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**CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN AMERICAN
GRAND STRATEGY (PART 2)**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
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PREPARED STATEMENTS:

[There were no Prepared Statements submitted.]

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

**CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN AMERICAN GRAND
STRATEGY (PART 2)**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 24, 2008.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Morning. Let me welcome you to the Armed Services Committee hearing on considerations for a grand strategy for the United States.

Appearing before us today is General Jack Keane, United States Army (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff of our Army. And General Keane, we welcome you, and today's hearing is actually a continuation of the hearing last week with Madeleine Albright.

As I mentioned at that hearing, we always try to present multiple viewpoints for our members' consideration, and I pledge that this committee will do so at the earliest opportunity.

So we want to get right to General Keane's testimony on this very busy day. And General, I must apologize for both Mr. Hunter and me. Our authorization bill is coming up in just a few minutes, and we must head to the floor. And I am sure that others will continue. It is my understanding Mr. Vic Snyder will be staying and presiding at that time.

I ask that my complete opening statement be put into the record. Duncan Hunter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. We had Madeleine Albright last week, and I thought we had a superb hearing with the former secretary.

And thank you for inviting General Keane to come and give his viewpoint today. And I think this is a great opportunity for the committee. Again, we apologize for congressional timing. It never fails. In fact, that is one reason we had you come, is because we knew the bill would be brought to the floor if we scheduled a hearing; so we did that.

But thank you, General, and your thoughts—you were here last September just a few days before General Petraeus arrived to give

his report to Congress. And you gave to the—as I recall, to the combined Armed Services and International Relations Committee your view of the situation in Iraq and how it was proceeding. And I think that was an excellent introduction to the hearing that we had the succeeding week when General Petraeus came and gave his report on the operation in Iraq.

Hopefully, in this hearing, you can talk to us about new challenges. And the—especially I am interested in the challenge that we are seeing in Afghanistan, the emergence of this border strip that lies in Pakistan as the new sanctuary for the Taliban and al Qaeda that is now giving rise to cross-border operations, which are taking on our Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

I am also interested, of course, in how you see this Georgian situation, whether you see this as indicative of a pattern, of a new Soviet era in aggressive foreign policy, in trying to retake, if you will, part of the dissembled Soviet empire; how you see the America relationship with China and the growing Chinese military capability and how the United States should respond to that—a couple of the areas that I think are important, especially to members of this committee.

So thank you for being with us this morning.

And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony.

And I am, again, so sorry that this coincides with our bill coming up on the floor. But I think we will have members who will, as we go back and forth from the floor, will be very interested in your testimony.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony.

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. And it is not just any bill on the floor. It is the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. HUNTER. And that is not a bad—

Dr. SNYDER. Although, Duncan, having my locker right next to yours in the gym, if you do not clean out your locker, we are going to change the name.

Mr. HUNTER. If you want 138 golf shirts, I have got them.

Dr. SNYDER. General Keane, it is good to see you again. My understanding is you did not submit any kind of written statement. Is that correct?

Yes, you go ahead. You are recognized, General Keane, for such time as you—I think your mic is not on.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JACK KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General KEANE. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. General Keane, go ahead.

General KEANE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me back to this distinguished committee where I have always enjoyed the dialogue and, even more, the positive relationship that we have had through the years.

Now, I understand the Authorization Bill is going to be on the floor this morning, and I respect your attention to it. I would stand on my head if I could help you, so you have somebody very sympathetic here to your going down to vote on it.

As I look at the world and the United States, as we begin the transition to a new Administration in 2009, and as we use this opportunity to re-examine our direction, our goals and our strategy, I recognize the worthiness of reaching for a grand strategy that served us so well during post-World War II in our struggle with the Soviet Union.

Our containment strategy transcended different Administrations. While we argued over means and methods at times, the overall strategy remained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In my view, this kind of grand strategy today is not particularly useful, for two reasons. One, we do not have a monolithic threat which subsumed all challenges. Quite the contrary, we are facing a multitude of challenges, from nuclear proliferation, radical Islam, instability in the Middle East and in some of the Arab Muslim world, the re-emergence of Russia as a potential adversary, the key relationships of India and China, global environment challenges, the multitude of problems in Africa, and a need for energy independence.

I have difficulty envisioning an overall grand strategy that relates to all these challenges and, most importantly, would define our response. That is what containment did. It provided us focus against a clear and present danger and unequivocally defined our response.

It is not that we could not conceive a grand strategy that encompasses our multifaceted challenges. We can. But it would, by necessity, be so overarching I think it would lose a sense of realism and practicality.

The second reason, and most importantly, we are a nation at war. We do not just have threats as we did during the Cold War and in the 1990's. We have enemies, enemies who will us harm, enemies who kill and hurt us, enemies who work very hard to achieve their goals and weaken the United States.

We have been at war for seven years, representing most of this decade. Our strategy should be focused on winning these wars and not on just ending these wars. Certainly, we should never take on a war we do not intend to win.

The reality is the center of gravity of international strife and security which was resident in Europe has moved from Europe, where it was for most of the 20th century, to the East, from the Middle East to the Pacific Rim, including parts of North Africa. We fought two major wars in Europe during the first half of the 20th century and were involved in an ideological struggle in the latter half with Communism in the Soviet Union.

As such, we fought two other wars outside of Europe in an attempt to contain Communism, as a part of that ideological struggle, in Korea and in Vietnam. We were overwhelmingly successful in providing stability and prosperity in Europe and winning the ideological struggle with Communism.

Today, we are involved in another ideological struggle, this time with an enemy every bit as ambitious as the former Soviet Union but, in my view, more dangerous. Of course, this is the struggle with radical Islam, or Islamic extremists, who see the United States as their strategic enemy. Our strategy and commitment to

defeat this enemy should be our highest priority now and in the future.

The good news is we are succeeding. The al Qaeda remains the imminent threat. And while their attack on us on 9/11 was a tactical victory, it was a strategic failure because, not only did they lose their key sanctuary in Afghanistan within weeks of the attack, but there are two fledgling democracies in Iraq and in Afghanistan that are attempting to take hold in the heart of the Arab Muslim world, where the radicals want to establish their Islamic caliph. This is like a dagger to their heart and why they have fought back so fiercely.

The al Qaeda remains dangerous, but they are a mere shadow of their former selves. Hiding in the mountains of Pakistan, scores of their leaders killed and captured, defeated in Iraq, every attack since 9/11 intended for the United States has been defeated, no longer able to reach out globally, they rely on surrogates in other countries who are motivated, but they are inexperienced, they are poorly trained, and they have a tendency to bungle the operation or fail. Moreover, some former members are openly criticizing the al Qaeda movement for a failed strategy in killing of the Muslims and in killing women and children.

We must continue our vigilance against them. Our strategy of confrontation and staying on offense is working. And doing so with the willing cooperation of other nations is critical.

Part of any strategy, in terms of the wars we are facing, has got to be winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, we have two foreign enemies who engaged us. One is the al Qaeda, and the other is Iran.

The al Qaeda, fortunately, have been operationally defeated by the Coalition forces and overwhelmingly rejected by the Sunni population. This is a major defeat for al Qaeda, and it is well known in the Arab Muslim world, particularly, that an Arab Muslim population had the courage to reject al Qaeda, despite the terror and barbaric killing.

Much can be done to leverage this extraordinary success in continuing our struggle with radical Islam. The Iranians have been killing us since 1980 and have been killing troops in Iraq for almost five years.

Brigadier General Sulamani, who is the Iranian Quds Force commander, a position he has held for 10 years, is in charge of this campaign, and he reports to one leader—the supreme leader in Iran. General Sulamani engineered and oversaw the defeat of the Israelis in Southern Lebanon.

He is an experienced, savvy, and ruthless commander. However, he has suffered a major setback in Southern Iraq, where they were attempting to Lebanize that portion of Iraq.

The Iranians want the United States defeated and out of Iraq. Therefore, they can get a foothold in southern Iraq and have significant influence over what they believe would be a weak central government in Iraq, which is aligned with Iran.

The Iranians will not succeed because the Iraqis do not want that influence, and the Iraqi and Coalition Force presence is crucial as they try to return in the coming months.

Given the defeat of the al Qaeda in Iraq, the major setback to the Iranians in the south, and the welcome reality that the Sunni insurgents are entering the political process versus using armed violence, we are on a path to achieving our objectives in Iraq. It is not simply about ending the war, but winning the war by accomplishing our objectives.

