[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUNWAY SAFETY: AN UPDATE
=======================================================================
(110-174)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 25, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
----------
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa York
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina Louisiana
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
JOHN J. HALL, New York MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
BOB FILNER, California THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin Virginia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TED POE, Texas
Columbia DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
CORRINE BROWN, Florida CONNIE MACK, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California York
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Crites, James M., Executive Vice President for Operations,
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport........................ 5
Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 5
Forrey, Patrick, President, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association.................................................... 5
Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by
Wes Timmons, National Director of Runway Safety, Federal
Aviation Administration........................................ 5
Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 5
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania............................. 51
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 52
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 53
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 59
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 60
Richardson, Hon. Laura A., of California......................... 64
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Crites, James M.................................................. 68
Dillingham, Dr. Gerald........................................... 137
Forrey, Patrick.................................................. 173
Krakowski, Hank.................................................. 190
Prater, Captain John............................................. 205
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Crites, James M., Executive Vice President for Operations,
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, ``Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport Perimeter Taxiway Demonstration,'' Karen
Buondonno and Kimberlea Price, July 2003....................... 77
Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration:
Insert for the record.......................................... 15
Insert for the record.......................................... 17
Insert for the record.......................................... 19
Insert for the record.......................................... 29
Insert for the record.......................................... 35
Insert for the record.......................................... 44
Responses to questions from Rep. Costello...................... 202
Responses to questions from Rep. Dent.......................... 203
Responses to questions from Rep. Hall.......................... 204
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
HEARING ON RUNWAY SAFETY: AN UPDATE
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Thursday, September 25, 2008,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry
F. Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
Chair will ask all Members, staff, and everyone to turn
electronic devices off or on vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
Runway Safety: An Update. I will give a brief opening
statement, call on the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, to give
remarks or his opening statement, and then hopefully we will go
directly to our witnesses.
I welcome everyone here today to our hearing on Runway
Safety: An Update. Runway safety continues to be an aviation
safety concern, appearing on the National Transportation Safety
Board's Most Wanted List since the list was created in 1990.
While we will hear today that the United States has the safest
air transportation system in the world, we cannot become
complacent about our safety. One accident or near accident is
one too many.
According to the General Accountability Office, the overall
rate for runway incursions for the first three quarters of 2008
has increased slightly compared to 2007. That, in conjunction
with three near misses within three weeks over the summer, at
two of our busiest airports and one last Friday at Lehigh
Valley International Airport, causes me and I think everyone
else concern, especially with operations decreasing almost
three percent in the first six months of 2008 compared with
2007, according to the FAA.
At our February 2008 hearing on runway safety, I requested
quarterly reports from the FAA on runway safety to ensure this
issue remains at the top of the FAA's agenda. Further, while I
am pleased that the FAA has filled its Runway Safety Office
Director position after nearly two years being vacant, and that
they have taken many of the recommendations from the GAO, we
still need to have an update on the FAA's plans to improve
runway safety.
The GAO also cites human factors, such as controller
fatigue and miscommunication, as factors in runway safety, and
I am interested in hearing more from the panelists, including
Mr. Pat Forrey, the President of the National Air Traffic
Controller Association, on this issue.
As our June 2008 hearing demonstrated, we have a controller
staffing shortage and the FAA has been slow to acknowledge the
problem or find a solution. As a result, controllers are being
asked to work longer hours to handle increasingly congested
runways and airspace. And, according to the GAO, by 2011, up to
50 percent of the controller workforce will have less than five
years experience, which could affect runway safety.
The near miss this last Friday clearly demonstrates how
staffing has an effect on safety. According to some reports,
the Lehigh Valley International Airport near miss was a result
of an inexperienced controller or trainee allowing both
aircraft on the same runway. Those planes missed each other by
about 10 feet. I am interested in hearing both from Mr.
Krakowski and Mr. Forrey concerning that particular near miss.
I am also interested in learning more about the
implementation and use of technology such as the airport
surface detection equipment model ASDE-X, runway safety lights
and low-cost surveillance systems. I am pleased that the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport is here to give us their perspective
on these technologies.
While the House of Representatives provided $42 million for
runway incursion reduction programs, $74 million for runway
status light acquisition and installation, and required the FAA
to submit a runway safety plan that includes a road map for the
installation and deployment of systems to alert controllers and
flight crews in H.R. 2881, unfortunately, the FAA
Reauthorization Act that we passed on September 20th of 2007
containing those provisions and authorizations, the Senate has
failed to act on that legislation. The Subcommittee will
continue to provide aggressive oversight on this and other
issues until these provisions become law.
As I have stated time and time again, safety must not be
compromised in an effort to save money or for a lack of
resources or attention. The FAA and the entire aviation
community must work together so that we can do better to ensure
our safety efforts remain on track. The American public
deserves no less.
With that, I want to welcome our witnesses here today, and
I look forward to hearing their testimony. Before I recognize
Mr. Petri for his opening statement, I ask unanimous consent to
allow two weeks for all Members to revise and extend their
remarks, and to permit the submission of additional statements
and materials by Members and witnesses. Without objection, so
ordered.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me, first
of all, thank you and actually the Chairman of this Full
Committee for having scheduled in this Subcommittee and I think
in some of the other Subcommittees an aggressive schedule of
safety oversight on different aspects of transportation. It is
an important subject and one that certainly our involvement in
can help keep in the forefront of everyone involved in the
safety system. It is clear we can have zero accidents and zero
mistakes if we just close down transportation, so that is not
the answer. The problem is to figure out how to take
intelligent risks and also to minimize mistakes and
opportunities for human error and all the rest.
This hearing is another occasion to help us learn more
about what we can do and what is being contemplated to do an
even better job of managing this wonderful system of mobility
that we have in the United States, air mobility and all the
rest, in as responsible a fashion as possible.
I certainly would like to thank the witnesses for appearing
before the Subcommittee to provide an update on runway safety
initiatives and on the ongoing efforts to decrease runway
incursions. Though work, as has been pointed out, currently in
the safest period in aviation history, as long as humans fly
aircraft--and even if they are replaced by machines, which is
no longer beyond the possibility--as long as aircraft fly,
there will always be the potential for mechanical failure and
for human error and for accidents. But the FAA, this
Subcommittee, and the entire aviation community are responsible
for ensuring that the U.S. has the safest national airspace
system possible.
A recent Government Accountability Office report on runway
incursions and runway and ramp safety found that while the rate
for the most serious category of runway incursions is down from
last year, 24 events out of 61 million aircraft operations,
there was an anomalous--at least we hope it was an anomalous--
up-tick in total runway incursions in the first quarter of this
year. Therefore, we must remain vigilant in our oversight of
this issue.
I am looking forward to hearing about the steps that
airports, pilots, controllers, and the FAA are taking to
mitigate the risk of these potentially deadly runway
incursions. Clearly, there is no silver bullet to eliminate all
runway incursions, but I believe that there are many ways to
address runway safety, and I am interested in hearing about the
many technologies currently deployed or under development to
reduce incursions.
During our hearing in February, the FAA discussed several
technologies, such as runway status lights, low-cost surface
surveillance, that would have the potential to drastically
reduce the number of runway incursions. I am interested in
hearing about the progress of testing and deploying these
technologies so vital to assisting controllers and pilots
during critical phases of a flight.
In addition to technological innovation, I am interested in
hearing about the bricks and mortar solutions, crushable
concrete engineered material arresting systems that have been
installed at 21 airports, improved markings and signage at
airports and around perimeter taxiway like the ones at
Atlanta's Airport, where runway crossings have been reduced
from roughly 640 to less than 100 per day.
I am interested in hearing about what the witnesses think
about these strategies and also look forward to hearing about
the status of the FAA's evaluation of these measures and their
plan to deploy them.
It is also important to explore whether the expected drop
in enplanements will affect the funding streams necessary to
continue these important projects.
I would also like to hear an update on the FAA's call to
action on runway safety. I join the GAO in applauding the FAA
for making runway safety a priority, but it would be important
for the agency to keep programs on schedule and to continue to
maintain the vigilant oversight that we are seeing now.
Beyond the flashing lights, radar, alerting systems, and
concrete, it is important we address human factors that affect
runway safety. Pilot alertness and situational awareness are
critical to safe flights. Also, we need to get more information
to pilots. It is important that we strike a balance that does
not overload or distract them.
Although the National Transportation Safety Board has not
cited controller fatigue as a factor causing any of the runway
incursions that they have investigated, including the tragic
accident in Lexington, Kentucky, some have cited controller
fatigue as an area of concern, and I am certainly interested in
hearing about these concerns, as well as plans to address them.
As with all safety issues, it is critical that this
discussion be based on facts. We must be cautious, when
discussing safety, to avoid confusing emotion with real safety
concerns. Both labor and management must build a cooperative
and collaborative relationship to achieve the safety benefits
that we are seeking, and I am concerned that the combative
posture employed by both sides will only lead to trouble.
The number if enplanements has dropped since last year, but
serious runway incursions have persisted, which indicates that
the risk of runway incursions has not yet been completely
addressed, and it will take everyone's continued effort and
cooperation to get us to the goal.
I appreciate all of our witnesses' efforts to address this
important safety issue and I look forward to your testimony and
thank you for being here today.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now
will recognize the witnesses. Mr. Hank Krakowski, who is the
Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Control
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration. He is
accompanied by Mr. Wes Timmons, who will not be offering
testimony, but who will be accompanying Mr. Krakowski for
questions. Mr. Timmons is the National Director of Runway
Safety, Federal Aviation Administration.
Dr. Gerald Dillingham, who has testified before our
Subcommittee more times than he probably likes, but he has been
here many times and I think has done an outstanding job. He is
the Director of the Physical Infrastructure Issues with the
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Patrick Forrey, who
is the President of the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association; Mr. John Prater, who is the President of the Air
Line Pilots Association, International; and Mr. James Crites,
who is the Executive Vice President for Operations, Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport.
Gentlemen, we, as you know, have a five minute rule. We
will recognize you. We would ask you to summarize your
testimony. Your entire statement will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Krakowski.
TESTIMONY OF HANK KRAKOWSKI, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR
TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
ACCOMPANIED BY WES TIMMONS, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF RUNWAY SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM,
DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; PATRICK FORREY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER,
PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; AND
JAMES M. CRITES, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Krakowski. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Petri. It is good to be here and see everybody again. Thank you
for this testimony to update you on the efforts since we last
met in February.
With me today is Wes Timmons, and what is important about
Wes being here is that Wes is bringing leadership and stability
as he continues to build up the runway safety office. I am
happy to report that we have made solid progress since February
and I am confident that our strategies will continue to reduce
risk.
Just a reminder that at the beginning of fiscal year 2008
the FAA did adopt a new ICAO standard, which is more risk-
inclusive. Therefore, year over year, from last year, you will
see more events reported, because we were not reporting less
serious events. I think that actually adds to the risk
assessment.
Of course, Category A incursions are the most serious
incidents, in which a collision is narrowly avoided; Category B
are ones when you have a separation decrease, where there is a
significant potential for a collision; and, of course, Category
C and D are the serious events.
If the chart can be brought up, either electronically or--
--
Mr. Costello. There it is.
Mr. Krakowski. Very good. Thank you.
I would like to just draw your attention to that. I recall
being here last February, Mr. Chairman, and the concern that
you had, and we had as well, is if you look at the gray line,
which is the lower line on this chart, you can see that last
year, which is what that line represents, the serious
incursions were beginning to increase in early summer, and, as
we entered the fall period, they continued to increase at an
alarming rate.
Given the rate of increase that we were seeing, we had to
do something to arrest that change, and what we did is, through
the Call to Action, through very specific things that the
Acting Administrator did in January to refocus this effort, we
intended to put a tourniquet on that rate of change, and I
think you can clearly see that we did arrest the increase, and
we have settled the situation down.
