DNI has spoken of. How many actual people do you
have devoted to this?
Mr. Leipman. I am not sure which shortfall we are talking
about. We currently have 400, slightly more than 400 government
workers in NCTC.
Ms. Eshoo. I am not asking you how many you have in your
agency. I am asking you how many you have working on your
intelligence portion of what the committee hearing is about
today to secure the intelligence. This is about the NIE. This
is a startling NIE.
Mr. Leipman. Ma'am, we have 230 analysts right now. All of
them work on terrorism, the majority of whom focus on the nexus
of foreign intelligence and domestic threat.
Ms. Eshoo. Well, in a secured setting, those are not the
numbers that we received.
To General Clapper, it is nice to see you again. Can you
tell us about the resources, how you break down your resources
and use them in this area?
Secretary Clapper. Well, the totality of the resources
apart from NCTC, or there are other organizations.
Ms. Eshoo. The context--my direct question was the DNI has
said that there is a gap in the ability to track terrorists'
communications. So how many people, both at NCTC and in your
agency, General Clapper, do you have on this?
Secretary Clapper. Well, I think to be perfectly accurate
about this, to include the population of NSA, which we
shouldn't discuss that in open session anyway, and we would
have to research that. And so I would like to take that for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Ms. Eshoo. Is that the same for NCTC?
Mr. Leipman. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Eshoo. Let me ask the following question.
There is $10 billion being spent in Iraq per month. What
would--what amount of that and what impact would it have
relative to what the NIE describes as the huge challenge that
we have today in Pakistan?
Secretary Clapper. If I understand your question, ma'am, of
the money that is being expended in Iraq on a monthly basis and
if that were used for some other purpose; is that your
question.
Ms. Eshoo. Well, again, the hearing today is on the
implications of the NIE regarding al Qaeda. Now, the NIE, in
its unclassified summary with the key elements in it, directs
itself to what we know we have been talking about here today.
I believe that what we are doing in Iraq has really brought
us to the descriptions that are in this NIE. That doesn't seem
to be the policy of our country because of the administration.
So given what the NIE has described, I would like to have
an application of $10 billion to what the NIE directs itself
toward, and the description of America's enemies and where they
are growing and posing that much more of a threat to our
country.
Secretary Clapper. Well, a part of that threat emanates
from Iraq. I mean, we have to--as we discussed earlier, we need
to take on al Qaeda wherever it is. It happens right now that
one of the places that it is present is in Iraq.
Ms. Eshoo. Let me ask it this way.
Mr. Reyes [presiding]. Can you wrap it up?
Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Chairman, I have been here since early this
afternoon. I just want to finish with this question.
Mr. Reyes. I have, too.
Ms. Eshoo. In terms of al Qaeda, which is a--there are many
franchises. They are all over the world. They are limber. They
are entrepreneurial. And the NIE describes the kind of threat
that they are posing not only in Iraq, AQI, that is now
growing, but elsewhere. What percentage of this overall world
al Qaeda threat is in Iraq? What percentage do you attribute to
Pakistan? And then what to other countries?
Secretary Clapper. I believe, again, it would probably be
best served to research that in the interest of accuracy and
get that and provide that for the record.
If you are talking about our estimates on the population of
al Qaeda in various countries, if that is what you are----
Ms. Eshoo. It seems to me we assign resources to
priorities. So I just want to know how you broke down the
percentage.
Thank you.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I really like the analogy that the
gentleman from Georgia used earlier about cancer. And on 9/11,
we discovered a big cancer, and we went after the root causes
of the cancer. We went into a place that was a safe haven for
al Qaeda, and it was Afghanistan, and we rooted out and ran off
the Taliban who had provided the safe haven for al Qaeda; isn't
that correct?
Mr. Leipman. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Johnson. And it was not Iraq that was providing the
safe haven; it was Afghanistan, correct?
Mr. Leipman. That is correct.
Mr. Johnson. But then we have a misdiagnosis that took
place. We had already diagnosed the cancer, and then we got a
diagnosis of high blood pressure emanating from Iraq. We were
told that Iraq was the place where--had a relationship with al
Qaeda. We found out that that was not true. Misdiagnosis. We
were told that there were weapons of mass destruction. That was
not true. We were told that there was an attempt to obtain
nuclear materials from Niger, and that turned out to not be
true.
And then instead of doing follow-up treatments for the
cancer in Afghanistan, we then shifted our focus into treating
the high blood pressure that was not even--which was a
misdiagnosis, and we then enabled the cancer to spread to other
organs.
And so now we have a situation where, because we took our
attention off of clearing up the residual cancer, if you will,
down in Afghanistan that had been run off into the mountains of
Pakistan, now we got a resurgence of the situation with both
the Taliban and Afghanistan in Pakistan.