Our struggle in Afghanistan, while frustrating because we had liberated the country from radical Islamists—the Taliban, who are now fighting to return to power—is a war that is very winnable. Much of the solution in Afghanistan has to be found in Pakistan, where the extremists are protected in Pakistani sanctuaries. This is more of a regional issue in attempting to resolve this conflict, which we do have the wherewithal to influence and the wherewithal to accomplish it.

A part of any strategy is the crucial role of American leadership in the world. United States leadership was vital throughout the 20th century in the struggle against Nazism and Communism, and even in the 1990's, playing a defining role to lead a reluctant Europe to stop Milosevic's rampage in Southern Europe. United States leadership is equally important today in meeting the global challenges that we and the world face.

It is a harsh reality that many European leaders cannot ask their people to sacrifice for their overall stability and security. As such, they turn their heads as the Iranians move steadily toward a nuclear weapon, while many European countries, openly and secretly, trade with the Iranians. They turn their heads as the Russians occupy a portion of Georgia, changing fundamentally the Russian relationship with Europe.

Our leadership is vital to meeting these challenges and the others that I outlined earlier. Of course, we want to meet these challenges on a multilateral basis where we have common interests and where the stakes are so high. And we should do all we can to foster these critical relationships. But at times, we may have to act alone because it is in our national interest, and we should do so.

My last point, Mr. Chairman, is that, as this committee looks at our military capabilities as a vital part of national security strategy, that we recognize some stark realities. Now, I know the committee is very familiar with this. I am just emphasizing it from my own perspective.

And one is that we must re-cap the Air Force and the Navy, whose programs have been mortgaged somewhat to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that our ground forces are much too small and, in my view, even the ramp-up to increase them in size is significantly insufficient to meet the challenges we have in the coming years.

So in conclusion, one, I do not believe a grand strategy is appropriate when we are at war, and I am not convinced we could conceive one that subsumes our challenges and, most importantly, would adequately define our response. And number two, U.S. leadership is crucial to meeting the global challenges that we and the world face.

Fortunately, we have not lost our moral compass nor the courage of our people in their willingness to sacrifice to defeat our enemies,

to challenge the evil in the world, and to face many of the problems and challenges ahead.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Keane.

Mrs. Boyda for five minutes.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Keane, thank you so much for coming again today. We really appreciate your testimony, and it is good to see you.

I wanted to just ask you a little bit more about the whole Pakistan-Afghanistan, the Durand line, the so-called border, or lack thereof, however you want to characterize it. I just was able to come back from a trip there the day after Zardari got elected, right after the something-whatever happened in the—with the Waziristan provinces there.

So my question is General Hayden and Admiral Mullen have said we can expect a 9/11-type attack along that Pakistan-Afghanistan border. That was, what, six, eight months ago now. Do you still see that threat as that same level of threat, or are we getting it under control?

And my other question is: What can we expect from Pakistan? They are in a real bind. They are literally between that rock and a hard place. What can we expect from Pakistan, and how do we work with them in any way possible so that they are doing what they need for their people and we are working together?

General KEANE. Sure. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman.

Certainly, we do have significant issues dealing with the al Qaeda sanctuary and a Taliban sanctuary that is existing in Pakistan. And remember, we drove the al Qaeda out of Afghanistan weeks after 9/11, and that is where they have fled.

In the ensuing years, we have killed and captured multiple leaders of that organization with the assistance of the Pakistanis. Where we have failed is we have not gone into the sanctuary area and defeated the al Qaeda in that area.

The Pakistanis do not want us to violate their sovereignty and do it unilaterally. We have made a decision to cooperate with the Pakistanis and not do it unilaterally without their permission.

The basic reason for that, and it goes all the way back to the argument we had over this in the national security arena in 2001—the basic premise for that rationale is not to act unilaterally as it is the thought that it would destabilize Pakistan to the point that the radical could seize power and, of course, then they would have nuclear weapons.

That argument has won the day in this town since 2001, so that is a backdrop for part of our discussion. So the Administration has made a decision that, if we are going to eliminate that sanctuary that the al Qaeda has there, it can only be done with the cooperation of the Pakistanis.

Mrs. BOYDA. Do you agree with that premise?

General KEANE. No, I do not. I argued against that and lost that—I have never accepted the belief that the radicals, as a result of our response to a 9/11 attack on this country, could possibly destabilize Pakistan and take over and gain those nuclear weapons. I have never bought the argument.

But anyway, we are where we are—

Mrs. BOYDA. May I ask, seven years later, is that premise—has that changed in seven—if we had done that initially or seven years later, do we still have those same options?

General KEANE. Well, I think the issue, in my mind, is still on the table.

And the second issue with the Pakistanis, then, is their own preparedness to deal with this. Musharraf made a couple of feeble attempts to go up into that area, mostly at our urging. His military did not have the stomach for it, and they got hit pretty good.

Second, what is not obvious to people is that, much like our army, when we invaded Iraq in 2003, was prepared and trained for conventional operations—and in our case, we do that better than anybody in the world. But we were ill-prepared for unconventional or irregular war, which is what we have been involved in for the last five years. Now, we have since solved that issue. We are very good at it.

But the Pakistanis' military is not prepared for that kind of operation, and it has been very challenging to get their attention because their focus still is India, that it is, as you know, emotional, psychological—

Mrs. BOYDA. Historical.

General KEANE [continuing]. Center of gravity for them, and it preoccupies their intelligence apparatus, and it preoccupies their training and education and their military preparedness.

So we have been unsuccessful in getting them to operate at a much lower level in terms of irregular unconventional warfare. That has got to change. We have got to help the Pakistanis do this so they can be effective.

And the other thing with Musharraf, particularly dealing with the Taliban sanctuary, is he believed and had doubts about our stick-to-it-iveness in Afghanistan, and I think with some justification. He was not certain that the U.S. would stay the course, that, in time, we would run out of patience based on it taking too long, too many casualties, and we start looking at other issues.

As a result of that, he hedged his bet, and he worked with us, and he also assisted them through his Intelligence Service because he believed, in the long run, he may be dealing with a Taliban regime, and it was in his interest to have some kind of relationship, very similar to the relationship he had when the Taliban was in power in the past and his Intelligence Service was assisting them.

So that is part of the backdrop that adds to the complexity of this problem. Now, do we have cause for hope with this new Administration? I think we do. Certainly, the new President is not the same person that his wife, was in terms of her moral courage and physical courage, and she had already thrown down the gauntlet in terms of what she was going to do about the radicals. Make no mistake about it: She was going after them. Of course, that is why they killed her.

So I think we have an opportunity here to work with the Pakistanis, to assist their military, to help train their military if necessary, to conduct joint operations with them, to take down the al Qaeda sanctuary, and also to eliminate the Taliban sanctuary, certainly, that is sitting on Afghan soil.

We will not be able to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan unless we eliminate the sanctuary. All we will do is throw more resources at it and continuously protract the problem if you give the enemy a sanctuary where they can operate with impunity out of to conduct their operations and return to prepare for next and future operations.

So those are some of the challenges that we have. But I definitely, in my own mind, believe the situation in Afghanistan is not as challenging as the crisis we had in Iraq in 2006, and we certainly would never want it to get to that crisis. Two, it is achievable in terms of making certain that the Taliban do not get back in power. We cannot do it without the Pakistanis, and it is much more of a regional problem than Iraq was, in the sense that, to influence the Pakistanis and to assist with the problem in Afghanistan, we have got to solicit the cooperation of the other countries in the region and start to take a regional approach to this, because it is not in their interest to have that kind of government in power in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. And I think I will start doing the gentle tap at the end of the five minutes so we will give everybody the opportunity to—

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, sir.

We are here to talk about a grand strategy for America, and I am very concerned that we are permitting the tyranny of the urgent to sweep some really important things off the table. The urgent things, of course, are the Iraq-Afghan war and the threat of a market meltdown. And so we are giving essentially no attention to things that I think will be enormously more important in the future.

The first of those is energy. As you may know, in 1956, it was predicted that the United States would reach its maximum oil production in 1970. Right on target, M. King Hubbert was right. We did reach our maximum oil production, and now we produce half of what we produced then.

M. King Hubbert predicted in 1979 that the world would reach its maximum oil production about now. Apparently, we have. Both the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA)—both have world's oil production flat for the last 36 months.