Now, this year we still have 24 events, which is equal to
what we had last year. The event in Allentown was categorized
as an A, so we are 24 for 24. I would like to remind you that
the 2007 24 event figure represents the safest we ever had, so
we are at least on par with that. Obviously, we are not
sanguine with that type of statistic; we are still having
serious events going on.
The event in Allentown was a human factors issue, and one
of the things we try to do is mitigate human factors through
the use of technology as a safety net. ASDE-X is now being
deployed in 17 towers. Sixteen additional towers are scheduled
to be operational by the end of October 2010; two more in 2011.
Runway status lights, which has clearly shown safety benefit,
are scheduled to be installed at 22 airports beyond the ones we
have in Dallas and San Diego. We have also initiated memoranda
of understanding at 18 airports for runway status lights
configuration and construction.
Based on our evaluations in Spokane of low-cost ground
surveillance system, we have issued a request for proposal
across industry to offer low-cost alternatives for those
airports who do not have the funding mechanisms or the traffic
density for ASDE-X deployment. Several offers are currently
under review and we expect to complete those evaluations in the
next few months.
We also sent, over this year, our Runway Safety Action Team
to 20 of our busiest airports. These visits identified common
sense opportunities for curbing runway incursion, such as new
improved signage, markings, driver training, and airport
training. We identified a second tier of 22 airports to visit,
and we completed the analysis in July.
As part of the Administrator's Call to Action last year,
the FAA required 75 of the largest airports to enhance airport
markings by June of this year, and they have completed those.
We have also completed rulemaking requiring enhanced markings
at all part 139 airports by 2010.
Now, we can do everything right, but we still have human
factors issues to tackle.
At the last hearing, I disclosed our intention to work with
NATCA to implement ATSAP, the non-punitive voluntary reporting
system for our traffic controllers. The ATSAP demonstration is
now up and running at all the Chicago facilities, and we are
gathering valuable safety information regarding events and
incidents that previously have gone unreported. We intend to
expand this program beyond Chicago once the program is proven.
One major component, as you mentioned, was fatigue. The FAA
recently had a Fatigue Seminar and we do have a number of
follow-ups in the works right now to look at controller
schedules, particularly time off between shifts and how much
time is needed after working a midnight shift.
We also are going to start the Runway Safety Council this
fall, which we committed to, and we want to thank ALPA, NBAA,
AOPA, all the user groups and communities, for working with us
this year to give us the success that we showed in the chart.
Mr. Chairman, as you said, constant pressure is needed. I
personally appreciate the pressure that this Committee gives on
us to keep us to stay focused. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. I thank you, Mr. Krakowski.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Dillingham.
Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Mr. Petri. My
testimony this morning focuses on actions FAA has taken to
reduce runway incursions since we testified on this issue
before you last February. I will also identify some further
actions we think should be undertaken.
With regard to the actions of last year, we agree with Mr.
Krakowski, FAA has given a higher priority to improving
aviation safety. For example, it is establishing a Runway
Safety Council to analyze the root cause of serious incursions,
and it has continued to deploy and test new technologies,
conduct runway safety airport reviews, and issue new air
traffic procedures. FAA has also begun testing a voluntary
safety reporting program for air traffic controllers. Many of
the FAA initiatives are responsive to the recommendations that
we made to the agency.
Mr. Chairman, despite these actions, the risk of runway
collision is still high. The number of serious incursions is
about the same, or the same now, this year, as it was last
year. In both years, a third of the serious incursions involved
a commercial aircraft. Moreover, the rate for incursions in all
categories of severity increased by 10 percent. Using the ICAO
definition of incursions that it recently adopted, FAA has
counted nearly 1,000 incursions during fiscal year 2008. Most
of these incursions involved a general aviation aircraft. These
statistics do not include incursions that may have occurred at
non-towered airports.
The primary causes of incursions are human factors issues,
such as fatigue, miscommunication between pilots and air
traffic controllers, and loss of situation awareness on the
airfield by pilots. Going forward, air traffic controllers may
need to be a particular focus because FAA is hiring large
numbers of controllers, and the ratio of new hires to veterans
is increasing. Newly certified controllers will have much less
exposure to potential incursions and, therefore, may be less
efficient in mitigating them. Any loss in efficiency could
negatively affect runway safety.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss some
additional actions we think need to be undertaken.
First, FAA and other stakeholders must give sustained
attention to runway safety, even if the number and rate of
incidents decline.
Second, FAA's emphasis on serious incursions should not
detract attention from less serious incursions. Serious
incursions are only the tip of the iceberg. Less serious
incursions can lead to more serious incursions. Therefore, the
entire scope of incidents should be part of the search for
solutions.
Third, FAA and the airlines could further improve runway
safety by addressing human factors issues such as fatigue,
expediting the deployment of technologies, and increasing
training for pilots and air traffic controllers.
Finally, some version of the House FAA reauthorization bill
would provide more than $100 million for runway safety
initiatives.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, by 2025, air
traffic is projected to double or even triple. That could
equate to 100,000 to 150,000 flights each day, significantly
increasing the risk of incursions. The efforts that are
underway today by FAA, controllers, and pilots are very
promising, but must be sustained to meet the challenges of
today and enhanced to meet the challenges on the horizon.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Dr. Dillingham.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Forrey.
Mr. Forrey. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member
Petri for the opportunity to testify today. Let me again thank
you for your leadership on FAA reauthorization and express my
deep disappointment that the Senate failed to pass their own
bill, thus ignoring the current demise of the NAS and
neglecting the needed infrastructure improvements for a safe
and efficient airspace system.
Last Friday, I received news from Allentown, Pennsylvania.
A Cessna landing at Lehigh Valley International Airport was
given instructions to exit the runway, missed its taxiway, and
was still on the runway when the tower control cleared a Mesa
Airlines regional jet for takeoff. The two planes came so close
to collision that the RJ actually had to swerve to avoid the
Cessna and miss it by 10 feet. There were two employees in the
tower at the time. Both were trainees.
On June 10th, there was a runway incursion at New Orleans
Airport. There were three controllers in the tower at the time,
all trainees, and the cumulative FAA experience of all three
was 20 months. Supervising the operation was a controller in
charge who had been in the agency for a total of all of eight
months, and there was no supervisor on duty in the tower.
When I testified before this Committee in February, I
implored the FAA to ensure the proper staffing of air traffic
control towers. Working conditions continue to deteriorate and
experienced controllers are leaving the workforce at an
alarming rate. Over 3,000 controllers have left in the past 24
months since the FAA imposed their working payrolls.
The FAA is so desperate to staff its towers that it must
rely on untrained and uncertified controllers to work traffic
without the support of more experienced personnel. This is true
not only in Allentown and New Orleans, but in some of the
busiest and most complex facilities in the Nation.
The FAA has created a perfect storm. Controllers are
working longer days and weeks, and fewer opportunities for rest
and recovery. They are working combined positions and given
more training. Fewer and fewer trainees have the luxury of
learning from those with years of experience, and they are even
being trained by other trainees.
Yet, the FAA refuses to meaningfully address this issue. At
New Orleans, they fired the probationary controller working
local control instead of the manager who allowed that situation
to happen. And the terminal leader's answer to runway safety is
to order controllers to state I will participate in preventing
operational errors when they give a relief briefing.
The agency prefers to offer incentives designed to entice
controllers to leave one understaffed facility to go work at
another one. They have created a meaningless staffing standard
designed to mislead Congress and the flying public into
believing that no staffing problem exists. These so-called
standards are based not on scientific evaluation of necessary
staffing, but on the agency's financial goals.
Not surprisingly, runway incursions are up this year.
Whether we compare the old FAA or the new ICAO rules, runway
incursions are up. The rate of serious Category A and B
incursions is also up, and operational errors in the terminal
environment are up as much as 20 percent over last year.
But the FAA has done very little to substantively improve
runway safety. In addition to their failure to address the
staffing crisis, they have not formed local runway incursion
prevention committees; they have not worked with local
stakeholders to identify runway incursion hot spots; they have
no new plans to construct additional end-around taxiways; they
refuse to work with NATCA on new technology projects and have
subsequently encountered implementation problems that might
have been avoided from front-line controllers.
The only area where there has been any progress is in the
development of low-cost ground surveillance systems, which may
prove useful to airports where the installation of the superior
ASDE-X model type system is not a viable option. It seems that
only when a near catastrophic incident makes it into the
evening news does the FAA react, and even then change is
cosmetic more than substantive.
This July, there were two well publicized near collisions
in a one-week span at JFK Airport. Both these incidents were
caused by unsafe usage of perpendicular runways. Each time,
controllers were forced to contend with a last second go-around
incident, which, in this configuration, forces aircraft
aborting a landing to cross the flight path of a departing
aircraft, creating a potential for collision.
NATCA representatives at JFK have been trying for years to
convince the FAA to change this procedure, but until this
summer their warnings fell upon deaf ears. Only after hundreds
of passengers were nearly killed did the FAA finally act and
discontinue this operation.
The new rule is a no-brainer for safety; however, it barely
scratches the surface. The staggering of arrivals and
departures on these perpendicular runways does nothing to
address the dangers when they are both being used for arrivals.
Nor does it address the reciprocal application. It certainly
fails to address other issues at other airports facing the same
dangers.
In Detroit, for example, the FAA's Office of Aviation
Oversight found that similar operations were not compliant with
FAA regulations, and the operation had been halted. Yet,
throughout the Country, similar unsafe operations continue
unchanged. In Memphis, Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, Las Vegas,
Washington-Dulles, and Houston, perpendicular runways cause the
same danger and the FAA refuses to change it.
Controllers concerned about the safety of the airports
under their watch are speaking out in the only arena left to
them: by seeking asylum under the whistleblower protection
program. The Office of Special Council has issued a letter to
the Department of Transportation in response to the
whistleblower findings about unsafe runway operations at
Memphis and about Newark Airport, saying there is a substantial
likelihood that conditions at these two airports create a
substantial and specific danger to public safety. But the FAA
has dismissed these claims and retaliated against the
controllers.
When this panel met six months ago, we discussed serious
and growing problems in runway safety. The FAA chose to ignore
the warning signs presented to this Committee and disregard the
advice offered by panelists. Instead, it has continued the same
well-trodden FAA path, allowing the safety of the national air
space system to take a back seat to bottom-line management, and
their cozy relationship with the private aviation industry, and
put capacity over safety.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Forrey.
Captain Prater?
Mr. Prater. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Petri. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the 53,000
pilots that I represent's perspective on runway safety.
While Government and industry stakeholders have begun a
number of initiatives and made some improvements in runway
safety since the last hearing in February, I think we can all
agree that we can make our runway environments safer.
Less than a week ago, two of my members rejected a high-
speed takeoff when they saw a small Cessna still on the runway,
swerving their airliner to avoid a collision in Allentown.
According to the NTSB, the crew of the airliner estimated that
they missed the Cessna by as little as 10 feet. I will remind
that typical takeoff speeds in excess of 175 feet per second,
200 feet per second are normal, so 10 feet is less than a blink
of an eye.
The truth is that any one of us could be on a flight that
faces a similar threat. And, remember, there are approximately
60,000 commercial flights in U.S. airspace every day.
To make sure that the next close call or worse doesn't
happen, the environments we work in every day have to catch up
to the 21st century. That is why, today, the Air Line Pilots
Association will challenge both Government and industry to join
us in establishing a goal of zero serious runway incursions
involving commercial airliners. I propose that we focus our
resources and attention on that goal until it is achieved and
maintained, before any catastrophic event occurs.
As you know, technological solutions are available today.
They include everything from moving map displays in ADS-B to
runway status lights and digital data link clearances. The
testing, development, and requirements and actual
implementation of these solutions are moving at a pace that
won't speed up without Congress's assistance, especially in the
already strapped-for-cash airline industry.
While these technologies hold the most promise for reaching
our industry reach the eventual goal of zero serious
incursions, they do little to address it in the near term due
to funding challenges. But we don't need to sit around and wait
for technology. There are simple and cost-effective steps that
can improve runway safety now.