And it really was not this agreement on September the 5th
that President Musharraf of Pakistan signed with the tribal
elders that led to the resurgence of this cancer, was it?
Because that had started a long time ago when we shifted our
attention to the misdiagnosis.
Am I speaking correctly here or what?
Ms. Long. Congressman, if I may, I am not going to--I went
to law school, not medical school.
Mr. Johnson. Me, too.
Ms. Long. I do think it is important to note that shift of
focus or not, it is important to remember that we have had
about--I think we believe we currently have some 23,600 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan along with our 26 NATO partners as well
as the Coalition members, so we have never----
Mr. Johnson. We have got roughly about 145,000 troops now
bogged down in a civil war in Iraq. And in that war in Iraq, we
have fostered more terrorist development.
And so I say these things to just point out the fact that
the American people don't really have a lot of confidence in
this Administration to actually confront the issues that are
addressed in the National Intelligence Estimate that has been
compiled by you all, and we appreciate the great work that you
have done.
But let me ask you in terms of al Qaeda's ability to obtain
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material,
what are those prospects now, and has our government been
preparing for the possibility that those kinds of attacks could
be levied upon the American people inside the boundaries of the
United States of America?
Mr. Verga. Al Qaeda has the stated objective of obtaining
weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear materials. Even before the NIE came out,
we recognized that as a threat.
We have had--in 1996 there was a Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act that was passed that the Department of
Defense has been doing for training in about 120 cities around
the country. The Congress has authorized and funded 55 National
Guard weapons of mass destruction civil support teams--excuse
me, 52 of which are now operational. The other three will be
operational shortly.
United States Northern Command and the Secretary of Defense
has authorized them, a force package necessary to respond to a
CBRN attack inside the United States.
So the short answer to your question is yes, we recognize
the threat and yes, we have been preparing to deal with it.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, has a question
and the gentleman from Texas has a question, and then we will,
with the agreement of the Chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, we will then go into a closed session which will be
in room 2212.
All right. Mr. Saxton, then Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Saxton. I just want to take one minute to thank you for
holding this hearing and to express my great appreciation for
the time the witnesses have spent with us testifying here
today, and thank you all for the job that you are doing, which
is a very, very difficult one.
I will never forget being in this room in 1990 when the
Secretary of Defense came here and said, I have got good news
and bad news. He said the good news is the Soviet Union is
going to go away. The bad news is the threat isn't. It is just
going to change.
And unfortunately he--fortunately he suggested,
unfortunately we never carried through with making the changes
that were necessary to meet the new threat, because we didn't
know what the new threat was going to be, nor did anybody else
in this country, until well into the 1990's.
And so what you have heard today from some of the members
is a level of frustration, not so much from those of us who
lived through the 1990's and 2001 here in this room and in the
adjoining rooms, but from folks who got into this, came a
little bit later than those of us who had the opportunity to
watch the changes manifest themselves and to deal with the
frustrations of trying to change our political structure, the
structure of our Administration, the structure of our
intelligence-gathering apparatus and the structure of our
military. Keeping in mind that the only military people who
train for this mission were people numbering about 40,000 who
happened to belong to the Special Operations Command. The rest
of our military was configured for a completely different
mission.
And so I appreciate the frustration that I hear from some
of our colleagues, but I just wanted you to know that those of
us who have perhaps lived through this in a different setting
than some others understand how difficult it is to change and
how difficult it is to meet this new threat.
And there are lots of analogies that can be used which I
will save for another time.
But thank you for what you do.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. I just want to quickly wrap up by--I also want
to echo my good friend from Jersey's comments thanking you for
your service, because I know you have been here a long time
this afternoon, and it has to be frustrating knowing the
challenge that we face in trying to figure out how can we best
apply the precious resources that we have.
But I have--in March I was in Afghanistan with General
McNeal, and at the time we were talking about the reported
spring offensive that was--that the Taliban had threatened to
charge, to implement. And he told us that he had asked for
additional troops, and the answer had been ``no'' because of
Iraq, because we were using all of the available troops in
Iraq. And so there were no reinforcements.
I mention that because there are real consequences to what
Mr. Johnson and others have said about the effort that is
taking up precious resources in Iraq versus our ability to
support Afghanistan the way at least General McNeal and others
would like.
The other thing that the--the other comment that I have is
it is my understanding, General Clapper, that it is a well-
known fact that Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri do not communicate
by any means that we would be able to intercept using our FISA
capabilities; is that true or not?
Secretary Clapper. Well, to the best of our knowledge, we
believe that they use couriers or some other means, but they
are certainly very OPSEC, operation security conscious.