Sir, a very insightful speech. Perhaps the most insightful speech of the last century was given by Hyman Rickover on the 14th day of May, I think it was, to a group of physicians in St. Paul, Minnesota 51 years ago.

In that, he noted that this Golden Age of oil would be but a blip in the 8,000-years recorded history of man, and he said that he did not know how long it would last. Now we know, pretty much, but he said, no matter how long it lasted, the only important thing was that, the longer it lasted, the more time would we have to plan for an orderly transition to alternative fuel.

Sir, we have done none of that, with 51 years' warning from Hyman Rickover. And we now have known for 28 years, known with absolute certainty because, in 1980, looking back to 1970, M.

King Hubbert was right. So we have known for 28 years we were going to be here today, and we have done nothing.

A second thing that I am very much concerned about is electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Our military is not prepared, sir. We are not hardened to anywhere near the degree we need to be hardened, and our national infrastructure will come crashing down, and we are paying essentially no attention to this. It could end life as we know it in our country.

And the third thing that really concerns me, when I worked for IBM from 1967 to 1975, and we were very much concerned, we in IBM and we in our country, that, unless we did something, the Japanese were going to take over the preeminent position in computers simply because, every year, they were producing more, and at least as good, scientists, mathematicians, engineers as we. Now China this year will graduate six times as many engineers as we graduate, and I am concerned, sir, about our long-term future.

And these three things—we are giving essentially no attention to these three things. Give me some attention to energy, but the wrong attention. “Drill, baby, drill” will not solve the problem, and not drilling will not solve the problem, either. What do we have to do so that we can prevent the urgent from pushing the really important things off the table?

General KEANE. Well, I agree with most of what you just said, frankly. I just do not know how you make that a grand strategy, and given the wars that we are facing, I understand what you are saying about the tyranny of the urgent. But in my own view on energy, I thought energy would be a major feature of this previous Administration these last eight years in moving us toward energy independence, because energy independence, which I mentioned in my remarks, is a national security issue, front and center. As a result of our dependence, and therefore our economic dependence in that part of the world where we are getting oil from in the Middle East, it affects a lot of the relationships we have and the decisions that we make.

And certainly, we have to move toward alternative fuels as well. And I think most military professionals like myself would feel very strongly about moving to energy independence in this country as a major feature of a national security strategy. So I completely agree with you.

Electro Magnetic Pulse is a vulnerability that we have, make no mistake about it. And I am not privy to know now what we are doing in the classified world to assist with that because, while I am on the Defense Policy Board, we have had no briefings on it. So I do not know what we are doing. I know when I was wearing a uniform, we were not doing much. So if we have done much in the intervening years, I cannot comment.

Cyber-warfare, though, I would add to your list. It is something that the Chinese look at as an asymmetric strategy, as opposed to building blue-water Navy and Army that would rival the United States or an Air Force that would rival the air power that we have.

I think they have made—while they will do some of that, most of what they are attempting to do is asymmetric and investment in cyber-warfare, which they are involved in today, as we are painfully aware of. And I would add that to the list of—most of all of

that is obviously in the highly classified world, and it is something we have made a lot of progress on, and I am sure the committee has some familiarity with it.

In terms of China, myself and three other retired four-stars went to China early this year to sit down with four—turned out five—Chinese four-stars to talk about improving our military relations with each other so we did not create the enemy that we are trying to avoid here, by letting these relationships drift apart and miscalculate and not understand each other's aspirations and goals.

And now as military professionals, we are not naive about military capabilities. But, in the same time, we believe that the most important relationship the United States will have in the 21st century is with China.

And we should get this relationship right. We should not foul this thing up and let other issues overtake it. And like any relationship, you have to build it.

Now one of the things we brought back and talked to Secretary Gates and others about is that we have got to at least start on the military side, following on the coattails of our business leaders who are out in front of us and start building relationships in the officer corps of the Chinese military and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at different levels, not just among the generals, but in the future generations. And bring them to our schools, and let us go to some of theirs and do some joint training together, and open this thing up a lot more than what it really is. So I think our relationship with China is crucial to us. We have to keep our eyes open here in terms of what they are doing.

We do not know what their intent is. We know what their stated intent is. But at the same time, the relationship we can improve on and hopefully build trust.

Even though there is different government systems operating here, the needs of the Chinese people are staggering by comparison to the issues that our people are dealing with, and there is much help that they need in doing that.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Gillibrand for five minutes.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General, for being here.

I want to follow up with what my colleague started on, particularly some of the urgent needs for how we transform our military to address the real risks of today. And in particular, I am concerned about cyber-terrorism. Do you have any recommendations to our committee about what you would like the military to look like over the next 10 years to be a more responsive force?

And in particular, we have had a number of hearings about the importance of having certain civil skills, having the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) be part of some unit of the armed services. And I want your thoughts on whether that flexibility, that ability to do the reconstruction, to do peacekeeping in a different way, is something that the military should have a role in. And if so, how do we transform our forces to have those capabilities ready available?

General KEANE. Yes. Well, thank you for the question.

I think these wars that we have been involved in since 9/11, if you would step away from the controversy surrounding how the

war in Iraq got started, should we or should not we have, we have to take away some vital lessons that should influence and inform us about the future of our military structure, its capabilities.

In the first instance, post-conflict operations are every bit as important as the conflict itself, and we are painfully aware of that. And therefore, we have to have structures in our military and capabilities there to deal with that better than what we have now in terms of civil military operations, the kinds of engineers that we need, more military police, better intelligence apparatus.

And second, the enemy that we are facing in the world today that surrounds this ideological struggle that we have with radical Islam, they very carefully have selected the form of warfare. I mean, Saddam Hussein now, given the fact that we have interrogated his generals and we have lots of other documents to substantiate it, we know now that Saddam Hussein was in the planning phase of this form of warfare for two years, that he was in the execution phase for six months prior to our invasion.

See, he never intended to militarily defend his regime. He always intended to fight us using unconventional tactics and irregular warfare, believing that he could really take his country back, knowing that we would take it from him.

So he selected that form of warfare even though he had an organized army. Why did he do that? He selected it because he knows that we are vulnerable to it, that it disarms our technological advantage and that, if you protract a war with America, given its impatience about results, you have a chance to succeed.

Now what he does not know is 75 to 80 percent of these insurgencies fail, and it is very high for urban insurgency, which he was conducting. And he has failed, as we all know now.

But our enemies will continue to select that form of warfare because of our vulnerabilities to it. If we had to fight the Iranians—let us assume that, for argument's sake—and when I was a corps commander and a division commander in the Army, we would run scenarios against Iran since 1979. So most of us are all very familiar what it takes to defeat the Iranian military, and we would be able to defeat it. And I am not suggesting we go to war with Iran. We do not want to do that. But the real war would start after this because they would use this form of warfare to come after us.

So in our future kit bag of the United States military, which has always been optimized for high-end warfare, we have to have capabilities now in there for low-end of war fighting. We have to have a more balanced force.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. And what is your recommendation for how we get there?

General KEANE. Well, we have to continue the education and training of our officers that we have now on the low end as well as on the high end. The ground forces are the prevailing issue here. The air and naval forces, by nature, will stay high-end, and you can use a very small percentage of them on the low end.

But the ground forces, the challenge for them is they have to be able to do the high-end warfare that they have always been very good at, but now also be able to do this with a balanced force. The only way you can get there, the only way to get there is you have

to increase the size of the ground force to do it, and the ramp that we have right now is inadequate to get us there.

Why do I say that? You need to have—if you analyze this problem, we need about 25 brigades to be able to sustain ourselves in some kind of conflict. We are using about 17 of them now, but, on average, we need about 25.

If you want to have 25 brigades that you can put into a conflict—and, regardless, of the years involved, you need somewhere between 68 to 75 brigades to sustain that level of activity and also be ready for another war or another form of war either on the high end or the low end—right now, we cannot do that. We have all our eggs in one basket.

We are fighting two wars, both on the low end, and we are not prepared to fight high-end with ground forces. They are not doing any training because they are completely focused on being in the rotation, on the scene in Afghanistan or Iraq, returning home and preparing to go back. And there is no time to be able to do the high-end skills, and all those skills are atrophying.

So the major issue is size of force, followed by the structure and then building the capabilities in the force to do both forms of warfare. What we did in the past, we can no longer do. What we did in the past—and I was part of it, and I supported it, and I was wrong—and that is just build the high-end ground force and tell yourself that you can do low-end warfare as a pickup team when it comes your way. Does not work.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wilson for five minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Keane, thank you so much for being here today.