Airports around the U.S. can help pilots navigate airfields
better with something as simple as a can of paint. The FAA
intends to require that all Part 139 airports provide enhanced
markings by no later than 2010. We would urge the airport
operators to not wait for a regulation that requires these
needed markings, but to include them immediately in their next
facility upgrade plans during the next construction season.
Airlines can do their part by standardizing operating
procedures to allow pilots to complete as much heads-down
activity as possible prior to the taxi phase before takeoff and
after landing and taxying to the gate. Following the guidance
in the FAA's advisory circular on standard operating procedures
for ground operations will reduce pilots' distractions during
the taxi phase, enabling both of them to focus entirely on
maintaining situational awareness.
The runway and taxiway and ramp environment demands two
sets of eyes scanning for trouble at all times, with both
pilots monitoring an ATC frequency instead of company radios.
Using the same words and phrases around the world when
navigating airfields here at home would help pilots during taxi
operations as well. ALPA welcomes the FAA's recent adoption of
the ICAO lineup and wait phraseology and encourages the FAA to
take it one step further by adopting the ICAO phraseology for
runway crossings as well. Doing so will reduce the possibility
of a pilot inadvertently crossing a runway without clearance.
Let me be clear. I can attest that the potential for
confusion in airport environment is already inherently high,
and we shouldn't increase that confusion for foreign flight
crews operating in the U.S. by using different phrases from
what they hear elsewhere in the world. ALPA continues to
communicate directly with our pilots and will expand that to
other airline pilots through our Hold Sharp for Runway
Campaign. We have encouraged our pilots to increase their
vigilance when they are sitting at the controls of their
airliner on the ground or in the air. We will continue to put
out newsletters and other interactive tools to keep high focus
on this very dangerous situation.
When it comes to airline safety, the bottom line is that
demanding schedules, inadequate rest periods, and insufficient
or inaccurate information can degrade the performance of even
the most seasoned pilot or controller. We operate in complex
and demanding environments, where the risk for a runway
incursion is ever-present and growing. All of us must renew our
commitment to improve safety throughout the operational
environment. Together, we can make the goal of zero serious
runway incursions involving commercial airliners a reality.
Today, I pledge our union will work towards that goal.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Captain Prater.
Now, the Chair recognizes Mr. Crites.
Mr. Crites. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri,
Congressman Johnson, good morning and thank you for inviting me
to participate in this important hearing. I am Jim Crites,
Executive Vice President of Operations for the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport. I also serve as the Aviation Group
Chair for the Transportation Research Board, part of the
National Academy of Sciences.
As in security runway safety must be addressed in a multi-
layered approach with numerous checks and balances, at DFW we
have implemented this very approach through our partnering
efforts with the FAA, NASA, and our tenant airlines to
implement the latest technology, as well as deploy low-tech
improvements to increase and enhance safety.
Situational awareness is critical to establishing a safe
runway operating environment. As such, DFW partnered with the
FAA to successfully test runway status lights. These lights
provide a real-time visual reference for pilots, air traffic
controllers, and vehicle operators as to the current status of
the runway, that is, whether it is safe to make use of the
runway for either an aircraft departure or runway crossing. I
find it best to think of this system as traffic lights for
runways which provide clear, simple to understand, real-time
visual situational awareness.
This system has had an immediate and positive effect on
runway safety. In fact, we believe that the runway status light
system prevented at least two runway incursions at DFW airport
in its first year alone. This system has won high praise from
the entire aviation community and we are grateful for its
expedited deployment by the FAA.
Eliminating the need to cross a runway is the ideal
situation. We have discovered a way to accomplish this while
simultaneously restoring airport capacity and efficiency, and,
in so doing, reducing aircraft emissions as well. Perimeter or
end-around taxiways are now being constructed at high
operational temp airports after having proven that they can
accomplish all three goals. DFW, along with its partners, using
NASA's human-in-the-loop simulation capability, demonstrated
that the use of perimeter taxiways results in a significant
reduction in required air traffic controller and pilot
communications, as well as a 30 percent increase in overall
capacity at DFW.
Our first of four perimeter taxiways will become
operational this year. Once completed, these perimeter taxiways
are expected to eliminate as many as 1,500 runway crossings per
day, as well as to save air carriers approximately $100 million
per year through increased efficiency, while significantly
reducing aircraft emissions.
In response to the FAA Administrator's Call to Action
Safety Summit in the summer of 2007, DFW held a runway safety
workshop wherein aviation stakeholders at all levels of their
organizations were invited to participate. Pilots and air
traffic controllers, along with airport operations personnel
who work side-by-side in the aircraft movement area, joined
with senior representatives of the FAA, airport, and airlines.
Local issue identification and development of creative,
empowered solutions enabled immediate action on issues of
concern while simultaneously providing valuable insight for the
development of long-term solutions.
The insights gleaned from these workshops and conferences
not only have resulted in prompt resolution of issues through
the fielding of low-tech, low-cost physical improvements, such
as additional signage and markings, but, more importantly, they
have provided operators with an insight as to how valued they
and their ideas are, as exemplified by the actions taken by
their senior management. We believe these efforts have also led
to a heightened state of vigilance of everyone operating on the
airfield.
Concern remains regarding vehicle deviation-induced runway
incursions, whereby a vehicle operator driving in the aircraft
movement area will lose track of where they are in relationship
to an active runway and inadvertently cause an incursion.
Twenty-nine percent of runway incursions are caused by vehicle
deviations, most of which we find are due to a loss in
situational awareness.
In search of a solution, we have partnered with our local
FAA representatives, the University of Texas-Arlington, the
Texas Workforce Commission, and local businesses to explore the
leveraging of the off-the-shelf technologies which will provide
visual and audible alerts to vehicle operators who come within
a defined safety area surrounding a runway. We are discovering
a wide variety of promising technologies that leverage the use
of the vehicles' existing onboard systems. In short, we are
constantly looking at new ideas and are proud to report that we
have one of the most advanced safety programs in the world.
In closing, as Chairman of the Aviation Group for the
Transportation Research Board, I want to express my sincere
appreciation to this Committee, which helped to create and fund
the highly effective Airport Cooperative Research Program. We
are currently entering our fourth year of research aimed at
finding practical, near-term solutions to the aviation safety,
security, and environmental challenges facing airports today.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
hearing. I look forward to responding to your questions.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Crites.
Dr. Dillingham, on page 12 of your testimony, you say,
``Despite ongoing efforts, FAA risks not meeting its current
plans to meet the deployment of ASDE-X by 2010.'' You have
touched on that in your oral and written testimony. I wonder if
you might expand upon that and indicate why you have concerns
that they may not meet their current plans by 2010.
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Chairman, I think FAA was able to
deploy a small number of ASDE systems in the first few years of
the program. They now have around a dozen that they need to put
in within the next two years, and just time-wise it doesn't
seem like it is something that they will be able to accomplish,
or they would have great difficulty. We talked to FAA about it
and FAA has a plan whereby they will not be putting these
systems in one by one, as they did early on, but they will be
doing them simultaneously so the possibility is there. But
since so much depends on this, for example, runway safety
lights are hooked to this system, and until you get the systems
in you can't get the runway safety lights, which Dallas has
indicated has been a plus for safety.
Our concern is that this is a pretty aggressive schedule
that they have set for themselves.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Krakowski, if you would comment on the
schedule and if you feel that you are going to meet the
schedule by 2010.
Mr. Krakowski. Indeed, Mr. Chairman. We want an aggressive
schedule. The situation, as described in this hearing thus far,
demands that we stretch ourselves and that we try to put as
much out there as we can. If we miss the goal, it won't be
because of our intention not to try as hard as we can.
To Mr. Dillingham's point, when you put these systems out
early on, you want to do them one by one sequentially, but as
you get experience and confidence that the system works and you
have got the bugs worked out, you can actually start ramping up
multiple deployments. That is how these typically go. So we are
just trying to pedal as hard as we can, sir.
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Mr. Costello. And the schedule for the next either fiscal
year or calendar year, how many do you anticipate will be
installed?
Mr. Krakowski. Sir, we have 13 systems now. We are
anticipating 35 by the end of 2010, sir.
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Mr. Costello. And you have a schedule?
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, we do.
Mr. Costello. How many do you intend to have installed by
this time next year?
Mr. Krakowski. I will have to take a look at that and get
back to you, sir.
Mr. Costello. Okay.
Mr. Krakowski. I don't have it at the tip of my tongue.
Mr. Costello. We would like that information.
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Mr. Costello. Captain Prater referred to a number of things
and he said one of the things that can be done immediately is
airports can assist by just using a can of paint, and gave some
examples. I wonder, Mr. Crites, if you would comment on
airports taking the initiative to go forward and do what
Captain Prater is suggesting.
Mr. Crites. Today, we are have already deployed or followed
Captain Prater's guidance and suggestions and we have done
that. We find airports are leaning forward as a result of the
Runway Safety Summit of 2007 and I think they are on track
expediting and putting forward those very basic, fundamental
things. I would call it maintaining Part 139 compliance 365
days a year is kind of the call to order, and we are taking
that very seriously and concur quite a bit with Captain
Prater's remarks.
Mr. Costello. We had a discussion, Mr. Krakowski, about
Allentown, and I think that Mr. Forrey indicated that there
were two trainees on duty at the time. You were going to look
into the matter and get back to us. We have not heard from you,
so I would ask you now to explain what you know about Allentown
and the near miss that happened there.
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, sir. In fact, I received the final
information I was looking for right before the hearing, so I
apologize for the delay. It is an NTSB investigation, so we are
trying to be respectful of that process as we go through.
Mr. Costello. We understand that, but you have to know who
was in the tower and who wasn't.
Mr. Krakowski. Indeed. So we did have a very fresh
developmental controller who was working the traffic at the
time, who was just certified on position in August. That was
the controller that was working the traffic. The developmental,
though, that was the controller in charge actually is a
transfer in from the Grand Forks tower with over five years of
experience there, ten months on duty in Allentown, about six
months as a CIC, controller in charge, duty there. So the
controller, while being a developmental for all the positions
in Allentown, actually is a seasoned controller.
Mr. Costello. I wonder if you would comment, Mr. Forrey.
Mr. Forrey. Yes. You know, it takes years of experience to
learn an operation at a particular airport, and the seasoned
controller that Mr. Krakowski speaks to was five years at, I
think--what did you say, North Dakota?
Mr. Krakowski. Grand Forks, yes.
Mr. Forrey. Grand Forks, but still not certified at the
facility all the way through. All he was certified in was the
tower, not the TRACON. So both people that were working that
tower had very limited experience of working that tower in
particular.
Mr. Costello. Were they the only two in the tower at the
time? Was there a supervisor?
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, there were actually five people on
duty. Three of them were on break at the time, sir.
Mr. Costello. So three of them were on break and the
trainees were there at the time of the incident.
Mr. Krakowski. Actually, there were eight on duty. Three
were on break, the other two were in the radar room. Sorry.
Mr. Costello. Is that the information you have, Mr. Forrey?
Mr. Forrey. No, I don't know how many were on duty at the
time. I do know there were a couple on break, but I think there
were three working in the tower and five working in the TRACON;
and the two in the tower were left there, the two trainees were
left in the tower while the fully certified controllers was on
break. He just went on break at the time.
Mr. Costello. Does that concern you, Mr. Krakowski?
Mr. Krakowski. It does. It does. And to be completely
candid here, we do want to work with the NTSB to completely
understand there, but there is a concern here how we ended up
in that configuration.
Mr. Costello. And ending up in that configuration, if in
fact it is the case, is that a violation of your internal
policies within the FAA?
Mr. Krakowski. We don't believe it is, sir, because the CIC
who was in the charge or the developmental who was in charge
was, again, a seasoned controller, had been checked out in
those positions up in the tower cap, had the amount of time
necessary to qualify for the CIC position. So everything that
we know at this time suggests there was no violation.
Mr. Costello. I will give you the final comment on this,
then I have some other questions, Mr. Forrey.