Mr. Reyes. Just very quickly. Where are they on our target
list? Are they--are they in the top 10 or----
Secretary Clapper. They are still considered very high
priority.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
And thank you again, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Let me thank the members of the Intelligence Committee,
members of the Armed Services Committee that have been here
today, and special thanks to the panel. And I want to say
publicly, we appreciate your service and your being with us
today, and some of the questions have been difficult. We
appreciate your candor and your answers.
So then, without objection, we will close this part of the
hearing and go to room 2212. But you have to get into 2212
through next door, 2216.
So don't get lost between here and there in the middle, and
we will take that up in just a few minutes.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committees proceeded in
closed session.]
======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 25, 2007
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 25, 2007
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 25, 2007
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 25, 2007
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. ESHOO
Secretary Clapper. The ability to track terrorist communications is
not solely a number of personnel issue. The ability to effectively
exploit terrorist communications involves several factors: the
appropriate technology to collect communications, analyze the data, and
disseminate the intelligence. Additionally, having the right ``mix''
and balance of human resources to conduct the business of exploiting
communications has and always will be a never ending challenge to the
Intelligence Community. The right ``mix'' includes linguists,
technology experts, and communications and all-source analysts to put
the ``terrorist'' intelligence puzzle together.
More importantly, the advancement in modern communications over the
last 30 years has afforded terrorists the ability to effectively
communicate with each other without much recourse. The gap discussed by
the DNI was created because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) did not keep pace with these changes in technology. Merely
adding resources did not solve the fundamental flaw in the FISA
requiring the Intelligence Community to spend time and effort providing
privacy protections to foreigners overseas. The gap was mitigated when
Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA) and updated FISA. To
effectively track terrorist communications, we need people, the right
``mix'' of people, the technology and updated legal authorities;
without these elements, we put our country at risk for warning against
a terrorist attack. [See page 51.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ISSA
Ms. Long. Ms. Mary Beth Long provided the information to Rep.
Darrell Issa in a letter dated 9 August 2007. [The letter is retained
in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.] [See page 45.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 25, 2007
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON
The Chairman. When was witness aware of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and
what was he doing?
Mr. Gistaro. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been an active participant in
a variety of militant/terrorist activities since the early 1990s,
working with a broad network of associates, including al-Qa'ida.
Following U.S. and Coalition action in Afghanistan in late-2001, al-
Zarqawi looked to capitalize on the growing instability in the region
to advance his terrorist agenda, including through longstanding
relationships and personal ties with like-minded extremists stretching
from Afghanistan to the Levant. Our understanding is al-Zarqawi had
reestablished ties by mid-2002 to extremists in Iraq to broaden his
network and expand his capability to undertake terrorist operations
against Israeli, Jordanian, and other western interests in the region.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Clearly, al-Qaeda has now been involved in high-
visibility bombings of civilian populations in Iraq that have been
spread across not only American television, international television,
but television in the Arab world. Has that diminished the popularity of
al-Qaeda. the bombings of civilians? In newscasts which identify the
bombings as being attributed to al-Qaeda, has that diminished their
popularity in the general Muslim community worldwide? What is your take
on that?
Mr. Gistaro. Over the past several years, we have seen indications
that public support in predominantly Muslim countries for al-Qa'ida's
tactics has continued to wane. Results of a Pew Poll study released in
July 2007 showed a drop in support for suicide bombing in seven of
eight Muslim countries surveyed between 2002 and 2007, and declining
confidence in Usama Bin Ladin in all seven Muslim countries surveyed
between 2003 and 2007--with the greatest decrease in Jordan, reflecting
widespread condemnation of the 9 November 2005 attacks on hotels in
Amman. Data from this same study found that a majority of respondents
in 11 of 12 predominantly Muslim countries cited television as their
primary source of news, suggesting that most Muslim audiences primarily
receive information on al-Qa'ida targeting of civilians through
television broadcasts.
Aside from the study results, we also have seen al-Qa'ida take
steps over the past year to continue to defend or clarify tactics used,
specifically related to bombings of Muslim civilians. In an early-April
2008 response to questions submitted by al-Qa'ida supporters and
sympathizers from mid-December 2007 through mid-January 2008 via an
``open interview'' on the Internet, Ayman al-Zawahiri defended and
justified situations in which al-Qa'ida actions resulted in Muslim
civilian casualties. Zawahiri's comments addressed questioners who
specifically cited Muslim casualties from the December 2007 Algeria
bombings conducted by al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb. Zawahiri's defense was
also likely in part a response to comments made by several leading and
influential clerics, including Sayid Imam al-Sharif, aka Dr. Fadl, a
Zawahiri mentor and early ideological leader of the jihadist movement,
who have publicly raised questions over the last year about al-Qa'ida's
use of tactics that result in civilian deaths.