Last September, in the midst of doom and gloom, you were a voice of positive prognosis. Indeed, your visions came through, and I just appreciate your service very much.

I appreciate your military service, but I particularly appreciate your vision for victory, understanding that we must defeat the terrorists overseas to protect American families at home, to protect American troops in the future. I just appreciate this as a veteran myself, and, indeed, I appreciate it as a parent, and I know that other parents feel the same way.

I have got four sons serving in the military, two who have served in Iraq, and so I want the safest world we can have. And the best way to do that is to defeat the terrorists overseas. And I appreciate your comments again this morning, too. It is just always positive to hear from you.

As we look ahead for a grand strategy, and it is not in capital letters, so it is sort of a general view, as you indicated when you initially testified, should we be emphasizing the existing alliances and international partnerships we have? But you also indicated that there may be conditions where we need to proceed on our own. Can you tell us what you see for the future?

General KEANE. Well, I think our alliances and partnerships should be re-examined in the face of current realities and analyze them. And probably the most significant one that we need to take a look at is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) itself.

I mean, it certainly has served us well through the 20th century in the Cold War struggle that we had with the Soviet Union, but,

also, NATO is representative of many European countries, in my judgment, who have lost their will, and it is reflected in NATO as well.

The deployment of NATO forces to Afghanistan and the problem that that has caused the on-scene commander is pretty significant, because we have forces there that, while they are there, they are forbidden from combat operations, even though this is a war and they are a military.

I mean, they are not the Red Cross. They are not a non-government agency. They are a military force, but they are forbidden from combat operations. And others are there, but they do not want them to go into areas that are too challenging, in terms of combat operations. So if you are the commander of that force, the complexity that that presents to you is staggering.

So what is the cost benefit of NATO in the future? I mean, this is a tough issue for us because we have been a part of it so long, and nobody wants to walk away from that. I am not suggesting it, but I am suggesting we look at it and analyze it and ask ourselves: What is wrong with this organization?

We are a part of it. We have a right to speak. We have a U.S. leader who is at the top of the military aspect of it. And I think this organization needs to re-examine itself, in terms of what its role is.

So these alliances that you mentioned should be looked at in the future in terms of what their role is and what our participation is in it. We do not want to be dismissive of them, and I am not suggesting that we walk out on a world stage by ourselves and we act unilaterally.

Quite the contrary. I do believe strongly that we should seek multilateral participation to challenge the complexity of this world, in terms of the enemies and adversaries that we have and the evil that is in the world, and we should do everything we can.

But, I mean, I am also suggesting that, at times when we have countries of the unwilling, despite the obvious need, then we have to act in the interest of the American people to protect them, even though, while doing that, we are also going to protect others, obviously, who are unwilling. And we must have the courage to do it.

Mr. WILSON. As we conclude, as you have the opportunity to travel to different countries—I just returned from visiting the joint U.S.-Bulgarian base at Novo Selo, the U.S.-Romanian base at Constanta—you will be so encouraged to see people who understand that it was the American military sacrifices and efforts that made it possible for them now to live in free-market democracies after living 50 years under totalitarianism.

So people there are positive, and, indeed, I saw the troops and visited with the Bulgarian troops in Afghanistan. My son served with Bulgarian troops in Iraq. And so thank you again for your service.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. McIntyre for five minutes.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you so much.

General, it is great to have you here. I am sure you still remember—we fondly do—my wife and I and my two sons on January the 2nd of 1997, the day we came to visit you at Ft. Bragg and delayed

moving up here to start a new congressional career on January the 3rd.

And thank you for standing tall and standing strong then, as we spent time together for that full day at Ft. Bragg, and thank you for everything you have done throughout your career and in the 12 years since then that we spent that time together.

And I want to ask you a question. As we look to the role that Congress plays in the development of grand strategy and its execution, what specifically you think Congress's role should be in the development of that and how our policy process can support the execution of a grand strategy. I do not know if you have got some bullet points or ways that you could say, "I will tell you like it is, and here is really what Congress can do to help execute this," so as we look ahead now with a new Administration, whoever that might be, we can be in a position to do what we ought to be doing.

General KEANE. Well, I clearly believe that the Congress plays a role here, not just in its oversight but also—I mean, it is a contemplative body, and there is collective wisdom here. And I think that you have a right to be in the arena, so to speak, in helping to development strategy.

It clearly is the responsibility of the executive branch, make no mistake about it. But the complexity of this, the challenge of it, I think there is a role for the Congress to play in that.

The hearings that you are doing and the people that you bring in here is usually thoughtful, and you normally cast a much wider net than the executive branch does in the formulation of this, which is usually done against deadlines and done with the team that is in residence.

So I think your opinions are valuable. I found that to be—that the case when I was in uniform, and I am not saying that to patronize anybody here. It is just a fact.

You force leaders in the executive branch, at times, to think about things that they had not thought about, and it does not always have to be in a committee hearing to do that. There are other ways and other forums to do it in a less public way, so that we can do some teaming and some formulation together.

So I think there is a role to play here. I think the executive branch clearly has the lead here. And these are tough issues, and eventually, when it gets down to it, choices. We are eventually going to make choices in terms of what we believe our priorities are and the resources that we will apply against those priorities.

And this body certainly has every right, speaking for the American people, to challenge those choices that we are going to make, as you have done in the past. And it is good to see you again, Mr. Congressman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. LoBiondo for five minutes.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here.

General, two years ago, the whole focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, seemed relatively stable. Seems like things have changed dramatically.

And I am curious of what you think of our perceived strategy in Afghanistan, what we need to do to get stabilized, and how that relates to how we are looking at Pakistan and the increasing chal-

lenge that we know we are going to be facing. And I have heard others say, and I think I believe, that we are never going to fix Pakistan until we have a clear strategy for—never going to fix Afghanistan unless we have a clear strategy for dealing with Pakistan.

And it appears that our strategy might be changing a little bit. But I am curious about your views on this.

General KEANE. Yes. Thank you. I answered partly that question before, but I would be glad to do it again.

Let me just say at the outset, we have made tremendous progress in Iraq, and we should feel good about that progress. And what General Petraeus and his leaders have been able to achieve is nothing short of remarkable, particularly in the timeframe that they accomplished it. But it is not over, and there are challenges ahead.

And while it will not get the headlines, because the level of violence is now at such a low level that most Iraqis are living normal lives, there still is a danger and a threat there that we have to manage our way through over the next two to three years. And we will, but we have to keep the troop presence there at some appropriate levels to deal with that, so we can cement the gains that we have made.

And in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has—while there is challenge there, it is also very winnable, what we are doing in Afghanistan. It does not rise to the crisis-like problem we had in Iraq with the enormous complexity of fighting probably the most formidable insurgency we have ever faced in the West, a former regime element operating as an insurgency, and then aided by two foreign interventions, the al Qaeda and also the Iranians, which added a degree of complexity to that that made it much more challenging.

Though Afghanistan has its own set of complexities, and most notable is the fact of the sanctuaries, as you are familiar with, that are in Pakistan. And so I think it is correct that the road to success in Afghanistan has to pass through Pakistan. We cannot keep the sanctuaries in Pakistan and be successful in Afghanistan. It will not work.

So the sanctuary that the Afghans have in Pakistan has got to go, and we have to do that with the cooperation of the Pakistanis, or they have to give us the authority to eliminate it ourselves, which obviously we could do rather easily.

Second, in Afghanistan, we obviously need more resources. I mean, that has been a secondary effort with the primary effort in Iraq. And that has been for good reason. But now you will see a transition of resources from the levels of troop levels in Iraq going down and the troop levels in Afghanistan going up. And that should happen.

And we are fortunate that we will be able to do that. And we are only able to do that because of the success that we have enjoyed in Iraq.

So Afghanistan needs more forces, to be sure. As we outlined, there is a lot of problems with some of the European forces. Some are helping significantly, but there is a shortage of forces there. And the increase in forces will be largely U.S., and that is the reality of it. So we need that as well.

But we need the cooperation of the Pakistani government, and we also need the cooperation of other governments in the region. We cannot look at Afghanistan just as an Afghanistan-Pakistan problem. We should look at it as a regional issue, bring the regional players to bear in terms of what our collective objectives are in Afghanistan. It is not in any of those regional players' interest to have a radical Islamic regime in charge in Afghanistan.