Mr. Forrey. Well, I guess if we are going to rely on
regulations all the time, instead of common sense, I guess what
he says is true. But you don't leave a facility staffed with
people who have very limited experience in it and leave them
alone to work the operation. A perfect example of this is
Charlotte tower. They have an ASDE-X system that is not working
properly.
There was one controller working in the tower; it happened
to be a very experienced controller, thank God. He was redoing
stuff, the aircraft counts and RNP procedure and we have to
change that in the FIDO and the flight data processing. The
aircraft was told to hold short of the runway. He drifted right
out onto the runway while an aircraft was inbound.
Had he not looked up, had he not been experienced enough to
realize that I better double-check this, that would have
probably been a pancake situation on a runway or a possible
death of all those people on those two aircraft. But because he
was experienced, he was able to catch something like that. His
opinion as if they had an experienced controller up there that
was limited in control ability of that facility, they might not
have known better to look up. So I think it is a bad policy to
have people sitting in a tower that aren't fully certified all
by themselves.
Mr. Costello. Let me ask you about New Orleans. In your
testimony, oral testimony as well, you indicated that there
were three trainees on duty with no supervisor, and one of the
trainees was fired, but not the supervisor. I wonder if you
would elaborate on that.
Mr. Forrey. I would be happy to expand on that. That
particular trainee was still in his first year of training, was
not fully certified in the facility. He had an operational
error just a couple months prior to that, where he made a
mistake on a potential runway incursion or an error as well, so
they had put him on notice that we are going to put you on
opportunity to demonstrate performance.
He then had this incident, where this aircraft went over
the hold short line of the runway. He verified that he went
over the hold short line and still allowed the aircraft to land
that was coming onto the runway, so they removed him. So why
would you leave someone who is on a performance plan in the
tower as a developmental with other developmentals, instead of
not being supervised much more closely? So he was removed.
Maybe it was a good idea; maybe it wasn't.
But my opinion is the agency, in their reckless abandon,
put that person in that position, and that is just not the way
we should be doing business as an agency. We should be making
sure that these experienced controllers are there to teach
these inexperienced controllers so they do the job right. There
is no safety net. They are deteriorating the safety net of the
system and they think it is okay, and I think that is a huge
problem.
Mr. Costello. Well, I have some other questions, but there
are some other Members that I need to yield to at this time,
but I will come back for a second round. Before we leave the
issue of controllers, I think I made clear many times my
concern. I think the GAO has, as far as staffing levels and the
fact that the most experienced controllers are leaving, and in
Dr. Dillingham's report I think he indicates that in the not
too distant future we are going to be down to having well over
half of the controllers that are working in the towers and the
TRACONs with very little experience.
So with that, Mr. Petri, you are recognized.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you, again, for your testimony. Before I ask
specific questions, you have each had an opportunity, I expect
either personally or with your office, to review the others'
testimony and listen to it, and I don't know if there are any
follow-up comments or anything that anyone on the panel would
have about anything that another member of the panel said that
would help us to understand the situation. I certainly would
give you all an opportunity to do that.
Mr. Forrey. I think the only thing I would comment on--
because I really haven't seen anyone else's testimony, I will
just base it on what I heard here today. Certainly, the FAA
always has a plan, they always have a plan, they always have a
plan, but they never seem to get it done. So I just would
caution you that they have some great ideas, but they never
follow through with those great ideas, and I think that is what
this Committee should do, is make sure they follow through with
those plans.
Mr. Krakowski. May I comment on that? Actually, thank you
for the compliment that we do have some great ideas. We do
intend to follow up. That is one of the reasons that I am in
the job, is that we take this really seriously, what is
happening here, what the risks are. We are doing a lot of
things to build up the safety effort within the ATO and we
intend to stay on task.
Mr. Petri. I do have a couple of questions. One, we are all
aware that there is not the happiest labor management
relationship, at the current time, between the air traffic
controllers and the agency, for a whole variety of reasons.
There is no point in getting into that or pointing fingers, but
I would just be interested in knowing whether that has any
impact on safety at all or whether it is a totally isolated--
not totally, but basically an isolated or separate issue. I
don't know if any of you would care to comment on that.
Mr. Forrey. I would be happy to comment. It permeates
everything we do. It is a distraction on the job. The fact that
we argue about staffing all the time because FAA says we have
enough and we say we don't. We keep bringing these examples out
to the public of why the staffing is a problem in this agency
and what danger it is causing to the flying public, and the
agency just says safety is never compromised, there are no
problems, we have it under control, we are hiring new people.
That is great, hire new people, but find a way to keep the
veterans in place.
It permeates through everything. It is a distraction for
our workforce; it is a distraction on what we do. And it goes
so far more into just the contract issues; it goes into the way
they are treated. They are disrespected. Our professional
opinions are not taken into consideration with new technology,
with procedures. Look at the JFK incident. We have been arguing
about this at Detroit and JFK and other airports for years, and
they just disregard us out of hand. And until there is a near
catastrophe is the only time they are going to change it.
So the runway safety call to action issue. We were invited
to that and yet they go on without us on several of the
committees, without even inviting us to participate, because
they don't feel they need to. That is the kind of attitude that
permeates throughout the workforce and it is a huge distraction
on the safe operation of the system.
Mr. Petri. But is it really all one-sided or is there blame
to go around? We have the retention bonus issue and various
other things that could contribute as well.
Mr. Forrey. There are all kinds of issues. Is there both
sides problems? Sure. When you start getting frustrated, people
start acting up. What else are they going to do? That is why
they are leaving. This retention bonus thing and that kind of
stuff does nothing more than divide the workforce even more.
You have an A scale and a B scale, so now you have people
trying to do the same for considerably different pay.
Then you are going to pay someone even more money to go
from one understaffed facility to work at another understaffed
facility, and then, therefore, pay someone else to come back to
the other understaffed facility. What a waste of money. They
need to fix the system, and they need to fix the system by
building a system where there creates the incentive for career
improvement and career progression. They got rid of all that
when they imposed what they imposed. So that kind of stuff,
again, like I said, it does everything to inhibit a good
operation and experience the mood throughout the system and,
instead, stifles it.
Mr. Costello. If you would yield, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Sure.
Mr. Costello. Let me just say for the record--I think we
have said this before, but to remind people and to remind
Members--when we were in the last session negotiating a
settlement that we had had high hopes that we could get an
agreement between the union and the FAA, the FAA said what it
would take in order to settle this contract and this dispute.
They gave a dollar figure and they told us--they told Mr. Mica,
Chairman Oberstar and myself and Mr. Petri--what that dollar
amount was that it would take, and NATCA said they didn't see
how they could agree to that.
But in the final session, when we sat down, NATCA said if
that is what it takes to get this done, then we will give it,
and the acting director now, Bobby Sturgell, said, well, there
are other issues. And that is when I became convinced that the
Administration did not want a settlement. They laid down
exactly what they needed. When NATCA agreed to it, we thought
we had a settlement, and Mr. Sturgell then said, well, there
are other issues.
So I think it is important to keep that on the record and I
think it is important that Members of this Subcommittee
continue to remain engaged to try and get the Administration. I
think Mr. Krakowski has at least reached out somewhat to Mr.
Forrey and to the union, but, frankly, I think we are going to
have to wait until the results of the November 4th election to
determine where we are going forward as far as labor issues and
morale issues within the FAA.
Thank you, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. If I can add to that, it is my understanding
there is an offer pending that goes until September 30th that
some have valued at some $300 million figure. I don't know how
they figured that. I don't know if you share that valuation
number or are intending to do anything between now and
September 30th about it.
Mr. Forrey. The FAA's generous offer you are referring to?
Is that what you are talking about, that generous offer that
doesn't do anything? Yes, I have rejected it and will continue
to reject it because it doesn't solve the problem. It is not a
comprehensive contract that deals with all the other myriad of
issues that we have to work through. It is just something that
is not going to do any good. It doesn't meet anyone's needs.
Mr. Petri. Well, this is a safety hearing. I thought it
would be interesting to point out that there are aspects to it
which may heighten and color somewhat the whole subject, and
that is unfortunate.
I have a question for Mr. Crites. If you could talk about
some of the low-tech solutions that you are implementing to
improve runway safety at airports around the Country and just
kind of expand on them, both big and small, it would be
helpful.
Mr. Crites. Yes, sir. I think the key to it is what I
indicated in what we learned from the Runway Safety Summit that
we held at DFW Airport, where we invited in rank and file
controllers, operators, pilots, and the like to share their
real world experiences at our airport as to what they were
encountering. From that, we invited all Members to take tours
of the airport from the airfield, so you could see it from the
airfield perspective, so that all parties could understand what
each other was talking about from a firsthand view. And what
that led to were things simple as Captain Prater mentioned
earlier, that is, taking Part 139 certification seriously, 24
hours a day, 365 days a year. So if there is a signage outage
or if a sign is blown down, or something needs to be addressed,
address it then and there. If it is a can of paint that needs
to be applied to renew some markings, we do that.
In addition to that, we decided to go forward and all of
our Surface Movement Guidance systems, our runway guard lights
and that, we have that on 24 hours a day so as to highlight
when you are approaching a runway. Things as simple as
additional non-standard signage for vehicle operators to let
them know to yield, signs that they are used to on a regular
road, so that when they see those on an airfield, which they
are very familiar with, the signs provide them with situational
awareness.
In addition to that, you have heard about the hot spot maps
and things of that nature. What came from the hot spot map at
DFW Airport and the shared collaboration was the development of
some standard taxi path routings. If we can circumvent those
areas that are problematic and that are causing pilots or
controllers or vehicle operators that much of an issue we will.
Other types of things such as when there is a runway
closure for, let's say, an hour for immediate maintenance or
something of that nature, we place our airport operations
vehicles down at the end of the runway to visually see and to
be on the radio traffic for the tower just in case there is a
miscommunication or something, to be another set of eyes to
safeguard the operation.
We also use extensive use of escort vehicles, follow me
vehicles, things of that nature, so as to say that anyone who
is not familiar in the airfield at all, to make sure that they
are safeguarded when they are out there operating.
So it is a wide variety of things. It is the whole thing,
but it is a continuous thing, whether it be yearly runway or
driver certification training, whether it is I Brake for
Runways campaign. Captain Prater mentioned something they are
doing for pilots. We have an I Brake for Runways campaign where
it is a video followed up with training, followed up with the
bumper stickers for the dashboard of your vehicle and others,
just to better ensure safety.
But the largest issue that we have gone after lately is
what I mentioned in my testimony, and that is this vehicle
operator-induced runway incursion. Runway status lights are
wonderful for the pilots, the controllers, and they are on an
exception basis, so when it is not safe and it is an exception,
it gets your notice. We have noticed great success with vehicle
operators familiar with operating on the airfield, picking up
trash, attending to maintenance issues and that.
You can get too familiar with your environment and forget
where you are. So we are starting to work with very low-tech,
low-cost items to equip a vehicle similar to what we are seeing
with runway status lights, to help address the 29 percent of
runway incursions that are caused by vehicles.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now
recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to ask Mr. Crites. You indicated that,
at DFW, FAA, NASA, airlines, pilots, and air traffic
controllers all meeting to address runway safety and
efficiency. Who pulled that meeting together?
Mr. Crites. That was led by the airport, it was a
partnership of all those entities as well.
Ms. Johnson. Have you continued to meet or this was one
meeting?
Mr. Crites. Indeed. We meet now on a quarterly basis to
obtain input. The notion is, if the situation changes or the
players change out there, to go ahead and get their ideas.
Ms. Johnson. Okay.
Now, Mr. Krakowski, in your testimony you discuss the
voluntary reporting program for air traffic controllers, called
the Air Traffic Safety Action Program, that you began in the
Chicago area facilities. How long has this program been
running?
Mr. Krakowski. Just about a month, month and a half. We
started at the Midway control tower and moved it to all the
other facilities. It is a very tricky program to execute
properly. The airlines have been doing it for about 15 years
and it takes a lot of both sides or all sides of this to get
used to how the program will go. But we are pretty happy with
what we see so far. I am quite pleased, at Chicago Center we
have over 100 reports right now, which does speak to the fact
that people are participating, which is exactly what you want.