And if that is the case, then start from that point, in terms of common interest and goals, and let us work toward common solutions. I think this is doable, and we should—with the new Administration in Pakistan, we do not know that much about it, but we will find out in the ensuing months. And hopefully, we can work toward common goals in cooperation with them.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

General Keane, thank you for being with us this morning, and your voice of reason gives this member great comfort.

I wanted to get back to the subject of the hearing in regard to the grand strategy issue. And of course, while we are wanting to develop a grand strategy and talking about it here, other major countries, they have their own grand strategy, and I am talking mainly about countries like China and Russia, Iran of course.

And I am concerned with what their grand strategy has to do with ours, adversely affects ours, how we can implement our grand strategy, in light of theirs. And things like right now what Russia is doing off the coast of Venezuela in joint military exercises with them. I am real curious to know how you feel we can develop a grand strategy in light of what is going on in the rest of the world.

And then the other thing, if you would address, do you think it is possible in this current partisan political environment—of course, maybe it will get less so after the Presidential elections—but we are always going to be living with that. Is it possible, politically, for us to come together as Republicans and Democrats and agree on a grand strategy, or is there room for multiple grand strategies?

General KEANE. Well, as I said in my opening remarks, given the absence of a monolithic threat that we had when we truly had a grand strategy called “containment” for the second half of the 20th century, and that strategy served us well. It is hard to envision one that would encompass the complexity of the world that we are dealing with, or you could come up, certainly, with one. We can conceptualize something. But the real issue would be in the choices we are making underneath that umbrella, I think, because we do not have resources to do all of the things that this world is facing. So it is always a question of priorities and choices that we would have to make.

And as a result of that, we have a tendency, then, to look at the threats that are the most dangerous to us. And as I suggested, the fact that we are fighting wars and we are trying to formulate a strategy, part of that strategy has to be we have to win the wars we are fighting.

We cannot put the wars over there and pretend that they are not happening and develop some grand strategy away from that. I mean, this is a country that is at war. And sometimes I think, be-

cause the form and nature of the war is different than a clash of armies, then somehow we sort of denigrate it in how—that it may not be as important or as significant as a more typical 20th century type of war.

And nothing could be further from the truth, because the enemy has selected this form of warfare because of our vulnerabilities. The consequences of losing in Iraq, as an example, they selected the form of warfare, were dramatic in terms of regional instability, Iranian hegemony, al Qaeda sanctuary, and increased security vulnerability to the United States. That is a significant ensemble of consequences that are dire if that happened, so we could not afford to lose it for those reasons.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, General, if I can interrupt just for a second, I agree with you. I agree with you completely.

And when we were talking about this, when we were talking about the surge, and that debate raged on and on, this idea of, well, we—from a personnel perspective and from the perspective of a reset, we need to bring all these troops home to get ready for the next grand war. It never made any sense to me.

I mean, it was always in my mind, and I think you just said it, a war is a war is a war. You do not lose one to get ready for another one, but—you go ahead. Excuse me. I just wanted to interject that.

General KEANE. Yes. And certainly, other countries have national interests and strategies that they are pursuing, most of which they are not going to share with us, particularly these adversarial relationship that we have, but we can judge them by their actions.

And I think it is right for us to prioritize our relationship with these countries in terms of what that relationship is going to be, what the character of that is. Is it an adversarial relationship or potentially adversarial?

Certainly, what the Russians are about in Europe has got to give us a lot of pause for concern. It appears, by virtue of what they are doing, that Putin has a strategic view that may be similar to the view that his predecessors had with the Soviet Union on a smaller scale.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Ortiz for five minutes.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, good to see you, sir. We want to thank you for appearing before our committee and thank you for your service in the military.

As a former military officer, other than military instruments of power, what sort of power tools, such as diplomacy and non-military elements of national power, would you recommend be incorporated in the incoming Administration's grand strategy, and where should those efforts be focused?

Because I feel, and this is my personal opinion, that we have not done enough diplomatic work or communications with the countries around Afghanistan and Iraq. And maybe you can give us a little input as to what you think we should do there.

General KEANE. Well, I certainly agree with you. When you look at that region of the world, as I was trying to suggest that the center of gravity for international strife and security is in that region of the world, and we know we have an ideological struggle there,

in winning this ideological war, just as we won the ideological war with the Soviet Union, I really believe it has more to do with what you are suggesting than it has to do with military power.

To defeat that radical Islamic movement is more about our ideas and our values of this country. It is more about capitalism and democracy. It is more about changing the conditions that the moderates are having to live and contend with in the many countries in the region. It is considerably less about the use of military force.

The one thing that I have come to conclude since 9/11 and the steep learning curve I think that all of us have been on since, if we are honest about it, in learning about radical Islam and what it is trying to accomplish is, is that killing them and capturing them is not enough. That will not defeat them. They just continue to regenerate because of their belief system.

The real issue is the moderates, Arab Muslims for the most part, have to reject these extremists, reject them the same way that the Sunnis did in Iraq, which is the first time that has ever happened. And to get that kind of rejection, we have to assist them in helping with the conditions that exist in their countries, and that is not easy.

This is what you were talking about in terms of soft power. This is using all the elements of national power—political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, education—all of those elements of national power to assist us. And in this case, one of the least useful tools is the application of force.

Now, listen. As a military practitioner, we have to hold their horrific behavior liable. When they kill 3,000 of our citizens or they blow up embassies and ships and buildings, we have to hold that behavior liable. And when we have the opportunity to defeat that kind of behavior using force, we should.

But it still leaves the pregnant issue on the table, so to speak, of the moderate Islamists, and they have to reject the extremists if we are going to achieve a strategic victory in the long run. So fashioned into the ideological struggle against them has got to be our own use of all the elements of national power, as I think you were suggesting. And it is crucial to success against this ideological struggle, at least.

Mr. ORTIZ. Another problem that I have been seeing recently is that Central and South America, just recently, Russia deployed two bombers to Venezuela in preparation for a joint training exercise, which included a Russian naval squadron that set off from Russia to Venezuela.

Now what should we do? We know—and in my opinion, we have not done enough, either any type of exercises that I know of militarily. And we know that, just recently, they kicked our ambassadors out of two or three countries in Central America.

Is this something that we should worry about, what is happening there, this training with the Russians right in our back yard?

General KEANE. Yes. I think, when I look at Central and South America, there have been different kinds of governments that have been coming and going there, on the left, on the right, but most all of those countries, with the exception—all of those countries, with the exception of Venezuela and Cuba, we have very good relations

with. And quite frankly, Venezuela is a pariah in that part of the world.

There is sort of an entente that is formed among Russia, Venezuela, Iran, China, and the Sudan, and so how much do we need to worry about that? I think we should understand it. They have what they believe to be a common adversarial relationship, probably, in the United States, and I think it is something that deserves our looking at.

But at the same timeframe, I think Chavez and—the more he opens that mouth of his and the more he keeps putting his foot in it in his own country, and certainly in full view of the other countries in that area, he is his own worst enemy. And we could give him too much credence by worrying about him too much, all right, in my view, and putting an unnecessary spotlight on him.

But it does—this sort of odd relationship that these countries have with each other for mutual interests, that does deserve some work. It deserves our intelligence agency certainly, looking at this and understanding it and probing it to make sure we truly know what is going on there.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General, for joining us again.

You came before our subcommittee, and it was one of the more exciting and interesting hearings that we have had. And you were a big part of making that happen.

Had a couple different thoughts, and so I thought I would just run them by, and then you can tick them off, if you can deal with them quickly.

The first is, as a statement of foreign policy, I was struck by what the President put in one of his speeches a number of years ago, that our foreign policy should be to export freedom. Now I know that could be defined and understood in somewhat different ways. But as an overarching grand strategy, I thought that seemed like a good way to say it, because what you are saying is, as you export freedom, it helps our country as well, and it also takes away the safe havens for people that are a lot of troublemakers.

So first, that would be the first question. What do you think about that?

Then, the second thing is, is what is the possibility—because I have sensed here in Congress, on Armed Services Committee, at least, a pretty bipartisan agreement that we need to take the Goldwater-Nichols to the next step, beyond just creating one Department of Defense, and create a more seamless, if you will, front for America in terms of our State Department, Commerce, Justice, along with Department of Defense, so we are really combining those tools, as you have mentioned.

What do you think our actual practical chance of doing that, because some of it starts right here in Congress with our stovepipes between committees? You have been around a while. What is the probability of us being able to improve in that area, second question?

Third question, just out of historic curiosity but of great interest, and that is are you aware of our struggle with radical Islamic in the early days? That is, George Washington and Adams, the fact

that, in the Washington Administration, we had six of these city-state Barbary pirates in North Africa, and that we had to bribe them to keep them from enslaving our crews and stealing all of our merchant ships and their cargos.

And that bribe at the end of the Washington Administration was about 20 percent of the overall federal budget. And Adams said, "Well, maybe we need to lay the keel of the Constitution and the Constellation," but he said, "We do not want to get in a war with these city-states because the American public has no stomach for a long and protracted war with Islamic country." Sort of interesting. Just did not know if you knew that.

And then, the very last—well, I will leave those three questions on the table.

General KEANE. The Goldwater-Nichols certainly has had profound impact on the Defense Department, and largely successful in changing the culture of the United States military, make no mistake about it. And I do think, along with a lot of other people who have looked at this, and some considerably more than I have, that it is time for us to apply that at least to the rest of the national security team, because the inter-agency effort that we are currently using, we designed that at post-World War II, and I think it served us well during the Cold War.

But in terms of the 21st century and the kinds of challenges that we are having, the multifaceted nature of them, the complexity of them, the global information grid, our interdependency in the world today, that the speed at which decisions have to be made because information is shared so rapidly in the world today, that that structure does not serve us well. And we have seen it, painfully, these last eight years up close.

And I think just as the United States military, which I was a part of, was incapable, itself, of making the cultural change that was so necessary to improve itself, this structure I do not believe is capable of making that change itself. I do not believe an Administration, by itself, is capable of making this change. And so this body could really make a contribution here in taking us to the 21st century national security apparatus that we need to cope with the problems that we have.

Your first question dealing with—

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. So, your point was you said the Administration by itself cannot. You are saying you think that Congress, working with the Administration, could do that.

General KEANE. Right. What I am saying—the Congress would have to be the catalyst for it as an outside body, independent of it, just as Goldwater-Nichols did looking at it, and starting here with you members, because you have significant knowledge, and there is other committees here that do, to move in that direction.

And I know there has been a lot of thought given about it, but I think it is time probably for some action. And with a new Administration coming, be Democrat or Republican, there is the opportunity to start.

In terms of freedom as a grand strategy, certainly who is not for freedom? I mean, it is—but I think it is more a byproduct of a strategy than the strategy itself. And the reason is is that, in my mind, freedom is about people and countries moving toward it.

And when you have it as a national strategy, as you suggest, I think it implies that we are going to move them toward it, that you get the connotation that we may, even though we probably will qualify and not say that, that we are going to impose it. And that is not what the United States is about, as we all know. So I always would draw back from something like that.

On your third question—I know we are out of time—you just gave me a history lesson. I did not know anything about what you were just talking about, the introduction of radical Islamists in the Revolutionary War.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Taylor for five minutes.

Mr. AKIN. The Marine Corps hymn has “The Shores of Tripoli.” That is where that came from.

General KEANE. Okay.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Taylor for five minutes.

Mr. TAYLOR. By the way, General, I know you are a busy man, but former secretary of the Navy Lehman wrote a book called *On The Seas Of Glory*, which does a pretty good job of walking you through the Barbary pirates.

General, I am curious. What do you think the chances are that the Pakistani government in the next two years is taken over by radical Islamists? And if that is the case, given that it is about a 10- to 14-day drive through Pakistan to resupply our troops in Afghanistan, what do you do then?

General KEANE. Well, that is a great question, and we were talking about it earlier.

I do not think the radical Islamists have the capacity in Pakistan to take the country over. They certainly do not have the popular support. Witness some of the challenges they have had in political elections.

It is going to take us a while to understand, about this new government, what kind of character does it have in dealing with the problems inside its country and, also, with Afghanistan and the long-term challenges they have had with India, so we will have to let that play out.

But I am not concerned at the—I have never bought the argument that the United States’ interest in Pakistan, particularly in going after the al Qaeda, would provoke an implosion in Pakistan that would result in the overthrow of the country by the radicals, and therefore they have nuclear weapons. I do not see that happening.

But I do see a continued potential malaise in Pakistan and not much of an improvement as a possibility. And I do not know that for a fact. I certainly do not want that to happen.

I want a good relationship with this government, one where we could move the ball a little bit in improving the Pakistani military to actually conduct counter-insurgency operations, assist them with those skills, and also I think, as a result of the actions we will take and others in the region, convince them in a way that we were never able to convince Musharraf that we have genuine national interest in Afghanistan and we are going to stick with it to the end. Therefore, you do not have to hedge your bet against us and work both sides of this, which Musharraf did for five years.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, again as a—and I deeply respect your service to our Nation—how would you define the end game in Afghanistan? Because I know the typical Afghan refers to Karzai as the American Bull. I do not see that changing. I do not see a strong central government coming of this.

So other than that, how would you define the end game in Afghanistan? What do you think our goals should be?

General KEANE. Well, I do not have largely ambitious goals about Afghanistan. I think we have to be very realistic about it. I mean, this is a very poor country, highly uneducated. Their major source of revenue is opium trade business. Be quite frank about it, 30 years from now, this will be a very poor country, highly uneducated, with an opium trade business, and I think we should be realistic about that.

In the same light, we do not want the radical Islamists in charge of that country. And in the same light, we should be willing to accept a form of government there that is quasi-elected by its people, that is aligned with the United States where we have common interest with them in the region. And we are trying to improve the situation politically, economically, culturally, and education-wise.

So I do not believe we are going to create strong central government in Afghanistan, and I do not think we are going to dramatically change those other conditions very much. But this much we can do: We can assist them to have a capable military, as we have done in Iraq, and we have to put more numbers on it and more resources and do it quicker. And we have done this in Iraq, and it can be done.

And we have to drive the threat and the enemy in the Taliban out of that country or at least get them to the point where they know that they cannot achieve their political objectives using armed violence. And that is very doable. And we know how to do that. We need cooperation with the Pakistanis to do that.

So I do not have lofty goals about Afghanistan, but the one thing we can do is prevent the Taliban from regaining power and attempt to stabilize that country. And albeit it will have those other conditions that we talked about that will still be there.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And incidentally, Mr. Chairman, thank you for just driving through the Defense Bill and exercising great leadership to get a bill that we thought was in some doubt now to the House floor and wrapped and tied and ready for everything finishing up with the vote here, hopefully in an hour or two. Great work, Ike, on that bill.

General Keane, I agree with you with respect to the metrics with which we measure success in Afghanistan, in that I am reminded we want to fight corruption, which we do, in the Afghanistan government. On the other hand, we have fought corruption in the Tijuana police force for now about 100 years, and we have not—our wonderful next-door neighbor still has problems in that respect, and they still have problems with respect to the drug trade. And

by the same token, we are going to have that problem for a long time in Afghanistan.

So I think we need to re-look at our mission there or remained focused on that mission. And you have, I think, correctly placed it at preventing a re-emergence of a terrorist-dominated state. And in that respect, are not we really looking at the need to have, essentially, a containment strategy, if you will, that is not within Afghanistan?

That means we dampen and we suppress the attempt by the terrorists to re-emerge, but with all of the real-world understandings that we are going to have lots of cross-political currents on the other side of that border in Pakistan and that we cannot predict that Pakistan is going to ever become an extremely strong ally in handling that border region.

And as a result of that, I think that one thing we do need to do right now, and I have told the secretary of defense this, is to establish an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) curtain across that border strip area where you have fairly major channels because of that mountainous terrain, which does lend itself to a strong surveillance capability.

And as I look at our surveillance assets across the board, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and manned capability and other capabilities, we are not focusing in that, in my estimation, as strongly as we could on that border strip region. And I think we also need to get that operational digital network (ODIN) capability that we have developed and used in Iraq, in terms of surveilling the roads and using platforms to take out those that are in-placing roadside bombs.

Look at the casualty rates in the Marine battalions that are operating in the south. They are substantial. And a number of those now are coming from roadside bombs, which indicates to me that we need to have an ODIN capability there to get those bomb in-placers.

So just those two questions. I know they are pretty focused. And I apologize for not being here while you were giving the rest of your discussion, but I would like you to discuss your thoughts a little bit about Georgia and Russia and the United States, too, if you have got a second on that.

General KEANE. Congratulations on passing the Defense Authorization Bill. That is wonderful.