In all candor, when I started this position 11 months ago,
it was clear there was more of a punitive safety culture within
the ATO. It is my fervent intention to change that. This
program will be the cornerstone of doing that.
Ms. Johnson. Mr. Forrey, would you like to comment on this?
Mr. Forrey. Sure. The ATSAP program, I think, is a good
program. It needs a lot of work. We are looking at expanding at
other places, but at this point in time we want to make sure it
is working properly where we have it, at some facilities where
there are some fairly good relationships that are taking place.
In the end, it is going to enhance the safety of the system. It
is going to be good for my controllers, it is going to be good
for the system safety, and it will be something we are looking
for.
The reason we haven't moved out right now is because of
what Mr. Krakowski said: we have a punitive safety culture in
the FAA. Discipline is the name of the game. Fear and
intimidation is the way you stop people from having errors, and
it doesn't work real well. So we have to change some of those
attitudes before we move out and Dallas, unfortunately, and the
whole Southern Texas area is a problem right now, and we need
to get out hands around that issue with the management down
there, in my opinion, anyway, before we move down there with
the safety program to try and help those facilities out.
So that is kind of where we are at right now.
Ms. Johnson. Dr. Dillingham, do you have any insight on
this program, the effectiveness it might be?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, Ms. Johnson. As Mr. Krakowski said,
the program, as implemented in other areas of aviation, has
been very effective. I think what Mr. Forrey alluded to is a
part of the previous discussion about the relationship between
FAA management and the controllers. As we talked to all
parties, one of the things that came up was a concern on the
controllers' part that if in fact they reported, that it could
in fact turn into a punitive situation. So we agree that it has
a potentially positive effect on safety. Getting past these
issues is not going to be easy.
Ms. Johnson. One last question. Mr. Forrey, you mentioned
in your testimony about the widespread understaffing as being a
concern for runway safety. Would you explain that a little
further?
Mr. Forrey. Well, I will give you a prime example. The
agency, right now, is in the process of trying to split certain
major towers and TRACONs, and leaving standalone towers in
Memphis and Orlando. They are looking at Miami and Philadelphia
and other places to do it. What you are going to end up with is
you are going to end up with inexperienced, very time-limited
controllers in the towers running those runways, and all the
experienced controllers are going to move into the TRACONs.
That is going to create a situation what we just saw in
Lehigh, up at Allegheny County, and what we saw in New Orleans,
and what we are seeing all over the Country, where you have
inexperienced controllers working at these very busy terminal
facilities and these towers with very little experience, that
are not fully certified, so they don't even understand the full
operation. In fact, we have Southern California TRACON we have
eight incidents of controllers being ordered to work radar
positions that they are not even certified on.
So this is a situation that is affecting staffing, because
you have low staffing or you have controllers working long
hours on position without breaks, inexperienced controllers, no
veterans, it is going to create a very unsafe situation at
these very complex facilities.
Ms. Johnson. Now, we have been talking about understaffing
for a long time. What efforts are we putting forth to improve
that?
Mr. Forrey. What efforts are we putting forth? Well, we are
trying to call attention, certainly, to the situation. We have
been working with this Committee and Chairmans Costello and
Oberstar to try and make the FAA get back to the table so that
we can stop the flood of experienced controllers out of the FAA
and stay and tray these new persons coming in. That is kind of
what we are doing.
Ms. Johnson. I should have directed that to Mr. Krakowski.
Mr. Krakowski. Thank you. First of all, I do want to take
exception to the split situation down in Orlando and places
like that. By our estimation, when you split a facility like
that, what you do is you take the controllers who are working
there and you reduce their responsibility for more positions,
so they have fewer positions to be responsible for. That
creates better currency, it creates better stability within
that workforce, and we actually think it increases and enhances
safety.
The other thing, particularly with Orlando, we actually
believe that some of the overtime will be reduced as well. So
we think it is a very good business practice in some
facilities. So we take these facility by facility, but we
actually think it has a better effect on the workforce and on
safety, in our opinion.
We are hiring almost 2,000 controllers a year right now.
Right now, we have over 200 more than we need. Now, a lot of
them are trainees. We have about 25 percent trainees out in the
system right now. But we are aggressively hiring people. About
a third of the controllers come from the CTI schools, the air
traffic control schools; another third from the military; and
another third from the general population. We have to keep that
pace up for the age 56 retirements that we have been
anticipating. We have problems out there in some facilities,
but, overall, we have enough people. Getting the right people,
the right experience level will continue to challenge us for
the next year or two.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
conducting this very important hearing on runway safety. I
happen to represent Lehigh Valley International Airport, call
letters ABE. I have flown in and out of that airport on many,
many occasions. As has been discussed, there was a very serious
near collision or incursion that occurred just a few days ago.
I guess my main question would be to Mr. Krakowski. I
assume that this incident would be categorized as the most
severe type of runway incursion. Would that be a fair
statement?
Mr. Krakowski. Without question. In fact, we did the
severity analysis yesterday, and it was a Category A, which is
the most serious.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. A few other things, too. I know that
the GAO did a runway safety project report in November 2007.
They concluded that the FAA National Runway Safety Plan was out
of date and uncoordinated. I have also noticed, too, that the
FAA has deployed technology and has tested new technology,
including technology deployed at, I think, 39 airports to allow
air traffic controllers to identify aircraft on the ground, and
of those 22 with runway status lights. Forty-two airports were
selected based on their incursion data to receive safety
reviews and improved signage and markings were installed.
Did LVIA receive any of this technology that was referred
to?
Mr. Krakowski. I will have to look directly. In fact, I
just flew there myself. I do remember seeing the enhanced
markings, but let me get back to you on that. Certainly, the
really big, busy airports had the highest level of attention,
and we will check into that and get back to you.
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Mr. Krakowski. On the issue of the Runway Safety Plan, when
I walked into the position 11 months ago, Wes Timmons here, the
Director of Runway Safety, was just entering the job. It was a
position that was unfilled for over two years, and the position
and the effort of runway safety lacked stability and
leadership. Wes expects to have the revised document, the
updated document out next month; it is under review right now.
Mr. Dent. As I understand the incident in Allentown, there
were three controllers who were on break at the time of the
incident, and I believe a controller supervisor determines who
is on duty at what time, meaning that someone in the tower made
the decision to have the two developmentals--or trainees,
depending on your perspective--on duty in the tower at the same
time. I guess that is the question I have. Who determined that
the trainees or the developmentals would be staffing a control
tower at the same time?
Mr. Krakowski. Typically, it is the supervisor or the
operating manager at the time. The NTSB is looking at this as
they do their investigation. It is an area of concern to us as
well, so we will be working with them to sort out why this
happened and what issues we need to address.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Forrey, do you have any comments that you
would like to make at this time with respect to the incident in
Allentown? I think you have talked a little bit about it, but
further elaborate?
Mr. Forrey. Just very briefly. You asked about the
technology or the equipment, the radar on the ground and stuff
like that. There is no ground radar at Allentown. They may have
runway markings, but I am not even sure of that. That is one of
those third-tier facilities that the agency doesn't really put
a whole lot of effort into, unfortunately. I believe the
staffing is pretty good there.
As we see, there were a few people on break, but, again,
the supervisor--and I don't even know if one was on duty that
night--was supposed to be the one rotating controllers to
positions and that left a developmental, who, by the way, was
also in charge of that tower. So it is not a good situation, in
our opinion.
Mr. Dent. I have been in that tower, actually, and I just
was curious about the incident itself, the fact that the Cessna
missed its exit and then the commercial jet was permitted to
take off. The sight lines aren't that great. I was just curious
if somebody would comment on that. Could the commercial jet see
the Cessna that was still on the runway, even if was given
clearance to take off?
Mr. Forrey. Cessnas are a pretty small profile, and you
have got to understand he is 3,000 or 4,000 feet down the
runway. He probably thought he was off when he got the
clearance. But the significant point here is the controller,
who had very little experience, knew--the pilot said I did not
stop short of the runway, and he looked in the binoculars and
saw that the front wheel gear did not go over the line, but the
nose was sticking out into the runway.
Because he didn't have any experience, okay, he didn't
cross the runway threshold line or the hold short line, I am
going to go ahead and clear that guy to land. An experienced
controller would not have done that, they would have made that
aircraft go around. That is the basic issue here because
experienced and inexperienced.
Mr. Dent. I guess anyone who wants to answer, what is the
lesson learned from the incident at LVIA?
Mr. Krakowski. Well, if I may, the NTSB has control of the
investigation. I think you asked a very good question about the
conspicuousness of the light aircraft and whether the lights on
the aircraft were visible enough. They are fairly dim on some
aircraft, and where they were relative to the control tower, I
think that the sighting issue is certainly a valid thing for
NTSB to look at, so we will look at all of this.
Typically, these types of incidents aren't just one thing--
a controller error, a pilot error, a technological error--it is
usually a chain of events, and that is what we have to really
look at with this incident.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Forrey, do you want to make a further
comment?
Mr. Forrey. I lost my train of thought when Hank started
talking, but the bottom line is the inexperience of that
controller to clear someone on, that is a problem. You have to
have experienced controllers working with new trainees all the
time. You cannot leave people that are partially certified to
work by themselves in operations. It should be a no thing. But
the problem is they don't have enough veterans to do it.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Costello. If I can ask for a clarification on a couple
of points concerning this incident. One, Mr. Krakowski, we all
understand the NTSB has an investigation going on which will
last for many, many months, but there are some things we do
know. We know how many people were in the tower; we know the
level of their experience. A couple of things that I am
confused on that I would like to have clarified, number one, is
the communication between the pilot in the Cessna and the air
traffic controller. What was the communication, the last
communication? Mr. Forrey, and then Mr. Krakowski.
Mr. Forrey. The controller cleared the Cessna to depart off
of a taxiway, probably a high speed taxiway. After that had
happened--well, when he got to the taxiway, the pilot of the
Cessna said I missed it.
Mr. Costello. He told the controller that?
Mr. Forrey. He told the tower he missed it and he went
down. The issue at hand is the aircraft was cleared to depart.
I don't think I am mixing two incidents up. The aircraft was
cleared to depart when he thought that aircraft had actually
gotten off the taxiway at that point in time, but he did not.
Mr. Costello. The regional jet was cleared to depart?
Mr. Forrey. Because he thought that the Cessna had gotten
off the runway at that time.
Mr. Costello. And isn't it the controller's responsibility,
before that controller clears, in this case, the regional jet,
to know exactly where that Cessna is?
Mr. Forrey. He needs to ensure where that Cessna is at. And
I did make a mistake earlier with the one going over the
threshold, that was at the New Orleans Airport, that is where
that incident was.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Krakowski?
Mr. Krakowski. Our understanding of the sequence of events,
which, again, the NTSB will clarify as they do this, is that
the controller thought the aircraft had cleared the runway,
cleared the RJ for takeoff, the regional jet, and after the
regional jet began the takeoff roll, the Cessna pilot reported
that he missed the taxiway. The regional jet was already under
power when that occurred, so the controller instructed the
Cessna to exit the runway immediately, and it was that delay
which caused the event to get as close as it did.
Mr. Costello. So, again, just for clarification here, there
may be a number of factors, but in this case, if the Cessna was
still on the runway, the controller should have known exactly
where that Cessna was before he gave clearance for the regional
jet to take off.
Mr. Krakowski. Mr. Chairman, there is no dispute that
controllers should not clear airplanes for takeoff unless they
are absolutely assured that the runway is clear.
Mr. Costello. So we know if in fact he did in this case, it
was controller error. There may have been other factors, but we
know that that controller erred if he cleared the regional jet
to take off, if in fact he did so when the Cessna was on the
runway.
Mr. Krakowski. The current evidence is pointing that
direction. We will let the NTSB do their work.
Mr. Costello. Let me ask, as far as disciplinary action,
has any disciplinary action been taken? I realize this was last
Friday, but either against the trainee or against the
supervisor in charge?
Mr. Krakowski. My understanding is the controller was
decertified, which is a standard practice in a situation like
that, with a return to work plan that will have to be developed
after all the complete understandings are----
Mr. Costello. That was the trainee or the supervisor?
Mr. Krakowski. The trainee, sir.
Mr. Costello. And the supervisor?
Mr. Krakowski. Supervisor, I don't have that information.
Mr. Costello. Okay. But if in fact two trainees were in the
tower at the time and there was no supervisor there at the
time, doesn't that concern you, that your supervisor was on
break and not in the tower?
Mr. Krakowski. Mr. Chairman, I think we just have to, once
again, remember that the other developmental controller--and
these are people who are certified to work traffic alone, they
are. When you certify in a position----
Mr. Costello. They are not fully certified.
Mr. Krakowski. They are not fully certified in all
positions, but the positions that they were working in the
control tower were fully certified. The controller in charge
was over a five-year veteran, transfer in, had ten months in
the facility already, six months already doing controller-in-
charge duty. That is not necessarily an unusual situation, but
we have some work to do to understand this whole picture, sir.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Forrey?
Mr. Forrey. You know, when I checked out as a controller,
as a CPC, I didn't know everything. I barely knew anything,
just to keep my head above water. It is invaluable to not have
an experienced controller to help you learn your task and your
profession as you go, even though you certify and them deem you
safe, because you make mistakes and you make bad judgment
calls. It is just invaluable to have an experienced controller
on duty all the time with trainees.
Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.. Krakowski, how successful has the Airport Movement
Area Safety System been since its implementation? It is my
understanding that the system is currently located at 34
airports. Have there been any incidents of severe runway
incursions at those locations?
Mr. Krakowski. The AMASS system is kind of one of the
earlier iterations of the Runway Safety Systems. The ASDE-X
ones that are going to be deployed going forward are the much
more sophisticated, much more robust systems. So, for a while,
we will have those legacy systems, but they have served good
purposes. I can recall, in Atlanta, we had an event where an
aircraft began to cross the runway, it alerted exactly like it
should have. For the most part, the system works. I can
remember events in Denver where snow plows were crossing
runways and alerted appropriately. But, again, they don't have
the predictive capability as the new systems do, so we are
looking forward to getting the new systems out there.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. In your testimony, sir, it says that
we had only--I want to reiterate--we had only 23 serious runway
incursions as of September 15, a full year, 2008 as compared to
24 last year. That is not good news to me.
Mr. Krakowski. No, it is not good news. Quite frankly, that
word shouldn't have been there; it is inappropriate.
Ms. Richardson. Absolutely, I would agree. My last question
is about the status of the lights at the 22 major airports. We,
right now, this Country, are going through a very serious
financial situation--gas prices, of course, airlines. Everyone
has issues. You know that we all fly, most of us two times a
week. I have been on planes where they are telling us to put
the shades down so they can turn the motor off so they don't
have to run the air. I mean, every one is obviously doing at
the bare bones of what they can do.
What assurance does this Committee have that the
implementation and the actual distribution and putting in these
lights as promised is going to happen, the cockpit information?
How do we know that, given the next crisis tomorrow, that you
guy aren't going to put this on the shelf and say, hey, we
don't have enough money, we can't do this?
Mr. Krakowski. Well, I certainly hope that we don't find
ourselves in that situation. These programs----
Ms. Richardson. Well, we cannot find ourselves in that
situation.
Mr. Krakowski. I don't disagree with that. When you start
to put these systems in airports, you have got to tear up
runways and put taxiway lights in and all kinds of new
technology. So when you commit to programs like this and you
actually start working with them, you actually have a pretty
good feeling that they will be reliably funded before you
actually start doing the work.
Perhaps Mr. Crites from Dallas could shed some light from
the airport perspective on that.
But we feel confident with the announcements that we have
made for the acceleration of this technology that we have the
money to get that done.
Ms. Richardson. Have you provided to this Committee a list
of these 22 airports when the installations are supposed to
occur?
Mr. Krakowski. I believe it was in the GAO report, but we
will make sure you get that.
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Ms. Richardson. And will you be tracking that to ensure we
meet it?
Mr. Krakowski. Always do.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now
recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Dillingham, has the FAA seen improvement on false
targets problems noted in the beginning of the ASDE-X
deployment program? In November I believe you cited Atlanta and
Seattle as problem spots. Has the FAA addressed the issues at
these busy airports and does the agency appear to be learning
lessons from those early deployments?
Mr. Dillingham. Thank you for the question. Yes, in
preparation for this hearing, we checked to see how things had
developed at both of those airports, and in both cases we found
that there was a reduction of over 80 percent of the false
alerts at both of those airports. We have not been able to
determine to what extent things have changed with the
subsequent installations of that technology, but we would
assume that the lessons learned from Seattle and so forth would
in fact be carried forth with the subsequent installations.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you very much.
Captain Prater, could you describe the ATSAP program that
pilots use to report mistakes to the FAA? How has the program
helped to address safety issues facing the aviation community
compared to the period before the program existed? How do you
evaluate the Air Traffic Safety Action Program the FAA is
piloting in Chicago for controllers?
Mr. Prater. First of all, we have had quite a bit of varied
reports on our ATSAP programs. At the airlines where the
cooperation between the FAA, management, and the union
representatives have been high and have been based on safety,
it has been excellent. It has removed the threat of discipline
to the point that pilots readily come in, and other employees,
to report things before they happen, things that they saw.
I will just give you one quick case. When I flew in on
Monday, the crew told me that they had been on duty for four
days in a row; they had been on their 16th hour of on duty, and
they landed without clearance. After they cleared the runway,
they realized they had touched down without traffic control.
They turned themselves in and reported all of the factors that
went into that air so that it would try to be caught.
Other places where discipline is the rule of the day, or
even litigation against the union--it goes to Congressman
Petri's concern about labor management relations--where labor
management relations are bad, you see an effect on safety.
While we try, every tries to split it, the fact is we are all
human beings. So where there is bad labor management relations,
there will be an impact on safety.
At the FAA, we have pushed very hard for our partners, both
the FAA management, as well as our brothers and sisters at
NATCA, to try this because we believe very much that the more
information that is out there, the better. On the other hand,
you are not going to turn yourself the second time if you get
beat across the knuckles or fired for turning yourself in the
first time. So that is what we have to break.
Mr. Boozman. That is good to know.
Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to visit the new bridge
that had failed in Minneapolis, and that bridge was completed
in a year, versus the regular nine or ten years. But one of the
things that they felt like made the difference was getting rid
of the adversarial relationships that we see often with OSHA
and this and that. Instead of it being an adversarial
relationship, they actually came out on the job in a proactive
manner and said, guys, you need to be doing this and that. So
it is good to hear that this is also working in this regard.
Certainly, those things don't cost money, they save money, and
hopefully that is something we, as a Committee, can continue to
push forward.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. I thank the gentleman and assure you that we
will continue to do that.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am not sure if this should be directed to Mr. Krakowski
or to Mr. Timmons, but whoever feels more comfortable fielding
it, please. I am from Memphis and there are several issues in
Memphis, but the most current is a whistleblower discussed the
problems with, he believes, the landing patterns there. I
believe one of the runways is perpendicular to the other three.
Mr. Krakowski, can you assure me that that system is safe
and that we won't be seeing a story in the paper that has a
crash in Memphis and goes back to this close call that we had
where USA Today highlighted that problem and said that it was a
concern and a safety factor?
Mr. Krakowski. Sure. I will ask Mr. Timmons to add any
comments he would like to as well, but the CRDA program and the
procedures we have in place at Memphis evolved over the past
few years out of some safety concerns that we judged were
legitimate, and we put the technology of CRDA in place. We
think it works. We believe it works. We have deemed it safe and
continue to believe so. We think we have some people in Memphis
who don't agree with that and will work with the IG's office to
make sure that they understand our point of view on this. But
we believe it is safe, sir.
Wes, do you have any comments?
Mr. Cohen. Do either FedEx and Northwest/Delta concur? Do
they have any concerns?
Mr. Krakowski. They have not raised any to me.
Mr. Cohen. Okay. And you are familiar with Mr. Nesbitt, who
is the gentleman that is the ``whistleblower''--and I guess he
is a whistleblower--who said he witnessed this twin turbo prop
approaching Runway 27, the crossing runway when a DC-9 was on
approach to the left and the pilot informed they were going
around to an unsafe gear indication and that, I think, made
people aware of the possible problem? Are you aware of that?
Mr. Krakowski. If I may, I think when we think about a
future so we don't have events actually drive us into action, I
think of these programs like the ATSAP program we were talking
about, because under those programs people are able to give us
data to bring these problems up to light before events actually
happen. That is the whole purpose of them.
So it is our intention, with the new Runway Safety Office,
with the new leadership within the safety organization, to make
sure that we are constantly evaluating what is going on there
not just from a technological performance point of view, but
with the people actually working the traffic as well.
Mr. Cohen. Do you know who Mr. Scott Block is?
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohen. I have a note here that Special Counsel Block
said in three letters to Transportation Secretary Mary Peters
that the FAA did not adequately respond to complaints from air
traffic controllers about the potential for collisions
involving planes taking off and landing on intersecting runways
at airports in Memphis and Newark. Do you have a comment on Mr.
Block's allegation?
Mr. Krakowski. Those are fairly recent letters to the
Secretary. We actually disagree with his premise. We will be
going through the process to respond to him through the
Secretary's office.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you. And I don't mean to necessarily
convey any opinion on the issue, I am concerned, as I think we
all are--I know we all are--about safety, and Memphis prides
itself on being a transportation center. Our airport is very
important to us and certainly our citizens' lives are.
The air traffic controllers have expressed a concern to me
about decoupling, and they believe if we decouple Memphis, that
there will be a danger to safety. I met with some of your
people and they were with the air traffic controllers, and the
gentleman who came down was most helpful. We talked about some
people may be having the ability to know both the tower and
dual capabilities in case they needed such a person.
Do you believe there are any possibilities that what the
air traffic controllers are saying is accurate, that this could
be a safety hazard if we decouple the tower?
Mr. Krakowski. We have talked with them extensively through
this process, not just at Memphis, but at Orlando, West Palm
Beach, Miami, places like that. We believe this actually
enhances safety because we are asking controllers to be
qualified on fewer positions, which increases their currency,
familiarity with less complexity.
Mr. Cohen. Is it accurate that in other areas--I think they
mentioned Palm Beach and Philadelphia--that you held possibly
because of safety concerns?
Mr. Krakowski. We held off because the local management
teams were able to work together with the union to find some
interesting compromises of sectorization. That doesn't work at
Memphis because the facilities are so physically split, versus
the other locations where they are very, very close and you can
actually work traffic better between----
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, can I have another 30 seconds?
Mr. Costello. Sure.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
Mr. Forrey, do the air traffic controllers have a proposal
they can bring to the FAA to possibly have a situation in
Memphis that would be similar to Philadelphia and Palm Beach
and to make this thing work?
Mr. Forrey. Not only do they have a proposal, they have
given it without a response from the agency. And I just want to
make one thing clear, because it was stated earlier. Orlando,
Memphis, Philadelphia, Miami are safer operations, cost less
per operations than all the other facilities the agency split
already. When you split that facility, it is going to require
more controllers to work the tower and more controllers to work
the approach control than they have right now at a combined
facility. It is called economy of scale, when you have them
together; you can now move people up and down, in and out,
wherever you need them to go.
When you split it apart, you are going to have the less
experienced people working the tower only than the ones working
in the TRACON. Now you are going to have an experience where
these people don't understand what it is to clear aircraft into
a tower controller and a tower controller clearing one out to
an approach controller. It is an inefficient operation that is
going to cause more controllers to be needed and it is
``unsafer.'' It truly is unsafer. And that is the FAA's
statistics, not mine.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for you and/
or one of your more senior staff people to possibly work with
Mr. Krakowski and Mr. Forrey to see if there is some way that
we can protect the flying public in this situation?