Certainly, I think Georgia and what the Russians are attempting to do has got to give us a lot of concern, obviously. When you look back on the 1990's, I think we, if we are honest with ourselves about this, I think we helped to create some of this problem that Putin has in a sense that they suffered a very humiliating defeat in the Cold War, and we sort of rubbed their noses in it a little bit. And the Russians are a proud people, and they got shoved off the world stage summarily.

And not too surprising, a tough guy like Putin ascends to power, and he has got about an 80 percent approval rating. And he has that approval rating because he is returning Russia's sense of pride in themselves by putting them on a world stage and flexing his muscles a little bit, flying a bomber here or there. I mean, the mili-

tary in Russia is in horrible conditions and certainly is no threat to us.

But I think he has a greater plan for Russia, and he has ambitions that surround it. And he wants them to play a much larger role in the world, and I think he wants to reach out to some of the countries that are now on his border and make certain that he has control and influence of those countries.

And this was a test of that. I think he strongly resents the movement of some of these countries into NATO, and certainly Georgia would be one of them. The Ukraine certainly would be another one.

I think the former nation-states moving to NATO that had strong nation identity prior to World War II, like a Czechoslovakia or Poland, et cetera, he had considerably less problems with. But those other nations that have been contiguous to Russia and have cultural identification with Russia I think he has lots of problems with.

And so this is an issue, and it is out there in front of us. And I think we have got to, one, start to understand the significance of it, that he has already changed the relationship between Russia and Europe and, in a sense, the United States, as well, under the guise that he was doing it to put down resistance, and that is a bold-faced lie.

And I think we have got to bring Putin into real clarity here. I think what he did was more about thuggery, and we have to realize what we are dealing with in Putin.

So we have to be informed by this. I think we have to take a strong stand, recognize that there is some ambitious goals here, that this is maybe a beginning and not an end, that the Europeans, who have a tendency to be weak on this, who will want to turn their head on this—40 percent dependency on Russian oil and gas resources are an issue. We have to exercise some leadership here, and we have to bring them with us in dealing with this.

And if pride is a part of this, which I believe it is—money and economics is the other part of it, to be sure—then Russia's position on the world stage is a vulnerability to them because they want it so badly. And in the organizations that give them that world stage, we can put them at liability with that, and we should start that effort, politically and diplomatically, to isolate them for this kind of action and hold them liable in those organizations and, if necessary, eliminate them from those organizations as a consequence of their behavior.

So we have to see it for what it is. It is not just an isolated issue. It is part of a larger picture, a grander scheme that the Russians have. It is not in our interest. It is not in the European interests. And the longer we put off dealing with it, the tougher the problem will be.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just one last fast question. Do you agree that we need to establish a surveillance curtain over the Pakistan border?

General KEANE. Well, Congressman Hunter, I agree with that, and I—but much more, I think what we will find ourselves doing—I mean, the Afghanistan situation has been a secondary effort because of the magnitude of what we were dealing with in Iraq. And now that Iraq is stabilizing, we will begin to transition our forces

to Afghanistan, not just ground forces, but special operation forces and intelligence platforms and capabilities that you are talking about.

And we will start to get a center of mass with these forces. They do not need to be at the numbers that we had them in Iraq, to be sure, but the capabilities representative of all those forces that we have never had that kind of mass there will start to really make a difference.

And I think we will see that playing out in front of us through 2009, as we transition forces and capabilities from Iraq to Afghanistan. And that, as you are suggesting, is a part of it, but there is more that we are going to be able to do, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Keane, both for your active duty service and for your remarkable service as a retired general. I have just been reading Bob Woodward's book, *The War Within*, and if you have any general comments about the accuracy or lack thereof, I was particularly impressed by his alleged account of your private briefing of Secretary Rumsfeld on the need for change in strategy.

General KEANE. I would prefer not to get involved in Robert Woodward's book, if I may, and stick to the purpose of the testimony.

Mr. COOPER. Well, if I may ask a more general question, how do you feel about circumventing the chain of command? Is that appropriate military policy? Is that good for the services? Is that the right way to run wars?

General KEANE. Are we talking about—is this in reference to Iraq?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

General KEANE. Circumventing the chain—who is circumventing the chain of command?

Mr. COOPER. Well, at least according to the front page of *The Washington Post* in a series of articles that were serialized—

General KEANE. Oh, okay. I understand. I am missing the point.

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

General KEANE. Well, my own view of that—I think a President takes advice wherever he wants to get it from. I walked into the White House with two other generals and two people from a think tank, and certainly I was asked to come, and I dutifully came. And some of what I said to them appeared to resonate, so they continued to seek that advice, and I was certainly honored to provide it, frankly.

And General Petraeus wanted some help as a mentor in Iraq, and I was honored to provide him with that help. And I think people make much more out of this than what it was, and I have always felt that, and it is what it is.

Mr. COOPER. Well, do we need to be worried that, as an institution, perhaps we cannot just rely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the services, and that we need to have multiple conduits for information so that the Commander-in-Chief can get the best advice?

I keep on asking myself how you would have reacted when you were on active duty if a retiree had played the significant role that you apparently played in the last several years.

General KEANE. Well, I think that question probably would be better suited to ask the Administration. I think how they get information is a decision that they made.

And I think a President—it is probably healthy for a President to get information from multiple sources, particularly concerning something as important as a war and multiple opinions, viewpoints on what is going on. There are lots of people who are in and out of the White House who have visited Iraq and were giving their opinions about the war, and certainly I was one of them, as well.

But I do not necessarily see that as a bad thing. I, frankly, think that is probably healthy for most Administrations to seek multiple viewpoints on what is taking place, and I do not think the chain of command needs to be threatened by it, whether it is in the State Department or the Department of Defense or another agency of government.

I think they have their viewpoints, and they have a right to make them. The President has a right to take those viewpoints from multiple sources and make decisions based on them. I, frankly, see it as a healthy thing, not necessarily a negative thing.

Mr. COOPER. Thanks to Chairman Skelton, he allowed me to chair a panel on roles and missions, studying future ways for the Pentagon to be organized. Do we need to be concerned about an atrophying or an arteriosclerosis of the current arrangement of the services and the Joint Chiefs?

General KEANE. In the post-Goldwater Nichols, I mean, as I said before, I think Goldwater-Nichols clearly made a dramatic improvement in the culture of the United States military, and the military is better for it. And we were not capable of making those changes ourselves.

We were trying to move in that direction, but I think the Congress, rightfully so, got frustrated with us and moved the ball a lot faster. And therefore, we are better for it.

The next thing that has to be done, I believe, is the national security team apparatus, which was designed for us post-World War II and I think served us pretty well during the Cold War but appears inadequate for the 21st century and this complexity of problems and the speed of decision-making dealing with the global information grid. It just does not measure up to it.

I do not know what the answer is myself, but I think this body, working with a future Administration that we are going to have here in January, can offer a lot in terms of improving that structure.

In terms of the military side, I think a consequence of Goldwater-Nichols, an unintended consequence of Goldwater-Nichols I think that could be re-looked is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are certainly, by law, accountable to the organization, training, and equipping of their service. And that is largely their responsibility, and they are held accountable for that by law, by statute.

But when we move the Joint Chiefs from a direct role in advising a President, de facto they took a subordinate role to operational

oversight in the joint arena. And I do not think that was necessarily intended consequence. I think it was a desire to fix responsibility for the chairman as the principal military advisor to the President, not necessarily that the Chiefs would not be, but that is how it is evolved over time.

And they are held accountable, by law, for their services, and there is no accountability in terms of operational oversight of a war. And I think it is something we could take a look at, and it has nothing to do with the people who are in the positions. It has all to do with what their responsibilities are, and the unintended consequence may be of that.

I mean, I applaud Goldwater-Nichols. Do not misunderstand. We are all better for it. But that may be something that is worth taking a look at.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. Excellent suggestion.

I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I was there at the birth of Goldwater-Nichols and all four years of its gestation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff situation is really what caused all of it. David Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff, later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went public, saying that the advice the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives is pabulum. It is watered down to the least common denominator.

And Richard White of Texas had a series of hearings on this issue, assisted by the very able staff member by the name of Arch Barrett, and then he retired. And I picked up that gauntlet and introduced legislation. General, you would be pleased to know that I abolished the Joint Chiefs of Staff in my legislation of 1983 and, needless to say, none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a sense of humor at the time.