Mr. Costello. We have in the past and we will continue to,
yes.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Forrey, you indicate in your testimony,
in both oral and written, about the Runway Safety Council and
that NATCA has been, I guess, invited and included in the
Runway Safety Council. Elaborate for me. What has your
participation been and what role do you have?
Mr. Forrey. One of the premises of the agency and one of
the things that Hank has brought--and that is a good thing--is
the safety management system to the FAA. It is a worldwide
thing through the ICAO. We are all for it, but we want to be a
stakeholder in the process, and the problem is the agency is
conducting safety management panels throughout the Country on
changing in procedures, changing in equipment, and they are not
including NATCA or the controllers in that process as a
stakeholder.
We were invited to do the runway safety thing last year by
the Administrator. We participated in the meeting the had for
the one or two days. They subsequently had several panels
meetings after that original one and we were not invited to
most of those at all. In fact, I think the comment from the
Vice President of Terminal, the person that works under the
Vice President of Terminal was when I want NATCA's opinion and
input, I will ask for it.
So that is the kind of attitude that permeates up at
headquarters, and we are trying to change that, I am trying to
change that, and we are trying to do that through an agreement
on how this process is going to work, which has stalled for the
time being. So, as we are trying to work that nationally,
locally, they are doing these things all over the place and
basically ignoring the input of the controller workforce.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Krakowski, you know--it was prior to your
time, but it is apparently happening as well, if in fact what
Mr. Forrey indicates is true that these meetings are going on
all over the Country and NATCA's representatives are not
involved--we have had this problem with NextGen. We had other
stakeholders saying the GAO has identified that this is a
problem, we are designing a system, NextGen, that the people
who are going to have to run the system are not involved with
input. Hopefully, we have changed that and NATCA has been
involved in NextGen and some of the decisions.
In fact, I just read an article yesterday, talking about
NextGen versus Euro Control, what they are doing in Europe, and
it said one of the things that some believe that they are ahead
of us now, and one of the reasons that they point out is
because they have all the stakeholders involved and all the
stakeholders, people who are involved the system, who will use
the system and who will run the system are in fact helping
design the system. That has been a problem in the past with
NextGen. I am going to ask the question has that been resolved
and do we have adequate input from the stakeholders.
But before I ask that question, tell me about Runway Safety
Council. Mr. Forrey has indicated NATCA has been involved at
the national level, but not in these meetings that are going on
around the Country.
Mr. Krakowski. Sir, the Runway Safety Council, the actual
council that we have committed to, is not up and running yet;
it will be up and running in the next month or two. NATCA will
be invited as full participating stakeholders in it, that is
our intention.
Mr. Cohen. What are these meetings that are going on around
the Country that Mr. Forrey refers to, then?
Mr. Krakowski. This was from the Call to Action. These are
where we went out and surveyed airports to look for markings,
risks out there, signage, sighting issues, all of that. The
statistics we have show that about 43 percent of those did have
direct participation of NATCA people.
Wes, you have got probably a good feel for this.
But, in general, we have invited NATCA to all of those with
the exception of one. In general, if you look at all of the
activities around runway safety, we can demonstrate NATCA has
participated in about 25 percent of them. That is not enough,
in my opinion, so we need to work harder at making that happen.
Mr. Cohen. And tell me why that is. Why have they only
participated in 25 percent? Are you saying that they haven't
been invited in the other 75 percent or they have refused to
participate?
Mr. Krakowski. Or scheduling conflicts, things like that.
It is kind of a mix. I think Wes could probably help us with a
little bit of data on that.
I do want to say, though, to one thing Pat said, is we are
trying to craft that agreement on the safety management working
group. I believe we are very close. Based on conversations he
and I had yesterday, we think we can bridge this.
Mr. Cohen. I am going to give Mr. Forrey an opportunity to
comment on the other 75 percent, but before I do, let me ask
you, Mr. Krakowski, on the issue of NextGen and the problem
that we have had with stakeholders not participating, in
particular, NATCA. Has that been corrected?
Mr. Krakowski. Yes. Sir, we have the old OEP, Operational
Evolutionary Partnership, which is now the NextGen board. I go
to many of these meetings, and, typically, Pat has one of his
safety people there all the time, so they are there.
Mr. Cohen. NextGen, Mr. Forrey?
Mr. Forrey. NextGen, yes. The only participation we have
with the FAA with NextGen is the fact that we go to these OEP
meetings once every week or once every two weeks and hear the
progress of where they are going. We are not participating in
any of their workgroups or anything of that nature.
Mr. Cohen. Is that correct?
Mr. Krakowski. They are going to at least those meetings.
Mr. Cohen. But the point that he is making is, you know, we
can get into a whole other issue here about the reorganization
of NextGen as well, but that will be for another day. But the
point is--I mean, let's not kid each other here--either they
are involved and they are giving input and they are actively
involved in helping to design the system or they are not.
Mr. Krakowski. Sir, let's be clear, if we could, about one
thing. We have controller involvement in all of the critical
areas where controller involvement is needed. Now, are they
necessarily representing NATCA's institutional interest? No.
But that is what we are trying to build back in from the
vestiges of the labor dispute that has created a separation
here. That is what I am trying to do, sir.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Forrey, I asked you about NextGen and now
would ask you about the Runway Safety Council.
Mr. Forrey. The 75 percent that you referred to we are not
asked. We are asked when the agency finds it convenient to
bring us onboard, like when they want to split these towers and
TRACONs, when they want to institute something else that is
politically a hot potato for them that they want NATCA's
involvement in. Taking a controller off the floor is not
serving the interests of what the union does, and that is to
protect and make sure the systems run safe and efficient and
the controllers are considered.
The fact that they are taking someone who essentially would
say yes or no, whatever the agency tells them to do so they can
go work this project, is not the kind of person we want
representing the interests of the workforce. So to say that
they have controller involvement, they had controller
involvement when they did ISSS and invest automation system,
and that was only about a $3 billion or $4 billion waste of
money.
So to say they are going to have controller involvement or
that they have had controller involvement means they have taken
their people that want to be supervisors or managers, or
whatever they want to be, their yes men and women, and say,
okay, we will take to get the controller input. That doesn't
work for me, it doesn't work for my membership, and it doesn't
work for the system.
Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry I was double-booked and missed our statements, but I
have the written statements.
Mr. Krakowski, you state that the FAA will continue to
examine the information from the fatigue symposium it hosted to
determine next steps. What are some of these next steps? Did
NATCA participate in the fatigue symposium? And maybe Mr.
Forrey could respond also to that question.
Mr. Krakowski. Sir, NATCA and all the labor unions--pilots
unions, flight attendants unions--were at the symposium and it
was really a good event. One of the takeaways that we had
looking at it is how controllers are scheduled and, more
importantly, the time off between shifts that may be kind of
close together or, after you work a midnight shift, how much
time do you really need off to be completely refreshed for the
next shift.
So all of that is under review by FAA right now and will be
continuing to hopefully roll out some guidance here in the next
future. Some of this could potentially create a bargaining
issue with the union; we don't know yet.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Forrey?
Mr. Forrey. Mr. Hall, yes, we did participate in the forum.
We think it is very important. We have been asking the agency
to include us and work together with us to build a fatigue
management system, which includes a lot more than just what
time you work in between schedules; it includes stuff as
educating your membership on how to stay rested in between
shifts, what you can do with scheduling, what you can do with
on-duty rest periods.
There are a whole myriad of issues that you have to do or
have to come up with to formulate a fatigue management system,
and the agency met with us one time, and that was before this
seminar. We discussed several different issues that could cause
fatigue or that would add towards fatigue of a controller
workforce, which went well beyond just schedules, and that was
the last we ever met with the FAA. Then they had the fatigue
symposium and then they briefed information at the fatigue
symposium that they wouldn't even give us when we met with them
the first time.
So we told the FAA--and I have told Hank this personally--
you go do what you want to do; we are going to build our own
fatigue management system. So we are working with IFATCA, which
is the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers, the
ITF, International Transportation Federation. We are working
with other countries and other air traffic service providers to
find out what they are doing and we are going to develop our
own fatigue management system. We are in the process of doing
that right now and then we will present it to the FAA and say
do you want to participate or not.
Mr. Hall. Thank you.
Captain Prater, in your testimony, you mentioned the lack
of adequate weather information as a factor in runway
incursions. Could you explain that, please?
Mr. Prater. Certainly, sir. I would tag on to the fatigue
comments that tired human beings, tired pilots make mistakes,
and trapping those mistakes is what we try to concentrate on
right now. Making sure that another pilot or a controller
catches a mistake to prevent it from becoming a runway
incursion is one of our focuses.
We need more information, certainly, about the friction of
the airport. If there has been rain, freezing precipitation,
snow, we do not have adequate information on our stopping
ability on that particular runway, much less we are using an
ancient system, if you will, of what did the other guy feel,
what did he report. Well, he may not have touched down in this
exact same area of the runway that we did. There are vehicles
out there that can provide us with some information, but they
are not standard enough. We do need an increase in information
on what that runway feels like to the airplane itself, how fast
can we stop.
Mr. Hall. Thank you.
Mr. Crites, your testimony states that the perimeter end-
around taxiways result in a two minute per operation time
reduction savings in Atlanta, $27 million a year, and also that
there is a significant reduction in emissions from the
perimeter end-around runway. Would you comment on those
factors?
Mr. Crites. Yes, sir. The perimeter taxiways is a system
solution. There are arrivals, departures, and runway crossings,
aircraft and vehicles trying to cross a runway, and perimeter
taxiways addresses all of those. By taking the aircraft that
are going to cross a runway, you now have a consistent in-trail
separation for all arrivals and all departures; simplify the
communication, the complexity of the situation.
So you may have a longer taxi-in time by having a taxi-
around the end of a runway, but your out-to-off time and your
airspace time have been reduced. So the net-net is a benefit.
In our NASA human-in-the-loop simulations, we added roughly two
minutes and seven seconds on a taxi in, but reduced taxi outs
by four minutes and 37 seconds, so a net of about 2 minutes and
21 seconds per operation. That is where we get our figures
from. It is a great solution.
Mr. Hall. Thank you very much.
Since my time is about to expire, I want to ask a parochial
question of Mr. Krakowski. There was just announced a two hour
a day reduction in staffing at the Duchess County, ,New York
airport, which, in a county that is attempting to do economic
development and to attract more businesses and people who would
fly in and out from their residences to do business around the
Country, this is a problem for us that we have heard from our
community leaders and business leaders, as well as from the
airport management and pilots and controllers about it, and I
think it is unfortunately going to have a detrimental effect on
our ability to use that airport as an attraction for economic
development in the Hudson Valley.
Are you familiar with this or could you----
Mr. Krakowski. I am not, but I would be happy to research
it and get back to you.
[Information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hall. I would appreciate that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Now I
understand the gentleman from Michigan has one question, Dr.
Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Relatively brief one.
Dr. Dillingham, you cited that there are about 957 runway
incursions. I assume that is for this year?
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir, that is for this year. That
includes all runway incursions, all severity levels.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. Now, my question is how many of those
would you consider serious or likely to cause accidents and so
forth, and how many are just a plane wandering off onto a
runway and then quickly getting off, with no other airplanes in
sight?
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Ehlers, I think the number this year of
serious ones are 24, but I also want to say that a point that
we made earlier is that even though the 24 are the more serious
ones, FAA shouldn't lose sight of the others because they can
in fact turn into serious ones.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. I just wanted to check and get some idea
what the total number was.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. With that, I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
Final question that I have, Dr. Dillingham, on a positive
note, you indicate that you believe that the FAA and pilots and
controllers are on the right track to address the problems of
runway incursions. What would you name as the top three
priorities going forward from here, what they should be doing?
Mr. Dillingham. Chairman Costello, I think focusing on what
has been determined to be the leading causal factors, human
factors, in fact, is the direction in which FAA and the other
stakeholders should go, and included in that are the things
that we have all talked about today: accelerating the
technology and doing the low-cost things.
But I would also argue that there should be some focus on
making sure that all these initiatives that have been started
or planned, that they actually take place and that FAA follows
up and takes what information, lessons learned from those and
folds it back into the process for continued improvement. I
think look at the factors that are contributing factors: GA
aircraft are involved in two-thirds of the runway incursions,
so a focus needs to be there; Pilots are involved in a
significant number, so the focus needs to be there. So those
would be the things would be the things that I would suggest,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you.
Let me just say, as you know, and I think Mr. Krakowski
indicated, we have provided aggressive oversight, and we are
going to continue to, not only in runway incursions, but also
on some of the projects, as was noted today, the FAA has
started and may not have completed or may not be on track to
complete. That is one of the responsibilities that this
Subcommittee takes seriously and we are going to continue to do
so.
At this time, the Chair recognizes the distinguished
Chairman of the Full Committee, Chairman Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, I had indicated earlier I just
came to listen, but can't participate in an aviation hearing
without getting something stirred or stimulated. Earlier this
morning, I participated and spoke to a rail labor management
conference hosted by the National Mediation Board and talked
about exactly what Captain Prater referenced and Pat Forrey has
talked about, that is, fatigue--fatigue of pilots, fatigue of
air traffic controllers. Fatigue, as Vince Lombardi put it in a
different context, makes cowards of us all. What he meant by
that is it takes away our strength, our reserves of energy, our
alertness, our ability to stay at the top of our game, and that
is true whether it is you are a locomotive engineer, whether
you are a captain of a towboat, or driving a truck, managing
the air traffic controller, route center, the TRACON, or the
airplane.
But, separately, over many years we have had hearings on
runway incursions and, for that reason, I very much appreciate
Mr. Costello staying on top of the issue and raising the
visibility level on it and getting all this splendid testimony.
Aren't there too many vehicles on the runway surface? Mr.
Forrey?
Mr. Forrey. There are a lot of vehicles on the runway
surface, yes, and----
Mr. Oberstar. I see an increasing number, no matter which
airport I am at, and I get to a lot of them all over the
Country, as I know my colleagues do. But there are way too many
vehicles moving at remarkable speeds, and with no apparent
traffic direction.
Mr. Forrey. Well, anyone that gets on the active surface,
control surface, has to be in contact with the towers. I mean,
that is there. There are a lot of service vehicles that
probably in the tarmac areas and by the gates that are driving
all over the place as well, but on the runways we are in
contact with those vehicles, just like we are with airplanes.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, but how many people does it take in the
tower to track those vehicles moving on the surface to keep
them away from this, that, or the other?
Mr. Forrey. Well, for every vehicle you add, you are adding
the workload to a controller that has got to separate the
planes from the service vehicles.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Krakowski, what have you done to take
notice of this issue and to limit the number or vehicles and to
manage their movements better?
Mr. Krakowski. Well, one of the things that I think if you
look at the Call to Action that we started on runway safety
beginning last year, we did take a strong emphasis with the
airports on vehicle training, recurrent training, which was not
a standard that was being held up at a lot of the airports, to
make sure that everybody that does drive on the surface of the
airport knows what the procedures are, knows about calling the
control tower. I think it was an unfocused effort until then.
The airports helped us a lot over this past year in getting
to those communities, and not just the people at the airports,
but the airlines that have ground staff running around in
vehicles as well. So the first thing is to make sure people are
properly trained, certified to operate in that environment, and
have recurrent training.
And perhaps our gentleman from Dallas would like to add to
that.
Mr. Crites. Certainly. I would just like to echo that, Mr.
Chairman. Recurrent training, familiarization for all folks out
there on the airfield. But to your point, trying to keep them
off the airfield I think is job number one for us.
Mr. Oberstar. Captain Prater, what do your members say
about the number of vehicles on the runway?
Mr. Prater. Well, the number of distractions certainly have
increased, but I think the runway environment itself, while
there may be maintenance, whether it is construction crews or
grass cutting or snow removal crews, I believe that those are
controlled well by the controllers. As you get closer to the
ramps, however, you get a lot more equipment being driven by
people who may be out there without very much training. The
turnover in many of our ground personnel, because they are no
longer working for the airlines, they may be contract, the
turnover is tremendous, so keeping people aware that, you know
what, you better yield to the big airplane and not cut in front
of it. We see far too many of those incidents. Fortunately,
they are usually on the ramp, versus being close to the runway.
Mr. Oberstar. That ramp area is very congested. Exactly my
concern.
Mr. Krakowski, I think that it behooves the FAA to step up
the effort with airports, one, to limit the number of vehicles,
especially in the ramp area; two, improve the training and the
coordination with air traffic control and give us a report in
another couple months about your progress on that. I have been
a few places that just really have startled me, and I have
watched this for 35 years. Twenty-five years I have been doing
aviation oversight and I see an increased number of vehicles;
just my visual observation of it, no scientific counting. I
know when there are too many, and there are too many out there.
Now, what is happening with the hold short procedure and is
that contributing, Mr. Forrey, to difficulties? You notice what
we found some years ago, creep with the aircraft in the hold
short position.
Mr. Forrey. I think the hold short position in and of
itself isn't necessarily, the problem it is the taxying to the
hold short position that is the problem. The agency has, again,
unilaterally implemented that we have to start doing
progressive taxiways. Instead of saying a taxi to runway 27 via
taxiway Romeo, now they have got to say taxi to runway 27 via
taxiway Romeo, turn right on taxiway Whiskey, turn left on
taxiway Tango, hold short of runway.
So there is added verbiage to this thing that is going on
now. It is creating more room for error; it has got to be read
back exactly the way it is, so now you have got congestion tie-
up. It is just a problem. It is something that they didn't ask
us for our opinion on, they didn't allow us to participate in
that SMS panel that we were talking about earlier; they just
did it.
So it is a problem for us. It is going to create delays in
the system. It creates an unsafe situation where now there is a
mis-readback that can happen, more human error can take place.
It is just that kind of stuff that is a problem. But the actual
holding short isn't necessarily the issue.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Captain Prater?
Mr. Prater. I think we need to focus, Mr. Chairman, on the
fact that we need the same verbiage, whether I am coming from
Spain or whether I am flying to Spain, whether I am coming from
Holland or traveling to Holland. The hold short procedures and
the taxi procedures need to be common across the world. Just
like English is the common language, we need to bring in our
standards up to the world ICAO standards. It will take some
retraining of controllers, of pilots, but I think, overall,
that would be a step that we could take to improve the system.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Krakowski, can you take action on these
matters?
Mr. Krakowski. We already are doing the analysis on the
ICAO verbiage standards, and we should have that done within
the next few months so we can actually start working on it. And
I absolutely agree with Captain Prater. I disagree with Mr.
Forrey, though, on the detailed----
Mr. Oberstar. Well, you usually do, don't you?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Krakowski. Well, but I come from a position, honestly,
in my previous employer, it was one of my aircraft that got
disoriented last year and caused a very serious runway
incursion. If the pilots had a pathway in their mind on what
taxiways specifically to get to, we believe that that would
have mitigated that type of an issue. Another thing that we
have recently done is we will not allow an aircraft to receive
its takeoff order until all other runways that it is crossing
going to that runway have been crossed.
So we are doing procedural things as we learn through the
Call to Action that are good practices. They are different.
They are different for the pilots and they are different for
the controllers, but we will get used to them. We changed how
we displayed weather to pilots and we went to the international
format many, many years ago. Everybody complained about it and
it was a distraction, but now we have a common worldwide
system. We are good, we are adaptable. Pilots and controllers
are good at these sorts of things. So to standardize, to have
specific instructions we believe is the right way to go.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend, in your
continuing vigilance, a follow up on this matter of
standardization and compatibility with ICAO, and I will
distribute for Subcommittee Members relevant portions of a
hearing I held 22 years ago on common language in aviation.
Unfortunately, the text doesn't relate what I said at the
outset. I repeated a number of commands in the various accents
that you hear in the flight deck.
English is indeed the common language of aviation, with a
French accent, with a German accent, Dutch, who have a
different accent, and by the time you get through it and then
you tune in on entering French airspace and every now and then
there is a pilot talking to the tower in French. He is supposed
to be speaking in English.
Last question. What happened to precision runway monitoring
technology?
Mr. Krakowski. Sir, we have had it in a couple occasions
like San Francisco and Minneapolis and in Detroit.
Mr. Oberstar. Detroit, yes.
Mr. Krakowski. Right. We use it quite extensively, or I
should say regularly, in San Francisco, where you have those
really two close runways. We don't use it quite as often.
Mr. Oberstar. Has it proven effective in fog?
Mr. Krakowski. At certain levels of visibility we can use
it. We can't use it down to the very lowest minimums,
typically. But I think the answer to that is the work we are
doing on RNAV and RNP and NextGen all begins to really get at
that very issue. I think the PRM program is going to be
obviated by the new technology.
Mr. Oberstar. That was sort of the prediction for it when
it came into effect after that tragic accident, the DC-9 on the
tarmac at Detroit.
Mr. Forrey, do you and your members have ideas about
technology improvements that make your workload better and the
runway area safer?
Mr. Forrey. Yes, there is a lot of technology that we could
use. The PRM, by the way, the problem with it mostly is it only
gives you a little bit more, maybe a couple aircraft more an
hour, and they don't have the staffing to open the extra
positions, so that is why it is not used a lot of places. But
there is a lot of technology in the cockpit. I mean, there is
ADS-B with in and out, where pilots can actually see the moving
map of the runways, instead of having to give all kinds of long
clearances.
By the way, I would expect that from a pilot, to not agree
with a controller. Typically, that is the scenario that goes
these days.
The problem is I am all for standardizing this stuff in
phraseology and technology, but why are we going after the rest
of the world that doesn't work the kind of traffic this Country
does? You don't have O'Hares and you don't have Kennedys and
you don't have Newarks and you don't have Miamis and Atlantas
and Dallases over in Europe. Maybe they have one airport over
there. So using their standards for our kind of operation isn't
necessarily the best thing to do.
But there are all kinds of new technology with the ADS-B or
ASDE-X, even the light version of it, that we can start putting
down. The cockpit ADS-B, where pilots can see the moving
taxiways, where they can see other aircraft on the runways.
That can come into them as well, so that there is another
redundant system available so that we can avoid accidents and
incursions and all sorts of other safety issues. So there is a
lot of technology that we could using; we would just like to
get involved to use it.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If the Senate had passed our
House-passed aviation authorization bill, we would be underway
with funding to advance the state of the art of technology for
a good many of these systems that we are talking about here. If
the Senate doesn't act on it by the end of this session, I know
that Mr. Costello is going to have that bill, have a quick
review of it in Committee, will have it on the Floor, and we
will have it through the House before the next administration,
whichever it is, can screw it up.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costello. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. We have had
discussions about next year, if in fact the Senate does not
act, and we intend to have the Subcommittee and the Full
Committee move on the FAA reauthorization as soon as possible
and very early in the next session if in fact the Senate does
not act by the end of this session.
This has been a good hearing. I think we need to continue,
and will continue, to focus on this issue to make certain.
I think, Mr. Krakowski, you acknowledge that there was a
point when the FAA took their eye off the ball, did not fill
the position as Director, and now that it is filled and has
been filled, some progress is being made. I would encourage you
to continue. We have had this discussion before, and I would
encourage you to continue to involve all of the stakeholders,
including the controllers, and to make certain that it is not
only at the national level, but around the Country, as well, as
these meetings are taking place.
I made mention of the article that talked about Euro
Control and NextGen, and about how the stakeholders there are
actually involved in designing the system and all have a stake
in it and a voice, and that is what we need to see here, not
only with NextGen, but runway incursion issues and with the
Runway Safety Council as well.
Again, we thank all of you for your testimony today, and
the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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