But over a period of four years, the House passed three measures. The first two were killed in the Senate by John Tower, then the chairman. And then, when Barry Goldwater became chairman and Sam Nunn the ranking, they developed their own, and we went to conference. And it came out something that actually worked.

The folks in the Pentagon, with rare exception, were adamant against this. Several of us had a breakfast with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, and it bordered on being bitter right before we passed it in the House for the final time.

But I am thrilled to hear you say that it works, and thanks for your comment on the Joint Chiefs, per se, as you have, and might take a good look for us to—might be a good thing for us to take a good look at it. But most members here—Duncan was here and I was here, and time moves on, and most folks were not here at the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.

And it did pass. It changed the culture of the military, and I think that was a good thing, and I am pleased to hear you say that.

General, on a different note, I have been concerned over the need for a national security strategy looking back to the era of Harry Truman with his fantastic advisors, and President Truman developed the Truman Doctrine—that is, the doctrine of containment. But there was just one major enemy at the time—Communism, the Soviet Union, China, other Communist states.

And in some respect, I suppose it was a simpler time, although at the time no one saw it as such. Today, the potential threats are diverse. On the one hand, you have the Islamic extremists; on the other hand, the potential of state-on-state threats.

And the question is, how does one devise a national strategy to fit today as the Truman Doctrine did in the late 1940's—which, by the way, was adopted after considerable review by President Eisenhower when he took office in 1953. How would you advise a new Administration, a new Congress, and the American people on the strategy that we need from here on out regarding the national security of our country?

General KEANE. Yes.

Well, as I said previously—and you were not here, but I would be more than happy to present it—is that I also agree that the containment strategy that we had during World War II was very useful. It was practical. It transcended Administrations.

Different administrations would argue over methods and means, but the strategy, that overarching strategy of containment of Communism, stayed in place. And we even fought two wars on that basis, one in Korea to contain Communism, one in Vietnam, and it served us very well.

But I think you have already touched on it. We are very challenged here. We do not have a monolithic enemy as we had then.

So it is very hard to find an overarching strategy which would also be able to define our response, because containment in the strategy was also our response. And that is what led to its utility, in my view.

Given the complexities that we have without a monolithic threat, certainly we can conceptualize an overarching strategy. But to get everything underneath that tent, by definition it would not define our response. We would have to have, then, various components of that strategy that would deal with what is our response to nuclear proliferation.

What is our response to the ideological struggle with radical Islam? What is our response, as Congressman Hunter mentioned, to the emergence of Russia and what they are attempting to do and, certainly, our position and relationship with India and China?

So I think that any strategy that we fashion, it will be unfair to compare it to that period where containment fit so well with that monolithic threat that we had where, in the strategy itself, it also defined a response to that threat. That is, from a practical perspective, I think, impossible with an overarching strategy.

We can certainly conceptualize, in general terms, what a strategy would be. But Speedy Martin, who I was with the other day on a panel, suggested global collective security.

So let us take Speedy's. If global collective security—he is a retired four-star Air Force—was, in fact, our overarching strategy, for want of another one, you would have to come up with the components of what that really means, and that would really be the essence of what you are doing because, in the components, would be your priorities and the choices that are associated with those priorities, which would be the essence of it.

And we certainly should have one. I am not suggesting we do not. But I think it will be unrealistic to be able to have one like

we did during the Cold War and meet those kinds of expectations, given the complexities we face today and a lack of a monolithic threat.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that.

I have one question. Are you familiar with the new Army field manual that was just developed? Are you?

General KEANE. I read it. You are talking about their operations manual?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, that is correct, which I had an excellent briefing on it by General Caldwell a good number of weeks ago. It seems to cover the waterfront, on the one hand fighting insurgents, guerrillas, and on the other a force-on-force, and it seems like it is very broad.

Do you have any comments, since you have actually read it? Yes, this really touches on, in a mini way, a strategy for our country.

General KEANE. Well, I actually was pleasantly surprised by it for this reason: the Army that I was a part of and been in support of since I retired in 2003, we have been, by and large, preoccupied with ensuring that we had the best conventional capability we could in terms of major combat operations.

And remember, we made a decision that turned out to be flawed, and that decision was that we would be ready for high-end warfare. And if low-end warfare came, then we would use a pick-up team, so to speak, to do that. In other words, we would take the high-end forces and transition them to fight the low-end war. Therefore, we would use the high-end organization, and we could learn that low-end war while we were conducting that war.

That turned out to be a flawed decision, and that came home to roost for us after the Saddam Hussein invasion, when we found out that he was not surrendering. His regime was trying to take power back using unconventional, irregular warfare, a form of war that we were not prepared for, and we had to learn on the run, so to speak. We should not repeat that mistake.

So this manual, one of the things that I am attracted about it, it begins to balance our ground forces for the first time, that they would maintain high-end conventional operational skills, but also maintain low-end operational skills.

So what does that really mean? That means that something you are very familiar with in the Army education system, from lieutenant to captain, at Command Staff College and in War College, then both of those major areas would be addressed so that the officers, and also the non-commissioned officers, in their education system, would have the requisite skills.

Also, it means, when they make organizational equipment choices, they have to make those choices based on the operational capabilities as desired in that manual. And that is really where the tough decisions will be in making those choices, so that the Army is more balanced than what it has been in the past to do both.

And that is the major point that I took out of that operational manual and the Army moving in that direction. Now, that is just a manual. The decisions that are forthcoming and programs that they are providing to you in the form of a budget, and to the Defense Department in terms of a five-year program, is where the

rubber meets the road, in terms of the tough decisions that have to be made about those choices.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very, very much for being with us. Unless there is further question, we have a——

Mr. BARTLETT. (OFF MIKE)

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BARTLETT. If I might make just one quick observation, you noted, in their present state, Russia is no threat to us. For conventional warfare, that is true.

Just wanted to note something that happened a few years ago that gives me considerable pause. I and eight other congresspersons were in Vienna, Austria. Three Russians were there. One of them was Vladimir Lukin, who was the ambassador at the end of Clinton and beginning of Bush I and a personal representative of Slobodan Milosevic. This was just before the resolution of the Kosovo conflict.

Vladimir Lukin was very angry. He sat in that hotel room in Vienna, Austria with his arms crossed, looking at the ceiling for three days. He said at one point, "Why should we help you? You spit on us."

And then, later he said this: "If we really wanted to hurt you with no fear of retaliation, we would launch an submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). We would detonate a nuclear weapon high above your country and shut down your power grid and your communications for six months or so."

The third-ranking Communist was there, Alexander Shabanov. He smiled and said, "And if one weapon would not do it, we have some spares, like about 10,000, I think." This gave me considerable pause, which is why I am so concerned about EMP and the fact that we are really not mobilized to address that enormous asymmetrical threat.

Thank you, sir. You are right. They are no threat for us conventionally, but with this non-conventional thing, they could just end life as we know it, and we do not have an appropriate response either in our military or in our civilian infrastructure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and I know we are going off to vote on our bill.

But just one word, General, and to my colleagues, just to address the notion that somehow it is outside the chain of command to have retired military leaders give advice to the Administration. That witness table has been filled, over my last 28 years, with retired military leaders who have been an enormous resource to this country.

And I found myself looking forward to the attendance of not only those folks that agreed with some of the things that I believed, but the folks who adamantly opposed Administration policy and the policies of this Armed Services Committee, because it was instructive to listen to the criticism. Mr. Chairman, this pool of retired officers is an enormous resource for this country.

And last, the Joint Chiefs are advisors to the President. They are not the chain of command. The chain of command runs from the President to one person in the Pentagon, and that is the Secretary

of Defense, and then to the combatant commanders. And the idea that a President should foreclose himself to any voices other than a few who have been appointed to be the advisors means that we should have a confined chain of advice, and I think that would be very detrimental to the country.

So, General, whether you are right or wrong on the many, many issues that you have come and commented on for not only the legislative body but the executive body, thanks for that service. And I think you and your colleagues have provided us an enormous service when we entered these heretofore unknown waters in Iraq, as we made this change from taking Iraq to trying to make that occupational meaningful and effective. That transition period was very difficult, and it was one that required a lot of advice and a lot of wisdom, and I think we finally got it right as a result of that.

So thanks for your service, and I hope it continues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much for appearing today. I am sorry that several of us had to be absent. We did take the bill up on the floor. We are going to have a formal vote here shortly. And thank you for your past service and your present service and your testimony today.

Thank you again.

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

